IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2018-CA-00476-COA RAYMOND EARL REYNOLDS APPELLANT

v. ELIZ ABETH KAY HENRY REYNOLDS APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT 01/29/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. GERALD MARION MARTIN COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LAW RENCE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MATTHEW ALLEN BALDRIDGE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JOSEPH A. FERNALD JR. JAMIE NICOLE HARDISON-EDW ARDS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 12/17/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., TINDELL, McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ. TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. On January 29, 2018, the Law r e n c e County Chancery Court granted a n irreconcilabledif f erences divorce to Ray

m ond Rey

nolds and E lizabeth “Kay ” R ey nolds. In his f

indings of f a c t, conclusions of law, and f inal judgm ent of divorce, the chancellor m ade the f ollowing determ inations: (1) Ray

m ond was required to pay a ny outstanding debt on the couple’s 2012 Ford F ocus; (2) Kay was a warded $4,200, or half , of the m arital equity in the couple’s f orm er

m arital hom e; and (3) Kay was awarded lum p-sum a lim ony in th e a mo unt of $19,500. Ray m ond now appeals, arguing that the chancellor’s f oregoing determ inations were

erroneous. Finding no error, we af f irm the chancellor’s f

indings of f

act, conclusions of law,and f

inal judgm ent. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Ray

m ond and Kay were m arried on Novem ber 16, 2000, until their separation on o r

a b o ut May 24, 2013. On Septem ber 17, 2013, Kay f

iled her com

p laint f or d ivor c e a n d

m otion f or tem porary relief

, and Ray m ond f iled h is a n swer and counterclaim f or divorce on October 3, 2013. B oth parties requested a f ault-based d ivorc e o r , a lternatively , an irreconcilable-dif

f erences divorce. ¶3. Ray

m ond and Kay had two children during their m arri a g e, one of w hom died prior

to the divorce p r oceedings. On M a y 20, 2014, the c hancellor entered an o rder f or tem porary relief that granted tem

porary joint custody of t he couple’s surviving child, granted Ray m ond

tem porary use and possession of the m arital hom e, a nd e njoined b oth parties f rom liquidating or transf erring any assets during this tim e. ¶4. On January 4, 2015, upon a joint m otion by the parties, the chancellor entered an order withdrawing the p arties’ f ault-based divorce pleadings and allowing Ray mo n d and Kay to proceed with an irreconcilable-dif f erences divorce. That sam e day , Ray m ond and Kay f

iled

a c onsent to divorce, wherein they agreed to allow the chancellor t o d e c i d e t he f ollowing issues: (1) child custody , ( 2) visitation, (3) child support, (4) equitable d istribution of m arital assets, (5) obligation to pay t he rem aining de b t o f t h e couple’s 2012 Ford Focus, and (6)

assessm ent of

attorney ’s f

ees, if any . ¶5. Divorce p r o ceedings took place over nine d ay s in 2015 and 2016. On the f inal day of trial, Ray

m ond and K ay cam e to an a g r e e m e n t a s to c ustody a nd visitation of their

2surviving child, leaving a ll rem aining issues f or the chancellor’s determ ination. O n January 29, 2018, the chancellor entered his f indings of f

act, c onclusions of law, and f inal j udgm ent of divorce. In the f

inal judgm ent, the chan cellor granted Ray m ond and Kay an i r r e c oncilable-dif

f erences divorce and m ade t he f o llowing determ inations pertinent to this appeal: (1) Kay was awarded use, ownership, and possession o f t h e couple’s 2012 Ford Focus; (2) Ray

m ond was obligated to pay all outstanding debt on the 2 012 F ord Focus; (3) Kay was awarded $19,500 i n lum p-sum alim ony ; and (4) K ay was awarded $4,200 as her equitable distribution of the couple’s m arital pro p e r t y . Aggrieved by the chancellor’s determ inations and f

inal judgm ent, Ray

m ond now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6. We apply a lim ited standard of review when e xam ining a chancellor’s d e c i s i o n i n dom estic-relations m a tters. W i lliams v. W

i lliams , 2 24 So. 3d 1 282, 1284 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). “Chancellors are af f orded w ide latitude in f ashio n i n g e q uitable rem edies in dom estic[ -]relations m atters, and their decisions will not be reversed if the f indings of

f act

are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.” Henderson v. H enderson , 757 So. 2d 2 8 5, 2 89 (¶19) (Miss. 2000). W e review “the f a cts of a divorce decree in a light m ost f avorable to the a

ppellee,” and unless the chancellor’s judgm ent was m a n if estly wrong or clearly erroneous, or the c hancellor applied an e r roneous legal standard, the judgm ent should stand. Fisher v. Fisher , 771 So. 2d 364, 367 (¶8) (Miss. 2000). ¶7. Specif

i cally , we review a chancellor’s judgm ent of property division “to ensure that the chancellor f

ollowed the appropriate standards a n d did n ot a buse his d iscretion.” W

ells v.

3W

ells , 800 So. 2d 1 2 39, 1243 ( ¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). “Alim ony awards are [ also] within the sound discretion o f t he chancellor.” Speed v. Speed , 757 So

. 2 d 2 2 1 , 2 2 4 (¶6) (Miss. 2000) (citing McEachern v. McEachern , 605 So. 2d 809, 814 (Miss. 1992)).
ANALYSIS ¶8. On appeal, R ay

m ond takes issue with the chancellor’s dist r i b u t i o n of the couple’s

m arital assets a nd m arital debt and his decision to award alim ony . “Mississippi law requires equitable distribution of the m arital estate during divorce proceedings.” Gr i n er v. Griner , 235 So. 3d 177, 184 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) ( citing Owen v. Owen , 798 So. 2d 394, 399 (¶14) (Miss. 2001)). “W hen t he parties requ e s t t hat the chancellor resolve t he issue of property d ivision, t he chancellor m ust do three things: ( 1 ) c l assif y t he parties’ assets as

m arital or separate, (2) value those assets, and (3) divide the m arital assets eq u i t a b l y . ” Burnham v. B urnha m , 185 So. 3d 358, 361 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (citations and internal quotation m arks om itted). Bef ore d ividing the m arital property , the chancellor m ust

em ploy the f actors set f

orth in Ferguson v. Ferguson , 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994), keeping in m ind the am ount of n onm arital property belonging t o the parties. See B urnham , 185 So. 3d at 361 (¶¶12-13). ¶9. The Ferguson f

actors are: (1) contribution to the accum ulation of property ; (2) dissipation of

assets; (3) the m arket or em otional value of the assets subject to distribution; (4) the value of

assets not subject to distribution;

4(5) the tax and econom ic consequences of the distribution; (6) the extent to which property division m a y

elim inate the need f

or alim ony ; (7) the f

inancial security

needs of the parties; and (8) any other f

actor that in equity

should be considered. Ferguson , 639 So. 2d at 928. “[ E]quitable distribution of property does n ot necessarily m ean

an equal division of property .” C arter v. Carter , 98 So. 3d. 1109, 1113 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Rather, “f

airness is the prevailing guideline in m arital division.” Ferguson , 639 So. 2d at 929. In reviewing a chancell o r ’ s j u dgm e nt this Court only analy zes the chancellor’s f indings in apply ing the Ferguson f actors; “ w e do not conduct the Ferguson analy sis anew.” Carter , 98 So. 3d at 1112 (¶9). As long as the chancellor properly applies Ferguson , we

m ust allow the distribution to s tand. Id

. at 1113 (¶12). Finally , “af ter equitable division, an equitable def

icit exists, the chancellor then should consider alim ony .” Carn ey v. C arney , 201 So. 3d 432, 440 (¶28) (Miss. 2016). ¶10. In his f

orty -three-page f

indings of f

a ct, c o n c l u sions o f law, and f inal judgm ent, the chancellor p rovided a detailed analy sis of each Ferguson f actor bef ore d e t e rm ining the distribution of the couple’s m a r i t a l assets. The chancellor determ ined that b oth Ray m ond and
K a y h a d signif

icantly c ontributed to the accum ulation of the m arital property

. During th e

m arriage, Ray

m ond prim arily worked of f shore w h i le Kay prim arily t ended to the m arital hom e a nd cared f

or the couple’s two children. K ay later received education a n d training as a licensed practical nurse (LPN), allowing her to contribute econom ically to the m arriage. ¶11. The c hancellor determ ined that, at the tim e of the trial, Ray

m ond and Kay both had

5s i mi l a r incom es and had incurred very lim ited am ounts o f debt during the m arriage. T h e

chancellor also f

ound that no u nreasonable dissipation or waste of assets occurred by either party

. ¶12. Regarding the valuation of the real and personal property , the c hancellor noted that neither party p rovided the court with specif ic values of the couple’s personal property other tha n the vehicles. The chancellor also acknowledged t hat Ray m ond purchased the m arital hom e and surrounding property prior to the m arriage a n d that the nonm arital equity totaled $40,200. The parties stipulated, h o w e v er, that the property had m arital equity of $8,400. Also, the chancellor determ ined that the em otional value of the real property and m ost of the vehicles was attributable to Ray m ond. ¶13. W i th regard to tax and econom ic conseq u e n c e s , t h e chancellor f

o und that neither party should be signif

icantly im pacted. H owever, t he c hancellor did a cknowledge a need to divide retireme n t a c c ounts equally to c ure t he f o reseeable d ef

icit to K ay ’ s s e parate estate by not receiving any real property and receiving lim ited personal property

. The chancellor f inally determ ined that both Ray m ond and Kay possessed sim ilar earning potential and ability to

m aintain their separate estates m oving f o rward. ¶14. The chanc e l l o r u l t i ma t ely awarded R a y m ond $40,200 of nonm arital e quity in the

ma r i t a l h om e. The chancellor e qually divided the r em a i ning m arital equity in the hom e, awarding R ay

m ond and Kay $4,200 each, or half , of the m arital equity

. W hile Ray m ond was awarded p o s session a nd exclusive use o f the m arital h om e, the chancellor determ ined that Kay ’s portion o f the m arital equity would b e paid through lum p-sum alim ony . The

6chancellor equally divided the total value of all retirem e nt accounts, awarding both Ray m ond and Kay with $71,401.40 in retirem ent assets. ¶15. Pursuant to t he parties’ agreem e nt, the chancellor awar d e d K a y t h e couple’s 2012 Ford Focus, valued at $16,000. Ray m o nd was awarded the rem aining seven vehicles, which possessed a total value o f $26,350. Ray m o nd was also a warded a ll personal assets identif ied

to t he c hancellor, including f urniture, appliances, t elevisions, a nd com p uters, which totaled $3,500. Any other unidentif i ed personal assets were a warded to the s pouse in possession of those item s. ¶16. The chancellor noted that, while Ray m ond a n d Kay h ad their own p ersonal debts, the only debt subm i tted bef

ore the chancellor f

o r d istribution was the pay m ent of the rem aining $9,000 balance on the couple’s 2012 Ford F ocus. W hile the parties a g reed to aw ard the vehicle to Kay , t he c hancellor determ ined that Ray m ond had been prim arily responsible f or all pay m e n ts on the vehicle. The chancellor assigned t h e rem a i ning debt o n t he vehicle to Ray m ond and credited him

$9,000 to pay

of f the vehicle. ¶17. Finally , d

ue to the lim ited n u mb e r a n d n a t u re of available m arital assets and the $40,200 in s eparate p r o p e r t y owned by Ray m ond, the chancellor determ i ned that it was
necessary to award lum

p-sum alim ony to Kay

. Accordingly , the chancellor awarded Kay $19,500 in lum

p-sum alim ony , to be pay able in $300 installm ents over sixty -f ive m onths. ¶18. In total, Kay was lef t with $96,400 ($106,900 of m arital equity m inus $ 1 0 , 5 0 0 i n personal debt). Ray

m ond was lef

t with $109,950 ($109,650 of m arital equity m inus $9,000
in m arital debt m i nus $19,500 i n lum p-sum alim on y mi n u s $11,400 in personal debt plus

7$40,200 in separate, nonm arital propert y ). Ray m ond now appeals the chancellor’s distribution a

n d l um p-sum a lim ony award, a rguing that s ubstantial evidence does not support the chancellor’s decisions.
I. Whether the chancellor er r oneously failed t o consider the $6,000 Kay rem oved f

rom the couple ’ s j o i nt checking account in t he equitable distribution. ¶19. Prior to distribution, the chancellor entered a tem porary order o n May 20, 2014, which enjoined the parties f

r om liquidating, transf

erring, or changing benef

iciaries f or any m arital

assets. Ray

m ond claim s that Kay transf erred approxim ately $6,000 f rom t he couple’s joint

c hecking account af

ter this order was entered. Ray m ond now argues t hat the cha n c e l l o r abu s e d h i s discretion b y f ailing to consider this t ransf er in h is Ferguson analy sis bef ore distributing the couple’s m arital assets. ¶20. The second Ferguson f actor requires the chancellor t o consider any dissipation of the

m arital assets, or “the d egree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn o r otherwise disposed of m arital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreem ent, decree or otherwise.” Ferguson , 639 So. 2d at 9 2 8

. W h ile Mississippi has no specif ic test f or discerning the d issipation of m arit a l a s s ets, “we f ind it reasonable when c onsidering if

m arital assets h a ve been d i s s i p a ted to look to whether the assets i n q uestion were actually wasted or m isused.” Smith v. Smith , 90 So. 3d 1259, 1268 (¶37) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). ¶21. In h i s f

i n a l j u d g me n t , the chancellor stated t hat h e did not f ind any unreasonable dissipation of m a rital assets by either party prior to the injunction of the tem p orary order or prior to trial. Ray

m ond disagrees with this f inding, arguing that he provided the chancellor

8with undisputed testim ony that Kay took app r o x i m ately $6,000 f rom t he parties’ joint checking account in violation of the tem porary order and that t he chancellor f ailed t o include this in his Ferguson analy sis. However, Kay disput e d R a y mo n d’s t estim ony herself by testif y ing that Ray

m ond a ctually withdrew $7,000 f rom t he joint checking account, and she did not. S he f

urther testif

ied that when she withdrew f rom the a c c o u n t , t here was only approxim a tely

$1,000 lef

t in the account. ¶22. A l s o , a s K ay asserts in her brief , no evidence exists in t he record establishing if or exactly when any transf

ers f rom the joint checking account would have occurred. Ray m ond provided no docum enta t i o n of t he alleged transf er to the chancellor p rior to or d uring the trial. The only evidence Ray m ond u sed to establish this claim is his own testim ony and nothing m ore. As such, the chancellor had n o substantial evidence of Kay ’s alleged transf er bef ore h im to incor p o rate into his Ferguson analy sis. W e theref ore f ind Ray m ond’s
argum ent to be without m e rit and f ind that the chancellor was w ell within his discretion in determ ining that no dissipation of assets occurred.
II. Whether the c hancellor ab u sed his discretion by equally dividing the equity in the m arital hom e. ¶23. Ray

m ond a lso argues that t he chancellor e r roneously awarded $4,200, or half , of the

m arital equity in the couple’s hom e to Kay

. Ray m ond contends that K ay was not entitled to half of the m arital equity in the h om e because she f ailed to prove that she contributed to the

m aintenance of

the hom e. ¶24. The f

irst Ferguson f

actor requires the chance l l o r t o c o nsider each s p ouse’s signif icant

c ontributions to the accum ulation of the property , which includes any econo m i c

9contributions, m arital and f am ilial relationship contributions, and contributions which have
any bearing on the earning power of a spouse. Ferguson , 639 So. 2d at 934. “ A spouse who has m ade a m aterial c ontribution toward the acquisition of property [ ,] which is titled in the

nam e of the other[ ,] m ay claim an equitable interest i n such jointly accum u lated property in c i dent t o a divorce proceeding.” Id

. at 935. In d ivorce cases, there is a presum ption that “the contributions and ef f orts of t h e m arital partners, whether e c onom ic, dom estic or otherwise are of e qual value.” H e m s l e y v
. H e m s l ey , 639 So. 2d 9 09, 9 15 (Miss. 1994). Furtherm o re, o ur suprem e c ourt has acknowledged t he n onm oneta r y c o n t ributions of a housewif e and caregiver and has allowed this spouse to obtain an e q uitable interest i n m arital property so as to lessen the unf airness previou s l y p l aced upon the traditional h ousewif e. Ferguson , 639 So. 2d at 926. ¶25. A s s t a t e d , t h e c h a n c e l lor f ound t hat both Ray

m ond and Kay m ade signi f i c a n t contributions to the accum ulation of the m arital property

. W hi l e R a y m ond brought in the

m ajority of the household incom e during the m arriage, Kay was prim arily responsible f or the upkeep of the m a rital h om e and served as the prim ary caregiver f or the couple’s two children. During the course of the couple’s seventeen-y ear m arriage, Ray m ond’s of

f shore job required him to be gone f

or m o re than half

of each m onth of the y ear, leaving the m arital hom e and children within the sole care o f Kay during that t i m e . A l s o , as soon as K ay received her education and training as an L PN, Kay began to contribute m onetarily to the m arital property while m aintaining her job taking care of the m a rital hom e a n d children. ¶26. C o n t r ary t o Ray

m ond’s assertions, the r e c o r d c e r t a i n l y r e f l e c t s t h a t K a y d i d

1 0signif

icantly contribute to the accum ulation of the m arital property

. F u r t h e r , R a y m o n d w a s awarded the m ajority of the m arital estate, including the m arital h om e. As s uch, we f ind that substantial evidence s upported t he chancellor’s d ecision to award half o f the m arital equity in the hom e to Kay , and, theref ore, the chancellor acted within his discretion in doing so.
III. Whether t he chancellor erroneously determ ined that Ray m ond should pay the rem aining debt on the 2012 Ford Focus. ¶27. In June 2012, a y ear bef ore the couple’s separation, Ray m ond p urchased a 2012 Ford
Focus. Kay prim arily drove the vehicle w hile Ray m ond m ade all the p ay

m ents and paid all applicable taxes and insurance on the vehicle. In t heir consent to divorce, the parties agreed that Kay would receive ownership a n d p o ssession of F ord Focus but subm i tted to the chancellor the issue of

who would pay

the rem a ining debt on the vehicle. ¶28. Prior to trial and in com pliance with Mississippi Unif o rm Chancery Court R

ule 8.05, 1 Ray m ond and Kay both f

iled f inancial disclosure statem ents with the court. The vehicle was

n o t l i sted as debt in Kay ’s f inancial s tatem ent but was listed in Ray m ond’s statem ent with

a $9, 0 0 0 r e ma ining balance. Also, both parties adm itted at trial that Ray m ond was still

m aking all pay

m ents on the vehicle up until that point. In his f inal j udgm ent, the chancellor awarded the Ford Focus t o K ay while awarding all rem aining vehicles to Ray m ond. Because the outstanding d ebt o n the vehicle was listed on Ray m o nd’s Rule 8.05 statem ent r ather than

1 M i s s i s s i p p i U n if

o rm R u le o f C h an cery C o u rt 8 .0 5 req u i res p arties i n d o m esticrelatio n s d isp u tes in v o lv in g eco n o m ic issu e s an d / o r p ro p erty d iv isio n to su b m it to th e ch an cello r: ( 1 ) “[ a] d etailed w r itten statem en t o f actu al in co m e an d e x p en ses a n d assets an d liab ilities”; (2 ) F ed e ral an d S tate In co m e T a x retu rn s o r W-2 s f ro m th e p rev io u s y ear; an d (3 ) a d escrip tio n o f th e p arty ’ s e m p lo y m en t h isto ry an d earn in g s d u r in g th e m arriag e. U C C R 8 .0 5 (a). 1 1on Kay ’ s s tatem ent, the chancellor determ ined that Ray m o nd had been p rim arily responsible f or the debt since the vehicle was purchased. The chancellor ordered Ray m ond to pay any outstanding debt on the vehicle a nd credited Ray m ond with $9,000 toward that pay m ent, as listed on Ray

m ond’s R ule 8.05 statem ent. Ray

m ond now a rgues that the chancellor abused his discretion by

requiring Ray

m ond to pay

the outstanding debt on the vehicle. ¶29. Equitable distribution also includes the d ivision o f m arital d ebt. Carter , 98 So. 3d at
1114 (¶15). In this case, the parties stipulated that the Ford Focus was a m arital asset with

a v alue o f $16,000. The parties also agreed that Kay would be awarded this asset. However, Ray m ond now argues that the chancellor f a iled to p roperly apply Ferguson and apportioned the vehicle’s debt inequitably

. Ray m ond claim s that Kay continued driving the vehicle while he “alm ost com

pletely f ooted the bill.” Also, Ray m ond notes that Kay provided no evidence of her contribution to the vehicle, nor does she include the vehicle as a d ebt on her Rule 8.05

statem ent. As such, Ray m o n d a sserts tha t t h ere is no evidentiary basis as to why the chancellor held him

accountable f

or the rem aining debt on the vehicle. ¶30. Because the parties m utually agreed in t heir consent to divorce t o award Kay with the Ford Focus, the chancellor’s only task was t o apportion the outstanding debt of the vehicle

to t he parties. Although Ray m ond continued to m ake t he m o nthly pay me n t s , both parties adm itted that K ay s olely drove and m aintained th e vehicle throughout t hat tim e. Also, in assigning this debt to Ray m ond, the chancellor credited him with the $9,000 to pay of f the outstanding debt, as docum ented in Ray m ond’s Rule 8.05 statem ent. ¶31. W e are also m indf

ul that, during distribution, t he chancellor voiced a prim a ry concern

1 2about the lim ited num ber of assets available f

or distribution a nd the size of R ay m ond ’s separate e s tate com

pared to K ay ’s separate estate once all of t he assets w ere distributed. The chancellor acknowledged that K ay received no real property , had no e quity i n t e r e s t i n a hom e, a nd received no tangible, m arital assets other than the Ford Focus. On the contrary , Ray m ond received $109,650 i n m arital assets, including the m arital hom e , seven vehicles, personal assets, and retirem e nt assets, in addition to his own separate, nonm a rital property worth $ 40,200. W hile Ray m ond and Kay w alked away f r om the m arriage with p ersonal debt of $11,400 and $10,500, r espectivel y , t h e o n ly m arital debt lef t f or the chancellor’s determ ination was the outstanding balance on the 2012 Ford Focus. ¶32. This Court has previously f ound nothing inequitable i n a chancellor’s assignm ent o f

m arital debt to a s pouse receiving a m uch larger portion of t he m arital estate. See Carter , 98 So. 3d at 1114 (¶¶15-18); see also Seymour v. Seymour , 960 So. 2d 513, 519 (¶¶13-15) (Miss. C t. App. 2 006) ( a f

f irm ing a chancellor’s a ssignm ent of the rem ainder of t he m ortgage of the m arital hom e to t he husband, because t he husband’s separate estate and incom e were l arger); Humphries v
. Humphries , 904 So. 2 d 192, 1 98-99 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. A p p . 2 0 0 5 ) (af f irm ing the chancellor’s assignm ent of the m arital debt to the h usband in order to balance

t h e h u s band’s f

inancial s tability against the wif e ’s f inancial stability )

. Ray

m o nd walke d
away f rom the m arriage w ith a m u ch larger separate estate and also continued to pay on the vehicle throughout the entire divorce proceedings. In apply ing our s am e logic to the current

case, w e f

ind nothing inherently inequitable ab o u t t h e c h ancellor’s decision to a ssign the $9,000 of outstanding m arital debt t o Ray m ond. W e a lso f

ind that substa n t i a l , c r e d ible

1 3evidence supports the chance l l o r ’ s decision and that t he chancellor did not a buse his discretion.
IV. Whether the c hancel l or erroneously aw arded $19,500 in lum p-sum alim ony to Kay . ¶33. Last, Ray

m on d a r g u e s t h at the chancellor abused his discretion b y awarding Kay $19,500 of l um

p -sum alim ony . Ray

m ond f u rther asserts that because the c h ancellor f ailed

to consider a ny m isconduct b y Kay in his analy sis, the chancellor’s determ ination to award alim ony was based upon an erroneous legal standard. ¶34. An award of alim ony is largely within the chancellor’s discretion. Carney , 201 So. 3d at 440 (¶28). Regarding lum p-sum alim ony , this Court has said:
L u mp - s u m a l i mony . . . is a f ixed and irrevocable am ount, used e i t h e r a s alim ony or as a part of

