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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.

JAMES J. CICARELLA

(AC 42788)

Prescott, Moll and Alexander, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of larceny

in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed

that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss, which

alleged that the prosecution had been instituted improperly. Held that,

because the defendant failed to challenge all of the court’s independent

bases for denying his motion to dismiss, the court was unable to provide

the defendant with any practical relief and, therefore, the appeal was

moot and the court was without subject matter jurisdiction; accordingly,

the appeal was dismissed.

Argued January 19—officially released April 13, 2021

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crime

of larceny in the first degree, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical

area number twenty-three, where the court, Alander,

J., denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss; thereafter,

the defendant was presented to the court, Clifford, J.,

on a conditional plea of nolo contendere; judgment of

conviction in accordance with the plea, from which the

defendant appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.

David V. DeRosa, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state’s

attorney, and Michael R. Denison, assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The defendant, James J. Cicarella,

appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered by

the trial court following his conditional plea of nolo

contendere1

to larceny in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (2). On appeal, the

defendant claims that the court improperly denied his

motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Practice Book § 41-

8 (1)2

in which he claimed that the Madison Police

Department did not have jurisdiction to investigate and

arrest him because the alleged crime occurred in Wallingford. The state disagrees and, in addition, contends

that the appeal is moot. The state argues that the defendant failed to challenge all of the bases for denying

the motion set forth in the court’s memorandum of

decision. We agree with the state, and, because we

cannot afford the defendant any practical relief, we

dismiss his appeal as moot.

The following facts, as set forth in the trial court’s

memorandum of decision, and procedural history are

necessary for the resolution of this appeal. In an affidavit attached to an application for an arrest warrant,

Christopher Sudock, a Madison police officer, asserted

that the defendant, a resident of Madison, participated

in a fraudulent scheme resulting in the theft of $578,466

from the victim, Dorothy Minervino. Specifically, the

defendant, who had performed maintenance at the victim’s residence in Wallingford, falsely informed her that

he had been diagnosed with a life-threatening illness.

At the defendant’s request, the victim agreed to give

the defendant money to pay for his medical insurance

and purported medical procedures. The victim deposited $535,000 into a joint bank account that she had

opened with the defendant, with the understanding that

the money would be used for these medical expenses.

She also deposited $43,000 into the defendant’s personal account for that same purpose.

Sudock’s affidavit further alleged that the defendant

withdrew funds from these accounts and falsely represented to the victim that the money had been used for

his medical expenses. The defendant instead used the

money to purchase, inter alia, a house in Madison. The

defendant was charged with larceny in the first degree,

and an arrest warrant was issued on August 1, 2016.

On December 17, 2018, the defendant moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the prosecution had

been instituted improperly. The defendant claimed that

‘‘the crime(s) alleged in the warrant submitted by the

Madison Police Department and the state’s long form

information were committed in another jurisdiction,

Wallingford. Consequently, the defendant was not properly under the jurisdiction of the Madison Police Department inasmuch as no crime has been alleged to have

been committed in Madison and as a result, the court
does not have jurisdiction.’’ The state countered that

larceny constituted a continuing crime and that the

subsequent involvement of, and the steps taken by, the

state’s attorney’s office rendered the arrest and prosecution of the defendant proper.

The court, Alander, J., held a hearing on January 8,

2019, and issued a memorandum of decision two days

later. In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the

court set forth two bases for its decision. First, the

court, citing State v. Benson, 153 Conn. 209, 218, 214

A.2d 903 (1965), agreed with the state’s argument that

larceny constituted a continuing crime and rejected the

defendant’s efforts to draw a distinction between the

theft of physical property and that of money. Second,

citing State v. Fleming, 198 Conn. 255, 262–63, 502 A.2d

886, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143, 106 S. Ct. 1797, 90 L.

Ed. 2d 342 (1986), the court determined that ‘‘[a]ny

investigation by the Madison police of a crime committed outside their municipality does not invalidate the

defendant’s prosecution.’’

On January 16, 2019, the defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of larceny in

the first degree, which the court, Clifford, J., accepted.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a, the court concluded that a ruling in the defendant’s favor on the

motion to dismiss would be dispositive of the case. See

generally State v. Cervantes, 172 Conn. App. 74, 78, 158

A.3d 430, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 927, 169 A.3d 231

(2017). On April 2, 2019, the court imposed a sentence

of twelve years of incarceration, execution suspended

after six years, and five years of probation. This appeal

followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly denied his motion to dismiss the information charging him with the crime of larceny in the first

degree. In support of this claim, he first contends that

the municipal police generally may operate only within

‘‘their territorial jurisdiction.’’ The defendant then

argues that the court improperly concluded that the

larceny of money, as compared to that of ‘‘physical

personal property,’’ constituted a continuing crime.3 As

a second argument, the defendant maintains that ‘‘[t]he

Wallingford police and not the Madison police are the

only authority that have the power to arrest the defendant.’’ Finally, his brief concludes with various policy

arguments as to why we should reverse the decision

of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss.

Absent from the defendant’s appellate brief, however,

is a challenge to the second basis relied on by the trial

court in denying the motion to dismiss, namely, that,

pursuant to State v. Fleming, supra, 198 Conn. 255, an

illegal arrest does not invalidate his prosecution and

subsequent conviction. In Fleming, our Supreme Court

stated: ‘‘The relationship between an illegal arrest and

a subsequent prosecution under federal constitutional
law is well settled. In an unbroken line of cases dating

back to 1886, the federal rule has been that an illegal

arrest will not bar a subsequent prosecution or void a

resulting conviction.’’ Id., 259; see also State v. Johnson,

227 Conn. 534, 539–40, 630 A.2d 1059 (1993); State v.

Bagnaschi, 180 Conn. App. 835, 857, 184 A.3d 1234,

cert. denied, 329 Conn. 912, 186 A.3d 1170 (2018).4 The

defendant’s failure to challenge this independent basis

for the denial of his motion to dismiss renders his appeal

moot, as we cannot afford him any practical relief.

‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be

determined as a threshold matter because it implicates

[this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . The

fundamental principles underpinning the mootness doctrine are well settled. We begin with the four part test

for justiciability . . . . Because courts are established

to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must

be justiciable. Justiciability requires (1) that there be

an actual controversy between or among the parties to

the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be

adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be

capable of being adjudicated by the judicial power . . .

and (4) that the determination of the controversy will

result in practical relief to the complainant. . . .

‘‘[I]t is not the province of appellate courts to decide

moot questions, disconnected from the granting of

actual relief or from the determination of which no

practical relief can follow. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful

appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any

way. . . .

‘‘Where an appellant fails to challenge all bases for

a trial court’s adverse ruling on his claim, even if this

court were to agree with the appellant on the issues

that he does raise, we still would not be able to provide

[him] any relief in light of the binding adverse finding[s]

[not raised] with respect to those claims. . . . Therefore, when an appellant challenges a trial court’s

adverse ruling, but does not challenge all independent

bases for that ruling, the appeal is moot.’’ (Citations

omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Lester, 324 Conn. 519, 526–27, 153

A.3d 647 (2017); see also Sobel v. Commissioner of

Revenue Services, 333 Conn. 712, 716–17, 218 A.3d 581

(2019); In re Phoenix A., 202 Conn. App. 827, 838–40,

A.3d (2021); State v. Carter, 194 Conn. App.

202, 206–208, 220 A.3d 882 (2019); State v. Holley, 174

Conn. App. 488, 503–507, 167 A.3d 1000, cert. denied,

327 Conn. 907, 170 A.3d 3 (2017), cert. denied, U.S.

, 138 S. Ct. 1012, 200 L. Ed. 2d 275 (2018).

Here, the defendant failed to challenge the court’s

independent basis for denying his motion to dismiss

that, pursuant to State v. Fleming, supra, 198 Conn.

255, an illegal arrest does not invalidate his prosecution
and subsequent conviction.5

In his brief, the defendant

first argued that the court erred in its finding that the

Madison Police Department had the authority to investigate this crime and in its determination that larceny of

money, as opposed to larceny of physical property, is

a continuing crime such that each municipality where

the money is spent has jurisdiction to arrest the defendant. Second, he contended that, even if the investigation by the Madison Police Department was proper, the

correct course of action was to dismiss the case and,

‘‘if the [state’s] attorney in coordination with [the] Wallingford Police Department [commences] a new case

and it is within the statute of limitations, then proceed

on the new arrest.’’ Accordingly, as a result of the defendant’s failure to challenge all of the court’s bases for

denying his motion to dismiss, we cannot afford him

any practical relief, rendering this appeal moot and

leaving this court without subject matter jurisdiction.

The appeal is dismissed.

1 General Statutes § 54-94a provides in relevant part: ‘‘When a defendant,

prior to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to take an appeal from the court’s denial of the defendant’s

. . . motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition of sentence may

file an appeal within the time prescribed by law provided a trial court has

determined that a ruling on such . . . motion to dismiss would be dispositive of the case. The issue to be considered in such an appeal shall be

limited to whether it was proper for the court to have denied . . . the

motion to dismiss. A plea of nolo contendere by a defendant under this

section shall not constitute a waiver by the defendant of nonjurisdictional

defects in the criminal prosecution.’’

2 Practice Book § 41-8 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The following defenses

or objections, if capable of determination without a trial of the general issue,

shall, if made prior to trial, be raised by a motion to dismiss the information:

(1) Defects in the institution of the prosecution . . . .’’

3 Specifically, the defendant set forth the following: ‘‘There is, however,

a meaningful distinction in larceny by false pretenses with regards to money

and larceny of personal property as to the impact that [the crime] has on

[municipal] power and jurisdiction as defined by the Connecticut legislature.

First, the whole concept of the municipal police jurisdiction as set forth in

statute would suddenly be meaningless when money is involved because a

complainant could trace any place where the funds were spent by [the

person alleged to have committed the larceny], and convince that police

department that . . . he should be arrested and incarcerated for a larceny.’’

4

In State v. Ostroski, 201 Conn. 534, 555, 518 A.2d 915 (1986), our Supreme

Court noted: ‘‘We specifically excluded from our holding [in State v. Fleming,

supra, 198 Conn. 262–63] . . . cases . . . where the fairness of the defendant’s trial is compromised by the circumstances of his arrest. . . . [A]n

illegal arrest may impair the fairness of a subsequent prosecution only where

evidence obtained as a direct consequence of that arrest is admitted against

the defendant at trial.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

See also State v. Ryerson, 201 Conn. 333, 338, 514 A.2d 337 (1986). This

exception to the rule established in State v. Fleming, supra, 262–63, does

not apply in the present case.

5 At oral argument before this court, the defendant claimed, for the first

time, that the trial court’s reliance on State v. Fleming, supra, 198 Conn.

App. 255, was misplaced. ‘‘Appellate courts generally do not consider claims

raised for the first time at oral argument. See State v. Wright, 197 Conn.

588, 595, 500 A.2d 547 (1985); see also State v. Holmes, 70 Conn. App. 4, 5

n.2, 796 A.2d 561 (2002).’’ State v. Marcelino S., 118 Conn. App. 589, 592

n.4, 984 A.2d 1148 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 904, 988 A.2d 879 (2010);

see also State v. Butler, 296 Conn. 62, 70 n.10, 993 A.2d 970 (2010) (appellate

claims must be briefed adequately and cannot be raised for first time at

oral argument).