Joint Special Operations University

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JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

In this monograph, Dr. Norman Cigar provides Special Operations Forces (SOF) commanders and planners with an overview of 

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) operational framework and presence in the area. He analyzes the strategic and 

operational issues that confront policymakers in responding to 

the threat posed by AQAP within Yemen’s challenging social, 

political, and physical environment. This monograph presents the 

far-reaching implications for SOF, from recognizing the nuances 

of Yemen’s tribal-based human terrain to understanding key relationships, rivalries, and competition between AQAP and other 

Yemeni players. AQAP will likely continue to represent a threat 

to U.S. interests and regional stability for the foreseeable future.

ISBN 978-1-941715-30-7

The Enemy is Us: 

How Allied and U.S. Strategy in Yemen 

Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Norman Cigar

JSOU Report 18-4

JSOU Report 18-4 How Allied and U.S. Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival Cigar 

Yemeni soldiers are pictured on the frontline of fighting with the Houthis 

near Sana’a, Yemen, on 27 January 2018. PHOTO BY REUTERS/NEWSCOM
Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Command Historian, CANSOFCOM Education 

and Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

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Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

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Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

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Resident Senior Fellows

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Editorial Advisory Board
JSOU Report 18-4

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2018

The Enemy is Us:

How Allied and U.S. Strategy 

in Yemen Contributes to 

AQAP’s Survival

Norman Cigar
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to 

the Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, Joint Special Operations 

University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

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in the JSOU Press. 

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Printed in June 2018.

ISBN 978-1-941715-30-7
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

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authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Complexity, Organizational Blinders, and the SOCOM Design Way, JSOU Report 18-3, 

David C. Ellis and Charles N. Black

Advancing SOF Cultural Engagement: The Malinowski Model for a Qualitative 

Approach, JSOU Report 18-2, Robert R. Greene Sands and Darby Arakelian

Growing SOLO: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities, 

JSOU Report 18-1, Troy White

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Small State Resistance, edited by Kevin D. Stringer and Glennis F. Napier

How Do SOF Contribute to Comprehensive Deterrence? 

JSOU Report 17-11, Robert Haddick

The Death of the Golden Hour and the Return of the Future Guerrilla Hospital, 

JSOU Report 17-10, Warner D. Farr

On the cover. A close up of a world map emphasizes Yemen. PHOTO BY WOLLERTZ/STUTTERSTOCK.COM 

Back cover. Yemeni soldiers are pictured on the frontline of fighting with the Houthis 

near Sana’a, Yemen, on 27 January 2018. PHOTO BY REUTERS/NEWSCOM
v

Contents

From the Director ........................................................................vii

Foreword ......................................................................................ix

About the Author...........................................................................xi

Acknowledgements .....................................................................xiii

Chapter 1. Navigating Tribal Waves: The Political 

Foundations of AQAP’s Military Strategy in Yemen......................... 1

Chapter 2. Tribes in Yemen: The Undercurrents of 

Politics and Conflict ...................................................................... 9

Chapter 3. Safe Harbor: AQAP’s Objectives in Yemen’s 

Most Recent Round of Conflict.................................................... 27

Chapter 4. Charting the Coalition Course .................................... 47

Chapter 5. The Way Forward........................................................ 61

Chapter 6. Conclusion................................................................. 77

Appendix: Yemeni Media Guide ................................................. 83

Endnotes...................................................................................... 87

vii

From the Director 

We are pleased to publish this research from Dr. Norman Cigar, a 

research fellow at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. His examination of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) highlights one important facet of a complicated counterterrorism setting. Indeed, 

his nautical-themed headings remind the reader of the fluid and complex 

operating environment that involves a terrorist threat immersed in a civil 

war, a dramatic humanitarian crisis, and a contest for regional influence. 

Planners and others who must address operational and strategic choices can 

use this text and related JSOU Press publications to gain appreciation for 

how this particular threat manages to retain some freedom of maneuver by 

playing off local government, national (Yemeni) policy and forces, ISIS, tribal 

allegiances, rebel groups, Iranian influences, and an Arab coalition led by 

Saudi Arabia. As Dr. Cigar says, victory in this case may not mean AQAP’s 

elimination but containment and management once the organization has 

been degraded to an irreducible minimum. As always, we welcome comments from readers as well as recommendations for future monograph topics.

Francis X. Reidy

Interim Director, Center for Strategic Studies

ix

Foreword 

The presence and influence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP) in Yemen, long seen as a threat to U.S. interests, has grown 

in the midst of continuing internal conflict in that country. It threatens the 

stability of other states within the Arabian Peninsula, particularly Saudi 

Arabia, as well as states that make up the Horn of Africa. Conceivably, it also 

represents a potential threat to freedom of navigation in important adjacent 

sea lanes of communication. Yemen, and especially the security threat posed 

by AQAP, is likely to remain a focus of interest for the United States and U.S. 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) well into the future. 

In this monograph, Dr. Norman Cigar provides SOF commanders and 

planners with an overview of AQAP’s operational framework and presence 

in the area. He analyzes the strategic and operational issues that confront 

policymakers in responding to the threat posed by AQAP within Yemen’s 

challenging social, political, and physical environment. Cigar contends that 

understanding the complexity of AQAP’s place in Yemen’s largely tribal society and the characteristics of Yemen’s political, social, and regional dynamics 

can help military and civilian officials appreciate the opportunities and limitations of U.S. policy. He further argues that successfully engaging AQAP 

in Yemen requires an emphasis on the desired political effects over time. 

Cigar draws on his in-depth understanding of AQAP to reveal the organization’s flexibility in adjusting its methods and operational locales to 

maintain the initiative and gain advantage over its competitors and adversaries. He explains the ways in which AQAP exploits grievances and takes 

advantage of a disintegrating central government and an environment that 

features a proliferation of warlords and shifting coalitions and allegiances.

This monograph presents the far-reaching implications for SOF, from 

recognizing the nuances of Yemen’s tribal-based human terrain to understanding key relationships, rivalries, and competition between AQAP and 

other Yemeni players. AQAP will likely continue to represent a threat to U.S. 

interests and regional stability for the foreseeable future. 

Will Irwin

Resident Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic Studies 

xi

About the Author

Dr. Norman Cigar is a research fellow at the Marine Corps University in 

Quantico, Virginia, from which he retired as director of regional studies and the Minerva research chair. He is also a senior fellow at the Potomac 

Institute for Policy Studies. Previously, he served on 

the staff of the Marine Corps Command and Staff 

College and the Marine Corps School of Advanced 

Warfighting, where he taught military theory, strategy 

and policy, military case studies, and regional studies. 

Previously, he was director of the Army’s Psychological Operations Strategic Studies Detachment responsible for the Middle East and Africa at Fort Bragg. 

He also spent seven years in the Office of the Army’s 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence as the Army’s 

senior political-military intelligence analyst in the Pentagon responsible for 

the Middle East, and supported the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff 

of the Army, the Army Staff, and Congress with intelligence, and represented 

the Army on national-level intelligence issues in the interagency intelligence 

community. During the Gulf War, he was the Army’s senior political-military 

intelligence staff officer on the Desert Shield/Desert Storm Task Force.

He has authored numerous works on politics and security issues dealing with the Middle East and the Balkans, and served as a consultant at the 

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at The Hague. He 

also taught at the Defense Intelligence College and was a visiting fellow at 

the Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution, George Mason University. 

Among his writings are Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons: How Do 

Countries Think about the Bomb?; Iraq’s Shia Warlords and Their Militias; 

Al-Qaida, the Tribes, and the Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq’s 

Unstable Triangle; and Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency.

Dr. Cigar holds a D.Phil. from Oxford (St. Antony’s College) in Middle 

East history and Arabic; a masters of international affairs from the School of 

International and Public Affairs; a certificate from the Middle East Institute, 

Columbia University; and a master’s degree in strategic intelligence from the 

Defense Intelligence College where he was a distinguished graduate.

xiii

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my sincere gratitude and recognition to the staff of the 

Joint Special Operations University without whose expert guidance and 

interest this work would not have appeared. Dr. Peter McCabe offered his 

welcome encouragement throughout the process. And, in particular, Resident Senior Fellow Will Irwin contributed generously of his time, invaluable 

advice, expertise, and editorial assistance that enabled me to arrive at the 

final version of this study. Without his valued input, my task would have 

been intractable at certain points. 

Other anonymous reviewers also provided valuable insights and recommendations for which I am indebted. Finally, my thanks to Mrs. Lisa 

Sheldon for her care and expertise in editing what is a technically complex 

manuscript.

1

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Chapter 1. Navigating Tribal Waves: The 

Political Foundations of AQAP’s Military 

Strategy in Yemen

Unavoidably, the situation in Yemen has evolved since the following study was 

written, which was based on information up to August 2017. An epilogue summarizes some of the salient recent events as of January 2018, including the 

death of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in early December 2017, who 

until then had continued to play a prominent role in the events addressed in 

this study, and a major Arab Coalition campaign along the country’s western 

coast. Nevertheless, ongoing developments have not invalidated assessments 

on the central subject of this study, al-Qaeda in Yemen.

There Be Dragons: U.S. Counterterrorism Interests in Yemen

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) presence in Yemen has long 

represented a terrorist threat to U.S. interests and has been the source 

of a number of successful and failed attacks against U.S. interests, including 

the attack against the destroyer USS COLE in 2000, the attack on the U.S. 

Embassy in Sanaa in 2008, the “underwear bombers” in 2009 and 2012, the 

package bombs shipped by air in 2010, and the credible terrorist threat that 

compelled the U.S. government to temporarily withdraw its nonessential 

diplomatic staff from Yemen in 2013. AQAP has continued to try and take 

the fight abroad, with reports in 2017 of plans to introduce laptop bombs 

onto airplanes and encouraging lone wolf attacks in the West, as in a May 

2017 video featuring AQAP leader Qasim al-Raymi (Abu Hurayra al-Sanani) 

speaking in Arabic with English subtitles.1 Not surprisingly, the United States 

has placed a $5 million reward on al-Raymi. 

Al-Qaeda has a long history in Yemen, where it has not only played a role 

on the local level, but over the years has also been involved in activities in 

neighboring Saudi Arabia and Somalia. More recently, AQAP has expanded 

its influence within Yemen as a result of the upsurge in internal conflict 

starting in March 2015. AQAP threatens significant enduring U.S. interests, 

including the prevention of direct attacks on the U.S. homeland and states on 

the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, and, potentially, the freedom 

of navigation in the busy adjacent sea lanes of communication. New interests 
2

JSOU Report 18-4

such as the planned Saudi oil pipeline and terminal on the South Yemeni 

coast, intended to bypass the risk of the Strait of Hormuz, only add to the 

necessity of dealing with the jihadist threat in Yemen.2

Although the U.S. has been working in concert with a Saudi Arabian-led 

coalition, and local forces can and do operate against AQAP, their focus of 

effort has often been directed instead to fighting against the alliance between 

Iranian backed Shia Ansar Allah (usually called Houthis by their adversaries) and the deposed former-President Ali Abdullah Saleh along with other 

local rivals.3 That is, for any local actor, depending on the time and situation, 

AQAP may or may not be the main priority that it is for the United States. A 

source from Saleh’s party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), encapsulated 

this truism of Yemeni political life when he complained in 2012, just after 

Saleh had been ousted from power, that “the U.S. does not want a real army 

in Yemen. Instead, they want a force that can fight al-Qaeda. This is one of 

Yemen’s goals, but it is not our only priority.”4

Yemen, and especially the security threat represented there by AQAP, 

is likely to remain a focus of interest for the United States well into the 

future. And, in particular, Special Operations Forces (SOF), because of their 

versatility, agility, and ability to have a disproportionate impact in certain 

situations, are likely to be the option of choice to deal with military threats 

emanating in that country. This monograph is intended to provide planners, 

commanders, and instructors in SOF dealing with AQAP now or in the 

future with background and an analysis of the operational framework, and 

of the strategic and operational issues that confront the crafting of successful policy within that country’s challenging social, political, and physical 

environment. In particular, understanding the complexity of AQAP’s place 

in what is largely a tribal society and the specific characteristics of Yemen’s 

political and social dynamics and interactions with its neighbors, can help 

military and civilian officials appreciate the opportunities and limitations 

of U.S. policy and the impact military actions can have on the situation and 

how it can contribute to U.S. policy goals. Such broader awareness is important at all levels of war, whether strategic, operational, or tactical, especially 

since fighting a counterinsurgency (COIN) such as against AQAP tactical 

actions can also have an impact at higher levels, whether positive or negative. 
3

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

AQAP’s Following Seas in Yemen’s Internal Conflicts

The thesis of this study is that to fight AQAP in Yemen, the emphasis must 

be placed first on desired political effects over time, and secondly on how 

the military solution shapes the environment to move the system toward 

that end. A counterterrorism (CT) policy in Yemen alone is unlikely to be 

effective against AQAP and indeed could actually ensure its relevance to the 

local population. AQAP has become an accepted, if uncomfortable, player in 

the volatile Yemeni power structure. Given the 

governance vacuum and competition among 

a spectrum of local warlords in that country 

against the background of the country’s enduring political, security, social, and economic 

dynamics, AQAP will continue to represent a 

significant threat in some form for the foreseeable future. Understanding the strategic 

and operational environment in Yemen is key 

in dealing effectively with AQAP in terms of 

framing a strategy and operational plans to 

counter the jihadist threat in that country. This discussion is especially relevant to SOF given that U.S. forces are again in harm’s way in Yemen and 

that the kinetic U.S. presence is likely to expand under a CT strategy.

Understandably, AQAP’s military and terrorist operations are key to its 

perceived threat to the U.S. and they represent and attract the most attention locally and internationally. Although the military element of power is 

vital for success and even survival, al-Qaeda military thinkers have always 

stressed the link between military activity and objectives, on the one hand, 

and political objectives on the other, and that these two strands of strategy must be viewed in tandem as an integrated policy of armed combat 

and political activity, albeit with the military element in a subordinate role. 

According to one al-Qaeda military thinker reflective of the shared view of 

his peers, military strategy is “the use of military means to achieve political 

objectives” and initiative in war is “rooted in the moment when a political 

objective emerges from the political leadership,” while “the determination 

of the military objective within the broad political framework is considered 

within the basic purview of the political leadership.”5

Understanding the 

strategic and operational 

environment in Yemen is 

key in dealing effectively 

with AQAP in terms 

of framing a strategy 

and operational plans 

to counter the jihadist 

threat in that country.
4

JSOU Report 18-4

AQAP agrees, also viewing the military effort as supporting its political 

objectives, as well as serving as a mechanism to recruit followers and promote AQAP’s integration into Yemen’s sociopolitical fabric. Significantly, 

the only military thinker of stature that Yemen has produced, Nasr bin Ali 

al-Anisi, was categorical that “there is no strategy without a policy content 

that shapes its basic plan and is its true energizer.”6

 And, in discussing the 

Prussian theorist Karl von Clausewitz, al-Anisi agreed explicitly with the 

latter’s emphasis on this outlook, noting that “the soldier in our age cannot 

operate without the politician, but must fight in cooperation with the latter, 

and political leaders are the ones who are always in control.”7

How AQAP fights and other intangible factors are perhaps even more 

important than its order of battle in terms of equipment and number of 

personnel. By 2014, AQAP’s military thinker al-Anisi had produced a video 

lecture series on military strategy, representing an orderly synthesis of theory 

and practice to guide military activity at all levels of war and a primer on 

operational art along the spectrum of conflict. 

As he emphasized, the military objective should be to “undermine the 

adversary’s will,” but he stressed that in insurgencies, given the enemy’s 

advantages, what may be uppermost in the early stages is to be flexible, willing to change objectives, and just avoid being defeated.8

 AQAP has shown 

flexibility in how it fights rather that adhering to a rigid plan and has been 

willing and able to adjust the main effort horizontally in space, varying the 

location of its commitments even within the short period of the recent civil 

war. AQAP puts emphasis on maintaining the initiative and can take advantage of targets of opportunity, as when it moved into the undefended cities 

in South Yemen after much of the Yemeni Army stationed there was disintegrating in 2015. AQAP has also developed a capability to move vertically, 

shifting the level of combat and type of forces committed from an insurgency 

and guerrilla operations to more conventional mobile operations, and back 

as a situation requires, although it has not reached a fully conventional force 

structure and operations yet. 

Stranger Tides: Rethinking CT Strategy in Yemen

As is true in any conflict, AQAP’s military capabilities have to be measured in terms relative to those of other local actors, whether adversaries or 

potential cobelligerents. Yemen traditionally has been characterized by an 
5

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

established pattern of a large number of players combining in frequentlyshifting coalitions based on recalculations of the balance of power—a situation that can result in pragmatic cooperation even of former enemies.9

 This 

dynamic has only been intensified by the resumption of hostilities in 2015, 

with the disintegration of the central government and a proliferation of 

warlords and local centers of power, abetted by foreign intervention, which 

has made it easier for AQAP to operate not only by weakening the power of 

potential adversaries but also by allowing it to find a niche in the system as a 

player in its own right. Naturally, AQAP is not an inert object, but a reactive 

and adaptive adversary whose own capabilities and strategies affect and limit 

what is possible for its adversaries in countering it. AQAP’s strengths and 

vulnerabilities will become clearer in tangible terms as seen in the specific 

military operations and political relationships that will be addressed subsequently, but a general overview here will serve as an introduction.

The implication for SOF is that AQAP is not a snake that perishes when 

its head is cut off; rather, AQAP is more like a hydra whose decapitation 

produces two new heads in its place. Effective strategy in Yemen therefore 

calls for a different way of dealing with the threat—one that undermines 

how it perceives its own strengths and amplifies its own perceived weaknesses according to the time scale it has adopted. For example, AQAP’s 

veteran planner, organizer, and trainer10 Qasim al-Raymi, assumes as “a 

given fact” (waqi) that the United States is the strategic center of gravity of 

the enemy bloc in what for him is a unitary global war, or “single battle” 

(maraka wahida), as he calls it. For al-Raymi, the focus of effort, therefore, 

should be to target the United States in what he acknowledges may be a long 

war.11 However, given the clear overmatch that the United States enjoys in 

military power, al-Raymi recognizes that the ummah (Muslim community) 

is on the defensive and that engaging the United States in a direct approach 

is not advisable and suggests instead looking for and targeting the latter’s 

critical vulnerabilities, or “weak points” (da’ f), as he terms them.12 In practical terms, however, the unavoidable immediate task for AQAP has been to 

confront in combat local and regional forces, as the U.S. homeland is out 

of reach.

The fight against AQAP, whether by local actors, the Arab Coalition, or 

the United States, remains a work in progress, as is indicated by AQAP’s 

continued presence and activity. U.S. and coalition military contributions 

will be addressed later, but it is local forces that have borne and will continue 
6

JSOU Report 18-4

to bear the brunt of confronting the jihadists in Yemen, even if supported by 

outside forces. When the civil war erupted, much of the Yemeni professional 

officer corps and most Army units sided with former-President Saleh, who 

had nurtured personal networks for years within the military, and the coalition faced the daunting task of rebuilding the Yemeni Army and security 

establishment. 

While having an effective national army is perceived by the U.S. and 

coalition as vital in the fight against AQAP, the group itself has figured out 

how to navigate local tribal relationships by flexibly adapting to circumstances as they permit. As indicated by Saleh’s political colleague, U.S. and 

coalition CT objectives do not necessarily align with local Yemeni political 

dynamics, so a military solution working through an institutionally and 

politically tenuous central government will be subject to turbulent and constantly changing political changes. 

Along with its military operations, AQAP has waged a political campaign in pursuit of its objectives. AQAP recognizes that combat operations 

are a supporting—although essential—effort to a political one, although 

both aspects of AQAP’s strategy, of course, function in tandem and interact 

with the country’s society and political system. Yemen’s human terrain is an 

enduring reality, with informal, though very real, social and political institutions and patterns of activity within whose opportunities, challenges, and 

limitations AQAP or any political player, domestic or foreign, must operate. 

Yet, while AQAP has been able to burrow and integrate itself into the 

country’s social fabric, economy, and security, it faces at the same time a 

policy dilemma in dealing with society, one that constitutes a potential 

critical vulnerability. On the one hand, AQAP can accept and exploit the 

enduring aspects of the Yemeni political system and society but, on the other 

hand, if its intent is to make significant changes to the same political system 

and society in accordance with its ideology, it could alienate key elements 

of the population. Herein lies the opportunity for U.S. and coalition efforts 

to reconceptualize its efforts to dislodge AQAP in Yemen, but it requires a 

deeper understanding of how AQAP has navigated the tribal waves to throw 

it off track.
7

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Research Methodology

Rather than a narrative chronological history of AQAP, the thrust of this 

study is to address salient aspects of the environment in which the latter 

exists and operates in pursuit of its goals, as well as to analyze key events 

that illuminate AQAP’s objectives, strategy, and prospects. In particular, 

understanding such key elements as the military balance between AQAP and 

other Yemeni players, the characteristics of the country’s social and political 

system, and the role that the Arab Coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE) plays can help clarify the challenge and the 

available options for the United States at both the strategic and operational 

levels in dealing with AQAP. Ultimately, the practical intent of this study is 

to provide a better appreciation of the threat from AQAP in Yemen and of 

the context of that country’s political and security dynamics within which 

the jihadists operate. 

The local media is an important complement to Western reporting as a 

source of data for this study, as it has better access to the local scene than 

does the foreign media, often contains more detail, and offers an additional 

perspective. With the outbreak of the conflict, virtually all the Yemeni media 

became partisan—if it had not already been—and one cannot always tell 

where it is published, as some of the Yemeni media on all sides are now 

headquartered abroad. Fortunately, it is quite obvious where Yemeni media 

sources stand—whether with President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, Saudi 

Arabia, Qatar, or the UAE and their local allies and, on the other side, the 

Ansar Allah or Saleh. An appendix is provided at the end of this monograph 

to facilitate the reader’s evaluation of the source of information. In addition, 

the study also relies on an “inside-out” approach, that is by also engaging 

AQAP’s sources in order to appreciate objectives and strategies from the 

latter’s own perspective. The information cutoff here is early August 2017 

and, although the details are likely to change as events develop, conclusions 

should remain valid beyond the near term.

As was the case elsewhere in the Arab World during the Arab Spring, the 

new term Ansar Al-Sharia appeared in Yemen although, even more clearly 

than elsewhere, there was in practice little substantive change, as the Ansar 

Al-Sharia were essentially part of AQAP simply using a new name, and very 

often it was impossible even for Yemenis to differentiate between the two 

names. AQAP has even used the two terms interchangeably at times in a 
8

JSOU Report 18-4

single article in its publications. Al-Qaeda branches region-wide apparently 

assumed that the name Ansar Al-Sharia, with its religious connotation of 

religious law, might be more popular with the public than the prosaic alQaeda name and, as AQAP’s chief legal officer, Adil Al-Abab (killed in 2012), 

noted in 2011, “this name was introduced in order to attract people in the 

areas under Al-Qaida’s control by linking it to the Sharia.”13 In this study, 

the term AQAP will be used, unless there is a specific reference in the texts 

or sources cited to the Ansar Al-Sharia or to al-Qaeda with reference to the 

parent organization. 

This study will analyze methodically AQAP within its operating environment as well as “inside out”—that is, from the perspective of AQAP’s own 

objectives and its assessments of its adversaries and of the situation. Chapter 

1 sets the parameters and methodology of this study and the significance of 

AQAP and Yemen for U.S. interests. AQAP, of course, does not operate in a 

vacuum but is very much part of the Yemeni social and political landscape, 

and chapter 2, in particular, sets the scene of the current conflict that erupted 

in 2015 against the background of AQAP’s strengths and weaknesses, ideology, and leadership within the pervasive tribal environment which AQAP, 

the Arab Coalition, and the United States must take into consideration in 

any operations. Chapter 3 addresses AQAP’s political and military strategy, 

capabilities, and vulnerabilities as an organization and a military adversary, especially in relation to what it sees as its own objectives and what this 

reveals in terms of prospects for countering AQAP. Given the central role 

that the Arab Coalition, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular have played 

in the current fighting, chapter 4 examines how the coalition’s divergent 

interests, objectives, and strategies have affected and often complicated the 

fight against AQAP, including the development of local military forces that 

ultimately will bear the brunt of dealing with AQAP. The final chapters 

draw conclusions and looks at policies that could have a desired outcome in 

dealing with the AQAP threat.
9

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Chapter 2. Tribes in Yemen: The 

Undercurrents of Politics and Conflict

Pools of Trust in an Ocean of Distrust

Inherently, Yemen presents a challenging operational environment for any 

government, let alone conventional forces. With an area of 204,000 square 

miles, Yemen is larger than Iraq, but smaller than Afghanistan, and has a 

population of some 26 million, comparable in size to that of Iraq or Afghanistan, with over 38,000 often isolated villages (roughly the same number 

as Afghanistan, while Egypt with its far larger population only has 5,500), 

making central government as well as security, difficult. This dispersion is 

exacerbated by a woeful transportation infrastructure, and compounded by 

Yemen’s rugged terrain; with an average elevation of over 6,000 feet for the 

country as a whole, a mountainous interior with peaks in the 9,000–12,000 

foot range, a portion of the Rub' Al Khali desert, and a coastline that is 

almost 1,400 miles long. Tribes have long played a key political, social, and 

military role in much of Yemen, including in cities as a result of migration 

from the countryside.14 As such, the tribes constitute the country’s bedrock 

human terrain, and success or even just survival depends on the ability to 

operate within this social context. Major players are well aware of this fact, 

and AQAP, President Hadi’s coalition, and the Arab Coalition partners all 

compete for support from the same Yemeni Sunni tribes. The Yemeni tribes’ 

prominence has been both the result, as well as the cause, of the country’s 

traditionally weak central state, although the tribes’ disunity has facilitated 

the central government’s uneasy balance of power over the years. Moreover, 

Saudi Arabia traditionally has preferred a weak Yemeni government as a 

neighbor, and has exercised direct relations with selected tribes, encouraging and enabling them to assert their autonomy with money, arms, and 

other benefits such as work permits to keep the Yemeni government from 

consolidating its authority. In fact, Saudi Arabia, after almost 60 years of 

dealing with Yemeni tribes through its ministry of defense, prides itself on 

being able to navigate and influence that country’s tribal system. Nevertheless, Riyadh apparently woefully underestimated the tribes’ independence 

in pursuit of their own interests during this conflict, as many of them did 
10

JSOU Report 18-4

not respond as expected to Saudi blandishments and pressure. For example, 

retired Saudi Colonel Ibrahim al-Marie—who often serves as an unofficial 

spokesman for the Saudi government—after an inspection visit to Yemen, 

noted with indignation on UAE television that progress on the Taizz front 

was so slow despite earlier optimistic Saudi estimates because “there are 

[tribal] shaykhs there who received weapons and money [obviously from 

the Saudis], but who have not lifted a finger ... This has also happened in a 

number of other provinces.”15

At the same time, the fact that tribes—not to mention the country’s 

many security units that are often drawn from specific tribes, with de facto 

warlords commanding tribesmen in uniform—are so well armed that they 

inhibit what other Yemeni or foreign actors can do. AQAP recognizes this 

operational reality and, as one AQAP commander noted, “You know that the 

whole population of Yemen is armed, and the presence of weapons among 

the tribes is something natural in these parts and elsewhere; the presence of 

weapons is nothing surprising.”16 AQAP, in fact, has relied on and encouraged the armed tribes, seeing them as a useful counterweight to the government, warning the tribes even when Saleh was still president that the latter 

“wants to disarm you and to control you and to humble you, and then what 

do you think he will do to you?”17

The tribes, of course, are active political players with their own interests. 

Even before the civil war, government writ often extended only over the 

capital Sanaa and other large cities, with the tribes dominant in rural areas, 

and, as the head of the Bakil tribal council reminded the Yemeni government 

“we’re not government employees” when pressured to act against AQAP on 

behalf of the government.18 As Yemenis have concluded correctly, the collapse 

of the central state—weak and corrupt though it may have been at the best 

of times—as a result of the most recent conflict increased the importance of 

tribes as the individual’s primary mechanism for defense and survival.19 In 

fact, with the disintegration of the country’s police and judicial system, the 

swift and relatively lenient tribal law has become prevalent even in cities.20

Recently, in fact, many tribes have been acting as virtual mini-states in their 

own right, as when individual tribes (beginning with Hadi’s own tribal confederation) granted or withheld their approval of Hadi’s controversial order 

replacing Aden’s pro-UAE governor in 2017.21

The fact that most AQAP members are locals rather than foreigners 

and, by default of tribal origin, no doubt facilitates AQAP’s operations and 
11

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

alliance-building. AQAP leaders have certainly tried to appeal to such tribal 

solidarity with one AQAP leader calling for support for the local mujahidin especially from those tribes in which “the enemy in cooperation with 

his agents is pursuing your sons the heroic mujahidin.”22 Even in the highprofile case of Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni AQAP figure long wanted by 

the United States who was killed in a drone strike in September 2011, the 

head of his tribal confederation had long refused to hand him over to the 

Americans, claiming that was the Yemeni government’s job.23 And, that 

tribe’s website was still carrying AQAP material in 2012. Likewise, when the 

authorities attempted to arrest AQAP military thinker Nasr al-Anisi and 

broke into his home in 2012, his tribe rallied to his support with thousands 

of his fellow-tribesmen protesting in front of the Ministry of the Interior in 

Sanaa.24 Tellingly, in late 2013, the Army thought it wise to distribute leaflets 

in Hadramawt province warning the tribes not to shelter AQAP personnel 

and not to go near where the latter were to be found.25 And, conversely, once 

the fortunes of war had turned against their organization in 2012, AQAP 

reportedly withdrew its northern members from the southern provinces, 

understanding that they would be safer in their own home tribal areas.26

In particular, AQAP seeks to exploit the tribes’ deep-seated grievances 

and sense of neglect by the government.27 For example, pro-Hadi government assessments acknowledge that the continuing neglect of Abyan province results in a favorable environment among the tribes for AQAP and 

that cooperation by the local population 

with the pro-Hadi forces is problematic.28 Ultimately, the tribes’ relationships 

with AQAP are dynamic ones, most often 

based on near-term interests. From a tribe’s 

perspective, a working relationship with 

AQAP can mean an ally against any government, warlords, or other tribes, and 

does not necessarily mean they agree with 

AQAP’s principles and objectives. Even if 

a tribe is not favorable to AQAP ideologically, it may still oppose, for instance, the Hadi coalition for other reasons, 

as when a tribe in Al-Jawf province joined the Ansar Allah-Saleh forces in 

an attack against the Army and the Islah party (the Yemeni branch of the 

Muslim Brotherhood angered by an earlier raid by the latter against the tribal 

From a tribe’s perspective, 

a working relationship with 

AQAP can mean an ally 

against any government, 

warlords, or other tribes, 

and does not necessarily mean they agree with 

AQAP’s principles and 

objectives.
12

JSOU Report 18-4

market).29 Tribes can also view AQAP as a counterweight to neighboring 

countries, as some tribes have long had confrontations with Saudi Arabia 

over the border, even blowing up border demarcation markers placed unilaterally by the Saudi government.30

The Whirlpool of Recent Yemeni Conflict

The particular focus here will be on the Yemeni civil conflict that resumed 

in March 2015, as this conflict has reshaped the Yemeni political and security environment and has been a watershed for AQAP as well as for the 

country’s mainstream actors. This conflict has pitted the country’s former 

long-time president, Saleh, who was ousted in 2011 in a power struggle that 

coincided with the Arab Spring, in a coalition with the Ansar Allah (often 

called Houthis by their adversaries after the name of the family that has 

provided their leaders) against Saleh’s successor as interim president, AbdRabbu Mansour Hadi, and a mosaic of warlords.31 To be sure, fighting was 

already occurring between the local warring parties before 2015. However, 

the large-scale intervention by the Saudi and UAE-led Arab coalition catalyzed a qualitative change in the situation, as it escalated and prolonged the 

war. Otherwise the situation would probably have reverted to the country’s 

more traditional, if volatile, pattern of “managed instability,” with balanceof-power politics based on armed force, concrete interests, and shifting alliances, and with no one player able to establish a durable hegemony.32 To 

be sure, Saudi Arabia, although a champion of Sunni Islam, backed the 

largely-Zaydi tribal base of the country’s ruling Imam ousted by the 1962 

revolution, since the opposing republicans were supported by the Nasser 

regime in Egypt (which Riyadh at the time viewed as its greatest threat). And, 

in later years, Riyadh often courted Yemen’s Zaydi tribes to counterbalance 

Yemen’s government. Even today, one should not view the line-up of forces 

in a Manichean perspective, where everyone has taken sides along sectarian 

lines. Many tribes and individuals have either joined the fray only recently, 

have shifted allegiances during the course of the war, or have remained 

neutral all along as suited their tangible interests. Indeed, a key element of 

the failure of pro-Hadi forces to advance on Sanaa has been Saudi Arabia’s 

failure to induce the neutral tribes surrounding the capital to allow for a 

passage of forces.
13

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

The alliance between Ali Abdullah Saleh and Shia Houthi Ansar Allah 

appears superficially unnatural to the Western eye, especially since Saleh 

fought six campaigns against the Houthis. However, in the context of Yemeni 

politics, the alliance is a natural continuation of local tribal balance of power 

concerns superseding those of sectarian identity. It also exemplifies the fluidity of political-military alliances in Yemeni culture and ease with which 

AQAP can feasibly adapt and embed in Yemeni society as circumstances 

permit. 

Absent foreign intervention in 2015, the Ansar Allah-Saleh alliance would 

probably soon have fallen apart and a reconfiguration of a new domestic 

balance of forces among the country’s many players would have developed. 

Instead, the resulting protracted conflict created a security vacuum by 

removing the central government—however weak it may have previously 

been—resulting in a patchwork of de facto warlords within a system dominated by tribal, ideological, regional, and personal loyalties and networks 

including in the military and security forces. This new situation has provided 

a benign environment for AQAP, enabling it to emerge as a significant player 

due to the disruption of the local economy, unemployment approaching 84 

percent, high degrees of infrastructure destruction, hunger, and a cholera 

epidemic in many areas resulting from the coalition’s maritime blockade 

and kinetic actions.33

Although the focus in this study is on AQAP, of course, many of the 

current dynamics have a longer history, as is true of the country’s underlying social and political structures and relationships. In particular, AQAP’s 

policies and strategies have to be seen within the context of the period immediately following the Arab Spring. AQAP had already been battling against 

the Yemeni Army for several years by the time the Arab Spring broke out in 

Sanaa in early 2011 and, in many ways, the Arab Spring and its aftermath in 

Yemen, served as a dry-run or shaping phase for AQAP. That is, the turmoil, 

weakened government, and sharpened rivalries on the Yemeni political scene 

provided the landscape for the developing political and security patterns that 

have matured in the following years. 

The character of the Arab Spring in Yemen in 2011–2012, more so than 

in the other affected countries, consisted not only of a protest movement 

in favor of reform, but also of a struggle for power between the regime and 

competing forces that were often similar in political outlook as the regime 

but differed in their tribal, regional, religious affiliation, or personal loyalties. 
14

JSOU Report 18-4

What the Arab Spring did in Yemen was set in motion events that eventually 

led to the downfall of the Saleh regime, and, in relation to AQAP, facilitated 

an accompanying disruption of the established—if rickety and always mutating—domestic balance of forces and opened the path for AQAP’s significant 

expansion.34

AQAP Fights the Ansar Allah

AQAP views the Ansar Allah as the main enemy and, conversely, it is not 

surprising that the Ansar Allah have been the most consistent Yemeni party 

fighting AQAP over the years. In many ways, the presence of the Ansar Allah 

has served AQAP as a mechanism to facilitate its integration into the Sunni 

community, as Sunnis needed any ally they could get in the fight against the 

Ansar Allah. AQAP has a history of alliances with other local groups against 

the Ansar Allah preceding the current conflict, as in the 2013 campaign that 

pitted the Ansar Allah against the Salafis—the country’s ultra-conservative 

religious activists—who welcomed AQAP’s support.35 Hostility between 

AQAP and the Ansar Allah has been endemic, not least because of the latter’s Shia character, which AQAP views as deviant in religious terms.36 In 

fact, AQAP in November 2014 issued a fatwa (a decree handed down by an 

Islamic religious leader) proclaiming a jihad against the Ansar Allah, whom 

it claimed were out to “pollute religion and this life,” and make it legal to kill 

any Ansar Allah.37 Conflict intensified in 2014 as the Ansar Allah surged, 

leading to increased clashes in numerous provinces.38 The fighting escalated 

to major engagements such as one in 2014 in which AQAP claimed that the 

Ansar Allah had deployed 400 fighters to attack an AQAP stronghold in 

Al-Bayda’ province.39

In many ways, the outbreak of conflict in March 2015 provided an unprecedented opportunity for AQAP to be accepted as at least a cobelligerent by 

elements of the coalition in what was to become a difficult and protracted 

fight against the unlikely alliance of interest between the ousted President 

Saleh and the Ansar Allah. In the highly fragmented political landscape on 

the coalition’s side, virtually any party willing to oppose the Ansar AllahSaleh Coalition was welcome, especially in light of the unexpectedly tenacious resistance by the latter. AQAP portrays themselves as the defender of 

the country’s Sunnis and previously saw opposition to the Ansar Allah as 

a vehicle to penetrate society. As al-Anisi, AQAP’s military thinker, noted 
15

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

in 2014, others were relying on AQAP to stop the Ansar Allah and, despite 

its differences with other elements in Yemen, he affirmed that AQAP was 

willing to join forces against the common threat.40 Since the start of the civil 

war, AQAP has worked actively to promote a sectarian vision and solidify 

a position within a Sunni front against the Ansar Allah. As a prominent 

AQAP figure, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, put it, “We call on our brother Sunnis 

for solidarity ... against the Houthis and their ally Saleh.”41 More specifically, AQAP issued a communique in March 2017 warning that the Qayfa 

front—“the keystone of the war against the Houthis” it claimed—where the 

United States had mounted its largest raid on the ground, could fall to the 

Ansar Allah, and called for Sunni solidarity and for Sunni aid to AQAP in 

the common fight.42

In fact, local commanders and government officials reportedly have often 

welcomed AQAP as a cobelligerent against the Ansar Allah, according to 

a Popular Committee commander and former AQAP member, and have 

diverted arms meant for the committees to AQAP.43 Conversely, AQAP 

apparently has long found opposition to the Ansar Allah a useful vehicle 

to ingratiate itself with the tribes, and in 2012 ordered its members not to 

clash with or otherwise alienate the tribes in the interest of a united front 

against the Ansar Allah.44

AQAP fighters have been active on the battlefield against the Ansar AllahSaleh Coalition and, in fact, AQAP has claimed that it has forces committed in no fewer than 11 fronts against the Ansar Allah.45 Moreover, AQAP 

has often shared the battlespace or participated with other Arab Coalitionsupported forces. Such cooperation has been especially evident on the Taizz 

front, where frequent media reports and videos of operations have shown 

AQAP present on the battlefield with pro-coalition forces, openly fighting 

under its own flag, as well as with some of the more than 20 smaller jihadist 

militias that have sprouted up there.46 AQAP reportedly played a significant 

role embedded in the local Popular Committee in Aden in resisting the original Ansar Allah-Saleh advance in 2015 and continued to be active in clashes 

against the Ansar Allah there and elsewhere, as in Al-Bayda’ and Shabwa 

provinces.47 Later, there may have been a tacit understanding between AQAP 

and the Hadi forces, as suggested both by AQAP leaders and the Hadi-controlled media, which assessed that AQAP would continue to avoid confronting the Hadi coalition in Abyan province and would focus instead on the 

fight against the Ansar Allah-Saleh, as well as against the UAE-controlled 
16

JSOU Report 18-4

Hizam Amni forces.48 In at least one case in Abyan, the local UAE-backed 

militia, the Hizam Amni, complained that the Hadi government had been 

pressuring it to make unspecified political concessions to the local AQAP 

organization, although it was not clear what agreement or understanding 

might have been in play.49

For example, when AQAP evacuated the town of Azzan in August 2016, 

its forces redeployed to the front against the Ansar Allah.50 In that vein, an 

AQAP journalist in 2016 announced that AQAP would cooperate with any 

other Sunni entities including Saudi Arabia in the fight against the Ansar 

Allah.51 And, when AQAP figure Abd-al-Ra’uf al-Dhahab was killed in a 

January 2017 U.S. raid, a senior military officer in the Yemeni Army focused 

on what he termed as al-Dhahab’s valuable cooperation with the Hadi faction, as commander of the Popular Resistance, against the Ansar Allah, while 

complaining that the Army had not been informed of the raid beforehand.52

Significantly, in March 2017, the head of AQAP, Qasim al-Raymi, viewed as 

routine the fact that AQAP was collaborating with a range of players on the 

battlefield, mentioning specifically the Islah party, other Salafi groups, and 

various tribes.53

Operational cooperation with other anti-Ansar Allah combatants in the 

field has at times been close, such as reportedly sharing training camps with 

Islah.54 Saudi Arabia, in particular, often air drops weapons and supplies 

to the forces it supports in Yemen, and this imprecise delivery system can 

easily be intercepted by AQAP units operating in close proximity to those 

forces.55 In a number of areas, AQAP has reportedly carried out joint combat 

operations with other actors against the Ansar Allah, such as with the local 

tribes in Al-Bayda’.56 As a selling point for itself, AQAP has often claimed 

to be the most effective counter to the Ansar Allah.57 In fact, many tribes 

reportedly joined with AQAP not for ideological reasons but as a partner 

already having an existing organization on the ground in the fight against the 

Ansar Allah.58 Understandably, Yemeni forces are not anxious to publicize 

any cooperation with AQAP. For example, while the pro-Hadi field commander on the Balah front in Lahij in 2015 was adamant that there were no 

AQAP or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) personnel on his front fighting 

against the Ansar Allah-Saleh coalition, the Ansar Allah claimed that AQAP 

personnel were being killed in the fighting in that sector.59 Tellingly, in late 

July 2017, a photograph appeared in the media of a senior AQAP official in 
17

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Taizz, Harith Al-Izzi, accompanying the pro-Hadi deputy governor as they 

hosted a delegation from the International Red Cross.60

AQAP vs. ISIS

The emergence of ISIS in 2014 after its break with al-Qaeda complicated the 

security situation further in Yemen. Although it has had limited prospects, 

thanks in great part to the already-established position of the local al-Qaeda 

branch in Yemen—traditionally very loyal to the central al-Qaeda leadership—one cannot ignore the presence of ISIS. Competition between AQAP 

and ISIS is said to be particularly fierce in Aden, given the city’s importance 

as a political and economic center.61 However, there have also been reports by 

Yemeni security that AQAP and ISIS have cooperated on occasion at a local 

level, as in attacks against UAE-supported forces in Al Mukalla in mid-2016.62

AQAP has sought to differentiate itself from ISIS, accusing the latter of 

being too hasty to declare other Muslims as infidels and seeing themselves 

as the only true Muslims, as well as shedding Muslim blood too easily, while 

AQAP portrayed itself as constructive and not divisive.63 However, it may be 

easy to exaggerate ISIS’s extremism and AQAP’s supposed moderation, as 

the AQAP in Yemen has engaged in its share of egregious actions, and differences are often a matter of personal competition rather than of ideology. 

Unsurprisingly, membership in jihadist organizations can be fluid, as 

rank-and-file individuals can switch between groups.64 However, media 

reports suggest that ISIS has had a difficult time attracting a following, in 

part hampered by the fact that many of its top leaders in Yemen are Saudis, 

that is, outsiders.65 Moreover, the ISIS leadership reportedly has been fraught 

with internal dissension and discontent.66 The pro-Hadi media also assessed 

that AQAP was stronger and more popular than ISIS and more flexible in 

working with the local administration.67 Nevertheless, despite their differences, AQAP and ISIS could draw closer, especially if the power and prestige 

of the parent ISIS recede in the Iraq-Syria theater, or if both organizations in 

Yemen come under significantly increasing pressure from local adversaries 

or from the United States.

Captain and Crew: AQAP’s Situational Leadership

AQAP has consciously nurtured and highlighted its ties to local society 

both as a recruiting tool and as a force protection mechanism to seek refuge 
18

JSOU Report 18-4

among the people when pressured. As an AQAP leader stressed, AQAP’s 

members in Yemen are mostly locals, so that “we are not hobbled by any 

alienation from society; we are [society’s] sons and part of the social fabric 

of our tribal and popular environment ... We are rooted in the land ... we 

are not outsiders.”68 This organic relationship was a source of strength for 

it afforded AQAP “flexibility and survivability,” allowing it to melt away, as 

it did following its evacuation of Al Mukalla.69 And, as a corollary, AQAP 

reminded Yemenis that one day the UAE would leave but that the nativeborn AQAP would still be around.70 At the same time, the local ties of AQAP 

fighters—as is true of all combatants in Yemen—can make them reluctant to 

fight far from home.71 AQAP also seeks to hug the population tactically by 

operating in proximity to both civilians and other armed groups, and this 

approach can physically insulate AQAP from attacks by making it difficult to 

carry out strikes against it without the risk of considerable collateral damage 

to the surrounding population.

Over the years, AQAP has made a conscious effort to win what it calls 

explicitly “the hearts and minds of the population.” As one AQAP leader 

Khaled Batarfi stressed, “We are not just an armed organization or a combat 

group. Yes, we are all of that but also part of the Muslim population and 

we offer it everything we can in the way of services in the area of social 

and economic services. We also engage in outreach, supervision of markets 

and morals, courts, and reforms in many fields. We see this as our duty.”72

Western news reports confirmed that AQAP did indeed provide some public 

services including medical help during its administration of Al Mukalla.73

And, as it had after the Arab Spring, AQAP continued to view its provision 

of social services as a core element of its appeal so that after it withdrew 

from towns in 2016, it again cited as accomplishments the fact that it reduced 

crime, refurbished schools and hospitals, provided fuel, food, medical services, and electricity to the population, and fixed roads, bridges, and sewers.74

Even as fighting raged in Taizz, with AQAP deeply involved, according to 

sympathetic local Sunnis, they “do not bother [the latter]; rather, they help 

procure water and aid for them.”75

AQAP has played, what is at times, a shadowy role in the country’s political system. To a significant extent, the environment of “managed instability” alluded to earlier made possible AQAP’s informal integration into the 

country’s political system, as AQAP has adapted to this pattern over the 

years. One can trace back the activity of al-Qaeda-linked elements in Yemeni 
19

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

power politics to at least 1994, when Saudi Arabia supported the Sanaa government that during the 1994 Summer War—in which South Yemen sought 

to regain its independence from North Yemen by ending the union that had 

been formed in 1990—used the mujahidin who had fought in Afghanistan 

(and many of whom were still in direct contact with Bin Laden and would 

subsequently organize what came to be al-Qaeda in Yemen). For Riyadh, the 

fact that many prominent southern leaders were veterans of the earlier Marxist regime made the South suspect and a target to be crushed. Accordingly, 

the Saudi-backed Sanaa authorities reportedly provided training, weapons, 

funding, and other support to the mujahidin as part of the overall war effort 

against the South, who engaged in combat operations and ran death squads 

against southern figures, according to former key figures in the Yemeni 

mujahidin who took part.76 At that time, Saleh, and Army Generals Hadi 

(although a southerner he sided with the north) and Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar 

(who has been deputy supreme commander of Yemen’s armed forces and 

vice president during the current civil war) all cooperated with Riyadh and 

with the mujahidin.77 To what degree channels with all those political actors, 

even if only indirect ones, have continued is unclear.

In subsequent years, Saleh mastered a pattern of an ambiguous policy 

toward the jihadists, modulating periodic crackdowns with tolerance.78 AlQaeda served Saleh’s interests, as he benefited from the implicit al-Qaeda 

threat in order to ensure southern obedience. And, as was to be expected, 

Saleh marketed himself to the West as the best prospect for dealing with 

al-Qaeda/AQAP, as well as later against the Ansar Allah when convenient.79

Though lacking a domestic power base, his successor, Interim President 

Hadi, may have sought to continue that pattern. Indeed, in 2013 there was 

even a strong possibility that AQAP and the new Hadi government at one 

point were seriously considering striking a deal for a truce (hudna)—albeit 

a temporary one initially for two months—with AQAP prepared for a more 

extended peace (sulh). Apparently, the mediation committee composed of 

neutral clerics (ulama) had drafted a proposal for the truce, a copy of which 

was subsequently leaked to the Yemeni press. Nasir al-Wuhayshi, as then 

head of AQAP, signed on its behalf. Government representatives had also 

approved the deal in principle, but reneged when Hadi refused to go along—

very likely in consideration of relations with foreign countries—much to 

the dismay of the mediation committee. The sticking point turned out to be 

Hadi’s demand that AQAP disarm, to which the latter had countered that 
20

JSOU Report 18-4

all Yemenis are armed and that AQAP has to live in that environment.80 This 

event is revealing because it indicates that within the mainstream religious 

establishment and the government itself there are many who could envision 

making a deal with AQAP as a valid partner in the political system. In fact, 

in early 2014, a member of Yemen’s parliament publicly suggested that the 

government begin a dialog with AQAP.81 And, 

again, the pro-Hadi media reported in 2016 that 

General al-Ahmar had called for negotiations 

with AQAP in order to avoid further confrontations.82 Symptomatically, AQAP, as well as 

ISIS, appear to have penetrated successfully 

into Aden’s society, as they are reported to hide 

weapons in family homes there, making it all 

the more difficult to root them out.83

Another pattern related to al-Qaeda’s presence over the years has been that of reintegrating its members into society. The reintegration 

policy carried out by such means as a broad-based amnesty for al-Qaeda 

fighters had long been a feature of Yemeni political practice, and one former 

al-Qaeda member described the policy of dealing with the state as “everyone 

reached an acceptance of coexisting with the other.”84 Such mechanisms have 

also been in use for Yemenis returning from detention in Guantanamo with 

whom the government reportedly made an informal deal to not arrest them 

if they agreed not to be active.85 Of course, some mechanism is necessary to 

rehabilitate al-Qaeda militants, although the intent appears often to have 

been a utilitarian one, that is to have a manpower pool available for domestic 

power politics contingencies, leaving such a mechanism vulnerable to abuse. 

This pattern continues to be a feature with authorities in Al Mukalla, for 

example, offering amnesty and a reeducation program for anyone leaving 

AQAP.86 And, in 2017, the governor of Hadramawt, Major General Ahmad 

Bin Barik, an ally of the UAE, released 18 AQAP detainees with more to 

follow in conjunction with the beginning of the month of Ramadan, stating that this was in the cause of social peace and as “an incentive to others 

who are misguided to repent and abandon extremism and terrorism and to 

reintegrate into society.”87

Despite its ideological basis, AQAP can also act out of pragmatism when 

necessary. For example, it is opposed to independence for the South, calling 

This event is revealing 

because it indicates that 

within the mainstream 

religious establishment 

and the government itself there are many who 

could envision making 

a deal with AQAP as 

a valid partner in the 

political system.
21

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

such nationalism counter to Islam and a trait of the pre-Islamic pagan period 

(jahiliya).88 AQAP has often clashed with Hirak, the southern separatist 

movement, in areas controlled by the UAE, which is sympathetic to the 

separatists, while those also opposed to the South’s separatism such as Saudi 

Arabia, Hadi, and Islah may view AQAP’s opposition to the separatists as a 

positive element.89 Nevertheless, indicative of its ability to modify its policy 

at the local level according to concrete interests, elsewhere, as in Lahij province, however, AQAP members are said to also have cooperated with or been 

members of Hirak in the past.90 Even AQAP and the Ansar Allah, despite 

their long history of conflict, can interact out of pragmatism, as in conducting prisoner-of-war exchanges, often through tribal mediation.91 Of course, 

there may be attempts to disguise cooperation between AQAP and other 

groups, as was apparently the case when unescorted shipments of arms were 

inexplicably sent along 700 km of insecure roads in Abyan province and 

predictably were seized by AQAP. The UAE authorities were quick to blame 

Islah and pro-AQAP elements within the Hadi government for a deliberate 

transfer of weapons to AQAP.92 Supposedly, according to UAE sources, Hadi, 

knowing that AQAP would strike at the UAE and its clients, was using that 

group to indirectly exact revenge against the UAE following a confrontation 

between the latter’s clients and Hadi’s over control of the Aden airport.93

The tangled political and cobelligerence relationships, fluid alliances, and 

cross-cutting loyalties involving AQAP and the multiple roles that figures 

can play, are indicative of the degree to which AQAP may have infiltrated 

the country’s social, political, and economic life. 

Typically, AQAP members, even local leaders, may have multiple roles. 

Shaykh al-Dhahab, who was killed in a January 2017 U.S. raid, was a prominent AQAP figure, but also governor of Al Bayda’ province, a tribal chief, 

commander of the 117th Brigade, and a senior official in the Al-Rashad political party. Most recently he reportedly had been cooperating with the Islah 

party and with other elements of the coalition with logistics and finance.94

And, a senior Yemen Army officer insisted that al-Dhahab was not part of 

AQAP, suggesting that there might have been some confusion with some 

of his relatives, insisting that al-Dhahab was cooperating with the Hadi 

government.95

Another case in point is that even individuals whom the United States 

has designated as AQAP supporters have been prominent figures of the Arab 

Coalition-led team. For example, Nayif Saleh al-Qaysi and Abd al-Wahhab 
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JSOU Report 18-4

al-Humayqani are on the U.S. Treasury’s list as senior AQAP officials 

involved in financial and operational activities. However, highlighting the 

intertwined threads of connections with AQAP, both are powerful tribal 

leaders. Al-Qaysi was also one of President Hadi’s advisers and a member of 

the coalition team during negotiations in Riyadh and Kuwait.96 Al-Humayqani, for his part, represented his party in talks in Riyadh to craft a new 

Yemeni political coalition in 2016.97 In 2017, he led a delegation of Salafi and 

military personalities to the Saudi border area to commemorate an earlier 

Salafi defeat.98 Other figures in the coalition added to the U.S. terrorist list 

have included a prominent cleric and figure in the Islah party, Abdallah alAhdal, and Al Hassan Ali Abkar, a powerful tribal shaykh in Al-Jawf and 

also an Islah party official, who resides in Saudi Arabia. Invariably, not only 

the Islah party but much of the pro-coalition public opinion has expressed 

indignation, accusing the United States of lacking evidence of being in favor 

of the Ansar Allah, and of being hostile to the coalition, while treating the 

affected individuals as heroes.99

Finally, to illustrate this phenomenon over time one can look at Tariq alFadli, paramount chief of the Al Fadl tribal confederation. He was a former 

mujahid in Afghanistan who had collaborated with Bin Laden and had led a 

mujahid unit cooperating with Saudi Arabia during the 1994 civil war. Later, 

he was said to have helped set up a training camp for al-Qaeda in Yemen.100

Still later, he was accused of having facilitated AQAP’s takeover of Abyan 

province, and opposed the tribal committees being formed within his tribe 

backed by Hadi’s, labeling them “mercenaries” in the service of the Americans and “puppets of the occupation.”101 By late 2012, clashes had erupted 

between the tribal committees and his followers, and al-Fadli was eased out 

of the province by the Hadi government through mediation. However, Hadi, 

who was from the same tribe as al-Fadli and shared family ties, treated him 

relatively leniently by only placing him under house arrest for a time in a 

seaside villa.102 Escaping from his detention in June 2014, he then reportedly 

adhered formally to AQAP.103 A 2016 prisoner exchange between the Ansar 

Allah and AQAP included two of al-Fadli’s sons, members of AQAP.104 In 

early 2017, al-Fadli suggested that AQAP and ISIS be included in a new coalition government to end the war and that former President Saleh’s son be 

made president as a compromise candidate.105

Likewise, indicative of the often intertwined economic relationships 

including AQAP, in 2016 the U.S. Treasury placed the Al Omgy Brothers 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Money Exchange network on its sanctions list for dealings with AQAP in 

Yemen, although it is an important cog in the local economy with relationships with the Hadi government, the UAE administration, and ordinary 

Yemenis, as well as having had unavoidable dealings with AQAP-controlled 

entities.106 Yemenis who were part of the Arab Coalition were supportive of 

the firm and were critical of the U.S. decision.107

Head Winds: Critical Vulnerabilities in AQAP’s 

Ideological Vision

At the same time, AQAP also has critical vulnerabilities that can be exploited 

by adversaries. AQAP must maintain good relations with the tribes who 

could prove formidable armed adversaries. AQAP’s ideology and its inherent agenda and harshness can alienate tribal elites and the population it 

needs to recruit, move through tribal territory, and shield its presence from 

government or foreign forces.

AQAP’s vision for politics and society represents an inherent dilemma 

for it in interacting with the country’s other political actors. The application 

of Sharia law and of rigid social mores has been a basic element of AQAP’s 

platform from the onset and it instituted its social program in the territories 

it controlled after the Arab Spring, but the popular response had often been 

anything but positive and likely contributed to the tribes’ hostility and to 

AQAP’s defeat. At times, AQAP met with armed resistance, as in the case 

of its attempt to suppress a “sorcerer” in Rida in 2012, which led to a lethal 

shootout between the sorcerer’s followers and the AQAP enforcers.108 Perhaps 

recognizing the need to bend to reality on some issues, AQAP compromised 

on the presence of the traditional and ubiquitous addictive stimulant narcotic 

called khat, or “qat” in Arabic. In Al-Bayda’ province, for example, AQAP 

arrested, among others, three khat sellers not for their trade but for providing 

the Army with information, while in Jaar AQAP did not ban the substance 

altogether but only relegated its sale to the edge of town.109

As AQAP’s amir, or governor, in Abyan province, Jalal Bal’idi al-Marqashi acknowledged in one town that his organization had tried to negotiate 

an agreement with the local tribal committees, but the stumbling block had 

been AQAP’s insistence on the implementation of the Sharia, which the tribal 

council had rejected categorically, asserting “We cannot apply the Sharia in 

the town!”110 Local people reportedly often grumbled that punishments were 
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JSOU Report 18-4

handed out arbitrarily, without adequate investigations.111 The imposition of 

the Sharia to replace the more flexible and familiar traditional tribal law at 

times also created more than its share of armed conflict with the tribesmen 

subjected to it.112

How effectively AQAP adapted its lessons learned from its earlier Arab 

Spring experience is debatable. On one hand, AQAP realized that it had 

become bogged down in administration and attempts to set up an “Islamic 

state” during the first time without, as it later assessed, engendering “a big 

popular response from the local population,” whereas when it returned in 

2015, AQAP wanted to involve locals in the administration, according to 

AQAP’s governor of Al Mukalla.113 As the AQAP leadership claimed, administration this time was placed at least formally in the hands of a local Popular 

Council, although AQAP retained control of the police and continued to 

provide what it called “advice.”114

In some instances, AQAP appeared to be more flexible the second time 

in terms of social policy. Thus, when it retook the town of Jaar in 2015, 

AQAP apparently was not as strict in imposing its social mores as it had 

been earlier and, for example, reportedly few attended Friday prayers while 

women in the market did not have to wear a veil.115Although it again tried 

to ban the use of khat, AQAP apparently ultimately relented and only levied 

a tax on it.116 However, the differences may only have been relative. According to the AQAP governor, Al Mukalla’s city administration again applied 

Sharia punishments.117 In fact, whenever it was again in control of a town, 

AQAP banned clothes mannequins, removed women from ads, stoned them 

for adultery, shut down alcohol stills and brothels, introduced its own curriculum in schools, flogged those who listened to music, killed a popular 

female folk singer at a wedding party, and executed individuals convicted 

of “immorality.”118 Likewise, in parts of Taizz under its sway, AQAP built an 

administrative substructure, battled against the Ansar Allah-Saleh forces, 

instituted its own courts, carried out police functions and, characteristically, reportedly invaded the local hospital to prevent the mixing of sexes.119

In particular, AQAP has methodically demolished or blown up saints’ 

shrines—a traditional element of Yemeni religious history and practice.120

AQAP has also executed clerics who have challenged its control, and while 

it controlled Al Mukalla it arrested and tortured journalists and lawyers 

who were critical.121
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Operationally, AQAP is vulnerable to air power, especially once it operates outside mountain areas and in open terrain with limited air defense 

capabilities and largely passive air defense measures. Nevertheless, AQAP 

has some capabilities that can threaten at least Arab Coalition aircraft, given 

the coalition’s limited skills, as evidenced by the shoot down of a UAE fighter 

aircraft by an SA-7 shoulder-fired missile, and, at a minimum, can degrade 

the effectiveness of adversary air operations by forcing aircraft to fly at higher 

altitudes and not linger.122

Operational security is another vulnerability; AQAP over the years has 

been penetrated—even at a high level—by agents working for foreign intelligence services who were able to provide, in particular, support for U.S. drone 

strikes.123 Although a number of such agents were caught and eliminated, the 

security failure still made AQAP look ineffective and may still be a problem, 

especially given the group’s integration within society and uneasy proximity to cobelligerent forces in the field. Moreover, personnel reportedly are 

often lax about adhering to AQAP’s security regulations on where to shop, 

how to secure a cell phone, or about minimizing the number of personnel 

in a single vehicle.124

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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Chapter 3. Safe Harbor: AQAP’s 

Objectives in Yemen’s Most Recent 

Round of Conflict

Background on AQAP in Yemen’s Turbulent Politics

Jihadists have long had a significant presence in Yemen, with many veterans of Afghanistan either settling back into society or continuing their 

activity in various jihadist groups, especially those affiliated with al-Qaeda. 

The present AQAP organization resulted from the January 2009 merger of alQaeda’s branches in Yemen (itself an amalgam of groups) and Saudi Arabia, 

while retaining the original name. Al-Qaeda in Yemen was always close to 

mother al-Qaeda, a term that refers to the first generation of al-Qaeda in 

Afghanistan. Not least because of the personal ties that many leading Yemeni 

figures, including Nasir al-Wuhayshi (killed in 2015) who became the longtime leader of the local al-Qaeda branch, had developed fighting alongside 

Osama Bin Laden, who then sent al-Wuhayshi back to Yemen to become the 

leader of the local al-Qaeda branch. As another prominent AQAP leader, 

Fahd al-Qus al-Awlaqi (killed 2012), stressed, “we manage and coordinate 

[strategy] with the leadership of the mujahidin,” that is with al-Qaeda’s central leadership.125 Qasim al-Raymi, AQAP’s military commander since 2009, 

who became AQAP’s leader when he succeeded al-Wuhayshi in 2015, also 

had personal experience fighting under Bin Laden in Afghanistan. And, 

AQAP has always maintained an outlook of being part of a broader jihadist 

movement in which Yemen was only one of multiple fronts in a single war, 

considering itself as one of al-Qaeda’s regional armies that would converge 

on Jerusalem one day and set up a single Islamic state—a caliphate—in which 

society would be ruled according to the Sharia.126 While this relationship has 

diminished under Ayman al-Zawahiri, who lacks the combat experience, 

charisma, and stature of his predecessor, AQAP nevertheless remained loyal 

to mother al-Qaeda when the split with ISIS occurred in 2014. 

Mother al-Qaeda figures have always viewed Yemen as a favorable operational area, given the country’s rugged terrain, long open borders, conservative tribal society, experienced indigenous jihadist leadership, weak 
28

JSOU Report 18-4

government, divided national military, and dismal economic conditions. 

However, Osama Bin Laden saw Yemen primarily as a refuge and reservoir 

for other fronts rather than as a battlefield, as he believed that the Yemeni 

jihadists lacked the administrative capabilities and financial resources to 

wage a successful insurgency and establish and run a government.127 Many 

in the local al-Qaeda, however, argued for a more active mission, since the 

mujahidin would be able to organize and mass in areas outside government 

control, making Yemen “appropriate to adopt the idea of the jihad ... and the 

ideal location for the mujahidin at present.”128 As an intermediate objective, 

AQAP believed it had a mission to first overthrow the government in Yemen 

for cooperating with the United States, counter the Shia/Iranian influence 

locally, institute the Sharia in Yemen, and overthrow the monarchies in the 

Arabian Peninsula, which it accused of facilitating the United States’ presence and operations.129

AQAP has long courted Yemen’s tribes, viewing them as vital for success 

and as a potential ally, as was the case with its past leader al-Wuhayshi, who 

in 2009 appealed to the fiercely-independent tribes to “fight for your religion 

and for the honor of your morals, protect those who seek shelter with you, 

and bring back those glorious pages of victory and the jihad.”130 In fact, 

Anwar al-Awlaki had identified the tribes as key to the jihad.131 Understandably, the tribes can have a direct impact—positive or negative—on vital warfighting functions for AQAP, such as mobility (tribes control territory and 

roads), force protection (tribes can provide refuge), intelligence, and logistics. 

In particular, AQAP recruits come largely from the tribes, and it is not 

without reason that the tribes in Yemen are commonly known as “the stockroom of fighters.”132 Individual members of a tribe may join AQAP as a means 

to protect tribal interests, although at times tribes have also been divided 

over ties with AQAP.133 Although tribal identity is said to still be stronger for 

individuals than loyalty to AQAP, nevertheless AQAP has at times sought 

to target the tribal loyalty of youth, but thereby threaten and compete with 

tribal leaders. In 2010, for example, an AQAP communique appealed to tribal 

youth, arguing that “if some of your shaykhs have abandoned your ancestors’ 

tradition of helping the victim and honoring the guest, water cannot wash 

away the shame, and history will not forget that. The only hope is for you to 

wash away that shame with blood,” and this focus on youth has continued.134

While AQAP can exploit tensions between ordinary tribesmen and their 

tribal notables, especially if the latter do not deliver the benefits that tribal 
29

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

followers expect, that is a risky policy that could turn the tribal leadership 

against AQAP, as it has on occasion.135

AQAP has often been able to find refuge among the tribes whenever it 

finds itself under pressure—what the Yemeni government in the past has condemned as AQAP’s taking advantage of the “rural population’s generosity.”136

Tribes have long served as a mechanism to reintegrate AQAP members into 

society, as traditional tribal loyalties have often trumped political allegiances 

or ideological differences in dealing with individuals.137 As even a simple 

soldier in the Hizam Amni recognized, “No one and certainly not the tribes 

feel a responsibility to stand up to members of AQAP. Whenever there has 

been a security operation, all the residents of a village stick together.”138 Of 

course, there have been exceptions, where the level of ideological commitment can split even a single family, as in the case of an AQAP commander, 

Shaykh Tariq al-Dhahab and his brother, who were killed in 2012 by their 

own half-brother and his followers who sided with the government, although 

ideological differences, as is often the case in Yemen, may have been a cover 

for personal rivalry.139 More commonly, following the government’s defeat of 

AQAP in the South in 2012, many AQAP personnel returned to their tribal 

homes around Ibb at the request of AQAP’s legal officer to the tribal leadership.140 Likewise, it was not surprising that after AQAP’s defeat in Abyan and 

Shabwa in 2012, some of its personnel reportedly were able to simply melt 

back into their own tribes or even join the local Tribal Committees militia 

for protection.141 As a tribal shaykh stressed, “Those who are killing or being 

killed are all our children, whether they are misguided or innocent,” and 

promised that anyone who left AQAP would be allowed to return home at 

their families’ responsibility. However, anyone who refused to do so was to 

leave the tribal area.142 A tribe can also simply deny that there is any AQAP 

presence in its territory, as was the case with the al-Maraqisha tribal confederation in February 2017.143

Not surprisingly, AQAP has sought to build political and economic links 

with the tribes in order to solidify its local relationships. In many ways, 

AQAP has integrated itself into the local conflict-negotiations cycle of political life, with tribes accepting them as a player with whom they will deal. 

For example, a tribe mediated between AQAP and another tribe in Abyan 

province so that AQAP could recover the bodies of its members killed in 

a clash with the first tribe over control of a checkpoint, with AQAP thus 

functioning de facto within the tribal system as a quasi-tribe.144 At times, 
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JSOU Report 18-4

established political actors have supported a dialog with AQAP through the 

tribes, implicitly considering it a legitimate element in the Yemeni system. 

For example, tribes have mediated between AQAP and the Yemeni Army, 

not least because some of their tribesmen belonged to the Army and wished to 

avoid casualties.145 In some cases, AQAP 

and the tribes have cooperated militarily, 

as in the case of AQAP’s takeover of an 

Army base in Shabwa province in early 

2015, with the local tribe negotiating the 

surrender of the base to AQAP.146 AQAP 

has also worked to create smuggling networks and other commercial ties 

with the tribes when it had control of several cities, and some of these links 

and revenue sources may have continued even after AQAP’s withdrawal 

from those cities.147 Likewise, when AQAP took over Al Mukalla in 2015, it 

shared benefits with the local tribes, such as allowing them to replace the 

oil company guards.148

At the same time, AQAP realized that the tribes are not to be trifled with, 

and tribal opposition had been one of the key elements in defeating AQAP 

in 2012. However, in the current dynamic wartime situation, maintaining 

good relations with the tribes may not always be easy for AQAP. In other 

words, AQAP is not often seen as a snake preying on Yemeni society rather, 

it is one of the heads of the hydra representative of the larger Yemeni body 

politic. Taming its bite requires a larger social bargain to restrain it since 

under current conflict circumstances it has the power to organically regenerate its head every time it is cut off.

Illustrating AQAP’s understanding of the need not to alienate the tribes, 

when the Al Bu Bakr Bin Dahha tribe in 2016 accused AQAP of killing one 

of its shaykhs and his retinue and began revenge killings, AQAP was able to 

convince the tribe to accept an investigation and ruling by an impartial panel 

which eventually ruled that the tribesmen had been killed by an improvised 

explosive device (IED) that AQAP had planted that had been intended for the 

Army, not for the tribe. AQAP accepted responsibility and paid compensation for the tribal deaths, in line with tribal protocol, ending the matter.149

Likewise, when ISIS attacked the Sulban military base near Aden in December 2016, a number of recruits from a single tribe were killed. In response, 

that tribe pressured AQAP to take a stand condemning ISIS, which AQAP 

In many ways, AQAP has 

integrated itself into the local 

conflict-negotiations cycle of 

political life, with tribes accepting them as a player with 

whom they will deal. 
31

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

did in order to placate the powerful BaKazim tribe.150 In another case, a tribe 

Al-Bayda’ expelled AQAP and forced it to redeploy to another area after the 

latter had detained a man and his wife from that tribe.151 Tribal values, such 

as revenge on behalf of a member, can run deep, as was the case when a tribe 

waited six months until there was an opportunity to avenge the death of one 

of its members at the hands of AQAP.152 In fact, the governor of Hadramawt 

province appealed to revenge to incite a tribe against AQAP.153 Although 

uncommon, a tribe—as was the case with the Jaadina tribe in Abyan, the 

first to do so in 2016, after a convocation of the shaykhs—may decide to ban 

any member who joins AQAP, which can be an effective counter to AQAP 

recruiting, as it removes tribal protection the individual’s blood can be shed 

with impunity with no threat of tribal revenge, although how strictly that 

was followed up is not clear.154

Tribes control their territory and can exclude access to AQAP, as was the 

case when several tribes in Shabwa decided to do so after a tribal meeting 

and took upon themselves responsibility for enforcing the agreement in their 

area.155 Competition over control of territory can also lead to friction between 

tribes and AQAP. In Abyan province for example, rivalry over control of 

the town of Lawdar led to the local tribe’s forcing AQAP to leave the area 

in February 2017.156 AQAP and tribes, including the tribally-based Hizam 

Amni forces, can also compete over territory for income, as with control of 

checkpoints.157 Confrontations can develop into open fighting, as when tribes 

in Shabwa province attacked and blew up AQAP’s headquarters in Azzan 

in 2016 over a dispute.158

AQAP’s Safe Harbor Strategy

AQAP has accumulated an impressive arsenal, profiting from the disintegration of parts of the Yemeni Army when the civil war erupted in 2015 with 

the coalition’s entry, acquiring, for example, the depots of two Army brigades, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, multiple launch rocket 

systems, and artillery (up to 180mm).159 AQAP also has drones, as well as a 

night-fighting capability, as shown in a video depicting an attack on a special 

forces compound in Hadramawt in June 2017.160

It is difficult to determine the number of AQAP personnel, in part because 

of part-time auxiliaries and sympathizers, as local officials have acknowledged.161 However, the Saudi media estimated that in 2014 there were between 
32

JSOU Report 18-4

400 and 450 AQAP members in Yemeni prisons, who probably qualified 

as cadres, and all of whom apparently were set free during the subsequent 

fighting.162 No doubt there were addition recruits over time, and some sources 

estimated that during the period that AQAP controlled the city of Al Mukalla 

in 2015-16, it was able to train more than 2,000 individuals—many of whom 

may have been attracted for economic reasons due the high rates of unemployment rather than by ideology—which would likely reduce their level 

of personal commitment.163 Traditionally, al-Qaeda’s leadership has always 

viewed the younger generation as a focus of effort for recruitment calculating this as the section of the population that would be most likely to be 

responsive to its appeals.164 One of the consequences of the civil war was that 

significant numbers of prisoners, including many belonging to AQAP, were 

released. For example, in the Taizz area, many members of AQAP escaped 

when Islah party fighters seized police headquarters in August 2015.165 Likewise, AQAP freed some 300 prisoners being held in Al Mukalla when they 

took control of the city in 2015.166 And, AQAP was able to overrun the prison 

in Jaar in mid-2016 and freed its members being detained.167 AQAP losses 

are hard to determine. Saudi Arabia’s military spokesman claimed that in 

the two years of the civil war, AQAP had lost 800 of its members in Yemen, 

although it was not clear whether that included the latter’s losses in fighting 

against the Ansar Allah-Saleh forces.168

AQAP appears to have instituted a simple but functional logistics system 

with adequate equipment and supplies, largely by relying on the local economy. As money is the sinew of war, even for a jihadist organization, AQAP 

was careful to build up a war chest by looting local banks when it controlled 

parts of the country in 2012, and it seized the Central Bank’s Al Mukalla 

branch when it took that city again in 2015.169 While it had control of Al 

Mukalla, AQAP could also count on revenues from the oil trade and shipping duties which amounts to about $2 million a day.170 In addition, AQAP 

was able to extort money from large firms such as the national oil company 

and private communications companies.171

AQAP has shown itself to be tactically proficient both in the offense and 

the defense, with a capability to engage in a spectrum of operations ranging 

from small-scale hit-and-run raids employing only one or several operatives to larger more complex operations involving dozens of fighters, or even 

sustained conventional combat using combined arms. For example, when 

it took the city of Azzan in early 2016 (admittedly in a road march, without 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

opposition), the advancing AQAP task force consisted of over 400 fighters 

and included eight armored vehicles.172 AQAP appears to have better tactical 

intelligence than its adversaries in the South enabling it to mount operations 

using the element of surprise, penetrating even government security units, 

while its local personnel know the physical and human terrain and often 

have tribal and family ties. In terms of force structure, AQAP has adhered 

to the more flexible Vietnamese school which focuses on conventional and 

guerrilla forces coexisting and complementing each other rather than following Mao’s sequential doctrine in which once conventional forces can 

operate guerrilla forces are no longer necessary. 

AQAP has exhibited effective command and control with its ability to 

convince subordinates to comply, as shown by the disciplined evacuation 

from positions in Abyan province in compliance with orders from AQAP’s 

senior commanders to do so following an agreement with the local police.173

And, to move significant numbers of men and equipment at short notice out 

of a city or a region in an orderly fashion, as AQAP has done routinely, is no 

mean accomplishment. Significantly, a substantial number of AQAP fighters 

trained and fought in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Somalia. More than just 

numbers, what such returning veterans contribute to the Yemeni theater is 

their recent combat experience against modern conventional forces, as well 

as cohesion forged in battle. In particular, Yemenis fighting with al-Qaeda 

and ISIS in the Syrian-Iraqi theater have returned in succeeding waves. Some, 

such as one batch of 150 fighters in March 2014, returned home specifically 

citing their not wanting to have to take sides when the ISIS-Jabhat al-Nusra/

al-Qaeda split occurred.174 Moreover, when the Ansar Allah and Saleh went 

on the offensive in 2015, AQAP reportedly put out a call to its members (most 

of whom were said to have sided with the pro-Al-Zawahiri Jabhat al-Nusra) 

to return home from Syria to confront “the enemy at the gates” (al-aduww 

al-sa’il).175 Yemeni sources confirmed the arrival of fighters from Syria soon 

thereafter.176 Returnees have continued to come, especially following the 

recent jihadist reverses in Syria and Iraq.177

As for intangible factors, Clausewitz’s moral factors, AQAP appears to 

have developed a noticeable degree of cohesion, sealed for many by a religious 

purpose and a bay’a, “pledge of allegiance,” and buttressed at times by tribal 

or regional homogeneity of units. While not immune to factionalism, as is 

common in Yemeni society, AQAP cadres appear to be committed, which 

is an important element in maintaining discipline and cohesion among the 
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JSOU Report 18-4

rank-and-file, and promotion seems to be largely by merit. AQAP’s willingness to address, absorb lessons learned, and adapt, as suggested by its references to failures during the Arab Spring period, is a strength, although its 

ideology limits potential changes. 

The Maritime Facet of AQAP Strategy

AQAP and its al-Qaeda precursors have also long integrated a maritime 

component into their overall strategy by taking advantage of Yemen’s poorlycontrolled seacoast of almost 1,400 miles and over 100 islands along busy 

international waterways. The deputy leader of what was then called Al-Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen, Abu Sufyan al-Azdi (Said al-Shihri), 

highlighted the impact his theater could have on al-Qaeda's overall strategy, 

citing such factors as “the geographical significance of this region, especially 

the maritime aspect, and the importance of the Bab Al-Mandab which, if 

we dominate—God willing—and return to Islamic control, would be a great 

victory with a global impact. The Bab [al-Mandab] would thereby be closed 

off and the Jews would be throttled because it is through the latter that 

America provides them with support, by way of the Red Sea.”178 Al-Shihri 

underlined that the mujahidin in the two adjoining theaters of Arabia and 

the Horn of Africa could also threaten the sea lanes used for the world’s oil 

supply.179 This outlook is indicative of AQAP’s intent even if it does not have 

the capability to do so. However, more realistically, over the years, AQAP 

and its precursors have used the sea both as means to launch attacks on shipping (both military such as the USS COLE in 2000 and against commercial 

ships) and against shore-based targets, as well as an avenue of approach 

and supply route for its combat operations on land. In addition, AQAP has 

benefited economically from maritime activity whether by collecting port 

fees or through smuggling.180

AQAP’s Information Element of Power 

AQAP’s energetic information effort must be included as part of its combat 

power as non-lethal fires complementing kinetic operations by engaging 

in a war of ideas and seeking to win hearts and minds to ensure internal 

cohesion. In addition, the public media is a convenient method to communicate with one’s own dispersed or clandestine forces. AQAP targets a 

variety of audiences both local and international, whether consolidating the 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

loyalty of existing members, trying to win over new supporters, or undermining the morale of adversaries and isolating them from the population. 

While it may be difficult to assess the effectiveness of such efforts, the range 

of media that AQAP employs is impressive. 

AQAP posts official communiques online as 

events warrant and disseminates material on 

central al-Qaeda fora, although in recent years 

international efforts have managed to severely 

limit their number. AQAP is characterized by 

the skillful use of communications techniques 

that exploit familiar and widely-accepted religious, national, and tribal themes and symbols, 

and has a quick reaction time to events. Its own, 

Madad News Agency, active since 2010, publishes local bulletins and official weekly news 

in their magazine Al-Masra (which deals with 

broader al-Qaeda issues too) online—although it seems to have stopped 

in July 2017—as well as video and audio products. AQAP also has taken 

advantage of the social media, using Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other 

vehicles. As al-Qaeda has done virtually everywhere else, AQAP also relies 

on poetry, a traditional means in Arab society, to diffuse its message.181

Anashid (motivational chants) are particularly worrisome because they are 

popular among children.182 In areas where the group has control, AQAP also 

uses field mobile kiosks and face-to-face contacts, whether with sermons in 

mosques or outreach lectures. In fact, pro-AQAP clerics are said to officiate 

at mosques in Aden and Lahij Province, although it is often difficult to verify 

such accusations hurled by adversaries.183 AQAP’s Ramadan contest in Taizz 

in 2017, which centered on summarizing a given book, proved an effective 

recruitment and propaganda tool, and showed AQAP’s good knowledge of 

its audience by providing an AK-47 as first prize.

Al-Qaeda spokesmen are often sticklers for using the more formal literary Arabic, or fusha, but AQAP are more attuned to local sensitivities and 

are cognizant that using the colloquial language in its video products can 

be more effective in reaching people, as was the case with Yemeni military 

thinker al-Anisi in his video lectures (even if he excused himself for using 

foreign and colloquial terms). AQAP media also focus on combat operations both to motivate sympathetic audiences and undermine enemy morale, 

AQAP targets a variety of audiences both 

local and international, 

whether consolidating 

the loyalty of existing 

members, trying to win 

over new supporters, or 

undermining the morale 

of adversaries and 

isolating them from the 

population.
36

JSOU Report 18-4

using technically-proficient combat photography stills and videos (including 

sophisticated multiple cameras and head-cams). AQAP has an outreach effort 

to foreign audiences, especially with its English-language Inspire magazine 

(which also has an Arabic edition), seeking to encourage lone wolf attacks 

abroad. Conversely, a Saudi journalist was critical of what he characterized 

as the pro-coalition Yemeni media’s slow and feeble response to terrorism.184

Tribal Politics as Military Capability: Taking Cities, Fighting, 

and Not Fighting Battles

According to prominent AQAP figure Khalid Batarfi, his organization has 

adapted its operational art against the Ansar Allah depending on the character of a particular front in Yemen, with conventional operations in Abyan 

province, military operations in the urban terrain in Aden and Taizz, and 

guerrilla operations in Al-Bayda’ province.185 More specifically, as an AQAP 

situational report from the field noted in November 2016, “recently, the focus 

is against the Houthis’ field commanders.” Having formed hit squads specifically targeting Ansar Allah commanders, AQAP boasted of having killed 

eight commanders during a single month.186 And, since the start of the 2015 

conflict, AQAP has also offered a reward of 20 kg in gold to anyone who 

kills or captures the Ansar Allah leader, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, or Saleh.187

In particular, during the course of the civil war, AQAP has faced the 

option of whether or not to take control of territory and cities. AQAP’s decision in 2015–16 to do so appears to have come about as a target of opportunity 

following the collapse of pro-Hadi forces, and from a desire to prevent the 

Ansar Allah-Saleh from taking over, although in most of the areas affected 

it was a case of Army units stationed there crumbling or declaring their 

loyalty to Saleh rather than of Ansar Allah forces advancing. And, typically, 

this vacuum made taking control easy. In the case of the town of Azzan, for 

example, AQAP took control in less than an hour without firing a shot.188 In 

the event, AQAP seized a number of cities in the South early in the civil war, 

including Al Mukalla, Azzan, Zinjibar, and Jaar. Yet, within a year, AQAP 

had withdrawn from those same cities. In fact, in the case of Al Mukalla, 

local and provincial officials reportedly preferred an AQAP takeover, at least 

temporarily, to one by the Ansar Allah, and apparently even Riyadh saw that 

option as the lesser of two evils.189
37

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

A closer look at two engagements can shed light on AQAP’s strategy 

and on the broader military balance between AQAP and its local adversaries—one well-publicized (the retaking of the city of Al Mukalla by the 

Arab Coalition and its local allies) and one not publicized (the Battle of 

Al-Masini). These two events shed considerable light on the military and 

political-military challenges and interests at play that continue to have a 

bearing on the fight against AQAP.

Al Mukalla: The Battle That Never Was 

In the case of Al Mukalla, the UAE claimed that as the result of a fierce battle 

waged by UAE-trained local forces supported by intensive air cover, planning, logistics, and intelligence by the UAE in April 2016, AQAP had been 

driven out from the city that the latter had taken the previous year. According to official reports, over 800 AQAP fighters had been killed in a single 

day during the fighting, or as some even claimed, within a 12-hour period, 

or “within the first few hours,” with the loss of only 10 coalition personnel.190

However, the number of dead AQAP may have been decided arbitrarily by 

the coalition even before the operation began, as a communique it issued just 

as the operation kicked off already contained that information.191 The Governor of Hadramawt province also reported that over 60 AQAP fighters had 

been captured and that over 300 more wanted to surrender.192 Shortly thereafter, the commander of the 1st Military District, responsible for Hadramawt, 

announced that combat operations against AQAP were finished, declaring 

“victory,” as the Army had “achieved its objectives.”193

The UAE’s local allies and the UAE media, at the time and much later, 

with much fanfare depicted the operation as having “broken the back of 

terrorism and of the extremist groups” and of having “shaken [AQAP’s] 

foundations,” and portrayed the operation as “the biggest blow to terrorism 

in years,” and even much later the UAE-financed press in Yemen would 

continue to refer to it as “a resounding victory.”194 UAE officials were quoted 

in the UAE press claiming that this had been al-Qaeda’s single greatest loss 

of personnel ever.195 The vice president of the UAE, Shaykh Mohammed 

bin Rashid, would even boast to Arab audiences that killing more than 800 

AQAP fighters had foiled the latter’s plans to threaten the Gulf Cooperation 

Council countries themselves.196
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JSOU Report 18-4

In particular, the coalition was quick to use this operation to counter 

criticism about their neglecting AQAP in its objectives, with the UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash challenging critics: “Where 

are those who claimed that the coalition is not targeting al-Qaeda?”197 The 

UAE, in particular, has continued to highlight Al Mukalla often by means 

of its local clients—as evidence of its key role against AQAP.198 Saudi Arabia, 

which probably was not involved in a significant way in what was a UAE area 

of operations, nevertheless was anxious to be associated with what could be 

presented as a victory.199 For example, a retired Saudi officer who often acts 

as an unofficial spokesman highlighted that it was the Saudi Land Forces’ 

deputy commander who had planned the operation, while another Saudi 

general was said to have been the UAE field commander’s deputy.200 However, 

the Saudi media at times was hard-pressed to “spin” the story, and in one 

instance while the headline talked about 800 AQAP dead and Saudi special 

forces participating, the accompanying story quoted local sources as saying 

that there had been no clashes and carried no mention of Saudi forces.201

AQAP, for its part, countered that it had lost fewer than 10 personnel 

in the entire operation.202 Significantly, the daily program on UAE television devoted to the war in Yemen “Al-Hazm wa’l-Amal,” the following day 

repeatedly showed the same footage of only a couple of bombed buildings 

in Al Mukalla, and of tribal militia entering the city unopposed in pickup 

trucks, but no enemy corpses, prisoners, destroyed equipment, or any other 

evidence of recent fighting. Pro-coalition media at times admitted that there 

had been no fighting and that the Army and local militias had entered the 

city only after AQAP had departed.203

Moreover, the official version of Al Mukalla also conflicts with the usual 

combat pattern between AQAP and coalition-supported Yemeni forces, 

which typically consists of small-scale firefights rather than major engagements, with limited casualties on either side, as in one clash that the procoalition media characterized as a “fierce battle,” even though only two 

AQAP fighters were killed.204 Likewise, claimed successes such the procoalition press report in February 2017 that “a spectacular operation” by UAE 

helicopters against a training camp had allegedly killed 60 AQAP fighters, 

are often uncorroborated and probably are to be discounted.205 Instead, in 

the case of Al Mukalla, as some of local officials acknowledged to the media, 

AQAP’s withdrawal had come about through negotiations mediated by tribal 

notables, not due to combat, for reasons that will be addressed later.206
39

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Al-Masini: A Battle That Was

On the other hand, one battle that did occur in Wadi, Al-Masini, west of 

Al Mukalla in November 2016 suggested a considerably more problematic 

coalition combat balance with AQAP. This time, the UAE-backed forces 

and media claimed that a task force composed of local special forces, supported by UAE helicopters, killed about 30 AQAP fighters, took prisoners, and destroyed equipment, with a pro-UAE source characterizing the 

engagement as a “massive military campaign” that resulted in wiping out 

the enemy without taking any friendly casualties.207 However, another coalition account admitted that only six AQAP fighters had been killed in an 

hour-long clash.208 What was more telling was an after-action report of the 

engagement published in the (pro-Qatar) South Yemen press. The article 

was based on recollections by veterans of the battle that was indicative of 

the continuing shortcomings of the coalition’s war effort. According to this 

version, the lightly-armed special forces were sent in by their commanders 

who told them the operation would be an easy one, and that UAE airpower 

would have already cleared away much of the resistance. However, the reality 

was that they were without adequate reconnaissance, intelligence, and any 

real plan. The commanders remained well to the rear. When they arrived, 

they were surprised to find themselves trapped in a valley at the foot of 

mountains and unable to exit their armored vehicles due to intense enemy 

fire. Timely air support was not forthcoming despite repeated calls and did 

not arrive until late in the day, at which time the troops tried to move forward 

under air cover, but were pinned down by AQAP fighters raining down a 

hail of fire from the mountain. Although promised reinforcements never 

came, eventually the special forces were able to extricate themselves, albeit 

with difficulty, leaving behind their dead and wounded, as well as at least 

one prisoner, whom AQAP executed the following month.209 AQAP, for its 

part, later released a video, showing AQAP still in possession of the battlefield, and maintained that the fighting had lasted two days and that it had 

lost only five personnel to more than 30 for the attacking task force, and 

displayed some of the latter’s pickup trucks and U.S.-built armored vehicles 

that AQAP had destroyed.210
40

JSOU Report 18-4

Why Did AQAP Leave the Cities Without a Fight?

