Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

James E. Saylor

Carlisle, IN

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Frances Barrow

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James E. Saylor,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana ex rel. 

Department of Workforce 

Development, 

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 25, 2020 

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CC-343 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of 

Lawrence County 

The Honorable Nathan Nikirk, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

47C01-0411-CC-1357 

May, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 2 of 10

[1] James E. Saylor1 appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in 

favor of the State of Indiana ex. rel. Department of Workforce Development 

(“DWD”). He argues the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him 

and the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of DWD. We 

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

1. Administrative Action

[2] Saylor received unemployment compensation insurance benefits from July 19, 

2003, until November 22, 2003. On April 20, 2004, DWD mailed a 

determination of eligibility letter to Saylor seeking repayment of the benefits 

given to Saylor between October 10, 2003, and November 22, 2003, because 

Saylor was incarcerated during that period and, thus, ineligible for benefits. 

Saylor requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and the 

ALJ set the matter for hearing on July 1, 2004. Saylor did not appear at the 

appeal hearing, and the ALJ dismissed Saylor’s appeal. The notice of dismissal 

stated the ALJ’s “determination will become final unless the party requesting 

the appeal files a written request for reinstatement within seven days from the 

mailing date of this Notice and shows good cause why the appeal should be 

1 Saylor is currently incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction serving sentences for Class A 

felony child molesting, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3 (1998), and Class B felony vicarious sexual gratification, Ind. 

Code 35-42-4-5 (2003). His earliest possible release date is February 14, 2075. Indiana Department of 

Correction Offender Search [https://perma.cc/CVN4-GL73]. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 3 of 10

reinstated.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 125.) Saylor did not take any 

additional action at the administrative level.

2. Collection Action

[3] On November 29, 2004, DWD filed a complaint in the Lawrence County 

Superior Court2 alleging Saylor had not fully repaid the illegal unemployment 

benefits he received. DWD moved for default judgment after Saylor failed to 

appear in the collection action. The court granted the State’s motion on 

September 6, 2005, and entered judgment in the State’s favor for $1,731. 

[4] Saylor filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 

60(B) on June 27, 2016. In his motion for relief from judgment, Saylor stated 

that he was not aware the court had entered default judgment against him until 

he learned DWD intercepted his 2015 state and federal income tax refunds.

The trial court denied his motion, and Saylor appealed to this court. We held 

the trial court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over Saylor due to 

inadequate service, and we remanded the case with instructions for the trial 

court to vacate the default judgment entered against Saylor. Saylor v. State, 

47A04-1611-CC-2641, 2018 WL 895547, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2018). 

We did not address the other arguments Saylor raised on appeal, concluding the 

“issues should be addressed on remand.” Id. at *1 n.3.

2 The case was later transferred to the Lawrence County Circuit Court pursuant to a change in the local rules.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 4 of 10

[5] On March 1, 2018, Saylor filed a “Motion for Return of Property Seized by 

State Agency” in the trial court, and he subsequently amended the motion. 

(Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 2.) In response to Saylor’s amended motion, DWD

argued,

as Respondent has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of this 

Court through his requests for relief and various motions, the 

Department requests that the Court take judicial notice of its 

personal jurisdiction over Respondent in this matter, so as to 

allow the Department to move forward with the proceedings

towards obtaining judgment against Respondent.

(Id. at 17.)

[6] Following a hearing in which Saylor appeared telephonically, the trial court 

denied Saylor’s motion for return of property and found he had submitted 

himself to the personal jurisdiction of the court. The trial court went on to 

explain that because the initial default judgment granted to DWD “was 

determined by the Indiana Court of Appeals to be void on a procedural basis 

(lack of personal jurisdiction), and not due to any factual basis or invalid claim, 

the substantive nature of the claim has not changed and [DWD] still has a right 

to pursue a final judgment.” (Id. at 45.) Saylor attempted to pursue a 

discretionary interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order on his motion for 

return of property, but we denied the motion for interlocutory appeal on 

December 5, 2018. Saylor v. State, 18A-CC-02580, slip op. at *2. (Ind. Ct. App. 

Dec. 5, 2018). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 5 of 10

[7] Saylor subsequently filed a motion to dismiss DWD’s complaint pursuant to 

Indiana Trial Rule 41 on January 9, 2019, and the trial court denied Saylor’s 

motion on February 5, 2019. DWD filed a motion for summary judgment on 

December 6, 2019. DWD argued the administrative order finding Saylor 

illegally received unemployment benefits while incarcerated was a final agency 

order not subject to collateral attack and, therefore, DWD was entitled to 

collect on that action. Saylor argued the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction 

over him because DWD never properly served him, and he argued the ALJ’s 

order dismissing his appeal in the administrative action was not a valid agency 

action. On January 10, 2020, the trial court granted DWD’s motion for 

summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of DWD for $1,621.76. 

Discussion and Decision

[8] Initially, we note Saylor proceeds before this court pro se. A pro se litigant “is 

held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent 

leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 

N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). “This means that pro se litigants are bound to 

follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the 

consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied. Pro se litigants have “‘no license to harass 

others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already 

overloaded court dockets.’” Zavodnik, 17 N.E.3d at 266 (quoting Farguson v. 

MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 6 of 10

A. Personal Jurisdiction 

[9] Saylor argues DWD never properly served him and, therefore, the trial court 

never acquired personal jurisdiction over him. “Personal jurisdiction is the 

court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process and render a valid 

judgment over a person. The existence of personal jurisdiction over a defendant 

is a constitutional requirement to rendering a valid judgment, mandated by the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Keesling v. Winstead, 858 

N.E.2d 996, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). It is generally within the trial court’s discretion to determine facts that 

may decide whether the court possesses personal jurisdiction over a litigant. Id. 

However, once those jurisdictional facts are determined, the existence of 

personal jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. at 

1001.

[10] An individual “who seeks affirmative relief from a court voluntarily submits 

himself to the jurisdiction of the court, and is thereafter estopped from 

challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction.” Sims v. Beamer, 757 N.E.2d 1021, 

1025 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Similarly, a litigant “can waive lack of personal 

jurisdiction and submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court if he responds or 

appears and does not contest the lack of jurisdiction.” Heartland Resources, Inc. 

v. Bedel, 903 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Even if a party timely 

objects to jurisdiction, it may still be estopped from raising a jurisdictional 

challenge ‘if subsequent actions by the [party] go beyond matters of defense and 

seek affirmative relief from the court.’” Allen v. Proksch, 832 N.E.2d 1080, 1096-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 7 of 10

97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Hotmix & Bituminous Equip. Inc. v. Hardrock 

Equip. Corp., 719 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. 

denied). 

[11] Our first opinion in the collection action vacated the default judgment entered 

against Saylor, but it did not prohibit DWD from continuing to pursue the 

collection action. See Saylor v. State, 47A04-1611-CC-2641, 2018 WL 895547, at 

*1 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2018). On remand, Saylor sought affirmative relief 

from the trial court when he petitioned the court to order DWD to return his 

intercepted tax refunds. Thus, Saylor submitted himself to the trial court’s 

jurisdiction, and the trial court had personal jurisdiction over him when it 

granted DWD’s motion for summary judgment in 2020. See Allen, 832 N.E.2d

at 1097 (holding father estopped from challenging trial court’s jurisdiction over 

child custody case when father filed motion to modify custody and information 

for contempt in the court).

B. DWD’s Summary Judgment Motion 

[12] Saylor also argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor 

of DWD. Our standard for reviewing a trial court’s order on summary 

judgment is well-settled.

We review summary judgment using the same standard as the 

trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the 

designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316, 320 (Ind. 2016). All facts 

and reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the non-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 8 of 10

moving party. City of Beech Grove v. Beloat, 50 N.E.3d 135, 137 

(Ind. 2016). Where the challenge to summary judgment raises 

questions of law, we review them de novo. Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 

320.

ONB Ins. Group, Inc. v. Estate of Megel, 107 N.E.3d 484, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), 

reh’g denied, trans. denied. “An issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to 

resolve the truth of the matter; a fact is ‘material’ if its resolution affects the 

outcome of the case.” Henderson v. Kleinman, 103 N.E.3d 683, 686 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2018) (quoting Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014)).

[13] A party cannot collaterally attack a final agency action in a suit to enforce the 

action. In Yellow Cab Co. of Bloomington, Inc. v. Williams, the Yellow Cab 

Company sought judicial review of the Bloomington Human Rights 

Commission’s order directing the company to pay $1500 to Williams after a cab 

driver refused to serve Williams because of her race. 583 N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied. The Yellow Cab Company did not timely file the 

agency record, and the trial court dismissed the company’s petition for judicial 

review. Id. The Commission then filed a petition to enforce its administrative 

action when the Yellow Cab Company failed to pay Williams. Id. at 777. We 

held that because the Yellow Cab Company failed to comply with the statutory 

procedures for challenging the Commission’s action through a petition for 

judicial review, the Yellow Cab Company could not collaterally attack the 

administrative order in a proceeding to enforce the administrative order. Id. at 

779. Like the Yellow Cab Company, Saylor did not avail himself of the proper 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 9 of 10

procedures to contest the administrative action, and therefore, he may not 

collaterally attack the administrative action in the present collection action. 

[14] Saylor further contends, “If this matter had been dismissed, the summary 

judgment could not be filed. Since the dismissal was warranted under Trial 

Rule 41, summary judgment should not have been available to DWD and the 

order should be reversed.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) Trial Rule 41(E) outlines a 

procedure for dismissing a case due to failure to prosecute if no action has been 

taken in the case for a period of sixty days. Saylor attempted to appeal the trial 

court’s order denying his motion for return of property. The chronological case 

summary indicates the completion of clerk’s record was filed on November 16, 

2018, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction. See Ind. Appellate Rule 8 (“The 

Court on Appeal acquires jurisdiction on the date the Notice of Completion of 

Clerk’s Record is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.”). We remanded 

the case back to the trial court on December 5, 2018, and Saylor filed his 

motion to dismiss only thirty-five days later, on January 9, 2019. Therefore, 

Saylor’s motion was premature and the trial court properly denied it. 3 The 

trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of DWD because 

3 Saylor asserts the trial court “threatened Saylor with monetary penalties that he could and cannot afford,” 

and he “was denied Due Process of Law.” (Appellant’s Br. at 8.) However, Saylor fails to develop such 

arguments in his brief, and they are consequently waived. See Tavake v. State, 131 N.E.3d 696, 702 n.3 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2019) (holding appellant waived argument regarding alleged jury instruction error because he failed 

to develop a cogent argument on appeal), trans. denied. Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court in a civil 

action may order a party to pay the opposing party’s attorney fees if the party continues to litigate an “action 

or defense after the party’s claim or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless[.]” Ind. 

Code § 34-52-1-1(b). Thus, Saylor has not demonstrated error. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 10 of 10

Saylor did not properly contest DWD’s administrative action and his 

arguments in the collection action to avoid enforcement of the ALJ’s order lack 

support in law. See Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 952 N.E.2d 817, 831 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011) (holding trial court properly granted collection agency’s motion for 

summary judgment in action to collect medical debt), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[15] We affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for DWD because 

the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Saylor and DWD is entitled to 

enforce the ALJ’s decision requiring Saylor to repay unemployment benefits he 

illegally obtained.

[16] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Altice, J., concur.