property division. It m a y be pay able as a single, lum p sum ( as its nam e im

plies) or in f

ixed periodic installm ents. Lum p -sum alim ony has been described as a m eans o f adjusting f inancial inequities that r e ma in af ter property division. I t i s intended as an equalizer between t he parties to serve e quity am ongst them com pletely once a nd f

or al l

. W hen lum

p-sum alim ony i s awarded as a m echanism to equitably divide t he m arital assets, t hen chancellors m a y c onduct their analy sis under the F erguson f actors. However, when a chancellor awards l um p-sum . . . alim ony af

ter equitably dividing the estate, the chancellor should consider the Armstrong f actors. Castle v
. C

astle , 266 So. 3d 1042, 1051 (¶38) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 018) (quoting Stroh v. Stroh , 221 So. 3d 399, 413 (¶45) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). ¶35. In this c ase, the chancellor awa r d e d l u mp - s u m a l i mo n y i n c o nnection with the equitable distribution of the m arital assets and theref ore properly considered the Ferguson f actors in his determ ination. The chancellor determ ined that a v ery l im ited n u m b e r a n d

nature of the a vailable a ssets e xisted f or distribution b etween Ray m ond a nd Kay

. Af

ter

1 4equitable distribution, Ray m ond received m a r i t a l assets totaling $ 109,650, including retirem ent assets, the m arital h om e, $26,350 w orth of autom obiles, a nd $3,500 of equity in other personal p roperty , while K ay received approxim ately $87,400, includin g retirem ent
assets and $16,000 of equity in t he couple’s 2012 Ford Focus. The chancellor then awarded Kay w i t h $19,500 in lum p-sum alim ony based in part on the def icit between the couple’s separate estates that resulted f rom the distribution of t he assets. ¶36. Ray

m ond a rgues that in apply ing F e r g u s o n , t h e chancellor erroneously f ailed to consider Kay ’s m i sconduct when dividing the m arital e state. Ray m o nd c laim s that although the parties agreed to a n i rreconcilable

- dif f e r ences divorce, Kay ’ s dissipation o f assets and estrangem ent f

rom the couple’s child contributed to the end o f the m arriage. As discussed earlier, the chancellor provided a thorough Ferguson analy sis in h is equitable distribution of the couple’s m arital a ssets and determ ined that no u nreasonable dissipation of m a rital assets occurred. W e f

ind no evidence in the record to t he contrary a nd agree w i th t he chancellor’s f indings regarding dissipation of the assets. ¶37. Regarding the m inor child, the chancellor f o und that, despite any contentiousness that existed b etween Ray

m ond and Kay relating to their child, the couple ultim ately cam e to an

a g r e e me n t r egarding custody and visitation that was within the b est interest of the child

. Ray m ond is correct that f

a ult m ay be considered in an award of a lim ony . Lauro v. Lauro , 847 So. 2d 843, 848 (¶11) ( Miss. 2003). However, the purpose of alim o ny is not to punish but t o a s s i s t a spouse in his or her transition to l if e o utside of the m arriage. Mamiaro v. Mamiaro , 179 So. 3d 51, 54 ( ¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). Again, we note that the chancellor

1 5considered e v e r y a p p l i c able Ferguson f actor and awarded Ray

m ond a large portion of the

m arital estate. The suprem e c o urt has held that the single m ost im portant f actor when the chancellor considers a n award of lum p-sum alim ony i s the disparity of the separate estates. Castle , 266 So. 3 d at 1052. Because such disparity existed between Ray m ond’s and Kay ’s

e s t a t e s a ft e r e q

u i t a b l e distribution, we f

ind that substantial e v idence supports the chancellor’ s decision to award lum

p -sum alim o ny to Kay

. W e theref ore f ind n o abuse of discretion here.
CONCLUSION ¶38. Upon review, w e f ind that s ubstantial evidence s u pports the chancellor’s distribution of t he couple’s m arital property and award of lum p-sum alim ony to K ay . W e theref ore f ind no abuse of

discretion and af

f irm the chancellor’s f

inal judgm ent. ¶39. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., C ARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WE S T B R OOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. W ILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

1 6