Present: All the Justices 

CHRISTOPHER BECK 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

v. Record No. 962431 APRIL 18, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 

 In this appeal, we review the capital murder convictions and 

the death sentences imposed by the trial court, sitting without a 

jury, on Christopher Beck. The principal issues presented are 

whether the trial court erred in receiving "victim impact 

evidence" from persons other than family members of the victims 

and in receiving "recommendations" concerning the imposition of 

the death penalty from the victims' friends and family members. 

 I. PROCEEDINGS 

 Beck was charged with multiple offenses including capital 

murder, burglary, rape, robbery, and use of a firearm in the 

commission of these offenses. Prior to trial, Beck filed a 

motion to suppress the introduction of all statements made by him 

to the police and any evidence obtained as a result. After 

reviewing the statements, receiving additional evidence, and 

hearing argument of counsel, the trial court denied this motion. 

 Beck does not assign error to this action of the trial court. 

 Beck also filed a motion challenging the constitutionality 

of Virginia's capital murder statute and the attendant statutes 

governing trial and appellate procedures in death penalty cases. 

The trial court denied this motion without comment. 

 At trial, Beck pled guilty to the capital murder of his 
cousin Florence Marie Marks during or subsequent to rape or in 

the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, Code 

§ 18.2-31(4) and (5), the capital murder of William Miller in the 

commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, Code 

§ 18.2-31(4), the capital murder of David Stuart Kaplan in the 

commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, Code 

§ 18.2-31(4), as well as statutory burglary, rape, three offenses 

of robbery, and seven offenses of the use of a firearm.* At the 

time the pleas were taken, the Commonwealth, at the trial court's 

direction, made a proffer of the evidence of Beck's guilt. This 

proffer referred the trial court principally to statements made 

by Beck to the police which the trial court had reviewed during 

the suppression hearing. On the basis of this proffer, the trial 

court accepted the pleas and found Beck guilty. 

 Following the acceptance of Beck's pleas, the trial court 

granted a continuance prior to beginning the sentencing phase of 

the trial. During the continuance, the trial court received a 

large number of letters from family members and friends of the 

victims which contained statements concerning the impact of 

Beck's crimes and "recommendations" concerning the imposition of 

the death penalty. 

 During the sentencing phase, the trial court heard evidence 

in aggravation and in mitigation and fixed punishment for each of 

 

 *Beck also pled guilty to the capital murder of the three 

victims as part of a single act or transaction, Code 

§ 18.2-31(7); that capital multiple murder charge was 

subsequently nolle prossed and Beck's plea withdrawn. See

Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 96, 472 S.E.2d 263, 273 

(1996). 
the three capital murders at death premised upon findings of both 

"vileness" and "future dangerousness." The trial court sentenced 

Beck to four life terms plus a total 53 years' imprisonment for 

the remaining offenses. 

 II. EVIDENCE 

 The critical facts are not in dispute and may be fairly 

summarized as follows: 

A. Beck's Statements to Police

 Beck told police that several days before the murders he 

formulated a plan to kill Miller, Beck's former employer. On 

Monday, June 5, 1995, Beck traveled by bus from his home in 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Washington, D.C., arriving there 

at 6 p.m. The following morning Beck went to Arlington to the 

house shared by Marks, Miller, and Kaplan. He arrived at the 

house at 11 a.m., "walked around the perimeter," and then broke 

in through a basement window under the porch. 

 Wrapping a sledge hammer he found in the basement with a 

cloth to "muffle the sound," he used the sledge hammer to batter 

a hole in a door to the first floor of the house. Beck then went 

to Miller's apartment and chose a .22 caliber semi-automatic 

pistol from several loaded guns Miller kept in the house; he 

rejected another larger caliber weapon because its report would 

be too loud. After loading a spare magazine for the pistol, Beck 

went to the basement and waited for Miller to return home. As 

Beck waited he became "nervous," but finally concluded, "I guess 

I'll go through [with] it." 

 Later that afternoon, Beck heard the sound of someone 
entering the basement. Beck raised the pistol to "arm level," 

and, as the door opened, he closed his eyes and fired two shots. 

 When Beck opened his eyes, he saw Marks on the basement floor. 

Beck said, "you stupid bitch, why did you have to come home?" In 

an attempt to make it appear that Marks had been raped and 

robbed, Beck cut off most of her clothes and stabbed her in the 

right buttock. He threw a condom he had found in the washer onto 

the floor and, in a further effort to make it appear that Marks 

had been sexually assaulted, he kicked her and penetrated her 

vagina with a hammer. Beck reasoned that sexual assault evidence 

would lead the police to believe that the crime had been 

committed by a stranger and not by a family member. Beck then 

went back upstairs to the first floor. 

 About one hour later, Miller returned home. Beck was on the 

stairs leading to the second floor and hid behind the bannister. 

 Miller remained downstairs for a while and then started up the 

stairs. Beck shot Miller in the face as he mounted the stairs. 

Miller fell down the stairs as Beck continued to shoot him, 

firing a total of five rounds at him. Beck put Miller's body in 

Kaplan's apartment and threw a blanket over the body, "because I 

got sick and tired looking" at it. 

 Later that evening, but while it was still light outside, 

Kaplan returned home to find Miller's body lying in his room, 

Beck with a gun in his hand, and blood "all over." As Kaplan 

stared at the scene, Beck shot Kaplan in the back of the head. 

Beck fired "several times and [Kaplan] just wouldn't die." As 

Kaplan lay on the floor, he talked to Beck, saying, "hello, I'm 
awake, hello." Beck fired what he believed was a full magazine 

at Kaplan and then stabbed him in the head. Beck stated that he 

"just wanted [Kaplan] to stop having the pain." After he was 

stabbed, Kaplan appeared to have a "seizure" and then died. 

 Beck went back through the house taking several guns and two 

bicycles. He also took cash from each of the victims. He took 

the keys to Miller's car, changed his clothes, loaded the car 

with the guns and bicycles, and drove to Washington, D.C., to see 

a girl. As he left the house, Beck waved to the next door 

neighbor. 

 After a parking mishap in the District of Columbia in which 

Beck parked the car but neglected to engage the parking brake, 

and the car rolled into another vehicle, Beck drove home to 

Pennsylvania. Once there he hid the guns and "stashed" the 

bicycles with a friend. He "cleaned the car of all prints[,] 

wiped it all down," and abandoned it after covering the license 

plates. 

 Beck was initially interviewed by Arlington County Police 

officers at his mother's home in Philadelphia. Beck at first 

claimed to have been transporting bicycles from Tennessee at the 

time of the murders. When a friend failed to corroborate Beck's 

alibi, Beck admitted to police that he had killed Marks, Miller 

and Kaplan. After his arrest, Beck was returned to Arlington, 

where he gave a full statement concerning the murders to police. 

 During his statement to the police, Beck was given a chance to 

say something for himself; he said: 

 That ah I know what is like to kill somebody, its 

one of the worst feelings you can live with that I 
don't know that it is pretty painful that is one of 

those things that you can't go to sleep and I'm so 

sorry that I did, I'm so sorry that I had all that 

anger built up, I should had went to a counselor or 

something could have prevented it. I don't know, I'm 

sorry but I know this is going to be pretty hard for 

people to believe what happened. 

 In addition to giving that statement, Beck assisted the 

police in the recovery of the stolen car, guns, and bicycles. 

B. Additional Evidence

 Autopsies of the three victims revealed that each had 

suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the head which had resulted 

in rapid, if not immediate death. Dr. Frances Patricia Field, an 

assistant chief medical examiner, testified that Marks had 

sustained two gunshot wounds to the head. Dr. Field concluded 

that either of these gunshot wounds could have been lethal. In 

addition, the autopsy revealed that Marks had sustained multiple 

bruises on her body, a stab wound in the right buttock, and 

"hyperemia or redness in the left back part of the entrance to 

the vagina." 

 Miller's autopsy revealed bruises and abrasions of the lower 

extremities and several gunshot wounds to the face. Dr. Field 

concluded that the bullet which entered the left side of the head 

would have caused death "relatively quick[ly] if not 

instantaneously." 

 Kaplan's autopsy revealed the presence of seven gunshot 

wounds. Kaplan had sustained wounds to the left side of the 

head, the left and right sides of the face, the left side of the 

chin, the top and right side of the nose, and the left upper 

chest. In the medical examiner's opinion, only the bullets which 
entered the chest and the head below the ear would have been 

immediately or rapidly fatal. Dr. Field was unable to determine 

the order in which the wounds had been inflicted. 

 At the time the plea was taken, in addition to referring the 

trial court to Beck's statements, the Commonwealth made the 

proffer that a used condom found in the house was analyzed and 

that genetic material of both Marks and Beck was found. This 

evidence was in direct conflict with Beck's statement concerning 

the rape of Marks. 

 At sentencing, the trial court received evidence of Beck's 

prior criminal history. Beck, at the age of 14 years, was 

charged with aggravated assault after he pushed his high school 

teacher, Joyce Leff, as he left her class. According to Ms. 

Leff, Beck was "hostile towards authority, didn't want to do any 

class work." Beck wore "a jacket with swastikas on it" until a 

school vice principal asked him not to wear it. When Beck told 

Leff that he had guns he "used to target shoot the neighbor's 

house," she became "very afraid" and re-arranged her classroom so 

that she was not visible from outside the classroom. Leff 

further testified that Beck was in a special education class and 

read on a first or second grade level; she felt he was 

"emotionally disturbed . . . [v]ery hostile, full of rage and 

anger." Beck subsequently was committed to the Pennsylvania 

Department of Welfare in 1991 after an incident in which he 

threatened to harm his former girlfriend and her parents. While 

in the jail segregation unit awaiting the present trial, Beck 

substituted disinfectant for mouthwash belonging to one inmate 
and struck another inmate. In addition, Beck wrote a document 

describing his feelings in which he incorporated the phrase: "I'm 

sorry but I love killing." 

 Dr. Dewey G. Cornell, a clinical psychologist and professor 

at the University of Virginia, diagnosed Beck as learning 

disabled, suffering from attention deficit and hyperactivity 

disorder (ADHD), and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Evan 

Nelson, a licensed clinical psychologist specializing in forensic 

psychology, also concluded that Beck suffers from ADHD and a 

learning disability. Dr. Nelson did not conclude that Beck 

suffers from antisocial personality disorder, but conceded that 

he met all the criteria for such a diagnosis. He opined that 

neglect by Beck's mother was the primary cause of Beck's 

pathology. According to Dr. Nelson, Beck is able to express 

regret but lacks the capacity to experience remorse. 

C. Victim Impact Evidence

 Prior to sentencing, Beck's attorney asked the trial court 

not to consider "victim impact" type evidence submitted by 

persons other than members of the victims' families. The trial 

court observed that the decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 

808 (1991), permitted it to "go either way." The trial court 

indicated that it would be necessary to review the materials to 

make a determination of their admissibility, and that the court 

would make its decision based upon the closeness of the 

relationship between the victim and the witness. Beck renewed 

the objection to non-family victim impact evidence at the outset 

of the sentencing hearing, but did not raise express objections 
to any specific evidence or testimony. 

 Among the documents received by the trial court were letters 

from family members, co-workers, and friends of the victims, and 

numerous letters sent to Kaplan's parents. Included with these 

were news accounts and essays written by co-workers of Kaplan, 

who was a journalist. Some of the letters included the authors' 

views favoring imposition of a death sentence or life 

imprisonment. 

III. ISSUES WAIVED 

 Beck assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion 

to declare Virginia's death penalty statute unconstitutional and 

to prohibit imposition of the death penalty on the ground that 

Virginia's procedures for trial and appellate consideration of 

the death sentence are also unconstitutional and violate the 

Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishment and the 14th Amendment's guarantee of due process. 

These assignments of error seek to raise issues that Beck waived 

by the entry of his guilty pleas and, thus, they are not 

cognizable in this appeal. See Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 

136, 141, 431 S.E.2d 48, 51, cert.denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993); 

Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 539, 391 S.E.2d 276, 278-79, 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882 (1990); Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 

126, 131-32, 376 S.E.2d 288, 291, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 

(1989). 

IV. VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE 

 Beck asserts that it was improper for the trial court to 

receive victim impact evidence from persons not related to the 
victims. Beck's initial position is that such evidence is 

constitutionally barred because it exceeds the scope of victim 

impact testimony permitted by the United States Supreme Court's 

decision in Payne. Beck further asserts that even if not 

constitutionally barred, admission of such evidence is not 

permitted under Virginia's criminal procedure code. We will 

consider each of these assertions in turn. 

A. Constitutional Admissibility

 We have previously decided that "victim impact testimony is 

relevant to punishment in a capital murder prosecution in 

Virginia." Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 476, 450 S.E.2d 

379, 389-90 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 100 

(1995). There, we relied on the statement in Payne that "[a] 

State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim 

and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is 

relevant to the . . . decision as to whether or not the death 

penalty shall be imposed." 501 U.S. at 827. 

 Citing the foregoing language in Payne, Beck maintains that 

Payne limits the source of victim impact evidence to family 

members. We disagree. No such limitation is either express or 

implied by this language. To the contrary, the Court was 

describing the nature, not the source, of victim impact evidence. 

 Indeed, it has been expressly recognized that the impact of the 

loss of the victim of a murder may extend beyond the victim's 

family members to the victim's friends and community. Id. at 830 

(O'Connor, J., concurring). Human experience and common 

knowledge support this recognition of the unique worth of the 
individual. Thus, there is no merit to Beck's assertion that 

victim impact evidence is constitutionally limited to that 

received from the victim's family members. 

 We hold that the admissibility of victim impact evidence 

during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial is limited 

only by the relevance of such evidence to show the impact of the 

defendant's actions. While statements from the immediate family 

members of the deceased will normally be the best source of such 

evidence, the Eighth Amendment does not restrict the trial court 

from looking to statements of others well acquainted with the 

victim. Such evidence provides the sentencing authority with an 

understanding of the individualized circumstances present in the 

life of the victim and the specific harm caused by the crime in 

question. Id. at 825. So long as its prejudicial effect does 

not outweigh its probative value, such evidence is beneficial to 

the determination of an individualized sentence as is required by 

the Eighth Amendment. Id.; see also Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 

793, 804 (Nev. 1996)(victim impact evidence from neighbors, 

co-workers and others did not violate defendant's Eighth 

Amendment rights). 

B. Statutory Admissibility

 Beck asserts that even if constitutionally permissible, the 

criminal procedure provisions within Title 19.2 of the Virginia 

Code limit victim impact evidence in a capital murder case to 

that received from the victim's family members. In support of 

this position, Beck relies upon Code §§ 19.2-11.01, 19.2-264.5 

and 19.2-299.1. Beck asserts that, when read in concert, these 
three statutes provide only for gathering and presentation of 

evidence from those persons designated as "victims" under the 

Crime Victim and Witness Rights Act (the Act). Code § 19.2-11.01 

to -11.4. We disagree. 

 Pertinent to our resolution of this issue, the code 

prescribes: 

 § 19.2-11.01. Crime victim and witness rights.

 A. In recognition of the Commonwealth's concern 

for the victims and witnesses of crime, it is the 

purpose of this chapter to ensure that the full impact 

of crime is brought to the attention of the courts of 

the Commonwealth; 

 . . . . 

