Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Decisions Needed to 

Shape Army’s Combat 

Systems for the 

Future 

March 2009 

GAO-09-288 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2009

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Decisions Needed to Shape Army's Combat Systems

for the Future 

Highlights of GAO-09-288, a report to 

congressional committees 

The Future Combat System (FCS)

program is the centerpiece of the 

Army’s effort to transition to a

lighter, more agile, and more

capable combat force. By law, GAO

is to report annually on the FCS 

program. Also, law requires the 

Department of Defense (DOD) to

hold a milestone review of the FCS 

program, now planned for 2009.

This report addresses (1) what 

knowledge will likely be available 

in key areas for the review, and (2) 

the challenges that lie ahead 

following the review. To meet these 

objectives, GAO reviewed key 

documents, performed analysis, 

attended demonstrations and 

design reviews, and interviewed

DOD officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO suggests Congress consider

not approving full funds for the 

program until several conditions 

are met, such as preparation of a 

complete budget for any program 

emerging from the milestone 

review. GAO also recommends the 

Secretary of Defense, among other

things, ensure: the program that 

emerges conforms to current 

defense acquisition policy, such as

technology maturity; any spin out 

approach is based on fully tested

results; and any incremental

strategy involves free-standing,

justifiable increments. DOD

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations. 

The Army will be challenged to demonstrate the knowledge needed to 

warrant an unqualified commitment to the FCS program at the 2009 

milestone review. While the Army has made progress, knowledge 

deficiencies remain in key areas. Specifically, all critical technologies are 

not currently at a minimum acceptable level of maturity. Neither has it 

been demonstrated that emerging FCS system designs can meet specific 

requirements or mitigate associated technical risks. Actual demonstrations 

of FCS hardware and software—versus modeling and simulation results—

have been limited, with only small scale warfighting concepts and limited 

prototypes demonstrated. Network performance is also largely unproven.

These deficiencies do not necessarily represent problems that could have 

been avoided; rather, they reflect the actual immaturity of the program. 

Finally, there is an existing tension between program costs and available 

funds that seems only likely to worsen, as FCS costs are likely to increase 

at the same time as competition for funds intensifies between near- and 

far-term needs in DOD and between DOD and other federal agencies. 

DOD could have at least three programmatic directions to consider for 

shaping investments in future capabilities, each of which presents 

challenges. First, the current FCS acquisition strategy is unlikely to be

executed within the current $159 billion cost estimate and calls for 

significant production commitments before designs are demonstrated. To 

date, FCS has spent about 60 percent of its development funds, even

though the most expensive activities remain to be done before the 

production decision. In February 2010, Congress will be asked to begin 

advancing procurement funds for FCS core systems before most prototype 

deliveries, critical design review, and key system tests have taken place.

By the 2013 production decision, Congress will have been asked for over

$50 billion in funding for FCS. Second, the program to spin out early FCS 

capabilities to current forces operates on an aggressive schedule centered 

on a 2009 demonstration that will employ some surrogate systems and 

preliminary designs instead of fully developed items, with little time for 

evaluation of results. Third, the Army is currently considering an 

incremental FCS strategy—this is to develop and field capabilities in 

stages versus in one step. Such an approach is generally preferable, but 

would present decision makers with a third major change in FCS strategy

to consider anew. While details are yet unavailable, it is important that 

each increment be justified by itself and not be dependent on future 

increments. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-288.

For more information, contact Paul Francis at 

(202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Background 2

Significant Knowledge Gaps Persist in Key Areas 7 

Oversight Challenges Will Continue Beyond the Milestone Decision 19 

Conclusions 34

Matters for Congressional Consideration 36 

Recommendations for Executive Action 36 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 40 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 41 

Appendix III Legislative Requirements for 2009 FCS Go/No-Go 

Review 43 

Appendix IV 2009 Defense Acquisition Board In-Process Review 

Criteria 45 

Appendix V Other Related Legislation 47 

Appendix VI Technology Readiness Levels 48 

Appendix VII FCS Critical Technology Ratings and Projections for 

Achieving TRL 6 50 

Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52 

 

Page i GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
Related GAO Products 53 

Tables 

Table 1: Actual and Projected Maturity of FCS Critical 

Technologies 9

Table 2: Surrogate, Non-Production, and Not-Yet-Tested Systems 29 

Table 3: TRL Descriptions 48 

Figures 

Figure 1: FCS's Core Systems 4 

Figure 2: Differences between Best Practices Acquisition Approach 

and FCS Approach 21 

Figure 3: Remaining FCS Research and Development Funding and 

Key Events 22 

Figure 4: FCS Program Events and Congressional Budget Decisions 25 

Page ii GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
Abbreviations 

ARV-A-L Armed Robotic Vehicle – Assault (Light) 

C2V Command and Control Vehicle 

CDR Critical Design Review 

Cl. I UAV Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Cl. IV UAV Class IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

DAB Defense Acquisition Board 

DOD Department of Defense 

FCS Future Combat System 

FRMV FCS Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

ICV Infantry Carrier Vehicle 

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System 

KP Knowledge Point 

LSI Lead System Integrator 

LUT Limited User Test 

MCS Mounted Combat System 

MSC Milestone C 

MULE-C Multifunction Utility / Logistics and Equipment 

Countermine

MULE-T Multifunction Utility / Logistics and Equipment Transport 

MV-E Medical Vehicle Evacuation 

MV-T Medical Vehicle Treatment 

NLOS-C Non-Line of Sight Cannon 

NLOS-LS Non-Line of Sight Launch System 

NLOS-M Non-Line of Sight Mortar 

PDR Preliminary Design Review 

SUGV Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle 

TRL Technology Readiness Level 

T-UGS Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor 

UAS Unmanned Aerial Systems 

UGS Unattended Ground Sensors 

UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicles 

U-UGS Urban Unattended Ground Sensor 

WIN-T Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page iii GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 12, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

The Future Combat System (FCS) program—which comprises 14 

integrated weapon systems and an advanced information network needed 

for a brigade combat team—is the centerpiece of the Army’s efforts to 

transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force and 

according to the Army, the greatest technology and integration challenge it 

has ever undertaken. The Army seeks to develop and then integrate 

dozens of new technologies in the FCS program and ultimately create a 

force in which people, platforms, weapons and sensors are linked 

seamlessly together in a system-of-systems. 

The Army started the FCS program in May 2003 without having fully 

defined the individual systems, their functions, or how they would 

interact. The Army moved ahead without determining whether the concept 

could be successfully developed with existing resources—without proven 

technologies, a stable design, and available funding and time. The Army 

currently projects the program will cost $159 billion, although the Army 

has indicated that cost increases are likely. The program is also using a 

unique partner-like arrangement with a lead system integrator (LSI), the 

Boeing Company, to manage and produce the FCS. For these and other 

reasons, the program is recognized as being high risk and in need of 

special oversight. Accordingly, in 2006, Congress mandated that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) hold a milestone review (also called go/nogo review) following the FCS preliminary design review, which is now 

tentatively scheduled for May 2009.1

 Congress directed that the review 

include an assessment of whether (1) the needs are valid and can best be 

met with the FCS concept, (2) the FCS program can be developed and 

produced within existing resources, and (3) the program should continue 

as currently structured, be restructured, or be terminated. Congress 

required the Secretary of Defense to review and report on specific aspects 

of the program, including the maturity of critical technologies, program 

risks, demonstrations of the FCS concept and software, and a cost 

estimate and affordability assessment. 

 1

John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364,

§ 214 (2006). 

Page 1 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

Given the cost, scope, and technical challenges, section 211 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires GAO to report 

annually on the FCS program.2

 The objectives of this report are to 

determine (1) to what extent knowledge will likely be available to DOD, 

the Army, and the Congress in the key areas of technology, design, 

demonstrations, network performance, and cost and affordability to 

support the 2009 milestone review and (2) the challenges that a program 

(or programs) to furnish the Army with future capabilities will face 

following the milestone review. 

In conducting our work, we reviewed documents pertaining to the FCS 

program, including the Operational Requirements Document, the 

Acquisition Strategy Report, technology assessments, and modeling and 

simulation results; attended meetings at which DOD and Army officials 

reviewed program progress; and held discussions with key DOD and Army 

officials on various aspects of the program. Officials from DOD and the 

Army have provided us access to sufficient information to make informed 

judgments on the matters in this report. In addition, we drew from our 

body of past work on weapon system acquisition practices and conducted

our own analyses in key areas such as cost and technology. We conducted

this performance audit from March 2008 to March 2009 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. Appendix I further discusses our scope and methodology. 

The FCS concept is designed to be part of the Army’s Future Force, which 

is intended to transform the Army into a more rapidly deployable and 

responsive force that differs substantially from the large division-centric 

structure of the past. The Future Force is to be offensively oriented and

will employ revolutionary concepts of operations, enabled by new 

technology. The Army envisions a new way of fighting that depends on 

networking the force, which involves linking people, platforms, weapons, 

and sensors seamlessly together in a system-of-systems. If successful, the 

FCS system-of-systems concept would integrate individual capabilities of 

weapons and platforms, thus facilitating interoperability and open system 

Background 

 2

Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 211.

Page 2 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

designs. This concept would represent a significant improvement over the 

traditional approach of building superior individual weapons that must be 

retrofitted and netted together after the fact. 

The Army is reorganizing its current forces into modular brigade combat 

teams, each of which is expected to be highly survivable and the most 

lethal brigade-sized unit the Army has ever fielded. The Army expects FCSequipped brigade combat teams to provide significant warfighting 

capabilities to DOD’s overall joint military operations. The Army is 

implementing its transformation plans at a time when current U.S. ground 

forces continue to play a critical role in ongoing conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. The Army has instituted plans to spin out selected FCS 

technologies and systems to current Army forces throughout the 

program’s system development and demonstration phase. 

FCS is to be composed of advanced, networked air and ground-based 

combat and maneuver sustainment systems, unmanned ground and air 

vehicles, and unattended sensors and munitions. (See fig. 1.) The soldier is

the centerpiece of the system-of-systems architecture and is networked 

with 14 FCS core systems and numerous other enabling systems referred 

to as complementary programs. FCS is expected to be networked via a 

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance architecture, including networked communications, 

network operations, sensors, battle command systems, training, and both

manned and unmanned reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities that 

will enable improved situational understanding and operations at a level of 

synchronization heretofore unachievable. With that, FCS brigade combat 

teams are expected to be able to execute a new tactical paradigm based on

the quality of firsts—the capability to see first, understand first, act first, 

and finish decisively. Fundamentally, the FCS concept is to replace mass 

with superior information—allowing the soldier to see and hit the enemy 

first rather that to rely on heavy armor to withstand a hit. 

Page 3 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

Figure 1: FCS's Core Systems 

Source: U.S. Army.

Medical Vehicle

Treatment (MV-T)

Sensors

Battle Command

SOSCOE Transport

Mounted Combat

System (MCS)

Infantry Carrier

Vehicle (ICV) Command and

Control Vehicle (C2V)

FCS Recovery and Maintenance 

Vehicle (FRMV)

Non-Line of Sight Mortar

(NLOS-M)

Medical Vehicle

Evacuation (MV-E)

Armed Robotic Vehicle

– Assault (Light)

(ARV-A-L)

Small UGV

(SUGV)

T-UGS

U-UGS

Class I UAV Class IV UAV

Tactical and Urban Unattended

Ground Sensors

Non-Line of Sight

Launch System

(NLOS-LS)

Unattended Ground Systems (UGS)

Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)

Manned Ground Vehicles Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) (MGV)

Common Chassis

Reconnaissance amd

Surveillance Vehicle (RSV)

Non-Line of Sight Cannon

(NLOS-C)

Multifunction

Utility

/ Logistics and

Equipment

Countermine

(MULE-C)

Multifunction

Utility

/ Logistics and

Equipment

Transport

(MULE-T)

The Army is using a management approach for FCS that centers on an LSI 

to provide significant management services to help the Army define and

develop FCS and reach across traditional Army mission areas. Because of

its partner-like relationship with the Army, the LSI’s responsibilities 

include requirements development, design, and selection of major system

and subsystem contractors. The team of Boeing and its subcontractor, 

Page 4 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

Science Applications International Corporation, is the LSI for the FCS 

system development and demonstration phase of acquisition, which is 

expected to extend until 2017. The FCS LSI is expected to act on behalf of

the Army to optimize the FCS capability, maximize competition, ensure 

interoperability, and maintain commonality in order to reduce life-cycle 

costs, and for overall integration of the information network. Boeing also 

acts as an FCS supplier in that it is responsible for developing two 

important software subsystems. Army officials have stated they did not

believe the Army had the resources or flexibility to use its traditional 

acquisition process to field a program as complex as FCS under the 

aggressive timeline established by the then-Army Chief of Staff. The Army 

will maintain oversight and final approval of the LSI’s subcontracting and 

competition plans. 

Legislative Requirements 

for FCS Milestone Review 

The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 

mandated that the Secretary of Defense carry out a Defense Acquisition 

Board milestone review of FCS not later than 120 days after the system-ofsystems preliminary design review, which is now tentatively scheduled for 

May 2009.

3

 The legislation is consistent with our 2006 report on FCS 

wherein we recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish a 

Defense Acquisition Board milestone review following the Army’s design 

review.4

 Moreover, we recommended that this should be a go/no-go review 

of the FCS program based on its ability to meet knowledge markers 

consistent with DOD acquisition policy and best practices and 

demonstrate the availability of funds necessary to meet program costs. 

According to the law, DOD’s 2009 milestone review of FCS should include 

an assessment for each of the following: 

(1) whether the warfighter’s needs are valid and can be best met with 

the concept of the program; 

(2) whether the concept of the program can be developed and 

produced within existing resources; and 

(3) whether the program should 

 3

Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 214 (2006). 

4

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Is Needed for Future Combat

System’s Successful Outcome, GAO-06-367 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006). 

Page 5 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

(a) continue as currently structured; 

(b) continue in restructured form; or

(c) be terminated. 

Furthermore, the Congress stipulated that the Secretary make specific 

determinations when making the assessment concerning the future course 

of the FCS program. The original language contained six criteria the 

Secretary was to use when answering the three assessment questions. In 

our 2008 report on the FCS program, we recommended that the Secretary

establish objective and quantitative criteria that the FCS program will have 

to meet in order to justify its continuation and gain approval for the 

remainder of the acquisition strategy.

5

 Subsequently, the Duncan Hunter 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 amended and 

expanded the existing requirements and added four new criteria.6

 These 

changes expand the scope of supporting information the Congress 

mandated to be included with the DOD milestone review report. 

For example, the 2009 Act requires the Secretary, when making his 

assessment of the program, to determine whether actual demonstrations, 

rather than simulations, have shown that the software for the program is 

on path to achieve threshold requirements on cost and schedule. Appendix 

III contains the legislative requirements for the 2009 milestone review. For 

the purposes of our analysis, we aggregated the congressional criteria into

four key areas: technology maturity, requirements/design, demonstrations

(FCS concept and network), and cost. 

In 2008, we found that the progress made by FCS, in terms of knowledge 

gained, was commensurate with a program in early development but was 

well short of a program halfway through its development schedule and its 

budget. In view of these findings, we recommended, in part, that the 

Secretary of Defense establish criteria that the FCS must meet in the 2009 

milestone review in order to justify continuation along with identifying 

viable alternatives to FCS.7

In response to this recommendation, and to facilitate the Secretary’s 

assessment of the status of FCS and to decide the program’s future, the 

 5

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: 2009 Is a Critical Juncture for the Army’s Future Combat 

System, GAO-08-408 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2008). 

6

Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 211 (2008). 

7

GAO-08-408. 

Page 6 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics 

issued an acquisition decision memorandum in August 2008 to the 

Secretary of the Army outlining the information the Army must provide. 

The Under Secretary established criteria for supporting information in five 

program areas: program execution, unmanned systems, manned ground 

vehicles, network, and test/experimentation/demonstration. The Under 

Secretary has established specific criteria within each of the five areas, as 

shown in Appendix IV. For example, in the area of program execution, the 

Army must demonstrate that the FCS, Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), 

and Warfighter Information Network Tactical (WIN-T) programs’ 

development, build, and test schedules are aligned and executable. The

Under Secretary’s memorandum also instructed the Army to mature its 

acquisition approach to deliver initial increments of FCS capability to 

infantry brigade combat teams rather than the originally planned heavy 

brigades. For the FCS core program, the Under Secretary stated that the

Army shall pursue an incremental or block approach to acquiring FCS 

capability. 

Along with the mandated 2009 milestone review of FCS, the Congress has 

required the DOD and the Army to perform analyses and report separately 

on two core systems of the FCS system-of-systems.8

 Specifically, the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration 

is to report on an analysis of the FCS communications network and 

software. This report, due not later than September 30, 2009, will include 

assessments of issues such as network vulnerability to enemy attack, 

electronic warfare, jamming, and adverse weather. (See app. V.) 

Compared with the criteria to be used for the milestone review, the FCS 

program has significant knowledge gaps. Specifically, the program has yet

to show that critical technologies are mature, design issues have been 

resolved, requirements and resources are matched, performance has been 

demonstrated versus simulated, and costs are affordable. The Army will be

challenged to convincingly demonstrate the knowledge necessary to 

warrant an unqualified commitment to FCS at the 2009 milestone review. 

Four of the critical technologies have not yet achieved minimally 

acceptable maturity levels despite being in development for at least 6 

years. The schedule to complete the remaining preliminary design reviews 

is aggressive, and it seems clear from the results of the initial system-level 

Significant Knowledge 

Gaps Persist in Key 

Areas 

 8

Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 212.

Page 7 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

preliminary design reviews that numerous performance trade-offs will be 

needed to close gaps between FCS requirements and designs. Actual 

demonstrations (versus modeling and simulation) of the FCS concept,

including its critical survivability aspects, have been limited to date; 

demonstrated network performance is particularly limited with many key 

questions yet to be answered. Finally, FCS costs appear likely to increase 

again at a time when available funds may decline. 

Major Risks Remain in the 

Maturation of FCS 

Technologies 

In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue, 

DOD is required by congressional direction to make a determination of 

whether each critical technology for the program is at least TRL 6. The 

Army has struggled to attain this level of maturity, despite being a lower 

standard than preferred by DOD policy and falling short of best practices. 

At TRL 6, a representative model or prototype exists and is tested in a 

relevant environment—a maturity level well beyond TRL 5 where the 

technology demonstrates functionality in a laboratory environment but 

does not have the physical form or fit of the finished product. Appendix VI

contains a complete listing and description of TRLs. Army technology 

officials stated the purpose of TRL 6 demonstrations is to build confidence 

the concept is technically feasible, and TRL 6 actually means extensive 

testing remains before TRL 7 can be achieved. Maturing technologies to 

TRL 7 (prototype possessing the form, fit, and function of the finished 

product that is demonstrated in a realistic environment) prior to starting 

product development is a best practice and a DOD policy preference.9

Against these standards, all FCS technologies should have achieved TRL 7 

as the program proceeded into the system development and 

demonstration phase in May 2003. Even if the Army does demonstrate TRL 

6 in 2009, extending technology development this late into the acquisition 

process puts FCS at risk for experiencing problems that may require large

amounts of time and money to fix. 

The Army anticipates that all the critical technologies will reach TRL 6 by

the milestone review, but this projection deserves closer examination and 

perspective. The Army may be unable to demonstrate technology maturity 

as quickly as it plans. Based on Army assessments from January 2009, 

three of the 44 FCS critical technologies were rated TRL 7 and 37 were 

rated TRL 6. The remaining technologies are expected to complete TRL 6 

 9

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, but More 

Controls Are Needed, GAO-04-53 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2003). 

Page 8 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

demonstrations prior to the system-of-systems preliminary design review, 

but some of those scheduled demonstrations are slipping. Appendix VII 

contains a list of all FCS critical technologies with their 2007 and 2008 TRL 

ratings and Army projections for attaining TRL 6. 

Thirteen of the technologies that the Army rated at TRL 6 are awaiting 

validation from technology review authorities—independent teams 

convened by the FCS program manager and from the Director, Defense 

Research and Engineering. These reviews could actually downgrade 

maturity levels if demonstration results do not support the Army’s TRL 

designation. This occurred in 2007 with the mid-range munition’s terminal 

guidance.

10 In 2008, independent reviewers cautioned the Army about the 

maturity levels of three technologies: (1) JTRS ground mobile radio, (2) 

Mobile Ad-hoc Networking Protocols, and (3) Wideband Networking 

Waveforms. According to Army officials, the Army had claimed these 

technologies had demonstrated TRL 6; however, the independent 

reviewers suggested the Army consider providing additional justification 

to strengthen the case for a TRL 6. Consequently, it is not clear whether 

independent reviewers will concur with the Army’s assertion that these 

technologies have demonstrated TRL 6 maturity. Table 1 illustrates both 

the actual progress the Army has made maturing FCS critical technologies 

and projected progress through the production decision. 

Table 1: Actual and Projected Maturity of FCS Critical Technologies

Actual progress Projected progress 

Program start 

2003 

August 

2006 a

July 

2007 a

January 

2009

2009 Preliminary 

design review

2011 Critical 

design review

2013 Production 

decision

TRLs ≥ 7 0 1 2 3 3 6 44

TRLs = 6 10 34 30 37 40 38 0

TRLs ≤ 5 42 11 12 4 1 0 0

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

a

In these years, the Army removed technologies from its assessments. 

As we have shown in the past, accepting lower technology levels in 

development frequently increases program schedule and cost. In the case

of FCS, the downgrade in TRLs is particularly troublesome because TRL 6 

 10The Army subsequently provided additional information to support the independent

review team’s validation of TRL 6 for the mid-range munition. 

Page 9 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

represents a significant development step over TRL 5. Army engineers 

maintain that anything beyond TRL 6 is a system integration matter and 

not necessarily technology development. Leading commercial firms treat 

adapting the technologies to the space, weight, and power demands of 

their intended environment—in essence, TRL 7—as part of technology 

development. Even if one accepts the lower standard of TRL 6 at program 

start, the integration of these technologies into systems and subsystems 

should have taken place in the first half of development, which DOD refers 

to as “system integration.” As a complex, networked system-of-systems, 

FCS will have unprecedented integration issues. Yet, FCS system 

integration will have to occur in the second half of development, where it

will compete for resources that are intended to be for demonstration of 

the system. 

As we have previously reported, advancing technologies to TRL 6 has been 

especially challenging.11 The Army’s history of maturing FCS technologies 

does not inspire confidence that it will be able to execute the optimistic 

and challenging integration plans involved with advancing technologies to

a TRL 7 before the production decision in 2013. 

Technologies critical to FCS survivability are illustrative of the program’s 

technology maturity issues. FCS survivability involves a layered, networkcentric approach that consists of detecting the enemy first to avoid being 

fired upon; if fired upon, neutralizing the incoming munition before it hits 

an FCS vehicle; and finally, having sufficient armor to defeat those 

munitions that make it through the preceding layers. Each of these layers 

depends on currently immature technologies to provide the aggregate 

survivability needed for FCS vehicles. Many of the technologies intended 

for survivability have experienced developmental delays. As a key 

component of FCS survivability, the short range active protection system 

is intended to neutralize incoming munitions and help protect vehicles 

from threats such as rocket-propelled grenades. Initially, Army 

requirements for the system included the ability to defeat long-range antiarmor threats, such as antitank missiles. However, Army officials have 

decided to delay demonstration of this capability until 2011 or 2012. The 

Army held a short-range active protection system demonstration in the 

latter part of 2008 and declared that the system had reached TRL 6. The 

results of these demonstrations are pending validation from technology 

review authorities. It is important to note that the Army plans to continue 

 11GAO-08-408. 

Page 10 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

active protection system technology development and demonstration for 

some time to ensure that it is an operationally effective and safe capability. 

This is challenging because the active protection system is to provide 360-

degree protection for the relatively lightly-armored FCS manned ground 

vehicles by using, among other things, sensors, processors, rocket motors, 

and a counter-munition warhead to counter multiple threats.

Lightweight hull and vehicle armor technology for FCS vehicles is also 

problematic because it will not be sufficiently advanced to provide 

military usefulness for several years. The Army is developing armorrelated critical technologies in a phased approach. The initial phase of 

armor development only recently demonstrated TRL 6. The results of 

these demonstrations are also pending validation from technology review 

authorities. The Army intends for that initial version to satisfy threshold 

(or minimally acceptable) survivability requirements and plans to use it 

only in prototypes of manned ground vehicles. The second phase of armor 

is expected to meet objective (or desired) survivability requirements but is 

not scheduled to reach TRL 5 until fiscal year 2011. Even then, Army 

engineers do not believe that armor design will meet weight requirements. 

The third phase will be used for low-rate production vehicles and is 

scheduled to demonstrate TRL 6 in 2012. This armor is expected to satisfy 

objective threat requirements and be 25 percent lighter than the second 

armor iteration. The Army plans to mature the fourth and final phase of 

armor to a TRL 6 in fiscal year 2014. The Army also plans to make 

manufacturing technology investments in the armor area in order to 

reduce its production costs. 

Trade-offs Needed to Close 

Gaps between FCS 

Requirements and Designs 

For the 2009 milestone review, Congress has directed DOD, for each 

system and network component of the program, to assess key design 

knowledge and risks, based on system functional reviews, preliminary 

design reviews, and technical readiness levels. Now tentatively scheduled

for May 2009, the system-of-systems preliminary design review is a major 

technical review to assess whether the full suite of FCS systems and 

information network are ready for detailed design and that the FCS 

detailed performance requirements can be obtained within cost, schedule,

risk, and other system constraints. 

The Army has continued to gain knowledge about FCS development, but 

design knowledge expected to be available at the time of the 2009 

milestone review may not provide confidence that FCS design risks are at 

acceptable levels. Key design risks include the Army’s ability to 

accomplish all system-level design work in the time remaining before the

Page 11 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

2009 system-of-systems preliminary design review, demonstrate that 

emerging system designs match detailed requirements, and mitigate 

recognized technical risks to acceptable levels. This challenge has its roots 

in the fact that the Army started FCS development in 2003 without 

establishing firm requirements and preliminary designs to meet those 

requirements; that is, demonstrating a match between customer needs and 

available resources. Consequently, the Army is still seeking to stabilize 

FCS designs at a time when the program is already past the mid-point of 

development phase—the point when a program following best practices 

and DOD policy would normally conduct a critical design review 

demonstrating a stable, producible design capable of meeting performance 

requirements. Having passed that mid-point, FCS is now far out of 

alignment with current DOD policy, which requires a program to show a 

match between requirements and resources at or shortly after 

development start. 

Over the past year, the Army has continued the process of setting and 

refining requirements in order to establish system designs. At the systemof-systems level, requirements are relatively stable. At the individual 

system level, requirements continue to evolve. The Army scheduled a 

series of 15 system-level preliminary design reviews, with the first held in 

2007 and the last expected to occur in March 2009, in order to assess 

whether individual systems are ready to proceed into detailed design. 

Although the Army plans to conduct all system design reviews by the end

of March 2009, the schedule to close out all the reviews may take some 

time, and requirements and design trade-offs will be necessary. Several 

examples are illustrative: 

• The preliminary design review for the Multi-Function 

Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle occurred in December 

2007 and noted critical design problems regarding vehicle weight 

reduction. The Army did not close the weight issue until some 10 

months later, in October 2008. 

• The Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle had its preliminary design 

review in October 2008 and has now entered into detailed design. 

Operational requirements call for the vehicle to operate for 6 hours 

between battery changes within a temperature range of minus 25 

degrees and 120 degrees. However, the vehicle does not meet those 

requirements at any temperature. Even with optimum operating 

temperature, mission length is no longer than 5.4 hours. 

Additionally, the vehicle cannot satisfy operational requirements 

for storage at temperatures of 60 degrees below zero because its 

motor lubricant decomposes and battery becomes useless. 

Page 12 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

Consequently, the Army now plans to remove the batteries and 

provide for special storage. 

• During the first part of the network preliminary design review held 

in November 2008, the Army recognized that there are significant 

gaps between the FCS requirements and the emerging network 

design. These include the JTRS handheld radio; ground mobile 

radio; and airborne, maritime, and fixed-station radios; the WIN-T 

increment 3; and the Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier 

Radio Waveforms. The Army has not yet been able to obtain 

validation of its TRL 6 rating for JTRS ground mobile radio; the 

mobile, ad-hoc networking protocols; and Wideband Networking 

Waveforms. According to Army officials, if additional funding is 

provided and developments are fully successful, they will not fully 

meet FCS requirements until about 2017 or 2018. The Army 

conducted the second part of its network preliminary design 

review in January 2009. The results were not available for inclusion 

in this report. 

For several months, the Army has been conducting a series of technical 

reviews of various aspects of the FCS manned ground vehicle

requirements and designs. Those efforts culminated at the manned ground

vehicle preliminary design review in January 2009. The results of that 

review were not available in time for inclusion in this report. 

According to Army assessments, key risks remain within several areas: 

software development and integration, network and transport, manned 

and unmanned platforms, and average unit production cost. Many risks 

involve the likelihood that requirements may be unachievable when or as 

expected. The assessment of these risks will be a key determinant in the 

overall feasibility of the FCS concept and the ability to execute the FCS 

acquisition strategy going forward. FCS is also working to address 

significant areas of high risk such as network performance and scalability, 

immature network architecture, and synchronization of FCS with the JTRS 

and WIN-T programs. JTRS and WIN-T are also having difficulty with 

technology maturation and are at risk of being delayed or delivering 

incomplete capabilities to FCS. 

In a 2007 acquisition memorandum, DOD stated that its acquisition policy 

was to adjust requirements and technical content to deliver as much as 

possible of planned capability within budgeted cost. At the same time, it 

directed the services to establish Configuration Steering Boards in order 

to review all requirements changes and any significant technical 

configuration changes that have the potential to result in cost and 

schedule impacts. Despite this direction, the Army has not established a 

Page 13 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

steering board for FCS. DOD officials told us that such a board would be 

useful for providing input to FCS requirements and design trade-offs. 

Army Has Not Yet 

Convincingly 

Demonstrated FCS 

Concept 

In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue, 

Congress required DOD to make a determination on whether actual 

demonstrations, rather than simulations, have shown that the concept of 

the program will work. FCS brigade combat teams are expected to be able

to execute a new tactical paradigm based on what the Army refers to as 

“the quality of firsts”—the capability to see first, understand first, act first, 

and finish decisively. Because this paradigm depends on the aggregate 

performance of interdependent FCS systems versus the performance of 

any single system, it is essential that this concept be proven through 

demonstrations. While modeling and simulation are essential to assessing 

the performance of FCS, they must be anchored in actual demonstrations. 

DOD will be challenged to meet the congressional direction to 

demonstrate (versus simulate) that the FCS warfighting concept will work 

by the time of the 2009 milestone review. At this point in the program, the 

FCS concept has been simulated but has not been convincingly

demonstrated in any sort of field event. This stems from the fact that 

technologies have not finished development and prototype systems with 

the essential network components are not ready to be built yet. In 

preliminary field demonstrations, some people, sensors, and platforms 

have been connected and information was transferred from one to the 

other. Basic capabilities of the unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, as 

well as some of the unattended sensors and munitions, have been 

demonstrated. The manned ground vehicles have demonstrated some of 

their mobility and lethality capabilities. There have been some technology 

demonstrations of early versions of the lightweight armor and an active 

protection system, but the feasibility of the FCS survivability concept 

remains uncertain. Nothing approaching a demonstration of the “quality of

firsts” paradigm has yet been attempted nor will it be before the 2009 

milestone review. 

The Defense Acquisition Board has established criteria for the 2009 

Review including several in a category entitled 

“Test/Experimentation/Demonstration.” (See app. IV.) However, none of 

the criteria address the issue of demonstrating that the FCS concept will 

work. Instead, the criteria call for the demonstration of some early FCS 

prototypes and the completion of some events such as a 2008 joint service 

experiment. The Defense Acquisition Board criteria also include several 

that call for delivery of certain early prototypes and others that call for 

demonstration of selected capabilities. Without questioning the value of 

Page 14 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

these individual criteria, it is not clear what they will tell decision makers 

about the value or demonstration of the FCS concept as a whole. 

Demonstrations of FCS 

Network Performance 

Very Limited 

In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue, 

Congress required DOD to make several determinations, including (1) 

whether actual demonstrations, rather than simulations, have shown that 

the software for the program is on a path to achieve threshold 

requirements on cost and schedule; (2) whether the program’s planned 

major communications network demonstrations are sufficiently complex 

and realistic to inform major decision points; (3) the extent to which 

manned ground vehicle survivability is likely to be reduced in a degraded 

communications network environment; (4) the level of network 

degradation at which FCS manned ground vehicle survivability is 

significantly reduced; and (5) the extent to which the FCS 

communications network is capable of withstanding network attack, 

jamming, or other interference. 

In addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration is required to submit a report to Congress on the 

FCS communications network and software. That report is to be 

submitted by September 30, 2009 and is to include an assessment of the 

communications network that will specifically address areas such as 

vulnerability to network attack, electronic warfare, adverse weather, and 

terrain; dependence on satellite communications support; and operational 

availability and performance under degraded conditions. The report is also 

to include assessments of the communications network’s test schedule 

and Army efforts to synchronize funding, schedule, and technology 

maturity of critical networking programs with FCS. Appendix V contains 

the comprehensive criteria from the legislation directing this review.

These assessments of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the FCS 

network will be important in determining if the FCS concept is feasible. 

However, as we reported last year, the Army had an understanding of 

network requirements and how to build the network, but many challenges 

and work remained before the network would reach maturity.12 Hence, 

network development and demonstration is at a very early stage and 

therefore, the network assessments will most likely be based on analysis 

 12GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Significant Challenges Ahead in Developing and

Demonstrating Future Combat System’s Network and Software, GAO-08-409 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 7, 2008). 

Page 15 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

and simulations rather than demonstrated results. Even if software 

development proceeds on schedule and technical risks of key network 

elements, such as JTRS and WIN-T are successfully retired, the uncharted

nature of the FCS network makes predicting its eventual performance 

difficult. Army test officials are assessing network scalability, which 

relates to increasing the number of radios, or nodes, on the network, 

through limited testing. However, the number of nodes used in testing to 

date has been limited, using only 30 nodes, while a brigade combat team 

may require as many as 5,000 nodes. Considering that mobile, ad-hoc 

networks have limited scalability, and performance decreases as more 

nodes are added, the ultimate FCS network performance is difficult to 

predict. 

To date, actual demonstrations of FCS software have been limited to the 

early spin out tests and experiments, and it is not yet known whether the 

information network is technically capable of delivering the quality of 

service needed to make the FCS warfighting concept possible.13 At the time 

of the FCS milestone review in 2009, the extent of network demonstration 

is expected to be very limited. For example, in 2008, the Army 

demonstrated, among other basic capabilities, sensor control, terrain 

analysis, and unmanned platform planning and operations. Other limited 

demonstrations are scheduled on a regular basis. For example, in the 2008 

joint service experiment, several portions of the FCS network—including 

an early version of the system-of-systems common operating environment, 

the unattended sensors, and Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System—were 

evaluated in terms of their basic operation and interoperability with other 

systems. The first major demonstration of the FCS network is the limited 

user test scheduled for fiscal year 2012, which will be at least a year after 

the critical design review and only about a year before the start of low-rate 

initial production for the core FCS program. This event comes after the 

vehicle designs on manned ground platforms have been established. One 

of the key objectives of that test will be to identify the contributions and 

limitations of the network regarding the ability of the FCS brigade combat 

team to conduct missions across the full spectrum of operations. However, 

the fully automated battle command system is not expected to be available 

until 2013 when the Army expects 100 percent of the network capabilities, 

including software, to be available. 

 13Quality of Service is the capability to transport information across the network while 

satisfying communication performance requirements such as low delay, low loss, or high 

throughput. 

Page 16 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

As a key part of the overall FCS communications network, it is uncertain 

whether FCS software requirements can be achieved within cost and 

schedule estimates. The first of 4 software builds has been delivered and

qualified, and build 2 is still in development, with a planned delivery in 

2010. As we have reported earlier, FCS software estimates continue to 

grow, and the total estimate for the network and platforms is projected to 

total over 100 million lines of computer code, which is more than triple the 

size the program estimated in 2003. Army officials have identified 16 risks 

in the software arena, or specific areas where there is a risk of not 

achieving goals within cost and schedule estimates, including system-ofsystems common operating environment, network management/quality of

service, network security/information assurance, distributed fusion 

management, and estimated effective source lines of code. According to 

Army officials, software development costs are capped at approximately 

$2.6 billion. As a result, Army officials stated that they have had to defer 

some planned FCS capabilities to later software builds. Yet, development 

experience to date, coupled with the risks yet to be resolved, raise 

questions as to whether the necessary software can be developed within 

cost and schedule estimates. Alternatively, the Army may have to reduce 

or eliminate FCS requirements. 

FCS Costs Are Expected to 

Increase Again and 

Affordability Is Still in 

Doubt 

In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue, 

Congress required DOD to make a determination on (1) what the cost 

estimate for the program is, including spin outs, and an assessment of 

confidence levels for that estimate; and (2) what the affordability 

assessment for the program is, given projected Army budgets, based on 

that cost estimate. 

For the 2009 milestone review, DOD and the Army are expected to provide 

the updated program cost estimate and an affordability assessment for the 

FCS program. The Army has indicated that the most recent cost estimate 

for the program is no longer valid, but it has not yet completed an official 

updated estimate. While full details are not yet available, the Army is 

considering plans to request additional funds for FCS beyond the current 

cost estimate of $159 billion. Those plans would involve additional 

development costs of about $2 billion and procurement costs of about $17 

billion over the current cost estimate. Where the Army has offset some 

cost increases in the past with reductions in program content, we are not 

yet aware of any similar actions to offset the expected cost increases. 

According to DOD officials, DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group is 

expected to prepare an updated independent cost estimate for the 

milestone review. Previous estimates from the group have been 

Page 17 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

significantly higher than the Army’s, particularly regarding the cost to 

develop software. DOD officials also stated that DOD’s Program Analysis 

and Evaluation group may be tasked to provide input for an FCS 

affordability assessment. These assessments are intended to cover all of 

the costs, including those for the spin outs, which will be necessary to 

fully field the FCS program. This would be the first complete cost estimate 

that will include spin outs and other costs. The Army now projects that the 

costs of its revised FCS spin out initiative will be about $21 billion beyond 

the core FCS program costs of $159 billion. In addition to FCS-specific 

costs, complementary program costs are separate from FCS and represent 

significant additional commitments from the Army and other services. 

Several of these complementary programs have funding issues of their 

own. For example, the JTRS and the WIN-T programs are not yet fully 

funded to develop the full capabilities currently required by the FCS 

program. 

Ultimately, FCS’s affordability will hinge on two factors: the actual cost of 

the program and the availability of funds. Heretofore, there has not been a 

sound basis for preparing a firm cost estimate. The preliminary design 

review process should provide a better foundation for one. Yet, such an 

estimate would have the confidence of a program in early development,

with many risks and unprecedented challenges to meet. As it stands, FCS 

commands the largest portion of the Army’s acquisition budget and, as 

currently planned, will continue to do so for many years. The Army 

continues to indicate its willingness to accept the high risks of the 

program and make trade-offs in both requirements and other programs to 

accommodate its growing costs. Since the program began, costs have 

increased from $92 billion to $159 billion, which only covers the cost to 

equip one-third of the Army’s active forces. Indicative of the tension 

between program costs and available funds, the Army recently proposed 

deferring upgrades to current systems such as the Abrams Tank and 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle to free up funds for FCS. This tension seems only 

likely to worsen, as indications are that FCS costs are about to increase 

again at the same time competition for funds—both between near-term 

and far-term needs within DOD and between defense and other needs 

within the federal government—is intensifying. The Army’s position has 

been that it will reduce FCS capabilities to stay within available 

development funds but at some point, reductions in FCS capability—

whether driven by money or technical feasibility—will fall below an 

acceptable level. That level appears as yet indefinable. 

Page 18 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

The 2009 milestone review will not only require DOD to decide if FCS is 

technically feasible and militarily worthwhile, it will provide the 

opportunity to structure the emerging program so that it complies with 

current acquisition policy and is knowledge-based—thus more conducive 

to oversight. On several scores, the current FCS program falls short. Its 

acquisition strategy is more schedule-driven than it is knowledge–based 

and is unlikely to be executable, with a significant amount of development 

and demonstration yet to be completed. The timing of upcoming 

commitments to production funding puts decision makers in the difficult 

position of making production commitments without knowing if FCS will 

work as intended. For example, the Army plans for FCS core production 

to directly follow the early NLOS-C production, which may be premature 

based on design maturity and demonstrations expected to be done up to

that point. Likewise, the Army’s schedule for providing early FCS 

capabilities to current forces is hurried, as spin out systems may not be 

fully demonstrated before the Army commits to their production. Finally, 

the Army’s potential adoption of an incremental approach to FCS 

acquisition could represent another major restructure of the program. 

While an incremental approach is generally preferable, it would represent 

the fourth different strategy for the FCS program that DOD and the 

Congress will be asked to evaluate and oversee.

We have previously reported that to date, the FCS program has advanced

through acquisition milestones without having achieved the level of 

knowledge preferred by best practices and DOD’s own policies and a 

commensurate level of information needed for oversight, given the scope

of the program and the risks it entails.14 The issuance of DOD’s 2008 

acquisition instruction underscores the wide variance between policy and

the FCS acquisition strategy. Ideally, requirements trades would already

have been made and a high-confidence design established. This would 

position the program to move toward maturity as evidenced by such 

measures as successful completion of subsystem critical design reviews, 

maturity of critical manufacturing processes, planned corrective actions to 

hardware and software deficiencies, and adequate developmental testing. 

At this point, however, FCS has yet to establish a firm system-of-systems 

design and is several years from any large-scale testing at the system-ofsystems level. The milestone review represents an opportunity to judge 

FCS on critical knowledge markers and set it on a more reasonable course 

Oversight Challenges 

Will Continue Beyond 

the Milestone 

Decision 

FCS Acquisition Strategy Is 

Not Knowledge-Based and 

May Not Be Executable 

Within Estimated 

Resources 

 14GAO-08-408. 

Page 19 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

with opportunities for effective and meaningful oversight from the Army, 

DOD, and the Congress. Under its current acquisition strategy, the FCS is 

neither knowledge-based nor does it lend itself to meaningful oversight. 

Figure 2 compares a knowledge-based approach to developing a weapon

system (consistent with DOD policy) with the approach taken for FCS. 

Best practices for successful product development include three 

knowledge points (KP). Knowledge Point 1 should occur at development 

start and is attained when technologies and resources match requirements; 

KP 2 should occur at the mid-point between development and production 

and is attained when the product design performs as expected; and KP 3 

should occur at production start and is attained when production can meet 

cost, schedule, and quality targets. Ideally the preliminary design review 

occurs at or near the start of development and the critical design review 

occurs mid-way through development. 

Page 20 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

Figure 2: Differences between Best Practices Acquisition Approach and FCS Approach

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

Best practice approach (knowledge driven)

Low-rate

production

start

Development

start

Technology development System development and demonstration Production

KP 1

and

PDR

KP 2

and

CDR

KP 3

Knowledge acquired over time

FCS approach (schedule driven) FCS KP 1, KP 2, and KP 3?

Technology development

System development and demonstration

PDR CDR

Prototype delivery and test

Long-lead

production

Production

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

As shown in figure 2 above, FCS technology development and system 

development and demonstration phases will overlap by several years. The 

Army has scheduled only 2 years between the critical design review in 

2011 and the production decision in 2013. This leaves little time to gain

knowledge between the two events, and is particularly important because 

the critical design review is the point at which a program begins building 

fully-integrated, production-representative prototypes whose testing will 

prove the design’s maturity and form the basis for the low-rate production 

Page 21 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

decision. Instead, FCS will rely on less mature prototypes and the decision 

to proceed into production will be made without a mature design. As a 

result of the current acquisition approach, the FCS program may not be 

executable given the amount of development budget remaining and the 

development work that remains to be done, as illustrated in figure 3 

below. 

Figure 3: Remaining FCS Research and Development Funding and Key Events

Fiscal year

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Percent of funds remaining

Preliminary Design Review

Critical Design Review

Low-Rate Initial Production

Initial Operating Capability

At the preliminary design review, the program expects to have all critical 

technologies mature to TRL 6, system-level requirements nearing 

completion, and a preliminary design available to reconcile technologies 

with requirements. Using DOD policy as a reference, this is about the point 

at which the FCS program should be ready to begin. Should the program 

be approved to continue on its present course at the 2009 milestone 

review, the Army would have to complete development—in essence, the

entire system development phase—with 40 percent of its financial and 

schedule resources remaining. This is not to judge either the value of the 

work done to date or the rate of progress, but rather to underscore where 

the program really is in terms of the development process. Accordingly,

ahead of FCS remains what is typically the most expensive part of system 

development: completing the detailed system and network designs and 

building prototypes and using them to demonstrate that the system will 

work. In the case of FCS, there are the added challenges of integrating 

Page 22 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

multiple technologies and showing that the system of systems as a whole 

will work, including the unprecedented network. 

The late completion of the system development activities that will 

demonstrate whether FCS can deliver the promised capability is at odds 

with the early requests for production funds. Additional maturation of 

critical technologies, followed by the challenging prospect of integrating 

FCS subsystems and systems, lies ahead. Design work is ongoing and 

many designs remain to be matured and verified. A key indicator of the 

Army’s progress in this area will be the percentage of design drawings that 

will be released to manufacturing at the critical design review, currently 

scheduled for fiscal year 2011. The Army is currently fabricating key FCS

prototypes, many of which are scheduled for delivery in the 2010 time 

frame. After they are delivered, much additional engineering work will 

remain to be conducted as part of a disciplined test, fix, and retest 

approach. For example, several prototypes will be built based on 

preliminary versus final designs, and will not have all key technologies 

integrated. In this sense, they will not be representative of production 

items. Many of the results of these demonstrations, and other key test and

evaluation results, will not be available until late in the program, creating 

difficulty in applying knowledge gained from previous tests into 

subsequent tests. For example, a key system-of-systems test scheduled

before the low-rate production decision is the limited user test 3 in 2012 to 

assess brigade combat team network capabilities. This test will be the first 

large-scale FCS test that will include a majority of the developmental 

prototypes and a large operational unit and occurs only one year before 

the low-rate initial production decision for the core FCS program. This test 

is important because the Congress has required a broad network 

demonstration to be conducted before starting low-rate production of the 

core FCS program. This demonstration is also expected to occur in fiscal 

year 2012 as part of the limited user test. Finally, the Army will have to

develop and mature production processes for a wide range of FCS 

systems. 

Our work has shown that development costs for programs with mature 

technologies at the start of system development increased by a modest 

average of 4.8 percent over the original estimate, whereas development 

costs for programs with immature technologies increased by 34.9 

percent.15 Our work has also shown that most development cost growth 

 15GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs, 

GAO-06-391 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006). 

Page 23 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

occurs after the critical design review. Specifically, of the 28.3 percent cost

growth that weapon systems average in development, 19.7 percent occurs 

after the critical design review. In the case of FCS, the Army’s strategy is 

schedule-driven and calls for beginning low-rate production in 2013 and 

initial operational capability in 2015, which leaves little time to overcome 

the remaining technological and engineering challenges the program faces 

prior to committing to production. Thus, it is likely that under the current 

schedule, additional cost growth would be incurred as the Army works 

through these remaining challenges. 

According to DOD officials, the Systems and Software Engineering group, 

within DOD’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics organization, has 

been tasked to conduct a systems engineering review of FCS that will 

include an evaluation of risks associated with the FCS acquisition strategy,

test plans, software, and key complementary programs. According to the 

Systems and Software Engineering group, the assessment will also cover 

the FCS system engineering plan for reasonable exit criteria associated 

with critical design review and production readiness. The reporting 

objectives for this effort include, among other things, clearly illustrating 

the risks and challenges of proceeding to critical design review as planned. 

The Systems and Software Engineering group’s review is expected to 

provide input to address three of the required congressional 

assessments—FCS requirements/design, concept demonstration, and 

software demonstration—and should provide critical information on the 

amount of FCS development and demonstration work yet to be completed 

and its expected cost and schedule. 

Timing of Currently

Planned Funding 

Commitments Puts 

Decision Makers in 

Difficult Position 

Funding commitments for production begin before FCS capabilities are 

demonstrated and even before the critical design review is held. This puts 

decision makers in a difficult position, particularly when considering that

FCS is to deliver more than a better set of equipment—it embodies a new 

concept of combat. Procurement funding for core FCS production 

facilities will be requested for fiscal year 2011, the budget for which will be 

presented to Congress in February 2010—several months after the 

milestone review and before the stability of the FCS design is assessed at 

the critical design review.

16 In fact, based on results of system-level 

preliminary design reviews conducted to date, the Army could still be 

 16 The money requested for fiscal years 2009, 2010 and a portion of the money for fiscal 

year 2011 is for NLOS-C production. 

Page 24 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

working to close action items resulting from the system-of-systems 

preliminary design review when it requests funding for FCS core 

production facilities. Further, when Congress is asked to approve funding 

for low-rate initial production of core FCS systems, the Army will not yet 

have proven that the FCS network and the program concept will work. A 

key demonstration of the FCS network, limited user test 3, is currently 

scheduled for later in 2012, after the Congress will have received the fiscal

year 2013 budget submission. This is illustrated further in figure 4 below. 

Figure 4: FCS Program Events and Congressional Budget Decisions

Article delivery and testing

NLOS-C LUT 3

CI. IV

MGV UAV

FCS Program decision points

Congressional budget decisions on production money

PDR M DAB CDR SC

CDR = Critical Design Review

DAB = Defense Acquisition Board Milestone Review

LUT = Limited User Test

NLOS-C = Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon

MGV = Manned Ground Vehicle

MSC = Milestone C

PDR = Preliminary Design Review

Cl. IV UAV = Class IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

FY 09

request -

$154.6 million

FY 10

request -

$148 million

FY 11

request -

$677.8 million

FY 12

request -

$2.2 billion

FY 13

request -

$5.7 billion

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Early NLOS-C Production 

May Portend Risks for FCS 

Since fiscal year 2003, the Army has been required by Congress to develop

and field the NLOS-C early in order to provide a self-propelled indirect fire

capability.17 The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2008 

 17Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-248, § 8121 (2002), and 

similar provisions in subsequent defense appropriations acts.

Page 25 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

required the Army to deliver eight NLOS-C prototypes by the end of 

calendar year 2008 and to field early production versions of the system by 

fiscal year 2010.18 These systems are to be in addition to those needed for 

developmental and operational testing. The Army determined that a set of 

18, a full battalion’s worth, would be needed to meet the intent of the act’s 

language in terms of the early production units. Although the NLOS-C is 

one of eight FCS manned ground vehicles, it is proceeding about 5 years 

ahead of the other vehicles. 

The Army began procuring long-lead production items for the NLOS-C 

vehicle in 2008 to meet the requirement for the early production versions. 

According to program officials, an urgent need to build Mine-Resistant 

Ambush Protected vehicles diverted subcontractor resources away from 

the NLOS-C efforts. Officials further indicated that technological 

challenges associated with a lack of completed production facilities and 

specialized tooling also contributed to delays. The Army accepted delivery 

of the first two NLOS-C prototypes in fiscal year 2008 and the remaining 

six vehicles in the following two years. A Defense Acquisition Board 

decision to begin low-rate production for the additional set of 18 NLOS-C 

vehicles was expected in December 2008. Details of that decision were not 

available for inclusion in this report. If approved, the Army expects 

delivery of six early production units per year in fiscal years 2010 through 

2012. None of these early NLOS-C vehicles will meet FCS threshold 

requirements nor will they be operationally deployable. Rather, they will 

be used as training assets for the Army Evaluation Task Force.

In order to meet the early fielding dates, the Army will begin production of 

the NLOS-C vehicles with immature technologies and designs. Several key 

technologies, such as lightweight armor, the active protection system, and 

the JTRS radios will not be fully mature for several years. Much 

requirements definition work remains for all the manned ground vehicles, 

including the NLOS-C. Software development is in its early stages. Design

work on the manned ground vehicles also remains to be done, including 

work on the chassis and mission modules. Significant challenges involving 

integrating the technologies, software, and design will follow. To the 

extent that these aspects of the manned ground vehicles depart from the 

early production cannons, costly rework of the cannons may be necessary 

if they will ever be used for other than training purposes. 

 18Pub. L. No. 110-116, § 8088 (2007). 

Page 26 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

The Army’s efforts and financial investments made on the NLOS-C vehicles 

could create additional pressure to proceed with FCS core production, 

prior to achieving a solid basis of knowledge on which to move forward. 

Production on the cannon is beginning 5 years in advance of the 

production decision on the FCS core systems. By the time of that decision, 

in fiscal 2013, the Army plans to have invested about $12 billion in FCS 

procurement funds and more than $50 billion for FCS overall. In addition,

the Army also plans to invest millions in production facilities in which to 

build the vehicles. These activities all contribute to starting up the manned 

ground vehicle industrial base. If the FCS strategy goes according to plan,

FCS core production would directly follow NLOS-C production, with long 

lead items for the FCS core program providing a transition. That may be 

premature based on the expected design maturity and demonstrations 

expected to be done to that point. DOD has attempted to make a 

distinction between NLOS-C and the core FCS program, but the linkages 

continue to exist in the FCS acquisition strategy. If decision makers were 

to consider delaying FCS core production because it was not ready, a gap 

could develop when early NLOS-C production ends. Sustaining the 

industrial base could then become an argument against an otherwise 

justified delay. 

FCS Spin Outs Will Not be 

Proven Prior to Production 

The Army initiated spin out development in 2004, when it embarked on an

effort to bring selected FCS capabilities to current force heavy brigade 

combat teams while development of the core FCS program remained 

under way. In 2006, the Army established the Army Evaluation Task Force 

to use, evaluate, and train with the spin out capabilities, and the Task 

Force began its testing under that brigade construct in early 2008. In mid2008, the Army changed its focus from fielding spin out equipment to 

heavy brigades and instead to field the equipment to infantry brigade

combat teams beginning in fiscal year 2011.19 Army officials stated that this

change occurred because infantry brigades are the optimal forces to fight 

in an urban environment, are being used in combat more than other types 

of forces, and are the most vulnerable forces. Accordingly, the Army now 

proposes to have 43 infantry brigade combat teams fully equipped with 

spin out equipment by 2025 at a total cost of $21 billion, with over $5 

billion to be provided in fiscal years 2010 to 2015. DOD officials have 

 19Heavy brigades are equipped with armor, such as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Light 

brigades are equipped with motorized infantry, such as the High Mobility Multi-purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle. 

Page 27 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

reviewed the Army’s revised FCS spin out plans, but they have not yet

made a decision to approve those plans. 

The switch to infantry brigades led the Army to abandon its previous plan

for a series of three spin outs and instead pursue a two-phased effort 

termed “early” and “threshold” with respective planned production 

commitment dates of fiscal years 2010 and 2013. The early spin out items 

are not expected to meet all FCS threshold requirements nor will the 

threshold spin out items have the same network and battle command 

capabilities as in the core FCS program. The early spin out will include: 

• Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, 

• Urban and Tactical Unattended Ground Sensors, 

• two types of Joint Tactical Radios, 

• integrated computer system, 

• early versions of the system-of-systems common operating 

environment and battle command software, 

• Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle, 

• Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, and 

• Ground Soldier System.20

The second phase of spin outs will include improved versions of the above 

systems as well as add the Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment 

vehicle, Class IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Armed Robotic Vehicle—

Assault (Light), and Centralized Controller.21 

With the advent of the new structure, the Army moved its initial spin out 

production decision from January 2009 to December 2009. However, 

testing to date has not made a convincing case for this production 

commitment for several reasons. First, the Army has conducted only one 

test focused on the infantry brigade combat team structure. The two initial 

spin out tests—a technical field test in early 2008 to verify technical 

aspects of the capabilities and force development test and evaluation in 

May 2008 to validate requirements and training associated with those 

capabilities—occurred prior to the restructure and therefore employed 

heavy brigade combat team constructs. While Army officials have 

 20The Joint Tactical Radios and Ground Soldier System are complementary programs and 

not directly part of the FCS program. 

21The Centralized Controller will provide the dismounted soldier with a hand-carried device 

capable of enabling remote network interface with a number of FCS unmanned systems

and remote control operation of manned ground vehicle functions. 

Page 28 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

indicated that the force development test results have applicability to the 

infantry brigades, the test’s major objective in terms of construct was to 

confirm the organizational structure and equipment distribution for a spin 

out-equipped heavy brigade combat team. The third test in July 2008, a 

preliminary limited user test to assess maturity, interoperability, and 

contribution of spin out systems, did utilize the infantry brigade structure. 

However, because of the restructure, that test was a shortened 2-day 

version of an event originally planned as a much longer effort focused on 

the heavy brigade combat team. 

Additionally, testing completed to date employed spin out systems that are 

not in the form that will be fielded. In fact, four of the systems planned for 

the early spin out have only been tested in surrogate or non-production 

representative forms (not in a mature or final configuration). The Ground 

Soldier System has not yet been included in any testing. Table 2 shows the 

versions of the prototypes used in each of the three tests to date. 

Table 2: Surrogate, Non-Production, and Not-Yet-Tested Systems 

System

Technical field test 

(February/March

2008) 

Force 

development test

(May 2008) 

Preliminary 

limited user test 

(July 2008) 

JTRS Ground Mobile 

Radio 

Non-production

representative

Non-production

representative

Non-production

representative

JTRS Handheld Radio Surrogate Surrogate Surrogate 

Small Unmanned 

Ground Vehicle

Not tested Not tested Non-production

representative

Class I Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle

Not tested Not tested Surrogate 

Ground Soldier System Not tested Not tested Not tested 

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Using surrogate and non-production representative systems is problematic 

because it does not conclusively show how well the spin out systems can 

address current force capability gaps in situational awareness, force 

protection, and lethality. Moreover, they limit the ability to translate spin 

out tactical operations from heavy brigade to infantry combat teams and 

from spin outs to the core FCS. In fact, DOD’s current acquisition policy 

requires that systems meet approved requirements and are demonstrated 

in their intended environments using the selected productionrepresentative articles before the engineering and manufacturing 

development phase—which precedes the production phase—can end.

Army test officials and equipment users told us, and test reports for the 

Page 29 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

2008 spin out tests confirm, that the surrogates and non-production 

representative systems limited the ability to gauge system performance, 

forced adjustments in testing, and made it difficult to know whether 

beneficial lessons were learned in testing. Officials from the Army’s 

independent testing organization, the Army Test and Evaluation

Command, stated that prototype JTRS radios impact the ability to evaluate 

overall system effectiveness regarding such factors as range and reliability. 

They also noted that radio performance can impact tactics used by the 

testing unit. Army officials who actually participated in the testing 

expressed similar views, and noted that the surrogates limited tactical

operations. As a result, they said, the Army is immature tactically in terms 

of what it knows about spin out operations. 

The three tests scheduled for 2009 will continue to include surrogate and 

non-production representative systems. As in past tests, surrogates will 

take the place of JTRS handheld radios in all three tests. As noted by Army 

testers, this surrogate radio has limited basic functionality and will impact 

the evaluation of performance for systems used in conjunction with it, 

including the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System and unattended ground 

sensors. According to Army officials, they will not have production 

representative versions of this radio to test until initial operational test and 

evaluation in fiscal year 2011. In addition, JTRS ground mobile radios used 

in 2009 testing are to consist of a mix of non-production and production 

representative models, but the composition will be heavily weighted 

toward the non-production representative models. Of the 16 total radios 

planned for use in the limited user test, only 4 are expected to be the 

production representative version. Additionally, Army officials told us that 

if these radios are delayed, they will not be able to properly operate and 

evaluate the needed networking capabilities. 

The schedule for completing 2009 testing is tight, and the issues identified

in the 2008 testing may not be resolved prior to the spin out production 

decision. According to Army and DOD officials, the Army Evaluation Task

Force has proven extremely useful in identifying system issues and 

suggesting design changes. While the Army is working to improve spin out 

systems in accordance with the Task Force’s testing observations and 

recommendations, it does not plan to prove out all final designs prior to 

the production decision. For example, the Army is redesigning the Tactical 

Unattended Ground Sensor because 2008 testing showed that it had issues 

with range, battery life, and hardware reliability. However, the Army does 

not expect to have the final version of the redesigned sensor available 

until February 2010, after the initial spin out production decision has been

made. The Army is also redesigning the Urban Unattended Ground Sensor 

Page 30 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

in accordance with testing feedback because that sensor had issues with 

battery life, user set-up time, and display of data. A final version of that 

sensor will not be available until February 2010. Additionally, the JTRS 

ground mobile radio may not be able to achieve its schedule for a 

production decision, which would impact the FCS spin out initiative. 

The Army may be unable to thoroughly assess spin outs’ military utility for 

current forces because testing planned for 2009 is very compressed and 

leaves little time for analysis before the production decision. Under the 

revised spin out structure, the Army expects to conduct technical field,

force development, and limited user tests in a back-to-back period from 

July through September 2009. This schedule allows the Army only 12

weeks to conduct all the tests, assess tests results, and incorporate lessons 

learned from one test to the next. Additionally, the limited user test, the 

last test in the series before the production decision and arguably the most 

important in terms of demonstrating system interoperability and overall 

spin out military utility, is planned to conclude at the end of September. 

That means the Army only has 8 to12 weeks to assess those test results 

before DOD will make the expected December 2009 production decision. 

By comparison, the Army needed 8 months to produce its test report on 

the 2008 technical field test. A DOD testing official told us that, because of 

the testing schedule, the Army would be unable to analyze test results 

adequately before making decisions. Army officials acknowledged that the 

schedule is extremely compressed and noted that any delay in maturity or 

receipt of hardware and/or software would impact the test schedule. They

also indicated that, because of the aggressive schedule, it might be 

necessary to change the order of the tests and hold the force development 

test after the limited user test. 

Potential Incremental 

Acquisition Approach for 

FCS Would Represent 

Another Major 

Restructuring 

Army officials informed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics that they are considering an incremental or 

block acquisition approach to FCS. Citing the need to set a path to a 

stable, executable baseline for FCS—one with appropriately scoped 

requirements—FCS program officials believe that by adopting an 

incremental or block approach, they may be better able to mitigate risks in 

four major areas. These areas include: immaturity of requirements for 

system survivability, network capability, and information assurance; 

limited availability of performance trade space to maintain program cost 

and schedule given current program risks (schedule risks, 

weight/survivability, cost growth); program not funded to Cost Analysis 

Improvement Group estimates and impact of congressional budget cuts;

Page 31 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

and continuing challenges in aligning schedules and expectations for 

multiple concurrent acquisitions (such as JTRS and WIN-T). 

Subsequent to the mid-2008 Defense Acquisition Board meeting, where the 

Army presented its case for its consideration of an incremental or block 

approach for FCS acquisition, the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued a memorandum directing 

the Army to, among other things, pursue this initiative. Moreover, the 

memorandum stipulated that the incremental approach to acquire FCS 

must be prioritized to meet the warfighter’s most critical operational needs 

and present a stable, executable program. The Army has been conducting

an analysis to define an incremental approach, which is expected to 

address organizational structure, platforms, warfighter needs, and unified

battle command. This analysis will be coupled with DOD assessments of 

FCS design maturity (including technology readiness levels, network and 

platform readiness, and associated risks and costs) and program maturity 

(including program execution feasibility, program scope, resource 

availability, and program alternatives). The Army was expected to present 

the analysis results and incremental FCS program plan to the DOD in late 

2008 or early 2009, but that had not occurred at the time of this report. 

According to a DOD official, the adoption of an incremental approach may 

affect both the FCS core program and the spin out initiative. For the core

FCS program, adoption of an incremental approach may involve a phased 

development and demonstration of individual FCS performance 

requirements and/or a phased fielding of individual components of the 

FCS family of systems. For the spin out initiative, the Army is considering 

if and when it should spin out FCS capabilities to the Heavy and Stryker 

Brigade Combat Teams. 

Restructuring the FCS program around an incremental approach has the 

potential to alleviate the risks inherent in the current strategy. It also 

represents an opportunity to apply the policy and thus provide decision 

makers more information before key program commitments, like 

production funding, are made. Taking an incremental approach to new 

acquisitions, versus attempting to acquire full capability in one step, has 

been preferred by DOD policy and best practices since before FCS began 

in 2003. The December 2008 policy adds several key features that would 

benefit a restructured FCS program. These include: 

• establishment of configuration steering boards that are tasked to 

review all requirements changes and any significant technical 

configuration changes that have the potential to result in cost and 

schedule impacts to the program; 

Page 32 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

• a post-preliminary design review assessment to be conducted 

where the results of the PDR and the program manager’s 

assessment are considered to determine whether remedial action is 

necessary to achieve the program’s objectives; 

• a critical design review, which is an opportunity to assess design 

maturity by measures such as completion of subsystem critical 

design reviews, the percentage of software and hardware product 

specifications and drawings completed, planned corrective actions 

to hardware and software deficiencies; adequate developmental 

testing, the maturity of critical manufacturing processes, and an 

estimate of system reliability based on demonstrated reliability 

rates; 

• a post-critical design review, which assesses the program 

manager’s report on the critical design review to determine 

whether the program can meet its approved objectives or if 

adjustments should be made; and 

• before production, a demonstration that the system meets 

requirements in its intended environment using a productionrepresentative article, manufacturing processes have been 

effectively demonstrated in a pilot line environment, and industrial 

capabilities are reasonably available. 

On the other hand, the newness of the incremental approach could 

complicate oversight at this important juncture. For example, its approval

will lag behind the congressional schedule for authorizing and 

appropriating fiscal year 2010 funds. Also, a new approach to FCS could 

affect the scope of the milestone review. Evaluation of the new approach 

will involve a number of factors, including whether: 

• the incremental approach adequately addresses program risks and 

unresolved questions on the feasibility of the FCS concept and its 

information network; 

• the initial increment of FCS capability is justifiable on its own, 

without being dependent on future increments; 

• each increment, including the first, will comply with current DOD 

policy as it applies to a new program starting at the preliminary 

design review stage; and

• the Army’s overall investment plan and resources for FCS 

increments, spin outs, and its current forces is sound and 

affordable. 

Should an incremental approach to FCS be pursued, one consideration 

will be the future role of the Army’s contracting relationship with the LSI. 

We have previously reported the uniquely close relationship that exists 

Page 33 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

between the Army and the LSI.22 While this has advantages, it also has 

disadvantages. In the past two years, the role of the LSI, originally limited

to development, has grown relative to production. It is expected to be the 

prime contractor for production of spin outs, the NLOS-C, and at least the 

low-rate production of the FCS core systems. The specific role the LSI will 

play in production of spin outs, NLOS-C, and FCS core production remains 

somewhat unclear. Statements of work for the production contracts have 

not yet been negotiated. According to the program officials, the LSI will 

contract with the first tier subcontractors, which will in turn contract with 

their own subcontractors. Thus, the production role of the LSI is likely to 

be largely in oversight of the first tier subcontractors versus fabricating 

systems or subsystems. The LSI is also responsible for defining and 

maintaining a growth strategy for integrating new technologies into the 

FCS brigade combat teams. Combined with a likely role in sustainment, 

the LSI will remain involved in the FCS program indefinitely. 

Recently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics issued a directive to pursue alternate arrangements for any 

future FCS contracts. The Under Secretary found that the fixed fee was 

too high and the fee structure allows industry to receive most of the 

incentive fee dollars prior to demonstrating integrated FCS system-ofsystems capability. The Under Secretary also directed that the Army 

conduct a risk-based assessment to examine contracting alternatives for 

FCS capability. This assessment is to evaluate opportunities for 

procurement breakout of the individual platforms/systems that comprise 

FCS and how the government’s interests are served by contracting with 

the LSI as compared to contracting directly with the manufacturers of the 

items. 

The 2009 milestone review is the most important decision on the Future 

Combat System since the program began in 2003. If the preliminary design 

reviews are successfully completed and critical technologies mature as 

planned in 2009, the FCS program will essentially be at a stage that statute 

and DOD policy would consider as being ready to start development. In 

this sense, the 2009 review will complete the evaluative process that began 

with the original 2003 milestone decision. Further, when considering that 

the current estimate for FCS ranges from $159 billion to $200 billion when 

Conclusions 

 22GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Role of Lead Systems Integrator on Future Combat Systems 

Program Poses Oversight Challenges, GAO-07-380 (Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2007). 

Page 34 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

the potential increases to core program costs and estimated costs of spin 

outs are included, 90 percent or more of the investment in the program lies 

ahead. Even if a new, incremental approach to FCS is approved, a full

milestone review that carries the responsibility of a go/no-go decision is 

still in order, along with the attendant reports and analyses that are 

required inputs. In the meantime, establishing a configuration steering 

board, as suggested in DOD policy, may help bridge the gaps between 

requirements and system designs and help in the timely completion of the 

FCS preliminary design reviews. 

At this point, there are at least three programmatic directions, or some 

combination thereof, that DOD could take at the milestone review to 

shape investments in combat systems for the Army, each of which 

presents challenges. First, the FCS program as currently structured has 

significant risks and may not be executable within remaining resources. 

Second, although an incremental approach may improve the Army’s 

prospects for fielding some capability, each increment must stand on its 

own and not be dependent on future increments. Third, spin outs to 

current forces currently rely on a rushed schedule that calls for making 

production decisions before production-representative prototypes have 

clearly demonstrated a useful military capability. The role of the LSI in the 

FCS production phase will be a factor that will have to be considered for 

any program that emerges from the milestone review. 

There is no question that the Army needs to ensure its forces are wellequipped. The Army has vigorously pursued FCS as the solution, a concept 

and an approach that is unconventional, yet with many good features. The 

difficulties and redirections experienced by the program should be seen as 

revealing its immaturity, rather than as the basis for criticism. However, at 

this point, enough time and money have been expended that the program 

should be evaluated at the 2009 milestone review based on what it has 

shown, not on what it could show. The Army should not pursue FCS at 

any cost, nor should it settle for whatever the FCS program produces 

under fixed resources. Rather, the program direction taken after the 

milestone review must strike a balance between near-term and long-term 

needs, realistic funding expectations, and a sound plan for execution. 

Regarding execution, the review represents an opportunity to ensure that 

the emerging investment program be put on the soundest possible footing 

by applying the best standards available, like those contained in DOD’s 

2008 acquisition policy, and requiring clear demonstrations of the FCS 

concept and network before any commitment to production of core FCS 

systems. 

Page 35 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

Any decision the Army makes to change the FCS program is likely to lag 

behind the congressional schedule for authorizing and appropriating fiscal 

year 2010 funds. Because of this, Congress needs to preserve its options 

for ensuring it has adequate knowledge on which to base funding 

decisions. Specifically, it does not seem reasonable to expect Congress to 

provide full fiscal year 2010 funding for the program before the milestone 

review is held nor production funding before system designs are stable 

and validated in testing. 

The Congress should consider taking the following two actions: 

• restricting the budget authority to be provided for FCS in fiscal 

year 2010 until DOD fully complies with the statutory FCS 

milestone review requirements and provides a complete budget 

justification package for any program that emerges, and 

• not approving any production or long lead item funds for the core 

FCS program until the critical design review is satisfactorily 

completed and demonstrations using prototypes provide 

confidence that the FCS system-of-systems operating with the

communications network will be able to meet its requirements. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

• ensure that the investment program that emerges from the 2009 

milestone review be conformed with current DOD acquisition 

policy, particularly regarding technology maturity, critical design 

reviews, and demonstrating production-representative prototypes 

before making production commitments; 

Matters for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• direct the Secretary of the Army to convene, following the 

preliminary design reviews and in time to inform the 2009 FCS 

milestone review, an FCS Configuration Steering Board to provide 

assistance in formulating acceptable trade-offs to bridge the gaps 

between the FCS requirements and the system designs; 

• ensure that if an incremental approach is selected for FCS, the first 

increments are justifiable on their own as worthwhile capabilities 

that are not dependent on future increments for their value, 

particularly regarding the order in which the information network 

and individual manned ground vehicles will be developed; 

• ensure that FCS systems to be spun out to current forces have 

been successfully tested in production-representative form before 

they are approved for initial production; and 

Page 36 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

• reassess the appropriate role of the LSI in the FCS program, 

particularly regarding its involvement in production. 

DOD concurred with all our recommendations and provided comments on

two. Regarding our recommendation on testing spin out systems, DOD 

commented that any production decision for FCS systems going to the 

current force will be informed by an operational assessment or user test of 

the systems. Although the Army plans to conduct such testing prior to the 

spin out low-rate initial production decision in late 2009, that testing will 

employ surrogate and non-production representative systems. We 

maintain that any systems planned for production should be productionrepresentative and thoroughly tested in a realistic environment. DOD 

noted that such testing was more in line with what is required for the fullrate production decision versus the initial low-rate decision. The testing 

standards we apply reflect the best practice and DOD policy of having 

production-representative prototypes tested prior to a low-rate production

decision. This approach demonstrates the prototypes’ performance and 

reliability as well as manufacturing processes—in short, that the product 

is ready to be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality goals. In 

fact, current DOD policy states that development “shall end when the 

system meets approved requirements and is demonstrated in its intended 

environment, using the selected production-representative article; 

manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated in a pilot line 

environment; industrial capabilities are reasonably available; and the 

system meets or exceeds exit criteria and [low-rate initial production] 

entrance requirements.” 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Regarding our recommendation about reassessing the role of the LSI, DOD 

stated that the FCS contractual arrangement is not an LSI contract as 

defined by law. According to the Duncan Hunter National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the FCS prime contractor “shall be 

considered to be a lead systems integrator until 45 days after the Secretary 

of the Army certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees 

that such contractor is no longer serving as the lead systems integrator.”23

Army officials have stated that they are unaware of the Army preparing 

any such certification for the defense committees. Regardless of how the 

prime contractor is characterized, it was originally envisioned by the Army 

as an LSI, and its unusually close relationship with the Army on the FCS 

program still warrants additional oversight. 

 23Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 112.

Page 37 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

Regarding our matters for congressional consideration, DOD expressed 

concern over the impact to FCS acquisition execution with the fiscal year 

2010 budget authority limitations that we suggested Congress consider. We 

believe a restriction is necessary as congressional committees will be 

asked to provide funds for fiscal year 2010 before the FCS milestone 

review, currently scheduled for July 30, 2009, is held. The review will lead 

to a decision on whether the program should continue as currently 

structured, continue in restructured form, or be terminated. The scope and 

significance of those decisions create the possibility that the Army’s fiscal 

year 2010 budget plans for FCS could differ significantly from the request 

that Congress will consider. A restriction need not amount to a denial or

reduction of funds, but rather creates an opportunity for Congress to 

review any change in Army plans before releasing funds for FCS for the 

entire fiscal year. 

We received other technical comments from DOD, which have been 

addressed in the report, as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretary of the Army; and the Director, Office of Management and 

Budget. Copies will also be made available at no charge on the GAO Web 

site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff has any questions

concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Paul L. Francis 

The major contributors are listed in appendix VIII. 

Sourcing Management 

Director 

Acquisition and

Page 38 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable John M. McHugh 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr. 

Chairman 

The Honorable C. W. (Bill) Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 39 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 40 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To develop information on to what extent knowledge will likely be 

available to DOD and the Congress in the key areas of technology, design, 

demonstrations, network performance, and cost and affordability to 

support the 2009 milestone review, and the execution challenges that a 

post-milestone review FCS program presents to DOD and the Congress, 

we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Secretary of Defense’s Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group; the Secretary of Defense’s Program Analysis 

and Evaluation; Director Defense Research and Engineering; the Joint 

Staff; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information 

Integration); the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command; the Director of 

Operational Test and Evaluation; the Future Force Integration Directorate; 

the Army Evaluation Task Force, the Army Test and Evaluation Command; 

the Director of the Combined Test Organization; the Program Manager, 

Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); and the Project Manager, 

Future Combat System Spin Out. 

We reviewed relevant Army and DOD documents, including the Future 

Combat System’s Operational Requirements Document, the Acquisition 

Strategy Report, the Selected Acquisition Report, critical technology 

assessments and technology risk mitigation plans, and spin out test 

results. 

We attended system-level preliminary design reviews, board of directors 

reviews, and system demonstrations. In our assessment of the FCS, we 

used the knowledge-based acquisition practices drawn from our large 

body of past work as well as DOD’s acquisition policy and the experiences 

of other programs. 

We certify that officials from DOD and the Army have provided us access 

to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the matters in 

this report. We discussed the issues presented in this report with officials 

from the Army and the Secretary of Defense and made several changes as

a result. We conducted this performance audit from March 2008 to March 

2009 in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 41 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 42 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix III: Legislative Requirements for 

2009 FCS Go/No-Go Review 

Page 43 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 

Appendix III: Legislative Requirements for 

2009 FCS Go/No-Go Review 

Section 214 of Public Law 109-364 mandated that the Secretary of Defense

perform a milestone (go/no-go) review of the Future Combat Systems 

acquisition program. The following depicts that legislation in its entirety as 

amended by section 211 of Public Law 110-417. 

(a) MILESTONE REVIEW REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after the 

preliminary design review of the Future Combat Systems program is 

completed, the Secretary of Defense shall carry out a Defense Acquisition 

Board milestone review of the Future Combat Systems program. The 

milestone review shall include an assessment as to each of the following:

(1) Whether the warfighter’s needs are valid and can be best met 

with the concept of the program. 

(2) Whether the concept of the program can be developed and 

produced within existing resources. 

(3) Whether the program should— 

(A) continue as currently structured; 

(B) continue in restructured form; or

(C) be terminated. 

(b) DETERMINATIONS TO BE MADE IN ASSESSING WHETHER 

PROGRAM SHOULD CONTINUE.—In making the assessment required by 

subsection (a)(3), the Secretary shall make a determination with respect 

to each of the following:

(1) Whether each critical technology for the program is at least 

Technical Readiness Level 6. 

(2) For each system and network component of the program, what 

the key design and technology risks are, based on System 

Functional Reviews, Preliminary Design Reviews, and Technical 

Readiness Levels. 

(3) Whether actual demonstrations, rather than simulations, have 

shown that the concept of the program will work. 

(4) Whether actual demonstrations, rather than simulations, have 

shown that the software for the program is on a path to achieve 

threshold requirements on cost and schedule. 

(5) Whether the program’s planned major communications 

network demonstrations are sufficiently complex and realistic to 

inform major program decision points. 

(6) The extent to which Future Combat Systems manned ground 

vehicle survivability is likely to be reduced in a degraded Future 

Combat Systems communications network environment. 
Appendix III: Legislative Requirements for 

2009 FCS Go/No-Go Review 

(7) The level of network degradation at which Future Combat 

Systems manned ground vehicle crew survivability is significantly 

reduced. 

(8) The extent to which the Future Combat Systems 

communications network is capable of withstanding network 

attack, jamming, or other interference. 

(9) What the cost estimate for the program is, including all spin

outs, and an assessment of the confidence level for that estimate. 

(10) What the affordability assessment for the program is, given 

projected Army budgets, based on the cost estimate referred to in 

paragraph (9). 

(c) REPORT.—The Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense 

committees a report on the findings and conclusions of the milestone 

review required by subsection (a). The report shall include, and display, 

each of the assessments required by subsection (a) and each of the 

determinations required by subsection (b). 

(d) RESTRICTION ON PROCUREMENT FUNDS EFFECTIVE FISCAL 

2009.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—For fiscal years beginning with 2009, the 

Secretary may not obligate any funds for procurement for the 

Future Combat Systems program. 

(2) EXCEPTIONS.—Paragraph (1) does not apply with respect 

to— 

(A) the obligation of funds for costs attributable to an 

insertion of new technology (to include spin out systems) 

into the current force, if the insertion is approved by the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics; or 

(B) the obligation of funds for the non-line-of-sight cannon 

system. 

(3) TERMINATION.—The requirement of paragraph (1) terminates 

after the report required by subsection (c) is submitted. 

Page 44 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix IV: 2009 Defense Acquisition Board

In-Process Review Criteria 

Page 45 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 

Appendix IV: 2009 Defense Acquisition Board 

In-Process Review Criteria 

Program Execution1

• Preliminary Design Reviews completed for System-of-Systems, 

Network, Manned, Unmanned, and Sensors/Munitions Family-ofSystems 

• Platforms and Networks—Design, build, and test schedules are 

aligned and executable 

• FCS/Joint Tactical Radio System/Warfighter Information NetworkTactical Programs development, build, and test schedules are

aligned and executable 

• Technology Readiness Level 6 achieved for threshold critical 

technologies 

Unmanned Systems 

• 36 Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Block 0 operational with 2nd

Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division 

• 8 Class IV airframes (less payloads) built 

• Unmanned Ground Vehicles and Autonomous Navigation System 

engineering technology demonstrators built 

• 22 Small Unmanned Ground Vehicles, Block 1 Delivered to Army 

Evaluation Task Force 

Manned Ground Vehicles 

• Demonstrated Manned Ground Vehicle Common Chassis 

• Demonstrations of Non-Line of Sight-Mortar and Mounted Combat 

System firing platforms 

• 5 Non-Line of Sight-Cannon early prototypes built

Network 

• 12 Engineering Development Model ground mobile radios and 40 

Engineering Development Model handheld, manpack small form fit 

radios delivered to FCS and operational in an unclassified 

environment 

• Demonstration of integrated sensor data feeds using Level 1 Fusion 

in an operational environment 

• Integrated Computer Systems with cross domain demonstrated 

 1

Future Combat Systems (FCS) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) for Secretary of

the Army issued by The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, Aug. 16, 2008. 
Appendix IV: 2009 Defense Acquisition Board

In-Process Review Criteria 

• Software Build 1.0 Qualification Test complete 

• Centralized Controller Spiral 1 prototype 

• System-of-Systems Common Operation Environment Build 2 

(Services or Air and Ground Network) Functional Qualification 

Test Complete 

Test/Experimentation/Demonstration 

• Demonstration of 16 Urban-Unattended Ground Sensors, 10 

Tactical-Unattended Ground Sensors, 6 Non-Line of Sight-Launch 

System Container Launch Units, 4 Small Unmanned Ground 

Vehicles Block 1 and 6 Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Block 0 

with the Army Evaluation Task Force in an operational 

environment 

• Ongoing Non Line of Sight Launch-System guided test vehicle

flights 

• Spin Out Pre-Limited user test completed 

• Experiment 2.1/Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 2008 and 

Experiment 2.2 completed 

• Integrated Mission Testing 1 completed 

• Software Build 2 Early Engineering Release completed 

• System-of-System Simulation Framework maturation assessment 

completed 

Page 46 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix V: Other Related Legislation 

Page 47 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 

Appendix V: Other Related Legislation 

Section 212 of Public Law 110-417 requires the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Networks and Information Integration) to report by September 

30, 2009 on its analysis of FCS communications network and software. The 

specific issues to be addressed are listed below. 

• An assessment of the vulnerability of the FCS communications 

network and software to enemy network attack, in particular the 

effect of the use of significant amounts of commercial software in 

FCS software. 

• An assessment of the vulnerability of the FCS communications 

network to electronic warfare, jamming, and other potential enemy 

interference. 

• An assessment of the vulnerability of the FCS communications 

network to adverse weather and complex terrain.

• An assessment of the FCS communication network’s dependence 

on satellite communications support, and an assessment of the 

network’s performance in the absence of assumed levels of 

satellite communications support. 

• An assessment of the performance of the FCS communications 

network when operating in a degraded condition ...and how such a 

degraded network environment would affect the performance of 

FCS brigades and the survivability of FCS Manned Ground 

Vehicles. 

• An assessment, developed in coordination with the Director of 

Operational Test and Evaluation, of the adequacy of the FCS 

communications network testing schedule. 

• An assessment, developed in coordination with Defense, 

Operational Test & Evaluation, of the synchronization of the 

funding, schedule, and technology maturity of the WIN-T and JTRS 

programs in relation to the FCS program, including any planned 

FCS spin outs. 
Appendix VI: Technology Readiness Levels 

Page 48 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 

Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) are measures pioneered by the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration and adopted by DOD to 

determine whether technologies were sufficiently mature to be 

incorporated into a weapon system. Our prior work has found TRLs to be 

a valuable decision-making tool because they can presage the likely 

consequences of incorporating a technology at a given level of maturity 

into a product development. The maturity level of a technology can range 

from paper studies (TRL 1), to prototypes that can be tested in a realistic 

environment (TRL 7), to an actual system that has proven itself in mission 

operations (TRL 9). According to DOD acquisition policy, a technology 

should have been demonstrated in a relevant environment or, preferably, 

in an operational environment (TRL 7) to be considered mature enough to 

use for product development. Best practices of leading commercial firms 

and successful DOD programs have shown that critical technologies 

should be mature to at least a TRL 7 before the start of product 

development. 

Table 3: TRL Descriptions

Technology readiness 

level Description

Hardware and 

software 

Demonstration 

environment 

1. Basic principles 

observed and reported. 

Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific 

research begins to be translated into applied 

research and development. Examples might 

include paper studies of a technology’s basic 

properties. 

None (paper studies and analysis). None. 

2. Technology concept 

and/or application 

formulated. 

Invention begins. Once basic principles are 

observed, practical applications can be invented. 

The application is speculative and there is no

proof or detailed analysis to support the 

assumption. Examples are still limited to paper 

studies. 

None (paper studies and analysis). None. 

3. Analytical and 

experimental critical 

function and/or

characteristic proof of 

concept. 

Active research and development is initiated. This 

includes analytical studies and laboratory studies 

to physically validate analytical predictions of 

separate elements of the technology. Examples 

include components that are not yet integrated or 

representative.

Analytical studies and 

demonstration of non-scale 

individual components (pieces of 

subsystem). 

Lab. 

4. Component and/or 

breadboard. Validation in 

laboratory environment. 

Basic technological components are integrated to 

establish that the pieces will work together. This 

is relatively “low fidelity” compared to the eventual 

system. Examples include integration of “ad hoc” 

hardware in a laboratory. 

Low-fidelity breadboard. Integration 

of non-scale components to show 

pieces will work together. Not fully 

functional or form or fit but 

representative of technically 

feasible approach suitable for flight 

articles. 

Lab. 

Appendix VI: Technology Readiness Levels 
Appendix VI: Technology Readiness Levels 

Technology readiness 

level Description

Hardware and 

software 

Demonstration 

environment 

5. Component and/or 

breadboard validation in 

relevant environment. 

Fidelity of breadboard technology increases 

significantly. The basic technological components 

are integrated with reasonably realistic supporting 

elements so that the technology can be tested in 

a simulated environment. Examples include “high 

fidelity” laboratory Integration of components.

High-fidelity breadboard. 

Functionally equivalent but not 

necessarily form and/or fit (size, 

weight, materials, etc.). Should be 

approaching appropriate scale. May 

include integration of several 

components with reasonably 

realistic support 

elements/subsystems to 

demonstrate functionality. 

Lab 

demonstrating 

functionality but 

not form and fit. 

May include flight 

demonstrating 

breadboard in 

surrogate aircraft. 

Technology ready 

for detailed design 

studies. 

6. System/subsystem 

model or prototype 

demonstration in a 

relevant environment. 

Representative model or prototype system, which 

is well beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is 

tested in a relevant environment. Represents a 

major step up in a technology’s demonstrated

readiness. Examples include testing a prototype 

in a high-fidelity laboratory environment or in

simulated operational environment. 

Prototype—Should be very close to 

form, fit, and function. Probably 

includes the integration of many 

new components and realistic 

supporting elements/subsystems if 

needed to demonstrate full 

functionality of the subsystem. 

High-fidelity lab 

demonstration or 

limited/restricted

flight 

demonstration for 

a relevant 

environment. 

Integration of 

technology is well 

defined. 

7. System prototype 

demonstration in an 

operational environment. 

Prototype near or at planned operational system. 

Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring 

the demonstration of an actual system prototype 

in an operational environment, such as in an 

aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include 

testing the prototype in a test bed aircraft. 

Prototype. Should be form, fit, and 

function integrated with other key 

supporting elements/subsystems to 

demonstrate full functionality of 

subsystem. 

Flight 

demonstration in 

representative 

operational 

environment such 

as flying test bed 

or demonstrator 

aircraft. 

Technology is well 

substantiated with 

test data. 

8. Actual system 

completed and “flight 

qualified” through test and 

demonstration.

Technology has been proven to work in its final 

form and under expected conditions. In almost all 

cases, this TRL represents the end of true system 

development. Examples include developmental 

test and evaluation of the system in its intended 

weapon system to determine if it meets design 

specifications.

Flight-qualified hardware. Developmental

test and 

evaluation in the 

actual system 

application. 

9. Actual system “flight 

proven” through 

successful mission 

operations. 

Actual application of the technology in its final 

form and under mission conditions, such as those 

encountered in operational test and evaluation. In 

almost all cases, this is the end of the last “bug 

fixing” aspects of true system development. 

Examples include using the system under 

operational mission conditions. 

Actual system in final form. Operational test

and evaluation in 

operational 

mission 

conditions. 

Source: GAO analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration data. 

Page 49 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix VII: FCS Critical Technology 

Ratings and Projections for Achieving TRL 6 

Page 50 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 

FCS Critical 

Technologies

2007 

TRL 

rating

2007 

TRL 6

projection 

2008

TRL 

rating

2008

TRL 6

projection 

Software programmable radio

1 JTRS Ground Mobile Radio 6 N/A 6 N/A 

2 JTRS Handheld, manpack, small form fit 6 N/A 6 N/A 

3 WIN-T 5 2008 6 N/A

Interface and Information Exchange

4 Army, Joint, multinational interface 6 N/A 6 N/A 

Joint 

interoperability 

5 SOSCOE interoperability 5 2008 6 N/A 

Security Systems and Algorithms 

6 Cross Domain Guarding Solution 6 N/A 6 N/A 

7 Intrusion detection--IP network 5 2008 6 N/A 

8 Intrusion detection--waveform 6 N/A 6 N/A 

9 Mobile ad hoc networking protocols 6 N/A 5 2009

10 Quality of service algorithms 5 2008 6 N/A

11 Unmanned systems relay N/R N/A N/R N/A

Wideband waveforms

12 Wideband waveform--JTRS 6 N/A 5 2009 

13 Wideband waveform--SRW 6 N/A 6 N/A 

14 Advanced man-machine interfaces 6 N/A 6 N/A

15 Multi-Spectral sensors and seekers 6 N/A 6 N/A

16 Decision aids/intelligent agents 6 N/A 6 N/A

Combat identification

17 Air (rotary wing/UAV)--to--ground 6 N/A 6 N/A 

18 Air (fixed wing)--to--ground (interim/robust solutions) N/R N/A N/R N/A 

19 Ground--to--ground (mounted) 6 N/A 6 N/A 

20 Ground--to--air (mounted) N/R N/A N/R N/A 

21 Ground--to--soldier N/R N/A N/R N/A

22 Rapid battlespace deconfliction 5 2008 5 2009

Sensor/data fusion and data compression algorithms

23 Distributed fusion management 5 2008 6 N/A 

24 Level 1 fusion engine 6 N/A 6 N/A 

Networked

battle 

command 

25 Data compression algorithms 6 N/A 7 N/A 

26 

Dynamic sensor--shooter pairing algorithms and fire

control 6 N/A 6 N/A

LOS/BLOS/NLOS precision munitions terminal 

guidance

Networked

lethality 

27 PGMM precision munitions N/R N/A N/R N/A 

Appendix VII: FCS Critical Technology 

Ratings and Projections for Achieving TRL 6 
Appendix VII: FCS Critical Technology 

Ratings and Projections for Achieving TRL 6 

FCS Critical 

Technologies

2007 

TRL 

rating

2007 

TRL 6

projection 

2008

TRL 

rating

2008

TRL 6

projection 

28 MRM precision munitions 6 N/A 6 N/A 

29 Excalibur precision munitions 7 N/A 7 N/A 

30 NLOS-LS 6 N/A 6 N/A

Aided/automatic target recognition

31 Aided target recognition for RSTA 5 2008 6 N/A 

32 NLOS-LS ATR for seekers 6 N/A 6 N/A 

33 Recoil management and lightweight components 6 N/A 6 N/A

34 

Distributed collaboration of manned/unmanned 

platforms 6 N/A 6 N/A

35 Rapid battle damage assessment N/R N/A N/R N/A

Transportability

High-power density/fuel-efficient propulsion 

36 High-power density engine 6 N/A 6 N/A 

37 Fuel-efficient hybrid-electric engine 6 N/A 6 N/A 

38 Embedded predictive logistics sensors and algorithms N/R N/A N/R N/A

39 Water generation and purification N/R N/A N/R N/A

Sustainability / 

reliability 

40 Lightweight heavy fuel engine 5 2008 5 2009

Training 41 Computer generated forces 6 N/A 6 N/A

42 Tactical engagement simulation 6 N/A 6 N/A

Active protection system 

43 Active protection system 5 2008 6 N/A

44 Threat warning sensor 4 2010 6 N/A 

45 Signature management 6 N/A 6 N/A

46 Lightweight hull and vehicle armor 5 2008 6 N/A

47 Health monitoring and casualty care interventions 7 N/A 8 N/A

48 Power distribution and control N/R N/A N/R N/A

Advanced countermine technology

49 Mine detection 6 N/A 6 N/A 

50 Mine neutralization 6 N/A 6 N/A 

51 Efficient resource allocation N/R N/A N/R N/A 

52 Protection 5 2008 6 N/A

53 High-density packaged power 6 N/A 6 N/A

Class 1 UAV propulsion technology 

Survivability 

54 Ducted fan 6 N/A 6 N/A

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Page 51 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix VIII: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 52 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Paul L. Francis, (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, major contributors to this 

report were Assistant Director William R. Graveline, Marcus C. Ferguson, 

William C. Allbritton, Noah B. Bleicher, Dr. Ronald N. Dains, Tana M. 

Davis, John Krump, Carrie W. Rogers, and Robert S. Swierczek. 

Contact 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 53 GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 

Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisitions: 2009 Review of Future Combat Systems Is Critical 

to Program’s Direction. GAO-08-638T. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-08-467SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: 2009 Is a Critical Juncture for the Army’s Future 

Combat System. GAO-08-408. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Risks Underscore the 

Importance of Oversight. GAO-07-672T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat 

System. GAO-07-376. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Key for Future Combat 

System’s Success. GAO-06-564T. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case is Needed for Future 

Combat System’s Successful Outcome. GAO-06-367. Washington, D.C.: 

March 14, 2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key 

for Future Combat System’s Success. GAO-06-478T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects 

for Success. GAO-05-428T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.

Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features, 

Risks, and Alternatives. GAO-04-635T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2004. 

Issues Facing the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program. 

GAO-03-1010R. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2003. 

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 

Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 

2001. 

(120740) 
GAO-09-288 Defense Acquisitions 

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