United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Caterpillar Financial Services Corp., 

Plaintiff,

v.

Venequip Machinery Sales Corp., 

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 22-23002-Civ-Scola

Order to Show Cause Why This Case Should Not Be Dismissed for 

Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This matter is before the Court on an independent review of the record. “As 

federal courts, we are courts of limited jurisdiction, deriving our power solely 

from Article III of the Constitution and from the legislative acts of Congress,” and 

“we are bound to assure ourselves of jurisdiction even if the parties fail to raise 

the issue.” Harris v. United States, 149 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1998). In 

addition, “a jurisdictional defect cannot be waived by the parties and may be 

raised at any point during litigation.” Allen v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 

155 F. App’x 480, 481 (11th Cir. 2005). Upon review of the complaint, the Court 

is not certain whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action because 

the Plaintiff Caterpillar Financial Services Corp. (“CFSC”) has failed to properly 

plead diversity.

CFSC brought this matter under the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, alleging 

complete diversity between the parties. (See Compl. ¶¶ 23–25, ECF No. 1.) Per 

the complaint, CFSC is a Delaware corporation, and the sole Defendant,

Venequip Machinery Sales Corporation (“VMSC Miami”), is a Florida corporation. 

(Id. ¶¶ 20–21.) However, CFSC has not properly alleged either its own principal 

place of business or that of VMSC Miami. Under 28 U.S.C § 1332(c)(1), a 

corporation is deemed a citizen of its state of incorporation and of the state 

where it has its principal place of business. A corporation’s principal place of 

business is determined by its “total activities,” and must take into account its 

“nerve center” and its “place of activities.” See Crockett v. Securitas Sec. Servs. 

USA, Inc., 278 F. App’x 863, 864-65 (11th Cir. 2007).

Here, the complaint fails to allege either party’s principal place of 

business. Instead, it alleges that CFSC “is a Delaware Corporation with offices

located” in Tennessee and that VMSC Miami “is a company operated and 

existing under the laws of the State of Florida with its principal office located” in 

Florida. (Compl. ¶¶ 20–21, ECF No. 1 (emphases added).) These allegations do 

not suffice because the place of a corporation’s “offices” or even of its “principal 

Case 1:22-cv-23002-RNS Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/16/2023 Page 1 of 2
office” does not necessarily correlate to the location of its principal place of 

business under the “total activities” test. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 

130 S. Ct. 1181, 1195, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1029 (2010) (allegations regarding 

corporation’s “principal executive offices,” as set forth in SEC form, insufficient 

to establish location of corporation’s “nerve center,” and thus its principal place 

of business, for diversity purposes).

In sum, having examined the complaint, the Court finds the jurisdictional 

allegations to be lacking. Based on the present allegations, the Court is unable 

to fully satisfy itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this controversy. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that by June 22, 2023, Sterling shall show 

cause why this matter should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Failure to respond within this timeframe will result in dismissal of 

this action without prejudice, without further notice.

Done and ordered in Miami, Florida, on June 15, 2023.

________________________________

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Case 1:22-cv-23002-RNS Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/16/2023 Page 2 of 2