NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

SALVADOR MEDINA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0118 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2019-003621-002

The Honorable David W. Garbarino, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Eric K. Knobloch

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Cynthia Dawn Beck

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 03-28-2024
STATE v. MEDINA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Salvador Medina appeals his convictions and sentences for 

two counts of first-degree murder, attempt to commit first-degree murder, 

and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. For the following reasons, 

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the victims and 

witnesses. Medina and his father, Sal, purchased what they believed to be

a bag of methamphetamine from Gianna. But the bag contained mostly 

broken fiberglass and only a small amount of methamphetamine. Medina 

and Sal asked Gianna to meet so they could resolve the issue.

¶3 Medina then began sending threatening text messages to 

Gianna saying, “I got my army ready for whatever,” and “I didn’t get all 

my shooters rounded you for nothing.” Gianna thought Medina was 

“blowing smoke,” but she asked her supplier, Joseph, to come with her to 

the meeting because she was “being threatened.”

¶4 Medina, Sal, and Medina’s friend, Jeffrey Alvarez, met 

Gianna and Joseph in the parking lot of Joseph’s apartment. Gianna’s 

girlfriend, Nancy, was also at the scene but remained in Gianna’s car during 

the meeting. While Sal and Joseph were arguing about the bad batch of 

methamphetamine, Gianna saw Medina say something to Alvarez, to 

which Alvarez responded, “Right here, right now?” Alvarez then pulled 

out a gun and shot Joseph, Gianna, and Nancy. Joseph and Nancy died from 

their wounds, but Gianna survived.

¶5 Medina was arrested and charged with two counts of firstdegree murder, attempt to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to 

commit first-degree murder, and possession of dangerous drugs.

¶6 During jury selection, Medina’s counsel objected to Juror 50 

because of a response to a multiple-choice question. Juror 50’s response 
STATE v. MEDINA

Decision of the Court

3

indicated that he assumed “someone did something wrong” because there 

were murder victims. The superior court overruled the objection but 

brought Juror 50 to be questioned on his response. Juror 50 explained his 

response was generalized, that “murder victims imply a murderer,” but he 

did not think Medina was guilty without evidence. 

¶7 Medina’s counsel then asked Juror 50 if he anticipates the 

defense to prove anything, or if he would hold it against Medina if he 

decided not to testify, to which he answered, “not specifically.” Medina’s 

counsel further prodded, asking if the state produces evidence and the 

defense does not, “your inclination is to rule for guilty?” Juror 50 responded 

“if there is damning evidence, yes.” He then clarified that he understood 

damning evidence to be evidence that “proves [guilt] beyond a reasonable 

doubt.”

¶8 Defense counsel moved to strike Juror 50 for cause based on 

his answers. But the court denied the motion, finding that the juror had not 

said anything inconsistent with the concept that the state had to meet its 

burden of proof for the jurors to find Medina guilty.

¶9 At trial, Medina objected to the admission of body-worn 

camera footage from the responding officers and security guard. Medina 

also objected to the admission of graphic crime-scene photographs. The 

body-worn camera footage was from four different points of view and 

depicted the scene and witnesses as officers arrived. The videos contained 

graphic images of the injuries to the victims, and the victims’ screams of 

pain can be heard as the officers gather evidence and administer first aid. 

The court excluded some of the crime scene photographs but admitted the 

body-worn camera footage, finding the videos’ probative value was not 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Medina. 

Medina proposed showing the videos on mute so the jury would not hear 

the victims screaming or choking on blood. But the court found the sounds 

in the video, including the witnesses’ statements, and the officers detailing 

the location of the victims’ firearms, admissible. When presented with the 

footage, multiple jurors looked away, and two jurors cried.

¶10 After a 14-day trial, the jury found Medina guilty on all counts 

except possession of dangerous drugs. The court sentenced Medina to two 

natural life prison terms and one prison term of 28 years, all running 

consecutively. Medina was also sentenced to life with the possibility of 

release after 25 years to run concurrently with his first natural life sentence. 

Medina timely appealed and we have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 9;

A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, 13-4033(A)(1).
STATE v. MEDINA

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶11 Medina argues the court should have struck Juror 50 for cause 

because he could not or would not follow the law regarding the burden of 

proof or weighing of evidence. Medina also argues the superior court 

abused its discretion by admitting the body-worn camera footage.

I. The superior court did not err by denying Medina’s motion to 

dismiss Juror 50.

¶12 We review rulings on strikes of potential jurors for an abuse 

of discretion, giving deference to the superior court which was able to 

observe the potential jurors. State v. Colorado, 256 Ariz. 97, 103, ¶ 23 (App.

2023).

¶13 A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by 

an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24. A court 

must excuse a prospective juror “if there is a reasonable ground to believe” 

the juror “cannot render a fair and impartial verdict.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

18.4(b). Accordingly, the court must strike a juror who expresses “serious 

misgivings about his ability” to be fair and impartial, State v. Smith, 182 

Ariz. 113, 115 (App. 1995), but need not remove a juror who “ultimately 

assures the court that he can be objective,” State v. Reasoner, 154 Ariz. 377, 

384 (App. 1987). “In assessing a potential juror’s fairness and impartiality, 

the trial court has the best opportunity to observe prospective jurors and 

thereby judge the credibility of each.” State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 139, ¶ 

37 (2000). The court must consider the totality of a juror’s conduct and 

answers, and the party challenging a juror for cause “has the burden to 

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the juror cannot render a 

fair and impartial verdict.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5(h).

¶14 Medina claims that Juror 50 “took the position that if the State 

put on damning evidence[,] he would expect the defendant to put on 

evidence.” Medina argues that “[Juror 50’s] unwillingness to follow the law 

and correctly weigh the evidence should have disqualified him,” and, as 

such, the superior court’s failure to strike Juror 50 deprived Medina of the 

right to a fair and impartial jury. 

¶15 But Juror 50 clarified upon questioning outside of the 

presence of other potential jurors that, to him, “damning evidence” is 

evidence that proves Medina’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This is an 

unequivocal statement that Juror 50 was able to correctly follow the law. 

Hoskins, 199 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 44 (denying motion to strike a challenged juror

who “exhibited an initial, fundamental misapprehension” of burdens of 
STATE v. MEDINA

Decision of the Court

5

proof because she responded affirmatively to follow-up questioning about 

understanding the law). Juror 50’s answers during jury selection do not 

establish that he was unable to be fair and impartial. Because the superior 

court is in the best position to assess the responses and demeanor of 

prospective jurors, we defer to its finding that Juror 50 was able to render a 

fair and impartial verdict. State v. Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. 197, 210, ¶ 30

(2018) (deferring to the superior court’s assessment that a challenged juror 

“understood the process sufficiently to serve as a fair and impartial juror”); 

Hoskins, 199 Ariz. at 141, ¶ 48 (“We observe that juror statements and 

circumstances normally warrant further exploration by the trial court to 

assure fairness and impartiality. Here, the trial court questioned each juror 

on matters of individual concern and was satisfied on the question of 

fairness.”). The court did not abuse its discretion.

II. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by admitting bodyworn camera footage.

¶16 Medina next argues the superior court improperly admitted 

body-worn camera footage from the responding police officers and security 

guard. We review the admissibility of video evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 339, ¶ 69 (2007). We consider “the 

[video’s] relevance, its tendency to inflame the jury, and its probative value 

compared to its potential to cause unfair prejudice.” Id. (cleaned up).

Medina contends the videos had “so little probative value . . . that admitting 

even one, let alone all four [videos], could only have been for the purpose 

of inciting the passions and inflaming the minds of the jurors.” He 

maintains that the videos are not relevant because they do not shed light on 

any contested issues.

¶17 We agree with the superior court that the videos have 

probative value to depict “the location of particular items at the scene . . . 

[and] the witnesses’ state of mind immediately following the events at 

issue.” Medina nonetheless suggests the footage is cumulative because 

these facts could have been proven by witness testimony. But “[w]hether 

the subject-matter of a [video] can be described with words is not the test 

of admissibility.” State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 459–60, ¶ 157 (2016). And 

video evidence is relevant, notwithstanding an offer to stipulate, if it helps 

to illustrate what occurred. State v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 584 (1997).

¶18 Medina points to several cases in which the court excluded 

graphic evidence to support his contention that the videos’ unfair prejudice 

outweighed any probative value. See State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 287–88 

(1983) (finding color photos of charred body, damaged skull, and exposed 
STATE v. MEDINA

Decision of the Court

6

brain matter inadmissible); State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 208–09, ¶¶ 61, 63 

(2004) (finding crime scene photos depicting charred and decomposing 

bodies inadmissible); State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1, 10, ¶¶ 30–33 (2002) (finding 

photos of a minor victim’s genital area and anus inadmissible). The 

evidence at issue here—videos briefly depicting the victims’ injuries while 

responding officers administered first aid—is not so gruesome and 

shocking as to require its preclusion. State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335, 343 

(1984) (“Gruesome photographs may be admitted to . . . aid the jury in 

understanding testimony.”). Video evidence may be admissible, even if 

supported by other evidence, if it is offered to complement witness 

testimony. See Davolt, 207 Ariz. at 209, ¶¶ 61–62. And in fact, the superior 

court did exclude some of the proffered crime scene photos after weighing 

probative value against unfair prejudice. 

¶19 The superior court explicitly weighed probative value against 

the danger of unfair prejudice in admitting the body-worn camera footage 

as the law requires, and the record supports its findings. The court did not 

abuse its discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm Medina’s convictions and sentences.