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Wings at War Series, No. 3

Pacific

Counterblow

THE 11TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP AND THE

67TH FIGHTER SQUADRON IN THE

BATTLE FOR GUADALCANAL

An Interim Report

Published by Headquarters, Army Air Forces

Washington, D. C.

Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

New Imprint by the

Center for Air Force History

Washington, D. C. 1992
Wings at War

COMMEMORATIVE EDITION

Originally published shortly after key air campaigns,

the Wings at War series captures the spirit and tone

of America's World War II experience. Eyewitness

accounts of Army Air Forces' aviators and details

from the official histories enliven the story behind

each of six important AAF operations. In cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the

Center for Air Force History has reprinted the entire

series to honor the airmen who fought so valiantly

fifty years ago.

Air Force

History

Washington, D.C.
Foreword

Pacific Counterblow tells the story of the Battle for Guadalcanal

(1942), focusing on the operations of the 11th Bombardment

Group and the 67th Fighter Squadron.

Months after the devastation of Pearl Harbor, U.S. forces had

crushed the Japanese fleet at Midway and then moved to

seize the initiative. AAF commanders in the Pacific sought

to prevent the enemy from severing Australia's supply lines.

So the B-17s of the 11th Bomb Group and the P-39s and

P-400s of the 67th Fighter Squadron, flying from makeshift

bases at Espiritu Santo and Henderson Field, began grueling

attacks on Japanese shipping between Rabaul, New Britain

and the Solomon Islands. After several months of bitter

fighting, American forces gained control of Guadalcanal,

positioning them to swing forward beyond Rabaul to New

Guinea.

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
CONTENTS

The South Pacific, Summer I942 ............................ I

The iith Group and the Landing in the Solomons .......... 3

T he Jagdstaffel ............................................ 17

T he O ctober Crisis ........................................ 29

The Securing of Guadalcanal .............................. 44

ILLUSTRATIONS

Lt Gen. Millard F. Harmon .......................... Frontispiece

The Solomons and Related Area............... : ............ 7

H eading A ir H om e ........................................ 14

H enderson Field Area ..................................... 23

Brig. Gen. LaVerne G. Saunders ............................ 33

T h e "Slot" ......... ........... .......................... 39

V eteran .................................................. 46

D irect H it ................................................ 51

V
Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, former Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

Pacific Ocean Areas, who has been missing since 26 February 1945 when the

aircraft on which he was making a noncombat flight in the POA was lost.
Pacific

Counterblow

The South Pacific, Summer 1942

P EARL HARBOR secured for the Japanese the initiative in the

Pacific. They chose first to strike southward. By March 1942

the Netherlands East Indies, and with them any opportunity

of reinforcing the Philippines, had largely disappeared in the maw

of Nippon's war machine. March and April a successful but less

precipitate foe devoted to the initial digestion of his gains and the

extension of his forces along the flanks of Australia. Already Australian security had thus become the first charge of U. S. forces in the

South Pacific, and defense of Australia meant defense of the last

remaining reinforcement route to the subcontinent-the 7,o00 miles

of island-studded Pacific seas lying between San Francisco and

Sydney.

Twice more the enemy moved offensively. A thrust in early May

against either Port Moresby or the Free French isle of New Caledonia, bastion of the supply route from the United States, was smashed

in the Coral Sea. And after 6 June, with its ambitious two-pronged

offensive against Midway and the Aleutians crushed at Midway, the

Japanese fleet retired westward to lick its wounds. For the first time

in the Pacific war, America possessed the initiative-a limited, precarious initiative, demanding the earliest possible, exploitation.

How this initiative was employed is the history of the operation

against Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. Primarily

it was an operation to safeguard Australia's supply line, threatened

The ranks of officers mentioned in this booklet are those which they held at the time of the

events described herein.
first from Rabaul, secured by the enemy in January; then from

Tulagi, where by May the Japanese were already well established.

(It was at Tulagi on Florida Island that the Yorktown's aircraft carried out a successful strike during the Battle of the Coral Sea.)

In June grass was burning on Guadalcanal's Lunga Plain, one of

the few spots in the Solomons where an airdrome could easily be built.

Around 4 July, Jap troops and construction personnel moved ashore

and in less than a month Allied search planes saw the first signs of

what appeared to be a concrete runway.

The Tulagi-Lunga Plain combination was extremely convenient.

Enclosed by the small islands of Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, the

harbor at Tulagi is deep and spacious; with air cover from Guadalcanal it presents an excellent naval base site. Backing this advanced

base were Rabaul, only 565 nautical miles distant; Bougainville, with

the important Buin-Faisi-Tonolei complex, protected from Kahili

Field, at its southern tip; Kieta, where an airdrome was already being

laid out-an impressive array of supporting bases. And from many

lesser bases in the Solomons-from Gizo, Rekata Bay, Kieta and

Buka Passage-seaplanes were already operating.

With Lunga airdrome complete, land-based bombers would be able

to soften the New Hebrides for a thrust southward. If the Japanese

were to be stopped short of a point where they could snap the lifeline to Australia, then Tulagi-Guadalcanal offered the last possible

opportunity.

The man facing this problem was Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley,

COMSOPAC. As Commander, South Pacific Area, Admiral Ghormley commanded all U. S. ground, air, and naval forces in his area,

and certain New Zealand units as well. His air commander was

Rear Adm. John S. McCain, who, as COMAIRSOPAC, controlled all

land-based aircraft in the South Pacific Area, including those of the

USAAF.

General Harmon Takes Over

Top Army commander in the South Pacific was Maj. Gen. Millard

F. Harmon, who arrived in the theater to assume the title of

COMGENSOPAC, Commanding General, United States Army

Forces in the South Pacific Area, only a week before the Guadalcanal

offensive opened. Subordinate to COMSOPAC, General Harmon

2
was charged with the training and administration of all U. S. Army

ground and air force troops in the South Pacific. His advent clarified the supply and administration of the string of island bases and

lessened any possibility of Army units disintegrating organically

under local Navy, Marine, or New Zealand control.

General Harmon had stepped directly from the post of Chief of

the Air Staff. Moreover, the small staff which flew down with him

to Noumea in the last week of July numbered such officers as Brig.

Gen. Nathan F. Twining, future commander of the Thirteenth and

Fifteenth Air Forces; Lt. Col. Dean C. Strother, future commander

of the Thirteenth's fighters; and Col. Frank Everest who was to

command its bombers. If Admiral McCain retained operational control of Air Corps units, he recognized that the wide dispersion and

dissimilar composition of his air establishment made it impracticable

to exercise his command directly. Training and a certain amount

of tactical discretion remained to COMGENSOPAC and his subordinate commanders.

In July the Army Air Forces were mainly represented in the forward area by the iith Bombardment Group (Heavy) and the 67th

Fighter Squadron. The former disposed of 27 B-17's on New Caledonia and 8 at Nandi in the Fijis. The 67th mustered 38 P-39's and

P-4oo's, all on New Caledonia. The P- 4oo, to quote the men who

flew it, was "a cheap version of the early P-3 9's." Additionally, there

were on New Caledonia io B-26's with a dozen more in the Fijis.

The ilth Group and the Landing

in the Solomons

D ESPITE the fact that a workable basis for Army-Navy cooperation had been reached at a time when the June victory at

Midway made it possible to mount an initial offensive against

the Japanese, the remainder of 1942' loomed precariously for the

Allies in the South Pacific. The Midway battle had only approximately restored the balance of fleet power. Shipping was extremely

short. Only the ist Marine Division, reinforced, could be spared for

the assault on Guadalcanal. General Harmon found himself in command of units originally sent posthaste in early 1942 to garrison the

637691-45--2 3
stepping stones to Australia, units largely tied down to a defense for

which they were scarcely adequate.

Nevertheless, preparations for the blow against the Guadalcanal

area went forward. As early as April Tulagi had been designated the

number one American objective in the Solomons. The Marines

began arriving in New Zealand in mid-June; D-day was set originally

for i August, then for as near that date as practicable. Arrangements

were completed whereby General MacArthur's aircraft would search

and bomb in the northern Solomons and strike the airdromes at Lae

and Salamaua.

The final week in July saw the initial B-I7's of the xith Bombardment Group arrive in the South Pacific, the first squadron landing

during a driving rainstorm at Plaines des Gaiacs airdrome on New

Caledonia. The ixth had been based in Hawaii, was a veteran of

Midway. Now, under the leadership of Col. Laverne G. Saunders,

it was to participate in the assault on Guadalcanal.

The Army Air Forces, seeking to give air striking forces a mobility

analogous to that of major naval units, had initially distrusted committing heavy bombers to fixed assignments in the islands. The area

was described as "linear in type and of limited depth." Its defense,

it was thought, could be accomplished more economically by holding

major air striking forces at the extremities, and providing bases and

logistical services for their rapid concentration against a threat to

intermediate points. Originally this concept envisaged stationing

heavy bombers only in Hawaii and Australia. However, in July

the ixth Group was ordered to New Caledonia as the Mobile Force,

Central Pacific, and below in Australia the i9th Group was named

the Mobile Force in the Southwest Pacific.

Four days after the new designation, the squadrons of the iith

Group left Hickam Field, the 98th and 42d arriving at Plaines des

In the early stages of the battle for Guadalcanal the AAF was represented by the 1ith

Bombardment Group (H) and the 67 th Fighter Squadron. Later the aith was joined by

squadrons of the 5th Bombardment Group, and still later, replaced by the 3 o7th Bombardment

Group (H). Various other fighter squadrons stationed in rear areas, such as the 12th, 4 4 th,

68th, 7oth, and 3 3 9 "h, all eventually contributed detachments or moved up to the island as did

the 69th and 70th Bombardment Squadrons (M). As the subtitle implies, this narrative is

concerned primarily with the activities of the 67 th Fighter Squadron and the iith Bombardment Group (H). Thus the actions of the 19th Bombardment Group (H), located at Port

Moresby, which were coordinated with the initial attack and subsequent actions on Guadalcanal,

are not detailed here and deserve a separate narrative.

4
Gaiacs on the 21st and 23d of July, respectively. On the 24th the

43ist landed at Nandi in the Fijis and the following day the pilots

of the 26th set down their planes at Efate. It had been planned to

base one squadron each at Plaines des Gaiacs, Koumac--also on New

Caledonia-Nandi, and Efate, and advance these when practicable

to the new base under construction at Espiritu Santo.

Lying directly in the path of a possible thrust from the Solomons,

Espiritu had been a sort of no man's land. Admiral McCain, perceiving the value of the position to the contemplated seizure of Tulagi,

had immediately upon his arrival in the theater in May requested

that troops be sent in and an airfield constructed. The troops were

sent but construction of the airdrome was not approved. Nevertheless, COMAIRSOPAC surveyed a site, built a road to it, and confidently awaited orders to complete the project; the orders came in

July. All available troops pitched in and in i6 days an airstrip 5,000

by 200 feet was hacked out. On 30 July, Maj. Allen J. Sewart of the

i ith Group's 26tb Squadron set down the first B-I 7 on the new

strip.

Pre-Assault Operations

For the Guadalcanal operation, Admiral McCain dividedhis shorebased planes into task groups. The iith constituted the second task

group, responsible for daily search of the southern Solomons and

their western waters, for tracking important enemy contacts, and for

execution of air attacks as directed. The dual role of search and

bombing assigned the B-17's by COMAIRSOPAC's operations orders

had been foreshadowed by his policy of placing the B-17's, together

with the Navy patrol bombers, under both Air Patrol and Bomber

Commands at South Pacific air bases. The great areas of the Pacific,

shielding a powerful and aggressive enemy fleet, made search a prime

necessity.

With its service crews still at sea, the iith nevertheless tackled vital

photo work almost on arrival, flying photographic missions over the

Tulagi-Guadalcanal-Gavutu area on 23 and 25 July and getting its

first taste of local fighter opposition when float Zeros ineffectively

intercepted both missions.' During the very few. days remaining

' The greater part of the operations described in this narrative took place before the standard

names "Hamp," "Zeke," etc., had been adopted for reporting Japanese aircraft.

5
before the departure of the Marines for Guadalcanal, strenuous efforts

were made to procure information on Japanese positions. Maj. Gen.

Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding the ist Marines, was experiencing a woeful lack of photos, and Navy charts were badly out of

date. In an effort to remedy this situation the 43 5th Squadron of the

x9th Group during June and July had flown a number of reconnaissance missions over the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area from Port Moresby.

General Vandegrift particularly desired recent photographs of the

north coast of Guadalcanal, the area he was called on to assault. He

received only two, a print of Tulagi and one of the Lunga PointKukum area-both dropped on a carrier by light planes, developed,

and forwarded to the Marine commander by COMAIRSOPAC, and

constituting the first photos to reach General Vandegrift since 24 June.

At no time during 1942 were trained Army personnel or Army

photographic equipment available for photographic work. Cameras

came from the Navy, photographers from the Marines. Only the

xith's B-i7's represented the Army, and this condition remained

SOP until AAF photo and mapping units arrived in 1943. "Quackenbush's Gypsies," as Lt. Comdr. Robert Quackenbush's naval photo

personnel were named, regularly flew with the heavies on photographic

coverage of the Solomons.

Colonel Saunders' bombardment directive from Admiral McCain

was both general and concise: to hit Tulagi and Guadalcanal with

maximum strength from 31 July to 6 August, inclusive. COMAIRSOPAC left the group commander free to carry out this task as he

saw fit, and the i mth forthwith inaugurated heavy bombardment

against the Japanese in the South Pacific. During the 7 days, in

addition to 22 sorties for purposes of search, the group flew 56 bombardment sorties, a most creditable performance in view of the primitive conditions under which operations labored.

Although the advanced field on Espiritu Santo was reported ready,

Colonel Saunders was skeptical as to its service facilities and decided

to open his attack from Efate, 71o nautical miles from the target at

Guadalcanal. For his first mission on 31 July, Colonel Saunders

mustered every plane possessing a radio compartment tank. Since

each of the nine aircraft thus equipped also carried a bomb-bay tank,

full bomb loads were impossible. But in spite of this considerable

reduction in striking power, the initial blow was a success. Led by

6
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Colonel Saunders, the Forts flew the 710 miles to Guadalcanal under

the protection of bad weather and unloaded their bombs from 14,000

feet. The first flight, carrying 500-pounders, struck at the new landing strip, while the remaining six aircraft ravaged the supply dumps

in the Lunga Point area with ioo-pounders. Resistance was slight, the

AAA ineffective, and the Zeros at Gavutu, probably without functioning radar, failed to leave the water in time for interception. The

bombers came through Mission One against Guadalcanal undamaged.

It was determined that Lunga Point held the chief concentrations of supply and personnel and first claim to Colonel Saunders'

attention. Next ranked the nearly complete Lunga airdrome,

shortly to become Henderson Field. Tulagi also was to receive a

quota of bombs almost daily.

Thus was the pattern set. On i August the B-17's bagged two

Zeros, on the next day they got one and started fires in the Lunga and

Tulagi storage areas. By the 3d, reports had come in of land-based

Zeros on the Lunga field and on 4 August five enemy fighters intercepted a three-plane flight over the target. In this engagement a float

Zero, flaming and pressing a close attack, struck a B-I7 near the No. 3

engine, causing an explosion which destroyed plane and crew. This,

the first destruction of one of our aircraft by ramming, was considered

the result of a Zero out of control rather than intentional self-sacrifice.

With the field on Espiritu operational by i August, B-17's headed

for Guadalcanal were able to take on full bomb loads, fill their radio

tanks at Efate, and refuel at Espiritu on the return leg. Tulagi and

the Kukum area of Guadalcanal were thus bombed on 5 August, when

another B-I 7 was lost; and on D-day, 7 August, two search planes

dispatched to cover the Solomons sector to a depth of 700 miles from

Espiritu, by that time the main base, took off at 0300 with instructions

to avoid the target area where the attack was scheduled at 0530. One

aircraft failed to return.

Guadalcanal Assault Opens

Below the searching B-17's the battle of Guadalcanal was unfolding.

Two major task forces had been set up for the occasion: Rear Adm.

Leigh Noyes commanded the supporting carriers, Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner the amphibious force which would undertake the

8
assault. Over-all command of these groups was vested in Vice Adm.

Frank Jack Fletcher on the Saratoga.

On 31 July the amphibious force had left Koro Island in the

Fijis, where it had proceeded from New Zealand to hold landing

rehearsals. As the fleet cleared the New Hebrides the weather

changed to a complete overcast, effectively hiding the force from

enemy search planes. Navy PBY's, meanwhile, operating from

Ndeni in the Santa Cruz group towards enemy bases to the north,

reported no hostile concentrations. At 0133, 7 August the dim bulk

of Guadalcanal could be made out, and the assault forces slid past

Savo Island, the one to the north headed for Tulagi, the southern

standing in for the Lunga area. The surprise was complete.

At o613, the cruiser Quincy opened on targets near Kukum on

Guadalcanal and 2 minutes later carrier planes, appearing on schedule, joined the attack. Simultaneously the bombardment of Tulagi

commenced. The landing at Guadalcanal occurred without opposition. Carrier-based aircraft from the Enterprise and the Saratoga

shielded the operation. Instead of the 5,000 enemy estimated on the

island, a mere 6oo Japanese were reported by prisoners and these

promptly took to the hills. The Marines met relatively light opposition on Guadalcanal during the first day, but at Gavutu and Tulagi,

across Sealark Channel, resistance was fierce and these islands were

not mopped up for several days.

On the 8th the Marines occupied Lunga airdrome.2 The runway,

damaged from iith Group attacks, was rapidly reparable, and in addition to this important field, large semi-permanent camps, finger

wharves, machine shops, radio sets, and an ice and power plant fell

to the Marines. These gains, however, were not to be consolidated in

peace. The Japanese reacted promptly with air and naval forces, and

on the afternoon of D-day hurled two heavy air attacks at the transports lying off Guadalcanal.

The evening of the 8th, Admiral Fletcher requested permission to

withdraw his carriers. Combat with raiding enemy aircraft and

other causes had reduced his carrier strength from 99 to 78 fighters.

' On 17 August this field was unofficially designated Henderson Field after Marine Maj. Lofton

Henderson. Construction begun by the Japanese was carried on by the Marine 5st Engineer

Battalion until the arrival of the 6th Naval Seabee Battalion. In November 1942 Fighter #1,

one mile East of Henderson, was rendered operational by the 6th Seabee Battalion and had been

used in emergencies as early as October. Before the end of the year Fighter #2, west of

Henderson, was also in operation.

9
Fuel was running low and the presence of large numbers of enemy

bombers in the area presented a serious menace. Admiral Ghormley

agreed to the request late that night and towards morning the Air

Support Force began retirement to the south. Its withdrawal left the

amphibious force dangerously exposed to enemy air, and the decision

was consequently taken to withdraw the remainder of the invasion

fleet at o6oo the following day. Previously it had been planned that

the transports would unload until D plus 4.

On the 8th the Japanese Navy took a hand. Through the moonless,

Solomons night a Japanese task force, slipping down past Savo Island,

closed with the Allied cruisers protecting the transports off Guadalcanal. Searchlights and flares illumined the sea; then the sudden

shock of shell and torpedo-and when the Japanese fleet retired into

the night it had sunk four heavy cruisers and one destroyer, the core

of the forces patrolling off Savo Island. The beachhead was uncovered. The Marines were left to shift for themselves, and on 9

August the transports up-anchored for the safety of Noumea.

For a time, the ixth settled back into its search routine. On days

immediately following the landings, the bombers covered the Lower

Solomons on sectors ranging from 286' over to 316' from Espiritu

to a depth of 700 to 8oo miles. Ordinarily, contact was with friendly

surface forces. However, on 9 August, two light cruisers, two destroyers, and a number of seaplane tenders were reported heading for

Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel. Eight B-17's were bombed up and took

off but, despite ideal visibility, failed to sight the enemy. Daily

searches through 14 August failed to reveal anything significantonly a handful of landing barges on Florida Island.

By the I 5th the Japanese were more in evidence. Destroyers, cargo

vessels, even light cruisers began to frequent the central Solomons,

and Gizo Island and Gizo Bay in the New Georgia group became

favorite target areas for the iith. Moreover, the tedium of the long

searches was apt to be broken by engagements with the huge Japanese patrol aircraft, the four-engine Kawanishi 97's, or their only

slightly smaller successors. These Goliaths were slower and less

maneuverable than the B-17's; their 20-mm. cannon were outranged

by the .50-calibers. Invariably Colonel Saunders' pilots attempted to

close with them. The first victim fell to the crew of Capt. W. Y.

Lucas when, after a 25-minute combat the Kawanishi, attempting to

10
settle her damaged bulk on the sea, was blown up by the Fort's tail

gunner. By 30 September the iith had encountered 21 Kawanishi;

5 were destroyed and 7 damaged.

Meantime the enemy prepared his counterblow. On 12 August

Admiral Ghormley had reported naval concentrations at Rabaul and

in the Bougainville region. A week later these concentrations began

to appear in the Buin-Faisi area, and on the 2oth the Admiral warned

Colonel Saunders that the task forces to retake Guadalcanal already

were moving down from Truk and Ponape. The grinding routine

of sea search became of utmost importance. Day after day, the Forts,

taking off from Espiritu at 0300, crossing over Tulagi at sunrise and,

scouring the sea to the northwest, logged i,6oo miles of open-water

flying.

Daily action had taken its toll. From 31 July to 2o August, ii

B-17's were lost, 8 operationally, 2 at sea, only i in combat. Men and

equipment stood up well against the enemy. Japanese gunnery, both

aerial and AAA, was uniformly poor and the supposedly fanatical

enemy pilots showed little eagerness to close with the B-i7's. During

the 8 days of intensive operations preceding the landings, enemy

fighters were engaged on all but two missions to the GuadalcanalTulagi area and other than in the "ramming" incident, no Fort was

lost to the float planes. The few hits scored on the heavies were by

7.7-millimeter fire and not very damaging. Three crew members

were slightly wounded. The pilots learned that the Japanese always

attacked singly, that, if the Forts turned their formation into him, he

would always draw off at the fire of the turret guns. Bad weather,

not the Zero, was the chief antagonist. Lack of homing facilities and

radio direction-finding equipment brought down more B-17's than

enemy pilots did.

Operational Problems

In the Pacific theaters nature and distance are usually as formidable

a foe as the Japanese. When Colonel Saunders and his 98th Squadron

set their ships down on Plaines des Gaiacs on 21 July, they found a

red dust strip hacked out of a swamp. High in iron oxide, this dust,

sifting through the filters, honed out the cylinders, so that shortly the

B-17's were fortunate to fly 6 hours with a full load of oil. Additional complications were lack of service and maintenance personnel.

63~7691-45-3 11
Nine maintenance men for nine aircraft were all that could accompany

the 26th to Efate, and these nine served additionally as ground crews

during the subsequent 3-week period of intensive operations. Under

such circumstances, a large share of the service and maintenance

burden fell upon the combat crews. The 26th owed a debt of gratitude to the Negro enlisted men of the 24th Infantry Regiment who

helped to service the planes and even improvised spare parts. Artillerymen messed the airmen on Efate, while over on Espiritu the entire

98th Squadron, not excepting Colonel Saunders, slept under trees or

wings, or in the Forts themselves.

The iith had no water carts; two of its eight Cletracs had arrived at

Nandi, when they were needed at Espiritu. The shops aboard the

USS Curtiss, Admiral McCain's headquarters, contributed tow bars;

but homing devices and navigational aids could not be improvised.

At Espiritu existed a fair example of South Pacific logistics. On

18 August Colonel Saunders described its unloading facilities as "one

barge, a sandy beach and a prayer." Heavy equipment was slung

over the side of cargo vessels into a lighter. Ashore there were no

cranes and the small, finger piers made of coconut logs salted down

with coral washed out and disappeared after 2 or 3 weeks' use. Since

the supply officer seldom was informed of arrival dates, boxes and

crates accumulated in the coconut groves. There was no question of

living off the country; each item of food, clothing, and housing had

to be brought in. The mud was there in abundance. Espiritu possessed a foot-thick covering of soft black dirt, a quagmire after the

tropical rains.

The Navy had moved .50-caliber ammunition and 300,000 gallons

of gasoline to Espiritu in preparation for the iith. Fuel consumption

had been estimated for 2 weeks of operations and a safety factor of

ioo per cent allowed, but the supply was exhausted in io days and

only the timely arrival of the Nira Luckenbach with 3,ooo drums of

gasoline prevented operations from coming to a sudden halt. Getting

the fuel out of the drums and into the tanks of the B-17's was one of

those impossible jobs which somehow got done. Gas trucks and

trailers did not exist; the steel drums were dumped over the ship's

side, floated ashore in nets, hand-rolled up under the trees, and dispersed in dumps of 20 to 30. From these they were loaded on trucks,

rolled up on stands, and emptied into the tank wagons which serviced

12
the aircraft. On 6 August, all available hands-and available hands

included Colonel Saunders and Brig. Gen. William C. Rose, who commanded ground forces on Espiritu and Efate-worked a bucket line

for 20 hours in a driving storm to put 25,000 gallons of gasoline aboard

the bombers. But such labors were not enough, and strike missions

were delayed for lack of service facilities.

Espiritu's airdrome was no Randolph Field. A narrow strip cut

partly from a coconut grove, partly from the encroaching jungle;

revetments barely deep enough to keep a B-17's nose off the runway

and so narrow a man had to stand at each wing tip to guide the pilots

out to the short taxiway; no lights. Bottles of oil with paper wicks

flickered along the runway and jeep headlights marked its end as the

early morning missions took off.

The squadrons of the iith were distributed as follows: The 42d

at Plaines des Gaiacs; the 98th at Espiritu, where the 26th subsequently

joined from Efate; and the 431st at Nandi. Headquarters was at

Efate, but Colonel Saunders maintained a command post on Espiritu

and flew part of his headquarters personnel there on io August.

Nandi, the most rearward of the bases, was clean and quiet and served

as a rest area and a convenient place for engine changes. Colonel

Saunders regularly relieved his units after i week in the forward

area.

Operational control defied the field manuals. The wide dispersal

of the units and unreliable radio communications made contact with

the squadrons exceedingly difficult. Colonel Saunders could exercise

direct control only over the 14 Fortresses at Espiritu, and even this

was complicated by lack of field telephones and motor transport.

He was running four search missions daily and holding six aircraft

for a striking force. In an emergency he might supplement the latter with six B-i7's from Efate, but he strongly doubted that the Efate

contingent could hit the target at such a distance. He advised General Harmon that additional fields were needed on Espiritu.

By the I8th of August, the supply situation of the group had become critical. Six ball turret doors had already broken off and no

spares were available. Turbosupercharger regulators were giving

trouble, as were flight and engine instruments. The dusty fields

necessitated constant engine changes; Nandi's 12 spares were already

in service and the next change at Plaines des Gaiacs would exhaust

13
HEADING FOR HOME. After a successful attack on the shipping shown in

the lower left of the photograph, a B-i 7 of the i ith Bombardment Group (H)

wings over Kahili Airfield as enemy fighters taking off raise clouds of dust.

The picture was taken looking southwest. The surface ships are off the settlement at Buin, and the finger of water above the wing at the left is Tonolei

harbor.

14
the supply in New Caledonia. But in spite of such operational aches

and twinges, the iith was prepared to take part in the series of

actions known as the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, the first

Japanese attempt to retake Guadalcanal.

Battle of the Eastern Solomons

Following the disastrous Savo Island drama, there had been a lull

on Guadalcanal. The Navy ran in small reinforcement convoys,

but operated its task forces well to the southward of the island, out

of range of Japanese search planes; and the enemy seized the opportunity to reinforce Guadalcanal on his own account. Nightly, his

destroyers and cruisers shelled the Marines, for the most part without

let or hindrance. The beginnings of the "Tokyo Express" were

discernible.

However, on 19 August a light cruiser venturing on such a reinforcement mission was unwisely left exposed in Sealark Channel by

day. A searching Fort spotted her, banked for a bombing run. The

delighted Marines saw columns of dark brown smoke pour from abaft

the warship's mainmast. She made for the open sea beyond Savo,

her fantail afire, and later sank.

On the 23 d the Navy received warning that the Japanese were

moving on the Solomons from the north. Carrier task forces, including the Saratoga, the Enterprise, and the new North Carolina were

readied to meet the threat. On the 24th the Saratoga's torpedo and

dive bombers, engaging the Jap carrier Ryujo, sent her into an evasive

turn, dived in a coordinated attack, and hammered their bombs the

length of her deck. Fierce air battles during the day all but stripped

the enemy carriers of their aircraft and by nightfall the enemy fleet,

badly hurt, retired. The damaged Enterprise returned to Pearl

Harbor for repair.

In relation to its striking power the iith Group played an important

role in this action. On 24 August at 1215 Colonel Saunders was

advised of a contact with an enemy carrier force 720 miles from

Espiritu. Admiral McCain, aware that a B-i7 strike would involve

hazardous night landings, left the attack decision to Colonel Saunders.

The risk was accepted. Two flights of heavies were dispatched separately, three Forts under Maj. Ernest R. Mannierre and four led by

Major Sewart.

15
At 1745 the three-plane flight attacked a carrier, dead in the water

and under tow by a cruiser or large destroyer. On the first run the

bombs overshot and the Forts banked for another try. Four direct

hits were claimed. (Whether this vessel was the Ryujo, blasted more

than an hour before by the Saratoga's planes, or another small carrier

is unknown.)

When this flight returned to Espiritu the night landing took its

toll. Espiritu's field was just a wide slash through the jungle, with

low hills close in. As the planes approached, a tropical rainstorm

drenched the field and the darkness was complete. Lt. Robert E.

Guenther's plane, the No. 4 engine failing, went into a steep bank

and crashed into the hillside. The pilot and four of the crew were

lost.

Forts Assail Japanese Ships

Sixty miles to the eastward of Major Mannierre's strike, Major

Sewart's four B-17's surprised a second Japanese armada at twilight.

Below the Forts plowed a possible small carrier, with escort of one

battleship, four light cruisers, and four destroyers. The Forts steadied

for the run. Two or more hits were claimed on the carrier, but

final results were observed only by one ball turret gunner who contended that the warship could not have been a carrier since the 500-

pounders had "knocked her turrets off." The attack did not go

unopposed, and of a swarm of Zeros attacking the bombers five were

surely, seven probably destroyed. Two of the Forts were damaged

and all were desperately low on fuel, but Major Sewart led his flight

back to Efate intact.

Again on the 25 th the heavies saw action. The preceding day

Lunga airdrome, now named Henderson Field after the commander

of the Marine dive bombers at Midway, had been attacked by landand carrier-based planes, the latter probably from the Ryujo. Newly

arrived Marine pilots, defending the Guadalcanal lodgment, knocked

down 21 of the attackers for a loss of 3. At midnight the Marine

positions were shelled by four enemy warships, one of which may

have been sunk by dive bombers from Henderson. A dawn air attack

was anticipated but none came.

At o835 on the 25th eight escorted dive bombers from Guadalcanal

uncovered the main Japanese occupation force about 125 miles to the

16
north. One large and three small transports, escorted by a heavy

cruiser, light cruisers, and four destroyers, presented a fat target.

Thousand-pounders gutted the large transport and damaged the heavy

cruiser. Eight additional B-17's, leaving distant Espiritu at o617,

broke the back of either a cruiser or a destroyer with three direct hits

from 500-pounders and at iOl5 saw her sink. By noon of the 25 th

the Japanese were making all speed to the north and Guadalcanal was,

for the moment, secure.

From this telling action, the iith returned to the tedium of search

duties and primitive operational conditions. The enemy reverted to

a pattern of harassing attacks and minor reinforcement efforts. At

noon on the 25th, 21 Jap bombers pounded Henderson Field, and that

evening destroyers landed reinforcements at Cape Esperance and came

down Sealark Channel, guns ablaze. By this time, however, Guadalcanal had the means to defend itself, partially at least, against such

measures; Marine fighters and dive bombers were based on the island

and elements of the USAAF's 67th Fighter Squadron had arrived.

The Jagstaffel

E XCEPT for lone, cruising B-17's, the Marines saw few friendly

aircraft for almost a fortnight after the withdrawal of the Navy

carriers on the night of 8 August. Meanwhile, back-breaking

labor was completing the unfinished Japanese air strip, and on the

afternoon of the 20th, the stubby little carrier Long Island, from

some 200 miles southeast of Guadalcanal, catapulted two Marine

squadrons, VMF-223 with 19 F4F-4's (Grumman Wildcat fighters)

under Maj. John L. Smith and VMSB-2 32 with 12 SBD- 3's (Douglas

Dauntless dive bombers) under Lt. Col. Richard C. Mangrum.' These

were followed in 2 days by five long-nosed Army fighters, P-4oo's

of the 67 th Fighter Squadron, under Capt. Dale Brannon.

The P-4oo's which flew into Henderson on 22 August inaugurated

a route over which many an Army fighter was destined to pass before

the Japanese were driven from the Lower Solomons. In none too

short hops they had flown all the way from New Caledonia, employing the Atlantic technique-fighters, equipped with belly tanks,

shepherded by bombers or transports.

STBF's, Grumman Avenger torpedo bombers, later appeared on Guadalcanal.

17
Leaving Blaines des Gaiacs on 21 August, Captain Brannon's flight

of five hopped 325 miles to Efate, 18o more to Espiritu. The following day, with gas tanks topped off after the warm-up, the P- 4oo's

tackled the 640 miles to Henderson. Gas consumption had been

predicated upon low engine speed, a lean mixture, a 15-mile tail wind,

and, in Captain Brannon's opinion, a landing powered by the proverbial fumes. Imperfect navigation and enemy fighters were written

off.

The P- 4oo's flew on the deck, at 200 feet, through mist and lowhanging clouds. In clear spaces, they spread out; when weather

loomed ahead, they snuggled under the navigating B-17's wing. A

second Fort followed with rubber boats, to be tossed to the pilots if

they bailed out. After 3% hours of flying, all five planes were set

down on the Lunga air strip. The following day, Lt. Robert E.

Chilson with 3o enlisted men of the 67th's ground echelon arrived off

Lunga in the transport Fomalhaute; and when Capt. John A. Thompson brought in nine more P- 4oo's on 27 August, the 67th was ready

for action.

The 67 th Fighter Squadron

If hardships prepare men for hardships, the 67th was prepared for

Guadalcanal. Its personnel had sailed from New York in January

1942 in a crowded transport with inadequate water tanks-the men

had received a daily ration of one canteen for washing, drinking, and

shaving. After 38 days at sea they were rested for a week at a camp

near Melbourne, Australia, and on 15 March disembarked on New

Caledonia, where the inhabitants, military and civilian, momentarily

expected the Japanese.

The 67th's airplanes were not only in crates but of a type only two

of its pilots had ever flown. The 67th's new home was a halfcompleted airfield up at Tontouta, 35 miles from Noumea. Its one

combination truck and trailer took one of the crated planes to Tontouta every 8 hours, alternately groaning and highballing over the

mountainous road. When the crates were pried open instructions

for P- 39D's, F's, and K's were found, but none for P- 4oo's; neither

were the mechanics familiar with the plane. Still the work of assembly went forward. The men slept under shelter halves, the officers

in a farmhouse-44 of them in parlor, bedroom, and earth-floored

18
basement. All united in cursing the sudden, unpredictable rains and

in fighting the mosquitoes.

Tools for assembly consisted of io kits of simple first-echelon

maintenance tools. Lines were found plugged with Scotch tape;

one P-4oo's electrical circuit had evidently had the attention of a

factory maniac: when the flap switch was pressed wheels would

retract; when the wheel switch was pressed the guns would fire.

Nevertheless, in less than a month 41 planes were assembled with

the aid of the 65th Materiel Squadron, and the pilots were checked

out with only a single accident. The squadron, finding that the

P-4oo's instruments were inferior, learned how to fly without them.

Spare parts all came from salvage; and one plane, "The Resurrection,"

eventually evolved as a ioo-per cent mongrel.

First Action

When Captain Brannon and his pilots landed at Henderson, action

was not long in coming. The Marine pilots had pointed out on a little knoll near the runway the Japanese pagoda which served as Allied

air operations headquarters. Near it was a flagpole up which a black

flag was run when an air raid threatened. There was no real warning system-the first radar did not function until September-but

from other sources reports of approaching enemy formations were

received.

On the hot, sunny afternoon of the 24th, pilots and ground crews

were working around the P-4oo's when the black flag was hoisted.

Already the drone of engines could be heard. Two of the 67th's

pilots made a run for their planes, Captain Brannon and Lt. D. H.

Fincher taking off with the Grummans in a cloud of dust. Thirty

seconds later the bombs hit. The P-4oo's staggered off over the palm

trees and evaded the Zeros sweeping down to strafe. The Grummans climbed to 8,ooo feet, knocked down all but one of the nine

enemy bombers, which may have come from the doomed Ryujo off

to the north. The Army pilots happened on a wandering Zero,

pumped lead until it exploded.

The Marines, living largely on the Japanese quartermaster, introduced the pilots to life on Guadalcanal. In the green, canopied

Marine tents were straw sleeping mats and enamelware eating bowls--

both Japanese. Also Japanese were the chow, largely fish and rice,

637691-45 4 19
the cigarettes, and even the caramels. Socks, always too short, and

loincloths were also available by courtesy of the Japanese QM. And

across the river, a bare 200 yards away, was the enemy, with his snipers

always alert for U. S. officers' insignia.

Until the arrival of VMF-223 and VMSB-2 3 2, the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area had been without air resources. Moreover, few supplies

had come through to the beachhead. General Vandegrift had thrown

a perimeter defense around the airfield upon its capture and was able

to set up one battery of 9o-millimeter guns and 58 automatic weapon

positions against enemy air raids. The F4 F- 4's were immediately

assigned the air defense of the area and the SBD's began to conduct

long single-plane searches over enemy positions at Guadalcanal and

northward up to New Georgia and Santa Isabel. Operating under

Marine command, the P-4oo's soon took up part of the burden. On

the 25th, they were up on dawn-to-dusk patrols over Henderson and

on the 26th two pilots flew reconnaissance around the entire Guadal

canal coastline.

