[Cite as State v. Dumas, 2011-Ohio-2926.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 95760 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

MARLENE DUMAS

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

DISMISSED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-524605 

BEFORE: Rocco, J., Jones, P.J., and Keough, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 16, 2011 

 -i-
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Reuben J. Sheperd 

11510 Buckeye Road 

Cleveland, Ohio 44104 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Carl Sullivan 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.: 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Marlene Dumas appeals from her 

convictions for felonious assault and driving under the influence of alcohol 

(“DUI”). 

{¶ 2} Dumas argues her convictions are against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. She contends she proved her defense of not guilty by reason of 

insanity (“NGRI”). Upon a review of the record, this court is compelled to 

dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. 
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{¶ 3} The events surrounding Dumas’s convictions are not disputed. 

According to the witnesses to the incident, on the afternoon of February 24, 

2009, the Cleveland police received reports of a female motorist, who was 

later identified as Dumas, driving her vehicle in an erratic and dangerous 

manner on Interstate 90 in the westbound direction. 

{¶ 4} One of those callers was the victim, Christina Rokakis. As 

Rokakis proceeded along the West Shoreway, she observed Dumas scattering 

construction barrels, striking the concrete barrier along the median of the 

highway, and driving on only the rim of what should have been one of the 

front tires. 

{¶ 5} Although Rokakis increased her speed in order to outdistance 

Dumas, she was forced to stop for the traffic signal at the intersection at 

which the highway became Clifton Boulevard. Dumas, however, did not. 

Instead, she ran into Rokakis’s rear bumper, pushing Rokakis’s car forward. 

Rokakis called the police again. 

{¶ 6} Dumas then reversed her vehicle and proceeded to “ram” 

Rokakis’s car. Dumas repeated this activity three more times, causing 

Rokakis’s car to enter into the middle of the busy intersection. 

{¶ 7} At that point, Dumas got out of her vehicle and approached 

Rokakis. She stated to Rokakis that “God told her to hit the car to keep her 
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momentum going.” Dumas smelled of alcohol. While Dumas conversed 

with Rokakis, a bystander went over to Dumas’s vehicle and removed the 

keys from the ignition. 

{¶ 8} By the time the police arrived at the scene, Dumas had returned 

to her vehicle. Officer Patrick Becka noticed the odor, along with a bottle of 

brandy and a paper cup with liquor in it in the cupholder. Dumas had 

difficulty obtaining her driver’s license from her purse, her speech was 

slurred and barely coherent, and she seemed “happy.” 

{¶ 9} Dumas failed the sobriety tests Becka administered. Becka 

testified that Dumas admitted she had purchased the brandy and had been 

drinking it in her vehicle. She refused, however, to take a Breathalyzer test. 

 Later, Dumas telephoned her adult daughter from the police station and 

explained to her that the movie director wanted her to ram the car. 

{¶ 10} Dumas subsequently was indicted on five counts, charged with 

two counts of felonious assault, two counts of aggravated vehicular assault, 

and DUI. She originally entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. 

{¶ 11} The record reflects the trial court referred Dumas to the court’s 

psychiatric clinic for evaluations on three separate occasions. Although she 

was found competent to stand trial, questions remained concerning her sanity 

at the time of the incident. Dumas eventually changed her plea to NGRI. 
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The trial court thereafter further permitted Dumas to be evaluated by an 

independent psychiatrist. 

{¶ 12} The psychiatric reports all indicated Dumas suffered from the 

psychotic disorder labeled “Disassociative Identity Disorder,” formerly known 

as “Multiple Personality Disorder.” 1 Dumas had at least seven different 

personalities. 

{¶ 13} Dumas’s case eventually proceeded to a trial to the bench. After 

hearing the evidence, the trial court granted her motion for acquittal as to 

three of the counts, but found her guilty of one count of felonious assault and 

one count of DUI. The trial court sentenced Dumas to one year of conditional 

community control, suspended her driver’s license for five years, and imposed 

a one-thousand dollar fine. 

{¶ 14} Although Dumas argues that her convictions are against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, this court cannot address the merits of this 

appeal, because this court lacks jurisdiction to do so. The order of sentence 

issued does not constitute a final appealable order. 

 1The prosecution’s expert witness testified she could not render an opinion as 

to whether Dumas understood the wrongfulness of her actions at the time of the 

incident. Dumas’s expert witness, on the other hand, testified to a reasonable 

degree of medical certainty that Dumas did not. 
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{¶ 15} This court is compelled to dismiss on the authority of State v. 

Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 893 N.E.2d 163, 2008-Ohio-3330, and R.C. 

2929.19(B)(5), 2 and State v. Waters, Cuyahoga App. No. 85691, 

2005-Ohio-5137, which was cited by both the majority and the dissent in 

State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 922 N.E.2d 182, 2010-Ohio-2. The 

trial court in this case not only imposed a single term of community control 

for both of Dumas’s convictions, but indicated no potential sanction for either 

offense should she fail to comply with community control requirements. 

{¶ 16} The facts in State v. Pierce, Cuyahoga App. No. 92922, 

2010-Ohio-5467, appeal not allowed, State v. Pierce, 128 Ohio St.3d 1427, 

2011-Ohio-1049, 943 N.E.2d 573, and other cases that the supreme court has 

reversed3 are distinguishable because, by the time those were on appeal, the 

 2That section provides, in relevant part: “If the sentencing court determines 

at the sentencing hearing that a community control sanction should be imposed * * 

*, the court shall impose a community control sanction. The court shall notify the 

offender that, if the conditions of the sanction are violated, if the offender commits a 

violation of any law, or if the offender leaves this state without the permission of 

the court or the offender’s probation officer, the court may impose a longer time 

under the same sanction, may impose a more restrictive sanction, or may impose a 

prison term on the offender and shall indicate the specific prison term that may be 

imposed as a sanction for the violation, as selected by the court from the range of 

prison terms for the offense pursuant to section 2929.14 of the Revised Code.” 

(Emphasis added.) 

3 See, e.g., State v. South, 120 Ohio St.3d 358, 2008-Ohio-6693, 899 N.E.2d 

146; State v. Goldsberry, 120 Ohio St.3d 275, 2008-Ohio-6103, 898 N.E.2d 46. 
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defendant had violated community control and received a prison term that 

had not, in some cases, originally been pronounced. 

{¶ 17} In light of the foregoing, Dumas’s appeal is dismissed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

______________________________________ 

KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, P.J., and 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR