U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

29–815PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

LIBYA FRACTURED: THE STRUGGLE FOR UNITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 18, 2018

Serial No. 115–125

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign 

Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service .......... 6

Frederic Wehrey, Ph.D., senior fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ........................................................................ 23

Ms. Alice Hunt Friend, senior fellow, International Security Program, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 30

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Christopher Blanchard: Prepared statement ................................................. 8

Frederic Wehrey, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 25

Ms. Alice Hunt Friend: Prepared statement ......................................................... 32

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 56

(1)

LIBYA FRACTURED:

THE STRUGGLE FOR UNITY 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and my friend, the ranking member Deutch, for 

5 minutes each for our opening statement, I then will recognize 

other members seeking recognition as well. 

We will then hear from our witnesses. Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the record. 

And members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

Nearly 7 years after Qaddafi’s removal, Libya remains mired in 

civil conflict, political division, lawlessness, and economic crisis, 

with few signs of abating anytime soon. ISIS and al-Qaeda, though 

seriously degraded, are regrouping, and as we have seen in a series 

of car bombings this year, they are still very much capable of violence. Despite backing by the United Nations and its partners, the 

western-based Government of National Accord, or GNA, has not 

been able to provide security or consolidate power throughout 

Libya’s vast territory, and it continues to clash with eastern-based 

House of Representatives backed by General Haftar and his Libyan 

National Army, or LNA. 

Armed militias, some with ties to the LNA and GNA, profit off 

the lack of security and the rule of law, smuggling drugs, weapons 

and people, and migrants using Libya as a waypoint into Europe, 

suffer horrific treatment at the hands of smugglers, including torture, sexual abuse, and enslavement. 

Adding to the chaos, a host of external actors continue to back 

different Libyan factions with the U.S. and the U.N. supporting the 

GNA; Egypt, the UAE, and Russia supporting Haftar, and Qatar 

and Turkey supporting the country’s Islamist groups. And as we 

saw when three French soldiers were killed fighting ISIS alongside 

Haftar forces in 2016, even France has played both sides, sometimes assisting the U.S. and the GNA while at other times supporting Haftar and his factions. 

2

All of this has made political reconciliation more remote, as both 

sides have dug in their heels and negotiations have stalled. The 

prospect of U.N.-backed elections this year, which were probably 

too soon anyway, also seems to have fallen by the wayside. 

There are some encouraging signs, however, including better governance at the local and municipal levels and growth in the oil sector, which for now has saved Libya’s economy from collapse. And 

it remains to be seen how Haftar’s now-confirmed hospitalization 

in Paris will impact Libya’s fractured state. If he is, indeed, incapacitated, will this be the opening that Libya needs for reconciliation or will there be more chaos as his coalition breaks apart and 

his backers look for a successor? 

With the challenges I have laid out, as well as the competing foreign policy priorities elsewhere, it is perhaps understandable that 

this administration would be wary of spending political capital in 

Libya. The administration does so at its peril, however, as this is 

a problem that is not going away and is only going to get worse 

for the region, for Europe, and for U.S. interests, if it is not addressed. 

Just last month, our U.S. commander in Africa stated that, ‘‘The 

instability in Libya and North Africa may be the most significant 

threat to the U.S. and our allies’ interest on the continent.’’

Our partners in Tunisia and Egypt are already feeling the impact. Mali, Chad, and Sudan have been impacted. And we have 

seen how ISIS networks in Libya can reach into Europe with the 

Manchester and Berlin terror attacks in the last 2 years alone. 

Libya’s instability is a major problem for U.S. interests, and we 

need a concerted effort from this administration to make it a priority. It is past time to appoint a new U.S. Ambassador to Libya. 

And soon, as it is viable from a security standpoint, we need to consider reopening our Embassy in Tripoli to increase engagement on 

the ground. The administration should also fill the empty special 

envoy slot as soon as possible, so that the U.S. has another dedicated diplomat who can work with our partners and coordinate our 

Libya policy, whatever that may be. 

More than anything, more than military aid, more than financial 

aid, Libya needs U.S. leadership, leadership that can corral the 

various countries’ interfering in Libya, leverage our connections, 

and help push the political reconciliation process forward. I urge 

this administration to give Libya the attention that it deserves. 

And with that, I am pleased to yield to my friend, Mr. Deutch, 

the ranking member. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this hearing and for your continued recognition of Libya’s importance. 

I also would like to thank our panel of witnesses for attending 

and for their wealth of knowledge on these vital topics. 

We have all been shaken and horrified by the images and stories 

coming out of Libya, including slave markets, dismal conditions of 

refugee camps, extrajudicial killings, torture in illegal retention facilities, and other human rights violations on a shocking scale. 

These are all issues that desperately need to be tackled and are all 

symptoms of the years without a functional government. 

I am proud that this committee unanimously passed House Resolution 644 strongly condemning the slave auctions of migrants and 

3

refugees in Libya, but we acknowledge the only way to stop these 

evil practices is to see Libya set toward a path of lasting stability. 

Despite the efforts of the United Nations, the internationally brokered Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli, has been 

far from successful. The rise of competing strongmen and militias, 

defined by their quickly changing loyalties, and the persistent 

vacuums allowing terror groups to grow, are preventing the country from moving toward stability. 

And these factors of instability are enabling a humanitarian crisis to fester and worsen, emphasizing the need to address the root 

causes of Libya’s plight. Unfortunately, the country’s trajectory 

does not appear to have been altered over the previous year in any 

way that would suggest that conditions are improving. 

Attempts to bring together warring parties have been hindered 

by fractured loyalties and varying goals. Libya’s economy is disjointed and struggling to rise above the prevailing black market. 

This only serves to promote smuggling, trafficking, and other illicit 

activities. Libyans, who once benefitted from the country’s oil reserves, lack opportunity and job prospects, with youth unemployment now over 40 percent. 

Unfortunately, without functioning institutions, the government 

will continue to lack the ability to put basic structures in place for 

economic improvement. A continued fractured government and persistent security concerns will also prevent investment in the country. 

The implications of Libya’s unrest and instability don’t only 

apply to its own security. Libya’s neighbors are directly impacted 

by the lawlessness, movement in smuggled weapons and trafficked 

people, and a draw for terrorist groups seeking safe haven from regions with stronger rule of law. 

As we have seen in Syria, Russia has attempted to expand its influence by exploiting the Libyan unrest. With little regard for 

human dignity and international law, Russia will not lead Libya toward stability. They only work toward furthering their own interests, likely at odds with our own national security priorities. That 

is why a coherent United States policy, along with the U.S.’s work 

with the U.N. to move Libya in the right direction, becomes even 

more pressing. 

The U.S. has long focused on counterterrorism, pressuring Libya 

to combat the various extremist threats plaguing the country. This 

is continuously challenged by the difficulty in securing Libya’s vast 

desert borders. Border security is further challenged, given the 

chaos of the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa, the use of Libya as a 

transit point for ISIS and al-Qaeda’s allied fighters, and the smuggling of weapons to various terror groups. As conflict persists 

among Libya’s armed forces and militia groups, it appears less and 

less likely that border security will increase. 

We maintain the goal of setting Libya on a course toward stability through a buildup of democratic institutions, the resiliency of 

which is not reliant upon personalities, but upon the framework of 

a functional government. U.S. engagement has been a challenge, 

given that U.S. Embassy personnel continue to operate out of 

Tunis. Nonetheless, we remain committed to democracy and governance and civil society programs. 

4

Of course, the solution for Libya must be ultimately a Libyan solution. We must look at the specific population needs, cultural dynamics, tribal identities, and social conditions to find a path forward that works for Libyans. And despite the obvious challenges, 

it remains in our national security interest, and those of international stability, that we continue to encourage and assist Libya 

in moving toward stability and preventing dangerous transnational 

terror groups from finding safe haven there. Only once good, honest, and comprehensive governance takes hold will the root cause 

of the horrors that we have witnessed be truly addressed. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses as to how Libya can 

best move forward on the path of reconciliation that resists the influence of non-state actors and provides stability and opportunity 

for all of the people of Libya. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, our ranking member. 

And now, I would like to turn to the members of our subcommittee for any opening statements they would like to make, 

and we will start with Mr. DeSantis of Florida. 

Mr. Kinzinger of Illinois? 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I don’t have a lot to say, except that, obviously, we find ourselves 

in a pretty tough situation there, a lot of debate, a lot of questions, 

but I think it is obvious that, with the part of the world that Libya 

is in, and potentially the ramifications for the rest of the world, including Europe, of a failed Libyan state, it is important that we 

stayed engaged. 

Unfortunately, we have been seeing Libya sometimes how we 

have been seeing, for instance, Syria, which is just through the lens 

of a counter-ISIS campaign, which is important, but this is a much 

bigger issue than just a fight against terror. 

So, I appreciate all of you being here, and I want to thank the 

chair for having this hearing. 

And I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Adam. 

Mr. Chabot of Ohio? 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for holding 

this important hearing, and I will be very brief. 

I happened to be the chair of this committee when Qaddafi fell, 

when the so-called Arab Spring was happening, et cetera. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You might have been the cause of all these 

democracy movements. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes, maybe. Maybe. All this democracy. 

But I was in Libya with the Ambassador a month before he and 

three other brave Americans were killed. And so, it was obviously 

a traumatic experience for our country. It is one of the, I think, 

most unfortunate circumstances, not that incident necessarily, but 

just the overall chaos that ensued after the fall and where we are 

now. There is a tremendous amount that needs to be done in Libya. 

Hopefully, this hearing will shed some light on that. And so, I 

thank you very much for holding it. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. That was such a tragedy. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. 

5

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island is recognized. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and the ranking 

member, for holding this hearing. 

Libya has been a difficult challenge for the United States and 

our allies since the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi. As we have seen 

in many other places, it is far easier to topple a government than 

to rebuild a new one. Libya continues to be challenged by political 

fragmentation, rival factions, decentralization, terrorist threats, 

and the challenges of migration. 

I want to take a moment in my opening to recognize and remember the men who were killed in the attack on our consulate in 

Libya in 2002. Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen 

Doherty, and Tyrone Woods served our country with honor and 

gave their lives in defense of our freedoms. 

I thank our witnesses for appearing here today and look forward 

to hearing your perspectives on what we can do to help stabilize 

Libya and ensure a viable path forward, so the people of Libya can 

live in peace. 

Thank you. And with that, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Cicilline. 

Seeing no other requests for time, I am so pleased to recognize 

our witnesses. 

First, we are delighted to welcome Mr. Christopher Blanchard, a 

specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs at the Congressional Research 

Service. Mr. Blanchard has covered developments in Libya since 

2005 and served as an election observer for Libya’s first postQaddafi elections in 2012, very historic. 

Thank you for being here today. We appreciate all the work you 

have done over the years at CRS, and we look forward to your testimony, Mr. Blanchard. 

Next, we are delighted to welcome Dr. Frederic Wehrey. Did I do 

that right? Thank you. He is senior fellow in the Middle East Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a 21-

year veteran of the U.S. Air Force. 

Thank you for your service, Dr. Wehrey. 

He has just had a book published about Libya, and has written 

many articles on Libya and the wider Middle East. 

Thank you for your service again, and thank you for your testimony today, Doctor. 

And finally, we are delighted to welcome Ms. Alice Friend. Is 

that right? Just like that? Okay. Friend, that is a great name. 

She is senior fellow in the International Security Program at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies. Previously, Ms. 

Friend served in various roles at the Department of Defense, including as Principal Director for African Affairs in the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. She has also held numerous 

research positions at CSIS and at the Center for New American Security. 

Thank you for being here today, and we also look forward to your 

testimony. 

As I had said previously, your written testimony will be made a 

part of the record. Please feel free to summarize. 

We will start with you, Mr. Blanchard. 

6

STATEMENT OF MR. CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD, SPECIALIST 

IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, 

AND TRADE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. BLANCHARD. Thank you Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking 

Member Deutch, members of the committee, for inviting me to testify today on behalf of the Congressional Research Service on 

Libya. I will summarize my testimony by briefly making three observations. 

First, as you have discussed, several internal and external factors are disrupting Libya’s post-Qaddafi transition. These factors 

are interrelated and they have been difficult to overcome. For example, transitional leaders and institutions with competing claims 

to legitimacy have accumulated in Libya since 2011. This challenges U.S. preferences to work with and through a single national 

government partner. 

Since December 2015, the U.N. Security Council and the United 

States have recognized the negotiated GNA as Libya’s governing 

authority. This seeks to confer international legitimacy on the GNA 

and to encourage unification. But, nevertheless, the GNA and its 

eastern-Libya-based rivals have made little progress, as you have 

noted. The GNA’s reach remains limited and, importantly, it relies 

on militias for security support. 

In 2017, U.N. officials launched an action plan to move the transition promptly and to renew the legitimacy of these Libyan institutions, but its implementation has faltered. Meanwhile, the power 

of armed non-state groups remains unmatched, and there is a lawless atmosphere that persists. Militias, criminals, and terrorists, including remnants of the Islamic State, operate with impunity in 

some areas, endangering civilians and committing human rights 

abuses. These entities exploit instability and state weakness for political and financial gain. This creates powerful incentives for them 

to maintain the unstable status quo. Thousands of migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons remain particularly vulnerable. 

Many foreign governments are seeking to mitigate transnational 

threats emanating from Libya, and some are actively working to 

shape the transition’s outcome in line with their preferences. 

Libya’s oil resources, its geographic location, and weak institutions 

all raise the stakes of its instability for others. Libyan-based terrorists, traffickers, and armed groups pose risks to U.S. partners in 

North Africa, the Sahel, Europe, and beyond. Locally organized 

Libyan actors cooperate and compete amongst themselves and with 

these outsiders. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the European states are all engaging directly with different Libyan factions 

for a range of specific purposes. 

As my written testimony and reporting for CRS describe in more 

detail, this produces a complex and opaque web of overlapping interests and rivalries. Taken together, these challenges and dynamics are likely to last and to have enduring effects, even if the current mediation efforts improve. 

Second, U.S. policy in Libya has two main goals. It seeks to 

eliminate Libya-based terrorists and combat other transnational 

threats, and it seeks to support the transition to a unified, incluVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:23 May 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\041818\29815 SHIRL
7

sive, and accountable government as the basis for long-term stability. The Trump and Obama administrations have used different 

blends of diplomacy and military operations, sanctions, and foreign 

aid to achieve relatively consistent objectives over time. Diplomatically, the United States is lending support to U.N. mediation rather than seeking to engineer a U.S.-defined solution. Given that 

zero-sum attitudes have divided post-Qaddafi Libya, U.S. policymakers judge that an inclusive, Libyan-defined solution is more 

likely to result in stability than solutions imposed by force or by 

outsiders. Current policy also reflects the judgment that a settlement can’t be reached without international support and coordination. 

So, what more can the United States do to support Libya’s transition? Events since 2011 suggest a series of factors to consider. 

More active U.S. diplomacy and more robust assistance could boost 

actors that share U.S. goals, but also could create enduring costs 

for the United States, link the United States to actors that lack domestic legitimacy, or invite others to intervene similarly. Less active U.S. involvement could reduce diplomatic and financial burdens on the Unites States and could simplify relations with outsiders, but it might also result in less desirable security outcomes. 

If security were to deteriorate rapidly, containment costs could increase, pressure on U.S. partners could rise, and calls for new U.S. 

intervention could emerge. 

Third, for Congress, different scenarios may raise unique questions, but certain topics have been shown to have lasting relevance 

in Libya, regardless of how conditions have evolved. These include 

the balance of U.S. diplomatic, military, and foreign aid efforts; the 

roles of other outside actors; frameworks defined by the U.N. Security Council; funding and terms for U.S. assistance; the selection 

and vetting of U.S. partners, and authorizations for the use of military force. 

This concludes my brief remarks. Thank you for the opportunity 

to testify, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blanchard follows:]

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Statement of 

Christopher M. Blanchard 

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs 

Before 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Hearing on 

"Fractured Libya: The Struggle for Unity" 

April 16, 2018 

Congressional Research Service 

7-5700 

vvvvvv.crs.gov 
9


29815a-2.eps

Thank you Chairnmn Ros-Lchtincn, Ranking Member Deutch, and Members of the committee. for 

imiting me to testifY on behalf of the Congressional Research Service on Libya. 

Overview 

Libya's political transition has been disrupted by anned non-state groups and threatened by the indecision 

and infighting of interim leaders. After an anned uprising ended the 40-plus-year rule ofMuammar al 

Qadhafi in late 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form a stable government, address pressing 

security issues. reshape the country's public finances. or reconcile. Qadhafi lctl state institutions weak and 

depriYed Libyans of experience in self-govemment, compounding stabilization challenges. 

Elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional drafting assembly held in 2012 and 2014 were 

administered transparently. but were marred by declining rates of participation, threats to candidates and 

voters, and zero-sum political competition. Insecurity became prevalent in Libya following the 20 II 

conflict and deepened in 2014, driven by overlapping ideologicaL personaL financial, and transnational 

rivalries. Issues of dispute have included governance, military command, national finances, and control of 

oil infrastructure. 

At present, anned militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters 

of public affairs. An atmosphere of persistent lawlessness has enabled militias, criminals, and Tslamist 

terrorist groups to operate with impunity, fiuther endangering civilians' rights and safety. The United 

Nations (U.N.) Security Council m1d the United States have recognized a Govennnent of National Accord 

(GNA). Based in the capital, Tripoli, it has made little progress in oyercoming disputes that have split the 

country politically ar1d geographically since 2014. A rival governing entity is based in eastern Libya. 

Meanwhile, Libya's remote south suffers ±rom neglect and remains both an arena for domestic conflicts 

m1d a pern1issive transit zone for migrants, criminals. traffickers. and terrorist groups. U.S. Africa 

Command (AFRTCOM) has emphasized the importance of a political solution for stability, and in March 

2018, told Congress that, in light of prevailing tunnoil, ''the risk of a full-scale civil war remains real." 

U.S. officials and other international actors have worked since 2014 to convince Libyan factions m1d their 

various e:..'ten1al supporters that inclusive, representative govenunent and negotiation are preferable to 

competing attempts to achieye dominance through force of arms. The U.N. Security Council has 

authorized financial and travel sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for threatening '·the 

peace. stability or security of Libya,·· obstructing or undem1ining "the successful completion of its 

political transition," or supporting others who do so. A U.N. arms embargo is in place, and U.S. executive 

orders provide for sm1ctions against individuals undcnnining Libya's transition. 

In December 2015, some Libym1lcaders endorsed the U.N.-brokcrcd political agreement to create the 

Govenunent of National Accord to oversee the completion of the transition. GNA Prime Ministerdesignate Fayez al Sarraj and members of a GNA Presidency Council have attempted to implement the 

agreement m1d have competed for influence with political figures m1d anncd forces based in eastern 

Libya. including Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar 's "Libym1 National Arn1y" (LNA) movement. A U.N.-

sponsored Action Plan launched in 2017 seeks to complete Libya's transition during the coming year, and 

Libyans m1d outsiders arc debating tenns ±or its implementation. Previous mediation efforts struggled to 

gain traction, m1d outsiders have at times pursued their own agendas through tics with Libyan factions. 

Such competition by proxy may raise the stakes of Libya's intemal rivalries and complicate negotiations. 

The State Department suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in July 2014 and has delayed 

the reintroduction of U.S. personnel on a pennanent basis in light of prevailing security conditions. U.S. 

diplomats engage with Libym1s m1d monitor U.S. programs in Libya via the Libya External Office (LEO) 

at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia. U.S. military strikes and advice supported some Libyan forces in 

Operation Odyssey Lightning, a 2016 campaign to expel thousands of lslmnic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) 

supporters ±rom the central coastal city of Sirte (Table 1). Periodic U.S. strikes target IS members and 

Cf{S nooT•un,Mv 

PrepBred for Congress--·----------·----------------·-----~----~-------
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29815a-3.eps

other terrorists. U.S ofl:lcials judge that the threats posed by IS members and Al Qaeda have been 

degraded. but note that these groups could resurge if overall political and security conditions deteriorate. 

Table I. Libya Map and Facts 

. 

Zalt.lh 

L I B'(A 

Land Area: 1.76 million sq. km. (slightly larger than Alaska); Boundaries: 4,348 km (-40% more than U.S.-Mexico border); 

Coastline: 1,770 km (more than 30% longer than California coast) 

Population: 6,653,210 Quly 2017 est., in 2015 the U.N. estimated 12% were immigrants), 42.9% <25 years old 

GOP PPP: $63.14 billion: annual real% change: 55.1% (20 17 est.); per capita: $9,800 (20 17 est.) 

Budget (spending: balance): $22.32 billion, deficit 18% of GDP (20 17 est.) 

External Debt: $2.927 billion (December 2017 est.) 

Foreign Exchange Reserves: $69.35 billion {December 2017 est.), $124 billion (20 12 est.) 

Oil and natural gas reserves: 48.36 billion barrels (20 17 est.); 1.505 trillion cubic meters (20 17 est.) 

Source: Congressional Research Service using data from U.S. State Department, Esri, United Nations, and Google Maps. 

Country data from CIA World Factbook, April 20 18. 

CRS TESTiMONY 

Pr.;:;pa:cdforCongn:::ss---------------------------------
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-~~~E?SSIOnal ~~~~--~:':0~':__----------------------------------

Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for limited U.S. transition support and security 

assistance programs for Libya since 2011 and is considering the Tnunp Administration-s request for 

additional assistance funds for FY20 19. Congress continues to shape U.S. policy toward Libya through its 

oversight of existing diplomatic, foreign assistance, and defense activities and its consideration of new 

proposals and requests. Relative resource investment and a lack of physical presence in Libya arguably 

limit U.S. influence on the ground. 

The Administration and some Members of Congress are considering options for future engagement in 

Libya with t>\O interrelated goals: supporting the emergence of a unified_ capable national government, 

and reducing transnational threats posed by terrorists and other actors who have exploited Libya's 

instability Pursuing these objectives simultaneously presents U.S. policymakers with complicated choices 

about relative priorities and the interrelated consequences of a range of options. Points of active 

discussion concen1 

the nature and extent of U.S. partnership with different Libyans: 

the type, timing, and extent of U _s_ assistance; 

the potential utility or costs of sanctions or other coercive measures: and 

the degree of cooperation or confrontation with other outside actors seeking to influence 

developments_ 

These issues will likely shape U.S. policy debates about Libya for the foreseeable future_ 

Background and Current Political Dynamics1 

A Succession of Transitional Governments 

According to Ghassan Salam6, the Special Representative of the UN. Secretary-General (SRSG) and 

head of the UN. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Libyans arc struggling to overcome a political 

''discourse of hatred"' and "mutual exclusion" that has prevented the completion of the country's transition 

to date.' This discourse is in part a legacy of Muammar a! Qadha±i 's decades of divisive rule and in part a 

product of the internal divisions, rampant insecurity, and zero sum competition that has follo\ved 

Qadhafi 's downfall. 

Since 20 II_ a series of transitional governing arrangements (Figure 1) have been endorsed in two national 

elections and a constitutional drafting assembly referendum, but rates of participation have declined over 

time. The net result has been a de facto accrual of transitional leaders with competing claims of 

legitimacy, who have been locked in an inconclusive political struggle. Sustained national civil war has 

been avoided, but violent clashes have occurred in many areas, and the threat of wider conflict persists. 

The most serious outbreak of±ighting between rival Libyan groups occurred in 2014, and ultimately was 

defused through U.N.-backed talks. In December 2015, these negotiations led to an agreement in Skhirat 

Morocco among leading factious to establish a Government of National Accord (GNA) to oversee the 

completion of the transition period that began after Qadha±i-s fall. Rivals in eastern and western Libya 

nominally committed to the agreement, but in practice struggled to preserve their interests and gain 

advantage throughout its two-year implementation period. 

1 Forhackground, see CRS Report RL33142, Uh_va: Transition and U,)'. Policy, h~· Chrislopher M Blanchard. 

2 Remarks ofSRSU Uhassrm Salame to the UniteU Nations Secmity Council, March 21,2018. 'lhe U.N. Secmity Council created 

lJNS:rvtiL as an integrated special political mission in September 2011 (Resolution 2009}"at the request of the Libyan authmities 

to suppmt the cotmtry 's ne\v transitional authorities in their post -conflict efforts.'' See [https:/ /unsmil.munissions.org./mandate]. 

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In western Libya, GNA Prime Minister Fayez a! Sarraj and GNA cabinet members gained administrative 

control over ministries and agencies in Tripoli, but did not fi1lly consolidate their political position or 

establish national security control. The GNA's presence in Tripoli has been secured by the support of 

aligned non-state militias. Some former members of the General National Congress legislature (GNC. 

elected in 20 12) were incorporated into a High Council of State (HCS), which was formed as an advisory 

and consultative body under the 2015 Skhirat agreement (also referred to as the Libyan Political 

Agreement, LPA). 

The leaders of the eastern Libya-based House of Representatives legislature (HOR. elected in 2014) 

signed the 2015 Skhirat agreement, but they have prevented the HOR from fully endorsing the agreement 

and the GNA cabinet, challenging the GNA's claim to national authority. HOR leaders instead have 

supported an eastern Libva-based interim government while partncring with former Qadhati-era military 

officer Klmlifa Haftar and his "Libyan National Anny" (LNA) coalition of military units, militia groups, 

and local fighters. LNA forces declared victory over numerous opposing militia groups in Benghazi last 

year after a costly, destructive three year battle, but the LNA does not appear capable of a military victory 

against rivals in westem Libya in spite of threats to lallllch operations. Forces aligned with the GNA and 

the LNA have clashed in areas of central and southern Libya since mid-2017. even as some of their 

respective commanders and civilian officials have engaged in unity talks sponsored by Egypt. 

Figure 1. Libya's Contested Transition 

(Select Actors and Developments, 2011-2018) 

Source: Congressional Research Service. 

I National 

Election 

Draft 

Constitution 

TESTIMONY 

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The United Nations Action Plan 

The U.N. Security Council has recognized the GNA as Libya·s goveming authority since 2015, in an 

effort to confer intemationallegitimacy on its leaders and encourage unification efforts. When the Skhirat 

agreement reached the end of its originally intended duration in December 2017, the Security Council 

restated its endorsement of the agreement and of the GNA as enduring reference points for the completion 

of Libya's transition to a hoped-for pennanent representative govemment stmcture. UNSMIL in 

September 2017 proposed an 'Action Plan for Libya' to bring the transition period to an end through a 

series of planned democratic exercises, including a constitutional referendum and the election of 

legislative and executive bodies. SRSG Salame has stated his hope that new elections could help 

overcome wh~t he views as the '·shallow legitimacy·· and ··tenuous mandates" of present governing 

arrangements 

The Action Plan initially focused on the negotiation of an1endments to the 2015 Skhirat agreement to 

address issues that have prevented its implementation. These issues include differences O\-er the size and 

role of the GNA's Presidency Council, the assignment of executive authority, and who holds the power to 

approve the leadership of national security bodies and ci vii service institutions. As of April 2018, the 

parties have not agreed to proposed amendments, and SRSG Sal arne has expressed doubt that consensus 

on changes to the Skhirat agreement will emerge 4 In parallel, the HOR and HCS have begun drafting and 

debating laws tor a constitutional referendmn and elections, which. if held. could obviate the need tor 

amendments to current arrangements by granting a mandate to a new executive authority. 

UNSMIL is facilitating discussions among Libyan parties and their intemational backers on these issues 

and also has begun consultations with local actors to inform and build support for a National Dialogue 

conference planned tor later this year. According to SRSG Salamc. some Libyan m1111icipalities arc 

expected to proceed with local elections over the next few months. SRSG Salam6 cites Lmspecified 

polling suggesting that Libyans want to hold national legislative elections 5 He is seeking advance public 

commitments from rival ±actions that they will participate and not interfere .vith the conduct of such 

elections and that they will accept and abide by the outcome. 

Recent Developments and Prospects 

The U.N. Action Plan's original goal for implementation by the end of2018 added renewed urgency to 

efforts to resolve Libya's political crises, but observers and officials have yet to identify any significant 

breakthroughs. The potential prize of a renewed electoral mandate has proven attractive to leading actors 

on all sides, but zero SlLlll political calculations have thus far outweighed efforts to find common grmmd 

and move ahead. A successful national voter registration drive and leaders' continued engagement in 

discussions with UNSMIL arc positive signs,' but rivals also appear to be leveraging the nonimplementation oflegislative and bureaucratic arrangements to intlucncc the scope and pace of progress. 

Specifically, significant decisions regarding electoral legislation and timing have yet to be taken. 

3 Remarks ofSRSG SalamC before the U.N. Secmity Com1cil, March 21,2018. 

.1. SRSG Salaml: told lh~ U.N. s~curily CoLmcil in March 2018 lhallh~ ammdmcnb ~have littl~ chtmc~ ofbL'ing pass~d.-- H~ also 

said, ·-The Action Plan docs not depend on these amendments, and ce1tainly, the closer Liby·a is to elections, the less relevant 

these provisional amendments become.'' lbid. 

5 Address of SRSG tOrT ,ibya Ghassan Salame at the Meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April 12, 201 S. 

0 libya's llig.h National Election Cotmnission (llNUC) chainnm1 Umad Sayeh has moved fo:rwan.l \"\-ith preparations for national 

elections v .. i.th intemational technical assistm1ce.llNLC registered one million new voters from December 2017 to lVI.arch 2018, 

bringing. the registered voter total to more than2.-lmillion, roughly 53% of the eligible voter population. Abclulkader Assad, 

"IINEC: Nmnber of registered voters give credib1lit~y to any elections," Libya Obsen'fT, April9, 2018. 

CRS TESTIMONY 

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The atmosphere at the end of2017 was particularly confrontational, as the Skhirat agreement neared its 

two-year anniversary and LNA leader Khalifa Haftar asserted his view that the agreement and the 

legitimacy of associated institutions had expired. Observers then speculated that Haftar and his supporters 

might resort to unilateral measures and/or seck to impose a solution by force. Timt outcome was avoided, 

but Haftar has pal red subsequent statements about \Vanting elections ··as soon as possible" \Vith statements 

questioning Libya's readiness for democracy and implying that the LNA could resort to other means 7 

In April 20 I R, press reports conceming Haftar 's alleged incapacitation or death-reportedly due to a 

stroke-caused confusion and uncertainty. Analysts and observers arc emphasizing the LNA coalition's 

potentially fractious intemal makeup, speculating about its durability, and discussing the potential related 

implications for Libya's stability. The U.S. government has engaged Haftar and his LNA and HOR 

partners to encourage them to support the U.N. Action Plan, and U.S. engagement with leaders in eastern 

Libya in support of unity and reconciliation efforts would presumably continue in the event oflasting 

leadership change in the LNA or among its political partners. 

In March, members of the High Council of State voted to replace Abderrahman a! Swehli, a powerfid 

western Libyan figure from Misrata and prominent critic of the LNA and HOR, with Khalid al Mcshri of 

the Justice and Constmction movement_ Libya·s Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated party. AI Meshri and 

HOR leaders have agreed to meet_ and their discussions may lead to progress on required legislation for 

planned elections. LNA ofticers and GNA-aftiliated military ofticers also have met for several rounds of 

talks in Cairo as part of an Egyptian govenuuent -led process that seeks to unify and reorganize Libya-s 

national military forces. 

Global concem about the trafficking and detention of migrants in westem Libya has been accompanied by 

increased international attention to the region's political economy and security in recent months. The 

GNA s presence in Tripoli is tmderwritten by the support of powerfid local militia groups, some of whom 

are reportedly involved in human rights abuses_ crime, and illegal detentions (see below). 

The Roles_and Concerns of External Actors in Libya 

The Un~ted States is one external a<;tor'among seve~! seeking to influence Libya's political and security trajector)'< Libya's 

immediate neighbors have been most directly affected by,the unrest and persistent insecurity in the counFry. Foreign fighters 

from Tunisia, Algeria. Egypt,. Niger, ChaQ, and Sudan have travelled to libya to support various armed groups over time, and 

Libya-based extremists and criminal organizations have created security challenges and/or been linked to attacks in several of 

these countries sinCe 20 t I. As noted above, Egypt is engaged io mediation efforts with libyan military figures, leveraging its 

dose ties to ea.stern libya~based lea?ers and the LNA. 

Across the Mediterranean, European countries share concerns, about the transit of migrants from Libya and the presence in 

Lib~ of terrorist groups. The European LJn~n has extended its efforts to respond to migrant transit at sea and initiated new 

efforts tb train libyan coast gt~ard personnel and support Libyan communities that host migrants. France acknowledged 

conducting military operations in libya in 2016 after three of it~ -special forces personnel Were killed there. Italy, which first 

deployed to libya in 20f6,to s:upport and protetta military hospital irl Misrata, approved an increase in its troop deployment iri 

january 2018, with 400 persormel authorized for non-combat mis?ions. Italy also has engaged with western Libyan militias to 

limit traffkker~supported migrant departures by sea. jordan and the Arab Gulf States maintain links to different Libyan factions, 

with the United Arab Emirates having buflt particularly close ties with LNA leaders and others in eastern Libya. 

Russia had dose ties to the Qadf-tafi government and has been more a-ctive in cultivating relationships with libyan actors since 

2014. Rl.lssian officials portray their efforts a~ even handed and open to all sidesJn Libya, but their ties with Haftar and the LNA 

appear to be more robust. These ties may serve a range of purposes, includl•W addressing Russian counterterrorism con<: ems, 

restoring Russian military ties to Libya, and balancing Western European and U.S. influence. U$. military officials expressed 

concern in 2017 that Russian support. for the LNA could expand in violation of the U.~. arms embargo adop1;ed in Security 

Council Resolution 1970 (20{ I), which restricts _unauthorized arms transfers to any Uby'an party and from Libya . 

.. Libyan Anny Commander IIaftm Says Libya Not Yet M1ture for Democracy;· Jeune AJi·ique (Paris), January 7, 2018. 

CRS TESTIMONY 

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Representatives of the GNA. LNA, and other armed groups have traveled to Moscow and engaged with Russian officials. 

-r:he U.N. Panel of Experts established pursuant to.Resolution 1973 {2011) issued a report in June: "2017, documentrng ac~ual and 

potential violations of the Libya arms embargo and waming that foreign support to armed groups in Libya was contribyting to 

escalation}\ The Panel of Experts mandate was most recently extended to November 15, 2.018·in Resolution 2362. 

