Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 112 / Friday, June 9, 2000 / Proposed Rules 36649

(1) An administrative change to

technical specifications (TS) including a

change to achieve consistency

throughout the TS, correction of an

error, or a change in nomenclature.

(2) A TS change to ensure that no

significant increase exists in the

probability or consequences of analyzed

accidents and does not significantly

reduce safety margins such as an

increase in the allowable leak rate

compensated by an increase in fill gas

quantity, an increase in the allowable

handling height of the cask

compensated by energy absorbing

features, addition of a more reactive fuel

design that could lead to Keff exceeding

0.95 compensated by an increase in

areal poison density of fixed neutron

poison sheets, and an increase in

helium backfill pressure compensated

by increased material properties to

prevent components from exceeding

code allowables.

(3) A change in the TS that includes

an additional limitation, such as a more

stringent surveillance requirement.

(4) A change that may result in some

increase to the probability or

consequences of a previously analyzed

accident or may reduce the safety

margin in some way, but where the

results are within all acceptable criteria

at the time of approval, such as an

increase in Keff or offsite exposures

beyond ‘‘minimal.’’

(5) Replacing explicit limits on fuel

assemblies, decay heat, and source

terms with a table that incorporates

limits and ensures that these limits are

met by prescribing minimum cooling

times for various combinations of

enrichment versus burnup.

(6) Substitution of another NRCapproved quality assurance program for

fabrication of casks such as modifying

Part 50, Appendix B for Part 72.

(7) A change to a CoC that consists of

minor changes to storage operations that

remain within regulatory requirements

such as a reduction in the center-tocenter cask spacing in the Independent

Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI),

a reduced storage cask temperature

monitoring frequency, an increased time

duration without transfer cask annulus

cooling for canisters with fuel loading

below a certain kilowatt level, or a

reduction in the areal poison density in

boral fixed poison sheets offset by an

increase in the allowable percentage of

the manufacturer’s minimum assured

boron content in criticality calculations.

(8) An expansion of the cask capacity

including the number of bundles, higher

initial enrichment, or higher burnup

bundles when certain conditions are

satisfied.

(9) Inclusion of a more recent NRC

requirement than is contained in the

licensee’s CoC or site-specific license.

(10) Inclusion of an exception or

alternative approved by the NRC for

another licensee.

(11) Administrative improvements

such as the use of generic organization

position titles that clearly indicate

position function as opposed to specific

titles or use of generic organization

charts to delineate functional

responsibilities.

The Petitioner’s Conclusions

The petitioner has concluded that the

NRC requirements governing storage of

spent nuclear fuel in 10 CFR Part 72

should be amended to establish a more

efficient process for issuing and

amending CoCs for dry cask storage

under a general license. The petitioner

has also concluded that the current NRC

process of traditional notice and

comment rulemaking is not appropriate

for the routine task of maintaining a list

of certified casks and that the burden of

maintaining this listing in the

regulations outweighs any benefit. The

petitioner requests that the list of CoCs

be removed from the regulations and

that the NRC notice applications for

new CoCs and amendments to existing

CoCs in the Federal Register for a 60-

day comment period. The petitioner

also requests that amendments for

existing CoCs that have no potential to

have a significant impact on public

health and safety be immediately

effective upon publication in the

Federal Register.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day

of June, 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Annette L. Vietti-Cook,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 00–14686 Filed 6–8–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 73

Re-evaluation of Power Reactor

Physical Protection Regulations and

Position on a Definition of Radiological

Sabotage

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Request for comments.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is re-evaluating its

power reactor physical protection

regulations and the proposed definition

of radiological sabotage, using

performance criteria as the basis. The

purpose of this re-evaluation is to state

precisely what kinds of sabotageinduced events a licensee is expected to

protect against. This request invites

public comment on these issues. The

NRC is publishing as an attachment to

this Federal Register Notice, a

Commission paper entitled, ‘‘Staff ReEvaluation of Power Reactor Physical

Protection Regulations and Position on

a Definition of Radiological Sabotage,’’

(SECY–00–0063).

DATES: Submit comments by August 23,

2000. Comments received after this date

will be considered if it is practical to do

so, but the Commission is able to ensure

consideration only for comments

received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments to:

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001. Attention: Rulemakings and

Adjudications Staff.

Deliver comments to 11555 Rockville

Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30

am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.

You may also provide comments via

the NRC’s interactive rulemaking

website at (http://ruleforum.llnl.gov).

This site provides the capability to

upload comments as files (any format),

if your web browser supports that

function. For information about the

interactive rulemaking website, contact

Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415–5905 (email: CAG@nrc.gov).

The attached Commission paper is

associated with a rulemaking plan,

‘‘Physical Security Requirements for

Exercising Power Reactor Licensees’’

Capability to Respond to Safeguards

Contingency Events,’’ which is located

on the NRC’s rulemaking website.

Copies of any comments received and

certain documents related to this reevaluation may be examined at the NRC

Public Document Room, 2120 L Street

NW, (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

These same documents may be viewed

and downloaded electronically via the

rulemaking website.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Richard P. Rosano, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555–0001, telephone (301) 415–

2933, e-mail: RSS@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

In a Staff Requirements Memorandum

(SRM) of November 22, 1999, the

Commission approved the staff’s

recommendation in SECY–99–241

(Rulemaking Plan, Physical Security

Requirements for Exercising Power

Reactor Licensees’ Capability to

36650 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 112 / Friday, June 9, 2000 / Proposed Rules

Respond to Safeguards Contingency

Events, October 5, 1999) to begin a

comprehensive review of 10 CFR 73.55

and associated power reactor physical

protection regulations. The Commission

directed the staff to provide position

papers on: (1) The attributes of the

design basis threat; and (2) the

definition of radiological sabotage. The

purpose of the first position paper is to

identify the types of weapons and

equipment that may be used in the

design basis threat and clarify the intent

of the regulations concerning the

strength of the response and the strategy

of a licensee’s security organization. The

purpose of the second position paper is

to define precisely what kinds of

sabotage-induced events a licensee is

expected to protect against. This request

for comments responds to the

Commission’s second direction to the

NRC staff regarding development of a

position paper on radiological sabotage

at reactors.

Discussion

In accordance with the SRM dated

November 22, 1999, the staff began

considering the fundamental issues that

would guide a re-evaluation of the

power reactor physical protection

requirements, including conducting

several public meetings with

stakeholders on the subject. This

process highlighted a longstanding issue

with the implementation of 10 CFR

73.55 requirements at power reactors.

Specifically, the implementation of

these requirements assumed that

compliance with the prescriptive

requirements of the physical protection

plans written in accordance with 10

CFR 73.55(b) through (h) would provide

the high assurance required by 10 CFR

73.55(a). In fact, results of force-on-force

drills conducted pursuant to the

Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER)

program and the Operational Safeguards

Response Evaluation (OSRE) program

cast doubt on the validity of this

assumption, due in part to the way the

requirements were (a) understood by

licensees and (b) inspected and enforced

by NRC. However, overall site security

and the security organization’s

readiness to respond to an adversary

attack were tested and confirmed during

regional inspection activity and OSREs.

The staff examined approaches and

principles used in existing NRC

regulations, including the use of margin

of safety. The staff also integrated

appropriate results of previous analyses,

such as the study to re-evaluate the

guidelines and bases used to determine

vital equipment and areas to be

protected in nuclear power plants, as

documented in ‘‘Vital Equipment/Area

Guidelines Study: Vital Area Committee

Report,’’ NUREG–1178 (March 1988).

In the attachment to SECY–99–241,

the staff proposed to review the

definition of radiological sabotage and

consider ways to clarify the issue in a

way that is meaningful for the protective

strategy and enhances the process of

performance evaluation. After

considerable discussion, the staff

determined that a definition of

radiological sabotage at power reactors

in the new rule may not be necessary if

the regulation could delineate more

clearly the performance criteria to be

used as the basis for the new physical

protection regulations. Several public

meetings were held with representatives

from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI),

the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), and

the media, from which the staff

developed a set of physical protection

performance criteria that are consistent

with criteria used in other areas of

nuclear power plant regulation. These

performance criteria would provide the

risk-informed basis for the

comprehensive review of 10 CFR 73.55

and associated power reactor physical

protection requirements, including the

exercise requirement.

These performance criteria are based

on ensuring that a plant retains the

capability to shutdown the reactor

safely and assure long-term heat

removal in the face of a malevolent act

by the design basis threat against the

facility. The staff is developing

performance criteria and requirements

for 10 CFR 73.55(a) to protect the plant

against a malevolent act by protecting

critical safety functions, with an

appropriate margin of safety, that

include:

(1) reactivity control;

(2) reactor coolant makeup for

maintaining reactor and spent fuel pool

inventory;

(3) reactor and spent fuel pool heat

removal;

(4) containment of radioactive

materials;

(5) process monitoring necessary to

perform and control the above

functions; and

(6) actions necessary to support the

operation of the equipment used for safe

shutdown.

These performance criteria would

clarify the scope of radiological sabotage

against which a licensee is expected to

protect. In 10 CFR 73.55(b) and

succeeding paragraphs, specific

performance criteria would be provided

for the physical security organization

and response elements. As described in

SECY–99–241, new paragraphs of 10

CFR 73.55 would require periodic drills

and exercises and corrective actions for

vulnerabilities identified in the

exercises.

The above performance criteria

represent a new concept in formulating

security programs and aligning security

with other areas of regulation involving

plant operations. This approach would

provide insights on how the remainder

of 10 CFR 73.55 might be revised. The

staff believes that it is important to

continue to have stakeholder

involvement in the early stages of

development of performance criteria.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day

of June, 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Annette L. Vietti-Cook,

Secretary of the Commission.

Rulemaking Issue—SECY–00–0063

(Notation Vote)

March 9, 2000.

For: The Commissioners.

From: William D. Travers, Executive

Director for Operations. Subject: Staff Re-evaluation of Power

Reactor Physical Protection Regulations

and Position on a Definition of

Radiological Sabotage.

Purpose: To obtain Commission

approval of the staff’s (a) approach to reevaluation of the power reactor physical

protection regulations, and (b)

definition of radiological sabotage by

providing design criteria as the basis for

physical protection regulations. Background: In the Staff

Requirements Memorandum (SRM) of

November 22, 1999, the Commission

approved the staff’s recommendation in

SECY–09–241 (Rulemaking Plan,

Physical Security Requirements for

Exercising Power Reactor Licensees’

Capability to Respond to Safeguards

Contingency Events, October 5, 1999) to

begin a comprehensive review of 10

CFR 73.55 and associated power reactor

physical protection regulations, and

directed the staff to provide position

papers on: (a) the attributes of the

design basis threat, and (b) the

definition of radiological sabotage. The

first is used to define the weapons and

equipment used by the design basis

threat and clarify the intent of the

regulations concerning the response

strength and strategy of the licensees’

security organizations. The purpose of

the second is to precisely state what

sabotage-induced event sequences the

licensees are expected to protect against.

This paper addresses the second request

regarding development of a position

paper on radiological sabotage at

reactors.

Contact: Richard Rosano, NRR, (301)

415–2933.

Discussion: In accordance with the

Staff Requirements Memorandum dated

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 112 / Friday, June 9, 2000 / Proposed Rules 36651

November 22, 1999, the staff began

consideration of the fundamental issues

that would guide a re-evaluation of the

power reactor physical protection

requirements, including conducting

several public meetings with

stakeholders on the subject. This

process highlighted a longstanding issue

with the implementation of 10 CFR

73.55 requirements at power reactors.

Specifically, the implementation of

these requirements assumed that

compliance with the prescriptive

requirements of the physical protection

plans written in accordance with 10

CFR 73.55(b) through (h) would provide

the high assurance required by 10 CFR

73.55(a). In fact, results of force-on-force

drills conducted pursuant to the

Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER)

program and the Operational Safeguards

Response Evaluation (OSRE) program

cast doubt on the validity of this

assumption, due in part to the way the

requirements were (a) understood by

licensees and (b) inspected and enforced

by NRC. However, overall site security

and the security organization’s

readiness to respond to an adversary

attack were tested and confirmed during

regional inspection activity and OSREs.

The staff examined approaches and

principles used in existing NRC

regulations, including the use of margin

of safety. The staff also integrated

appropriate results of previous analyses,

such as the study to re-evaluate the

guidelines and bases used to determine

vital equipment and areas to be

protected in nuclear power plants, as

documented in ‘‘Vital Equipment/Area

Guidelines Study: Vital Area Committee

Report,’’ NUREG–1178.

In the attachment to SECY–99–241,

the staff proposed to review the

definition of radiological sabotage and

consider ways to clarify the issue in a

way that is meaningful for the protective

strategy and enhances the process of

performance evaluation. After

considerable discussion, the staff

determined that a definition of

radiological sabotage at power reactors

in the new rule may not be necessary if

the regulation could delineate more

clearly the performance criteria to be

used as the basis for the new physical

protection regulations. A series of

public meetings were conducted,

including representatives from Nuclear

Energy Institute (NEI), Nuclear Control

Institute (NCI), and media, from which

the staff developed a set of physical

protection performance criteria in terms

of public protection that are consistent

with criteria used in other areas of

nuclear power plant regulation. These

performance criteria would provide the

risk-informed basis for the

comprehensive review of 10 CFR 73.55

and associated power reactor physical

protection requirements, including the

exercise requirement.

These performance criteria are based

on ensuring that a plant retains the

capability to safely shutdown the

reactor and assure long-term heat

removal in the face of a malevolent act

by the design basis threat against the

facility. The staff is developing

performance criteria and requirements

for 10 CFR 73.55(a) to protect the plant

against a malevolent act by protecting

critical safety functions, including

appropriate margin of safety, including:

(1) reactivity control,

(2) reactor coolant makeup for

maintaining reactor and spent fuel pool

inventory,

(3) reactor and spent fuel pool heat

removal,

(4) containment of radioactive

materials,

(5) process monitoring necessary to

perform and control the above

functions, and

(6) actions necessary to support the

operation of the equipment used for safe

shutdown.

These performance criteria would

clarify the scope of radiological sabotage

which licensees are expected to protect.

10 CFR 73.55(b) and succeeding

paragraphs would provide specific

performance criteria for the physical

security organization and response

elements. As described in SECY–99–

241, a new sub-section of 10 CFR 73.55

would require periodic drills and

exercises and corrective actions for

vulnerabilities identified in the

exercises.

The above performance criteria

represent a new concept in formulating

security programs and align security

with other areas of regulation involving

plant operations. This approach would

provide insights on how the remainder

of 10 CFR 73.55 might be revised. The

staff believes that it is important to

continue to have stakeholder

involvement in the early stages of

development of performance criteria.

OSREs have been conducted since

1992 to test licensees’ performance

relative to the requirements in 10 CFR

73.55(a). The last OSRE in the current

cycle is scheduled for May 2000 and

with the final rule not expected to be

published for three years, steps have

been taken by the staff to fill the gap

between May 2000 and the time when

the new rule is in place. In the shortterm, OSREs will continue. Then,

pending NRC endorsement, an industry

proposal for a Self-Assessment Program

will be used on a trial basis, with NRC

oversight, to pilot the performance

criteria envisioned in the revised

physical protection regulations.

Coordination: The Office of the

General Counsel has reviewed this

paper and has no legal objection to its

content. The FTE and resource issues

involved in this paper are already

budgeted.

Recommendations: That the

Commission: Approve (a) the staff’s

approach to re-evaluation of the power

reactor physical protection regulations,

and (b) the definition of radiological

sabotage by providing design criteria as

the basis for physical protection

regulations.

Note that: Upon the Commission’s

approval, the staff will (a) continue with

this work to implement this approach in

the new security regulations; (b) test

these concepts in the industry SelfAssessment Program, as appropriate;

and (c) publish this paper in the Federal

Register for public comment, seeking

comment on the approach described

above for revising 10 CFR 73.55(a).

William D. Travers,

Executive Director for Operations.

[FR Doc. 00–14685 Filed 6–8–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 64

[CC Docket No. 94–129; DA 00–1220]

Common Carrier Bureau Extends

Pleading Cycle on Proposal to Require

Resellers to Obtain Carrier

Identification Codes

AGENCY: Federal Communications

Commission.

ACTION: Reopening of comment period.

SUMMARY: This document extends the

comments and reply comments due

dates of a document published at 65 FR

33281 (May 23, 2000). The Common

Carrier Bureau published a document

soliciting comments on proposals in this

proceeding to require resellers to obtain

their own carrier identification codes.

DATES: Submit comments on or before

June 13, 2000 and reply comments on or

before June 20, 2000.

ADDRESSES: See 65 FR 33281 (May 23,

2000) for where and how to file

comments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

William J. Scher or Dana WaltonBradford (202) 418–7400 TTY: (202)

418–0484.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In a recent

Public Notice, 65 FR 33281 (May 23,