 4. Victim input. 

 a. Victims shall be given the opportunity, 

pursuant to § 19.2-299.1, to prepare a written victim 

impact statement prior to sentencing of a defendant and 

may provide information to any individual or agency 

charged with investigating the social history of a 

person or preparing a victim impact statement under the 

provisions of §§ 16.1-273 and 53.1-155 or any other 

applicable law. 

 . . . . 

 B. For purposes of this chapter, "victim" 

means. . . a spouse, parent or legal guardian of such a 

person who . . . was the victim of a homicide. 

 § 19.2-264.5. Post-sentence reports.

 When the punishment of any person has been fixed 

at death, the court shall, before imposing sentence, 

direct a probation officer of the court to thoroughly 

investigate the history of the defendant and any and 

all other relevant facts, to the end that the court may 

be fully advised as to whether the sentence of death is 

appropriate and just. Reports shall be made, presented 

and filed as provided in § 19.2-299 except that, 

notwithstanding any other provision of law, such 

reports shall in all cases contain a Victim Impact 

Statement. Such statement shall contain the same 

information and be prepared in the same manner as 

Victim Impact Statements prepared pursuant to 
§ 19.2-299.1. After consideration of the report, and 

upon good cause shown, the court may set aside the 

sentence of death and impose a sentence of imprisonment 

for life. 

 § 19.2-299.1. When Victim Impact Statement required; 

contents; uses.

 The presentence report prepared pursuant to 

§ 19.2-299 shall, with the consent of the victim, as 

defined in § 19.2-11.01, in all cases involving 

offenses other than capital murder, include a Victim 

Impact Statement. Victim Impact Statements in all 

cases involving capital murder shall be prepared and 

submitted in accordance with the provisions of 

§ 19.2-264.5. 

 A Victim Impact Statement shall be kept 

confidential and shall be sealed upon entry of the 

sentencing order. If prepared by someone other than 

the victim, it shall . . . provide such other 

information as the court may require related to the 

impact of the offense upon the victim. 

 Beck asserts that by limiting the definition of "victim" in 

the Act to the "spouse, parent or legal guardian" of the 

deceased, the legislature implicitly intended to limit the 

admissibility of victim impact evidence to that provided by such 

persons for the reports described in Code §§ 19.2-264.5 and 

19.2-299.1. There is no merit to this assertion. 

 While the Act provides for the right of victims, as defined 

therein, to prepare a written impact statement, nothing within 

the Act limits the nature of victim impact evidence to such 

statements alone. Similarly, the reference to the Act in Code 

§ 19.2-299.1 merely defines the person or persons whose consent 

the Commonwealth must obtain in order to include the victim 

impact statement in the sentencing report. Moreover, by its 

express terms Code § 19.2-299.1 exempts the Commonwealth from 

having to obtain such consent in capital murder trials, and the 
preparation of a victim impact report in a capital murder trial, 

though done in the same manner as other such reports under Code 

§ 19.2-299.1, is mandated by Code § 19.2-264.5. 

 The clear import of the Act is to preserve the right of 

victims of crimes to have the impact of those crimes upon their 

lives considered as part of the sentencing process, if that is 

their wish, and to protect their privacy thereafter. The 

requirement in Code § 19.2-299.1 of obtaining victim consent to 

include the statement of the victim in the pre-sentence report is 

further recognition of the right of victims to maintain their 

privacy if they so desire. By exempting the Commonwealth from 

having to seek such consent when presenting victim impact 

evidence during capital murder trials, the legislature has 

recognized expressly that the impact of such crimes is of such 

magnitude as to require the consideration of victim impact 

evidence even at the risk of intruding upon the sensibilities of 

those closest to the victim. 

 Nothing in Code § 19.2-299.1 expressly or implicitly limits 

the sources on which the Commonwealth may draw in its preparation 

of the victim impact portion of the presentence report. Rather, 

the report is to contain whatever information the trial court 

"may require related to the impact of the offense upon the 

victim." 

 Accordingly, we hold that the statutes do not limit evidence 

of victim impact to that received from the victim's family 

members. Rather, the circumstances of the individual case will 

dictate what evidence will be necessary and relevant, and from 
what sources it may be drawn. In a capital murder trial, as in 

any other criminal proceeding, the determination of the 

admissibility of relevant evidence is within the sound discretion 

of the trial court subject to the test of abuse of that 

discretion. See Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 

820, 823 (1986); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 269-70, 

257 S.E.2d 808, 815-16 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980). 

C. Admissibility and Consideration of Evidence Received

 We now turn to the victim impact evidence actually received 

by the trial court during the sentencing phase of Beck's trial. 

In doing so, we stress that this was a trial without a jury. In 

responding to Beck's generalized objections to its receiving 

victim impact evidence, the trial court stated that it would 

assess each statement to determine whether the relationship of 

the declarant to the victims was sufficient to warrant the trial 

court's consideration, limiting that consideration to the 

testimony of family members and close friends of the victims. 

The trial court further stated that it was "mindful of the types 

of statements that would be inappropriate for its consideration." 

 Although provided with the opportunity to review the victim 

impact evidence prior to sentencing, Beck did not raise any 

particularized objection to the admission of any statement or 

testimony. Accordingly, we need only consider whether the trial 

court erred in considering the evidence received. 

 As noted above, the determination of admissibility of 

relevant evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court. In order to exercise that discretion, the trial court 
must weigh the relevance and probative value of the evidence 

against its potential undue prejudice to the defendant. "A 

judge, unlike a juror, is uniquely suited by training, experience 

and judicial discipline to disregard potentially prejudicial 

comments and to separate, during the mental process of 

adjudication, the admissible from the inadmissible, even though 

he has heard both." Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 213, 216, 

279 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1981); see also Williams v. Commonwealth, 

234 Va. 168, 182, 360 S.E.2d 361, 369 (1987), cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 1020 (1988). Here, the trial court's statements clearly 

establish its awareness of this responsibility. 

 In reviewing an exercise of discretion, we do not substitute 

our judgment for that of the trial court. Rather, we consider 

only whether the record fairly supports the trial court's action. 

 We find that none of the declarants of the victim impact 

evidence received by the trial court was so far removed from the 

victims as to have nothing of value to impart to the court about 

the impact of these crimes. Thus, the determination that this 

evidence was relevant and probative of the issue under 

consideration was clearly within the trial court's discretion. 

Similarly, our review of the content of the victim impact 

evidence reveals no statement concerning the impact of the crimes 

so inherently prejudicial that its admission would constitute an 

abuse of discretion. Accordingly, to whatever extent that the 

trial court chose to consider the evidence it received, we cannot 

say that doing so constituted an abuse of its discretion. 

D. Evidence of "Recommendations" for Imposition of Death Penalty
 Beck further asserts that the trial court erred in 

considering statements contained within the victim impact 

evidence which "recommended" the imposition of the death penalty. 

 The mere fact that the trial court received statements from 

family and friends of the victims in which the imposition of the 

death penalty was urged as an appropriate sentence does not 

establish that the trial court relied upon those statements in 

reaching its judgment. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 

268, 389 S.E.2d 871, 885, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990). 

Moreover, the trial judge, by virtue of his training and 

experience, is presumed to have separated the permissible victim 

impact evidence from any potentially prejudicial statements, if 

any, concerning sentencing and to have considered only the 

former.** The record amply supports the conclusion that this was 

done in this case and that the trial court's judgment was not 

made in an arbitrary manner. 

V. SENTENCE REVIEW 

 Beck's remaining assignments of error challenge the 

imposition of the death sentences on the ground that the evidence 

failed to establish the predicate determinations of future 

dangerousness and vileness and that the sentences were excessive 

and were imposed under undue influence of passion. 

 

 **We do not mean to suggest that we agree with Beck's 

characterization of the lay witnesses' statements with regard to 

the imposition of the death sentence in this case as 

"recommendations" to the trial court, or that the trial court 

received them as such. Rather, we believe these statements were 

received by the trial court as expressions of the depth of the 

witnesses' feelings concerning the impact of these crimes. 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Predicate Determination

 The record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial 

court's finding of future dangerousness. Beck attempts to 

minimize the evidence of his prior criminal history and 

subsequent violent acts while incarcerated. This evidence, 

however, must be considered not in isolation, but in the context 

of the present offenses. The circumstances surrounding the 

commission of the capital murder of Miller were sufficient to 

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Beck would commit future 

criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 

threat to society. See Code § 19.2-264.4(C); Murphy, 246 Va. at 

144, 431 S.E.2d at 53. By his own admission, Beck planned and 

executed that murder, in the process killing his cousin Marks, 

and then remaining at the crime scene to kill Kaplan. These 

facts, along with the evidence of Beck's prior and subsequent 

actions, provided sufficient evidence from which the trial court 

could conclude that Beck placed no value on human life and would 

kill others whenever it suited him to do so. See Goins v. 

Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 468, 470 S.E.2d 114, 131, cert. 

denied, 519 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 222 (1996). 

 Beck's sole contention with respect to the determination of 

vileness is that the term is unconstitutionally vague. We have 

already addressed and rejected this argument in Breard v. 

Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675, cert. denied, 

513 U.S. 971 (1994). A finding of "vileness" must be based on 

conduct which is "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 

inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an 
aggravated battery to the victim." Code § 19.2-264.2. Proof of 

any one of these three components will support a finding of 

vileness. Id.; Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 411, 422 

S.E.2d 380, 395 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993). We 

hold that the evidence sufficiently established Beck's depravity 

of mind to warrant a finding of vileness. 

B. Proportionality Review

 Code § 17-110.1(C) requires us to review the death sentences 

imposed on Beck to determine whether (1) they were imposed under 

the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary 

factor; or (2) they are excessive or disproportionate to the 

penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crimes and 

the defendant. We will combine the review required by statute 

with the identical issues raised by Beck in his appeal. 

 In support of his contention that the death sentences were 

imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other 

arbitrary factor, Beck asserts that the trial court failed to 

give consideration to mitigating evidence. This argument is 

merely conclusory and we find nothing in the record to support 

it. To the contrary, the record contains the trial judge's 

statement that he "carefully considered the aggravating and the 

mitigating circumstances found to exist in this case," and the 

judgment orders state that the trial court took into 

consideration "all of the evidence in the case." See Boggs v. 

Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 522, 331 S.E.2d 407, 422 (1985), cert. 

denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986). Additionally, our independent 

review of the trial record fails to disclose that the sentences 
of death were imposed under the influence of any of the statutory 

factors. 

 In conducting our proportionality review, we must determine 

"whether other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally 

impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, 

considering both the crime and the defendant." Jenkins v. 

Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), cert.

denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993); see also Code § 17-110.1(C)(2). We 

have examined the records of all capital murder cases reviewed by 

this Court, under Code § 17-110.1(E), including those cases in 

which a life sentence was imposed. We have given particular 

attention to those cases in which the death penalty was based on 

both the "future dangerousness" and the "vileness" predicates. 

 Based on this review, we conclude that Beck's death 

sentences are not excessive or disproportionate to penalties 

generally imposed by other sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth 

for comparable crimes. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra; Briley v. 

Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563, 273 S.E.2d 57 (1980); Stamper, supra. 

VI. Conclusion 

 We find no reversible error in the judgments of the trial 

court. Having reviewed Beck's death sentences pursuant to Code 

§ 17-110.1, we decline to commute the sentences of death. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgments. 

Affirmed.