Significantly, as seen with Al Mukalla, AQAP withdrew from all the cities 

it had taken recently—Lawdar, Azzan, Jaar, Shaqra, and Zinjibar. Why 

did it leave those cities so quickly and without a fight? No army likes to 

withdraw without a fight and, very likely, many AQAP fighters—motivated 

and probably at least at the same level of proficiency as the nascent Yemeni 

Army—would have wanted to fight for the cities they held, which could have 

meant a costly and long campaign for the Yemeni Army. As suggested by 

the later experience in Iraq and Syria, a cohesive jihadist force entrenched 

in an urban environment can present a difficult tactical problem for a conventional force, and especially so in a case such as Yemen, where the army 

was raised recently, trained hastily, and was untested in combat. Under the 

circumstances, with its disciplined and rapid withdrawal from those cities, 

AQAP displayed a significant degree of cohesion and command and control. 

In fact, where AQAP resisted government forces, as it did initially in 

Zinjibar in April 2016 just before the Al Mukalla events, it was able to repulse 

the attackers handily.211 In that instance, what was described as a “major 

military force” attacked and succeeded in killing eight AQAP personnel in 

violent clashes in the perimeter defenses, while supporting UAE Apache 

helicopters were said to have killed another 12. AQAP displayed resilience, 

however, with the ability to reinforce from outside during the battle and to 

mount a combined-arms counterattack that obliged the coalition-backed 

Yemeni forces to retreat, compounded by the bombing of friendly forces by 

the helicopters due to poor coordination, and with an apparently greater 

total of casualties for the attacking force for the day.212 The coalition, and 

especially Saudi Arabia, has relied disproportionately on airpower thanks to 

the coalition’s command of the skies, but this does not seem to be effective 

in terms of close air support to ground forces or in battlefield air interdiction, especially against small mobile AQAP elements, and even the coalition media reports that in operational situations airpower often misses its 

targets, not to speak of frequent incidents of hitting friendly forces, and is 

best suited for large stationary targets such as cities.213 It would not be until 

the following August that Zinjibar was retaken by the government, although 

this was accomplished by negotiations even though the coalition press again 

sometimes reported that AQAP’s withdrawal had been the result of armed 

clashes in which air and artillery were used.214
41

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

AQAP’s departure from Al Mukalla in 2016 should be seen within a 

broader strategic pattern rather than as an isolated event. That is, the decision to evacuate apparently was a uniform policy related to experience 

from the Arab Spring, and provides some insights into AQAP’s longer-term 

political-military objectives and strategy. During the Arab Spring, AQAP 

had exploited the security vacuum resulting from 

the disruptions in the Yemeni government and 

military that accompanied the upheaval and the 

ouster of President Saleh to take control in 2011 of 

a number of cities in the South, including Zinjibar, Jaar, Lawdar, Shaqra, Rida, and Azzan. In its 

hubris, AQAP had even proclaimed that “we have 

laid down the first foundation on which to build 

the Caliphate.”215

However, holding cities had tied down and dispersed AQAP forces in garrison and had entailed 

a loss of mobility. The decision at that time to 

defend committed AQAP to a war of attrition 

which, as a far smaller force that the reorganized 

Yemeni government had been able to muster that 

included the new Tribal Committee militias, was 

not to its advantage, as well as making the static 

AQAP forces vulnerable to U.S. airpower. During 

the government’s Operation Golden Swords campaign of 2012, as a result of 

some hard fighting—including some conventional large-scale engagements 

in open terrain defending the approaches to the cities—AQAP had suffered 

significant casualties and was forced to relinquish all its gains, although 

by the end, recognizing the inevitable, it negotiated directly with the tribal 

committees to leave the town of Azzan.216 To be sure, within a year, profiting from the country’s continuing instability, AQAP was able to rebuild 

much of its lost combat power, forcing the government to launch another 

major campaign —Operation Armed Deterrence—in spring 2014 to again 

push AQAP out of its remaining territories. Although most AQAP personnel were probably able to melt away, that meant a dispersion of forces and 

a resulting inability to mount further significant operations until, as noted 

already, another catalyst—the eruption of the civil war—had enabled it to 

regenerate its earlier power and more. 

During the Arab 

Spring, AQAP had 

exploited the security vacuum resulting 

from the disruptions 

in the Yemeni government and military 

that accompanied 

the upheaval and the 

ouster of President 

Saleh to take control 

in 2011 of a number 

of cities in the South, 

including Zinjibar, 

Jaar, Lawdar, Shaqra, 

Rida, and Azzan.
42

JSOU Report 18-4

AQAP now again had to decide how to deal with the cities that seemed 

to fall into its lap, but apparently this time AQAP was prepared to withdraw 

from the cities it was holding much more readily than the first time, almost 

always without any combat. In fact, there were skeptics, including Qasim 

al-Raymi, who believed it was unrealistic to try to establish a state without 

being able to ensure the unlikely permanent control over a territory, and he 

cited recent failures of such attempts in other parts of the Middle East, as 

well as the need to orient on the enemy first rather than on territory.217 AQAP 

was very likely reacting to the lessons learned from its earlier failure to hold 

on to territory after the Arab Spring. In particular, AQAP may have wanted 

to avoid the earlier attrition and placed its priority instead on preserving its 

force structure in the expectation that instability would continue and grow 

in the future.218 By February 2016, local tribes had already helped AQAP 

negotiate a peaceful withdrawal from the city of Ahwar in Abyan province.219

To its own members and to the local population, AQAP justified its policy of 

withdrawal by arguing that it wanted to “fight our enemy as we decide, not 

as the latter decides,” that it would not be trapped again into the same earlier 

policy that had provided the adversary with an advantage.220 In the case of 

Al Mukalla, according to an AQAP journalist, AQAP withdrew because it 

wanted to avoid what it believed was a U.S. strategy to maneuver it into an 

urban war of attrition.221 In fact, as an AQAP spokesman noted at the time, 

the intent was to place the UAE in a dilemma: If the UAE wanted to hold 

the cities, it would thereby lose the initiative to AQAP in the countryside or 

it could try to control everything and overextend itself.222

After leaving Al Mukalla, according to coalition sources, AQAP also 

evacuated Zinjibar and Jaar thanks to tribal mediation, reaching a deal that 

local forces, with the support of the coalition, were said to have welcomed, 

in order to “spare the two cities violence, destruction, and looting.”223 Photos 

of evacuated cities in Abyan province, in effect, showed the Army’s armor 

entering on heavy equipment transporters on a routine road march, not in 

a combat mode.224 Reportedly, AQAP also evacuated Azzan in August 2016 

following negotiations, with local tribes mediating on behalf of Saudi Arabia, 

although some local pro-coalition media insisted that AQAP had withdrawn 

only after “massive losses” from air power, even though admitting that only 

five air sorties had been flown.225 As a local official acknowledged, AQAP 

also withdrew in August 2016 from the town of Lawdar without offering any 

resistance to the Yemeni Army.226
43

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Post-Withdrawal Security 

Nevertheless, often such AQAP withdrawals were temporary and, according 

to local sources, AQAP personnel usually remained in the area. One source 

commented that such agreements were based on the principle of la darar 

wa-la dirar, “live and let live.”227 In all such cases, AQAP appears simply 

to have repositioned its forces in an orderly manner using the main roads, 

even taking its heavy weaponry for subsequent availability.228 After leaving 

Zinjibar and Jaar, in Abyan province, for example, reports indicated that 

AQAP was able to simply shift its forces, with critics accusing the provincial 

governor of having issued at the time bogus reports of clashes and that many 

AQAP killed.229 Significantly, after the retaking of Al Mukalla, many AQAP 

personnel reportedly just stored their weapons at home and often joined 

coalition military forces with the connivance of the local government.230

Likewise, it left the town of Lawdar in February 2017, and AQAP was able to 

quickly melt into nearby mountains and neighboring provinces.231

The Arab Coalition portrayed AQAP in Abyan as being “weak now and 

unable to offer any military resistance.”232 However, AQAP operatives soon 

reappeared in what remained a security vacuum, even retaking control of 

the local police station, and estimates were that AQAP retained some 2,000 

personnel in Abyan province alone, while the provincial governor described 

AQAP’s continued presence as being “as tight as a bracelet on a wrist.”233

By early 2017, AQAP was said to have reestablished its earlier influence in 

that province.234 Even in the key city of Al Mukalla and the surrounding 

region, the South Yemeni press was reporting that by August of that same 

year AQAP was returning more openly and recruiting and training tribal 

youths.235 And, it was questionable how effectively the UAE-supported government forces were able to ensure security in Al Mukalla itself once they 

took over, as within a week ISIS carried out a suicide attack against a recruiting camp in the city, causing almost a hundred casualties, while weeks after 

that AQAP launched two suicide attacks against the security forces there 

killing at least 35.236

Since then, almost everywhere outside of Ansar Allah-controlled areas, 

AQAP has been responsible for too many small-scale attacks to mention 

against such targets as isolated security checkpoints, individual military personnel, or security patrols.237 In 2017, rather than being brought under control, if anything, there appears to have been an upsurge of such small-scale 
44

JSOU Report 18-4

attacks, especially against UAE-supported local forces and police stations, 

particularly in Abyan and Hadramawt provinces.238 Even in mid-2017, a UAE 

government publication acknowledged that the road between Hadramawt 

province and Aden was unsafe, and Yemeni military personnel were advised 

not to carry a military identification when traveling.239 In addition to lowlevel engagements, AQAP also carried out larger sophisticated ones. For 

example, in July 2016, in a coordinated strike on Camp Sulban near Aden, a 

supporting attack consisting of a suicide car bomb breached the main gate, 

followed by another car bomb that was set off inside the camp, while the 

main attack was launched at the back gate, where an AQAP fighter wearing 

an explosive belt cleared the way for an exploitation force of 15–20 gunmen 

wearing military uniforms that was dislodged by a relief force only after 

air strikes and a gun battle that lasted hours.240 In the provinces, likewise, 

there was a well-planned surprise attack on the Hizam Amni headquarters 

in Zinjibar in February 2017. A car bomb was used to breach the compound 

gate and a man wearing a suicide vest entered while gunmen wearing military uniforms and bullet-proof vests attacked from four directions, raining 

gunfire from rooftops in the surrounding neighborhood and preventing 

with concentrated fire quick-reaction personnel from reaching their armored 

vehicles.241

In a similar operation in March 2017, over 70 AQAP fighters attacked a 

security force headquarters in Lahij province. Wearing military uniforms, 

they breached the gate with a mini-bus bomb and detonated a truck bomb 

within the compound, while fighters on foot scaled a wall and a blocking 

force held off a government relief unit in town, allowing the attacking force 

to withdraw.242 Elsewhere, in March 2017, AQAP also mounted a successful 

attack against a battalion of Yemeni border guards at a crossing point with 

Saudi Arabia, seizing arms, vehicles, and prisoners.243

Most actions undertaken by local forces against AQAP have been smallscale ones, usually consisting of the arrest of cells or individuals, the defusing 

of explosives, or the seizure of arms caches. For example, AQAP’s numbertwo man, the Saudi-born Abu Ali al-Sairi, was arrested in Hadramawt in 

March 2017, which the UAE publicized, taking credit for having trained the 

personnel who made the arrest, and of another senior operative the following 

month, although AQAP issued a denial of that second arrest.244 Typically in 

Aden, the year-long tally for 2016, showcased as “significant successes in the 

fight against terrorism,” consisted of the prevention of 24 potential car bomb 
45

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

attacks and defusing 235 IEDs and 301 landmines, as well as seizing maps, 

remote controls, and documents.245 Thwarting such attacks is necessary in 

the fight against AQAP, although this often occurs thanks to the individual 

attacker’s incompetence or by chance, and may be troubling as an indicator 

of AQAP’s continuing initiative and of its opponents’ posture as normally 

reactive. The Ansar Allah-Saleh forces, for their part, in addition to fighting 

against AQAP and ISIS at the front, have also arrested AQAP and ISIS cells 

throughout the areas under their control.246

Overall, so far, such operations have not been decisive, but the focus 

of coalition and local forces has often been elsewhere. Significantly, when 

the UAE-supported special forces stationed in Al Mukalla expanded to the 

interior of Hadramawt province in May 2017, ostensibly it was in response 

to a recent series of attacks by AQAP, but these had been small-scale raids. 

In part, what became a significant force deployment to Duan, supported by 

UAE heavy weapons, may have been intended to gain favorable publicity. 

Soon, the UAE press and the local pro-UAE press were reporting “crushing 

defeats,” “the eradication of terror,” and that it was now “Qaida-free” even 

though there appears to have been no battles against AQAP and the latter 

had never controlled the area.247 What may have been an alternative intent of 

the deployment at this time may have been suggested in the pro-UAE South 

Yemeni press which reported that personnel loyal to General al-Ahmar, a 

partisan of the Islah and a rival of the UAE and of the South, were infiltrating 

into the area and called on the UAE-controlled special forces to move and 

preempt that threat and, indeed the media focus on security there remained 

on the Islah and its alleged backer Qatar, not on AQAP.248 Nevertheless, 

the new exposed special forces positions apparently presented an inviting 

target and AQAP soon mounted an attack. Although pro-UAE quarters 

downplayed the incident, some press accounts acknowledged that the night 

attack had been coordinated along multiple axes using mortar and rocket 

fire, and that UAE aircraft had to be called in to repel the attackers.249 In 

fact, throughout the summer of 2017, UAE sources admitted that AQAP also 

mounted “numerous attacks” in Abyan province, forcing the deployment 

of two additional brigades.250 Likewise, in Shabwa province, AQAP in early 

August 2017 hit an exposed special forces position causing 15 casualties and 

taking prisoners while losing only one of its own.251

A day later, the UAE, with U.S. advisory and other unspecified support, 

began a deployment of hundreds of locally-raised special forces to their 
46

JSOU Report 18-4

home province of Shabwa, with the stated objective of securing the area 

from AQAP.252 UAE officials judged the deployment a “major, spectacular, 

operation” against AQAP and declared a “significant victory,” while the UAE 

media reported that AQAP had fled the province and the UAE and UAEcontrolled media in Yemen concluded that the back of AQAP was broken 

and that it was now disintegrating, although there were reports of only a few 

arrests.253 Pro-Hadi and Islah sources, however, provided a counternarrative, 

suggesting a turf battle for influence within the Arab Coalition as the focus, 

rather than AQAP, and UAE sources in Yemen acknowledged that the operation was “a severe blow ... to Qatar’s clients.”254 The Hadi and Islah media 

claimed that the UAE’s real objective was to secure control of the province’s 

lucrative oil and gas infrastructure, roads, airport, and port facilities held by 

pro-Hadi, pro-Ahmar, and pro-Qatar military units and officials, and argued 

that the UAE-backed forces should be helping the legitimate government 

instead of deploying rival units.255 These sources pointed out that there had 

been no clashes with AQAP which, as it had done elsewhere, appeared simply 

to have redeployed and predicted that, as had happened earlier, it would 

reestablish its presence.256 Pro-UAE sources themselves reported that local 

AQAP members were frequently simply melting back into their families, as 

they had done earlier on such occasions.257 Not only could the situation in 

Shabwa lead to further confrontations within the Arab Coalition without 

having a significant impact on AQAP, but the perception that such operations have the political and material backing of the United States could risk 

creating the unwelcome impression that the latter itself is becoming a player 

in the country’s political system and favoring specific parties even within 

the same coalition. 
47

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Chapter 4. Charting the Coalition Course

Full Speed Ahead! Allied Forces in Yemen

In many ways, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as the principal movers of the 

Arab Coalition, have dominated the military landscape in areas not under 

the control of the Ansar Allah-Saleh coalition. Both countries have devoted 

considerable military power to Operation Resolute Storm (codename for the 

Saudi-led operation in Yemen) that, if directed against AQAP, potentially 

could have had a decisive impact on reducing its threat. Riyadh and Abu 

Dhabi have committed special forces, as well as regular ground troops at 

various stages and mercenary contingents of various nationalities, and the 

UAE, in particular, has raised, funded, trained, equipped, and often led 

local Yemeni forces. However, this opportunity may have been squandered 

because of the two countries’ priorities in Yemen. Moreover, to some extent 

their direct military participation has led to an escalation in the level of violence and hardened local warring factions’ negotiating positions, prolonging 

the security vacuum that has favored AQAP’s activity. Yemenis, whatever 

their political persuasion, are still nationalistic, and can often be resentful 

and suspicious of the objectives of such outsiders as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, whatever help 

they may have provided. Characteristically, the 

suggestion a few years ago in Saudi Arabia that 

Yemen would be a good source for maids to 

replace those from Asia caused an indignant 

furor against the Saudis along the entire Yemeni 

political spectrum. Perhaps more relevant to 

the present situation, as one young Yemeni told 

journalists about neighboring countries, “some 

people are coming to think they [i.e. the neighboring countries] came to Yemen not because 

they love us and want to help us, but because they have their own interests 

here.”258 For her part, Tawakkul Karman, Nobel Peace Prize laureate noted 

for her activism during the Arab Spring in Yemen, while hostile to the Ansar 

Allah-Saleh faction, also expressed indignation at what she called the UAE’s 

Yemenis, whatever their 

political persuasion, are 

still nationalistic, and 

can often be resentful 

and suspicious of the 

objectives of such outsiders as Saudi Arabia 

and the UAE, whatever 

help they may have 

provided.
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JSOU Report 18-4

insulting and degrading treatment of Yemenis. Accusing the UAE of promoting divisions by raising parallel armed forces and warlords, she warned in 

frustration, “Leave before you are forced out.”259

For Riyadh, arguably, it was not AQAP’s presence but the Iranian factor 

and an exaggerated view of an Iranian-Ansar Allah connection that may 

have been the catalyst and continuing priority for Saudi decision making 

in Yemen. It was also aggravated by anxiety about the then-ongoing talks 

between the 5+1 Group (the members of the United Nations Security Council 

plus Germany) and Iran on the latter’s nuclear program, a possible rapprochement between Iran and the West, and especially with the United 

States, at Riyadh’s expense, as well as to counter what Riyadh interpreted as 

Iran’s expansion. The emphasis in the Saudi state-controlled media for the 

Yemen intervention was certainly on Iran from the beginning and has continued to be so.260 Even in 2017, when discussing Yemen, senior Saudi officials 

focused only on the Iranian angle without even mentioning AQAP.261 For 

the UAE, a sensitivity to Iranian influence, as well as countering the Islah 

party (the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) may have been the 

key motivations, as the UAE attributed the Arab Spring uprisings as due in 

great part to the Muslim Brotherhood’s ability to mobilize popular discontent and has gone to great lengths to crack down on any manifestation of 

this movement both at home and in the region.262

Saudi Strategy Against AQAP

Often, the countries in the Arab Coalition have used their claimed effectiveness in countering AQAP as a selling point with the international community for their presence in Yemen, as the coalition realizes that AQAP/

ISIS may be the priority for the international community rather than the 

Ansar Allah, and has taken that into consideration. The Saudi ambassador 

to Yemen, for his part, also portrayed the Iranian and AQAP/ISIS threat in 

Yemen as connected, however, perhaps sees this as an effective mechanism 

to appeal to all facets of U.S. interests.263 For its part, the UAE-controlled 

press in Yemen often spoke of the UAE as having the lead in anti-terrorist 

operations in Yemen and of achieving “great victories” against AQAP and, 

by 2017, it assessed that “these evil organizations are almost finished,” but 

also then shifted the focus to the UAE’s rivals, the Ansar Allah and the 

Islah (Muslim Brotherhood), as being responsible for AQAP’s persistence.264
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Conversely, a pro-Saudi Yemeni newspaper downplayed AQAP’s presence in 

Abyan in early 2017, accusing the UAE and its local clients of exaggerating 

the threat in order to draw in the United States further to help consolidate 

UAE control over certain areas.265

However, in practical terms, when asked by a journalist in April 2015 

whether it was targeting AQAP, Riyadh’s military spokesman then-Brigadier 

General Ahmad Asiri replied somewhat flustered: “The operation was clear 

from the first. Al-Qaeda and ISIS were not specified in the list of objectives 

for Operation Resolute Storm. Everyone knows that there is an international 

coalition operating against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, with Saudi Arabia and 

some other countries participating in that coalition. However, as far as Operation Resolute Storm, I want to reiterate that the specified objectives are clear: 

support for the legitimate government and President Abd Rabbu Mansur 

Hadi, and support for efforts to return security and stability in Yemen.”266

Reports of the briefing in the Saudi media avoided General Asiri’s direct 

denial, perhaps to avoid potential international criticism about the official 

indifference to AQAP and ISIS and the Saudi priorities that that implied. 

Nevertheless, General Asiri continued to suggest that this remained the 

Saudi perspective when he again claimed that the Arab Coalition had a 

“deeper understanding” of what was at stake in Yemen than was true of the 

“Western countries and much of their media,” whom he accused of focusing 

on AQAP and ISIS in Yemen while allegedly “ignoring the Yemeni citizen” 

and thus allowing the Ansar Allah to emerge on top. “We will not tolerate 

such an approach,” he concluded, and argued that the focus instead should 

be on building a strong—presumably pro-Saudi—Yemeni state (in itself an 

ambitious objective) and that the AQAP problem would then resolve itself.267

Significantly, after AQAP evacuated the city of Al Mukalla in April 2016, 

General Asiri declared that “major military operations against Al-Qaida in 

Yemen are nearing an end.”268

Some have sought to downplay the threat from AQAP. One retired general, who often serves as an unofficial spokesman for the Saudi palace assured 

audiences in mid-2015 that al-Qaeda was declining worldwide as a threat 

and was on its way to disappearing in Yemen as well.269 Likewise, another 

retired Saudi general asserted in 2016 that AQAP’s presence in Yemen was 

“extremely limited,” with only a few commanders active mostly in the media 

and only some 200 fighters—a far from realistic assessment, as suggested 

by even the partial numbers discussed earlier.270 Often citing allied Yemeni 
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military officers to lend credibility to estimates, the Saudi media by early 2016 

also portrayed AQAP as weak as a result of the coalition air campaign, and as 

consisting just of “remnants ... fleeing to peasant homes in the mountains.”271

In fact, the Hadi authorities and the Saudis declared in August 2016 that 

Abyan province was now completely AQAP-free, something that subsequent 

events such as a suicide attack shortly thereafter that killed or wounded 25 

troops showed to be far from accurate.272 At the same time, the Saudi military 

leadership calculated that neighboring Shabwa province, thanks to local 

forces led by Saudi and UAE officers, would also be AQAP-free “within a few 

weeks”—again an overly-optimistic assessment.273 In fact, by early 2017, the 

Saudi Ministry of the Interior spokesman went on record saying that, as a 

result of operations by the Arab Coalition, AQAP “has been paralyzed to a 

great extent,” while the Ministry’s CT expert added that AQAP now “lacks 

the ability to operate abroad.”274

As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia has a history of willingness to deal with the 

jihadists in Yemen for its own understandable pragmatic interests. Perhaps 

typically, according to tribal Shaykh al-Fadli, who at the time was an ally of 

Saudi Arabia thanks to Riyadh’s mediation, a deal had been struck allowing 

AQAP fighters in 2012 to withdraw from Zinjibar and Jaar in Abyan province 

without either the Yemeni or Saudi military striking them, provided that 

the mujahidin agreed to go to Syria to fight against the Asad regime.275 The 

Saudis, at times, have gone out of their way to deny the presence of AQAP 

fighters in combat operations which the Saudis have supported, although 

media reporting indicated otherwise.276 Eventually, AQAP fighters were said 

to also have participated even on the front along the Saudi border, where 

Riyadh had brought South Yemenis to help it repel the Ansar Allah’s penetrations into Saudi territory, and where a number of AQAP commanders 

reportedly lost their lives.277 Likewise, during the 2017 coastal campaign 

that targeted the Ansar Allah ports, there were reports by the pro-Saleh 

media that AQAP forces were operating alongside coalition forces.278 The fact 

that the AQAP attackers who struck the security headquarters in Lahij in 

March 2017 had apparently been part of the Arab Coalition force operating 

against the Ansar Allah along the coast and had used vehicles they had been 

issued by the Yemeni Army seemed to confirm such suspicions, although 

an embarrassed Army leadership sought to downplay the relationship.279 In 

what may be a tacit understanding, AQAP by and large has avoided attacking Saudi forces directly—although ISIS has done so—while focusing its 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

attacks on the forces of the UAE and its clients, calling the UAE presence 

“an occupation.”280 Even some of the pro-Hadi media, in fact, has suggested 

the existence of what one newspaper called an informal interest-based “nonnegotiated truce” between AQAP and Saudi Arabia.281 When the prominent 

AQAP figure Khalid Batarfi reacted publicly in June 2017 to the visit by U.S. 

President Donald Trump to Riyadh the previous month, perhaps signaling 

intensified anti-AQAP activity by the Arab Coalition with U.S. support, his 

criticism of Saudi Arabia was restrained, identifying his target generically 

as “traitorous rulers” rather than specifying anyone by name, and avoiding 

the standard harsh language of earlier times such as “apostates,” “thieves,” 

or “deviants,” or the insulting “Al Sallul” name for the Saudi ruling family, 

or calling for its overthrow, while focusing on Islamic unity instead.282

UAE Strategy Against AQAP

The UAE’s policy of presence on the ground in the South and its major role 

in the media, economy, security, and political life unavoidably has brought it 

into conflict with AQAP, especially as it has sought to play a significant role 

on the ground in support of its local allies. In the long run, perhaps one of 

the most valuable aspects of its policy that can make AQAP less attractive 

has been the UAE’s efforts to stabilize the local economy with aid projects 

related to electricity, water, health, and communications, although the scope 

is still far from what is needed. The provision of desperately-needed aid has 

been limited to civilians in areas under coalition control. The UAE media 

has depicted their country’s involvement in Yemen as an example of success against terrorism and offer it as a model for other scenarios.283 Yemenis 

who line up with Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, often accuse the UAE 

of “sowing discord” and “destroying the social fabric” in Yemen with its 

involvement.284

Overall, however, the UAE’s direct involvement in local affairs has at 

times complicated the fight against AQAP. For example, UAE-controlled 

forces have been accused of being heavy-handed with their blanket accusations and arrests of alleged AQAP suspects, reportedly often just targeting 

UAE opponents.285 After Al Mukalla was supposedly cleared of AQAP in 

April 2016, UAE-controlled forces still managed to arrest 250 alleged AQAP 

members in the city shortly thereafter.286 Likewise, in Lahij Province, a crackdown by UAE and UAE-supported forces in 2016 resulted in over 300 arrests 
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of alleged AQAP and ISIS members, but that was clearly not the case, since 

over 200 of those arrested were soon released following “their re-education 

and a psychological and ideological evaluation.”287 In one incident in Shabwa 

province, a tribe blocked a key road for fuel truck traffic in protest to pressure 

the UAE to release two of its fellow-tribesmen that the latter had arrested.288

Even after their release such an experience may alienate local tribal populations. Hadi allies, for their part, charge that the UAE-backed clients target 

all Islamists indiscriminately.289 Elsewhere, the UAE reportedly disregarded 

fighters from Aden in building the city’s local Hizam Amni defense force and 

brought in, instead, fighters from other provinces, which was said to have 

resulted in many of the rejected Adenis then joining AQAP.290

Anti-AQAP clerics, and especially conservative Salafi ones, can provide a 

religious counterweight to AQAP’s claims of a monopoly on religious legitimacy. However, this body of potential anti-AQAP clerics has suffered in the 

rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and of their respective clients, 

with the Hadi faction claiming that its clerical supporters in Aden were being 

ousted from posts in mosques by the pro-UAE authorities, contributing to 

confusion.291 In fact, Yemeni Salafi clerics were said to shun the UAE’s client, 

Minister of State and Commander of the local Hizam Amni, Hani Bin Brik, 

even though he is a Salafi cleric.292 Significantly, clerics in Hadramawt have 

complained that the UAE has used accusations of belonging to AQAP and 

ISIS as a club to silence critics and, paradoxically, even reminisced about the 

Saleh era when they could speak out freely.293

Local Military Forces

However, as important as outside players are, ultimately it is the relative 

balance between AQAP and local forces that will be decisive. Both Saudi 

Arabia and the UAE have raised local forces, such as the special forces (alNukhba) used by the UAE in Hadramawt and Aden, conventional Army 

maneuver units, local militia forces such as the UAE-sponsored Al-Hizam 

Al-Amni (Security Belt), or the Popular (or tribal) Committees, or the Popular Resistance and traditional police. In early 2017, Saudi-backed elements 

established a new anti-terrorist force in Aden, trained by personnel from the 

former Marxist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.294 Both sponsoring 

countries have provided the new local military forces with large amounts 

of equipment including tanks and other armored vehicles, artillery, trucks, 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

small arms, and other equipment and supplies. They have also provided 

training, often abbreviated to three months or less, to Yemeni forces in camps 

in Eritrea, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or locally, and have continued 

to pay their salaries. Indicative of the seriousness of the AQAP threat, by 

2016, plans were announced in Hadramawt to even recruit policewomen in 

order to search females at checkpoints.295 In addition, Saudi Arabia and the 

UAE have operated directly in Yemen with their own ground, air, and naval 

forces—whether in direct support of local forces or independently—and have 

embedded advisers to aid local forces with planning, intelligence, logistics, 

and often command and control. 

In particular, the Hizam Amni militias have led in specifically providing security against AQAP in areas controlled by the UAE which finances, 

equips, trains, and appoints its commanders, and often provides combat support.296 However, these forces have exhibited limited reliability. For example, 

Hizam Amni forces often withdraw from their posts, citing a lack of adequate support by the UAE in terms of pay, fuel, weaponry, and intelligence 

sharing.297 At the same time, there have been instances of factional fighting 

between forces favorable to the Islah party and the UAE-controlled Hizam 

Amni.298 There have also been clashes between units simply competing for 

control of turf.299 Some units in the Hizam Amni, for their part, are said to 

resent rigid UAE control.300 Moreover, the Hizam Amni is routinely accused 

of extortion, torture, arbitrary arrests, and of acting as a state-within-astate, hampering the authority of any future national government.301 The 

tribally-based Popular Committees local defense militias supported by the 

coalition and the Yemeni government, likewise, have been accused of abusive 

behavior toward the public.302 The UAE-backed special forces in Hadramawt, 

too, have been criticized for unsubstantiated accusations against citizens of 

belonging to AQAP and for arbitrary arrests.303 AQAP propaganda takes 

advantage of such transgressions to try to separate the security forces from 

the population.304 The UAE media, for its part, has accused Hizam Amni 

commanders of preferring to stay in relative security in Aden rather than 

leading from the field.305

Stuck in the Doldrums

Despite the significant coalition material commitment, the results of building 

a national army remain disappointing, with many of the Yemeni military’s 
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traditional shortcomings now only magnified by the disruptions caused by 

the conflict.306 Factionalism along regional, tribal, or party loyalties continues to undermine overall cohesion. While one would expect local selfdefense forces to be tribally or provincially-based, this characteristic also 

applies to new army units. Although tribal loyalty 

can contribute to unit cohesion, it can also be disruptive, as in the case of the 3rd Brigade in Lahij 

province when the rank-and-file mutinied against 

their commander who was able to call on fighters 

from his own tribe for support.307 A narrow local 

focus also affects operational effectiveness, with 

units loathe to operate out-of-area, and the debilitating North-South friction 

endures within the coalition-backed armed forces.308 As one UAE adviser 

rued, “southerners would not fight beyond their borders. Taking them there 

[i.e., North] was a big challenge,” and in fact units have at times simply 

left the front and gone back to their home areas.309 In addition, in the fight 

against the Ansar Allah, the coalition is said to also support various jihadist 

groups with values and an impact in local society that are similar to those of 

AQAP, although not part of the latter’s organization. For example, while not 

tolerating them in areas it controls in the South, the UAE supports selected 

jihadist groups in Taizz to balance the Islah and Hadi’s forces, with whom 

the UAE has been at odds.310

Moreover, the fragmented political situation has encouraged the phenomenon of Army and militia commanders acting as local warlords in their 

own areas, who can and often do ignore central directives. At times, such 

disparate forces, including factionalized Army units, end up clashing over 

control of turf, as in Taizz, rather than focusing on AQAP.311 Mistrust of the 

intentions of foreign countries or of other Yemeni regions also looms large, 

with South Yemenis often suspicious that the fight against terrorism could 

be used as a cover for North Yemen to continue controlling the South, or 

for outside powers to establish control in what one editorialist characterized as “colonies run from a distance.”312 While supporting warlords, tribal, 

ideological, regional, and party militias have been a necessary expedient for 

the coalition in the absence of other tools—this may also hamper building a 

strong state in the long run, as even pro-coalition Yemeni observers admit.313

Significantly, the problem of “ghosts,” that is absentee, soldiers and 

police listed on the rosters to enable commanders to collect their salaries 

Factionalism along 

regional, tribal, or 

party loyalties continues to undermine 

overall cohesion.
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

fraudulently, or adding the names of clients to the rolls, remains pervasive 

and hampers force development.314 For example, information about Hadi’s 

forces indicates that instead of the 52,000 carried on the rolls, only 10,000 

are actually present for duty in the field, and that the abuse even extends to 

“ghosts” on the list of those killed in action in order to collect undeserved 

death benefits.315 One Saudi-financed Yemeni newspaper complained about 

the lackadaisical operations in one district: “Everyone knows and can see 

that many checkpoints are unattended because its personnel do not care 

about their service and that they are not serious. This is plain chaos. They do 

not want to serve but at the end of the month they do want their pay in full 

without having been on duty.”316 This is by no means a marginal problem, 

as higher-ups in one instance reportedly ordered 5,000 fictitious names to 

be added to one unit’s roster.317 Entrenched corruption also affects arms 

purchases—some Hizam Amni units in Abyan reportedly sold some of their 

weapons and vehicles, presumably to the tribes or perhaps to AQAP.318 Moreover, AQAP or ISIS military success affects the local forces’ morale, as in the 

case of the August 2016 attack on Camp Sulban, which reportedly had a deep 

psychological impact on surviving personnel and hurt recruitment efforts.319

At times, coalition-backed forces may not be anxious to confront AQAP. For 

example, the Army’s 115th Brigade garrisoning the town of Lawdar in Abyan 

province blandly denied that AQAP was present in its area of operations.320

Or, as Yemeni military sources insisted, local forces operating with UAE 

forces had completely cleared the Balhaf liquid gas export port in Shabwa 

of AQAP when they retook the city, which was called into question by continuing attacks.321 Again in 2017, the governor of Abyan gave a doubtful 

reassurance that there was no AQAP presence in his province.322 Even at a 

higher level, President Hadi’s foreign minister in 2016 categorically denied 

that there was any ISIS presence whatsoever in Yemen and attributed claims 

to the contrary only to the Ansar Allah-Saleh media.323

At the same time, military, police, coast guard, and tribal militia units 

routinely complain of inadequate support, with weapons, fuel, and supplies not forthcoming.324 Money provided by Saudi Arabia or the UAE for 

Yemeni military and security units has often not made its way down from 

higher echelons to the field, resulting in protests such as blocked key roads 

in response to late or no pay, and a general lack of support a routine occurrence in virtually every province.325 One unit expressed receiving only some 

rice as their daily meal, and of having to rely on charity.326 Not surprisingly, 
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salaries are key to the military’s effectiveness, as many recruits reportedly 

joined the pro-coalition forces specifically because they could find no other 

work.327 At times, salaries can be hostage to political rivalries, as when the 

Hadi-controlled Central Bank stopped paying the salaries of the security 

forces in May 2017 to the provinces where the UAE is dominant—a result of 

the Hadi (and Saudi) tension with the UAE.328 Such a lack of material support, all too often, can lead to a unit withdrawing from the field, as was the 

case of a Hizam Amni unit guarding the approaches to the town of Lawdar 

from AQAP attacks.329 In another case, after military police at the Ra’s Abbas 

training camp in Aden withdrew in protest of a lack of pay, ISIS was able 

to mount a successful suicide attack, killing nine and wounding thirteen.330

Some army units have threatened to switch sides to the Ansar Allah, angry 

that their commanders were stealing their pay.331 One Army brigade commander on the Abyan coast even feared that his disgruntled personnel, who 

were not receiving pay or support despite government promises, would begin 

drifting to AQAP or ISIS.332 Under such circumstances, some security units 

may be fragile, as a Hizam Amni unit withdrew from a town in Abyan 

province after suffering just two casualties in an ambush set by AQAP.333

Moreover, even forces that the Arab Coalition specifically established to 

fight terrorism often are diverted to nonessential missions such as the UAEbacked Hadramawt special forces being used to pursue what they refer to 

as “sorcerers” and “moral deviants,” or the UAE-backed CT forces in Aden 

used to seize control of the Aden airport from Hadi’s Saudi-backed security 

as part of Saudi-UAE rivalry.334

One must also take into consideration peculiarities in Yemeni society that 

may lower the effectiveness of local armed forces such as the daily break for 

the consumption of khat, a mild local narcotic that is so pervasive that coalition forces include it in daily rations for their troops at a cost greater than 

that of the food provided.335 Moreover, units are often reluctant to fight outside their home areas. One Popular Committee commander matter-of-factly 

noted that his unit had no intention of defending Aden from the advancing 

Ansar Allah and had returned home to Abyan province instead.336 And, 

characteristically, in the Army’s 39th Armor Brigade, all but 10 of its personnel went home to spend the feast at the end of Ramadan, creating unavoidable security vulnerabilities.337

As a senior defector from AQAP assessed, the Yemeni Army had failed 

so far to defeat AQAP during the civil war because it contains AQAP 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

sympathizers.338 At times, former members of AQAP reportedly also were 

recruited into Hadi-controlled military forces.339 In some instances, AQAP 

has coexisted informally alongside Yemeni Army forces, as in Hadramawt 

during the early days of the conflict.340 In 2016, Aden’s chief of police was 

accused of appointing a number of individuals with ties to AQAP to security 

positions.341 In some areas, moreover, the Hizam Amni is said to be riddled 

with personnel sympathetic to AQAP and has cooperated with the latter.342

Likewise, AQAP’s membership in the Popular Resistance, in a sense, may 

lead others to view AQAP as legitimate and may facilitate recruitment.343

Although defense mechanisms such as the tribally-based Popular Committees were originally established to operate against AQAP, members from 

AQAP also joined, whether as a vehicle for protection against prosecution or 

as a way to undermine their effectiveness, according to a former member of 

AQAP who became a commander in the Popular Committees.344 In fact, in a 

clash between the Yemeni Army and the Popular Committees over funding 

provided by Saudi Arabia, AQAP elements were said to have been present in 

the Popular Committees.345 Likewise, when AQAP fighters returned to the 

Al Mukalla area after having negotiated a withdrawal a few months earlier, 

many now had Southern Resistance Committee identity cards, suggesting 

that they had joined the latter, while others were reported to have joined 

the coalition-supported Army and security forces after AQAP had negotiated a withdrawal from areas in Abyan province in 2016.346 And, in 2017, 

the governor of Hadramawt claimed that some of the AQAP prisoners they 

were holding had Yemen Army ID cards and had deployed from military 

bases.347 Symptomatic of the unreliability of local security services—whether 

because of ideology or money—was the April 2017 jail break in Ataq, Shabwa 

province, in which prisoners, including AQAP detainees, simply walked out 

the front gate, apparently enabled by internal collusion.348 In fact, at times, 

intelligence provided from inside the security forces reportedly has enabled 

AQAP to mount its ambushes.349

Saudi-UAE-Qatar Objectives and Rivalry and the Impact on 

the War against AQAP

Rivalries within the Arab Coalition, initially between Saudi Arabia and 

the UAE and more recently between those two countries and Qatar, have 

often been played out in Yemen by their local clients, whether in armed 
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clashes, attacks in the local media, or the ouster of local officials, and have 

had an impact on the fight against AQAP. For example, pro-Hadi spokesmen (and thereby Saudi Arabia) accused the UAE of not coordinating with 

Saudi Arabia, much less with the Hadi forces, in their pursuit of AQAP.350 In 

fact, Saudi sources interpreted UAE operations against AQAP as a cover to 

strike at the pro-Saudi resistance elements in South Yemen and were suspicious of the UAE’s intentions.351 This rivalry has been intense, as was the case 

between the Saudi-backed Hadi and the UAE which escalated in 2017, with 

the latter accusing Hadi of making a deal with AQAP and of coordinating 

with the latter in attacking UAE interests, a “stab in the back” as the UAE 

termed it.352 Others in South Yemen have hinted more directly at Saudi collusion with AQAP, pointing to such indications as a Saudi officer intervening 

with the local police to allow AQAP suspects to avoid arrest, arguing that 

they were collaborating with the coalition.353 Pro-Hadi partisans, for their 

part, have insisted that ISIS’s members are all South Yemenis, although that 

must also be seen within the context of the bitter rivalry between Hadi and 

the UAE and the latter’s clients, especially pro-independence UAE-backed 

Southerners.354

Saudi-UAE rivalry was apparently put in abeyance in mid-2017, as mutual 

opposition to Qatar erupted into the open, fueled by long-simmering regional 

rivalry, including Qatar’s support for the Arab Spring, its benevolent view 

of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its improving relations with Iran and the 

Syrian regime.355 Saudi Arabia and the UAE mounted an economic and political blockade of Qatar and mounted a full-scale media campaign—repeated 

by their local clients in Yemen—bluntly accusing Qatar of supporting not 

only the Islah but also AQAP, and seeking to tie together those three actors 

(along with Iran and Turkey).356 Usually, Qatar’s financial support to AQAP 

was alleged to have taken the form of paying ransom for the release of foreigners that AQAP had kidnapped over the years.357

Riyadh’s pivot against the Islah and the Muslim Brotherhood more generally appears to have been related to its cooperation with UAE to focus on 

Qatar. Significantly, one journalist in the UAE-controlled Yemeni media 

boasted that it was the UAE that had convinced Saudi Arabia that it was now 

time to eliminate “terrorism” in Yemen (although identifying the Islah and 

Qatar as the latter) and to end Riyadh’s “temporary alliance” with the Islah 

and the Hadi coalition, alleging Qatar’s support for Islah.358 UAE arguments 

that Islah and Qatar had obstructed attaining victory in Yemen, however 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

exaggerated, may have also influenced Riyadh, frustrated by being bogged 

down in the continuing war.359 In effect, Saudi Arabia’s focus on anti-terrorism in mid-2017 shifted radically to the Muslim Brotherhood, both at home 

and the local level in Yemen, and was reflected in a full-scale campaign by 

the country’s media, clerical establishment, and the military’s Center for 

Ideological Warfare.360

Saudi Arabia and the UAE did compile new terrorist lists of individuals 

and charity organizations in Yemen, which served as the basis for the arrest 

or ouster of officials said to have had ties to AQAP. Although they had long 

been on the U.S. Treasury’s list, the driving factor for the new lists and the 

new measures at this time appears to have been their links with Qatar and 

the Muslim Brotherhood.361 And, in fact, Saudi Arabia apparently had also 

cooperated with those organizations and individuals in the past.362 As a 

case in point, Nayif al-Qaysi, whom Hadi had appointed governor of AlBayda’ province in 2015, was, in addition, the self-appointed major general 

commanding the 17th Brigade, a tribal notable and prominent figure in the 

Islah party. Al-Qaysi made extravagant promises about his ability to achieve 

a victory over the Ansar Allah, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE continued 

to accept him as a valid partner as noted by their media and that of their 

local clients, even after the U.S. had placed him on its terrorist list in May 

2016 for cooperating with AQAP.363 In fact, al-Qaysi had been praised in the 

coalition-backed media for his effectiveness in fighting against the Ansar 

Allah-Saleh forces and for his “coordination with the forces of the Arab 

Coalition led by Saudi Arabia in order to operate together.”364 In the end, 

what appears to have been key for the UAE in engineering his ouster in July 

2017 was al-Qaysi’s ties to the Islah and to Qatar.365

The Hadi regime (and its Saudi backers) and the UAE made compromises to replace some officials, and some forces on both sides were shifted 

to different areas. Whether such expedient compromises masking continuing rivalry will result in a more cohesive coalition effort or lead to further 

disruptions and a decreased focus on AQAP is problematic, as the coalition 

parties scramble to realign their alliances. Very likely, the UAE and its local 

clients, in particular, are likely now to focus even more on Islah and Qatar 

as adversaries. 

And, whatever element of truth there might or might not be in the accusations swirling about in coalition circles of secret backers of AQAP, this 

situation illustrates how regional players have their own shifting national 
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interests and how events outside the country can reverberate in Yemen and 

rearrange and further destabilize the volatile local political balance and 

security situation. Such regional rivalries also indicate the level of mistrust 

within the Arab Coalition and among their Yemeni allies, which diverts 

from efforts to deal with AQAP effectively, as coalition factions focus on each 

other. Accusations by the local UAE-controlled press of treason by senior 

commanders linked to Qatar in the Yemeni Army are only likely to erode 

the army’s cohesion and divert its attention further from fighting AQAP.366

In particular, Islah retains combat power that is not negligible, including 

control of a number of army brigades. In the shifting coalitions, a hardpressed Islah could be willing to cooperate more directly with AQAP as a 

defensive mechanism. At the very least, Islah may redirect its focus against 

other coalition forces and their local allies. 
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Chapter 5. The Way Forward

Sailing Past the CT Paradigm

AQAP has been able to expand during the civil war in terms of the territory it controlled, the arsenal it acquired, and the prestige it earned—

even establishing a quasi-state administration in some areas. Moreover, 

dealing with AQAP may be difficult, especially as it has become a player 

during this civil war (even an accepted cobelligerent in some circles) within 

Yemen’s fragmented mosaic of shifting tribal, ideological, religious, and 

personal coalitions, and has embedded itself in the country’s social, political, 

and economic fabric. AQAP and ISIS have been able to establish relationships that may outlast the current civil war, and a United Nations (UN) 

report assessed that their current activity could a have long-term impact, 

as they were “laying the foundation for terrorist networks that may last for 

years.”367 AQAP presents a complex problem and as this study suggests, there 

is no one, easy, or quick solution for the problem, 

rather a combination of approaches and methods 

are needed to achieve progress. Based on the preceding assessment, a number of conclusions and 

recommendations emerge. 

The ultimate objective should be to defeat AQAP 

and to achieve “victory,” but one has to define what 

that means in concrete terms. Given its current 

entrenchment in Yemen’s society and political life, 

it may not be possible to eradicate AQAP completely without also implementing difficult systemic 

political, economic, and social changes. Under the 

circumstances, victory in the near term may mean 

not so much AQAP’s eradication as its containment and management by 

reducing to the greatest extent possible, through continuous focused, pressure at the operational level, along with a change at the strategic level in 

AQAP’s surrounding environment, in order to reduce AQAP’s capabilities 

and the threat it poses, especially beyond Yemen’s borders. 

AQAP presents a 

complex problem 

and as this study 

suggests, there is 

no one, easy, or 

quick solution for 

the problem, rather 

a combination of 

approaches and 

methods are needed 

to achieve progress.
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JSOU Report 18-4

At the operational level, there are certain kinetic measures that are feasible and necessary, not only to prevent the current security situation from 

deteriorating, but also as a contributing factor to longer-term stabilization 

efforts for a desired end-state. While necessary, such means can only act as 

a temporary facilitating “shield,” providing time and security for the implementation of the “sword”—that is political and economic measures—that can 

bring about greater long-term stability and greater success against AQAP. 

In addressing military strategies, some analysts have argued convincingly 

that the dichotomy between population-centric approaches to COIN and 

enemy-centric approaches is misplaced. Rather, they maintain that a more 

appropriate concern is: on the one hand, whether the focus should be on the 

use of physical force or of political or moral actions; and, on the other hand, 

insofar as targets are concerned, whether they should be on the insurgents or 

on the insurgents’ support.368 Indeed, one could add that at times the focus 

could be sequential, at other times simultaneous, depending on the specific 

situation. In the case of Yemen and AQAP, one could maintain that multiple 

efforts would be synergistic. In terms of targets, as the present study suggests, 

eliminating AQAP leaders and cadres does have an impact. However, this 

does not preclude, at the same time, also targeting and shaping the wider 

support base upon which AQAP must rely for the various combat support 

functions noted earlier. 

Crossing AQAP’s “T” in Yemen

At the time of this writing, the United States is considering an expansion of 

military operations in Yemen.369 While this is ultimately a political decision, 

at the operational level, the United States should avoid a large-scale ground 

combat presence in Yemen, which could present the risk of developing into 

a long commitment and also of being drawn in as a player in local and 

regional politics. Significantly, Saudi Arabia itself has avoided a sustained 

ground presence, only committing its special forces and limited forays across 

the border. Saudi authorities have justified this restraint by a wish to avoid 

what they have described as “significant casualties.”370 Riyadh instead, had 

sought to enlist large ground task forces from Egypt and Pakistan for that 

mission, but both declined. Not surprisingly, local and regional players may 

stress the AQAP angle as a theme to elicit greater U.S. involvement. In early 

2016, for example, the UAE asked the United States to provide increased air 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

power, logistics, and intelligence support, casting the request specifically in 

terms of the fight against AQAP.371

Neutralizing AQAP’s strategic center of gravity—its leadership, as a direct 

approach disrupts at least temporarily, AQAP’s command structure and 

operations. While eliminated leaders are replaced, this process is sometimes 

far from smooth, and can be subject to factional or regional pressures that 

can hobble the organization at least temporarily. This was the case after the 

deaths in 2016 of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, AQAP’s leader, and of a key AQAP field 

commander, Jalal Balaidi al-Marqashi (Hamza al-Zinjibari), when the latter’s brother contested Qasim al-Raymi (who had been military commander 

since 2009) for overall leadership of the AQAP. This rivalry included armed 

clashes by their followers and resulted in Balaidi’s retention of at least a 

regional leadership role.372 However, decapitation alone may be insufficient, 

as leaders may be difficult to reach and, moreover, this is not a one-bullet 

regime, but relies on a broader network of command personnel who may be 

hard to eliminate completely. 

At the same time, by default, an indirect longer-term and labor-intensive 

approach focusing on attriting AQAP’s operational center of gravity may 

be necessary to weaken AQAP’s ability to pose a threat. Such a strategy 

should disrupt AQAP’s ability to field forces and generate combat support; 

maintain political and physical infrastructure that enables the leadership 

to carry out policy; and sustain such warfighting functions as recruitment, 

logistics, intelligence, training and education, and command and control 

for combat operations. Basic to enabling any such long-term military operations is maintaining the U.S. forward presence both afloat and by relying on 

the imposing security infrastructure that has been established on Yemen’s 

periphery, including in the Horn of Africa. These facilities range from the 

major base at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, with over 4,000 personnel, to 

bare-bones positions (the numerous so-called “lily-pads”), strategicallylocated skeleton facilities with infrastructure that can provide the nucleus 

for a rapid expansion as needed, most often in conjunction with existing 

host-country facilities.373
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JSOU Report 18-4

Eroding AQAP’s Base

Conducting Information Operations

U.S. information operations are key, given that Yemen’s factions, tribes, 

parties, and even individuals have their own newspapers or other media 

outlets (often in conjunction with foreign countries). Providing accurate 

and balanced news, whether directly to Yemeni consumers or through local 

outlets, can play an important role in countering not only the AQAP information effort but also the rumors that arise and spread rapidly and provide 

the broader social background, often counter to U.S. interests. One area 

where SOF can be especially relevant is in producing and operationalizing 

information support, given its organic army’s special forces capabilities, 

which can counter AQAP propaganda and provide a positive message that 

can support operations and contribute to stability and security at a strategic 

level. An information effort can also play a supporting role in the campaign 

against AQAP. While the nucleus of AQAP may be relatively impervious—

requiring its physical defeat—a more positive effect may be possible with the 

periphery, although even here the impact is most likely a dependent variable of the situation. That is, it is difficult to argue with success, and unless 

they are coupled with the infliction of tangible failure for the jihadists on 

the ground, psychological campaigns may not be effective. Nevertheless, 

such campaigns to delegitimize AQAP could help complicate the latter’s 

operational environment by degrading support among active and potential 

sympathizers on whom AQAP relies for support functions such as logistics, 

intelligence, or force protection. Not surprisingly, such campaigns would 

be most effective using trusted key communicators and, specifically, local 

religious or tribal ones.

Developing Tribal Militias

In the near-term, the focus of effort can be to build up local forces to operate 

against AQAP by contributing money, weapons, intelligence, and training, 

which can be conducted in secure areas offshore. In particular, tribal militias 

have a proven track record of effectiveness against al-Qaeda, including in 

Yemen, when managed correctly.374 As seen in this study, Yemen’s tribes are 

a key element in the country’s security and political equation and countering 

AQAP’s efforts to recruit from and operate in tribal areas can go a long way 

toward containing AQAP and securing territory, since such militias know the 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

terrain and population, have a permanent presence, and have built-in cohesion thanks to tribal loyalty. As this is a zero-sum game, any development of 

tribal militias at the same time also represents a subtraction from the potential pool of assets for AQAP. Tribal militias not only provide security, but of 

equal importance, are also a source of employment and income, and can be 

attractive especially to tribal leaders if such forces are organized and financed 

using these leaders as the conduit, thereby enhancing the leadership’s authority and support. Of course, if accompanying economic 

projects complement the enhanced security provided 

by tribal militias, the buy-in of tribal leaderships and 

their followers would likely increase, with a synergistic impact on security and an inversely negative 

effect on AQAP. 

The United States can take advantage whenever 

possible of tribal tensions with AQAP, although such 

tensions may not always automatically translate to 

popularity for the United States, and not every tribe 

will be amenable to partnering with the United States. 

In fact, some tribes have remained neutral throughout the civil war. And, as one op-ed in the South Yemeni press pointed out 

recently, the image of a powerful United States pitted against a weak AQAP, 

in fact, has often won AQAP grudging popular respect for being able to 

survive in the unequal struggle.375 U.S. special forces can play an especially 

important role in this aspect of the war thanks to their extensive experience in training foreign forces, their range of expertise in combat functions, and their limited footprint—and the UAE government has reported 

that had already begun.376 As there is no real functioning national Yemeni 

government in place at this time, dealings with the tribal militias may have 

to be handled directly with the individual tribes or indirectly through the 

local warlords/military commanders in an area. However, one must also 

understand the limitations, as such militias function best when there is an 

effective complementary conventional force available. Special care must also 

be taken to ensure tribes do not use their militias for intertribal warfare 

instead of against AQAP. As a prospective Yemeni government emerges, 

understandably it may be wary of seeing the tribes strengthen, since they will 

compete with its authority and tighten the tribes’ chokehold over oil and gas, 

pipelines, electricity infrastructure. A new central government should then 

As this is a zerosum game, any 

development of 

tribal militias at 

the same time 

also represents a 

subtraction from 

the potential 

pool of assets for 

AQAP.
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JSOU Report 18-4

become the intermediate for building tribal militias. The special forces and 

the Hizam Amni that the UAE has built pretty much controls tribal militias, 

although this has often led to resentment in the pro-Hadi camp. Fears exist 

that such parallel forces could lead to the country’s partition and to further civil wars, as well as their use against the interests of the Hadi faction. 

The latter has called instead for their integration into the Hadi-controlled 

Army.377 Illustrative of the potential pitfalls of such forces, the UAE reportedly has raised these militias only among specific tribes and, when such 

forces have been used for political advantage by their sponsors—as the Hadi 

and Ahmar camps alleged in the UAE-backed Shabwa campaign in August 

2017—this can give rise to tensions within the coalition and even dispose 

rival tribes favorably to AQAP as a reaction.378

Shaping Operations

The Centrality of Intelligence

The current focus on what are often small, mobile, or ambiguous AQAP 

targets underscores the importance of reliable all-source actionable intelligence. Admittedly, as a result of the conflict, the United States lost its earlier 

permanent presence on the ground and assets used for intelligence collection.379 By and large, AQAP operates in areas that are under the coalition’s 

at least nominal control, which can still enable this process to some extent. 

The assets of SOF, in particular, can make a major contribution in collecting signals intelligence/human intelligence. Naturally, in Yemen’s volatile 

environment, U.S. forces must remain cautious with intelligence provided 

by local or regional sources, who may shape it to promote their own objectives. Similarly, operational security remains a challenge, given that multiple 

players and interests with cross-cutting loyalties are involved in operations, 

increasing the possibility of compromised intelligence and the loss of surprise, as the media suggested may have been the case with the January 2017 

SEAL raid.380

Air and Naval Strikes

Manned and unmanned airpower or drones, as well as missile strikes, have 

often been the U.S. weapon of choice in Yemen as a way to avoid a significant 

ground presence. And, recently there has been an upsurge in the tempo of 

drone strikes, with 80 such strikes reported in March and April 2017.381 Drone 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

strikes have often been a subject of controversy. On one hand, their use has 

made possible the targeting and successful elimination of individual AQAP 

cadres who would otherwise be largely immune, and they have forced AQAP 

leaders to restrict their movements. However, although drones cause far 

less collateral damage than would likely result from the use of less accurate 

manned aircraft, in the long run, the collateral damage drones cause from 

time to time may result in political harm to the Yemeni authorities’ efforts to 

establish their legitimacy and hurt the United States’ image, to the benefit of 

AQAP, which has certainly highlighted such collateral damage in its propaganda.382 As a senior Yemeni military officer in Ma’rib province pointed out, 

AQAP can be said to “hug” the population, whether as a conscious defensive 

policy or simply as a result of being integrated in local society, which makes 

collateral damage always a risk in such strikes.383 In one drone attack, one 

of Tariq al-Fadli’s sons was killed, probably as an ancillary rather than a 

principal target.384 Whether eliminating an insignificant AQAP member 

outweighed potentially angering the paramount shaykh of a tribal confederation and alienating wider swathes of the population may be questionable. 

In general, U.S. air strikes are not popular in Yemen, and local sources 

may even downplay the AQAP threat or exaggerate government success in 

order to avoid such strikes.385 As a member of parliament argued in October 

2012, “these air strikes pave the way for al-Qaeda and terrorism” and “induce 

many to join al-Qaeda.”386 Even the pro-Hadi media has raised concerns 

at times about U.S. strikes, noting that they cause “great fear” to the local 

population.387 U.S. planners have to perform an extensive calculus for each 

target in order to account for the second-order effects of such strikes, especially in light of the recent downstreaming of operational decision making 

to the military.388

Moreover, operationally there is limited control over the necessary subcontracted local agents who provide intelligence and apply tracking devices, 

which could result in the recruitment of children.389 As in any military operation, there is the element of chance, which is perhaps magnified by the remote 

command and control of drone strikes. In one reported case, an AQAP 

operative had sold his car after, unbeknownst to him, it had been tagged with 

a homing device, resulting in the new innocent car owner being targeted by a 

drone strike.390 Practical support among Yemenis for the drone program may 

also decrease if AQAP becomes more proficient in identifying and retaliating against those it believes to be collaborating and who are, for all intents 
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JSOU Report 18-4

and purposes, unprotected. When AQAP took the city of Jaar in December 

2015, for example, it executed a local commander who it accused of being 

a distributor for the United States drone homing devices to sub-agents.391

Various intelligence agencies appear to have had considerable success in 

generating intelligence for drone strikes by penetrating AQAP itself in the 

past, as indicated by the number of its own members that AQAP has executed 

over the years. AQAP has been trying to implement new operational security measures and such sources could dry up if AQAP counterintelligence 

improves.392

U.S. strikes on concentrations of AQAP fighters and operational centers 

of gravity are uncommon but are possible even without a large U.S. ground 

presence. What may have been a mixed manned and drone air strike against 

an AQAP training camp in March 2016, for example, reportedly resulted in 

some 70 militants killed.393 Training camps, in fact, may provide the most 

suitable force concentrations, with the presence of both recruits and harderto-replace trainers, for such strikes. Once AQAP forces are deployed to the 

field, especially at the front, they are likely to be collocated with other forces 

attached to the coalition in some way, risking friendly casualties, or nearby 

civilians. Although the availability of such targets and relevant intelligence 

may not always be forthcoming, one can create such force concentrations 

by targeting individuals or objectives that AQAP must mass to defend. U.S. 

Navy missile strikes have also been used and, again, may have the same costs 

and benefits as drone strikes. 

Manned Airborne and Seaborne Raids

When a presence on the ground is required such as to collect intelligence, 

target individuals, take prisoners, preempt an attack, or perform a rescue, 

forces with a limited footprint, high level of training, and ability to react in 

a timely manner to exploit opportunities with airborne or seaborne raids, 

such as the Marine Corps and SOF, are optimal. Recently, SOF have had the 

lead in Yemen.394 In particular, SOF make sense in this environment due 

to their ability to provide small, agile, and stealthy expeditionary forces in 

the form of flexible force packages with multiple capabilities that can act 

quickly can make a contribution to the overall effort in excess of the size of 

the forces committed. 

With raids too, collateral damage is a sensitive issue, and the January 2017 

airborne raid in which a SEAL was lost and a number of civilians died was 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

criticized openly across the entire political spectrum in Yemen. A subsequent 

less-publicized amphibious landing raid in Shabwa province in February 

2017 resulted in no clashes or casualties, although it is unclear whether the 

intent was to land in an unoccupied area or whether AQAP had received 

warning and left.395 Such raids clearly put AQAP on edge, as suggested by 

the fact that the latter’s leader Qasim al-Raymi—who may himself have been 

the target of the January 2017 raid—sought to adapt, and publicly propagate countermeasures for his followers soon thereafter.396 Al-Raymi identified intelligence to avoid being surprised as key to countering such raids, 

including by posting sentries for early warning, drafting contingency plans, 

avoiding moving out into the open, laying mines and IEDs, and allowing the 

attacker to approach in order to draw him into an ambush.397

It appears that such special forces air-land raids were becoming part of a 

recurring pattern of U.S. operations, with even two near-simultaneous raids 

on a single day in May 2017, well into Yemen’s interior.398 Operationally, the 

recent raids have been impressive, with the use of combined arms—including a variety of air assets such as Apache helicopters, an AC-130 gunship, 

and drones—and have achieved surprise.399 Such manned raids are subject 

to the same considerations of a cost-benefit calculation as drone strikes. 

Significantly, those killed and wounded in Ma’rib in one of the May 2017 

raids all belonged to the same tribe, which would indicate the level of AQAP’s 

penetration in tribal society. However, the tribe that insisted those killed did 

not belong to AQAP organized a large funeral for the victims, and criticized 

the Hadi authorities for their cooperation with the United States.400

Support to Regional Forces

U.S. advisers were on the ground in Yemen in May 2016, supporting UAE 

and Hadi’s troops, as were forces afloat in the area.401 UAE forces participated in a number of combined operations, such as several of the raids the 

United States has mounted.402 And, as part of the fight against AQAP in 

Yemen, Saudi Arabia reportedly has long hosted facilities for some of the 

U.S. drones that operate over Yemeni skies.403 Cooperation with Arab Coalition forces in Yemen should continue, but the focus should be specifically 

on countering AQAP rather than allowing such support to be diverted to 

other priorities. Moreover, care must be taken not to become identified with 

some controversial coalition practices that might be difficult to defend. For 
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JSOU Report 18-4

example, UAE-controlled forces have come under scrutiny from human 

rights organizations for their secret prisons in Yemen.404

Weakening AQAP by Changing the Operating Environment 

Simultaneously, the indirect approach of political action can have an even 

greater impact on the fight against AQAP. Looking toward the longer term, 

the objective should be to affect the environment in which AQAP operates 

by ending the war and promoting a more stable political system, as this is 

necessary in order to contain the jihadist threat and reduce AQAP’s room for 

maneuver within that environment. Indeed, in the case of Yemen, a gamechanger for dealing with AQAP would be promoting a viable political deal, 

one that would satisfy the principal mainstream combatants and reduce the 

foreign presence. Such a resolution would make AQAP less attractive as a 

cobelligerent and partner while at the same time increasing the incentive 

and ability of a restructured, more broadly-based, Yemeni government to 

pursue AQAP. 

In effect, as this study notes, perhaps AQAP’s greatest asset is its ability to 

promote itself as a cobelligerent for other players in the Yemeni conflict and 

its ability to provide functions that an absent government does not, such as 

protection, commercial dealings, and rudimentary judicial or public services. 

In a power vacuum made possible by conflict, the population’s concrete 

needs can supersede ideological qualms. The most dramatic impact on that 

score would probably occur at the strategic/political level, with a political 

agreement ending the war that deals AQAP out of the equation. Ending the 

conflict can provide a window to reestablish greater security and a semblance 

of governance that can make AQAP less relevant and less attractive as a 

partner. A key goal of such political-military measures to promote security 

is to isolate AQAP by peeling away the latter’s tribal allies and individuals 

who may have only an interest-based relationship with AQAP. This process 

of convincing AQAP’s allies and less committed members that their interests 

are better served elsewhere, or that the price of alliance with AQAP is too 

high, would not only degrade AQAP’s capability to do damage but would 

also make it a more vulnerable target by removing defensive layers of territory and population at its disposal. Of course, the operational and strategic 

levels of war are closely interconnected. Achieving such a political objective 

would thereby also facilitate U.S. kinetic operations against a weakened 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

adversary to marginalize the AQAP threat to a great extent. Conversely, 

U.S. kinetic operations targeting AQAP, now and in the future, can have a 

significant impact on preventing the latter from derailing a peace process 

and undermining a future Yemeni government. 

All wars must end, but how they end is influenced by the military balance 

on the ground. There is always an interplay between military and political 

activity, with players seeking to achieve as strong a position in the field as 

possible which can be leveraged into being able to negotiate a more advantageous political deal eventually. And, a belligerent’s cost-benefit calculus 

leading to war termination is to a great extent future-oriented. That is, assessing the likely cost of continuing a war is even more important than the cost 

incurred up to then.405 To be sure, international and local experts have considered various potential mechanisms for restructuring the country’s political system so as to foster stability.406 More important than the specific formal 

structures and institutions that would be introduced is for the international 

community to promote an informal consensus among Yemenis in which all 

mainstream players feel that at least their core interests are addressed and 

that they will have an equitable share in the country’s political and economic 

life, including in international reconstruction funds and aid, the economy, 

the government and the bureaucracy, and the military and security forces. 

At present, there is no one with country-wide 

legitimacy, nor even just within the Hadi bloc. 

For a post-settlement government to succeed, 

it must include the participation of all major 

mainstream warring parties representative of 

the society including the Ansar Allah, Islah, 

southern autonomists, various warlords, and 

the Saleh grouping who represent a significant 

part of the country’s population. The independent-minded and most consistent adversaries of AQAP, Ansar Allah, are motivated by 

domestic, rather than regional objectives, and 

it would be a mistake to view them simply as 

an Iranian proxy, although the war has made 

them need Tehran’s aid.407 Admittedly, whatever government emerges in the post-war period is likely to remain fractious 

and of limited effectiveness for some time to come. Yemen’s political scene 

For a post-settlement 

government to succeed, 

it must include the 

participation of all major 

mainstream warring 

parties representative of 

the society including the 

Ansar Allah, Islah, southern autonomists, various 

warlords, and the Saleh 

grouping who represent 

a significant part of the 

country’s population.
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JSOU Report 18-4

will continue to be characterized by the traditional roles of warlords, tribes, 

political parties, ideological movements, and factional struggles. While social 

and political change is a slow and imperfect process, a realistic expectation 

could be the reduction of conflict to a more manageable level, one where 

conflict, even if it occurs in peacetime, does so locally, sporadically, and at 

a much lower level. Such a situation would still be an improvement over the 

current wartime situation which has resulted in an unprecedented national 

disintegration resulting in the security vacuum that favors AQAP’s growth 

and activity. Even in a post-war scenario, the U.S. military, and especially 

SOF, will likely still play a key role using the same warfighting tools already 

in use, but now in a role supporting government forces as part of a continuing campaign against AQAP, even if the latter becomes weaker and more 

isolated than before.

At the strategic level, the United States should play an active role in promoting a negotiated settlement of Yemen’s civil war that would lead to such 

a national compact. Soon after the Arab Coalition’s intervention in Yemen, 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE were able to use their considerable international 

clout to craft and promote UN Resolution 2216 in April 2015, which focused 

on pressuring the Ansar Allah and Ali Abd Allah Saleh. The Arab Coalition and its local allies have used the document as the basis for negotiations, 

although interpreting it in a way that would entail a literal surrender of the 

other side, with its provisions for the Ansar Allah-Saleh to withdraw from 

areas under their control and to disarm, while providing no real guarantees 

for their future. The prospects for such a negotiated outcome may recede if 

the principal Arab Coalition players and their local allies believe that the 

international community, and especially the United States, will continue or 

even increase its military support for their position. In fact, in an apparent 

hardening of the Saudi position based on such considerations, in April 2017, 

Riyadh’s military spokesman excluded “the Rebels”—that is, the Ansar Allah 

and Saleh—from any future solution.408 If an elusive military victory were to 

be achieved one day by the Arab Coalition to then exclude communities that 

may account for a third of Yemen’s population, that would be destabilizing 

in the long-term and entrench grievances, ensuring that conflict reemerged 

in the future. The United States should exert an effort to convince Riyadh 

and Abu Dhabi that a continuation of the war is not in the interest of the 

region’s stability and security and that a negotiated compromise settlement 

is the most realistic option. The United States can wield considerable, and 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

probably decisive, leverage with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE as, realistically, without U.S. military support (including that of civilian military 

contractors) both countries would be hard-put to conduct sustained out-ofarea operations. In the public arena, of course, the UN has played and should 

continue to play a major facilitator role in peace negotiations, especially given 

its neutral image and the international political cover and legitimacy that it 

can provide to any deal on which the belligerents can agree. 

Promoting Economic Stabilization

While not necessarily the cause of AQAP’s emergence, Yemen’s precarious 

socioeconomic environment has certainly been conducive to its growth. As 

noted, AQAP has focused its recruitment on the country’s youth, plagued by 

unemployment and the high costs of housing and education, exacerbated by a 

collapsed state apparatus. AQAP’s ability to offer money, weapons, and food, 

has proved to be a powerful recruitment tool.409 A South Yemeni political 

activist linked “unemployment and deadly free time,” for the “overwhelming 

majority” of youth in Hadramawt, as rendering them “an easy morsel for 

recruitment” by AQAP, although he was careful to blame AQAP for being the 

cause of the unemployment, rather than politically sensitive official actors.410

Illustrative at the micro level, in one case a young Yemeni suicide bomber 

joined ISIS only after he had lost hope of finding work.411

Realistically, focusing on far-reaching, central government-oriented 

political and social change in the near term could be counterproductive by 

alienating pro-status quo forces such as the tribes and conservative religious 

elements. However, without a commitment to basic economic improvement 

and the extension of social services, best brought about by a joint and multinational effort of government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 

military success against AQAP may be temporary, and the latter is likely to 

endure and regenerate in some form. For 

success, reconstruction efforts must be 

sufficiently substantial and broad-based 

to benefit all mainstream actors. Otherwise, warlords may find it profitable for 

the fighting to continue or resume, seeing 

it preferable to collect the foreign wartime 

subsidies that make it profitable for a small number of individuals in charge 

to wage war. In the near term, in order to a reach even a modicum of stability, 

For success, reconstruction 

efforts must be sufficiently 

substantial and broad-based 

to benefit all mainstream 

actors.
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JSOU Report 18-4

what will be required is a large-scale humanitarian effort (with aid extended 

to all communities, not just to political allies), with a follow-on longer-term 

reconstruction program to rebuild the damage caused by the war to the 

country’s already inadequate infrastructure and failing economy. Widespread hunger bordering on famine resulting to a significant extent from 

a coalition blockade not only raises moral questions but also makes little 

strategic sense, and any worsening of the economy would only contribute 

further to instability and facilitate AQAP’s expansion.412

Yemenis across the spectrum have seen the availability of social services 

and the alleviation of poverty as important elements in reducing AQAP’s 

attractiveness. President Hadi acknowledged as much before taking power in 

2011: “If the government fails to tackle the issue of these areas being run by 

armed Islamists, they will continue to expand, as people are actually satisfied with their rule since they provide services to citizens including fuel and 

cooking gas and maintaining security, and that is what everybody is looking 

for.”413 Likewise, a former Yemeni minister of security noted that in order 

to effectively counteract the appeal of organizations such as AQAP and to 

“uproot terrorism,” what is needed is a more comprehensive approach which 

includes in addition to military and security means a “political, economic, 

educational, cultural, and media strategy.”414 Yemen’s massive economic 

challenges notwithstanding, even modest progress on this front can have a 

positive impact on security. As former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Edmund 

Hull noted during his tenure, pairing development with security helped: “we 

adopted a broad strategy that linked security with development. Our motto, 

which the Yemenis adopted to a remarkable extent was, ‘No development 

without security and no security without development.’”415 Not surprisingly, 

a rapid improvement in bringing public services, or even an administration, 

to most parts of the country is unlikely as long as the war continues. 

In this sector, neutral international agencies and NGOs can play a significant role in the provision and management of economic relief and social services, and the international community may have to adapt and work within 

Yemen’s society (instead of seeking to change it) and use traditional tribal 

and patronage organization to its advantage for an orderly process, while 

working to limit corruption. Humanitarian relief and economic development, as is true of political stabilization, also have an interactive relationship 

with security. For example, Yemen’s principal potential sources of income 

such as the oil and gas industry, tourism, fishing, agriculture, maritime 
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

traffic, and the export of labor to neighboring Gulf countries are all vulnerable to domestic instability and a lack of security. Here too, U.S. special 

forces can play a valuable role by providing the security cover that the aid 

process and economic development will require, especially as AQAP is likely 

to try to disrupt such stabilization efforts. Admittedly, it may be difficult to 

convince donors to provide adequate funding for reconstruction in Yemen, 

especially with oil income and the demand for Yemeni labor in the Gulf 

countries stagnant, and with Western countries dealing with multiple crisis 

zones. The United States can play a significant role by convincing potential 

regional donors that stability in Yemen is in their interest and, in the long 

run, far preferable and cheaper than having to deal with an unstable Yemen. 

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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Chapter 6. Conclusion

Based on the preceding study, a number of take-aways or conclusions 

can be drawn with respect to AQAP and the situation in Yemen.

First, AQAP continues to be a threat to U.S. interests affecting not only 

regional stability but, potentially, it could again also target the American 

homeland, as it has in the past. Not only political leaders, but also military 

planners, commanders, and instructors will have to continue dealing with 

AQAP for the foreseeable future. As such, a familiarity with the strategic and 

operational issues that confront the crafting of successful policy within that 

country’s challenging and unstable social, political, and physical environment will remain highly relevant.

Second, AQAP represents a complex problem, especially because of its 

success in embedding itself in Yemen’s political and social environment, 

including the country’s pervasive tribal structures. Taking advantage of 

the security and governance vacuum that has resulted from the conflict 

that has engulfed the country since 2015, AQAP has expanded its presence, 

capabilities, and influence, presenting itself as a useful cobelligerent, protector, or service provider to certain elements of Yemeni society. As long as 

the conditions that have favored it remain in place, dealing decisively with 

AQAP will be a challenge. 

Third, the ultimate objective should be to defeat AQAP and to achieve 

“victory,” but one has to define what that means in concrete terms. Given 

its current entrenchment in Yemen’s society and political life, it may not be 

possible to eradicate AQAP completely without also implementing difficult 

systemic political, economic, and social changes. Under the circumstances, 

victory in the near term may mean not so much AQAP’s elimination as 

its containment and management by reducing to the greatest extent possible, through continuous focused pressure and a change in its surrounding 

environment AQAP’s capabilities and the threat it poses, especially beyond 

Yemen’s borders. 

Fourth, SOF will play an especially important role in dealing with AQAP. 

In particular, given the drawbacks of any large and long-term U.S. military 

commitment in Yemen that could lead to the United States itself becoming 

a player in the local political system, SOF, with their versatility, agility, and 
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ability to have a disproportionate impact in similar situations, is likely to be 

the option of choice to deal with military threats emanating in that country. 

Their small footprint, ability to enter and exit an operational zone quickly, 

experience working with foreign forces, and jointness provide the optimal 

mix of capabilities needed to deal with an elusive adversary while avoiding 

deeper entanglements. 

Fifth, Yemenis themselves are best positioned to deal with AQAP, provided they see it is in their interest to do so and they have the resources to 

deal with that issue. Ending the current war should be a priority to counter 

the security vacuum that has enabled AQAP’s expansion. The United States 

should play an active role in promoting a settlement of Yemen’s civil war by 

promoting a negotiated consensus among Yemenis in which all mainstream 

players feel that their core interests are addressed and that they will have 

an equitable share in the country’s political and economic life, including in 

international reconstruction funds and aid, the economy, the government 

and the bureaucracy, and the military and security forces. As part of this 

process, the United States should exert an effort to convince Riyadh and Abu 

Dhabi that a continuation of the war is not in the interest of the region’s stability and security and that a negotiated compromise settlement is the most 

realistic option. A plausible expectation with a negotiated settlement could be 

the reduction of conflict to a more manageable level, one where conflict, even 

if it occurs in peacetime, does so locally, sporadically, and at a much lower 

level. Such a situation would be an improvement over the current wartime 

situation which has led to an unprecedented national disintegration resulting 

in the security vacuum that favors AQAP’s growth and activity. And, a new 

Yemeni government, with U.S. and international support, would be able to 

devote a greater effort to countering AQAP. 

An Update

As an update to the current study, the Yemeni civil war was marked by 

discontinuities that at the time appeared to be potentially significant for 

the overarching strategic framework of the war, as well as for the subordinate fight against AQAP but that, in the end, proved to conform to existing patterns or to not be decisive. In terms of the strategic conduct of the 

current war in Yemen, two principal factors can be noted. While political 

gambits and military operations had dragged on indecisively, some in the 
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Arab Coalition believed there were indications heralding a decisive change 

in the dynamics of the war—former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s decision 

to switch sides, and the campaign along Yemen’s west coast whose objective 

was to cut off the Ansar Allah (Houthis) from the sea.

Specifically, in early December 2017, former President Saleh broke openly 

with his erstwhile Ansar Allah allies, apparently as part of a deal reached 

with the Arab Coalition, leading to armed clashes in Sanaa.416 Literally overnight, the Saudi and United Arab Emirates (UAE) press that had routinely 

called Saleh “the deposed one,” “the good-for-nothing,” “criminal,” and 

worse, began to refer to him respectfully as “the former president.” The 

Saudis looked forward to renewing their longstanding relationship with 

Saleh, with one retired senior military officer contrasting President Abd 

Rabbu Hadi’s inept officials (“hotel staff [good only] for sleeping and traveling”) with what he saw as a powerful Saleh.417 The Saudi and UAE media 

characterized Saleh’s shift as “the blessed uprising,” “a popular uprising,” and 

“a historic moment.” The Arab Coalition appeared to succumb to excessive 

optimism, with the Saudi media speaking openly of “victory fever,” predicting that Sanaa would soon be “liberated,” that the war would end rapidly 

in victory, and that the Ansar Allah movement would disappear forever, as 

Saleh was “the key player” and had now changed the balance of power.418

In the event, such calculations turned out to be grossly mistaken, as 

Saleh’s personal coalition had been eroding over time and splintered even 

before he was killed a few days after changing sides, with probably the majority of his Republican Guard tribal networks, General People’s Congress 

Party, and extended family continuing their alliance with the Ansar Allah 

or remained neutral, rather than joining Saleh in switching to the Arab 

Coalition, despite the latter’s attempts to provide support in the form of air 

strikes and air drops of equipment.419 Strangely, coordinated and optimistic 

Saudi press assessments continued to appear, even the day the same newspapers announced Saleh’s death and into the following day, that were clearly 

indicating Riyadh had been taken aback in its estimates.420 Instead of the 

expected rapid decisive victory for the coalition, the outlook appeared to be 

for the war of attrition to continue.421

Second, the Arab Coalition—perhaps to compensate for the disappointment with the outcome of the Saleh gambit—in December 2017 immediately 

following Saleh’s death launched what in this case was a largely UAE-run 

campaign in the Western coastal theater, using mostly South Yemeni and 
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Sudanese forces, in a bid to take Hodeidah, the Ansar Allah’s main remaining port. Despite initial gains, touted by UAE military sources as “spectacular 

advances” and “significant rapid victories,” and the promise of “a major shift 

in the balance of forces in the theater” within days, by the end of the month 

the advance had stalled, as what was now a more cohesive Ansar Allah coalition mounted a stubborn defense, inflicting significant casualties on their 

adversaries.422 To be sure, the coalition did impose an even tighter blockade 

which has, if anything, worsened Yemen’s ongoing severe humanitarian 

crisis without proving decisive.423

In terms of the focus of this study, neither did the basic dynamics of the 

fight against AQAP change, as existing patterns have continued. Over the 

fall of 2017, the UAE-controlled Hizam Amni and Nukhba (special forces) 

expanded in South Yemen’s Shabwa and Abyan provinces in a pattern similar to that employed earlier in other provinces. As one senior officer of the 

UAE-run Hizam Amni forces claimed, the operations were a “great success” 

and proclaimed the provinces clear of terrorist groups.424 Indeed, the UAE 

media characterized these operations as “lightning-quick thrusts” leading to 

“genuine victories” that had resulted in the defeat of terrorism in Yemen.425

As before, the local media indicated there was apparently no resistance or 

significant engagements, with AQAP melting away and repositioning to 

nearby mountain villages and camps and tribes, retaining its force structure, 

equipment, and organization, with even the “dozens” claimed as killed or 

detained probably inflated.426 In terms of captured equipment, all that even 

the UAE-controlled local media could show as booty in photographs were 

a few old light weapons that had apparently been in caches.427 Some AQAP 

members reportedly went to fight at the fronts, including to the developing 

Western Coast front, apparently as part of the government forces.428

Confident assessments notwithstanding, AQAP seemed to retain a presence even in the affected provinces, continuing small-scale ambushes, raids, 

and repositioning.429 Endemic problems affecting the efficiency of Yemeni 

forces remained unresolved, and have included recent instances of army 

personnel selling their weapons to AQAP or to the Ansar Allah after not 

receiving their pay for months.430

Significantly, the coalition’s focus of effort (as well as that of AQAP) may 

still be against the Ansar Allah and on the rivalry among local warlords 

supported by different political leaders and regional powers more than on 

AQAP, diluting the fight against the latter. Characteristically, pro-Hadi Army 
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forces stressed to the Saudi press that their expansion into Shabwa province 

would enable “clearing out the Houthi rebellious militias.”431 Likewise, tensions flared over control of oil and gas facilities, checkpoints, and roads in 

the affected provinces and elsewhere between the expanding UAE-backed 

forces and those supporting President Hadi, General Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar, 

or local warlords.432 The recent coalition coastal campaign, if anything, at 

least indirectly, may have diverted the focus further from operations against 

AQAP, requiring the redeployment of additional ground forces from other 

theaters in South Yemen as progress slowed on the ground.433 The United 

States, for its part, has conducted frequent strikes—more than 120 air 

strikes in 2017—keeping AQAP off-balance and hampering its effectiveness, 

although these have not been decisive, and pro-coalition elements in Yemen 

have complained of civilian collateral casualties.434

Overall, the author believes the dynamics identified when the preceding 

study was written remain valid. 

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Appendix: Yemeni Media Guide 

In Yemen, the media became almost universally polarized after the civil 

war escalated in March 2015, even if outlets had been independent previously, with the major warring parties and countries such as Saudi Arabia, 

the UAE, and Qatar establishing varying degrees of control. This appendix 

indicates the current principal affiliation of media sources, although even 

within each major bloc the center of mass of identification may be different. 

For example, while media that is pro-Hadi automatically is also pro-Saudi 

Arabia, the degree of affinity to each patron may differ. And, a source’s 

orientation can change for political or financial reasons. With the demise 

of Ali Abd Allah Saleh, the media loyal to him was either taken over by the 

Ansar Allah or shut down. 

26 Sibtimbir pro-Ansar Allah-Saleh, Army newspaper

Aden Al-Ghad pro-Coalition

Aden Al-Hadath pro-UAE

Aden Observer pro-South Yemen independence

Aden Hurra pro-South independence

Aden Post initially pro-UAE, later pro-Saudi

Aden Time pro-UAE

Akhbar Aden defunct

Akhbar Al-An pro-Arab Coalition

Akhbar Al-Saa pro-Hadi, pro-Saudi

Akhbar Al-Yawm General Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar

Al-Arabi pro-Qatar

Bawwabat Hadramawt 

Al-Ikhbariya pro-UAE

Al-Bayda’ Press pro-Coalition
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Bilqis TV Islah Party

Bu Yemen News Net pro-Saudi

Al-Dali News pro-Hadi

Al-Fajr Al-Jadid pro-UAE

Al-Ghad Al-Mushriq TV pro-UAE

Hadramawt.net pro-Hadi, defunct

Hayat Aden pro-Saudi

Hisad Al-Yawm pro-Saleh

Huna Aden pro-Hadi

Huna Taizz pro-Saleh

Iqlim Aden pro-Saudi

Al-Janub Al-Jadid pro-Qatar

Al-Janub Al-Yawm pro-Hadi

Al-Janubiya Net pro-Qatar

Al-Jumhuriya neutral, now defunct

Al-Khabar pro-Qatar

Khabar News Agency pro-Saleh

Lahij News pro-Ansar Allah-Saleh

Madad News Agency AQAP

Malahim News Agency AQAP

Mandab Press pro-Hadi

Ma’rib Press Islah Party

Marsad News Agency pro-Saleh

Al-Masa’ Press pro-Saleh
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Al-Masdar pro-Hadi

Al-Mashhad Al-Janubi pro-Qatar

Al-Mashhad Al-Yamani pro-Hadi

Al-Masila Press pro-UAE

Al-Masra AQAP

Al-Mawqi Post pro-Hadi

Al-Mithaq pro-Saleh

Al-Mukalla Al-An pro-UAE

Al-Mukalla Al-Yawm pro-UAE

Al-Muntasif pro-Ansar Allah

Al-Murasil leans toward Ansar Allah

Al-Mushahid pro-Hadi

Al-Mustaqbal pro-Saleh

Mutabaat pro-Ansar Allah

Najm Al-Mukalla pro-UAE

Nashwan News pro-Qatar

Nas Times pro-Qatar

Qari Net pro-Hadi

Al-Ra’y Press pro-Hadi

Radfan Press pro-Saleh

Rasd 24 pro-Hadi

Saba’ News Agency pro-Ansar Allah-Saleh

Sada Aden: London pro-Saudi 

Sada Al-Malahim AQAP 
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JSOU Report 18-4

Al-Sahwa Islah Party

Sawt Al-Janub pro-Qatar

Sawt Saba’ pro-Saleh

Shabwa Al-Hadath pro-Qatar

Shabwa Press pro-UAE

Al-Taghyir pro-Hadi

Taqrir Ikhbari AQAP

Thawrat Shabab Al-Taghyir early neutral, now defunct

Al-Umana’ pro-Hadi

Al-Wasat neutral, later pro-Ansar Allah-Saleh

Wifaq Press pro-Ansar Allah

Yafa News pro-Hadi

Yaman 24 pro-Hadi

Al-Yaman Al-Arabi initially pro-Saudi, later pro-UAE

Al-Yaman Al-Said pro-Qatar

Al-Yaman Al-Jadid pro-Saudi

Al-Yaman Al-Yawm pro-Saleh

Yamanat pro-Saleh

Al-Yamani Al-Jadid pro-Hadi

Yamaniyun pro-Saleh

Al-Yawm Al-Thamin pro-UAE

Yemen Monitor pro-Hadi

Yemen Press pro-Saudi

Yemen Times pro-Hadi

Yemen Voice pro-Hadi, pro-Saudi
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Endnotes

1. Barbara Starr and Rene Marsh, “AQAP Trying to Hide Explosives in Laptop Batteries, Official Says,” CNN, 22 March 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/03/21/politics/

electronics-ban-devices-explosives-intelligence; and Qasim Al-Raymi video 

“Mujahid munfarid am jaysh fi mujahid” [A lone-wolf mujahid or an army of 

one], May 2017, www.okaz.com.sa/article/1053116.

2. Mitib Al-Awad, “Mashru al-qarn al-saudi qanat tarbut Al-Khalij bi-Bahr AlArab badilan li-Hurmuz” [The project of the Saudi century is a canal that will 

link the Gulf with the Arabian Sea instead of Hormuz], Ukaz (Jeddah), 19 April 

2016, http://okaz.co/bwKOddFpA.

3. The Ansar Allah belong to the Zaydi sect, an offshoot of the Shia, but are now 

closer to the Sunnis than to the Shia of Iran in terms of theology and religious 

law.

4. International Crisis Group, Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New 

Conflict? Middle East Report 139, Brussels, 4 April 2013, 29.

5. Hani Ahmad Al-Duraydi, Al-Madkhal li’l-thaqafa al-askariya [Introduction to 

military science] (Minbar Al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad, n.d.) 10, 11.

6. Nasr bin Ali al-Anisi, Al-Istratijiya al-askariya [Military strategy] (Al-Malahim, 

2014) 7.

7. al-Anisi, Al-Istratijiya al-askariya [Military strategy], 9.

8. al-Anisi, Al-Istratijiya al-askariya [Military strategy], 8.

9. In 2014, for example, the Ansar Allah and the conservative hardline Sunni Salafis 

signed an agreement of peaceful coexistence despite earlier conflict, “Al-Kashf an 

wathiqat taayush wa-ikha’ sirriya waqqaha al-salafiyun ma al-huthiyin” [Secret 

document revealed that the Salafis signed along with the Houthis on coexistence 

and brotherhood], Hayat Aden, 11 July 2014, https://www.adenlife.net/news26281.

html.

10. “Al-Yaman tanfi taliq amaliyat mukafahat al-irhab bi’l-taawun ma Amrika” 

[Yemen denies it is suspending counterterrorist operations in cooperation with 

America], Iram News (Abu Dhabi), 9 February 2017, www.eremnews.com/news/

arab-world/yemen/717976.

11. Qasim Al-Raymi, “Mafahim” [Concepts], transcript of a video lecture, Mu’assasat 

Al-Tahaya, 26 May 2015, http://justapaste.it/ml71 (website since removed).

12. Al-Raymi, “Mafahim” [Concepts].

13. “Washintun tudif Ansar Al-Sharia fi Al-Yaman ila qa’imatha li’l-munazhzhamat 

al-irhabiya” [Washington adds the Ansar Al-Sharia in Yemen to its list of terrorist 

organizations], Al-Waqi (al-Qaeda), November–December 2012, 21.

14. Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel, “Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists 

and Tribesfolk in Yemen,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 27, 4 
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JSOU Report 18-4

(November 1995), 405–31; and Elham M. Manea, “Yemen, the Tribe and the 

State,” (paper presented to the International Colloquium on Islam and Social 

Change at the University of Lausanne on 10–11 October 1996), http://al-bab.

com/yemen-tribe-and-state.

15. “The Past Week in an Hour” program, UAE TV (Abu Dhabi), 2 April 2016.

16. Interview with Khalid Abd al-Nabi (Abu al-Basir al-Yazidi) by Abd al-Khaliq 

al-Hud, “Al-Zaim al-mutatarrif Khalid Abd l-Nabi: Natawahhad ma Al-Qaida 

fi al-hadaf wa’l-mutaqad” [The extremist leader Khalid Abd Al-Nabi: we are one 

with al-Qaeda in our objectives and beliefs], Aden Al-Ghad, 6 April 2011, www.

samaa-news.net/news4729.html.

17. Abu Basir Nasir al-Wuhayshi, “Wa-yamkuruna wa-yamkuru Allah” [They plot 

and plan and God too plans], 27 November 2009, transcript at http://forums.

ibb7.com/ibb49428.html.

18. Shaykh Arfaj bin Hamad Bin Hadban quoted in “Qaba’il Al-Yemen tarfud an tatahawwal ila adat fi al-harb ala Al-Qaida” [Yemen’s tribes refuse to be transformed 

into a tool in the government’s war against al-Qaeda], Al-Wasat (Manama), 9 

January 2010, www.alwasatnews.com/news/362750.html.

19. Muadh Munsir, “Al-Shaykh Saleh bin Nasir Al-Ahmar: Al-Saudiya khasarat 

alaqatha bi-mashayikh al-qaba’il” [Shaykh Saleh bin Nasir al-Ahmar: Saudi 

Arabia has lost its relations with the tribal shaykhs], Al-Arabi, 12 March 2017, 

https://www.al-arabi.com/Dialogue/11038.

20. “Al-Urf al-qabali yafudd nizaat al-yamaniyin” [Traditional tribal law settles the 

Yemenis’ disputes], Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, 24 July 2017.

21. “Qabilat Al-Jaadina fi Abyan tulin ta’yidha li-qararat al-ra’is Hadi” [The AlJaadina tribe in Abyan declares its endorsement of President Hadi’s decrees], 

Aden Al-Ghad, 29 April 2017, http://adenalgd.net/news/256831; and “Qabilat AlMaraqisha tastankir istihdaf al-shariya li’l-rumuz al-janubiya” [The Al-Maraqisha 

tribe condemns the targeting of prominent southerners by the legitimate government], Shabwa Press, 3 May 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/42966.

22. Abu Sufyan al-Azdi, “Radd al-udwan al-salibi” [Repelling the Crusaders’ aggression], 2010, Al-Falluja website, http://202.71.102.68/~alfaloj/vb/showthread.

pho?p=725409 (website since removed). 

23. Abd Allah Al-Arifaj, “Shaykh Al-Awaliq li-Ukaz: Mulhim al-Qaida taliq fi 

jibal Shabwa wa-al-amn yalam bi-taharrukatih” [Shaykh Al-Awaliq to Ukaz: 

Al-Qaeda’s spiritual guide is on his own in the mountains of Shabwa and the 

security forces know his movements], Ukaz, 8 April 2010.

24. Interview with Nasr al-Anisi by Abd Al-Razzaq Al-Jamal, “Al-Qiyadi fi al-Qaida 

Nasr al-Anisi li’l-Wasat: Al-Tadakhkhul al-ajnabi mawjud mundh uqud wa’lmubadara al-khalijiya ajhadat al-thawra” [The al-Qaeda leader Nasr al-Anisi 

to Al-Wasat: Foreign interference has been present for decades and the Gulf 

initiative aborted the revolution], Al-Wasat, 13 November 2013, www.alwasat-ye.

net/?ac=3&no=37595.
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25. Muhammad Al-Ghibari, “Tafajjur al-qital fi Sada wa-jamaat Al-Houthi taqsif 

Dammaj” [The outbreak of fighting in Sada and the Houthi organization 

shells Dammaj], Al-Bayan, 3 November 2013, www.albayan.ae/one-world/

arabs/2013-11-03-1.1991680.

26. “Al-Qaida tulin sahb anasirha al-shimaliya min muhafazhat al-janub” [Al-Qaeda 

announces the withdrawal of its northern members from the Southern Provinces], 

Aden Al-Ghad, 21 September 2012, http://adenalghad.net/print/news/17869.htm.

27. For perceptive studies on this facet, see W. Andrew Terrill, The Conflicts in 

Yemen and U.S. National Security (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2011); 

and Alistair Harris, Exploiting Grievances; Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), http://

carnegieendowment.org/files/exploiting_grievances.pdf.

28. “Li-madha tantaish al-jamaat al-irhabiya fi mintaqat Al-Maraqisha bi-Abyan?” 

[Why do terrorist groups survive in the Al-Maraqisha Area of Abyan?], Al-Mawqi 

Post, 30 March 2017, http://almawqea.net/reports/18193.

29. “Thaman ghadab maqtal wa-isabat 30 unsuran min quwwat Hadi fi Al-Mutun 

bi’l-Jawf” [The killing and wounding of 30 of Hadi’s forces in Al-Mutun in Al-Jawf 

is the price of anger], Al-Murasil, 24 February 2017, www.almrasel.net/?p=15751.

30. “Wast tahliq li’l-tayaran al-saudi qaba’il yamaniya shimaliya tuhajim al-hudud 

al-saudiya wa-taqtali alamat tarsim al-hudud” [Amid Saudi aircraft sorties, 

northern Yemeni tribes attack the Saudi border and remove border demarcation 

markers], Yafa News, 2 September 2013.

31. For a brief background on the conflict and the warring parties, see “Yemen 

Crisis: Who Is Fighting Whom?” BBC, 28 March 2017, www.bbc.com/news/

world-middle-east-29319423; and Ali al-Dhahab, “Yemen’s Warring Parties: 

Formations and Dynamics,” Aljazeera Centre for Studies (Doha), 30 June 2016, 

http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/06/yemens-warring-parties-formations-dynamics-160630100544525.html.

32. For background on the formation of Yemen’s political system over the years, see 

Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Robert D. Burrowes, “The Yemen Arab Republic and the Ali 

Abdallah Saleh Regime: 1978–1984,” The Middle East Journal, 39, 3 (Summer 

1985), 287–316; and Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway, eds., Yemen on the 

Brink (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).

33. Amir Al-Naawi, “Muaskarat al-tahaluf la tuqawim al-bitala: shabab al-janub bi-la 

amal” [The coalition’s military camps do not have an impact on unemployment: 

the youth of the south have no work], Al-Arabi, 14 April 2017, https://al-arabi.

com/Issues/11951.

34. A particularly insightful policy study on that period is that by W. Andrew Terrill, 

The Struggle for Yemen and the Challenge of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2013).

35. “Al-Qaida tulin wuqufha ila janib al-salafiyin fi Dammaj didd al-Houthiyin 

raghm ida’ihim laha” [Al-Qaeda announces its support for the Salafis in Dammaj 
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against the Houthis despite the fact that the former are al-Qaeda’s foes], Haqq 

News Agency (then al-Qaida), 15 November 2013, www.dawaalhaq.com/?p=8080; 

“Al-Salfiyun yurahhibun bi-shidda tadamun Al-Qaida mahum wa-yatabirunahu 

nusra li-Dammaj” [The Salafis heartily welcome al-Qaeda’s solidarity with them 

and consider it as help for Dammaj], Thawrat Shabab Al-Taghyir, 13 November 

2013.

36. “Bad ayyam min tafjir al-Houthiyin mabna sakniyan wa-mahallat tijariya bi’lmadina qatilan wa-7 jarha fi hujum li-musallahin ala mushayyiin fi ihda maqabir 

Rida” [A few days after the Houthis blew up a house and shops in the city two 

dead and seven wounded in an attack by gunmen on mourners in one of Rida’s 

cemeteries], Akhbar Al-Yawm, 9 September 2014.

37. AQAP, “Fatwa li’l-lajna al-shariya li-tanzhim Qaidat Al-Jihad fi Jazirat Al-Arab 

bi-sha’n qital al-shia al-Houthiyin fi janub Al-Jazira Al-Arabiya” [Fatwa from 

the legal committee of AQAP on the subject of fighting the Houthi Shia in the 

southern part of the Arabian Peninsula], Al-Haqq News Agency, 9 November 

2014.

38. “Al-Qaida takhruj alanan fi Rida fi zhill ghiyab al-amn wa-tatawaad musallahi 

al-Houthi bi-jazz al-ru’us” [Al-Qaeda emerge into the open in rida in the absence 

of the police and threatens the houthi fighters it will cut off their heads], Al-Wasat, 

25 September 2014, http://alwasat-ye.net/index.php?ac=3&no+40317&d_f=38&t_

f=0&t=5&lang_in=Ar; and “Tanzhim Al-Qaida yakshif sabab al-insihab min 

mintaqat Al-Manasih bad muwajahat ma al-Houthiyin” [Al-Qaeda reveals the 

reasons for its withdrawal form the Al-Manasih area following clashes with the 

Houthis], Shabakat Al-Jihad Al-Alami forum (al-Qaeda), 27 October 2014.

39. “Anba’ an iqtiham milishiyat al-Houthi li-ahad maaqil tanzhim Al-Qaida fi Rida” 

[News of Al-Houthi militias’ invasion of one of al-Qaeda’s strongholds in Rida], 

Shabakat Al-Jihad Al-Alami al-Qaeda site, 27 October 2014.

40. Interview with Nasr bin Ali al-Anisi, Al-Malahim News Agency, November 2014, 

Shabakat Al-Jihad Al-Alami al-Qaeda site.

41. Interview with Sad bin Atif Al-Awlaqi, “Al-Masra fi hiwar jadid ma al-qa’id Sad 

bin Atif Al-Awlaqi ahad qadat Ansar Al-Sharia fi Al-Yaman” [New interview 

by Al-Masra with the commander Sad bin Atif Al-Awlaqi, one of the Ansar AlSharia Leaders in Yemen], Al-Masra, 4 April 2016, 4.

42. Communique “Nida’ li-ahl al-sunna fi Yaman al-iman wa’l-hikma” [Appeal to 

the Sunnis of pious and wise Yemen], 9 March 2017, Al-Izza site (al-Qaida), www.

alizzaa.com/showthread.php?359.

43. Dhuwayzin Mukhshif, “Abd Al-Latif Al-Sayyid,” and interview with Abd AlLatif Al-Sayyid “Abd Al-Latif Al-Sayyid yakshif li-awwal marra: Hadhihi asbab 

insihabna min Adan qabl wusul al-Houthiyin” [Abd Al-Latif Al-Sayyid reveals 

for the first time: these are the reasons for our withdrawal from Aden before the 

Houthis arrived], BuYemen News Net, 31 March 2016, www.buyemen.com/print.

php?id=25209.
91

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

44. “Khiyarat jadida li’l-Qaida bad muwajahat al-qaba’il fi Ma’rib: Al-Qiyadat 

al-askariya wa’l-Houthiyin ahdaf jadida fi marma tanzhim Al-Qaida” [New 

options for al-Qaeda after no longer confronting the tribes in Ma’rib: military 

commanders and the Houthis are the new targets for al-Qaeda], Ma’rib Press, 

16 December 2012, http://marebpress.net/nprint.php?sid=49953.

45. “Al-Qaida tu’akkid maqtal Al-Wuhayshi wa-tuwalli Al-Raymi wa-tuhaddid 

Amrika: Mat al-nabi fa-ma intaha al-islam” [Al-Qaeda confirms the killing of 

al-Wuhayshi and appoints Al-Raymi and threatens America: The prophet died 

but Islam did not disappear], CNN in Arabic, 16 June 2015, http://arabic.cnn.

com/middleeast/2015/06/16/al-qaeda-leader-killed-confirmation; and “Ishtibakat 

bay anasir Al-Qaida wa’l-houthiyin fi muhafazhat Al-Bayda’” [Clashes between 

al-Qaeda elements and the Houthis in Al-Bayda’ province], Wifaq Press, 5 August 

2015, http://wefaqpress.net/news_details.php?sid=27416&lng=arabic.

46. “Yemen Conflict: Al-Qaeda joins coalition battle for Taizz,” BBC, 22 February 

2016, www.bbc/news/world-middle-east-35630194; “Taizz: 30 qatil min almurtaziqa baynhum athnayn min qiyadat Al-Qaida wa-amid Al-Awni” [Taizz: 

30 mercenaries killed including two al-Qaeda leaders and brigadier Al-Awni], 

Mutabaat, 19 March 2016, www.motabat.com/?p=24981; “Maqtal abraz qiyadi fi 

tanzhim Al-Qaida bi-Taizz” [Al-Qaeda’s most prominent commander in Taizz 

killed], Uyun Al-Khalij (Cairo), 5 February 2017, https://www.gulfeyes.net/

Al-Ymn/1190436.html; “Abu Abd Al-Rahman Al-Shihri yusallib khusumah wayaslahhum fi Taizz” [Abu Abd Al-Rahman Al-Shihri crucifies and car-drags his 

opponents in Taizz], Al-Ra’i (Kuwait), 22 November 2016, http://m.alraimedia.

com/Home/Details?Id=c5ec0d4c-fbef-4c32-825f-32f4931a49cb; Abu Ahmad AlMaliki, “23 tanzhiman irhabiyan tanhish Taizz wa-tuhaddid amn al-mintaqa” 

[23 terrorist groups are tearing Taizz apart and threaten the area’s security], AlMithaq, 30 August 2016, www.almethaq.net/news/print.php?id=47087 (website 

since removed); and video from November 2015, https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=Ap6uSDa202E (website since removed).

47. “Al-Tafasil al-kamila li-saytarat wa-intishar Al-Qaida fi al-madina; al-tahaluf yusirr ala al-nukran; rayat Al-Qaidatuzhallil Adan” [Complete details 

of al-Qaeda’s control and expansion in the city; The coalition insists on denials; Al-Qaeda banners fly over Aden], Masa’ Press, 26 August 2015, http://

masapress.net/news/5316 (website since removed); and Maria Abi-Habib and 

Mohammed Al-Kibsi, “Al Qaeda Fights on Same Side as Saudi-Backed Militias 

in Yemen,” Wall Street Journal, 16 July 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/

al-qaeda-fights-on-same-side-as-saudi-backed-militias-in-yemen-1437087067.

48. Interview with Khalid BaTarfi, “Liqa’ shamil ma al-shaykh Khalid BaTarfi al-qiyadi 

fi jamaat Ansar Al-Sharia fi Al-Yaman” [Far-ranging interview with Shaykh Khalid 

BaTarfi, a leader of the Ansar Al-Sharia organization in Yemen], Al-Arin website 

(al-Qaeda), 9 September 2015, http://al-aren.com/vb/showthread.php?t=11427 

website removed (website since removed); and “Lan yantashir Ansar Al-Sharia 

fi Abyan mujaddadan wa-lan tataarrad Abyan li-darbat amrikiya” [The Ansar 

Al-Sharia will not expand in Abyan again and Abyan will not be subjected to 
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JSOU Report 18-4

american strikes], Al-Umana’, 2 February 2017, www.alomanaa.net/news50078.

html.

49. “Li-madha hukumat Hadi tujbir al-hizam al-amni taqdim tanazulat li-anasir 

tanzhim Al-Qaida fi Abyan?” [Why does the Hadi government force the hizam 

amni to make concessions to al-Qaeda Elements in Abyan?], Al-Mashhad AlJanubi, 8 February 2017, www.salmashhad.com/news/12313.

50. “Insihab Al-Qaida min Azzan: safqa jadida?” [Al-Qaeda’s withdrawal from Azzan: 

Another deal?], Aden Al-Ghad, 12 August 2016, www.adengd.net/news/216280.

51. Hussam Al-Amawi,”Kayf najahat Al-Qaida bi-ifshal al-mukhattat al-amriki fi 

Al-Yaman?” [How did al-Qaeda succeed in foiling the American plan in Yemen?], 

May 2016, https://justpaste.it/u55r.

52. “Hal yara al-liwa’ Khasruf bi-ann al-shaykh Al-Dhahab kan irhabiyan? Wa-ma 

alaqathu bi’l-shariya?” [Does Major General Khasruf believe that Shaykh AlDhahab was a terrorist? And what is his relationship to the legal government?], 

Al-Mashhad Al-Yamani, 29 January 2017, www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/66879.

53. Interview with Qasim Al-Raymi, “Hiwar ma al-shaykh Qasim Al-Raymi” [Interview with Shaykh Qasim Al-Raymi], Al-Malahim News Agency, March 2017, 

published April 2017, 9.

54. “Qiyadi ikhwani ta’ib: Ikhwan Al-Yemen khazin istratiji li’l-Qaida” [A repentant 

brotherhood leader: Yemen’s brothers are al-Qaeda’s strategic reserve], Al-Arab 

(London, UAE-owned), 10 March 2014, www.alarab.co.uk/?id=17336.

55. “Asliha wa-amwal al-udwan yuwassian min intishar Al-Qaida wa-DAESH” [Arms 

and funds from the aggression help al-Qaeda and ISIS Expand], Al-Masa’ Press, 

3 December 2015, http://masapress.net/news/6110 (website since removed).

56. “Ansar Al-Sharia ma ikhwanihim min al-qaba’il yaqudun harb istinzaf did AlHouthiyin” [The Ansar Al-Sharia together with their brothers from the tribes 

are carrying out a war of attrition against the Houthis], Al-Masra, n. 1, 1 January 

2016, 2; and “Al-Mujahidun ma abna’ al-qaba’il yusaytirun ala manatiq istratijiya 

fi wilayat Taizz” [The mujahidin together with tribesmen take control of strategic 

positions in Taizz Wilaya], Al-Masra, n. 7, 14 March 2016, 8.

57. Khalid BaTarfi, “Hiwar ma al-qiyadi.”

58. “Muqawamat Al-Bayda’ wa’l-Qaida bayn al-ilam wa’l-waqi” [The resistance in 

Al-Bayda’ and al-Qaeda: the media versus the reality], Al-Ra’i Press (Hadi), 17 

April 2017, www.alraipress.com/news38462.html.

59. Interview with Abu Harun Al-Yafai by Yasir Al-Yafai, “Al-Qiyadi fi jabhat BalahAl-Anad Abu Harun Al-Yafai fi hiwar ma Yafa News” [The commander on the 

Balah-Al-Anad Front, Abu Harun Al-Yafai , in an interview with Yafa News], 

Yafa News, 20 July 2015, http://yafa-news.net/archives/150709; “Lahij: Maqtal 

20 min anasir Al-Qaida wa-murtaziqa al-udwan fi manatiq Balah wa’l-Husayni 

wa’l-Anad” [Lahij: 20 members of al-Qaeda and the aggressor’s mercenaries killed 

in the areas of Balah, Al-Husayni, and Al-Anad], Mutabaat (Ansar Allah), 6 July 

2015, www.motabaat.com/?p=9076.
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

60. “Fadiha li’l-shariya: Amir tanzhim Al-Qaida bi-rifqat wakil muhafazhat Taizz 

fi istiqbal mas’ul batha umamiya” [A scandal for the legitimate government: 

An AQAP commander in the company of the deputy governor of Taizz as they 

greet an international delegation], Al-Murasil, 30 July 2017, www.almrasel.

net/?p=22102.

61. “Sira salafi-salafi fi Adan bayn markazay DAESH wa’l-Qaida” [A Salafi-Salafi 

struggle in Aden between the ISIS and al-Qaeda nodes], Al-Yemen Al-Yawm, 30 

May 2016, www.yemen-today.net/DetailsNews.aspx?Id=25353 (website since 

removed).

62. “Hadramawt: Irtifa hasilat tafjirat DAESH fi Al-Mukalla ila 38 qatilan wa-24 

jarih” [The toll from the explosions in Al-Mukalla by ISIS rises to 38 dead and 

24 wounded], Aden Hurra, 28 June 2016, http://adenhurra.com/?p=133913.

63. Interview with Khalid BaTarfi, “Hiwar ma al-qiyadi fi Al-Qaida Khalid BaTarfi” 

[Interview with al-Qaeda leader Khalid BaTarfi], Al-Wasat, 6 March 2016, www.

alwasat-ye.com/index.php?ac=3&no=469114 (hereafter Khalid BaTarfi, “Hiwar 

ma al-qiyadi”); and Khalid BaTarfi, “Bayan bi-sha’n ma warad.”

64. “Al-Tanzhimat al-irhabiya al-musaytira ala madinat Taizz; Malumat tafsila 

bi’l-asma’ wa-maqarr al-qiyada tunshar li-awwal marra” [The terrorist groups 

that control the city of Taizz: Detailed information of names and headquarters 

published for the first time], Al-Mustaqbal, 2 August 2016, www.future-fm.

net/?p=27665.

65. Asa Fitch and Saleh Al Batati, “ISIS Fails to Gain Much Traction in Yemen; Al 

Qaeda’s Local Branch Thrives in War’s Chaos while Islamic State Loses Ground,” 

Wall Street Journal (New York), 28 March 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/

isis-fails-to-gain-much-traction-in-yemen-1459203675.

66. Fitch and Al Batati, “ISIS Fails."

67. “DAESH Al-Yaman: Munafis Al-Qaida al-ghamid fi al-nufudh wa’l-qiyada” 

[ISIS: Al-Qaeda’s shadowy rival for influence and leadership], Nashwan News, 

20 February 2016, http://nashwannews.com/45975.

68. Interview with Sad bin Atif Al-Awlaqi, “Al-Masra fi hiwar jaded ma al-qa’id Sad 

bin Atif Al-Awlaqi ahad qadat Ansar Al-Sharia fi Al-Yaman” [Interview by AlMasra with the commander Sad bin Atif Al-Awlaqi, one of the Ansar Al-Sharia 

leaders in Yemen], Al-Masra, 4 April 2016, 5.

69. Interview with Sad bin Atif Al-Awlaqi.

70. AQAP Communique, “Risala ila ahlina fi Hadramawt” [A letter to our people 

in Hadramawt], 16 March 2017.

71. “Al-Houthiyun yahtajizun qawafil muttajiha ila Taizz al-yamaniya” [The Houthis 

block convoys heading for Taizz in Yemen], Iram News, 4 February 2017, www.

eremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/711087.

72. Khalid BaTarfi, “Hiwar ma al-qiyadi.”
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JSOU Report 18-4

73. Yara Bayoumi, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s 

War in Yemen Has Made al Qaeda Stronger- and Richer,” Reuters, 8 April 2016, 

www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap.

74. Al-Qaida’s Hadramawt branch, “Bayan ila ahlina fi Hadramawt hawl muaskarat 

al-tajnid fi Al-Rumat wa’l-Masila wa-ghayrha” [Communique to our people in 

Hadramawt on the subject of the recruitment camps in Al-Rumat, Al-Masila, and 

elsewhere], 22 April 2016, http://store1.up-00.com/2016-04/146135303326771.jpg; 

“Kayf tabdu manatiq saytarat Ansar Al-Sharia muqaranatan bi-baqi al-mudun 

al-yamaniya” [How the areas under Ansar Al-Sharia control compare with the rest 

of Yemeni cities], Al-Masra, 14 March 2016, 3; and “Irtiyah shabi wa-namudhaj 

idari najih fi tahqiq al-amn wa-tanfidh al-mashari” [Popular comfort and a successful administrative model, security, and fulfillment of projects], Al-Masra, 

15 April 2016, 3.

75. “85 amaliyat ightiyal; tasfiyat hisabat wa-sira ghayr mulan bayn fasa’il Al-Qaida 

bi-Taizz” [85 Assassinations; a settling of scores and an undeclared war among 

al-Qaeda factions in Taizz], Al-Masa’ Press, 9 April 2017, www.masa-press.

net/2017/04/09/85.

76. Interviews with Tariq Al-Fadli, “Tariq Al-Fadli: Al-Ishtirakiyun dhabahu waqatalu, wa-ma lahum illa al-sikkin” [Tariq Al-Fadli: The Socialists Butchered 

and Killed, and All They Deserve Is the Knife], Yamanat, 14 October 2012, www.

yemenat.net/?p=96123; with Abu Al-Fida’, “Al-Qiyadi fi Al-Qaida wa’l-muqrib 

min Bin Ladin Abu Al-Fida’: Fi harb 1994 Al-Zindani qal lana sa-naqdi ala alhizb al-ishtiraki” [The Al-Qaida Leader Close to Bin Ladin Abu Al-Fida’: During 

the 1994 War, Al-Zindani Told Us We Would Eliminate the Socialist Party], 

Al-Yaman Al-Said, 30 August 2012, www.yemensaeed.com/print.php?id=1607; 

and Johnsen, 39-46.

77. John F. Burns, “Yemen Links to Bin Ladin Gnaw at F. B. I. in Cole Inquiry,” 

New York Times, 25 November 2000, 3; Robert F. Worth, “Yemen’s Deals with 

Jihadists Unsettle the U.S.” New York Times, 28 January 2008, www.nytimes.

com/2008/01/28/world/middleeast/28qaeda.html; (hereafter Worth, “Yemen’s 

Deals with Jihadists”); and Uzi Rabi, Yemen: Revolution, Civil War and Unification (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015). First-person accounts include those by former 

Al-Qaida figures, such as the interview with Abu Al-Fida’ (Rashad Muhammad 

Said), “Al-Qiyadi fi Al-Qaida wa’l-muqarrab min Bin Ladin Abu Al-Fida: Fi harb 

1994 Al-Zindani qal lana sa-naqdi ala al-hizb al-ishtiraki wa-sa-tuqam al-khilafa 

al-islamiya min Al-Yaman wa-tawjihatna kunna natalaqqaha min Ali Muhsin 

Al-Ahmar” [A Leader in Al-Qaida and a Confidant of Bin Ladin, Abu Al-Fida: 

During the 1994 War Al-Zindani Told Us That We Would Eliminate the Socialist Party and That the Caliphate Would Be Established Beginning in Yemen 

and We Received Our Orders from Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar], Al-Yaman Al-Said, 

30 August 2012, www.yemensaeed.com/print.php?id=1607; and interview with 

Tariq Al-Fadli, “Tariq Al-Fadli yuwasil kashf asrar al-hukm fi Al-Yaman” [Tariq 

Al-Fadli Continues His Revelations about the Government in Yemen], Al-Yaman 

Al-Said, 7 November 2012, www.yemensaeed.com/print.php?id=2593.
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Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

78. See the informative account by Gregory D. Johnsen, The Last Refuge; Yemen, AlQaeda, and America’s War in Arabia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013), 35–219.

79. Interview with Ali Abd Allah Saleh, transcript in “Ra’is al-jumhuriya fi muqabalat tilifiziyuniya: Al-Dawla azima ala al-qada’ ala al-anasir al-irhabiya bi-Sada” 

[The president of the republic in a television interview: the state is determined 

to eliminate the terrorist elements in Sada], Al-Jumhuriya, 18 October 2009, 

www.algomhoriah.net/news_details.php?lng=Arabic&sid=16862 (website since 

removed).

80. “Lajnat wisata: Al-Qaida waqqaat ala ittifaq wa’l-sulta nakathat wa-nuhammilha 

kamil al-mas’uliya” [The mediation committee: Al-Qaeda signed the agreement 

but the government broke its word and we blame it completely], Nashwan News, 

7 February 2013, http://nashwannews.com/news.php?action=view&id=22926, 

and AQAP, “Bayan fi al-radd ala khitab Abd Rabbih Hadi fi kulliyat al-shurta” 

[Communique in response to Abd Rabbuh Hadi’s speech at the police academy], 

30 August 2013, https://nokbah.com/~w3/?p=4111 (website since removed).

81. “Barlamani yadu li-tajribat al-tahawur ma tanzhim Al-Qaida” [A member of 

parliament calls to attempt a dialog with al-Qaeda], Yemen Press, 2 January 2014, 

http://yemen-press.com/news25657.html.

82. “Muhafizh Hadramawt yarfud tawjihat Al-Ahmar bi’l-tafawud ma Al-Qaida” 

[The governor of Hadramawt rejects Al-Ahmar’s orders to negotiate with alQaeda], Al-Umana’, 28 April 2016, www.alomanaa.net/news34940.html.

83. “Al-Natiq bi-ism amn Adan: Bi-hadhihi al-injazat wihdat mukafahat al-irhab altabia li-amn Adan sahaqat al-khalaya al-irhabiya wa-jannabat al-madina kulfat 

istihdafha bi’l-ta’irat” [The spokesman for Aden security: The successes of Aden 

security’s counterterrorist unit have wiped out the terrorist cells and spared the 

city the affliction of being targeted by aircraft], Aden Al-Ghad, 5 March 2017, 

http://adenalgd.net/news/247837.

84. Interview with Fawzi Al-Wajih by Khalid Al-Hammadi, “Al-Haris al-shakhsi 

al-asbaq li-Usama Bin Ladin” [Osama bin Laden’s former personal bodyguard], Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 9 January 2009, www.alqudsalarabi.info/index.

asp?fname=data/2009/2009/01/01-31/30qpt53.htm; and Worth, “Yemen’s Deals 

with Jihadists.”

85. “Asharat min anasir Al-Qaida yatamarkazun fi mintaqat Al-Udayn bi-madinat 

Ibb” [Dozens of al-Qaeda members congregate in the Al-Udayn section of 

the city of Ibb], Al-Wasat, 31 March 2013, www.alwasat-ye.net/?ac=3&no=

35656&d_f=38&t_f=0&t=5&lanf_in.

86. “Masdar askari: Anasir min Al-Qaida sallamat nafsaha li’l-sultat min Al-Mukalla 

wa-talabat al-afw” [A military source: Elements of al-Qaeda surrendered to the 

Al-Mukalla authorities and requested amnesty], Aden Al-Ghad, 1 August 2016, 

http://adenalgd.net/news/214917.

87. “Muhafizh Hadramawt yuwajjih bi’l-ifraj an adad min al-mawqufin ala qadaya 

al-irhab” [The governor of Hadramawt orders the release of a number of detainees 
96

JSOU Report 18-4

held on charges of terrorism], Al-Masila Press, 23 May 2017, http://almasilapress.

net/?p=18054.

88. As in a flyer it distributed in 2015, and threatening to flog any supporters of 

separatism, “Al-Qaida tatawaad bi-jald kull man yunadi bi-fasl janub Al-Yaman 

an shimalih” [Al-Qaeda threatens to flog anyone calling for the separation of 

south Yemen from the north], Al-Yaman Al-Said, 16 December 2015, www.

yemensaeed.com/news45330.html.

89. “Al-Qaida yakhtatif nashit fi Al-Hirak al-janubi bi-Hadramawt” [Al-Qaeda 

kidnaps an activist in the southern Hirak in Hadramawt], Al-Fajr Al-Jadid, 27 

March 2016, http://alfjeralgaaded.net/news_details.php?lang=arabic&sid=11828.

90. Nadim Shabil, “Masiratan fi Lahij tandidan bi-muhakamat mutaqili Al-Hirak wa’lQaida tutliq al-nar ala sayyarat isaf” [Two marches in Lahij protesting the trials 

of the Hirak detainees and al-Qaeda opens fire on an ambulance], Lahij News, 

17 November 2009, www.lahjnews.net/ar/print.php?id=1138; and “Akthar min 

100 musallah min Al-Hirak al-qaidi yatadun ala kulliyat al-tarbiya wa-yaksarun 

karasi al-madaris bi-Radfan” [More than 100 armed men of Qaeda-linked-Hirak 

attack the teachers’ college in Radfan and smash chairs], Lahij News, 25 January 

2010, www.lahjnews.net/ar/news-2381.htm.

91. “Safqat jadida li-amaliyat tabadul asra bayn Al-Houthiyin wa’l-Qaida” [New deals 

on prisoner exchanges between the Houthis and al-Qaeda], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 

23 April 2016, http://aawsat.com/node/623196; and “Tabadul asra bayn milishiya 

al-Houthi wa’l-Qaida” [Prisoner exchange between the Houthi militia and alQaida], Qari Net (pro-Coalition), 5 May 2017, www.qary.net/yemen/330990.html 

(website since removed).

92. “Ittihamat li’l-ikhwan bi-tazwid Al-Qaida bi-asliha fi Abyan” [Accusations against 

the brotherhood of supplying arms to al-Qaeda in Abyan], 24.ae, 3 March 2017, 

24.ae/article/325585/.

93. “Man yusallim al-asliha li-tanzhim Al-Qaida fi Al-Yaman?” [Who is delivering 

weapons to al-Qaeda in Yemen?], Iram News, 4 March 2017, https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/747614.

94. “Al-Tafasil al-kamila li-amaliyat al-inzal al-amrikiya fi Al-Bayda’: 56 qatilan 

baynhum 3 min qadat Al-Qaida” [Complete details on the American raid in AlBayda’: 56 dead including 3 al-Qaeda leaders], Al-Mustaqbal, 29 January 2017, 

www.future-fm.net/?p=51293.

95. Al-Mashhad Al-Yamani, “Hal yara al-liwa’ Khasruf.”

96. “Al-Qaysi bad Al-Humayqani: kayf yuhit Hadi nafsah bi’l-musannafin amrikiyan 

fi qa’imat al-irhab wa-yahzha bi-dam Washintun?” [Al-Qaysi after al-Humayqani: 

How does Hadi surround himself with those America has placed on its terrorist 

list and still maintain Washington’s support?], Al-Murasil, 20 May 2016, www.

almrasel.net/?p=2183.

97. “Mukawwinat siyasiya mu’ayyida li’l-shariya tastaidd li-ilan tahaluf jadid qabl 

al-taswiya” [Political organizations supporting the legal government prepare to 
97

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

announce a new coalition before a settlement], Al-Yamani Al-Jadid, 24 March 

2016, www.alyemeni.com/news.php?id=6751.

98. “Qiyadat salafiya ala ra’sihim amin amm Al-Rashad wa-adw al-hay’a al-istishariya 

Al-Humayqani tasil Sada fi dhikra tahjir al-salafiyin min Dammaj” [Salafi leaders, with the general secretary of Al-Rashad party at their head and member 

of the consultative committee Al-Humayqani, arrive in Sada to commemorate 

the expulsion of the Salafis from Dammaj], Huna Aden, 16 January 2017, www.

hunaaden.net/news36769.html.

99. Wi’am Abd Allah, “Ma wara’ tasnif Al-Qaysi daiman li’l-irhab wa-kayf nazhar 

salfiyu Al-Yaman li-dhalik al-qarar?” [What is behind categorizing Al-Qaysi 

as a supporter of terorrism and how did Yemen’s Salafis view that decision?], 

Al-Mawqi Post, 23 May 2016, http://almawqea.net/news.php?id=8103; and “AlZubaydi yulhiq bi-Shallal;” and “Al-Islah yudin idraj al-khizana al-amrikiya 

li-Abkar wa’l-Ahdal fi qa’imat al-mashmulin bi’l-uqubat bi-mazaim alaqathima 

bi-jamaat irhabiya” [The Islah condemns the U.S. treasury department’s placing 

Abkar and Al-Ahdal on the sanctions list with claims they have links to terrorist 

organizations], Al-Sahwa, 9 December 2016, https://alsawha-yemen.net/p-1151.

100. “Muaskar Al-Qaida fi Al-Mahfad uqim bi-dam mubashir min Al-Fadli” [AlQaeda’s camp in Al-Mahfad was established with Al-Fadli’s direct support], 

Radfan Press, 19 December 2009, www.rdfanpress.net/news_details.php?sid=455.

101. Arafat Madabish, “Al-Yaman: Hisar musallah li-manzil zaim qabali janubi” 

[Yemen: Armed siege of a southern tribal leader’s residence], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 7 

November 2012, http://archive.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=703230&issueno=12398; 

and “Tariq al-Fadli: Sa-aud ila Abyan ma al-habba al-shabiya raghm anf umala’ 

al-nizham” [Tariq al-Fadli: I will return to Abyan with the popular movement in 

spite of the regime’s puppets], Aden Al-Ghad, 16 December 2013, http://adengd.

net/printpost/82279.

102. Tik Root and Casey Coombs, “A Sheikh’s Life,” The American Prospect (Washington, D.C.), 30 April 2013, http://prospect.org/article/sheikhs-life.

103. “Fi-ma al-lijan al-shabiya bi-Khanfar wa-Jaar tu’akkid annaha lan tasmah bi-tikrar 

sinariyu 2011 Al-Fadli yu’akkid indimamhu li’l-Qaida wa-yulin bad’ al-kifah didd 

al-hukuma” [While the popular committees in Khanfar and Jaar affirm that they 

will not permit a repetition of the 2011 scenario Al-Fadli confirms he has joined 

al-Qaeda and that the struggle against the government has begun], Akhbar AlYawm, 17 June 2014, www.akhbaralyom.net/nprint.php?lng=arabic&sid=80184.

104. “Ma wara’ ifraj al-Houthiyin li-najlay Tariq Al-Fadli al-muttahamayn bi’l-irhab?” 

[What is behind the release of two of Tariq Al-Fadli’s sons accused of terrorism?], 

Aden Post (then pro-UAE), 20 April 2016, http://adenpost.info/news/46422.

105. “Zaim sabiq fi Al-Qaida yutalib bi-tansib najl al-makhlu ra’isan li’l-Yaman waishrak DAESH wal’-ikhwan bi’l-hukm” [A former al-Qaeda leader demands that 

the deposed president’s son be appointed as Yemen’s president and that ISIS and 

the Muslim Brotherhood be included in the government], Sada Aden, 1 February 

2017, www.sadaaden.uk/portal/print.aspx?t=1&id=331482.
98

JSOU Report 18-4

106. Saeed Al-Batati and Ben Hubbard, “The Only Bank in a Company Town 

(When the Company Was Al Qaeda),” New York Times, 15 November 2016, 

www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/world/middleeast/yemen-al-qaeda-bank.html?

ref=middleeast&_r=0.

107. “Mudir far sharikat Al-Umgi bi-mudiriyat Radfan wa’l-Anad li-Aden Al-Ghad: 

Al-Sharika lam tata’aththar bi-tilka al-sha’iat wa-nushayyid bi’l-tafaul al-rasmi 

wa’l-mujtamai” [The director of the Al-Omgy company’s branch in the Radfan 

and Al-Anad Districts to Aden Al-Ghad: The firm has not been affected by the 

rumors and we applaud the official and public dealings], Aden Al-Ghad, 25 

February 2017, http://adengd.net/news/237919.

108. “Ansar Al-Sharia fi Rida yu’akkidun ann al-nizham al-fasid al-zhalim la yanfa 

mahu illa al-jihad li-radih wa-radd zhulmih” [The Ansar Al-Sharia in Rida 

confirm that the only way to deal with the corrupt and unjust regime is by the 

Jihad in order to prevent it and resist its injustice], Taqrir Ikhbari, Madad News 

Agency, 9, February 2012, 1.

109. “Fi-ma al-anasir al-irhabiya talja’ li-isthdaf al-muwatinin wa-tahtajiz 8 min 

al-muwatinin fi Al-Makhzan” [The terrorist elements resort to attacking 

citizens and arrest eight in Al-Makhzan], Akhbar Al-Yawm, 13 August 2011, 

www.akhbaralyom.net/nprint.php?lng=arabic&sid=43907; and Sam Kimball, 

“Yemenis Left with Mixed Feelings after government troops oust Islamists,” 

The Guardian (London), 20 July 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/20/

yemen-islamist-al-qaida-abyan/print.

110. Interview with Jalal Al-Marqashi by Abd Al-Razzaq Al-Jamal, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 

5 May 2012, www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=data\2012\05\05-13\13qpt962.

htm.

111. “Shahid bi’l-vidiyu: Anasir Al-Qaida yudimun muwatin bi-madinat Jaar janub 

Al-Yaman” [See the video: Al-Qaeda elements execute a citizen in the city of 

Jaar in South Yemen], Aden Al-Ghad, 30 September 2011, http://adenalghad.net/

news/3978.

112. Arafat Madabish, “Qaba’il Abyan tantafid didd Al-Qaida wa-qatla bi’l-asharat fi 

sufuf al-musallahin” [The tribes of Abyan revolt against al-Qaeda and there are 

dead by the dozens in the ranks of the combatants], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 19 July 

2012, www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=631737&issueno=11921.; Sudarsan Raghavan, “In Yemen, Tribal Militias in a Fierce Battle with Al-Qaeda Wing,” Washington 

Post, 10 September 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/

in-yemen-tribal-militias-in-a-fierce-battle-with-al-qaeda-wing/2012/09/10/0cce

6f1e-f2b2-11e1-b74c-84ed55e0300b_story.html?utm_term=.79d5e2dc03dc.

113. Interview with Khalid BaTarfi by Sanad BaYashub, “Al-Qiyadi bi’l-Qaida BaTarfi 

yatahaddath fi awwal muqabala suhufiya bad saytarat al-tanzhim ala asimat 

Hadramawt Al-Mukalla” [The al-Qaeda leader BaTarfi gives the first press 

interview since al-Qaeda took control of Al-Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt], 

Hadarim Net, 26 June 2015, www.hadarem.com/index.php?ac=3&no=16141.

114. Khalid BaTarfi, “Liqa’ shamil.”
99

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

115. Abd Al-Kahliq Al-Hud, “Jaar laysat Qandahar” [Jaar Is Not Kandahar], Al-Arabi, 

18 October 2016, https://www.al-arabi.com/Thoughts/7074.

116. Adnan BaWazir, “Imarat Al-Qaida fi Hadramawt: Al-Amr bi’l-dara’ib wa’l-nahy 

an al-rawatib” [Al-Qaeda’s Imara in Hadramawt: Enjoin taxes and forbid salaries], 

Al-Akhbar (Beirut), 25 March 2016, www.al-akhbar.com/node/254792.

117. Interview with Khalid BaTarfi by Sanad BaYashub, “Khalid BaTarfi: Lam natadakhkhal fi tashkil al-majlis al-ahli wa-la fi ikhtiyar ashkhasih wa-huwwa laysa 

wajiha lana bal kiyan munfasil anna yusahim fi idarat al-bilad” [Khalid BaTarfi: 

We did not interfere in setting up the popular council or in selecting its members 

and it is not just another one of our entities but is separate from us and participates 

in administering the city], Najm Al-Mukalla, 26 June 2015, www.mukalla-star.

com/news/2015/213928.html (website since removed).

118. “Al-Qaida yughliq aswaq Al-Mukalla al-yamaniya tafarrughan li’l-ibada” [AlQaeda closes the markets in Al-Mukalla, Yemen, for prayers], Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, 

8 July 2015, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2015/7/8/%D8%A7%D9%84%

D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%BA%D9%84%D9%

82-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%

D9%83%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%

8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%BA%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%

D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9; “Fi haditha hiya al-ula bi’l-Yaman: 

Tanzhim Al-Qaida yunaffidh hukm al-rajm bi-imra’a ittahamat bi’l-zina’ fi 

Al-Mukalla” [In the first incident of its kind in yemen: Al-Qaeda Carries out a 

judgment of stoning a woman accused of adultery in Al-Mukalla], Al-Yaman AlSaid, 4 January 2016, www.yemensaeed.com/news47225.html; “Al-Qaida yafrud 

minhajan dirasiya khass bih bi’l-Mukalla wa-yujallid shakhs bi-tuhmat samaa 

li’l-aghani” [Al-Qaeda imposes its own school curriculum in Al-Mukalla and 

flogs an individual accused of listening to songs], Sawt Saba’, 1 April 2016, http://

sautsaba.net/news_details.php?lng=arabic&sid=13728; ”Qatla wa-jarha bi-hujum 

li’l-Qaida ala hafl zifaf bi-mudiriyat Tibn” [Dead and wounded following an 

attack by al-Qaeda on a wedding party in Tibn District], Marsad News Agency, 

1 April 2017, www.mersadnews.net/archives/51614; “Al-Qaida tulin tanfidh alidam ala 3 ashkhas bi-Ghil BaWazir” [Al-Qaeda reports it has executed three 

individuals in Ghil BaWazir], Aden Al-Ghad, 17 March 2016, http://adengd.net/

news/197109; and “Kayf tabdu manatiq saytarat Ansar Al-Sharia muqaranatan 

bi-baqi al-mudun al-yamaniya” [How the areas under Ansar Al-Sharia control 

compare with the rest of Yemeni cities], Al-Masra, 14 March 2016, 3.

119. “Tanzhim Al-Qaida bi-Taizz yasdur awamir ihdar li-suhufi ala khalfiyat nashr 

maqal suhufi” [Al-Qaeda in Taizz issues a summons to a reporter following the 

publication of a newspaper article], Aden Al-Ghad, 14 March 2017, http://adenalgd.net/news/249322; and “Taizz: Iqtiham mustashfa Al-Jumhuri min qibal 

jamaat mutashaddida wa-man al-dawam bi-sabab al-ikhtilat” [Taizz: Invasion 

of Al-Jumhuri hospital by hardline groups and a work stoppage because of the 

mixing of sexes], Huna Taizz, 25 July 2016, www.hunataiz.net/?p=9071.
100

JSOU Report 18-4

120. “Al-Qaida tunaffidh tahdidha hadm ihda al-qibab al-tarikhiya fi al-Shihr biHadramawt” [Al-Qaeda carries out its threat–the demolition of a historic shrine 

in Al-Shihr in Hadramawt], Sada Aden, 29 June 2015, http://www.sadaaden.

uk/read-news/315206; “Al-Qaida tuhaddim adad min al-adriha al-tarikhiya 

bi-Qubbat Yaqub bi’l-Mukalla” [Al-Qaeda demolishes a number of historic 

mausolea in Qubbat Yaqub in Al-Mukalla], Sada Aden, 22 September 2015, 

www.sadaaden.uk/read-news/317283; “Al-Qaida yuwasil hadm al-qibab wa’ladriha bi-Hadramawt” [Al-Qaeda continues its destruction of shrines and 

mausolea in Hadramawt], Sada Aden, 29 September 2015, www.sadaaden.uk/

read-news/317415; and “Tanzhim Al-Qaida al-irhabi yudammir adadan min 

al-maqabir al-ahliya bi-Wadi Abida bi-Ma’rib” [Al-Qaeda destroys a number of 

popular tombs in Wadi Abida in Ma’rib], Saba’ News Agency, 15 January 2016, 

www.sabanews.net/ar/news416167.htm.

121. “Anasir Al-Qaida tudim bi-tariqa wihshiya imam wa-khatib jami Al-Kawla fi 

Ma’rib” [Al-Qaeda elements execute in a brutal manner the imam and Khatib of 

Al-Kawla Mosque in Ma’rib], Saba’ News Agency, 24 July 2015, www.sabanews.

net/ar/news400235.htm; and Ghamdan Al-Duqaymi, “Yamaniyun fi sujun tanzhim Al-Qaida” [Yemenis in al-Qaeda prisons], Irfa Sawtak program, Al-Hurra 

TV, 2 November 2016, https://www.irfaasawtak.com.

122. Bill Law, “Yemen Conflict: Al-Qaeda ‘Used Surface-to-Air Missile’ to Bring 

Down Emirati Fighter Jet,” The Independent (London), 27 March 2016, www.

independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-conflict-al-qaeda-usedsurface-to-air-missile-to-bring-down-emirati-fighter-jet-a6954671.html.

123. Posting by ISIS, “Qaidat Al-Yaman bayn al-ikhtiraq wa’l-ihtiraq” [The Yemen 

al-Qaeda: Penetration or collapse], 12 March 2017, https://justpaste.it/jwia; and 

“Al-Amaliyat al-amrikiya tuwassi sharkh al-jihadiyin: Al-Dawla yastathmir 

(sic) fi ikhtiraqat Al-Qaida” [U.S. Operations deepen the divide among the 

Jihadis: The Islamic State exploits al-Qaeda’s penetration], Al-Arabi, 12 March 

2017, https://www.al-arabi.com/Issues/11025/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9

%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%

85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3-

%D8%B9-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%87%

D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D

9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%

B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%

D8%A9.

124. “Qaidat Al-Yaman wa’l-drunz” [Yemen’s al-Qaeda and the drones], Al-Arabi, 

3 May 2017, https://www.al-arabi.com/Issues/12402/%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%

B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%88

%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B2--%

D8%A5%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%88%D9

%82-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A

5%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B7.
101

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

125. Interview with Fahd Al-Qus Al-Awlaqi by Abd Al-Razzaq Al-Jamal, 13 September 

2011, transcript by Al-Malahim News Agency, 2-3.

126. Hamil Al-Misk, “Fi Al-Aqsa naltaqi” [We will converge in Al-Aqsa], Sada AlMalahim, April-May 2009, 27, 31.

127. Osama Bin Ladin, letter to Mahmud Atiya, May 2010, Combating Terrorism 

Center at West Point, SOCOM-2012-0000019, 20-23.

128. Hamil Al-Misk, "Min huna nabda' [This is where we begin] Sada Al-Malahim, 

February-March 2009, 27, 29. A spokesman with ties to the senior Al-Qaida leadership echoed these same considerations, Asad Al-Jihad 2, "Istiratijiyat tanzhim 

Al-Qaida fi 11/9/2008 wa-bad' mukhattatih al-azhim" [Al-Qaeda's strategy on 

11/9/2008 and the beginning of its great plan], 11 September 2008, Al-Thughur 

forum, http://althoghor.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=3004 (website since 

removed).

129. Interview with Nasir Abd Al-Karim Al-Wuhayshi by Abd Al-Ilah Haydar Sha’i, 

“Abu Basir: Nansur Ghazza bi-darb al-maSaleh al-gharbiya bi’l-mintaqa” [We are 

supporting Gaza by striking Western interests in the region], Al-Jazira TV (Doha), 

27 January 2009, www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveID=1167805; 

and Mishal Al-Shadukhi, “Li-madha nuqatil fi Jazirat Al-Arab?” [Why do we 

fight in the Arabian Peninsula?], Sada Al-Malahim, June-July 2009, 42-3.

130. Al-Wuhayshi, “Wa-yamkuruna.”

131. “Al-Liqa’ al-awwal wa’l-hisri ma al-shaykh Anwar Al-Awlaqi” [The first and 

exclusive interview with Shaykh Anwar Al-Awlaqi], Internet Archive, 23 May 

2010, https://archive.org/details/WarOnTerror-039.

132. “Al-Saudiya tuazziz min tahalufatha al-qabaliya tamhidan li-marakatay AlHudayda wa-Sana’” [Saudi Arabia shores up its tribal alliances in preparation for 

the two battles of Hodeida and Sanaa], Al-Umana’, 11 April 2017, www.alomanaa.

net/news54624.html.

133. Nuha Al-Badawi, “Hal sa-tatahattam ahlam Al-Qaida ala aswar al-qabila?” [Will 

al-Qaeda’s dreams flounder on the tribe?], Al-Masdar, 10 February 2017, www.

almasdaronline.com/article/print/83290 (hereafter Al-Badawi, “Hal sa-tatahattam 

ahlam Al-Qaida”).

134. Al-Qaida, “Bayan bi-sha’n qatl al-nisa’ wa-tadmir al-buyut wa’l-masajid bi-Wadi 

Abida” [Communique on the killing of women and the destruction of homes 

and mosques in Wadi Abida], 11 June 2010; and Al-Badawi, “Hal sa-tatahattam 

ahlam Al-Qaida.”

135. “Bad muhawalat ightiyal shakhsiya qabaliya tawattur shadid bayn Al-Qaida wa’lqaba’il fi Abyan” [Following an attempt to assassinate a tribal notable serious 

tension between al-Qaeda and the tribes in Abyan], Akhbar Aden, 2 December 

2011, www.aden-news.net/nprint.php?lng=arabic&sid=8355.

136. “Al-Qaida tastaghill akhlaq al-badawa al-tayyiba wa’l-tabia al-shrawiya saadathum: muhafizh Ma’rib Al-Zaydi” [Al-Qaeda takes advantage of the rural 

population’s noble morals and the desert environment helps them: The governor 
102

JSOU Report 18-4

of Ma’rib Al-Zaydi], Al-Bayda’ Press, 6 February 2010, www.albidapress.net/press/

news_view_4656.html.

137. Arafat Madabish, “Al-Yaman: Tahrir imarat Azzan min Al-Qaida” [Yemen: 

The liberation of the Emirate of Azzan from al-Qaeda], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 24 

June 2012, www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=683253&issueno=12262 (hereafter 

Madabish, “Al-Yaman: Tahrir imarat Azzan”).

138. “Al-Faragh al-amni fi Abyan ila mata?” [The security vacuum in Abyan: How 

long will it last?], Aden Al-Ghad, 24 July 2017, http://adenalgd.net/news/269000.

139. “Istishhad al-shaykh Tariq Al-Dhahab ma akhih al-asghar Ahmad fi Rida” [The 

martyrdom of Shaykh Tariq Al-Dhahab and his younger brother Ahmad in Rida], 

Taqrir Ikhbari, Madad News Agency, 10, February 2012, 1.

140. Abd Al-Razzaq Al-Jamal, “Mustaqbal muhafazhat Ibb bad inhiyar al-ittifaq bayn 

al-amn al-siyasi wa-a’idi Ansar Al-Sharia min Abyan” [The future of Ibb province 

after the collapse of the agreement between the political security forces and the 

Ansar Al-Sharia returning from Abyan], Al-Majlis Al-Yamani forum (Sanaa), 6 

December 2012, www.yemen-forum.net/vb/showthread.php?t=701364.

141. Madabish, “Al-Yaman: Tahrir imarat Azzan;” and Samir Hasan, “Makhawif min 

awdat Al-Qaida ila Abyan” [Fears of Al-Qaida’s return to Abyan], Al-Jazira TV, 

1 August 2012, http://aljazeera.net.

142. “Al-Shaykh Saleh bin Farid Al-Awlaqi yadu li-tard anasir Al-Qaida min mintaqat Al-Said bi-Shabwa” [Shaykh Saleh bin Farid Al-Awlaqi calls for members 

of al-Qaeda to be expelled from the Al-Said area of Shabwa], Aden Al-Ghad, 10 

March 2017, http://adenalgd.net/news/248686.

143. “Qabilat Al-Maraqisha tanfi wujud anasir Al-Qaida fi manatiqha” [The AlMaraqisha tribe denies that al-Qaeda personnel are in its territory], Aden Time, 

5 February 2017, http://aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=21208.

144. “Al-Qaida tukhda li-qabilat Al BaKazim bad maqtal amirha” [Al-Qaeda submits 

to the Al BakAzim tribe following the death of its amir], Al-Yaman Al-Said, 7 

February 2016, www.yemensaeed.com/news50447.html.

145. Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki, “Tribal Groups Attempt to Broker Peace in Abyan, 

Shabwa,” Yemen Times, 8 May 2014, www.yementimes.com/en/1779/news/3818/

Tribal-groups-attempt-to-broker-peace-in-Abyan-Shabwa.htm.

146. “Al-Qaida tusaytir ala muaskar li’l-jaysh fi Shabwa” [Al-Qaeda seizes an army base 

in Shabwa], Al-Madina, 13 February 2015, www.al-madina.com/printhtml/587930.

147. “Anasir Al-Qaida ma zalat tajni makasib min wuqud muharrab bi’l-Yaman” 

[Al-Qaeda elements are still making money from smuggled fuel in Yemen], AlSharq Al-Awsat, 10 August 2016, http://aawsat.com/node/650906.

148. Radi Sabih, “Hadramawt tataqasamha Al-Qaida wa’l-qaba’il wa-quwwat askariya” 

[Al-Qaeda, the tribes, and the military forces share Hadramawt], Al-Jazira TV, 

24 November 2015, www.aljazeera.net.
103

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

149. Ansar Al-Sharia communique, “Tawdih hawl qadiyat Al BuBakr Bin Dahha 

wa-Ibn Al-Hayj” [A clarification on the al Bu Bakr bin Dahha and the Ibn alHayj case], 20 October 2016.

150. “Makhawif Al-Qaida min al-qaba’il tadfa al-tanzhim li-muhajamat DAESH” 

[Al-Qaeda’s fear of the tribes prompts it to attack ISIS], Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, 16 

December 2016, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/Print/9f48bcd0-a029-4e10-b363-

6e2b89f51683/3ee9fa60-117f-4967-acbc-89dc229e69a1; and “Ansar Al-Sharia fi 

Al-Yaman yanfi ayy sila lah bi-tafjir muaskar li’l-tajnid wa-yatabarra’ min afal 

tanzhim Al-Dawla” [The Ansar Al-Sharia in Yemen deny having any link to 

the explosion of the recruiting base and distances itself from the Islamic State’s 

actions], Al-Islamiyun, 18 December 2016, http://islamion.com/news.

151. “Qabila bi-muhafazhat Al-Bayda’ tantafid wa-tatrud Al-Qaida bad ihtijazhim rajul 

wa-zawjathu” [A tribe in Al-Bayda’ Province rises up and expels al-Qaeda after 

the latter detained a man and his wife], Al-Mashhad Al-Yemeni, 13 September 

2016, www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/topics/MY/8/56988.html.

152. “Masra qiyadi min Al-Qaida fi kamin bi-muhafazhat Shabwa” [Al-Qaeda leader 

killed in an ambush in Shabwa Province], Al-Arabi, 15 April 2017, https://www.

al-arabi.com/Movement/11969.

153. “Muhafizh Hadramawt yadu qaba’il Hadramawt li’l-tha’r li-abna’ihim dahaya 

al-irhab bi-Duan” [The governor of Hadramawt calls on the tribes of Hadramawt 

to exact revenge for their sons who were victims of terrorism in Duan], Aden 

Al-Hadath, 30 May 2017, http://adenalhadath.net/news_details.php?sid=18079.

154. “Fi awwal mawqif tarikhi min nawih qabila ariqa bi-Abyan tatabarra’ min 

afradha al-muntamin li-tanzhim al-Qaida” [For the first time in history for such 

an occurrence a noble tribe in Abyan disowns its members who join al-Qaeda], 

Aden Al-Ghad, 18 August 2016, http://adenalgd.net/news/216910.

155. “Qaba’il Laqmush bi-Shabwa tasdur bayanan tu’akkid manaha dukhul Al-Qaida 

aradiha” [The Laqmush Tribes in Shabwa issue a communique prohibiting alQaeda from entering their lands], Aden Al-Ghad, 28 April 2016, http://adengd.

net/news/202903.

156. “Maarik anifa fi Lawdar bayn Al-Qaida wa-rijal al-qaba’il” [Intense battles in 

Lawdar between al-Qaeda and tribesmen], Shabwat Al-Hadath, 7 February 2017, 

http://shabwahalhadath.net/print/13570.

157. “Shabwa: qatla wa-jarha min Al BaAwda fi ishtibakat ma Al-Qaida” [Shabwa: 

Dead and wounded from the Al BaAwda in clashes with al-Qaeda], Al-Arabi, 24 

December 2016, https://www.al-arabi.com/Movement/9030; “Qatla qabaliyun 

fi hujum li’l-Qaida bi-Hadramawt” [Tribesmen dead in an al-Qaeda attack in 

Hadramawt]; Aden Al-Ghad, 3 March 2017, http://adenalgd.net/news/247607; and 

“Qatil min Al-Qaida wa 4 min al-amn bi-hujum istahdaf hajiz amni bi-Zinjibar” 

[One al-Qaeda and four police dead from an attack on a security checkpoint 

in Zinjibar], Al-Dali News, 20 October 2016, http://addalinews.com/news/%20

394009.
104

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158. “Qaba’il munahida li-tanzhim Al-Qaida janub Al-Yaman tantaqil ila istratijiya 

jadida” [Tribes in South Yemen opposed to al-Qaeda shift to a new strategy], 

Mandab Press, 21 April 2016, https://mandabpress.com/news30048.html.

159. “Masadir yamaniya li’l-Siyasa: Alfa musallah min Al-Qaida yusaytirun ala 

muzham al-manatiq fi muhafazhat Abyan” [Yemeni sources to Al-Siyasa: Two 

thousand al-Qaeda fighters control most areas in Abyan Province], Al-Siyasa

(Kuwait), 25 June 2016, http://al-seyassah.com; (hereafter “Masadir yamaniya 

li’l-Siyasa”); “Al-Qaida tastawli ala asliha fi Abyan” [Al-Qaeda seizes weapons 

in Abyan], 24ae (Abu Dhabi), 27 February 2017, http://24.ae/article/327108; and 

“Tanzhim Al-Qaida yastaqdim muaddat askariya baynha madafi tawilat al-mada 

ila Zinjibar” [Al-Qaeda repositions military equipment, including long-range 

artillery, to Zinjibar], Al-Mashhad Al-Yamani, 7 August 2016, www.almashhadalyemeni.com/topics/MY/8/54784.html.

160. “Iqtiham nuqtat Badda bi-Duan” [Overrunning the Badda Bastion in Duan], 12 

June 2017, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B87bCpoqg95cQ0VxTVhHZjJadk0/

view?usp=drive_web (website since removed).

161. “Ra’is hilf Hadramawt: Al-Mujtama la yatajanas ma Al-Qaida wa-yarfud wujudha” 

[The head of the Hadramawt alliance: Society is not conducive to al-Qaeda and 

rejects its presence], Al-Taghyir, 20 March 2016, www.al-tagheer.com/news86985.

html.

162. Arafat Madabish and Hamdan Al-Rahbi, “Akthar min 400 nazil min Al-Qaida 

fi al-sujun al-yamaniya, wa’l-asharat farru” [More than 400 AQAP prisoners in 

Yemeni jails, and dozens have escaped], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 7 March 2014, http://

archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=12883&article=763845.

163. “Nihayat hulm Al-Qaida bi-Hadramawt: Huna kan mawtin Bin Ladin” [The End 

of al-Qaeda’s dream in Hadramawt: Here was bin Laden’s homeland], Al-Arabi 

Al-Jadid (London, Qatar-owned), 26 April 2016, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/poli

tics/2016/4/25/%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%

84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%

D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B6%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AA-%D9%87%D9%

86%D8%A7-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86-%

D8%A8%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%86.

164. According to Osama bin Laden, “We find that the cohort from fifteen to twentyfive is the cohort with the ability to commit and struggle; that is what we observed 

during the jihad in Afghanistan, that is that most mujahidin were that age.” 

Interview with Osama bin Laden by Jamal Ismail, “Bin Ladin wa'l-Jazira wa-ana” 

[bin Laden, Al-Jazira, and me], 1998, www.arabslink.net. Likewise, Ayman AlZawahiri noted that youth were “the jihadi vanguard” and that “It is the Muslim 

youth who must spread the battle against the Jews and the Crusaders over the 

widest possible area of the world.” Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Taht rayat al-qur'an 

[Under the banner of the Qur'an] (Al-Sahab li'l-Intaj Al-Ilami, 30 January 2005), 

17.
105

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

165. “Anasir hizb Al-Islah taqtahim mabna al-amn al-siyasi bi-Taizz wa-tufrij an almutaqalin min tanzhim Al-Qaida” [Members of the Islah party burst into the 

political security building in Taizz and set free al-Qaeda detainees], Wifaq Press, 

6 August 2015, http://wefaqpress.net/news_details.php?sid=27421&lng=arabic.

166. Harriet Alexander, “Al-Qaeda Frees 300 Prisoners in Yemen Jail Break,” The 

Telegraph (London), 8 April 2015, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/11510765/Al-Qaeda-frees-3000-prisoners-in-Yemen-jail-break.

html.

167. “Al-Qaida tusaytir ala al-sijn al-markazi fajr al-yawm fi Jaar bi-Abyan” [At dawn 

today al-Qaeda seized the central prison in Jaar in Abyan], Mutabaat, 21 June 

2016, www.motabaat.com/?p=33135.

168. Interview with Major General Ahmad Asiri by Turki Al-Dakhil, “Malumat liawwal marra an asifat al-hazm al-yawm ma Turki Al-Dakhil” [Information for the 

first time about Resolute Storm today with Turki Al-Dakhil], Al-Arabiya TV (Abu 

Dhabi), 16 April 2017, https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/mob/saudi-today/2017/04/16.

169. Mansur Al-Ghadra, “Ansar Al-Sharia nahabu 5 milyarat riyal yamani wa-dhahaban wa-murattabat al-muallimin min bunuk Zinjibar” [The Ansar al-Sharia 

looted 5 billion Yemeni Riyals, gold, and the teachers’ salaries from the banks in 

Zinjibar], Al-Madina (Jeddah), 12 May 2012, www.al-madina.com/article/154894; 

and interview with Khalid BaTarfi, “Liqa’ shamil ma al-shaykh Khalid BaTarfi 

al-qiyadi fi jamaat Ansar Al-Sharia fi Al-Yaman” [Far-ranging interview with 

Shaykh Khalid BaTarfi, a leader of the Ansar Al-Sharia organization in Yemen], 

Al-Arin Al-Qaida website, 9 September 2015, http://al-aren.com/vb/showthread.

php?t=11427 (website since removed) (hereafter Khalid BaTarfi, “Liqa’ shamil”).

170. Yara Bayoumi, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari, “How Saudi Arabia’s 

War in Yemen Has Made al Qaeda Stronger- and Richer.”

171. Ibid. and “Milyarat wa-taawun istikhbari yafrudha Al-Qaida ala sharikat alittisalat” [Al-Qaeda imposes billions and intelligence cooperation on communications firms], Al-Muntasif , 26 February 2016, www.almontasaf.net/news28237.

html (website removed).

172. “Wasalu Azzan min Hadramawt” [They came to Azzan from Hadramawt], AlYaman Al-Said, 6 February 2016, www.yemensaeed.com/news50279.html.

173. “Li-hadhihi al-asbab anasir tanzhim Al-Qaida tansahib min mawaqi fi Abyan 

saytarat alayha sabah al-juma” [Al-Qaeda members withdraw for these reasons 

from positions in Abyan that they took Friday morning], Al-Mashhad Al-Janubi, 

4 February 2017, www.salmashhad.com/news/12021.

174. Samir Hasan, “Madha wara’ awdat nushshat Al-Qaida bi-janub Al-Yaman?” 

[What is behind the return of Al-Qaeda activists to South Yemen?], Al-Jazira 

TV, 27 March 2014, http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2014/3

/27/%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b0%d8%a7-%d9%88%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d8%

b9%d9%88%d8%af%d8%a9-%d9%86%d8%b4%d8%a7%d8%b7-%d8%a7%d9%

84%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b9%d8%af%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d8%ac%d9%86%d9%8

8%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%86.
106

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175. Uthman Mukhtar, “Jihadiyu Al-Yaman yaudun min Suriya wa’l-Iraq li-muharabat al-Houthiyin” [Yemen’s Jihadis return from Syria and Iraq to fight the 

Houthis], Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, 22 January 2015, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/

f160774c-8795-480c-8ff2-44341ddc5f1d.

176. “Al-Asharat min anasir DAESH wasalu ila Hadramawt al-yamaniya abr al-bahr” 

[Dozens of ISIS members have arrived in Hadramawt, Yemen, by sea], Al-Yaman 

Al-Jadid, 29 January 2015, www.newyemen.net/dgNews/news-10222 (website 

since removed); and “Muqatilu tanzhim DAESH yasilun Al-Yaman bahran bad 

tawaqquf al-khutut al-turkiya” [ISIS fighters arrive in Yemen by sea after Turkish air stops flying], Shabwa Press, 18 February 2015, http://shabwaahpress.net/

news/26016.

177. Elisabeth Kendall, “War-torn Yemen May Attract Jihadi Fighters from Syria 

and Iraq,” The Financial Times (London), 27 February 2017, https://www.ft.com/

content/3d598142-fc43-11e6-8d8e-a5e3738f9ae4.

178. Abu Sufyan al-Azdi, "Radd al-udwan al-salibi" [Repelling the Crusader aggression], 8 February 2010, online at http://202.71.102.68/~alfaloj/vb/showthread.

php?p=725409.

179. al-Azdi, "Radd al-udwan al-salibi" [Repelling the Crusader aggression].

180. For additional details, see Norman Cigar, The Jihadist Maritime Strategy: Waging 

a Guerrilla War at Sea (Quantico, VA: Middle East Studies, 2017), 13, 16, 18, 21–3, 

26–31.

181. Elisabeth Kendall, “How Does Al-Qaeda Attract Yemenis?” BBC, 4 May 2015, 

www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32488389.

182. “Shuhud: Intishar anashid Al-Qaida al-hamasiya wast al-atfal bi-Sanaa’” [Witnesses: The spread of al-Qaeda’s motivational chants among the children of 

Sanaa], Akhbar Al-Saa, 15 June 2014, http://hournews.net/news-30770.htm.

183. “Al-Qaida tatadakhkhal fi tahdid a’immat al-masajid” [Al-Qaeda intervenes 

to appoint imams in mosques], Al-Yaman Al-Said, 20 December 2015, www.

yemensaeed.com/news45699.html; and Akram Al-Shatiri, “Mudir awqaf Adan 

yatanassal mas’uliyat himayat al-masajid min al-jamaat al-takfiriya” [The director 

of the Aden Awqaf sidesteps his responsibility to protect the mosques from Takfiri 

groups], Shabwa Press, 15 March 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/41787.

184. Hani Salim Mashur, “Al-Tahaluf al-arabi fi Al-Yaman” [The Arab Coalition 

in Yemen], Al-Jazira (Riyadh), 26 December 2016, www.al-jazirah.com/2016/

20161226/du14.htm.

185. Khalid BaTarfi, “Hiwar ma al-qiyadi.”

186. “Al-Taqrir al-shahri li-amaliyat Ansar Al-Sharia” [Monthly report for the Ansar 

Al-Sharia’s operations], November 2016, http://justpaste.it/ppdf/105o1 (website 

since removed); and “Musallahan majhulan yaghtalan qiyadiya barizan mahsuban 

ala al-Houthiyin bi’l-Yaman” [Two unidentified gunmen kill a prominent Houthi 

commander in Yemen], Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, 28 February 2017, https://alaraby.

co.uk/Print/9f48bcd0-a029-4e10-b363-6e2b89f51683/649614f1-9b69-4df4-8062-
107

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55463a236f9e; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2017/2/28/%D9%85%

D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%

88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%BA%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84%

D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%

A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%88%

D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%

88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%

D9%85%D9%86.

187. “Tanzhim Al-Qaida: 20 kilu dhahab li-man yaqtul zaim al-Houthiyin wa’l-ra’is 

al-sabiq” [Al-Qaeda: 20kg of gold to anyone who kills the leader of the Houthis 

or the former president], Al-Watan (Cairo), 8 April 2015, www.elwatannews.

com/news/details/705184.

188. “Musallahu tanzhim Al-Qaida yusaytirun ala baldat Azzan fi muhafazhat Shabwa 

dun maarik” [Al-Qaeda gunmen take the city of Azzan in Shabwa Province 

without a battle], Al-Masdar, 12 February 2016, http://almasdaronline.com/

article/79287.

189. Asma’ Al-Ghabiri, “Al-Majlis al-ahli fi Hadramawt yulin baqa’ Al-Mukalla 

taht saytarat Al-Qaida” [The popular council in Hadramawt announces that 

Al-Mukalla remains under AQAP control], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 4 May 2015, 

https://aawsat.com/home/article/351946/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%

D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%87%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%

81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B6%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AA-%D9%8A%

D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%

84%D9%85%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AA-%D8%B3%

D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%C2%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%

A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9%C2%BB.

190. Saudi Press Agency, “Qiyadat tahaluf dam al-shariya fi Al-Yaman tulin intilaq amaliya askariya didd tanzhim al-Qaida” [The command of the coalition 

supporting the legitimate government in Yemen announces the start of the 

military operation against al-Qaeda], Al-Riyadh, 25 April 2016, www.alriyadh.

com/1149902; Bassam Abd Al-Salam, “Al-Shariya tubassit kamil saytaratha ala AlMukalla” [The legitimate government takes full control of Al-Mukalla], Al-Ittihad

(Abu Dhabi), 26 April 2016, www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=16837&y=2016; 

“Al-Yaman: Maqtal 800 min anasir Al-Qaida fi 12 saa” [Yemen: 800 al-Qaeda 

members killed in twelve hours], Al-Arabiya TV (Abu Dhabi), 25 April 2016, 

www.alarabiya.net; “Al-Shariya wa’l-tahaluf yutliqan amaliya li-dahr Al-Qaida 

fi Al-Yaman” [The legitimate government and the coalition kick off an operation 

to defeat al-Qaeda in Yemen], Al-Bayan (Dubai), 26 April 2016, www.albayan.ae/

supplements/restoring-hope/news/2016-04-26-1.2626551 (hereafter “Al-Shariya 

wa’l-tahaluf yutliqan”); Arafat Madabish, “Al-Qaida yataraja amam quwwat 

al-tahaluf wa-qiyadat al-tanzhim tafurr min Hadramawt ila al-Houthiyin” 

[Al-Qaeda retreats in the face of the coalition’s forces and al-Qaeda’s leaders 

flee from Hadramawt to the Houthis], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 26 April 2016, http://

aawsat.com/node/625606; and Saleh Askul, “Qa’id amaliyat tahrir Al-Mukalla: 
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Hasm al-maraka al-khatifa tamm bi-11 alf muqatil” [The commander of the 

operation to liberate Al-Mukalla: The blitzkrieg battle was decided by 11,000 

troops], Al-Madina, 26 April 2016, www.al-madina.com/article/445247.

191. “Al-Tahaluf al-arabi yutliq amaliya askariya didd Al-Qaida bi’l-Yemen” [The Arab 

Coalition initiates an operation against al-Qaeda in Yemen], Sky News Arabia 

TV (Abu Dhabi), 24 April 2016, www.skynewsarabia.com/web/article/835562.

192. Muhammad Al-Zaydi, “Muhafizh Hadramawt: Mi’at al-mutashaddidin talabu 

al-istislam” [The governor of Hadramawt: Hundreds of extremists want to surrender], Al-Watan (Abha), 3 May 2016, www.alwatan.com.sa/Politics/News_Detail.

aspx?ArticleID=262315.

193. “Hadramawt: Ilan intiha’ al-amaliyat al-askariya didd Al-Qaida bi-mudiriyat 

Al-Qatan” [Hadramawt: announcement of the end of military operations against 

Al-Qaeda in Al-Qatan district], Al-Khabar, 4 May 2016, https://www.alkhabarnow.net/news/223722/2016/05/04.

194. The commander of the local military district Major General Faraj Salimin 

Al-BaHasani quoted in “Kasarna shawkat al-irhab fi Hadramawt wa-itaqalna 

qiyadat Al-Qaida” [We broke the back of terrorism in Hadramawt and arrested 

al-Qaeda’s leadership], Al-Ittihad, 21 May 2016, www.alittihad.ae/details.

php?id=21251&y=2016; Interview with the Governor of Hadramawt, Major 

General Ahmad Said Bin Barik, “Muhafizh Hadramawt: Dam Al-Imarat nasarna 

ala Al-Qaida” [The governor of Hadramawt: The UAE’s support enabled us to be 

victorious over al-Qaeda], Al-Khalij (Sharjah), 8 May 2017, www.alkhaleej.ae/

alkhaleej/page/40aaef48-ac8a-47ee-87d4-119e30033bfb (hereafter Ahmad Said 

Bin Barik, “Muhafizh Hadramawt”); editorial by Muhammad Al-Hamawi, “AlMukalla: Intisar al-tahaluf ala irhab Al-Qaida” [Al-Mukalla: Coalition victory 

over al-Qaeda’s terrorism], Al-Ittihad, 26 April 2016, www.alittihad.ae/details.

php?id=16802&y=2016; and “Al-Imarat wa-bina’ jaysh al-nukhba al-hadramiya” 

[The UAE and building the Hadramawt special forces], Shabwa Press, 10 February 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/41015.

195. “Mawt tanzhim Al-Qaida al-irhabi fi Hadramawt” [Demise of the al-Qaeda 

terrorist organization in Hadramawt], Al-Ittihad, 16 May 2016, www.alittihad.

ae/details.php?id=20308&y=2016&article=full.

196. “Muhammad bin Rashid bi’l-dhikra al-40 li-tawhid al-quwwat al-musallaha” [Mohammed bin Rashid on the 40th anniversary of the unification 

of the armed forces], CNN in Arabic, 5 May 2016, https://arabic.cnn.com/

middleeast/2016/05/05/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-arab-coalition.

197. Quoted in “Al-Shariya wa’l-tahaluf yutliqan.”

198. For example, Ahmad Said Bin Barik, “Muhafizh Hadramawt.”

199. An unnamed Hadi official, in fact, complained that the UAE was not coordinating operations with either the Hadi government or with Saudi Arabia, “Ma wara’ 

saytarat Al-Imarat ala Hadramawt?” [What is behind the UAE’s taking control 

of Hadramawt?], BuYemen Net, 24 April 2016, www.buyemen.com/news26290.

html.
109

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200. Colonel (ret.) Ibrahim Al Mar’i, Twitter, 28 April 2016, http://mobile.twitter.

com/almarieibrahim?lang=fr.

201. “Quwwat al-nukhba al-saudiya tusharik wa-maqtal 800 unsur min Al-Qaida fi 

tahrir Al-Mukalla” [Saudi special forces participated and 800 al-Qaeda members 

killed in the liberation of Al-Mukalla], Al-Sharq (Dammam), 26 April 2016, www.

alsharq.net.sa/2016/04/26/1512789.

202. Communique from AQAP, “Bayan ila ahlina fi sahil Hadramawt hawl al-hamla alaskariya al-ghashima al-akhira” [Communique to our people on the Hadramawt 

Coast about the recent unjust military campaign], 25 April 2016, Hadramaout 

Gateway News, 25 April 2016, www.hdgatewaynews.com/news/?p=54500.

203. “Quwwat al-jaysh wa’l-muqawama tusaytir ala madinat Al-Mukalla wa-hurub 

jamai li-anasir tanzhim Al-Qaida” [The army and resistance take control of the 

city of Al-Mukalla and al-Qaeda personnel flee en masse], Aden Al-Ghad, 24 

April 2016, http://adenalgd.net/news/202412; “Wisata qabaliya li-iqna Al-Qaida 

bi’l-insihab min Al-Mukalla dun muwajahat” [Tribal mediation to convince 

al-Qaeda to leave Al-Mukalla without fighting], Aden Al-Ghad, 24 April 2016, 

www.adengd.net/news/202357; and “Al-Jaysh al-yamani yadkhul Al-Mukalla wainsihab anasir Al-Qaida” [The Yemeni army enters Al-Mukalla while al-Qaeda’s 

members leave], Al-Jazira TV, 4 April 2016, www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/201

6/4/24/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9

%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%

A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%

D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8

%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9.

204. “Maarik anifa bayn quwwat al-jaysh wa-anasir tanzhim Al-Qaida bi-muhafazhat 

Shabwa” [Fierce battles between the army and members of al-Qaeda in Shabwa 

Province], Al-Mashhad Al-Yamani, 6 October 2016, www.almashhad-alyemeni.

com/topics/MY/8/58486.html; and “Maqtal 8 min afrad tanzhim Al-Qaida 

fi amaliyatyan munfasilatayn li-quwwat al-jaysh wa’l-amn bi-muhafazhatay 

Hadramawt wa-Abyan” [Eight members of al-Qaeda killed in two separate 

engagements by the army and police in Hadramawt and Abyan provinces], Bilqis 

TV, 9 November 2016, http://belqees.tv/yemen/4966.

205. “Maqtal 60 unsur min tanzhim Al-Qaida fi ghara li-tayaran al-tahaluf al-arabi 

ala muaskar tadribi li’l-tanzhim gharb Al-Mukalla bi-sahil Hadramawt” [60 

members of al-Qaeda killed in a strike by Arab Coalition aircraft on an al-Qaeda 

training camp west of Al-Mukalla along the Hadramawt coast], Al-Mukalla 

Al-An, 28 February 2017, www.mukalla-now.com/2017/02/60_28.html (website 

since removed).

206. “Wisata qabaliya li-iqna Al-Qaida bi’l-insihab min madinat Al-Mukalla” [Tribal 

mediation to convince al-Qaeda to withdraw from the city of Al-Mukalla], 

Al-Yaman Al-Arabi (at the time pro-Saudi Arabia), 24 April 2016, www.

alyamanalaraby.com/39965; and “Wisata qabaliya li-iqna Al-Qaida bi’l-insihab 

min Al-Mukalla dun muwajahat” [Tribal mediation to convince al-Qaeda to 
110

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withdraw from Al-Mukalla without fighting], Aden Al-Ghad, 24 April 2016, 

www.adengd.net/news/202357.

207. “Qiyadat al-mintaqa al-askariya al-thaniya: Maqtal al-asharat min anasir AlQaida fi amaliya istibaqiya ala mazraat BaGhazwin gharb Al-Mukalla” [The 

command of the second military district: Dozens of al-Qaeda members killed in 

a preemptive operation at the baghazwin farm west of Al-Mukalla], Al-Mukalla 

Al-Yawm, 8 November 2016, www.mukallatoday.com/pages/print.aspx?ID=37767 

(website since removed); “Hamla askariya dakhma taqudha al-nukhba bi-musharakat tayaran Al-Apache didd maaqil Al-Qaida fi mintaqat Al-Hamra’ gharb 

Al-Mukalla” [Massive military campaign led by the special forces supported 

by Apache helicopters against al-Qaeda’s strongholds in the Al-Hamra’ region 

west of Al-Mukalla], Shabwa Press, 8 November 2016, http://shabwaahpress.

net/news/38521; and “Maqtal 30 min anasir Al-Qaida fi amaliya nawiya gharb 

Al-Mukalla bi-isnad min tayaran al-tahaluf” [30 al-Qaeda members killed in a 

spectacular operation West of Al-Mukalla with coalition air support], Al-Imarat 

Al-Yawm (Dubai), 10 November 2016, www.emaratalyoum.com/politics/issues/

yemen-latest/2016-11-10-1.944488.

208. “Maqtal 6 irhabiyin min Al-Qaida bi-darba istibaqiya li’l-tahaluf wa’l-quwwat 

al-yamaniya” [Six al-Qaeda terrorists killed in a pre-emptive strike by coalition 

and Yemeni forces], Iqlim Aden, 8 November 2016, http://adenprovince.net/

NDetails.aspx?contid=18381.

209. “Junud najun min marakat Al-Masini bi-gharb Al-Mukalla yurawwun asrarha” 

[Troops who survived the battle of Al-Masini West of Al-Mukalla recount its 

secrets], Al-Janubiya Net, 17 November 2016, http://webcache.googleusercontent.

com/search?q=cache:RXWFj5ouomoJ:www.jnobia.com/90245.html+&cd=1&hl=

en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-b; and “Al-Qaida taqum bi-idam ahad aljunud al-asra ladayhim min marakat Al-Masini” [Al-Qaeda carries out the 

execution of one of the prisoners of war from the battle of al-Masini], Al-Janub 

Al-Jadid, 11 December 2016, http://newjnoob.com/?p=26253. That, contrary 

to UAE reports, its client’s Special Forces did take casualties is confirmed by 

the fact that the district’s commanding general expressed his condolences to 

the families of those killed in action, “Qa’id al-mintaqa al-thaniya yaltaqi usar 

shuhada’ marakat Al-Masini” [The commanding general of the second district 

meets with the families of those who fell in the Al-Masini Battle], Shabwa Press, 

14 November 2016, http://shabwaahpress.net/38673.

210. Ansar Al-Sharia video, “Repelling the Advance of the Special Forces on the 

Positions of the Mujahidin in the Al-Masini Area,” January 2017.

211. “Al-Quwwat al-hukumiya tughadir Zinjibar ithr hajamat al-sayyarat al-mufakhkhaha” [Government forces leave Zinjibar in the wake of attacks by car bombs], 

Al-Khabar, 24 April 2016, https://www.alkhabarnow.net/news/222642/2016/04/24.

212. “Abyan: Asharat al-qatla wa’l-jarha min Al-Qaida wa’l-jaysh wa’l-hamla alaskariya tataraja ila Al-Alam” [Abyan: Dozens of dead and wounded from alQaeda and the army and the task force retreats to Al-Alam], Akhbar Al-Yawm, 

24 April 2016, http://akhbaralyom-ye.net/news_details.php?sid=88613.
111

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213. “Al-Quwwat al-hukumiya.”

214. Saleh Askul, “Al-Shariya wa’l-tahaluf yuharriran Zinjibar min anasir Al-Qaida” 

[The legitimate government and the coalition liberate Zinjibar from al-Qaeda 

elements], Al-Madina, 15 August 2016, www.al-madina.com/article/463827.

215. Hamza Al-Zinjibari, “Hamza Al-Zinjibari: Ali Muhsin talab min al-wusata’ 

iblagh al-asra an dughutu kanat wara’ iltlaqhim!” [Hamza Al-Zinjibari: Ali 

Muhsin asked the mediators to inform the prisoners that it was his pressure that 

was behind their release], Taqrir Ikhbari, Madad News Agency, 18, May 2012, 

4; and “Al-Amrikiyun yulhibun sama’ Al-Yaman” [The Americans set Yemen’s 

skies ablaze], Taqrir Ikhbari, Madad News Agency, 19, May 2012, 1.

216. For an excellent overview of that military campaign, see Terrill, The Struggle for 

Yemen.

217. Qasim Al-Raymi, “Mafahim” [Concepts], transcript of a video lecture, Mu’assasat 

Al-Tahaya, 26 May 2015, http://justapaste.it/ml71 (website since removed).

218. “Al-Qiyadi bi’l-Qaida BaTarfi yatahaddath.”

219. “Tanzhim Al-Qaida yansahib min Ahwar bi-wisata qabaliya” [Al-Qaeda leaves 

Ahwar through tribal mediation], Al-Mukalla Al-Yawm, 21 February 2016, www.

mukallatoday.com/pagesDetails.aspx?ID=35027&&C=NewsDetails (website since 

removed).

220. “Bayan ila ahlina fi sahil Hadramawt.”

221. Al-Amawi,”Kayf najahat Al-Qaida.”

222. Abu Majid Al-Khabbubi, “Bad ghiyab mutaammid min Qaidat Al-Jihad bi’lYaman 6 shuhur taud li-taktsaih al-saha bad an taarra batil al-murtaddin” 

[Following a deliberate absence by al-Qaeda in Yemen for six months it returns 

to wipe the floor after laying bare the apostates’ error], Ana Muslim forum, 9 

November 2016, www.muslm.org/vb/showthread.php?563259.

223. Muhammad Ali Muhsin, “Ittifaq qabali yatakallal bi-insihab anasir al-Qaeda 

min Zinjibar wa-Jaar” [Tribal agreement crowned by al-Qaeda’s withdrawal 

from Zinjibar and Jaar], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 6 May 2016, http://aawsat.com/

node/633106.

224. “Masdar askari: Intishar al-jaysh fi Abyan tul al-amad wa-niha’i” [A military 

source: The deployment of the army in Abyan is permanent and for good], Aden 

Al-Ghad, 14 August 2016, http://adenalgd.net/news/216528.

225. “Insihab Al-Qaida min Azzan;” and Bassam Al-Qadi, “Al-Tahaluf yutahhir Azzan 

min Al-Qaida bi-gharat kathifa” [The coalition clears Azzan of al-Qaeda thanks 

to intensive air strikes], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 10 August 2016, https://aawsat.com/

home/article/710511.

226. “Mudir amm Al-Wadi: Anasir Al-Qaida harabat qabl dukhul al-hamla wanatatalla ila fard haybat al-dawla” [The director general of Al-Wadi: Al-Qaeda’s 

members fled before the expeditionary force entered and we are now witnessing 

the establishment of the state’s authority], Akhbar Al-Yawm, 24 August 2016, 

http://akhbaralyom-ye.net/nprint.php?sid=88875.
112

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227. “Al-Tawassul ila ittifaq yaqdi bi-khuruj Al-Qaida min Abyan khilal usbu” [The 

conclusion of an agreement entailing al-Qaeda’s departure from Abyan in a 

week], Aden Al-Ghad, 4 May 2016, http://adengd.net/news/203702.

228. “Muhafizh Abyan li’l-Siyasa: Anasir Al-Qaida mawjudun fi kull al-mudiriyat” 

[The government of Abyan to Al-Siyasa: Al-Qaeda members are present in all the 

districts], Al-Siyasa, 12 June 2016, http://al-seyassah.com; (hereafter “Muhafizh 

Abyan li’l-Siyasa”); and Ramzi Al-Fadli, “Anasir tanzhim Al-Qaida tansahib 

min baldat rifiya bi-Abyan sawb Al-Bayda’ wa’l-Houthiyun yaqsifun Lawdar” 

[Al-Qaeda members withdraw from rural towns in Abyan toward Al-Bayda’ 

and the Houthis shell Lawdar], Aden Al-Ghad, 16 August 2016, http://adengd.

net/news/216810; and “Tanzhim Al-Qaida yastaqdim muaddat askariya baynha 

madafi tawilat al-mada ila Zinjibar” [Al-Qaeda repositions military equipment, 

including long-range artillery, to Zinjibar], Al-Mashhad Al-Yamani, 7 August 

2016, www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/topics/MY/8/54784.html.

229. “Al-Qaida tuawid saytaratha ala Abyan.”

230. Al-Duqaymi, “DAESH fi Al-Yaman?”

231. “Maarik anifa fi Lawdar bayn Al-Qaida wa-rijal al-qaba’il” [Intense battles in 

Lawdar between al-Qaeda and tribesmen], Shabwa Al-Hadath, 7 February 2017, 

http://shabwahalhadath.net/print/13570.

232. Bassam Al-Qadi, “Quwwat askariya dakhma tasil Abyan li-tathirha min alirhabiyin” [Massive military forces arrive in Abyan to clear the latter of terrorists], 

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 23 April 2016, http://aawsat.com/node/623201 (hereafter 

Al-Qadi, “Quwwat askariya”).

233. “Li-madha hukumat Hadi tujbir;” “Muhafizh Abyan li’l-Siyasa;” and “Masadir 

yamaniya li’l-Siyasa.”

234. “Al-Qaida tuawid saytaratha ala Abyan.”

235. “Bi’l-tawazi ma tadribat.”

236. Ahmad Al-Shamiri, “Al-Mukalla: 97 qatilan wa-jarihan fi hujum intihari waDAESH yatabanna” [Al-Mukalla: 97 dead and wounded in a suicide attack 

which ISIS claims], Ukaz, 15 May 2016, http://okaz.com.sa/article/1057583; and 

“35 qatilan fi tafjirat Al-Mukalla maqal Al-Qaida al-sabiq fi Al-Yaman” [Thirtyfive dead in the explosions in Al-Mukalla, al-Qaeda’s former stronghold in 

Yemen], Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London, Qatar-owned), 28 June 2016, www.alquds.

co.uk/?p=557153&print=1.

237. For an exhaustive chronological list of Al-Qaida operations up to early 2016, see 

“Ansar Al-Sharia fi Al-Yaman warith Al-Qaida” [The Ansar Al-Sharia in Yemen 

are al-Qaeda’s heirs], Al-Mukalla Al-An, 2 April 2016, www.almukallanow.com/

item/2755 (website since removed).

238. “Anasir Al-Qaida taqtul jundi wa-tusib akhar fi hujum sharqi Abyan” [Al-Qaeda 

elements kill one soldier and wound another in an attack in eastern Abyan], 

Shabwa Press, 14 April 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/42436.
113

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

239. “Tanzhim Al-Qaida fi Al-Yaman yasa li’l-waqia bayn al-qaba’il” [AQAP seeks 

to sow discord among the tribes], 24.ae, 18 July 2017, http://24.ae/364760.

240. “Al-Qissa al-kamila li’l-hujum ala muaskar quwwat al-amn al-markazi fi Aden” [A 

complete account of the attack on the central security force base in Aden], Aden AlGhad, 6 July 2016, http://adenalgd.net/news/212026; “Maqtal 6 askariyin wa-jarh 

10 akharin fi hujum intihari istahdaf muaskar Al-Sulban bi-Adan” [Six personnel 

killed and another ten wounded in a suicide attack on Al-Sulban base in Aden], 

Al-Khabar, 6 July 2016, https://www.alkhabarnow.net/news/229329/2016/07/06; 

“Al-Quwwat al-hukumiya tastaid al-saytara ala qaida askariya janub Al-Yaman” 

[Government forces reestablish control over a military base in south Yemen], AlKhabar, 7 July 2016, https://www.alkhabarnow.net/news/229342/2016/07/06; and 

Mohammed Al Qalisi, “10 Yemeni Soldiers Killed in Al Qaeda Attack near Aden 

Airport,’ The National, 6 July 2016, https://www.thenational.ae/world/10-yemenisoldiers-killed-in-al-qaeda-attack-near-aden-airport-1.152095.

241. “Al-Muhajimun kanu yartadun al-badlat al-askariya wa-sitrat al-waqiya didd 

al-rasas” [The attackers wore military unifroms and bullet-proof vests], Aden AlGhad, 24 February 2017, http://adenalgd.net/news/246638; “Al-Tafasil al-kamila 

li’l-hujum al-intihari ala muaskar al-hizam al-amni bi-Abyan” [Complete details 

of the suicide attack on the Hizam Amni Camp in Abyan], Aden Al-Ghad, 24 

February 2017, http://adenalgd.net/news/246639; “Fi hiwar ma Aden Al-Ghad: 

Qa’id muaskar al-hizam al-amni bi-Zinjibar yakshif haqiqat ma hadath fi alhujum al-irhabi yawm 24 fibraayir” [In an interview with Aden Al-Ghad: The 

commander of the Hizam Amni Camp in Zinjibar reveals the truth about what 

happened during the terrorist attack on 24 February], Aden Al-Ghad, 5 March 

2017, http://adenalgd.net/news/247941; “Musallahu tanzhim Al-Qaida yashunnun 

hujuman ala markaz shurtat Shaqra bi-muhafazhat Abyan” [Al-Qaeda fighters 

carry out attack against the Shaqra police station in Abyan province], Al-Masdar, 

3 May 2017, http://almasdaronline.com/article/90889; and “Musallahun yutaqad 

intima’uhum li’l-Qaida yufajjirun mabna li’l-amn fi Duan bi-Hadramawt” 

[Gunmen believed to belong to al-Qaeda blow up the police station in Duan in 

Hadramawt], Al-Khabar, 4 May 2017, https://www.alkhabarnow.net/new11079.

242. “Tafasil al-hujum al-irhabi ala idarat amn Lahij wa-suwar dahaya qatla quwwat 

al-hizam al-amni” [Details of the terrorist attack on the Lahij police headquarters 

and photos of the dead victims of the Hizam Amni forces], Al-Janub Al-Yawm, 

28 March 2017, www.aljanoobalyoum.com/?p=3286.

243. “Hal tujad alaqa bayn qarar iqalat Fahmi Mahrus min qiyadat all-liwa’ 11 haras 

hudud wa-hujum Al-Qaida ala mawqi tabi li’l-muaskar?” [Is there a connection 

between the relief of Fahmi Mahrus as commander of the 11th brigade of border 

guards and al-Qaeda’s attack on the position connected to the base?], Shabwa 

Press, 28 March 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/42110.

244. “Al-Yaman: Itiqal al-rajul al-thani fi Al-Qaida” [Yemen: The arrest of the numbertwo man in al-Qaeda], Al-Watan (Abu Dhabi), 29 March 2017, http://alwatannewspaper.ae/?p=157570; and “Quwwat al-tahaluf tataqil adadan min al-anasir 

wa’l-qiyadat bi-tanzhim Al-Qaida fi Hadramawt” [Coalition forces arrest a 
114

JSOU Report 18-4

number of al-Qaeda members and leaders in Hadramawt], Ukaz, 22 April 2017, 

http://okaz.com.sa/article/1541786.

245. Waddah Al-Ahmadi, “Adan tastakmil al-qada’ ala majami al-irhab” [Aden 

finishes off terrorist groups], Al-Watan, 7 March 2017, www.alwatan.com.sa/

Politics/News_Detail.aspx?ArticleID=296228.

246. “Al-Ajhiza al-amniya tadbut khaliya irhabiya tantami li’l-Qaida fi mudiriyat AlNadira fi Ibb” [The security forces detain a terrorist cell in Al-Nadira district in 

Ibb province], Mutabaat, 23 June 2016, www.motabaat.com/?p=33276; “Al-Ajhiza 

al-amniya tadbut khalaya tabia li-tanzhim DAESH fi adad min al-muhafazhat” 

[The security forces detain a number of cells belonging to ISIS in various provinces], Yamaniyun, 17 April 2016, www.yamanyoon.com/?p=33759; “Al-Ajhizaalamnniya tufakkik khaliya irhabiya fi Bayt Al-Faqih bi-muhafazhat Al-Hudayda 

wa-taqtul amir tanzhim Al-Qaida fi al-mudiriya” [The security forces disband a 

terrorist cell in Bayt Al-Faqih in Hodeida province and kill al-Qaeda’s amir for 

the district], Ministry of the Interior site (Ansar Allah-Saleh), 7 June 2016, www.

smc.gov.ye/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=14883:%D8%A7%D9%

84%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%

D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%83%D9%83-%D8%

AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%

D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D8%A7%

D9%84%D9%81%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%

A7%D9%81%D8%B8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%

D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%

8A%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%

D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%

84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9&Itemid=589; and 

“Al-Qabd ala adad min al-anasir al-ijramiya kanat tukhattit li-tanfidh amaliyat 

mukhilla bi’l-amn” [The arrest of a number of criminal elements planning to 

conduct operations to undermine security], 26 Sibtimbir, 28 December 2016, 

www.26sep.net/news_details.php?lng=arabic&sid=124354.

247. “Al-Jaysh al-yamani yuharrir Duan al-hadramiya min irhab Al-Qaida” [The 

Yemeni Army liberates Duan in Hadramawt from al-Qaeda’s terrorism], Al-Khalij, 

18 May 2015, www.alkhaleej.ae; Bassam Abd Al-Salam, “Sultat Hadramawt tulin 

tahrir Duan min Al-Qaida” [The Hadramawt authorities announce the liberation of Duan from al-Qaeda], Al-Ittihad, 18 May 2017, www.alittihad.ae/details.

php?id=29060&y=2017; and Al-BaHasani yazur Duan wa-yulin tahrirha min 

al-irhab” [Al-BaHasani visits Duan and proclaims it liberated from terrorism], 

Shabwa Press, 17 May 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/43337.

248. Saud Al-Shanini, “Al-Mutarabbisun bi-Hadramawt” [Those lurking over Hadramawt], Shabwa Press, 12 March 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/41739; and 

“Ikhwan Al-Yaman yanqulun musalsal al-ightiyalat wa’l-irhab ila Wadi Hadramawt” [Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood shift their string of assassinations to Wadi 

Hadramawt], Shabwa Press, 5 June 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/43834.
115

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

249. “Al-Qaida tuhajim muaskar al-nukhba fi Duan” [Al-Qaeda attacks the special 

forces camp in Duan], Akhbar Duan, 12 June 2017, www.doannews.com/news; 

and “Al-Mintaqa al-askariya al-thaniya Al-Mukalla tar’awi fi bayan tafasil hujum 

istihdaf muaskar Badda wa-ifshalih min quwwat al-nukhba” [The Al-Mukalla 

second military district in a communique delves into the details of the attack 

on the special forces camp at Badda and of its failure], Aden Al-Hadath, 12 June 

2017, http://adenalhadath.net/news_details.php?sid=19523.

250. “Hamla askariya jadida didd Al-Qaida fi Abyan” [A new military campaign against 

AQAP in Abyan], 24.ae, 27 July 2017, http://24.ae/article.aspx?ArticleId=367103.

251. “Maqtal 7 junud wa-isabat 8 akharin fi hujum li’l-Qaida ala nuqta amniya fi 

Rudum bi-Shabwa” [Seven soldiers killed and eight others wounded in an attack 

by AQAP on a security position in Rudum, Shabwa], Al-Khabar, 3 August 2017, 

https://www.alkhabarnow.net/new/14955.

252. Lucas Tomlinson, “U.S. Special Ops Help UAE Forces in Yemen Anti-Terror 

Operation,” 3 August 2017, Fox News, www.foxnews.com/world/2017/08/03/

us-special-ops-help-uae-forces-in-yemen-anti-terror-operation.html.

253. “Intisar kabir li’l-shariya al-yamaniya ala al-irhab bi-isnad imarati” [Major victory over terrorism for the legitimate Yemeni government with UAE support], 

Al-Bayan, 4 August 2017, www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2017-08-04-1.3017438; 

“Amaliya nawiya didd Al-Qaida fi shabwa bi-isnad imarati amriki” [Spectacular 

operation against AQAP in Shabwa with UAE and American support], Al-Khalij, 

4 August 2017, www.alkhaleej.ae/alkhaleej/page/bc9abd70-90a2-4d3c-90c7-

29a4962a86ea; and “Shabwa fi qabdat al-nukhba bad kar azhm Al-Qaida” [Shabwa 

is under the control of the special forces after AQAP’s back was broken], Shabwa 

Press, 5 August 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/45129.

254. “Al-Amaliyat al-askariya al-nawiya bi-Shabwa darba qasima li-adawat Qatar 

al-irhabiya bi’l-mintaqa” [The spectacular military operations in Shabwa are a 

mortal blow to Qatar’s terrorist clients in the region], Shabwa Press, 6 August 

2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/45156.

255. “Masadir mahalliya tukadhdhib Al-Imarat wa-takshif haqiqat al-amaliyat allati 

naffadhat fi muhafazhat Shabwa” [Local sources contradict the UAE and reveal 

the truth about the operation it carried out in the province of Shabwa], Yemen 

Press, 4 August 2017, http://yemen-press.com/news99354.html; “Qa’id himayat 

sharikat Al-Uqla bi-Shabwa yarfud al-taslim li’l-nukhba al-shabwaniya wayuhaddid bi-ihraq al-sharika” [The commander of the force defending the AlUqla Company refuses to hand it over to the Shabwa special forces and threatens 

to burn down the company], Al-Umana’, 4 August 2017, www.alomanaa.net/

print.php?id=60940; “Bad saytarat al-nukhba al-hadramiya ala abar al-naft 

wa’l-ghaz bi-Shabwa wa-khawfan ala a’idatha al-maliya Al-Miqdashi ya’mur 

bi-tard al-nukhba min al-mintaqa wa-quwwat al-liwa’ 21 tataharrak” [After the 

Hadramawt special forces seize the oil and gas wells in Shabwa,and worried about 

the revenue from them, Al-Miqdashi orders the expulsion of the special forces 

from the area and the 21st brigade to deploy], Al-Mashhad Al-Janubi, 4 August 

2017, www.salmashhad.com/news/18533; Shakir Ahmad Khalid, “Muharabat 
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al-irhab: Wajihat Al-Imarat al-jadida li’l-saytara ala manabi al-naft fi Al-Yaman” 

[Fighting terrorism: The UAE’s new façade to control the oil sources in Yemen], 

Bilqis TV, 5 August 2017, https://www.belqees.tv/news-reports; and “Al-Nukhba 

al-shabwaniya tatasallam mahammat ta’min khatt Al-Ubar-Ataq allati tusaytir 

alayh quwwat Hadi” [The Shabwa special forces receive the mission of securing 

the Al-Ubar-Ataq route held by Hadi’s forces], Al-Mashhad Al-Janubi, 6 August 

2017, www.salmashhad.com/news/18636.

256. “Al-Nukhba al-shabwaniya wa’l-quwwat al-imaratiya wa’l-amrikiya yusytirun 

ala mudiriyat Shabwa dun muwajaha ma al-anasir al-irhabiya” [The Shabwa 

special forces, UAE, and U.S. forces take control of Shabwa’s Districts without 

any clashes with terrorist elements], Al-Mashhad Al-Janubi, 4 August 2017, www.

salmashhad.com/news/18555; and “Sukkan: Farar anasir min tanzhim Al-Qaida 

ila manatiq muhita bi’l-Mahfad wa-Mudiya min Shabwa” [Locals: AQAP elements flee to the surrounding areas of Al-Mahfad and Mudiya in Shabwa], Aden 

Al-Ghad, 5 August 2017, http://adengd.net/news/270809.

257. “Ila ayn farrat anasir Al-Qaida aqb tardiha min Shabwa?” [Where did the AQAP 

members flee following their expulsion from Shabwa?], Al-Yawm Al-Thamin, 5 

August 2017, http://alyoum8.net/news/8405.

258. William Maclean, Noah Browning and Yara Bayoumy, “Yemen CounterTerrorism Mission Shows UAE Military Ambition,” Reuters, 28 June 2016, 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-emirates/yemen-counterterrorism-mission-shows-uae-military-ambition-idUSKCN0ZE1EA.

259. Tawakkul Karman, “Al-Rihan al-khasir li’l-Imarat fi Al-Yaman” [The UAE’s 

losing bet in Yemen], Bilqis TV, 6 August 2017, www.belqees.tv/opinion-articles.

260. Norman Cigar, Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons (New York: Routledge, 2016), 

161–2; Ma’mun Fandi, “Qimmat Sharm Al-Shaykh: Qimmat Al-Malik Salman” 

[The Sharm Al-Shaykh Summit: King Salman’s Summit], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 

30 March 2015, http://aawsat.com/node/324316; and Ali Al-Qarni, “Asifat hazm 

siyasiya li-muwajahat al-tawassu al-irani” [A political Resolute Storm to counter 

Iranian expansion], Al-Jazira, 21 April 2016, www.al-jazirah.com/2016/20160421/

ar6.htm.

261. Interview with Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman by MBC TV 

(Beirut), “Waliy waliy al-ahd: Al-Wusul li-qiblat al-muslimin hadaf ra’is li-Iran” 

[The deputy crown prince: Reaching the Muslims’ Qibla is the goal of Iran’s president], Al-Riyadh, 3 May 2017, www.alriyadh.com/1590716; Foreign Minister Adil 

Al-Jubeir, “Wazir al-kharijiya: Ziyarat Trump bidayat hiqba jadida fi al-alaqat” 

[The foreign minister: Trump’s visit is the beginning of a new era in relations], 

Al-Riyadh, 21 May 2017, www.alriyadh.com/1596050; and Muhammad Said Al 

Jabir, Saudi ambassador to Yemen, “Iran wa’l-Yaman al-jadid” [Iran and the new 

Yemen], Al-Hayat (London, Saudi-owned, Saudi edition), 24 May 2017, www.

alhayat.com/Opinion/Writers/22022072/%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%

D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%

84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF.
117

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

262. David B. Roberts, “The United Arab Emirates' Secular Foreign Policy,” Center for 

Geopolitical Analyses (Athens), 23 March 2016, http://icmu.nyc.gr/%20Mosque%20

and%20State; Courtney Free, Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood 

in the Gulf, Middle East Centre Paper 9, (London: LSE, 2015), 18-20, http://eprints.

lse.ac.uk/64446/1/RentierIslamism.pdf; and Rania El Gamal, “UAE Lists Muslim 

Brotherhood as Terrorist Group,” Reuters, 15 November 2014, www.reuters.com/

article/us-emirates-politics-brotherhood-idUSKCN0IZ0OM20141115.

263. “Al-Safir al-saudi Al Jabir yarudd ala ittihamat al-makhlu wa-yakshif an mukhattat irani li’l-saytara ala Al-Yaman bi-dam duwali” [The Saudi Ambassador Al 

Jabir replies to the deposed president’s accusations and exposes an Iranian plan 

to take control of Yemen with international support], Ma’rib Press, 27 April 2017, 

http://marebpress.net/nprint.php?sid=127835.

264. “Mukafahat al-irhab awwaliya imaratiya fi al-janub” [Counterterrorism is a 

UAE priority in the south], Shabwa Press, 8 March 2017, http://shabwaahpress.

net/news/41651.

265. “Al-Mawqi Post yakshif khafaya.”

266. “Asiri: Istihdaf tanzhim Al-Qaida laysat min mahamm asifat al-hazm” [Asiri: 

Targeting al-Qaeda is not one of resolute storm’s missions], You Tube, 16 June 

2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8k_WYNqAHl0.

267. Interview with Brigadier General Ahmad Asiri, “Asiri li’l-Bayan: 90% min 

misahat Al-Yemen fi aydi al-shariya” [Asiri to Al-Bayan: 90% of Yemen’s area 

is in the hands of the legitimate government], Al-Bayan, 24 March 2016, www.

albayan.ae/supplements/restoring-hope/news/2016-03-24-1.2602374?pt=pt.Pri.

268. Quoted in Isa Al-Shimali, “Asiri: Istiadat Al-Mukalla khutwa li-iadat al-hayba 

li’l-shariya al-yamaniya” [Asiri: The return of Al-Mukalla is a step toward renewing the authority of the legitimate Yemeni government], Ukaz, 26 April 2016, 

http://okaz.com.sa/article/1054497. 

269. Major General Anwar Ishgi (Ret.) quoted in “Khabir istratiji: Al-Qaida tahtadir 

fi Al-Yaman” [A strategic expert: Al-Qaeda is moribund in Yemen], Dot Misr 

(Cairo), 16 June 2015, www.dotmsr.com.

270. Brigadier General Hasan al-Shihri (Ret.) quoted in “Mas’ul askari saudi yakshif haqiqat Al-Qaida fi Al-Yemen wa-adad al-muntamyin li’l-tanzhim” [A 

Saudi military figure reveals the nature of al-Qaeda in Yemen], Ma’rib Press, 24 

February 2016, http://marebpress.net/mobile/news_details.php?sid=117354. At 

the same time, the UN estimated that ISIS alone in Yemen had just under 500 

fighters, United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General 

on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to International Peace and Security and 

the Range of United Nations Efforts in Support of Member States in Countering the Threat, S/2017/467, 31 May 2017, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.

asp?symbol=S/2017/467.

271. Al-Qadi, “Quwwat askariya.” 

272. “Ilan muhafazhat Abyan mintaqa mutahhara bi’l-kamil min Al-Qaida” [Proclamation of Abyan province as completely cleared of al-Qaeda], Bu Yemen News 
118

JSOU Report 18-4

Net, 27 August 2016, www.buyemen.com/news34174.html; Al-Qadi, “Quwwat 

askariya;” and “Abyan: Maqtal jundi min al-hizam fi Zinjibar wa’l-Qaida tusaytir 

mujaddadan ala Al-Wadi” [Abyan: A soldier in the Hizam Amni is killed in 

Zinjibar and al-Qaeda retakes Al-Wadi], Akhbar Al-Yawm, 24 September 2016, 

http://akhbaralyom-ye.net/news_details.php?sid=89656.

273. Bassam Al-Qadi, “Hamla askariya murtaqaba li-tathir shabwa min barathin alirhab” [A military campaign to free Shabwa from the terrorist claws], Al-Sharq 

Al-Awsat, 23 August 2016, https://aawsat.com/home/article/719991/%D8%AD%

D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%

A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%

D8%B7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D9%

85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AB%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%

D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8.

274. Major General Mansur Al-Turki and Abd Allah al-Shihri, respectively, quoted in 

“Gharat al-tahaluf fi Al-Yaman shallat qudrat Al-Qaida” [The coalition’s raids in 

Yemen have paralyzed al-Qaeda’s capabiltiies], Al-Hayat (international edition), 

24 March 2017, www.alhayat.com/Articles/20901002.

275. Interview with Tariq Al-Fadli, “Tariq Al-Fadli yakshif asrar insihab Al-Qaida 

min Abyan” [Tariq Al-Fadli reveals secrets about the withdrawal of al-Qaeda 

from Abyan], Aden Al-Ghad, 31 August 2012, http://adenalghad.net/news/16756.

276. Hugh Naylor, “Saudi-Backed Fighters Try to Build on Gains in Yemen War,” 

Washington Post, 30 July 2015, A10.

277. “Maqtal qiyadi bi-tanzhim Al-Qaida fi maarik Al-Buqa wa’l-tayaran yashinn 

akthar min 25 ghara” [The death of an al-Qaeda commander in the fighting for 

Al-Buqa while aircraft fly more than 25 sorties], Al-Murasil, 18 October 2016, 

www.almrasel.net/?p=10219.

278. “Kayf laqiya al-qiyadi fi tanzhim Al-Qaida Muhsin Al-Awlaqi wa-asharat almunafiqin masrahum?” [How did the al-Qaeda commander Muhsin Al-Awlaqi 

and dozens of hypocrites lose their lives?], Hisad Al-Yawm, 10 February 2017, 

www.hasadalyoum.com/news15649.html.

279. “Qiyadat jabhat Al-Mandab takshif haqiqat intisab munaffidhi hujum Lahij liafrad al-jabha” [The leadership of the Al-Mandab front reveals the truth about 

the membership of the perpetrators of the Lahij Attack in the front’s forces], 

Bawwabat Hadramawt Al-Ikhbariya, 29 March 2017, www.hdgatewaynews.com/

news/?p=66310.

280. “Duwaylat Al-Imarat wa’l-dawr al-karithi fi Al-Yaman” [The Emirate mini-state 

and its disastrous role in Yemen], Al-Masra, 3 October 2016, 4.

281. “Al-Qaida raddan ala al-itmi’nan al-saudi: Ma baynana hudna laysa illa!” [AlQaeda in response to Saudi Equanimity: There is no truce between us, please!], 

Bu Yemen News Net, 21 April 2017, www.buyemen.com/news45341.html.

282. Khalid BaTarfi, “Saqat al-qina” [The Mask Has Fallen], June 2017, video at https://

justpaste,it/17w3s (website since removed).
119

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

283. For example, Yusuf Al-Sharif, “Al-Tajruba al-khalijiya fi idarat al-azmat” [The 

Gulf experience in crisis management], Al-Bayan, 9 May 2017, www.albayan.ae/

opinions/articles/2017-05-09-1.2941211.

284. Abd Allah Al-Yafai, “Al-Namudhaj al-imarati: Misr, Libiya, wa’l-Yaman mithalan” [The UAE Model: Egypt, Libya, and Yemen as examples], Al-Taghyir, 31 May 

2017, www.al-tagheer.com/art35532.html.

285. “Al-Jaysh bi-Hadramawt yaqul innah atlaq sarah al-asharat min al-ashkhas alladhina ishtabahu bi’l-intima’ li’l-Qaida” [The army says it has released dozens who 

had been suspected of belonging to al-Qaeda], Aden Al-Ghad, 13 September 2016, 

http://adenalgd.net/news/220292; “Nushata’ yudashshinun hamla ala mawaqi 

al-tawasul li-mutalabat al-sultat li-ifraj an ulama’ Hadramawt” [Activists start 

a campaign on social media demanding the authorities release the Hadramawt 

Ulama’], Al-Dali News, 3 August 2016, http://addalinews.com/news/%20381332; 

“Hizb Al-Islah al-yamani fi Al-Bayda’ yahtajj ala al-hamla al-amniya didd AlQaida” [The Yemeni Islah party in Al-Bayda’ protests against the security campaign against al-Qaeda], Aden Al-Ghad, 13 September 2016, http://adenalgd.net/

news/220298; and “Al-Mawqi Post yakshif khafaya ma yahdath fi muhafazhat 

Abyan li-isqatha fi yad Al-Qaida” [Al-Mawqi Post Reveals the Secrets of What 

Is Happening to in Abyan Province to Have It Fall into Al-Qaida’s Hands], AlMawqi Post, 6 February 2017, http://almawqea.net/reports/16309.

286. “Aqil Al-Halali and Bassam Abd Al-Salam, “Itiqal 250 unsuran min Al-Qaida 

fi Al-Mukalla” [250 members of al-Qaeda arrested in Al-Mukalla], Al-Ittihad, 

14 May 2016, www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=19951&y=2016.

287. Bassam Abd Al-Salam, “Itiqal 300 unsur min Al-Qaida wa-DAESH fi Lahij” [The 

arrest of 300 al-Qaeda and ISIS members in Lahij], Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi), 20 

November 2016, www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=56632&y=2016.

288. “Shabwa: Musallahun qabaliyun yaqtaun tariq Ma’rib wa-madinat Ataq taghriq 

fi al-zhalam” [Armed tribesmen cut the road from Ma’rib and the city of Ataq 

goes dark], Al-Mawqi Post, 31 March 2017, http://almawqea.net/news/18229.

289. “Sura tajma bayn intihari Adan wa-mas’ul amni muqarrab min Al-Imarat” [A 

photograph links the Aden suicide attacker with a security commander close to 

the UAE], Arabi 21, 31 August 2016, http://arabi21.com. The pro-Hadi media in 

Yemen widely repeated this report.

290. “Al-Kazimi: Kull ma yahdath fi Adan yatahammal mas’uliyathu al-tahaluf al-arabi 

wa-hukumat al-shariya wa-muharabat al-irhab fi Aden kidhba” [Al-Kazimi: The 

Arab Coalition and the legitimate government are responsible for everything that 

is happening in Aden and the fight against terrorism is a sham], Aden Al-Ghad, 

4 August 2016, http://adengd.net/news/215372.

291. “Asharat al-salafiyin yughadirun Adan bad saat min itiqal quwwat amniya imam 

salafi bi’l-madina” [Dozens of Salafis leave Aden hours after the security forces 

arrest a Salafi Imam in the city], Aden Post, 26 July 2016, http://adenpst.info/

news/49262; and Ashraf Al-Falahi, “Dur al-ibada fi da’irat al-sira bi-madinat 

Aden janub Al-Yemen: Li-madha?” [Houses of worship caught up in the struggle 
120

JSOU Report 18-4

in Aden, South Yemen: Why?], Arabi21, 17 March 2017, http://arabi21.com/

story/989798. The latter article was reproduced in much of the pro-Hadi media, 

indicating the latter’s approval.

292. “Ulama’ al-salafiya fi Al-Yaman yatabarra’un min Hani Bin Barik wa-yaqulun 

innahu yajurr atbaahu ila al-hawiya” [Salai Ulama’ in Yemen dissasociate themselves from Hani Bin Barik and say that he is dragging his followers into perdition], Yemen Press, 24 August 2016, http://yemen-press.com/news80249.html.

293. “Madha yahdath ya muhafizh Hadramawt?” [What is going on, governor of 

Hadramawt?], Al-Mashhad Al-Yamani, 8 August 2016, www.almashhad-alyemeni.

com/topics/MY/W/89444.html.

294. “Qa’id wihdat mukafahat al-irhab bi-Adan: Jahhazna quwwat shababiya limukafahat al-irhab fi mukhtalif al-takhassusat” [The commander of the counterterrorist unit in Aden: We have stood up youth counterterrorist forces having 

all capabilities], Hayat Aden, 15 January 2017, http://adenlife.net/news32313.

html. 

295. “Tajnid kadir nisa’i wa-taghtiyat naqs al-asliha bi-dam min al-tahaluf al-arabi” 

[The recruitment of female personnel and support by the Arab Coalition to cover 

the weapons shortage], Al-Mukalla Al-Yawm, 30 June 2016, www.mukallatoday.

com/pages/print.aspx?ID=36261 (website since removed).

296. Adham Fahd, “Quwwat al-hizam al-amni: Sulta mutawaziya wa-kiyan ghayr shari 

yumaris sultat al-dawla” [The Hizam Amni Forces: A parallel authority and an 

extra-legal entity exercising government powers], Al-Mawqi Post, 14 March 2017, 

http://almawqea.net/reports/11153 (hereafter Adham Fahd, “Quwwat al-hizam 

al-amni”); and “Adan: Taghryirat imaratiya fi qiyadat al-hizam al-amni bad ishtibakha ma al-quwwat al-ri’asiya li-Hadi” [Aden: UAE changes in the leadership 

of the Hizam Amni following clashes with Hadi’s presidential guard], Ma’rib 

Press, 17 February 2017, https://marebpress.net/news_details.php?sid=126033.

297. “Tadshin hamla shabiya li-dam jabhat Lawdar wa’l-hizam yulin hizhr al-tajwal 

fi al-madina” [Popular campaign begun to support the Lawdar Front and the 

Hizam Amni announces a traffic ban in the city], Akhbar Al-Yawm, 5 February 

2017, http://akhbaralyom-ye.net/news_details.php?sid=92305; and “Istiqala liqa’id quwwat al-hizam al-amni takshif tawatu’ Hadi wa’l-tahaluf ma tanzhim 

Al-Qaida” [The resignation of the commander of the Hizam Amni Forces reveals 

the collusion by Hadi and the coalition with al-Qaeda], Al-Mashhad Al-Janubi, 

5 February 2017, www.salmashhad.com/news/12089.

298. “Adan: Al-Hizam al-amni yatadi ala muwazzii sahifat Akhbar Al-Yawm wa-yanhab 

bas al-tawzi” [Aden: The Hizam Amni attacks distributors of Akhbar Al-Yawm 

newspaper and seize the delivery van], Al-Mawqi Post, 13 February 2017, http://

almawqea.net/press/16585.

299. “Ishtibakat bayn quwwatayn min al-hizam al-amni fi Adan wa-ibtal sariqat 

atqum askariya bi-Abyan [Clashes between two Hizam Amni units in Aden and 

the theft of military pick-up trucks foiled in Abyan], Huna Aden, 15 December 

2016, http://hunaaden.net/news36218.html.
121

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

300. “Al-Mawqi Post yakshif khafaya ma yahdath fi muhafazhat Abyan li-isqatha fi yad 

Al-Qaida” [Al-Mawqi Post reveals the secrets of what is happening to in Abyan 

Province to have it fall into al-Qaeda’s hands], Al-Mawqi Post, 6 February 2017, 

http://almawqea.net/reports/16309 (hereafter “Al-Mawqi Post yakshif khafaya”).

301. “Shatara: Niqat al-ibtizaz al-amniya tasabbabat bi-nuzuh al-amal al-tijariya an 

mina’ Adan” [Shatara: The shakedown checkpoints have caused a fall in commercial activity in the Port of Aden], Al-Umana’, 3 October 2016, https://www.

al-omana.com/print.php?id=42723; “Usrat muataqal tuwuffiya bi’l-tadhib bi-sijn 

al-hizam al-amni tarfud istilam juththatih fi Hutat Lahij” [The family of the 

detainee who died under torture in the Hizam Amni prison refuses to accept 

his corpse in Huta in Lahij], Huna Aden, 22 January 2017, http://hunaaden.net/

news36899.html; “Usra fi Abyan tattahim quwwat al-hizam al-amni bi-tadhib 

najlihim fi al-bahr wa-ighraqih hatta al-mawt” [A family in abyan accuses the 

Hizam Amni forces of torturing their son at sea and drowning him], Al-Masdar, 

14 March 2017, http://almasdaronline.com/article/89592; and Adham Fahd, 

“Quwwat al-hizam al-amni;” Abigail Fielding-Smith, “Is This American Ally 

Backing Torture and Forced Disappearances?” Daily Beast (New York), 9 June 

2017, www.thedailybeast.com/is-this-american-ally-backing-torture-and-forceddisappearances; and Ahmed Al-Haj, “Yemen to probe alleged interrogation abuses 

by UAE, US,” Associated Press, 24 June 2017, https://www.apnews.com/569f166

4c28a4b2ab2aea8aef4202e7c.

302. Ghamdan Al-Duqaymi, “DAESH fi Al-Yaman?” [ISIS in Yemen?], Irfa Sawtak 

program, Al-Hurra TV (U.S. government, Springfield, VA), 30 October 2016, 

https://www.irfaasawtak.com (hereafter Al-Duqaymi, “DAESH fi Al-Yaman?”).

303. “Am ala tard tanzhim Al-Qaida min Al-Mukalla; fa-madha yaqul al-sukkan?” 

[A year after the expulsion of al-Qaeda from Al-Mukalla; What do the people 

say?], Al-Mushahid, 9 May 2017, www.almushahid.net/?p=14880.

304. “Fima al-tanzhim yuwazzi manshurat wa-yuhadhdhir min al-iqtirab min mawaqi 

wa-niqat quwwat al-hizam” [Al-Qaeda [Al-Qaeda Distributes Leaflets and Warns 

against Approaching Hizam Amni Positions and Checkpoints], Akhbar Al-Yawm, 

29 January 2017, www.akhbaralyom-ye.net/news_details.php?sid=91980.

305. “Al-Houthiyun yahtajizun qawafil muttajiha ila Taizz al-yamaniya” [The Houthis 

block convoys heading for Taizz in Yemen], Iram News, 4 February 2017, www.

eremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/711087.

306. For a perceptive study that suggests pessimism about the future development of 

a national army, see Zoltan Barany, The Challenges of Building a National Army 

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016).

307. “Tamarrud askari didd qa’id al-liwa’ al-thalith Hazm bi-jabhat Kahbub wa-majami 

qabaliya tataharrak li-musanadatihi” [Troop mutiny against the commander of 

the Hazm Amni Third brigade on the Kahbub front and tribal groups move to 

support him], Al-Murasil, 6 May 2017, www.almrasel.net/?p=18752.
122

JSOU Report 18-4

308. “Ma alladhi yamna al-shariya min ta’sis jaysh qawi fi al-janub?” [What is preventing the legitimate government from establishing a strong army in the south?], 

Aden Al-Ghad, 16 December 2016, http://adengd.net/news/235205.

309. Aziz El Yaakoubi, “UAE Builds Up Yemen Regional Army But Country Fragments,” Reuters, 3 May 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-securityemirates-idUSKBN17Z0LW.

310. “Man huwa Abu Al-Abbas qa’id Humat Al-Aqida bi-Taizz wa-ma alaqathu bi’ltahaluf?” [Who is Abu al-Abbas the commander of Humat al-Aqida (defenders 

of the faith) in Taizz and what is his relationship with the coalition?], Arabi 21

(Cairo), 9 November 2015, http://arabi21.com./story/871732; and “Hiwar muthir 

ma al-qiyadi bi-jabhat Taizz Abu Al-Abbas” [Provocative interview with the 

commander at the Taizz Front Abu Al-Abbas], Al-Ra’y Press, 23 October 2016, 

www.alraipress.com/news32048.html.

311. “Yaghus fi ahdath al-sira bi-Taizz wa-yakshif khafaya muriba wa-irtibatat mahalliya wadalia mufzia wa-hahiqat Abu Al-Abbas wa-mashruuhu” [He plunges into 

the events of the struggle in Taizz and reveals the frightening secrets of the local 

linkages and alarming networks and the truth about Abu Al-Abbas and His 

Plans], Ma’rib Press, 30 January 2017, http://marebpress.net/mobile/news_details.

php?sid=125682; and “Asma’ al-musabbibin fi ahdath al-shaghab bi-Taizz watasdur tawjihat bi-ilqa’ al-qabd alayhim” [The names of the provocateurs in the 

troubles in Taizz and instructions go out for their arrest], Nas Times, 17 February 

2017, www.nasstimes.com/print.php?id=18906.

312. Abd Al-Wahhab Al-Sharafi, “Mintaqatna bayn khatar al-irhab wa-khatar ‘mukafahat al-irhab’” [Our region between the threat of terrorism and the threat of 

“counterterrorism”], Aden Observer, 4 February 2017, http://adenobserver.com/

read-news/12204.

313. “Hadramawt: Hizam qabali li-himayat Al-Mukalla min Al-Qaida” [Hadramawt: 

A tribal Hizam Amni to protect Al-Mukalla from al-Qaeda], Sada Aden, 18 

November 2016, www.sadaaden.uk/read-news/329452 (website since removed).

314. “Bi’l-watha’iq: Ikhwan Al-Yaman yastaghillun al-harb wa-yamnahun anasirhum 

rutaban askariya” [Documents: Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood take advantage of 

the war and give out military ranks to their members], 24.ae (Abu Dhabi, UAE 

government), 14 February 2017, http://24.ae/article/318145/%d8%a8%d8%a7%d

9%84%d9%88%d8%ab%d8%a7%d8%a6%d9%82-%d8%a5%d8%ae%d9%88%d8

%a7%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%86-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d8

%aa%d8%ba%d9%84%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%

a8-%d9%88%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%86%d8%ad%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%b9%d9%

86%d8%a7%d8%b5%d8%b1%d9%87%d9%85-%d8%b1%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a

7%d9%8b-%d8%b9%d8%b3%d9%83%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a9; “Al-Mawqi Post, 

yakshif khafaya.”

315. “’Al-Jaysh al-watani’: milishiyat fasad” [The “National Army:” Corrupt Militias], 

Al-Arabi, 18 July 2017, https://www.al-arabi.com/Issues/14571.
123

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

316. “Qa’id al-hizam al-amni bi’l-Mahfad li’l-Umana’: Atana al-tahaluf indharan 

akhiran li-iltizam al-afrad ma-lam sa-yatimm hall al-hizam al-amni li-adam 

al-indibat” [The commander of the Hizam Amni in Al-Mahfad to Al-Umana’: 

The coalition gave us a final warning about our members being present for duty 

or the Hizam Amni will be disbanded due to a lack of discipline], Al-Umana’, 

12 February 2017, www.alomanaa.net/news50537.html.

317. “Qa’id katibabi’l-Buqa yattahim al-qiyadi Mahran Al-Qubati bi’l-istila’ ala 

murattabat al-muqatilin” [A battalion commander in Al-Buqa accuses the senior 

commander Mahran Al-Qubati of embezzling the troops’ pay], Aden Al-Ghad, 28 

March 2017, http://adenalgd.net/news /251599 (hereafter “Qa’id katibabi’l-Buqa”).

318. “Qa’id al-quwwa al-shabiya al-janubiya yuwajjih risala hamma ila al-ra’is hadi 

wa-qiyadat al-tahaluf al-arabi wa-yuhadhdhir” [The commander of the southern 

popular force sends an important letter to President Hadi and the leadership of 

the Arab Coalition and warns], Aden Al-Ghad, 7 September 2015, http://adengd.

net/news/163061; and “Abyan maraka khasira?” [Abyan: A Losing Battle?], AlArabi, 8 January 2017, https://www.al-arabi.com/Issues/9413.

319. Mohammed Al Qalisi, “Suicide Bomber Kills More Than 50 Yemen Soldiers Queuing for Salaries,” The National (Abu Dhabi), 18 December 2016, 

www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/suicide-bomber-kills-more-than-50-

yemen-soldiers-queuing-for-salaries.

320. “Ma haqiqat ma jajri fi Lawdar bi-Abyan?” [What is the truth about what is happening in Lawdar in Abyan?], Al-Mawqi Post, 3 February 2017, http://almawqea.

net/reports/16179.

321. “Quwwat al-shariya tuharrir mina’ Balhaf min Al-Qaida fi muhafazhat Shabwa” 

[The forces of the legitimate government liberate the Port of Balhaf in Shabwa 

Province from al-Qaeda], Akhbar Al-An, 4 December 2016, https://www.akhbaralaan.net/news/arab-world/2016/12/4/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%

D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%

AD%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A8%

D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%

82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%

D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9.

322. “Muhafizh Abyan: Jami mudiriyat al-muhafazha tukhda li-saytarat al-shariya 

wa-la wujud li-anasir Al-Qaida fiha” [The Governor of Abyan: All of the districts 

of the province are under control of the legitimate government and there are no 

al-Qaeda members there], Al-Mawqi Post, 21 March 2017, http://almawqea.net/

news/17858.

323. “Al-Mikhlafi: La wujud li-DAESH fi Al-Yaman illa fi ilam al-inqilabiyin” [AlMikhlafi: There is no ISIS presence in Yemen except in the rebels’ media], Yaman 

24, 29 January 2016, http://yemen-24.com/news22544.html.

324. “Amniyun janubiyun yashkun adam istilam rawatibhim mundh akthar min sittat 

ashhur” [Southern policemen complain of not receiving their pay in more than six 

months], Aden Al-Ghad, 22 November 2016, http://adenalgd.net/news /231246; 
124

JSOU Report 18-4

“Al-Dali: Afrad al-jaysh wa-muqawamat Mirris yahtajjun ala al-murattabat” 

[Al-Dali: Personnel in the army and the Mirris Resistance complain about their 

pay], Shabwa Press, 15 April 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/42466.

325. “Fawda wa-ihtijajat bi-Lawdar li-askariyin uqb tawaqquf sarf murattabat” [Chaos 

and protests in Lawdar by troops in Lawdar in the wake of an interruption in 

the disbursement of salaries], Aden Al-Ghad, 11 April 2017, http://adenalgd.net/

news/253765; and “Qa’id katibabi’l-Buqa.”

326. “Ma all-ladhi ya’kulhu al-muqatilun bi-jabhat Thara?”[What do fighters on the 

Thara front eat?], Aden Al-Ghad, 24 July 2017, http://adenalgd.net/news/269080.

327. “Mujannadun bi-Abyan li-Aden Al-Ghad: Nutalib al-muhafizh wa-mudir al-amn 

bi-hall mushkilatna wa-raf al-zhulm anna” [Recruits in Abyan to Aden Al-Ghad: 

We ask the governor and the security chief to solve our problem and to end the 

unfairness to us], Aden Al-Ghad, 25 July 2017, http://adengd.net/news/269230.

328. “Muhafizh al-bank al-markazi Adan yuwajjih bi-iqaf sarf murattabat rijal al-amn 

fi Shabwa wa-Hadramawt wa’l-Mahra wa-Suqutra” [The director of the Aden 

Branch of the central bank orders that salaries to security personnel in Shabwa, 

Hadramawt, Al-Mahra, and Soqotra be halted], Shabwa Press, 25 May 2017, 

http://shabwaahpress.net/news/43575.

329. “Quwwa min al-hizam al-amni bi-Abyan tansahib min mawqiha li-adam husul 

afradha ala al-iasha wa’l-rawatib” [A unit of the hizam amni in Abyan withdraws 

from its positions because its members have not received rations and pay], Shabwa 

Press, 2 February 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/40802.

330. “Al-Tafasil al-kamila li’l-tafjir al-intihari bi-muaskar Ra’s Abbas bi’l-Bariqa” 

[Complete details on the suicide explosion at Ra’s Abbas camp in Al-Bariqa], 

Aden Al-Ghad, 17 February 2016, http://adenalghad.net.

331. “Insihab jamai li-muqatili al-tahaluf min jabhat Ma’rib wa-akharun bi’l-indimam 

li’l-Houthiyin li-hadhihi al-asbab” [Mass abandonment by coalition fighters of 

the frontlines in Ma’rib and others would join the houthis for that reason], AlMurasil, 4 April 2017, www.almrasel.net/?p=17442.

332. Ali Muhammad Ahmad, “Qa’id muqawamat Ahwar wa-muaskar al-liwa’ 111 

li-Aden Al-Ghad: Iltaqayna Hadi fi Al-Riyad fa-amar bi-taslih al-muaskar watawfir al-dam lah wa-dhahabna ila Al-Miqdashi lakinnahu rafad wa-li-dhalik 

saqatat Ahwar” [The commander of Ahwar’s resistance and of the 111th Brigade 

Base to Aden Al-Ghad: We met Hadi in Riyadh and he ordered weapons and the 

provision of support for the base and we then went to Al-Miqdashi but he refused 

and that is why Ahwar fell], Aden Al-Ghad, 3 June 2016, http://adenalghad.net.

333. “Al-Hizam yansahib min baldat Amiyin fi Abyan bad ayyam min kamin adda 

ila maqtal jundiyayn” [The Hizam Amni withdraws from the Town of Amiyin 

in Abyan days after an ambush led to the death of two soldiers], Al-Dali News, 

8 January 2017, http://addalinews.com/news/%20413007.

334. “Hadramawt: Hamlat nawiya tunaffidhha al-quwwat al-khassa bi-Duan” [Hadramawt: The spectacular campaigns that the special forces carry out in Duan], 

Al-Umana’, 20 May 2017, www.alomanaa.net/news57100.html; and “Quwwat 
125

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

mukafahat al-irhab wa-liwa’ al-dam wa’l-isnad yusaytirun ala matar Adan” [The 

Counterterrorism forces and the support brigade seize Aden airport], Aden AlGhad, 31 May 2017, http://adenalgd.net/news/261782.

335. Fu’ad Muhammad, “Al-Qat: muwazana maliya askariya kabira fi al-harb bi’lYaman; tafasil” [Qat: Major military financial budget item in the war in Yemen; 

Details], Al-Mushahid, 18 April 2017, https://www.almushahid.net/?p=14434.

336. Interview with Abd Al-Latif Al-Sayyid by Dhuwayzin Mukhshif, “Abd AlLatif Al-Sayyid: Mukhassas al-muqawama athna’ al-harb sallam li’l-Qaida 

wa-DAESH” [Abd Al-Latif Al-Sayyid: He transferred the resistance budget to 

al-Qaeda and ISIS], Al-Yemen Al-Said, 31 March 2016, www.yemensaeed.com/

print.php?id=55577. (hereafter Dhuwayzin Mukhshif, “Abd Al-Latif Al-Sayyid”).

337. “10 junud yatawallawn hirasat muaskar Badr mundh nihayat shahr Ramadan 

wa-hatta al-yawm” [Ten personnel have been guarding Badr base since the 

end of Ramadan until today], Aden Al-Ghad, 9 July 2016, http://adenalgd.net/

news/212204.

338. Al-Sayyid al-munshaqq an Al-Qaida: Qawamt Ansar Al-Sharia li-anni arfud 

al-zhulm” [Al-Sayyid, the dissident from al-Qaeda: I opposed the ansar AlSharia because I reject injustice], Al-Umana’, 1 January 2017, http://alomana.

net//news533.html.

339. “Bad tarqimhim Hadi yasrif murattabat li-shabab jannadathum Al-Qaida fi 

Muaskar Al-Thawra athna’ saytaratha ala madinat Al-Mukalla” [After enrolling 

them, Hadi pays the salaries of youths that al-Qaeda had recruited in camp AlThawra while al-Qaeda was in control of Al-Mukalla], Al-Mashhad Al-Janubi, 

4 February 2017, www.salmashhad.com/news/12082.

340. Ahmad Al-Juaydi, “Al-Qaida tataraja an wuudha bi-mughadarat Al-Mukalla 

wa-tataqil dubbatan askariyiyin mutaqaidin” [Al-Qaeda reneges on its promises 

to leave Al-Mukalla and arrests retired military officers], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat

(London, Saudi-owned), 23 July 2015, http://aawsat.com/node/413786.

341. “Al-Zubaydi yulhiq bi-Shallal ila Al-Imarat bad istida’ih bi-sura ajila wa-adilla 

tuthbit tawarruthuma ma DAESH wa’l-Qaida” [Al-Zubaydi joins Shallal in the 

UAE after being hastily summoned there and evidence confirms their involvement with ISIS and al-Qaeda], Shabwa Al-Hadath, 25 May 2016, http://shabwahalhadath.net/news/12641 (hereafter “Al-Zubaydi yulhiq bi-Shallal”).

342. “Al-Qaida tuawid saytaratha ala Abyan wa’l-kiyan al-siyasi hibr ala waraq” 

[Al-Qaeda re-establishes its control over Abyan and the political structure is 

just ink on paper], Al-Mashhad Al-Janubi, 1 April 2017, www.salmashhad.com/

news/7701 (hereafter “Al-Qaida tuawid saytaratha ala Abyan”).

343. “Al-Qaida wa’l-muqawama: Man yakhtariq man?” [Al-Qaeda and the resistance: 

Who penetrates whom?], Al-Arabi, 5 December 2016, https://www.al-arabi.com/

Issues/8510.

344. Dhuwayzin Mukhshif, “Abd Al-Latif Al-Sayyid.”
126

JSOU Report 18-4

345. “Khilafat kabira bayn Al-Nawba wa-lijan Hadi wa’l-Qaida bi-Shabwa taarraf ala 

al-sabab” [Learn the cause of the major disputes between the Nasir Al-Nawba 

brigade and Hadi’s committees and al-Qaeda in Shabwa], Sada Press, 30 October 

2015, www.saadahpress.net/news/news-26928.htm.

346. “Bi’l-Tawazi ma tadribat fi iddat mudiriyat: Tawafud anasir Al-Qaida min 

muhafazhat yamaniya ila Al-Mukalla wa-Wadi Hadramawt” [Simulataneous with training in several districts: Al-Qaeda elements redeploy from other 

provinces to Al-Mukalla and Wadi Hadramawt], Shabwa Press, 6 August 2016, 

http://shabwaahpress.net/news/36386 (hereafter “Bi’l-Tawazi ma tadribat”); and 

“Muhafizh Abyan yajtami bi-lajnat wisata ma Al-Qaida” [The governor of Abyan 

meets the mediation committee dealing with al-Qaeda], Aden Al-Ghad, 5 May 

2016, http://adenalgd.net/news/203836.

347. Interview with Major General Ahmad bin Barik, Al-Ghad Al-Mushriq TV, 

transcript, Al-Masila Press, 18 May 2017, http://almasilapress.net/?p=17957.

348. “Farar sujana’ min sijn Ataq fi zhuruf ghamida wa-masdar askari yuhdhir” 

[Flight of prisoners from the Ataq Prison under suspicious conditions and a 

military source warns], Al-Mukalla Al-An, 19 April 2017, www.almukallanow.

com/item/5562.

349. “Maqtal unsurayn min al-hizam al-amni fi kamin li’l-Qaida bi-mintaqat Shaqra 

muhafazhat Abyan” [Two members of the Hizam Amni killed in an ambush by 

al-Qaeda in the Shaqra Area of Abyan province], Yafa News, 3 January 2017, 

www.yafa-news.net/archives/224255.

350. “Ma wara’ saytarat Al-Imarat ala Hadramawt wa-limadha ghabat tasrihat alamid Asiri an al-maraka?” [What is behind the UAE’s control over Hadramawt 

and why was there no statement by Brigadier General Asiri about the battle?], 

BuYemen News Agency, 24 April 2016, www.buyemen.com/news26290.html.

351. “Diblumasi yakshif ma wara’ tasrihat wazir al-kharijiya al-saudi hawl Al-Houthiyin wa-allati atharat jadlan wasian” [A diplomat reveals what is behind the Saudi 

foreign minister’s declarations on the Houthis that stirred significant controversy], 

Nas Times, 13 May 2016, www.nasstimes.com/print.php?id=2970.

352. “Hadi yuhawil iqna Abu Dhabi bi-saihi ila al-istiqrar fi Al-Yaman” [Hadi tries 

to convince Abu Dhabi that he is trying to stabilize Yemen], Al-Arab, 3 March 

2017, http://alarab.co.uk/article/search/103096/. The fact that the article was also 

reproduced on the UAE government’s 24.ae site indicates that the original article 

reflected official thinking.

353. “Masdar: Dabit Saudi yusahhil hurub saba muttahamin bi-tafjirat irhabiya biAdan” [A source: A Saudi officer facilitates the escape of seven suspects in terrorist bombings in Aden], Al-Fajr Al-Jadid, 16 April 2016, http://alfjeralgaaded.

net/news_details.php?lng=arabic&sid=11847.

354. “Al-Imarat tasdim al-janubiyin wa-takshif an mawqifha min ‘infisal al-janub’ 

wa-tuwajjih tuham khatira li-fasa’il janubiya” [The UAE shocks the Southerners and reveals its position on “Southern Separatism” and hurls serious charges 
127

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

against southern factions], Yemen Press, 12 February 2016, http://yemen-press.

com/news67799.html.

355. Anne Gearan and Karen DeYoung, “State Department Chastises Saudis, UAE 

over Qatar; False Pretenses Suggested in Drawing the U.S. into Diplomatic Crisis,” 

Washington Post, 21 June 2017, A11.

356. For example, “Khabiran saudiyan: Qatar tumaththil al-khanjar al-masmum fi 

zhahr al-tahaluf bi’l-Yaman” [Two Saudi military experts: Qatar represents a 

poison dagger in the back of the coalition in Yemen], Al-Ittihad, 21 July 2017, 

www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=42967&y=2017.

357. Ibid.; and “Al-Yaman wa-karihu al-salam: Al-Houthiyun wa’l-Qaida wa-dam 

Qatar” [Yemen and those who hate peace: The Houthis, AQAP, and Qatar], Sky 

News Arabia TV, 26 May 2017, www.skynewsarabia.com/web/article/952150.

358. Saleh Abu Udhil, “Kayf sa-tuwajih Al-Saudiya ikhwan Al-Yaman?” [How will 

Saudi Arabia confront Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood?], Al-Yawm Al-Thamin

(Aden), 15 June 2017, http://alyoum8.net/print/6961; and “Masadir hukumiya 

li’l-Khalij: Al-Yaman yamtalik adilla damigha tuthbit tawarrut Al-Dawha” 

[Government sources to Al-Khalij: Yemen has irrefutable evidence proving 

Dawha’s involvement], Al-Khalij, 18 June 2017, www.alkhaleej.ae/alkhaleej/

page/019a3845-9e99-4db7-a16c-1b649d0c7972.

359. “Qatar ishtarat qiyadat hizb al-islah al-yamani” [Qatar bought off the leaders 

of the Yemeni Islah party], Al-Bayan, 13 June 2017, www.albayan.ae/one-world/

arabs/2017-06-13-1.2976152; and “Qatar tutin zhahr al-tahaluf al-arabi bi-damha 

ikhwan Al-Yaman” [Qatar stabs the Arab Coalition in the back with its support 

of Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood], Al-Khalij, 4 June 2017, www.alkhaleej.ae/

alkhaleej/page/eb5a0f0a-c137-48b2-979f-9075423a3ac1.

360. “Jamaat al-ikhwan laysa lahum inaya bi’l-aqida wa-la bi’l-sunnawa-manhajhum 

qa’im ala al-khuruj ala al-dawla” [The Muslim Brotherhood group does not care 

about doctrine or the Sunna and their program is based on rebellion against the 

state], Al-Jazira, 20 June 2017, www.al-jazirah.com/2017/20170620/ln57.htm; and 

Markaz al-harb al-fikriya, Twitter, 10-21 June 2017, https://mobile.twitter.com/

fekerksa?lang=en.

361. “Itiqal Barraud wa’l-Yazidi al-madarrajin bi-qa’imat al-irhab” [The arrest of 

Barraud and Al-Yazidi who are on the terrorist list], Al-Janub Al-Jadid, 25 July 

2017, http://newjnoob.com/?p=43901; and “Hazhr jamiyat ikhwaniya fi Al-Yaman 

khutwa li-ijtithath irhab Qatar” [The ban of the Muslim Brotherhood organizations in Yemen is a step toward uprooting Qatar’s terrorism], Al-Ittihad, 28 July 

2017, www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=44020&y=2017&article=full.

362. “Mazaim muharabat al-irhab: Al-Afal tudahhid al-aqwal” [Claims of fighting 

terrorism: Actions speak louder than words], Al-Arabi, 4 July 2017, https://www.

al-arabi.com/Issues/14060.

363. “Qarar jumhuri bi-tayin muhafizh li’l-Bayda’” [Decision to appoint a governor for 

Al-Bayda’], Yemen Voice, 28 December 2015, www.voice-yemen.com/news95087.

html; Said Al-Abyad, “Muhafizh Al-Bayda’ li’l-Sharq Al-Awsat: Khutta askariya 
128

JSOU Report 18-4

li-tahrir al-muhafazha qariban” [The Governor of Al-Bayda’ to Al-Sharq AlAwsat: A military plan to liberate the province soon], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 15 

March 2016, https://aawsat.com/node/592166; “Al-Shaykh Nayif Al-Qaysi ism 

yasta fi sama’ Al-Bayda’ bi-kull wuduh” [Shaykh Nayif al-Qaysi is a name that 

shines brilliantly in the sky of Al-Bayda’], Aden Al-Ghad, 4 August 2015, http://

adengd.net/news/165740; and “Muhafizh Al-Bayda”: Al-Intisar asbah qariban” 

[The governor of Al-Bayda’: Victory is now near], Al-Ittihad, 14 September 2016, 

www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=43957&y=2016.

364. “Muhafizh Al-Bayda’: 10 alaf qatil min Al-Houthiyin fi Al-Bayda’ wa-la wujud 

li-drone fi sama’ al-muhafazha” [The governor of Al-Bayda’: 10,000 Houthis killed 

in Al-Bayda’ and there are no drones in the skies over the province], Al-Mawqi 

Post, 13 January 2016, http://almawqea.net/news.php?id=4336.

365. “Qatar tutin zhahr al-tahaluf al-arabi bi-damha ikhwan Al-Yaman” [Qatar Stabs 

the Arab Coalition in the back with its support for Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood], 

Al-Khalij, 4 June 2017, www.alkhallej.ae/alkhaleej/page/eb5a0f0a-c137-48b2-979f9075423a3ac1; and “Al-Islah al-yamani yabni jayshan ta’ifiyan bi’l-Bayda’” [The 

Yemeni Islah is building a sectarian army in Al-Bayda’’], Al-Yawm Al-Thamin, 

28 January 2017, http://alyoum8.net/news/1543.

366. “Dabit bi-Ma’rib yakshif an khiyanat min qibal dubbat dakhil al-jaysh wa-tasrib 

al-ihdathiyat li’l-inqilabiyin” [An officer in Ma’rib reveals treason by officers in 

the Yemeni Army and the leaking of position locations to the rebels], Al-Mandab 

News, 31 July 2017, http://almandeb.news/?p=49566.

367. United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 27 January 2017 from the Panel of 

Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2017/81, 

31 January 2017, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/859551/files/S_2017_81-EN.

pdf.

368. The most perceptive such argument is perhaps that made by Christopher Paul, 

Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Martha Dunigan, “Moving Beyond PopulationCentric Vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 

xxvii, 6, 2016, 1019-1042.

369. Joe Gould, “Trump Considers Military Push in Yemen War. U.S. Lawmakers Push 

Back,” Defense News (Tysons, VA), 13 April 2017, www.defensenews.com/articles/

trump-considers-military-push-in-yemen-war-and-us-lawmakers-push-back; 

and Mirren Gidda, “U.S. Considering More Military Assistance for Saudi Arabia 

in Yemen’s Civil War,” Newsweek (New York), 20 April 2017, www.newsweek.

com/yemen-civil-war-us-saudi-arabia-airstrikes-houthi-rebels-587018.

370. Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman quoted in “Al-Amir Muhammad 

bin Salman: Tajannabna al-harb al-barriya fi Al-Yaman khashiyata suqut adad 

kabira min al-dahaya” [Prince Muhammad bin Salman: We avoided a ground 

war in Yemen fearing large numbers of casualties], Al-Jazira, 8 May 2017, www.

al-jazirah.com/2017/20170508/fe9.htm.

371. Phil Stewart and Matt Spetalnick “U.S. Considers Supporting New U.A.E. Push 

against Al Qaeda in Yemen,” Reuters, 15 April 2016, www.reuters.com/article/
129

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

us-mideast-crisis-usa-yemen-exclusive-idU.S.KCN0XC19A; and Phil Stewart. 

“Small U.S. Military Team in Yemen to Aid UAE Push on Al Qaeda,” Reuters, 

7 May 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-yemen-pentagon/small-us-military-team-in-yemen-to-aid-uae-push-on-al-qaeda-idUSKCN0XX1ZJ.

372. “Shahid awwal sura li-amir tanzhim Al-Qaida al-jadid fi Al-Yaman wast ikhtilafat 

wa-inqisamat dakhil al-tanzhim” [See the first photo of the new amir of al-Qaeda 

in Yemen amid disputes and rifts in the organization], Al-Yaman Al-Said, 11 

February 2016, www.yemensaeed.com/news50948.html.

373. James Kitfield, "Inside America's Shadow War on Terror—and Why It Will Never 

End," National Journal (Washington, D.C.), 15 May 2014, http://go.galegroup.

com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA368477209&v=2.1&u=fairfax_main&it=r&p=PP

MI&sw=w&asid=515c0852e5c982a0ce17422fcbe1086d; Nick Turse, “Under the 

Cover of Humanitarian Aid: The U.S. Military Is All over Africa,” Salon (San 

Francisco), 21 November 2015, www.salon.com/2015/11/21/americas_secret_

military_bases_in_africa_partner; Joseph Trevithick, “This Small Airstrip Is the 

Future of America’s Way of War,” Reuters, 5 January 2016, http://blogs.reuters.

com/great-debate/2016/01/05/this-small-airstrip-is-the-future-of-americas-wayof-war; and Tomi Oladipo, “Why Are There So Many Military Bases in Djibouti?” 

BBC, 16 June 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33115502.

374. See Norman Cigar, Tribal Militias: An Effective Tool to Counter Al-Qaida and Its 

Affiliates? (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Press, 2014).

375. Taha BaFadl, “Amrika wa’l-Qaida wa’l-Yaman” [America, al-Qaeda, and Yemen], 

Hadramawt.net, 12 February 2017, http://7adramout.net.

376. “Al-Bahriya al-amrikiya tudarrib quwwat yamaniya ala muharabat al-irhab” 

[U.S. Navy personnel training Yemeni forces in counterterrorism], 24.ae, 5 March 

2017, http://24.ae/article/328762/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d8%ad%d8%b1%d9%

8a%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%85%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%83%d9%8a%

d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%af%d8%b1%d8%a8-%d9%82%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%aa-%

d9%8a%d9%85%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d9%85%

d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a8%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%b1%d9%

87%d8%a7%d8%a8.

377. Saleh Al-Jabwani, “Al-Nukhba al-shabwaniya!!” [The Shabwa Special Forces!!], 

Yemen Voice, 4 August 2017, www.yemenvoice.net/art5014.html.

378. “Ma hiya dalalat wa-abad harb Al-Imarat ala Al-Qaida fi Al-Yaman?” [What 

are the indicators and dimensions of the UAE’s war against AQAP in Yemen?], 

Al-Mawqi Post, 6 August 2017, http://almawqea.net/news/22059.

379. “U.S. Commander Says Loss of Military Toehold in Yemen Is Worrisome,” Stars 

and Stripes (Washington, D.C.), 1 May 2015, www.stripes.com/news/army/

us-commander-says-loss-of-military-toehold-in-yemen-is-worrisome-1.343835.

380. Robert Windrem, William M. Arkin, Courtney Kube, and Charlene Gubash, 

“'Almost Everything Went Wrong': SEAL, U.S. Girl Die in First Trump-Era Military 

Raid,” NBC News, 31 January 2017, www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/almosteverything-went-wrong-seal-us-girl-die-in-first-trump-era-military-raid/ar-AAm
130

JSOU Report 18-4

qoaG?li=BBnb7Kz&ocid=mailsignout; and Martha Raddatz, “Al-Qaeda Fighters in 

Yemen Seemed Ready for SEAL Raid: Source,” ABC News, 2 February 2017, http://

abcnews.go.com/International/al-qaeda-fighters-yemen-ready-seal-raid-source/

story?id=45177216.

381. Cheryl Pellerin, “Pentagon Spokesman Updates Iraq, Syria, Yemen Operations,” 

U.S. Department of Defense, 24 April 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/

Article/1161065/pentagon-spokesman-updates-iraq-syria-yemen-operations.

382. Within the voluminous literature on drones, insightful analyses assessing their 

benefits and costs in the Yemeni theater are provided by W. Andrew Terrill 

“Drones over Yemen: Weighing Military Benefits and Political Costs,” Parameters, 42, 4 and 43i, 1, (Winter-Spring 2013), 17-23; Adam C. Seitz, “In Yemen, 

‘If Not Drones, Then What?’” Middle East Studies Insights, (Marine Corps 

University), December 2013, https://www.usmcu.edu/sites/default/files/MES/

Insights/MES_insights_v4_i6.pdf; and Greg Miller, “Killing Terror Leaders But 

Not Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post, 17 June 2015, A1, A10.

383. Interview with Staff Brigadier General Naji Ali Al-Zaydi, “Al-Zaydi: AlQaida wa-ajandat al-qabila fi Ma’rib” [Al-Zaydi: al-Qaeda and the Tribal 

Agenda in Ma’rib], Ma’rib Press, 19 July 2010, http://marebpress.net/articles.

php?lng=arabic&print=7563.

384. “Maqtal najl al-shaykh Tariq Al-Fadli bi-ghara amrikiya fi Shabwa” [Shaykh Tariq 

Al-Fadli’s son killed in an American strike in Shabwa], Al-Mashhad Al-Yamani, 

5 March 2017, www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/topics/MY/9/69395.html.

385. Aden Al-Ghad, “Al-Natiq bi-ism amn Adan.”

386. Sudarsan Raghavan, “In Yemen, U. S Airstrikes Breed Anger, and Sympathy for 

Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post, 29 May 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/

world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-airstrikes-breed-anger-and-sympathy-for-alqaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_story.html.

387. “Maa istimrar al-gharat wa’l-sawarikh ala Al-Qaida: Abyan hal asbahat mintaqat 

qasf maftuha li’l-bawarij wa’l-ta’irat bi-dun tayyar?” [As the Raids and Missiles 

Continue against al-Qaeda; Has Abyan Become a Free-Fire Zone for Ships and 

Drones?], Yafa News, 11 May 2017, www.yafa-news.net/archives/242591.

388. Leo Shane III, “Trump: I'm Giving the Military 'Total Authorization'” Military 

Times (Vienna, VA), 13 April 2017, www.militarytimes.com/articles/trumpmilitary-total-authorization-afghanistan-iraq; and John Kirby, “Trump's Leave 

It to the Generals Policy Is Risky,” CNN, 12 May 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/05/12/

opinions/trump-leave-it-to-the-generals-policy-is-risky-opinion-kirby.

389. Gregory D. Johnsen, “Did an 8-Year Old Spy for America?” The Atlantic 

(Washington, D.C.), September 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/

archive/2013/09/did-an-8-year-old-spy-for-america/309429.

390. “Yamani yashtari sayyara min ahad anasir Al-Qaida fa-tunhi hayathu ta’ira 

amrikiya bi-dun tayyar” [A Yemeni buys a car from a member of al-Qaeda and 

his life is ended by an american drone], Al-Umana’, 7 October 2016, www.alomanaa.net/news42944.html.
131

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391. “Ansar Al-Sharia yuridun ahdath tathir Abyan min lijan Abd Al-Latif Al-Sayyid” 

[The Ansar Al-Sharia recount the actions of clearing Abd Al-Latif Al-Sayyid’s 

committees from Abyan], Al-Masra, 6 January 2016, 7.

392. “Qaidat Al-Yaman wa’l-drones: Ikhtiraq fawq mustawa al-ihtiyat?” [AQAP and 

Drones: Penetrations despite precautions?], Al-Arabi, 3 May 2017, https://www.

al-arabi.com/Issues/12402.

393. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “U.S. Airstrike on Al-Qaida in Yemen Kills ‘Dozens’ of 

Fighters, Pentagon Says,” Washington Post, 23 March 2016, A9.

394. Dave Philipps, “Special Operations Troops Top Casualty List as U.S. Relies 

More on Elite Forces,” New York Times, 4 February 2017, https://mobile.nytimes.

com/2017/02/04/us/navy-seal-william-ryan-owens-dead-yemen.html.

395. “Yaman Press yakshif al-tafasil al-kamila li’l-yawm al-awwal min al-amaliyat 

al-amrikiya fi Al-Yaman” [Yaman Press reveals the details of the first day of 

American operations in Yemen], Yaman Press, 2 March 2017, http://yemen-press.

com/news92549.html; and “Istihdaf amriki li’l-Qaida bi-20 ghara wa-inzal fi 

Al-Yaman” [U.S. Targets al-Qaeda with 20 sorties and a landing in Yemen], AlKhalij, 3 March 2017, www.alkhaleej.ae.

396. “Hiwar ma al-shaykh Qasim Al-Raymi,” 4; and Cynthia McFadden, William 

M. Arkin, and Tracy Connor, “Yemen Raid Had Secret Target: Al Qaeda Leader 

Qassim Al-Rimi,” NBC News, 7 February 2017, www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/

yemen-raid-had-secret-target-al-qaeda-leader-qassim-al-n717616.

397. “Hiwar ma al-shaykh Qasim Al-Raymi,” 4.

398. Terri Moon Cronk, “Pentagon Spokesman Describes U.S. Raid in Yemen,” DoD 

News, 23 May 2017, www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-ArticleView/Article/1191797/pentagon-spokesman-describes-us-raid-in-yemen; and 

“Inzalan amrikiyan jadidan fi Al-Bayda’ wa-Ma’rib sharq wa-wasat Al-Yaman” 

[Two new U.S. raids on the ground in Al-Bayda’ and Ma’rib in eastern and central Yemen], Yemen Monitor, 23 May 2017, www.yemenmonitor.com/Details/

ArtMID/908/ArticleID/18417.

399. Missy Ryan, “U.S. Special Operations Forces Kill 7 Suspected Al-Qaeda Militants 

in Yemen,” Washington Post, 24 May 2017, A7. 

400. “Inzal Ma’rib yaqtul 5 madaniyin baynhum tifl wa-ajuz wa’l-Awadhil tatawaad” 

[The Ma’rib raid kills five civilians, including a child and an old man, and 

the Adhal Tribe threatens], Al-Arabi, 24 May 2017, https://www.al-arabi.com/

Movement/12942.

401. Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Missy Ryan, “U.S. Advisers on the Ground in Yemen, 

Pentagon Says,” Washington Post, 7 May 2016, A9.

402. Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “Raid in Yemen: Risky from the Start and 

Costly in the End,” New York Times, 1 February 2017, https://www.nytimes.

com/2017/02/01/world/middleeast/donald-trump-yemen-commando-raidquestions.html?_r=0; and Ryan, “U.S. Special Operations Forces.”
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403. Ian Black, “CIA Using Saudi Base for Drone Assassinations in Yemen,” The 

Guardian, 6 February 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/06/ciausing-saudi-base-drone-yemen.

404. SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties, “Close All Illegal Detention Centers in 

Territories under Legitimate Government in Aden and Hadhramout,” Geneva, 25 

May 2017, www.samrl.org/close-all-illegal-detention-centers-in-territories-underlegitimate-government-in-aden-and-hadhramout.

405. Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 196-7. Clausewitz, too, had already 

stressed that a decision to end a war is made based not only on a belligerent’s 

assessment of the effort already exerted but also on “the efforts yet to come,” 

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 92.

406. See for example Paul Williams, Tiffany Sommadossi, and Ayat Mujais, “A Legal 

Perspective on Yemen’s Attempted Transition from a Unitary to a Federal System 

of Government,” Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 33, 84 (April 

2017), 4–22.

407. Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in 

Northern Yemen: The Houthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010); Alex 

Emmons and Zaid Jilani, “Former U.S. Diplomats Decry the U.S.-Backed Saudi 

War in Yemen,” The Intercept, 6 May 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/05/06/

former-u-s-diplomats-decry-the-u-s-backed-saudi-war-in-yemen; and Joost 

Hiltermann and April Longley Alley,“The Houthis Are Not Hezbollah,” Foreign 

Policy (Washington, D.C.), 27 February 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/27/

the-houthis-are-not-hezbollah.

408. Military spokesman Major General Ahmad Asiri, “Lan naqbil bi’l-afkar alrumadiya allati tashurr an al-inqilab” [We Will Not Accept Ideas in the Ashes 

That Spark a Coup], Al-Jazira, 15 April 2017, www.al-jazirah.com/2017/20170415/

ln33.htm.

409. “Tahdhirat min suqut Wadi Hadramawt bi-yad DAESH” [Warnings that Wadi 

Hadramawt will fall into ISIS’ hands], Al-Masdar, 12 February 2016, http://almasdaronline.com/article/77248; and “Al-Qaida akhla Zinjibar/Abyan bad al-darabat 

al-amrikiya” [Al-Qaeda evacuated Zinjibar/Abyan following the U.S. Strikes], 

Khabar News Agency, 31 March 2016, http://khabaragency.net/news56476.html.

410. Marwan Al-Hammumi, “Al-Tawiya al-mujtamaiya min khatar al-tatarruf wa’lirhab ahamm ma yanqusna fi Hadramawt” [The most important thing we lack 

in Hadramawt is social awareness of the danger of extremism and terrorism], 

Shabwa Press, 3 March 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/41568.

411. “Shabb yamani yarwi qissat sadiqih al-intihari” [A Young Yemeni tells the story 

of his friend the suicide bomber], Yaman Press, 21 April 2016, http://yemen-press.

com/news71067.html.
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412. UN News Centre, “Millions in Yemen on Brink of Famine, Situation ‘Close to 

a Breaking Point,’ Warns UN Agency,” 12 April 2017, www.un.org/apps/news/

story.asp?NewsID=56550.

413. Hadi quoted in Ali Saeed, “Azzan: A Town Run by Armed Islamists,” Yemen 

Times, 19 December 2011, www.yementimes.com/en/1530/report/125/AzzanA-town-run-by-armed-Islamists.htm (website since removed). For a perceptive 

study of the enduring socio-economic and political issues that facilitate AQAP’s 

activity, see Harris, Exploiting Grievances.

414. Interview with Muhammad Said Abd Allah Hajib by Arafat Madabish, “Wazir 

yamani sabiq: ‘Mushkilat Al-Qaida sa-tazhall qa’ima bad dahrha min Abyan’” 

[Former Yemeni Minister: “The Al-Qaida problem will continue after it was 

driven out of Abyan”], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 21 June 2012, www.aawsat.com/

print.asp?did=682874&issueno=12259. Abyan’s governor also shared this view, 

“Al-Qaida tahya tahalufatha al-qadima ma qaba’il Shabwa” [Al-Qaeda revives 

its old alliance with the Shabwa tribes], Al-Yaman Al-Yawm, n.d. 2013, www.

yemen-today.net/DetailsNews.aspx?ID=51 (website since removed).

415. Quoted in Azmat Khan, “Understanding Yemen’s al-Qaeda threat,” Frontline, 

PBS TV, 29 May 2012, www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/understandingyemens-al-qaeda-threat.

416. Helen Nianias, “Landmark Shift in Yemen Crisis as Former President Reaches 

Out to Saudi Adversaries,” The Telegraph, 2 December 2017, www.telegraph.

co.uk/news/2017/12/02/landmark-change-yemen-crisis-former-president-reachessaudi; and Ali Al-Mujahed and Kareem Fahim, “Rebel Alliance in Yemen May 

Be Collapsing,” Washington Post, 3 December 2017, A3.

417. Major General (Ret.) Abd Allah Ghanim Al-Qahtani, “Ali Abd Allah Saleh 

yahtaj dam sari” [Ali Abd Allah Saleh requires quick support], Al-Ra’y (Jazan), 

3 December 2017, http://alraynews.net/6379553.htm.

418. For example, Salman Askar, “Tathir Sana’ yujbir qiyadat iraniya ala al-hurub” 

[The clearing of Sanaa obliges Iranian commanders to flee], Al-Watan, 4 December 2017, http://alwatan.com.sa/Politics/News_Detail.aspx?ArticleID=322709&

CategoryID=1; Mashari Al-Dhaydi, “Al-Yaman yantaqid ala Al-Huthi akhiran” 

[Yemen finally revolts against Al-Huthi], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 4 December 2017, 

https://aawsat.com/home/article/1102571; Zuhayr Al-Harithi, “Iran tafqud 

waraqat Sana’” [Iran loses its Sanaa card], Al-Riyadh, 5 December 2017, www.

alriyadh.com/1643561; Abdu Khal, “Masir Al-Yaman” [Yemen’s destiny], Ukaz, 3 

December 2017, www.okaz.com.sa/article/1594798; “Sana’ fi mustahall taghayyur 

jadhari wa-awda ila al-asl” [Sanaa begins a profound change and a return to its 

true identity], Al-Khalij (Sharjah), 3 December 2017, www.alkhaleej.ae/alkhaleej/

page/e73294d7-78bd-4514-97c6-a1823c52a8fd; and Ali Mahmood, “Cheers for ExPresident Saleh, jeers for the Houthis who tore Yemen apart,” The National (Abu 

Dhabi), 2 December 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/cheers-for-expresident-saleh-jeers-for-the-houthis-who-tore-yemen-apart-1.680813.
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419. “Saudi-led Air Strikes Support Yemen's Saleh as He Shifts against Houthis,” 

Reuters, 3 December 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/sau di-led-air-strikes-support-yemens-saleh-as-he-shifts-against-houthisidUSKBN1DX07O.

420. One opinion piece that appeared in the Saudi press a day after news of Saleh’s 

death even predicted confidently that Saleh would be victorious over the Ansar 

Allah and would expel Iranian influence in a struggle that might take months, 

Muhammad Al Al-Shaykh, “Al-Yaman yaud ila urubatih” [Yemen returns to its 

Arab identity], Al-Jazira. 5 December 2017, www.al-jazirah.com/2017/20171205/

lp7.htm.

421. Ben Hubbard and Nour Youssef, “Yemen’s war enters a dark stage as rebels 

squeeze the capital,” New York Times, 23 December 2017, https://www.nytimes.

com/2017/12/23/world/middleeast/yemen-sana-houthis-saudi-arabia.html.

422. “Al-Tahaluf al-arabi yutliq marakat tahrir Al-Hudayda” [The Arab Coalition 

launches the battle for the liberation of Hodeidah], Al-Bayan (Dubai), 7 December 

2017, www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2017-12-07-1.3123705?ot=ot.PrintPageLayout; “Al-Quwwat al-musallaha al-imaratiya taqud marakat tahrir Al-Hudayda 

bi-basala wa-iqtidar” [The UAE armed forces are leading the battle for the 

liberation of Hodeidah with courage and skill], Al-Bayan, 14 December 2017, 

www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2017-12-14-1.3130893; “Tumuhat al-tahaluf 

li-ma bad Saleh: Al-Rihan yafuq furas al-midan” [The coalition’s ambitions in 

the post-Saleh period:The bet goes beyond what can be achieved in the field], 

Al-Arabi, 28 December 2017, https://al-arabi.com/Issues/19142; and “Waqi hal 

al-jabahat: Karr wa-farr wa-la ufuq li’l-hasm” [The situation at the fronts: Back 

and forth, and no prospects for a decisive outcome], Al-Arabi, 4 January 2018, 

https://al-arabi.com/Issues/19305.

423. Editorial Board, “Saudis Try to Starve Yemen into Submission,” New York Times, 

16 November 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/opinion/saudi-arabiayemen-famine.html; UN News Centre, “Yemen: As Threat of Famine Looms, UN 

Urges Saudi-led Coalition to Fully Lift Blockade of Red Sea Ports,” 2 December 

2017, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=58209; and Amanda Jackson, “1 

Million People Have Contracted Cholera in Yemen during the Past 18 Months,” 

Washington Post, 25 December 2017, A10.

424. “Dabit bi’l-liwa’ al-awwal dam wa-isnad: Baqun fi madinat Al-Mahfad li-ta’minha” 

[An officer in the 1st support brigade: We will remain in the city of Al-Mahfad in 

order to secure it], Aden Time, 17 November 2017, http://aden-tm.net/NDetails.

aspx?contid=36401.

425. Faruq Abd Al-Salam, “Al-Imarat tusahim bi-takhlis janub Al-Yaman min kabus 

al-irhab” [The UAE participates in delivering South Yemen from the nightmare 

of terrorism], Al-Khalij (Sharjah), 5 January 2018, www.alkhaleej.ae/alkhaleej/

page/71893d08-e8c6-4372-9434-47b696cdb81f.

426. “Qiyadi bi’l-Hizam Al-Amni yaqul inn muhafazhat Abyan batat khaliya min 

Al-Qaida wa-yulin tahrirha” [A commander in the Hizam Amni says that Abyan 
135

Cigar: How Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival

Province is free of al-Qaeda and proclaims the province liberated], Aden AlGhad, 29 October 2017, http://adengd.net/printpost/284858; and “Hamlat Abyan: 

Al-Waqai wa’l-ahdaf wa-masir Al-Qaida” [The Abyan campaign: The facts, the 

objectives, and the fate of al-Qaeda], Al-Arabi, 30 October 2017, https://al-arabi.

com/Issues/17561.

427. “Al-Hizam Al-Amni yudahim manzil al-irhabi Abu Muslim bi-Mudiya wayadbit kammiyat min al-ubuwwat wa-ajhizat al-ittisal” [The Hizam Amni raids 

the home of the terrorist Abu Muslim in Mudiya and seizes a quantity of IEDs 

and communications gear], Aden Time,19 September 2017, http://aden-tm.net/

NDetails.aspx?contid=33301; and “Quwwat Al-Hizam Al-Amni taqtahim akbar 

muaskarat Al-Qaida fi Al-Mahfad wa-tadbit kammiyat kabira min al-asliha” 

[The Hizam amni forces penetrate al-Qaeda’s largest camp in Al-Mahfad and 

seize large quantities of arms], Aden Time, 31 October 2017, http://aden-tm.net/

NDetails.aspx?contid=35376.

428. “Hamlat Abyan ala maqas Al-Imarat: Maqal Al-Qaida kharij al-istihdaf” [The 

Abyan campaign According to the the UAE’s Capabilities: Al-Qaeda's Stronghold 

Is Not Targeted], Al-Arabi, 28 September 2017, http://al-arabi.com/Issues/16667; 

“Hurub al-asharat min anasir Al-Qaida min Abyan ila jabhat Al-Mukha” [Dozens 

of al-Qaeda personnel flee Abyan to the Al-Mukha Front], Aden Al-Ghad, 6 

October 2017, http://adengd.net/news/281130; and, “Al-Hizam fi fakhkh AlQaida” [The Hizam Amni in al-Qaeda’s trap], Aden Al-Ghad, 7 October 2017, 

http://adengd.net/news/281270.

429. “Anasir min Al-Qaida tughadir Taizz ila Abyan” [Al-Qaeda elements leave Taizz for 

Abyan], Al-Arabi, 10 October 2017, https://al-arabi.com/Movement/17010;“Qatla 

wa-jarha fi muwajahat musallaha bayn Al-Qaida wa-quwwat Al-Nukhba” [Dead 

and wounded following an armed clashes between al-Qaeda the Nukhba Special Forces], Aden Al-Ghad, 10 November 2017, http://adengd.net/news/286647; 

“Infijar ubuwwa nasifa istahdafat sayyarat tamwin Al-Hizam Al-Amni bi’lMahfad wa’istishhad muwatin” [Explosion of an IED targeting a Hizam Amni 

supply vehicle and the death of a civilian], Shabwa Press, 20 November 2017, 

http://shabwahpress.net/news/47749; “Quwwat al-amn tatawaad al-irhabiyin” 

[The security forces give warning to the terrorists], Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi), 2 

December 2017, www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=72644&y=2017.

430. “Fadiha madwiya li-qiyadat al-shariya: Ra’is hay’at al-arkan al-amma fi quwwat 

Hadi yatarif rasmiyan bi-bay junudih aslihatihim li’l-Huthiyin” [Big scandal for 

the legitimate government’s leaders: The chief of staff of Hadi’s forces admits 

officially that his troops sold their weapons to the Huthis], Al-Mashhad Al-Janubi, 

6 January 2018, www.salmashhad.com/news/28470.

431. “Liwa’ Al-Hazm li’l-Sharq Al-Awsat; Harrarna Shabwa wa’l-Bayda’ al-wajha 

al-muqbila” [The Hazm brigade to Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: We liberated Shabwa 

and the next front is al-Bayda’], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 17 December 2017, https://

aawsat.com/home/article/1115776/%d9%84%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d8%a7%

d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b2%d9%85-%d9%84%d9%80%c2%ab%d8%a7%d9%84%

d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%88%d8%b3%d8%b7%
136

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c2%bb-%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%b1%d9%86%d8%a7-%d8%b4%d8%a8%d9%88%

d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%b6%d8%a7%d8%a1-%

d8%a7%d9%84%d9%88%d8%ac%d9%87%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%

d9%82%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a9.

432. “Bi-Amr Ali Muhsin al-mintaqa al-askariya bi-Say’un tuarqil istiab afrad min 

al-Nukhbaal-hadramiya” [By order of Ali Muhsin the military district in Say’un 

interferes with the transfer of the Hadramawt special forces personnel], Shabwa 

Press, 25 October 2017, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/47013; “Quwwat Ali 

Muhsin Al-Ahmar taud il-ihtilal Shabwa” [Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar’s forces are 

coming back to re-occupy Shabwa], Shabwa Press, 17 December 2017, http://

shabwahpress.net/news/48416; “Tawattur amni bi-Ataq bad man nuqta amniya 

dukhul qa’id Al-Nukhba ila al-madina li’l-musharaka bi-ijtima li’l-majlis alintiqali” [Security tensions in Ataq after a security checkpoint refused to allow the 

Nukhba commander to enter the city for a meeting of the transitional council], 

Aden Time, 6 January 2018, http://aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=39177; 

“Abyan: Junud yaqtaun al-khatt al-duwali fi Ahwar” [Abyan: Troops cut the 

national road in Ahwar], Al-Arabi, 5 January 2018, https://al-arabi.com/Movement/19328; and “Quwwat Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar tastahdif nuqta askariya 

tabia li’l-Nukhba al-shabwaniya gharb madinat Ataq” [Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar’s 

forces target a military position belonging to the Shabwa Nukhba west of the 

city of Ataq], Al-Mashhad Al-Janubi, 15 January 2018, www.salmashhad.com/

news/28947.

433. “3 firaq min quwwat al-jaysh maduma bi’l-muqawama tatawazza ala al-khatt 

al-sahili li-tahrir Al-Hudayda” [Three army divisions supported by the popular 

resistance deployed along the coastline to liberate Hodeidah], Sahwa TV, 11 

December 2017, www.alsahwa-yemen.net/p-13571; and “Al-Tahaluf yadfa tazizat 

2 alwiya janubiya ila al-sahil al-gharbi” [The coalition sends two south Yemeni 

brigades as reinforcements to the West Coast], Shabwa Press, 14 December 2017, 

http://shabwaahpress.net/news/48327.

434. Rebecca Kheel, “US Military Carried Out More Than 120 Airstrikes in Yemen 

in 2017,” The Hill (Washington, D.C.), 20 December 2017, http://thehill.com/

policy/defense/365896-us-military-acknowledges-multiple-ground-operations120-airstrikes-in-yemen; Eric Schmitt and Saeed Al-Batati, “The U.S. Has Pummeled Al Qaeda in Yemen. But the Threat Is Barely Dented,” New York Times, 

30 December 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/30/world/middleeast/

yemen-al-qaeda-us-terrorism.html; “Qatla wa-jarha bi-ghara amrikiya istahdafat 

mazari fi Al-Bayda’” [Dead and wounded from an American raid that targeted 

farms in Al-Bayda’], Al-Arabi, 30 November 2017, https://al-arabi.com/Movement/18466; and “Al-Bayda’: Maqtal usra mukawwana min 3 nisa’ wa-tiflayn 

bi-ghara amrikiya fi mintaqat Yakla” [Al-Bayda’: A family of three women and 

two children killed in an American raid in the Yakla Region], Bilqis TV, 16 

December 2017, www.belqees.tv/yemen.