MONOGRAPHS IN AEROSPACE HISTORY 

Number 15 

July I! 

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Headquarters 

Washington, DC 20546 

ferent magnitude. There were many lessons to be learned and many expensive failures. But 

with each new failure, new experience was gained, and with each successive attempt, the 

goal was closer. 

In October 1960, with Project 1M, two spacecraft were launched, but the third stages of each 

rocket failed. In November 1962, the spacecraft Mars 1 was launched, but it fell silent at a 

distance of 106 million kilometers. 

In March-April 1969, with Project M-69, there was an attempt to launch two spacecraft, but 

both failed on launch. In May 1971, with Project M-71, two spacecraft, Mars 2 and Mars 3, 

each with a lander, were launched. The lander for Mars 2 crashed on the surface of Mars. 

The lander of Mars 3 reached the surface, but its transmissions soon disappeared. However, 

the orbiters of Mars 2 and Mars 3 continued circling the planet for 8 months sending images 

to Earth. 

In June 1973, Mars 4 and Mars 5 were launched. On Mars 4, the braking system failed, it 

therefore missed the planet. Mars 5 took images of Mars on a flyby. In August 1973, Mars 6 

and Mars 7 were launched. Mars 6 was unable to receive commands after 2 months but, surprisingly, continued in an autonomous mode for another 5 months after landing on the 

Martian surface and sending back data. Mars 7 missed the planet. 

Foreword 0 
The OiHicult Road to Mars 
2.2 

2.3 

Chapter 3 

3.1 

3.2 

3.3 

3.4 

3.5 

Chapter 4 

4.1 

4.2 

4.3 

4.4 

4.5 

4.6 

4.7 

Challenges en Route to Mars ................................... 14 

The Second Generation of the Spacecraft ......................... 16 

Project M.69 ............................ I! 

The First Version of the Preliminary Design ....................... 19 

The Second Version of the Preliminary Design .................... 21 

The Government Decision Should Be Accomplished ............... 23 

The Onboard Instruments of Spacecraft M-69 ..................... 26 

The Beginning and End of Project M.69 .......................... 31 

Project M-71 ............................ 34 

The Optional Routes to Mars ................................... 34 

The Decision Is Made: The Search Continues ..................... 35 

The Lander: The Search for the Best Decision ..................... 38 

The Lander Design and Its Mission .............................. 41 

Spacecraft Development and Testing ............................ 48 

The Spacecraft's Struggle to Mars ............................... 52 

Main Results of Mars Exploration With the Spacecraft Mars 2 and 3 . . 59 

Contents 
p The Difficult Road to Mars 
of life on Mars. 

The idea of life on Mars appeared at the end of the 19th century after the Italian astronomer 

and director of the observatory in Milan, Giovanni Virginio Schiaparelli, discovered a network of fine lines, which he called "canals," on the planet's surface. Also on the Martian 

surface, Schiaparelli observed large dark areas, which he called "oceans." Dark areas of 

smaller size he named "lakes," and light yellow areas he named "continents." 

The discovery of Schiaparelli attracted the attention of many astronomers. Using powerful 

telescopes, they managed to discover on the Martian surface many canals that always linked 

seas or lakes. In 1906, assuming that the canals on Mars did exist, American astronomer 

Percival Lowell put forward a theory that attempted to explain their origin. According to 

ths theory, the canals were built by Martians to transport water from polar to arid areas. 

Schiaparelli and Lowell observed that the Martian surface changes with the seasons and 

suggested that this may be related to vegetation. 

In the spring and summer, some areas of the Martian surface darken and acquire a greenishblue hue. In autumn and winter, the same areas acquire a yellowish-brown hue. The best 

time to observe these changes is when the white polar caps start to melt. At this time, the 

Martian dark areas remind one of Earth's moist soil. 

Introduction 
gg p 

past but were neglected by ancient people, and they are now covered with sand. 

In 1971, the largest dust storm ever registered by astronomers covered the whole Martian 

surface. For a few montlis, hundreds of millions of tons of dust were suspended in the 

Martian atmosphere. As a result, one could not observe the martian surface. Nevertheless, 

one cannot rule out that cities covered by sand may exist in the Martian deserts. That would 

be evidence of an ancient Martian civilization that disappeared or moved to other planets. 

Perhaps Martians once arrived on Earth and left some evidence of their visit. Perhaps they 

built huge runways in South America, maybe constructed a chemically pure iron column in 

India (now chemically pure iron can be produced only in the laboratory), and built the mysterious Egyptian pyramids. 

It is also possible that the English fiction writer D. Swift managed to find and decipher records 

that Martians left on Earth. Based on these records, long before the Martian moons were discovered, Swift predicted that Mars had two satellites. One of them he named Phobos (fear), the 

other he named Deimos (horror), and rather precisely predicted the parameters of their orbits. 

Possibly, the next generations of Mars explorers will clarify these questions. In particular, 

this book is written to preserve the record of the events of the first difficult road to Mars. 

rn The OiHicult Road to Man 
The first Martian spacecraft started to be developed in 1959 in the Experimental Design 

Bureau No. 1 (OKB-1) under the supervision of the Chief Designer and Academician 

S.P. Korolev. The preliminary design of the spacecraft included three major objectives: 

1. To investigate interplanetary space between Earth and Mars 

2. To study Mars from a flyby trajectory and to obtain images of its surface 

3. To check the ability of onboard instruments to operate during the long flight in 

space and to provide radio communication from large distances 

The scientific part of Project 1M was under the supervision of Academician M.V. 

Keldysh. At that time, he was Vice-president of the Academy of Sciences of the 

Soviet Union. Teams from different institutes of the Academy submitted scientific 

proposals. After close examination, a decision was made to put the following scientific instruments on the spacecraft lM: 

Magnetometer 

~ p~ 

Documentation for automatic Martian spacecraft was developed in OKB-1 and kindly given to us by 

G.Yu Mnksimov and A.G. Trubnikov. 

Top: 

G.Yrr Maksirrroc, the 

rrrnirl ifesigrrer 

Bottom: 

A.G. Trubr~ikov, rcsporrsiblefir tlrc.Piyht progrnrrr nrrd t1w spcecrff 

logic 

Chapter I: Pioneers of Space Flight 
telemeter information, a decimeter wavelength radio 

transmitter was used. This radio system operated with a 

high-gain antenna. Two-square-meter solar panels and 

silver-zinc batteries were used for the power supply. 

In October 1960, two spacecraft, with payloads of 

650 kilograms each, were launched. Because of the 

failure of the third-stage rocket, neither spacecraft 

entered the proper flight trajectory to Mars. However, 

the effort of designers of the first Martian spacecraft 

was not a waste of time. Like small children, who fall 

and get bumps on their head while they learn to walk, 

the designers learned their own valuable lessons and 

accumulated the experience required for developing 

more sophisticated spacecraft. 

1.2 Project 2MV 

In the spring of 1961, Korolev directed the design of a 

new muItipurpose spacecraft for the exploration of 

The Difficult Road to Mars 
y py p

perature control, a binary gas-liquid system was used. For cooling and heating, liquid hemispherical coolers were utilized. In 

the upper part of the orbital module, a liquid propellant engine 

with a correction control system isolated by gimbal was installed. 

launched the spacecraft 

 mars 1 with a payload of 

893.5 kilograms into a 

Martian trajectory. After 

the spacecraft and the 

fourth stage of the rocket 

were separated, the solar 

panels opened and a stable 

orientation of the spacecraft with respect to the 

Sun was maintained. 

However, the telemetered 

information was discouraging. It revealed that one 

On November 1,1962, the four-stage rocket Soyuz (Figure 3) 1 

Chapter I: Pioneers of Space Flight 
I The Difficult Road to Mars 
the space. 

In 1956, after the successful completion of the testing of the rocket R-7, designed by 

Korolev and known in mass media as Sputnik, the realization of these projects gave 

the Soviet Union the leadership in space exploration. The legendary R-7 rocket and 

its modifications were reliable, powerful, and able to deliver a payload of 

6,000 kilograms in orbit. 

In addition to the above-mentioned projects, the designers from OKB-1 developed 

military missiles, communications satellites, reconnaissance satellites, and remotesensing satellites. Naturally, Korolev and his colleagues were too busy to concentrate on the main project-a manned flight to the Moon. The Lunar project required 

the design of the powerful rocket N-1, which would be able to launch a payload of 

100 tons and a lunar spacecraft into lunar orbit. 

At that time, the tremendous success of the Soviet Union in space exploration put the 

United States far behnd. To reestablish the prestige of the United States, President 

Kennedy announced a lunar Apollo project to be a national priority. The unprecedented 

race between the two powerful countries began. To be able to concentrate on the lunar 

project, Korolev ordered a number of interesting projects to be transferred to other 

Chapter 2: Space Marathon 
The design team of the Lavochkin design bureau had extensive experience in the 

development of automatic aircraft, particularly intercontinental ballistic cruise missiles and unmanned airplanes. Few of these designers had any experience in the 

design of spacecraft. 

By the end of 1959, Lavochkin had organized a team of 15 young designers who 

were already well known tor using new techniques and instructed them to design a 

space aircraft. The idea was that the aircraft should take off, enter a lunar orbit, and 

return to land at an airport. Lavochkin told us, "Ths assignment is intricate and 

will take a lot of time. That is the reason why I decided to organize the team of 

young designers so you would have time to finish the project." 

For the project to make progress, Lavochkin needed to hire more designers. 

Unfortunately, in June 1960, after Lavochkin passed away, the team was dismissed 

and the project for the design of a space aircraft was discontinued. To continue to be 

employed, the designers from the Lavochkin design bureau should recall how to 

design spacecraft and combine this knowledge with the skills acquired in the design 

of unmanned aircraft. Also, they wanted to use the valuable experience of the 

designers of OKB-I. 

The Oifficult Road 10 Mars 
Korolev that Mars possesses an atmosphere. Glancing at me, he turned around and 

approached the table. Being the chairman of the meeting, he invited everybody to 

take a seat. 

Various experts who represented many organizations participated in the meeting: 

Babakin-the main designer of OKB-1, I.N. Lukin-the head of the Lavochkin 

design bureau, V.E. Izhevskiy-deputy to the main designer, I.A. Skrobko-the leading designer of the lunar spacecraft, V.G. Perminov-the leading designer of the 

Mars and Venus spacecraft, M.I. Tatarintsev-the head of the design bureau, M.K. 

Rozhdestvenskiy-the deputy director of the design bureau in the fields of aerodynamics and thermal control, D.K. Brontman-the head of the design for systems 

analysis, R.S. Kremnyov-the secretary of the Communist Party Committee of the 

Lavochkin design bureau, and G.Yu. Maksimov-the head of the department of 

OKB-1 for the designing of lunar and planetary spacecraft. 

Korolev spoke briefly. He emphasized how hard the team was working on the lunar 

project and the frustrating mistakes discovered during the flights of the spacecraft. 

In addition, he said that it is not feasible to continue to work in the same manner 

and suggested transferring the promising project to the Lavochkin design bureau. 

His final remarks are still in my memory. He said, "I hand over to you the most 

the Lavochkin design 

bu renri 

Middle: 

V E. Izhrvskiy, deputy 

to fhu main designer 

Bottom: 

LA. Skrobko, lead 

desigrzer of the lunar 

spacecraft 

Chapter 2: Space Marathon 1[(1 
organizations. 

Soon we concluded that the project and system management structures in OKB-1 

and in the Lavochkin design bureau were fundamentally different. Project management responsibility in OKB-1 assumed: 

1. Preliminary design and configuration of the spacecraft 

2. Definition of the main systems and their parameters 

3. Development of the flight program and its rationale 

4. Supervision and management during the whole flight 

The technical part of the project was supervised by the head of the design division. 

The main designer did not participate in the project development and took responsibility only after the divisions of OKB developed and issued the technical documentation. It was certainly a hierarchic management structure. 

Taras Bulba is a fictitious character in the novel by Gogol, Tnras Bulbn. In this novel, Taras Bulba kills his 

son for betraying the country. 

The Difficult Road to Man 
The project managers did not believe that our personnel in the short time span 

would be able to comprehend all the nuances of this new design. Therefore, they 

decided that OKB-1 would continue to develop the operational and attitude control 

systems. The results would be transferred to the Lavochkin design bureau, where 

they would be used for designing spacecraft based on technology developed in the 

Venus 2 and Venus 3 projects. With small modifications, these spacecraft could be 

used to measure the parameters of the Martian atmosphere with a flyby trajectory 

and with a lander if it would replace the scientific module. 

The flyby option did not give any possibility of obtaining new data on the Martian 

atmosphere and was excluded. To study the Martian atmosphere, it was necessary 

to increase the weight of the lander midsection because the data from Mariner 4 

showed that near the Martian surface, the pressure was less than 0.09 atmosphere. 

However, the lander developed in OKB-I was designed for a pressure of 

0.1-0.3 atmosphere. We tried to determine whether it would be feasible to simultaneously increase the weight of the lander midsection and provide a soft landing to 

the Martian surface. Eventually, we decided that the change in the configuration 

and the number of the onboard instruments would not give us the opportunity to 

increase the weight of the lander midsection. 

Chepter 2: Space Marethnn a 
2.3 The Second Generation of the Spacecraft 

In l%5, the new powerful two-stage Proton rocket was launched for the first time. This 

rocket delivered in the predetermined orbit a payload of more than 12 tons. This was 

almost twice as much as Molniya, the recently modified three-stage R-7 rocket delivered. 

Simultaneously, the development of a three-stage Proton rocket, which would be 

able to deliver in orbit a payload of 17-20 tons, was planned. The development of 

the second-generation spacecraft could be based on this launch vehicle. It was 

planned that the new multipurpose spacecraft would perform major experiments 

during the reconnaissance flights. The data obtained would be used to develop 

more advanced spacecraft, which would allow more detailed exploration of interplanetary space and the planets in our solar system. 

Assuming that in 5-7 years the program of reconnaissance flights would be completed, I felt it was necessary to build a multipurpose versatile spacecraft that 

would be able to simultaneously explore Mars and Venus and solve the scientific 

and technical problems that appear during the flight. To reduce production costs, 

decrease the time required for developing and building the spacecraft, and enhance 

the probability of a successful flight, it was planned not to make significant changes 

in the design of the spacecraft and its onboard systems. 

1 The Difficult Road to Man 
from the lander to Earth at a rate about 100 bits/sec. 

5. The transmittal of scientific information from the spacecraft to Earth at a rate of 

about 4,000 bits/sec. 

The following scientific problems were to be solved during the reconnaissance 

flights of the second-generation spacecraft. 

A.The proposed missions for Mars exploration: 

1. To measure the temperature, pressure, wind's speed, and direction on the Martian 

surface. To measure the chemical composition of the Martian atmosphere with 

position reference. It was proposed that in 1969 a lander would be used to acquire 

a pressure and temperature atmospheric profile. At that time, a soft landing was 

not planned. 

2. To perform a soft landing at a chosen site and use the lander to obtain images of 

the Martian surface to study the relief and vegetation. 

3. To measure the parameters of the Martian soil (composition, rigidity, and 

temperature). 

4. To measure the radiation and the intensity of the magnetic field at the Martian surface. 

5. To detect traces of microorganisms in the Martian soil. 

Chapter 2: Space Marathon 
explore Mars from their satellite orbit and with the probe device, was planned for 

the nearest launch window in March 1969. Only 3 years remained until this date. 

However, we believed that under the proper management and supervision, the 

problems could be solved. 

Taking into account the proposed missions, our specialists started the spacecraft 

design. Unfortunately, because of the malfunctioning of the temperature control 

system, the spacecraft Venus 2 and Venus 3, as they approached the planet in 

February-March 1966, were not able to conduct the investigations pla~ed. 

In April 1966, the government decided that the next expedition to Venus would be 

in the following launch window of June 1967. This task seemed to be too ambitious. 

In 13 months, we were required to develop the new design, fabricate the spacecraft, 

perform all testing operations, and launch the spacecraft to Venus. 

The Soviet Union was also competing with the United States, and leaders of our 

country were unwilling to concede defeat. Now all efforts were focused on building 

the spacecraft for Venus exploration. 

The Oifficult Road to Mars 
the main missions planned for 1969 remained unchanged. The main missions were: 

1. Exploring Mars with an orbiter 

2. Acquiring data of the Martian atmospheric profile with the entry probe 

At that time, the designers from the Lavochkin design bureau were developing a 

third-generation spacecraft for lunar exploration. The primary component of this 

spacecraft was the propulsion system with four spherical fuel tanks connected by 

modules of cylindrical shape. Onboard instruments were located in the cylindrical 

modules. The technical documentation for the fuel tank was already developed, and 

we were looking into industrial opportunities for its fabrication. 

For the Martian spacecraft, the engineers proposed the use of the design of the 

propulsion system, which was already used for the lunar spacecraft. Only a few modifications, related to the installation of the modules between the tanks, the replacement of some instruments, and a change of the sequence in which fuel was burned, 

were suggested. The Martian lander was attached to the spacecraft on the side (Figure 

4). Exactly at this place, the lunar rover was attached to the lunar spacecraft. This configuration restricted the use of the spacecraft for further flights and contradicted 

major instructions. However, it allowed the spacecraft to be launched in 1969. 

Chapter 3 Project M-69 
be used to transfer the spacecraft to a trajectory for a planetary encounter. The calculated angle at which the lander should enter the Martian atmosphere was in the 

range of 10-20 degrees. 

During deorbiting, when the speed of the lander in the Martian atmosphere would 

be decreased to Mach 3.5, the parachute deployment would be initiated and data on 

the Martian atmosphere would be transmitted to Earth. The calculated altitude of 

the parachute system deployment would depend on the angle at which the lander 

entered the Martian atmosphere and would vary from 2.2 to 31.7 kilometers. In 

accord with that, the time of information transmission would change and vary from 

30 to 900 seconds. 

After the separation from the lander, the spacecraft would keep moving in its trajectory. After approaching the target point, the correction braking propulsion system 

would transfer a braking impulse equal to 1,750 m/sec. Depending on the real 

height of pericenter of the flyby hyperbolic trajectory, the spacecraft would enter an 

orbit of the Martian satellite with the following parameters: the height of the pericenter 2,000 k1.5 kilometers, the height of apocenter would vary from 13,000 to 

120,000 kilometers, period of rotation would vary from 8.5 to 12 hours, and the inclination of the orbit would vary from 35 to 55 degrees. 

The Difficult Road to Man 
vehicle might enter the Martian atmosphere and limitations on the time required for 

the spacecraft to pass the target point would increase. Also, the temperature control 

system, which was designed to provide the appropriate temperature environment for 

instruments located in the three isolated modules, was becoming quite complicated. 

However, a major problem was discovered during testing of the elastic membranes, 

which were designed for the displacement of the fuel from the tank. Testing of the 

membranes after a few months of storage showed that sometimes in fracture areas 

they were not hermetically sealed. Because of the shortage of time, we were unable 

to find the proper solution that would guarantee reliable sealed membranes. 

We started to analyze the results of a study that was performed by the team of 

designers (V.I. Smirnov, A.Y. Fisher, and others). To start the engines in the weightless state, they attempted to develop the new system, which was composed of the 

main and supply tanks. They suggested that the lenticular-shaped supply tank with 

the metallic membranes and a valve that regulated the consumption of fuel should 

be placed in the main tank. To exclude the bubbles in the engine, the vacuum 

processed fuel from the supply tanks was used in starting the engine. Under acceleration, 6-8 seconds after the engine was started, the fuel was forced against the 

bottom of the main tanks, the bubbles floated up to the surface, and the fuel for the 

Chapter 3: Project M-69 
The Difficult Road to Mars 
(i) Mass-spectrometer H and He 

(j) X-ray photometer 

(k) Ultraviolet photometer 

(1) Infrared Fourier spectrometer 

(m) Three telephotometers with the focal distances of 35, 50, and 250 millimeters 

To study the Martian atmosphere, it was planned to install the gas analyzer and the 

detectors of pressure, density, and temperature in the lander. The total weight of the 

scientific instruments installed on the spacecraft was 99.5 kilograms. This number 

included the weight of scientific instruments installed in the lander (15 kilograms). 

The preliminary project required that the first spacecraft should be launched on 

March 24,1969, and the second spacecraft on April 2,1969. 

The Government Decision Should Be Accomplished 

A joint decree of the Communist Party Central Committee of the Soviet Union and the 

Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union assigned that the spacecraft for Mars exploration should be launched in 1969. To accomplish this task, the Commission of the 

Presidium of the Council of Ministers issued a special Military Industrial Resolution 

Chepter 3: Project M-69 
lem appeared, it should be solved immediately. The chauffeur of a special car was 

ordered to quickly deliver the specialists to work at nighttime. 

Quite often, I was awakened during the night and was taken to work from a warm 

bed. There were wild nights, when problems appeared in several divisions simultaneously. Then, my wife worked like the secretary and by telephone told where one 

can could find me. 

Our Minister S.A. Afanasiev, one of the most talented leaders of the Soviet Union 

industry, helped us a lot. He was the head of the Ministry of the General Machine 

Building, which was in charge of the organizations with more than 1 million 

employees. It was a huge staff. Afanasiev did not like to procrastinate and made 

decisions quickly. He realized that to meet the schedule, some problems should be 

solved immediately. Sometimes in the course of the spacecraft fabrication, it was 

necessary to develop a new system or an instrument in an organization that did not 

belong to our ministry. Apparently, in the VPK Resolution, the new devices were not 

mentioned because the problem appeared after the resolution was issued. 

Naturally, the main managers who were not mentioned in the VPK Resolution did 

not want to be in charge of new devices. In this situation, Afanasiev carefully con- 

< The Difficult Rosd to Mars 
as the experimental plant in the Lavochkin design bureau. It did not take a long time to 

see the results of his efforts. Soon, the parts of the spacecraft were delivered to the 

experimental plant, and the assemblage and testing of the main systems were begun. 

The testing operations required that the technological decisions were implemented correctly and that our designers and technicians were highly qualified. The cold dumping 

and fire testing of the propulsion system were successful. Thermovacuum testing of 

the duplicate spacecraft ensured that the thermal calculations were made correctly. 

We could not wait until the assembly of the spacecraft would be finalized and vibrostatic testing performed. The aircraft, developed earlier in the Lavochkin design 

bureau were tested differently, and we were not experienced in the vibration testing 

of big and heavy craft. 

At that time, our organization did not possess the vibration exciters with the necessary 

power. Therefore, the vibration testing of the M-69 spacecraft was performed in a wellequipped test facility of Scienhfic Production Association (NPO) of Machine Building 

in the town of Reutovo. At the beginning of testing, all systems performed well. 

However, in a short time, the vibration of the modules with the scientific instruments, 

accompanied by an unbelievable noise, started to increase dramatically. It seemed that 

Chepter 3: Project M-69 
3.4 The Onboard Instruments of Spacecraft M-69 

The body of the spacecraft is its mechanical design, and the soul of the spacecraft is 

its instruments and systems. 

The brain of the spacecraft is its control system. It directs the spacecraft to the predetermined position in space and holds it in this position while the engines work. 

Besides that, the control system measures the thrust impulse, and after the spacecraft achieves a predetermined speed, it executes the command to turn it off. To 

deliver the spacecraft to the planet, the control system should have a high precision. 

The attitude system serves as the eyes of the spacecraft. The spacecraft instruments 

have to be able to watch the Sun and to be able to find, among the billions of stars, 

the only one that matters, Canopus. 

At the same time, these instruments should not lose sight of Earth, which at the distance of tens of thousands of kilometers appears to be a bright star. The attitude system 

should be able to maintain the basic reference system with a high degree of accuracy. 

Based on this reference system, the control system will be able to perform its functions. 

The nifficult Road to Mars 
M-69 spacecraft. After acquiring expertise in the design of the control and orientation systems for the Venus 4 spacecraft, our specialists began the development of 

these systems for the M-69 spacecraft. 

The head of the division, S.D. Kulikov (now the main designer and executive director of the Lavochkin design bureau), was ordered to develop the control system. 

The control system included the gyros that were composed of two free gimbals for 

measuring the normal velocity, a gyroscope to measure the longitudinal acceleration, sensors to measure the angular velocities, the unit for amplifying the signal, 

the logic unit, and the operational tools. Gyroscopes were developed in the 

Scientific Research Institute of the Applied Mechanics, which was headed by 

Academician V.1 Kuznetsov. The system provided the attitude stabilization of the 

spacecraft in the active periods of interplanetary flight as well as after separating 

from the booster block D and entering the interplanetary trajectory. 

The head of the division, AS. Demekhin, was in charge of the development of the 

attitude conti-01 system. It was quite different from the attitude control system of the 

first-generation spacecraft, in which the Sun and star combined sensor, with a field 

of view of a littIe more than a hemisphere, was used. The presence of any objects in 

the hemisphere was forbidden because they could reflect sunlight to the quartz 

Chapter 3: Project M-69 
micro-engine, the Sun moved to the edge of the sensor and passed over a few zones, 

the sensor would generate the signal to relocate the spacecraft to a position where 

the Sun would return to the center of the sensor. It was expected that, while the Sun 

moves to the center of the sensor, the signal would be generated only after the Sun 

moves through several zones. If this design works, the requirements for the attitude 

system would be reduced. 

To simpllfy the design, the specialists from TsKB Geophysics proposed decreasing the 

number of zones in the Sun sensor. With that, the signal generated after the insertion 

of the micro-engine wouId appear independently of the direction of the Sun's movement. An extended discussion was finished only after Babakin became involved. He 

convinced the directors from TsKB Geophysics that our requests should be completed. 

At that time, TsKB Geophysics was overloaded with orders to develop the optical 

instruments. To facilitate their schedule, the Ministry of Defense transferred the development of the Earth sensor in 'Kiev to the Central Design Bureau (TsKB) Arsenal. 

At that time, the jobs performed under the VPK Resolution were not covered by the 

contract. After the completion of the job, the contractor should send the bill to the 

organization that proposed the job. TsKB Geophysics sent us a bill for 300,000 rubles 

for the deveIopment and fabrication of the set of extremely intricate optical instruThe Difficult Road to Mars 
Soon the technological instructions were developed, and the set of the microengines was fabricated. The test experiments showed that the micro-engines were in 

compliance with our requirements. 

Thereafter, TsNII TA transferred the technological documentation for the fabrication 

of the micro-engines to the experimental plant of the Lavochkin design bureau. The 

first set of micro-engines fabricated and assembled in the experimental plant was in 

compliance with all requirements, except one major point. After a few thousand 

insertions, the hermetical seal of the double valves were destroyed. As a result, during a long space flight, the nitrogen retained in the attitude system could be vented. 

The specialists from TsNII TA believed that the thin layer of grease over the valve 

plate could not be the reason of the flaw that was discovered, and they delegated 

their technician to our organization. Upon arrival, the technician commented on the 

good quality of the valve surface, degreased the plate surface of the valve, pulled 

out of his pocket a wooden beech board, covered it with tracing paper, and rubbed 

with the plate against it. After this procedure, an almost undetectable grease layer 

remained on the plate. Micro-engines assembled according to this technological 

process worked perfectly, proving once again the correctness of the Russian provcrb 

"A good master does good work." 

Chapter 3: Project M-69 
images of the Martian surface. This intricate and clever device consisted of: 

1. A film bobbin, whose sensitivity was artificially reduced to avoid exposure to 

radiation 

2. A unit designed to restore the film sensitivity 

3. A unit for film processing 

4. A unit for exposure 

5. A data encoder 

It is worth noting that in spite of the complex design, the FTU worked perfectly. 

Each device could store 160 images. Each image was made with 1,024 x 1,024 pixels. 

The power system was developed in the Lavochkin design bureau under the supervision of N.F. Myasnikov, who was the head of the department. The power was provided by solar panels with an area of 7 square meters, which was designed in the 

Scientific Research Institute of Current under the supervision of N.S. Lidorenko, the 

director, main designer, and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of 

the Soviet Union. The system included a hermetically sealed cadmium-nickel battery with a capacity of 110 amp hours. This battery was designed by the Scientific 

Research Institute of the Battery in Leningrad. 

The OiHicult Road to Man 
Although official ideologv dlcvavs rejected tough competition between the institutes 

'ind the design bure,iu, in technical circles it always existed. Being a young sp~ci'ilist, 

I dcsignt.cl a high-quality air regulator for pressurization ot the f~lel tanks, which \\,as 

installed in the LA-2.50A airplane. G.1. Voronin, ~vho was tlie main designer ot OKB124, which developed parts tor airplcincs, learned about mv device. To be abk to use 

advanced technologicdl solutions, he delegated to S.A. Lavoclikin, the head of tl~> 

department, cincl instructect him to lcarn about the design of tlie air regulatur. 

The leader of mv clepartment, N.N Gorshkov, gave me '1 Ictter from G.1. Voronin, 

enctorsecl bv S.A. Lavoclikin, and s'iid, "Semcn Alekseevich asked you to givt. him 

intormation but to do it in sucli a rvav tli~t he would not be ,ible to learn anvtliing." 

It was mv iirst vivid example of direct competition bet~veen tn;o organizationi of 

tht. s'ime ministry. 

3.5 The Beginning and End of Project M-69 

At the, cvci ot thc. third qu~u-ter of lClhS, we were quite behind scheclule in the dcvclq71mait of systems and parts of the spacecraft and their fabric'ition. This trend had 

tcr tw changed immediatelv, because. otht.rwisc> tlic launch of thc spacccrai~ to h/I;~!-s 

Chapter 3 Project M-69 
r.xplanations. Thc blacklist of unctc

rpcrfornir wcis compilcd hclorc, thC meeting. \I1c 

uncicrstood the pressures imposed on the heads of thosc organiz'itions. If we wcrc 

certain that they would complctcly fulfill their orders for onboard equipment, we 

would not include them on the blacklist. 

This strategy corrected the situation. 'l'hc first sets of the onboard instruments were 

delivered to the 1-avochkin design bureau and to thc Institute of Spcct liesearch. 

The control and attitude systems startcd to be tested, and the asscmblv of the first 

spacecraft began. The equipment for the sccnnd spaccucift was cic~li\~cred with 

approximately a I-month clday. Finally, after tcsting in tht. Institute of Space 

Kcsearch, thc mcdulc~ with thc. scientific instruments 'ind the. data processing system 

was delivcrrd. E.M. Vxilicv, wlio was tht. head of the ctep,irtnirnt in the Inbtitute ot 

Space Research, handed it c)ver to thc 1,avochkin design bureau on 11t~cc.mhc~r 31, 

1968, at 11:OO p.m. 

In tht, micicitc. of the, January 1960, thc tcsting of the first spa~ccr~~ft ,lnd the aswnbly 

of the second spacecraft werc cornplctcct. Thcl timc th~t rem,iintd until the launching 

date was limited. That was why the dccision was made th~t the> plant and ground 

stages of the twting operations of the powu system would be combined for thc second spacecraft. Both spaccu-aft were sent to thc. Haikonur I'tunch complex. 

The 01ff1cuIt Road to Mars - - 
Chapter 3: Project M-69 
The unsuccessful launches of the M-69 spacecraft put us in difficult position. We 

could postpone the program until 1971 and undertake Mars exploration from a 

satellite orbit and with an entry probe. In this case, we would repeat the program 

initially planned for the M-69 spacecraft. Thereafter, in 1973, we could launch a 

spacecraft, consisting of an orbiter and a lander, to Mars. 

It was proposed that after a soft landing, the lander would make a scientific exploration of the martian surface. After careful consideration, a delay of the program was 

abandoned. This decision was made because, in 1973, the power required for launching the spacecraft had to be increased, and as a result, one rocket would not be able 

to launch both an orbiter and a lander to Mars. Launching an orbiter and a lander 

separately would be very expensive and intricate and would require four launches. 

Eventually, the appropriate decision was made. The main point was that three 

spacecraft should be launched to Mars in 1971. A spacecraft with a very large supply of fuel and the maximum amount of scientific instruments on board should be 

launched first. This particular spacecraft would reach Mars significantly earlier than 

the next two and would be placed in a Mars satellite orbit. Also, it would serve as a 

radar beacon for the second and third spacecraft. 

The Oifficult Road to Mars 
Keldysh was the main driving force of all space programs in the Soviet Union. He 

participated in each meeting vital to the space program. Keldysh cherished Babakin, 

who for a short period of time became very successful in the exploration of the 

Moon and Venus. Keldysh believed in his talent and supported his daring projects. 

After careful and detailed consideration, our project was approved. At the end of 

meeting, Ryasanskiy addressed the audience. He suggested that efforts of specialists 

be focused and that costly resources be avoided. In his view, to process the scientific 

data, the telemetry unit in the radiotelemetry system should replace the telemetry 

system developed by Guskov for the M-69 spacecraft. 

At first glance, this idea seemed to be reasonable, and the participants of the meeting approved it. That was because no one except Babakin, Vasiliev, and myself was 

aware of the characteristics and operational functions of this system. Only Babakin 

could defend the Guskov system, but he kept silent. Technical progress was sacrificed because of his friendship with Ryasanskiy. 

4.2 The Decision Is Made: The Search Continues 

If the first M-71s spacecraft could be launched ahead of schedule, about 

800 kilograms of fuel was needed for its tanks. The current spherical tank designed 
repeated. These procedures led to a great waste of time and to the appearance of 

hidden flaws. 

After considering all the pros and cons, we decided to modify the configuration 

design of the spacecraft again. Several designers were challenged to find the best 

solutions. B.N. Martynov, the head of the design division, and I very carefully analyzed the proposals and, if negative points were revealed, rejected them. Eventually, 

we approved the configuration design of the spacecraft proposed by a young 

designer, V.A. Asyushkin (now he is the main designer of the booster rocket Fregat). 

The configuration of the spacecraft was in complete accord with the major instructions. To achieve the different tasks, the spacecraft could be easily modified without 

changes in the main design. The propulsion unit was the major element of the 

spacecraft. It was composed of a separate module with a cylindrical fuel tank. The 

fuel tank was divided into two tanks consisting of fuel and oxidizer. With a gimbal, 

the engine was mounted to the lower surface of the tank. The solar panels, the highgain antenna, and the radiators of the temperature control system were attached to 

the cyIindrical part of the tank. The lander was attached to the upper surface of the 

tank. The instrument module with a separable lower cover was attached to the 

lower part of the tank. 

The Difficult Road to Mars 
developed under the supervision of Pilyugin for the last stage of the N-1 rocket was 

suggested as the prototype. Unanimously, this system was rejected by our specialists. It was heavier and required more power than the control system of the M-69 

spacecraft. 

Pilyugin agreed to develop the new system with suitable power and weight parameters. But he was able to finish ths job only in 1973. For us, that was absolutely 

unacceptable. Only Babakin and Pilyugin participated in the further meetings at 

which the development of the control system for Project M-71 was considered. We 

were listening to each other's arguments, evaluating them, meeting again, and just 

could not reach an agreement. At one of the meetings, Pilyugin, usually calm and 

reserved, quite seriously suggested that Babakin fire Demekhn, who was the main 

opponent of the new system. 

Eventually, our head managers got tired of the ongoing battles. They secluded 

themselves from others for half an hour and came out with a joint decision. The 

control system suggested by Pilyugin would be installed in the M-71 spacecraft. To 

console us, Pilyugin agreed to fabricate the automatic blocks of the spacecraft at his 

experimental plant according to our technical instructions (for NPO AP, it was an 

unheard-of compliance). 

Chapter 4: Project M-71 
771~7 Mnrs 3 SpacccrnJt- 

(1) c-orrt~tioii b,n!iiir~ 

err~irrt: (2) riii~~irc~torrrc~t~~~ 

(2A) .Hrrt.o nrrtcirrrri, 

(3) iiri~dr~l~ zoitlrt/r~, 

iirstr~iiircirts, (4) orierrtliti011 y5tl7l1l, (5) stizr[,ll 

4.3 The Lander: The Search for the Best Decision 

Scientifically and technically, the development of the lander design was a very complex problem. To solve it, one should search for the best decision. First of all, it had 

to be decided how the lander would descend in the Martian atmosphere. Which 

type of descent should it be? Gliding or ballistic? If the gliding option would be chosen, the lander's gravity center with respect to the axis of symmetry of the brake 

cone should be changed. Under the influence of aerodynamic forces, the lander 

would be stabilized at some angle of attack to the approaching airflow. As a result, a 

gravitational force (G-force) would be generated, and the length of the braking path 

and altitude, at which the parachute would be deployed, would be increased. 

In 1975, this landing design was used by American specialists in the Viking Project. 

Because of the lack of the detailed data on the Martian atmosphere, we were unable 

to use the gliding descent. 

Therefore, for Project M-71, a ballistic descent was chosen. The trajectory would be 

entirely defined by the initial conditions under which the lander would enter the 

Martian atmosphere and by the ballistic coefficient that is directly proportional to 

The Difficult Road to Man 
The testing operations were an important stage in the design of the parachute system and were performed to prove its proper deployment during flight. The testing 

procedures for the parachute system carrying the probe had already been developed 

during Project M-69. At that time, we decided to use a small balloon to lift the 

model probe with gunpowder accelerators at an altitude of 32 kilometers above 

Earth's surface. Using gunpowder accelerators, after separation from the balloon, 

the probe sped up until a predetermined velocity at which the parachute system 

would open. 

While developing the parachute system for the Viking lander, American specialists 

independently made the same choice of lander testing operations. That did not console us. We recalled that the main reason for eliminating the probe device from 

Project M-69 was the necessity to perform intricate experiments, which simulated 

the conditions of the deployment of the parachute system with big balloons. Fearing 

a repetition of the same events in Project M-71, the decision was made to study 

other versions of parachute systems. 

The mutual efforts of the specialists from the Lavochkin design bureau and NII PDC 

bore fruit. It was proven that reliable information about the performance of the 

parachute system could be obtained on test models of the lander with a scale factor 

Chapter 4: Project M-71 
offer a prayer that the landing area would be flat and contain no stones. 

Unfortunately, because of the insufficient weight of the lander, a descent with instruments working on Doppler principles was not feasible. Therefore, we decided to utilize 

another descent design. When the lander approaches the Martian surface, a radaraltimeter, at the appropriate altitude and velocity of descent, will direct commands for 

the insertion and deactivation of the soft landing engine. The major component of the 

lander, the automatic Martian station, would fall free to the surface from a low altitude. 

The lander has to be durable enough to sustain the impact of this free fall landing. 

We attempted to use rubber air bags, which were already used for shock absorption 

of the automatic lander on the Luna 9 mission. However, we were unable to protect 

air bags from the stream of hot gases coming from the gunpowder engine. Other 

methods of shock absorption for the Martian station, including one using a special 

nose cone spear, were not considered because they could not make the automatic 

Martian station secure in all simulated situations. 

Babakin approved my idea to use foam plastic for the protection of the station during landing. I suggested that the automatic Martian station should be covered by 

foam plastic on each side. Design experiments indicated that the foam plastic 

The Difficult Road to Mars 
In these plans, the 

joint frame was 

attached to the braking cone by four bars. 

The gas microengines, which would 

provide the attitude 

control of the lander 

during its autonomous flight near the 

planet, were installed 

on the bars. Four gunpowder micro-engines 

were attached to the 

outer part of the 

braking cone. Two 

micro-engines were 

used for controlling 

Chapter 4: Project M-71 
The Difficult Road to Man 

pg 

dangerous production 

facility. 

Once, having arrived at 

the institute, I found 

myself as if in a theater. In 

front of me was a production facility line with 

working equipment. The 

wall of the production 

facility was missing. It 

was lying nearby on the 

ground. "Are you trying 

to remode1 the plant while 

continuing fabrication?," I 

asked an acquaintance of 

mine. "No," he said calmly. "Yesterday, the gunpowder cartridge explod- 
(11) move the temperature and wind velocity recorders outwards to protect their 

readings from the impact of the station. Simultaneously with the opening of the 

petals, the elastic antennas (1) of the radio system are switched into use (Figure 10). 

The x-ray spectrometer and the instrument (PROP-M) designed for soil penetration 

are placed on the Martian surface. The PROP-M instrument has a cable 15 meters 

in length. During its maneuvering, mechanical properties of the Martian soil are 

measured using the press tool. These data would be used in the future to develop 

the Martian rover. 

The landing program would be started at the distance of 46,000 kilometers from 

Mars. Using pyrotechnic devices, the lander (Figure 11) and orbiter would separate. 

In 900 seconds, when the lander is at a safe distance from the orbiter, the gunpowder engine is started. As a result, the lander acquires a velocity of 120 meters per 

second and is transferred from the flyby trajectory to a Martian encounter trajectory. 

In another 150 seconds, in accord with the commands from the automatic control 

system, the lander would turn to such a position that the direction of its longitudinal 

axis would coincide with the velocity vector of the moving air stream during the lander's entry into the Martian atmosphere. In this position, the lander, using the gunpowdered engines, turns around its longitudinal axis. The joint frame with the 

Chapter 4: Project M-71 
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15-rl,!?O~AllA-fl;r'bI %ST BEPTLlKAnLl3 ,I6 -flEflEC,TKkI 2!KT BEPTL4K , II-BblTECH MElLlOK , 

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The Oifficult Road to Mars 
altimeter (RVBV). The parachute pro

vides a speed of the descent of not 

more than 65 meters per second. 

Depending on the descent velocity, in 

an altitude range of 16 to 30 meters, 

the high-altitude radar-altimeter issues 

a command; the onboard radio system 

is disconnected, the engine that controls the soft landing is started, and a 

second PVM program is initiated. 

When the lander's vertical speed of 

descent drops to 6.5 meters per second, 

the low-altitude radar-altimeter issues 

a command to break the metallic ribbons that attach the parachute-instrument module to the automatic Martian 

station. Simultaneously, the engine that 

controls the maneuvering of the parachute container is started. 

Chapter 4 Project M-71 
The Oifficult Road to Man 

KOCMMYECKMA 

The Oifficult Road to Mars 
oped in thC 

Un~tcd States, 

bccame available. Thc mass 

media indicated 

that the new 

management 

concept allowed 

for a reduction 

in thc timc for 

developing and 

building the ballistic rocket 

Polarjs. 

In my view, the 

new concept 

was very attractive. At each 

stage of the 

Chapter 4, Project M-71 
The Diff~cult Road to Man - 
12 meters per second at the time of landing were simulated. The tests showed that 

foam plastic provides a proper shock absorption and protection of the capsule during landing and if the G-force does not exceed 180 units. The separation of aeroshell 

cover and the placement of the station in a vertical position under maximum speeds 

and with different directions of impact were accomplished properly. 

In conclusion, the simulation of all flight conditions was made. The operational ability of the lander was checked in different stages of the simulated flight. Vibration 

and linear overloading tests simulated the launch of the spacecraft and its placement in an interplanetary trajectory. Centrifuge tests simulated the ballistic braking 

of the lander, and the drop of the automatic Martian station was simulated by the 

catapult with the load factor of 180 units. After the above simulations, the onboard 

program-timing device was initiated. By its command, the aeroshell cover was separated, the flaps were opened, and the station was placed in a vertical position. 

Simultaneously, the transmitters and scientific instruments were turned on, and the 

x-ray spectrometer was placed on a duplicate of the Martian soil. The PROP-M 

instrument made its short trip, still analyzing Earth's soil. During the next 25 minutes, panoramic images and scientific data were transmitted and received by the 

radio system. In addition, for 25 hours, the station was tested in a vacuum chamber 

Chapter 4: Project M-71 
CXEMA IlOnETA ObbEKTA M-71 K IlnAHETE MAPC 

B 1971 TOnY 

awaited for three 

upcoming launches. 

Spacecraft M-71 was 

launched on May 5, 

1971. At first, the ignition of all three stages 

of the Proton rocket and 

booster block D worked 

properly. The spacecraft 

with booster block D 

was placed in the predetermined Earth orbit. 

In approximately 

1 hour, after orbiting 

Earth and approaching 

Guinea Bay, block D 

should have started a 

second time and transferred the spacecraft to 

m~he Difficult Rosd to Mars 
Chapter 4: Project M-71 
interplanetary trajectory. All stages of the Proton rocket and booster blocks D operated perfectly. In accord with the results of the outbound trajectory measurements, 

the first correction of the Mars 2 and Mars 3 spacecraft trajectory was made on 

June 5 and on June 8,1971, respectively. The onboard equipment of both spacecraft 

performed without any problems. The group of flight managers started their routine 

work. Because of the particular flight trajectories to mars, communication with the 

spacecraft was maintained at night. 

After the communication sessions were completed, the management group analyzed the data acquired, then if it was necessary reconsidered the agenda for future 

communication sessions, and transferred the report of their work to Babakin. Then 

the group rested. Every morning, upon coming to work, we listened to the presentation of V.G. Timonin, who was the head manager. If it was necessary, we instructed 

the OKB departments to undertake the jobs required. 

A bright sunny morning on June 25 did not forecast any troubles. The telephone on 

Babakin's dedicated line rang unexpectedly. "Come urgently," his troubled voice 

said. Gloomy Babakin was pacing his office. "I just spoke with Timonin," he said. 

"Communication with both Mars failed last night. Get the team together and fly out 

to Yevpatorija immediately." 

The Oifficult Roud to Man 
plan of work. Finally, we arrived at Sirnferopol. The airplane landed and moved to 

the terminal. We proceeded down the stairwell and went to the exit. 

Porters with their carts rushed toward us in a chaotic fashion. Upon exiting the airport, we turned around and observed a silent scene like in Gogol's play lnspcctor. 

Stunned porters are struggling to grasp the reality. In the middle of the vacation season, an empty airplane had arrived from Moscow. 

Soon we reached the flight control facility and carefully analyzed the telemetry 

information. Strangely enough, there was no sign of the abnormal functioning of the 

telemetric system during the previous communication sessions. We discussed a suggested plan of actions with the management team and introduced some changes 

based on their comments. 

At night, when the Mars spacecraft became visible, we began its implementation. 

The first night went by. A few straws of hope appeared for reestablishing communication in the decimeter band. A whole day was devoted to analyzing the tclcmetric data acquired at night and developing a new plan. The second night was productive. We identified the operating conditions in which the duplicate transmitters 

worked in the decimeter band without errors. Simultai~eously, communication with 

Chapter 4: Project M-71 
worry, everything will be all right." The next day, the team of cosmonauts of the 

Soyuz 11 spacecraft crashed during their flight back to Earth. Perhaps, some human 

beings can predict the danger. I recollect a similar example. 

In March 1968, in the headquarters of the Council of Ministers, I met Yu.A. Cagarin. 

He was slightly overweight and wore a military greatcoat, which obviously did not 

fit him. Probably, he was waiting for somebody. At this time, the VPK Resolution, 

which determined the launch of the spacecraft Venus 5 and Venus 6, was almost 

completed. I told him jokingly, "Yuriy Alekseevich, we have the position of the main 

pilot vacant on the Venusian spacecraft." He did not respond to my joke and with 

gloomy smile said, "Maybe next time." In a few days, Yu.A. Gagarin died. 

On July 1, we returned to Moscow and as usual began to work. We did not anticipate the future loss. Very soon, we were stunned with the news that Babakin died 

from a heart attack. The death of Babakin was an enormous loss for space technology and for our team as well. Nobody could replace him. Talented people are not 

born very often. 

S.S. Kryukov, the former first deputy of Babakin, was appointed the main designer. 

Kryukov was a highly qualified specialist. He used to be the deputy of Korolev and 

The Oifficult Road to Mars 
Because of time limitations, the testing of the computer programs for the space automatic positioning system was not completed. We just did not have time to perform 

computer modeling of a situation in which the real and previously calculated trajectories would coincide. 

Could we have avoided these results? Definitely yes, but only if the first space 

barter in the history of human civilization would have happened 1 year earlier, in 

1971. The barter included the exchange of the American precise data for the Martian 

ephemeris for the Soviet data on Venus. If that had taken place and being aware that 

the spacecraft was close to its predetermined trajectory for a Mars flyby, we would 

have activated the Earth-based control system and the flight would have been controlled by commands from Earth. 

A third correction to the Mars 3 spacecraft trajectory was made on December 2, 

1971. The lander separated from the spacecraft and entered its predetermined trajectory for a Mars encounter. After 4 hours and 35 minutes, the lander entered the 

Martian atmosphere and landed at a location with coordinates 45" S and 158" W. 

The spacecraft was placed in a Martian satellite orbit with a pericenter height of 

1,500 kilometers and a period of rotation of 12 days and 19 hours. The predetermined 

Chapter 4: Project M-71 
panoramic images of the Martian surface recorded on the magnetic tape was initiated. The main engineer of NII KP, Yu.K. Khodarev, who was standing close to the 

rack where the signal was displayed, gave a command to reduce the signal because 

it was too strong. Then, the telephotometer data were transmitted. There was a gray 

background with no details. 

In 14.5 seconds, the signal disappeared. The same thing happened with the second 

telephotometer. Why did two telephotometers working in independent bands 

simultaneously fail within a hundredth of a second? We could not find an answer to 

this question. 

Later on, I discovered an interesting fact. During the second world war, British radio 

operators had their transmitters malfunction because of a coronal discharge while 

working in the desert of Lebanon during a dust storm. On Mars, the size of dust 

particles, the humidity, and the atmospheric pressure are much less, but the wind 

velocity is much higher than in the desert of Lebanon. 

Perhaps, the coronal discharge was the reason why the signal from Mars suddenly 

disappeared. Even if the radio link worked properly, in a dust storm, we still would 

be unable to get the topography images. It was planned that after a 1-minute time 

: The Oifficult Road to Mars 
p

4.7 Main Results of Mars Exploration 

With the Mars 2 and 3 Spacecraft 

The Mars 2 and 3 spacecraft were equipped with scientific instruments designed for 

the remote and planet-based study of the Martian surface and atmosphere. 

As a result of this study, the temperature and atmospheric pressure on the Martian 

surface and the nature of the surface rocks along the tracks of the satellite orbits 

were defined. The data on the soil density, its heat conductivity, dielectric permeability, and reflectivity were acquired. The temperature in the lower atmosphere and 

its change with time and latitude were determined. The heat flow anomalies on the 

Martian surface were discovered. 

Also, it was defined that the temperature of the northern polar cap was less than 

-110 degrees Celsius. Altimetry data along the satellite's tracks were obtained. It 

was defined that in the Martian atmosphere, the concentration of water vapor was 

5,000 times less than in Earth's atmosphere. The data on extent, composition, and 

temperature of the upper atmosphere were obtained. The altitude of the dust 

clouds and the size of dust particles were determined. 

Chapter 4: Project M-71 
The Difficult Road to Mars 
, pg 

face. Scientifically, the Viking lander was much more advanced than the M-71 lander. Being aware of the potential failures of the M-71 spacecraft, the government 

made a decision to launch the spacecraft in 1973, before the results of the Project M71 would be available. 

However, in 1973, the ballistic conditions for flights to Mars were not good. The 

speed required to place a spacecraft in an interplanetary trajectory had to be 

increased. In addition, it turned out to be impossible, as required in Project M-71, to 

deliver the spacecraft with the lander to an orbit that would allow the descent to be 

slowed by one braking rocket. 

The only solution that would be in accordance with the government resolution was 

to launch four spacecraft. Two of them would become Martian satellites and two 

other would deliver landers to the Martian surface. Their general design and the 

onboard systems were identical to the Mars 2 and 3 spacecraft. 

However, a number of the scientific instruments had to be redesigned. Simultaneously, 

an additional radio system had to be installed on the lander so it could transmit to 

Earth the information acquired after the parachute started to be deployed. Apparently, 

this system increased the probability of receiving the data transmitted from the lander. 

Chapter 5: The Last Thrust to Mars 
intcrcrystalline corrosion in the area of the transistor lead. 

To save the gold resources, some "smart person" suggested that the gold leads be 

replaced by aluminum ones. The necessary tests were not made. And so 2 years 

later, this suggestion caused major trouble. The only way to remedy this situation 

was to replace the flawed transistors with transistors fabricated according to the 

old technology. 

A11 experimental study showed that this task would require at least 6 months. 

This was exactly the time remaining until the spacecraft should be launched. To 

find a solution for this dead-end problem, A.N. Davydov, the head of the reliability department of the Lavochkin design bureau, was ordered to conduct a careful 

analysis of all known failures of the 2T-312 transistors, including failures in instruments of other organizations. Also, he was directed to consider the results of this 

analysis as it might affect the reliability of spacecraft already using this equipment. 

The analysis showed that the transistor's failure rate begins to increase 1.5-2 years 

after its production date. For transistors installed in our instruments, that corresponded to the arrival date of the spacecraft to Mars. The probability of completing 
I telephoned G.M. Priss, the deputy of Pilyuqn. At NPO AP, he was in charge of the 

control system of the Martian spacecraft. I told him all the details of our emergency 

situation. For a while, Priss reflected and after that suggested that we drive over to 

NPO AP. We grabbed the test results and raced through the deserted Moscow night. 

During the trip, we developed a plan. We suggested that the control system be 

removed from the spacecraft and installed and tested in the testing facility of NPO 

AP. Only after the main designer and the military representative had approved the 

results of the test would the control system be installed in the spacecraft agai.n. To 

reduce an inevitable delay in the testing of the power system, we suggested that the 

order in which spacecraft would be launched be changed. Specifically, we suggested 

launching the spacecraft where the emergency situation took place the last time. 

Eventually, we arrived at NPO AP. We passed the empty and resonant corridors and 

went upstairs into the office of Priss. We were awaited, and the flow charts of the 

control system were laid on the desk. Priss had already discussed the possible solution of the problem with specialists from NPO AP. During the last session, parameters of the control system were recorded. We put the notes with records on the desk. 

The specialists bent over the records and sometimes made short comments that I 

could hardly understand. That reminded one of a consultation near the patient's 

bed when doctors discuss the diagnosis and how to cure the disease. 

Chapter 5: The Last Thrust to Mars 
The Difficult Rued to Mars 
and completed intricate programs without commands from Earth. 

Approaching Mars, the spacecraft measured its position with respect to Mars, calculated strength and direction of the correction impulse for its trajectory, performed 

the correction of the trajectory, calculated the direction of the lander descent, sepa- Figure l!. 

The iMars 6 and 7 

rated the lander from the spacecraft, and received and transmitted to Earth informa- Spacecraft 

tion from the lander at the point when the parachute system started to be deployed. 

The silent spacecraft accomplished the flight mission 

completely. The additional 

transmission channel was 

operative only during the 

descent of the lander. 

Information from the Martian 

surface had to be transmitted 

by the main radio channel to 

the Mars 5 spacecraft; however, the signal did not reach its 

destination. 

Chapter 5: The Last Thrust to Mars 
ing the next flights?" We were not concerned with a single 

failure because the spacecraft systems continued to operate in that situation. 

A.I. Shokhin offered two suggestions. The first one was to 

use the electronic components that were designed about 

10 years ago and were fabricated in accord with welldeveloped technology. The second option was to choose 

advanced electronic components using a special program. 

Without a second thought, we rejected the first suggestion. The second option was accepted. Programs were 

developed to choose the electronic components (they got 

the abbreviation MB). They increased the reliability of the 

onboard instruments. On the other hand, the cost of the 

MB electronic components was almost 10 times the previous cost. But, as they say, "The goal is worth the effort." 

The Difficult Road to Mars 
of lunar rocks and deliver them back to Earth. 

A sudden thought went through my mind, and I said, "What if on the lunar landing 

platform the land rover would be replaced by a rocket. The rocks could be collected 

and delivered to Earth." Babakin focused on this idea and thought for a while. His 

eyes moved to the right, then to the left, probably following his thoughts. 

Eventually, he returned to his usual mood and said, "But it is a very difficult problem." I responded, "I do not have expertise in designing lunar spacecraft and cannot 

make a decision." However, the idea attracted Babakin, and he issued instructions 

to work on it. 

After careful consideration, it was concluded that the project could be realized only 

if the advanced technical decisions were used and strict weight limitations taken 

into account. Babakin gave much attention to this project. He was eager to see the 

project completed, and he always participated in the solution of intricate scientific 

and technicaI problems. Probably, the project was accomplished successfully 

because of the enormous efforts of Babakin. 

At the beginning of 1970, the lunar project's problems had been solved. At this 

time, Babakin gave instructions for a technical proposal to consider how the 

Chapter fi. Hov: to Oeliver Martian Soil7 
rocket was installed. The rocket included 

the orbital Mars-Earth module, which 

weighed 750 kilograms, and a return 

craft, which weighed 15 kilograms and 

was designed to deliver 200 grams of 

Martian soil back to Earth. The design of 

the Venus 4/6 orbiter was used for fabricating the orbital Mars-Earth module. 

To transfer the spacecraft from Earth's 

orbit to an interplanetary orbit, a twostaged boosting rocket was proposed. 

When the spacecraft would approach 

Mars, a trajectory correction had to be 

performed. Then the lander would be 

separated from the orbiter. To receive the 

telemetry data from the lander, the 

orbiter would be placed in a flyby 

trajectory. 

The OiHicult Road to Mars 
Chapter 6: How to Deliver Martian Soil? 
aware how they would operate 

during almost 3 years. 

However, Minister Afanasiev liked 

this project. He admitted that our 

arguments on biological insecurity 

were reasonable. Siinultaneously, 

being confident that biological problems would be solved soon, he 

attempted to convince Babakin to 

begin the project . Nevertheless, 

Babakin did not agree. The minister 

suggested that I become the main 

designer of the project. He promised 

all kinds of help. The help of such a 

powerful and influential chief meant 

a lot, but I could not accept his offer. 

Afanasiev was disappointed, but he 

did not forget this project. 

The OiHicult Road to Mars 
planetary trajectory. 

The flight had to be performed with a trajectory that would eventually approach 

Mars. Upon approaching the planet and to receive data transmitted from the lander, 

the orbiter would be transferred to a flyby trajectory (Figure 24). The lander would 

perform a gliding descent and land on the Martian surface. Using the panoramic 

images, there would be a command from Earth and the Martian soil would be collected and loaded in the capsule, which was installed in the second stage of the 

booster rocket. The rocket, which weighed 2,000 kilograms, had to deliver the 

capsule with the soil to a Martian orbit. 

To deliver the capsule back to Earth, the spacecraft with the return craft should be 

placed in a Martian orbit. In this orbit, the spacecraft had to be docked with the last 

stage of the rocket that contained the capsule. Then the capsule should be reloaded 

in the return craft. 

When a favorable starting date arrives, the soil should start its trip to Earth. To place 

the spacecraft in a Martian orbit, it was necessary to launch a third Proton rocket. To 

avoid biological contamination, it was proposed to place the return craft in an Earth 

orbit, dock it with a manned spacecraft, reload the return craft into the manned 

Chapter 6. How to Oel~ver Marlien Soil? 
The Oifficult Road to Mars 
opened to create the aeroshield cover. 

All suggestions about a possible weight decrease of onboard instruments had been 

carefully analyzed. As a result, the design of the spacecraft, which weighed 

9,135 kilograms and consisted of the orbiter (1,680 kilograms) and lander 

(7,455 kilograms), was developed. The lander included a two-stage booster rocket, 

which weighed 3,190 kilograms, and the Mars-Earth return craft. 

In January 1976, Kryukov approved the preliminary design of the return craft, 

which had to deliver the Martian soil and whose weight should not exceed 

2 percent of the spacecraft weight. With these weight limitations, there was hope 

that the project could be completed. However, the problem of biological contamination had not been solved. SimuItaneously with the development of the technical 

assignment, we started the second stage of the project to find a solution to the 

weight limitations. To do that, a number of highly advanced technical solutions to 

decrease the weight of the spacecraft were implemented. 

The idea of Academician A.P. Vinogradov was very helpful. He suggested conducting thermal sterilization of the soil samples while in the Martian orbit. This suggestion completely solved the problem of biological security of Earth. In addition, the 

Chapter 6: How to Deliver Martian Soil? 
\vere out of business! 

The main designer, Kryukov, who said he was guilty of mismanaging the project, 

resigned. At that time, V.M. Kovtunenko, the deputy to the main designer of 

Yushnoe NPO in Dnepropetrovsk, was appointed the main designer of the 

Lavochkin design bureau. 

Kovtunenko had been working at Yushnoe NPO in Dnepropetrovsk for many years. 

In the beginning, lie developed ballistic rockets. During the last 10 years, before he 

was appointed the main designer of the Lavochkin design bureau, Kovtunenko was 

in charge of the Intercosnios ~~itellites, which were developed according to a cooperative program among socialist countries and bvere designed to study the space near 

Earth. The Intercosmos satellites were developed using the design of one of the 

Cosmos series satellites. They had small weight, a simple design, and were 

Iaunched in an Earth's orbit with the two-stage Tsyklon rocket. 

Naturally, the problems that had to be solved by the recently appointed main 

designer to develop the interplanetary automatic spacecraft were not similar to the 

problems with which he dealt while developing the Intercosmos satellites. 

Kovtunenko decided to find his own way in this new field. He was fascinated with 

The Difficult Road to Man 
port, it was difficult to achieve 

a quick success in the development of new spacecraft. 

Therefore, the Phobos 1 and 2 

spacecraft (Figure 26) were 

launched only in 1989, 

10 years after their development had been initiated. The 

flight program outlined: (1) to 

place the Phobos 1 and 2 

spacecraft in a Martian orbit, 

(2) to approach the Martian 

satellite Phobos, (3) to land 

two automatic stations on 

Phobos' surface, (4) to conduct 

a remote distance study of 

Phobos soil chemistry from a 

flyby trajectory and (5) to conduct an extensive study of 

Mars from its satellite orbit. 

Chapter 6 How to Del~ver MartIan So117 
, pp

sad result. 

The Mars 96 spacecraft (Figure 27) failed as well. This spacecraft was built to perform an extensive study of Mars from its orbit with penetrators dropped to the 

Martian surface. The Mars 96 spacecraft was not injected in an interplanetary trajectory. 

Today, it seems that the Soviet and, thereafter the Russian, program of Mars exploration was ended on a sour note. However, there is the Russian proverb that says: 

"One beaten person is worth two unbeaten ones." 

As soon as the Russian economy is stabilized, young creative minds who have 

already developed the original approach to Mars and Phobos exploration will overcome and succeed. 

POI The Difficult Road to Man 
Central Scientific Research Institute of the 

Fuel Automatics, 29 

Central Scientific Research Institute of the 

Space Instruments Development, 30 

Davydov, A.N., 62 

Demekhin, A.S., 27,28,36,37 

Dobrovolskiy, G., 56 

Dulnev, L.J., 8 

Experimental Design Bureau No. 1 (OKB-I), 

7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 54 

Fedchenko, I.N., 25 

Fisher, A.Y., 21 

Fregat, Rocket, 36 

Gagarin, Yuri, 11, 56 

Glushko, V.P., 75 

Guskov, G. Ya., 31 

Kubasov, V.N., 8 

Kulikov, S.D., 27, 37 

Kurushin, V.I., 53 

Kuznetsov, V.I., 27,37,40 

Lavochkin, S.A., 12,13,15,25,31,35,39,69,74 

Lidorenko, N.S., 30 

Lobanov, N.A., 39 

Lowell, Percival, 5 

Lukin, I.N., 13 

M-69 Project, 19-33 

M-71 Project, 34-60 

Makarov, Yu.F., 35,55, 62 

Maksimov, G. Yu, 7,13 

Mariner 4,14 

Marov, M.Ya., 35 

Mars 1, 11, 20 

Mars 2,54,59-60 

Mars 3,54,59-60 
j

Project SM, 7'1.-73 

Project 5NM, 67-72 

Proton Rocket, 16,17,20,39 

Reshetnev, M.V., 12 

Rozhdestvenskiy, M.K, 13,14 

Ryasanskiy, MS., 30, 31, 35, 55 

Zond 2,10 

The Oifficut Road to Man 
fy 

gppy

Logsdon, John M. moderator. Tile Lrgislatiue Origins ofthe National Aeronautics and Space Act of 

1958: Proceedbrgs ofm Oral Histoy IWorkslrup (Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 8,1998). 

Rumerman, Judy A. Compiler. U.S. Human Spacef2ight: A Record ofAchievement, 1961-1998 

o monographs in Aerospace History, No. 9,1998). 

Portree, David S.F. NASA's Origins arrd th~ Dmon of the Space Age (Monographs in Aerospace 

History, No. 10,1998). 

Logsdon, John M. Togetlrcr in Orbit: Tllr Origirrs oflntemational Cooperation in the Space Station 

Prograrrl (Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 11, 1998). 

Phillips, W. Hewitt, Joun~~y in Aerorrautical Researclr: A Carem at NASA Lnnglqj Research Center. 

(Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 12,1998). 

Braslon: Albert L. A Histor!/ ofsuction-Tie Latninar-Flow Control with Evlphasis on Flight Research 

(Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 13, 1999). 

Logsdon, John M. Moderator. Marmgirrg tlw Mooir Program: Lcssons Ltarnedfiom Project Ayollo 

(Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 14,1999). 

Perminov, V.G. TIlc Dificrrlt Rnld to Mars: A Brief History . of . Mars Exploration in the Soviet Union 

(Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 15,1999). 

Those monographs still in print are available free of charge from the NASA History Division, 

Code ZH, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC 20546. Please enclosed a self-addressed 9x12" 

envelope stamped for 15 ounces for these items. 

Monographs in Aerospace Histor;