Report to the Subcommittee on 

National Security and Foreign Affairs, 

Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

DEFENSE 

MANAGEMENT 

Actions Needed to 

Address Stakeholder 

Concerns, Improve 

Interagency 

Collaboration, and 

Determine Full Costs 

Associated with the 

U.S. Africa Command 

February 2009 

GAO-09-181 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 2009

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, 

Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine 

Highlights of GAO-09-181, a report to Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command 

Subcommittee on National Security and 

Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

In February 2007, the President

directed the Department of

Defense (DOD) to establish the

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)

to help strengthen U.S. security

cooperation with African nations 

and bring peace and stability to the

continent. For this review, GAO 

assessed DOD’s (1) efforts to 

establish the command and 

communicate its mission, (2) 

progress in integrating personnel 

from other U.S. government

agencies into AFRICOM, and (3) 

plans and costs for establishing a 

permanent headquarters and 

supporting offices in Africa. In 

assessing DOD’s efforts to establish 

AFRICOM, GAO analyzed relevant

documentation and obtained 

perspectives from the combatant 

commands, military services, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Department of State (State), U. S.

Agency for International 

Development, and 

nongovernmental organizations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that AFRICOM 

include three key elements in its 

communications strategy, seek 

formal commitments for 

interagency personnel, and develop

a comprehensive assessment of the 

possible locations of its permanent 

command headquarters and offices 

in Africa. In responding to a draft 

of this report, DOD partially agreed

with GAO’s recommendations and 

noted that in some cases it was 

already taking action. 

DOD declared AFRICOM fully operational on September 30, 2008, and had 

more than 950 military and civilian personnel assigned to the command; 

however, concerns about its planned mission and activities persist. DOD 

created AFRICOM to bring a more cohesive and strategic focus to its efforts in 

Africa. However, initial statements made about its mission and the scope of 

its activity raised concerns among U.S. and African stakeholders that 

AFRICOM could militarize diplomacy and development. Since the initial 

announcement, DOD has taken some steps to clarify its mission and in May 

2008 published an approved mission statement. But concerns persist and 

DOD has not yet finalized a strategy for future communication with the wide 

range of stakeholders. It will take time for concerns generated by the initial

announcement to subside and will largely depend on AFRICOM’s actions. 

Unresolved concerns about AFRICOM’s intentions could limit support from 

key stakeholders like State and potential African partners. GAO’s prior work 

shows that a communications strategy can help address stakeholder concerns 

and clarify expectations. 

AFRICOM has begun integrating personnel from other U.S. government 

agencies into the command but it has not yet determined the ultimate extent 

of desired interagency representation. DOD officials said that integrating 

personnel will help AFRICOM develop plans that are more compatible with 

U.S. agencies. DOD set some initial personnel goals, but continues to revise 

them. Initially, DOD conceived of a command in which about a quarter of the 

staff (about 125 people) would be from other agencies. DOD later reduced the

goal to 52 positions, but this number is under review and expected to change. 

These goals did not fully consider the perspective of contributing civilian 

agencies, which is important because some face personnel shortages. 

AFRICOM is now taking steps to involve agencies in determining personnel 

goals, but this process does not guarantee commitments from agencies to 

provide personnel. Without agreed-upon interagency personnel commitments, 

AFRICOM could continue to develop unrealistic targets and ultimately risk 

losing the knowledge and expertise of interagency personnel. 

DOD cannot reliably estimate AFRICOM’s total future costs because decisions 

on the locations of a permanent headquarters and supporting offices in Africa 

have not been made. DOD is re-examining its initial concept for AFRICOM’s 

command presence because of concerns over its initial headquarters concept, 

authorities under which it would operate, and sensitivities about a U.S. 

military presence. In the meantime, AFRICOM is increasing its representation

in some U.S. embassies in Africa and spending about $140 million to renovate 

facilities in Stuttgart, Germany, for its interim headquarters. Current cost 

projections exceed $4 billion through 2015, but these estimates do not include 

an operations center or component commands, which could increase costs. 

DOD plans to make decisions in fiscal year 2012 on command locations. 

GAO’s prior work shows that an assessment of tangible and intangible 

benefits and costs can help organizations decide between alternatives. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-181.

For more information, contact John H. 

Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 

pendletonj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 7

AFRICOM Declared Fully Operational but Stakeholder Concerns 

Persist 10

AFRICOM Has Not Determined Needed Interagency 

Representation 16

Total Costs to Establish AFRICOM Are Uncertain, and Depend on 

the Location of AFRICOM’s Permanent Headquarters and 

Supporting Offices 23 

Conclusions 28

Recommendations for Executive Action 29 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 33 

Appendix II DOD’s Initial Concept for Headquarters Location and 

Command Locations in Africa 35 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 36 

Appendix IV Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 39 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 40 

Related GAO Products 41 

Page i GAO-09-181 Defense Management
Tables 

Table 1: Number and Percentage of Military, Civilian, and 

Interagency Personnel Planned and Assigned for U.S. 

Africa Command Headquarters as of October 2008 13 

Table 2: Embedded Interagency Personnel on AFRICOM staff as of 

October 2008 18 

Figures 

Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands and Areas of 

Responsibility, as of December 2008 8 

Figure 2: Areas of Responsibility and Examples of Activities Being 

Transferred to AFRICOM from Other Combatant 

Commands 12

Figure 3: AFRICOM’s Plans for Interim Headquarters Location and 

Command Presence, as of October 2008 26 

Abbreviations 

AFRICOM U. S. Africa Command 

DOD Department of Defense 

State Department of State 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-09-181 Defense Management
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

February 20, 2009 

The Honorable John F. Tierney 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jeff Flake 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The 2008 National Defense Strategy describes a spectrum of security 

challenges facing the United States that range from violent transnational

extremist networks to natural and pandemic disasters and growing 

competition for resources. U.S. experiences in Africa, the Balkans, 

Afghanistan, and Iraq over the last several years have demonstrated that 

U.S. government agencies need to improve the coordination and 

integration of their activities to address security challenges. In February 

2007, in order to provide a more strategic, holistic approach to U.S. 

military activities in Africa, the President directed the Secretary of 

Defense to establish the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), a new 

geographic combatant command that consolidated the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) activities in Africa under one command. Previously, 

these activities had been managed by the U.S. European, Central, and 

Pacific Commands. AFRICOM is primarily focused on strengthening U.S. 

security cooperation with African nations, creating opportunities to 

bolster the capabilities of African partners, and enhancing U.S. efforts to 

bring peace and stability to the continent.1

 To do this, AFRICOM is 

integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies into the 

command structure and is considering options to establish a permanent 

headquarters outside Africa as well as placing personnel in Africa. 

The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on National 

Security and Foreign Affairs of the House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform requested that we review the establishment of the 

 1

A security cooperation activity is defined as military activity that involves other nations 

and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include 

programs and exercises that the U.S. military conducts with other nations to improve 

mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential 

coalition partners. These activities are designed to support a combatant commander’s 

theater strategy. 

Page 1 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

new U.S. Africa Command. In July 2008 we provided testimony to the 

Chairman and Ranking Member on our preliminary observations on DOD’s 

progress and challenges associated with establishing AFRICOM.2

 We 

testified that the initial concept for AFRICOM, designed and developed by 

DOD, met resistance from within the U. S. government and African 

countries and contributed to several implementation challenges. First, 

DOD had encountered some concerns from civilian agencies, African 

partners, and nongovernmental organizations over the command’s mission

and goals. Second, DOD was having difficulties integrating interagency 

personnel in the command, which DOD viewed as critical to synchronizing 

military efforts with other U.S. government agencies. Third, DOD had not 

yet reached agreement with the Department of State (State) and potential 

host nations on the structure and location of the command’s presence on 

the continent of Africa. This report expands on the information provided 

in that testimony and makes recommendations to enhance DOD’s efforts 

to establish AFRICOM. Specifically, we assessed DOD’s (1) efforts to 

establish the command and communicate its mission, (2) progress in 

integrating personnel from other U.S. agencies into AFRICOM, and (3) 

plans and costs for establishing a permanent headquarters as well as 

supporting offices in Africa. 

To assess DOD’s efforts in establishing AFRICOM and communicating its 

mission, we met with a variety of DOD officials and reviewed a wide range 

of DOD guidance, plans, directives, speeches, testimony statements, and 

reports. We interviewed officials at State and the United States Agency for

International Development (USAID) to obtain other agencies’ perspectives

on the establishment of the command and input into the process. We also 

interviewed representatives from an organization representing U.S.-based

international nongovernmental organizations for their perspectives on 

AFRICOM. In addition, we interviewed officials from AFRICOM on their 

efforts to communicate the mission of the command to multiple 

audiences. To assess the extent to which AFRICOM has taken steps to 

improve interagency collaboration, we obtained information on its plans 

and goals for integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies 

and on its efforts to align its plans and activities with federal agencies. To

assess DOD’s plans to establish a permanent headquarters and supporting 

offices in Africa, we obtained information related to the initial and current 

 2

GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges

Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command, GAO-08-947T (Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 2008). 

Page 2 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

plans for AFRICOM’s presence in Africa, including DOD implementation 

guidance, planning documents, budget proposals, and facility renovation 

plans. We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to February 

2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

DOD designated AFRICOM fully operational on September 30, 2008, and 

the command has assumed responsibility for DOD activities in Africa; 

however, it continues to face concerns from U.S. government,

nongovernmental, and African stakeholders about its mission and 

activities, which could limit support for the command. In October 2007, 

AFRICOM began assuming responsibility for existing DOD activities 

conducted by U.S. European, Central, and Pacific Commands in Africa and

began to staff its headquarters with DOD military personnel, DOD civilian 

personnel, and interagency personnel. DOD subsequently approved 1,356 

positions for the command’s headquarters, of which 639 are positions that 

are to be filled by military personnel, 665 are to be civilian DOD 

employees, and 52 are to be filled by non-DOD agencies like State and 

USAID. As of October 2008, about 70 percent (959) of the total personnel 

were assigned to AFRICOM. Most of the military personnel were in place, 

but only about half of the DOD civilians and about a quarter of the 

interagency personnel had been assigned. In addition, the Army, Navy, 

Marine Corps, Air Force, and the Special Operations Command have each

begun to establish component and theater-level commands that will 

support AFRICOM’s operations and will also require hundreds of 

additional personnel. Although DOD declared AFRICOM fully operational,

concerns surrounding the command’s mission and activities persist among 

its various stakeholders. DOD established AFRICOM to bring a more 

cohesive and strategic focus to its activities in Africa; however, initial 

statements about the new command’s intended mission and scope of its 

activities met with concerns from U.S. government, nongovernmental, and 

African partner stakeholders. Concerns are particularly keen in areas like 

humanitarian assistance and other non-combat activities that involve nonDOD agencies and organizations. Their concerns center on the view that 

AFRICOM could blur traditional boundaries between diplomacy, 

development, and defense. In some cases, these apprehensions stem from 

DOD having more resources than other agencies and thus could dominate 

U.S. activities and relationships in Africa. In response to the concerns 

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

AFRICOM took steps to clarify its mission and goals, such as shifting its 

emphasis from a whole-of-government approach to more traditional 

military missions, and AFRICOM now has a mission statement that was 

approved following consultation with other U.S. government agencies. 

Stakeholders remain skeptical about AFRICOM’s intentions, however. Our 

previous work suggests that to build trust with stakeholders, clarify 

misperceptions, and create shared expectations, a communication strategy 

can be an effective tool, although it alone cannot resolve all concerns. A 

communication strategy should allow for early and frequent 

communication, ensure a consistent message, and encourage two-way 

communications with stakeholders. DOD and the State previously issued 

guidance on communicating AFRICOM’s mission to an early AFRICOM 

planning team and to U.S. embassies in Africa, but these documents did 

not address the full range of AFRICOM’s stakeholders. According to 

AFRICOM officials, the command is currently developing an approach to 

address stakeholder concerns and clarify expectations for the command, 

but it is unclear what this approach will include or when it will be 

completed. Until AFRICOM has a communications strategy that ensures a 

consistent message and facilitates two-way communication with 

stakeholders, it may be limited in its ability to reduce persistent concerns 

from U.S. government, nongovernmental, and African stakeholders and 

garner support for the command. We are recommending that the Secretary 

of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Africa Command to include all

appropriate audiences, encourage two-way communication, and ensure 

consistency of message related to AFRICOM’s mission and goals as it 

develops and implements its communications strategy. 

AFRICOM has taken initial steps to integrate personnel from other U.S. 

government agencies into the command, but it has not yet determined the 

ultimate extent of interagency representation. AFRICOM has focused on 

integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies into staff, 

management, and leadership positions. According to DOD and AFRICOM 

officials, integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies is 

essential to achieving AFRICOM’s mission because it will help AFRICOM 

develop plans and activities that are more compatible with those agencies. 

As of October 1, 2008, AFRICOM had 13 personnel from six other agencies 

assigned to the command, including the Deputy to the Commander for 

Civil-Military Activities, who is from the State. DOD continues to revise its 

interagency personnel goals and has not yet determined the total number 

of interagency positions it will ultimately need in the command. Initially,

DOD conceived of a command with about a quarter of the headquarters 

staff (roughly 125 people) being filled by other agencies, but later reduced 

this goal once it became clear that other agencies would not be able to

Page 4 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

provide that level of personnel support.3 DOD later established a goal of 52 

interagency personnel for fiscal year 2009, but said that this number would 

also change as the command learned about the skills other agencies could 

provide to the command. Both DOD and AFRICOM officials said that these 

initial personnel goals were notional and not based on an analysis of the 

skill sets needed to accomplish its mission. In addition, agencies that 

would be contributing personnel were not always included in developing 

or reviewing AFRICOM’s initial personnel targets, and therefore, 

personnel shortages at some agencies were not fully taken into 

consideration. For example, the State Department, which is facing a 25

percent shortfall in mid level personnel, did not have the opportunity to 

provide input until after the personnel target for that agency had been

established. DOD has officially requested that State fill 13 positions at 

AFRICOM in addition to the 2 it has already filled; however, State officials 

told us that they would not likely be able to fill these positions due to 

personnel shortfalls. Our previous work indicates that successful 

organizations need valid and reliable data about the personnel number and 

skills required to accomplish their mission, stakeholder involvement in 

determining those elements, and strategies to address gaps in number and 

skills. AFRICOM has recently begun taking steps to work with other 

agencies to help identify the number of interagency positions by inviting

representatives to the command to survey the need for their personnel to 

help carry out the mission of the command. Because contributing agencies 

ultimately decide whether or not to provide personnel to fill requested 

positions, this process does not guarantee a commitment to contribute 

personnel to AFRICOM. In addition, AFRICOM officials told us that they 

had not developed action plans or alternative solutions to gain other 

agencies perspectives should interagency positions go unfilled. Without 

including all relevant stakeholders in assessing needed interagency skills 

and obtaining commitments from them, AFRICOM could continue to 

develop unrealistic personnel goals that contributing agencies are not able

to support or acquire skill sets that are less relevant for its mission. We are 

recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. 

Africa Command to seek formal commitments with contributing agencies 

to provide personnel as part of its efforts to determine interagency 

personnel requirements and to develop alternatives for how AFRICOM can 

obtain interagency perspectives in the event that interagency personnel 

cannot be provided due to personnel shortfalls in contributing agencies. 

 3

AFRICOM’s initial interagency personnel goal was based on a headquarters size of 500-600 

personnel; therefore, one quarter would be approximately 125 people. 

Page 5 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

The total future cost for AFRICOM will be significant but remains unclear 

because decisions on the locations of AFRICOM’s permanent headquarters 

and its supporting offices in Africa have not been made. DOD is reexamining its initial concept for AFRICOM’s command presence in Africa

because issues surrounding the location of AFRICOM’s proposed 

headquarters and the authorities under which it would operate caused 

concern with State and several African nations. In the interim, DOD 

located AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, and now 

estimates it will spend about $140 million in fiscal years 2007 through 2009 

to renovate those facilities, which is more than double the initial cost 

estimates. In addition to renovation costs, cost projections exceed $4 

billion through 2015 to operate AFRICOM’s interim headquarters, expand 

DOD’s presence in 11 U.S. embassies in Africa, and improve existing 

facilities for a combined joint task force in Djibouti. However, these 

projections do not include the costs to establish AFRICOM’s permanent 

headquarters or other supporting offices in Africa, a potential joint 

operations fusion center to support the headquarters, or costs associated 

with its new component and theater special operations commands.4

 DOD

officials told us that decisions on command locations will have a 

significant effect on future cost projections. DOD does not intend to 

decide the locations of AFRICOM’s permanent headquarters and 

supporting office locations until fiscal year 2012. Our prior work provided 

key business practices that can inform DOD’s decisions on command 

locations, such as discussing alternatives with key stakeholders to 

incorporate their insight and conducting an analysis of the costs and 

benefits, both tangible and intangible, of potential alternatives. Such 

considerations include infrastructure costs, risks to the effectiveness of 

DOD operations, and geopolitical impact on U.S. relationships with 

African partners. Until decisions are made on the structure and locations 

of AFRICOM’s headquarters and supporting offices in Africa, the total 

investments required for the command will remain unclear. The merits of 

infrastructure investments in Germany in the interim may be difficult to 

assess without knowing how long AFRICOM will use these facilities or 

how they will be used after permanent locations are established. We are 

recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 

Secretary of State as appropriate, conduct an assessment of the costs and

benefits of potential alternative locations for AFRICOM’s permanent 

 4

AFRICOM will have four service component commands and a theater special operations 

command. They are: U.S. Army Africa (USARAF); U.S. Naval Forces, Africa; U.S. Marine

Forces, Africa; U.S. Air Forces Africa Command; and Special Operations Command, Africa.

Page 6 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

headquarters and supporting offices to help in determining the long-term 

fiscal investment for AFRICOM infrastructure and limit additional 

expenditures on interim AFRICOM infrastructure until decisions are made 

or investment plans developed. 

In reviewing a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with each of our 

three recommendations, stating that in some cases, actions were already 

underway that would address the issues identified in this report. Based on 

these comments we modified two of our recommendations to incorporate 

DOD’s comments. State did not provide written comments on our report. 

In written comments, USAID affirmed its support of AFRICOM and stated 

that it had met its personnel requirements in support of AFRICOM. DOD 

and USAID’s written comments appear in their entirety in appendix III. 

To perform its military missions around the world, DOD operates 

geographic combatant commands that conduct missions and activities 

within assigned areas of responsibility (figure 1 illustrates the boundaries 

for each of the geographic combatant commands’ areas of responsibility). 

Combatant commands are responsible for a variety of functions including 

tasks such as deploying forces to carry out a variety of the missions that 

range from humanitarian assistance to combat operations; providing 

administration and support, including control of resources and equipment 

and training; and assigning command functions to subordinate 

commanders. Combatant commands are supported by service component

commands (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) and a theater 

special operations command. Each of these has a significant role in 

preparing the detailed plans and providing the resources that the 

combatant commands need to execute operations in support of their 

mission and goals. On February 6, 2007, the President directed the 

Secretary of Defense to establish a new geographic combatant command 

to consolidate the responsibility for DOD activities in Africa that had been 

shared by U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. 

European Command.5

 AFRICOM was officially established as a sub unified 

command within the European Command on October 1, 2007, and 

Background 

 5

AFRICOM’s area of responsibility will include the African continent and its island nations, 

with the exception of Egypt. Egypt will remain within U.S. Central Command’s area of 

responsibility, and AFRICOM and U.S. Central Command will have overlapping but distinct 

relationships with Egypt, which will be addressed under separate memorandum of 

agreement. 

Page 7 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

designated fully operational as a separate, independent geographic 

combatant command on October 1, 2008. 

Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands and Areas of Responsibility, as of December 2008 

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data; map©Corel Corp., all rights reserved.

U.S.

PACIFIC

COMMAND

U.S.

SOUTHERN

COMMAND

U.S.

NORTHERN

COMMAND U.S.

CENTRAL

COMMAND

U.S.

PACIFIC

COMMAND

U.S.

EUROPEAN

COMMAND

U.S.

AFRICA

COMMAND

Alaskaa

a

The state of Alaska is assigned to the U.S. Northern Command’s Area of Responsibility. Forces

based in Alaska, however, may be assigned to multiple commands. 

In November 2005, DOD directed that stability operations be given priority

on par with combat operations.6

 DOD has defined stability operations as 

an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and 

activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 

U.S. government agencies to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure 

environment, provide essential government services, emergency 

infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief.7

 This new policy 

emphasized that integrating civilian and military efforts is key to 

 6

DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stabilization, Security, Transition, and

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Washington, D.C. November. 28, 2005). 

7

Joint Publication 1-02, DOD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington,

D.C. September. 2008). 

Page 8 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

successful stability operations and it recognized that these types of 

activities will not always be led by the military and that DOD needs to be 

prepared to provide support to both government and nongovernmental 

organizations when necessary. DOD’s efforts to address this shift are 

captured in numerous publications and documents, including the 2008 

National Defense Strategy, the Guidance for Employment of the Force, 

and guidance for joint operations and joint operation planning.

8

 AFRICOM 

is primarily focused on this shift toward emphasizing the importance of 

stability operations. Its mission is to act in concert with other U.S. 

government agencies and international partners to conduct sustained 

security engagement through military-to-military programs, militarysponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote 

a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy. 

Some of AFRICOM’s programs, activities, and operations are either 

conducted jointly or coordinated with State and USAID, and other 

departments and agencies as required. 

According to the President’s National Security Policy, defense, diplomacy

and development comprise three key elements of the U.S. foreign policy 

apparatus. While DOD is responsible for national defense, State plans and 

implements foreign diplomacy, and USAID leads foreign development, 

including efforts to support economic growth and humanitarian 

assistance. For example, in implementing the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership in the countries of northwest Africa, State 

has hosted educational and cultural exchange programs intended to 

marginalize violent extremism; USAID has supported efforts to improve 

education and health; and DOD has provided counterterrorism training 

and distributed equipment to the program’s partner countries.9

 Although 

State and USAID work together closely on strategic and program planning, 

they are independent agencies, both of which coordinate with AFRICOM. 

 8

Guidance for Employment of the Force (May 2008), Joint Publication 3-0, Joint

Operations (Washington, D.C. September. 2006), and Joint Publication 5-0, Joint 

Operation Planning (Washington, D.C.: December. 2006). 

9

GAO, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership, GAO-08-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008). 

Page 9 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

On September 30, 2008, DOD declared AFRICOM to be fully operational, 

but the command continues to face persistent concerns from U.S. 

government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and African 

partners over its mission and scope of activities. To establish the 

command, AFRICOM focused on obtaining staff and building the 

capabilities necessary to assume responsibility for all existing DOD 

activities in Africa. DOD, however, continues to face persistent 

stakeholder concerns, such as fears of AFRICOM militarizing foreign aid 

because of initial statements about the new command’s intended mission. 

Our previous work suggests that to build trust with stakeholders, clarify 

misperceptions, and create shared expectations, a communication strategy 

can be an effective tool. Although it alone cannot resolve all concerns. It 

will take time for concerns generated by the initial announcement to 

subside and will largely depend on AFRICOM’s actions. AFRICOM has 

taken some steps to clarify its mission after it received initial pushback 

from stakeholders and, after consultation with other agencies, now has an

approved mission statement. But concerns persist and DOD has not yet 

finalized a strategy for future communication with the wide range of 

stakeholders. Until AFRICOM has a strategy that ensures a consistent 

message and facilitates two-way communication and that is linked to other 

U.S. government communication efforts, AFRICOM may be limited in its 

ability to address stakeholder concerns and achieve their acceptance and 

support for the command. 

AFRICOM Declared 

Fully Operational but 

Stakeholder Concerns 

Persist 

Page 10 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

After the President announced the creation of AFRICOM, the command 

focused its efforts on building the capabilities necessary to assume 

responsibility for all existing DOD activities inherited from the U.S. 

European, Central, and Pacific Commands without disrupting them or 

other U.S. government and international efforts. To accomplish this task, 

AFRICOM officials created a process to manage the transfer of ongoing 

activities that it had identified within its area of responsibility. These 

activities ranged from efforts to combat HIV/AIDS in foreign militaries to 

programs that provide training opportunities for foreign military personnel 

and include the two largest U.S. military activities in Africa, the Combined 

Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans 

Sahara. 10, 11 The areas of responsibility and examples of activities being 

transferred to AFRICOM from the U.S. European, Central, and Pacific 

Commands are presented in figure 2.

AFRICOM Has Assumed 

Responsibility for Existing 

DOD Missions in Africa 

 10The Horn of Africa countries include Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Seychelles, Ethiopia, Eritrea,

Djibouti, and Yemen. The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa was formed to work

with Horn of Africa governments to promote capacity building, support professionalization 

of militaries, and counter the proliferation of terrorism. 

11Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara is designed to strengthen the ability of 

regional governments to police large expanses of remote terrain in the Trans-Sahara. 

Page 11 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

Figure 2: Areas of Responsibility and Examples of Activities Being Transferred to AFRICOM from Other Combatant 

Commands 

Number of Countries Involved

42

Examples of Activities Being Transferred

• Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara

 • A series of military-to-military exercises

 designed to strengthen the ability of

 regional governments to police the large

 expanses of remote terrain in the

 trans-Sahara

• Africa Partnership Station 

 • A program to enhance maritime safety and security

 through ship visits, training and the provision of

 equipment to African host nations

• Medical Exercises

 • Exercises in which U.S. military doctors and other medical

 personnel interchange medical information and techniques

 with African host nation medical personnel and provide

 humanitarian assistance such as immunizations

 to the population

• International Military Education and Training 

 • Program that provides military education, training, and

 professional development to African military personnel on a

 grant basis through funding from the Department of State

• Humanitarian Assistance Activities

 • Various activities including providing HIV/AIDS prevention

 education to African military personnel, drilling wells,

 improving school buildings, and developing infrastructure

Number of Countries Involved

7

Examples of Activities Being Transferred

• Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa

 • One of the two largest military programs

 in Africa, includes operations, training,

 and humanitarian activities to help

 nations improve their capacity to combat

 terrorism and prepare for challenges

 such as natural disasters

Number of Countries Involved

3

Examples of Activities Being Transferred

• Pacific Endeavor

 • Workshops that bring nations together to

 test the compatibility and interoperability

 of their communications systems and

 assist in their integration

• Tempest Express

 • Biannual workshop with multinational

 military personnel aimed to increase the

 speed of multinational crisis response

 and improve force interoperability 

U.S. European Command U.S. Central Command

U.S. Pacific Command

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data; map©Corel Corp., all rights reserved. 

Egypt will remain in the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility.

Beginning in October 2007, AFRICOM began staffing its headquarters with 

DOD military personnel, DOD civilian personnel, and personnel from other 

U.S. government agencies. Officials explained that staffing the command’s 

positions was the most critical and limiting factor in the process for 

assuming responsibility for activities in Africa because activities could not 

be transferred without personnel in place to execute them. DOD approved 

1,356 positions for the command’s headquarters, of which 639 are 

positions that are to be filled by military personnel, 665 are to be civilian 

DOD employees, and 52 are to be filled by non-DOD agencies like State 

and USAID. Table 1 illustrates the number of authorized and assigned 

positions as of October 2008. 

Page 12 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

Table 1: Number and Percentage of Military, Civilian, and Interagency Personnel 

Planned and Assigned for U.S. Africa Command Headquarters as of October 2008

Fiscal year 2009

Authorized number 

of positions

Number 

assigned

 Percentage of

authorized positions 

with personnel 

assigned

Military 639 628 98

Civilian 665 318 48

Interagency 52 13 25

Total 1356 959 71

Source: GAO analysis of DOD budget justification materials, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and AFRICOM

documents. 

In addition to establishing AFRICOM as a combatant command, DOD 

directed the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and the Special 

Operations Command to establish component command or theater-level

headquarters that would support the planning and execution of 

AFRICOM’s operations. Each of the services and the Special Operations 

Command has either initiated or completed steps to identify the 

organizational structure and resource requirements to establish the 

various component and theater-level commands. For example, in terms of 

resources, personnel requirements for the various component commands 

range from approximately 90 personnel for the Marine Corps to more than 

400 for the Army.12 Army officials have said that they will likely face 

difficulties in filling positions because of the limited number of personnel 

with the rank or level of experience required due to the high demand for 

these individuals to support operational requirements already underway 

around the world. 

AFRICOM Faces 

Persistent Stakeholder 

Concerns about Its Mission 

AFRICOM continues to face persistent concerns among stakeholders 

within the U.S. government, nongovernmental organizations, and African 

countries over its mission. Beginning in February 2007, DOD held 

numerous press conferences, briefings, and meetings with State, USAID, 

and African nations in an effort to convey the purpose and goals for 

establishing AFRICOM. According to officials, DOD created AFRICOM to 

 12The staff for these component commands are in addition to the staff the military 

departments are providing for the headquarters. For example, in fiscal year 2009, 

Department of Army is providing 260 personnel for AFRICOM headquarters and

approximately 400 personnel to staff its component command to support AFRICOM. 

Page 13 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

bring a more cohesive and strategic focus to its activities in Africa. 

Although DOD often stated that AFRICOM is intended to support, not lead, 

U.S. diplomatic and development efforts in Africa, some State officials 

expressed concerns that AFRICOM would become the lead for U.S. 

government activities in Africa, even though U.S. embassies lead decision 

making on U.S. government non-combat activities conducted in African 

countries. Other State and USAID officials noted that the creation of 

AFRICOM could blur traditional boundaries among diplomacy, 

development, and defense, thereby militarizing U.S. foreign policy. At the 

same time, however, some saw AFRICOM as a key organization that could 

support other U.S. government activities on the continent. 

An official from an organization that represents U.S.-based international 

nongovernmental organizations told us that many nongovernmental 

organizations shared the perception that AFRICOM would further 

militarize U.S. foreign aid and lead to greater U.S. military involvement in

humanitarian assistance. An official from another nongovernmental 

organization testified before a Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 

August 2007 on fears of the military using humanitarian assistance for its 

own purposes. Nongovernmental organizations are concerned that this 

could put their aid workers at greater risk if their activities were confused

or associated with U.S. military activities. In our discussions with USAID 

officials, they stated that these concerns persist within this community. In 

some cases, these concerns stem from the fact that DOD has more 

resources and capacity than other U.S. agencies and could therefore 

overwhelm non-DOD agencies’ and organizations’ activities in Africa. 

Among African countries, there is some apprehension that AFRICOM will 

be used as an opportunity to increase the number of U.S. troops and 

military bases in Africa. African leaders also expressed concerns to DOD 

that U.S. priorities in Africa may not be shared by their governments. For 

example, at a DOD-sponsored roundtable, a group of U.S.-based African 

attachés identified their most pressing security issues as poverty, food 

shortages, inadequate educational opportunities, displaced persons, and 

HIV/AIDS, while they perceived U.S. priorities were focused on combating

terrorism and weakened states. 

AFRICOM has taken some steps to clarify its mission after it received 

initial pushback from stakeholders. For example, initial stakeholder 

concerns led to a shift in how DOD portrayed AFRICOM’s mission, moving 

from an emphasis on a whole-of-government approach to a reorganization

within DOD with an emphasis on traditional military missions, like 

exercises with African militaries. AFRICOM’s mission statement also went 

Page 14 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

through several iterations between February 2007 and May 2008, ranging 

in its emphasis on humanitarian-oriented activities to more traditional 

military programs. The mission statement was approved following DOD’s 

consultation with U.S. government stakeholders, but some stakeholders 

remain skeptical of AFRICOM’s intentions. According to an official from 

an organization representing nongovernmental organizations, the 

emphasis on humanitarian assistance as part of AFRICOM’s mission early 

on has contributed to their fears that AFRICOM would be engaged in 

activities that are traditionally the mission of civilian agencies and 

organizations. 

Our prior work notes that during large-scale organizational 

transformations, such as the establishment of AFRICOM, a 

communications strategy can be an effective tool for building trust with 

stakeholders, clarifying misperceptions, and creating shared

expectations.

13 Such a strategy should include early and frequent 

communication with stakeholders, a consistent message, and two-way 

communication. By communicating early and often, organizations help 

build an understanding of the purpose of planned changes and trust among 

stakeholders. