Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

NUCLEAR 

DETECTION 

Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office 

Should Improve 

Planning to Better 

Address Gaps and 

Vulnerabilities 

January 2009 

GAO-09-257 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2009

NUCLEAR DETECTION

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve 

Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities

Highlights of GAO-09-257, a report to 

congressional requesters 

In April 2005, the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office (DNDO) was 

established within the Department

of Homeland Security (DHS) to 

enhance and coordinate federal,

state, and local efforts to combat

nuclear smuggling domestically 

and overseas. DNDO was directed

to develop, in coordination with the 

departments of Defense (DOD), 

Energy (DOE), and State (State), a

global strategy for nuclear 

detection—a system of radiation

detection equipment and

interdiction activities domestically

and abroad. GAO was asked to

examine (1) DNDO’s progress in 

developing programs to address

critical gaps in preventing nuclear 

smuggling domestically, (2) 

DNDO’s role in supporting other 

agencies’ efforts to combat nuclear

smuggling overseas, and (3) the 

amount budgeted by DHS, DOD,

DOE, and State for programs that 

constitute the global nuclear 

detection strategy. To do so, GAO 

analyzed agency documents;

interviewed agency, state, and local 

officials; and visited select pilot 

program locations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS 

(1) develop a plan for the domestic 

part of the global strategy, and 

(2) in coordination with DOD, 

DOE, and State, use the Joint 

Annual Interagency Review to

guide future strategic efforts to

combat nuclear smuggling. GAO 

also has two recommendations 

related to maritime planning. DHS

did not directly comment on the 

recommendations, but said they

aligned with DNDO’s efforts. 

DNDO has made some progress in strengthening radiation detection 

capabilities to address critical gaps and vulnerabilities in combating nuclear 

smuggling, which include the land border area between ports of entry into the 

United States, aviation, and small maritime vessels. However, DNDO is still in 

the early stages of program development, and has not clearly developed long 

term plans, with costs and time frames, for achieving its goal of closing these

gaps by expanding radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. For 

example, DNDO and Customs and Border Protection have been collaborating 

on radiological and nuclear detection options to better secure the land 

borders between ports of entry. However, DNDO-sponsored field evaluations 

to test radiation detection equipment are still not complete and DNDO and 

CBP may not have all radiation detection equipment in place until 2012. In 

addition, DNDO is in the first year of a 3-year maritime pilot program, working 

with the Coast Guard and local law enforcement agencies in the Puget Sound, 

Washington, area to field test equipment and to develop radiological and 

nuclear screening procedures. However, DNDO has made little progress in (1) 

developing criteria for assessing the success of the pilot to help determine 

whether it should be expanded to other locations, and (2) resolving some of 

the challenges it faces in the pilot program, such as technological limitations 

of the detection equipment and sustaining current detection efforts. 

Although DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies’ programs to 

combat radiological and nuclear smuggling overseas, it has worked with DOD, 

DOE, and State to provide subject matter expertise and exchange lessons 

learned on radiological and nuclear detection. However, most of DNDO’s 

efforts are modest in scope, reflecting the fact that these agencies have wellestablished programs to combat nuclear smuggling. For example, DNDO has 

been working with State’s Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to 

develop model guidelines that other nations can use to establish their own 

nuclear detection programs. 

According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted by DHS, DOD, 

DOE, and State in fiscal year 2007 for programs included in the global strategy 

for nuclear detection. Of this amount, approximately $1.1 billion was 

budgeted for programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, $1.1 billion was 

budgeted for nuclear detection programs at the U.S. border and within the 

United States, and approximately $577 million was budgeted to fund crosscutting activities, such as providing technical support to users of the radiation 

detection equipment. DNDO collected budget data and published them in the 

Joint Annual Interagency Review, an annual report required by Congress.

DOD, DOE, and State officials told GAO that this information is used primarily 

as a status report of individual programs to combat nuclear smuggling. It is

not used as a tool to help plan for or inform the future direction of the strategy 

or to help establish current or future priorities. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-257. 

For more information, contact David Maurer 

at (202) 512-3841 or maurerd@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 9

DNDO Is in the Early Stages of Enhancing Domestic Initiatives for 

Nuclear Detection 13 

DNDO Has Limited Role in Influencing U.S. Efforts to Combat 

Radiological and Nuclear Smuggling Overseas 23 

A Total of $2.8 Billion Was Budgeted in Fiscal Year 2007 for 

Programs Associated with Detecting Radiological and Nuclear 

Materials 25

DNDO Has Not Yet Implemented Recommendation from July 2008 

Testimony 32

Conclusions 32

Recommendations for Executive Action 34 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34 

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 39 

GAO Comments 50 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 56 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 58 

Related GAO Products 59

Table 

Table 1: Distribution of Fiscal Year 2007 Budget for Detecting 

Radiological and Nuclear Weapons or Materials 26 

Figures 

Figure 1: Elements of the Global Nuclear Detection Strategy 10 

Figure 2: Cargo Vehicle Passing through Radiological Detection 

Equipment at Dulles International Airport 16 

Page i GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Figure 3: A Coast Guard Officer Wearing Standard Boarding Team 

Equipment 22

Figure 4: Budgets by Program Focus and Agency 26 

Abbreviations 

ASP advanced spectroscopic portal (monitor) 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

NYPD New York Police Department 

RIID radioactive isotope identification device 

SAFE Port Act Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 

 2006 

State Department of State 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page ii GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

January 29, 2009 

Congressional Requesters

Preventing terrorists from using radiological or nuclear material to carry 

out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. If terrorists 

were to carry out such an attack, the consequences could be devastating

to national security. Since the events of September 11, 2001, there is 

heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle radiological and 

nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States or obtain 

such materials within the United States. In 2002, Congress established the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and gave it authority to, among 

other things, develop and deploy technologies to detect, prevent, and 

interdict nuclear materials or devices from being transported into and 

used within the United States. 

Preventing terrorists from using radiological or nuclear material to carry 

out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. If terrorists 

were to carry out such an attack, the consequences could be devastating

to national security. Since the events of September 11, 2001, there is 

heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle radiological and 

nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States or obtain 

such materials within the United States. In 2002, Congress established the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and gave it authority to, among 

other things, develop and deploy technologies to detect, prevent, and 

interdict nuclear materials or devices from being transported into and 

used within the United States. 

In April 2005, the President issued a directive establishing the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), within DHS, to enhance and coordinate 

federal, state, and local efforts to prevent radiological and nuclear attacks. 

Congress subsequently passed the Security and Accountability for Every 

Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), which established DNDO in statute.1

Among other things, DNDO is required to develop, in coordination with 

the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the 

Department of Justice, and the Department of State (State), an enhanced 

global nuclear detection architecture—essentially a strategy involving 

radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat 

nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the 

United States.

2

 DNDO is responsible for coordinating the implementation 

of the domestic portion (at the U.S. border and within the United States)

of the global strategy, including the efforts of federal, state, and local 

governments. It is also responsible for developing and acquiring radiation

detection equipment to support the domestic efforts of DHS and other 

federal agencies. The directive and the SAFE Port Act reaffirmed that 

In April 2005, the President issued a directive establishing the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), within DHS, to enhance and coordinate 

federal, state, and local efforts to prevent radiological and nuclear attacks. 

Congress subsequently passed the Security and Accountability for Every 

Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), which established DNDO in statute.

 

1

Among other things, DNDO is required to develop, in coordination with 

the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the 

Department of Justice, and the Department of State (State), an enhanced 

global nuclear detection architecture—essentially a strategy involving 

radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat 

nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the 

United States.

2

 DNDO is responsible for coordinating the implementation 

of the domestic portion (at the U.S. border and within the United States)

of the global strategy, including the efforts of federal, state, and local 

governments. It is also responsible for developing and acquiring radiation

detection equipment to support the domestic efforts of DHS and other 

federal agencies. The directive and the SAFE Port Act reaffirmed that 

1

Pub. L. No. 109-347, section 501, 120 Stat. 1884, 1932 (2006). 

2

Neither the presidential directive nor the SAFE Port Act, which established DNDO and 

directed the agency to develop a global nuclear detection architecture, defined the term

“architecture.” DNDO has interpreted “architecture” as a time-phased, geographic approach

to reducing the risk of a radiological or nuclear attack. For the purposes of this report, we 

refer to the architecture as a strategy. 

Page 1 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

DOD, DOE, and State, among other agencies, are responsible for programs 

to combat radiological and nuclear smuggling outside the United States. 

In its initial approach, DNDO categorized existing nuclear detection 

programs into three main geographic regions—overseas, U.S. border, and 

U.S. interior—which it further divided into nine more specific geographic 

segments. In addition, agencies identified other programs that support 

more than one segment; DNDO categorizes these as cross-cutting. While 

DNDO is responsible for developing the global strategy for nuclear 

detection, each federal agency that has a role in combating nuclear 

smuggling is responsible for implementing its own programs. DNDO 

identified 73 federal programs, which are primarily funded by DOD, DOE, 

and DHS, that engage in radiological and nuclear detection activities. 

Since its inception about 4 years ago, DNDO has been examining nuclear

detection strategies along potential pathways—such as air, land, or sea—

for smuggling radiological or nuclear material and identified opportunities 

to improve the likelihood of detection and interdiction. Through these 

studies, DNDO concluded that potential smuggling pathways outside of 

traditional ports of entry—where U.S. government efforts have been 

focused—represented critical gaps in the existing nuclear detection 

strategy. Specifically, DNDO identified several gap areas, among others, 

with respect to detecting potential nuclear smuggling and prioritized its 

efforts on three primary pathways: (1) land border areas between ports of 

entry into the United States, (2) aviation, and (3) small maritime craft.3

These pathways are important because of their size, volume of traffic, and 

limited deployment of radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. 

Specifically, the United States has more than 6,000 miles of land border 

with many locations where people and vehicles can easily enter the United 

States. Nuclear weapons and material also can be small and portable 

enough to be carried on most aircraft. On average, nearly 2,000 

international commercial flights and over 400 international general 

aviation flights land in the United States each day.4

 In the maritime 

 3

Small maritime craft are vessels less than 300 gross tons and can include recreational 

boats, commercial fishing vessels, and tug boats. These vessels are subject to few security 

regulations. For example, they do not have to provide a 96-hour advance notice of arrival. 

4

International general aviation applies to noncommercial, nonmilitary aircraft traveling to 

the United States from an international location. International general aviation aircraft can 

range in size from small planes (such as a Cessna 182) to planes as large as a DC-9 or even 

an Airbus A380. 

Page 2 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

environment, a Coast Guard risk assessment revealed that small boats 

pose a greater threat for nuclear smuggling than container ships. There are 

at least 13 million registered domestic pleasure craft in the United States 

and 110,000 commercial fishing vessels. These small boats have

traditionally been used to smuggle drugs and people, but, as occurred in 

the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, can be used to deliver a weapon. 

GAO was asked to examine (1) DNDO’s progress in developing programs 

to address critical gaps in preventing nuclear smuggling domestically, 

(2) DNDO’s role in supporting other agencies’ efforts to combat nuclear 

smuggling overseas, and (3) the amount budgeted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and 

State for programs that constitute the global nuclear detection strategy 

and the extent to which the budget information is used for planning 

purposes. In addition, we are providing an update on DNDO’s efforts to 

implement the recommendation made in our July 2008 testimony, which 

presented preliminary observations on the global strategy for nuclear 

detection.5

To evaluate the status of DNDO’s progress in developing programs to 

address critical gaps and its role in supporting other agencies’ efforts to 

combat nuclear smuggling overseas, we reviewed and analyzed documents 

DNDO used to help create the baseline, or initial strategy, as well as 

DNDO-sponsored studies on gaps identified in the strategy. We also 

reviewed our previous reports on nuclear and radiological detection.6

 We 

interviewed officials from DNDO about steps taken to develop and 

improve upon the existing strategy for nuclear detection and interviewed 

agency officials from DOD, DOE, and State who manage programs that are 

part of the global strategy to obtain their perspectives on how these 

programs fit into the global strategy and to learn about any new initiatives 

to address gaps and vulnerabilities. In addition, we interviewed officials 

from a variety of federal, state, and local agencies—including Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), the Coast Guard, the New York City Police 

Department, and local law enforcement participating in the Puget Sound 

maritime pilot—to obtain their views on DNDO’s initiatives to combat 

nuclear smuggling. We chose the New York City Police Department 

because of its efforts to enhance nuclear detection capabilities through the 

 5

GAO, Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office’s Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, GAO-08-999T 

(Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2008). 

6

See the list of related GAO products at the end of this report.

Page 3 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

Securing the Cities initiative and Puget Sound because that was the first 

location chosen for the maritime radiological and nuclear detection pilot 

program. We also interviewed subject matter experts from the academic

and nonprofit sectors, as well as representatives from the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to gain their perspective on efforts to 

develop and implement the strategy. To examine the amount budgeted for 

the programs that constitute the global strategy for nuclear detection, we

analyzed budget data submitted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and State to DNDO 

as part of DNDO’s Joint Annual Interagency Review and spoke with 

officials from these agencies to discern how this information was used. We 

assessed the reliability of these data and determined it was sufficient for 

the purposes of this analysis. We conducted this performance audit from 

November 2007 through January 2009 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. 

DNDO has made some progress in strengthening radiation detection 

capabilities to address critical gaps and vulnerabilities in combating 

nuclear smuggling, which include the land border areas between ports of 

entry into the United States, aviation, and small maritime vessels. 

However, DNDO is still in the early stages of program development, and 

has not clearly developed long-term plans, with costs and time frames, for 

achieving its goal of closing these gaps by expanding radiological and

nuclear detection capabilities. Specifically, we found: 

Results in Brief 

• Land border areas between ports of entry. DNDO and CBP, both agencies

within DHS, have been collaborating on radiological and nuclear detection 

options to better secure the border areas between ports of entry. CBP is 

responsible for developing and implementing screening procedures; 

DNDO provides the equipment for these operations. DNDO and CBP plan 

to have radiation detection equipment in place at all 20 CBP sectors by 

fiscal year 2012. However, DNDO-sponsored laboratory and field 

evaluations to identify and test radiation detection equipment are still not 

complete, DNDO has fallen behind on its original test schedule, critical 

testing has been postponed owing to problems with the detection 

technology being tested, and DNDO has not estimated the total cost of this 

effort. In addition, DNDO has not provided CBP with the equipment 

Page 4 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

needed in a timely manner to improve radiation detection capabilities 

either at ports of entry or land border areas between ports of entry. 

• Aviation. DNDO is still in the early stages of developing programs to 

achieve its goal of screening all incoming international planes, cargo, and

passengers for nuclear weapons and material. Although some initiatives in

the aviation arena are under way, it is unclear how long this effort will 

take or how much it will cost. Since December 2007, CBP has been 

screening 100 percent of passengers and baggage on arriving international

general aviation flights (approximately 400 flights per day), as well as the 

aircraft, for radiological or nuclear materials. However, CBP efforts to 

screen international cargo have not proceeded as smoothly. Jurisdictional 

and operational issues between the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), CBP, and the local airport authority delayed efforts 

to screen international cargo at the initial airport selected for screening 

until September 2008. Planned expansion of this screening to a total of 30

U.S. airports, which represent 99 percent of incoming international cargo,

is not projected to be fully achieved until 2014. 

• Small maritime vessels. DNDO has developed and tested equipment for 

detecting nuclear material on small maritime vessels. However, efforts to 

use this equipment in a port area have been limited to pilot programs for 

demonstrating the feasibility of screening small vessels. Whereas 

initiatives to combat smuggling at land border areas between formal ports 

of entry and through aviation routes are being integrated into already 

existing CBP screening operations, initiatives in the maritime environment 

require developing and testing new equipment and new procedures with 

the Coast Guard and local law enforcement agencies. DNDO is currently in 

the first year of a 3-year pilot program in Puget Sound and San Diego to 

design, field test, and evaluate equipment and is working with CBP and 

Coast Guard as they develop procedures for screening. This review is 

scheduled to end in 2010, when DNDO will decide whether screening of

small vessels for radiological and nuclear material is feasible. However, 

DNDO has not established criteria for assessing the success of this pilot 

effort to help determine whether it should be expanded to other locations. 

In addition, should DNDO decide to continue this program, it does not 

currently have a plan detailing which locations it would target for 

maritime radiological and nuclear detection programs, nor has it estimated 

the total cost of this initiative. Although DNDO is providing state, tribal, 

and local agencies with initial equipment, support, and training during the 

pilot, DNDO expects them to seek funding from federal grant programs to 

sustain these initiatives. For many state and local agency officials we 

spoke with, the uncertainty of federal resources jeopardizes their ability to

continue radiological and nuclear detection activities. 

Page 5 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

Although DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies’ programs to 

combat radiological and nuclear smuggling, it has worked with DOD, DOE, 

and State to support these agencies’ efforts to combat nuclear smuggling 

overseas by, for example, providing subject matter expertise and 

exchanging lessons learned on radiological and nuclear detection. 

However, most of DNDO’s efforts are modest in scope, reflecting the fact

that DOD, DOE, and State have well-established programs to combat 

nuclear smuggling. Some of the areas in which DNDO has been able to 

contribute to other agencies’ overseas programs include (1) working with 

State’s Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to develop model 

guidelines that other nations can use to establish their own nuclear 

detection programs and sponsoring a related workshop, and 

(2) exchanging lessons learned with DOE from its efforts to develop 

operations to screen for radiological and nuclear materials in the aviation 

arena. In addition, DNDO has been collecting information and developing 

an inventory of radiation detection equipment deployed overseas. DNDO 

subsequently has shared this information with relevant agencies, and 

agencies have used this information to guide equipment placement 

decisions. 

According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted by DHS, 

DOD, DOE, and State in fiscal year 2007 for programs included in the 

global strategy for nuclear detection; however, agencies are not analyzing

this budget information to ensure that resources are clearly aligned with 

overarching priorities. Of this $2.8 billion, approximately $1.1 billion was 

budgeted for programs designed to combat nuclear smuggling and secure 

materials overseas. Approximately $220 million was budgeted for 

programs to support the detection of radiological and nuclear material at 

the U.S. border; an additional $918 million funded security and detection 

activities within the United States. Finally, approximately $577 million was 

budgeted for a number of cross-cutting activities that support many 

different layers of the strategy, such as those focused on research and 

development or technical support to users of the detection equipment. 

When analyzed by agency, the majority of the $2.8 billion—$1.8 billion, or 

62 percent—was budgeted for DOE programs, primarily those related to

securing nuclear weapons and weapons material at its source and 

deploying radiological and nuclear detection systems at international 

border crossings, airports, and seaports. DNDO collected these programlevel budget data in response to a statutory requirement that select 

agencies, including DHS, DOD, DOE, and State, annually assess their 

capacity to implement their portion of the global nuclear detection 

strategy. DNDO’s June 2008 report discusses, among other things, 

programs and budgets in support of the global nuclear detection effort. 

Page 6 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

The report provides an overview of the global nuclear detection strategy 

and discusses programs and budgets for combating nuclear smuggling 

domestically and overseas. Agency officials from DOD, DOE, and State 

said that this information is used primarily to provide agencies and 

Congress with a picture of the already established roles and 

responsibilities within the layered structure of the strategy. The 

information is not being used, however, as a tool to look more broadly 

across the global strategy, to help assess the overall strategic direction of

global detection efforts, or help establish current or future global 

priorities, according to these officials. 

In July 2008, we testified that DNDO had not developed an overarching 

strategic plan to guide its development of a more comprehensive global 

strategy for nuclear detection.7

 We recommended that DHS, in 

coordination with DOD, DOE, and State, develop a strategic plan to guide 

the development of a more comprehensive global nuclear strategy 

including (1) clearly defining objectives, (2) identifying the roles and 

responsibilities for meeting each objective, (3) identifying funding 

necessary to achieve those objectives, and (4) employing monitoring 

mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify needed 

improvements. DNDO agreed with the need for an overarching strategic 

plan and believes that many elements of such a plan exist in DHS and 

other agency documents, but that there are gaps and vulnerabilities for 

which solutions are still under development. As of December 2008, DNDO 

had not yet established detailed plans to address those gaps and 

vulnerabilities, nor had it integrated all the plan elements into an 

overarching strategic plan as recommended. 

To complement our July 2008 recommendation, we are recommending 

that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a strategic plan for the 

domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy to help ensure the

future success of initiatives aimed at closing gaps and vulnerabilities. This

plan should focus on, among other things, establishing time frames and 

costs for the three areas of recent focus—land border areas between ports 

of entry, aviation, and small maritime vessels. In addition, to enhance 

DNDO’s future efforts to combat nuclear smuggling via small maritime 

vessels, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

develop criteria to assess the effectiveness, cost, and feasibility of its 

maritime radiological and nuclear pilot program. Furthermore, should the 

 7

GAO-08-999T. 

Page 7 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

Secretary decide to expand the program beyond the pilot, we recommend 

that DHS undertake additional planning to identify next steps, including 

how and where a broader strategy would be implemented, what 

technology would be needed, what organizations should be involved, and

how such efforts would be sustained.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOD, DOE, and State for 

comment. DHS and DOD provided written comments, which are presented

in appendixes I and II, respectively. DOE and State provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD concurred with 

the recommendation that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 

coordination with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and 

Secretary of State, use the Joint Annual Interagency Review to guide 

future strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DOD stated that 

greater use could be made of the review associated with the development 

of this annual report to guide U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. 

DHS did not directly comment on our recommendations but noted that the 

recommendations aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions. 

DHS pointed out what, in its view, were a number of shortcomings in the 

draft report. Specifically, the department believes that we did not give 

enough credit to DNDO’s strategic planning efforts. Furthermore, the 

department believes that we did not clearly and adequately explain the 

background and context of DNDO’s efforts to develop a global strategy, 

what has been accomplished so far, what remains to be done, and what 

challenges it faces. Finally, DHS asserted that the draft contained a 

number of inaccuracies and omissions that make it less reliable and useful 

than it could be. DHS also provided a number of more detailed comments 

on specific issues presented in the draft report. We have addressed those 

comments in our detailed responses in appendix I and incorporated 

changes, where appropriate. 

We believe that our report fairly and accurately presents DNDO efforts to 

develop and implement a global strategy to enhance nuclear detection 

efforts. We have reported DNDO’s key initiatives to improve radiation 

detection capabilities in the areas of land borders between the ports of 

entry, aviation, and maritime. For example, the report acknowledges how 

DNDO has helped highlight the need to address these critical gaps and has 

also made some progress in developing and supporting initiatives to close

these gaps. In our view, DNDO needs better planning to improve the 

chances that the strategy will be successfully implemented and sustained 

in the future. In its comments, DNDO agreed that the overarching strategic 

plan we had previously recommended in our July 2008 testimony based on

Page 8 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

our preliminary findings on this very issue was valuable and that work on 

such a plan has begun. 

According to IAEA, between 1993 and 2006, there were 1,080 confirmed 

incidents of illicit trafficking and unauthorized activities involving nuclear 

and radiological materials worldwide. Eighteen of these cases involved 

weapons-usable material—plutonium and highly enriched uranium—that 

could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. IAEA also reported that 124 

cases involved materials that could be used to produce a device that uses 

conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty 

bomb”). Past confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking in highly enriched 

uranium and plutonium involved seizures of kilogram quantities of 

weapons-usable nuclear material but most have involved very small 

quantities. In some of these cases, it is possible that the seized material 

was a sample of larger quantities available for illegal purchase. IAEA 

concluded that these materials pose a continuous potential security threat 

to the international community, including the United States.

Nuclear material could be smuggled into the United States in a variety of 

ways: hidden in a car, train or ship; sent through the mail; carried in a 

private aircraft or small boat; carried in personal luggage through an 

airport; or walked across the border. In response to these threats, U.S. 

agencies—including DHS, DOD, DOE, and State—fund, manage, and 

implement programs to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries and 

the United States. DOD, DOE, and State are responsible specifically for the 

overseas programs. Many of these programs started operations prior to 

DNDO’s creation and collectively cover all of the geographic regions of the 

global strategy. (See fig. 1.) 

Background 

Page 9 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

Figure 1: Elements of the Global Nuclear Detection Strategy 

 Overseas

1. Foreign origin: Locations in foreign 

countries where nuclear weapons or 

material, or radiological material are 

stored, used, or created

2. Foreign transit: Any transport of 

radiological or nuclear material within or 

between foreign countries from its site of 

origin to its point of departure to the U.S.

3. Foreign departure: Points of 

departure to the U.S. including seaports

and airports.

 U.S. Border

4 Transit to United States: Actual ship 

passage or airplane flight from the point

of departure to the port of entry

 U.S. Border: Radiation detection at all 

land borders with Canada and Mexico, the 

coastal and inland waterway borders, and 

international airports

 U.S. Interior

6. U.S. origin: Places within the U.S. 

where nuclear weapons, nuclear 

material or radiological material are 

stored, used, or processed

7. U.S. Regional: Capabilities that 

detect or identify radiation sources

between the entry into the United 

States (or the U.S. point of origin) and 

the ultimate target

8. Target Vicinity: Detectors located 

“near” targets but with sufficient 

standoff to protect the targets, or at 

least mitigate damage, if a device is

detonated

9. Target: Detect devices delivered to 

the target but not yet detonated

3

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

5

2

4

6 - 9

Sources: GAO analysis of DNDO data and Map Resources (map).

1

For example, DOE’s Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting 

program, initiated in 1995, provides support to the Russian Federation and

Page 10 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

other former Soviet Union countries to secure nuclear weapons and 

weapons material that may be at risk of theft or diversion.8

 In addition, 

during the 1990s, the United States began deploying radiation detection 

equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. DOD’s 

Cooperative Threat Reduction program was established in the early 1990s 

to help address proliferation concerns in the former Soviet Union, 

including helping secure sites where nuclear weapons are located.9

 Two 

other DOD programs have provided radiation portal monitors, hand-held 

equipment, and radiation detection training to countries in the former 

Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Similarly, DOE’s Second Line of 

Defense program, initiated in 1998, supplies radiation detection 

equipment, training, and communication systems to Russia and other 

countries.10 DOE’s Megaports Initiative, also part of the Second Line of 

Defense program, began in 2003 and is focused on providing radiation 

detection systems at major international seaports. Once the equipment is 

installed, it is then operated by foreign government officials and port 

personnel working at these ports.11 State also has programs that provide 

radiation detection equipment and training to numerous countries. 

Domestically, DHS, in conjunction with other federal, state, and local 

agencies, is responsible for combating nuclear smuggling in the United 

States and has provided radiation detection equipment, including portal 

monitors, personal radiation detectors (known as pagers), and radioactive 

isotope identifiers at U.S. ports of entry, as well as in other settings. For 

example, DHS has equipped Coast Guard boarding and inspection teams 

with portable detection systems and has provided equipment, training, and 

 8

GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian

Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is

Uncertain, GAO-07-404 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007). 

9

GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal 

Controls, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-329 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005). 

10GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination 

Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other 

Countries, GAO-06-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006). Since its initial deployment of 

equipment in 1998, the Second Line of Defense program has grown to include cooperation

with countries throughout the Former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus,

providing radiation detection equipment at land border crossings, international airports,

and feeder seaports.

11GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing

Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, GAO-05-375 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). 

Page 11 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

assistance in other maritime, air, and land venues. In addition, DOE has 

programs to secure nuclear and radioactive sources domestically. For 

example, the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction program recovers and

manages excess and unwanted radioactive sources that belong to U.S. 

licensees. In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as well as 35

states that have signed an agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, are responsible for regulating the security of radioactive and 

nuclear materials within the United States through its Radiological 

Materials and Reactor Security Programs. 

Several types of radiation detection equipment are used by CBP, the Coast 

Guard, and other agencies involved in radiological and nuclear detection

activities: radiation portal monitors, radioactive isotope identification 

devices (RIID), and personal radiation detectors, among others. Portal 

monitors are stationary or mobile pieces of equipment that can detect 

radioactive materials carried by vehicles or transported in cargo 

containers. RIIDs are a type of handheld radiation detection equipment 

that can detect radiation as well as identify the specific isotope of the 

radioactive source. Personal radiation detectors are worn by CBP officials, 

Coast Guard boarding teams, and other law enforcement agents. Unlike 

portal monitors and RIIDs, personal radiation pagers function primarily as 

personal safety devices to alert the individual wearer when he or she is 

exposed to an increased level of radiation. Under certain circumstances 

these devices also could be used to detect smuggled nuclear material. 

However, they can only indicate variations in the general level of radiation 

and their sensitivity is limited because of the small size of the detector. 

Therefore, they should not be relied upon for that purpose. 

All radiation detection devices have limitations in their ability to detect 

and identify nuclear material. Detecting attempted nuclear smuggling is 

difficult because many sources of radiation are legal and not harmful when 

used as intended. These materials can trigger alarms—known as nuisance 

or innocent alarms—that may be difficult to distinguish in some cases 

from alarms that could sound in the event of a true case of nuclear 

smuggling without a thorough secondary inspection. Nuisance or innocent 

alarms can be caused by patients who have recently had cancer 

treatments, a wide range of cargo with naturally occurring radiation (e.g.,

fertilizer, ceramics, and food products), and legitimate shipments of 

radiological sources for use in medicine and industry. Additionally, 

detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in weapons-useable nuclear 

material is complicated: one of the materials of greatest concern in terms 

of proliferation—highly enriched uranium—is among the most difficult 

materials to detect because of its relatively low level of radioactivity.

Page 12 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

DNDO is currently testing the next generation of radiation portal 

monitors—the advanced spectroscopic portal monitor, or ASP. We have 

repeatedly raised concerns about DNDO’s efforts to develop and test 

ASPs. Specifically, we found that testing of ASPs at DOE’s Nevada Test 

Site did not represent an objective or rigorous assessment because DNDO 

used biased test methods that enhanced the apparent performance of the 

ASPs and did not test the limitations of the ASPs’ detection capabilities.12

In 2008, we also found that DNDO’s cost estimate to equip U.S. ports of 

entry with radiation detection equipment is unreliable because it omits 

major project costs and relies on a flawed methodology. Furthermore, the 

agency is no longer following the original project execution plan, the 

scope of the agency’s current ASP deployment strategy has changed, and 

DNDO now plans a much more limited deployment of the ASP than 

initially proposed.13 The current ASP testing is expected to continue into 

2009. 

DNDO’s ultimate goal is to expand radiological and nuclear detection 

capabilities to areas identified as vulnerable to nuclear smuggling. To that 

end, in 2005, DNDO identified critical gaps in domestic efforts to prevent 

and detect radiological and nuclear smuggling, including, but not limited 

to: (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States, 

(2) aviation, and (3) small maritime craft. However, DNDO is still in the 

early stages of developing initiatives to address these vulnerabilities, and it 

has not clearly articulated a long-term plan for how to achieve its goal of 

closing these gaps by expanding radiological and nuclear detection 

capabilities in the time frames identified. 

DNDO Is in the Early 

Stages of Enhancing 

Domestic Initiatives 

for Nuclear Detection 

Land border areas between ports of entry. The United States has more 

than 6,000 miles of land border susceptible to illegal crossings by people

and vehicles. DNDO began addressing this gap in 2005 and currently is 

jointly working with CBP to equip Border Patrol agents—who are 

responsible for patrolling the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico—with 

portable radiological and nuclear detection equipment by 2012. Portability 

 12GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate 

Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment, GAO-07-1247T (Washington,

D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007). 

13GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Program to Procure and Deploy Advanced

Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the Department’s Previous Cost 

Estimates, GAO-08-1108R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2008). 

Page 13 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

is critical to strengthening radiation detection efforts because it expands 

the opportunity to detect a potential radiological threat should a Border 

Patrol agent encounter one. To date, as part of a phased approach, DNDO 

and CBP have tested and evaluated radiation detection equipment and 

CBP developed operating procedures for using the equipment and 

resolving radiation alarms along the southern U.S. border. However, 

similar tests along the northern U.S. border have been postponed.14

Specifically, DNDO and CBP originally scheduled equipment testing along 

the southern border for January 2008 and along the northern border for 

March 2008. However, they did not actually begin testing along the 

southern border until May 2008. According to a CBP official, DNDO 

explained that this schedule slip was caused by a delay in selecting the 

equipment for the test. DNDO told us that it chose to conduct an 

additional review of commercially available detection equipment before 

field testing, which caused these tests to be delayed. As a result of 

preliminary findings from the field tests, DNDO and CBP decided in 

November 2008 to indefinitely postpone the previously scheduled tests 

along the northern border. According to these agencies, the preliminary 

test results indicated that further technological improvements will be 

necessary before the portable radiation detection equipment can be

distributed more widely for use in this environment. Full distribution of 

equipment along the land border areas between ports of entry is 

contingent on completing these field evaluations and entails providing 

detection equipment and operating procedures to all 20 Border Patrol 

sectors across the United States. Assuming no further schedule and 

technological delays, the radiation detection equipment to help secure the 

U.S. land border areas between ports of entry may not be fully in place 

until fiscal year 2012. According to DNDO, the agency requested a total of 

$33.6 million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for such initiatives, but it has 

not estimated the total cost for this effort beyond those years.

One of DNDO’s roles in supporting the effort to close gaps in the land 

border area between ports of entry is to procure and supply detection 

equipment to CBP. However, according to CBP officials, in fiscal year 

2008, DNDO did not procure needed radiation detection equipment in a 

timely manner. Specifically, CBP’s Office of Field Operations—responsible 

for official ports of entry—and its Office of Border Patrol requested 

 14The southern U.S. border tests occurred in the Border Patrol’s El Paso, Texas, and

Tucson, Arizona, sectors. The northern U.S. border test was planned for the Border Patrol’s

Swanton, Vermont, sector.

Page 14 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

approximately 240 additional RIIDs. However, according to CBP officials, 

DNDO did not fill its procurement needs. As of November 2008, only 64 of 

the 240 devices requested had been delivered to CBP. This situation is 

particularly problematic for the Border Patrol because its agents do not 

have enough RIIDs to meet their current patrol needs, according to a 

Border Patrol official. 

Aviation. Because nuclear weapons and material can be small and 

portable enough to be carried on most aircraft, CBP, with the support of 

DNDO, has been working on initiatives to screen all incoming 

international planes, cargo, and passengers. Although progress has been 

made on screening international general aviation, many of the other 

initiatives are either in their initial phases or still on the drawing board and 

it is unclear how long it will take or how much it will cost to complete 

these initiatives. In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, DNDO has requested a total 

of $35 million for aviation-related activities; 15 however, it has not 

estimated the costs of these initiatives beyond the near term. 

Since December 2007, CBP has been screening 100 percent of arriving 

international general aviation aircraft (approximately 400 flights per day) 

for radiological and nuclear material. According to DNDO officials, such 

efforts are being included in the strategy for the first time. To assist with 

the international general aviation initiative, DNDO managed the testing 

and evaluation of radiation detection devices in close coordination with 

CBP officials to ensure that the technology and operating procedures 

would be consistent with CBP’s responsibilities to screen all aircraft 

arriving from outside the United States.16 Specifically, in 2008, DNDO, in 

partnership with CBP, tested portable radiation detection equipment for 

use in scanning small, medium, and large international general aviation 

aircraft and assessed whether CBP screening procedures needed to be 

modified. 

While CBP has made progress in ensuring that appropriate operating 

procedures for using the equipment and resolving radiation alarms are 

established and all international general aviation is screened, its other 

aviation initiatives have not proceeded as smoothly or have not yet begun. 

CBP is working with DNDO on an initiative to screen international air 

 15This number includes the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental Appropriation which provided

$22 million for aviation initiatives into fiscal year 2009. 

166 U.S.C. section 202. 

Page 15 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

cargo for radiological and nuclear material and has chosen Dulles 

International Airport as the first location for this screening. According to 

DNDO, this airport was chosen first because it has one gate through which 

all cargo travels. However, because both international and domestic cargo

pass through this gate, the start of operations was delayed until September 

2008 due to jurisdictional issues between CBP and TSA—CBP is 

responsible for screening international cargo for radiological and nuclear

material and TSA for scanning domestic cargo for explosives. The two 

agencies had to reach an agreement allowing CBP to screen all cargo for 

radiological and nuclear material, regardless of origin. (Fig. 2 shows cargo 

moving through a stationary radiation portal monitor at Dulles 

International Airport.) 

Figure 2: Cargo Vehicle Passing through Radiological Detection Equipment at 

Dulles International Airport 

Source: GAO.

In October 2008, we visited Dulles to observe this operation, including a

demonstration of radiation detection capabilities. CBP sent a vehicle 

containing a small sample of Cesium-137—a radiological material that is 

considered a highly attractive source for the purpose of a radiological

dispersal device, or dirty bomb—through the detection equipment. 

Cesium-137, which is generally in the form of a powder similar to talc, is 

highly dispersible. CBP uses this sample to routinely test equipment. 

However, the detection equipment failed to sound an alarm until the 

Page 16 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

material had passed through it for a third time. CBP officials told us that 

this source material triggered an alarm during a test earlier that week, and 

attributed the problems with this demonstration to either the shielding of

the source material by the vehicle or to a weak signal given off by the 

material because it may be nearing the end of its usable life. 

CBP plans to have cargo screening at the 30 U.S. airports that account for 

99 percent of incoming international cargo by 2014. However, because

cargo processing at Dulles is simpler than at other airports, due to the 

configuration of its cargo area, CBP officials acknowledged that their plan

is very ambitious. According to CBP officials, expanding the cargo 

screening initiative to larger, more complicated airports will require CBP 

to devise different operational procedures and possibly develop new 

detection technology. DNDO and CBP also plan to cooperate with other 

federal agencies on an initiative to screen passengers and baggage from 

international commercial flights. However, according to DNDO, it is still 

working on the basic approach for this initiative, such as where to locate 

passenger and baggage scanning equipment in an airport. To date, DNDO 

and CBP have initiated a pilot program for screening international 

passengers and their baggage at airports. In fiscal year 2008, they 

completed site surveys at five airports in order to develop requirements 

for testing planned for fiscal year 2009. 

Current aviation initiatives focus on radiation detection both prior to 

departure from a foreign location and after the aircraft lands in the United

States. Ultimately, DNDO and CBP would like the detection of radiological 

and nuclear materials to occur as far outside of U.S. borders as possible—

at the point of departure instead of the point of entry. For example, rather 

than screening international general aviation once the plane arrives in the 

United States, it would be preferrable to screen the plane at the country 

from which it departs. However, such a strategy would rely on negotiating 

agreements with foreign governments, which could prove challenging 

given concerns about sovereignty and rights of access. Furthermore, 

DNDO officials were uncertain when and if agreements could be reached 

with enough foreign governments to establish a more effective aviation 

strategy. As of December 2008, DHS has concluded agreements with 

Ireland and Aruba to include radiological and nuclear screening of 

international general aviation aircraft in these countries. 

Page 17 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

Small maritime vessels. A Coast Guard analysis revealed that small boats 

pose a greater threat for nuclear smuggling than transporting illicit 

material in shipping containers, according to a senior Coast Guard 

official.17 These small boats, which include maritime craft less than 300 

gross tons, number in the millions. DNDO efforts related to radiological

and nuclear detection on small maritime vessels are part of a larger DHS 

effort—the Small Vessel Security Strategy. This strategy recognizes a 

number of risks that small vessels pose, including serving as a vehicle to 

smuggle weapons or terrorists into the United States, and using the boat 

itself as an improvised explosive device. DHS is working to develop a 

Small Vessel Security Strategy implementation plan, which will, among 

other things, identify needed research, development, and testing, and 

recommend actions for future efforts and put the strategy into action. To

address one of the vulnerabilities, DNDO has been working since 2005 

with multiple federal agencies, including the Coast Guard and CBP, as well 

as state and local agencies, to develop and expand capabilities to detect 

radiological and nuclear materials that could be smuggled on small 

maritime craft. Coast Guard and CBP are responsible for developing the 

screening procedures and making decisions about what vessels are to be 

screened; DNDO provides the radiological and nuclear detection 

equipment. Coast Guard and DNDO have entered into a Joint Acquisition 

Strategy to update the current Coast Guard detection technology 

inventory, as well as to acquire new equipment if necessary. 

There are a number of challenges associated with radiological detection 

capabilities in the maritime environment that have limited DNDO’s ability 

to roll this initiative out widely. Specifically, these agencies have a pilot 

project underway in Puget Sound, Washington, to field-test equipment and 

develop standard operating procedures for detecting and interdicting 

radiological and nuclear materials on small vessels. DNDO chose Puget 

Sound because of its proximity to Vancouver, Canada, the host of the 2010 

Winter Olympics; its military and economic significance; and the large 

number of commercial and recreational vessels. DNDO is also expanding 

this pilot to San Diego, California, where it has conducted an initial 

assessment of the area and briefed officials about the program. DNDO 

selected San Diego as a pilot location because of its proximity to Mexico, 

geographic configuration, and many military facilities. DNDO is currently 

 17From testimony delivered by Vice Admiral Thad Allen on the role of Coast Guard in 

border and maritime security, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland

Security, U.S. Senate, Apr. 6, 2006. 

Page 18 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

in the first year of a 3-year pilot program; the Puget Sound and San Diego 

operations are scheduled to be completed in December 2010. According to 

DNDO’s data for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the agency requested 

$14.7 million for the pilot project and a total of $54.2 million for these and

other maritime initiatives. 

One significant challenge in developing maritime radiological and nuclear 

detection efforts is sustaining them beyond the original pilot projects; 

DNDO has not yet developed plans for doing so. In addition to the Coast 

Guard and CBP, state and local governments play a key role in maritime 

law enforcement activities. For example, in Puget Sound, the majority of 

the law enforcement personnel and equipment available for radiological

and nuclear detection belong to the 15 state, tribal, and local agencies 

participating in the pilot.18 However, these agencies generally have limited 

resources, making it difficult to expand their mission to include 

radiological and nuclear detection. Furthermore, these agencies have 

competing demands and could choose to fund other priorities. Although 

DNDO is providing these agencies with the initial equipment, support, 

training, and maintenance during the Puget Sound and San Diego pilots, it 

is expecting them to seek funding from federal grant programs to sustain 

these initiatives. For many state and local agency officials we spoke with, 

the uncertainty of federal resources jeopardizes their ability to continue 

radiological and nuclear detection activities. According to one local sheriff 

from Washington state, if funding to maintain and support radiation 

detection equipment provided during the pilot disappears, his department 

will not continue radiological and nuclear detection activities. 

Other state and local agencies participating in the Puget Sound pilot also

emphasized the difficulty in keeping personnel trained on detection 

equipment without additional federal support beyond the current pilot 

project. Because maritime law enforcement personnel may not frequently 

need to use the equipment, future training is necessary to ensure that that

they maintain their skills. However, without the additional resources 

currently provided by DNDO, state and local agencies would have 

difficulty covering the costs associated with ongoing training, including

 18The state and local agencies are Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife, Washington 

State Patrol, Washington Department of Health, Whatcom County Sheriff, Pierce County

Sheriff, Seattle Fire Department, Seattle Police Department, Port of Seattle Police, Everett 

Police Department, Bainbridge Island Police Department, Port Orchard Police Department, 

Tacoma Police Department, Suquamish Tribal Police, Port of Everett, and Skagit County 

Sheriff. 

Page 19 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

overtime salaries for personnel who have to take on the regular duties of 

those being trained. 

Given these state and local concerns, DNDO’s strategy for sustaining such 

programs appears problematic. According to DNDO officials, sustaining 

the existing pilot programs will be the responsibility of the local 

jurisdictions through a well-established federal grants process. 

Specifically, DNDO anticipates that funding for these programs will come 

from Homeland Security grants, Urban Areas Security Initiative grants, 

and the DHS Port Security Grant Program. However, DNDO currently does 

not have a plan detailing which locations it would target next for the 

maritime program, nor has it estimated the total cost of this initiative. 

According to DNDO officials, the office has focused first on just two 

locations in order to determine whether maritime screening of small 

vessels for radiological and nuclear material is feasible and to gather 

lessons learned that can be used to minimize challenges and develop

operating procedures for using the radiation detection equipment and 

resolving radiation alarms in other areas. However, DNDO has not 

established criteria for assessing the success of this pilot effort to help 

determine whether it should be expanded to other locations. Should its 

concept for detecting and interdicting radiological and nuclear material 

smuggled on small maritime vessels prove feasible, DNDO plans to 

develop guidance so that state and local law enforcement agencies can 

implement their own maritime radiological and nuclear detection 

programs. 

In addition, unlike radiation detection technology for land or aviation,

technology in the maritime environment is relatively undeveloped and 

poses unique challenges. For example, the level of background radiation in

water differs from the level of background radiation on land, which affects 

the capability of equipment to detect and identify certain types of 

radioactive material. Furthermore, the equipment needs to be water 

resistant and designed so that it can be used by agents who need their 

hands free to board and climb around ships. To date, DNDO has, among 

other things, tested boat-mounted radiation detectors, detection 

equipment that can be carried in a backpack, and handheld radiological 

detection and identification devices that can withstand exposure to water. 

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment in the 

maritime environment remains limited. For example: 

• The boat-mounted radiation equipment is unable to indicate the direction 

of the radioactive material causing the alarm, making it difficult to identify

Page 20 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

the potential threat in an open sea with many small vessels, according to a 

local law enforcement officer we spoke with. CBP Air and Marine officers 

also expressed uncertainty about how boat-mounted detection equipment, 

which has been tested only in a fairly controlled lake environment, will 

work in a more turbulent open sea environment, where it is more difficult 

to detect and determine radioactive material. DNDO officials told us that a 

fiscal year 2009 initiative will assess boat-mounted detection systems in 

real-world environments. 

• The backpack radiation equipment works best when physically worn by

someone, according to a DNDO official. However, Coast Guard officers 

already have a difficult time maneuvering through the small passageways 

on boats with the current equipment they must wear. (Fig. 3 shows a Coast 

Guard officer wearing standard boarding team equipment, without a 

backpack.) The backpacks have the potential to further decrease officers’

maneuverability and their ability to inspect boats. 

• If a hand-held radiological detection and identification device is 

accidentally dropped overboard, it does not float and can withstand being 

submerged under only 30 feet of water. These handheld devices cost 

$15,000 per unit, making them expensive to replace. 

Page 21 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

Figure 3: A Coast Guard Officer Wearing Standard Boarding Team Equipment 

DNDO has also delayed in rolling out radiation detection equipment to the 

agencies engaged in its maritime initiatives. Although federal, state, and

local agencies in the Puget Sound pilot determined their equipment needs 

in April 2008 and submitted this request to DNDO, they have received little 

equipment. According to a DNDO official, DNDO was slow to process the 

order and once it was placed, the manufacturer was unable to fill the order 

in a timely manner and did not immediately notify DNDO of this delay. 

According to DNDO, once it was notified of the delay from the vender, it 

borrowed units from the Coast Guard so that the pilot could proceed. Of

the 362 personal radiation detectors ordered, 95 had been delivered as of 

October 2008. However, the order may not be completely filled until early 

2009. 

DNDO, in coordination with the Coast Guard, the New York City Police 

Department (NYPD), and other state and local agencies, is also engaged in

maritime nuclear detection activities in the New York City area as part of

Source: Coast Guard.

the Securing the Cities initiative. This initiative is intended to enhance 

Page 22 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

protection and response capabilities in and around high-risk urban area

by designing a system to detect and interdict illicit radioactive materials 

that may be used as a weapon. As with the Puget Sound pilot, the agencie

involved in the initiative’s maritime activities do not presently have 

enough equipment to meet their needs, according to officials particip

in the Securing the Cities initiative. For example, the Coast Guard has one 

boat, with radiation detection equipment provided by DOE, and the NYPD

has two boats with radiation detection equipment. However, NYPD 

officials told us that the NYPD has another 28 boats that need to be 

equipped with radiation detection technology and these equipment 

purchases depend on the availability of future federal grant funding.

s

s

ating

lthough DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies’ programs to 

r, most

x

ms

• DOD. DNDO has been working with DOD, among other agencies, to 

f

gh

luating 

ll

• OE. DNDO has been collaborating with DOE to develop strategies for 

d

gun to

ials

A

combat radiological and nuclear smuggling overseas, it has exchanged 

lessons learned with DOD, DOE, and State and provided technical 

expertise on radiological and nuclear detection equipment. Howeve

of DNDO’s efforts are modest in scope and reflect the fact that DOD, DOE, 

and State have well-established programs to combat nuclear smuggling 

overseas. DNDO officials told us that their efforts to develop a more 

comprehensive approach to global nuclear detection are very comple

because each agency has a distinct area of authority. Areas in which 

DNDO has been able to contribute to other agencies’ overseas progra

include the following: 

DNDO Has Limited 

Role in Influencing 

U.S. Efforts to 

Combat Radiologi

and Nuclear 

Smuggling Ov

cal 

erseas

develop radiation detection equipment and to minimize duplication o

research efforts. For example, DNDO and DOD are collaborating throu

the National Institute for Standards and Technology to develop

interagency standards and common practices for testing and eva

radiation detection systems. These standards will be threat based and wi

state the minimum detection capability that certain radiation detection

systems should have to perform their purpose. 

D

addressing gaps in DOE’s overseas radiation detection programs that are

similar to those DNDO has been working on domestically. For example, 

DOE’s Second Line of Defense program had focused more on placing fixe

detectors at particular sites. However, as a result of DOE’s review of its 

existing nuclear detection programs and its discussion with other 

agencies, including DNDO, DOE officials told us the agency has be

work with law enforcement officials in other countries to improve 

detection capabilities for the land between ports of entry. DOE offic

Page 23 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

said they also are considering assisting other countries with the 

implementation of mobile detection technologies, similar to thos

domestically by CBP. DNDO and DOE also are exchanging lessons learn

from both agencies’ efforts to screen aviation, specifically the 

development of standard operating procedures for using hand-held 

radiation detection equipment. 

S

e used

ed

• tate. DNDO is working with State on the Global Initiative to Combat 

o

ar

egy

l

ssess

addition to providing the U.S. government agencies engaged in 

rom

e

tate,

e

,

d

 

Nuclear Terrorism—which provides 75 countries with an opportunity t

integrate resources and share information and expertise on nuclear 

smuggling prevention, detection, and response—to develop model 

guidelines that other countries can use to establish their own nucle

detection strategies. DNDO sponsored a Global Initiative workshop in

March 2008 to help 25 countries develop a draft of the model guidelines

document. This document, among other things, is intended to raise 

awareness about the elements of an effective nuclear detection strat

and build consensus for its implementation. In addition, DNDO personne

have traveled with officials from State to countries involved in the 

department’s Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, a program to a

and improve the capabilities of countries to combat smuggling of nuclear 

and radiological materials, in order to provide advice to these countries on

how to build their own capabilities to counter nuclear smuggling. DNDO 

also helped State develop questions that these countries could use to 

assess their own vulnerabilities. 

In

international nuclear detection programs with knowledge gained f

domestic nuclear detection initiatives, DNDO has been directed by thes

agencies to develop an inventory of radiation detection equipment 

deployed overseas. In a March 2006 report, we recommended that S

working with DOD and DOE, create, maintain, and share a comprehensiv

list of all U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment provided to foreign 

governments.19 In December 2006, State, in coordination with DOD, DOE

and DHS, issued a strategic plan giving DNDO responsibility for gathering 

data on the deployment of radiation detection equipment overseas, 

including portal monitors and handheld devices.20 As part of DNDO’s

efforts to develop the global strategy for nuclear detection, it is charge

with maintaining this database, share information from it at interagency

19GAO-06-311. 

20U.S. Department of State, Strategic Plan For Interagency Coordination of U.S.

Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas (Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 2006). 

Page 24 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

meetings, and provide other relevant government agencies with access to

the database. According to DNDO, it collected information on radiation 

detection equipment from DOD, DOE, and State most recently in 2007 an

is updating some of the information in 2008 and 2009. A DNDO official also

said that the agency analyzed these data to determine the proximity of 

radiation detection equipment to areas with nuclear facilities. 

d 

HS, DOD, DOE, and State budgeted a total of $2.8 billion in fiscal year 

t

r

o

ccording to our analysis of DNDO’s data, of the approximately 

t went to

d

A Total of $2.8 Billion D

2007 for the programs included in the global strategy for radiological and

nuclear detection, according to DNDO. Nearly the same amount of funds—

$1.1 billion—were budgeted for programs and activities to (1) combat 

nuclear smuggling overseas and (2) detect nuclear materials primarily a

U.S. borders and ports of entry; a smaller portion was budgeted for crosscutting programs. By agency, the majority of 2007 budgeted funds for the 

global strategy for radiological and nuclear detection went to DOE— 

62 percent. Although DNDO has detailed information on the budgets fo

various security and detection programs, it is not using this information t

coordinate with other agencies on the overall strategic direction of these

detection efforts. 

A

$2.8 billion agencies budgeted in fiscal year 2007, about 39 percen

combat nuclear smuggling overseas, while 41 percent went to programs to 

detect and secure radiological and nuclear materials at and within U.S. 

borders; another 20 percent went to programs that cut across foreign an

domestic activities. Figure 4 shows budgets by program focus and by 

agency. 

Was Budgeted in 

Fiscal Year 2007 f

Programs Associated

with Detecting 

Radiological an

Nuclear Materials

or

d

Amounts Budgeted for 

ect

rders

Programs to Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling 

Overseas and to Det

Nuclear Materials 

Primarily at U.S. Bo

and Ports of Entry Were 

Nearly the Same 

Page 25 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

Figure 4: Budgets by Program Focus and Agency 

Source: GAO analysis of DNDO data.

Overseas

Cross-cutting

3%

State

DOE

DOD

DHS

20%

39%

62% 24%

11%

41%

FY 2007 Budget by Program Focus FY 2007 Budget by Agency

United States

Table 1 shows the allocation of these funds by programs to combat 

nuclear smuggling overseas and within the United States. 

Table 1: Distribution of Fiscal Year 2007 Budget for Detecting Radiological and

Nuclear Weapons or Materials 

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year 2007 budget 

Geographic focus DHS DOD DOE StateaTotal

Overseas $139.77 $161.90 $736.74 $81.13 $1,119.54

United Statesb274.65 1.60 871.49 0.00 1,147.74

Cross-cutting 271.18 137.07 168.86 0.00 577.12

Total $685.60 $300.57 $1,777.09 $81.13 $2,844.39

Source: GAO analysis of DNDO data. 

es not sponsor domestic p co a nd r

rograms because these programs do not provide direct financial 

ssistance and generally leverage resources from other federal agencies and international partners.

a

State do rograms to mbat nucle r smuggling a did not p ovide budget

amounts for its cross-cutting p

a

b

United States includes efforts at the border as well as within the interior of the country. 

Page 26 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

Programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. DOE received the

ajority of the budget for programs to combat international nuclear 

ion

s

• ted $139 million for its Container Security Initiative, which 

provides multidisciplinary teams—agents, intelligence analysts, and CBP 

tes

nt

nd 

o test

•

verseas went to three programs that are part of the Cooperative Threat 

f

am had

r

t,

 

m

smuggling—$737 million (or approximately 67 percent) of the $1.1 bill

total in fiscal year 2007. For all the agencies, the international program

are largely intended to secure nuclear and radiological materials at their 

source or detect them in transit. By agency, key programs include the 

following: 

DHS budge

officers—to selected foreign seaports in order to protect the United Sta

from potential terrorist attacks using maritime cargo shipments and to 

help secure the primary system of containerized shipping for international 

trade.21 Another DHS program, the Secure Freight Initiative,22 is importa

to the global strategy for nuclear detection because it provides foreign 

countries with radiation scanning systems for containers at ports of 

departure and communications infrastructure to transmit radiological a

nuclear material data to the United States. This program is designed t

the feasibility of 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound container cargo at

seven overseas seaports and involves the deployment of integrated 

scanning systems, consisting of radiation portal monitors and RIIDs. 

At DOD, 98 percent of its budget for combating nuclear smuggling 

o

Reduction Program—a program that protects national security by 

reducing the present threat and preventing the proliferation of weapons o

mass destruction.23 The Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security Progr

a budget of $92.8 million to enhance Russia’s security systems at nuclear 

weapons storage sites and capability to account for and track nuclear 

weapons scheduled for dismantlement. The Proliferation Prevention 

Initiative had a budget of $32.4 million to help countries of the former 

Soviet Union prevent the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction o

related materials across their borders; this initiative provides equipmen

logistics support, and training. Finally, the Nuclear Weapons 

21GAO, Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports 

Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed, 

GAO-08-187 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2008). 

22GAO, Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo 

Containers, GAO-08-533T (Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008). 

23GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better 

Integration, GAO-05-157 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2005). 

Page 27 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

Transportation Security Program had a budget of $32.7 million to enhance

safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons from operationa

storage areas to enhanced security storage sites and dismantlement sites 

throughout Russia. 

At DOE, two progra

b

l sites and

• ms account for about 81 percent of the department’s 

udget to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. First, the Materials 

ation

lear

a

• nd

elated Border Security program to help stem the proliferation of 

l

nge of 

ry

ear smuggling at and within

.S. borders. As with programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, 

 

Protection, Control, and Accounting Program had a budget of 

$414 million.24 This program provides support to the Russian Feder

and other countries of the former of Soviet Union to secure nuc

weapons and weapons material that may be at risk of theft or diversion 

from their current location. Second, DOE’s Second Line of Defense—

cooperative assistance program for deploying radiological and nuclear 

detection systems and associated training at international border 

crossings, airports, and seaports—had a budget of $183 million.25

State budgeted approximately $42 million for its Export Control a

R

weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and conventiona

weapons by assisting recipient countries in detecting, deterring, 

preventing, and interdicting illicit trafficking in weapons and weaponsrelated items.26 The program is also designed to provide a wide ra

assistance and support, such as offering licensing and legal and regulato

technical workshops, and providing detection equipment and training for 

border control and enforcement agencies. 

Programs to combat radiological and nucl

U

DOE received most of the budget for programs to combat radiological and

nuclear smuggling domestically—$871 million (or 76 percent) of the 

$1.1 billion budgeted in fiscal year 2007. By agency, key programs include 

the following: 

24GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian

Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S. Funded Security Upgrades Is

Uncertain, GAO-07-404 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007). 

25GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination 

Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other 

Countries, GAO-06-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006). 

26GAO, Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Networks Need Better Data on 

Proliferation Risks and Program Results, GAO-08-21 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007). 

Page 28 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

•

budget of $209 million to provide systems development, 

acquisition, and deployment of these technologies to ports of entry. The 

nd

,

an

• ,

Protection Program. This

rogram uses the best available detection technologies to prevent or 

l and

•

the Nuclear and Radiological Materials

ecurity Program, which is intended to protect DOE’s critical assets—

rials, 

s.

oss-cutting

ctivities—about $271 million. By agency, key programs include the 

• et of

n to support the development of detection systems and the 

acquisition of advanced, hand-held radiation detectors. In addition, DHS 

ble of

At DHS, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals/Radiological Portal Monitors

program had a

Securing the Cities initiative, with a fiscal year 2007 budget of $8.47 

million, is intended to enhance protection and response capabilities in a

around the nation’s highest risk urban areas. Starting with New York City

the department will work with state and local officials to develop urb

and regional deployment and operations strategies, identify appropriate 

detection equipment, establish the necessary support infrastructure, and 

develop incident management and response protocols. In addition, DHS 

budgeted $1.1 million for the West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection 

Program, which is evaluating general radiation detection capabilities to be

deployed aboard Coast Guard or other law enforcement vessels that 

participate in vessel-boarding activities. 

DOD budgeted $1.6 million for domestic radiation detection programs

with $1.1 million directed to its Radiation

p

mitigate the effects of radiation exposure on Pentagon personnel and 

structures. The remaining funds were budgeted for the department’s

Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense, which installed radiologica

nuclear sensors at Camp Lejeune. 

At DOE, $846 million (or 97 percent) of the $871 million budgeted to 

combat nuclear smuggling went to

S

nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, special nuclear mate

classified information, and DOE facilities from such threats as terrorist 

activity, theft, diversion, loss, or unauthorized access. 

Cross-cutting activities that simultaneously support multiple program

DHS had nearly half of the $577 million budgeted for cr

a

following: 

At DHS, the Human Portable Radiation Detection System had a budg

$18.1 millio

budgeted about $11 million for the Technical Reachback Program, which 

provides technical assistance to help personnel operating radiation 

detection equipment identify the source that triggered the alarm. Finally,

the Joint Analysis Center had a budget of $1.75 million to collect and 

notify appropriate federal, state, and local agencies as early as possi

Page 29 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

radiological and nuclear threats and coordinate technical support to 

federal, state, and local authorities. 

DOD budgeted $94.5 million of the $137 million of its funds budgeted for 

cross-cutting programs to support it

•

s Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil 

•

eration Detection Program. This 

f

s 

•

tners, or these 

r

d

 

Support Teams. These 55 teams are deployed nationwide to support civil 

authorities during domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and

high-yield explosives incidents.27 In addition, the Nuclear Detection 

Technologies Division of DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency was 

budgeted $28 million in fiscal year 2007 to develop technologies to detect,

locate, and identify radiological and nuclear weapons and materials to 

support search and interdiction missions. 

At DOE, nearly all of the $168 million DOE budgeted for cross-cutting 

programs went to one program—the Prolif

program, budgeted at $148 million, provides technical expertise and 

leadership toward the development of next generation nuclear detection

technologies and methods to detect foreign nuclear materials and 

weapons production. This program develops the tools, technologies, and 

techniques for detecting, locating, and analyzing the global proliferation o

weapons of mass destruction, with a special emphasis on nuclear weapon

technology and the diversion of special nuclear materials. 

Because many of State’s efforts to combat nuclear smuggling leverage 

resources from other federal agencies and international par

efforts do not provide direct financial assistance, State does not have a

budget for all of its efforts. However, it still oversees a number of 

crosscutting programs. For example, the Nuclear Trafficking Response 

Group is responsible for coordinating responses to international nuclea

and radiological alarms; its mission is to protect the United States by 

resolving incidents of nuclear smuggling and by interdicting materials in 

transit. The National Combating Terrorism Research Program works to 

develop prototypes for technology with specific applications to detect an

characterize nuclear materials. This program is not a financial assistance

program, and therefore has no formal budget. 

27Each state, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam, 

has their own Civil Support Teams and California has two. Civil Support Teams are 

National Guard assets and are under the direction of the governor of that state. 

Page 30 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

In July 2007, Congress passed the “Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007,” which required DHS, DOD, DOE, the 

Department of Justice, and the Director of National Intelligence to 

coordinate the preparation of a Joint Annual Interagency Review of the 

Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. DNDO collected these programlevel budget data in response to a statutory requirement that select 

agencies, including DHS, DOD, DOE, and State, annually assess their 

capacity to implement their portion of the global nuclear detection 

strategy. DNDO issued this report in June 2008 after gathering data from 

relevant agencies on programs and budgets in support of each layer of the 

global nuclear detection effort. The report provides an overview of the 

global nuclear detection strategy and discusses programs and budgets for 

combating nuclear smuggling domestically and overseas. 

DNDO has collected these data since 2006. It used these data to identify

areas in which new domestic initiatives may be needed. For example, in 

the most recent review, DNDO said that programs focused on the land 

border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and maritime pathways will 

need to grow substantially in the years ahead. However, the Joint Annual 

Interagency Review does not serve as a tool to analyze nuclear detection 

budgets across agencies in order to ensure that the level and nature of 

resources devoted to combating nuclear smuggling are going toward the 

highest priority gaps and are aligned with the overall strategic direction of 

global detection efforts. 

Agency officials said that their program decisions and budget requests are 

primarily guided by their agencies’ mission-related needs, rather than by 

the overarching goals and priorities of a broader, more comprehensive 

global detection strategy. In addition, DOD, DOE, and State officials told 

us that the information in the review is primarily used to provide agencies

and Congress with an overview of already established programmatic roles 

and responsibilities across the range of programs to combat nuclear 

smuggling. Finally, agency officials told us that they do not use the specific 

budget data included in the Joint Annual Interagency Review to help 

determine whether funding levels are reasonable in terms of individual 

agency or governmentwide needs. 

DNDO’s Joint Annual 

Interagency Report Is Not 

Used for Analysis or to 

Focus Nuclear Detection 

Priorities 

Page 31 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

In July 2008, we testified on the preliminary findings of our work.28

Specifically, we found that while DNDO’s initiatives are a step in the right 

direction for improving the current efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, 

they are not being undertaken within the larger context of an overarching 

strategic plan. Although each agency with a role in combating nuclear 

smuggling has its own planning documents, an overarching strategic plan 

is needed to guide these efforts to address the gaps and move to a more 

comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. Our past work has 

discussed the importance of strategic planning.

29 We have reported that 

strategic plans should clearly define objectives to be accomplished, 

identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting each objective, ensure 

that the funding necessary to achieve the objectives is available, and 

employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify 

needed improvements. For example, such a plan would define how DNDO 

would monitor the goal of detecting the movement of radiological and 

nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small 

maritime craft or land border areas in between ports of entry. Moreover, 

this plan would include agreed-upon processes and procedures to guide 

the improvement of the efforts to combat nuclear smuggling and 

coordinate the activities of the participating agencies. 

DNDO agreed with the need for an overarching strategic plan and believes 

that many elements of such a plan exist in DHS and other agency 

documents, but noted that solutions for addressing gaps and 

vulnerabilities are still under development. As of December 2008, DNDO 

had not yet established detailed plans to address those gaps and 

vulnerabilities, nor had it integrated all the plan elements into an 

overarching strategic plan, as we recommended. 

Preventing terrorists from obtaining and smuggling radiological or nuclear 

material into the United States is a national security imperative. DNDO has 

DNDO Has Not Yet 

Implemented 

Recommendation 

from July 2008 

Testimony

Conclusions 

 28GAO-08-999T. 

29GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for 

Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005); ResultsOriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration 

among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); Combating 

Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-03-519T 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003); and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the 

Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 

1996). 

Page 32 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

an important and complex task in this regard—develop a global nuclear 

detection strategy to combat nuclear smuggling and to keep radiological

and nuclear material and weapons from entering the United States. 

However, DNDO has not yet taken steps to work with DOE, DOD, and 

State to develop an overarching strategic plan, as we recommended in 

July 2008. Given the national security implications and urgency attached to 

combating nuclear smuggling globally, we continue to believe that such a 

plan needs to be established as soon as possible. Without an overarching 

plan that ties together the various domestic and international efforts to 

combat nuclear smuggling and clearly describes goals, responsibilities, 

priorities, resource needs, and performance metrics, it is unclear how the 

strategy will evolve or whether it is evolving in the right direction. 

While DNDO has gathered useful program and budget information in its 

Joint Annual Interagency Review, we believe it has missed an opportunity 

to use this information as a basis for working with other agencies—most

notably DOD, DOE and State—to identify future priorities, and analyze 

and help determine future resource allocations. We are not suggesting that 

any of the agencies participating in U.S. efforts to combat nuclear 

smuggling cede authority to manage its own programs. However, this 

information could be used as a tool to better ensure that limited resources 

are leveraged to promote program effectiveness and avoid potential 

duplicative efforts. By doing so, we believe the federal government will be 

better positioned to take a holistic view of global nuclear detection and

develop a plan that helps safeguard investments to date, more closely links

future goals with the resources necessary to achieve those goals, and 

enhances the agencies’ ability to operate in a more cohesive and integrated 

fashion. 

DNDO, for its part, has helped highlight the need to address critical gaps in 

efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically. It also has made some 

progress in developing and supporting initiatives to close these gaps. 

However, remaining challenges are great, funding is uncertain, time frames 

are unclear, and the technology may not be available any time soon to 

bridge some of these vulnerabilities. Without a plan to guide development 

of initiatives to address domestic gaps, it is unclear how DNDO plans to 

achieve its objectives of closing these critical gaps, particularly in three 

key areas—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small 

maritime vessels. 

Maritime detection efforts pose unique technological and operational 

challenges. DNDO’s maritime pilot is a sensible first step to addressing this 

vulnerability. However, DNDO should establish criteria for assessing the 

Page 33 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

effectiveness of this effort and use the result of this evaluation to 

determine the feasibility of expanding this program beyond the pilot stage. 

Should the pilot prove worthy of replicating, we believe that DNDO will 

need to engage in additional planning to identify next steps to help ensure 

that it will be able to roll the program out to other locations in a timely 

manner. 

To help ensure that U.S. governmentwide efforts to secure the homeland 

are well coordinated, well conceived, and properly implemented, we 

reiterate the recommendation we made in our July 2008 testimony to 

develop an overarching strategic plan. We also recommend that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security take the following four actions: 

• In coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, 

and the Secretary of State, use the Joint Annual Interagency Review to 

guide future strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. This effort 

should include analyzing overall budget allocations to determine whether 

governmentwide resources clearly align with identified priorities to 

maximize results and whether there is duplication of effort across 

agencies. 

• Develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear 

detection strategy to help ensure the future success of initiatives aimed at

closing gaps and vulnerabilities. This plan should focus on, among other 

things, establishing time frames and costs for the three areas of recent 

focus—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small 

maritime vessels. 

• Develop criteria to assess the effectiveness, cost, and feasibility of the 

maritime radiological and nuclear pilot program. 

• Should the decision be made to expand the maritime radiological and

nuclear program beyond the pilot, undertake additional planning to 

identify next steps, including how and where a broader strategy would be 

implemented, what technology would be needed, what organizations 

should be involved, and how such efforts would be sustained.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOD, DOE, and State for 

comment. DHS and DOD provided written comments, which are presented

in appendixes I and II, respectively. DOE and State provided technical 

comments which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD concurred with 

the recommendation that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 34 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

coordination with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and 

Secretary of State, use the Joint Annual Interagency Review to guide 

future strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DOD stated that 

greater use could be made of the review associated with the development 

of this annual report to guide U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. 

DHS did not directly comment on our recommendations but noted that the 

recommendations aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions. 

The department agreed, however, that planning can always be improved 

and that the office will seek to continue to do so. DHS also reiterated that 

it agreed with a recommendation that we made in our 2008 testimony on 

the need for an overarching strategic plan to guide future efforts to combat

nuclear smuggling and move toward a more comprehensive global nuclear

detection strategy. In its comments, DHS noted that work had already

begun on an overarching plan. 

DHS also pointed to what, in its view, were a number of shortcomings in 

the draft report. Specifically, the department believes that we did not give

enough credit to DNDO’s strategic planning efforts. The department 

asserted that we did not clearly and adequately explain the background 

and context of DNDO’s efforts to develop a global strategy, what has been

accomplished so far, what challenges it faces, and what remains to be 

done. Finally, DHS asserted that the draft contained a number of 

inaccuracies and omissions that make it less reliable and useful than it 

could be. DHS also provided a number of more detailed comments on 

specific issues presented in the draft report. We have addressed those 

comments in our detailed responses and incorporated changes where 

appropriate.

First, we found no evidence that DNDO engaged in long-term strategic 

planning to carry out its initiatives to address gaps in domestic nuclear 

detection. During the course of our review, we specifically asked DNDO 

for strategic planning documents used to develop and implement a global 

radiation detection strategy. In response, DNDO officials referred to the 

more than 4,000 pages of documents provided and stated in their 

comments on the report that this material was the basis for their plan. 

Although this information documented the efforts put forth by DNDO in 

developing its initial strategy and identifying gaps and vulnerabilities, it did 

not constitute a plan with clear goals, time frames, and costs. More 

specifically, DNDO commented that we did not mention the DNDO-Coast 

Guard Joint Acquisition Strategy as a cornerstone of its small maritime 

strategy, that we only mention DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy in 

passing in the back of the report, and that we do not mention the DHS 

Page 35 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

Small Vessel Security Strategy implementation plan. We revised the report 

to include references to the Joint Acquisition Strategy and the

implementation plan. However, we disagree with DNDO’s characterization 

that we failed to give the Small Vessel Security Strategy adequate 

attention. In fact, the report describes the strategy and how it relates to 

efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. We would also point out, however, 

that these planning documents cited by DNDO only apply to one specific 

critical gap area identified—the small maritime vessel threat. 

Second, we disagree with the department’s comment that we did not 

clearly and adequately explain the background and context of DNDO’s 

efforts to develop a global strategy, what has been accomplished so far, 

what remains to be done, and what challenges it faces. Specifically, our 

report contains an overview of DNDO’s initial approach in developing a 

global strategy, including providing information on steps DNDO has taken 

to identify potential pathways for radiological and nuclear material. In 

addition, the report identified some of DNDO’s accomplishments in 

specific areas, such as working with the other agencies to develop new 

radiation detection technologies. Furthermore, we recognize that DNDO 

has helped highlight the need to address critical gaps in efforts to combat 

nuclear smuggling, and we have reported DNDO’s key initiatives to 

improve radiation detection capabilities in areas that had previously 

received insufficient attention—land borders between the ports of entry, 

aviation, and maritime. The report also recognizes the many challenges 

that DNDO faces as it attempts to enhance nuclear detection capabilities, 

including technological limitations of detection equipment and sustaining 

initiatives beyond their pilot phase. We also believe that DNDO needs to 

undertake additional planning so that it can be in a better position to 

determine the work that remains. That is why our recommendation to 

develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear 

detection strategy is so crucial. 

Finally, where appropriate, we have incorporated a variety of technical 

comments provided by DHS to better characterize DNDO’s role and 

accomplishments, and the challenges it faces in developing a global 

nuclear detection strategy to combat nuclear smuggling. We do not believe 

that any of the comments that we incorporated represented a serious flaw 

in the content or quality of the draft report and in fact improve the 

technical accuracy of the report. In the few areas where DHS commented 

that we were factually incorrect, we have made minor changes to the 

report to clarify our point, to correct technical inaccuracies, or to avoid 

confusion. Where appropriate, we have provided additional information to 

Page 36 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

further support our point, in some cases using information contained in 

DHS’s letter. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional 

committees and Members of Congress, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the 

Secretary of State. The report will also be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-3841 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are 

David Maurer 

listed in appendix III. 

Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment 

Page 37 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
 

List of Requesters 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Chairman 

The Honorable Peter T. King 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Bart Gordon 

Chairman 

Committee on Science and Technology 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Edolphus Towns 

Chairman 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Charles E. Schumer 

United States Senate 

The Honorable James R. Langevin 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul 

House of Representatives 

Page 38 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

of Homeland Security 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Page 39 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 40 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

See comment 5. 

Page 41 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 6. 

See comment 7. 

See comment 8. 

See comment 9. 

See comment 10. 

Page 42 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 11. 

See comment 12. 

Page 43 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 13. 

See comment 14. 

See comment 15. 

See comment 16. 

Page 44 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 17. 

See comment 18. 

See comment 19. 

Page 45 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 20. 

Page 46 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 21. 

See comment 22. 

See comment 23. 

Page 47 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 24. 

See comment 25. 

See comment 26. 

See comment 27. 

See comment 28. 

Page 48 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 29. 

See comment 30. 

See comment 31. 

See comment 32. 

See comment 33. 

See comment 34. 

Page 49 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland 

Security’s letter dated January 14, 2009. 

1. We agree with DHS that deploying or purchasing ineffective equipment 

would be inappropriate. We also agree with DHS that, as we reported, 

field evaluations are not complete and that the necessary equipment 

may not be deployed until 2012. We discuss the reasons for these 

delays on page 14 of the report. In addition, we disagree with DHS’s 

assertion that Border Patrol told us that lessons learned from field 

evaluations “would help avert large amounts of taxpayer funds for 

equipment that would not have been effective.” We do not dispute the 

importance of spending taxpayer dollars wisely; however, it was not 

expressed to us as such until this letter. 

GAO Comments 

2. We added language on the highlights page to clarify that CBP is also 

responsible for putting radiation detection equipment in place. 

3. We discuss in more depth the technological limitations of detection 

equipment and sustaining detection efforts on pages 19 through 21 of

the report. 

4. DHS commented that we have understated the value, importance, and

challenge of technology development efforts needed to arrive at 

effective solutions. We disagree. We acknowledge these challenges in 

the body of the report and discuss some of the measures DNDO has 

taken to develop needed equipment. Furthermore, we disagree with 

DNDO’s statement about our findings regarding the status of 

sustainability planning. We describe at more length on pages 19 and 20 

of the report our concerns with DNDO’s efforts to sustain maritime 

initiatives into the future. 

5. While we do not mention the Phased Deployment Implementation Plan 

by name, on page 14 we state that DNDO and CBP are jointly working 

on measures to better secure the border areas between ports of entry 

and that these efforts are part of a phased approach. We have added

clarifying language to the paragraph on page 4 to more clearly

delineate the different roles CBP and DNDO play in this regard. 

Furthermore, while we do not disagree with taking a phased approach, 

DNDO has not kept to its original schedule and if such delays continue, 

it is uncertain whether DNDO and CBP will meet their original goal of 

full deployment of equipment by 2012. 

Page 50 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

6. We have modified the text on page 16 to include a reference that 

efforts to screen aviation for radiological and nuclear materials are 

being included in the strategy for the first time. 

7. We have modified the language on page 5 to clarify the roles and 

responsibilities of DNDO and CBP. 

8. DHS may have misunderstood the point we were making concerning 

maritime screening as compared with land and aviation screening. We 

agree that non-port of entry screening will require modifications to 

existing screening operations and new equipment. However, we were 

told that maritime screening posed unique challenges, which we have 

documented on pages 18-21 of this report. 

9. We disagree with DHS that the conclusions we reach regarding the 

maritime program are incorrect. Although DHS comments that our 

conclusions are incorrect, DHS does not dispute the facts we present. 

Namely, DNDO has not established criteria for assessing the success of 

pilot efforts and it has no plan detailing which locations it would target 

next. Furthermore, during the course of our work we heard repeated 

concerns about the sustainability of the maritime radiological and 

nuclear screening from state and local law enforcement. Specifically, 

we asked the maritime mission area manager if a sustainability plan 

existed and we were told no. After our visit to Puget Sound, we 

received an e-mail from the manager stating DNDO would begin to 

develop a sustainability plan should the decision be made to continue 

the initiative. 

10. We understand the role of grants in funding these types of activities 

and agree with DHS that, according to DNDO, grants are the primary 

mechanism it plans to rely on for sustaining radiological and nuclear 

detection activities in the maritime environment. We agree with DNDO 

efforts to work with the Coast Guard to adapt the Maritime Security 

Risk Assessment Model to accommodate more explicitly radiological 

and nuclear detection challenges. However, we maintain our concern 

that DNDO does not have any detailed plans, including how and where 

a broader strategy would be implemented, what technology would be 

needed, what organizations should be involved, and how such efforts 

would be sustained for this important national security issue. 

11. DNDO incorrectly asserted that we did not recognize its contributions 

to international efforts. On page 23 of the report we acknowledged 

DNDO’s efforts to look for opportunities to work with other agencies 

to help strengthen their radiological and nuclear detection efforts, 

Page 51 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

despite the fact that these programs to combat nuclear smuggling are 

well established and are under the purview of another agency.

12. DNDO has misunderstood the reference to its annual assessment of 

the global nuclear detection strategy and we believe the text that now 

appears on page 6 is consistent with our discussion later in the report. 

Our discussion on page 6 focuses on the global strategy, encompassing 

radiological and nuclear detection activities across all relevant 

government agencies. The reference DNDO makes to text later in the 

report focuses specifically on actions taken by DNDO to enhance 

domestic detection capabilities. However, we have modified the 

language to be clearer about what is being discussed in each place. We 

acknowledge that DNDO does not have authority over the budgets of 

other agencies and we would not advocate for such authority to be 

provided to it. However, DNDO is responsible for enhancing and 

coordinating federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear 

smuggling domestically and overseas. We believe that the analysis we 

are recommending—that DNDO undertake using data collected as part 

of the Joint Annual Interagency Review—is consistent with this 

requirement. 

13. We recommended that DNDO develop a strategic plan to guide the 

development of a more comprehensive global nuclear strategy and 

delineated what such a plan should contain, including clearly defined

objectives, roles, and responsibilities for meeting the objectives; 

necessary funding; and monitoring mechanisms to determine progress 

in meeting goals. However, DNDO has not yet produced such a 

strategic plan. We acknowledge that combating nuclear smuggling on a 

global scale is a large and complex undertaking. We repeatedly asked 

DNDO for detailed plans, containing the elements described above, but 

did not receive any. 

14. We have modified the text on page 12 to recognize the role of the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

15. DNDO commented that portal monitors can also be used to monitor 

pedestrians, but according to CBP, it does not currently use portal 

monitors for this purpose. However, we have modified the text to 

reflect that portal monitors are used for screening cargo containers. 

With regard to the use of pagers to detect smuggled nuclear material, 

we have reported in the past on the limitations of using these devices 

and that pagers should not be relied upon to detect smuggled nuclear 

material. 

Page 52 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

16. None of the radiation detection devices discussed in this report use the 

active interrogation techniques cited by DHS. 

17. DHS commented that including a paragraph on ASPs (now on page 13) 

was beyond the scope of this audit and should be removed from this 

report. The scope of our review is presented on pages 3 and 4 of the 

report. As such, we agree with DHS that our review did not include an

assessment of DNDO’s efforts to test and procure ASP technology. 

However, several prior GAO reports have found significant problems 

with DNDO’s work in this area. Reporting the results of our prior work 

in the background of this report is appropriate and germane because 

portal monitors are a key component of the global nuclear detection 

strategy. 

18. DHS commented that our findings on DNDO’s lack of long-term plans 

are misleading and suggest DNDO has no plans or strategies. We agree 

that DNDO has identified gaps and vulnerabilities and has taken some 

steps to address these, including jointly working with CBP as 

mentioned on page 14 of our report. However, DHS does not dispute 

our finding that it has not developed a detailed plan, which clearly 

conveys the goals, responsibilities, resource needs, and performance 

metrics needed to further its detection efforts. Identifying gaps and 

initiating programs are positive steps toward enhancing detection 

capabilities, but these efforts alone do not constitute a long-term plan. 

Without a detailed, documented plan, DNDO will be unable to 

determine whether these new programs are actually succeeding and 

addressing the identified gaps. 

19. We believe DHS had misconstrued our description of efforts to 

implement radiological and nuclear screening at the border areas in 

between official ports of entry. We acknowledge that there are a 

number of challenges associated with implementing portable detection 

equipment for use in the field and appreciate DNDO and CBPs efforts 

to develop this capability. However, the fact remains that DNDO has 

not kept to its original schedule, and if such delays continue, it is 

uncertain whether DNDO and CBP will meet their original goal of full 

deployment of such equipment by 2012. 

20. Our description of the procurement challenges faced by DNDO and 

CBP is an accurate summary of the information we were provided. 

One of DNDO’s primary roles is to test and procure needed

radiological and nuclear detection equipment for use by CBP and other 

agencies. We were informed by CBP that it did not receive the 

equipment it had originally ordered in the agreed upon time frames. 

Page 53 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Regardless of whether the equipment was for use at an official border 

crossing or for use by Border Patrol officers in the field, the needed 

equipment was not procured as requested. In CBP’s technical 

comments on a draft of this report, it stressed that its radiological and

nuclear detection equipment procurement funding was handed over to 

DNDO in 2006. CBP further stated that it believes that the most 

effective way to procure commercial off-the-shelf equipment is for 

CBP to have its own radiation and nuclear equipment budget. 

21. We have modified the text on pages 15 through 17 to more clearly 

delineate roles and responsibilities. 

22. We have accurately described what we observed during our visit to 

Dulles International Airport. We were told by CBP officials that the 

source used in the demonstration was what they use to routinely check 

the responsiveness of the portal monitor and successfully did just that 

earlier in the week. 

23. We believe DHS has misconstrued our statement about detecting 

radiological and nuclear material outside the U.S. borders. We are not 

minimizing the importance of such a goal. In fact, since DNDO believes 

that it is one of the largest and most important vulnerabilities in the 

existing detection architecture, it will be even more important that 

DNDO develop detailed plans for securing such arrangements with as 

many nations as possible. 

24. We have listed on page 18 of the report a number of other factors we 

were told by DHS officials influenced the decision to pilot the maritime 

program in the Puget Sound area. In response to the draft report, DHS 

provided an additional reason for the selection of Puget Sound. 

25. We modified the text on page 19 to include the actual funding amount 

for the pilot project. 

26. See comments 9 and 10.

27. DHS provided new information that the Preventative Radiological and 

Nuclear Detection handbook is under development and that DNDO 

reached out to state and local entities in its development. This is 

another positive step. However, as DNDO stated, this handbook is 

currently in draft, undergoing review, and not yet finalized or in use by 

any locale. 

Page 54 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

28. We believe DNDO has incorrectly characterized our finding regarding 

detection technologies in the maritime environment. On pages 20 and 

21, our report delineates some of the technological limitations, as they 

were presented to us by the users of the equipment. We do not assert 

that these limitations are insurmountable; only that they exist and 

should be taken into consideration when crafting a plan for 

radiological and nuclear detection in the maritime environment. 

29. The information contained in the report on page 22 is factually 

accurate. 

30. The information contained on pages 22 and 23 of the report was 

obtained through interviews with NYPD officials in the presence of a 

DNDO representative. The primary purpose of the statement was to 

point out the number of boats with boat-mounted radiation detection 

equipment in use at the time of our review. 

31. While there are other complexities with developing a global nuclear 

detection strategy, DNDO officials repeatedly told us during the course 

of our review that a primary complicating factor is the office’s limited 

ability to influence other agencies’ programs to combat nuclear 

smuggling. 

32. We modified the text on page 25 to reflect DNDO’s efforts to update 

some of the information. 

33. We modified the text on page 25 to reflect the fact that DNDO should 

coordinate with other agencies on the overall strategic direction of 

detection efforts. 

34. In response to our July 2008 recommendation that DNDO develop an 

overarching strategic plan, DNDO commented that it has included a 

request for strategic planning information as part of its efforts to 

develop the next edition of the Joint Annual Interagency Review. 

However, DHS did not comment on how this will inform or contribute 

to an overarching strategic plan to guide future enhancement to global 

nuclear detection. 

Page 55 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 56 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 57 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 58 GAO-09-257

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

David Maurer, 202-512-3841 or maurerd@gao.gov

In addition to the contact person named above, Glen Levis (Assistant 

Director), Elizabeth Erdmann, Rachel Girshick, Sandra Kerr, Omari 

Norman, Kim Raheb, Rebecca Shea, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, and 

Tommy Williams made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Nuclear Detection
Related GAO Products 

Page 59 GAO-09-257

Related GAO Products 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Focusing on the Highest Priority Radiological 

Sources Could Improve DOE’s Efforts to Secure Sources in Foreign 

Countries. GAO-07-580T. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at 

Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded

Security Upgrades Is Uncertain. GAO-07-404. Washington, D.C.: 

February 28, 2007. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s International Radiological Threat 

Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the 

Highest Priority Radiological Sources. GAO-07-282. Washington, D.C.: 

January 31, 2007. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and 

Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed. 

GAO-06-93. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2005. 

Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source Recovery 

Efforts and Apply Lessons Learned to Future Recovery Missions.

GAO-05-672. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to 

Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening. GAO-03-638. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed 

to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. 

GAO-03-482. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003. 

Nuclear Security: DOE and NRC Have Different Security Requirements

for Protecting Weapons-Grade Material from Terrorist Attacks.

GAO-07-1197R. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2007. 

Nuclear Security: Actions Taken by NRC to Strengthen Its Licensing 

Process for Sealed Radioactive Sources Are Not Effective. GAO-07-1038T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2007. 

National Nuclear Security Administration: Security and Management 

Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the NNSA Act. 

GAO-07-428T. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007. 

Securing Nuclear and 

Radiological Material 

Overseas 

Securing Nuclear and 

Radiological Material 

in the United States 

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Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: Poor Planning Has Complicated DOE’s 

Plutonium Consolidation Efforts. GAO-06-164T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 7, 2005. 

Nuclear Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded

Recovery of Sealed Radiological Sources. GAO-05-967. Washington, D.C.: 

September 22, 2005. 

Nuclear Security: Actions Needed by DOE to Improve Security of 

Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material at Its Energy, Science and

Environment Sites. GAO-05-934T. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2005. 

Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely 

Consolidate Plutonium. GAO-05-665. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2005. 

Nuclear Security: DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, 

Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to 

Meet the New Design Basis Threat. GAO-05-611. Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 2005.

Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security

of Sealed Radioactive Sources. GAO-03-804. Washington, D.C.: 

August 6, 2003. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy 

Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United 

States. GAO-06-558T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and 

Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation 

Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.: 

March 14, 2006. 

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in 

Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign 

Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.

GAO-02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002. 

Radiation Detection 

Programs Overseas 

Page 60 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
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Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One 

Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007. 

Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port 

Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved.

GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005. 

Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But Implementation and 

Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2005. 

Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment 

Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection 

Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Phase 3 Test Report on Advanced 

Portal Monitors Does Not Fully Disclose the Limitations of the Test 

Results. GAO-08-979. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2008. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Program to Procure and Deploy 

Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the 

Department’s Previous Cost Estimates. GAO-08-1108R. Washington, D.C.:

September 22, 2008. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure 

Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.

GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy 

the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported 

by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis. GAO-07-581T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 14, 2007. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the 

National Laboratories’ Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in 

Support of DNDO’s Testing and Development Program. GAO-07-347R. 

Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support 

the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based 

Container Security 

Radiation Detection 

Technology 

Page 61 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
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on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the 

Monitors’ Costs and Benefits. GAO-07-133R. Washington, D.C.: 

October 17, 2006. 

Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear 

and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response 

Capabilities Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-1015. Washington, D.C.: 

September 21, 2006. 

Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across 

Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations. GAO-06-940T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 7, 2006.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying 

Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns 

Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006. 

Technology Assessment: Securing the Transport of Cargo Containers. 

GAO-06-68SU. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2006. 

Homeland Security: Limited Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection 

Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry. GAO-03-963. Washington, D.C.: 

September 4, 2003. 

Nuclear Safety: Construction of the Protective Shelter for the Chernobyl 

Nuclear Reactor Faces Schedule Delays, Potential Cost Increases, and 

Technical Uncertainties. GAO-07-923. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2007. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Management Controls Needed for Some 

DOE Projects in Russia and Other Countries. GAO-05-828. Washington,

D.C.: August 29, 2005. 

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management and 

Internal Controls, but Challenges Remain. GAO-05-329. Washington, D.C.: 

June 30, 2005. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better 

Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.

Nuclear 

Nonproliferation and 

Security 

Page 62 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
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Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium 

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(360896) Page 63 GAO-09-257 Nuclear Detection
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