L :

) 3 H andling of

Rail D isp u tes

U n d e r th e

R a ilw a y L a b o r A ct,

1 9 5 0 - 6 9

Bulletin 1753

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Bureau of Labor Statistics

1972

P u M c Library

JAN i 6 1973

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
H a n d l i n g o f 

R a i l D i s p u t e s 

U n d e r t h e 

R a i l w a y L a b o r A c t , 

1 9 5 0 - 6 9

Bulletin 1753

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

J. D. Hodgson, Secretary

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

Geoffrey H. Moore, Commissioner

1972

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Preface

This bulletin provides a descriptive and statistical account of the industrial 

relations, mediation, work stoppages, and emergency dispute experience of die 

railroad industry under the Railway Labor Act. Published and unpublished records, particularly those of the National Mediation Board, were utilized to prepare 

this report.

The definition of this major industry group (railroad transportation) covered 

by the Railway Labor Act conforms to major group 40 in the Standard Industrial Classification M anual, 1967 edition, issued by the Office of Management 

and Budget, formerly the Bureau of the Budget.

This bulletin was prepared in the Bureau’s Division of Industrial Relations, 

Office of Wages and Industrial Relations, by Michael H. Cimini under the supervision of Albert A. Belman. The cooperation of the National Mediation Board, 

particularly Mrs. Vivian Yancey and Mr. Thomas Tracy, in the preparation 

of chapters IV and V I is gratefully acknowledged.

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Contents

Chapter I. Background of Railway Labor A c t ____________________________________________________ 1

Sum m ary___________________________________________________________________________________ 1

Introduction ________________________________________________________________________________ 2

Financial condition__________________________________________________________________________ 2

Government regulation_______________________________________________________________________ 3

Mergers and other major unifications_________________________________________________________ 3

Technology and unem ploym ent_______________________________________________________________ 4

Collective bargaining unit and jurisdictional d isp u tes___________________________________________ 6

Chapter II. Legal framework of the Railway Labor A c t __________________________________________ 8

Procedural aspects of the a c t _________________________________________________________________ 8

History of railroad legislation_________________________________________________________________ 8

Chapter III. Railroad mediation c a s e s ___________________________________________________________ 11

Role of the National Mediation B o a rd ________________________________________________________ 11

Operating and nonoperating g ro u p s___________________________________________________________ 11

Issues ______________________________________________________________________________________12

Disposition of mediation c a se s________________________________________________________________ 12

Chapter IV. Appointment of railroad emergency b o a r d s __________________________________________ 14

Intent of the a c t ____________________________________________________________________________ 14

Factors affecting the appointment of b o a rd s ___________________________________________________ 15

M oratorium s___________________________________________________________________________ 15

National m ovem ents____________________________________________________________________ 15

Economic tre n d s ________________________________________________________________________ 16

Strike th r e a ts __________________________________________________________________________ 16

Role of the p a rtie s _____________________________________________________________________ 16

“Proliferation” of emergency b o a rd s _____________________________________________________ 16

Ineffective collective bargaining__________________________________________________________ 17

National ca ses_______________________________________________________________________________ 18

Grievance b o a r d s ___________________________________________________________________________ 18

Chapter V. The Role of G overnm ent____________________________________________________________ 20

Ad hoc legislation___________________________________________________________________________ 20

Presidential railroad com m issions------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22

Presidential seizu res_________________________________________________________________________ 23

Other forms of intervention__________________________________________________________________ 23

Major interruptions__________________________________________________________________________ 23

Identical issues on separate c a rrie rs----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------23

Chapter VI. Characteristics of emergency boards, 1950-69 ________________________________________25

P articipation------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 25

S iz e ________________________________________________________________________________________ 25

Issues _____________________________________________________________________________________ 27

D u ra tio n ___________________________________________________________________________________ 27

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Contents—Continued

M ajor issues and g ro u p s_________________________________________________________________ 29

National ca ses_______________________________________________________________________________29

Reasons for the long d u ra tio n ________________________________________________________________30

Mediation s p a n _________________________________________________________________________ 30

Agency s p a n ___________________________________________________________________________ 31

The p a rtie s____________________________________________________________________________ 32

A rb itra tio n _________________________________________________________________________________ 33

Emergency board re p o rts____________________________________________________________________ 33

Methods of settlem ent______________________________________________________________________ 35

Disposition _________________________________________________________________________________36

Chapter VII. Railroad work stoppages___________________________________________________________ 39

Size of stoppages___________________________________________________________________________ 39

D u ra tio n ___________________________________________________________________________________ 41

Operating vs. nonoperating personnel stoppages---------------------------------------------------------------------- 42

Issues _____________________________________________________________________________________ 42

Tables:

1. Unions representing railway employees, as of June 30, 1969 ___________________________ 6

2. Mediation cases disposed of, by occupational group, selected periods, 1950-69 _____________ 12

3. Number of mediation agreements and percent of total cases disposed of, selected periods,

1 9 5 5 -6 9 _____________________________________________________________________________ 12

4. Railroad emergency boards, by size and m ajor group, selected periods, 1950-69 ____________ 25

5. National railroad emergency boards, by m ajor issue and group, selected periods,

1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________________26

6. Railroad emergency boards, by detailed issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69 __________ 27

7. Duration of railroad emergency boards, by major work group and spans, selected

periods, 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________ 28

8. Duration of railroad emergency boards (in calendar days), by major issue and group, selected

periods, 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________ 29

9. Railroad emergency board spans (in calendar days), by major group, selected periods,

1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________________ 29

10. National and nonnational emergency board spans, selected periods, 1950-69 ________________ 30

11. Methods of settlement in railroad boards, by major issue and group, selected periods,

1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________________ 36

12. Number and percentage of agreements resolved through arbitration, mediation, and

direct negotiations____________________________________________________________________ 36

13. Railroad emergency board work stoppages, by major issue and group, 1950-69 __________ 37

14. Workers involved and man-days idle, by m ajor group, 1950-69 __________________________ 38

15. Number of railroad work stoppages, workers involved, and man-days idle, 1950-69 _________39

16. Number and percent of railroad work stoppages, by size, selected periods, 1950-69 _________40

17. Railroad work stoppages involving 10,000 workers or more, 1950-69 _____________________ 41

18. Duration of railroad stoppage by major issues, 1950-69 ___________________________________ 42

Chart:

1. Collective bargaining procedures, and “status quo” periods, under the Railway Labor

A c t--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9

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C o n t e n t s — C o n t i n u e d

Appendixes:

A - l. Selected railroad financial and economic statistics, 1950-69 __________________________44

A -2. Railroads’ involvement in RLA procedures, fiscal years 1950-69 ______________________ 45

A -3. Railroad mediation cases disposed of by the National Mediation Board, by major

occupational group, fiscal years 1950-69 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 46

A -4. Railroad emergency boards, 1950-69 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 48

A -5. Chronology of railroad RLA — emergency boards, fiscal years 1950-69 _________________52

A -6. Railroad work stoppages, by duration and size of unit and group of workers, calendar years 1950-69 ______________________________________________________________ 58

A -7. Major issues involved in railroad work stoppages, calendar years 1950-69 _____________ 59

A -8. Railroad work stoppages, by duration and major group, selected periods, calendar

years 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________60

A -9. Duration of railroad stoppages, by major issue, selected periods, calendar years

1950-69 _________________________________________________________________________ 62

A -10. Railroad work stoppages, by major issue and group, selected periods, calendar years

1950-69 _________________________________________________________________________ 64

Selected B ibliography____________________________________________________________________________66

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Chapter 1. Background of the Railway Labor Act1

Sum m ary

This study presents the first complete examination 

of basic data on the state of labor relations in the 

railroad industry in the 1950’s and 1960’s. It is 

based on records of railroad mediation cases, work 

stoppages, and emergency boards appointed under 

the provisions of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), together with the circumstances that led to government 

intervention. A number of significant findings followed from this inquiry.

In a vast majority of cases, negotiations have been 

concluded successfully on the local properties without government intervention, active assistance of the 

National Mediation Board (NMB), or interruptions 

of work. However, when impasses have been 

reached, the conflicts have required the mediatory 

services of the Board. Mediation has performed 

successfully as a tool to compose unadjusted collective bargaining disputes; nearly 98 percent of docketed railroad mediation cases have been resolved 

without resort to an emergency board.

After the exhaustion of unsuccessful mediatory efforts, emergency boards, some involving more than 

one mediation case, were created when, in the opinion of the President, the disptue “threatened substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of 

essential transportation services.” Of the 71 emergency panels, only 23 were appointed to consider 

nationwide disputes, and 18 were convened to hear 

cases involving only a single railroad carrier and a 

single union.

1 T he R ailw ay L abor A ct, w h ich bore the joint approval

o f the m ajor railw ay carriers and unions, w as passed in

1926. Its coverage, w h ich originally extended o n ly to railroads, w as enlarged to include airline carriers in 1936.

T his study w as conducted fo r fiscal years 1 9 5 0 -6 9 . A

fiscal year refers to the tim e period July 1 o f the previous

year to June 30 o f that year, i.e., fiscal year 1950 extended

from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950. (Som e m aterial relating to events occurring in 1970 or 1971 has b een included

in chapter V for illustrative reasons.)

Although this emergency procedure was conceived 

as a type of adjustment machinery to resolve labormanagement conflicts involving terms and conditions 

of employment, grievance disputes have been 

brought before boards on eight occasions.

The duration of the RLA emergency dispute procedure has been lengthy, averaging 670 calendar 

days. Average duration increased substantially between the 1950’s and the 1960’s, in part because of 

12 prolonged panels (the majority of which involved 

rule issues) that occurred during the later period.

Of the cases in which responses were ascertained, 

both parties initially accepted the boards’ reports 

only on six occasions. Railroad carriers generally accepted “adverse” as well as “favorable” reports, 

while railroad unions usually rejected “adverse” recommendations.

The parties most frequently relied on negotiations, 

rather than mediation or arbitration, to effect settlements. Eight emergency board disputes were settled 

either before a board was appointed or a formal report was issued. Of the remaining panels, settlements 

were reached without work stoppages in the majority 

of instances.

Since presidents and Congress have viewed nationwide railroad work stoppages as being detrimental to the public welfare, other forms of government 

intervention outside the scope of the act have played 

an integral part in the settlement of railroad emergency disputes. Presidential commissions, the offices 

of the White House or the Labor Department, ad 

hoc legislation, and seizures have been utilized in situations in which the Executive or Legislative 

branches felt that collective bargaining could not 

peacefully settle railroad disputes. In addition, presidential intervention was evident in 12 emergency 

board cases, and the mediatory services of the Labor 

Department were used in numerous instances. 

Finally, President Truman seized railroad carriers 

twice in 1950.

During the 1950-69 period, the railroad industry 

sustained 316 work stoppages involving 1.4 million 

workers and 8.4 million man-days idle. Compared

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with the average annual level of 23.4 calendar days 

for the total economy, the average duration of all 

railroad strikes was much shorter, 13.0 days. Of the 

316 stoppages, 75 percent extended less than 1 week 

and only 3 percent, or eight cases, lasted longer than 

90 days.

Introduction

For many years there has been general concern 

with the vitality and effectiveness of the law that governs railroad industrial relations, the Railway Labor 

Act, and its procedures have been criticized by many 

practitioners and students of collective bargaining. 

At various times, these experts have argued that the 

act, as implemented by the National Mediation 

Board— the agency charged with its administration 

— has encouraged labor and management to bargain 

in a perfunctory manner, to relinquish their rights 

and duties to resolve disputes on their own, to engage in dilatory strategy at every stage of their negotiations, and to depend on government intervention 

for the solution of disputes. Some critics have alledged also that the Executive Branch, acting under 

political pressures, has at times intervened needlessly 

in railroad disputes.2

Contributing to these concerns, however, are circumstances peculiar to the economic nature of the 

industry that impinge on the parties’ collective bargaining relationship and contribute to its instability. 

One source is the large number of specialized craft 

unions, often competitive, that exist in the railroad 

industry.3 Throughout the years, each craft union has 

adhered rigidly to its own work rules and jurisdic2 B enjam in A aron, “E m ergency D isp ute Settlem ent,” Labor Law Developments, 1967.

Jacob J. K aufm an, “E m ergency B oards U n d er the R ailw ay L abor A ct,” Labor Law Journal, V o l. 9, N o . 12, D e ­

cem ber 1958.

“T h e R ailroad L abor D ispute: A M arathon o f M aneuver

and Im provisation,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review,

V ol. 18, January 1965.

D a v id L evinson, “T h e L oco m o tiv e F irem en ’s D isp u te,”

Labor Law Journal, V o l. 17, N o . 11, N ov em b er 1966.

E dw ard B. Shils, “Industrial U n rest in th e N a tio n ’s R ail

Industry,” Labor Law Journal, V o l. 15, N o . 2, February

1964.

A rthur M . W isehart, “T ransportation Strike C ontrol

L egislation,” Michigan Law Review, V o l. 66, June 1968.

3 A recent d evelop m en t w h ich m ay ind icate that the un ion

rivalry problem w ill decline in the years to co m e has been

the m erging o f various railroad un ions. In 1969, fo u r such

consolidations, affecting 2 6 3 ,0 0 0 railroad u n ion m em bers,

occurred.

tional claims, has promoted its own set of “job 

rights,” and has often been reluctant to accept technological changes.

Besides this “union fractionalism,” other factors 

have operated to create an atmosphere of “emergency bargaining.” Actual and anticipated introduction of innovations (which may obscure lines of demarcation between crafts) and consolidations of rail 

facilities have engendered fears of job losses. Reinforcing these pressures have been the secular trends 

of declining employment of nonsupervisory workers 

because of introductions of laborsaving devices and 

because of a reduction in the railroads’ share of the 

transportation market.

Still another source of bargaining instability, regulatory agencies (which control competition, rates, 

routes, and subsidies) have also been cited as tending “to supply a negative influence on labor-management harmony and stability.” 4 Nor have other 

forms of government intervention always proven to 

be stabilizing forces.

Financial condition

In 1969, the U.S. Railroad System consisted of 

721 carriers, operating 222,164 miles of track and 

employing 623,326 workers. These railroads earned 

$12.0 billion in operating income and incurred $9.5 

billion in operating expenses. Net revenues from 

railway operations in 1969 amounted to $2.5 billion, 

of which $555.0 million in dividends were declared.5 

(See appendix table A -l.)

Under the Interstate Commerce Commission 

(ICC) classification system, the industry is composed 

of five main groupings.6 This analysis is largely confined to the three largest and most important groups: 

Class I, class II, and switching and terminal carriers. 

Of the 721 railroads operating in 1969, 73 were 

class I carriers. These larger railways employed 93 

percent of the industry’s work force and operated 80 

percent of its mileage.

At the time of the act’s passage, railroads hauled 

77 percent of the Nation’s intercity freight traffic 

ton-miles and 76 percent of nonautomobile passenger traffic. In 1969 by contrast, the railroads trans4 Shils, op. cit., p. 81.

5 Eighty-Third Annual Report on Transport Statistics in

the United States for the Year Ended D ec. 31, 1969 (U .S.

Interstate C om m erce C om m ission ), pp. 3, 19, 23, 4 8, 49.

(Later cited as 83rd Annual Report on Transport Statistics).

6 T he five m ajor categories are class I, class II, sw itching

and term inal, proprietary, and unofficial.

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ported only 41 percent of intercity freight ton-miles 

and 1 percent of intercity passenger miles.

A major cause of the railroads’ long-term declining share of intercity freight and passenger service 

was their inability to compete economically with 

newer forms of transportation. As far back as the 

1920’s, motor vehicles had begun making inroads 

into the railroads’ passenger operations. Following 

World War II, commercial aviation, pipelines, trucking, and buses began to pose ever-increasing competition. Even the railroads’ steady fare, transportation 

of higher value commodities (such as fresh fruits and 

vegetables, livestock, dairy products, and other highrate goods) had been adversely affected.7

Besides difficulty in competing economically with 

newer forms of transportation, railroads have been 

adversely affected by levels of national economic 

activity8 and by internal developments. One result 

has been the unfavorable rate of increase in operating costs compared with revenues— 29.1 percent and 

21.6 percent, respectively, between 1950-69— despite a precipitous drop in employment. Another 

manifestation of the various problems besetting the 

industry has been the number of insolvencies. Between 1894 and 1942, there were more than 840 

railroad bankruptcies. During the early 1950’s 

(1950-54) a large number of carriers (approximately 40) were in bankruptcy; but by 1957, the 

number of bankruptcies had declined to six and 

has not since been greater than eight in any year.9 

Since World War II, there have been only eight 

major (class I) bankruptcies, three occurring in 

1970. A significant number of railroad companies 

have also incurred deficits over the years (approximately 17 annually), and many more have experienced liquidity problems.10

G overnm ent regulation

According to some industry spokesmen and trans7 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 109

(U .S. N ation al M ed iation B oard, M arch 25, 1955), pp.

2 7 -2 8 .

Eighty-Third Annual Report on Transport Statistics, op.

cit., pp. 4 8 -4 9 . Interstate C om m erce C om m ission data.

8 M orris A . H orow itz, “L abor’s R o le in the D eclin in g

R ailroad Industry,” Labor Law Journal, V o l. 9, N o . 5,

M ay 1958, p. 473.

9 Report of the Presidential Railroad Commission (W ashington: U .S . G overnm ent P rinting O ffice, F eb . 1963), p.

79. IC C data.

10 Labor, O ct. 3, 1970, p. 8.; N ew York Times, Sept. 2,

1970, p. 53 and A u g. 2, 1970, p. F -1 0 ; IC C data.

portation and labor experts, government regulation 

has intensified the financial problems of the industry. 

Public policy, or its lack, has also had an impact on 

collective bargaining. Various problems have been 

noted, including deficits incurred from passenger 

service, the uncertain role of railroads in metropolitan transportation systems, the inadequate recognition of severe competition facing railroads, subsidization of competitive forms of transportation, and 

insufficient coordination of various forms of transportation. According to one report, “a large part of 

the growing difficulties of the parties in collective 

bargaining reflects a failure to develop adequate national policies for the railroads and for a coordinated 

transportation system.” 11 Another critic has even 

claimed that regulation has “stifled innovation, discouraged industry, driven many of the capable and 

imaginative men out of it (the industry), and provided a convenient excuse for inaction on the part 

of less capable men who have come and stayed.” 12

Chairman of Illinois Central Industries, William 

B. Johnson, noting the disparity between the dynamic nature of inflation and the more static nature 

of regulation, has asserted that rigidity and incessant 

delays in regulation would impede future developments in the industry. (During periods of inflation, 

the argument goes, demands for substantial wage increases, coupled with lagging productivity, result in 

pressures on profit margins. Wage raises can be met 

by infusions of capital expenditures, or growth of the 

industry, or increased prices— a combination of all 

three being optimal. Railroad capital expenditures 

have been characterized as being “too little, too 

late;” the industry as “declining” ; and the procedures for raising rates as “archaic,” “tedious,” and 

“stifling.”) 13

M ergers an d o th er m ajor unifications

Besides setting rates and determining routes, government regulates the unification of railroad properties. Mergers and other consolidations of railroad 

properties usually are predicated on increasing the 

carriers’ market share or achieving operating economies and decreasing costs. At the same time, since 

these activities constitute a persistent threat to job 

security, they usually result in proposed contract

11 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 130

(U .S. N ation al M ed iation B oard, June 8, 1960), pp. 3 -4 .

n N .Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1971, p. 10.

13 New York Times, A u g. 2, 1970, p. 47.

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provisions for improving employment and income 

protection. Actual and anticipated mergers commonly generate fears and anxieties which lead to 

labor hostility and attempts to thwart managements’ 

plans. For instance, the Brotherhood of Maintenance 

of Way Employees (BMWE) and the Railway 

Labor Executives’ Association (RLEA) filed a suit 

against the ICC in 1960 to halt the Erie-Lackawana 

merger and claimed that the agency did not prescribe 

adequate employee protection measures.

During fiscal years 1950-60, the ICC approved 50 

merger applications14 under section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as well as 470 other unifications (including ownerships of stock, purchases, 

modifications of track rights, trackage rights, modified leases, joint uses, leases, and various combinations of the above consolidations). Other major unifications authorized from 1961 to 1970 included 40 

mergers, 27 control agreements, 15 purchase agreements, and 3 lease agreements.15 Approximately 

one-third of the industry’s trackage currently is involved in pending proceedings before the Commission. As with previous consolidations, the Commission will authorize or dismiss the applications, but 

will not pursue the unifications to a conclusion. 

However, it will receive testimony on the classes or 

crafts of employees involved— who usually oppose 

the transaction— and will prescribe conditions in the 

agreements to protect employees who are affected 

adversely.16

T echnology and unem ploym ent

Another economic condition intimately affecting 

workers’ security is the extent and pace of technological developments, as indicated by productivity 

changes. Expressed as an average annual rate, output per man-hour (productivity) in the railroad industry increased 5.3 percent between 1947 and 1969 

and 6.2 percent between 1957 and 1969, compared 

with only 3.2 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively, 

for the private economy.17 Among these technological 

developments which influenced productivity levels 

were electronically operated classification yards,

14 Including m ergers cou p led w ith other unification plans.

15 Includes tw o m ergers and on e control authorization

granted in the form er period.

16 U n pu blished IC C data.

17 Indexes of Output Per Man-Hour, Selected Industries,

1939 and 1 9 4 7 -6 9 (BLS B ulletin 1680, 1970), p. 104. Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1970 (B L S B ulletin 1666, 1970),

p. 159.

modernization of equipment for right-of-way maintenance, processing and computer equipment, and 

many other innovations. As in other industries, railroad collective bargaining agreements embody many 

provisions relating to the implementation of technological innovations. Technological developments also 

frequently lead to numerous proposals for changes in 

labor agreements, some of which result in labor 

strife. In fact, technological change probably places 

the single greatest strain on collective bargaining relationships of any factor in the industry.

Management has claimed consistently that improved technology is necessary to compete effectively with other modes of transportation and to defray increased costs, including wages. Unions have 

pointed to the dislocations and resultant loss of 

workers’ job opportunities and income caused by 

fundamental industrial changes. Initially, they usually have attempted to impede changes or, at least, 

abate the pace of implementation while carriers usually have pressed for quick institution of operational 

and technological changes. A t times, the parties have 

indicated a mutual desire to arrange simultaneously 

for protection schemes (such as severance pay, retraining, etc.) to cushion the effect of technological 

developments, without at the same time instituting 

protective measures which would lapse into restrictive work rules. On several occasions, a conflict of 

interest has resulted and neutral parties have had to 

decide how fast and far, at whose expense, and to 

whose profit technological developments should be 

instituted.18

As early as the 1950’s,19 warnings were regularly 

issued that a breakdown in railroad collective bargaining was imminent; the primary cause cited was 

technology:

W e h a v e n o t r e a c h e d th e e n d o f th e s e c h a n g e s.

T e c h n o lo g y c o n tin u e s to a d v a n c e . M a n y ra ilr o a d s

h a v e n o t y e t a d o p te d te c h n o lo g ic a l c h a n g e s w h ic h

o th e r s h a v e sh o w n t o b e s u c c e s s fu l. N e w te c h ­

n ic a l d e v e lo p m e n ts a re in th e m a k in g . S o fa r ,

c o lle c tiv e b a r g a in in g h a s n o t r e s p o n d e d t o th e s e

c h a lle n g e s w ith su ffic ien t v ig o r o r im a g in a tio n to

c o p e w ith th e p r o b le m s th a t lo o m o v e r th e in d u str y

a n d its la b o r r e la tio n s. C o lle c tiv e b a r g a in in g h a s

fu n c tio n e d in th e s e q u e n c e o f c h a lle n g e a n d r e ­

sp o n se ; a n d th e r e s p o n s e h a s a t tim e s b e e n lo n g

d e la y e d . It h a s n o t a n tic ip a te d in a tim e w h e n

a n tic ip a tio n is n e c e s s a r y t o c o p e w ith p r o b le m s

18 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 86

(U .S. N a tio n a l M ed iation B oard, July 6, 1950), p. 6.

19 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 97

(U .S. N a tio n a l M ed iation B oard, Jan. 2 5, 1952), p. 97.

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which become even more difficult to resolve once

their full impact is felt.20

On several occasions, the carriers have alleged 

that railroad unions attempted to assume management’s prerogatives, by insisting on a veto power 

over consolidation or discontinuance of jobs, stations, and other rail facilities. A t other times, according to carrier representatives, railway unions have 

attempted to retard technological change and modernization and to impede the elimination of inefficient 

work rules and duplication of services by strict observance of exclusive jurisdictional claims, excessive 

severance demands, job freezes, and other proposals 

designed to inflate the cost of technologies’ implementation to the carriers. For example, the Telegraphers (ORT) served notice on the Chicago and 

North Western Railway and requested that “No position in existence on December 3, 1957, will be 

abolished or discontinued,” except by mutual agreement between the parties. After negotiations and 

mediation were unsuccessful and arbitration was rejected, the unadjusted dispute resulted in the appointment of Emergency Board No. 147. Eventually 

the controversy was settled, but not before a 30-day 

strike ensued.

Because of operating economies (consolidations, 

abandonments of main and branch lines, mergers), 

technological developments, and secular trends in 

the competitiveness of railroads, railway employment 

has decreased in successive years. (See appendix 

table A -l.) In 1950, the class I railroads, accounting 

for 95 percent of the railroad industry’s mileage and 

employment, provided 1,220,784 jobs. Twenty years 

later, railway carriers employed about one-half this 

number, 578,277 persons. With one exception, the 

seven major occupations,21 as classified by the Interstate Commerce Commission, also experienced 

declining job opportunities of varying degrees. 

Employment of nonoperating employees decreased 

precipitiously compared with that of operating 

classes, despite “diesilization” and other innovations 

affecting operating crafts.22 * Only the number of

20 Report to the President by Emergency Board No, 145

(U.S. National Mediation Board, May 3, 1962), p. 64.

21 Executives, officials, and staff assistants; professional,

clerical, and general; maintenance of way and structure;

maintenance of equipment and stores; transportation (other

than train, engine, and yard); yardmasters, switch tenders,

and hostlers; train and engine service.

22 Operating employees are “those workers engaged directly in the movement of trains, such as locomotive enexecutives, officials, and staff assistants increased 

over the two decades (6.4 percent), a phenomenon 

frequently stressed by railway unions.

Anticipated or actual losses in employment have 

always been a real substantive issue in the railroad industry. Over the years, various railroad unions have 

cited declining employment opportunities and resultant hardships faced by their members. In 1954, the 

Firemen (BLFE), appearing before Emergency 

Board No. 110, testified that 21,000 firemen and 

hostlers’ positions had been eliminated in the railroad industry during the preceding 6 years.28 The Telegraphers (ORT), who were involved in hearings 

before Emergency Board No. 138, noted that their 

craft’s employment had been reduced 36.8 percent 

from 1955 through I960.24 Average employment for 

Pullman conductors (ORCB), who participated in 

Emergency Board No. 139, declined almost threefourths in 14 years (from 2,683 in 1946 to 729 in 

I960).25

However, the magnitude of the problem cannot be 

expressed solely by statistics detailing declining employment levels. Other characteristics of the railroad 

labor force— such as age distribution and length of 

service— reinforced the human aspects of working in 

a declining industry. The median age of shopcraft 

employees as of 1967 was 49 years, 10 years greater 

than the median age of all male nonagricultural 

workers. Moreover, 49 percent of these employees 

had worked 20 years or more in the railroad industry, and 26 percent more had 10 to 19 years of 

service.26 “Once a railroad worker loses his job, his 

chances of finding another one are small, consequently railroad labor tends to be hostile to any 

technological change.” 27

gineers, locomotive firemen, road conductors, road trainmen, and yardmen.*’ Nonoperating employees “are those not”

directly involved in the movement of trains, such as shopcrafts, maintenance-of-way, and signal forces, clerical and

communication employees.” Thirty-Second Annual Report

of the National M ediation Board, F or the Fiscal Year

Ended June 30, 1966 (U.S. Mediation Board, 1967), p. 10.

23 Report to the President by Emergency Board No, 110,

(U.S. National Mediation Board, July 30, 1955), p. 12.

24 Report to the President by Emergency Board No, 138,

(U.S. National Mediation Board, Sept. 15, 1961), p. 6.

25 Report to the President by Emergency Board No, 139,

(U.S. National Mediation Board, Dec. 11, 1961), p. 13.

26 Railroad Shopcraft Fact-Finding Study (U.S. Department of Labor, 1968), pp. 20-21.

27 Ann F. Friedlander, The Dilem m a o f Freight Transport

Regulation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969),

p. 97.

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Collective bargaining unit and Jurisdictional

disputes

Table 1 indicates another prominent problem confronting the industry, “fractionalized” unionism. 

Railway carriers must negotiate with a large number 

of unions, some of which represent more than one 

class or craft of employees. Besides the 10 marine 

unions and the various small or local independent organizations, railroad companies may negotiate with

20 national unions or more, the vast majority affiliated with the A FL-CIO . This situation stems from 

the historic development of the industry’s collective 

bargaining experience, as well as judicial and administrative interpretations of what constitutes the collective bargaining unit.

Regardless of the geographic extent of a carrier’s 

operations, the collective bargaining unit under the 

RLA is the “craft or class,” which is undefined by 

the act. Throughout its history, the NMB has enTable 1. Unions representing railway employees as of June 30, 19701

Initials Names

Number of members

Total Estimated number in railroad 

industry

OPERATING UNIONS

BLE Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (Ind.) ____________________________ 32,900 32,900

UTU United Transportation Union2 _________________________________ _____ 3 242,600 3 242,600

FCRE Federated Council of Railway Employees (Ind.)4 _________________ ________ 375 375

NONOPERATING UNIONS

ARSA American Railway and Supervisors Association ------------------------------------------- 6,203 2,000

ADTA American Train Dispatchers Association -------------------------------------------------- 3,193 3,193

AMS Association of Mechanical Supervisors (Ind.) ______________ ___ __________ (®) (8)

BB(F) International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and

Helpers ________________________________________ ____ _ 130,770 3,000

BMWE Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees ___________________________ 103,994 72,200

BRASC Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and

Station Employees6 ___________ ________________________________ 252,737 144,336

BRC Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America and Canada ______________________ 7 88,800 46,200

BRS Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen ___________________________________ 11,980 11,980

(B)SCP Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters ___________________________________ 1,616 1,616

HREU Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union_____________ 434,136 3,250

1AM (and AW) International Association of Machinist and Aerospace Workers __________ _____ 820,126 17,621

IBEW International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers___________________________ 864,652 11,600

IBF0 International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers __________________________ 46,000 15,000

IBT International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of

America (Ind.) __ ______ ____ _________________________________ 1,759,502 (8)

MDFA Mechanical Department Foremen's Association (Ind.) ___ ____________________ (8) (8)

RYA Railroad Yardmasters of America8 _________ ____ ____________ ______ 5,171 5,171

SMW(IA) Sheet Metal Workers' International Association ___________________________ 88,384 5,400

USA United Steelworkers of America ___________________ _______ ________ 1,059,325 3,500

UTSE United Transport Service Employees ____________ ______________________ 2,000 (®) WRSA Western Railway Supervisors Association (Ind.) ___________________________ (8) C5)

NONOPERATING MARINE UNIONS

GLLO Great Lakes Licensed Officers Organization (Ind.) _________________________ 61 <•)

ILA international Longshoremen's Association _______________________________ 7 41,000 (*)

IU0E international Union of Operating Engineers _______________ ___ __________ 366,343 (8)

IUP Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific ......................... __............................ .......... • 3,697 (8) MMP International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots ___________ _________ 10,980]

NMEB National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association .................................................... 10,317 > 1,900

SIU Seafarers International Union of North America ________________ __________ 64,389 J

TWU Transport Workers Union of America .............. .................... ............................... 7 149,789 14,000

District 50 International Union of District 50, Allied and Technical Workers of the U.S. and

Canada (Ind.) _____________________ _______ ____ ______________ 210,000 250

NMU National Maritime Union of America .............. ....................................................... 41,000 500

iaThe figures for total union membership are 1970 levels and those 

for the railroad industry are current levels.

2 A union created on Jan. 1, 1969, by the merger of the Trainmen 

(BRT), the Firemen and Engineers (BLFE), the Switchmen (SUNA), and the 

Conductors (0RCB).

3 Includes approximately 2,000 busmen organized by the union.

4 Merged with the UTU in 1970.

5 Not available.

•The Clerks (BRASC) were involved in mergers twice in 1969: with the 

2,500 member Railway Patrolmen's International Union on Jan. 1, 1969;

and the 45,000 member Transportation-Communication Employees Union 

(formerly the Order of Railway Telegraphers) on Feb. 20, 1969.

7 Estimate.

•The Railroad Yardmasters of North America (Ind.) merged into the 

Railroad Yardmasters of America on July 1, 1969.

•An affiliate of SIU.

NOTE: The unions are affiliated with the AFL-C10 except where they 

are noted as independent (Ind.).

SOURCE: National Mediation Board; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Individual unions.

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deavored to honor past practices of railroad workers 

in organizing for representation purposes and of the 

carriers in making collective bargaining agreements 

with such representatives.28 Coupled with the majority rule (the majority of eligible employees must participate and cast valid ballots) “fractionalized” representation— a large number of specialized unions 

— became inevitable and led to competitiveness between railroad unions for membership and for job 

rights.29

With the exception of the Teamsters (IBT), railroad unions have adhered rigidly to their traditional 

jurisdictional claims to jobs on a craft basis, even 

though technological changes have blurred lines of 

demarcation between the original crafts. As early as 

1950, the NMB noted that “the close cohesion between the powerful (operating) brotherhoods . . . 

has been affected by differences arising between 

them as to representation, mileage limitations, promotional rights, and similar differences which are in 

the realm of jurisdictional disputes.” 30 Nor have the 

nonoperating crafts been free of jurisdictional disputes over work assignments.31

A recent and well publicized instance of union rivalry which demonstrates the dimension and intensity of the problem was one facet of the dispute re28 Adm inistration of the Railway Labor A ct by the National Mediation Board 1934-1970 (U.S. National Mediation

Board, 1971), p. 73.

29Shils, op. cit., pp. 81-84.

30 Sixteenth Annual Report o f the National Mediation

Board, F or the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1950 (U.S. National Mediation Board, 1951), p. 7.

31 Twentieth Annual Report o f the National Mediation

Board, F or the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1954 (U.S. National Mediation Board, 1955), p. 23.

suiting in the appointment of Emergency Board No. 

178. After protracted bargaining and a nationwide 

trucking stoppage in April and May 1970, the Teamsters negotiated a wage boost of $1.85, or 45 percent, over a 39-m onth period. Meanwhile in the railroad industry, the Clerks (BRASC), who represent 

workers in various transportation industries, were 

pressing wage and rule demands on the Nation’s carriers represented by the National Railway Labor 

Conference (NRLC).

Large wage increases won by other unions, particularly the Teamsters (who compete vigorously with 

the Clerks for membership in both the airline and 

railroad industries), created high wage expectations 

among the Clerks’ members and difficult negotiating 

goals for the Clerks’ union leaders. After negotiations and mediation were unsuccessful in reaching an 

accord and arbitration was refused, an emergency 

board was appointed to consider the dispute. On November 9, 1970, the Board released a report in 

which it suggested a 32.5 percent wage adjustment. 

Assailing the wage recommendation, the Clerks’ 

president claimed that his union could not “live with 

that (wage increase) in the transportation industry 

when the Government okays a higher increase for 

the Teamsters.” 32 The union rejected the Board’s report, and conducted a nationwide strike on December 10, 1970, which was terminated by ad hoc legislation. Under the terms of the eventual settlement, 

which was reached in the following February, the 

clerks received a 44.0 percent wage adjustment over 

42 months.

32 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 10, 1970, p. 3.

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Chapter II. Legal Framework of the Railway

Labor Act

Procedural aspects of the act

The Railway Labor A c t33 requires the parties to 

follow a step-by-step procedure, from the initial notice of intention to change the terms of an agreement 

to the last step, which leaves the union free to strike 

or the employer free to lock out his workers. (See 

chart 1.) The procedure is set in motion when a 

“Section 6” notice— a declaration of intention to 

change the collective bargaining agreement— is 

served. A “status quo” period prohibits changes in 

the terms and conditions of employment until the 

parties reach agreement, or all the required procedures of the act have been exhausted, or a period of 

10 days has passed since the termination of discussions without either party’s request for or an offer 

of the National Mediation Board (NMB’s) assistance. The parties are expected to negotiate until an 

agreement is reached or an impasse develops. If, 

however, the parties cannot reach agreement in such 

direct negotiations, one or both of the parties may 

request the mediatory assistance of the Board; or, 

should the facts warrant it, the NMB may offer its 

assistance.

When mediation is unsuccessful, the NMB as one 

of its last formal obligations, may request the parties 

to submit their dispute to binding arbitration. If either party refuses arbitration, the Board is required 

to formally notify both parties of its failure to reconcile their differences. Again, a “status quo” period is 

instituted, and neither party can alter the terms of 

the collective bargaining agreement for 30 days from 

the date of the NMB’s notice unless, in the interim, 

arbitration is agreed on, or an agreement is reached 

by the parties. If, however, these measures fail, and 

emergency board may be established under Section 

10 of the act. Action under this section is taken if, in 

the opinion of the Board, an actual or imminent

33 Congress of the United States. In U.S. 44 Stats., 557

ch. 347, 69th Cong. (1926), as amended Congress of the

United States. In U.S. 48 Stats. 1185, ch. 691 73d Cong.

(1934).

strike arising out of an unresolved dispute “threatens 

to substantially interrupt interstate commerce.” The 

Board so notifies the President, who, as a last resort 

under the act, may establish an emergency board to 

examine the nature of the issues and to make recommendations concerning the dispute.

History of railroad legislation

Like some other provisions of the act, inclusion of 

the emergency boards proceeded from 38 years of 

experience gleaned in previous railroad legislation.

1888: First endeavor made by Congress to

eliminate or minimize serious railroad disputes;

instituted the use of voluntary arbitration and

temporary investigating panels created by the

President to investigate and report the underlying

causes of disputes.

1898: Erdman Act passed; for the first time the

Federal Government utilized the procedure of voluntary mediation, which was conducted jointly

under the auspices of the Commissioner of Labor

and the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce

Commission; “status quo” period adopted during

course of arbitration; investigation feature of 1888

act abandoned.

1913: Previous procedures adopted by Newlands

Act; more formal provisions for voluntary arbitration instituted; primary reliance on mediation to

solve disputes; permanent board of mediation and

conciliation created.

1 9 1 7 :M Federal Director General assumed control of railroads on December 28, 1917; instituted

national handling of wage proposals and signed

national agreements with unions; more standardization of work rules and working conditions

achieved; bipartisan adjustment boards developed.

1920: Transportation Act of 1920 passed; media34 In 1916, the Adamson Act was passed in an attempt

to compose (settle) a dispute concerning the basic 8-hour

day by direct Congressional intervention. The author

assumes this extralegal measure must be the precedent for

ad hoc legislation passed since 1963.

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Chart 1

R a ilw a y c o l l e c ti v e b a r g a in in g p r o c e d u r e s a n d " s t a t u s q u o " p e r i o d s

u n d e r th e R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t .

PROCEDURES

rvlO D A O i t i r\iv i

''STATUS QUO" 

(IN ABSENCE OF 

GOVERNMENT CARRIER(S) AND UNION(S) AGREEMENT)

UlorUo IT 1 ON

FROM

NOTICE

UNLESS 10 

DAYS ELAPSE 

FOLLOWING 

TERMINATION 

OF

CONFERENCES 

WITHOUT 

REQUEST FOR 

OR PROFFER 

OF

MEDIATION

TO

30 DAYS 

FOLLOWING 

NMB

NOTICE TO 

PARTIES THAT 

MEDIATION 

HAS

FAILED AND 

ARBITRATION 

WAS REFUSED

FROM 

CREATION 

OF BOARD

TO

30 DAYS 

FOLLOWING 

EMERGENCY 

BOARD 

REPORT

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
tio n d isc a r d e d ; p r im a ry r e lia n c e p la c e d o n c o lle c ­

tiv e b a r g a in in g ; v o lu n ta r y a r b itra tio n a d o p te d as

se c o n d a r y lin e o f d e fe n s e ; trip a rtite tr ib u n a l ( N a ­

tio n a l R a ilr o a d L a b o r B o a r d ) c r e a te d b y T itle II

o f a c t to “in v e s tig a te ” a n d “d e c id e ” d isp u te s o f

a ll ty p e s; B o a r d m a n d a te d to issu e r e c o m m e n d a ­

tio n s w h ic h w e r e n o t s p e c ific a lly e n fo r c e a b le c o n ­

c e r n in g s e ttle m e n t o f th e d isp u te ; r e lia n c e w a s

p la c e d o n p u b lic o p in io n to fo r c e r e c a lc itr a n t

p a rty t o a c c e p t r e c o m m e n d a tio n s.

Within a relatively short period of time, it became 

evident that the Transportation Act of 1920 had become ineffective, that the Railroad Labor Board had

become practically powerless, and that the parties 

had become dissatisfied with the provisions and implementation of the act. After holding conferences, 

the Nation’s railroads and labor organizations jointly 

drafted and sponsored a bill which eventually was 

accepted by Congress and approved by President 

Coolidge; this was the first time in labor history that 

the interested parties wrote a labor act. With the 

passage of this law, mediation was reinstituted as the 

principal means of settling railroad disputes and was 

to be supplemented by voluntary arbitration and 

emergency factfinding boards.

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Chapter III. Railroad Mediation Cases85

Role of th e N ational M ediation B oard

Under the provisions of the act, two primary duties, relating to two types of disputes, are delegated 

to the NMB: (1) the mediation of disputes which 

involve proposals to change wages, rules, or working 

conditions (major disputes); and (2) the determination and certification of the representative of any 

craft or class of employees after secret-ballot elections (representation disputes). This chapter briefly 

describes the railroads’ experience with major disputes, some of which have required the appointment 

of emergency boards.

Contrary to widely held beliefs, mediation often 

has been used effectively by the NMB to peacefully 

conclude settlements in the railroad industry. Over 

the two decades following 1950, the board disposed 

of 3,984 railroad mediation cases, 1,900 since 

I960.35 6 (See appendix table A -2.) Whether the 

slightly smaller number of mediation cases occurring 

in the 1960’s, as against the 1950’s, indicated that 

collective bargaining was more effective or that 

fewer proposals for changes in the terms and conditions of employment were processed in the former 

period was not ascertainable.

Ranging from a high of 306 in 1969 to a low of 

133 in 1963, the distribution of railroad mediation 

cases successfully mediated, withdrawn by the 

parties, or dismissed by the Board differed significantly among adjacent years; however, large numbers of cases tended to cluster, especially in the years

1951-53, 1955-58, and 1968-69. In the early 

1950’s, the standard railway unions, with the exception of operating organizations whose proposals dealt 

with the manning of diesel locomotives and the establishment of the 40-hour workweek, were con35 A ll data, except fo r w ork stoppage figures, in this and

in the fo llo w in g sections are based o n the fiscal year (ending June 30).

36 B ecause o f a lim itation in data, the analysis proceeds

on the basis o f m ediation cases disposed o f (settled b y on e

m eans or another) rather than m ediation cases docketed in

any particular fiscal year.

cerned mainly with nonwage issues. Prominent 

among these issues were grievances, time claims, 

jurisdictional disputes, union shop, and other rules 

dealing with operational matters. Excluding the large 

number of mediation cases dealing with rates of pay 

in 1956, the NMB was concerned primarily in the 

second half of the decade with jurisdictional disputes, time claims, and rules demands, particularly 

those dealing with health and welfare, vacations, holidays, and cost-of-living provisions. However, toward 

the end of the decade (1958) a significant change 

took place. Actual or anticipated introduction of laborsaving devices and changes in operational methods generated pressures which resulted in the processing of “Section 6” notices relating to job security 

provisions.

Throughout the 1960’s, anticipated or actual displacements of railroad workers or reductions in their 

earning capacity because of (1) accelerations in 

planned or actual consolidation of carriers or facilities and (2) introductions of laborsaving equipment 

or new methods of work performance affecting manpower utilization resulted in numerous proposals 

dealing with job security, employment stability, severance pay and related matters. Because of the rising 

cost-of-living during fiscal year 1969, disputes dealing with wages and other economic issues became 

progressively more prevalent.

O perating an d non o p eratin g g ro u p s

Of the mediation cases disposed of between 1950 

and 1969 that could be classified by major occupational group, 2,312 (61 percent) involved operating 

employees and 1,503 (39 percent) nonoperating 

employees. (See appendix table A -3 .)37 Operating 

employees accounted for an inordinately large and 

growing share of mediation cases over the years, 

especially in light of their numbers in relation to total

37 T he category o f com bined railroad w orkers w as elim ­

inated from the analysis because classification o f those

m ediation cases by m ajor group w as im possib le.

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
railroad workers. Over the 20-year period, these employees constituted slightly less than 25 percent of 

the total railroad labor force.38

Table 2. Mediation cases disposed of, by occupational 

group, selected periods, 1950-69

Year

Total Operating

groups

Nonoperating

groups

Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

1950-69 3,815 100.0 2,312 60.6 1,503 39.4

1950-54 _____ 944 100.0 471 49.9 473 50.1

1955-59 _____ 1,059 100.0 663 62.6 396 37.4

1960-64 _____ 788 100.0 468 59.4 320 40.6

1965-69 _____ 1,024 100.0 710 69.3 314 30.7

SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

Within the operating group, the division of mediation cases involving the three separate classifications 

of train, engine, and yard employees was not available, but a distribution of nonoperating employees 

by major occupations was made. With the addition 

of the clerical and related class to the operating 

crafts, these groups participated in approximately 

70 percent of all railroad mediation cases, as follows:

Train, engine and

yard service,

clerical and related

Number Percent

1 9 5 0 -6 9 2 ,7 1 2 71.1

1 9 5 0 -5 4 589 6 2 .4

1 9 5 5 -5 9 7 6 9 72 .6

1 9 6 0 -6 4 566 71.8

1 9 6 5 -6 9 788 7 7 .0

SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

Issu es

Union demands for changes in an existing agreement are seldom confined to a single issue. Most frequently, they include economic as well as noneconomic proposals. Nevertheless, when an impasse has 

been reached, generally one broad issue can be identified as the impediment to agreement. Although full 

agreement may not have been reached on all of the 

provisions which were considered in negotiations, in 

the data discussed here and in appendix A -2, mediation cases were classified by the issue considered by 

the parties and the mediators as primarily responsible for the impasse.

Because of the unavailability of data for the pre1955 period, the analysis was confined to subsequent 

years. Of the 2,999 mediation cases disposed of between 1955 and 1969, 2,114 were concerned with 

work rules, 671 with rates of pay, 30 with the nego38 B ased on class I carriers’ em p loym en t figures.

tiation of first contracts, and 184 with miscellaneous 

issues. (See appendix table A -2.) Work rules were 

the principal subject of mediation cases docketed by 

the Board over the 15-year period (70.5 percent) 

and also in each of the three subperiods, 1955-59, 

1960—64, and 1965—69. In fact, this issue accounted 

for a growing share of total cases between the subperiods. Combined with wages (the second most 

prominent issue), work rules and rates of pay were 

involved in 92.9 percent of all railroad mediation 

cases. New agreements and miscellaneous issues accounted for a small and declining share (7.1 percent) of total cases, probably because the negotiation of first collective bargaining agreements was 

nearly at an end in the railroad industry by 1950 and 

because such miscellaneous issues as grievances and 

time claims were being processed through other adjustment machinery.

D isposition of m ediation c a s e s 39

Of the various methods of disposing of these 

2,999 cases, mediation agreements constituted the 

most prevalent method of settlement, far exceeding 

other categories. Between 1955 and 1969, 1,672 of 

these agreements, accounting for 55.8 percent of all 

railroad mediation cases, were consummated. Thus, 

after direct negotiations had failed, the NMB’s efforts were effective in assisting the parties to reach 

agreement.

As table 3 indicates, the consummation of mediation agreements varied between the 5—year periods; a 

decline occurred between the first and the second 

subperiods, because of an increase in the absolute 

and relative number of dismissals and withdrawals, 

and an upswing took place in the third period. 

Although more cases were disposed of by mediation 

agreements in the first and third subperiods compared with the second, in relative terms fewer and 

fewer accords were reached by mediation in each 

successive subperiod.

Table 3. Number of mediation agreements and percent 

of total cases disposed of, selected periods, 1955-69

Years Number As a percent of total mediation cases 

disposed of

1955-69 _______ 1,672 55.8

1955-59 ___________ 690 62.8

1960-64 ___________ 445 54.7 1965-69 ___________ 537 49.4

SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

" D a ta on disposition o f railroad m ediation w as also u n ­

available b efore 1955. (See appendix tab le A -2 .)

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Two other categories of disposition, withdrawals 

and dismissals,40 were significant. Over the 15-year 

span, they accounted for 923 dispositions (552 and 

371, respectively). The number of withdrawals and 

the number of dismissals varied considerably between the three 5-year periods, declining between 

the first and second subperiod and increasing between the second and third. In relative terms, the 

distribution of dismissals plus withdrawals increased 

significantly between the three subperiods: 23.7 percent, 28.5 percent, and 39.7 percent, respectively.

Arbitration, another method for disposing of mediation cases, was seldom used by the parties. During 

the 15-year period under consideration, only 32 

agreements to arbitrate were reached, an average of 

slightly over two annually. Since 1955, the parties’ interest in this procedure has apparently declined in 

both absolute and relative terms. Perhaps this decline reflected both labor and management’s refusal 

to allow third parties to determine the terms and 

conditions of employment, especially complicated 

work rules. The following tabulation shows how mediation cases disposed of by arbitration agreements 

declined between 1955 and 1969.

40 A w ithdraw al refers to the action o f the party w h ich

initially requested the m ediatory services o f the B oard w h en

the party retracts its application. A dism issal refers to the

action o f the Board w hen it dism isses the request fo r its

services according to the conditions required under the

act (R L A ).

Years Number Percent

1 9 5 5 -6 9 _______ 3 2 1.1

1 9 5 5 -5 9 _______________ 17 1.5

1 9 6 0 -6 4 _______________ 9 1.1

1 9 6 5 -6 9 _______________ 6 0.6

SO U R C E : N a tio n a l M ed iation B oard data.

The remaining category of settlement, refusalsto-arbitrate, constituted a significant measure of the 

Board’s success and its failure in achieving the objectives of the RLA and the parties’ acceptance of the 

spirit and intent of the act. Over the 15-year span, 

one or both parties refused to accept arbitration as a 

final and binding method to resolve the issues in dispute on 372 occasions: 105 times by carriers; 229, 

by unions; and 38, by both.

Excluding dismissals and withdrawals, 2,076 cases 

were resolved by mediation (in 80.5 percent of the 

cases), arbitration (1.5 percent), and refusals-to-arbitrate (17.9 percent). With the consummation of 

the first two methods of settlement, the objective of 

peaceful industrial relations, as envisioned by the 

act, was achieved. On 372 occasions however, the 

Board was unsuccessful in persuading the parties to 

rely on the lower machinery of the act to resolve labor-management controversies. Because of the 372 

refusals, 47 emergency panels (involving 68 mediation cases) were created in the 15-year period.

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Chapter IV. Appointment of Railroad Emergency Boards

Intent of th e act

Since the RLA does not fully define the role of 

emergency boards, an inquiry into the Congressional 

hearings conducted before the law’s enactment in 

1926 should help to clarify the function and goals of 

this procedure. One witness (counsel for the organized railroad employees), testifying at the Senate 

hearings, asserted that the “primary purpose and use 

for such a board is clearly a last effort to settle a 

controversy which threatens to injure public opinion 

. . . Such . . . (a) board . . . would . . . want to 

exercise first of all the mediatory power that would 

rest within its hands.” 41 Beyond the primary function, the boards were to conduct investigations concerning the issues in dispute, to prepare impartial 

recommendations, and to make their reports to the 

President.42 43

The technique purportedly represented a recognition of the public interest by the parties when they 

were confronted by an impasse in negotiation:

T h e m o s t v a lu a b le fe a tu r e o f th is la w is th e fa c t

th a t it r ep re se n ts th e a g r e e m e n t o f th e p a r ties,

th a t th e y w ill b e u n d e r th e m o r a l o b lig a tio n to

se e th a t th e ir a g r e e m e n t a c c o m p lis h e s its p u rp o se ,

a n d th a t i f ( it is ) e n a c te d in to la w , th e y w ill d e ­

sire to p r o v e th e la w a s u c c e s s .48

As such, this tool was clearly an aid to collective 

bargaining and was to perform the service of 

prompting continued dialogue and compromise.

It was obvious from the Congressional hearings 

that all parties concerned anticipated that this instrument of last resort would be infrequently utilized.44

41 Railway Labor A ct, H earings b efore the C om m ittee on

Interstate C om m erce, U .S . Senate, 69th C on g., 1st Sess., on

S. 23 0 6 , Pt. 1, p. 83. (later cited as 1926 Senate Hearings).

A lso see Railroad Labor Disputes, H earings b efore the C om ­

m ittee on Interstate and F oreign C om m erce, U .S . H ou se o f

R epresentatives, 69th C on g., 1st Sess., on H .R . 7 1 80, pp.

19 and 118. (later cited as 1926 House Hearings).

42 1926 Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 35. 1926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 18.

431926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 21.

441926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 109.

During the RLA ’s early years (1926-40), the act 

apparently proved successful. On only 17 occasions 

were Presidents forced to resort to the use of an 

emergency procedure. Furthermore, recommendations of the boards were accepted, and labor disputes 

in the industry were minimal.45

By 1941, however, collective bargaining relations 

in the industry began to deteriorate noticeably. 

Pending “minor disputes” (controversies arising over 

the meaning or application of an agreement) began 

to accumulate, especially in the First Division which 

handles minor disputes involving operating employees. Nor were the awards always accepted by management, who purportedly claimed the decisions 

were too “legalistic or pro-labor or both.” 46 Unions, 

on the other hand, purportedly did not bargain conscientiously on grievance issues and “forced” their 

arbitration in the belief that they would obtain 

greater concessions from adjustment boards.47 For 

major disputes, direct negotiations proved progressively less successful and the number of mediation 

cases coming before the NMB increased substantially.48 Between 1941 and 1949, the number of actual work stoppages (91), as well as imminent disputes, accelerated rapidly, and 55 railroad emergency 

panels were appointed. In addition, 51 boards— the 

vast majority dealing with railroads— were created 

during World War II years (1943-47) by the National Railway Labor Panel to supplement the “Section 10” procedures of the RLA.49

A distinct new pattern of emergency board imple45 A ccordin g to the D epartm en t o f L abor’s B ureau o f

L abor Statistics, a total o f 11 w ork stoppages occurred in

the period 1 9 3 4 -4 0 .

46 Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 68.

47 Ibid.

48 B etw een 1935 and 1939, an annual average o f approxim ately 110 railroad m ediation cases w ere disposed o f b y

the B oard, the average rising to 2 0 2 during the n ext 5 years

(1 9 4 0 -4 4 ).

49 Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the National Mediation Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1963 (U .S.

N ation al M ed iation B oard, 1964), p. 7.

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mentation was becoming perceptible. In 1941, the

major railroad unions “progressed” (advanced) national wage demands, and management met the unions proposals with counter demands for rule

changes. After an impasse was reached in conferences between the parties, the mediatory services of

the Board were utilized. When mediation proved unsuccessful, arbitration was proffered and rejected by

the unions. With an imminent work stoppage in

sight, the President appointed an emergency board

whose recommendations were rejected by the unions. In an unexpected and unprecedented stratagem, the President, hoping to keep the roads

operating, personally intervened in the dispute and

recommended that the Board be reconvened and

their report be modified.50

R a ilr o a d e m e r g e n c y b o a r d s , 1 9 5 0 - 6 9

Since 1950, the Board has disposed of 3,984 mediation cases, of which 94 required the final step

in the RLA emergency procedures. (See appendix

tables A -4 and A -5.) In total, 71 emergency panels

were appointed by the President to investigate and

report on these disputes. Occurring mostly in scattered clusters, the incidence of these boards over

time was irregular and depended on various factors,

such as the extent and complexity of proposals, economic trends, pattern settlements, moratoriums, the

“forcing” of emergency panels’ appointments

through strike threats, the partie’s understanding of

the tools provided by the act, and court decisions

(discussed in a later section).

F a c to r s a ff e c tin g th e a p p o in tm e n t o f b o a r d s

Moratoriums. At least overtly, the prime mover of

industrial relations stability is the negotiation of

wage and rule moratoriums in labor agreements. Unlike those in most other industries, railroad collective

bargaining agreements are open-ended, that is, they

contain no definite termination date and are subject

either to reopenings for negotiation or to termination

at any time, on proper notice by either party. Moratorium provisions, on the other hand, specify time

spans during which labor and management agree neither to initiate nor to process demands for modifica50 Apparently, there were only three direct Presidential

interventions in railroad emergency board disputes before

1950, twice by Franklin D. Roosevelt (in 1941 and in 1943)

and once by Truman (in 1946).

tions in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.

When moratorium provisions are included in railroad labor agreements, the “exposure rate”, or

chance of conflict, obviously is diminished extensively. For instance, the relative calm in the years

1958-1959 can be attributed, to a significant degree,

to 3-year wage and rule agreements which were

signed by the railroad employees and the major

trunk line rail carriers and other ancillary rail facilities and which contained moratoriums extending

until November 1, 1959.

National movements. Whether a dispute eventually

culminated in a work stoppage or not, the nature of

bargaining in the railroad industry—the preponderance of national wage and rule movements—inherently carried with it the potential of a national

emergency. In the processing of these movements,

the experience was generally satisfactory when the demands involved relatively uniform wage proposals or

few rule changes. When the parties initiated proposals dealing with numerous rule changes or with

substantial modifications in existing rules or the revision of the entire agreement, the resultant conflicts

proved extremely difficult to settle. An example was

the set of proposals brought before Emergency

Board No. 147, which involved job security and income protection. Since railroad labor contracts may

contain as many as 100 provisions or rules dealing

with the terms and conditions of employment, and

since the proposed modification of a single rule often

produces many issues between the parties, the likelihood of protracted disputes in rules cases was substantial.

When the national wage and rule disputes were

settled, the accords usually created patterns for the

railroad industry, extending to practically all the

major railroads. Other carriers or ancillary railroad

facilities which did not participate in these industrywide negotiations generally settled on identical or

similar terms. Therefore, if the initial national movement resulted in an agreement without resort to

economic “self-help” (a strike or lockout), the negotiations of hundreds of similar settlements on the various carriers in the industry became unnecessary.

For example, on March 2, 1959, the Conductors

(ORCB) served the Nation’s carriers with wage

proposals which were met by counter demands for

cancellation of cost-of-living provisions and for a

reduction in wages and allowances. After an impasse

was reached in direct negotiations, the dispute was

settled by mediation of June 4, 1960.

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On the other hand, some of the industrywide negotiations were not settled peacefully and resulted in

transportation crises which at times had adverse effects on the economy. For example, on November 2,

1959, the Nation’s major carriers, associated with

the National Railway Labor Conference, served

“Section 6” notices dealing with rule changes on all

five operating unions. After exhausting all provisions

of the act, including use of an emergency board, a

Presidential Commission was appointed to consider

the dispute. Even though the National Mediation

Board, an emergency board, the President of the

United States, the U.S. Department of Labor, and a

Presidential Commission (among others) intervened

in this dispute, three work stoppages ensued, including one terminated by Congressional ad hoc legislation (Public Law 88-108).

Economic trends. Economic trends have also played

a substantive role in determining the incidence of

emergency situations. In periods of rising national

employment, output, and prices, pressures which

were transmitted to the industry led the union

leadership (and rank-and-file) to seek substantial

wage increases and management to issue counter proposals dealing with rule changes. Secular trends in

the competitiveness of the railroad industry with

other modes of transportation, as well as the introduction of new technology, have induced management to adopt alterations in work methods, resulting

in union proposals for rule changes, employment stabilization, and in com e p rotection benefits.

Strike threats. Creation of emergency situations

through strike threats also has precipitated the

Board’s proffer of mediation under section 5 of the

act and, at times, its notification to the President of

an imminent work stoppage that threatened to substantially interrupt interstate commerce. The Board

has stated many times that its efforts were more successful in reconciling the parties’ divergent interests

when the dispute was not complicated by a strike

threat.

When strike threats were issued, the procedures of

the act often had not been exhausted, either in the

adjustment process for “minor” disputes or in collective bargaining, mediation, and arbitration for the

handling of major disputes. For instance, Emergency

Board No. 86 chastised the Trainmen, who were

confronted with the introduction of Budd Diesel

cars, for not inaugurating proceedings before an adjustment board or under “section 6” of the act. “In

preference to either of these alternatives, it invoked

mediation; and when it failed to achieve its objectives, it voted to strike. This procedure caused the

controversy to come before an Emergency Board

without the basic issues ever having been considered

in conference between the parties, and without

(the basic issues) having been presented to this

(Emergency) Board.” 51

Moreover, unions sometimes issued strike threats

in the belief that this action would result in greater

concessions than would otherwise be obtainable.

Thus, both parties tended to refrain from granting

concessions until after the emergency board’s report

had been released.

Role of the parties. Ultimately, the factor determining the incidence of emergency board appointments

is the parties themselves. The act is based on the

principles of freedom of contract and maximum

self-determination, rather than on government coercion. Under this system, the principals must decide

the merit of their proposals and negotiate “liveable”

collective bargaining agreements which will provide

adequately for the public interest. To aid the parties

in this pursuit, the act provides for various settlement procedures. These procedures, in themselves,

obviously cannot guarantee industrial relations stability and the absence of work stoppages. If labor

and management genuinely accept the spirit and intent of the act and attempt to understand its procedures and to utilize the tools available to them, the

appointment of an emergency board should be a rare

occasion.

“Proliferation” of emergency boards. In the past 20

years, the “Section 10” procedure has been depicted

as being overused and labor-management negotiations in emergency disputes as being dominated by

the Government, contrary to the original intent of

the act. Critics have frequently charged that the

NMB has pursued a policy of automatically notifying

the President of almost any dispute which was unsettled after it had intervened, the only criterion being

whether a work stoppage threatened interstate commerce. Since the railroad unions have routinely set

strike dates when impasses were reached in negotiations or in mediation conducted by the Board, the

occurrence of these “imminent work stoppages” has

been extremely high. Consequently, it has appeared

that the effectiveness of the emergency board proce51 Emergency Board Report No. 86, op. cit., p. 6.

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dures as an instrument of last resort has been reduced

and that the parties to the disputes have integrated

the procedure into their own collective bargaining

strategy.

If this lessening of effectiveness has in fact occurred, its cause may have been in the implementation of the act.52 The proponents of the act and Congress obviously had anticipated that few emergency

situations would occur and require the appointment

of an emergency board, which was intended to be an

instrument of last resort. But by the early 1950’s,

“the term ‘emergency’, in the sense of limitation to

rare cases, was becoming outmoded.” 53 As the NMB

observed in one of its annual reports:

The three (earlier) steps (negotiations, m ediation

and arbitration) should operate to hold to a m inimum the necessity for the use o f Emergency

Board procedure (s ic ). Such procedure was not

designed as a substitute for collective bargaining

or to provide a catchall for all disputes or a tem ­

porary refuge from the problems that should be

faced and resolved by sincere and conscientious

collective bargaining efforts, but was intended for

use only in extreme situations w here work stoppages on important transportation facilities w ould

result in substantial disruption to business and

would im pose extreme hardships on the traveling

public in peacetime or retard or im pede defense

efforts in tim e o f war or national em ergency.54

Ineffective collective bargaining. Collective bargaining on the local properties constitutes the first step in

reaching an agreement between the parties. In the

vast majority of cases, negotiations are concluded on

these properties without government intervention or

active assistance of the Board. Although there are no

accurate statistics on the number of peaceful settlements at this level, the NMB receives on the average, annually, well over 1,000 amendments or revisions of labor agreements. This statistic understates

the number of “Section 6” notices served by the

parties on each other, since many revisions or

amendments, especially those dealing exclusively

with local issues, are never filed with the Board.

82 The avowed efficacy and acceptance of the act, even by

late 1949, can be exemplified by this quote from one labor

leader: “The splendid record which the railroad industry has

developed generally in the peaceful settlement of differences

which have arisen is ample and eloquent testimony of the

high regard in which this Act is held.” (Trainmen News, Oct.

3, 1949, p. 3.)

58 Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 68.

54 Twenty ^Fourth Annual Report of the National Mediation Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1958 (U.S.

National Mediation Board, 1959), p. 7.

At times however, the machinery of collective

bargaining, for the reasons cited in the following sections, may break down, and this failure can result in

a national emergency. On union leader intimately involved in many railroad disputes has characterized

the cause of emergencies in the industry in these

terms: “Those who charge that the RLA has broken

down either fail to understand it (the act) or refuse

to do so. The act has succeeded. It is collective bargaining that has failed.” 55

According to the members of Board No. 169, perfunctory bargaining occurred in most disputes that

culminated in the use of the act’s emergency machinery:

It becam e apparent that n o real bargaining has

actually taken place between the parties (prior to)

their appearance before the Board. W e believe

this is generally the case in proceedings before

Em ergency Boards . . . The parties begin to negotiate only after an Em ergency Board has been

appointed, and often only after a report has been

submitted to the President. W e believe that continuation o f this practice w ill defeat other attempts to im prove labor relations in the railroad

industry.56

Observing a similar tendency, the members of Emergency Board No. 154 noted, “there has been an unfortunate tendency in this industry to postpone real

collective bargaining until the final hour.” 57

One manifestation of this inclination was the actual number of days the parties faced each other

across the bargaining table in negotiations.58 The

principals involved in Emergency Board No. 147

(1958) failed to reach an accord in their only conference conducted before invoking the mediatory

services of the NMB. The parties who participated in

the deliberations before Emergency Board No. 145

conferred only four times before requesting government intervention. Similarly, an impasse in direct negotiations preceding Board No. 118 was reached almost immediately; and, after the NMB’s proffer of

arbitration, the parties negotiated only once. Between July and October 1957, the participants involved in Emergency Board No. 133 (Pennsylvania

Railroad and the Transport Workers) conferred for

35 Machinists Monthly Journal, November 1950, p. 329.

36 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 169

(U.S. National Mediation Board, March 10, 1967), p. 4.

57 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 154

(U.S. National Mediation Board, May 13, 1963), p. 11.

58 This measure is arbitrary and does not reflect “conferences” conducted over the telephone, by letters, and by

other “informal” means of communications.

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only 2 days. In many of these emergency situations,

the unions claimed that the carriers, assured of government protection against actual or imminent work

stoppages, did not engage in “genuine” bargaining.

On the other hand, management asserted that the

unions, in the expectation of precipitating an emergency dispute, did not conduct “good-faith” negotiations, but awaited the appointment of a board and its

report, of which the favorable recommendations

would be accepted and the others would be

rejected.59 *

National cases. In connection with national cases,

the NMB, as early as 1950, publicly disclosed its

concern with the parties’ perfunctory bargaining:

The Board is further disturbed by the apparent

reluctance o f both the carriers and the organizations in national cases to conduct through collective bargaining; each side apparently feeling that

the responsibility for the disposition o f all such

cases should be attached to som e other source. If

the Railway Labor A ct is to survive, there must

be an ever-present consciousness o f and the desire

o f the parties to make it work in the manner

w hich they (the parties) so strongly advocated

when it was placed on the Federal Statute books.®0

At that time there was a growing tendency for fewer

and fewer national movements to be settled in mediation, and, in the early 1950’s, emergency

boards became increasingly ineffective in the settlement of such disputes.61 For example, on March 1,

1951, several unions representing nonoperating employees signed their first wage settlement, in 14

years, not disposed of by arbitration or an emergency board.62 In their next four general wage movements, three resulted in the appointment of an emergency board.63

This same problem also was evident in the national movements of ancillary rail facilities. Except

for a negotiated agreement in 1960, all of the Railway Express Agency (REA) and the Teamsters’

(IBT) national bargaining movements, which were

59 The parties, themselves, have requested the appointment

of boards, e.g., the unions for Emergency Board Nos. 81,

95, 173, and others; the carriers for Emergency Board Nos.

129, 154, 157, 172, and others.

00 NMB, Sixteenth Annual Report, op. cit., p. 7.

61 Eighteenth Annual Report of the National Mediation

Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1952 (U.S. National Mediation Board, 1953), p. 24.

02 Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 72, No. 4, Apr. 1951, p.

451.

03 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 159

(U.S. National Mediation Board, Apr. 3, 1964), p. 26.

initiated in 1941, resulted in the creation of emergency boards, 12 in number, the last one appointed

in September 1962.64

Grievance boards. Besides ineffective and perfunctory collective bargaining, another activity which violated the spirit and intent of the act and which

vitiated the effectiveness of its implementation was

evident in the early 1950’s.65 In seven instances, the

parties did not comply fully with the adjustment machinery that the RLA provided for the settlement of

disputes dealing with the interpretation and application of agreements, i.e., grievances or time claims.66

Instead they actively impaired the effectiveness of

the act by “forcing” the use of mediation and emergency boards for the processing of these controversies, contrary to the intent of the framers of the act:

W e com e here with the im plication by our com ing

that both parties are com m itted to this (the act)

as a m eans o f preventing interruptions o f transportation. A nd that every step in it must be pursued before there is an interruption o f transportation.67

In the early 1950’s, the NMB usually pursued a

policy of refusing to docket mediation cases which

were properly referable to adjustment boards. When

confronted with a strike threat or an imminent work

stoppage, the Board, however, proffered its mediatory services, as authorized under section 5(b), in an

attempt to prevent interruptions of railroad operations. In some instances (e.g., Emergency Board No.

86), the parties did not negotiate on the local properties prior to bringing the dispute before an emergency board. Several of the grievances processed by

emergency panels were pending before adjustment

boards or were previously decided in principle by a

prior emergency or adjustment board, e.g., Emergency Board No. 79.

Moreover, the parties, at times, threatened to resort to “self-help” (economic force) rather than to

the normal channels of the RLA’s procedures. One

emergency board (No. 91) characterized this practice as one pursued “in the hope that it (an emergency board) will make favorable recommendations

concerning contentions about grievances, with no

84 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 153

(U.S. National Mediation Board, Nov. 10, 1962), p. 4.

65 Starting in 1945, operating unions displayed a growing

inclination to set strike dates on grievance dockets which

were properly referable to an adjustment board, particularly

the First Division’s.

66 Emergency Board Nos> 76, 78, 79, 80, 86, 91, and 104.

67 1926 Senate hearings, op. cit., p. 16.

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binding effect if the reverse recommendation should

be made.” 68 On some occasions, the unions claimed

that the railroads systematically ignored the stages of

negotiations and mediation, and thus, “made the last

step the first by hurdling the first two steps . . . into

an emergency which need not have existed,” 69 e.g.,

Emergency Board No. 79.

At other times, the unions agreed that the grievances were within the jurisdiction of an adjustment

board, but claimed that the circumvention of normal

channels was necessary because of processing delays

in these types of disputes and because of the carriers’

refusals to apply precedents, e.g., Emergency Board

No. 78. Considerable merit seemed to exist on the

matter of delay, as evidenced by this statement of

Emergency Board No. 76:

This Board is not unmindful o f the fact that for

som e considerable tim e there has been long and

unusual delay in the progressing o f cases through

the First D ivision (adjustment boards). A number

o f other Em ergency Boards have taken note o f

this unfortunate situation and have m ade recom ­

mendations for the elimination o f these delays. W e

believe that substantial progress has recently been

made in that direction . . . (W )e should how ­

ever like to point out that if it is permissible

under the Railway Labor A ct for em ployees to

circum vent the functioning o f the Adjustment

Board m erely by creating a situation that calls for

the appointment o f an Em ergency Board the act

has lost its efficacy for m aintaining harmonious

and orderly relations in the railroad industry insofar as operational disputes are concerned.70

NMB records also substantiated the union claims.

The number of pending minor cases dealing with the

interpretation and application of agreements increased substantially between 1947 and 1952. A vast

majority of these docketed and pending cases (77

percent in 1953) were accounted for by the adjustment boards in the First Division.

" Report to the President by Emergency Board No, 91

(U.S. National Mediation Board, Sept. 13, 1950), p. 7.

"Labor, March 4, 1950, p. 1.

70 Report to the President by Emergency Board No, 76

(U.S. National Mediation Board, Aug. 2, 1949), pp. 2-4.

To relieve the First Division’s burdensome workload, leaders of the five operating organizations and

the three carrier conference committees consummated an agreement creating two supplemental adjustment boards on May 19, 1949. Because of delays

in obtaining the necessary funds, the boards did not

function effectively until January 1950. During thenext 4 fiscal years, the number of minor cases disposed of by the First Division, fluctuating substantially, increased, as shown below:

Cases disposed of

1949 _____________________________________ 731

1950 --------------------------------------------------------- 1,438

1951 -----------------------------------------------------------1,110

1952 --------------------------------------------------------- 1,313

1953 --------------------------------------------------------- 2,792

On December 12, 1953, the union leaders representing the operating employees advised the carrier conference committees that they desired to terminate

these adjustment boards, the official cessation coming on March 22, 1954.

A landmark decision which effectively eliminated

the “necessity” of appointing emergency boards to

consider grievance cases was the Brotherhood of

Railroad Trainmen vs. the Chicago River and Indiana Railroad Co.71 After conducting negotiations

dealing with 21 grievances on the local properties,

the trainmen set a strike date, and the NMB proffered mediation. Following the exhaustion of mediation and the rejection of arbitration, the carrier filed

a grievance with an adjustment board. After the

union again set a strike date, the carrier transferred

the case to the courts. When the case finally was

appealed to the Supreme Court, it ruled that once a

grievance dispute was brought before an adjustment

board the courts could issue an injunction to halt a

work stoppage and that the provisions requiring the

submission of minor disputes to adjustment boards

“were to be considered as compulsory arbitration in

this limited field.” 72

71 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen vs. Chicago River

and Indiana Railroad Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).

72 Ibid., p. 39.

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Chapter V. The Role of Government

Another contributory factor explaining the “proliferation” in the number of emergency boards was 

that these panels were not always instruments of last 

resort. At various times, one of the principals 

claimed that the other did not bargain in “good 

faith” and awaited the appointment of an emergency 

board. The unions asserted that the carriers acted on 

the assurance that the government would intervene 

to settle an imminent or actual national emergency 

dispute, and the carriers argued that the organizations perfunctorily progressed the controversies 

through the emergency procedures until the “final” 

step was reached in anticipation of reaping “rewards” beyond those recommended by the boards by 

utilizing political influence to obtain more favorable 

terms from Congress or the White House. Under 

these conditions, labor and management were both 

inclined to adopt relatively inflexible, doctrinaire 

bargaining positions and refused to grant concessions until the boards issued their reports.

Faced with impasses in negotiations and pending 

work stoppages, the Federal Government often actively intervened under the stress of pressures and 

the necessity of protecting the public interests, despite the fact that direct government intervention, 

exclusive of the (National) Mediation Boad’s role, 

was not contemplated by the framers of the law. The 

counsel for the Firemen and Engineers, testifying before the Emergency Board No. 97, asserted that:

Another fault in recent years stems from the

tendency o f the E xecutive Departments to subordinate or disregard the functions o f the N a ­

tional M ediation Board, and to take direct charge

o f and to make recom m endations for the settlement o f disputes. Then, it appears, after negotiations have failed, the (em ergency) boards have

been appointed by the executive’s office for a

specific purpose to perhaps report on a prejudged

dispute rather than to study the facts impartially

and objectively.73

Individuals familiar with the industry have criti73 Report of Emergency Board Report N o. 97, op. cit., p.

64.

cized the Federal Government, particularly the Executive Branch of placing political expediency before 

the intent and spirit of the act by offering the “good 

offices” of the Labor Department or the White 

House to resolve disputes. Presidents at times have 

asked for legislation to provide compulsory settlement of imminent or actual disputes, because they 

felt that direct negotiations had failed. But, it has 

been argued, direct negotiations may have failed because Presidents at times publicly announced that 

work stoppages would not be tolerated, thus mitigating the parties’ incentive to resolve the disputes on 

their own. Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that carriers have petitioned the Federal 

Government for arbitration and other forms of intervention and that unions have applied economic pressures.

Ad h o c legislation

In four disputes, all since 1963, Congress intervened in railroad national emergency disputes and 

settled them, at least temporarily, by means of ad 

hoc legislation.74 The first case came about when five 

operating unions were served “Section 6” notices, 

which primarily dealt with rule changes, especially 

manning issues, by the Nation’s major carriers represented by the Eastern, Western, and Southwestern 

Carriers Conference Committees. After national 

conferences were broken off on May 17, 1962, the 

unions applied for the mediatory services of the 

NMB. On June 26, 1962, the Board proffered arbitration which was declined by the unions. With the 

approach of a strike deadline, the President created 

an emergency board on April 3, 1963, and received 

the board’s report on May 13, 1963. The parties, 

thereupon, returned to the bargaining table to reach 

an agreement, but were unsuccessful in their efforts.

74 On May 18, 1971, Congress passed emergency legislation (Public Law 92-17) ordering a halt to a fifth dispute,

a 2-day nationwide railroad strike conducted by the Signalmen (BRS) against carriers represented by the National

Railway Labor Conference.

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To provide for the settlement of this labor dispute, 

Congress, on August 28, 1963, enacted Public Law 

88-108 requiring compulsory arbitration to resolve 

two issues. Under the terms of the law, Arbitration 

Board No. 282 was created with representatives of 

all the interested parties, including the public, to investigate and to issue a final and binding award on 

the use of firemen (helpers) and crew consist of 

train, road, and yard crews. The award was to remain in effect until January 25, 1966. The dispute 

was revived by demands for rule changes served by 

the Firemen and Engineers (BLFE) on November 

15, 1965, and by the counter proposals issued by 

the Nation’s carriers on January 31, 1966.75 Under 

the terms of the union’s “Section 6” notice, it desired 

to restore a majority of the 18,000 fireman positions 

eliminated by the provisions of Arbitration Board 

No. 282. After negotiations and mediation proved 

unsuccessful in resolving the dispute and after arbitration was rejected, a strike was conducted by the 

union on July 17, 1970, and the President was 

compelled to appoint an emergency board (No. 

177) to resolve the dispute.

Because of an imminent work stoppage after the 

rejection of Emergency Board No. 169’s recommendations, congressional intervention was required for 

another dispute, one which involved proposals for 

wage increases, modification of wage differentials, 

and improvements in fringe benefits for 137,000 

workers represented by six shopcraft unions (the 

Machinists, Boilermakers and Blacksmiths, Sheet 

Metal Workers, Electricians, Firemen and Oilers, 

and Carmen). Faced with a strike deadline of April 

13, 1967, Congress on April 11, 1967 approved, and 

the President on the following day signed into law 

Public Law 90-10, which extended the period of 

statutory restraint provided in section 10 of the RLA 

until May 3, 1967. The President, on April 22, 

1967, appointed a three-man Special Mediation 

Panel, which issued a report that included a “paediation solution” to resolve the dispute.

The Panel’s report, however, did not produce a 

settlement; and when an impasse in further negotiations between the parties was reached, the President,

"’This statement is somewhat misleading since this issue

was alive; see Emergency Board Report Nos. 164 (p. 4)

and 172 (pp. 2-3).

For a brief and informative digest of the Firemen’s dispute, see Emergency Board Report No. 177, Appendix A,

pp. 11-15; and Joseph F. Fulton, The Railway Firemen

Manning Dispute: History and Issues, 1959-70, Library of

Congress Legislative Reference Service, July 31, 1970.

on April 28, 1967, again petitioned for a congressional solution. On May 2, 1967, Public Law 90-13, 

which provided for an additional 20 days restraint 

beyond that provided in section 10 of the act, was 

passed by Congress and signed by the President. 

Two days later, in a message to Congress, the President proposed special legislation to dispose of the 

controversy. Thereupon, the unions agreed to postpone a strike for a “reasonable length of time.”

On July 16 and 17, work stoppages were conducted against various carriers and were terminated 

on July 17 by Congress through passage of Public 

Law 90-54, which authorized a five-man Special 

Board to provide a final settlement of the shopcraft 

dispute. The Board’s Report and Determination was 

issued on August 15, 1967. In subsequent negotiations, the parties accepted the Board’s determination.

In November 1968, both parties simultaneously 

served “Section 6” notices. The unions’ demands 

dealt mainly with wages, and the carriers’ with work 

rules. Some of the issues involved in Emergency 

Board No. 169 were revitalized in this dispute and 

included such questions as whether the pattern of 

wage increases of other nonoperating employees 

should apply to shopcraft workers, whether to permit 

continued narrowing of differentials between journeymen (and mechanics and helpers) and less 

skilled workers, and whether to change some basic 

rules (subcontracting, advance notice of force reductions due to emergencies). After an impasse in negotiations was reached, the parties jointly applied for 

the NMB’s mediatory services on April 10, 1969. 

When mediation and arbitration failed to produce a 

settlement, the President created an emergency 

board (No. 176) on October 3, 1969. With the issuance of the Board’s report on November 2, 1969, all 

provisions of the act were exhausted without settling 

the dispute.

The unions, however, did not walk out; instead, 

bargaining was resumed with the assistance of the 

Department of Labor. On December 4, 1969, a 

tentative agreement was reached, but the accord was 

not ratified by the Sheet Metal Workers (SMWIA). 

Because this rejection precipitated an imminent national emergency, the President, on March 3, 1970, 

requested special legislation to deal with the threatened work stoppage. Public Law 91-203 was approved on March 4, 1970, and prohibited a strike or 

lockout for 37 days. When a final impasse was 

reached, Public Law 91-226 was passed by Con21

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gress, on April 9, 1970, as anticipated by the members of Emergency Board No. 176.76

In the fourth dispute, congressional intervention 

was set in motion by the serving of wage and rule 

proposals in 1969 by four unions—the Clerks, Maintenance of Way Employees, Hotel and Restaurant 

Employees, and United Transportation Union (the 

latter a union created by the merger of all operating 

employees, except those represented by BLE, on 

January 1, 1969)—on the members of the National 

Railway Labor Conference (NRLC). After negotiations were conducted on local and national levels, 

the parties jointly applied for the mediatory services 

of the NMB. When mediation failed to resolve the 

dispute and arbitration was rejected, the President 

appointed an emergency board (No. 178) on September 18, 1970, and received the Board’s report on 

November 9, 1970. After all the steps in the RLA 

procedure were exhausted, the NMB officially terminated its mediatory services on August 10, 1970.

During September 1970, negotiations were conducted under the auspices of the NMB and the Department of Labor. An impasse in bargaining quickly 

developed, and a selective work stoppage was called 

against three lines, the Baltimore and Ohio, Louisville and Nashville, and Southern Pacific railroads. 

On the issuance of an injunction restraining the unions from further withdrawing their members’ services, the strike was terminated.

Negotiations between the parties resumed once 

more. Although both wages and rules were in contention, the main obstacles to settlement for the nonoperating unions were economic issues and for the 

UTU, rule issues. On December 10, 1970, the organizations again conducted a nationwide work stoppage, the fifth since the end of World War II. On the 

same day, Congress passed legislation (Public Law 

91-541) that terminated the strike and provided for 

a wage increase of 13.5 percent, but no modifications in work rules.

P resid en tial railroad com m issions

Besides ad hoc legislation, direct government intervention was evidenced by establishment of three 

Presidential commissions to investigate and report on 

critical railroad disputes. The first commission was 

an outgrowth of the dispute that resulted in the appointment of Emergency Board No. 154 and con76 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 176

f^U.S. National Mediation Board, Nov. 2, 1969), p. 5.

gressional intervention in the form of ad hoc legislation. On October 17, 1960, the five operating unions 

and the Nation’s railroad carriers agreed to submit 

their work rules controversy to a Railroad Commission established by President Eisenhower on November 1, 1960. A 15-man Commission, including five 

representing the public interest, was appointed and 

reported on February 28, 1962. Because the parties 

were unable to resolve the dispute on the terms of 

the report, Public Law 88-108 was passed.

The two remaining commissions dealt with railroad marine disputes, both involving the New York 

Harbor Carriers Conference Committee. In the first, 

all the procedures of the RLA were exhausted by the 

carriers and the Pilots (MMP), the Marine Engineers (NMEB), and the Seamen (SIU), with the issuance of an emergency board’s report on December 

10, 1960.

After rejecting the board’s recommendations, the 

unions struck from January 1 to January 23, 1961. 

On the latter date, the parties settled all issues, except those relating to manning. A decision on this 

issue was deferred until a railroad commission could 

be created and its report released. By Executive 

Order 10929, the President established the Railroad 

Marine Commission on March 24, 1961. The Commission released its report on June 11, 1962; the unions rejected its recommendations.

In addition, the Railroad Lighter Captains Commission was created by Executive Order No. 10948 

on June 12, 1961, to decide a controversy between 

the Longshoremen (ILA) and the New York Harbor Carriers Conference Committee. It, too, 

proceded from an emergency dispute, one precipitated on September 31, 1959, by the serving of demands relating to the manning of lighters. The 

parties negotiated over a 5-month period, the last 

conference being held on September 29, 1960. On 

that day, the carriers invoked mediation. When mediation failed to resolve the controversy and arbitration was rejected, the President appointed a panel on 

January 21, 1961. Shortly after the board 111 £dv 

public its recommendations, the parties entered into 

an agreement on the issues in dispute, but held the 

issue of the manning of lighters in abeyance pending 

the report of a lighter captains’ commission pursuant 

to the recommendations of Emergency Board No. 

134. On June 12,1961, the Commission was created 

by Executive Order 10948. The Commission released its report, which was not accepted by the unions, on July 11, 1962.

22

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P residential seizu res

To maintain the operation of key industries, because of anticipated or actual work stoppages, Presidential seizures of production and distribution facilities have occurred at various times in the United 

States. Only four Presidents (Lincoln, Wilson, 

Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Truman) have utilized 

this form of government intervention. Of this total of 

71 seizures, 12 involved railroads, the first occurring 

at the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad in 1864, 

and the last at the Newburg and South Shore Railroad (a subsidiary of U.S. Steel) in 1951. During 

the period under study, President Truman seized the 

Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad on July 

8, 1950, when the Switchmen (SUNA) rejected 

Emergency Board No. 83’s recommendations and 

struck the above railroad and four other carriers; a 

temporary injunction was secured to insure continued 

operation of these carriers. Fifty days later, President 

Truman seized 194 major railroad carriers involved 

in Emergency Board No. 81, after the Trainmen 

(BRT) and the Conductors (ORC) announced that 

they would withdraw from the services of the railroads associated with the Eastern, Western, and 

Southeastern Carriers Conference Committees. On 

May 23, 1952, when these three organizations 

reached agreements with the Nation’s major carriers, 

the President relinquished control over the railroads.77

O ther form s of intervention

Presidents have also intervened in railroad emergency disputes by offering their “good offices” to 

help resolve the parties’ divergent interests. Although a compendium of such activity was not made, 

Presidential intervention was observed in more than 

12 emergency boards. For example, following the 

seizure on August 27, 1950, of most of the Nation’s 

carriers involved in the 40-hour week movement of 

early 1950, conferences between representatives of 

two operating unions (the Trainmen and Conductors), the carriers, the NMB, and the President were 

held in Washington. On November 2, 1951, the Engineers and Firemen (BLFE) joined the parties in

77 John Blackman, Presidential Seizures in Labor Disputes, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University (1969), pp.

3, 4, 257-8.

Because of these seizures, the carriers participating in

the deliberations of Emergency Board Nos. 95, 97 and 98

were under Federal control at the time of the boards*

appointments.

negotiations conducted at the White House. Seven 

weeks later a tentative agreement was signed at the 

White House by the parties, but subsequently the unions’ general committees rejected the accord. On 

January 18, 1951, conferences resumed at the White 

House, were later broken off, and continued again in 

April 1952. On May 25, 1952, the parties settled all 

issues in dispute.

M ajor interruptions

The “proliferation” of “Section 10” procedures 

(establishment of emergency boards) was also aggravated by the appointment of boards in situations 

which may not have resulted in major interruptions 

of interstate commerce. Such excessive use of emergency procedures was deplored by the NMB in its 

1953 Report:

It is the feeling o f the Board that this procedure

(em ergency boards) should be reserved for cases

that threaten major interruptions to interstate

com m erce, cind that disputes w hich are o f lesser

importance, or w hich m ay affect interstate com ­

merce to a lesser degree, should be disposed o f

through the other adjustment procedures in the

A ct.78

Under section 10, the precondition to establish an 

emergency board is the existence of a dispute which 

“threaten(s) substantially to interrupt interstate 

commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section 

of essential transportation service . . .” Despite the 

relatively clear intention of section 10 and the supporting NMB statement, the NMB has at times recommended the establishment of emergenpy panels in 

cases that were concerned solely with small and localized carriers or those that could not possibly 

threaten commerce to the extent required by law because their lines were sufficiently paralleled by other 

railroads.

Identical issu e s on s e p a ra te ca rrie rs

Another type of questionable use of the act’s 

“Section 10” procedure related to the appointment 

of emergency boards to investigate controversies involving identical issues on separate railroads. For example, on September 1, 1961, 11 cooperating railroad labor organizations representing nonoperating

78 Nineteenth Annual Report of the National M ediation

Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1953 (U.S. N ational Mediation Board, 1954), p. 23.

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employees issued “Section 6” notices, dealing primarily with wage demands, on the Nation’s major 

carriers, who quickly served identical counter proposals on the unions. After negotiations and mediation (which was requested by the unions on October 

10, 1961) proved unsuccessful, arbitration was proffered by the Board on February 2, 1962, and was 

declined by the unions. The NMB notified the President on February 27, 1962, that an imminent national emergency dispute existed, and he, in turn, 

created an emergency board on March 3, 1962, to 

consider the controversy.

Meanwhile, the Florida East Coast Railway 

(FEC) informed the organizations on February 9, 

1962, that it was no longer actively participating in 

the national movement. After the FEC refused to be 

a signatory to the national agreement, which was 

signed on June 5, 1962, the unions requested the 

mediatory services of the NMB (on July 20, 1962). 

An impasse in mediation, which was initiated on August 15, 1962, was quickly reached. On September 

25, 1962, the Board proffered arbitration, which was 

declined by both parties.

In November, FEC requested that die NMB notify the President of an imminent emergency dispute. 

The Board, in turn, formally notified the carrier:

. . . The issues in this dispute are the sam e as

w ere fully and adequately heard by Presidential

Em ergency Board N o. 145 . . . T he R ailway

Labor A ct never contem plated that . . . Boards

would be created to consider identical issues arising on separate railroads. T o proceed in that m anner would weaken or destroy d ie effectiveness o f

the A ct.”

On the same day the unions conducted a work 

stoppage, and FEC began to hire permanent replacements which enabled the carrier to restore the major 

portion of its freight operations by late summer of 

1963. The President, nevertheless, ordered an anquiry to determine the possible effects of the work 

stoppage on defense and space programs After conducting hearings, the Board of Inquiry claimed that 

“this labor dispute is currently and potentially detrimental to our Nation’s defense and space efforts.” 80 

When negotiations, mediation, and arbitration again 

proved unsuccessful, the NMB notified the President 

on November 4, 1963, that the dispute remained unadjusted and threatened to deprive a section of the 

country of essential transportation services. Five 

days later, the President appointed a board to investigate and report on the controversy.

'"'Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 157

(U.S. National Mediation Board, Dec. 23, 1963), n 3

“ Ibid., p. 5.

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C h a p t e r V I . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f E m e r g e n c y B o a r d s ,

1950-69

Participation

The incidence of emergency board participation 

by operating and nonoperating groups was quite distinct; both groups were the sole principals in 35 instances each and they were involved jointly in one 

case. (See table 4 and appendix table A -4 ). In the 

1950’s, the operating unions participated in 22 panels— 15 of these between 1950 and 1952— many 

dealing with either grievances or the introduction of 

and conversion to the 40-hour week. In this same 

decade, the nonoperating groups were involved in 14 

boards; five were appointed between September 

1955 and August 1957, the remaining nine scattered 

throughout this decade. On the other hand, nonoperating groups were involved in 22 boards in the 

1960’s, 18 of which were established between May 

1960 and August 1964. During the same decade, the 

operating crafts participated in 14 emergency disputes and were active in all the boards created between September 1964 and January 1969 which 

were concerned with crew size and job security.

Unlike the incidence of participation by major 

groups, the involvement of various national unions 

was quite irregular and depended on the crafts the

unions represented and the type(s) of bargaining 

they conducted (e.g., on their own or allied with others). Some unions, particularly those representing 

operating employees and shopcraft workers, participated frequently. The other nonoperating unions 

generally were involved more infrequently.

Size

Under the provisions of the act, an emergency 

board may be appointed if, in the opinion of die 

President, a dispute “threaten(s) to substantially interrupt interstate commerce.” By definition then, the 

establishment of these panels inherently depends on 

the size and routes of the carriers, the size and essentiality of the crafts involved in the dispute, and the 

effects of a work stoppage, the last being the decisive 

factor. One indication of size, and thus potential impact of a strike or lockout, is the number of principals involved in any dispute.

Only 30 emergency disputes involved single-units, 

that is, controversies between only one carrier and 

one union. (See table 4.) Of the 30 panels, 18 were 

convened to hear and decide cases involving operating employees and 12 for nonoperating workers.

Table 4. Railroad emergency boards, by size and major group, selected periods, 1950-69

Period All boards

Single-unit

boards

Total multiunit boardsMulti-union

boards 1

Multicarrier

boards1

“Pure” multiunit boards1*2

Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

Operating employeesNonoperating employeesOperating employeesNonoperating employees

1950-69 ____ 71 18 12 818 8 24 8 8 815 14 21 4 12

1950-54 _________ 24 9 4 7 4 5 3 4 4 2 3

1955-59 _________ 12 3 3 3 3 — 1 3 3 — 1

1960-64 _________ 23 4 5 3 11 1 6 3 9 1 4

1965-69 _________ 12 2 — 8 5 8 6 8 2 8 5 4 5 1 4

1 Double counting enters here, i.e., the number of multiunion boards

includes those panels which involved a single carrier and more than one

union and panels in which both more than one union and more than

one carrier participated; similarly for multicarrier boards. Obviously, then,

only six multiunit boards were characterized as having only more than one

union; and 19, as having only more than one carrier.

8 Both operating and nonoperating employees were involved in Emergency Board No. 170.

NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.

SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

s “Pure” multiunit boards refer to those involving both more than one

carrier and more than one union.

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Perhaps this differing rate of participation reflected 

the operating crafts’ commanding position when 

withdrawing their labor services.

Not surprisingly, the unions whose members’ skills 

were more essential to the continued operation of 

railways and auxiliary facilities were active parties 

in most of the single-unit panels. Employees represented by the Trainmen (BRT) were associated with 

nine of these emergency disputes; the Conductors’ 

(ORCB) members on five occasions; the Engineers’ 

(BLE), four times; and the Clerks’ (BRASC), 

twice. Similarly, railroads involved in the “Section 

10” procedures were more often than not carriers 

with extensive passenger operations (e.g., the Long 

Island Railroad’s participation in Emergency Board 

Nos.129 and 173), with routes that are not extensively paralleled by many other carriers (e.g., Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Railroad’s involvement in 

Emergency Board Nos. 126 and 165), or with unusual operations necessary, but somewhat adjunctive, 

to the operations of the Nation’s rail facilities (e.g., 

REA ’s participation in Emergency Board Nos. 93, 

105, 111, 117 and 153 and the Pullman Co.’s in 

Emergency Board Nos. 89, 96 and 107).

Another prominent finding was that over time 

fewer and fewer boards were appointed, in relative 

terms, to investigate and report single-unit emergency 

disputes. (See table 4.) During the 1950’s, 19 such 

panels were convened, 13 in the first half of the decade. Of these 19 boards, 12 were appointed to consider emergency disputes involving operating crafts. 

Presidents intervened 11 times to adjust emergency 

rail disputes in the 1960’s, only twice in the 1965-69 

period. Of the 11 panels, six were convened to decide cases in which operating employees participated.

On the other hand, Presidents intervened in multiunit disputes (i.e., those involving more than one 

union or more than one carrier) on 41 occasions, 22 

in which more than one union participated, 35 in 

which more than one carrier was involved, and 16 in 

which more than one union and more than one railway participated (“pure” multiunit panels), as 

shown in table 4.81 Interestingly nonoperating 

groups participated in 12 “pure” multiunit cases, primarily because some of the unions representing nonoperating employees “progressed” (conducted) 

wage and rule movements jointly. A division of panels by major groups revealed that operating crafts 

participated in 18 multiunit boards and nonoperating 

crafts in 24, one of which (Emergency Board No. 

170) involved both major groups.

Because of the predominance of industrywide 

movements, the nature of bargaining apparently explained the higher incidence of nonoperating employees’ unions in the multiunit boards. Throughout 

most of the two decades under study— until 1964— 

11 railroad organizations representing the vast majority of nonoperating employees jointly initiated and 

progressed uniform industrywide wage and rule 

movements.82 On the other hand, the five operating 

unions generally dealt with wage and rule movements in the same manner, but separately.

81 Double counting enters here, i.e., the number of multiunion boards includes those panels which involved a single

carrier and more than one union and panels in which both

more than one union and more than one carrier participated,

similarly for multicarrier boards. Obviously, then, only six

multiunit boards were characterized as only having mote

than one union; and 19, as only having more than one

carrier.

K The 11 included the shop craft, maintenance of way,

signal, clerical, and communications employees’ unions.

Table 5. National railroad emergency boards, by major issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69

Period

All emergency

boards

Total

national

National emergency boards

Major issue

Wages Rules

Wages, rules, and

working conditions Wages and rules

Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

Operating employees

Nonoperating employeesOperating employees

Nonoperating employees

Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

1950-69 ______________ 71 23 3 5 1 2 1 1 4 6

1950-54 ___________________ 24 5 — — — 1 — 1 2 1

1955-59 ______ ______ ______ 12 4 2 —• — — 1 — — 1

1960-64 ___________________ 23 6 — 3 1 1 — — — 1

1965-69 __________________ 12 8 1 2 — — — — 2 3

NOTE: Dashes denote zeros. SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

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Of the disputes between one or more unions and 

the vast majority of class I line haul and switching 

and terminal companies (associated with the Eastern, Western and Southeastern Carriers Conference 

Committees before 1963 and the National Railway 

Labor Conference since 1963), 23 were national in 

scope. (See table 5.) Of these 23 boards, 14 were 

convened to decide cases that involved nonoperating 

employees, often involving wages (five times) or 

wage and rule proposals (six times). Similarly, of the 

nine operating employees’ national emergency cases, 

seven dealt primarily with demands for changes in 

wages (three times) or wages and rules (four 

times), as shown in table 5.

During the 1960’s, 14 boards, eight since 1964, 

were appointed to consider unsettled mediation disputes that were national in scope; the remaining nine 

panels were created between 1950 and 1959. This 

and previously mentioned observations indicated that 

the “Section 10” procedure has been reserved principally in recent years for disputes that threatened 

major interruptions to interstate commerce and that 

controversies of lesser importance were relegated to 

other adjustment machinery provided by the act. Although the nature of the controversy and structure of 

bargaining were undoubtedly important factors, it 

appeared that the NMB became more selective in 

certifying an unadjusted dispute as a “national emergency.”

Issues

Major issues were almost evenly divided between 

rules (16 cases) and wages (18), both issues jointly 

(wages and rules) coming before emergency boards 

23 times. (See tabel 6.) Considering the prime issues in dispute, the operating crafts were more concerned with rules (10 cases) and wages and rules 

(11), while nonoperating employees’ cases were 

more inclined toward wages (12) and wages and 

rules (13). All eight boards dealing with grievances 

or time claims) were processed by operating employees’ associations.

Duration

Another important characteristic of the emergency 

board procedure was the disparity in duration, defined as the time span from the serving of a “Section 

6” notice to 30 days after the release of an emergency board’s report. (See appendix table A -5.) 

With an array ranging from 170 days (Emergency 

Board No. 105, which dealt with adjusting wages) to 

3,314 days (Emergency Board No. 165, which involved rule changes), the average duration of all 

emergency boards was 670 days. (See table 7.) An 

appreciable upward trend over time in the average 

duration of the four subperiods was observable.

This phenomenon was explained by the number of 

prolonged emergency board procedures, those whose 

duration exceeded 1,000 calendar days. Twelve in 

number, all the boards experiencing extended duration were confined to the 1960’s (nine of them between 1960 and 1964) and to the issues of rules (8 

times), wages and rules (3 times), and rules and 

working conditions (once). Of these 12 panels, the 

operating employees accounted for seven, all dealing 

with rules (four cases) and rules and wages (three 

cases); nonoperating employees were involved in the 

remaining boards, four of which concerned rules and 

one of which dealt with rules and wages.

Table 6. Railroad emergency boards, by detailed Issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69

1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 Total, 1950-69

Issue Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

All

crafts

Totals .............. 16 8 6 6 7 16 1 7 *6 136 *36 71

Grievances ..................... 8 __ _. — _ 8 _ 8

Rules ............................. 3 1 2 — 3 5 2 — 10 6 16

Wages ....... ................... 2 3 2 — 1 7 1 2 6 12 18

Wages and rules --------- 3 3 1 3 3 3 M »4 *11 *13 23

Wages, rules, and

working conditions ___

__ 1 1 3 _ _ _ 1 4 5

Rules and working

conditions ____ _____ — — — — — 1 — — — 1 1

1 Includes one wage and rule beard In which both major groups participated.

NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.

SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

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Table 7. Duration of railroad emergency boards, by major work group and spans,1 selected periods, 1950-69

Period

Emergency board spans in calendar days

Operating

crafts,

average

duration

Nonoperating

crafts,

average

duration

All crafts

Number of

days

Number of

days

Total duration Negotiation 1 Mediation Recognition Agency Negotiation II

Number of

days

Percent

Nwiber

Percent

Number

PercentNumber

PercentNumberPercentNumberPercent

1950-54 ___________________________ 441 418 429 100.0 228 53.1 75 17.5 37 8.6 89 20.7 158 (?)

1955-59 ______________________ _____ 460 384 422 100.0 212 50.2 89 21.1 41 9.7 81 19.2 55 (?)

1960-64 ___________________________ 951 822 861 100.0 351 40.8 254 29.5 148 17.2 106 12.2 116 (?)

1965-69 ______ ___________ _________ 1,113 518 874 100.0 291 33.3 275 31.5 229 26.2 84 9.6 60 (?)

Average— 1950-69:

All crafts________ ____ __________ O') (?) 670 100.0 278 41.5 184 27.5 115 17.2 93 13.9 99 (?)

Operating ________________________ (?) (?) 741 100.0 318 42.9 189 25.5 141 19.0 93 12.6 130 (?)

Nonoperating _____________________ 09 (?) 609 100.0 252 41.4 174 28.6 92 15.1 92 15.1 71 (?)

1 Average number of calendar days of the total procedure or any span; NOTE: Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal

each board is given equal weight regardless of size. totals.

2 Not included in duration figure for the total procedure. SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

2 Not applicable.

Since the overall averages mask the movements 

occurring within the various segments of the total 

procedure, the RLA-emergency procedure was divided into five segments or spans as follows: negotiation I span, the time period between the issuance of 

a “Section 6” notice and the request for or proffer of 

the mediatory assistance of the Board (NMB); mediation span, the period after the request for or proffer of mediation to the proffer of arbitration; recognition span, the time period following the proffer 

of arbitration to the creation of an emergency board; 

agency span, the period from the establishment of a 

emergency panel to 30 days after the rendering of 

its report; negotiation II span, the time period between the board’s report and agreement between the 

parties.83 (See tables 7 and 9.)

Counting calendar days, the negotiation I span in 

absolute terms has increased significantly over time, 

the mediation span has risen substantially, as has the 

recognition span, while the agency and negotiation II 

spans have fluctuated considerably. Comparing the 

particular spans to total duration in the four time periods, the negotiation I span has decreased significantly in relative terms; the mediation span has risen 

appreciably, while the recognition span has increased 

substantially, and the agency and negotiation spans 

have decreased substantially. (See table 7.)

What do the figures suggest? In absolute terms,

” Date of settlement can refer to the date of either tentative settlement, ratification, or award of arbitration.

the procedures generally became more time-consuming over the years, especially in the first 3 steps of 

the 5-step process— the duration of the last 2 steps 

decreasing in the second and fourth subperiods of 

time from the first and third, respectively. The increase in total duration suggests that the parties were 

integrating the emergency board procedure into their 

collective bargaining strategy and that government 

was taking a more direct and active role in these disputes. One contributory factor in the increased total 

duration— the growing length in the recognition period— may be a sign that the NMB was more closely 

scrutinizing “imminent work stoppages” rather than 

routinely notifying the President of “imminent work 

stoppages.”

For the two decades, duration of the various parts 

of the entire procedure was arranged in both absolute and relative terms in the same sequence as the 

chronological order of the steps in the procedure, 

i.e., negotiation I span was the longest, followed in 

descending order by mediation, recognition, and 

agency spans. One interesting comparison between 

periods was the difference between negotiation I 

(278 days) and negotiation II spans (99). This may 

have indicated that genuine collective bargaining in 

these emergency disputes occurred only after the 

boards released their reports. Although this comparison is not proof positive, the implication is clear, 

especially in light of the small number of days in 

which the parties actually conferred across the bargaining table.

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M ajor issues and groups. Another prominent characteristic of duration was its variation according to 

major issues. Cases involving rule issues were on the 

average much longer in duration than those dealing 

with rates of pay or wages and rules, 1,046 days 

compared with 480 days and 594 days, respectively. 

Although there were some exceptions, duration by 

major issue generally increased over time, as shown 

in table 8. Analyzing major issues by major group, 

rules cases and wage cases of nonoperating unions 

extended for longer periods on the average than 

those of operating unions. On the other hand, combined wage and rule boards were substantially more 

prolonged on the average for operating, workers than 

for nonoperating employees.

For the entire period 1950-69 and all subperiods, 

emergency boards appointed to consider operating 

unions’ disputes were considerably longer than those 

for nonoperating organizations, 741 days vs. 609 

days. (See table 9.) The 132-day difference probably reflected the large number of operating employees’ rule boards, and wage and rule boards, relative to the total number of “Section 10” procedures

in which these operating crafts participated.84 Likewise, the various steps in the emergency procedure 

for the operating unions were more prolonged than 

for the nonoperating associations; and the duration 

of these various spans in both groups* procedure was 

ordered in the same direction as the chronological 

sequence of the steps in the procedure.

National cases

An important question concerning duration was 

the effect of national cases upon the various measurements. A priori, the expectation was that nationwide disputes, because of the numerous and complex 

issues and the large number of participants, would 

probably have significantly inflated the average 

length of emergency boards. However, actual investigation generally revealed the opposite to be true, as 

shown in table 10.

Apparently, the national boards’ average duration

84 Eight grievance cases were excluded because some of

the steps in the emergency procedures were skipped.

Table 8. Number and average duration off railroad emergency boards (in calendar days), by major issue and group, 

selected periods, 1950-69

Period

Wages Rules Wages and rules

Wages, rules, and

wonting conditions

Number

Average

duration Number

Average

duration Number

Average

duration Number

Average

duration

1950-54 , ___________________________ 5 302 4 368 6 583 1 389

1955-59 ____________________________ 2 498 2 580 4 296 4 432

1960-64 ____________________________ 8 585 8 1,199 6 745 — —

1965-69 ____________________________ 3 484 2 2,258 7 645 — —

1950-69:

All crafts ----------------------------------- 18 480 16 1,046 23 594 5 423

Operating --------------------------------- 6 463 10 986 *11 698 1 425

N o n o p eratin g _____________________________ 12 488 6 1,148 113 492 4 423

1 Both major groups participated in Emergency Board No. 170. SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.

Table 9. Railroad emergency spans, (in calendar days), by major group, selected periods, 1950-69

Period

Average

total duration

Average duration of spans

Negotiations 1 Mediation Recognition Agency Negotiaiton II1

Operat­ Nonoper­ Operat­ Nonoper­ Operat­ Nonoper­ Operat­ Nonoper­ Operat­ Nonoper­ Operat­ Nonopering em­ ating em­ ing em­ ating em­ ing em­ ating em­ ing em­ ating em­ ing em­ ating em­ ing em­ ating employees ployees ployees ployees ployees ployees ployees ployees ployees ployees ployees ployees

1950-69 741 609 318 252 189 174 141 92 93 92 130 71

1950-54 ___ 441 418 195 261 97 54 63 10 86 92 180 126

1955-59 ___ 460 384 231 194 90 88 51 32 191 72 46 67

1960-65 ___ 951 822 533 271 222 269 69 182 *10 103 243 2 57

1965-69 ___ 1,113 518 316 249 344 169 379 18 *81 82 43 74

1 Not included in duration figure for total procedure.

2 Because this table excludes a few agency spans in this period, the

sums of individual spans do not equal the total.

2 Because this table excludes a few negotiation II spans in this period,

the sums of individual spans do not equal the total.

SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

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for the negotiation I and II spans did not seemingly 

reflect the inherent bargaining nature of industrywide 

cases. It was anticipated that in national cases the 

negotiation I span would be significantly longer than 

in nonnational cases, because bargaining would 

commence on local properties and be followed by 

the creation of national committees to negotiate industrywide contracts. In a similar vein, it was expected that the national boards’ average duration for 

the negotiation II span (compared with the nonnationals’) would be appreciably shorter, mirroring immediate and strong pressures to conclude settlements 

of unadjusted controversies that could possibly halt 

the operations of the Nation’s railroad system.

On the other hand, the anticipation of the direction and volume of some spans was substantiated. 

The longer agency span was probably a consequence 

of the large number of witnesses and voluminous 

statements and exhibits introduced into the record; 

the shorter recognition span apparently demonstrated that the unadjusted disputes emanating from 

national wage and rule movements were easier to determine and to certify as imminent national emergency disputes. From the information available, it 

was not possible to ascertain or to hypothesize on the 

significantly smaller mediation span.

R easo n s for th e long duration

The long average duration of the railroad boards 

was primarily the result of three factors.

Mediation spans. First, under die provisions of the 

act, no time limitations were placed on mediation. 

Defined as the time span between the request for or 

proffer of mediation and the proffer of arbitration,85 

the average duration of mediation activities was 184 

days, the longest period covering 1118 calendar 

days. For example, the Telegraphers (ORT), whose

^ This is somewhat of an arbitrary definition since hearings are often intermittently held, sometimes informal in 

nature (for example, over the telephone), and often extend 

beyond the formal period as defined in the act.

Table 10. National and nonnational emergency board

spans, selected periods, 1950-69

Size Total Negotia­ tion 1

Duration in days for

Media­ tion Recog­ nition Agency Negotia­ tion It

All cases .. 670 278 184 115 93 99

National ______ 595 263 153 80 101 99 Nonnational ____ 714 287 204 136 88 99

SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

dispute was heard by Emergency Board No. 148, requested the mediatory assistance of the NMB on 

June 2, 1958, to aid in adjusting a rules dispute with 

the New York Central Railroad; mediation began 

8 1 /2 months later. On January 25, 1962, arbitration was proffered by the Board. In the second part 

of that dispute, which involved the Pittsburg and 

Lake Erie Railroad, the organization petitioned the 

NMB on August 7, 1959; mediation sessions commenced on December 8, 1959; and the Board 

proffered arbitration on January 25, 1962.

A t various times, the parties, especially the unions, have castigated the Board for what they considered to be “unnecessary” and “arbitrary” delays in 

the mediation proceedings. On June 1, 1962, die 

Teamsters even resorted to filing a civil action complaint (No. 1747-62) for declaratory judgement and 

a mandatory injunction against the Board asserting 

that the “Plaintiffs (Teamsters) are adversely affected and aggrieved by the unnecessary delay on the 

part of the NMB and have been adversely affected 

by the Board’s arbitrary and capricious refusal to 

mediate the . . . dispute . . . By recessing cases 

A-6671 and A -6696 . . . (the Board) has failed to 

use its best efforts, by mediation, to being the parties 

to agreement, as required by the RLA .” W hat the 

union did not publicly acknowledge though was that 

“there (was) no question that in this dispute the 

parties made no more than nominal efforts to compose their differences.” 86 Nor did the unions acknowledge that only one collective bargaining dispute in the two decades preceding this controversy 

was settled without exhausting all the steps in the 

RLA-emergency procedures, a situation that raised 

“the fundamental question whether the parties . . . 

(were) negotiating their differences in accordance 

with traditional free collective bargaining principles 

or in the manner or spirit contemplated in the Railway Labor Act.” 87

Beside the Board’s problem of coordinating its 

available manpower resources with its needs, the 

parties to the disputes were also often unable to synchronize the accessibility of each of their bargaining 

representatives. This problem of manpower coordination was especially evident in national cases in 

which representatives of the three Carriers Conference Committees (or the National Railway Labor 

Conference) and representatives of the national (or 

international) unions had jointly to decide on hearing dates, when both labor and management might

88 Emergency Board Report No. 153, op. cit., p. 4.

81 Ibid.

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have conflicts because of bargaining commitments 

with other parties.

With all these impediments, actual mediation days 

were usually a small proportion of the total mediation span. Over the 20-year period ending 1969, the 

average mediation span was 184 days; yet only 23 

days, on the average, were devoted to mediatory activities. Significant differences were evident in the average number of actual mediation hearing days during the four subperiods; in chronological order they 

were 16, 30, 29, and 16 days. But more importantly, 

the relative time actually consumed by mediation 

hearings (the number of actual hearing days relative 

to the total mediation span) declined significantly 

over time: 23 percent, 34 percent, 11 percent, and 6 

percent, chronologically.

Agency span. Second, although section 10 of the 

act established a time limit for the emergency board 

procedure (30 days from the date of the board’s 

creation to the date of its report), with the consent 

of both parties the Board can notify the President 

that an extension is necessary which he, in turn, is 

authorized to grant. As measured by the time span 

between the establishment of the emergency board 

and the rendering of its report, the average duration 

of railroad emergency board hearings 88 was 63 days, 

the longest 1,154 days in Emergency Board No. 126, 

which was precipitated by the Engineers’ (BLE) 

serving requests for wage and rule changes on the 

Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Railroad. Of the 23 

prolonged board hearings (those requiring more 

than 60 days), nine were appointed to hear operating employees’ disputes and 14 to decide those of 

nonoperating workers. The majority of these panels 

were concerned with wages and rules (nine cases), 

rules (seven), and wages (five).

Under the provisions of the bill as originally 

drafted, emergency panels were to investigate and 

make their reports within 30 days, regardless of the 

nature of the dispute.89 Counsel for the railway unions, Donald R. Richberg, explained that the fixed 

time limit would compel the party that was more interested than the other in preserving the status quo, 

the party who was engaging in delaying action, to

'* The duration of emergency board hearings plus 30 days, 

by definition, is identical with the agency span.

Eight boards (No. 80, 85, 104, 115, 141, 150, 165 and 

171) were not included because formal emergency board 

reports were not issued.

* Enactors of the law, however, provided for more flexibility in the procedures, one more suitable to the nature of 

railroad disputes on a case-by-case basis.

confine its testimony and evidence to an “acceptable” level. One prominent carrier representative, 

echoing the desires of both parties, said that the 

“board is not going into a meticulous examination of 

the question; it is undoubtedly intended to reach its 

considerations on large questions (i.e., broad issues). Those matters do not require the summoning 

of witnesses and the taking of great volumes of 

testimony.” 90

Although early experience with the emergency 

board investigations and reports was favorable, most 

hearings and the writing of recommendations for the 

post-1949 panels were not completed in the 30 days 

stipulated in the original executive orders creating 

the boards. Excluding the eight emergency disputes 

for which no formal reports were issued, only 15 

post-1949 boards (10 of which were appointed between 1950-54) concluded their hearings and issued 

their recommendations without extensions of time.

Actually both “parties have long shown a preference for lengthy, rather formal hearings, of a quasijudicial nature, in which most witnesses read their 

testimony and in which mountains of exhibits containing data, some of current value and some of historic significance only are filed.” 91 Counting actual 

hearing days, Emergency Board No. 154 extended 

for 96 days during which 15,306 pages of testimony 

and 20,319 pages of exhibits were introduced. Almost as “prolific” was Emergency Board No. 81, 

which exhausted 49 hearing days, in which 8,385 

pages of testimony (49 volumes) and 143 exhibits 

were entered into the records. Besides boards being 

presented with numerous studies, charts, statements, 

and statistics, other factors contributed to the prolongation and thus extension of board hearings. 

Among these factors were the seriousness of the disputes and complexities of the issues, the utilization 

of the board’s services in a mediation capacity, the 

preoccupation of the board with other disputes, the 

request for continuances or delay in the initiation of 

hearings, and other discontinuations in hearings.92

In an attempt to ease the hearings’ problems, 

boards have at times instituted procedural rules. For 

example, Emergency Board Nos. 161-3 barred the

901926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 154.

91 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 160

(U.S. National Mediation Board, Aug. 7, 1964), p. 2. Also 

see Locomotive Firemen and Engineers Magazine, Aug. 

1955, p. 89. Conductor & Brakeman, Sept. 1955, p. 252.

92 Emergency Board Nos. 84, 97, 134, 141, 147, 150, 155, 

157, 160-63, and 173. See Emergency Board Nos. 129 (p. 

2), 161-3 (p. 3), 138 (p. 1) and 139 (p. 1).

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actual reading of testimony and exhibits by witnesses. Emergency Board No. 160 limited each party 

to seven days for presenting briefs and rebuttals 

(one day for oral arguments), stipulated that time 

expended in cross-examination was to be charged to 

the party cross-examining, encouraged the parties to 

“submit background or other noncontroversial evidence in exhibit form,” and required 6 hours of 

hearings daily.

One other problem, lack of cooperation in hearings, was of sufficient significance to merit comment. 

During the Congressional hearings in 1926, the framers of the act felt that “it was absolutely inconceivable that either party would hesitate to furnish the 

Board all the information within its power that 

would help the presentation of its point of view.” 98 

In the event that either party failed to fulfill its responsibilities at once public opinion (would) condemn that party and a public opinion (would) be 

created in the right direction by that very refusal.” 94 

Yet union officials involved in six emergency boards 

refused to present evidence or to formally participate 

in board hearings.95 One, in fact, “issued an anticipatory declaration critical of the Board’s forthcoming 

findings of fact and recommendations, before either 

have been conceived or published.” 96

The parties. Third, as previously mentioned, the 

parties often contributed to the problem of duration 

by bringing issues before the NMB on which they 

had spent little time bargaining. Two auxiliary 

points, the first relating to the degree of skill and 

time needed by neutrals to digest rule proposals and 

the second to the ratification of tentative agreements 

by general committees and the rank-and-file, merit 

further attention.

As the NMB has publicly stated, “Expert knowledge and experience is required for proper consideration of proposals to change rules relating to work 

performance, and the most satisfactory results are 

obtained if the parties directly concerned, who are 

familiar with the technical aspects of the operation 

and elements of the dispute, work out settlements 

which they can understand and translate into everyday practice for the efficient operation of the particular facility involved.” 97 Emergency boards, when 

presented with numerous technical and complicated

031926 Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 85.

941926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 154.

95 Emergency Board Nos. 83, 93, 97, 110, 129 and 174.

M Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 31.

97 NMB, Twenty-Fourth Annual Report, op. cit., p. 4.

rule proposals and testimony which more often than 

not appear to confuse the issues, have reached the 

same conclusion. “No one has ever entertained even 

a captious doubt but that ‘Railroad Rules’ and ‘Railroad Rules Changes’ constitute one of the most technical, involved, and highly complex subjects in the 

entire baffling welter of industrial relations problems 

which from time to time are thrown into the lap of 

Emergency Boards for solutions.” 98 Moreover, several boards have declined to decide on various technical rule proposals or counterdemands and have asserted that the issues may better be resolved by the 

parties directly.99

Union leaders involved in emergency boards have 

expressed doubts concerning the ability of the emergency board members to understand the complexities 

of pay, rules, and working conditions on the individual properties.100 “I believe much of the failure of 

emergency board procedures over the past 5 years 

(1960-65) can be attributed to the personnel of 

those boards and not to the procedures as such . . . 

Men of experience should be chosen not people who 

have sat on just one or two emergency boards in the 

past 5 years, but men of long experience and great 

understanding of railway problems. Above all, they 

should have the time to discharge fully their 

obligations.” 101 Some labor leaders also have castigated board members for “sidestepping” issues for 

which the boards recommended their removal because of the issues’ technical nature.102 Other union 

officials have based their rejections of boards’ reports 

on the grounds that board members lack sufficient 

knowledge of the industry.108

According to the NMB, the parties themselves appear to have contributed to the impairment of the 

act’s implementation by not granting their bargaining 

representatives sufficient authority to accept final 

contract terms a situation not unique to the railroad 

industry.104 For example, after exhausting all the 

provisions of the RLA, the Switchmen (SUNA) and

98 Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 31.

99 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 89

(U.S. National Mediation Board, Nov. 3, 1950), pp. 8-9.

100 L. W. Homing, Vice President of Personnel, New York 

Central Railroad, on Sept. 22, 1955.

101 Eli L. Oliver “Procedures Under the Railway Labor 

Act”, Discussion, Eighteenth Annual Meeting of National

Academy of Arbitrators, 1965, pp. 51-52.

103 Labor, Nov. 25, 1950, p. 3.

103 Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 64.

104 Thirty-Fourth Annual Report of the National Mediation Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1968 (U.S. 

National Mediation Board, 1969), pp. 23-24.

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the Western Carriers Conference Committee in September 1960 tentatively reached an accord disposing 

of all issues in dispute (on terms recommended by 

Emergency Board No. 131), subject to ratification 

by the union’s rank-and-file. Under the terms of the 

union’s by-laws, if the majority of the membership 

rejected the recommendations of an emergency 

board, the International President was required to 

set a strike date. The NMB claimed that these “restrictions . . . placed on the representatives of the 

employees . . . (were) inconsistent with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, defeat (ed) the purpose of the Act, and (m ade) its administration cumbersome and ineffective.” 105 Ultimately, the dispute 

was settled without a stoppage, but the terms were 

in excess of the board’s recommendations.

A rbitration

As noted earlier, the act gives the NMB the option 

to suggest to the parties that they submit their dispute to arbitration, the next-to-last step available to 

agree to settle major disputes. As with other features 

of the law, the parties are not compelled to accept 

the proffer of arbitration; however, the law places a 

moral obligation on the parties to consider this 

method of resolving disputes after previous steps in 

the act have failed.

Between 1955 and 1969 (the only period for 

which detailed information was available), 2,999 

railroad mediation cases were docketed and disposed 

of, 2,595 by means of mediation, by withdrawals, or 

by dismissals.106 Of the 404 remaining cases, the 

parties refused to arbitrate 372 disputes, and agreed 

to do so in 32. During the period under study, 

(1950-69), mediation cases which eventually required the appointment of emergency boards were 

closed when carriers rejected arbitration in one case 

(1 percent of the total), unions in 53 (78 percent), 

and both parties in 14 (21 percent). In no case did 

both parties simultaneously agree to submit the dispute to arbitration. As early as 1941, a formal censure of the parties’ tendency to decline proffers of 

arbitration was recorded by the NMB and was reiter105 Letter from E. C. Thompson, Executive—Secretary of 

the National Mediation Board to William Rogers, Attorney 

General, on Sept. 14, 1960.

106 A withdrawal refers to the action of the party which

initially requested the mediatory service of the Board when

the party retracts its application. A dismissal refers to the

action of the Board when it dismisses the request for its

service according to the conditions required under the

act (RLA).

ated almost every year since then in the Board’s A n ­

nual Report.

It was apparent from witnesses’ testimony during 

the 1926 House hearings on the proposed railroad 

legislation that if disputes were not resolved in mediation the parties would be persuaded to settle them 

by means of arbitration and if disputes were assigned 

to emergency panels the party who declined the 

Board’s proffer of arbitration would have “to make 

good before the emergency board.” 107 A t various 

times, the recalcitrant parties offered reasons for rejecting arbitration. For instance, unions involved in 

Emergency Board No. 81 deliberations claimed, “We 

do not believe that arbitration should be substituted 

for bonafide collective bargaining in a case such as 

this.” 108 A high union official of the Engineers 

(BLE) explained their rejection of arbitration, 

“Most of the 282 cases are based on fundamental 

rules which are not arbitrable under our contract, for 

to arbitrate would in effect change certain rules without carrying out the provisions of the RLA.” 109

E m ergency b o ard rep o rts

The Railway Labor Act does not compel the 

parties to reach an accord; rather it places maximum 

reliance on self -determination by labor and management. While recognition of the right to strike is an 

integral part of this public policy, the parties are required to adhere to a step-by-step process during 

which the nature of the dispute and the merits of the 

opposing claims would be made public. The assumption in the law was that this type of disclosure would 

generate public pressures that would contribute to 

just and equitable settlements.110

On eight occasions, the NMB or the emergency 

boards functioned in a mediatory capacity and 

effected settlements between the parties without issuing formal reports.111 In the vast majority of instances, however, recommendations for the resolution of the disputes were made by the boards. The 

framers of the act anticipated that both parties would 

be extremely reluctant to reject a report, unless it 

was “so inequitable as to be almost beyond the limits 

of human endurance.” 112 However, actual results

1071926 House Hearings, op. cit., pp. 102-3.

108Labor, Feb. 18, 1950, p. 1.

109 Trainmen N ews, Oct. 3, 1949, p. 3.

110 See 1926 House Hearings, op. cit., pp. 18-19. Also see 

1926 Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 14-15, 25.

111 Emergency Board Nos. 80, 85, 104, 115, 141, 150, 165, 

and 171.

112 Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 65.

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did not bear out these hopes. Of the 60 emergency 

board reports for which the parties’ responses were 

ascertainable, the vast majority were rejected by one 

or both parties.113 In fact, labor and management 

initially accepted the boards’ specific recommendations only on six occasions, four times in the 

1950’s . 114 Of the six, four affirmative responses were 

registered by operating groups involved twice in 

wage and rule cases (Emergency Board Nos. 107 

and 126) and once each in a wage case (Emergency 

Board No. 82) and in a rule case (Emergency Board 

No. 172). The only two nonoperating groups’ acceptances involved the REA, once in a wage dispute 

(Emergency Board No. 105) and once in a wage 

and rule controversy (Emergency Board No. 107).

Although the carriers generally accepted “adverse” as well as favorable reports, the unions consistently rejected “adverse” recommendations. National Mediation Board and other official records indicated that on 48 occasions railroad unions partially 

or totally repudiated the boards’ reports. Operating 

employees’ organizations accounted for 22 negative 

responses and nonoperating workers’ for 27.115 In 

four instances, all involving nonoperating crafts, railway carriers responded negatively. Of the four 

boards, three were convened between 1950 and 

1954 to consider cases national in scope. On two occasions, one involving the Firemen and Engineers 

(BLFE) in a wage case with the Nation’s railroads 

and the other involving the Telegraphers (ORT) in 

a rules’ case with Southern Pacific, both parties declined to accept boards recommendations.

Thus, the pressure of public opinion was not adequate to force the parties to accept the boards’ recommendations, nor was voluntary compliance 

common. As early as 1951, the NMB recognized 

the increasing predisposition of unions to reject 

emergency board recommendations. To explain this 

tendency, the NMB argued that the complicated 

and technical issues precipitating these disputes were 

given little publicity, and beyond that, they were 

somewhat incomprehensible to the public.118

Some extenuating circumstances relating to the 

boards’ directions and approaches may also have 

contributed to this high rejection rate. Some union

118The 111 for which responses were not ascertained 

boards included the 8 mentioned in footnote 111 plus 

Emergency Board Nos. 77, 86, 93.

114Emergency Board Nos. 82, 105, 107, 111, 126, and 172.

115 One case (Board No. 170) involved both major groups.

116 Seventeenth Annual Report of the National Mediation

Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1951 (U.S. National Mediation Board, 1952), p. 33.

leaders have adopted the position that this “final” 

step in the emergency process is just an administrative action to delay the application of economic 

power, that “the report is not final and binding” 

(and thus is not a “matter of acceptance or 

rejection”) 117

Under the original conception of the bill, a board’s 

direction and tone was to be mediatory, rather than 

legalistic:

. . . We are seeking to avoid what we regard as 

the fundamental error in the creation of the Railway 

Labor Board, and that was creating a public body 

which thinks its duty is to sit behind the table and 

hear the parties as witnesses in court and thereby 

continue the intensity of the controversy. We want 

this emergency board to take the power of a final 

board of mediation and try to bring an agreement. 

We do not want a dispute presented to the public in 

order that public opinion may castigate one party or 

the other, if we can get an agreement.118 Nor did 

the framers of the act anticipate that the boards 

would formally adjudicate disputes and issue intricate and detailed recommendations. It was expected 

that the panels would be lay boards and would not 

have the “capacity to decide a great dispute. If it is a 

problem of simple elements, they may be able to 

work it out, or else, if not simple, work out a method 

of solution for a complicated problem.” 119

Very early experience during the two decades 

under study was more favorable to the release of reports in which methods rather than detailed terms of 

settlement were suggested, especially in grievance 

cases. For instance, Emergency Board No. 79 concluded “that the issues here involved may be and 

should be resolved within the provisions of the Railway Labor Act.” 120 In its report to the President on 

July 6, 1950, Emergency Board No. 86 recommended that the issues in the dispute be processed 

through the normal channels of the act, either the 

grievance machinery or the issuance of a “Section 6” 

notice.

Overall though, boards primarily have devoted 

their energy and time to fact-finding, not mediation, 

and have attempted to adjudicate disputes by promulgating detailed recommendations, rather than

117 Letter from Mr. Val Simons, General Chairman of the 

ORCB, to Mr. L. W. Homing, Vice-President, Personnel, 

of the New York Central Railroad, on Sept. 22, 1955.

1181926 Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 135 Also see pp. 83- 

84.

1191926 House Hearings, op. cit., pp. 101-02.

120 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 79

(U.S. National Mediation Board, Feb. 28, 1950), p. 8.

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suggesting methods of settlement. For example, the 

members of Emergency Board No. 175 recommended a wage increase of 3 1 /2 percent effective 

July 1, 1968, 2 percent effective January 1, 1969, 3 

percent effective July 1, 1969, a differential of 20 

cents an hour for skilled employees, and the withdrawal of the employees’ cost-of-living proposals and 

all other demands not treated in the recommendations. In its report to the President filed on November 5, 1964, Emergency Board No. 164 suggested a 

9 cent an hour increase for firemen retroactive to 

January 15, 1964; an additional 9 cents effective 

January 1, 1965; $1.75 increase retroactive to June 

1, 1964 for engineers; a fourth week of vacation 

after 20 years; moratoriums on wages until January 

1, 1966; and the withdrawal of all other demands 

not treated in the recommendations.

Although the majority of boards have not hesitated to produce specific recommendations, some 

emergency boards, on the other hand, have recognized that direct party solutions are preferable to 

third party solutions and that suggesting methods of 

resolving disputes are preferable to issuing detailed 

terms of settlement.121 Notwithstanding, labor frequently has criticized boards for their purported legalistic approach and predisposition to recommend 

detailed terms of settlement:

The ineffectiveness of Emergency Board procedure does not stem from a stubborn determination 

on the part of labor leaders to consistently and 

arrogantly reject Board recommendations. In the 

past the leaders of labor have hopefully looked to 

Emergency Boards to provide them with a solution 

of their problems. That their hopes have not been 

fulfilled is not the fault of this side of the table. 

The fault we believe lies in large part with the 

detached attitude of Boards from the practicalities 

of the necessity to settle cases, from a determination to sit in the role of judge and law-giver to 

decide categorically whether a particular party is 

right or wrong, and in inability or unwillingness 

to seek a means of settlement of the dispute before them which would do justice to both sides 

and serve the public interest.122

In no case did the parties completely repudiate the 

emergency boards’ recommendations in negotiations 

or reach settlements entirely outside of those suggested. At various times, the boards’ recommendations 

served as a basis for eventual agreements without in121 Emergency Board Report No. 169, op. cit., p. 5 (Also 

see Emergency Board Report No. 130, p. 2). This board did 

however recommend specific wage terms. 

m Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit. p. 64.

terruptions of service. In the majority of cases, however, the boards’ reports served as a floor from 

which to bargain for more favorable terms, usually 

after strike threats or executive intervention.

At other times, the parties materially changed the 

recommendations in their final agreements, such as 

in the settlement between the Teamsters (IBT) and 

the REA, in which the parties substituted increased 

wages and health and welfare benefits, as well as effective dates of the various improvements, for the 

board’s recommendations.

Even when the boards were unsuccessful in completely reconciling the parties’ differences, they did 

narrow the scope of the dispute, so that the parties 

were able to effect a settlement in lesss time and with 

less interruption of railroad services. For instance, in 

hearings before Emergency Board No. 173, more 

than seven issues were withdrawn by the parties. 

Similarly, in hearings before Emergency Board No. 

Ill, certain proposals of Teamster Locals 459 and 

808 were withdrawn.

Methods of Settlement123

Over the 20-year period, few emergency board reports have served as a basis for quick settlement of 

railroad disputes. Fearing this very phenomenon, the 

counsel for the railway organizations warned:

They the employees) have felt that the machinery of this act for conferences, for adjustment, 

for mediation, for arbitration, should provide for 

the orderly and peaceful adjustment of all differences that might arise in the railroads. They 

know that as long as additional machinery is held 

out, as long as another avenue of escape is open, 

stubborn negotiators are likely to hold out.124

Even after the emergency board’s issuance of its 

report, the National Mediation Board generally has 

reentered the case, ready to assist the parties to 

reach a settlement by mediation or arbitration.

The principal method of settlement was ascertainable for 65 emergency board cases. Of these, 25 accords were reached by mediation agreements 

(M.A.) two by arbitration agreements (A.A.), and 

41 by the parties themselves (party agreements in

m It is assumed that a negotiated agreement was the 

principal method of settlement when there was no indication that either a mediation agreement or an arbitration 

agreement was consummated. In boards involving more than 

one carrier or union, the method of disposition was determined by the author’s knowledge of the prevalent means 

of settlement used by the parties.

1241926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 17.

35

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Table 11. Methods of settlement in railroad boards, by major issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69

Methods

1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69

Total,

1950-69

Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

Operating employeesNonoperating employees

Operating employees

Nonoperating employees

Operating employeesNonoperating employees

Operating employeesNonoperating employees

Arbitration agreements:

Rules ---------------------------- — — — — 1 — — — 1 —

Wages -------------------------- — — — — — — — 1 — 1

Mediation agreements:

Grievances ----- -------------- 1 — — — — — — — 1 —

Rules ------------------------- — — 1 — 1 3 1 — 3 3

Wages __________________ — — 2 — — 1 — 1 2 2

Wages and rules__________ 1 1 — 1 1 1 2 3 4 6

Wages, rules, and

working conditions ---------- — — 1 2 — — — — 1 2

Rules and working conditions _ -. — — — — — 1 — — — 1

Party agreements:

Grievances --------------------- 4 — — — — — — — 4 —

Rules -------------------------- 1 1 1 — 1 2 1 — 4 3

Wages __________________ 1 3^ — — 1 5 1 1 3 9

Wages and rules--------------- 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 8 7

Wages, rules, and

working conditions _______ — 1 — 2 — — — — — 3

NOTE: Dashes denote zeros. SOURCES: National Mediation Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and

Presidential emergency board reports.

direct negotiations) (P .A .)125 Operating workers organizations accounted for one of the arbitration 

agreements, which concerned rules. Of the 41 party 

agreements, 19 were signed by operating unions (12 

dealing with rules and wages and rules) and 22 by 

nonoperating organizations (16 dealing with wages 

and wages and rules). All the party agreements dealing with grievances were reached by operating crafts, 

but the vast majority (75 percent) of the 12 wage 

agreements were signed by nonoperating crafts and 

11 by operating employees, as shown in table 11. Although, as noted, most emergency board disputes 

were settled in direct negotiations, the parties increasingly turned to mediation and arbitration (in 

the 1960’s), as shown in table 12.

Disposition

Of the 71 emergency board cases, eight were disposed of by the parties, with or without the aid of 

the Board, either before board members were appointed or before a formal report was issued.126 Except for one (Emergency Board No. 141), these

m Disputes leading to three emergency boards were settled 

by more than one principal method, a P.A. and M.A. in 

the first and second instances (Nos. 118 and 174) and a 

P.A. and A.A. in the third (No. 169).

Emergency Board Nos. 80, 85, 104, 115, 141, 150, 165, 

and 171.

boards involved only operating employees, concerned 

mainly with noneconomic demands (grievances, 

three times; rules and wages and rules, both twice). 

Five of these emergency disputes127 were settled 

without a work stoppage, two with the mediatory assistance of the Board. Of the three remaining panels 

in which strikes occurred, all involved operating employees; Engineers (B LE) members twice, once in 

a 6-day stoppage before Emergency Board No. 115

127 Emergency Board Nos. 80, 104, 141, 165, and 171.

Table 12. Number and percentage of agreements resolved 

through arbitration, mediation, and direct negotiations, 

1950-69

Type of agreement 1950-

54

1955-

59

1960-

64

1965-

69

1950-

69

Number, total ---------- 19 13 22 14 68

Arbitration agreements______ — — 1 *1 2

Mediation agreements ______ 3 2 7 8 2 7 25

Party agreements ................... 16 2 6 13 M 6 41

Percent, total____ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Arbitration agreements _____ — — 4.5 7.1 2.9

Mediation agreements_______ 15.8 53.8 36.4 50.0 36.8

Party agreements _________ 84.2 46.2 59.1 42.9 60.3

10ne case in which both a party agreement and an arbitration agreement were the principal methods of settlement.

2 One case in which both a party agreement and a mediation agreement were the principal methods of settlement.

NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.

SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

36

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
was convened and once in a 1-day stoppage before 

Emergency Board No. 150 was appointed and 

Trainmen (BRT) once, in a 2-day strike over grievances heard by Emergency Board No. 85.

The remaining 63 emergency board disputes, 29 

of which involved operating employees, were settled 

after a formal emergency board report. Of these 63 

boards, appoximately one-third were concerned with 

wages and rules, one-fourth with wages, one-fifth 

with rules, and the remainder with miscellaneous issues. Following the boards’ reports, 16 of the above 

63 post-emergency board settlements were preceded 

by work stoppages. Also one stoppage began before 

a board was appointed and continued after the board 

released its report (No. 157). Twenty-one strikes 

were called by railroad employees participating in 

these 17 emergency boards (two each in Emergency 

Board Nos. 154 and 172 and three in Emergency 

Board No. 81). Eight additional work stoppages,128 

five conducted by nonoperating employees, occurred before the creation of an emergency board, a 

legal course of action once a 30-day status quo period has been observed following the NMB’s notice 

to the parties that mediation has failed and arbitration has been refused. Of the issues that were reported to be the cause of these 28 stoppages, wages 

and rules was the principal subject in dispute (10 

times), followed by rules (eight), wages (four), 

grievances (tw o), wages, rules, and working conditions (tw o), and rules and working conditions (tw o). 

(See table 13)

In total, 31 disruptions of railroad services, 18 

conducted by operating employees, were associated 

with 24 emergency boards. Combined, the 31 work 

stoppages entailed 7,054,095 man-days lost by

m Includes the one conducted by the parties participating 

in the hearings before Emergency Board No. 157.

950,231 railroad employees. This represented 83.8 

percent of all railroad man-days idle during 1950-69 

and 66.5 percent of all railroad workers involved in 

strikes during the same period. As table 14 indicates, 

nonoperating crafts accounted for a substantial share 

of these losses (approximately 69.7 percent of the 

workers involved and 67.2 percent of the man-days 

idle). This was true largely because of four strikes, 

including a 999 day stoppage conducted between 

January 1963 and December 1965 which involved 

2,023 workers and 1,371,900 man-days and another 

stoppage lasting 58 days in 1955 at the Louisville 

and Nashville Railroad which involved 23,870 

workers and 1,002,540 man-days.

For the entire period 1950-69, average duration 

of these 31 emergency board work stoppages was 57 

calendar days and the median was 19 calendar days. 

For the 31 stoppages, duration ranged from a high of 

999 days to a low of 1 day. Excluding the 999-day 

labor-management conflict, extending both before 

and after institution of the “Section 10” procedure, 

the mean duration was 26 calendar days, and the 

median was 14 calendar days. Again excluding the 

999-day stoppage, for those interruptions of work 

beginning before the appointment of a emergency 

panel, the average duration was 36 days, and the 

median was 19 days. In contrast, strikes occurring 

after the boards’ reports extended on the average for 

26 calendar days, with a median of 14 calendar days.

Only five emergency boards that were national in 

scope experienced work stoppages. In total, nine 

strikes were conducted (three each identified with 

Emergency Board Nos. 81 and 154 and one-each associated with Emergency Board Nos. 97, 106, and 

169) and involved 631,621 workers and 2,281,245

Table 13. Railroad emergency board work stoppages, by major issue and group, 195U-69

Issues

Total Occurred in disputes

for which no formal

report was issued

Occurred in disputes characterized by postemergency board settlements

Before boards' reports After boards’ reports

All

crafts

Operating

employees

Nonoperating

employees Operating

employees

Nonoperating

employees

Operating

employees

Nonoperating

employees

Operating

employees

Nonoperating

employees

Total _____ __________________ 31 18 13 3 — 3 *5 12 2 9

Grievances ____ _______ _______ _____ 3 3 _ 1 _ _ _ 2 —

Rules _____________________________ 9 8 1 1 _ 3 — 4 1

Rules and working conditions ....................... 2 — 2 — — — 1 — 1

Wages, rules, and working conditions _____ 2 — 2 — — — — — 2

Wages and rules ____________________ 11 7 4 1 — — 1 6 3

Wages--------------- ----------------------- 4 — 4 — — — *3 — 12

* Includes Emergency Board No. 157 that extended both before the

board was created and after it released its report.

NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.

SOURCES: National Mediation Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

37

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Table 14. Workers Involved and man-days idle, by major

group, 1950-69

Workers involved Man-days idle

Item Number

(in thousands) Percent

Number

(in thousands) Percent

Total, all

railroad

stoppages . _ 1,429.8 100.0 8,418.6 100.0

Total, all

emergency

board

disputes ___ 950.2 100.0 7,054.1 100.0

Operating employees . 288.2 30.3 2,310.9 32.8

Nonoperating

employees ______ 662.0 69.7 4,743.1 67.2

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

man-days of idleness.129 Of the nine stoppages, only 

one was nationwide, a 2-day interruption of work 

conducted by six shopcraft unions over wage demands. The average duration for all nine work stoppages was 20 calendar days, and the median was 6 

calendar days.

129 Does not include workers and man-days in “two” 

strikes as catalogued by the NMB; BLS, on the other hand, 

counted the “three” strikes associated with this board as one. 

Thus, no reliable figures were available for the “two” 

stoppages.

38

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
C h a p t e r V II. R a ilr o a d W o r k S to p p a g e s

Among the general purposes of the RLA was 

avoidance of interruptions to interstate commerce. 

Frequency and intensity of work stoppages is undoubtedly the most visible gauge to use in measuring 

the act’s effectiveness, although not necessarily the 

most reliable. Between 1950-1969, the railroads experienced 316 work stoppages that involved 

1,429,819 workers and 8,418,552 man-days of idleness. (See appendix tables A -5 and A -6 and table 

15.)

Almost all measures of strike activity were higher 

in the 1960’s than in the 1950’s, even without a 

substantially large difference in the number of strikes 

and man-days idle. Although average number of 

man-days per stoppage decreased slightly (1.9 percent) between the decades, the average number of 

workers per stoppage increased significantly, from 

3,157 in the 1950’s to 5,793 in the 1960’s. The rise 

in these measures of strike idleness occurred despite 

a 52.6 percent decline in railroad employment over 

the two decades.130 Estimated working-time lost, the 

most relevant and accurate guage of strike activity, 

increased significantly, from 0.15 percent in the 

1950’s to 0.26 percent in the 1960’s.

In 12 years there were 14 individual strikes each 

in which over 100,000 man-days were lost. With only 

three exceptions, each of these 12 years was associated with one or more major work stoppages (those 

involving 10,000 or more workers). In the 1960’s, 

there were 8 stoppages, each involving 100,000 mandays or more, which combined entailed 2.7 million 

man-days of idleness, and in the 1950’s there were

six stoppages of 100,000 or more man-days each, 

which combined resulted in 3.3 million man-days of 

idleness.

Size of stoppages

When coupled with duration, one commonly used 

variable— size— indicated the direct and immediate 

impact of work stoppages. Of the 316 total stoppages, one-quarter involved groups of less than 100 

employees, and three-fifths dealt with groups of less 

than 500 workers. (See appendix A -6 and table 

16.) A significant number of stoppages (69) dealt 

with fairly large groups of employees (1,000 and 

under 10,000), and only 17 strikes idled 10,000 or 

more workers each. In the 1960’s, the relative number of these major stoppages increased substantially. 

Approximately 600,000 nonoperating employees 

participated in five major strikes, and 230,000 operating workers were involved in seven such stoppages 

during this period. The number of stoppages involving 500-999 employees decreased significantly, from 

25 in the 1950’s to 19 in the 1960’s.

Another prominent characteristic of these work 

stoppages was the number of companies and unions 

participating in the disputes. Contrary to the implication of coordinated bargaining, single-unit work 

stoppages were most common, accounting for almost

130 The 1950-54 period did, however, experience a large 

number of stoppages and workers idle and the largest number of man-days lost in any subperiod.

Table 15. Number of railroad work stoppages, workers involved, and man-days idle, 1950-69

Years

Stoppages Workers involved Man-days idle

Number

Average

per period Number

Average

per

stoppage Number

Average

per stoppage

Estimated

working

time lost

1950-54 ___________________ 82 16.4 404,797 4,937 2,416,907 29,474 0.16

1955-59 ___________________ 70 14.0 75,049 1,072 1,673,519 23,907 .14

1960-64 ___________________ 64 12.8 189,908 2,967 2,405,628 37,907 .27

1965-69 ___________________ 100 20.0 760,065 7,601 1,922,498 19,225 .25

1950-69 _____________ ____ 316 15.8 1,429,819 4,525 8,418,552 26,641 .19

1950-59 ________________ 152 15.2 479,846 3,157 4,090,426 26,911 .15

1960-69 ___ _____ ____ 164 16.4 949,973 5,793 4,328,126 26,391 .26

SOURCE: Bureau o1 Labor Statistics.

39

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
80 percent of all strikes. In the 1960’s, this type of 

dispute constituted 83.5 percent of all stoppages. 

Only 66 strikes— 39 of them in the 1950’s— were 

multiunit in nature: 49 (15.5 percent) involving a 

single carrier and two or more unions; 11 (3.5 percent) in which one union and two or more carriers 

participated; and six involving more than one carrier 

and more than one union. Only one of these 66 multiunit stoppages was nationwide, a shopcraft dispute 

in 1967. Operating employees participated in these 

multiunit disputes on 36 occasions; nonoperating, 19 

times; both groups on 11 occasions.

Major strikes, stoppages involving 10,000 workers 

or more each, were even more infrequent then multiunit disputes. (See table 17.) Over the two decades, 17 major strikes occurred in the railroad industry, 12 after 1960. For the comparable period, the 

total economy sustained 418 major strikes, or 0.5 

percent of all stoppages. By contrast, the 17 major 

strikes conducted in the railroad industry constituted 

5.4 percent of all railroad stoppages, a level that can 

be traced to the prevalence of coordinated bargaining and observance of picket lines. These major railroad stoppages accounted for the bulk of man-days 

idle (61.4 percent) and workers involved (83.7 percent) in all railroad stoppages, 1950-69. Although 

fewer workers were involved in major railway strikes 

in the 1950’s (368,616) than in the 1960’s 

(828,288), man-days idle attributable to strikes in 

the former decade (2,853,451) exceeded the level 

of the latter decade (2,315,735).

Because they are normally chronicled by the various forms of mass communications, larger stoppages 

receive more public attention, particularly if they are 

associated with emergency boards cases. Twelve 

major stoppages followed the release of reports by 

emergency boards (11 appointed between 1950-69) 

and one* other major stoppage preceded the appointment of a board. (See table 17.) Four major strikes 

were not directly associated with an emergency dispute; however, two of these four stoppages were 

related to Arbitration Award No. 282 which “terminated” the dispute resulting in the establishment of 

Emergency Board No. 154.

Of the 17 major stoppages, only five involved a 

single carrier and a single union, all occurring in the 

1960’s. In the remaining 12 major stoppages, more 

than one union or more than one carrier were parties 

to the disputes.

Although involved in only six major stoppages 

(five of them in the 1960’s) nonoperating emr 

ployees’ unions accounted for 52 percent of the 

workers involved and 51 percent of the man-days 

idle associated with these larger strikes. The average 

duration of these nonoperating stoppages was 19.5 

calendar days, compared with 5.2 days for the 11 

major stoppages (7 in the 1960’s) in which operating employees participated.

In a vast majority of these 17 major strikes, the 

principal subjects in dispute were wages (7 cases) 

and job security (6). Plant administration was an 

issue three times (all in the 1968-69 period) and 

supplementary benefits, once. Four-fifths of the 

major disputes occurring in the 1950’s were attributTable 16. Number and percent of railroad work stoppages, by size, selected periods, 1950-69

Type o f 

em ployee

T otal s to p p a g e s

U n d er 100 

em p lo y e e s

100 and u n d e r 

500 em p lo y ees

5 0 0 an d u n d e r 

1 ,0 0 0 e m p lo y ees

1.0 0 0 an d u n d e r

10.000 em p lo y ees

10,000 an d o v e r 

em p lo y ees

Numb e r

P e rc e n tNum ­

b e r

P e rc e n tNum ­

b e r

P erc e n t

Numb e r

. P e rc e n t

Numb e rP e rc e n t

Numb e r

P e rc e n t

1 9 5 0 -6 9 ___________________ 3 1 6 100.0 79 2 5 .0 107 3 3 .9 4 4 13.9 69 2 1 .8 17 5 .4

O p eratin g w o rk ers 192 50 67 23 4 0 12

N o n o p eratin g

w o rk ers ---------------- 106 26 3 5 15 25 5

B oth _______________ 18 3 5 6 4 —

1 9 5 0 -5 4 ___________________________ 82 100.0 2 4 2 9 .3 24 2 9 .3 12 1 4.6 18 22.0 4 4 .9

O p eratin g w o rk e rs ---------------- 50 15 16 5 10 4

N o n o p eratin g w o r k e r s ________ 2 4 7 6 5 6 —

Both __________________________ 8 2 2 2 2 —

1 9 5 5 -5 9 _____ _________________ 7 0 100.0 12 17.1 30 4 2 .9 13 18.6 14 2 0 .0 1 1.4

O p eratin g w o r k e r s ____________ 4 3 9 20 7 7 __

N o n o p eratin g w o rk e rs ______ 2 0 3 8 3 5 1

Both --------------------------------------- 7 — 2 3 2 —

1 9 6 0 -6 4 ___________________________ 64 100.0 21 3 2 .8 21 3 2 .8 6 9 .4 11 1 7.2 5 7 .8

O p eratin g w o r k e r s ______ __ 4 0 12 13 4 8 3

N o n o p eratin g w o rk e rs _______ 21 8 7 1 3 2

Both __________________________ 3 1 1 1 — —

1 9 6 5 -6 9 ___________________________ 100 100.0 22 2 2 .0 3 2 3 2 .0 13 13.0 26 2 6 .0 7 7 .0

O p eratin g w o rk e rs - - ________ 59 14 18 7 15 5

N o n o p eratin g w o rk e rs _______ 41 8 14 6 11 2

Both __________________ _______ — ■— — — — —

NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

4 0

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Table 17. R ailroad w ork stoppages, involving 10,000 or m ore w orkers, 1950-69

P a rtie s involved

N um ber

o f

w o rk e rs

Mand ay s

id le

No

S to p p a g e

p rio r S to p p a g e

Y ear

B eginnin g

d a te

DuraM ajor

issu e

e m e rg en cy

b o a rd

to th e 

c re a tio n 

o f a

fo llo w in g 

(se c tio n 10) 

' ’s ta tu s q u o " 

p e rio d

(in

d ay s) C a r rie rs ) Union(s) involved c re a te d b o a rd

1950 _____ 6 - 2 5 -5 0 14 V arious W e ste rn r a ilr o a d s 1 SUNA 5 8 ,6 9 5 5 3 3 ,6 7 9 W ages 

Job s e ­

X

5 - 1 0 - 5 0 7 P e n n sy lv an ia; S o u th e rn ; New BLFE 174,7 6 9 7 7 2 ,0 2 2 (*)

York C e n tra l; S a n te Fe. c u rity .

1951 1 -3 0 -5 1 12 V arious c a r r i e r s 8 BRT 7 0 ,2 8 5 4 1 9 ,7 1 7 W ages X

1952 . . . . 3 - 0 9 -5 2 4 N ew Y ork C e n tra l; T erm inal BLE 4 0 ,9 9 7 1 2 5 ,4 9 3 W ages X

R ailroad A sso ciatio n o f BLFE

S t. L ouis. ORC

1 9 5 3 -

1 9 9 4 ------

1955 _______ 3 - 1 4 -5 5 58 L ouisville & N ash v ille 10 Non- 23 ,8 7 0 1 ,0 0 2 ,5 4 0 S u p p lem en ta ry

X

o p e ra tin g

u n io n s.2 *4 * b e n e fits .

1 9 5 6 -

1 960 _______ 9 - 0 1 -6 0 12 P en n sy lv an ia TWU, BB, 

SWMIA, 1AM.

72 ,0 0 0 5 0 4 ,0 0 0 Job s e ­ X

c u rity .

1 9 6 1 ______ 1 -1 0 -6 1 14 New York H arb o r C a rrie rs SIU, MMP, 2 2 ,9 7 0 1 3 6 ,5 4 4 W ages X

C o n feren ce C o m m itte e .8 NMEB.

1962 . . . 8 - 3 0 -6 2 3 0 C hicago an d N orth W e ste rn ORT 1 5 ,270 3 2 0 ,6 7 0 Job s e ­ X

c u rity .

1QCO l9 D i} ----------

flAIIA

1 9 6 4 _______ 4 - 8 - 6 4 2 Illin o is C en tral BLFE, BLE, 2 0 ,4 1 5 4 0 ,8 3 0 W ages X

ORCB, BRT.

6 - 1 5 - 6 4 1 M issouri-K ansas-T exas; BRT 1 2 ,768 1 2 ,7 6 8 Jo b -se ­ X

M isso u ri-P acific; T ex as 

M exican; S o u th e rn P acific; 

T exas & P a c ific; P o rt 

T erm inal A sso ciatio n o f

c u rity .

H ouston.

1965 _____ 1 1 -1 8 -6 5 1 A tch iso n , T opeka & S a n te Fe 

E ig h t c a rr ie r s 8

BRSC 2 9 ,0 2 0 2 9 ,0 2 0 W ages 

Job s e ­

X

1966 3 - 3 1 -6 6 4 BLFE 1 15,294 3 4 6 ,1 7 7 O Or d u rin g

c u rity . e m e rg en cy

b o a rd .

1967 ______ 7 - 1 6 -6 7 2 R ailroad in d u stry 6 s h o p c r a f t8 4 5 9 ,0 8 8 6 4 5 ,1 1 2 W ages X

1968 2 - 5 - 6 8 5 M isso u ri-P acific; S eab o ard BRT 3 9 ,3 6 9 176,9 2 6 P la n t (*)

C o a st; T ex as & P a c ific. adm inis tra tio n .

1 1 - 6 -6 8 2 L ouisville & N ash v ille BRT 12,994 2 5 ,9 8 8 Job s e ­ X

c u rity .

1969 ........... 1 - 1 3 -6 9 1 L ouisville & N ashville UTU (BRT) 12 ,9 0 0 1 2 ,900 P la n t X

a d m in is tra tio n .

4 - 8 - 6 9 5 Illin o is C en tral UTU (BRT) 1 6 ,200 6 4 ,8 0 0 P la n t X

ad m in is tra tio n .

1 C hicago, R ock Isla n d & P a c ific; G re a t N o rth ern ; C hicago G reat • P e n n sy lv an ia; C en tral o f G eorgia; Illin o is C e n tra l; G rand T runk; BosW e ste rn ; D enver & Rio G rande W e ste rn ; W e ste rn P a c ific. to n & M aine; M issouri P a c ific; Union P a c ific; a n d S e a b o a rd .

2 Follow ed th e r e p o r t o f a P re sid e n tia l e m e rg e n cy b o a rd w hich w a s 

c re a te d b e fo re fis c a l y e a r 1950.

* Various carriers involved in Emergency Board No. 81.

« 1AM, BB, SMWIA, IBEW, BRCA, IBFO, BMWE, BRS, ORT, BRSC.

* B altim o re & Ohio; Brooklyn E a ste rn D is tric t T erm in al; B ush T erm in al;

C en tral R ailro ad o f New J e rs e y ; E rie-L ackaw anna; Lehigh V alley;. New

York C e n tra l; New York D ock; New York, New Haven & H artfo rd ; P en n sy lv a n ia ; a n d R eading.

7 T he ra ilro a d s involved in th is s to p p a g e c la im e d t h a t th e s tr ik e r e ­

la te d to th e ru le s a n d p ra c tic e s in e ff e c t upon th e e x p ira tio n o f A rb itratio n A w ard 2 8 2 . A rb itra tio n B oard No. 2 8 2 w a s c r e a te d by PL 8 8 -1 0 8 to 

d isp o s e o f tw o is s u e s in d isp u te b e tw e e n th e c a rr ie r s an d u n io n s inv olved in E m erg en cy B oard No. 154.

8 1AM, BB, SMWIA, IBEW, BRCA, a n d IBFO.

9 T he d is p u te r e la te s to th e re d u c tio n o f " c re w s iz e s " in c e rta in 

in sta n c e s , a s a r e s u lt o f A.B. No. 2 8 2 .

SOURCES: N atio n al M ed iatio n B oard d a ta , B u reau o f L abor S ta tis tic s .

able to economic issues, while noneconomic issues 

predominated the major stoppages in the 1960’s (8 

cases). Major strikes involving economic issues extended, on the average, almost twice as long as those 

resulting from noneconomic issues (13.4 calendar 

days compared with 7.4 days). Combined, the 17 

major strikes’ duration, ranging from 1 to 58 days, 

averaged 10.2 calendar days, with a median of 5.0 

days. The majority of these larger strikes were terminated quickly, 10 within 1 week. Only two extended 

beyond 15 calendar days.

Duration

In comparison to major strikes, the average duration of all railroad stoppages over the two decades 

was 13.0 calendar days, 14.6 days in the 1950’s and 

11.2 days in the 1960’s. During the same period, the 

average annual duration of all strikes experienced in 

the total economy was 21.7 calendar days, 20.0 days 

in the 1950’s and 23.5 days in the 1960’s.

Approximately 75 percent of the railroad disputes 

extended 6 days or less, and over 91 percent lasted

41

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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
for fewer than 30 days. (See appendix table A—8 

and table A -1 0 .) Only eight railroad stoppages— 

four in each decade under study— extended for more 

than 90 days. Three-fourths of these prolonged stoppages were concerned primarily with wages. In contrast to the even distribution of prolonged strikes in 

the two decades, there was a significant decrease in 

relative number of medium-length strikes (15 to 29 

days and 30 to 59 days) in the 1960’s and a substantial increase in shorter stoppages, particularly those 

extending for only 1 day.

Almost one-half of all workers involved in railroad stoppages participated in strikes which extended 3 days or less, and over nine-tenths of 

workers involved were associated with stoppages less 

than 15 days in duration. Stoppages extending for 2 

weeks or less were responsible for one-half of all 

idleness, and strikes lasting less than 60 days accounted for three-fourths. Although prolonged stoppages involved less than 1 percent of all workers, 

they incurred more than one-fifth of all idleness.

Operating and nonoperating personnel

stoppages

Another pattern in the railroad work stoppages 

was the different degree of involvement of major occupational groups. Between 1950 and 1969, operating employees participated in 192 work stoppages; 

nonoperating workers in 106 stoppages; and both 

groups jointly in 18 strikes. Even though nonoperating employees called fewer strikes in both decades 

than operating employees, the former increased their 

strike rate in the 1960’s, as shown in table 16. Although nonoperating employees were involved in 

fewer strikes and accounted for a smaller number of 

workers involved, they nevertheless were responsible 

for 54 percent of all man-days lost over the two decades and accounted for the vast majority of man-days 

in the 1955-59 and 1960-64 periods. (See appendix table A -8.) Average duration for nonoperating crafts’ stoppages was 16.6 days, compared with 

10.0 for the operating crafts.

Another important difference between operating 

and nonoperating personnel strikes was the incidence 

of issues involved in their disputes. (See appendix 

table A -9 .) Although operating employees participated in more stoppages generated by either economic or noneconomic issues, both major groups’ 

disputes were dominated by noneconomic issues, 

particularly by plant administration and job security 

matters (in 2 out of 3 cases). Only one major issue,

intraunion or interunion matters, was predominated 

by a major group, nonoperating employees in this 

case.

Issues

Within the 20 years studied, the incidence of 

major issues in the railroad industry varied, but some 

patterns did emerge. (See appendix table A -7 and 

table A -1 0 .) These issues were classified into those 

involving economic matters, such as wages, supplementary benefits, and wage adjustments; and those 

concerned with workers’ security, i.e., union organization and security, job security, plant administration, interunion or intraunion matters, other working 

conditions, and other contractual matters.

Of the issues reported to be the causes of significant numbers of stoppages, plant administration was 

by far the principal subject in dispute over the 2 0 - 

year span and in every subperiod, except 1950-54. 

(See appendix tables A -7 and 9.) Although the results were not completely consistent in all periods, 

wages was the next most troublesome issue, followed 

by job security and interunion or intraunion matters, 

respectively.

Economic issues (including supplementary benefits) engendered longer periods of disputes on the 

average (27.8 calendar days) than survival issues, 

including union organization and security, other 

working conditions, and other contractual matters 

(5.0 days). Within these two major categories, two 

economic issues, wages and wage adjustments, had 

the longest durations on the average (38.1 and 9.5 

calendar days, respectively), followed by plant administration (5.8), job security (3.2), and intraunion or interunion matters (2.5).

Table 18, which shows duration by major issue, illustrates another important aspect of railroad stoppages. Wages predominated in the longer strikes

Table 18. Duration of railroad stoppages by major issue,

1950-69

D uration o f d isp u te

Issu e

3 0 d a y s an d o v er 60 day s an d o v e r 90 d ay s an d o v er

N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t

W ages _________ 16 6 6 .7 6 6 0 .0 5 8 3 .3

P la n t ad m in ­

istra tio n _____ 4 16.7 3 3 0 .0 1 16.7

W age a d ju s tm e n t _________ 3 1 2.5 1 1 0.0 __ ,__

Job s e c u r i t y ____ 1 4 .2 — — — *—

NOTE; Dashes denote zeros.

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics

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(those extending 30 days or longer), followed by 

plant administration, wage adjustment, and job security.

In terms of number of man-days idle and workers 

involved, economic issues generated substantially 

greater losses than did noneconomic issues, primarily 

because of 70 wage disputes which accounted for 54 

percent of all workers and all man-days idle. Combined, the 111 strikes dealing with economic issues 

were responsible for 69 percent of man-days idle and 

58 percent of workers involved in all stoppages. 

Within the two major categories, wages was the primary issue, accounting for 54 percent of all workers 

and all man-days idle; and job security disputes constituted 30 percent of all workers and 24 percent of 

all man-days.

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Appendix A

Table A -1 . Selected railroad financial and econom ic statistics, 1950-69

Year

Railroads’ share of intercity traffic1

Carriers in bankruptcy2

Rate of return 4 (percent)

Net investment (thousands)4

Number ol carriers incurring deficits 4

Operating

revenues3 (thousands)

Operating

expenses3 (thousands)

Labor costs

percent of railway operating

expenses5

Employ­ ment4

Index of output

per employee manhour6

fs

28 

§8

Ratio of operating

expenses to

revenue (percent)

Revenue freight ton 3 miles (percent)

Revenue

passenger miles3 (Per­ cent)

Num­ ber

Miles of road owned

1950 - 56.17 6.39 42 12,470 N.A. N.A. 16 t 9,587,000 $7,135,055 65.7 1,220,784 72.8 471 74.42 1951 55.63 6.14 42 12,455 4.16 $22,678,000 16 10,511,612 8,122,521 65.9 1,276,000 77.1 462 77.27 1952 - 54.48 5.61 40 12,226 4.54 23,735,900 14 10,702,877 8,134,811 66.5 1,226,663 77.2 454 76.01 1953 51.01 4.92 39 12,285 4.55 24,360,700 15 10,787,891 8,218,223 65.8 1,206,312 77.7 448 76.18 1954 49.56 4.38 37 10,966 3.51 24,893,100 21 9,484,015 7,460,507 66.3 1,064,705 80.9 443 78.66

1955 - 49.53 4.01 37 10,959 4.54 24,849,900 14 10,229,600 7,724,496 65.9 1,058,216 89.4 441 75.51 1956 48.40 3.81 12 1,564 4.19 25,517,800 13 10,686,492 8,199,792 67.2 1,042,664 93.7 422 76.73 1957 46.89 3.51 6 1,060 3.52 26,193,900 16 10,625,452 8,321,577 67.1 986,001 95.1 415 78.32 1958 45.98 3.11 7 1,075 2.91 26,190,100 19 9,686,289 7,631,341 67.8 840,575 99.9 412 78.78 1959 - 45.31 2.93 8 1,132 2.85 26,247,400 21 9,954,828 7,796,835 67.6 815,474 106.1 411 78.32

1960 44.06 2.75 8 1,308 2.21 26,396,700 27 9,641,593 7,657,329 67.8 780,494 110.4 407 79.42 1961 __ 43.50 2.59 7 2,202 2.04 26,372,500 24 9,309,696 7,361,751 67.5 717,543 118.2 397 79.08 1962 43.75 2.47 6 1,959 2.77 26,185,900 24 9,562,991 7,507,757 67.0 700,146 125.9 395 78.51 1963 - 43.27 2.19 5 1,601 3.07 26,266,200 22 9,684,636 7,542,306 65.8 680,039 133.9 395 77.88 1964 .. 43.18 2.05 5 1,586 3.22 25,394,500 22 9,985,187 7,830,168 65.0 665,034 142.5 380 78.42

1965 43.25 1.91 5 1,542 3.73 25,793,700 14 10,425,052 8,002,685 65.2 639,961 157.5 372 76.76 1966 42.97 1.78 4 1,464 3.92 26,699,500 13 10,880,467 8,277,294 64.8 630,895 169.2 375 76.07 1967 41.43 1.50 6 2,088 2.48 27,242,000 20 10,581,560 8,359,369 65.1 610.191 173.4 370 79.00 1968 41.16 1.23 4 485 2.52 26,903,000 19 11,061,902 8,723,664 65.1 590,536 181.0 360 78.66 1969 - 41.09 1.09 4 485 2.38 27,506,700 21 11,658,525 9,209,137 64.4 578,277 7188.8 361 78.99

1The railroads’ share of intercity ton miles (public and private) for freight and intercity passenger miles (public and private) for passengers.

2 Includes all haul-line railroads in receiverships or trusteeships.

8 For class I and II line-haul railroads only.

4 For class I line-haul railroads only

0 Labor costs include wages and salaries, welfare costs, and payroll taxes.

• Using 1957-59 = 100.

7 Preliminary.

NOTE: N.A. denotes not available.

SOURCES: ICC data, Association of American Railroads data, Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

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Os

Table A-2. Railroads’ involvement in Railway Labor Act procedures, fiscal years 1950-691 Year

Collective bargaining agreements 2

Mediation Cases

Number of

emergency boards 2

TotalAirlines

Year

Railroads

Major issues involved in railroad mediation cases

Disposition of mediation cases by:2 Refusals to arbitrate by:

Total

Airlines

Railroads

Mediation agreements

Arbitration agreements

Dismissals

Withdrawals

Number

Percent of total

Number

Newagreements

Rates of

payRules

Miscellaneous ________

J

Percent

After mediation

Before mediation

Carrier

EmployerBoth

Selected totals ________ 5,227 1243 3,984 30 671 214 184 1,672 32 371 282 270 105 229 38 71

1950. 5,092 241 4,851 95.27 234 49 185 79.06 (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 11 -..1950 1951_ 5,102 244 4,858 95.22 269 66 203 75.46 (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 6 -..1951 1952— 5,118 254 4,864 95.04 273 72 201 73.63 (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 4 --.1952 1953— 5,137 259 4,878 94.96 297 72 225 75.76 (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 1 -.1953 1954— 5,157 270 4,887 94.76 250 79 171 68.40 (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 2 —1954 1955— 5,180 275 4,905 94.69 312 71 241 77.24 1 64 149 27 158 4 16 22 7 17 17 3 —1955 1956— 5,190 277 4,913 94.66 324 64 260 80.25 8 97 75 80 165 3 16 24 25 10 12 5 4 —1956 1957--. 5,196 280 4,916 94.61 263 58 205 77.95 2 73 109 21 142 6 13 21 8 1 8 6 4 --.1957 1958— 5,205 280 4,925 94.62 305 77 228 74.75 7 51 162 8 119 3 12 23 36 13 20 2 1 -.1958 1959— 5,215 282 4,933 94.59 248 83 165 66.53 8 20 108 29 106 1 16 17 4 8 7 6 — -.-1959 1960— 5,218 284 4,934 94.56 226 73 153 67.70 1 40 100 12 72 3 13 28 12 8 13 4 6 - .I960 1961— 5,220 285 4,935 94.54 229 52 177 77.29 43 107 7 96 1 16 18 15 3 24 4 3 --.1961 1962— 5,221 286 4,935 94.52 205 53 152 74.15 33 119 99 3 10 18 4 7 10 1 6 --.1962 1963_ 5,226 286 4,940 94.53 199 66 133 66.83 42 91 70 1 7 17 9 5 23 1 4 —1963 1964_ 5,228 287 4,941 94.51 252 54 198 78.57 52 146 108 1 16 26 23 8 13 3 4 --’.1964 1965— 5,230 288 4,942 94.49 236 48 188 79.66 38 150 103 1 21 29 21 2 10 1 4 _1965

1966— 5,235 290 4,945 94.46 236 36 200 84.75 35 165 110 2 39 11 12 10 11 5 1 _1966

1967_ 5,275 318 4,947 93.97 242 61 181 74.79 25 156 72 2 10 18 41 2 36 3 ---1967

1968_ 5,285 324 4,961 93.87 284 72 212 74.65 2 51 159 130 1 37 7 15 10 12 — --.1968

1969_ 5,404 354 5,050 93.45 343 37 306 89.21 1 7 248 122 129 3 38 1 13 4 .--1969

*The definition of the industry conforms to industry classification 40 in the Standard Industrial Classification Manual, 1967 edition.

2 Represents collective bargaining agreements on file with the National Mediation Board, and mediation cases disposed of in a fiscal year, ending June 30.

2 The number of emergency boards appointed is directly related to the number of refusals

to arbitrate, a residual of the total number of mediation cases disposed of and the number of mediation and arbitration agreements, withdrawals, and dismissals. 4 Dashes denote information was unavailable for major issues and methods of disposition of railroad mediation cases before 1955.

SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

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Table A-3. Railroad mediation cases disposed of by the National Mediation Board, by major occupational group,

fiscal year, 1950-69

Major occupational groups

Year

All occupationsCombined groups, rail road 1

Train, engine, and yard service workers2

Mechanical foreman

Maintenance of equipment workers

Clerical, office, station, and storehouse workersYardmasters

| Maintenance of way and j signal workers

Subordinate officials in maintenance of way

Agents, telegrapher, and tower men

Train dispatchersTechnical engineers, architects, draftmen, etc.

Dining car employees and train and pullman porters

Patrolmen and special officers

Marine servicemen

Miscellaneous railroad workers

1950-69 ----- -------- 3,984 169 2,312 29 157 400 91 175 5 140 115 5 102 21 144 119

1950 ------------------ 185 6 103 5 6 11 3 8 _ 6 7 _ 12 3 8 7

1951..........- ---- ------------ 203 10 83 3 14 16 2 20 1 8 22 1 8 2 10 3

1952 -- --- ---------------- 201 8 74 2 17 35 4 12 — 10 21 — 5 3 6 4

1953 -........... 225 9 109 2 12 28 5 12 j io 7 — 14 1 6 10

1954 -- ------- 171 8 102 — 6 28 3 4 5 8 — 2 1 1 3

1955 ....... 241 13 147 1 13 24 4 9 — 2 13 — 5 3 4 3

1956 ____ ___ 260 6 150 1 10 23 16 13 — 3 13 — 7 — 13 5

1957 ---- ------ 205 11 117 — 11 19 6 11 — 2 8 2 3 — 10 5

1958 -- ____________ 228 4 153 2 5 19 8 13 — 7 5 — 2 1 5 4

1959 . -- ___ ___ ___ 165 6 96 2 4 21 4 7 2 9 1 — 3 1 5 4

1960 __________________ 153 4 78 — 2 31 4 10 — 10 1 1 3 1 — 8

1961 _________________ 177 7 107 — 3 15 1 6 — 10 1 — 4 — 12 11

1962 __________________ 152 4 85 1 5 22 7 7 2 4 — — 1 — 7 7

1963 _________________ 133 3 71 — 7 12 9 7 — 3 — — 7 1 7 6

1964 __________________ 198 7 127 — 9 18 2 7 — 7 — 1 1 1 8 10

1965 __________________ 188 16 94 1 10 17 9 9 — 11 3 — 3 — 9 6

1966 ______ __ _________ 200 10 111 1 19 14 1 5 — 21 — — 8 1 1 8

1967 _________________ 181 13 129 1 2 11 1 3 — — 1 — 3 — 9 8

1968 __________________ 212 13 147 4 2 10 1 8 — 4 3 — 4 1 9 6

1969 __________________ 306 11 229 3 — 26 1 4 — 8 1 — 7 1 14 1

1 Mediation cases in which more than one railroad craft was involved. NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.

2 This major occupational group constitutes all the operating crafts; the remaining occupational groups comprise the nonoperating crafts.

SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.

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Table A -4 . R ailroad em ergency boards, 1950-69

Major craft involved Major issue

Board number Union(s) Carriers) Operating Non- Operat­ ing Wages Rules Wages andrules GrievancesWages, rules and working conditions

Rules and working conditions

76

77

7879

80

BLE, BLFE, ORC, BRT BRTBRTBRT

ORC, BRT, BLE, BLFE

Missouri Pacific Southern Pacific Monongaheia Denver & Rio Grande Western Texas & Pacific

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

81 ORC "j

BRT l

Eastern, Western & South- "j eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committees v

J

X

82 J

BLE, BLFE Terminal Railroad Assn, of St. Louis X X

83 SUNA Certain western Railroads7 X X

84 RYA Eastern, Western & South­ eastern Carriers Con­ ference* Committees

X X

85 BRT Chicago & Illinois Midland X X

86 BRT Boston & Albany X X

87 ILA Toledo, Lakefront Dock Co. X X

88 ILA Toledo, Lorain & Fairport Dock Co. X X

89 ORC Pullman X X

91 BLE, BLFE, ORC, BRT New York Central X X

92 16 Cooperating nonoper­ ating unions 8

Atlantic & East Carolina and 25 other carriers 9

X X

93 IBT REA X X

95 BLE Denver & Rio Grande Western X X

96 ORC Pullman X X

97 BLFE Eastern, Western & South­ eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committees

X X

98 17 Cooperating nonoper­ ating unions19 Eastern, Western & South­ eastern Carrier’s Confer­ ence Committees

X X

104 BRT New York, Chicago & St. Louis X X

105 BRSC REA X X

106 15 Cooperating nonoper­ ating unions11 Eastern, Western & South­ eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committees

X X

107 ORCB Pullman X X

109 ORCB Eastern, Western & South­ eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committees

X X

110 BLFE Eastern, Western & South­ eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committees

X X

111 IBT REA X X

112 ORCB New York Central X X

113 TWU Pennsylvania X 13 X

114 12 Cooperating nonoper­ ating unions13 Eastern, Western & South­ eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committee

X X

115 BLE Spokane, Portland & Seattle X X

116 BRT Eastern, Western & South­ eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committees

X X

117 IBT REA X X

118 UNIW Toledo, Lorain & Fairport Dock; Toledo, Lakefront Dock; Cleveland Steve­ dore Co.

X X

119 MMP General Managers Assn, of New York X X

126 BLE Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe X X

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Work stoppages Emergency Board Recommendations

Occurred Responses of parties Settlement deviated from

Duration Before nuauvio vii Emer- “Section 6” under Number of Man-days board After gency notice act1 workers idle created board Accepted by Economic Job board (in calendar involved (thousands) or report Union(s) Carriersboth parties issues security 2 number days) (thousands) during board issued and other issues

09 (4) 27.2 816.6 X X 76 1_14_49 231 (5) ___ m____ 77

09 (4) 0.9 0.9 X X i x 78

09 (4) X X 79

09 (4) 09 ____ « _____ 80

r 81 | | f) 11 } 23.1 X

| 3-15-49 f 458 j

l

9.3 J

70.3

24.4 419.7

X

X

J J 1 r r

10-22-48 526

l J

X X J

82

9-20-49 211 58.7 533.7 X X X 83

4-10-48 796 X X 84

09 (4) 0.2 0.4 X 09 («) ____ 85

09 (4) 09 l___ m_____ 85

1-28-50 196 r 0.3 7.5 { x X 87

1-28-50 196 1 X 88

9-19-49 411 X 09 89

09 (4) X -------(«)-------- 91

4-10-48 883 0.4 15.8 X X 92

6-1-50 155 6.3 88.2 X 09 93

10-20-50 335 X 95

12-7-50 301 X X 96

11-1-49 816 41.0 125.5 X X X 97

2-5-51 375 X X 98

09 (4) — 09 -------- ------- o*) ------- 104

10-1-53 140 1.5 76.2 X X 105

5-22-53 359 23.9 1,002.5 X X 106

6-24-54 150 X 107

10-1-53 541 X X 109

7-1-54 395 X X X 110

2-4-55 ^

1-1-55 )

196 X X X 111

4-1-54 532 X X 112

1-21-53 i 8-27-54 / 717 X X 113

4-2-55 255 X 114

6-22-55 569 2.6 10.6 x 0*) ____(fl ) ____ 115

2-15-56 395 X 116

12-16-55 462 7.2 426.3 X X X 117

11-30-56 190 0.2 12.8 X X X X 118

11-20-56 305 X X 119

7-2-56 1,475 X X 126

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Table A -4 . Railroad em ergency boards, 1950-69— Continued

Major craft involved Major issue

Board number Union(s) Carrier(s) Operating Non- Wages Wages, rulesRules and Operat­ Wages Rules and Grievancesand working working ing rules conditions conditions

127 ORCB New York Central X X 129 BRT Long Island 130 11 Cooperating nonoper- Eastern, Western & South- X X

ating unions14 eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committees 131 SUNA Chicago, Rock Island & X X Pacific and Western Car­ riers Conference Com­ mittee 132 TWU, 1AM, BB, SMWIA Pennsylvania X X

133 Railroad Marine Harbor New York Carriers Confer- X X Council15 ence Committee16 134 ILA New York Carriers Confer- X X

ence Committee16 137 RYA Eastern, Western & South- X X

eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committees

138 ORT Southern Pacific X X

139 ORCB Pullman; Chicago, Mil- X X

waukee, St. Paul and Pacific 141 MMP Reading X X

145 11 Cooperating nonoper- Eastern, Western & South- X X ating unions14 eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committees

147 ORT Chicago & North Western X X

148 ORT New York Central, Pitts­ y

burgh & Lake Erie A X

150 BLE Belt Railway X X 151 BRSC Southern Pacific X X

153 IBT REA X X 154 BLE, BLFE, SUNA, ORCB, Eastern, Western & South­ X X

& BRT eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committees 155 BSCP Pullman; Chicago, Rock X X

Island & Pacific,- New York Central; Soo Lines 157 11 Cooperating nonoper­ Florida East Coast Ry. X X

ating unions14 159 BRS Eastern, Western & South­ X X

eastern Carriers Confer­ ence Committees 160 RED 20 NRLC21 X X

161 RED29 NRLC X X

162 RED22 NRLC X X 163 RED23 NRLC X X 164 BLFE NRLC X X

165 BRT Atchison, Topeka & X X

Santa Fe 169 RED19 NRLC X X

170 BRT, IBEW, 1AM Long Island X X X

171 ORCB NRLC X X

172 BRT Belt ^ Illinois Central & 1 Louisville & Nashville f

Long Island

X X

173 UTU (BRT) X X

174 ORCB, BLE NRLC X X

175 BRS NRLC X X

1 Simple mean in cases involving more than one party or more than one mediation case. Equal weight was attached to each parties’ duration in multi-unit boards and to each mediation case in single-unit panels. 2 Includes manning requirements, work rules, technological innovation issues, and grievances (and/or time claims). 3 Grievance cases do not entail “formal Section 6“ notices. 4 Since earlier steps in the RLA-emergency board process were not observed in grievance cases, duration figures could not be compiled. 5 Not available. 6 No forma! emergency board report.

7 Chicago, Great Western; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific; Davenport, Rock Island, and Northwestern; Denver & Rio Grande Western; Minne­ apolis and St. Louis; Railway Transfer Co.; Northern Pacific Terminal Co. of Oregon; St. Paul Union Depot; Sioux City Terminal; Western Pacific. 8 IBBFD, IBB I SB, BRCA, IBEW, I AM, SMWIA, IBFO, BRSC, BMWE, ORT, BRS, MMP, NMEB, I LA, HREU, RYA. 9 All class il carriers. 10 All 16 in footnote eight, plus ATDA. 111AM, IBBISB, IBBDF, SMWIA, IBEW, BRCA, IBFO, BRSC, BMWE, ORT, BRS, MMP, NMEB, I LA, HREU.

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Work stoppages Emergency Board Recommendations

Occurred Responses of parties Settlement deviated from

Duration Before icwiiimoiiluauuio uii Emer- “Section 6" under Number of Man-days board After gency notice act1 workers idle created board Accepted by Economic Job board (in calendar involved (thousands) or report Union(s) Carriersboth parties issues security2 number days) (thousands) during board issued and other issues

7-10-58 712 X X 127 11-2-59 5-29-59 199

} 329

6.0 132.0 X X X X 129

9-1-59 X 130

3-2-59 495 X X 131

1-21-58 } 1,043 9.8 10.2 X \ V 132 6-6-59 72.0 504.0 X ; x 6-25-59 534 23.0 136.5 X X X 133

10-31-59 493 X 134

10-1-59 649 X 137

4-24-58 5-5-59 } 1,053 X X X 138 2-27-59 1,019 X 139

3-3-60 610 CO CO 141 9-1-61 245 X X 145

12-23-57 12-19-57 } 1,637 15.3 320.7 X X 147

3-27-58 5-5-59 } 1,416 X X 148

9-7-59 1,259 1,562 0.3 0.3 X CO COX

150 9-22-58 X 151 11-1-61 ]

375 1 (IT) (17) X

X X

l

153

V 11-2-59 y 1,289 (17) (17) X r x y X 154 J J 20.4 40.8 X J I

9-1-61 793 X X 155

9-1-61 844 2.0 1,371.9 x» X12 3456718 X x» 157

2-1-63 428 X 159

10-15-62 663 X X 160 5-31-63 509 X X X 161 5-31-63 509 X X X 162 5-31-63 509 X X X 163 12-2-63 340 X X 164 9-28-56 3,284

298

CO CO 165

5-17-66 459.1 645.1 X X X 169 4-6-66 5-23-66 } 378 X 170 3-2-59 7-13-66 } 1,669

1.1 79.2 X

— co CO 171

1 7-6-65 f 12-23-65 f W73 r 16.213.0 64.8 r 26.0 X X

} x r

172

J J \ 12.9 l 12.9 X j J 7-2-68 9-1-67 294

)

X X X 173

9-1-67 y 4io X X X 174 4-30-68 3-15-67 1 724 X X 175

12 Board did not consider wages an issue, but union did; subsequent agreement confirmed union's position. 131AM, BBF, SMWIA, IBEW, BRCA, IBFO, BRSC, BMWE, ORT, NMEB, I LA, BRS.14 1AM, BBF, SMWIA, IBEW, BRCA, IBFO, BRSC, BMWE, ORT, BRS, HREU. 15 MMP, NMEB, SIU. 16 Twelve railroads engaged in passenger and freight transportation over New York harbor. 17 NMB data indicated two work stoppages occurred after the board was created; BLS officially recorded one stoppage.18 Work stoppage extended both before the board was created and after it released its reports. 19 No formal agreement consummated until December 1971.

20 Six shopcraft unions: 1AM, BBF, SMWIA, IBEW, BRCA, IBFO. 21 National Railway Labor Conference, the successor to the three car­ riers conference committees. 22 Six shopcraft unions, plus BRSC, BMWE, ORT, BRS, HREU. 23 BRSC, BMWE, ORT, HREU, BRS (except for wage issues). SOURCES: National Mediation Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

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76

77

78

79

80

*81

82

*83

*84

85

86

1187

1188

89

91

92

93

95

96

97

98

104

105

106

107

109

110

of railroad RLA—Emergency Boards fiscal years 1950-69

Carrier(s) Union(s)

Dateof “Section 6” notice

Direct negotiations

Beginning date Ending date

Date of request for mediation1

Union(s) Carriers)

Missouri Pacific -------

Southern Pacific . —

Monongahela connecting

Denver and Rio Grande Western ---- ---- ..

Texas and Pacific ---- .

Eastern, Western and Southeastern ____ Carriers Conference Commit­ tees (EWSCCC) ____ Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis----------

Certain Western railroads 9 .. -

EWSCCC ............ ....

Chicago and Illinois Midland.

Boston and Albany ___ Toledo, Lake Front Dock Co._ Toledo, Lorain & Fairport Dock Co. ------------- Pullman ---------------

BLE, BLFE, ORC, BRT

BRT

BRT

BRT ORCBRT BLEBLFE

BRT

6r C

BLEBLFE

SUNA

RYA

BRT

BRTILA

ILAORC

1-14-49| 2-10-49 | 2-17-49 j

Grievance dispute 

17-49

Grievance dispute

i

Grievance dispute

I I Grievance dispute

3-15-49| 9-22-49 | 12-14-49

(4)

}

10-22-48 11- 8-48 1-26-50

9-20-49 (i°) 2- 2-50 2- 2-50

4-10-48 9-22-49 1-10-50 1-11-50

-----Grievance dispute.

I I

__ Grievance dispute .

1-28-50 2-27-50

1-28-50

9-19-49

<4)

10-14-49

3-30-50

6-16-50

12-21-49

1-26-49 

\ 4-28-49 

S 4-26-49

4-25-50

12-27-49

Atlantic and East Carolina and 25 other class II carriers ___ ___

ORC, BRT 

16 coop­ 4-10-48 (4) (i°) 7- 3-50

Railway Express Agency (REA) ----------------

erating nonoper­ ating unions12

IBT 6- 1-50 7-11-50 9-15-50

Denver and Rio Grande Western ______ . BLE 10-20-50 10-30-50 11- 9-50 11-13-50 Pullman ____ . ORC 12- 7-50 1- 5-51 1- 5-51 1- 8-51

EWSCCC ________ BLFE 11- 1-49 10- 5-5014 (4) 10-24-50

EWSCCC __ ____ 17 cooperat­ 2- 5-51 (i°) (10) 5-23-51

New York, Chicago and Saint Louis_____

ing non­ operating unions»

BRT Grievance ;and time claim 

11-27-53

s dispute

REA ____ __ . BRSC 10- 1-53 11-24-53

Akron, Canton and Youngstown EWSCCC_____ _ 5 cooperat­ 5-22-53 0°) 10-12-53 10-20-53

Pullman ...............

ingnonoper­ ating unions1T ORCB 6-24-54 7-21-54 8- 6-54 Baltimore and Ohio EWSCCC _______ ORCB 70- 1-53 12- 9-53 12-15-53 12-15-53 EWSCCC___ ____ BLFE 7- 1-54 1-10-5518 5- 3-55 5- 6-55

Digitized for FRASER 

http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Proffer of arbitration

Disposition of emergency board dispute

Date of Emergency board report With a strike Initiation National Date of Mediation Type Date3 Before emer­ mediation Board board of of gency board After emer­ sessions Rejected notification created Rejected agreement agreement created or gency board Date by to President Dated by during emer­ gency board report issued

"1 9- 9-49 1 6-16-49 y 7- 8-49 y Unions 1 7- 8-49L 7-11-49y 8- 2-49 y Union ^Negotiation3 y10-23-49 ► to J J [ I J 10-23-49

j. 5-20-49 | 7- 1-491 Both | 7-18-49► 7-20-49| 9- 1-49j (4) } n } ° 1-21-50 8-31-49 9- 7-49 Union 9- 8-49 9-15-49 10- 7-49 Union Negotiation 1-22-50 to 1-22-50

3-21-49 11-25-49 Union 2- 2-50 2- 4-50 2-28-50 Union (4) (4)

} 5-16-49 } 8-12-491 Unions y 2- 9-50► 2-10-50y 3- 9-50 y > Mediation6 1 3- 8-50 10-24-49 2- 8-50 J

"j

1

1 j Jf \ Negotiation J

1 5-25-51 

y 8- 1-51 j 5-23-52

r 8-21 to

l 1-16-50 J- 2-14-50 JJ

Unions L 2-17-50J- 2-24-50

j

}» 6-15-50 jJ J

Unions J / (Arbitration *) 1 ^Negotiation U (Arbitration) {

8-26-50 12-13 to 12-15-50

2- 9-50 2-18-50 Unions 3- 3-50 3— 3—50 4- 1-50 Negotiation 4-20-50 6-25-50 3- 8-50 3-10-50 Union 3-14-50 3-20-50 4-18-50 Union Negotiation 9-21-50 to 7- 8-50 3-13-50 3-15-50 Both 4- 3-50 4-11-50 6-15-50 Union Negotiation 11- 2-50 4-27-50 4- 6-50 4-21-50 Union 4-25-50 4-26-50 5-19-50 (5) Negotiation 5-17-50 to 4-29-50 4-26-50 5- 3-50 Union 6- 2-50 6- 6-50 7- 6-50 (4) (4) (4) 4-24-50 6-29-50 Union 6-29-50 7- 3-50 8-11-50 Union Negotiation (4) ) 6-16-50

J 7-13-50 r t0 6-28-50 7- 1-50 Union 7- 3-50 7- 3-50 8-11-50 Union Negotiation (4) 1- 6-50 3-13-50 Union 6-26-50 7- 6-5C 11- 3-50 Union Negotiation 12-20-50 5-25-50 8- 4-50 Unions 8- 4-50 8- 4-50 9-13-50 Unions (4) (4)

7-18-50 7-28-50 Both 8- 7-50 8-11-50 9— 9—50 Carriers Mediation (4)

9-23-50

1-29-51 to 3-10-51

9-30-50 (13) (13) 10- 2-50 10- 3-50 11- 2-50 (4) Negotiation (4) to 10-12-50

1-15-51 3-27-51 Both 8- 8-51 9- 6-51 9-19-51 Union (4) (4) 3- 2-51 6-22-51 Both 8-28-51 9- 6-51 10- 3-51 Union Mediation 7-24-52 3- 9-52 10-30-50 (4) (4) 11- 6-51 11- 6-51 1-25-52 Union Negotiation 5-23-52 to 3-12-52 10- 3-51 10-26-51 Unions 11- 7-51 11-15-51 2-14-52 Carriers Negotiation 8-29-52 16

3-26-53 3-27-53 (4) 4-22-53 4-24-53 (6) (#) Negotiation 4-26-53 9-14-53 12- 7-53 12-16-53 Both 12-16-53 12-16-53 2-17-54 Negotiation 3-26-54 to 12-17-53

11- 9-53 12-17-53 Carriers 12-23-53 12-28-53 5-15-54 Carriers Negotiation 8-21-54 3-14-55 1-18-55 to 5-10-55

9-15-54 9-24-54 Union 10-15-54i 10-16-54i 11-20-54 Negotiation 1- 3-55

1-11-54 10-15-54 Both 11-18-54 11-23-54 3- 2-55 Union Mediation 5-26-55 5-10-55 5-27-55 Union 6-13-55i 6-17-55i 7-30-55 Both Mediation 10-14-55

53

Digitized for FRASER 

http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Table A -5 . Chronology of railroad RLA— Em ergency Board fiscal years 1950-69— Continued

National Date —

Date of request Date of Emer- Mediation of Direct negotiations for mediation gency Board Carriers) Union(s) ^'Section 6” proffer of number number notice Beginning Ending mediation date date Union(s) Carriers)

111 A-4779 \ REA __________ \ IBT 2- 4-55 3- 2-55 3- 3-55 3- 3-55 3- 3-55 A-4860 r 1- 1-55 1-25-55 5-11-55 5-11-55 112 A-4712 New York Central ___ ORCB 4- 1-54 4-28-54 8-19-54 12-21-54 113 A-4717 Pennsylvania______ j* TWU 1-21-53 2-19-53 3-30-54 11-29-54 Ar-4867 Y 8-27-54 9-24-54 12-17-54 1-25-55 114 A-4985 J Albany Port District EWSCCC _______ 12 cooperat- 4- 2-55 (*) (2°) 9-30-55 ingnonoper­ ating unions19 115 A-5245 Spokane, Portland and Seattle--------- BLE 6-22-55 9-17-56 9-19-56 9-19-56

116 A-5248 EWSCCC BRT 2-15-56 (i°) 9-19-56 9-21-56

117 A-5211 REA........... .... - IBT 12-16-55 1-18-56 8-14-56 8-14-56 8-14-56

118 A-5385 Toledo, Lorain and Fairport ] n 1-24-57

A-5386 Dock_________1

Toledo, Lakefront Dock----f UMW [ 10-30-56 J Dec. '56 n

3- 7-57 1-24-57 4-10-57 A-5433 Cleveland Stevedore Co._J J 12-14-56 119 A-5435 General Managers Assoc, of New York22______ MMP 11-20-56 Dec. '56 2-25-57 3-29-57 126 E-218 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe__________ BLE 7- 2-56 11-20-59 11-20-59 2- 8-60 127 A-5866 New York Central-------- ORCB 7-10-58 7-18-58 8- 7-58 8-12-58 129 E-213 Long Island-------- ---- BRT 11- 2-59 11-10-59 12- 1-59 12- 4-59

11 cooper­ 130 A-6157 Akron and Barberton Belt ating 5-29-59 A-6158 EWSCCC ________ S- nonoper­ ating unions28

9- 1-59 >11-23-59 l 1-19-60

1

1-19-60

131 A-6082 Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Western Carriers Conference Committee (WCCC)________ SUNA System Fed­ 3- 2-59 Mar. '59 9-24-59 9-24-59 9-24-59

132 A-5949 l Pennsylvania ... eration No. 52 24 1-21-58 6-26-57 1-21-58 (4) } 2- 4-59} 2- 4-59} 2- 4-59

E-134 TWU 6-26-57 7-26-57 10- 8-57 10-28-57 J TWU 133 A-6217 New York Carriers Conference Committee25 ---------- Railroad 6-25-59 7-30-59 4-29-60 5- 2-60 Marine Harbor Council26 134 A-6352 New York Carriers Conference Committee .. _____ ILA 10-31-59 4-29-60 9-29-60 9-29-60 137 A-6360 Baltimore and Ohio EWSCCC___ __ RYA 10- 1-59 Oct. '59 10-19-60 10-20-60 10-20-60 138 A-5904 \ Southern Pacific ____ "j- ORT 4-24-58 (4) 6- 6-58 10-10-58 A-6083 f 5- 5-59 6- 4-59 8-19-59 8-25-59 139 A-6380 Pullman ________ 1 1

A-6400 Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul > ORCB y 2-27-59 3-30-59 5-26-59 } 9-24-59 & Pacific_______J J 3-31-59 5-27-59J 141 A-6246 Reading_______ __ MMP 3- 3-60 3-30-60 5-12-60 5-26-60 5-26-60 145 A-6627 Akron and Barberton Belt EWSCCC _______ 11 cooperat­ 9- 1-61 Sept. '61 (10) 10-10-61 ingnonoper­ ating unions22 147 A-5696 \ A-5739 J Chicago and Northwestern __ j* ORT 12-23-571 12-19-57J 1-17-58j- 1-17-58 2- 5-58 3- 17-58

148 A-5809 New York Central____ \ ORT 3-27-58 (4) 4-25-58 6- 2-58 A-6063 Pittsburgh and Lake Erie ___j 5- 5-59 6- 3-59 7-11-59 8- 7-59 150 A-6690 Belt Railway______ BLE 9- 7-59 (4) 5- 2-62 5- 3-62

54

Digitized for FRASER 

http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Proffer of 

arbitration

Disposition of emergency board dispute

Initiation

of

mediation

session

Date of 

National 

Mediation 

Board

notification 

to President

Date

mergency board reported With a strike

Type

of

agreement

Date2

of

agreement

Before emergency board 

created or 

during emergency board

Date

Rejected

by

board

created

Dated

Rejected

by

After emergency board 

report issued

4- 20-55

5- 25-55

5- 18-55)

6- 6-55 r Union } 7- 1- 55} 7- 1-55 } 8- 1-55 y Negotiation

} w 1-24-55 3-11-55^ Union 8-11-55 8-13-55J 9-14-55 Union Mediation 10-19-55

2- 3-55 

6-27-55 V 8- 1-55 \ Union j. 8—25—55 9- 1-55 10-26-55^ Union V Negotiation ^ 1- 5-56

10- 5-55 10-27-55 Unions 11- 3-55 11- 7-55 12-12-55 Unions Negotiation 12-21-55

10- 2-56 10- 9-56 Union 12- 3-56 12- 5-56 (8) (5) Negotiation 1-10-57

12- 1-56 

to

12- 6-56

10- 3-56 12-10-56 Union 12-20-56 12-22-56 3-15-57 Union Mediation

(Arbitration)

4- 5-57 

3-20-58

10- 4-56 12-17-56 Union 1-14-57 1-25-57 3-21-57 Union Mediation 7-22-57 4-22-57

to

7-18-57

3-15-57

3- 7-57

4- 15-57

j- 4- 5-57 Union j- 5- 7-57 j 5- 9-57

J

6- 7-57 j- Union

Negotiation

Mediation

(4)

7- 7-57 

9-13-57 

(4)

7- 7-57 

to

9-13-57

5-13-57 6-27-57 Union 8- 5-57 8- 6-57 9-20-57 Union Mediation 10-22-57

2- 8-60 2-11-60 Union 2-11-60 2-12-60 7-15-60 Negotiation 8- 7-61

10-22-58 1- 4-60 Both 2-26-60 2-29-60 6-20-60 Union Mediation 1-27-61

2-17-60 3-11-60 Union 4-12-60 4-18-60 5-18-60

'I

Union Mediation

1

8-10-60 7- 10-60 

to

8- 4-60

1-25-60 ► 3-28-60 l L 4-19-60 l 4-22-60 i 6— 8—60 l Unions > Negotiation l 8-19-60

10-25-59 5- 5-60 Union 5-11-60 5-23-60 7- 8-60 Union Negotiation 10- 1-60

} 2-24-59 

11-19-57

1 10-26-59 i

j J

Unions 1 1 

> 5-18-60

J J

5-20-60 6-24-60 !

J

Unions Mediation

(Arbitration)

9-12-60

8-31-61

1 5-16-60 

j 5-19-60

) 9- 1-60 

> to j 9-12-60

5- 9-60 8-24-60 Unions 9-19-60 9-28-60 12-10-60 Union Mediation 1-23-61 1-10-61

to

1-23-61

10-31-60 12- 6-60 Union 1- 5-61 1-21-61 3- 6-61 Union Negotiation 3-14-61

12- 6-60 3-16-61 Union 5-16-61 5-19-61 7-10-61 Union Mediation 9-27-61

12- 8-60 

11- 4-59

3-14-61) 

3-15-61 r Both i 7-17-61 ] 7-20-61 9-15-61VBoth y Mediation )

^10-29-61

5- 2-61

6- 1-61

1 V

) J ] 1

- J

"I ) J 12- 7-63 V 7-19-61 y

J J

Union y 8- 30-61 y 9- 1-61 >■ 12- 11-61 y Union y Negotiation 4- 9-62

8-29-60 8-28-61 Union 10-11-61 10-11-61

J

12- 5-61 C5) >

Negotiation 11- 2-61

1-30-62 2- 2-62 Unions 2-27-62 3- 3-62 5- 3-62 Unions Negotiation 6- 5-62

| 5-22-58 | 5-27-58 > Both | 4-18-62 - 4-23-62 > 6-14-621

■'j

Union Mediation

(Arbitration)

\

9-28-62 

10- 8-62

8- 30-62 

to

9- 28-62

3-16-59 

12- 8-59 | 1-25-62^ ' Union | 6- 5-62 > 6- 8-62 8-30-62J Union r Negotiation 112-10-62

5- 3-62 6-21-62 Union 8- 2-62 8- 6-62J 3- 4-63 (5) Negotiation J 2-16-63 5- 2-62 

to

5- 3-62

55

Digitized for FRASER 

http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Table A -5. Chronology of railroad RLA— Emergency Boards fiscal years 1950-69— Continued

National Date Date of request 

Mediation for mediationEmerUnion(s)

of Direct negotiations Date of

gency

board

Board Carriers) “Section

6” proffer

of

number number notice Beginning Ending mediation

date date Union(s) Carrier(s)

151 A-6617 Southern Pacific-------------- BRSC 9-22-58 (1 2*4) 1-17-62 1-18-62

153 A-6671 \ 

A-6696 j

REA ___________________| IBT j* 11- 1-61 | 1- 9-62 3- 8-621 

1-10-62J 3- 9-62

154 A-6700 EWSCCC ________________ BLFE, SUNA, 

BLE, BRT, 

ORCB

11- 2-59 (i°) 5-17-62 5-21-62

155 A-6794 Pullman ------------------ ..." | 1 ) 6-12-62"|

A-6795 Chicago, Rock Island and 8-24-62

Pacific ___________ bscp y 9- 1-61 ^ 9-26-61 7- 6-62 y 9- 4-62

A-6796 New York Central________ 1 1 4- 3-62

A-6797 Soo Line ----------------- __J J J J

157 A-6627, Florida East Coast ___ _ 11 cooper- 9- 1-61 (2°) (20) 7-20-62

Sub. 1 ating 

nonoperating 

unions23 67

159 A-6967 EWSCCC_______ _____ _ BRS 2- 1-63 (1°) 0°) 5- 6-53

160 A-7030 National Railway Labor

Conference (NRLC)______ RED27 9 10-15-62 Nov. ’62 (10) 6-28-63

28 161 A-7107 NRLC __________________ RED27 5-31-63 (1°) (10) 1-15-64

28162 A-7127 NRLC __________________ RED29 5-31-63 (10) 1-10-64 1-16-64

28 163 A-7128 NRLC . RED39 5-31-63 (10) 1-24-64 1-28-64

164 A-7173 NRLC __________________ BLFE 12- 2-63 3-17-6418 3-31-64 4-10-64

165 A-6318 Atchison, Topeka and Santa

F e ___________________ BRT 9-28-56 10-26-56 8-12-60 8-24-60

169 A-7949 NRLC, EWSCCC _________ RED27 5-17-66 (i°) July ’66 7-15-66

170 E-322 ) BRT 4- 6-66 (4) 1-23-67 2- 1-67

A-7970 Y Long Island IBEW 5-23-66 6-20-66 9-28-66 10- 6-66

J 1AM

171 A-6285 ^ NRLC .. . . . _ .jLORCB 3- 2-59 (4) (4) 9-24-59 9-24-59

A-7981 f r 7-13-66 11-14-66 11-15-66 11-16-66 11-16-66

172 A-7521, J Belt __________________ s

& Sub. 1 1 (4) 1 (4) 7-30-65

A-7538, Illinois Central _ y12-30-65 y 12-30-65 1- 6-66

& Sub. 1 > J (4) / (4) 8-19-65

A-7566, BRT 7- 6-65 

12-23-65

>1 1- 7-66 \ 1- 7-66 1-14-66

& Sub. 1 1 

A-7567, f Louisville and Nashville V « '

J (4)

(4)

1-21-66

8-12-65

1-26-66

& Sub. l j ' 1- 4-66 1- 4-66 8-12-65

173 E-346 Long Island . BRT (UTU) 7- 2-68 8- 1-68 9-27-68 1-13-66 9-30-68

174 A-8458 "1 9- 1-67

A-8478,

sub. y

NRLC . .. ... _______ 1

EWSCCC ________________j

i- ORCB j> 9-15-67 

4- 1-68 (!0) 9-18-68 9-19-68

32 1-7 i J 9- 1-67 (4) 10-13-67

A-8448 J BLE 4-30-68 (4) 9-13-68 12- 6-67 9—18—68

175 A-8433 NRLC, EWSCCC__________ BRS 3- 1-68 (10) 8-16-68 8-16-68 8—16—68

1 Date that one of the parties first requested the mediatory services 

of the National Mediation Board.

2 Date (1) agreement was reached by the parties, (2) agreement was 

ratified, or (3) arbitration award was rendered.

2 Parties settled directly; no evidence to indicate mediation or arbitra* 

tion was utilized to reach an agreement.

4 No data available.

5 No report or no formal recommendations issued.

6 Mediation agreement.

7 Related disputes that were handled concurrently or separately by the 

same board members.

8 Arbitration agreement.

9 Chicago, Great Western; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific; Davenport,

Rock Island, and Northwestern; Denver and Rio Grande Western; Minneapolis and St. Louis; Railway Transfer Co.; Northern Pacific Terminal Co. 

of Oregon; St. Paul Union Depot Co.; Sioux City Terminal Railway Co.; 

Western Pacific; Great Northern.

10 Negotiations on local properties commenced and/or ended on various 

dates.

11 See footnote 7.

12 IBBDF, IBBISB, BRC(A), IBEW, 1AM, SMWIA, IBFO, BRSC, BMWE, ORT, 

BRS, MMP, NMEB, I LA, HREU, RYA.

13 Apparently steps skipped because of a work stoppage.

14 National conferences.

»IAM, IBBDF, IBBISB, SMWIA, IBEW, BRC(A), IBFO, BRSC, BMWE, ORT, 

BRS, MMP, NMEB, I LA, HREU, ATDA, RYA.

16 Agreement signed with various carriers associated with the Eastern 

Carriers Conference Committee.

56

Digitized for FRASER 

http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Initiation

of

mediation

session

Proffer of 

arbitration

Date

Rejected 

by

Date of 

National 

Mediation 

Board

notification 

to President

Date

emergency

board

created

Emergency boar

Disposition of emergency board dispute

d reported

Type

of

agreement

With a strike

Date2

of

agreement

Before emergency board 

created or 

during emergency board

After emergency board 

Dated report issued

Rejected

by

12-31-62 Union Negotiation 3-16-63

\ -n

(Arbitration)

y 11- 10-62 y Union j ' Negotiation X 1-17-63

5-13-63J Unions Arbitration J 11-26-63 4- 5-63 1- 8-64

(Negotiation) 6-25-64 to to

5- 7-63 4- 7-64

7- 3-63

to

"J

8-28-63

l 11- 2-63 i Union y Negotiation

J

L12-17-63

J J

12-23-63 Carrier None to

J

date 1-23-63 to 2-21-65

4- 3-64 Union Negotiation 5- 1-64

1 8- 7-64 Unions Mediation 9-25-64

[ 10-20-64 Unions Mediation 11-21-64

[ 10-20-64 Unions Mediation 11-21-64

Mediation 2- 4-65 i 10-20-64 Unions Mediation 2- 4-65

Mediation 2- 7-65

\ 11- 5-64 Union Negotiation 12- 2-64

Negotiation 8-13-64 5 (6) (5) Mediation 10-31-61

Mediation 9-25-65

7 3-10-67 Unions Arbitration 9-15-67 7-16-67

Negotiation 9-27-67 to

7-17-67

1 5-29-67

7V 5-12-67 y Unions > Negotiation 6-14-67

\ ^ J

T Negotiation 7- 1-67 7/ w !

(®) r (Arbitration) 7-25-67

4- 4-69 7-29-68

to 4- 8-69 ^ 4-13-69 11- 6-68 to

8 f 12-13-68 > Union ► Negotiation I 2- 8-69 r May’69

11- 6-68 

to

4-12-69

11- 7-68 1-13-69

8 4-21-69 Union Mediation 7- 3-69

(Arbitration) 3-11-70

1 ] l Mediation l 3-19-69

9 I 2-12-69 \ Unions J J | Negotiation 3-10-69 J J Negotiation 3-11-69

9 3- 7-69 Union Mediation 4-21-69

1-29-62

5- 9-62

6- 28-62 

5-23-62

3- 7-63 

11- 6-62

1-17-63

11-19-62

8-15-62

4-13-62

j- 8- l- 6 2 \ 

6-26-62J

10- 22-63 

3-10-64 

3-10-64

3-10-64

7- 30-64

11- 18-60 

10-19-66

2- 7-67

1- 30-67 

Aug. *62

1 2 - 1 -6 6 

1-18-68 

1-18-68

8 - 8 -6 6 

5-28-68

12-30-65

2- 23-66

1- 17-66

2- 23-66 

1 0 -2 2 -6 8

10—31—68

10-15-68

9-24-68

8- 1-63 1! 10-25-63

1-30-64 

8- 5-64 

8- 5-64

8- 5-64

8-19-64

8-15-62

1- 6-67

| 3- 3-671

10— 1—62*1 

3-23-67

} 6- 3-68

} 7-29-68

4- 7-66 

8- 5-68 

4- 7-66 

8— 5—68 

1 1 -2 0 -6 8

11-26-68

11- 25-68

1 2 - 2 -6 8 '

7

Union

Both

Unions

8- 8-62

}

Union

Both

Both

Unions

Unions

Unions

Unions

Union

Union

Unions

Unions 

Both31

Union

Union

Unions

Union

9-11-62 

4- 2-63

}

}

6-25-63 

11- 4-63

•12-20-63

3- 10-64 

8-13-64 

8-13-64

8- 13-64

9- 16-64 

9-11-65 

1-19-67

4- 6-67

5- 23-67

V 1 1 - 6 -6 8

1 2 -2 0 -6 8

1-10-69

1- 2-69

8-10-62

9-14-62

1- 3-64

I

> 1 1 - 6 -6 8

12-27-68

1-13-69

1-13-69

17 1AM, IBBISB, IBBDF, SMWIA, IBEW, MMP, NMEB, HREU, BRC(A), IBFO, 

BRSC, BMWE, ORT, BRS, I LA.

18 On national basis.

13 1AM, IBBIS, SMWIA, IBEW, BRC(A), IBFO, BRSC, BMW, ORT, BRS, NMEB, 

I LA.

20 Did not appear to have bargained.

21 Impasse reached almost immediately.

22 New York Central; New Haven and Hartford; Brooklyn East District 

Terminal; Jay Street Connecting Railroad; New York Dock Railway; Bush 

Terminal; Baltimore and Ohio; Pennsylvania; Erie; Reading; Delaware, 

Lackawanna and Western; Central Railroad of New Jersey.

23 Six shopcraft (1AM, BB, SWMIA, IBEW, BRCA, IBFO) plus BRSC, BMWE, 

ORT, BRS, and HREU.

24 1AM, BB, SMWIA.

25 Baltimore and Ohio; Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal; Bush Terminal; Central Railroad of New Jersey; Erie-Lackawanna; Lehigh Valley; New

York Central; New York Dock Railway; New York, New Haven and Hartford; Pennsylvania; and Reading.

28 MMP, NMEB, SIU.

27 Six shopcraft.

28 See footnote 7.

23 Six shopcraft, BRSC, BMWE, ORT, BRS, HREU.

33 BRS, BMWE, ORT, HREU, BRS (except wages).

31 The carrier in the first case, and the union in the second.

32 Only case A-8478 Sub. 1 used.

NOTE: FEC and union representatives terminated the dispute precipitating Emergency Board No. 157 on Dec. 19, 1971, under a plan preliminarily approved by a Federal judge.

SOURCES: National Mediation Board case files, National Mediation Board 

Annual Reports, Presidential emergency board reports, and Bureau of 

Labor Statistics data.

57

Digitized for FRASER 

http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Table A -6. Railroad work stoppages, by duration and size of unit and group of workers, calendar years 1950-69

W orkers and man-days in thousands

Year

Number 

of work 

stoppages

Number 

of workers 

involved

Size of unit and group of workers

Man-days

idle

Under 100 workers 100 and under 500 workers

Operating

employees

Nonoperating

employees

Both Operating

employees

Nonoperating

employees

Both

1950-691 316 1,429.8 8,418.6 50 26 3 67 35 5

1950 _________ ___ 17 260.9 1,450.3 2 1 — 4 1 —

1951 _____________ 17 75.9 466.7 5 1 2 1 2 —

1952 ____________ 15 48.5 265.1 2 2 _ 3 1 2

1953 _____________ 23 15.6 197.8 3 2 __ 6 2

1954 _____________ 10 3.9 37.0 3 1

_ 2__

1955 _____________ 20 40.2 1,059.2 4 1 — 3 1 _

1956 _____________ 14 7.2 47.2 1 _ 4 4 1

1957 _____________ 15 16.6 494.1 2 1 — 6

1958 ____________ 11 3.3 3.6 1 1 __ 5 2 _

1959 _____ . ____ 10 7.8 69.4 1 — 2 1 1

1960 - ________ 16 100.9 759.4 1 2 2 3 _

1961__________ 9 24.3 169.0 3 1 — 2 1 1

1962 ______ _____ 4 15.7 391.3 1 — 1 1 — —

1963 _____________ 8 3.0 481.7 2 1 — 1 3 —

1964 _____________ 27 46.0 604.4 5 4 — 7 — —

1965 ____________ H 19 46.8 428.2 5 — — 2 3 —

1966 ____________ ^ 23 130.0 371.5 4 1 — 7 3 —

1967 ____________ -j 28 481.1 686.7 2 5 — 3 6 —

1968 ____________ u 19 63.9 318.7 2 2 __ 4 2

_

1969 _____________ 11 38.3 117.4 1 — 2 —

500 and under 1,000 workers 1,000 and under 10,000 workers 10,000 workers and over

Mean2 3

duration 

(in calendar 

days)

Operating

employees

Nonoperating

employees

Both Operating

employees

Nonoperating

employees

Both Operating

employees

Nonoperating

employees

Both

1950-69 1 . .. 23 15 6 40 25 4 12 5 _ 13.0

1950 ___________ 3 — 1 2 1 — 2 — — 4.8

1951 ___________ 1 1 — 2 — 1 1 — — 11.2

1952 ___________ — — — 2 1 1 1 __ _ 23.0

1953 ___________ 1 1 1 3 4 — — — _ 13.4

1954 ___________ — 3 — 1 — — — — — 6.5

1955 ___________ 2 1 1 4 1 1 — 1 — 10.8

1956 ___________ — 1 1 1 1 — — _ _ 11.4

1957 ___________ 2 1 — — 2 1 — — — 12.1

1958 ___________ 1 — — 1 — — — — — 1.5

1959 ....................... 2 — 1 1 1 — — — — 14.5

1960 ___________ 1 — — 5 1 — — 1 — 9.3

1961 ___________ — — — — — — — 1 — 8 48.7

1962 ___________ — — — — — — 1 — — 11.0

1963 ___________ — — — — 1 — — — — 4 128.1

1964 ___________ 3 1 1 3 1 — 2 — — 5.0

1965 ___________ 1 — — 7 — — — 1 — 1.9

1966 ___________ 2 — — 3 2 — 1 — _ 5.1

1967 ___________ — 4 — 3 4 — — 1 _ 8.6

1968 ___________ 2 1 — 1 3 — 2 — — 8.1

1969 ___________ 2 1 — 1 2 — 2 — — 5.5

1 Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals. 4 Includes one 999-day stoppage.

2 Figures are simple averages; each stoppage is given equal weight NOTE: Dashes denote zeros, 

regardless of size.

3 Includes one 392-day stoppage. SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

58

Digitized for FRASER 

http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Table A -7. M ajor issues involved in railroad work stoppages, calendar years 1950-69

[Workers and man-days of idleness in thousands]

General wage changes Supplementary benefits Wage adjustments | Other contractual matters 1 Job security

Year

Number of 

stoppages

Number of 

workers 

involved

Mandays

idle

Number of 

stoppages

Number of 

workers 

involved

Mandays

idle

Number of 

stoppages

Number of 

workers 

involved

Mandays

idle

Number of 

stoppages

Number of 

workers 

involved

Mandays

idle

Number of 

stoppages

Number of 

workers 

involved

Mandays

idle

1950-691 _____ 70 778.0 4,572.1 4 27.6 1,008.3 37 27.6 188.8 1 0.8 0.8 65 430.7 2,035.7

1950 ______________ 8 83.2 672.3 1 0.7 2.8 1 co CO — — — 4 176.6 774.3

1951 ______________ 9 72.4 445.6 — — — 4 1.0 7.3 — — — — — —

1952 ______________ 5 42.5 208.1 _ _ _ 3 0.4 2.9 ___ _ _ 1 0.1 0.3

1953 _____________ 5 3.2 96.2 _ _ _ 7 4.7 77.0 _ _ _ 2 0.6 4.9

1954 ______________ _ _ _ 2 1.5 31.6 _ _ _ 5 0.7 1.1

1955 ______________ 7 2.6 15.6 1 23.9 1,002.5 4 3.2 11.6 _ — _ 3 2.0 2.0

1956 ______________ 3 1.1 22.5 3 3.5 12.0 ___ _ _ 2 1.5 1.7

1957 ______________ 5 13.5 490.6 _ _ _ 1 0.1 0.2 _ _ 3 1.4 1.4

1958 ______________ __ _ ___ 1 CO

0.8

0.1 _ _ _ 8 2.0 2.2

1959 ______________ 1 0.6 47.6 _ _ _ 1 0.8 _ _ _ 3 3.4 16.0

1960 ______________ 5 11.7 193.2 — _ _ 2 6.0 35.5 _ __ __ 4 72.6 504.6

1961 ______________ 3 23.5 237.6 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2 0.1 0.1

1962 _ ________ 1 15.3 320.7

1963 ______________ 1 2.0 1,371.9 — — — — — — — — — 3 0.4 0.4

1964 _____________ 4 23.7 57.1 — — — 1 0.2 3.2 — — — 11 17.8 19.8

1965 ... __________ 4 32.0 33.7 2 3.0 3.0 — — — — — — 3 0.5 1.1

1966 ______________ 1 « CO — — — 2 4.1 4.1 — — — 5 119.0 349.9

1967 ______________ 5 461.1 659.4 _ _ _ 1 0.9 0.9 _ _ 3 3.6 4.7

1968 ______________ 1 1.2 1.2 _ _ _ 4 1.2 1.7 1 0.8 0.8 1 13.0 26.0

1969 ______________ 3 3.7 19.5 — — — 1 0.6 4.6

Jnion organization and security Plant administration Interunion or intraunion matters Other working conditions

1950-69 1 4 2.9 50.7 116 153.2 546.8 14 7.4 12.5 4 1.4 2.5

1950 ___________ 1 0.3 0.3 2 0.4 0.5 — — — — — —

1951 ___________ — — — 4 2.4 14.4 — — — — — —

1952 ___________ — 1.4 48.8 3 2.3 4.2 2 1.8 2.0 — — —

1953 ___________ — — — 9 7.1 18.0 — — — — — —

1954 ___________ — — — 2 1.1 2.4 1 0.6 1.9 — — —

1955 ___________ — — — 5 8.5 27.5 — — — — — —

1956 ___________ — — — 5 1.0 10.6 — — — — — —

1957 ___________ — — — 6 1.7 2.1 — — — — — —

1958 ___________ 1 1.0 1.0 1 0.2 0.2 — — — — — —

1959 ___________ — — — 4 2.4 6.6 1 0.6 1.1 — — —

1960 ___________ — — — 4 10.6 23.4 1 (2) CO — — —

1961 ___________ — — — 4 0.6 1.3 — — — — — —

1962 ___________ — — — 2 0.4 0.4 1 0.1 0.2 — — —

1963 ___________ — — — 4 0.6 1.8 — — — — — —

1964 ___________ — — — 8 3.6 9.6 3 0.7 0.7 — — —

1965 ___________ — — — 9 11.3 11.8 — — — 1 CO CO

1966 ___________ — — — 11 4.1 12.6 3 1.9 3.4 1 0.7 1.5

1967 ___________ — — — 16 13.3 17.9 2 1.7 3.0 1 0.4 0.8

1968 ___________ 1 0.2 0.6 11 47.6 288.6 — — — — — —

1969 ___________ — — — 6 33.8 93.0 — — — 1 0.2 0.2

1 Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals. NOTE: Dashes denotes zeros.

2 Less than 50. SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

59

Digitized for FRASER 

http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Table A-8. Railroad work stoppages, by duration and major group of workers, selected periods, calendar years

1950-69

P erio d an d m ajo r g roup 

o f w o rk ers

All

s to p p a g e s

D uration o f s to p p a g e s

1

day

2 to 3 

d ay s

4 to 6 

day s

7 to 14 

d ay s

15 to 29 

d ay s

30 to 59 

d ay s

60 to 89 

d ay s

90 d ay s 

an d o v e r

A verage 

N um ber p e r s to p p a g e

N um ber o f S to p p a g es

1 9 5 0 -5 4

All s to p p a g e s . --------------------- -------- 82 17 19 15 14 9 4 1 3 * 2 1 .1

O p eratin g e m p lo y ees . . _ _____ 50 12 11 10 9 5 2 1

N o n o p eratin g em p lo y ees . -------- 24 5 6 3 3 3 2 2

B o t h _____________________________ 8 2 2 2 1 1

1 9 5 5 -5 9

All s t o p p a g e s ---------- -------------------- 70 24 22 7 5 4 6 1 1 U 0 . 3

O p eratin g e m p lo y e e s _ . . __ _ 43 19 14 4 2 1 3

N o n o p eratin g e m p l o y e e s _____ 20 5 5 3 2 3 1 1

B o t h '____ 7 3 1 2 1

1 9 6 0 -9 4

All s to p p a g e s ----------------------- . . 6 4 33 11 1 9 3 5 2 * 2 8 .0

O p eratin g e m p lo y ees . . . - 40 18 9 6 2 4 1

N o n o p eratin g e m p l o y e e s _____ . 21 14 2 1 2 1 0 1

B o t h _____________________________ 3 1 1 1

1 9 6 5 -6 9

All s to p p a g e s ___________ - - 100 54 24 11 5 2 2 2 * 6 .1

O p eratin g e m p lo y ees 59 35 12 6 2 2 2

N o n o p eratin g e m p lo y ees - 41 19 12 5 5

B o t h '_____ _______________________

1 9 5 0 -6 9

All s to p p a g e s - . ________ 316 128 76 3 4 33 18 15 4 8 U S X )

O p eratin g e m p l o y e e s ___________ 192 84 46 20 17 10 9 3 3 U O .O

N o n o p eratin g em p lo y ees . . . 106 43 25 12 12 7 3 1 3 1 16.6

B o t h _____________________________ 18 1 5 2 4 1 3 2 1 2 3 .3

W orkers involved [in th o u sa n d s]

1 9 5 0 -5 4

All w o r k e r s ________________ 4 0 4 .8 5 .5 19.4 5 3 .9 3 0 7 .9 10.5 3 .5 (*) 4.1 8 4 .9

O p eratin g em p lo y ees 3 8 2 .9 3 .9 15.1 5 2 .5 3 0 6 .5 1.9 2 .9 (■>

N o n o p eratin g e m p l o y e e s ____ 17.4 1.5 4 .0 .7 .7 7.2 .6 2.7

B o t h _____________ __________ . 4 .5 .3 .7 .7 1.4 1.4

1 9 5 5 -5 9

All w o rk ers _____ ___________ 75.0 10.1 6.7 10.3 13.2 .9 26 .2 7.2 .6 8 1.1

O p eratin g em p lo y ees . . ________ 2 5.1 7 .6 4 .6 6 .4 5 .5 .3 .6

N o n o p eratin g em p lo y ees . . . . 4 5 .7 2.5 1.2 3 .9 6 .6 .6 2 3 .9 7 .2

Both .................. .. . . . . _____ 4 .3 .9 1.0 1.7 .6

1 9 6 0 -6 4

All w o r k e r s _____ .. . . . . 189.9 2 4 .9 2 3 .8 9 .8 103.4 6 .3 19.3 2 .4 8 3 .0

O p eratin g e m p l o y e e s _________ . 7 8.1 2 1.0 2 3.1 8 .4 6 .2 19.1 .4

N o n o p eratin g em p lo y ees . . . . 110.9 3 .3 .8 9 .8 9 5 .0 .1 2 .0

B o t h _____________________________ .8 .6 (?) .2

1 9 6 5 -6 9

All w o r k e r s ..................... 76 0 .1 3 9 .6 4 3 4 .5 175.3 8 .4 .7 .2 1.3 8 7 .6

O p eratin g em p lo y ees . . ____ . 2 4 0 .6 4 9 .5 16.0 172.9 .7 .2 1.3

N o n o p eratin g e m p lo y ees ........... 5 1 9 .4 4 0 .0 4 6 8 .4 2 .6 8 .4

B o t h _____________________________

1 9 5 0 -6 9

All w o rk ers . . _______________________ 1,42 9 .8 130.0 5 3 4 .4 2 4 9 .5 4 3 2 .9 18.3 4 9 .0 7 .4 8 .3 8 4 .5

O p eratin g e m p l o y e e s ____________ 72 6 .7 8 2.1 5 8.7 2 3 1 .9 3 2 0 .4 9 .1 2 2 .6 .3 1.6 8 3 .8

N o n o p eratin g e m p lo y ees ................ 6 9 3 .5 4 7 .4 4 7 4 .4 16.9 110.7 7 .9 2 4 .5 7 .2 4 .7 8 6 .5

B o t h _____________________________ 9 .6 .6 1.2 .8 1.8 1.4 1.9 2 .0 8 .5

M an-days o f id le n e s s [in th o u sa n d s]

1 9 5 0 -5 4

All m a n - d a y s ____ __ . _______ __ 2 ,4 1 6 .9 5 .5 4 2 .7 168.6 1,75 2 .1 151.0 9 3 .9 2 .4 200 .9 4 2 9 .5

O p eratin g em p lo y ees . . . . . 2 ,0 5 7 .9 3 .9 3 4 .5 163.7 1 ,7 4 2 .5 3 9 .1 7 1 .8 2 .4

N o n o p eratin g e m p l o y e e s ________ 2 8 9 .7 1.5 7 .6 2 .0 2 .8 101 .5 2 2 .1 152.2

B o t h _____________________________ 6 9 .3 .6 2 .9 6 .7 1 0.4 4 8 .8

60

Digitized for FRASER 

http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Table A-8. Railroad work stoppages by duration and major group of workers, selected periods, calendar years 1950-

69—Continued

P erio d an d m ajo r g roup 

o f w o rk ers

All

s to p p a g e s

D uration o f s to p p a g e s

1

day

2 to 3 

d ay s

4 to 6 

day s

7 to 14 

d ay s

15 to 29 

d ay s

30 to 59 

d ay s

60 to 89 

d ay s

90 d ay s 

an d o v e r

A verage 

p e r sto p p a g eN um ber

M an-days o f id le n e s s [in th o u sa n d s]— C ontinued

1 9 5 5 -5 9

All m an-days - - - - - - ________ _ 8 1 ,6 7 3 .5 10.1 11.9 4 0 .1 6 7.8 13.2 1,05 9 .1 4 2 6 .3 4 7 .6 4 2 3 .9

O p eratin g em p lo y ees 7 9 .9 7 .6 8 .4 2 3 .2 18.3 4 .4 18.1

N o n o p eratin g e m p lo y ees ________ 1,4 9 8 .6 2.5 2 .2 17.0 3 9 .2 8 .8 1 ,0 0 2 .5 4 2 6 .3

B o th ’ _____ r ____ _________________ ' 9 7 .6 1.2 10.3 3 8 .5 4 7 .6

1 9 6 0 -6 4

All m an-days _________________ . - 6 2 ,4 0 5 .6 2 4 .9 4 8 .5 10.2 68 9 .6 136 .4 4 0 4 .6 1 ,4 6 7 .5 4 3 7 .6

O p eratin g em p lo y ees . . 74 6 .0 2 1 .0 4 6 .4 4 8 .8 135.2 3 9 9 .1 9 5 .5

N o n o p eratin g em p lo y ees - - . . 2 ,0 2 9 .2 3 .3 2.1 10.2 64 0 .5 1.2 1,3 7 1 .9

B o t h __________ __________________ 6 .4 .6 .3 5 .5

1 9 6 5 -6 9

All m an-days ______ _____ . . . 7 1,9 2 2 .5 8 9 .6 692.0 596 .8 5 2.9 11.3 10.0 9 1 .4 4 19.2

O p eratin g em p lo y ees - ______ _ 786 .0 4 9 .5 3 1 .7 59 2 .1 11.3 10.0 9 1 .4

N o n o p eratin g em p lo y ees . . . . 7 5 8 .0 4 0 .0 6 6 0 .3 4 .7 5 2 .9

B o t h _____________________________

1 9 5 0 -6 9

All m a n - d a y s ____ __ _____. . . 8 .4 1 8 .6 130.0 795.1 8 1 5 .6 2 ,5 6 2 .4 3 1 1 .9 1 ,5 5 7 .6 4 3 8 .6 1 ,8 0 7 .3 4 26l6

O p eratin g e m p l o y e e s------------------ 3 ,6 6 9 .8 8 2 .1 121.1 7 7 8 .9 1,8 0 9 .6 189.9 4 8 9 .0 12.4 186.9 4 19.1

N o n o p eratin g e m p l o y e e s ________ 4 ,5 7 5 .5 4 7 .4 6 7 2 .2 3 3 .8 7 3 5 .5 111.6 1,0 2 4 .6 4 2 6 .3 1 ,524.1 4 4 3 .2

B o t h ________________________ 1 — 173.3 .6 1.8 2.9 17.3 10.4 4 4 .0 9 6 .3 4 9.6

1 A verage d u ratio n o f th e s to p p a g e s in th e p erio d .

2 L ess th an 100.

3 A verage n u m b er o f w o rk ers p e r sto p p a g e in th e p erio d .

4 A verage n u m b er o f m an-days o f id le n e ss p e r s to p p a g e in th e 

p erio d .

6 E xcludes a carry -o v er o f 2 ,5 8 0 m an-days, all d u e to o p e ra tin g 

e m p lo y e e s' w ork s to p p a g e s.

6 In clu d e s a c arry -o v er o f 2 ,5 8 0 m an-days from th e 1 9 5 5 -5 9 p erio d 

and ex c lu d e s a c a rry -o v er o f 3 7 8 ,5 6 2 m an-days in th e 1 9 6 5 -6 9 p erio d .

7 In clu d es a c a rry -o v er o f 3 7 8 ,5 6 2 m an-days from th e 1 9 6 0 -6 4 p erio d 

o f w hich 8 ,0 0 0 w ere lo st by o p e ra tin g c r a f ts ’ u n io n s and 3 7 0 ,5 6 2 

by n o n o p e ra tin g c ra fts .

NOTES: B ecau se o f ro u n d in g , su m s o f individual ite m s m ay n o t equal 

to ta ls . D ashes d e n o te z e ro s.

SOURCE: B ureau o f L abor S ta tis tic s .

61

Digitized for FRASER 

http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Table A-9. Railroad work stoppages,1 by major issue and group of workers, selected periods, calendar years 1950-69

(Workers and man-days idle in thousands)

1 9 5 0 -5 4 1 9 5 5 -5 9

W orkers M an-days W orkers M an-days

is s u e s S to p p a g es involved idile S to p p a g es involved id le

N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t

E conom ic iss u e s

W ages ___________________________ _____ — - - 27 32.9 2 0 1 .3 4 9 .7 1 ,4 2 2 .2 5 8 .8 16 2 3 .2 17.7 2 3 .7 5 7 6 .2 3 4 .4

O p eratin g em p lo y ees _ . -------------- - - -------------- 14 190.0 1 ,1 3 9 .4 8 2 .0 2 0 .6

N o n o p eratin g e m p lo y ees - ______________ ____ 10 10.6 27 6 .1 3 1 1.8 4 5 8 .7

B o t h _______________________________________________ 3 0 .8 6.8 5 3 .9 9 7 .0

S u p p le m e n tary b e n e fits __ - - - _______ ______ - - 1 1.2 0 .7 0 .2 2 .8 0 .1 1 1.4 2 3 .9 3 1 .9 1,0 0 2 .5 59.8

O p eratin g e m p lo y ees _ -------- ---------------- - - -- - — — — — — —

N o n o p eratin g em p lo y ees -------- --------- ---------------- — — — 1 2 3 .9 1 ,0 0 2 .5

B o t h _______________________________________________ 1 0.7 2 .8 — .—

W age a d ju s t m e n t s ------------ _____ _ ___________ 17 2 0 .7 7 .7 1.9 118.8 4 .9 10 14.5 7 .6 10.1 2 4 .7 1.5

O p eratin g e m p lo y e e s _______ ____ _ _ ________ 13 5 .7 113.4 5 6.0 19.2

N o n o p eratin g e m p lo y ees . . ... _____ 3 1.9 5.1 5 1.6 5 .5

B o t h . . . . _____ __________ . . . _____ 1 .2 .3 — — —

Total econom ic iss u e s . . . 45 5 4.9 209 .7 5 1 .8 1,5 4 3 .8 6 3.9 27 3 9 .1 4 9 .2 6 5 .7 1 ,6 0 3 .5 9 5 .7

S e c u rity is s u e s

O th er c o n tra c tu a l m a t t e r s ---------------- ------------------

__ __ _ _ .__ __ __ __ _ _ __ __

O p eratin g em p lo y ees ________ _ _____________ - . . — — — — — —

N o n o p eratin g e m p lo y ees ------------------------ ---------- — # — — — — —

B o t h _______________________________________________ — — — — — .—

Union o rg an iz a tio n and s e c u rity _______ _____________ 2 2 .4 1.7 0 .4 4 9.1 2.0 1 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.0 0.1

O p eratin g e m p lo y ees - - - _. ------------------ ---------- 1 0 .3 0.3 1 1.0 1 .0

N o n o p eratin g e m p lo y ees . _ _ _ ______

__ __ _ IM

B o t h _____________________________________ _______ _ 1 1.4 4 8 .8 — — —

Job s e c u rity __________ _______ __ __________________ 12 14.6 177.7 4 3 .9 7 8 0 .6 3 2 .3 19 2 7 .5 10.2 13.6 2 3 .2 1.4

O p eratin g em p lo y e e s — ____ ____ ______ 9 176.9 7 7 9 .4 11 4 .1 4 .1

N o n o p eratin g e m p lo y ees _ __________ ____ 2 0 .7 0 .9 7 6 .0

0 .2

18.9

B o t h _______________________________________________ 1 0 .1 0 .3 1 0 .3

P la n t a d m i n i s t r a t io n ________ ____________ ____________ 20 2 4 .4 13.2 3 .3 3 9 .6 1.6 21 3 0 .4 13.9 18.6 4 6 .9 2 .8

O p eratin g e m p lo y e e s ____ _____ - _ _ ____________ 12 8 .2 2 3 .5 17 11.4 3 4 .0

N o n o p eratin g e m p lo y ees ________________________ 7 3 .6 5.7 4 2 .5 12.9

B o t h _______________________________________________ 1 1.4 1 0.4 __ __ __

O th er w orking c o n d it i o n s ____ _____________ _______ _ — — — __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

O p eratin g e m p lo y e e s _____________________ . _ _ _ _ — — — — — _

N o n o p eratin g e m p lo y ees ------------------------ ----------

B o t h _______________________________________________

In trau n io n o r in te ru n io n m a t t e r s ________ __________

— — — — — —

3 3.7 2 .4 0 .6 3 .9 0 .2 1 1.4 0 .6 0 .7 1.1 0 .1

O p eratin g em p lo y ees ___ __________ __________ 1 1.8 2 .0 1 0 .6 1.1

N o n o p eratin g em p lo y ees ___ __________________ i

B o t h _______________________________________________

2 0 .6 1.9 — — —

Total se c u rity iss u e s ___ ________________ _ 37 45 .1 195.1 4 8 .2 8 7 3 .2 36.1 42 60.9 25.7 34 .3 72.3 4 .3

1 E xcludes o n e 2-day sto p p a g e in 1956 fo r w hich no m ajor issu e w as 2 L ess th a n .05 p e rc e n t,

rep o rted and w hich involved 186 w o rk ers and 37 2 m an-days of id le n e ss.

62

Digitized for FRASER 

http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
1 9 6 0 -6 4 1 9 6 5 -6 9 1 9 5 0 -6 9 1

W orkers M an-days W orkers M an-days W orkers M an-days

S to p p a g es involved id le S to p p a g es involved idle S to p p a g es involved idle

Num bei P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t N um ber P e rc e n t

13 2 0 .3 6 0 .9 3 2 .1 1,8 5 9 .8 6 6.9 14 14.0 4 9 8 .1 6 5.5 713 .9 4 6 .2 70 2 2 .2 7 7 8 .0 5 4 .4 4 ,5 7 2 .1 5 4.3

9 3 3 .9 3 4 4 .0 7 3 4 .8 4 8 .5 38 2 6 0 .7 1,5 5 2 .5

7 4 6 3 .2 66 5 .3 23 5 1 2 .4 2 ,9 1 0 .43 2 6 .8 1,5 1 0 .3

1 0 .2 5 .5 — — — 9 4 .9 109.3

— — — — — — 2 2 .0 3 .0 0 .4 3 .0 0 .2 4 1.3 2 7 .6 1.9 1 ,0 0 8 .3 12.0

— — — 2 3 .0 3 .0 2 3 .0 3 .0

— — — — — — 1 2 3 .9 1 ,0 0 2 .5

— — — — — — 1 0 .7 2 .8

3 4 .7 6.1 3 .2 3 8 .7 1.4 7 7 .0 6 .2 0 .8 6 .6 0 .4 37 11.7 2 7 .6 1.9 188.8 2 .2

3 6 .1 3 8 .7 3 4 .2 4 .3 2 4 2 2 .0 175.6

— — — 4 2 .0 2 .3 12 5 .4 12.9

— — — — — — 1 0 .2 0 .3

16 2 5 .0 6 7 .1 3 5 .3 1,8 9 8 .5 6 8.3 23 2 3 .0 5 0 7 .2 6 6.7 723 .5 4 6 .9 111 3 5 .2 8 3 3 .2 5 8 .3 5 ,7 6 9 .3 6 8.5

1 1.0 0 .8 0.1 0 .8 (2) 1 0 .3 0.8 0 .1 0 .8 00

—

z

— 1 0 .8 0 .8 1 0 .8 0 .8

— _ _ — _ — _ 1 1.0 0 .2 «*> 0 .6 (2) 4 1.3 2.9 0 .2 5 0.7 0 .6

— — — 1 0 .2 0 .6 3 1.5 1.9

_ _ _ _ _ _ 1 1.4 4 8 .8

21 3 2 .8 1 06.2 55.9 8 4 5 .5 3 0 .4 13 13.0 136.7 18.0 3 8 6 .3 2 5.0 65 2 0 .6 4 3 0 .7 3 0.1 2 ,0 3 5 .7 2 4.2

13 18.1 2 0.1 7 134.3 3 7 8 .2 40 3 3 3 .4 1 ,1 8 1 .8

8 8 8 .0 8 2 5 .4 6 2 .4 8.1 23 9 7 .0 8 5 3 .3 — — — — — — 2 0 .3 0 .6

22 3 4 .4 15.9 8 .4 3 6 .5 1.3 53 5 3.0 110.2 14.5 4 2 3 .9 2 7.5 116 3 6 .8 153.2 10.7 5 4 6 .9 6.5

14 4 .6 2 2 .5 3 4 9 0.6 3 7 6 .7 77 114.8 4 5 6 .7

8 11.2 14.0 19 19.6 4 7 .2 3 8 3 7 .0 7 9.8

— — — — — — 1 1.4 10.4 — — — — — — 4 4 .0 1.4 0 .2 2 .5 0 .2 4 1.3 1.4 0.1 2 .5 00

__ — __

4 1.4 2 .5 4 1.4 2 .5

5 7.8 0 .8 0 .4 1.0 00 5 5.0 3 .6 0 .5 6 .4 0 .4 14 4.4 7 .4 0 .5 12.5 0.1 — — 1 0 .4 0 .4 3 2.7 3 .5

3 0 .2 0 .2 4 3 .2 6 .0 9 4.0 8.1

2 0 .6 0 .8 — — — 2 0 .6 0 .8

4 8 7 5 .0 122.8 64.7 8 8 3 .0 3 1 .7 77 7 7.0 2 5 2 .9 3 3.3 8 2 0 .5 5 3.1 20 4 6 4 .8 596 .5 4 1 .7 2 ,6 4 8 .9 3 1 .5

NOTE: B ecau se o f ro u n d in g , su m s o f in d ividual ite m s m ay n o t eq u al SOURCE: B ureau o f Labor S ta tis tic s ,

to ta ls .

63

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“ ” '— — ~ — ' M ajor iss u e

Table A-10. Duration of railroad work stoppages, by major issue, selected periods, calendar years 1950-69

D uration 

in p erio d 

(in c a le n d a r 

days)

N um ber

o f

s to p p a g e s

W ages W age

a d ju s tm e n ts

S u p p lem en ta ry

b e n e fits

Union

o rg an iz a tio n

and

s e c u rity

Job

s e c u rity

P la n t

a d m in istra tio n

O th er

w orking

co n ­

d itio n s

O th er

c o n tra c tu a l

m a tte rs

In trau n io n

o r

in te ru n io n

m a tte rs

1 9 5 0 -5 4 ________________________ 82 27 17 1 2 12 2 0 — — 3

1 d a y ___________ - - -------------------------- 17 3 2 __ 1 4 7 _ _ __

2 to 3 __________________________________ 19 5 3 — — 3 7 — — 1

4 to 6 __________________________________ 15 4 3 1 — 2 3 — — 2

7 to 14 ________________________________ 14 8 3 — — 1 2 — — —

15 to 2 9 ________________________________ 9 3 3 — — 2 1 — — —

3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________ 4 2 2 — — — — — — —

6 0 to 8 9 ________________________________ 1 — 1 — — — — — — —

90 & o v e r _______________ ____________ 3 2 — — 1 — — — — —

1 9 5 5 -5 9 . - * 7 0 16 10 1 1 19 21 — — 1

1 d a y __________ - ................ 24 2 1 1 11 9

__ __ _ _

2 to 3 _________________________ - . . . . * 2 2 4 4 — — 7 5 — — 1

4 to 6 ______________________ ________ 7 — 4 — — 1 2 — — —

7 to 14 _____________________________ 5 2 — — — — 3 — — —

15 to 2 9 _______________________ - . . 4 1 1 — — — 2 — — __

3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________ 6 5 — 1 — — — — — __

6 0 to 8 9 ________________________ _______ 1 1 — — — — — — — —

90 & o v e r __________________ _________ 1 1 — — — — — — — —

1 9 6 0 -6 4 _________ ____________ 64 13 3 — — 21 22 — — 5

1 d ay ---------------------------------------------------- 33 2

__ __ __ 16 11 __ __ 4

2 to 3 __________________________________ 11 3 1 — — 1 6 — — —

4 to 6 __________________________________ 1 — .— — — — 1 — — __

7 to 14 ________________________________ 9 2 1 — — 3 2 — — 1

15 to 2 9 ________________________________ 3 1 1 — — — 1 — — __

3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________

60 to 8 9 ________________________________

90 & o v e r -------- --------------------------------

5 3 — — — 1 1 — — —

2 2 — — — — — — — —

1 9 6 5 -6 9 _ ________________ 100 14 7 2 1 13 53 4 1 5

1 day ---------------------- ---------- -------------- 54 6 4 2 6 3 0 2 1 3

2 to 3 __________________________________ 2 4 3 2 — 1 4 11 1 __ 2

4 to 6 __________________________________ 11 2 1 — — 2 5 1 __ __

7 to 14 ________________________________ 5 2 — — — 1 2 __ __ __

15 to 2 9 ________________________________

3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________

6 0 to 8 9 ________________________________

2 — — — — — 2 — — —

2

__ __ __ _ _ _ 2__ __ __

90 & o v er _____________________________ 2 1 — — — — 1 — — —

1 9 5 0 -6 9 ________________________ * 3 1 6 70 37 4 4 65 116 4 1 14

1 d ay _____________ ___________________ 128 13 7 2 2 37 57 2 1 7

2 to 3 __________________________________ * 7 6 15 10 — 1 15 29 1

__ 4

4 to 6 __________________________________ 3 4 6 8 1 — 5 11 1 — 2

7 to 14 ________________________________ 3 3 14 4 — — 5 9 — — 1

15 to 2 9 ________________________________ 18 5 5 — — 2 6 __ __ __

3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________ 15 10 2 1 — 1 1 __ __ , __

6 0 to 8 9 ________________________________ 4 1 1 — — __ 2 __ __ __

9 0 & o v e r _ . _ _ ______ _______ _ 8 6 — — 1 — 1 — — —

1 In clu d e s o n e c a s e fo r w hich no m ajo r iss u e w as know n. SOURCE: B ureau o f L abor S ta tis tic s .

NOTE: D ash es d e n o te s z e ro s.

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Appendix B

Selected Bibliography

Aaron, Benjamin. “Emergency Dispute Settlement,” Labor Law Developments, 1967.

“National Emergency Disputes: Is There A Final Solution,” Wisconsin Law R eview, No. 1, 1970.

“Observation on the United States Experience,” Labor L aw Journal, Vol. 14, No. 8, 

August 1963.

American B ar Association. Final R eport of the A d H oc Com m ittee to Study National

Emergency Disputes, 1966.

Association of American Railroads. Yearbook of Railroad Facts, 1950-66, Washington, 

D.C.

Blackman, John. Presidential Seizures in Labor Disputes, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Press, 

1969.

Burgoon, Beatrice M. “Effects of the Structure of Collective Bargaining in Selected Industries: The Railway Industry,” Labor Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 8, August 1970.

Cole, David. “U.S. Intervention Kills Collective Bargaining,” Nations Business, March 

1962.

Cullen, Donald. National Emergency Strikes, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University, 1968.

Curtin, William. “National Emergency Disputes Legislation: Its Needs and Its Prospects in 

the Transportation Industry,” Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 55, April 1967.

Derber, Milton. Collective Bargaining in the Quasi-Public Sector, Institute of Labor and 

Industrial Relations, University of Illinois, 1970.

Ernest, Dale and Robert Raimon. “Management, Unionism and Public Policy on the Railroads and the Airlines,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, July 

1958.

Federal Legislation to E nd Strikes: A Docum entary History, Vols. 1-2, Washington, D.C., 

Government Printing Office, May 1967.

Friedlaender, Ann F. The Dilemma of Freight Transport Regulation, Washington, D.C., 

Brookings Institution, 1969.

Fulton, Joseph F. The Railway Firemen Manning Dispute: H istory and Issues, 1 9 59-70,

Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1971.

Harber, William and M ark L. Kahn. “Maintenance of Way Employment,” M onthly Labor

Review, Vol. 80, No. 10, October 1957 and Vol. 80, No. 11, November 1957.

Hardman, J. C. “Cooperation in Collective Bargaining: The Airlines and Railroads Try

65

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Novel Approaches,” Quarterly R eview of Economics and Business, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 1962.

Herlong, A. Sidney. “Transportation Strikes: A Proposal For Corrective Legislation,” 

Fordham Law Review, Vol. 36, December 1967.

Horowitz, Morris A. “Labor’s Role in the Declining Railroad Industry,” Labor Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 7, July 1958.

Kaufman, Jacob J. “Emergency Boards Under the Railway Labor Act,” Labor Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 12, December 1958.

“Logic and Meaning of Work Rules on the Railroads,” Industrial Relations R esearch Association Proceedings, Vol. 14, December 1961.

“The Railroad Labor Dispute: A M arathon of Maneuver and Improvisation,” Industrial and Labor Relations R eview , Vol. 18, January 1965.

Krislov, Joseph. “Representation Disputes in the Railroad and Airline Industries,” Labor

Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, February 1956.

Lecht, Leonard A. Experience Under Railway Labor Legislation, New York, N.Y., Columbia University Press, 1955.

Levine, Marvin J. “The Railroad Crew Size Controversy Revisited,” Labor Law Journal,

Vol. 20, No. 6, June 1969.

Levine, Morton. “Adjusting to Technology on the Railroads,” M onthly Labor Review, Vol. 

92, No. 11, November 1969.

Levinson, David. “The Locomotive Firemen’s Dispute,” Labor Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 

11, November 1966.

“Railway Labor Act— A Record of A Decade,” Labor Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, 

January 1952.

Leviton, T. S. and P. D. Bazazian. “Strikes-Toward A Total Answer,” Journal of Urban

Law, Vol. 45, 1967.

Marsh, Michael. Strike Control Proposals in Light of Railroad Industry Experience, Washington, D.C., RLEA, 1967.

Marshall, Anthony P. “New Perspectives on National Emergency Disputes,” Labor Law

Journal, Vol. 18, No. 8, August 1967.

Murphy, Edward. “Injunctive Prevention of Strikes on Railroads and Airlines,” Labor Law

Journal, Vol. 9, No. 5, May 1958.

Northrup, H. R. Compulsory Arbitration and Governm ent Intervention in Labor Disputes,

Washington, D.C., Labor Policy Association, 1966.

Oliver, Eli L. “Labor Problems of the Transportation Industry,” Law and Contemporary

Problems, Vol. 25, No. 1, Winter 1960.

R eport of the Presidential Railroad Commission, Washington, D.C., Government Printing 

Office, February 1962.

Richardson, Reed. The Locom otive Engineer, 1863-1963, Ann Arbor, Mich., Bureau of 

Industrial Relations, University of Michigan, 1963.

Riche, M artha F. “Railroad Unemployment Insurance,” M onthly Labor R eview, Vol. 90, 

No. 11, November 1967.

Shils, Edward B. “Industrial Unrest in the Nation’s Rail Industry,” L abor Law Journal, Vol. 

15, No. 2, February 1964.

66

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Sloane, Arthur. “National Emergency Strikes: The Danger of Extralegal Success,” Business Horizons, Summer 1967.

Stem, James. “Alternative Dispute Settlement Procedures,” Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 

41, Fall 1968.

Troy, Leo. “Labor Representation On American Railways,” Labor History, Vol. 2, No. 3, 

Fall 1961.

U.S. Congress, House. Railway Labor Disputes, Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 69th Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 7180, 1926.

U.S. Congress, House. Railroad W ork R ules Dispute, Hearings before the Committee on 

Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 

on H.J. Res. 565, 1963.

U.S. Congress, Senate. R ailway Labor A ct, Hearings before the Committee on Interstate 

Commerce, U.S. Senate, 69th Congress, 1st Session, on S. 2306, 1926.

U.S. Congress, Senate. Railroad W o rk Rules Dispute, Hearings before the Committee on 

Commerce, Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, on S.J. Res. 102, 1963.

U.S. Congress, Senate. To Prohibit Strikes and to Provide for Compulsory Arbitration in

the Railroad Industry, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Railway Labor Act. 

Amendments of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, on S. 3463, 1950.

U.S. Department of Labor

Analysis of W ork Stoppages, annual bulletins, 1950-69.

Em ploym ent and Changing Occupational Patterns in the Railroad Industry, 1963.

H andbook of Labor Statistics, 1970.

Index of Output Per Man-Hour, Selected Industries, 1939 and 19 4 7 -6 9 , 1970.

Productivity in the Railroad Industry, 1970.

Railroad Shopcraft Fact Finding Study, September 1968.

U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission, Eighty-Third Annual R eport on Transport Statistics in the United States for the Year E nded Decem ber 31, 1969, Washington, D.C., 

Government Printing Office, 1970.

U.S. National Mediation Board. Adm inistration of the Railway Labor A ct B y the National

M ediation Board, 1 934-70, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1971.

U.S. National Mediation Board. Annual reports, 1950-70, Washington, D.C., Government 

Printing Office.

U.S. National Mediation Board. Determination of Craft or Class of the National M ediation Board, July 1 , 1934-June 3 0 ,1 9 4 8 , Vol. 1, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1948.

U.S. National Mediation Board. Presidential emergency board reports, (Nos. 76-89, 9 1 - 

93, 95-98, 104-107, 109-119, 126-127, 129-134, 137-139, 141, 145, 147-148, 

150-151, 153-155, 157, 159-165, 169-178).

Wisehart, A rthur M. “Transportation Strike Control Legislation: A Congressional Challenge,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 66, June 1968.

ft U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTIN6 OFFICE: 1972 0-469-548

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The 1972-73 edition of the H andbook reflects the effects of technological 

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The 1972-73 H andbook describes m ore th an 20 occupations not covered in 

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