By the last week in August, Japanese tactics in the Solomons had

begun to take form. In the Buin-Faisi area of Bougainville, at Vella

Lavella on Kula Gulf and at Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel, the Japanese

had bases easily supplied from Truk and Rabaul. By September,

enemy men and supplies were being loaded on fast vessels-destroyers

or cruisers. These marauders, hiding from the Henderson-based

aircraft during daylight, by night came fast down "The Slot" between

the parallel lines of islands, landed men and supplies, stood off Henderson Field, shelled it, and were generally safe in the central Solomons

by daylight. Thus the enemy in the Guadalcanal bush would be

reinforced to the point of mounting a final attack on the beachhead,

at which time other Japanese, supported by a sizeable portion of the

Imperial Navy, would be brought down from the Mandates as an

occupation force. Such actions were feasible so long as the enemy

controlled the sea approaches to the Lower Solomons. Once these

were lost, as they were in the mid-November engagements, the enemy

was obliged to rely for reinforcements solely on the Tokyo Express.

Meanwhile, air attacks on Henderson were carried out almost daily

from Rabaul via Kahili Field in southern Bougainville and various

harassments maintained against the American garrison. These latter

were ingenious sleep-destroyers. "Oscar," a sub, surfaced nightly in

20
the dark off Lunga, reconnoitered, threw a few shells at either Tulagi

or Guadalcanal. After midnight, an asthmatic two-engine bomber,

variously named "Louie the Louse," "Washing Machine Charlie," or

"Maytag Mike," would lay a stick of bombs across the field.

The 67th performed its daily patrols at the dangerous medium

altitude of 14,000 feet. The planes could struggle a little higher, but

the pilots, without oxygen,' could not make long-sustained flights at

this altitude. The P-4oo's days as an interceptor were numbered.

Fail to Reach Bombers

On 29 August came the first test. The P- 4oo's were scrambled

at noon to meet i8 enemy bombers with the usual Zero escort.

Twelve went up in flights of four, climbed to 14,ooo, and, to quote

the squadron's historian, "staggered around, looking closely at all

spots within their vision to make sure they were just spots and not

enemy formations." The bombers rode safely above, at 17,000 until

the Grummans hit them, knocking down four bombers and four

escorts. The discouraged P-4oo's returned to a runway swarming

with men. The strip seemed to have sprouted bushes; as it turned

out the ground crews were using them to mark bomb craters. Ammunition was exploding; grass, hangars, and aircraft were afire;

and scores of enemy snipers in the trees across the river.

30 August was a busy day. It began for the 67th at midnight; the

SBD's had been sent on a hunt for enemy destroyers and the Army

pilots were continuously on the alert until dawn, when their regular

duties began. That day these consisted of maintaining combat air

patrol over four friendly destroyers at Tulagi. The enemy raid was

due at about noon-"Tojo Time"--as it was known from the regularity with which the enemy appeared at that hour. The coast watchers reported 22 single-engine planes coming in from Buka Passage

and at i13o all aircraft came in for reservicing.

It was reasoned that the Japanese would not send Zeros down alone,

so the single-engine aircraft must be dive bombers and their target

the ships at Tulagi. Eight Grummans and ii P-4oo's were in commission and were disposed to meet the expected attack. Four P-4oo's

were to patrol over Tulagi and hop the dive bombers as they pulled

'These P-4oo's had been intended for export to the British and were equipped with the

British high-pressure oxygen system. No high-pressure oxygen bottles were available at either

New Caledonia or Guadalcanal.

21
out; seven cruised the towering cumulus at 14,000 feet to engage the

enemy as he started down. The Grummans were somewhat above

the latter group.

The seven P-4oo's had been cruising for about 30 minutes and

already were feeling lack of oxygen when they were attacked, not

by dive bombers but by Zeros. The agile Japanese (lived down around

a cloud, climbed up to take the P-400's from behind and below. They

numbered about 20. The P- 4oo's had started turning into a Lufbery

in which there were more Zeros than P- 4oo's when the Grummans

dived and the melee became general. The astonishing Zeros were

making almost square turns and the Army pilots found the only way

to shake them was to head down for a cloud, make a turn on instruments, and come out on top, ready for a pass.

Below, the weather over the sea had closed clown to i,ooo feet and

quarter-mile visibility, and consequently the four-plane patrol started

back. Coming out of a rain squall, the P- 4oo's were attacked by a

half-dozen Zeros and their formation torn apart. Two of the pilots,

Lts. R. E. Wythes and R. E. Chilson, did not return.

Altogether four P- 4oo's were lost, two pilots later making their

way to Henderson on foot, after bailing out. Five of the seven returning planes were out of commission by reason of bullet holes.

Against these losses, the 67 th was credited with four kills. The

Marines got 14.

That did not end the day's activities. At 1500, 17 F4F's and a

dozen SBD's, with two escorting B-17's, arrived at Guadalcanal.

Thirty minutes later, with 18 planes on Henderson, the Japanese dive

bombers arrived. Ignoring the tempting array on the air strip, they

caught the destroyer Blue a half mile offshore and sank her. Across

at Tulagi, the transport Burrowls ran aground and, to add to the commotion, nature intervened around 1615 with two earthquakes. That

evening the Tokyo Express ran again, giving Henderson a shelling.

Through all this, after but 4 days of operations at full strength, only

three of the original 14 P-4oo's survived in commission on i

September.

The air battle of 30 August proved that the P-4oo's on Guadalcanal could not be used as interceptors. In addition to the planes

shot down, six returned to Henderson that afternoon riddled beyond

repair. The 67th had early been aware of the limitations of its planes

and the reports of the action of the 3oth convinced General Harmon.

22
'0 _ _ _ __ _ _ _

Ln

02
No Army or Marine aircraft then extant was entirely satisfactory

against the Zero, but the P-4oo's possessed a peculiar disadvantage in

that they were unable to reach the altitude customarily employed by

enemy bombers. Rate of climb was low, wing load excessive, and

the engine extremely vulnerable to hits in the glycol cooling system.

The P-4oo had been flown under far from optimum conditions,

but its pilots were skilled and courageous, as Major Smith, commanding VMF-223 , later testified. General Harmon immediately asked

Washington for P- 38 and P- 47 squadrons, or the P-4o with the RollsRoyce Merlin engine. Meanwhile, since the P- 39 type was his mainstay in the theater, the General cast about for ways of improving its

performance. He considered that since .5o-caliber bullets neatly disintegrated the Zeros, the 37-millimeter nose cannon in the P- 39 could

be replaced by either a .50-caliber machine gun or a 20-millimeter

cannon. This would have the effect of lightening the plane.

Washington showed equal concern over the record of the 67th and

the specific dictum of General Vandegrift that the P-4oo was "entirely unsuitable" for operations on Guadalcanal. But the war had to

be fought with weapons presently available and considerable numbers

of P- 39's were on their way to Pacific theaters. The recommended

solution was stripping the fighter to lighten it. By the end of September, the P- 39K minus 650 pounds of its original equipment had

achieved a service ceiling of 27,000 feet, and the Bell aircraft's performance against the Japanese eventually reached heights far above

that of the old P-4oo's-the "klunkers," as the 67th dubbed them.

The P-4 oo as an Attack Plane

Meantime General Vandegrift at Guadalcanal faced the immediate

problem-he had the undesirable aircraft on hand and had to find a

use for it. The planes possessed good defensive armor plate and

armament consisting of a 20-millimeter cannon, two .5o-caliber and

four .3o-caliber machine guns; they could each carry one bomb and

their engines operated reasonably well at low altitudes. The Japanese,

moreover, had shown no extraordinary talent with flak. As an attack

plane, then, the P-4oo could use its bomb on shipping and shore

installations, its 20-millimeter cannon on landing barges, and its

machine guns on enemy personnel.

24
About 20 miles east of Henderson, the Japanese held the native

village of Tasimboko in some strength. The Marines planned to

bring fresh troops from Tulagi, effect a landing east of Tasimboko,

strike the position from the rear, and retire the same day. In preparation for this operation, the P-4oo's tried their wings in a new

employment.

On the night of i September, two enemy transports and two destroyers lay off Tasimboko discharging troops. Foul weather having

prevented the SBD's from interfering during darkness, Captain Brannon with five P- 4oo's took off at o6oo to attack landing parties in

the area. None were found, but five beached landing craft were

sighted. At o8oo four more Army fighters took off; they dropped

5oo-pound bombs on the village and strafed both the landing craft

and the village. Back on Henderson, Tojo Time was imminent

and rather than sit out the attack, the P-4oo's returned to Tasimboko.

In their absence i8 bombers, escorted by 21 Zeros, came over Henderson. The F4F- 4's reduced their number by three bombers and four

fighters, but the P-4oo's returned to a cratered runway, a burned-out

hangar, three fired SBD's, burning gas and ammunition dumps, and

a good many delayed-action bombs.

Such expeditions became routine with the 67th, which began to

be known as the "Jagdstaffel." The mechanics could always produce

a pair of "klunkers" to go out and work over the Japs. At first, the

pilots chose their own targets-landing barges or supply dumps.

Later they were sent out to bomb and strafe in the inlets and coves

of Santa Isabel, where the enemy maintained jumping-off points for

reinforcing Guadalcanal, and their bombing eventually became so

accurate they could be assigned targets quite close to the Marine

lines.

Day by day the P-4oo's went up to Tasimboko while the Japanese

bombed or shelled Henderson. On 4 September, with only three

Army aircraft in commission and 13 pilots to fly them, word was

received that the enemy was putting men ashore in landing barges

up on Santa Isabel, 75 miles northwest of Henderson. Led by Maj.

Robert E. Galer in his F4F- 4, the three P-4oo's were on their way

by iz4o; the target was easily located in a small cove. Six loaded

landing craft were destroyed by two direct hits with 5oo-pounders

and the boats and men still landing were thoroughly strafed. Alto25
gether a total of 25 landing craft out of 30 seen in the area were

claimed destroyed. That night, however, the Japanese retaliated with

the Express, a light cruiser and two destroyers sinking the American

destroyer-transports Little and Gregory off Savo.

On the 5th, after all personnel on Henderson had undergone a

dismal night of enemy shelling, the Jagdstaffel and the Grummans

uncovered a prime target-15 fully loaded landing barges about 5oo

yards off the northwest coast of Guadalcanal. Six Grummans and

two P-400's strafed until ammunition was exhausted. An Army

pilot may have had this mission in mind when he came back to report

that he and his wingman had literally cut a bloody X on the water

through which Japanese troops were wading towards land. Two

hours later, two P-4oo's returned to destroy most of the supplies in the

landing craft which had grounded on a reef close inshore.

The Tasimboko operation--or, rather, raid-occurred on 8 September. Beginning at o7oo, four P-4oo's and three SBD's bombed the

area for io minutes, with the object of pinning down the defenders

while the assault party went ashore. At ogoo the mission was repeated.

At noon help was again requested, the Marines having tackled a

rather larger force than had been anticipated, and the P-4oo's responded at once. Nevertheless, at 15.30 the Marines asked that the

P-4oo's cover their withdrawal.

Meanwhile, intermittent thundershowers had made 6-inch mud of

Henderson's runway. Three of the P-4oo's were in commission and

the pilots taxied them out. Captain Brannon lowered half flaps, held

the brakes, and gave his engine full throttle. The plane crept forward. He wrestled it down the runway and staggered off. Less

fortunate, Lt. V. L. Head lurched and skidded trying to pick up speed,

muddy spray drenching the plane as it plowed through pools of

water. Torque almost pulled it off the strip. Realizing he was

running out of runway, the pilot tried to "hang it on the prop." The

old P- 4oo stalled and hit, broke in three, and caught fire. Lieutenant

Head was able to get out, though badly burned.

The third pilot took off through the flame and smoke. For 2 hours

this lone pair of Army flyers covered the Marine withdrawal, doing

lazy eights over the beach while the boats were loaded and launched.

When the last had got away, the P-4oo's came in on reserve gas and

somehow in the twilight got down on the strip.

26
By the time the Tasimboko raiders had returned, the Japanese

were ready for a major attempt on the Marine positions. Their Express had been running regularly; their strength had been built to

a peak. The Marine air establishment at Henderson was being

whittled by operational losses and the necessity of daily interception.

On 9 September, the F4F- 4 's were down to i i.

Lunga Ridge

In anticipation of enemy thrusts, Marine air strength was substantially augmented on ii September and additional planes came

in on the 13th. By the 12th the Japanese had prepared a formidable

push against the perimeter defense of the airfield. Bombers hit at

Henderson by day and cruisers and destroyers from the Express

shelled it by night. A particularly heavy shelling occurred during

the night of the I3th, supporting a three-pronged assault on the

Marines. Two of the attacks were held, but the most vicious struck

at the Lunga Ridge just south of the airfield, a position held by Col.

Merritt A. Edson's First Raider Battalion. All night the Japanese

drove against the ridge. Colonel Edson's men were forced off the

crest and down on the other side. Only the inner perimeter defense

stood between the air strip and the enemy. Snipers broke through

and the field was brought under mortar and artillery fire. Radio

Tokyo announced that Guadalcanal was retaken.

The 67th mustered three of its P-4oo's to aid the Marine counterattack on the 14 th. At o73o Captain Thompson and Lts. B. W.

Brown and B. E. Davis were dispatched to "Bloody Ridge." They

did not have to fly to an objective; they simply circled the field,

visible at all times to their ground crews except when they dipped

behind the low hill. Then the murderous chatter of their armament

could be heard. They made repeated passes until enemy rifle and

machine-gun fire forced two of them down in dead-stick landings;

the last simply ran out of ammunition. The Marines retook the hill

and buried the enemy dead with a bulldozer.

It was clear that the Japanese had shot their bolt in the night attack

of the 13th. The American lodgment on Guadalcanal had survived

another push.

By now, the maligned P- 4oo had proved itself. General Vandegrift

consistently used the plane against any position blocking his Marines--

27
in fact, he even asked for more P-4oo's. COMAIRSOPAC's chief of

staff, Capt. Matt Gardner, testified to its effectiveness in strafing

troops and landing barges. The Marines preferred to use their SBD's

against the reinforcing vessels. The P-4oo had found in ground-air

cooperation its niche on Guadalcanal.

In definance of technical orders, the 67th developed its own technique

of dive bombing. On the plane's instrument panel was the warning:

"Do not release bomb when nose angle 3o degrees up or down or when

airspeed exceeds 280 m.p.h." The Jagdstaffel discovered that the

bomb would release at 70' and clear the propeller arc if a quick pressure on the stick was employed to pull the airplane away from the

falling bomb. Dives averaged 3oo and sometimes reached 500 m. p. h.

Unlike the SBD's, which pushed over at 15,000 to 17,000 feet, the

P-4oo's started their dives at 5,ooo, released and pulled out right over

the jungle, zig-zagging over the palms to avoid ground fire and returning to strafe where the latter revealed troop positions.

The cover offered by the jungle and coconut groves effectively

concealed the Japanese and distressed the Jagdstaffel, which often

could not find the target or believe it had caused damage. Marine

outposts reported enemy concentrations, which were shown the pilots

on a map and indicated by panels in American-held territory. The

P-4oo's dive-bombed the spot and came back to strafe blindly among

the trees. Only occasionally did they catch a fleeting glimpse of a

Japanese. However, the infantry, moving in, found bodies in abundance and sometimes silenced mortars, and captured diaries testified

to the Japanese trooper's great fear of the "long-nosed American

planes." The Marine and Navy intelligence officers who briefed and

interrogated the 67th employed this evidence to encourage the Army

pilots, and the Jagdstaffel took heart.

Henderson's Combat Routine

The routine of combat at Henderson Field began around noon.

Enemy bombers would arrive, 18 to 24 strong, high in the sun in a

perfect V of V's, escorted by 20 or more Zeros in flights of three.

Coming down from Kahili cr Buka fields, the formation would bend

its course around the islands to avoid being spotted. Some 150 miles

out of Henderson it would reach altitude, then come in fast-perhaps

as fast as 250 m. p. h.

28
As the warning came through, a captured Rising Sun flag, the

signal to scramble, would shoot up at the pagoda. Every flyable

aircraft would head through the craters for the runway. If the crews

noticed a wind drop amid the dust, they knew the plane had run

afoul of a dud hole or a small crater hidden in the tall grass. First

planes on the runway took off first, two at a time-SBD's or P-4oo's.

Once aloft, the Grummans, test-firing, would climb for altitude while

the SBD's and P-4oo's flew off to work over Japanese territory. The

ground crews worked until the black flag went up; then they'd hit

the foxholes.

The 67th's ground crews shared the Marines' hardships on Guadalcanal, even voluntarily manning the forward foxholes on nights when

a break-through seemed imminent. There were not enough of them

for the job; they had few tools, no hoist equipment, no new parts.

Only seven armorers had accompanied the original 14 planes. Refueling in particular was a back-breaking job. Crew chiefs regularly

slept under the P-4oo's-in case individual Japanese were able to

slip through the Marine lines. Nothing but combat materiel had

accompanied the first flights to Guadalcanal.

After their repulse on Lunga Ridge, the Japanese evidently retired

to give the Guadalcanal problem some thought. The elements of

their solution, however, did not at once differ importantly from the

familiar pattern. The Tokyo Express still ran and air raids on

Henderson continued, as did the knife work in the bush and the

activities of "Maytag Mike." It was clear that decisive naval actions

and the landing of heavy reinforcements were necessary to secure the

Guadalcanal-Tulagi area. These were in the offing, but not immediately. The Marines, reinforced by a large convoy on 18 September,

made their preparations. The ilth Group on Espiritu and the 67th

at Henderson carried on.

The October Crisis

N RESTROSPECT October was the crucial month in the Solomons. Though initially surprised, the Japanese had reacted vigorously to the American thrust. To begin with, off Savo Island their

guns uncovered the Marine lodgments. Next, tb exploit this advantage, they dispatched in late August a powerful task force which the

29
Navy turned back in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. The Japanese gradually built up strength which they expended at Lunga Ridge

in mid-September. October saw the near-triumph of their tactics;

they all but broke the American forces on Guadalcanal.

On 26 September, when the correspondent Richard Tregaskis

departed Guadalcanal, he first went north to Bougainville in an Army

B-I 7 . The plane probably belonged to Colonel Saunders' i ith Group,

although a new squadron, the 72d of the 5th Group, had recently

arrived in the area. Tregaskis furnished a good description of a

routine B-1 7 search mission.

The Fort he was in left Guadalcanal towards dawn and headed

over Tulagi Bay for the northwest. The navigator, explaining that

no excitement was imminently likely, took off his shirt to acquire a

tan. Not until the plane turned on a Bougainville bearing was the

first enemy aircraft seen. Two Zeros made a tentative pass. Later

an enemy cargo ship went into violent maneuvers as the Fort approached. A float Zero got too close and the .50-caliber sent her down

for a dead-stick landing. Meanwhile, the navigator counted and

identified the ships below and the bombardier decided that the flak

which thwacked against the fuselage was from naval guns. Another

Zero made a single frontal attack on the Fortress without either aircraft sustaining damage. The rest of the journey back to Espiritu was

without incident.

Throughout September and October, such missions were the principal occupation of Colonel Saunders' command, in order to keep

COMSOPAC informed of enemy surface movements. Statistics of

operations for those months reveal twice as many search as bombing

sorties. From Espiritu Santo the sectors fanned northwesterly in

narrow arcs of 6' each and extended approximately 8oo miles

with a xoo-mile width at the extremity. The maximum coverage included Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel and Gizo Bay in the New

Georgia group. When possible to stage through Henderson, the

range increased-to the Buin-Shortland-Faisi area-where the bombers could keep an eye on freight moving down from Rabaul or the

Mandates. These were long flights, averaging more than 1,500

miles-12 weary hours for the crews.

Occasionally, the Forts went even farther-to Kieta on Bougainville's eastern shore and then around to touch the Buka Passage. On

30
such lengthy missions it was not always possible to carry bombs,

but extra fuel and reduced bomb loads were the rule. Targets

abounded-at Bougainville's lower tip, where the harbor of Tonolei

and Buin settlement lay behind densely wooded Shortland Island,

and in The Slot, funneling down to Guadalcanal between the New

Georgia group and Santa Isabel and Choiseul to the east. Tonolei,

protected by Kahili Field, received shipping from Rabaul, Palau, and

Truk, while sightings in The Slot included every category in the

Japanese Navy.

Destroyers Hard to Hit

Unfortunately, it was not easy to hit shipping. Destroyers were

most numerous in The Slot, but they were extremely maneuverable

and almost defied direct hits. The slower cargo vessels, offering

easier targets, were nevertheless far from sitting ducks for a single

search plane. Infrequently, a task force was sighted-battleships,

cruisers, and escorts-and on 14 September, 250 miles north of the

Santa Cruz group, seven B-17's uncovered such a force-three battleships, four heavy cruisers, and a number of lighter craft moving to

the northwest. Through intense and accurate flak, two possible hits

were claimed.

Weather remained a formidable enemy, aborting a strike on ii

September by seven Forts against a sizeable naval force at Tonolei and

again turning back 15 B-17's tracking a carrier reported northeast of

the Santa Cruz group. In this last search three Forts crash-landed at

sea. Two of the crews reached the northern tip of New Caledonia

and were later rescued. The third drifted 7 days at sea, lost two of its

members to exposure, was finally rescued by the Navy.

By 20 September, the iith Group had sighted 155 vessels of all

types during 7 weeks of operation. It had bombed i9 and hit 4- Of

these, 2 were sunk. The scale of attack was always light; i attack by

4 plarqes; 4 by 3; 4 by 2; and io by single search planes.

To increase the striking power of the B-17's, another squadron was

dispatched from Hawaii in mid-September. Necessary maintenance

personnel moved out of Oahu on the 21st in LB-3o's-early versions

of the Liberator. By 23 September the B-17E's of the 5th Group's

72d Squadron had arrived in Espiritu and on the 24th some of them

31
were already up over Shortland Island. In mid-October, two additional squadrons of the 5th Group were dispatched to the South

Pacific. For all 'practical purposes, the 5th's squadrons operated as

part of the ixth, an arrangement recognized in December by the establishment of a joint headquarters for the two groups.

"Eager" was the adjective for the pilots of the ixth, who showed a

reckless tendency to use the big bombers as attack planes. The gunners were fond of strafing and the pilots obligingly took the B-17's

down over the ground and dock installations at Gizo or over the float

planes and flying boats at Rekata Bay. On i6 September, five separate strafing attacks were run over Rekata Bay and 3 days later the

docks at Gizo were treated similarly. Such employment of heavy

bombers disturbed General Harmon and he informed headquarters

that he was putting a curb to such activities.

The over-all tactical situation at Guadalcanal determined, that is,

limited, the effectiveness of General Harmon's heavy bombers. Although a Fort had come in to stay overnight as early as 25 August,

Henderson was never stocked with enough fuel to permit continuous

operations by B-17's. It was not stocked with fuel because the enemy

controlled the waters of the Lower Solomons. The Tokyo Express

ran often, fast, and in considerable strength. One way to hamper

the Express was to hit hard at Tonolei and Buka, but the gas for

these missions had to be picked up at Henderson, and Henderson

ordinarily lacked it, until after the middle of November.

Moreover, the field, shelled almost nightly and bombed almost

daily, was too exposed for heavy bombers and suffered as well from

lack of service personnel. During the first 3 months of the campaign

the Marines cheerfully took on a great part of the burden of servicing

the B-17's which came in from time to time. By October Henderson

had its Marston mat, but General Harmon doubted that the field

could support heavy-bomber operations. Taxiways and hard standings were lacking, dispersion was poor, and rain was likely to bring

operations to a soggy halt.

Nevertheless, in the first part of October, an attempt was made to

restrict the use of Buka, which the Japanese employed as an advanced

staging point for Rabaul-based bombers. As early as 2 September,

40 bombers and fighters had been reported on the field. On 4 October, only one B-17 could bore through the weather to drop a score

32
Official Photo USAAF

Brig. Gen. LaVerne G. Saunders, former commanding officer of the iith

Bombardment Group (H).

33
of ioo-pounders on the strip and parkways. Eight days later, another

mission hit the field more solidly; the bombs splashed along the runway and io parked aircraft were assessed as destroyed. Only two

Zeros rose from the surprised airdrome and only one got back. On

the i3th 6 more Forts repeated the mission, putting 6 tons on the

Buka strip. The day when the Guadalcanal gas supply could back

up a sustained offensive still lay in the future.

During late September and early October, the Japanese continued

to run the Express, filtering reinforcements into Guadalcanal at a

low but steady rate. Marine air at Henderson enjoyed only limited

success in coping with it. The Express did not get within range until

late afternoon; ordinarily only one strike could be accomplished before nightfall and weather often interfered, but whenever moon and

clouds permitted, the dive and torpedo bombers roared out for night

attacks. Back at Espiritu, Colonel Saunders found himself at a more

serious disadvantage; by the time his B-17's could cover the distance

to Guadalcanal, the Express would be out of range and dispersed up

The Slot.

On 5 October, another method of derailing the Express was tried.

The Hornet was dispatched to the north of the Solomons chain. Her

aircraft struck at Kieta and depots in the Shortland area, and at Faisi

hit hard at a naval force preparing for a southward voyage. Still that

night the Express made its run, and on succeeding nights as well.

But on ii October it met disaster at the other end of the line.

Cape Esperance

Army reinforcements were moving up to Guadalcanal in the second

week of October. Partly to cover the flank of this convoy, but expressly to seek battle with Japanese units on the Guadalcanal run, a

task force under Rear Adm. Norman Scott went hunting in the

Solomons. The eyes of this force were the B-i7's covering Bougainville's southern tip.

Current search routine of the B-17's was roughly as follows. Four

planes departed daily from Espiritu and Henderson Field. Those

from Espiritu took off at 0500, searched i,ooo miles between 2940 and

324', then landed at Henderson. Next morning, out of Guadalcanal,

these same Forts covered an arc 450 miles deep between 3000 and 3400,

34
flying to within 50 miles of Rabaul. Weather permitting, this was

efficient coverage. To hinder such activity, the Japanese brought a

fresh and highly trained fighter unit into the Shortland area. On

occasion, the B-17's went farther afield, on 2 October to Kapingamarangi (Greenwich) Island, where photos were taken and the area

strafed.

On ii October, Admiral Scott's cruiser force, San Francisco, Salt

Lake City, Helena, and Boise, two heavies and two lights, with attendant destroyers, cruised off Rennell Island, out of range of Japanese air search but within 5 hours' steaming of Savo. At 1345,

Henderson reported search planes had discovered two cruisers and

six destroyers southbound down The Slot. Further information on

Japanese naval movement was denied by intensive air raids on Henderson during the afternoon. Calculating that the enemy should

be off Savo an hour before midnight, Admiral Scott bore north,

expecting to meet only the force reported during the early afternoon.

Although the enemy's armada proved considerably more substantial,

that fact served only to increase Jap losses in the night action which

succeeded. The Battle of Cape Esperance cost the Imperial Navy

two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, five destroyers, and an auxiliary;

"another heavy cruiser and various destroyers were damaged. Our

own losses were 175 killed and a number wounded. The destroyer

Duncan was lost.

Cape Esperance not only failed to stop the Express; it hardly gave

it pause. However, 4,000 U. S. Army troops of Maj. Gen. Alexander

M. Patch's Americal Division were subsequently put ashore in time

to face the Japanese fury, which thenceforth increased in scale and

effectiveness. The enemy was working up to another big push. He

began by virtually knocking out the Guadalcanal airdrome.

At Henderson, the 67 th Fighter Squadron had been continuing its

strafing and bombing. New pilots had arrived; most of the original

group were dead or back in the rear areas. New planes-P-39D-I's

and P- 39K's-were coming in, being assembled, tested, and flown up

to Guadalcanal-just as the old P-4oo's had made the journey in

August.

The 9th of October was a routine day. The field was muddy.

Six P- 4oo's were scheduled for a mission against the Kokumbona area

to the west. Taxiing in the mud, one P- 4oo broke off a nose wheel;

35
another sustained two flat tires; a third simply got stuck. Still another

plane proved to have a rough engine. The remaining P- 4oo's bombed

and strafed for an hour near a bridge west of Kokumbona and at 1oo

four pilots returned to bomb. The enemy air raid at Tojo Time

failed to materialize. Earlier in the day, the new P- 39's had made

their debut up in the New Georgia area, accompanying SBD's in an

attack on Japanese ships. Of the float planes sent up to interfere, the

P-39's shot down one certain and two probables without loss to

themselves. Late in the afternoon, the P-39's, using xoo-pound incendiaries and demolition bombs, worked over the Marovovo district

beyond Cape Esperance.

In the succeeding 3 days the pattern was largely repeated. On the

ioth, the P- 39's went twice up to the New Georgia area as escort for

SBD's on ship strikes. On the iith, the 67 th lost one pilot and was

credited with i bomber in a scrap with 3o bombers and 20 Zeros carrying out the usual noon-hour raid. On the U2th, ground troops were

again harassed; the P-39's flew top cover for TBF's and SBD's which

went up after 3 destroyers in The Slot; and 2 P-39's cracked up in

take-offs from the muddy field. On this day, however, a new note

was added: a Japanese field piece began dropping shells in the dispersal area.

Henderson Field Knocked Out

Admiral Scott had chastened the Express on the night of the ixith.

Colonel Saunders' B-i 7 's, returning from Buka on the i3th, stopped

over at Tonolei long enough to score a direct hit on a transport and

shoot down 6 of 26 attacking fighters. The Americal Division's

x64th Infantry was disembarking at Lunga Point.

The morning of the i3 th the 67th attacked landing barges which

the enemy had beached during the night at the western end of Guadalcanal. At noon the air raid came. The Bettys were scarcely intercepted. The P-4oo's watched the show above from 12,ooo feet; the

P- 39's struggled to 27,0oo and still were 3,000 feet low; and insufficient warning prevented the F4 F's from making contact in force.

At 1400, while the fighters sat being refueled and rearmed, another

wave of Japanese bombers made an appearance and was able to bomb

at will, damaging aircraft at Henderson and causing casualties among

the i64th Infantry, still movhig ashore.

36
More serious, the Japanese field piece had again begun to lob

shells-this time into the area around the end of the runway. The

Seabees of the 6th Battalion had been racing up and down the strip

with pre-cut Marston mat and preloaded dump trucks prepared for

the expected craters, but their efforts had barely kept the field in

operation. Pilots and mechanics were crawling from their foxholes

to ready the P-4oo's for another mission-to track down "Pistol Pete,"

as the gun had already been named. Suddenly the mission was

called off-no gas!

Just before midnight came the main event. First the noise of a

small plane overhead. Then three flares, a red one for the west end

of the runway, green for the east, and white in the center. The men

were scarcely in the foxholes when bedlam broke loose. Off Guadalcanal stood an Express consisting of 2 battleships, i light cruiser, and

8 destroyers. For over 2 hours the bombardment continued. Runway and dispersal area were brought under fire; after a thorough

pattern shelling, the enemy shifted to the camp sites in the palm grove.

Gas and ammunition dumps took hits and all over the field aircraft

went up in smoke and flame. For whole minutes the area was bright

as day from the flares.

The Japanese let up long enough to cool their guns, then it began

again. At 0315, the Express stood for home. Three bombers came

overhead and dropped their sticks; then three more; and so on until

dawn.

The morning of the i4th lit up a shambles. Tents were collapsed

or shrapnel-riddled. The aerial defenses were seriously reduced; in

all, 57 aircraft had been destroyed or damaged. To meet the Express,

four SBD's remained, but no TBF's; to meet the Tojo Time raid, only

a few Wildcats. The 67th had been fortunate-two P- 39's damaged

and none of the P-4oo's even hit. A few barrels of aviation gas remained. On the I3th Colonel Saunders' B-17's had been bombing

over Buka and Tonolei, had returned to Henderson, where two of

the Forts were so sieved that night by shrapnel that they had to be

abandoned.

In the midst of the post-raid rubble and confusion, Colonel Saunders

led out his remaining B-17's. Less than 2,000 feet of Henderson's

runway was usable, but the bombers took off for Espiritu in i,8oo

feet, drawing 70 inches of pressure without a cylinder blowing out.

37
On instructions from Marine headquarters, officers of the 67 th went

through the two derelict B-17's, destroying radios, maps, charts, and

confidential papers, and biding the Norden sights. For the time

Henderson was useless as a heavy bombardment base.

In fact, Henderson was very nearly useless for any type of aircraft.

Pistol Pete-actually a number of guns-went into action again. His

range, short at first, improved with practice, most of the shells landing

in the area where the 67th's planes were parked. They came irregularly, about two every quarter-hour. As fast as the Seabces tackled a

crater, another shell would whine over and dig at the same spot, scattering men and equipment. Still the Seabees tamped, filled, and laid

mat, and for a time kept part of the field in operation. Providentially,

back in September, they had laid out a grass strip 2,000 yards distant

from and parallel with Henderson; although rough and short, this

strip supported the light planes during the critical mid-October days.

In an effort to silence Pete, four P-4oo's were hung with ioo-pound

bombs. The pilots, parachutes strapped on, crouched in nearby foxholes. One at a time, between the bursts, they ran for their planes.

Drunkenly, they taxied out, careened down the runway with new

craters pocking the surface behind them. All got off but failed to

silence Pistol Pete, who was numerous, concealed, and frequently

moved. Lack of fuel precluded further raids against him; every

drop was saved for fighter defense.

Enemy pressure was relentless. At 1154 and again at 1303, enemy

bombers and fighters struck, without warning or interception. Bomb

craters could be filled, but the Seabees fell behind in their race with

Pete. By afternoon of the i4th Henderson Field was knocked out.

Down from headquarters, shortly after noon, came a Marine colonel.

His words were reminiscent of the Philippines:

We don't know whether we'll be able to ho!d the field or not. There's

a Japanese task force of destroyers, cruisers, and troop transports headed

our way. We have enough gasoline left for one mission against them.

Load your airplanes with bombs and go out with the dive bombers and

hit them. After the gas is gone we'll have to let the ground troops take

over. Then your officers and men will attach yourselves to some infantry

outfit. Good luck and good-bye.

At 1425, then, 4 P- 39's, each with a 300-pound bomb, and 3 old

P- 4oo's with ioo-pounders took off with the 4 SBD's. Henderson

had few teeth left to show the Express. One hundred and fifty miles

38
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of precious fuel was burned before the planes sighted the Japanese

task force off the coast of Santa Isabel-6 transports in line astern,

well screened by 8 destroyers and cruisers, 4 on each flank. The

armada maneuvered violently, threw up heavy flak. The composite

attack group pushed over and went down. No planes were lostbut no hits were seen.

Someone recalled the abandoned B-i7's. The gas siphoned out of

their tanks proved enough for one more strike, and for this one old

P- 4oo, saddled with 5oo-pound bombs, barely wobbled off the runway.

This time the SBD's scored two hits on the Japanese force, by now at

the near tip of Santa Isabel. The 67th lost one plane over the target,

and another to a night-landing crash back at Henderson.

It was a glum prospect as darkness set in over the Marine beachhead.

Another shelling was a certainty. The enemy ships were anchored

between Kokumbona and Tassafaronga, only io miles down the

channel, busily unloading troops and supplies-a prime target for an

air strike, but no gas. However, the shelling which started at oioo,

though heavy, lasted but a short time, newly arrived PT boats out in

"Sleepless Lagoon" contributing to the premature withdrawal of the

Express. And gasoline was on the way.

By mid-morning it began to arrive, ferried in by the work-horse

C-47's. For over a week Henderson was to depend on the fuel

brought in by this service, maintained by two Marine transport squadrons and the AAF's i3th Troop Carrier Squadron. All day long on

the x5th the transports came in from Espiritu, each with about 12

drums-enough to keep 12 planes in the air for i hour. They braked

to a skidding stop, the drums were rolled out, and the planes took off

before Pistol Pete could lob a shell.

Henderson Strikes Back

With gas on hand, Henderson prepared to hit back. Battered

planes were patched, pilots belted their own ammunition, armament

crews shouldered the formidable task of bombing up the planes without bomb carts. Ten men hoisted a 5oo-pound bomb on a truck bed.

Hauled to the vicinity of the plane, then rolled through the mud, the

bombs were lifted and fitted into the racks by as many men as could

crowd under the aircraft's belly. All this on empty stomachs-with

40
the cooks in the foxholes, it had been hardtack and cold hash since

the x3th.

Down the beach were numerous targets. Between Kokumbona

and Doma Reef, five transports and eight destroyers were pouring

ashore upwards of io,ooo troops. No infiltration this, but invasion in

force, with a constant patrol of Zeros over the ships. All day on the

i5 th, the Henderson aircraft smashed at the convoy.

No sooner were the planes airborne than objectives were visible, and

waiting Zeros swept down on the Army and Marine planes starting

their dives. The destroyers contributed heavy flak. In this situation,

the technique of the P-39's and P- 4oo's shaped up somewhat as follows:

they tried to disregard enemy fighters, dived, released when the ship

was dead center in the gun sight, pulled out over the mast, and zigzagged out of the ack-ack. Then to Henderson for another load.

Results were encouraging. One of the 67th's pilots got a probable,

two other scored hits which damaged two transports; still another

dropped on a transport which caught fire, exploded, and sank. The

air score was even-one Zero for one pilot of the 67th. Altogether the

fighter squadron sent three missions up the beach on the i5th, and in

addition weathered the usual high-level Tojo Time raid.

The Forts also had a hand in the battle. On the I4 th, six had come

up from Espiritu to pound the Express, but lost it in the darkness of

Indispensable Strait. On the i5th, ii of them, now back, possibly

damaged a transport and fired what was thought to be a light cruiser.

Of the 20 Zeros covering the landing operation, the bombers knocked

down nearly half, and though many sustained major damage, all the

Forts made the 640 miles back to Espiritu.

The night of the i5th Henderson Field absorbed a shelling by a

cruiser, but in the morning the enemy task force had left. Three of

its transports lay blazing hulks on the beach, but troops, armament,

and supplies had gone ashore. Harassment of these reinforcements

became a principal mission of the Henderson-based aircraft. As often

as they could be refueled and rearmed, P-39's, P-4oo's, and SBD's

went down to Kokumbona. The F4F- 4's made the daily Japanese

raids a costly business; on the 23d, for instance, 24 Grummans, intercepting i6 bombers and 25 fighters, shot down 20 Zeros and 2 bombers

with no losses.

41
These days, prelude to a big enemy push, were utter weariness to

the 67th. Repeated missions multiplied the work of men forced by

repeated bombings and shellings to spend most of their time in foxholes. Sleep and sufficient food were always lacking. Planes were

wearing out. One day, four P-4oo's took the air. The first had a

bomb, but only one .30-caliber machine gun functioning; number

two had a bomb and no functioning armament, numbers three and

four had most of their guns in commission, but no bombs. Personnel cracked under the strain. On the i8th, officers and men,

affected by repeated bombings, were evacuated to New Caledonia.

Apparently the Japanese were sanguine of the outcome; their German allies announced that two important airfields had been captured

from U. S. forces in the Solomons. In Washington, Secretary Knox

hinted at the seriousness of the situation. The main strip at Henderson was only recurrently in operation despite prodigious efforts to

erase the pockmarks. Up in the northern Solomons the Japanese

marshaled cargo and warships and the Express ran on the nights of

the i6th, i8th, and 2oth--destroyers and cruisers feeding the units

ashore with foreboding regularity. The new COMSOPAC, Adm.

William F. Halsey, Jr., soberly prepared to counter a thrust by sea.

The laps' Grand Assault

Decision, however, was reached on land. The Japanese plan envisaged simultaneous attacks, eastward across the Matanikau and

from a point south of the airfield. D-day was 23 October; for days

before, patrols probed the American lines. But the grand assault,

from the Japanese point of view, was bungled; the attacks were

delivered separately, and separately they were beaten back.

The Matanikau action proceeded on schedule, if not according

to plan. Ten tanks and thousands of fresh troops, with ample

artillery support, were thrown against the defenders. Four times on

the 23 d the enemy lashed at positions held by the ist and 2d Battalions

of the 5th Marines. American half-tracks mounting 75's knocked

out the tanks one by one as they attempted to cross the Matanikau,

and the Marines picked off about 2,ooo Japanese troops. Undaunted,

the enemy repeated the effort at dawn of the 24th. The P-4oo's went

42
over, bombing and strafing the enemy lines, and all through the

day recurrent attacks were checked, although heavy afternoon rains

grounded the planes at Henderson.

At o8oo on the 25th, the men on Henderson Field were surprised

to find five Zeros circling above their strip, making no effort to strafe.

Soon this number swelled to 14 and a medium bomber, all awaiting

the signal to land, apparently under the impression that the field was

in Jap hands. No signal came, and as soon as the mud had dried

sufficiently, eight Grummans left the field and shot down the whole

force.

The Express had put in an appearance during the early morning.

One heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and four destroyers landed troops

and supplies and began to support with shellfire enemy attacks on

the embattled beachhead. The SBD's and the 67th went after this

force, making four separate attacks. At 142o, Lieutenants Dinn,

Purnell, and Jacobsen in P-39's caught the ships northeast of Florida

Island, barely missing them with 500-pound bombs. Two hours

later, these three and Captain Mitchell attacked once more, Lieutenant

Jacobsen putting his bomb squarely on the heavy cruiser. Near

misses on the light cruiser were obtained and the warships, trailing

oil slicks, moved slowly off.

On the 25th the enemy staged his attack from the south, striking

along Lunga Ridge. Although the Marines and the 164th Infantry

piled the attackers six deep, a night assault broke through until some

enemy elements stood close to the south side of Henderson. The

morning or the 26th a desperate American counterattack cleared the

field. Three of the old P-4oo's and two P-39's did their bit, bombing

and strafing the area south of the grass fighter strip. The counterattack of the morning of the 26th, as it turned out, ended the Japanese threat by land, but a major sea action was brewing.

In the Japanese plans, possession of Henderson Field was apparently

a prerequisite to a grand assault on Guadalcanal. With the strip harboring friendly carrier planes instead of the redoubtable Grummans,

SBD's, P-39's, and P-4oo's, additional troops could be safely brought in

for a mop-up. The Japanese fleet, meanwhile, could be expected to

see that the American Navy did not interfere. Appreciation of the

43
enemy intentions clarifies the role of the carrier action of 26 October,

known as the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands.

Enemy Confident

The success of their land drive on 25 October must have made the

capture of Henderson seem only a matter of hours to the Japanese,

and down from the Mandates moved a force formidable enough to

clinch the argument. Admiral Halsey had scraped his Pacific resources to meet it. The Enterprise and the new South Dakota were

rushed down from Pearl Harbor, where the former had been recovering from wounds received in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.

With the Hornet, these two composed the nucleus of the force with

which Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid was skirting the Santa Cruz

Islands on 26 October, ready to intercept whatever enemy forces the

Mandates might offer.

On that day the search planes-B-17's and PBY's-were out from

Espiritu. East of Malaita, Lt. Mario Sesso of the 5th Group located

one section of the Japanese force-which mustered four carriers and

four battleships, with a wealth of escort, transports, and auxiliaries.

During a half-hour's observation Lieutenant Sesso developed his report until it included a battleship, several cruisers, destroyers, and a

possible carrier. Seven carrier-borne Nagoya Zeros attempted to interfere. Two fell away smoking and one disintegrated in a frontal

attack. The Fortress suffered failure of the lower turret and loss of

one gun in the tail, another in the upper turret. The Zeros killed the

bombardier, but the Fort came back and the report got through to

the fleet.

In the Santa Cruz action, the Japanese, by destroying the Hornet,

reduced the American carriers in the South Pacific to the againdamaged Enterprise. They had sustained damage to two carriers

themselves, as well as to a Kongo class battleship, but it is unlikely

that this punishment prompted their withdrawal. The American

troops on Guadalcanal stood fast; Henderson's aircraft could still

hit at an occupation force. The Japanese, consistently enough, withdrew. The beachhead actually had saved itself.

44
The Securing of Guadalcanal O None of the last days of October 1942, the U. S. Navy's

submarine Amberjack slipped cautiously into Tulagi. Her

mission, cargo, and passengers were not usual for a submarine,

but well attuned to the Solomons campaign, in which almost anything was more than likely to happen. The Amberjack's spare fuel

tanks carried aviation gasoline-Henderson still suffered from insufficient gas. She carried torpedoes for the Tulagi-based PT boatsGuadalcanal still suffered from the visits of the Express. She carried,

in addition, Army Air Forces personnel, 15 airplane mechanics and

armorers for the worn 67th Fighter Squadron-which had always

suffered from lack of manpower.

After their big push the Japanese had receded somewhat and

the situation on Guadalcanal showed some improvement. The

Express still ran, although harassed by the two dozen submarines

COMSOPAC operated in the area and by the pilots from Henderson,

whose two strips had recovered from the ravages of October.

General Vandegrift's Marines celebrated by striking across the

Matanikau on 30 October. For a change, American warships, the

light cruiser Atlanta and four destroyers, stood offshore in support.

By 3 November, the Marines were beyond Point Cruz. However,

on the night of 2 November, the industrious Japanese landed i,5oo

men east of Koli Point and the American push to the west was

checked. On 4 November, the San Francisco, Helena, and Sterett

obligingly shelled this force, which because of subsequent attentions

by the Marines never seriously threatened American positions.

The 67th was carrying the war to the enemy in its own way. On

the 3d of November, for instance, two pilots bombed AAA emplacements at Kokumbona. Two more were up over the hills on reconnaissance, and, since intelligence had reported Japanese troops east of

the Tenaru, the afternoon was devoted to bombing and strafing this

region. The pilots went out in pairs, dropping ioo- and 5oo-pound

bombs, and returning with numerous bullet holes in their craft.

The routine was not light. Usually 4 or 5 missions were run, but

on some days the total might rise to 12 or more. As the newer P-39's

arrived, they were frequently dispatched to escort Marine strike forces,

or as dive bombers in company with the SBD's. One of the missions

45
o -

- A -- -J

(6
of 3 November had the following participants: 15 SBD's, 4 P-39's, 2

P-4oo's, i TBF, and 7 F4 F's-all out after the Japanese who had come

ashore near Koli Point. Such conglomerations constituted the primary

weapon against the Express.

The afternoon of 7 November, ii southbound Japanese warships

were sighted northeast of Santa Isabel and the composite force went

into action. Out from Henderson flew 7 SBD's with i,ooo-pounders,

3 torpedo-laden TBF's, and 8 P-39's lugging 5oo-pound bombs, the

whole escorted by 22 Wildcats. Th! Army pilots' instructions specified they were first to bomb the warships, identified as i light cruiser

and io destroyers, pull out, and join the Grummans as high cover.

However, the P-39's were held up on the take-off and were overtaking

the rest of the formation when they saw 3 float Zeroes and 2 float

biplanes about to attack 2 F4F's. Jettisoning their bombs, the P-39's

shot down all 5. Ahead, the strike was succeeding. The TBF's put

2 torpedoes into the cruiser and i into a destroyer, while the SBD's

planted a i,ooo-pounder on the cruiser. In the air battle, the enemy

lost 15 float planes, the Marines 4 F4F's.

The B-17's continued their searches from Espiritu. Daily six were

out, occasionally eight to provide a broader coverage. Air opposition

had for the time diminished, but to vary the routine there might be

a surfaced sub to strafe or a flight of float Zeros to dispute the passage. So far as bombing was concerned, without the necessary fuel

at Henderson the B-17's could not get up to Buin-Tonolei from

where the Japanese would mount any further offensive.

laps Plan Offensive

That the Japanese were contemplating such an offensive was obvious. By 9 November, reports of concentrations began to come in.

As of 12 November, when the battle was already under way, estimates put the enemy's strength at two carriers, four battleships, five

heavy cruisers, and all the escort and shipping needed for a major

attempt on Guadalcanal. Against such a force, Admiral Halsey's resources were slim, his principal units being the apparently indestructible Enterprise, under repair, the Washington, and the South

Dakota.

Additional complication was the fact that COMSOPAC was re47
quired not only to turn the Japanese thrust but to put Army and

Marine reinforcements on Guadalcanal. To aid the Guadalcanal

garrison, these reinforcements had to be landed on the island and

unloaded before the Japanese boiled down from Buin in any great

strength. Moreover, the transports had to be safely removed again.

Time was extremely short and the whole operation distinctly ticklish.

Fortunately, Admiral Turner, in charge of supplying Guadalcanal,

had developed a fairly accurate estimate of the chronology of Japanese moves. The predicted enemy timetable ran somewhat like

this: land-based bombing of Henderson starting on io November;

naval bombardment on the night of the iith; a carrier air attack on

the field on the 12th, with naval bombardment and landings that

night. The invasion force was expected on Friday the i 3th.

Since the U. S. transports had to clear Guadalcanal by Thursday

night, cargo vessels were to be off Lunga Point at dawn of Wednesday,

the iith; transports from Noumea would arrive Thursday morning.

The escorts of these groups, combined under Rear Adm. Daniel J.

Callaghan, were to deal with any Japanese naval force poking around

in Sleepless Lagoon. A great deal depended on the speed of unloading

and on the Japanese doing nothing unexpected.

The cargo vessels moved in on schedule and commenced unloading. At 0935, they were attacked and slightly damaged by divebombing Aichi 99's, the Marines losing six planes in the fight with

bombers and escort. At 1127 the high-level raid occurred; eight of

the 67th's pilots were forced to sit this one out at 12,ooo while the

Marines went up to destroy six of the raiders. That night, Admiral

Callaghan swept Savo Sound without incident.

The American transports anchored off Kukum beach at 0530 on

Thursday the 12th, screened by cruisers and destroyers. At 1340, on

warning of an approaching enemy formation, the ships got under way

and formed in antiaircraft disposition. High above the island, concealed in a cloud, waited Capt. Joe Foss and his Grummans. Not

far below cruised eight P- 39's ready, after their bombing and strafing

routine, for aerial combat. The combination of naval antiaircraft

guns and Henderson's fighters proved lethal to the Japanese airmen.

At 1405, upwards of 20 torpedo bombers appeared low from behind

Florida Island. In a long line abreast, they headed for the transports,

eight Zeros covering. Diving into the combat, the P-39's found their

48
canopies covered with mist as warmer air was reached, and one pilot,

blinded, continued down into the sea. He was the 67th's only loss as

against one Zero and one torpedo bomber to its credit. Altogether,

three Zeros and one torpedo plane got away; none of the American

ships sustained serious damage.

Scout planes up The Slot, meanwhile, had discovered that the Japanese were moving down a task force, probably with the intention

of attacking the transports off Guadalcanal, and towards evening the

latter were accordingly withdrawn. Then Admiral Callaghan headed

back for Savo, where he fought against odds, one of the wildest

night actions in naval history. Both sides suffered heavily, the

Japanese more heavily, and Henderson took no shelling that night.

Air Reinforcements

Thus far the defense had succeeded, but the main Japanese onslaught had not yet been met. To counter it, the Enterprise, South

Dakota, and Washington had moved out from Noumea on the iith.

COMSOPAC began to concentrate land-based aircraft on Guadalcanal. Fresh SBD's, TBF's, and Wildcats were flown in and on

12 November, at 1530, something new was added. Eight Lightnings

landed on the fighter strip just east of Henderson.

There is a pleasant story about the advent of these P- 38's. It holds

that as the Marines on the field spotted the Army pilots climbing

out of their formidable fighters they cheered wildly and rushed out

to greet them-with reason, for old friends had come. Leading the

flight was Maj. Dale Brannon, who back in August had brought the

first P- 4oo's, the "klunkers," into the strip the Japanese had begun.

With him were other former 67th pilots, veterans of the Jagdstaffel.

The eight P-38's belonged to the 339th Fighter Squadron. Late

in August it had been decided to activate a fighter group in New

Caledonia, to comprise the 67th, 68th, and 7oth Fighter Squadrons

and another yet to be activated. By the end of September the orders

had gone out; on 3 October, the 347th Fighter Group and the 339th

Fighter Squadron were officially in existence. As cadre for the 339 th,

the old 67th provided 29 officers and io6 enlisted men, with Major

Brannon in command. With him to the new organization passed

the four lieutenants who had accompanied him on the pioneer hop

49
to Guadalcanal. Command of the 67 th went to Capt. John A.

Thompson, who had headed the second flight of P-4oo's from New

Caledonia.

In September, General Harmon acquired P- 38's diverted from General Kenney's command. These were assigned to the 339th. During

October the Lightnings were held in New Caledonia; training was

not yet complete and frequency of naval bombardments of Henderson too high to risk the new fighters on Guadalcanal. By midNovember, however, they were ready to move.

On the morning of the 12th, the P-38's had left Tontouta at 0700,

escorted by a B-i7. Upon landing at Espiritu after 3V2 hours' flight,

mechanics discovered that low fuel consumption would have permitted a non-stop flight to Guadalcanal. The pilots, however, already

showed fatigue. En route to Henderson, radio report of an enemy

attack was received, and the B-i7 carrying the ground personnel

turned back at the southern end of San Cristobal. Consequently,

when the planes landed, the Marines turned to and serviced them.

On the 13th, additional AAF reinforcements arrived: eight more

P- 38's from the Fifth Air Force, flying in nonstop from Milne Bay.

Dawn of Friday the x3th found the Japanese battleship Hiyei

limping northwest of Savo. A casualty of the encounter with Admiral Callaghan, she became the main preoccupation of the American

planes in the combat area. First blood was drawn by the Enterprise,

which was cruising south of Guadalcanal with a damaged No. i

elevator. The carrier decided to ease operations by sending some of

her planes to Henderson Field. Nine TBF's and six fighters flew off

and at iioo sighted the Hiyei, a light cruiser, and four destroyers

headed for Guadalcanal, perhaps to finish off the Portland, lying off

Lunga Point. The TBF's promptly put three fish into the battleship.

Shortly afterward 17 Forts arrived. These had departed Espiritu

at o5oo and had subsequently been ordered to attack a carrier and a

battleship reported by a search B-17. The indicated targets were out

of range and the bombers proceeded to Guadalcanal, where they found

the Hiyei, circling slowly with her escorts. Despite heavy AAA

fire, one sure hit was obtained and five probables. All day long

Marine and Navy aircraft at Guadalcanal hammered the Hiyei, the

67th providing top cover with four of its planes. By evening, however,

the battleship was still afloat.

50
It is probable that the Hiyei was towed into position to assist in the

bombardment of Henderson Field that night. The shelling, carried

out by destroyers and cruisers as well, lasted 8o minutes until interrupted by the PT boats from Tulagi. On the field, one SBD and

two F4F- 4's were destroyed and 17 F4F- 4's damaged. The 67th

seemed to be the main target, every salvo but one landing near its camp

at the north end of the fighter strip. Sixteen planes had been in commission the evening before; only one now remained, "the Resurrection,

the oldest, most beat-up klunker on the field." Affording some consolation, nothing but an enormous oil slick suggested the Hiyei on

the 14th. Whether at this point the Japanese supposed Henderson

Field had been knocked out, as it had virtually been knocked out by

similar shellings in October, or thought that the American Navy was

too weak to interfere, or accepted a combination of these hypotheses,

is unknown. At any rate, Japanese transports which had been hovering in the Upper Solomons finally reversed course and came on for

Guadalcanal.

Concentrate on lap Convoy

On the 14th COMSOPAC directed the Enterprise to attack these

transports and as additional striking power the B-26's of the 7oth

Squadron were sent up to Guadalcanal. Under Maj. Leroy L.

Stefanowicz, io Marauders, in company with four P- 38's, left Plaines

des Gaiacs at o8oo. At Espiritu Santo, the bombers were refueled

and took off, disappearing in the clouds before the P-38's could be

readied for flight. Meanwhile, during the morning, the planes of the

Enterprise and Marine flyers from Henderson struck at the warships,

now retiring to the north, whose shells had wrought such havoc with

the 67 th the previous night.

At 083o, General Harmon had reported that his search B-17's had

sighted the Japanese convoy--cargo ships and transports, 12 of them

20 miles north of New Georgia. The escort consisted of a near-dozen

warships never positively identified. In addition, there was an advance

group of vessels including at least one battleship. Among the B-17's

making contact was "Typhoon McGoon." "Typhoon McGoon"

came back to Espiritu with tail surfaces entirely shot away. It had

fought off 3 ME-Io 9's, 3 Zekes, and a Rufe, shooting down 3 of these

5'
,-0

c•r-

. 4)

tu

41-,

"r6

0Uen•.

52Z
and perhaps 2 more. First Marine Air Wing at Guadalcanal heard

"Typhoon McGoon's" report and the dive and torpedo planes were

readied.

The convoy, carrying a force which General Vandegrift put at

30,000 to 35,000 troops, had been sighted and hit during the morning

by SBD's from the Enterprise. At ioi8, i6 B-17's were ordered to

attack from Espiritu. While the Forts were making their way northward, Marine and Navy planes from Henderson carried out two

damaging strikes on the Japanese armada. The B-17's arrived in

two flights, the first securing one hit on a transport from I7,ooo; the

second straddling a seaplane tender from 2o,ooo. Of i5 land-based

Zeros intercepting, at least five were shot down. The bombers suffered only minor damage. Throughout the day the destruction of the

transports, now separated from their escort, continued. The 67th,

able to put only four planes in the air, helped provide high cover for

the TBF's and SBD's. By nightfall, eight of the 12 vessels were

either sunk or gutted.

In the early morning hours of Sunday, 15 November, the U. S.

Navy task force, commanded by Rear Adm. Willis A. Lee, sailed

past Savo with the South Dakota and the Washington and slugged

the Japanese hard. The enemy had come down with a force including two battleships and a half-dozen cruisers; he left for safer waters

minus the Kirishima, the Hiyei's sister ship. Two cruisers, one heavy

and one light, may also have been sunk.

With daylight of the i 5th, one of the 67th's P- 39's was out looking

for breakfast fires, new tracks through the jungle, any sign of enemy

activity. It was no routine patrol. Along the shore at Tassafaronga,

about 18 miles west of Lunga Point, the pilot saw a beached vessel;

two more were in process of beaching and another was heading for

shore. Here were the survivors of the i2-ship convoy which had been

worked over the afternoon before. To make sure, the pilot flew over

at 8oo feet with the AAA literally bursting under his nose, then back

to Henderson with his discovery.

Mop-Up

Abetted by the Navy and Marine flyers, the 67th Fighter and 7oth

Bombardment Squadrons played havoc with the beached vessels. By

o7oo the 67th had in commission five planes'which went out with the

53
SBD's and the B-26's. All five dived on the last ship to reach the

beach, scoring two direct hits, setting the vessel afire. The B-26's

dropped a i,ooo-pounder on the third ship from 8,ooo feet; two more

i,ooo-pounders burst among small craft attempting to unload supplies.

At o9oo, the 67th returned with seven aircraft, to put four bombs on

the only vessel not then burning.

When the Japanese vessels were reported off Tassafaronga, 14

B-17's left Espiritu to attack. The first flight, arriving over the beach

to find the destroyer Meade shelling ships which were already on fire,

did not bomb. The second flight continued on up to the Russell

Islands, made two hits on a burning transport--one of four derelicts

abandoned by the Japanese in that area.

The Marines meanwhile had been able to bring a 155-millimeter

battery to bear on one of the ships, in addition to the 6oo rounds the

Meade had expended. Marine or Navy aircraft attacked all day, and

at 1045 four P- 39's made a hit on the least damaged of the blazing

hulks. On their return the flight spotted the bow of a sinking warship. Heads bobbed in the water nearby, whether friendly or enemy

the pilots did not know. Returning to the Meade, the flight strung

out in line, flew across the destroyer's bow, waggling wings--out to

the survivors and back. Three of these circuits convinced the destroyer and she went to investigate. The bobbing heads were

American.

The ruined vessels off Tassafaronga burned for 4 days, their

twisted hulks symbolic of the blasted Japanese hopes. A phase of

the Solomons campaign was at an end: Guadalcanal and Tulagi were

now secure and the American forces could give some thought to an

offensive. The decision in November, unlike that of the previous

month, had been obtained in two short but intense naval actions.

The 67th, chief victim of the only Japanese shelling during the

critical period, had been unable to strike heavy blows. Nor, in the

nature of the case, could the B-17's based 640 miles away at Espiritu.

Admirals Scott and Callaghan, killed in action, and Admiral Lee

deservedly garnered the greater part of the glory.

After their decisive beating in mid-November, the Japanese made

no major effort to recover Guadalcanal. During December and January the Express continued to run, putting small forces ashore and a

54
rather large one on 14 January. These increments, however, were in

the nature of replacements. Henceforth, the enemy was forced to

content himself with a tenacious defense; never again did he mount

a sustained threat to Henderson Field.

For the Americans, the defensive period on Guadalcanal was over

by December. The 1st Marine Division had borne the brunt of the

Japanese assaults on Henderson Field. With the exception of the 8th

and 2d Marine Regiments, it was withdrawn on 9 December to be

replaced during December and early January by two Army divisions.

These were the Americal, which began arriving in November, and

the 25th. These units, plus the fresh 6th Marine Regiment and the

2d Battalion of the ioth Marines, now proceeded to the offensive on

Guadalcanal. On 9 December, Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, USA,

succeeded General Vandergrift, USMC, as island commarlder.

With more abundant fuel and supplies, air operations proceeded on

a more extensive scale. The pattern remained the same. The

Marines still directed air activity, but the USAAF was more heavily

represented. The AAF now was able to send up additional fighter

units, its heavy bombers moved forward to base on Guadalcanal, and

all forces struck regularly at the Express on its trips down The Slot.

Buin was in easy range of the B-17's and the new Japanese base at

Munda Point received constant attention.

On 17 December a preliminary offensive to the west was initiated.

When the 25th Division, under Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, was

brought into position, a determined drive up Guadalcanal's north

coast was undertaken. The XIV Corps' push, opened on io January,

proceeded amid bitter fighting, and finally freed Henderson from

the menace of Pistol Pete. On 9 February organized Japanese resistance was eliminated. On the 8th, a search plane sighted 15 enemy

destroyers heading up the channel, the last run of the famous Express.

It had apparently evacuated the remaining officers and active troops

and left hundreds of sick, wounded, and starving Japanese to be

swept up by the Army.

AAF units on Guadalcanal worked with the ground forces in much

the same manner as had the old 67th Fighter Squadron. Better

planes were available: P-38's for escort, P-4o's for the middle air,

and P-39's for escort and ground strafing. If a particularly stubborn

enemy strongpoint were encountered, the B-i7's might be called on

55
to clear the way. The 67th had retired from Guadalcanal for a welldeserved rest, but pilots of the 44th, 68th, 7oth, and 3 39th Fighter

Squadrons took up the burden.

Most significant among these encouraging events was the activation

of the Thirteenth Air Force, occurring, appropriately enough, on

13 January 1943. Although operational control remained with

COMSOPAC, AAF units henceforth were trained and administered

by a theater air force, under General Twining. It was this air force,

evolved from such pioneer units as the xith Group and the 67th

Fighter Squadron, that was destined to move up through the Solomons until it rested on the Admiralties beyond Rabaul, then to swing

along the north coast of New Guinea, through successive forward

strides, anticipating the day when its mission reports would come

in headed-Tokyo.

50

56 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1945