RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 19a0292p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

LOCAL 1982, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S 

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MIDWEST TERMINALS OF TOLEDO, INTERNATIONAL,

INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 19-3319

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo.

No. 3:17-cv-01688—Jeffrey James Helmick, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: December 10, 2019

Before: ROGERS, STRANCH, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Ronald L. Mason, Aaron T. Tulencik, MASON LAW FIRM CO., L.P.A., Dublin, 

Ohio, for Appellant. Joseph C. Hoffman, Jr., Joseph D. Mando, FAULKNER, HOFFMAN & 

PHILLIPS, LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

STRANCH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which ROGERS and THAPAR, JJ., 

joined. THAPAR, J. (pp. 7–10), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. For the third time, we are asked to review this 

dispute over a labor arbitration award issued in 2012. In short, Local 1982 of the International 

>
No. 19-3319 Local 1982, Int’l Longshoremen Ass’n 

v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo

Page 2

Longshoremen’s Association successfully pursued a grievance against Midwest Terminals to 

enforce their contract requiring Midwest to establish pension and welfare trust fund plans that 

comply with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). In 2014, we enforced the 

Joint Grievance Committee’s award in Local 1982 I. When disputes arose about implementing 

that award, Local 1982 returned to court seeking clarification from the Committee, composed of 

one employer and one union arbitrator. Midwest argued that no ambiguity existed and by 

engaging in negotiations it had complied with the award and the grievance was terminated. We 

ultimately affirmed remand of the award to the arbitrators for clarification, Local 1982 II, but 

before that could occur, Midwest’s CFO was appointed to the Committee as the representative 

for the employers; a deadlock resulted. Local 1982 sought to follow the next step of the 

grievance procedure in the contract; Midwest refused, arguing that the deadlock terminated the 

grievance procedure. The district court ordered the parties to proceed to the next step. We 

AFFIRM. 

I. BACKGROUND

Our prior decisions set out the specific facts, which are briefly summarized here. At the 

time of the initial dispute, Local 1982 and Midwest were parties to a collective bargaining 

agreement (CBA) that consisted of a Master Agreement, formed between the parties’ affiliated 

regional employer group and the union, and a Local Agreement between the parties. Local 1982, 

Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo, Int’l, Inc., 560 F. App’x 529, 530 

(6th Cir. 2014) (“Local 1982 I”). Both agreements have provisions that address the benefit, 

pension, and welfare plans relevant to the underlying dispute. Id. at 531-32. 

In 2011, the union filed a grievance against Midwest for its failure to establish and 

contribute to such trust plans under Section 5.5A of the Master Agreement. After Midwest 

responded to the Union that it considered the grievance procedurally invalid, the Union escalated 

the grievance to Step Two of the Master Agreement grievance procedure—referral to a Joint 

Grievance Committee comprised of an employer representative and a union representative. Id. at 

532. 
No. 19-3319 Local 1982, Int’l Longshoremen Ass’n 

v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo

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Midwest refused to participate and did not respond to the requests of the Joint Grievance 

Committee for explanation and cooperation; the hearing went forward without Midwest present. 

Id. at 532-33. The central question at the hearing was whether Midwest established ERISAcompliant funds in accordance with Section 5.5A of the Master Agreement, which sets out “[t]he 

minimum contribution to affiliated local union and employer ERISA approved benefit, pension, 

and welfare plans.” The Committee determined that Midwest had failed to do so and issued its 

ruling against Midwest. Id. at 533. Under the Master Agreement, Midwest could appeal the 

unfavorable award within ten days but did not do so; the award became final and binding, and 

the union filed suit to enforce it. Id. at 534-35. Finding that any contract ambiguity is an issue 

for the arbitrator, not the courts, we directed the district court to enter an order enforcing the 

award. Id. at 537, 540. 

Shortly thereafter, the parties were back in court, this time over ambiguities in the content 

of the award. The district court found that the award was ambiguous and remanded to the 

Committee for clarification. We affirmed in Local 1982 II, finding that where an award “leaves 

doubt whether the submitted grievance has been fully executed, an ambiguity arises which the 

arbitrator is entitled to clarify.” Local 1982, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Midwest Terminals 

of Toledo, Int’l, Inc., 694 F. App’x 985, 987 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Local 1982 II”) (internal brackets, 

citations, and quotation marks omitted). We ruled that the award should be remanded for 

clarification, rejecting Midwest’s argument that it complied with the award by negotiating about 

terms and conditions of the trust agreement; we reasoned that those actions failed to fulfill “the 

CBA requirement for the creation of a trust fund” and “[c]ommon sense dictates that the 

Committee intended something more.” Id. at 989. 

After the remand but before clarification of the award, the composition of the two-person 

Committee changed. Over the opposition of the union, Midwest appointed its Chief Financial 

Officer, Fred Diechert, to replace the employer representative on the Committee. The new twoperson Committee deadlocked in clarifying the award. Local 1982 sought to escalate the 

grievance to Step 3 of the Master Agreement for review by an expanded grievance committee to 

resolve the deadlock. Midwest opposed the escalation and argued that Local 1982’s earlier 

efforts to confirm the arbitration award rendered it final, and a deadlock in interpreting the award 
No. 19-3319 Local 1982, Int’l Longshoremen Ass’n 

v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo

Page 4

terminated the procedure. The district court found Midwest’s arguments to be unavailing, and 

Midwest appeals. 

II. ANALYSIS

This litigation is principally about the definition of a minimally compliant ERISA plan. 

“ERISA is a complex statute, but its purpose is simple: to establish a uniform regulatory regime 

for plan administration that protects monies belonging to plan beneficiaries while such funds are 

held and managed by others.” Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 434 (6th Cir. 2019) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). With few exceptions, ERISA requires 

compliant plans to hold assets for plans in trust, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a), and plan assets may be 

used only to provide benefits and pay reasonable expenses and “shall never inure to the benefit 

of any employer,” 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1). An ERISA plan fiduciary may be an employer, but 

the fiduciary is required to act “solely in the interest of the [Plan] participants and beneficiaries,” 

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), and must not “deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for 

his own account,” 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1). While the details are in dispute and require further 

clarification, the award here mandates the establishment of plans that comply with these 

principles. We turn to the procedures at issue.

The district court remanded the case for further clarification of an arbitration award 

previously confirmed by this circuit in Local 1982 I. The parties dispute whether we should 

review the district court’s decision de novo or for an abuse of discretion. That issue turns on 

whether the district court’s decision to remand was based on application of the law of the case. 

Compare M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 143 F.3d 1033, 1037–38 (6th Cir. 1998), 

with Rouse v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 300 F.3d 711, 715 (6th Cir. 2002). Midwest loses under 

either standard.

Midwest argues on appeal that the grievance terminated because neither party filed a 

timely notice of appeal when the award was issued in 2012, and the clarification of the award 

resulted in a deadlock.1 But the practical consequence of this argument is that the winning party 

1Neither party has argued that this question should be decided by an arbitrator rather than a court. See John 

Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555–59 (1964); United SteelWorkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Saint 
No. 19-3319 Local 1982, Int’l Longshoremen Ass’n 

v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo

Page 5

in an arbitration would have to appeal a favorable decision or risk losing the relief sought. This 

frustrates the purpose of grievance proceedings. Local 1982 had no reason to appeal an award in 

its favor but every reason to enforce a final arbitral award in the courts. As noted in multiple 

decisions in this case, moreover, Midwest chose not to participate in the initial proceeding. 

It cannot argue now that the case is closed on an alternative ground when courts have already 

affirmed the legitimacy of the proceeding. See Marino v. Writers Guild of America, E., Inc., 

992 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A party may not sit idle through an arbitration procedure 

and then collaterally attack that procedure on grounds not raised before the arbitrators when the 

result turns out to be adverse.”).

It is also well settled that final arbitration awards may be remanded back to the original 

arbitrator or arbitration committee for clarification. See, e.g., Indus. Mut. Ass’n, Inc. v. 

Amalgamated Workers, Local Union No. 383, 725 F.2d 406, 412 n.3 (6th Cir. 1984) (“A remand 

is proper, both at common law and under the federal law of labor arbitration contracts, to clarify 

an ambiguous award or to require the arbitrator to address an issue submitted to him but not 

resolved by the award.”); United Steelworkers of Am., Local 4839 v. New Idea Farm Equip. 

Corp., 917 F.2d 964, 968 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Because there had been no timely motion to vacate, 

modify or correct the award, the district court could not have remanded for the purpose of 

modifying or correcting the award. But it did have the authority to remand for clarification.”); 

M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 143 F.3d 1033, 1038 (6th Cir. 1998) (“An ambiguous 

award may not be enforced but should be remanded to the arbitrator.”). 

Midwest’s argument, unadorned by precedent, is that the grievance is terminated, and 

that the award is unenforceable because it cannot be clarified by the initial arbitration 

Committee. But the award does not lose its effect simply because the original Committee cannot 

agree on a clarification of its contents. As established by the governing CBA, Step 3 of the 

grievance procedure specifies that if a grievance “is not satisfactorily settled or adjusted in Step 

2, it shall be referred to an Expanded Joint Grievance Committee,” the membership of which is 

Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 505 F.3d 417, 420–22 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc). So we need not resolve whether 

it otherwise would be. 
No. 19-3319 Local 1982, Int’l Longshoremen Ass’n 

v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo

Page 6

then defined. The district court properly remanded the dispute to the next step of the grievance 

procedure. We previously ordered the parties to fulfill “the CBA requirement for the creation of 

a trust fund,” Local 1982 II, 694 F. App’x at 989, and the process must now continue as set out 

in the CBA until that is accomplished. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order that the parties proceed 

with the grievance and arbitration procedure set forth in the Master CBA.
No. 19-3319 Local 1982, Int’l Longshoremen Ass’n 

v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo

Page 7

_________________

CONCURRENCE

_________________

THAPAR, Circuit Judge, concurring. Courts have long struggled to define what it means 

for a decision to be “final.” Over a century ago, the Supreme Court observed that “[p]robably no 

question of equity practice” had “been the subject of more frequent discussion” and confessed 

that its cases on the issue were “not altogether harmonious.” McGourkey v. Toledo & O.C. Ry. 

Co., 146 U.S. 536, 545–46 (1892). And matters have not improved much since then. See, e.g., 

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) (“No verbal formula yet devised can 

explain prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an utterly reliable guide for the 

future.”). Even so, courts should do the best they can to bring some coherence to the doctrine. 

I write separately to flag one such area for our court.

This appeal arises from a long and somewhat complicated procedural history. But here 

most of the details don’t matter. Almost a decade ago, Local 1982 of the International 

Longshoremen’s Association received an arbitration award against Midwest Terminals of 

Toledo. In an initial appeal, our court confirmed the award and ordered it enforced. Local 1982, 

Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo, Int’l, Inc., 560 F. App’x 529 (6th 

Cir. 2014) (Local 1982 I). In a later appeal, we affirmed an order remanding the award back to 

the arbitrator for clarification. Local 1982, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Midwest Terminals of 

Toledo, Int’l, Inc., 694 F. App’x 985 (6th Cir. 2017) (Local 1982 II). In this third appeal, 

Midwest challenges another order remanding the award for clarification.

Neither party questions our jurisdiction. Perhaps because our circuit has held that an 

order remanding an award back to the arbitrator for clarification is a “final decision” and thus 

appealable. M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 326 F.3d 772, 779–81 (6th Cir. 

2003) (per curiam). But that holding seems inconsistent with much of the law in this area.

Start with the principle of finality. The Supreme Court has made clear that a “final 

decision”—in the arbitration context and more generally—“ends the litigation on the merits and 

leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. 
No. 19-3319 Local 1982, Int’l Longshoremen Ass’n 

v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo

Page 8

v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000) (citation omitted). And that rule applies no less to 

proceedings that occur after the district court has entered a final judgment—as is the case here. 

Indeed, our circuit (like others) has explained that courts should view finality in post-judgment 

proceedings the same way they view finality more generally: they should ask whether the 

decision ends the post-judgment litigation. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 920 F.3d 

1103, 1105–08 (6th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases).

