United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued May 1, 2013

Decided May 7, 2013

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 12-3473

CLIFFORD LINNE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRIAN ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 10-3173

Richard Mills,

Judge.

O R D E R

Clifford Linne sued three employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they violated the First Amendment by refusing to promote him

because of his political affiliation. The district court granted summary judgment for the

defendants. Because Linne failed to produce any evidence that his political affiliation was a

motivating factor in the decision not to promote him, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

The Department has employed Linne as a guard since 1991. In December 2009, the

Department posted three openings for the position of Staff Development Specialist I. The

primary responsibility of the incumbent is training new guards. The Department received

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 12-3473 Page 2

50 applications forthe 3 positions and invited 10 candidates—including Linne—to interview.

Linne interviewed on January 28, 2010.

BrianAdams,theManagerofStaffDevelopment andTraining, andTaraOwen,theHiring

Process Manager, sought to ensure that politics would not influence the hiring process.

See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990) (concluding that political affiliation

maynot be thebasis forpromotionsorother employment decisions involvinglow-levelpublic

employees). To that end they created a standard questionnaire and conducted the interviews

identically for each candidate. At the beginning of each interview, Adams or Owen readfrom

a script directing the candidate to assume that the interviewers knew nothing about his or her

background and explaining that the candidate would be scored based on answers to the

questionnaire. The interviewers stuck to the questionnaire and asked only those questions,

none of which concerns political affiliation. The questionnaire includes 14 questions that the

interviewers scored on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being unsatisfactory and 4 being excellent, and

afinalyes-or-noquestion. AfterAdams andOwenhadconductedall 10interviews andscored

the candidates,theDepartment awardedthepositions tothe three candidateswiththehighest

scores: Charles Cadell, John Clegg, and Ben Tomhave. Linne did not receive an offer.

Linne then filed this suit against Adams and Owen alleging that he “was one of the three

most qualified applicants” but was passed over for promotion because he “is not politically

active and did not have a political sponsorin [the] Democratic Party.” Linne also included as

a defendant Neil Rossi, the Regional Manager for Correctional Industries (who recently had

been disciplined for influencing hiring decisions based on politics or friendship). Linne

accused Rossi of telling Adams and Owen not to promote him based on political biases.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. Rossi argued that he was not involved in

the hiring decision and did not discuss the candidates with Adams or Owen, and the two

interviewers averred that theydidnot knowthe political affiliation of Linne or any candidate.

In his response Linne conceded that Rossi was entitled to summary judgment because a jury

could not find that he participated in the hiring decision. But Linne opposed dismissing

Adams or Owen because, he asserted, when Owen was deposed she had been unable to

articulate her specific criteria for scoring the candidates’ responses to the questions she and

Adams asked during the interviews. Linne pointed out that Owen simply had said she

evaluated objectively “whether or not they answer the question in its entirety” and then

subjectively “how the candidate articulated that information.”

In ruling forthe defendants, the district court concluded that Linne lacked evidence that

the decision not to promote him was politically motivated: During his deposition Linne had

admittedthat hedoes not know the political affiliation ofthe three successful applicants, does

not know how well the other applicants interviewed, and does not know the educational and
No. 12-3473 Page 3

professional backgrounds of the other candidates. Moreover, the court concluded, Owen’s

difficulty articulating her scoring methodology was not enough by itself to raise a reasonable

inference of political influence, and, indeed, was understandable because the interviews had

taken place almost two years before she was deposed and the scoring was highly subjective.

Linne has expressly abandoned his claim against Rossi. On appeal he argues that

summary judgment should not have been granted for Adams and Owen because, he says,

these defendants did not support their motion with any “legitimate explanation” for passing

him over. This argument reflects a misunderstanding of the burden on the moving parties at

that stage oftheproceedings: FederalRuleof CivilProcedure 56 “does not require themoving

party to ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s

claim.’” Modrowski v. Pigatto, No. 11-1327, 2013 WL 1395696, at *2 (7th Cir. Apr. 8, 2013)

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). To meet their initial burden, it was

enough for Adams and Owen to assert that Linne lacked evidence substantiating his

accusationofpoliticalinfluence. SeeCelotexCorp., 477U.S. at 325;Modrowski, 2013WL1395696,

at *2; MMG Fin.Corp. v. Midwest Amusements Park, LLC, 630 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2011). Once

they pointed out this perceived gap in his case, Linne was obliged to provide evidence

demonstrating that a jury reasonably couldfindin his favor. SeeModrowski, 2013WL 1395696,

at *2; Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Adams and Owen

would have needed to introduce evidence explaining their decision not to offer the position

toLinne only ifhe first hadestablishedaprima facie case ofpoliticaldiscrimination. SeeGeorge

v. Walker, 535 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2008); Garrett v. Barnes, 961 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1992).

Linne also contends that he presented sufficient circumstantial evidence—pointing to

Owen’s inability at her deposition to articulate how she scored the candidates’ answers to the

interview questions—to show that his political affiliation was a motivating factor, see Brown

v. Cnty. of Cook, 661 F.3d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 2011); Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 977 (7th Cir.

2011), in the decision not to promote him. But Linne’s speculation about Owen’s difficulty

articulating her evaluation criteria does not establish a prima facie case of political

discrimination. Linne offered no evidence about the political affiliation of the 40 candidates

who appliedbut didnot get interviews, or of the 6 other applicants who were interviewed but

did not get offers. And he did not dispute that he is unaware of the political affiliation,

educationalbackground, andprofessionalqualificationsofthecandidateswhoreceivedoffers.

Linne also conceded that he never told Adams or Owen of his own political affiliation or

mentioned it in any documents he submitted forthe position, and neither did he contest their

affidavits stating that they knew nothing about his politics or the politics of any other

candidate. And though Linne contends that the district court erroneously accepted Owen’s

testimony as credible, he offered no evidence to challenge her credibility. Standing alone, his

accusation that she is lying does not create a genuine issue of material fact, see Springer v.
No. 12-3473 Page 4

Durflinger, 518 F.3d479, 484 (7thCir. 2008);Chiconv.ExelonGenerationCo., 401 F.3d803, 814–15

(7th Cir. 2005); Dugan v. Smerwick Sewerage Co., 142 F.3d 398, 406 (7th Cir. 1998), and the

inferencehewouldhave the jurydrawabout hertestimonyisnot reasonable. Ajurycouldnot

reasonablyconclude that thedefendantspassedLinneoverfor apromotiondue tohispolitical

affiliationwhentheundisputedevidenceestablishes that theyknewnothingaboutit andthere

is no evidence of an improper motive. See Brown, 661 F.3d at 336; Nelms v. Modisett, 153 F.3d

815, 819 (7th Cir. 1998).

Finally, Linne argues generally that “summary judgment in employment discrimination

claims should be granted sparingly” because the issues of causation in these cases are

“inherently fact based” and within “the exclusive province of the fact finder.” But, again, he

failed to identify any factual dispute about causation or any other material issue in this case,

andsosummaryjudgment was appropriate. SeeEmbry v.City of CalumetCity,Ill., 701 F.3d231,

234 (7th Cir. 2012); Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED.