Docket No. 109156.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

K. MILLER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Appellee, v.

JOSEPH J. McGINNIS et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed September 23, 2010.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,

Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

The Home Repair and Remodeling Act (815 ILCS 513/15 (West

2006)) states that, “[p]rior to initiating home repair or remodeling

work for over $1,000, a person engaged in the business of home

repair or remodeling shall furnish to the customer for signature a

written contract or work order.” At issue here is whether a home

remodeling contractor who violates this provision and enters into an

oral contract for home remodeling work over $1,000 may enforce the

oral contract or seek recovery in quantum meruit against a

homeowner who has refused to pay for a completed home remodeling

project. The appellate court concluded that such a contractor may not

enforce the oral contract but may seek recovery in quantum meruit.

394 Ill. App. 3d 248. For the reasons that follow, we hold that
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recovery is available under both theories.

Background

The plaintiff, K. Miller Construction Company, Inc., filed a

second-amended complaint in the circuit court of Cook County

against the defendants, Joseph and Frances McGinnis. The complaint

alleged the following.

Plaintiff is an Illinois construction firm whose sole owner is Keith

Miller. Defendant Joseph McGinnis is an Illinois real estate attorney

who has been in practice since 1970 and been a division counsel for

United General Title Insurance Company for 10 years. Defendant

Frances McGinnis is Joseph McGinnis’s wife. Plaintiff has done

remodeling work for defendants in the past and, prior to the initiation

of this litigation, Joseph McGinnis and Miller were friends.

In the spring of 2004, defendants purchased a three-flat apartment

building in Chicago. Defendants intended to convert the building into

a single-family residence by demolishing and rebuilding the interior

of the building while retaining the building’s exterior structure.

Architectural plans were drawn up and several discussions took place

among defendants, the architect and Miller about the scope and

details of the work to be performed. In the fall of 2004, plaintiff

entered into an oral contract with defendants to undertake the

remodeling project as general contractor for the sum of $187,000.

In December 2004 and January 2005, defendants told Miller that

they wanted to “vastly increase” the work to be performed on the

building and that the architect would develop new plans and

specifications for the expanded project. The new work included,

among other things, lowering of the basement foundation and floor,

installation of steel beams and framework to replace wood materials,

replacement of plumbing, installation of additional heating,

ventilation and air conditioning, and related changes. These

modifications raised the total cost of the project to approximately

$500,000.

Defendants instructed Miller to assist them in obtaining a new

building permit for the construction changes. The permit was issued

by the City of Chicago in January 2005. Plaintiff proceeded to

perform the construction ordered by defendants according to the
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revised architectural plans and the new building permit.

Defendants paid the first $65,000 of invoices issued by plaintiff

from April 2005 to June 2005. In September 2005, plaintiff submitted

an invoice to defendants for $58,000. Defendants refused to pay the

invoice and told Miller they did not want to make any further

payments until all construction work on the project was completed.

Plaintiff was unable to finance the remainder of the construction on

its own and, therefore, obtained a bank line of credit for $150,000 to

complete the remodeling project.

Defendants visited the construction site at least weekly in 2005

and 2006 to review and give approval to construction work plaintiff

had performed. In June and July of 2006, defendants conducted final

walk-throughs of the property. Defendants approved all of the

construction work with the exception of certain flooring that

defendants estimated would cost $300 to repair. Plaintiff’s final day

of construction on the project was July 10, 2006. Defendants made

some additional payments to plaintiff but at the close of construction,

the balance due to plaintiff for labor and materials furnished was over

$300,000. Defendants refused to pay plaintiff any of this amount.

Plaintiff thereafterfiled a three-count,second-amended complaint

against defendants. Count I sought to foreclose a mechanic’s lien.

Count II alleged a breach of contract. Count III, which was pled in the

alternative, sought recovery in quantum meruit for the reasonable

value of plaintiff’s work.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2–615 of

the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2006)). With

respect to count II of plaintiff’s complaint, defendants maintained that

the oral contract plaintiff entered into with defendants “violates

Illinois law and is therefore not enforceable.” In support, defendants

pointed to section 15 of the Home Repair and Remodeling Act (Act)

(815 ILCS 513/15 (West 2006)), which states that persons “engaged

in the business of home repair or remodeling” shall provide

customers with “a written contract or work order” prior to beginning

work on a project costing more than $1,000, and section 30 of the Act

(815 ILCS 513/30 (West 2006)), which at the time plaintiff filed its

complaint, stated that it is “unlawful” to engage in home remodeling

“before obtaining a signed contract or work order over $1,000.”

Defendants noted that plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the
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remodeling contract was not in writing and that it was for work

totaling more than $1,000. Based on these facts, defendants

maintained that the contract violated the Act and was unenforceable

and, therefore, that count II of plaintiff’s complaint should be

stricken. Further, because a mechanic’s lien may be enforced only if

there is a valid underlying contract, defendants contended that count

I of plaintiff’s complaint should also be stricken.

With respect to count III of plaintiff’s complaint, defendants cited

to Smith v. Bogard, 377 Ill. App. 3d 842, 848 (2007), wherein the

appellate court held that allowing a contractor to recover in quantum

meruit when he has breached the writing requirement of the Act

“would run afoul of the legislature’s intent of protecting consumers,

would reward deceptive practices, and would be violative of public

policy.” Relying on Bogard, defendants contended that count III of

plaintiff’s complaint should be stricken and plaintiff’s action

dismissed.

The circuit court granted defendants’ motion and dismissed

plaintiff’s cause of action with prejudice.

The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. 394 Ill.

App. 3d 248. The appellate court unanimously agreed that plaintiff’s

claims for breach of contract and foreclosure of mechanic’s lien could

not go forward. The appellate court reasoned that because the Act

imposes a writing requirement for remodeling work costing over

$1,000, the Act necessarily “bars the enforcement of an oral

contract.” 394 Ill. App. 3d at 254.

However, on the question of whether plaintiff could recover in

quantum meruit, the appellate court was divided. Justice Garcia,

writing the lead opinion for the court, concluded that plaintiff could

proceed with its quantum meruit claim because there was “no clear

and plain intent in the Act to do away with quantum meruit, an

equitable remedy that is a part of our common law going back to the

times when Abraham Lincoln practiced in our courts.” 394 Ill. App.

3d at 258. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Garcia expressly

disagreed with the appellate court’s decision in Bogard. 394 Ill. App.

3d at 258-61.

Justice Robert Gordon agreed with the result reached by Justice

Garcia, but not his reasoning. Justice Gordon pointed to the last
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sentence of section 30 of the Act, which, at the time plaintiff’s

complaint was filed, stated that the failure to obtain a written contract

is “unlawful but is not exclusive nor meant to limit other kinds of

methods, acts, or practices that may be unfair or deceptive” (815

ILCS 513/30 (West 2006)). Justice Gordon concluded that this

sentence “leaves the door open to equitable remedies, such as the

quantum meruit claim in this case.” 394 Ill. App. 3d at 266 (Gordon,

J., specially concurring).

Justice Wolfson dissented. Justice Wolfson concluded that

quantum meruit was unavailable to plaintiff, as there was no authority

“supporting the proposition that an act declared unlawful by the

legislature can be sanitized by filtering it through a court of equity.”

394 Ill. App. 3d at 267 (Wolfson, J., dissenting).

We allowed defendants’ petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d

R. 315.

Analysis

The circuit court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss brought

pursuant to section 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS

5/2–615 (West 2006)). A section 2–615 motion to dismiss challenges

the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects apparent on its

face. Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463,

473 (2009). In ruling on a section 2–615 motion, only those facts

apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters of which the court

can take judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record may be

considered. Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d at 473. The court

must also accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. Pooh-Bah

Enterprises, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d at 473. We review de novo an order

granting a section 2–615 motion to dismiss. Pooh-Bah Enterprises,

Inc., 232 Ill. 2d at 473.

At the outset,plaintiff suggests that defendants’ motion to dismiss

should have been brought under section 2–619(a)(9) of the Code of

Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(9) (West 2006)) because the

motion raised an affirmative defense, i.e., that the oral contract

between plaintiff and defendants violates the Act and, hence, is

unenforceable as a matter of public policy. See 735 ILCS 5/2–613(d)
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(West 2006) (listing illegality as an affirmative defense). However,

section 2–619(a)(9) speaks in terms of affirmative matter, not

affirmative defenses: “If the grounds do not appear on the face of the

pleading attacked the motion shall be supported by affidavit: ***

(9) That the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other

affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.”

735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(9) (West 2006). An affirmative defense may be

raised in a section 2–615 motion where the defense is “established by

the facts apparent on the face of the complaint” and no other facts

alleged in the complaint negate the defense. 3 R. Michael, Illinois

Practice §27.2, at 492 (1989). Here, the factual basis of defendants’

affirmative defense is found in plaintiff’s own allegations that the

remodeling contract was oral and was for work totaling more than

$1,000.

Turning to the merits, defendants contend that the appellate court

erred when it concluded that plaintiff could pursue relief in quantum

meruit and reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of count III of

plaintiff’s complaint. According to defendants, it is inconsistent to

hold, as the appellate court did, that plaintiff may not recover in

contract for having violated the Act, but that it may recover in equity.

Citing to Bogard, defendants further argue that to allow a contractor

who fails to comply with the writing requirement of the Act to seek

relief in quantum meruit would defeat the intent of the General

Assembly and violate the public policy expressed in the Act.

Plaintiff disputes defendants’ assertion that quantum meruit is

unavailable and also challenges the appellate court’s holding that

plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract in count II was properly

stricken by the circuit court. We address the latter issue first. If there

is no public policy that would prohibit plaintiff from recovering in

contract, then there is no inconsistency in plaintiff pursuing relief in

quantum meruit. Accordingly, our resolution of whether plaintiff may

pursue its claim for breach of contract may also determine whether

plaintiff may seek relief in quantum meruit.

Section 178 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) sets

forth the following rule regarding the unenforceability of a

contractual term because of the violation of a statute or other public

policy:

“§178 When a Term Is Unenforceable on Grounds of
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Public Policy

(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is

unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation

provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its

enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a

public policy against the enforcement of such terms.

(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term,

account is taken of

(a) the parties’ justified expectations,

(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement

were denied, and

(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of

the particular term.

(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a

term, account is taken of

(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by

legislation or judicial decisions,

(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term

will further that policy,

(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and

the extent to which it was deliberate, and

(d) the directness of the connection between that

misconduct and the term.” Restatement (Second) of

Contracts §178 (1981).

Pursuant to the Restatement, in considering whether a contractual

term is unenforceable as against public policy because of a statutory

violation, the first step is to examine the relevant statute itself. If the

statute explicitly provides that a contractual term which violates the

statute is unenforceable then, barring any constitutional objection, the

term is unenforceable. Conversely, if it is clear that the legislature did

not intend for a violation of the statute to render the contractual term

unenforceable, and that the penalty for a violation of the statute lies

elsewhere, then the contract may be enforced. But where the statute

is silent, then the court must balance the public policy expressed in

the statute against the countervailing policy in enforcing contractual

agreements:
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“Only infrequently does legislation, on grounds of public

policy, provide that a term is unenforceable. When a court

reaches that conclusion, it usually does so on the basis of a

public policy derived either from its own perception of the

need to protect some aspect of the public welfare or from

legislation that is relevant to that policy although it says

nothing explicitly about unenforceability. See §179. In some

cases the contravention of public policy is so grave, as when

an agreement involves a serious crime or tort, that

unenforceability is plain. In other cases the contravention is

so trivial as that it plainly does not preclude enforcement. In

doubtful cases, however, a decision as to enforceability is

reached only after a careful balancing, in the light of all the

circumstances, of the interest in the enforcement of the

particular promise against the policy against the enforcement

of such terms. The most common factors in the balancing

process are set out in Subsections (2) and (3). Enforcement

will be denied only if the factors that argue against

enforcement clearly outweigh the law’s traditional interest in

protecting the expectations of the parties, its abhorrence of

any unjust enrichment, and any public interest in the

enforcement of the particular term.” Restatement (Second) of

Contracts §178, Comment b, at 8 (1981). 

Importantly, the fact that there has been a statutory violation does

not, in itself, automatically render a contract unenforceable:

“The strength of the public policy involved is a critical

factor in the balancing process. Even when the policy is one

manifested by legislation, it may be too insubstantial to

outweigh the interest in the enforcement of the term in

question.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts §178,

Comment c, at 8 (1981). 

See also 5 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §12:4, at 995-96 (4th ed.

2009) (“To assert, however, as some courts have, that all unlawful

agreements are ipso facto void is opposed to many decisions and

unfortunate in its consequences, for it may protect a guilty defendant

from paying damages to an innocent plaintiff”); 15 Corbin on

Contracts §89.1, at 614 (rev. ed. 2003) (“The decision of whether and

how to enforce a contract involving a prohibited performance is and
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must be based on policy choices and a balancing of relevant factors”).

Illinois law is in accord with the Restatement. For example, in

Pascal P. Paddock, Inc. v. Glennon, 32 Ill. 2d 51 (1964), a contractor

entered into a written agreement with certain property owners to

construct a pool and bathhouse. After the owners refused to pay, the

contractor brought suit to foreclose a mechanics’ lien. The property

owners contended, however, that the underlying contract was

unenforceable because the contractor had used unlicensed plumbers

in the construction of the pool, in violation of the Illinois Plumbing

License Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 1111⁄2 , par. 116.38). The

appellate court agreed with the property owners, but this court

reversed.

In so doing, we noted that a statutory violation does not

automatically render a contract unenforceable: “the mere fact that [a

contract] was performed in violation of law will not invalidate the

resulting lien if not seriously injurious to the public order.” Paddock,

32 Ill. 2d at 53-54. Applying this rule, we then examined the facts and

concluded that the contract could be enforced because any violation

of the licensing statute which may have occurred was not “seriously

injurious to the public order.” Paddock, 32 Ill. 2d at 54. See also, e.g.,

Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Walker, 212 Ill. App. 3d 420, 422

(1991) (“Merely because a contract may violate some law or some

regulation does not necessarily make that contract unenforceable”);

Duncan v. Cannon, 204 Ill. App. 3d 160, 169-70 (1990) (party’s

failure to strictly abide by a municipal ordinance did not operate as a

bar to recovery for breach of contract); South Center Plumbing &

Heating Supply Co. v. Charles, 90 Ill. App. 2d 15, 18 (1968) (“not all

violations of law brought about in the performance of a contract are

considered serious enough to prevent recovery on the contract by the

party who violates the law”). 

With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to the case at hand.

In holding the oral contract at issue here unenforceable, the appellate

court relied on sections 15 and 30 of the Act. Section 15 provides:

“§15. Written contract; costs enumerated requirements;

contents. Prior to initiating home repair or remodeling work

for over $1,000, a person engaged in the business of home

repair or remodeling shall furnish to the customer for

signature a written contract or work order that states the total
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cost, including parts and materials listed with reasonable

particularity and any charge for an estimate. In addition, the

contract shall state the business name and address of the

person engaged in the business of home repair or remodeling.

If the person engaged in the business of home repair or

remodeling uses a post office box or mail receiving service or

agent to receive home repair or remodeling business

correspondence, the contract also shall state the residence

address of the person engaged in the business of home repair

or remodeling.” 815 ILCS 513/15 (West 2006).

Section 30, at the time plaintiff’s complaint was filed, stated:

“§30. Unlawful acts. It is unlawful for any person engaged

in the business of home repairs and remodeling to remodel or

make repairs or charge for remodeling or repair work before

obtaining a signed contract or work order over $1,000 and

before notifying and securing the signed acceptance or

rejection, by the consumer, of the binding arbitration clause

and the jury trial waiver clause as required in Section 15 and

Section 15.1 of this Act. This conduct is unlawful but is not

exclusive nor meant to limit other kinds of methods, acts, or

practices that may be unfair or deceptive.” 815 ILCS 513/30

(West 2006).

Based on these provisions, the appellate court reasoned:

“When the Miller construction company began home

remodeling work for the McGinnises without obtaining a

signed contract or work order, it violated the terms of the

Home Repair Act and, therefore, was precluded from proving

up an oral contract, as the Act declares such contracts

‘unlawful.’ ” 394 Ill. App. 3d at 265.

In other words, according to the appellate court, because there was a

statutory violation or “unlawful” act, the contract was, ipso facto,

unenforceable. This was error. The General Assembly is capable of

stating when a contractual term that violates a statute is

unenforceable. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/28–7 (West 2008) (gambling

contracts are “null and void”); 50 ILCS 105/3 (West 2008) (contracts

in which a public official has a financial interest and may be called to

vote upon are “void”); 625 ILCS 5/18c–4105 (West Supp. 2009)
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(indemnity agreements in motor carrier transportation contracts are

“void and unenforceable”). The General Assembly did not do so here.

See Fandel v. Allen, 398 Ill. App. 3d 177, 192 (2010) (Schmidt, J.,

specially concurring) (“it was not the legislature that said any

violation of the Home Repair Act, ipso facto, renders the contract

unenforceable; it was some judges”); Universal Structures, Ltd. v.

Buchman, __ Ill. App. 3d __, __ (2010) (“the Act is void of any

language which serves to invalidate the parties’ agreement when the

contractor fails to secure a signed written contract or work order”);

see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §179, Comment b, at 16

(1981) (“legislators seldom address themselves explicitly to the

problems of contract law that may arise in connection with

[proscribed] conduct. *** Usually they do not even have these

problems in mind and say nothing as to the enforceability of terms”).

Sections 15 and 30 of the Act make plain that an oral contract for

home remodeling over $1,000 is a statutory violation. However, the

Act left it an open question as to whether a statutory violation

rendered an oral contract unenforceable. Accordingly, the appellate

court should have conducted a balancing analysis and considered the

relevant facts and public policies before concluding that plaintiff

could not pursue relief for breach of contract.

Having determined that the appellate court erred, we ordinarily

would either remand to the appellate court to perform the required

balancing analysis or conduct the analysis ourselves. See, e.g.,

Asdourian v. Araj, 38 Cal. 3d 276, 289-94, 696 P.2d 95, 104-07, 211

Cal. Rptr. 703, 711-15 (1985) (conducting a balancing analysis and

concluding that an oral contract for remodeling was enforceable,

notwithstanding a statute which required that remodeling contracts in

excess of $500 be in writing and which made violations of the statute

a misdemeanor offense). However, we need not do so here.

Legislation which was enacted after the appellate court rendered its

decision in the case at bar has clarified that the General Assembly did

not intend for violations of the writing requirement under the Act to

render oral contracts unenforceable. 

Public Act 96–1023, effective July 12, 2010, has entirely

rewritten section 30 of the Act, removing all references to the word

“unlawful” and indicating that the remedy for violations of the Act is

to be had under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
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Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/10(a) (West 2008)). The section now

reads:

“Sec. 30. Action for actual damages. Any person who

suffers actual damage as a result of a violation of this Act may

bring an action pursuant to Section 10a of the Consumer

Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.” Public Act

96–1023, eff. July 12, 2010. 

“A subsequent amendment to a statute may be an appropriate source

for discerning legislative intent.” In re Detention of Lieberman, 201

Ill. 2d 300, 320-21 (2002) (citing People v. Parker, 123 Ill. 2d 204,

211 (1988), and Carey v. Elrod, 49 Ill. 2d 464, 472 (1971)). As we

have explained, while an amendatory change in the language of a

statute creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law

as it previously existed, “ ‘the presumption is not controlling

[citations] and may be overcome by other considerations.’ ” Parker,

123 Ill. 2d at 211, quoting People v. Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d 243, 248 (1979).

“The circumstances surrounding the amendmentshouldbe considered

and: ‘If they indicate that the legislature intended only to interpret the

original act, the presumption of an intention to change the law is

rebutted.’ ” Parker, 123 Ill. 2d at 211, quoting People v. Youngbey,

82 Ill. 2d 556, 563 (1980). A number of factors may indicate whether

an amendment is merely a clarification rather than a substantive

change in the law: “whether the enacting body declared that it was

clarifying a prior enactment; whether a conflict or ambiguity existed

prior to the amendment; and whether the amendment is consistent

with a reasonable interpretation of the prior enactment and its

legislative history.” Middleton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 663-

64 (7th Cir. 2009); see also 1A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory

Construction §22.30, at 366, 374-75 (6th ed. 2002 rev.) (“Although

generally, a statutory amendment is presumed to have been intended

to change the law, the legislative history may indicate that the

amendment was intended instead as a clarification. *** [In addition,

the] time and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the

amendment may indicate that the change wrought by the amendment

was formal only-that the legislature intended merely to interpret the

original act”).

At the time the General Assembly was considering Senate Bill

2540 (the bill which would become Public Act 96–1023), there was
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disagreement in our appellate court as to the effect a violation of the

Act had on the legal claims that could be pursued by a contractor. For

example, as noted previously, the appellate court in Smith v. Bogard,

377 Ill. App. 3d 842 (2007), had concluded that a contractor who

violated the writing requirement of the Act could not recover in

quantum meruit, while the appellate court in the case at bar had

concluded the opposite. Further, while the appellate court in both this

case and others had concluded that recovery in contract was per se

unavailable, the appellate court in Fandel v. Allen, 398 Ill. App. 3d

177, 186 (2010), had concluded that a violation of the Act “does not

act to automatically invalidate the agreement between the parties.”

The doctrine of substantial compliance had also been invoked by our

appellate court in addressing violations of the Act. See Behl v.

Gingerich, 396 Ill. App. 3d 1078 (2009).

The existence of these conflicting appellate decisions negates the

presumption that the legislature’s removal of the word “unlawful”

from section 30 was a change in the law. Because of the differing

views in the appellate court, there was no clear interpretation of the

law to be changed. It follows, therefore, that Public Act 96–1023 was

meant to clarify the previous law and make clear that a violation of

the Act does not render oral contracts unenforceable or relief in

quantum meruit unavailable and that, instead, the remedy for

violations of the Act lies elsewhere.

Legislative history supports this conclusion. During the debate on

Senate Bill 2540, Senator Wilhelmi, the Senate sponsor of the bill,

stated:

“Senate Bill 2540 does two things. First, it resolves confusion

as to the proper remedy for the courts to apply by providing

that any person who suffers actual damages as a result of a

violation of the Home Repair and Remodeling Act may bring

an action under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business

Practices Act. Secondly, the Home Repair and Remodeling

Act requires a contractor to give a pamphlet to his–his–his

customer, as well as to have a signed contract with that

customer. However, what the courts have found is that some

of these consumers are using the Act to get out of paying the

balance due on a home repair or remodeling contract. So the

courts are asking for a clarification of this. I think what we are
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doing through this bill is saying that, unless there’s actual

damages, a consumer cannot get out of paying the balance due

to a home repair or remodeling company by using these two

technical provisions in the Act of requiring a pamphlet to be

given and requiring a written contract before work on the

project.” 96th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, March 9,

2010, at 68 (statements of Senator Wilhelmi).

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Public Act 96–1023 is

a clarification of the prior statute and must be accepted as a legislative

declaration of the meaning of the original Act. There is, therefore, no

public policy requiring that oral contracts for home remodeling over

$1,000 be held unenforceable or that relief in quantum meruit be

denied. Accordingly, the appellate court erred in upholding the circuit

court’s dismissal of counts I and II of plaintiff’s complaint, but

properly reversed the dismissal of count III of plaintiff’s complaint.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that part of the appellate

court’s judgment which affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of

counts I and II. We affirm that part of the appellate court’s judgment

which reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of count III. The

judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded

to that court for further proceedings.

Appellate court judgment affirmed in part

 and reversed in part;

 circuit court judgment reversed;

 cause remanded.