So does a remand order end the litigation? It doesn’t seem like it. Courts remand 

arbitration awards for clarification because they can’t enforce ambiguous awards. See M & C 

Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 143 F.3d 1033, 1038 (6th Cir. 1998). The remand allows the 

arbitrator to complete its assigned task (i.e., resolve the dispute between the parties) and allows 

the court to review the award with more information. See Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 

967, 977 (6th Cir. 2000). By all appearances, then, the remand does not end the litigation. 

Rather, it contemplates that the parties will soon return to court for further enforcement 

proceedings. 

If you have any doubts on that score, just look at our past cases. Recall that our court 

previously exercised jurisdiction over a remand order. See Local 1982 II, 694 F. App’x at 986. 

And now the parties have returned to court with further grievances related to the remand. 

Ironically, this has happened before—in the very case that held that remand orders are final 

decisions. See M & C Corp., 326 F.3d at 774–78. So both logic and experience show that 

remands don’t end the litigation on the merits. 

Probably for that reason, every other circuit to address the issue has held (or at least 

implied) that an order that simply remands an award back to the arbitrator for clarification is not 

a final decision. See, e.g., Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 328 (1st Cir. 2000); 

Landy Michaels Realty Corp. v. Local 32B-32J, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 954 F.2d 

794, 795–98 (2d Cir. 1992); Virgin Islands Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Constr. Servs. Corp., 

27 F.3d 911, 913–14 (3d Cir. 1994); Murchison Capital Partners, L.P. v. Nuance Commc’ns, 

Inc., 760 F.3d 418, 420–23 (5th Cir. 2014); Jays Foods, L.L.C. v. Chem. & Allied Prod. Workers 

Union, Local 20, AFL-CIO, 208 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2000); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United 
No. 19-3319 Local 1982, Int’l Longshoremen Ass’n 

v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo

Page 9

Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1993); Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. Int’l Chem. Workers 

Union Council/UFCW Local 121-C, 776 F. App’x 939, 940–41 (9th Cir. 2019) (order); cf. 

Sanchez v. Elizondo, 878 F.3d 1216, 1219 n.1 (9th Cir. 2018).

Finally, consider how our own circuit (as well as most other circuits) treats remand orders 

in three analogous contexts:

• Administrative Agencies. A remand back to an administrative agency for further 

proceedings is generally not final and appealable. See Schuck v. Frank, 27 F.3d 194, 196 

(6th Cir. 1994); see also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. S.E.C., 873 F.2d 325, 329–30 

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (collecting cases).

• ERISA Administrators. A remand back to an ERISA plan administrator for further 

proceedings is generally not final and appealable. See Bowers v. Sheet Metal Workers’ 

Nat. Pension Fund, 365 F.3d 535, 536 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Mead v. Reliastar Life 

Ins. Co., 768 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (collecting cases).

• Bankruptcy Courts. A remand back to a bankruptcy court for further proceedings is 

generally not final and appealable. See Settembre v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 552 F.3d 

438, 441 (6th Cir. 2009); see also In re Holland, 539 F.3d 563, 565 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(collecting cases).

These cases provide a simple rule: remand orders are generally not final and appealable.

Of course, as with most rules, there are exceptions. Courts have recognized that a 

remand order can be immediately appealable if a statute provides as much, see Bowers, 365 F.3d 

at 537–38, or if the remand involves purely ministerial matters, see Settembre, 552 F.3d at 441, 

or if the remand can only be challenged through an immediate appeal, see Schuck, 27 F.3d at 

196–97. But these exceptions are exactly that: exceptions to the general rule that remand orders 

are not final and appealable. 
No. 19-3319 Local 1982, Int’l Longshoremen Ass’n 

v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo

Page 10

In the end, nothing in this case turns on whether we exercise jurisdiction over the remand 

order. Either way, the parties will return to arbitration to clarify the award. And regardless, this 

panel must follow our binding precedent on the issue. But in a future case, I would encourage 

our court to take another look at our precedent in this area.