Energy Resources, Fiscal Considerations, and the Economy 

Conflict and instability in Libya have taken a severe toll on the country ·s economy and weakened its 

fiscal and reserve positions since 2011. As of 2014 estimates, Libya held the largest proven crude oil 

reserves in Africa and the ninth largest globally. Oil and natural gas supply 97% of the govemment 's 

fiscal revenue, and a combination of supply disruptions and market forces caused oil production to 

plummet and devastated national finances from 2014 through 20169 Although state revenue has declined 

from its post-2011 high points, state financial obligations have increased, with public spending on 

sala.ties, imports_ and subsidies all having expanded. 1

u Libyan of:l:icials have identified more than I. 75 

million state employees (equivalent to more than 25% of the population) and estimate that salaries 

consume nearly 60% of the state budget.' 1 Government payments to civiliaus aud militia members have 

continued since the outbreak of con±lict in 2014, and Central Bank authorities have simultaueously paid 

salaries for military and militia forces aligned with opposing sides in the internal conflicts. 

To manage deficits and continue payments of salaries and subsidies, Libyan officials have drmvn on state 

±inaucial reserves, but reports of delays in salary payments persist. World Bank/International Monetary· 

Fund statistics aud U.N. estimates suggest that foreign exchange reserves have fallen from their high 

point of$124 billion in 2012 to an estimated $69 billion in 2017. 12 In August 2017. the U.N. SecretaryGeneral reported that the budget de±icit was then ''much higher thau previously projected" aud predicted 

that foreign currency reserves would remain daugerously low through the end of2017. 11 

An expausion of oil production since mid-2017 has provided a much-needed injection of new finaucial 

resources, with domestic production remaining near I million bpd for most ofthe period from December 

2017 through early April2018. As Libyau production has rebounded, Libya has faced calls from fellow 

OPEC members to participate in the group-s production cut agreement. Libyan authorities reportedly have 

agreed to recognize a cap near the current 1 million bpd level ofproduction. 1

-+ Fighting near the oil 

crescent region aud intermittent shutdowns of pipelines by militias, terrorist attacks, aud labor aud 

property disputes have demonstrated the prospect of potential disruptions or production declines. 

:o;l'i.twl repmt ofthe Panel of:Cxperts on Libya established pmsum1t to resolution 1973 (20 ll.l, U.N. document S/20 17/466. 

9 ll1c estimated budget Jdicit \Vas 49% of GDP in 2015 and was even greater m 2016, a<.; "'hudgd rcvL'11UC:-> and cxporL<.; proceeds 

rcru.:hcd Lhc lo\vcst amounb on record hccau:-;c orlow oil pmduction and prices.'' (Sec Vlorld Bank. Libya· s Fconomic OullookApril 2017 ) As of August 2016. umllict and budget shortfalls had canscd oil production to plummet to below 300,000 barrels 

pL-1 day (bpd) oul of tm overall capacity of 1.6 milhon bpd. Sec. lnLL.nwtional Monctm-y }\md_ "i\rab CoLmlrics in Transition: 

Economic Outlook and Key Challenges'· October 9, 2014; and, Sudarsan Raghavan "As oil output falls, Liby·a is on the verge of 

economic collapse,'· ll'ashing/on Po.sf, April16, 2016. 

10 Salaries and suhs1dies reportedly consumed 93% of the state budget as of September 201 G. Statement of SRSG Martin Kohler 

to the United Nations Security Council, September 13, 201G. 

u Sami Zaptia, ··sem~i spokesperson promises 201g budget Uetails \\ill be revealeU next week,'' Libya llerald, April9, 201g. 

11 WorlU Dank, .MlU.dlc Last and Nmth Africa Economic Monitor_ Lconomic anU Social Inclusion to Prevent Violent Extremism. 

Octo beT 20 16; T1V1F statistics citcU in Mi~s; Ryan, 'Dil-rich Libya. tom h; conllict, may he going hmkc,'· JFashington Post, 

February 1 g, 2015, and 1JNS1\!ITL rq1orl<.;, August 2017. 

13 UN. Document, S/20 17n26, Report ot"the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mi~sion in ljbya, Augu~L22, 

2017. 

I..J Salma r::l Wan.lnny, ··Libyn's Chl Output Revival Thwarted by Pipeline E:..;:plosion,"' Bloomberg, December 26,2017. 

CRS TESTIMONil' 

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In March 2018, SRSG Salamc told the U.N. Security Council that, ''Libya's finances remain precarious. 

Despite the country no\v producing \Veil over lmilhon barrels a day and generating rosy macro-economic 

indicators, the country docs not enjoy a true economic recovery."'" Salamc warned of"signs of a looming 

monetary and fiscal crisis'' and cautioned against "undcrinvcstmcnt or sabotage" of oil revenues. He also 

said that_ ··goven1ment e"<pendinue is bloated and continues to increase, but more spending. so far_ does 

not lead to better services." 

Libyan implementing and auditing agencies have attempted to improve budget execution. but serious 

challenges remain. Among these challenges have been rivalries an1ong parallel leaders of key national 

institutions such as the Central Bank, National Oil Company (NOC). and Libya's sovereign wealth 

fund-the Libya Investment Authority (LIA). These opaque, consequential rivalries have reflected the 

country's underlying political competition overtime. 

Crime, Human Rights, and Trafficking in Persons 

Average Libyans have faced tenuous economic circumstances for much of the post-20ll period amid 

unreliable state salary and subsidy support, weak state service provision and law enforcement. 

inflationary pressures, and hard currency shortages. Authorities in neighboring Tunisia assert that as many 

as !million Libyans have moved there at some point since 2011. Economic hardship has amplified the 

negative effects of deteriorations in local security and an overall decline in respect for the rule of law. In 

March 2018. SRSG Salanu\ told the U.N. Security Council that "Libyan men. women and children are 

increasingly kidnapped for profit," and decried what he described as '·an economic system of predation" 

and "plundering.'' In subsequent press intervie"s he has urged Libyan authorities and international 

supporters to act against prominent organized groups involved in the smuggling of people, fueL 

subsidized goods, and dmgs and to use investigations and sanctions to bring an end to the '·predation of 

public moncy." 1

A 

Prominent armed groups, including the LNA and militias aligned with the GNA, reportedly are linked to a 

vvide variety of illicit activities and Inaint.:tin infonnal detention centers where human rights abuses take 

place. According to a report recently released jointly by the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for 

Hmnan Rights and UNSMIL, "Men, women and children across Libya arc arbitrarily detained or 

unlawfully depriYed of their liberty based on their tribal or family links and perceived political 

affiliations. Victims have little or no recourse to judicial remedy or reparations, while members of anned 

groups enjoy total impunity."'17 

Migrants drawn to Libya in the hope of employment or onward passage f:~ce similar threats. and, in 

February 2018. the U.N. Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that "Refugees and migrants 

continued to be subjected to violence. forced labor. and other grave violations and abuses.'' In 2017, the 

lntemational Organization for Migration (!OM) relayed reports concerning the abuse of migrants 

transiting Libya and of ··slave markets,. operating intennittently in the country~ echoing details in press 

accounts. 1

s 

15 Remmks of SRSG Uhassan Salame to the United Nations Secmity: Com1cil, Mmch 21, 201 g_ 

10 AiUan LC\\1S, ''Libya Vi'on't stabilise unless shaUow economy smasheU- U.N. etwoy;· Reuters, March 29, 201g_ 

~ See Oflice of the 1Jnited Nations High Commissioner tOr Human Right.;; in cooperation \\·ith the United Nations Support 

Mission in Lihy~ "Ahnse Behmd Bars. Arhitrar~· and nnlawl"ul delenlion m Libya,'' Apri1201 S, and, Tim Eaton, "l.ihya's \Var 

Economy: Predalion, Pmliteering and Stale \Veakness,'· Chatham Hmtse, April 201 S. 

tc: IOM, IOM Leams of'Slave M11"lcet' Conditions I.ndange1ing. I.viJ.grants in Nmth Africa, April 11 20 17; and CNN, ··People for 

Sale: E:-;:posing :Migrant Slave Auctions in Libya," November 2017. 

CRS TESTIMONY 

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lntemational actors and the GNA have taken a series of responsive measures since late 2017, "ith some 

migrants repatriated to their countries of origin with U.N. support. 19 TOM reported in Febmary 2018 that 

more than 704,000 migrants were in Libya, among more than 165,000 internally displaced persons and 

more than 48,400 refugees and asylum seekers from other countries identified by the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 

The TOM reported that arriYals of migrants by sea to Italy decreased 34% in 2017 compared to 2016. as 

arrivals declined precipitously following the implementation of an agreement between the Italian 

govemment and some west Libya-based an11ed groups to target traffickers and limit departures. Deaths at 

sea also declined in the central Mediterranean in 2017, reflecting new arrangements and intensified 

rescue-at-sea efforts. As of February 2018,27 EU member states supported the European Union·s 

EUNAVFOR MED naval mission, and the mission reported that it had saved more than 42,000 lives at 

sea since its inception in June 2015_:o 

U.S. Policy 

Terrorist organizations active in Libya and the continuing weakness of Libya's national security bodies 

and government institutions pose a dual risk to U.S. and international security. \\'l1ereas U.S. intervention 

in Libya in 2011 was motivated largely by concern regarding threats posed to Libyans by the Qadhafi 

government, U.S. policy since has been defined by efforts to contain and mitigate the negative effects of 

state collapse and support transition efforts. Operations by Libyan partner forces, backed by U.S. military 

strikes, succeeded in ending the Islamic State organization's control over territory in central and western 

Libya during 2016, but little parallel progress has been made toward achieving durable political 

reconciliation. 

Today, U.S. and Libyan officials in the country's various goven1ing entities share concen1s about 

remaining extremists, the weakness of state institutions, and flows of migrants, refugees, and contraband 

within and across Libya·s largely un-policed borders. Current U.S. efforts focus on supporting the 

implementation of the U.N. Action Plan. preventing Libyan territory from being used to support terrorist 

attacks, and providing stabilization and transition assistance to local communities and national 

govenunent entities. Libya's natural resources and economic potential may provide opportm1ities ±or 

strent,>thening U.S.-Libyan trade and investment ties. but circumstances have not allowed such ties to 

flourish. 

The Trump Administration has maintained U.S. recognition of the GNA and signaled continuing interest 

in providing U.S. foreign aid and security assistance to support Libya's transition. Then-Ambassador to 

Libya Peter Bodde and AFRTCOM Commander General Thomas Waldhauser visited Libya in May 2017, 

and GNA Prime Minister Fayez al Sarraj visited Washington, DC. in November 2017. The Tmmp 

Administration has not appointed a Special Envoy ±or Libya to replace Jonathan Winer. whose mandate 

ended with the Obama Administration. Since 2017, the Tmmp Administration has imposed conditional 

restrictions on the entry of Libyan nationals to the United States, with some exceptions 21 

t<J In response to recent concems about migrant detention and slavery:, the European Union, African Union, and United Nations 

have established a Task Force to improve migrant protection along migration routes to. tlum, and in Libya. T11rough the Task 

Force, IOM has facilitated the return of more than 15J)00 migrants to their home countnes flam Libya tl1rough a vohmtary 

hmnamtanan returns program smce December 2017. In parallel, the Task Force has supported UNHCR-led evacuations of more 

than 1 ,300 refugees tfom T ,Jhya as ofMarch 201 g_ 

20 EUNA Vl 'OR ~D, --Activity updated to 19 l''ebmary 201 :r m1U, "A new liorce COimnanU.er and a ne\"\' t1agship for 

SOP!IIA.'' December 15.2017. 

11 Libya is mnong. the countries identificU in Executive Order 13nO ofMm-ch 2017, ·which restricts the entry of nationals of 

CL.'Ti.ain countries to the UnitcU Slate~, \-Vilh ~ome e"\cL.-ptions. Tn SeptcmhL--r 2017, the Trump AU.mini~Lrution issued J"urther 

(continued ... ) 

TESTIMONY 

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1U 

As noted above, tbe State Department suspended operations at the U.S Embassy in Tripoli in July 2014. 

U.S. diplomats engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. programs in Libya via the Libya Extemal Office 

(LEO) at tbc U.S. Embassy in Tunisia. U.S. Ambassador to Libya Peter Bodde retired in December 2017, 

and, as ofAprill6. the Trump Administration had not nominated a new Ambassador-designate. Senior 

Foreign Service officer Stephanie Williams leads the LEO as Charge d · Affaires. 

Diplomacy and Support for the U.N. Action Plan 

U.S. officials engage in multidirectional diplomacy with parties in Libya and beyond in support ofU.N.-

facilitated reconciliation efforts. In a statement on December 14, 20 17, the United States joined other 

members of the U.N. Security Council in stating that tbe 2015 Skhirat agreement "·remains the only viable 

frame;\Ork to end the Libyan political crisis and that its implementation remains key to holding elections 

and finalizing the political transition.'' The Council emphasized the agreement's ""continuity .... throughout 

Libya's transitional period., and rejected "·incorrect deadlines that only serve to undcm1inc the U.N.-

facilitated political process," a reference to Khalifa Haftar's statements at the time asserting the 

agreement's lapse. Council members further stated that '"any attempt, including by Libyan parties. to 

undermine tbe Libyan-led, U.N.-facilitated political process is unacceptable." 

In January 2018, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Nikki Haley said in a Security 

Council meeting on Libya that: 

The United Sl1tcs will oppose attempts to impose a military solution to Uris political crisis. wlrich 

vvould further undermine Libya-s stnbility. Those who pursue a militnry solution vvill \vind up 

helping terrorist ,groups that tlrrive on instability. The only legitimate path to pmver is through free 

and fair elections .... The House of Representatives must uphold its conunitmcnt to pass laws for a 

constitutional referendum and for elections this yenr, in consultation with the High State Council. 

As the Libyans prepare for elections, we support Urritcd Nations eliorts to promote more effective 

and accountable governance for this transitionnl period. All Libynn parties should engage 

constmctively witb tbe United Nations to strengthen the Libyan Political Agreement [the 2015 

Sklrirat agreement I. 

The United States and tbe European Union (EU) have placed financial m1d travel sm1ctions on some 

Libyan leaders for obstructing the implementation oftbe 2015 Skhirat agreement and for illicitly 

smuggling oil from the country." In June 2017, the U.N. Security Council unanimously extended 

maritime arms embargo enforcement provisions for one vear in Resolution 2357. The Security Council 

later adopted Resolution 2362-extending the mm1date for maritime enforcement of oil shipment 

( continued) 

gmdance on the entry restrictions, and suspended the entry to the United States of Libyan nationals as immigrants and nonit1m1igrants in business (B-1), tourist (B-2), and business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visa classes. The White House, Fact Sheet 

Proclamation on Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry· into the United States by Terronsts 

or Other Puhlic-Safety Threats. Septemher 24, 2017. 

22 Executive Order 13726 (Apiil2016) modified U.S. sm1ctions enforcement measmes in supp01t of the Sld1irat agreement by 

amending the scope of the national emergency with respect to Libya declm·eU in Executive Order 13566 !)"ebmmy 2011). Under 

the moilitled measures, property 1mder U.S. jmisiliction may be blocked and entry to the United States nl<ly be prohibited for 

individuals and entities found to be engaging or to haYe engaged in a range of actions, including threatening the peace, stability, 

or secmity of Libya and obstmcting, 1mdennining. delaying, or impeding the adoption of or transfer ofpo\ver to the CTNA or 

successor govenunent. I o d:'lte, the U.S. govenm1ent has placed related sanctions on former GNC govenunent prime minister 

Khalifa Gh\vcll and llOR leader Aqilahlssa Saleh for obstmcting the implementation of the Skhirat agreement. Uxccutivc Order 

13726 also proviUes for srmctions on individuals mvolveJ. in illicit oil smuggling from libya, anU the Tnnnp AUministration used 

this auth01ity inl,'ebmmy 20Ul. See U.S. Depmtment of the Treasury, ·'Treasury Designates AdUitionallibym1 Political 

ObstJ.11Ct10nist;' I\1ay 13, 2016; and, "Treasmy Sanctions Intenwtional Netvmrk Smuggling Oil from Libya to I:mope,'' l'ebnk"ll} 

26,2018. 

Cf{S "''oT•un'"•v 

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monitoring and rcafiinning existing am1s embargo, asset freeze, and travel ban measures." U S. naval 

forces interdicted an unauthorized oil shipment in 2014. and the European Union's EUNAVFOR MED 

mission currently monitors shipments to and from Libya. Resolution 2362 stresses "the need for the 

Government of National Accord to exercise sole and effective oversight over the National Oil 

Corporation, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Investment Authority as a matter of urgency. 

without prejudice to future constitutional arrangements pursuant to the Libyan Political Agreement." 

Counterterrorism and Defense Policy 

11 

Transnational terrorist groups and locally organized anned extremist groups, including supporters of the 

Islm11ic State organization m1d Al Qacda in the Islmnic Maghreb (AQIM). remain active in Libya2

" Some 

IS fighters appear to have regrouped in rural areas atlcr fleeing Sirtc in late 20I6, and the group claimed a 

series of attacks on Libyan forces in 2017. In January 2018. a spokesperson for U.S. Afiica Command 

(AFRICOM) projected that the Islmnic State would ''give priority to the restructuring of security forces 

m1d infrastructure, and to launch strikes, which may include targets in the Libyan oil crescent."'' In March 

2018 congressional testimony, AFRICOM Commander General Waldhauser described IS forces in Libya 

as "dispersed and disorganized and likely capable oflittle more than localized attacks."" 

General Waldhauscr advised Congress in March 20I8 that U.S. military support for anti-IS fighters is 

continuing, m1d he emphasized the importm1cc of political reconciliation as a prerequisite for lasting 

security. In this regard. AFRICOM's 2017 posture statement judged that "stability in Libya'' is likely to be 

··a long-term proposition requiring strategic patience." The statement also advised Congress that Libya's 

absorption capacity for international support remains '·limited," as docs the ability of outsiders. including 

the United States, "to influence political reconciliation between competing factions." In his March 2018 

testimony, General Waldhauser wmned that "the risk of a full-scale civil war remains real." At present, 

AFRICOM describes four objectives for its approach to Libya: degrading terrorist groups: averting civil 

war: supporting political reconciliation with the goal of achieving a m1ified central goverrm1ent: m1d, 

helping to curb the flow of illegal migmts into Europe via Libya. 

AFRICOM armounced that U.S. forces conducted airstrikes against Islmnic State positions south ofSirte 

in September and November 20 I7, killing IS fighters and the destroying am1s and vehicles. U.S. military 

statements said the Islmnic State used the locations targeted in September as trm1sit hubs and operational 

plarming centers, including for external attacks. In October 20 I7, U.S. forces and Libyan partner forces 

seized a second suspect in the 20 I2 Benghazi attacks in Libya, Syrim1 national Mustafa al hnam, ncar 

Misrata 27 He appeared in federal court in Washinb>ton. DC, in November 2017. In March 2018. 

AFRICOM announced the death of AQIM senior figure Musa Abu Dawud and an associate in a U.S. 

airstrikc ncar Ubari in southwest Libya." 

23 Maritime 01l shipment monitoring was first authorized in I\1arch 2014 under Security Council Resolution 2146. 

24 See CRS In Focus Il'10172, AI Qaeda m I he Islamic Afaghreb (A.QI.Af) and Relaied Groups, by Ale:-;:is Arieff. 

~ Robyn Mack, quoted in AI Sharq Al /\wsat (London), ·'AFRTCOM Fxpcct:-> TSTS Attack on Lihya· ~Oil Crc~CL-'11~ 'Janual)' 3, 

201S. 

20 US. Al'RICOM Commander Gen. Thonms Vlaldhauser, Testimony before the Senate Anned Services Committee, M1rCh 13, 

21118. 

~ See U.S. Depmtment of Justice. Libyan National Chm·ged \Vith federal Offenses In 2012 Attack on U.S. Speck"ll Mission and 

Almex in Benghazi, October 30,2017. Mustafa al Imam pled not guilty to charges against him in November 2017. In June 2014, 

U.S. forces apprehended AhmcU Abu K.hattala, a Libyan suspect in the attack and the reported leader of the Abu UbayU.ah ibn 

Jmah Battalion, in a militm;.·- opemtion in Libya m1U tmnstened him to the United States. ln November 2017, he was convicted in 

U.S. fedeml comi on-l of 18 charges that haU been brought against him. 

1

c: Abu Dm,.mU haU since2013 been put ··in charge of a miss10n in Tunisia tasked with rccmiting anU training nc\Y members from 

acmss North Aliica on the u:->e or weapons." according loa Slate Department release in 2016. SLate Dq1artmL-'llt Bureau or 

(continued ... ) 

CRS TESTIMONY 

Pmpt':lrcd for Congress------------------------·-----~----~-------
20


29815a-13.eps

President Trump· s December 2017 letter to Congress consistent "ith the War Powers Resolution 

acknowledged U.S. strikes against terrorist targets in Libya. Like the Obama Administration before it, the 

Trump Administration has described U.S. strikes against IS and AQIM targets in Libya as authorized by 

the 2001 Authorization for Usc of Military Force (AUMF. P.L. 107-40) and has stated that the strikes arc 

taken '"at the request and with the consent of the GNA in the conte"\i of the ongoing armed conflict against 

lSlL and in furtherance of U.S. national self-defense."'' 

Stabilization and Transition Support 

In parallel to counterterrorism and defense policy efforts. the United States is using U.S. foreign 

assistance funding to support a variety of stabilization and transition assistance programs at the local and 

national levels in Libya. Since the 2014 withdrawal of U.S. pcrsmmcl from the country, U.S. programs 

have been administered from outside the country. Despite related challenges, Administration officials 

remain committed to providing stabilization and transition support to Libyans and have notified Congress 

of planned aid obligations in2017 and 2018. 

Since 2016. the executive branch has notified Congress of planned programs to continue to engage with 

Libyan civil society organizations. support multilateral bodies engaged in Libyan stabilization efforts. and 

build the capacity of municipal authorities. electoral administration entities, and the emerging GNA 

administration. These notifications include. but arc not limited to 

$64.5 million to support the continuation ofUSAID"s Office of Transition h1itiatives and 

other USATD good governance and electoral support programs: 

$1.9 million in Middle East Partnerships mitiative (MEPI) civil society support 

programming: 

$4 million for the United Nations Development Program Stabilization Facility for 

Libya;'" 

$10 million for U.S. support to UNSMTL and governance programs in support of the 

GNA; 

$4 million for third-party monitoring of U.S. government Libya programs and for 

reconciliation, transitional justice, and accountability programming: and 

$10 million for training and advisory support to the GNA Ministry of ffiterior. 

The Trump Administration has requested $34.5 million in foreign operations funding for Libya 

programming in FY20 19 (see Table 2 below). 

Humanitarian Assistance 

The United States provided more than $90 million in immediate luunanitarian assistance to Libya in 20 II. 

and U.S. assistance for humanitarian operations in Libya has ebbed and flowed in the years since in 

response to fluctuating needs and conditions on the ground. U.S. humm1itarian funding for Libya in 

FY2016 m1d FY2017 totaled $28.325 million, more than $18 million of which was provided in FY2017. 

( ... continued) 

Countcticn-orism, "State Dcpmimcnt 'l'cnorist Designation of MusaAbu Da\vud,'' May 5, 2016. 

29 Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guidmg the United States' Use of Military Force and Related National Security 

Operations, December 2016 and March 201 R. See CRS Report R439R\ 2001. 1uthorizationj0r u~e of",\1ilitar_v Force: Jssues 

Conceming Jts Continued. lpplication, by Malthe\v C \Veed. 

30 See UNDP website: [http://v.,\YV•/.ly.undp.org/contentlhbya/en/home/operations/projects/sustainable-developmenVstabilizationfacility-for-libya.html] 

CRS TESTIMONY 

PrepmedforCongress ---------------------·-·--~----~-------
21


29815a-14.eps

This included U.S. contributions to the U.N. Oftlce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 

Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP) for Libya and programs overseen by the State Department Bureau of 

Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and USAID"s Oftlce of Foreign Disaster Assistance 

(OFDA). 11 The 2018 U.N. HRP seeks $306 million in international contributions. of which 2.1% was 

ftmded as of April 20 I 8. 32 

Table 2. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Programs in Libya 

(millions of dollars) 

FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 

Account Actual Actual Actual Request Request 

Bilateral Foreign Assistance 

Economic Support Fund {ESF/ESDF) 19.2• 10 88 23 27 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 1.987 10.2 (INCLE) 

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related 3.5 6.5 36 6.5 Programs (NADR) 

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations Funds 2.5 

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 

Total 27.187 18.5 139.2 31 34.5 

Source: State Deparonent appropriations requests and notifications FY20 15-FY20 18; and, Explanatory Statement for 

Division K of P.L. I 14-113, the FY20 16 Consolidated Appropriations Act. 

Notes: Amounts are subject to change. Funds from centrally managed programs, including the Middle East Partnership 

Initiative (MEPI) and Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) Office of Global Programming also benefit 

Libyans. State and USAID also use funds from the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and International Disaster 

Assistance (IDA) humanitarian accounts for programs in Libya. 

Includes ESF and ESF-OCO notified to Congress in 2016 to support Libya programs. 

Congress and Libya 

Congress has conditionally appropriated fLmding for limited U.S. transition support and security 

assistance programs for Libya since 2011 and is considering Tmmp Administration requests for additional 

±oreign operations and defense funds to support Libya-related progran1s tor FY2019. h1 recent years, 

Congress has enacted appropriations legislation requiring the Administration to certify Libyan 

cooperation with efforts to investigate the 2012 Benghazi attacks and to submit detailed spending and 

vetting plans to in order to obligate appropriated funds. Congress also has prohibited the provision of 

U.S. assistance to Libya for infrastructure projects "except on a loan basis with ten11S favorable to the 

United States.,. 

The foreign operations appropriations act for FY20 18 carries forward some past terms and conditions on 

FY2018 U S assistance to Libya (Section 7041(±) of Division K ofH.R 1625/P.L.ll5-141), and includes 

a requirement for notice to Congress in cases of aid diversion or dcstmction. The FY2017 and FY2018 

'

1 USATD, Lihya- Complex FmL--rgL'llcy Fact Shccl # 1, FY201 R, DecL-'lnhL-r 1, 2017. 

J: UN. Financial Tracking Sen'ice data. The 2017 appeal li:>r $151 nnllion was 71.3% J"unded h~, January 201 R. 

33 ln the l'Y201-l, l,'Y2015, l,'Y2016, and liY2017 Consolidated Approp1iations Acts (P.L. 113-76, DiYision K, Section 704ll±l 

P.L. 113-235, Division J, Section 7041 [tl; P.L. 114-113, Division K., Section 70-l1[f]; P.L. 115-31, Division J, Section 7041[g.]), 

Congress placed conditions on the provision of funds appropriated by those acts to the central govennnent ofLibya. 

TESTIMONY 

Prepared for CongJres.s -----
22


29815a-15.eps

_________________ ___2_': 

acts did not require submission of a spend plan to congressional appropriators prior to obligations. 

Division B of the December 2016 continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254) provided additional oYerseas 

contingency operations assistance and operations funding to the State Department and USAID, some of 

which is supporting post-IS stabilization c±forts in Libya and may facilitate the eventual return of U.S. 

government personnel to the country. 

Outlook 

At present, U.S. oftlcials remain engaged with Libym1 counterparts in eft'orts to move forward with the 

U.N.-backed Action Plan. Next steps may include a constitutional referendum m1d national elections some 

time in 2018 or later, but the timing, legal frmuework, and sequencing of these proposed steps has not yet 

been detern1ined. l11e potential success of U.N.-backed reconciliation could provide a new foundation for 

improving stability in Libya, and could create nevv opportunities for security and economic partnership 

between Libya m1d the United States. The potential failure ofU.N.-promoted reconciliation efforts muong 

Libyans may present U.S. decisionmakers with hard choices about how best to mitigate threats emm1ating 

from the cmmtry in the continuing absence of a viable. legitimate national govennnent. Possible questions 

before the United States may include 

whether and when to return U.S. personnel to Libya on a permanent basis; 

what types and extent of assistance. if any, to proYide for stabilization and transition 

support purposes: 

how to ensure that U.S. aid recipients and security partners have not been m1d are not 

now involved in gross violations of human rights: 

whether or how to usc existing sm1ctions provisions or other coercive measures against 

parties seen as obstmcting progress under the U.N. -sponsored Action Plan: 

whether or how to continue to intervene militarily against terrorist groups: 

whether or how to respond to the actions of other third parties. including Russia: 

whether or ho'v to leverage or amend U.N. am1s embargo provisions to allo\v for security 

assistance to parties in Libya: 

what degree of support. if m1y, to provide to emergent national security ±'orces 

(particularly in the absence of an agreed political framework): and 

whether or how to respond in the event of any military clashes between rival Libym1 

factions that involve groups that have received U.S. assistance. 

Legislative debates over future appropriations and defense authorization measures provide potential 

means for Members to influence U.S. policy and engagement with Libyan actors. Congressional oversight 

prerogatives also provide opportunities to engage Administration oftlcials 

to refine the scope m1d content of U.S. progrmns proposed to support the Govemment of 

National Accord and other Libyans; 

regarding U.S. contingency plmming for the possibility that other third parties may 

intervene more forcefully in Libya: 

regarding plans for potentially expanding U.S. partnership with Libyans ifU.N.-backed 

reconciliation measures succeed: and 

regarding the possibility that negotiations among Libyans and plmmed elections may not 

bring instability in Libya to a prompt close. 

This concludes my statement: thm1k you ±'or the opportunity to testify. m1d I look ±'onvard to your 

questions. 

CRS TESTIMONY 

Prepared for Congress-----------------------·-----~----~-------
23

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Wehrey? 

STATEMENT OF FREDERIC WEHREY, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 

INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. WEHREY. Thank you. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking 

Member Deutch, members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to 

speak with you here today about Libya’s ongoing struggle for stability, peace, and unity. 

I join you, having visited western Libya in December of last year, 

where I glimpsed firsthand the severity of the challenges, the growing power of its predatory armed groups and the criminal networks, the plunder of its economy, the potential re-emergence of 

radicalism, to name but a few. Underpinning all of these inflictions 

is the weakness of governing institutions and national political fissures. 

I will start with my visit to the central coastal city of Sirte, the 

object of intense American focus in 2016 during the war against 

the Islamic State. While the Islamic State was ousted from its 

stronghold there at the cost of over 700 Libyan lives, Sirte faces 

daunting challenges of reconstruction and recovery. Bridging the 

social damage wrought by the Islamic State’s divisive rule is especially crucial, as is restoring law and order. 

Though the Islamic State has dispersed to the desert southwest 

of the city, it is still potent. It could easily exploit Libya’s political 

divisions and the unwillingness of armed groups to confront it. We 

have seen this before where Libya’s opposing factions where so focused on battling each other that they ignored the growing radical 

presence in their midst. That is why national-level reconciliation is 

so important, along with unifying and reforming the security sector. 

Another important component of reform lies in the judicial and 

penal sector. Arbitrary detentions, torture, and killings in militiarun prisons is a potential time bomb for radicalism. In one such 

prison that I visited, suspected Islamic State fighters are detained 

in the same facility as petty criminals and drug addicts, along with 

the political rivals of the militias. 

And, of course, the militia-run detention centers for migrants are 

a wholly different moral tragedy. Thousands of migrants are kept 

in these horrific conditions, which I saw firsthand, and many of 

these detention centers, of course, are run by militias affiliated 

with the Government of National Accord. All this must change. 

Though security conditions in the absence of a diplomatic presence have constrained our ability to engage, there are still plentiful 

opportunities, especially at the level of municipal governance. 

Elected city councils in Libya are one of the country’s bright spots. 

In many cases, they enjoy strong legitimacy and they have been engines for reconciliation in a way that national actors have not. 

American aid and assistance to municipalities is, therefore, a worthy investment. 

But municipal governance is hampered by corruption in national 

economic institutions. Libya is afflicted by a culture of entitlement 

by its armed groups, many of whom, as I have mentioned, are afVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:23 May 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\041818\29815 SHIRL
24

filiated with the government. The plunder of Libya’s Central Bank 

adds to the income that these groups already get from illicit activities like smuggling, fuel smuggling and human trafficking. A lasting fix to this problem requires sustained American diplomatic engagement with officials from the Central Bank and other economic 

institutions. 

Now all of these challenges I have outlined hinge upon progress 

on the political front, on national reconciliation. The U.S. and its 

partners must continue to play a strong convening and persuading 

role, especially among its regional Arab allies and, also, the Europeans to support the U.N.-led roadmap. The U.N.-led roadmap is 

currently headed toward convening national Presidential and parliamentary elections. This shows that Libyans have not given up on 

a democracy, despite the turmoil of the past year. However, a word 

of caution is in order. Elections by themselves, if they are held 

hastily without a constitutional framework, risk a return to strife. 

We have seen this before in the past in 2012 and in 2014. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wehrey follows:]

25


29815b-1.eps

CARNEGIE 

ENDOWMENT FOR 

INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

THE GLOE.6.L. THINK TANK 

Libya Fractured: The Struggle for Uuity 

Frederic Wehrey 

Senior Fellow, 

Middle East Program 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Testimony before U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North 

Africa (Committee onlioreign Affairs) 

.\pril18, 2018 

BEIJING SE!RUT 8RlJSSEL$ MOS(OW NEW DELHt WAShJNGTON 
26


29815b-2.eps

Chairnun Ko~-Lclnrtlcn, K::tnki..ng J\Icmbcr DcLtt-ch, rncrnbcrs of the ~ubcotnmittcc, 1t i~ a priYilcgc to 

ivith ,~n J here about Libya's for ::;tlbihtY, and lUJity< I 1oin 

v1sncd wc~tcrn tri Decem bcr 1 

challenges the coun1 f}· faces; the g.t:O\\'it:tg power 

~he plunOe:r of it~ and thf' pntf:1ltt:J1 for a re-err>cr·~,ctlce 

fc\\. affhctl0H:'- is rhc \H'akncss o-nvcrni1W111St1tutinns and dctcriorat1nn 

which crcat('S an 1nccnt1~ c :tnd justification un.;.cntpulous local actryrs ld.;.c mfEt-1a 

bn .... ~C!' tn fill 1bc Yoid. /ddcd tn this JS nJ11ornl-lcvcl poEtlr.al dj\ iclc, a.nd continued 

ftghtcts atH1 \\·capons in cnmLlvctrtion of rhc UN 

T.et nlt: clabc•n1te on ::.otnt ( ~f the gu.-.;-est hurclk:::-. J.iby<'._ face:. anJ ,,,~a_ys thaL tht t~ mted States can 

assist. 

that the object of inrense Anw1~cm focus bsr 111 Lhe 

ccunpaign Jga:inst the State~ the centr:tl c<J,1-:ta1 citY nf Sjrtc. \X~hile the lda111ic State \V<1S nus ted 

front it::. stnmghukl there -in Dt:cemher 2\H G, <H the cosr of oyer 700 

<.L:n1nt~ng tac;k uf reco:n!'tnKtmn and :rec(_rn;·ry. than :.Tear after its 

du ... :ntown be in rubble :wrl rc~Hkn1S a-rc fUJJou~ 3._t !he T r:ipoJ.i 

respcn~e. \Ybk the l 'nw:d De~:~tlup-ment 

he11et1c1:liT ,.!fa a1d rffoft, :more remains to 

·vast :.,"\vathe.:~ uf its 

,glacial 

the 

The aftermath of Sir:..c alf;o rai<;;cs the of the lshrn.ic State' 51 potential reemergence. Based on 

my c.hscu~51on~: ,,~ith J .ibyctn {'ffic-ials, T ~lam-ic Strue h::Ls t1ed to the de~ert south-,;\-est of the c-ity 

Yvhc-rc it :etn~uns d1spcrscd) hut still potc:nL lt could poJit1ca1 dn·1"~ons and the 

1nab111t)· or un\Y1ll~-ngncss of arrncd 

faction>, \\~ere ~u f,_Kused on 

E, en further snuth~ 111 the ~outhwcst cotncr ncar the 

rrc':lt'11CC ~I round rhe tO\\T, o:fUbar;, ;,>;here the St~~re:; Cl!1 <Lit<::;trike la'-'t mo-nth aga-in'-'t 

::tl-Q3rd;:L l'clnsna.tional bn:rdcr control, tlnd 

cconorn1c despair to usc area J.s told 1nc ~...-h.trHlg ~l \ -is~t that the 

pcnctfatinn of radic::.Ji~n1 into Lhcif i~ slulln'i.Y and dut Jny suppn:rt t~•f the )iludist-s is 

nftcn here ag;a11J, a soh.tu.on for the challenge of 

rn1iltan.cy 1n bcHcr ,2,0\'crn:tnce' :-tnd ccono1nic oppor1u.n1t1cs, \\ aho hc,Jds true ac-ross soud1crn 

Libya. The Cnitcd SnJcs C:lt'l t:olc redoubling ilf' dcYclnpmcnt assisla....."'l.cc a11d 'llJ'l"Xlil:).!; 

i\.nothcr unpor1a.ni cornponcnt to dcny1n3 the cxtrcrni::::ts 

ren-:tl sector. ~\_sa ff'CE'flt t~r1jted Nations -report ·made 

1 

,~,.,, r1·nrnc'"' of 

and 
27


29815b-3.eps

detentions, tortlliT, ~1ud lulling~; in rnilitia-n.Jn prison:;'!_'-; a 

'fhe fKt that su1w.~ uf th(-:~e prison-:' (!H' nunti1ta1ly 

to lessen -:-lw of the a bu~e:-,. There is ofteurnin1.rnal 

the prisoners are 

ch::mge. 

\\, hile t::xtreruisnl :in L1hya this shcn.Ud nut Le the S!)le len~ through ~\vluch 

.I\n1Cr~Gl v1C\\·S count!'). Llby2ns 1tnct nf BcnghaLi :-:Hlfl acros.;;; the counlTy still recall 

\\·iih rond~1f'SS the \\!('11-rncanin~ efforts Df /\1no...:rintn diplornats, the htc :\n1b:tssador Chr-is 

Sn'\Tns., to \\T1th ci,~il and support Libyan~ educatmn, cjtizc'nslup, 

:wd 1ne:d-ia. security cond-ition~ the absc-1KC of an _{\rncrican diplnm~nic presence ha\·c 

constr~uncd our ability to do tbi:-;, there arc still plcntifLil oppn:rruniti.cs) especially at the le...-cl of 

mun:icipab tics 

C~ty- and tO\HJ-kvd go\ cnmncc in Llb; ans llkc to 8ay 

that since national in~titmtuns are and fro~:en in pnlijictll 

CfJU1Kils and mavors to :manage on their own. J\nd in nn.ny casc:1 theY cn1nv 

h:1vr pro\' en to be enginrs for teconciklttnn 1n thJt mrtional actors are not, 

\Vith other tu'v.Tns to cuunlinatt' un shared ecuno1nic and pulit1cal -inten:-sts. /\nH:'Ticln snppurt to 

nluniCJp3ht1Cs is therefore a \vorth) 111\'CStnKnt in future. Y ct d.;;, doprncnt at the town lc\·d 1s 

han1pered by endf1TIK hurlgetary problems, in turn are tied to co!'n1ption in nat1(Jnn1 

CC01l0!1l1C 

Libya's o-il rc\ cnucs arc h1gh, but the fcsulnng LC\ c1~uc 1s not reaching the 

better SE'f\'ic-c-s. T .iby:l's f-i.nanrill1tnstittltions r<?main di...-Jded Jnd beset onministfolhYP 

'!he' 

hke 

the absence of a budget Libva is afJlictcd 

by T .ibya 's anned 

Sustainrd nlt1m3te1y mc:1n.;:. an i~.1nerican chplon1:uic remrn tn the c1pita1 and the 

appuinr-ment _/\1nbassadur. ln an encuura,gll1g sign, Lile L'n.ited Natiuns 

nun1brr of othf·r countries have e1i-hrr a prrrnanftlt c,r dip1omMlc 

cJrs, 

are at the tntTCY rrt1ht1t:s ''idto conrrol ~pecific nr"i"h'l""·l:nnd" 

sornctinK'S hm-c' thc1r mYn that diverge sh:"llT·ply 

enforcement of cod1fj(· ... -1la\\, and their SjY:Hltatlcous ()\'Cr po\v'Ct, ~11oncy, a:nd turf n1can tbal 

l'npolt's OUt\Yard appearance nf reace 1s often illu~ory. 

Liby~~.n ofhcials rel;,- upon anued g;nmps fnr ~ecurity and i:nternatitmal acturs rdy 

ffmn co1 mtcr-lc:tJ·or:i:;w to 1s 

couperation \Yilh ulllitias un iru:uediat:e conn_T1b lnl1ate; their 

in1urn tmdcr:rnincs Lhc Libyan gnvcnunc1E ::t.nd perpetuate.;; a c~dc c1f insub11ity. 

2 
28


29815b-4.eps

lntciTJ;i_tiom!l cngagcrrlcnr 0:11 rmg1:ant snmr,ghng JS a p~t:rricnbr concc:rn: :rnibt1as h:J\'C oftc1·1 

for at:.):T~~ tu state hu11.b, ~orne fun:ttT \Ylwn pcr.;-..udt~d. tu 11b:mdott hurnaH 

cv'"''-""'V,,ll<L\T S\\'itched t() C)ther illicit the ennK~"ihruent ()finiJitias in 

government po11ce presrnrs. di1enlm<1S for to '-lS':.ist T ,ibva 's 

~ecroc The L'niccd N:uions has 1nstm.-ated policing as:-ii~cance dese:rYe'i 

suppnn. as d( >CS the Europc2n T_~n~on and 3 nwnbcr of cnunlnc~, djJ1gcncc u-npurtJJu, 

especially in Yctting ::uui pr,>per traming nde uf l:nv and due proce;:.,, 

Etncr 

because 

arn!rd T.itnit~~d 2nd \vell-tneaning so1dier~ t'f'turn1ng 10 

no defined <H1DY structure to jnin 

;\mcric:i J!ld ~'! i\ TO partHPr~-

alXJYted Gctlera1 

mcb.:ng bact Lo town nr nditta. 

Turkey- -le-arnrti tbs pa-inful kssr:.m with the 

that beg:ln 111 ~01 3. 'I'u avu-\d ~l repe;1C uf this episode, 

Jrom any furtbcr Of :Jssjstancc to the Libyan a.nny u11tll Libyans reach 

the '-'ariom:; armed gronps and deYe1op nn agre::d-npon roadtnap for 

and dcm,,biiiz,ingthc mili,[as_ 

/1Jl of tbc~.c challenges I\ c otnlmcd abo\T lunge 

re\\)11\.~liation. 1-Tere, thr l'.S. n1ust 

the C:nitcd 

also 1HU\'ing tnYFard a natmnal 

csLabhshment of J s1rong 1c;::,val tr:Jmfw<>"k 

tr;Jnsitiun pe-riud. J ·in;·lll;', it i~ as:si~ting in tlt1.~ 

elections---d1l e•,Tnt tbat nrHJ.erscr)rcs L1byans' 

nu-mo11 c,f the past ;Ta(s. 

on the political front and on national 

'"'rhc-nbirk in pe.rsu<1ding 

from .m:nn!mrw 

f-Ten::., hcr\Vf'YE'f, a \'.'Ord of caat1on is in ordrt. Tfhrld hastily or ':O,'ithuut t1w presencr of :1 

cuustitutiunal franK"\York, adequate ~ecurity, and l;:n-.;~s, electlnn~ ri:-,k a rerur:u co strife, either 

the actions nf body that do2s not enjoy buy1n 1:::1 st'en as '"''"'""·"'"L 

tdter 1he C~encral Nr1tiorw1 C 

Represetlcat-i\Tt.-, \Vl1ich buth 

thu::cforc, that dccrion~ by 

::1rc stuck 

lhlsheti in tlH:' pa!:.t-1H ~01~ 

201-t ;~_fter votin~ fnr the T-fuuse or 

-in thf1r·aftt->nnarh. lc ls cnH:i;;ll to n-:tnetnber. 

Let n1c dose v;ith a {cyv thoug)lts on a ltJ.1JlC that looms l!l the .An1cr:ican mjnd 

bl:cansc of the of Sepkrnbt:r and 12cll, :2012. >.Ylllch the h\'es of fnur bnve 

Amcr-ic-lllS. The 1IJf'l, cspcc1J 1Jy 1jl Benghazi, rcnlcn:t.bcr rhat n1ght \Vjih sadness and 

regret fur ...::\rnerlca tt> n1oYe Lt.ytmd r.he ~hadnw ()f the ;:~ ttack. 

to rctnind u~, js alsr.1 Liby~\: second largest ci.t;, 1Kmlc to a rich cultutc 

3 
29


29815b-5.eps

hi~;rory tbat 1t1cludcs the L1bynn d1]vc for independence and, cruciaUy, the Lib~~an 

Qadhaf-1. After tlut !-:>lnlt;ble, hu\\Tever. dw ciry fell111tu nt:glcct and Y-iu1ence, \vll1ch 

the 2012 attack and the deparn:u:e ( )f the 1ntetnati()iU l C01lUTilU11ty ( )llly "\V<)r:;;t~ned. , 1 'lw 

three plus years of non stop \\~flrf-are-, ""'hich dispbcr·d th-Jusands and n1ptnre-d i.ts social 

Libyan.:; :in the arc- thc-rcDxc rchshi_ng a -return to and arc cagct: 1{-;r ihc return nf 

internatiOnals a.n ~r\Lnencan pre~ence. ~\nlt'.rica··:-; ll1 the east, ho\\TYer, rnu~;r: be 

,.,n,rlic."1cd nn inclusi\T and dcn1ncrat1c J?,Cl\ crnancc and no1 on one pcr~n11 or h.ctioG. The 

""'I"""'""""L"' of a centra! flgurc in Bc-ngh:1zi's recent c.;-cncra1 T<.:::ha!tft Hiftar, who k<i a 

cmnpa1gn in rhc city LslaiTi.:i'ot'~ a11d otbcr and the:n 1ockcycd tor mrrionat 

political power, undcrsc<)rcs of placiLJ.g too rrwch stock in 01lC J-Iiftar's 

miL(tafv co2lJrio11 \\'as than ',vas comrnonly :1s~)nntcd, tr:1hcs, m_;_htt:ts, ilnd 

to his opc·ra6on for then· localized and sclf-irncrc51.cd goals. 

ur his di\apfH:'a::-anct- horn the scene co:..1ld thn1st eastern L1hya into a 

also prcscnt5- oppurtun~lics for fC'1K\vcd .,:\rnccican d~plorna.cy. 

often n\ crshado\\Trl b) a hnst oi· other cr~scs and 

i\rnrr!ca 's potential and i1 affef:ts 

c'<nt· -intcn:-':-.t-; and tLc•se uf unr l ·.nropcan p?i.rtaer-s, the thn:at of krrori~1TL l l.H).;(-' !he 

subo._;,mni1ttcc tn support a durable stratcg) tq ildpi_ng thi::< country realize the prom.isc of its 

nTnh1tion. 

Th<1nk yon for the oppnrtnnicy to sprak \Yil·h you hen'' tocby. 

4 
30

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Doctor. 

Ms. Friend? 

STATEMENT OF MS. ALICE HUNT FRIEND, SENIOR FELLOW, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. FRIEND. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, 

members of the committee, distinguished colleagues, it is my pleasure to be here today to discuss the current situation in Libya. 

The complexity of the civil war in Libya is rivaled only by the 

complexity of the related crisis it breeds. The diversity and ferocity 

of the country’s domestic politics create obstacles for terrorists attempting to establish havens, but also make the role of Islam in 

governance a central and contentious object of Libyan politics, amplifying Libya’s salience to global Islamic terrorism. Libya’s oil resources, proximity to Europe, and cultural connections to the Middle East make it a strategic prize for multiple powerful outside actors, and its competing governments and myriad militias fuel an 

international race for Libyan proxies. In the midst of it all, an historic volume of migrants is coming through Libya, fleeing into the 

Mediterranean, overwhelming European and broader international 

resources. 

Ending major violence and stabilizing Libyan politics to the point 

where powerful actors accept a single government will be the most 

durable way to address terrorism and humanitarian needs. Yet, the 

path to political equilibrium will likely be a long one. The international community, including the United States, should have a 

patient and realistic approach to Libyan politics that also accounts 

for Libyan internal security concerns. 

The current challenge for the U.S. is knowing whom and how to 

engage among the constantly shifting array of power brokers and 

would-be national leaders to encourage political accommodations 

and meaningfully address the humanitarian crisis. The reported incapacitation of the Libyan National Army command and the eastdominant center of power, Khalifa Haftar, is likely to generate 

some political and security realignments if Haftar is unable to return to the country. 

Although group alignments with the U.N.-backed Government of 

National Accord should open the door to outsider engagement in 

principle, the persistent dynamism of Libyan politics recommends 

a cautious approach to security assistance. Even if the policy remains largely focused on countering ISIS and al-Qaeda, the U.S. 

will need to determine ways to sustain pressure on terrorist groups 

without undermining the prospects for Libya’s stability. 

With regard to ongoing U.S. efforts to disrupt and dismantle 

ISIS’s operations in Libya, I believe the current offshore pressure 

campaign and counterterrorism capacity-building efforts among 

Libya’s neighbors strikes the right balance between U.S. national 

security and the prospects for Libyan stability. 

Given the range of crises consuming American policymakers’ 

time, it seems likely that U.S. efforts in Libya overall will remain 

relatively modest, but continued negotiations and implementation 

of the Libyan Political Agreement are best accomplished with the 

support of the U.S., not only in a diplomatic sense and by eventuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:23 May 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\041818\29815 SHIRL
31

ally assisting the development of national security forces, but also 

in a role supporting U.N. Security Council prohibitions on disrupting constructive intra-Libyan balances of power. This latter effort requires deft diplomacy, especially with Gulf partners and Russia, given the issue linkages elsewhere, but it would be the kind 

of international leadership only the U.S. can provide. 

Thank you again for calling us together today, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Friend follows:]

32


29815c-1.eps

Statement Before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

A Testimony by: 

Alice Hunt Friend 

Senior Fellow 

Center for and fntcmational Studies 

April18, 2018 

2172 Rayburn House Office 
33


29815c-2.eps

Friend: Written Testimony, HFAC MENA Subcommittee 04/1 R/201 R 

Introduction 

The complexity of the civil war in Libya is rivaled only by the complexity of the related 

crises it breeds. The diversity and ferocity of the country's domestic politics create obstacles for 

terrorists attempting to establish havens, but also make the role of Islam in governance a central 

and contentious object of Libyan politics, amplifying Libya's salience to global Tslamist terrorism. 

Libya's oil resources, proximity to Europe, and cultural connections to the Middle East make it a 

strategic prize for multiple powerful outside actors, and its three competing governments and 

myriad militias fuel an international race for Libyan proxies that includes Russia, Turkey, Egypt, 

the Gulf States, and others. In the midst of it all, an historic volume of migrants is coming both 

from and through Libya, fleeing into the Mediterranean and overwhelming European and broader 

international resources. 

Ending major violence and stabilizing Libyan politics to the point where powerful actors 

accept a single government will be the most durable way to address terrorism and humanitarian 

needs. Yet the path to political equilibrium will likely be longer than one U.S. presidential term. 

The international community, including the United States, will have to adopt a patient and realistic 

approach to Libyan politics that also accounts for Libyan internal security concerns. The current 

challenge for the U.S. is knowing whom and how to engage among the constantly-shifting array 

of power brokers and would-be national leaders to encourage political accommodations and 

meaningfully address the humanitarian crisis. Even if the policy remains narrowly focused on 

countering terrorism and, within that category, ISIS and a! Qaeda in particular, the U S. will need 

to determine ways to sustain pressure on terrorist groups without undennining the prospects for 

Libya's stability. 

The Dynamics of Libya's Civil War: Critical Events and Key Players 

It has been said that a state is defined by its ability to monopolize the legitimate control of 

violence within its own territory. 1 Typically, this occurs by marrying rule of law to a national 

armed force subordinate to state control and able to operate throughout the country. Contemporary 

Libya, however, is an amalgam of dozens of political groups and hundreds of militias engaged in 

civil war characterized by competition for urban centers and provincial territorial blocs. 

The international community has attempted to forge unity among Libya's various 

competing groups 2 But it is useful to keep in mind that unity across the three main regions of 

Libya would be an historical anomaly, something imposed only fleetingly by external actors and 

artificially by the country's late dictator, Muarnar Qaddafi. Moreover, in states with a population 

that is heterogeneous along multiple axes, regardless of domestic unrest, the notion of unity is not 

1 :Max \Veber. 19-1-6. ''Politics as a Vocation:· In Essays in Sodology, ed. H.H. Garth and C:W. Mills. New York: 

Macmillian. 

2 The European Council on Foreign Relations· Mattia Toaldo together a helpful compendium in his "A Quick 

Guide to Libya-s Main Players·· accessible at· llt!J!:j/_[>.!J.lUcgj:.£!1illli:J}lCD.l;t~tngjjj,>yJ!S!Jl'fL'§'· For an cxcc11cnt 

sununary of lslamist groups. sec Cameron Glc1m. Want.'' 

Woodrmv Wilson Center. August 8, 2017 l!rtl5.1Dl'clc1Y . .llJ.L\_u]QEUl£U'1J;i;Jllc<;.J;_IjJill;t"=l;ili"l!!.ot.:i:cll)JQ:icSI_:!!£;.:illUii:. 

1llmt:Llr.J:.:.'i2ml1 
34


29815c-3.eps

Friend: Written Testimony, HFAC MENA Subcommittee 04/1 R/201 R 

as useful as the concept of coalition3 A coalition links together a variety of actors with similar, 

but not necessarily identically overlapping, goals. The mechanism that creates a coalition 

combines power and opportunity: Where actors and groups see benefits to their own power in 

given circumstances, they will ally with others. And in civil war, until one coalition manages to 

accumulate the preponderance of power-or power distributes equally among a small number of 

groups to the point of stalemate-the fighting will endure, and coalitions will continue to splinter 

and realign. 

Recenl H i..-.;tory 

Beginning soon after the rebel victory in the uprisings of2011, clashes among and between 

regionally based militias that never disarmed after Qaddafi's ouster marked struggles for political 

autonomy within the nascent national framework. Throughout 2012 and 2013, networks of militias 

centered around the eastern city of Benghazi and the western city of Zintan built power and 

influence among emerging political parties, effectively preventing nationwide security institutions 

from developing. 

In 2014, the mandate for the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) expired with 

no clear successor organization. A vacuum of national legitimacy gave way to increased struggles 

for power in the Tripolitania and Cyrenaica regions, and disputed elections over the summer did 

nothing to resolve tensions. The government split in two, with the Islamist-dominated GNC in 

Tripoli and an internationally-recognized House of Representatives (HoR) in the far eastern city 

of Tobruk. That same year, a former Libyan army general named Khalifa Haftar organized the 

Libyan National Army (LNA) in opposition to the Islamist militias running Benghazi. Eventually 

given formal command of the armed forces by the HoR, Haftar became a major military and 

political power center in his own right, with rumored designs on control of national governance. 

By the end of2015, the UN had brokered a new Government of National Accord (GNA), headed 

by a Presidential Council initially based in Tunisia but eventually moving to Tripoli. However, 

large elements of both the GNC and the HoR refused to recognize this third government, and the 

process for the integration of the three governments has stalled. 

Meanwhile, the Islamic State saw an opening. Beginning in the port of Derna and 

expanding into Sirte, the group proceeded with its infamously brutal tactics, including releasing a 

video of group members beheading 21 Coptic Christians. From the end of20 14 to mid-20 17, Egypt, 

Misratan militias, Hattar's LNA, and the United States all mounted campaigns against ISIS' 

Libyan affiliate, eventually driving organized elements from Sirte, Derna, and Benghazi and into 

the southwestern Fezzan province 4 

Thus, in the post-2011 confusion around national governance, still-armed militias gathered 

power and territory, and coalesced around particular actors and regions. After 2014, one 

3 M! views are greatly shaped by the work of Fantini Christia's e:-..cellent 2012 book. Alliance Fonnation in Civil 

\Vars. Nev~· York: Cambridge University Press. 4 For more on the in Fczzan, sec International Crisis Group's 

Middle 179. 
35


29815c-4.eps

Friend: Written Testimony, HFAC MENA Subcommittee 04/1 R/201 R 4 

government became three, with varying attachments to Islam, secularism, and militia loyalists but 

none with a national military or the ability to impose legal authority over the entirety of Libya. 

Nor has any one figure or organization been able to amass enough power to either attract or compel 

de-facto national-levelloyalty. This has meant not only ongoing and violent struggles for federal 

power, but also frequent re-alignments among power blocs in attempts to generate such authority 

and control. It has also meant that ISIS and a! Qaeda are just two fish in a sea of violent groups, 

and that the fight against them has tended to involve a mix of militia campaigns, Hattar's LNA, 

and unilateral outsider action rather than pressure directed from any of the governing centers of 

the country 

Dynamics Today 

Today, a coalition of politicians in the Presidential Council of the GNA bring together 

Misratan, Zintani, Petroleum Facilities Guard, and other armed groups and political parties 

(including the Muslim Brotherhood). Recognized by the international community, the GNA is an 

alignment of actors who might compete more openly with each other absent greater threats outside 

the architecture of the GNA. For example, Haftar and the GNA's Minister of Defense, Mahdi alBarghathi, are political rivals. 

At the same time, the protracted and fractured nature of the conflict has generated both 

demand for outside assistance and opportunities for strategic advantage among international actors. 

Libya's proximity to Europe and Mediterranean ports, its borders with Egypt and sub-Saharan 

African countries, its energy resources and its Muslim population all attract a variety of outsiders. 

Of chief concern to the U.S. is ISIS' enduring toehold in Libya, the spillover ofthe Gulf crisis into 

Libyan proxy competition, and Russia's overtures to Libyan power brokers 

First, Nortb African states have long-terrn connections to global Islamism and to the Arab 

world, both of which made Libya a natural outlet for ISIS militants. It also has historic connections 

with civilizations south of the Sahara and links al Qaeda' s Sahelian atliliates with access to illicit 

economic opportunities and strategic depth away from both the Algerian government and Western 

counterterrorism forces. Although a combination of Misratan militia attacks and U.S airstrikes 

drove ISIS from its coastal enclave in Sirte in 2016 while Hattar's LNA conducted an unrelated 

offensive against ISIS and other groups in Benghazi, the Islamic State is still a scattered presence 

in the East and South, and the commander of Africa Command testified that the U S. conducted 

eight strikes against ISIS targets in late 2017 and early 20185 

Regional rivalries also have an outlet in Libya. Egypt plays two sides of the war, formally 

recognizing and rhetorically supporting the UN's efforts via the GNA but materially supporting 

the Tobruk government and Haftar. It appears that Egypt's endgame is to generate enough 

independence in the anti-Islamist government in the east to stave off Muslim Brotherhood 

encroachments near Egyptian territory, but also to allow stability in the west and avoid 

international diplomatic difficulties. The United Arab Emirates have also been known to provide 

~General Thomas Waldhauscr. House Armed Services Committee Hearing_ U.S. 

Military Activities in Mrica, ., March 6. 2018 ht!Ji'i/i.illlE,i'ic:!:IKo;bb!.'l'-'LgQ.l:/)..;~k]l:i!j!m[QGih~iliBl'm!l.:'!'.&~lill.: 

flli~lY.ll.@§::·and-us-Jn_ilirarr-{l;j_i:Jiljg:_?::.il~..;;J 
36


29815c-5.eps

Friend: Written Testimony, HFAC MENA Subcommittee 04/1 R/201 R 

weapons to both GNA-affiliated militias and Haftar The GNA enjoys unmitigated support from 

Qatar, and a limited relationship exists between the GNC and Turkey, which also supports the 

GNA 

Finally, Russia has long made efforts to influence both the outcome of the domestic 

struggle for power and the ultimate holder of that power. Although there are allegations of various 

Russian efforts to arm militias in exchange for oil and other favors, Russia (or Russian actors) 6 

seem to have put many of their chips on Haftar-a move now complicated by Haftar's ambiguous 

but apparently serious health condition taking him out of Libya entirely for the time being7 Like 

the Egyptians, Russia has also made overtures to the leader of the GNA's Presidential Council, 

Fayez al-Serraj. It seems clear that access is Russia's highest priority in Libya, with little principle 

attached to the ultimate outcome of the civil war 

The United States, for its part, has generally tried to support whichever government has the 

backing of the UN. As the security situation in Libya deteriorated throughout 2013 and 2014, and 

the American Embassy finally withdrew along with many other international missions in Tripoli, 

Washington's practical ability to implement assistance programs was also reduced, although it 

continues to conduct its diplomatic and assistance etforts from neighboring Tunisia. US. Atiica 

Command made various attempts over the course of the Obama administration to bolster the 

security capacity of forces allied with the internationally recognized government' AFRlCOM has 

stated that etforts to help build the GNA's security capacity have continued into the Trump 

administration, although recent press reporting suggests there has been a temporary halt to all 

''military" assi stance9 

The challenge for outside sponsors, especially those trying to enable security forces 

through equipping, is that both success and failure risk undermining durable political equilibria. 

Externally sponsored military success can mean domestic groups outpace the growth of their 

political legitimacy, empowering a leader or group whose goals and relationships might not 

otherwise allow them to achieve broad-based influence. In such a case, groups are not positioned 

to command national authority credibly. On the other hand, failure can simply spin wheels or 

freeze a conflict in place. 

Humanitarian Consequences 

The political ambiguity and violent undercurrents in Libya have taken a toll on its citizenry. 

Human Rights Watch has reported that ongoing struggles between militia blocs have led to an 

6 Jo Becker and Eric Schmitt. "As Tmmp Wavers on Libya, an ISIS Havc11 Russia Presses Ott The NC\Y York 

Times, Febmary 7. 2018 . . bill!.t-.1L1D£\UJ) tim~s c·.JlJJf..:fill~[\,22/()//lYQdd[<tfn-:>J1n.U.mL:llin:!~QJ.h::_:Dl~~-:U:illlll 

' As of this \Yriting. Haftar's condition is still unclear, although sporadic reports of his death in a Paris hospital over 

the weekend or April 1 -t.th and 15th appear to be have been incorrect. 

i_( Defense Security Cooperation Agency Ne\\, Release. "Libya- General PuT_IX)se Force Training."' JanuaiJ 22, 201-1-. 

hHo./:'\YW\Y.ds::n.wi!/~it,:s/dcff·,ldt/f!i:.;;/masJl!b>:ri ll-7-i-.pdf and Missy Ryan ... U.S. Establishes Libyan Outposts 

\Yith Eye TO\vard Offensive Against 1slam.i.e State." Washington Post. May 12. 2016. 9 Jack Dctsch. '·U.S. Freezes Military Aid to Chaotic Libya.'' ~11-"tlomtor .. AprillO. 2018. ~LY:J::TI~'11..: 

;w__onitgr.ccJ~!ip_lllsc/orim1J.Lsfl!lli .. d>-tr'us-.freez~lil..i..tm"3:..:il!d:.:sJlli.OJ..b.dililLLLJtml 
37


29815c-6.eps

Friend: Written Testimony, HFAC MENA Subcommittee 04/1 R/201 R 

environment of impunity for violence, degrading major social and legal services across the country, 

and displacing more than 200,000 Libyans. 10 

More visible to Western audiences has been the trans-Mediterranean migration crisis. 

Libya has long been a transit country for migrants originating south of the Sahara Desert Using 

many of the same ancient caravan routes across present-day Mali, Algeria, Niger, and Chad as 

those smuggling weapons, drugs, fuel, cigarettes, and other black-market goods, migratory 

populations aimed for Libyan ports as their penultimate destination prior to crossing into Europe. 11 

Domestic resentment in Libya pushed Qaddafi's government toward draconian suppression 

measures and set a precedent for discounting migrants' human rights. 

Since 2011, law enforcement is less of an impediment to crossing through Libya but 

migrants face greater danger. They are at the mercy of their traffickers, and are often abused, with 

little access to food or water. Most repugnant, CNN and other news organizations revealed last fall 

that many have become prey to a slavery economy. 12 European policy for many years has focused 

on maritime operations with the goals of saving those attempting transit in non-seaworthy craft 

and repatriating those ineligible for asylum back to North Africa. With the EU brokering a more 

pointed agreement with the GNA in 2017 to build Libyan capacity to keep migrants from escaping 

Libyan shores, the number of people successfully completing the crossing has dropped 

considerably, 13 meaning that a growing population of displaced Africans challenges the legal 

authority and humanitarian interests of the array of Libyan governing factions. 14 

Possible Resolutions 

Given their contentious history, the major players in Libya do not trust each other enough 

to allow the vulnerability that cooperation and eventual disarmament-or at least, centralization 

of arms into national institutions-requires. Yet absent compromise and nationwide coalitionbuilding, the only solution to the problem of violent competition is stalemate at best and more 

violence at worst. If a compromise has a chance of lasting, it must address mutual security 

vulnerabilities and generate a legitimate architecture for national security services. 

There is no immediate reason this cannot be achieved under the framework of the 2015 

Libyan Political Agreement, which established the GNA and calls for a variety of desirable 

security arrangements, to be implemented by the temporary security committee. What is less clear 

is how Libya will make the leap from fractured, militia-based security to the national army and 

10 Human Rights Watch WorldRcport20lg_ ·'Libya" ~·!LJ.I~_\'!_,JJ.rw QL.t;l2l.mid:r.;;mrt/20l::.l,~untr..-~char:tg:>ftlhva 

11 Hcin de Haas. 'Trans-Saharanlvligration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends.'" 

ct al. "People for Sale'· CNN Video: il.liQfi:lLF'W\5:...ftP1£QJJ.1L20 P/l J{L!i;ltD_0lli11!.Ll:lllig!E!1t: 

lltL~ti.Q.!J.~Lir&it:...!'bl!-tm.l and David D. Kirkpatrick ·'Europe Wanted Migrants Stopped. Nmv Some are Being Sold as 

Slaves:' The Sew rork Times, November 30. 2017. 13 Claudia Gazzini. ·'Quick Fi>..es \Von't Block Lib) a's People Smugglers rorLong." Jntemational Crisis Group 

Commental), September 1+. 2017. lulpr,::/\\ '<V\v.crisi«grQUQ..orglmldd!~-cclsl-ttortll-afncalnorth-al'rica/libi J/awckfi-xc~-\YOnt.:bJock-1tbY;1s-pc:oph;-smu!l'tl1cr-:::l_Qng 

H Elizabeth Collett. '·Ne·iY EU Partnerships in North Mrica: Potential to BackfucT 

Commentary. F cbruary 2017. !!!!J.JSJ .. '.\Y!:lli.cnJl.i!JliU.Q!llii!Ji£!C'!!;:;i;r''-l\~s!l!r~;o.!.C:l!ill1!!r:GilJ!J!.!'.:.'IQJ.Wr;!!;!9!::!1QiQ!t\:!!: 

_!m~};;_fu:<; 
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Friend: Written Testimony, HFAC MENA Subcommittee 04/1 R/201 R 

police forces laid out in the agreement Myriad arrangements and assurances must be made to 

incentivize anned groups to reorganize under new institutions and leadership. Given that Hattar 

himself recently declared the LPA null and void, such incentives are clearly not uniformly in place. 

Still, such a transition is a possible dream. Militias are already inclined to align with 

powerful politicians and cooperate with each other when beneticial. UN-led talks on the security 

sector are further proof that coalition-building is possible. The question is whether the GNA can 

manage a true integration of the myriad militias. Given developments over the past 18 months or 

so, continued coalition building among armed groups and political parties may need to continue 

within regions before a cooperative trans-regional architecture is possible. Much depends on what 

happens in the east without Hattar. Regardless, any transition ±rom militias to an army and police 

force should be slow and proceed in phases, taking care to sequence the major urban areas and 

their affiliated militia groups on their own timelines. 

Available Options for U.S. Policy 

Continued negotiations and implementation of the LPA is best accomplished with the 

support of the U.S., not only as a direct enabler of a national anny and police force through its 

assistance, but also in a role supporting UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting outside actors 

from disrupting constructive intra-Libyan balances of power. This latter effort would require deft 

diplomacy, especially with Gulf partners and Russia given the issue linkages elsewhere. But it 

would be the kind of international leadership only the U.S. can provide. 

If the administration chooses to maintain its narrow policy focus on disrupting and 

dismantling ISIS' operations in Libya, then there is little else it can do beyond the current otfshore 

pressure campaign and its counterterrorism capacity-building efforts among Libya's neighbors. 

Given the wide range of actors and their constantly shifting political fortunes, DoD is limited in 

the possible depths and breadth of its Libyan relationships at present. Military officials must take 

special care about empowering local groups at the wrong moment for national coalition-building 

purposes. Given the LPA's strong orientation against terrorism, the U.S has an enduring interest 

in doing what it can to help the resulting government succeed-even if only by doing it no harm. 
39

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you very much. Excellent testimony. We are very grateful for it. 

I wanted to follow up on something that I had said in my opening statement about Haftar and his health. We have discussed the 

power struggles between the west and the east, the GNA and the 

LNA, and how external actors back different factions. With the uncertainty around Haftar, this raises serious questions about the direction in which Libya may go if he is incapacitated. And we may 

have already seen the first bit of fallout this very afternoon, as 

news reports indicate that the general’s chief of staff survived a car 

bomb today in Benghazi. 

So, if you could tell us what the implications could be for the political process and for Libya’s security if the general is out of the 

picture—and, of course, we don’t know that—or perceived to be 

weakened? Of course, Haftar’s health scare, and the uncertainty 

that brings, also calls into question the U.N. Envoy in Libya’s efforts and assertion just last month that he believes Libya is still 

on track to have elections before the year is out. I think that was 

more aspirational than realistic, but it does raise questions about 

the U.N. support mission in Libya and the Special Representative’s 

role in all of this, and it also underscores the lack of a role the 

United States has thus far played in Libya. Can the U.N. effort be 

successful without the United States leadership in Libya? And how 

could the U.S. use our leverage to bring the external actors together to support the U.N. effort to seek political reconciliation? 

And as you know, last month the Foreign Affairs Committee 

passed House Resolution 644 strongly condemning the slave auctions that Mr. Deutch talked about of migrants and refugees in 

Libya. This is, obviously, a major concern and a reprehensible 

human rights issue. But I was hoping we could get a better understanding of the trafficking picture and the actors involved. Who is 

responsible for detaining migrants and refugees in Libya? Are 

there outside actors involved? How do they come in? How do they 

operate? What role do the Libyan factions play in all of this, and 

how can Congress and the U.S. do more to help this awful situation? 

You can tackle one or all of them, as you see fit, whichever one 

is your favorite. Mr. Blanchard? 

Mr. BLANCHARD. That is a rich agenda. I will try to proceed 

through those quickly. 

I think the danger in the East is a vacuum, both political and 

military, as we have seen or are observing, and you are hearing 

more about what is behind Haftar, right? The LNA is a coalition. 

And so, from a security standpoint, that is quite true. The different 

forces would need to select new leadership and that could get 

messy. 

With regard to politics, Haftar’s personal ambitions, although not 

directly and often clearly stated, are a sticking point in the negotiations. His desire, at a minimum, to lead the security forces, if not 

play a political role in the future, has been a sticking point. And 

so, his removal could, arguably, create an opportunity in that regard. 

In terms of the role of the U.N. mission and the United States, 

I think it is helpful to think about the role that the U.S. plays with 

40

the U.N. as setting a floor. Our role in the Security Council, our 

vote and diplomacy there with regard to things like the arms embargo and things like assets is the quiet backstop to what the U.N. 

mission is trying to do. 

In addition, our diplomacy, the statements that have been made 

in the Security Council are quite clear that this is the plan, this 

is the way we are moving forward. So, while we are not taking an 

active role, if you ask the actors with whom we may have challenging relationships, they certainly see our role as present. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. That is comforting. Thank you. 

Dr. Wehrey? 

Mr. WEHREY. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

I think Haftar’s removal in the East would just underscore what 

we have always known, that his coalition was just a coalition. Ever 

since he launched his operation in May or the summer of 2014, 

tribes, different religious groups and different militias attached 

themselves to his operation for their own self-serving purposes. 

Once he could claim liberation of Benghazi, that coalition has started to unravel. So, even before his health problems, there was also 

a lot of dissent when I was there in Benghazi, against his style of 

rule, against the empowerment of his sons, against his political ambitions, his corruption. So, all of this was building. You have different centers of power in the East, three different cities. You have 

different tribes that are maneuvering. 

The bottom line is I think you are going to see jockeying. It may 

devolve into some violence. I think it is also an opportunity in the 

sense that, if some new figure emerges at the head of the LNA, the 

Libyan National Army, that could be more amenable to western 

Libya, that could be an opportunity for reconciliation. It is important to underscore in western Libya just how demonized Haftar 

was because of his baggage, because of his political ambitions. 

I think the United States has an important role to play with the 

regional Arab states that backed Haftar, the United Arab Emirates 

and Egypt. They had already been cooling about General Haftar a 

bit. He was not delivering for them. I think this just underscores 

the point that, if these regional states want influence in the new 

Libya, they need to support the backing of a new figure in the East 

that is more amenable to reconciliation and unifying the country. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Dr. Wehrey. 

Ms. Friend? 

Ms. FRIEND. Ma’am, I agree with what my colleagues have said. 

I think there will be a real fight for control of the LNA if he doesn’t 

return. I think who takes over will really matter because, if it is 

a contentious figure, then the infighting will continue, and if it is 

a powerful figure——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let me just interrupt. When you say ‘‘fight 

for control,’’ will that be a bloody fight for control, an electoral fight 

for control? 

Ms. FRIEND. I think it will be bloody, ma’am. I think, as you 

pointed out in your comments, we are already perhaps starting to 

see some of the struggles in today’s car bomb attack. 

And so, I think there will be several consequences to this that 

are possible. There could be reduced pressure on violent Islamist 

groups in the area. Governance of Benghazi will certainly be very 

41

different going forward. I think it will interrupt reconciliation between the east and the west, simply because it is unclear who 

westerners now negotiate with. But it may help continuance of the 

LPA, which Haftar had announced in December was now defunct. 

So, I also agree it might be an opportunity. I also think it is going 

to interrupt Russian influence, at least for a time. They are going 

to have to figure out where they are going to put their investments 

now. 

On the U.S. side, I tend to focus on the counterterrorism piece. 

I think it is important the U.S. continue to be extremely discriminating in targeting, because, again, as all of these groups are realigning on the ground, we need to know exactly who we are 

watching and who the enemies are, and who is simply caught up 

in a fight, as it were. 

When it comes to trafficking, I would just say there is great variance among groups across the Sahel in how much they benefit from 

and are involved in trafficking, but it does allow them to blend in, 

if you will. And they are part of a larger illicit criminal network 

and lawlessness problem. And so, again, from a targeting perspective and figuring out who it is that we are most interested in from 

an American national security perspective, that just complicates 

matters. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very difficult to figure that out. 

Thank you so much. 

And I am pleased to yield to Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman. 

Thank you to our witnesses. 

The U.N.-appointed Envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, plans to 

amend the 2015 political agreement establishing the current government, hold a national conference, call a referendum on the constitution, and hold elections this year, as I am sure that you are 

aware and, Dr. Wehrey, you mentioned this. Human Rights Watch 

warned last month that Libya is not ready to hold free and fair 

elections, setting concerns about potential coercion, discrimination, 

and intimidation. 

So, I would like to know from each of you, what milestones does 

Libya need to reach to demonstrate that it is ready, actually, for 

fair elections? And I suppose, what can the U.S. do to help create 

the conditions for them to achieve those milestones? 

Mr. BLANCHARD. So, to begin, the Libyan electoral authorities 

have conducted a new voter registration drive, and that is one of 

the sort of highlights that SRSG Salame points to, that 2.5 million 

Libyans stepped forward to participate. That shows a baseline of 

a desire to participate in an election. 

The laws surrounding a referendum, the setting of districts, the 

balance, all that needs to be agreed, and hasn’t been. Again, as the 

Special Representative points out, I think he said at the meeting 

in Saudi Arabia, some of our Libyan brothers are very creative in 

their means of preventing action on those electoral issues, the nuts 

and bolts, right, the electoral structure. That needs to be taking 

place. So, I would watch that quite carefully. 

We saw participation decline over the past electoral exercises. 

And so, to the extent that we see turnout, that is something to 

watch very closely. Because, really, what this is about is the legitVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:23 May 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\041818\29815 SHIRL
42

imacy, the lack of legitimacy in domestic institutions. That is what 

needs to be reset here. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

Mr. WEHREY. I think there are a number of key danger points. 

The first one is the lack of a constitutional framework. I mean, my 

discussions with Libyans is, without a constitution, whatever government is produced is going to be yet another transitional government that is going to lack legitimacy, lack real authority. 

The other key milestones are voting laws, security. My visits to 

especially eastern Libyan underscored a degree of disenchantment 

with democracy, that we tried these elections before. Some people 

want a strongman, and that is why Khalifa Haftar was able to step 

into the void. And so, people saw that after the 2012, and especially the 2014, voting, there were parliaments that could not deliver to their constituents that were locked in committee disputes, 

and that led to strife. So, overcoming that popular aversion to elections is important. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

Anything that you have? 

Ms. FRIEND. Yes, sir. I would say that I think a study of the conditions prior to the 2014 elections would be very useful because, of 

course, those elections were what, then, led to greater disillusion 

politically inside the country. 

And then, just from my own narrow purview, I always say capacity for electoral security is extremely important because elections 

marred by violence, as we have seen in Kenya and elsewhere, have 

very poor outcomes as well. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

Some have argued that, based on the highly fractured nature of 

Libyan politics, governance may be better suited for a federalized 

system, granting relative autonomy for various regions. I am wondering whether you believe some manner of federalized Libya 

might bring about increased security and popular confidence in 

governance compared to a strong centralized government, where 

they have had so much, I think, disappointment with that model. 

Is that a feasible thing to consider? 

Mr. BLANCHARD. Decentralization has been a core theme of the 

political conversation in Libya since 2011. As Fred mentioned, municipalities have stepped forward and into the void to a certain extent. While a Federal arrangement or a decentralized political arrangement may emerge, difficult questions about state resources, 

the distribution of funding, management of security, all those 

would remain to be decided and dealt with. And it is likely that 

those will remain difficult. 

Mr. CICILLINE. If I could just have one final question, with the 

chairman’s indulgence? We have heard a lot about outside actors 

in Libya, and I want to focus for a moment on Russia, which appears to be playing several sides in this conflict. There are claims 

that Russia has facilitated the delivery of weapons to Haftar’s 

forces, sometimes through legal sales to Egypt, and the Russian 

special forces are reported to be operating in the porous border region between Egypt and Libya. So, if you could give me your assessment of what is Russia’s goal with respect to Libya and what 

does it have to gain in Libya? And what does the U.S. risk by RusVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:23 May 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\041818\29815 SHIRL
43

sia increasing its influence, or attempting to increase its influence, 

in the various warring Libyan groups long term? 

Mr. WEHREY. I think Russia wants to undercut European and 

U.S. influence. I think this is an opportunity for them. I think they 

have a number of financial goals in mind regarding arms contracts, 

many of which they had before the revolution. Gas deals, they had 

infrastructure projects. So, I think partly it is monetary, but it is 

also a political opportunity. I don’t think they have got all their 

eggs in the Haftar basket. I think they are diversifying their contacts to include Misurata, to include Tripoli. They see themselves 

as a potential power broker. They could certainly undercut the U.S. 

and the Europeans. 

Ms. FRIEND. Yes, sir, I would agree with that. I think they are 

playing as many sides as possible, so that they will have influence 

in the eventual government that wins out. 

Mr. BLANCHARD. Yes, I mentioned the Security Council earlier. 

The Russians have the same quiet role that we have and the ability to delay and obstruct. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you so much. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. Excellent questions 

and great answers. 

And now, I am pleased to yield to one of our favorite veterans 

on our subcommittee——

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thanks. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. That is very nice. Thank you, 

Madam Chair. 

As I said in the opening, thank you all for being here. 

I actually think Libya is an interesting study. With all the challenges we have, it actually could end up, if we figure out how to 

handle it—it is a very wealthy country with a relatively small population. I also used Libya as kind of the example when people argued, although the situation on the ground has changed a little bit 

much now, against intervention in Syria. I said, well, you have 1⁄2

million dead Syrians. You don’t have that level of instability in 

Libya, even though there is a major challenge. 

The problem with Libya is our failure to follow through, I think, 

what was rightfully an intervention. And then, we just kind of assumed it would all work itself out, and it didn’t. 

So, I think leaving Libya with no strategy, if we are dealing with 

a post-Qaddafi world, we can look back in 2020 and say, here is 

everything. I think it is important for us to talk about, though, 

what we could have done differently post-Libya, because it would 

be naive of us to think we will never be in this kind of situation 

again. 

So, Mr. Blanchard, if you have ideas of what we could have done 

differently? Or else we will go down the panel. I am curious of 

what you guys would say. If you could go back in time, what would 

you have changed in order to try to create a better post-Qaddafi 

scenario? 

Mr. BLANCHARD. I think perhaps Alice might be better suited to 

talk about the Obama administration’s view and what the conversation may have been. The President himself has been clear in 

44

terms of what he saw as the failure, and it really was, as you mentioned, the assumption not just that it would work itself out, but 

that the European partners and Arab states would step forward in 

a coordinated manner. 

If we look at the diplomatic level, it really is what SRSG Salame 

calls too many cooks in the kitchen, and too many cooks maybe 

with bad intent or their own selfish intent. So, it is that coordinating function, the speaking with one voice, and making sure that 

there wasn’t daylight such that those individual interests could 

begin to play themselves out and amplify the internal dilemma. So, 

early coordinated action may have been something that I would 

focus on. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Ms. Friend, actually, if you want to jump into 

that? And then, we will go to you, sir. 

Ms. FRIEND. Yes, sir. By the time I stepped into my Pentagon job 

in the Africa office, from a DoD perspective, we were already quite 

cautious because the empowerment of militias, of course, was off 

and running. And so, it was very hard to know from a security assistance perspective which party not only was aligned with a legitimate government we recognized at the time, but also would continue to be aligned and would continue to be a good-faith actor, 

which was something that AFRICOM certainly emphasized as well. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Did you guys discuss peacekeepers at all, and 

was that even a possibility? 

Ms. FRIEND. I don’t recall us discussing peacekeepers at that 

point. I know that it has been in the ether, especially among some 

Europeans, for quite a long time. Peacekeeping itself has its own 

sort of difficult track record as well. Peacekeeping is an extraordinarily difficult thing to do, and it really depends on the parties 

on the ground wanting to have a peace to keep. And I don’t think 

we were there with Libya yet. 

And so, I think the complexity and difficulty of the environment 

was something that we simply did not recognize long enough into 

it. And by the time we did, it was very hard to be able to have 

meaningful influence on the ground, particularly given the security 

situation for our own personnel. 

So, I do wish, if I could rewind the clock, I wish that the U.S. 

had perhaps taken a more forceful role at the United Nations, that 

we had been more involved among the parties, although I know 

Ambassador Stevens could not have been a better person to be 

there and working that issue. 

So, it is possible that Libya is a case where forces on the ground 

were such that it would have been very, very hard for the United 

States to do anything unilaterally, but I do think the international 

community could have put in much more focus and effort in the 

early days between 2011 and 2012 to perhaps head off the worst 

of the violence and get the negotiations started sooner. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

Sir? 

Mr. WEHREY. I think in the first year there was an excessive 

focus on elections as a success marker. And so, the U.N. was entirely focused on elections, to the detriment of dealing with the 

DDR problem, with the militias, with the security sector. I think 

45

the U.S. handed this off to the Europeans and the United Nations, 

who were both unable and unwilling to address it. 

So, you had these elections, but, then, you had no way to protect 

the democratic institutions from the power of militias. That raises 

the question of a stabilization force, which I agree brings a whole 

host of other consequences, but perhaps even a limited stabilization 

force to secure key facilities in Tripoli, the parliaments, economic 

institutions, to protect them from militia pressure. 

But the huge challenge of demobilizing the militias was made 

worse when the Libyan Government itself started paying the militias with oil wealth in late 2011. That was a disastrous decision. 

So, perhaps more U.S. oversight of Libya’s use of its oil wealth 

could have stopped this disaster. I think by the time we got around 

to trying to train and equip a Libyan military force, the General 

Purpose Force, it was too late. That effort led to disaster because 

the militias were too strong. So, again, the bottom line is I think 

we missed a key window in that first year to exert more of a presence. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And I think it is somewhat to the extent of the 

mistake made in Iraq, where we went in and there was a sense of 

lawlessness after the invasion instead of law, and people turned. 

And, Madam Chair, if I could ask just one more question with 

leniency? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. Go ahead. 

Mr. KINZINGER. We talk about Haftar. Whoever has the knowledge on it—maybe all three of you—how would you compare him 

and how you would see a Libya under the rule of Haftar, if you 

will, versus like Qaddafi? Is he more benevolent? Is he as ruthless? 

I mean, what is kind of the sense there? And I am sure there is 

no way to really know, but what are your thoughts? 

Mr. BLANCHARD. Muammar al-Qaddafi was a very unique individual. So, I would be reticent to compare or expect anyone to 

equate quite that way. 

The fact of the matter is that, personality aside, Libya has 

changed. The political and security power has been atomized, and 

any individual and/or ruling arrangement that emerges from this 

process is going to have to recognize that. In an odd sense, the 

Libya of Qaddafi’s imagination, with individual communities leading themselves and feeding upward. That is, ironically, now more 

the case than it was when he was there. And so, whoever is leading 

Libya in the future is going to have to deal with, as I said, this 

atomization that has occurred. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Fair point. 

Mr. WEHREY. I think Haftar’s support was already weakened. So, 

he didn’t have the sort of total control that Qaddafi had. But, that 

said, there were a number of similarities that his opponents have 

drawn and that I witnessed when I was in Benghazi. I mean, he 

was cultivating his sons. He did sort of enact a cult of personality 

where you would go around Benghazi and see billboards of Haftar’s 

picture everywhere. The police state, people were not free to speak 

their minds in Benghazi. People who criticized them disappeared. 

Censorship of the press. He brought back the old police, secret police. He relies on tribes. He tries to manage tribes, play them off 

against each other. So, there are some similarities. That said, as 

46

we have seen with his failing health and his diminishing influence, 

I don’t think it compares to Qaddafi. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Did you have anything else? 

Ms. FRIEND. No. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and I 

yield back. 

Thank you all. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And welcome to our panel. 

Dr. Wehrey, let me start with you. You said one of the bright 

spots potentially, not to overstate it, but were kind of at the local 

level in terms of elections, function. And that was music to my 

ears. I come from local government. I think it is long neglected. I 

think a lot of our democracy promotion programs start at the top 

and we start with the Parliament, as opposed to starting at the village level and working the way up. 

Can we build on that, do you think? Could that maybe affect our 

strategy moving forward, maybe a different course for us in terms 

of what we pursue in Libya, given the fact there is a hopeful sign, 

but it is working at the local level? 

Mr. WEHREY. Absolutely. I mean, we have seen a number of positive developments where there has been reconciliation between 

towns that were previously fighting. Towns enjoy strong legitimacy 

with their elected councils. This was true in 2012 through to the 

present, although I will caveat this that in the east there are nonelected mayors that have been appointed by the army. 

So, American engagement through USAID and through other 

channels, is absolutely the right way to go; however, not necessarily these non-elected councils. But I think, I mean, helping 

them to deliver services, the problem, though, also, it goes back to 

the national level, where they don’t get their budgets. They are 

criticizing the Government of National Accord for the way it distributes its budget. So, I think American engagement has to be 

from both levels. I mean, the local is important, but it can only get 

you so far. There has to be engagement at the national level. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, but the thing about local government that 

all over the world some institutions just don’t get it, but if you 

want to build democracy, it is built on a social contract. 

Mr. WEHREY. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I pay my taxes, and you pick up my trash. I pay 

my taxes; the clinic is open when I need it. I pay my taxes; the 

road gets paved. I pay my taxes; there is a clean source of water. 

If, on the other hand, there is no respect for that and there is 

no culture of, well, what do you mean we are supposed to make all 

that work, we don’t do that, it is corrupt, not our business, well, 

then you are going to completely erode confidence in the basic institution of governance, and it is why it exists, let alone democracy 

and what kind of government. And I think often that gets overlooked. That is why I picked up on what you said as one maybe 

helpful sign that we could build upon, expand; God forbid we invest 

in it. 

47

Mr. Blanchard, we have met before and we had a talk about terrorism in the Maghreb. And one of the things I recall you and I 

talking about, and I want to give you an opportunity to talk about 

it on the record here, but Libya is kind of key. I mean, if we are 

going to get at terrorists, well, instability in parts of Tunisia, parts 

of Nigeria, parts of Morocco, you cannot ignore the big, huge, festering sore of Libya. It is kind of key to addressing all the other 

potential hotspots in the region. 

Could you elaborate a little bit on that and how what we are 

talking about relates to other things we also care about in the region? 

Mr. BLANCHARD. Sure. As I said earlier, I think the United 

States is one actor among many outside Libya that is seeking to 

mitigate transnational threats, terrorism in particular. I think terrorism is the key driver of Egypt’s desire to back ‘‘the strongman 

approach’’ to security in eastern Libya. 

I think the continued availability of weapons, the ability, particularly on the southern and southwest borders, of people to transit 

back and forth allows a place for the ISIS fighters that Fred talked 

about being displaced from Sirte to hide, regroup, to reorganize. I 

also think that, in terms of our investment, the Department of Defense is, to the extent that we are investing in a sort of long-range 

counterterrorism approach, it is a containment strategy, and it is 

built entirely on this. So, it is a draw on our resources as well. 

With regard to local communities, I did just want to observe the 

USAID programs, the Transition Initiatives Programs have a lot of 

components that are focused precisely on aspects that you raised, 

you know, helping local communities and local government improve 

services, take the temperature of the town and see what they need. 

So, that kind of grassroots approach is one component of our policy. 

But, as Fred observed, in the absence of a nationwide national political accord, it is going to be difficult for those to really prosper. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, it is harder, and I am a big supporter of 

both NDI and IRI, and I think they are necessary. But I think 

sometimes it is easier to work with parliamentarians in the national capital than it is to roll up your sleeves and go down to the 

village level and try to help them do their jobs, and do it in a way 

that incorporates accountability and transparency, which are elements of democratic institution-building. 

From my own personal experience of working on some projects 

before I had this job, sometimes we do it well; sometimes we don’t. 

I believe the building block of democracy starts at the local level, 

not the other way around. 

Can I just ask one last question? This is the big philosophical 

one. But I was in Libya a few years ago with our former colleague, 

David Dreier, under the House Democracy Project. What struck me 

about Libya was, unlike some other places, you essentially have 

three population centers. They are all near the coast. You don’t 

have a huge interior population. It is, relative to some other places, 

not all that heterogeneous; it is a pretty homogeneous population. 

Tribal divisions, yes, but they used to, I mean, they are just coming 

off one-man rule for quite a long time. You could call that stability, 

not one we desire, but it is not like it is a novel thought that there 

48

could be a government, a central government, that exercises authority. It is a small population. 

So, why is this so hard? Why has it already been so long that 

we see this kind of chaos, this inability to put together meaningful 

coalitions that can govern and into which the population can invest 

and support? Why is it so hard? 

Mr. WEHREY. Congressman, thank you. 

I agree. I mean, these were all things that led to our optimism 

after the 2011 revolution. I think the fundamental problem is 

Qaddafi ruined this country. He gutted it of institutions. So, Libyans had no experience in self-governance. The entire muscle fiber 

you need to run a country was missing. Qaddafi ruled this in a 

highly personalized way. 

So, things like civil society, unions, elected municipal councils, 

they were all starting from scratch. And the fundamental vacuum 

is also the security sector. I mean, there was no army. So, you had 

the growth of these militias. You had, unfortunately, during the 

revolution and after, you did have real divisions growing between 

these different towns that acted like autonomous statelets that coalesced with their own militias, their own sources of income. 

I agree it is a small population; it should be easier. But the final 

thing I will add is the management of the economy. As the U.N. 

has mentioned, at its core, this is a contest for plunder, for access 

to economic resources. So, the economy is both, I think, a blessing 

and a curse. 

Ms. FRIEND. Sir, can I just say, historically thinking, the idea of 

Libya as one unified country is actually an anomaly. It is a very 

regional organization. In fact, there was no, there still is no rail 

line between eastern and western. It is very hard to drive. There 

is just not a lot of infrastructure integration between east and 

west. And the Fezzan in the south has always been isolated. 

And so, I think, at least from a regional perspective, even though 

it is a small population, there actually isn’t a tradition of integration across regions in Libya. And so, to some extent, this is a 

project that is imposing a new concept on Libya, Qaddafi notwithstanding. I mean, I think he papered over a lot of things and just 

did it through strength of arms. 

And I was intrigued by what Mr. Blanchard had said about how 

the hangover from Qaddafi is such that there is now a deep suspicion of centralized authority. So, it is not a historical tradition, 

and with Qaddafi as their example, why should the average person 

in Benghazi or Derna trust the Tripoli government? And this is 

what folks there have to overcome. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. BLANCHARD. I wouldn’t want to let the international community off the hook. As I said, seeking to mitigate transitional threats 

or pursuing their own agendas, political, regional, ideological, has 

led to a lot of interference, and it has amplified the real internal 

challenges and difficult dilemmas, zero-sum behavior, security 

threats, that Libyans are facing. When you have outsiders coming 

in, observing a difficult situation, and saying, well, ‘‘I need to back 

this person to solve my problem,’’ that has an amplifying effect, 

and it has really, I think, helped account for what we have seen 

subsequently. 

49

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chairman, you have been so gracious, 

but it has been a very thoughtful conversation. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I pay my taxes, and I want clean water. I 

pay my taxes. I got it. 

Thank you so much, Mr. Connolly. 

I would like to ask, if you would allow me, the questions that Mr. 

Deutch had. And they have kind of been covered a little bit, but 

I want to make sure that his are covered extensively. 

First, ‘‘The U.N. Refugee Agency estimates that there are 1.1 

million people in Libya in need of humanitarian assistance. Displaced families, refugees, and those living without basic services or 

health care continue to demonstrate Libya’s need for assistance.’’

So, Mr. Deutch asks, ‘‘Do you think the U.S. is providing adequate levels of humanitarian assistance to Libya, and what gaps 

remain where the U.S. or our international partners could step 

up?’’

Mr. Blanchard? 

Mr. BLANCHARD. I am looking for the data points that I brought 

with me because I want to get this right. 

So, there is an International Humanitarian Response Plan for 

Libya. The United States is the top contributor in 2016 and 2017 

of humanitarian funding by just a hair. The Germans and the 

Italians, the Europeans also put forward funds to support that. 

The needs that have been identified I think were 70 percent met 

last year. Could more be done, particularly with regard to the migrant situation? The United States approach has been, I think, to 

let European states and the European Union take the lead there. 

Working together, the European Union, the African Union, and the 

U.N. have taken some steps to address that problem. Again, the 

United States, I think, declaratory policy is quite supportive of 

that, and behind the scenes we are making a contribution. 

Mr. WEHREY. Chairman, I would defer to Mr. Blanchard on the 

actual specifics, but let me just underscore that the refugee displacement issue is so profound, and I saw it firsthand. I mean hundreds of families displaced from the city of Benghazi are crowded 

into other cities in the west, Misrata and Tripoli. There are refugees from the south that are in the capital. So, these refugees are 

straining the ability of the government in the capital. 

You have other local communities that have been displaced 

through fighting. The city of Tawergha is the main example, and 

I have been in their camps. There are truly horrific conditions, you 

know, young kids growing up year after year in these squalid refugee camps. So, it is a huge moral problem. 

The U.S. I think can always be doing more. I think its role, however, should be focused on Libyan economic institutions that can 

better address the plight of those displaced economically. So, there 

again, that leads me back to U.S. engagement with the Central 

Bank. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ms. Friend? 

Ms. FRIEND. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch mentioned root causes. I think in this case it is important to distinVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:23 May 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\041818\29815 SHIRL
50

guish between the humanitarian needs from the Libyan population 

as a result of the violence and, then, the humanitarian needs of the 

migrant population coming from sub-Saharan African largely. 

And when it comes to humanitarian needs for the Libyans, to address that, of course, involves addressing the root causes of the violence. And so, that, again, gets us back to these reconciliation efforts. 

And when it comes to the sub-Saharan Africans, then that is also 

its own set of root humanitarian and governance issues that are 

driving people out of their homes. So, we think of about Eritreans 

crossing the desert in Sudan to get to Libya, to get across the Mediterranean. Addressing what is happening in Eritrea or what is 

happening in Niger, or Mali, I think is as important as catching 

the problem by the time it gets to Libya. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

And his second question—thank you for those answers—‘‘The 

U.S. and the U.N. continue striving to work through the existing 

framework established under the Libyan Political Agreement to establish and move Libya forward. Some, however, do not recognize 

this agreement’s legitimacy. In your opinion, do you believe this 

framework is viable or does a new path need to be forged?’’

Mr. BLANCHARD. I think the SRSG’s current approach is driven 

by, as I said in my opening statement, a desire to refresh the legitimacy of institutions, in particular, so that decisions can be taken 

by a recognized authority. So, in terms of a legitimacy deficit, it is 

clear—not necessarily that we in the United States get to decide 

that or point to it; it is the Libyans themselves who think that various institutions lack legitimacy. And so, this entire exercise is, arguably, aimed at that. 

Mr. WEHREY. I agree. I mean, I think this was an important 

starting point. It was flawed. Certainly, it was opposed. But it was 

at least a mark on the wall. And so, before you peer into the abyss 

and jump into it, you have to have something to replace it. So, I 

think the U.N.’s approach with amendments, with reviving it, giving it new legitimacy, is the right approach. Of course, there are 

multiple actors across the board that benefit from the status quo, 

and spoiling it. Some of these actors are backed by international 

states. And that is why I think the U.S. has an important convening role to get everyone on the same page to say, let’s move forward on this roadmap. This LPA certainly was flawed, but was 

signed up to, and it needs to be the basis. 

Ms. FRIEND. Ma’am, I addressed in my written testimony the security elements of the LPA, which I think in principle are very 

good. The problem with the implementation has been making the 

leap, as I say, from militias to a national military force. 

In particular for the HOR and Tobruk that works with Haftar, 

the issue has been command and control and the Presidential 

Council being the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces with 

which elements of the HOR are not comfortable. 

So, I think in these discussions, if these issues can be worked 

out, the framework of the LPA from a security perspective is quite 

sound. 

51

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, we alternate between high hopes, low 

expectations, and it is just some kind of wild ride. And unfortunately, so many lives are at stake. 

Thank you so much for excellent testimony. 

And please tell Mr. Deutch that I did comply with his questions. 

I did my homework. 

Excellent witnesses. Thank you. 

With that, the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(53)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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29815n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMlVITTTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee ou the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtiueu (R-FL), Chairman 

April11,2018 

TO: MEJVffiERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of the 

Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

h!!!LQ.vvvw F orei UDAffajrs.hou~ov ). 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, April 18,2018 

2:00p.m. 

Libya Fractured: The Struggle for Unity 

Mr. Christopher Blanchard 

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs 

Congressional Research Institute 

Frederic Wehrey, Ph. D. 

Senior Fellow for Middle East Program 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Ms. Alice Hunt Friend 

Senior Fellow for International Security Program 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

By Direction of the Chairman 
55

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29815m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ______ _::M=:i"ildccte=-E=-,a:::s:...t "cc'=-"t_:_N<_::oc..:''=-l':cAfi"-''c..:ic.::_a ______ HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date. ___ -"0-"4."'1-"8,_,.1-"8 __ ~Room, ___ _.2"1-'"72"-------

Starting Time _ _.,_,z"'·Ow6yp:L..Unt..1_Ending Time 3:15p.m 

Recesses ( __ to __ ) L_to __ )( __ to __ )( __ to __ ) ( __ to __ ) L_to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen 

Check all ~fthefol/owing that app(v: 

Open Session [Z] Electronicall 

Executive (closed) Session D Televised 0 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Libya Fractured: The Stt•uggle for Uni~v 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

GOP: Reps. Chabot, DeSantis, Ki11zinger, Zeldin 

y Record'O!..(tapcd) 0 

Stenographic Record l.{J 

Dem: Rem king Member Deutch, Reps. Con11olly, Cicilline, Schneider 

NON-SUilCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an* if they are not members of fill/ committee.) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes EJ NoD 

(If "no", please list belmv and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record) 

Stateme11t ji1r the Record Submitted by Rep. Connolly 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

01' 

TIME ADJOURNED 3:15p.m. 
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29815d-1.eps

Statement for the Record 

Submitted by Mr. Connolly of Virginia 

More than two years after the December 2015 agreement to establish a Government of National 

Accord in Libya, rival political factions continue to obstruct the creation of a cohesive national 

government. Libya's security has dissolved into a puzzle of sub-state actors, militias, and violent 

extremist groups. With no national government and warring tribal rivalries running rampant 

around the country, Libya is a growing exporter of terrorism that is threatening its neighbors and 

undermining U.S. national security interests. The Trump Administration must understand that 

Libya is key to achieving broader U.S. counterterrorism objectives in the Middle East North 

Africa region. 

Separate governing entities in eastern and western Libya have impeded the Government of 

National Accord's (GNA) progress. The western Libya-based GNA leaders have begun to 

administer some government agencies, but have not consolidated national control. The eastern 

Libya-based House of Representatives (HOR), and a group of military officers aligned with the 

Libyan National Anny (LNA) led by retired General Khalifa Haftar, operate a parallel 

government that challenges the GNA's legitimacy. In late 2017, the United Nations launched the 

"Action Plan for Libya," which aims to complete Libya's political transition this year, but 

ongoing disputes threaten the plan's success. 

The United States and our European partners recognize the GNA as Libya's best hope for peace 

and stability, and have supported its development accordingly. However, not all governing 

entities in Libya have signed onto the GNA, and questions remain over unified political 

leadership and military command, national finances, and control of oil infrastructure. 

1nternational backing for the GNA has led some Libyan contingents to describe GNA leaders as 

"foreign-imposed interlopers." HOR members aligned with General Haftar take specific issue 

with recognizing the GNA Presidency Council as the legitimate leaders of Libya's armed forces. 

Libya's weak governance has allowed numerous anned groups to occupy territory throughout the 

country. Thanks in part to U.S. military support, the Libyan branch of 1SIL has largely been 

defeated, but other radical jihadist and secular militia groups continue to battle for regional 

control. According to Tunisia's Ambassador to the U.S., at least four terrorist attacks in Tunisia 

between March 2015 and March 2016 were planned from Libya. We cannot have a major failed 

state at the nexus of this region exporting violence to neighboring vulnerable countries. 

This ongoing conflict has opened up the country to a host of problems, including human 

trafficking; illegal migration; institutional rivalries; as well as food, fuel, and power shortages. 

Recent reports have detailed disturbing conditions for migrants and refugees in forced labor and 

slave auctions by both state and non-state actors. The House Foreign Affairs Committee recently 
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29815d-2.eps

passed H. Res. 644, which 1 was glad to cosponsor. The resolution condemns the exploitation of 

these migrants and refugees in Libya, and calls on the Government of Libya, the United Nations, 

and the African Union to investigate the existence of slave auctions in Libya and hold those 

involved accountable. It also calls on the State Department and US AID to use appropriated funds 

for humanitarian assistance for migrants and refugees in detention centers and to develop a 

holistic strategy for Libya. 

1 hope our witnesses will illuminate how the United States, in conjunction with our international 

and Libyan partners, can support compromise and demilitarization among Libya's rival factions 

and root out transnational terrorist threats. Ensuring a peaceful resolution and democratic 

governance will be an essential foundation to begin to address the many obstacles impeding 

Libya's progress. The road ahead is treacherous, but it is critical that the United States remain 

engaged to help Libya form a stable and united national government, and to support U.S. 

counterterrorism efforts across the region. 

2