IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION 

DONALD J. TRUMP, 

Plaintiff No. 9:22-cv-81294-AMC 

V. 

Dated: October 26, 2022 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

Defendant 

not highlighted 

MOV ANT-INTERVENOR (PRO SE)-RAJ K. PATEL'S 

FOURTH AMENDED DKT. 87 

I, T.E., T.E RAJK. PATEL, the undersigned movant-intervenor prose, in the abovenamed case, with a pending motion at Dkt. 36, hereby submit this fourth amended reply 

to Defendant-United States of America's Response at Dkt. 48, which is written to be an 

addition to Dkt. 60 (duplicate filing at Dkt. 61), or as my response to Defendant's Motion 

at Dkt. 69. L.R. 7.l(c)(2) (10 pages, front and back). Amendments. Second Amendments. 

Third Amendments. Fourth Amendments. 

WHEREAS, "Attorney General Brewster explained more than a century ago, ' [ t ]here 

are two kinds of official terms' ... One kind of 'term' refers to a period of personal service. 

In that case, 'the term is appurtenant to the person' ... Another kind of 'term' refers to 

a fixed slot of time to which individual appointees are assigned .. . There, 'the person is appurtenant to the term' .. .In other words, a 'term of office' can either run with the person 

or with the calendar," United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d 347, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 

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Comm 'rs of the Dist. of Columbia, 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 476, 476-79 (1882)); Hollingsworth v. 

Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 723, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2013); and, 

WHEREAS, the Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2209, makes the former 

President a part of the Executive Branch, and more specifically the Presidency, Wilson, 

290 F.3d at 353 & Federalist 78; and, 

WHEREAS, executive privilege "safeguards the public interest in candid, confidential deliberations within the Executive Branch; it is 'fundamental to the operation of Government,"' Trump v. Mazars U.S., LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2032 (U.S. 2020); and, 

WHEREAS, all Presidential data "(is] presumptively privileged," Nixon v. Sirica, 487 

F.2d 700, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1973); and, 

WHEREAS, "information subject to executive privilege deserves 'the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice,"' Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2024 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974)); and, 

WHEREAS, "(t]he high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive .. .is 

a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding," Clinton v. Jones, 520 

U.S. 681, 705, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1650-51 (1997), and that there is a tradition of federal courts' 

affording "the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 

1652," In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ((quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710-

11) (internal quotation marks omitted)); and, 

WHEREAS, "[t]he authority to protect national security information falls on the 

President," Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,527 (1988), see also, e.g., Murphy v. Sec'y, 

U.S. Dep't of Army, 769 Fed. Appx. 779, 792 (11th Cir. 2019), & Dkt. 69 at 13; and, 

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WHEREAS, for purposes of Presidential Records Act, the incumbent President who 

transitions to former PresidentT is an "agent" of the people, Egan, 484 U.S. at 529, Federalist 78, & Dkt. 69 at 18; and, 

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has emphasized that privilege claims, "must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law" and "[t]he need to develop 

all relevant facts in the adversary system," Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708-09 & Dkt. 69 at 9; and, 

WHEREAS, "[i]n the performance of assigned constitutional duties, [Executive 

branch] of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and ... The President's counsel, as we have noted, reads the Constitution as providing an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications," Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-4, 28 

U.S.C. § 516, Vargas v. United States, 114 Fed.Cl. 226, 236 (2014) ("The government's 

reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 516 is misplaced."); &seegenerallyDavidA. Strauss, "Presidential 

Interpretation of the Constitution," 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 113-135 (1993)1; and, 

WHEREAS, in other words, "executive branch must interpret the Constitution before it can decide what to do," see generally Strauss, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. at 113-135; and, 

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has "reject[ ed] the argument that only an incumbent 

President may assert" separation-of-powers claims, Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 

425, 439 (1977); and, 

WHEREAS, there is an internal, horizontal and vertical, separation of powers on interpreting the Constitution within the Executive Branch; and, 

l. David A. Strauss, "Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution," 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 113-

135 (1993), https: // chicagounbound.uchicago.edu / cgi / viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=l&article=3006&context=journal articles;Presidential. 

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WHEREAS, privilege and immunities may be used to sustain separation of powers 

inside branches of government and across governments under the United States Constitution; and, 

WHEREAS, the United States Department of State is responsible for interpreting and 

elaborating on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. const. art. IV, § 2; 

WHEREAS, the United States Department of State shows its elaboration on the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the United States Order of Precedence by the Office of 

the Chief of Protocol, https://www.state.gov/ wp-content / uploads/ 2022 / 02 / UnitedStates-Order-of-Precedence-February-2022.pdf (revised Feb. 11, 2022) & U.S. const. art. 

IV, § 2; and, 

WHEREAS, the United States Department of Justice, the Attorney General, or U.S. 

Attorney Juan Gonzales, did not follow the United States Order of Precedence duly established by the Office of the Chief of Protocol, Id.; and, 

WHEREAS, the incumbent President of the United States has supported the United 

States Order of Precedence housed by the United States Department of State Office of the 

Chief of Protocol, which shows that former President Trump outranks incumbent Attorney General Merrick Garland, Id. & 3 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., and Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 

at 2673-74 (proponents "are not elected" and "decide for themselves, with no review, 

what arguments to make and how to make them" in defense of the enacted initiative, ... 

those same charges could be leveled with equal if not greater force at the special prosecutors just discussed"); and, 

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WHEREAS, thus, the United States Department of State and the United States Department of Justice are adversaries in our system of rule of law, in order to create a separation of powers and checks and balance, but cf Doctrine of Comity, U.S. const. art. IV,§ 

2, & 28 U.S.C. § 516; and, 

WHEREAS, the incumbent President of the United States has not cleared, nor may 

ratify unconstitutional acts to make them constitutional,2 breach of protocol; and, 

WHEREAS, the executive Departments and its Heads have been created, by an Act 

of Congress, and appointed by the President, with advice and consent from the Senate, 

Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 886, 917 (1991) (discussing Heads and principal officers 

of the executive departments); and, 

WHEREAS, the Executive Branch's "interpretation of its [own] powers .. .is due great 

respect from the others," Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-4; and, 

WHEREAS, former Presidents retain "actual authority" to bind the Government of 

the United States to contractual obligations necessary to carry out the duties of their 

unique legal offices, including in Congress' United States Court of Federal Claims, The 

Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) &1491, Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1304-

2. Under the common law, the incumbent King may change protocol at-will against a former Head 

of State or a preceding Monarch; those vested powers are embedded in the United States Constitution and 

remain constant until lawfully amended. Besides, as the complaint and Attorney General's Merrick Garland's public, apolitical, and legal comments show, currently, only a unit of an Executive branch has acted, 

i.e. the Department of Justice-F.B.I., rather than the Executive branch as whole. 0kt. 1 at 10. To no surprise, 

even against a former president, in order to legally condition the peaceful transition of power, the Executive 

power is much weaker than of a common law King's. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 

701 (1988) (more than one "United States" is "startling"). Ma ine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 

140 S. Ct. 1308, 1334 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) ("federal common law" has unique 

interests). 

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06 (Fed. Cir. 2002), see supra, p. 15 n. 5, and but cf. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667; 

and, 

WHEREAS, "[all] powers of law enforcement ... are assigned under our Constitution 

to the Executive and the Judiciary," Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). 

THEREFORE, only a unit of the Executive Branch, the current Attorney General, has 

brought charges against former President Trump in violation of the inter-workings of the 

executive branch protocol, ordered by the incumbent President Biden, as housed by President Biden's subordinates, who are also either the Attorney General's superiors or coequals on the subject-matter, in the United States Department of State. 

FURTHERMORE, the President, the courts, or the Executive Branch cannot mute distinctions of office, person, state, and government, as they are an elaboration of the United 

States Constitution Privileges and Immunities Clause, which lays out the structure and 

lanes of enforcement. Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U.S. 270, 290 (1884) ("the distinction 

between the government of a State and the State itself is important, and [shall) be observed.") (underline added). In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 536-37 (1895) (internal 

citations omitted) & United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638 & 643-44 (1883). Federalist 

80 ("The power of determining .. . dissensions and private wars which distracted and desolated Germany prior to the institution of the Imperial Chamber by Maximilian, towards 

the close of the fifteenth century; and informs us, at the same time, of the vast influence 

of that institution in appeasing the disorders and establishing the tranquill ity of the empire. This was a court invested with authority to decide finally all differences among the 

members of the Germanic body ... It may be esteemed the basis of the Union."). 

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WHEREAS, in order for a federal district court of law to have personal jurisdiction, 

under Fed. R. Civ. 12(b )(2), traditional notions of "natural justice," "fair play," and "substantial justice" must at all time not be violated, McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917), 

Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 123 (1951), Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 

432, 435 (1957) (shock the conscience, traditional notions of fair play and decency, indicia 

of not a peaceful transition of power caused by Defendant-DO} is a violation of the conscience), Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 412 (1955) ("underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play"), Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324 & 

326 (1945), United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796 (1977) (due process embodies "fundamental conceptions of justice" and "the community's sense of fair play and decency") 

(see Federalist 77, United States as a community), Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 

833, 847 (1998) (conscience-shocking behavior is "so 'brutal' and 'offensive' that it [does] 

not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency.") (abuse of executive power) 

(decencies of "civilized conduct," epitomized in U.S. const. art. IV, § 2) (bowing and 

curtsy amongst and to state actors or the effect in our community), & Sessions v. Dimaya, 

138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (required by both "ordinary notions of fair play and the settled 

rules of law."); and, 

WHEREAS, traditional notions of natural justice states a former T.H. (T.E.) President 

of the United States (T.E. President of the United States for all documents foreign affairs), 

from the Natural State, is more fit than the current court (judge and Defendant) and the 

Natural Order demands that the incumbent Attorney General yield to pressing charges 

against Plaintiff, our former Head of State, see United States Order of Precedence-United 

States Dep't of State-Office of the Chief of Protocol, U.S. const. art. IV,§ 2, & Dkt. 60 at 2, 

5, 5 n. 3, & 7; and, 

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WHEREAS, traditional notions of basic fair play and substantial justice have been 

violated, see e.g. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 742 (2015) (harsh treatment is not fair 

play) (gays and lesbians have been denied the Natural Order, pursuant to their achievements in civil society, as the wealthiest community, particularly, gay men, in the United 

States; the same illness has entered state and governmental institutions, preventing the 

Natural Order, including in governing the Defendant's decisions) (Plaintiff has been denied rightful place in the aftermath of his honor's incumbency as President of United 

States)3 & Pet. for Writ of Cert.* 58-9, Patel v. United States, No. 22-5280 (U.S. 202_); and, 

WHEREAS, even with explicit informed consent the Plaintiff cannot avail himself 

before this court because his availment cannot overcome the violation traditional notions 

of fair play, natural justice, and substantial justice as applied to the court and any possible 

ruling by this court, U.S. const. art. IV,§ 2 & see also United States Order of PrecedenceUnited States Dep't of State-Office of the Chief of Protocol; and, 

WHEREAS, this court cannot attach personal jurisdiction to the Plaintiff as it would 

violate the traditional notions of fair play, natural justice, and substantial justice, and, 

thus, its opinion would only be advisory; and, 

WHEREAS, in addition, the corollary to Plaintiff's former Presidential privilege, immunity, is the court's limited judicial review, Federalist 78, U.S. const. art. IV,§ 2, art. III 

(original intent), & amend. V. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 

THEREFORE, this Court should dismiss sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), as 

the Court does not have personal jurisdiction for Plaintiff, or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as there is no enforcement mechanism to require the Plaintiff, the former Head of State and former President, who is also 

3. https: / / hrc-prod-requests.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com / Wage-Gap-Appendix.pdf. 

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Privileged, per the Natural State, and is Immune, per the Natural State too; the deficiencies can only be cured by new charges brought directly by the incumbent President, by 

his own counselor, rather than the incumbent Attorney General. 

FURTHERMORE, the notions of natural justice, fair play, and substantial justice buttress castle doctrine, as generally applied, and Plaintiff's castle can uniquely, along with 

the past Presidents, can withstand all forces except those directly and constitutionally 

commanded by the incumbent President, e.g. United States Secret Service or United States 

Armed and Space Force. See Dkt. 60 at 2, 5, 5 n. 3, & 7. This is also because due process 

cannot override a Privilege or Immunity, and substantive due process is considerate of 

Privileges and Immunities, per the Federalist and Anti-Federalist contract of the Bill of 

Rights, and the interest of the Founders and Amenders to preserve the culture of our 

Nation. U.S. const. art. IV,§ 2 & amend. XIV,§ 2, cl. 1; Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796; Federalist 80 ("It may be esteemed the basis of the Union , that "the citizens of each State shall 

be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States." And if 

it be a just principle that every government OUGHT TO POSSESS THE MEANS OF EXECUTING ITS OWN PROVISIONS BY ITS OWN AUTHORITY."); Pet. for Writ of Cert.* 

58-9, Patel v. United States, No. 22-5280 (U.S. 202J; & compare U.S. const. art. IV, §§ 

1-27 with U.S. con st. art. VI, § 1 referring to Articles of Confederation (1781 ), art. IV, paras. 

1 & 3 ("The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among 

the people of the different States in this Union [i .e., Doctrine of Comity in U.S. const. art. 

IV, § 2], the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives 

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from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in 

the several States; ... provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid 

by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them."// "Full faith and 

credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings 

of the courts and magistrates of every other State.") (("magistrates" replaced with "citizen") (see Dkt. 21 at 13) (see a/so Pate/ v. United States, No. 1 :21-cv-02004-LAS (Fed . 

Cl. 202_J, Dkt. 1 at 9-10 n. 6)). 

UNDER FED. R. C1v. P. 24, I have a common question of law or fact or interest in the 

transaction because a favorable ruling to the Defendant can violate my Excellencies, the 

style/titles, and my career and statesmanship by extension of this ruling amongst licensed Governmental actors, local, state, federal, and international, who might sympathize with this Court's unconstitutionality. 

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has held that a former President may not successfully assert executive privilege against review by "the very Executive Branch in whose 

name the privilege is invoked," Nixon, 433 U.S. at 447-48 & Dkt 69 at 8;4 and, 

WHEREAS, executive Privilege and executive Immunity are corollaries, but distinct 

concepts, U.S. const. art. IV, § 2 & amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; and, 

WHEREAS, asserting one necessarily imputes the assertion of the other, Id.; and, 

4. An F.B.I. cannot claim executive Privilege against the incumbent Attorney General, but a former 

President can claim executive Privilege (i.e. Presidential Privilege) against the incumbent Attorney General. 

Respectively, the independent concept of executive Immunity applies, which favors the former President 

against the incumbent Attorney General. 

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WHEREAS, former United States President Trump may assert executive Immunity 

from United States Governmental force which is not under the command of the incumbent United States President, Id.; and, 

WHEREAS, in the happenings related to Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425, incumbent President 

Gerald Ford was intimately involved in prosecuting former President Nixon, Id. & cf Dkt. 

1 at 10; and, 

WHEREAS, here, as unlike in the happenings related to Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425, the 

incumbent President is not intimately involved against the prosecution of President 

Biden, PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 12-13 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

(Madisonian presidential control), see Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1938) (holding that it is "not the function of the court to probe the mental processes of the [Executive]"), and Dkt. 1 at 10; and, 

WHEREAS, here, the topics of documents are related to foreign policy, unlike in 

Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425, where, the documents were related to domestic policy; and, 

WHEREAS, more specifically and materially, a former President/Head of State outranks the incumbent Attorney General in foreign relations and diplomatic matter, which 

are exclusively reserved for the President's recognition, see generally Providence Journal, 

485 U.S. at 701 (more than one "United States" is "startling"); and, 

WHEREAS, the incumbent President, the United States Order of Precedence duly 

established by the Office of the Chief of Protocol, and the Presidential Records Act show 

that the former presidents carry on official duties, which come with omnipresent privileges and immunities, which are absolute except at against an incumbent President, 

Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-4 & Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,239,241,244, & 248, (1974); and, 

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WHEREAS, the Constitutional power of executive Privilege and/ or executive Immunity of a former President, thus, may be lawfully asserted against the incumbent Department of Justice, U.S. const. art. IV, § 2 & amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2, Murray v. Bush, No. 

06-C-0781 * 1 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 31, 2006) ("whether the action is frivolous or malicious, or 

seeks relief from an immune party, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.") 

(italics added) (internal citations omitted); cf 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); Williams v. 

Holmes, No. 1:17-cv-00799-KOB * 1 (N.D. Ala. Sep. 5, 2017); Malcolm v. City of Miami, No. 

22-cv-20499-KING/DAMIAN * 2, 4, & 6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2022); & Lister v. Dep't of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309 (10th Cir. 2005); and, 

WHEREAS, the Plaintiff can lawfully possess the disputed United States records, 44 

U.S.C. § 2202; and, 

WHEREAS, the Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(l) allow for the affirmative defenses of illegality 

(Defendant's play in obtaining Presidential Records), license (U.S. const. art. IV, § 2), 

laches (Defendant should have acted quicker if truly suspicious of national security), or 

unclean hands (Defendant should have involved the incumbent President of the United 

States); and, 

WHEREAS, this Court is in Comity with both Plaintiff and Defendant, and has the 

privilege of serving each party in his/her/ their individual capacity, Doctrine of Comity, 

U.S. const. art. IV, § 2. 

THEREFORE, the Plaintiff is immune from prosecution from the Defendant, and the 

Court should return all records to plaintiff, President Trump, and order charges against 

The Honorable Garland for conversion, "treason"/ "war"/" attack," and rebellion or insurrection. U.S. const. art. III,§ 3; 18 U.S.C. § 2381; & Providence Journal, 485 U.S. at 701. 

FURTHERMORE, under the Constitutional fiction, which starts, at a minimum, with 

the corporate charters mentioned in the Declaration of Independence (1776), the local, 

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excellent corporations and other local authorities have devolved power to the Federal 

Sovereign, much more than the Sister States have to the Federal Sovereign; thus, the interest in the transaction is a check on the Devolved Sovereignty, Faithfully ordered by 

me, the intervenor, and as a taxpayer. U.S. canst. art. IV, §§ 1-2 & art. VI, § 1; Federalist 

78; & 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. See also White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/ iga / . 

WHEREAS, barring subordinate Executive Branch from reviewing and using the 

classified records for criminal investigates purposes is a meaningful way of protecting 

"the confidentiality of Presidential communications," Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 & contra. Dkt. 

69 at 10; and, 

WHEREAS, the reasons Presidents or the courts allow independent personnel across 

the Intelligence Community to review the very same records for other closely related 

purposes but not the remainder of the Executive Branch do not have to be revealed in 

order to protect the confidentiality of Presidential Records, Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705; and, 

WHEREAS, technocrats are the personnel across the Intelligence Community who 

usually receive these records and whose narrow objectives are precisely codified, unlike 

in the not-independent Executive Branch were partisans, party members, former members of Congress, and bureaucrats who are accountable to varying interests, such as foreign Heads of State and inter-governmental organizations and those hierarchies, are 

likely to receive and be exposed these records; and, 

WHEREAS, an affirmance of the default protectionist rule of Presidential Records 

will allow the Republic to remain One and intact, Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705, Providence Journal, 

485 U.S. at 701, Nixon, 433 U.S. at 447-9, & Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 

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U.S. 587 (2007) (Rather, they were "created entirely within the executive branch ... by Presidential executive order." (quoting Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F. 3d 

989, 997 (7th Cir. 2006)); and, 

WHEREAS, the Department of Justice is not an independent agency of the Executive 

Branch; and, 

WHEREAS, here, the "trial" is of a former President, which was not initiated by the 

incumbent President; and, 

WHEREAS, the enforcement of Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 is different due to the advancement of technology; and, 

THEREFORE, preventing the United States Department of Justice from gaining access to the material Presidential Records is lawful, as well as the appointment of the special master, but the Presidential Records are properly returned to President Trump at the 

earliest convenience; if not, at least a copy of all records, as the Plaintiff maintains his 

presumption of correctness until proven otherwise. 

FURTHERMORE, this transaction could extent to local governments, a set of Devolvers of Sovereignty, and interfere with local jurisdictions' record keeping practices and the 

privileges and immunities of their agents, including when those jurisdictions were demarcated in another state. 

WHEREAS, Dkt. 69 at 10-11 equivocates about the Executive Branch-generally with 

the more specific terminologies of executive Privileges and/ or Immunities applied to the 

Executive Branch-incumbent-President and Executive Branch-former-President; and, 

WHEREAS, Defendant is unpersuasively arguing, that in addition to its trespass to 

a former President's castle, its Governmental unit's needs are of more national importance than the status quo established by the Executive Branch-incumbent-President, 

which does not discriminate against the Executive Branch-former-President-Plaintiff, and 

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made publicly available through the United States Department of State-Office of the Chief 

of Protocol (whether the Executive Branch-incumbent-Attorney-General is a state actor or 

a governmental actor is irrelevant due to the order of precedence and the Executive 

Branch-incumbent-President's establishment of the national security agenda; nonetheless, these distinctions cannot be muted), Egan, 484 U.S. at 527; see also, e.g., Murphy, 769 

Fed. Appx. at 792 ("The authority to protect national security information falls on the 

President [directly]."), & Dkt. 69 at 13, Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 2905

; and, 

WHEREAS, the President is an agent, in the terms of the Presidential Records Act 

and Federalist 78; and, 

WHEREAS, aforesaid Protocol, furthering the Privileges and Immunities Clause, aids 

in deciphering between "the Rule of Law" and "who is trying to get their own way?, " 

which is tyranny, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2022/02/United-States-Order-of-Precedence-February-2022.pdf,_U.S. const. art. IV, § 2, & Federalist 80; and, 

WHEREAS, the courts must protect the President from aggression from unknown 

sources within Executive Branch, which concurrently politically answer to varying interests, Dkt. 69 at 18 quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 529; and, 

5. Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 290 ("In common speech and common apprehension they are usually 

regarded as identical; and as ordinarily the acts of the government are the acts of the State, because within 

the limits of its delegation of power, the government of the State is generally confounded with the State 

itself, and often the former is meant when the latter is mentioned. The State itself is an ideal person, 

intangible, invisible, immutable. The government is an agent, and, within the sphere of the agency, a 

perfect representative; but outside of that, it is a lawless usurpation. The Constitution of the State is the 

limit of the authority of its government, and both government and State are subject to the supremacy of 

the Constitution of the United States, and of the laws made in pursuance thereof ... This distinction is essential to the idea of constitutional government. To deny it or blot it out obliterates the line of demarcation 

that separates constitutional government from absolutism, free self-government based on the sovereignty 

of the people from that despotism, whether of the one or the many, which enables the agent of the State 

to declare and decree that he is the State; to say "L 'ttat c'est moi." "). 

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WHEREAS, the courts must be sensitive to the inter-workings and inter-politics of 

the executive branch; 

WHEREAS, hypothetically, Executive Branch-incumbent-Attorney-General-DOJand-FBI could have been denied access to Presidential Records of Executive Branch-former-President-Trump by Executive Branch-incumbent-President-Biden; and, 

WHEREAS, therefore, the current happenings in the case-at-hand are appeasement 

to vital parts of the Government and possible political parties and factions the President 

must appease, PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 1 & 12-13 (As the Supreme Court has explained, 

our Constitution "was adopted to enable the people to govern themselves, through their 

elected leaders," and the Constitution "requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.") (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. 

Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,499 (2010)); Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 ("They are free 

to pursue a purely ideological commitment to the law's constitutionality without the need 

to take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opinion [including polls 

factoring the opinions of social outcasts, U.S. const. art. IV, § 2 & amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2], 

or potential ramifications for other state priorities[,]" [appropriation through genomics]); 

United States v. Arthrex, Inc., No. 19-1434 * 23,594 U.S. __ (2021) (Roberts, C.J., The Constitutional hierarchy requires "the exercise of executive power [to remain] accountable to 

the people."); & Dkt. 69 at 18 quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 527 (unauthorized persons); and, 

WHEREAS, there is rule of law, the Courts must protect the Executive Branch-incumbent-President and the Executive Branch-former-President from aggressions; and, 

16 

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WHEREAS, the current acts are aggressions against the United States, found in some 

Western Hemisphere's- and Sister Common Law jurisdictions' - governmental fashion for 

coups de tat. 

THEREFORE, the Court should enter judgement in favor of Plaintiff, who is immune 

from prosecution by the Defendant-Mr. Gonzalez. 

WHEREAS, in addition to Dkts. 21, 36, and 60, the Political Question Doctrine, under 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department); and, 

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Political Question Doctrine the issue is reserved for the 

Presidency directly, for the interest of maintaining Presidential Autonomy (i.e. in an earlier draft of the Declaration of Independence of 1776, Thomas Jefferson addressed the 

Grievances against the Parliament, which he thought caused the denial of the Olive 

Branch Treaty; but, The King was still giving power to Parliament), compare Original Draft 

("we utterly dissolve all political connection which may heretofore have subsisted between us and the people or parliament of Great Britain: and finally we do assert and 

declare these colonies to be free and independent states, and that as free and independent 

states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do.") 

with Final Draft;6 and, 

WHEREAS, Robert Yates, who refused to sign the United States Constitution 

thought that the judiciary would be able "to mould" the role of the presidency; 7 and, 

6. https: / / teachingamericanhistory.org / document I rough-draft-of-the-declaration-of-independ7. https: / / www.heritage.org / courts/ report / against-judicial-supremacy-the-founders-and-thelimits-the-courts ("Every body of men invested with office," Yates observed, "are tenacious of power." 

Moreover, this love of power would "influence" judges "to extend their power, and increase their rights," 

with the result that the courts will tend to "give such a meaning to the Constitution in all cases where it can 

17 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 17 of 48
WHEREAS, "[h]uman experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for 

their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process ... [a] President and 

those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies 

and making decisions and to do so in a way that many would be unwilling to express 

except privately," Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 & 708; and, 

WHEREAS, "[i]n designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended 

to operate with absolute independence," Nixon, 433 U.S. at 442-3 (quoting Youngstown Sheet 

& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)); and, 

WHEREAS, the Attorney General might be appropriate if Congress' interests were 

violated with the Presidential Records Act, but cf Id., 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 & 271-288n, & Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821) (only when Congress' interests are violated, the Segreant-at-Arms does the enforcement; see generally Title 2 of the United States Code); and, 

WHEREAS, "[t]he essence of democracy is that the right to make law rests in the 

people and flows to the government, not the other way around[,]" Hollingsworth, 133 S. 

Ct. at 2675; and, 

possibly be done, as will enlarge the sphere of their authority." .. . The end result of all this would be a 

Supreme Court with power to rule the country in the most important matters according to its own willto not only exceed its authority but to usurp others' authority. "This power," Yates said, "will enable" the 

justices of the Supreme Court "to mould the government into almost any shape they please." ... Yates further contended that the Supreme Court would not only be supreme over all other courts, but that it would, in fact, 

be the supreme power in the government to be created by the Constitution. This supremacy, Yates contended, would follow from the Court's power of settling for all other political actors the authoritative meaning of the 

Constitution. The Supreme Court, he observed, "has the power, in the last resort, to determine all questions 

that may arise in the course of legal discussion, on the meaning and construction of the Constitution."). 

18 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 18 of 48
WHEREAS, the incumbent President of the United States is the "next friend" of the 

"the real party in interest," the unique Sovereign, of all the natural persons, each a sovereign, of the United States, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2665 & 2674. 

THEREFORE, the Court should enter judgement, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) or 

(b)(6), in favor of Plaintiff, who is immune from prosecution by the Defendant-Mr. Gonzalez, and advise that prosecution is most proper from the incumbent President himself 

or his honor's counselor, i.e. Counselor to the President (Mr. Steve Ricchetti, J.D.), but not 

the Attorney General (The Hon. Merrick Garland, J.D.). But cf White House General 

Counselor (Mr. Stuart F. Delery, J.D.). In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1280-2 (White House 

General Counsel under the command of the incumbent President v. DOJ). Hollingsworth, 

133 S. Ct. at 2665 & 2673 (referring to Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. at 700). Federalist 78. Maine Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1334 (Alito, J., dissenting) (Head of 

Washington, D.C. should direct its nat'I State and Government, an ordinary federal common law matter). All documents should be returned to Plaintiff. 

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, the court may dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). 

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, since the Defendant's acts are unconstitutional and cannot 

be ratified to become constitutional, as Defendant omitted the incumbent President-Head 

of State and -Head of Government against the incumbent President's own Order for Protocol, the court may dismiss and rule in favor of Plaintiff for the Defendant's unclean 

hands. 

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, the court may issue an Order to Show Cause to the Defendant for law enforcement jurisdiction. 

19 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 19 of 48
AT ALL COSTS, this Court should avoid creating a slippery slope so that the incumbent President will be subject to arrest by the incumbent Attorney General, who, but, 

serves at the honor's pleasure, or create an unconstitutional autonomy of executive departments, which will not be accountable to the People, - or, sometimes, to their varying 

interests - the epitome of executive tyranny. 

"[A] pro se [motion], however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007). 

I use my Constitutional Privileges, honors, and rights of knowing from my undergraduate and law school, juris doctor candidacy, educations, and political offices and 

from reading law outside of formal schooling for the writing and discussions, arguments, 

and motions of these filings, see Dkt. 21 at 5 & 20 and supra, p. 20 (signature line). Hoflingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 & 2670-71 ("unique legal status"). 

I move for leave to file this third amended Dkt. 87 . 

I move to reinstate my Motion to Continue Without Pre-Paying Filing Fees at Dkt. 

22, to avoid default and interest charges on other monetary commitments. 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Raj K. Patel 

T.E., T.E. Raj K. Patel (prose) 

6850 East 21s

t Street 

Indianapolis, IN 46219 

Marion County 

317-450-6651 (cell) 

rajp2010@gmail.com 

www.rajpatel.live 

20 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 20 of 48
J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame L. Sch. 2015-2017 

President/Student Body President, Student Gov't Ass'n of 

Emory U., Inc. 2013-2014 (corp. sovereign 2013-present) 

Student Body President, Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. 

Corp. /President, Brownsburg High Sch. Student Gov't 

2009-2010 (corp. sovereign 2009-present) 

Rep. from the Notre Dame L. Sch. Student B. Ass'n to the 

Ind. St. B. Ass'n 2017 

Deputy Regional Director, Young Democrats of Am.-High 

Sch. Caucus 2008-2009 

Co-Founder & Vice Chair, Ind. High Sch. Democrats 2009-

2010 

Vice President of Fin. (Indep.), Oxford C. Republicans of 

Emory U., Inc. 2011-2012 

21 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 21 of 48
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing Raj K. Patel's (Pro Se) Fourth Amended Dkt. 

87 on 10/26/2022 to below individuals via the e-mail: 

James M. Trusty 

IFRAH, PLLC 

1717 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Suite 650 

Washington, DC 20006 

Juan Antonio Gonzalez 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 

99 NE 4th Street, 8th Floor 

202-852-5669 Miami, Fl 33132 

Email: j trusty@ifr ahla w. com 

Lindsey Halligan 

511 SE 5th Avenue 

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 

720-435-2870 

Telephone: (305) 961-9001 

Email: juan .antonio. gonzalez@usdoj.gov 

Jay I. Bratt, Chief 

Email: lindseyhalligan@outlook.com 

Counterintelligence & Export Control 

Section Nat'l Security Div. 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, D. C. 20530 

Christopher Michael Kise 

Chris Kise & Associates, P.A. 

201 East Park Ave. Ste, 5th Floor 

Tallahassee, FL 32301 

(850) 270-0566 

chris@ckise.net 

M. Evan Corcoran 

(202) 233-0986 

jay.bratt2@usdoj.gov 

President Joe Biden 

c / o Marina M. Kozmycz, Associate Gen. 

Counsel 

Silverman, Thompson, Slutkin, & White, 

LLC 

The E.O.P. at the White House 

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, D. C. 20500 

Phone: 202-457-1414 

400 East Pratt Street, Suite 900 [REDACTED] 

Baltimore, MD 21230 

410-385-2225 

ecorcoran@sil vermanthom pson .com 

Dated: October 26, 2022 

Respectfully submitted, 

/ s/ Raj Patel 

T.E., T.E. Raj K. Patel (Pro Se) 

6850 East 21st Street 

Indianapolis, IN 46219 

Marion County 

317-450-6651 (cell) 

rajp2010@gmail.com 

www.rajpatel.li ve 

22 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 22 of 48
Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 23 of 48
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION 

DONALD J. TRUMP, 

Plaintiff No. 9:22-cv-81294-AMC 

V. 

Dated: October 26, 2022 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

Defendant 

MOVANT-INTERVENOR (PRO SE)-RAJ K. PATEL'S 

FOURTH AMENDED DKT. 87 

I, T.E., T.E RAJK. PATEL, the undersigned movant-intervenor pro se, in the abovenamed case, with a pending motion at Dkt. 36, hereby submit this amended reply 

to Defendant-United States of America's Response at Dkt. 48, which is written to be an 

addition to Dkt. 60 (duplicate filing at Dkt. 61), or as my response to Defendant's Motion 

at Dkt. 69. L.R. 7.l(c)(2) (10 pages, front and back). Amendments. Second Amendments. 

hird Amendments. 

WHEREAS, "Attorney General Brewster explained more than a century ago, '[t]here 

are two kinds of official terms' ... One kind of 'term' refers to a period of personal service. 

In that case, 'the term is appurtenant to the person' ... Another kind of 'term' refers to 

a fixed slot of time to which individual appointees are assigned ... There, 'the person is appurtenant to the term' .. .ln other words, a 'term of office' can either run with the person 

or with the calendar," United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d 347, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 

1 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 24 of 48
Comm 'rs of the Dist. of Columbia, 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 476, 476-79 (1882)); Hollingsworth v. 

Perry_, 570 U.S. 693, 723, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2013), and, 

WHEREAS, the Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2209, makes the former 

President a part of the Executive Branch, and more specifically the Presidency, Wilson, 

290 F.3d at 353 & Federalist 78; and, 

WHEREAS, executive privilege "safeguards the public interest in candid, confidential deliberations within the Executive Branch; it is 'fundamental to the operation of Government,"' Trump v. Mazars U.S., LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2032 (U.S. 2020); and, 

WHEREAS, all Presidential data " [is] presumptively privileged," Nixon v. Sirica, 487 

F.2d 700, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1973); and, 

WHEREAS, "information subject to executive privilege deserves 'the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice,"' Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2024 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974)); and, 

WHEREAS, " [t]he high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive .. .is 

a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding," Clinton v. Jones, 520 

U.S. 681, 705, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1650-51 (1997), and that there is a tradition of federal courts' 

affording "the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 

1652," In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710-

11) (internal quotation marks omitted)); and, 

WHEREAS, "[t]he authority to protect national security information falls on the 

President," Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,527 (1988), see also, e.g., Murphy v. Sec'y, 

U.S. Dep't of Army, 769 Fed. Appx. 779, 792 (11th Cir. 2019), & Dkt. 69 at 13; and, 

2 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 25 of 48
WHEREAS, for purposes of Presidential Records Act, the incumbent President who 

transitions to former Presiden is an "agent" of the people, Egan, 484 U.S. at 529, Federalist 78, & Dkt. 69 at 18; and, 

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has emphasized that privilege claims, "must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law" and " [t]he need to develop 

all relevant facts in the adversary system," Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708-09 & Dkt. 69 at 9; and, 

WHEREAS, " [i]n the performance of assigned constitutional duties, [Executive 

branch] of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and ... The President's counsel, as we have noted, reads the Constitution as providing an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications," Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-4, 28 

U.S.C. § 516, Vargas v. United States, 114 Fed.Cl. 226, 236 (2014) ("The government's 

eliance on 28 U.S.C. § 516 is mis laced."); & see generally David A. Strauss, "Presidential 

Interpretation of the Constitution," 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 113-135 (1993 )

1

; and, 

WHEREAS, in other words, "executive branch must interpret the Constitution before it can decide what to do," see generally Strauss, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. at 113-135; and, 

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has "reject[ed] the argument that only an incumbent 

President may assert" separation-of-powers claims, Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 

425, 439 (1977); and, 

WHEREAS, there is an internal, horizontal and vertical, separation of powers on interpreting the Constitution within the Executive Branch; and, 

1. David A. Strauss, "Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution," 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 113-

135 (1993), https: // chicagounbound .uchicago.edu / cgi / vievvcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=l&article=3006&context=journal articles;Presidential. 

3 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 26 of 48
WHEREAS, privilege and immunities may be used to sustain separation of powers 

inside branches of government and across governments under the United States Constitution; and, 

WHEREAS, the United States Department of State is responsible for interpreting and 

elaborating on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. const. art. IV, § 2; 

WHEREAS, the United States Department of State shows its elaboration on the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the United States Order of Precedence by the Office of 

the Chief of Protocol, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/UnitedStates-Order-of-Precedence-February-2022.pdf (revised Feb. 11, 2022) & U.S. const. art. 

IV,§ 2; and, 

WHEREAS, the United States Department of Justice, the Attorney General, or U.S. 

Attorney Juan Gonzales, did not follow the United States Order of Precedence duly established by the Office of the Chief of Protocol, Id.; and, 

WHEREAS, the incumbent President of the United States has supported the United 

States Order of Precedence housed by the United States Department of State Office of the 

Chief of Protocol, which shows that former President Trump outranks incumbent Attorney General Merrick Garland, Id. & 3 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., and Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 

at 2673-74 ( ro onents "are not elected" and "decide for themselves, with no review, 

what arguments to make and how to make them" in defense of the enacted initiative, ... 

hose same charges could be leveled with e ual if not reater force at the seecial prosecutors ·ust discussed"); and, 

4 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 27 of 48
WHEREAS, thus, the United States Department of State and the United States Department of Justice are adversaries in our system of rule of law, in order to create a separation of powers and checks and balance, but cf Doctrine of Comity, U.S. const. art. IV,§ 

2, & 28 U.S.C. § 516; and, 

WHEREAS, the incumbent President of the United States has not cleared, nor may 

ratify unconstitutional acts to make them constitutional,2 breach of protocol; and, 

WHEREAS, the executive Departments and its Heads have been created, by an Act 

of Congress, and appointed by the President, with advice and consent from the Senate, 

Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 886, 917 (1991) (discussing Heads and principal officers 

of the executive departments); and, 

WHEREAS, the Executive Branch's "interpretation of its [own] powers .. .is due great 

respect from the others," Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-4; and, 

WHEREAS, former Presidents retain "actual authori~" to bind the Government oii 

the United States to contractual obligations necessa!Y to car!Y out the duties of thein 

ucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) &1491, Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1304-

2. Under the common law, the incumbent King may change protocol at-will against a former Head 

of State or a preceding Monarch; those vested powers are embedded in the United States Constitution and 

remain constant until lawfully amended. Besides, as the complaint and Attorney General's Merrick Garland's public, apolitical, and legal comments show, currently, only a unit of an Executive branch has acted, 

i.e. the Department of Justice-F.B.I., rather than the Executive branch as whole. Dkt. 1 at 10. To no surprise, 

even against a former president, in order to legally condition the peaceful transition of power, the Executive 

power is much weaker than of a common law King's. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 

701 (1988) (more than one "United States" is "startling" ). aine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 

~ 40 S. Ct. 1308, 1334 (Alita, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) ("federal common law" has uni 

interests). 

5 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 28 of 48
nd, 

WHEREAS, "[all] powers of law enforcement ... are assigned under our Constitution 

to the Executive and the Judiciary," Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). 

THEREFORE, only a unit of the Executive Branch, the current Attorney General, has 

brought charges against former President Trump in violation of the inter-workings of the 

executive branch protocol, ordered by the incumbent President Biden, as housed by President Biden's subordinates, who are also either the Attorney General's superiors or coequals on the subject-matter, in the United States Department of State. 

FURTHERMORE, the President, the courts, or the Executive Branch cannot mute distinctions of office, person, state, and government, as they are an elaboration of the United 

States Constitution Privileges and Immunities Clause, which lays out the structure and 

lanes of enforcement. oindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 290 (1884) ("the distinction 

etween the government of a State and the State itself is imeortant, and [shall] be oberved. ") (underline added). 

6 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 29 of 48
WHEREAS, in order for a federal district court of law to have personal jurisdiction, 

under Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(2), traditional notions of "natural justice," "fair play," and "substantial justice" must at all time not be violated, McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917), 

Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 123 (1951), Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 

432,435 (1957) (shock the conscience, traditional notions of fair play and decency, indicia 

of not a peaceful transition of power caused by Defendant-DOJ is a violation of the conscience), Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 412 (1955) ("underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play"), Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324 & 

326 (1945), United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796 (1977) (due process embodies "fundamental conceptions of justice" and "the community's sense of fair play and decency") 

(see Federalist 77, United States as a community), Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 

833, 847 (1998) (conscience-shocking behavior is "so 'brutal' and 'offensive' that it [does] 

not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency.") (abuse of executive power) 

(decencies of "civilized conduct," epitomized in U.S. const. art. IV, § 2) (bowing and 

curtsy amongst and to state actors or the effect in our community), & Sessions v. Dimaya, 

138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (required by both "ordinary notions of fair play and the settled 

rules of law."); and, 

WHEREAS, traditional notions of natural justice states a former T.H. (T.E.) President 

of the United States (T.E. President of the United States for all documents foreign affairs), 

from the Natural State, is more fit than the current court (judge and Defendant) and the 

Natural Order demands that the incumbent Attorney General yield to pressing charges 

against Plaintiff, our former Head of State, see United States Order of Precedence-United 

States Dep't of State-Office of the Chief of Protocol, U.S. const. art. IV,§ 2, & Dkt. 60 at 2, 

5, 5 n. 3, & 7; and, 

7 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 30 of 48
WHEREAS, traditional notions of basic fair play and substantial justice have been 

violated, see e.g. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 742 (2015) (harsh treatment is not fair 

play) (gays and lesbians have been denied the Natural Order, pursuant to their achievements in civil society, as the wealthiest community, particularly, gay men, in the United 

States; the same illness has entered state and governmental institutions, preventing the 

Natural Order, including in governing the Defendant's decisions) (Plaintiff has been denied rightful place in the aftermath of his honor's incumbency as President of United 

States)3 & Pet. for Writ of Cert. * 58-9, Patel v. United States, No. 22-5280 (U.S. 202_); and, 

WHEREAS, even with explicit informed consent the Plaintiff cannot avail himself 

before this court because his availment cannot overcome the violation traditional notions 

of fair play, natural justice, and substantial justice as applied to the court and any possible 

ruling by this court, U.S. const. art. IV,§ 2 & see also United States Order of PrecedenceUnited States Dep' t of State-Office of the Chief of Protocol; and, 

WHEREAS, this court cannot attach personal jurisdiction to the Plaintiff as it would 

violate the traditional notions of fair play, natural justice, and substantial justice, and, 

thus, its opinion would only be advisory; and, 

WHEREAS, in addition, the corollary to Plaintiff's former Presidential privilege, immunity, is the court's limited judicial review, Federalist 78, U.S. const. art. IV,§ 2, art. III 

(original intent), & amend. V. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 

THEREFORE, this Court should dismiss sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b )(2), as 

the Court does not have personal jurisdiction for Plaintiff, or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as there is no enforcement mechanism to require the Plaintiff, the former Head of State and former President, who is also 

3. https: / / hrc-prod-requests.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com / Wage-Cap-Appendix.pdf. 

8 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 31 of 48
Privileged, per the Natural State, and is Immune, per the Natural State too; the deficiencies can only be cured by new charges brought directly by the incumbent President, by 

his own counselor, rather than the incumbent Attorney General. 

FURTHERMORE, the notions of natural justice, fair play, and substantial justice buttress castle doctrine, as generally applied, and Plaintiff's castle can uniquely, along with 

the past Presidents, can withstand all forces except those directly and constitutionally 

commanded by the incumbent President, e.g. United States Secret Service or United States 

Armed and Space Force. See Dkt. 60 at 2, 5, 5 n. 3, & 7. This is also because due process 

cannot override a Privilege or Immunity, and substantive due process is considerate of 

Privileges and Immunities, per the Federalist and Anti-Federalist contract of the Bill of 

Rights, and the interest of the Founders and Amenders to preserve the culture of our 

Nation. U.S. const. art. IV, § 2 & amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 1; Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796; Federalist 80 ("It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that "the citizens of each State shall 

be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States." And ifi 

it be a just principle that every government OUGHT TO POSSESS THE MEANS OF EXECUTING ITS OWN PROVISIONS BY ITS OWN AUTHORITY."); Pet. for Writ of Cert.* 

58-9, Patel v. United States, No. 22-5280 (U.S. 202_J; & compare U.S. const. art. IV, §§ 

1-27 with U.S. con st. art. VI, § 1 referring to Articles of Confederation (1781 ), art. IV, paras. 

1 & 3 ("The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among 

the people of the different States in this Union [i .e., Doctrine of Comity in U.S. const. art. 

IV, § 2], the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives 

9 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 32 of 48
from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in 

the several States; ... provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid 

by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them." II "Full faith and 

credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings 

of the courts and magistrates of every other State.") (("magistrates" replaced with "citizen") (see 0kt. 21 at 13) (see also Patel v. United States, No. 1 :21-cv-02004-LAS (Fed. 

Cl. 202_J, 0kt. 1 at 9-10 n. 6)). 

UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 24, I have a common question of law or fact or interest in the 

transaction because a favorable ruling to the Defendant can violate my Excellencies, the 

style/ titles, and my career and statesmanship by extension of this ruling amongst licensed Governmental actors, local, state, federal, and international, who might sympathize with this ourt's unconstitutionali~. 

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has held that a former President may not successfully assert executive privilege against review by "the very Executive Branch in whose 

name the privilege is invoked," Nixon, 433 U.S. at 447-48 & Dkt 69 at 8;4 and, 

WHEREAS, executive Privilege and executive Immunity are corollaries, but distinct 

concepts, U.S. const. art. IV,§ 2 & amend. XIV,§ 1, cl. 2; and, 

WHEREAS, asserting one necessarily imputes the assertion of the other, Id.; and, 

4. An F.B.I. cannot claim executive Privilege against the incumbent Attorney General, but a former 

President can claim executive Privilege (i.e. Presidential Privilege) against the incumbent Attorney General. 

Respectively, the independent concept of executive Immunity applies, which favors the former President 

against the incumbent Attorney General. 

10 

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WHEREAS, former United States President Trump may assert executive Immunity 

from United States Governmental force which is not under the command of the incumbent United States President, Id.; and, 

WHEREAS, in the happenings related to Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425, incumbent President 

Gerald Ford was intimately involved in prosecuting former President Nixon, Id. & cf Dkt. 

1 at 10; and, 

WHEREAS, here, as unlike in the happenings related to Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425, the 

incumbent President is not intimately involved against the prosecution of President 

Biden, PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 12-13 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

(Madisonian presidential control), see Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1938) (holding that it is "not the function of the court to probe the mental processes of the [Executive]"), and Dkt. 1 at 10; and, 

WHEREAS, here, the topics of documents are related to foreign policy, unlike in 

Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425, where, the documents were related to domestic policy; and, 

WHEREAS, more specifically and materially, a former President/Head of State outranks the incumbent Attorney General in foreign relations and diplomatic matter, which 

are exclusively reserved for the President's recognition, see generally Providence Journal, 

485 U.S. at 701 (more than one "United States" is "startling"); and, 

WHEREAS, the incumbent President, the United States Order of Precedence duly 

established by the Office of the Chief of Protocol, and the Presidential Records Act show 

that the former presidents carry on official duties, which come with omnipresent privileges and immunities, which are absolute except at against an incumbent President, 

Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-4 & Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,239,241,244, & 248, (1974); and, 

11 

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WHEREAS, the Constitutional power of executive Privilege and/ or executive Immunity of a former President, thus, may be lawfully asserted against the incumbent Department of Justice, U.S. const. art. IV, § 2 & amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2, Murray v. Bush, No. 

06-C-0781 * 1 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 31, 2006) ("whether the action is frivolous or malicious, or 

seeks relief from an immune party, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.") 

(italics added) (internal citations omitted); cf 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); Williams v. 

Holmes, No. l:17-cv-00799-KOB * 1 (N.D. Ala. Sep. 5, 2017); Malcolm v. City of Miami, No. 

22-cv-20499-KING/DAMIAN * 2, 4, & 6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2022); & Lister v. Dep't of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309 (10th Cir. 2005); and, 

WHEREAS, the Plaintiff can lawfully possess the disputed United States records, 44 

U.S. C. § 2202; and, 

WHEREAS, the Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(l) allow for the affirmative defenses of illegality 

(Defendant's play in obtaining Presidential Records), license (U.S. const. art. IV, § 2), 

laches (Defendant should have acted quicker if truly suspicious of national security), or 

unclean hands (Defendant should have involved the incumbent President of the United 

States); and, 

WHEREAS, this Court is in Comity with both Plaintiff and Defendant, and has the 

privilege of serving each party in his/her/ their individual capacity, Doctrine of Comity, 

U.S. const. art. IV, § 2. 

THEREFORE, the Plaintiff is immune from prosecution from the Defendant, and the 

Court should return all records to plaintiff, President Trump, and order charges against 

The Honorable Garland for conversion, "treason"/ "war"/" attack," and rebellion or insurrection. U.S. const. art. III, § 3; 18 U.S.C. § 2381; & Providence Journal, 485 U.S. at 701. 

FURTHERMORE, under the Constitutional fiction, which starts, at a minimum, with 

the corporate charters mentioned in the Declaration of Independence (1776), the local, 

12 

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excellent corporations and other local authorities have devolved power to the Federal 

Sovereign, much more than the Sister States have to the Federal Sovereign; thus, the interest in the transaction is a check on the Devolved Sovereignty, Faithfully ordered by 

me, the intervenor, and as a taxpayer. U.S. const. art. IV,§§ 1-2 & art. VI,§ 1; Federalist 

78; & 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. See also White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, 

https: / / www.whitehouse.gov/ iga / . 

WHEREAS, barring subordinate Executive Branch from reviewing and using the 

classified records for criminal investigates purposes is a meaningful way of protecting 

"the confidentiality of Presidential communications," Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 & contra. Dkt. 

69 at 10; and, 

WHEREAS, the reasons Presidents or the courts allow independent personnel across 

the Intelligence Community to review the very same records for other closely related 

purposes but not the remainder of the Executive Branch do not have to be revealed in 

order to protect the confidentiality of Presidential Records, Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705; and, 

WHEREAS, technocrats are the personnel across the Intelligence Community who 

usually receive these records and whose narrow objectives are precisely codified, unlike 

in the not-independent Executive Branch were partisans, party members, former members of Congress, and bureaucrats who are accountable to varying interests, such as foreign Heads of State and inter-governmental organizations and those hierarchies, are 

likely to receive and be exposed these records; and, 

WHEREAS, an affirmance of the default protectionist rule of Presidential Records 

will allow the Republic to remain One and intact, Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705, Providence Journal, 

485 U.S. at 701, Nixon, 433 U.S. at 447-9, & Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 

13 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 36 of 48
U.S. 587 (2007) (Rather, they were "created entirely within the executive branch ... by Presidential executive order." (quoting Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F. 3d 

989, 997 (7th Cir. 2006)); and, 

WHEREAS, the Department of Justice is not an independent agency of the Executive 

Branch; and, 

WHEREAS, here, the "trial" is of a former President, which was not initiated by the 

incumbent President; and, 

WHEREAS, the enforcement of Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 is different due to the advancement of technology; and, 

THEREFORE, preventing the United States Department of Justice from gaining access to the material Presidential Records is lawful, as well as the appointment of the special master, but the Presidential Records are properly returned to President Trump at the 

earliest convenience; if not, at least a copy of all records, as the Plaintiff maintains his 

presumption of correctness until proven otherwise. 

FURTHERMORE, this transaction could extent to local governments, a set of Devolvers of Sovereignty, and interfere with local jurisdictions' record keeping practices and the 

privileges and immunities of their agents, including when those jurisdictions were demarcated in another state. 

WHEREAS, Dkt. 69 at 10-11 equivocates about the Executive Branch-generally with 

the more specific terminologies of executive Privileges and/ or Immunities applied to the 

Executive Branch-incumbent-President and Executive Branch-former-President; and, 

WHEREAS, Defendant is unpersuasively arguing, that in addition to its trespass to 

a former President's castle, its Governmental unit's needs are of more national importance than the status quo established by the Executive Branch-incumbent-President, 

which does not discriminate against the Executive Branch-former-President-Plaintiff, and 

14 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 37 of 48
made publicly available through the United States Department of State-Office of the Chief 

of Protocol (whether the Executive Branch-incumbent-Attorney-General is a state actor or 

a governmental actor is irrelevant due to the order of precedence and the Executive 

Branch-incumbent-President's establishment of the national security agenda; nonetheless, these distinctions cannot be muted), Egan, 484 U.S. at 527; see also, e.g., Murphy, 769 

Fed. Appx. at 792 ("The authority to protect national security information falls on the 

President [directly]."), Dkt. 69 at 13 Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 290 ; and, 

WHEREAS, the President is an agent, in the terms of the Presidential Records Act 

and Federalist 78; and, 

WHEREAS, the courts must protect the President from aggression from unknown 

sources within Executive Branch, which concurrently politically answer to varying interests, Dkt. 69 at 18 quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 529; and, 

__ 5. Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 290 ("In common speech and common apprehension they are usuall .... 

egarded as identical; and as ordinarily the acts of the government are the acts of the State, because within 

the limits of its delegation of power, the government of the State is generally confounded with the Stat . 

·tself, and often the former is meant when the latter is mentioned. The State itself is an ideal person, 

intangible, invisible, immutable. The government is an agent, and, within the sphere of the agency, 

perfect representative; but outside of that, it is a lawless usurpation. The Constitution of the State is the 

limit of the authority of its government, and both government and State are subject to the supremacy of 

the Constitution of the United States, and of the laws made in pursuance thereof ... This distinction is essential to the idea of constitutional government. To deny it or blot it out obliterates the line of demarcation 

that separates constitutional government from absolutism, free self-government based on the sovereignty 

of the people from that despotism, whether of the one or the many, which enables the agent of the State 

to declare and decree that he is the State; to say "L 'l:tat c'est moi." "). 

15 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 38 of 48
WHEREAS, the courts must be sensitive to the inter-workings and inter-politics of 

the executive branch; 

WHEREAS, hypothetically, Executive Branch-incumbent-Attorney-General-DOJand-FBI could have been denied access to Presidential Records of Executive Branch-former-President-Trump by Executive Branch-incumbent-President-Biden; and, 

WHEREAS, therefore, the current happenings in the case-at-hand are appeasement 

to vital parts of the Government and possible political parties and factions the President 

must appease, PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 1 & 12-13 (As the Supreme Court has explained, 

our Constitution "was adopted to enable the people to govern themselves, through their 

elected leaders," and the Constitution "requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.") (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. 

Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,499 (2010)); Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 ("The are fre 

ito ursue a eurel ideological commitment to the law's constitutionali~ without the need 

ito take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in ublic o inion [including olls 

factoring the o inions of social outcasts, U.S. const. art. IV, § 2 & amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2], 

or otential ramifications for other state ~riorities[,]" [a ro riation throu h genomics]); 

United States v. Arthrex, Inc., No. 19-1434 * 23,594 U.S. __ (2021) (Roberts, C.J., The Constitutional hierarchy requires "the exercise of executive power [to remain] accountable to 

the people."); & Dkt. 69 at 18 quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 527 (unauthorized persons); and, 

WHEREAS, there is rule of law, the Courts must protect the Executive Branch-incumbent-President and the Executive Branch-former-President from aggressions; and, 

16 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 39 of 48
WHEREAS, the current acts are aggressions against the United States, found in some 

Western Hemisphere's- and Sister Common Law jurisdictions' - governmental fashion for 

coups de tat. 

THEREFORE, the Court should enter judgement in favor of Plaintiff, who is immune 

from prosecution by the Defendant-Mr. Gonzalez. 

WHEREAS, in addition to Dkts. 21, 36, and 60, the Political Question Doctrine, under 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department); and, 

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Political Question Doctrine the issue is reserved for the 

Presidency directly, for the interest of maintaining Presidential Autonomy (i.e. in an earlier draft of the Declaration of Independence of 1776, Thomas Jefferson addressed the 

Grievances against the Parliament, which he thought caused the denial of the Olive 

Branch Treaty; but, The King was still giving power to Parliament), compare Original Draft 

("we utterly dissolve all political connection which may heretofore have subsisted between us and the people or parliament of Great Britain: and finally we do assert and 

declare these colonies to be free and independent states, and that as free and independent 

states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do.") 

with Final Draft;6 and, 

WHEREAS, Robert Yates, who refused to sign the United States Constitution 

thought that the judiciary would be able "to mould" the role of the presidency; 7 and, 

6. https: / / teachingamericanhistory.org / document / rough-draft-of-the-declaration-of-independ7. https: / / www.heritage.org / courh / report / against-judicial-supremacy-the-founders-and-thelimits-the-courts ("Every body of men invested with office," Yates observed, "are tenacious of power." 

Moreover, this love of power would "influence" judges "to extend their power, and increase their rights," 

with the result that the courts will tend to "give such a meaning to the Constitution in all cases where it can 

17 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 40 of 48
WHEREAS, "[h]uman experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for 

their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process ... [a] President and 

those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies 

and making decisions and to do so in a way that many would be unwilling to express 

except privately," Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 & 708; and, 

WHEREAS, "[i]n designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended 

to operate with absolute independence," Nixon, 433 U.S. at 442-3 (quoting Youngstown Sheet 

& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)); and, 

WHEREAS, the Attorney General might be appropriate if Congress' interests were 

violated with the Presidential Records Act, but cf Id., 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 & 271-288n, & Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821) (only when Congress' interests are violated, the Segreant-at-Arms does the enforcement; see generally Title 2 of the United States Code); and, 

WHEREAS, "[t]he essence of democra~ is that the right to make law rests in th 

le and flows to the government, not the other way_ around[,]" Hollingsworth, 133 S. 

t. at 2675; and, 

possibly be done, as will enlarge the sphere of their authority." ... The end result of all this would be a 

Supreme Court with power to rule the country in the most important matters according to its own willto not only exceed its authority but to usurp others' authority. "This power," Yates said, "will enable" the 

justices of the Supreme Court "to mould the government into almost any shape they please." ... Yates further contended that the Supreme Court would not only be supreme over all other courts, but that it would, in fact, 

be the supreme power in the government to be created by the Constitution. This supremacy, Yates contended, would follow from the Court's power of settling for all other political actors the authoritative meaning of the 

Constitution. The Supreme Court, he observed, "has the power, in the last resort, to determine all questions 

that may arise in the course of legal discussion, on the meaning and construction of the Constitution."). 

18 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 41 of 48
HEREAS, the incumbent President of the United States is the "next friend" of th 

"the real art}' in interest," the unigue Soverei n, of all the natural eersons, each a sov 

ereign, of the United States, Hollin sworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2665 & 267 4. 

THEREFORE, the Court should enter judgement, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) or 

(b)(6), in favor of Plaintiff, who is immune from prosecution by the Defendant-Mr. Gonzalez, and advise that prosecution is most proper from the incumbent President himself 

or his honor's counselor, i.e. Counselor to the President (Mr. Steve Ricchetti, J.D.), but not 

the Attorney General (The Hon. Merrick Garland, J.D.). But . White House General 

Counselor (Mr. Stuart F. Delery, J.D.). In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1280-2 (White House 

General Counsel under the command of the incumbent President v. DOJ). --- ---- n 33 S. Ct. at 2665 & 2673 (referrin to Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. at 700). Federalist 78. Maine Cm~. Health Oe_tions, 140 S. Ct. at 1334 (Alito, J., dissenting) (Head of 

ashington, D.C. should direct its nat'I State and Government, an ordina!Y federal comon law matter). All documents should be returned to Plaintiff. 

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, the court may dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). 

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, since the Defendant's acts are unconstitutional and cannot 

be ratified to become constitutional, as Defendant omitted the incumbent President-Head 

of State and -Head of Government against the incumbent President's own Order for Protocol, the court may dismiss and rule in favor of Plaintiff for the Defendant's unclean 

hands. 

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, the court may issue an Order to Show Cause to the Defendant for law enforcement jurisdiction. 

19 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 42 of 48
AT ALL COSTS, this Court should avoid creating a slippery slope so that the incumbent President will be subject to arrest by the incumbent Attorney General, who, but, 

serves at the honor's pleasure, or create an unconstitutional autonomy of executive departments, which will not be accountable to the People, - or, sometimes, to their varying 

interests - the epitome of executive tyranny. 

"[A] pro se [motion], however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007). 

I use my Constitutional Privileges, honors, and rights of knowing from my undergraduate and law school, juris doctor candidacy, educations, and political offices and 

from reading law outside of formal schooling for the writing and discussions, arguments, 

and motions of these filings, see Dkt. 21 at 5 & 20 and supra, p. 20 (signature line). Ho/-

/ingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 & 2670-71 ("unigue legal status"). 

move for leave to file this third amended Diet. 87 

I move to reinstate my Motion o Continue Wi out Pre-Pa 

22, to avoid default and interest charges on other moneta~ commitments. 

Respectfully submitted, 

/ s/ Raj K. Patel 

T.E., T.E. Raj K. Patel (pro se) 

6850 East 21st Street 

Indianapolis, IN 46219 

Marion County 

317-450-6651 (cell) 

rajp20l0@gmail.com 

www.rajpatel.li ve 

20 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 43 of 48
J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame L. Sch. 2015-2017 

President/Student Body President, Student Gov't Ass'n of 

Emory U., Inc. 2013-2014 (corp. sovereign 2013-present) 

Student Body President, Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. 

Corp./President, Brownsburg High Sch. Student Gov't 

2009-2010 (corp. sovereign 2009-present) 

Rep. from the Notre Dame L. Sch. Student B. Ass'n to the 

Ind. St. B. Ass'n 2017 

Deputy Regional Director, Young Democrats of Am.-High 

Sch. Caucus 2008-2009 

Co-Founder & Vice Chair, Ind. High Sch. Democrats 2009-

2010 

Vice President of Fin. (Indep.), Oxford C. Republicans of 

Emory U., Inc. 2011-2012 

21 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 44 of 48
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing Raj K. Patel's (Pro Se) Fourth Amended Dkt. 

87 on 10/26/2022 to below individuals via the e-mail: 

James M. Trusty 

IFRAH, PLLC 

1717 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Suite 650 

Washington, DC 20006 

Juan Antonio Gonzalez 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 

99 NE 4th Street, 8th Floor 

202-852-5669 Miami, Fl 33132 

Email: jtrusty@ifrahlaw.com 

Lindsey Halligan 

511 SE 5th Avenue 

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 

720-435-2870 

Telephone: (305) 961-9001 

Email: juan.antonio.gonzalez@usdoj.gov 

Jay I. Bratt, Chief 

Email: lindseyhalligan@outlook.com 

Counterintelligence & Export Control 

Section Nat'l Security Div. 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, D. C. 20530 

Christopher Michael Kise 

Chris Kise & Associates, P.A. 

201 East Park Ave. Ste, 5th Floor 

Tallahassee, FL 32301 

(850) 270-0566 

chris@ckise.net 

M. Evan Corcoran 

(202) 233-0986 

jay.bratt2@usdoj.gov 

President Joe Biden 

c / o Marina M. Kozmycz, Associate Gen. 

Counsel 

Silverman, Thompson, Slutkin, & White, 

LLC 

The E.O.P. at the White House 

1600 Pennsylvania A venue NW 

Washington, D. C. 20500 

Phone: 202-457-1414 

400 East Pratt Street, Suite 900 [REDACTED] 

Baltimore, MD 21230 

410-385-2225 

ecorcoran@silvermanthompson.com 

Dated: October 26, 2022 

Respectfully submitted, 

Is I Raj Patel 

T.E., T.E. Raj K. Patel (Pro Se) 

6850 East 21st Street 

Indianapolis, IN 46219 

Marion County 

317-450-6651 (cell) 

rajp2010@gmail.com 

www .raj pa tel.Ii ve 

22 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 45 of 48
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

DONALD J. TRUMP, 

Plaintiff No. 9:22-cv-81294-AMC 

V. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant 

ORDER 

This matter COMES NOW before the Court on Mr. Raj K. Patel's Responses, 

along with Mr. Patel's Notice under 18 U.S.C. § 2382, and the following is ORDERED: 

[ ] Mr. Patel's Motion for Intervention is GRANTED. 

[ ] The Intervention is one of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). 

[ ] The Intervention is permissive under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). 

[ ] Mr. Patel's Motion for Leave to Proceed Without Pre-paying Filings Fees is 

GRANTED. 

[ ] The complaint is DISMISSED under 

[ ] Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). 

[ ] Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

[ ] Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). 

[ ] Unclean Hands Doctrine. 

[ ] Political Question Doctrine. 

[ ] The dismissal of the complaint is 

1 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 46 of 48
[ ] WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

[ ] WITH PREJUDICE. 

[ ] All seized documents and other property is ORDERED to 

[ ] Remain with the court, or 

[ ] Be returned to the Plaintiff, Mr. Donald J. Trump. 

[ ] After the previous happenings, then now, Mr. Patel's intervention 1s 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers at Fort Pierce, Florida, this __ day of 

______ , 2022 

HON. AILEEN M. CANNON 

United States District Judge 

Distribution to all attorneys and prose litigants of record. 

2 

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 47 of 48
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Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 163 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/28/2022 Page 48 of 48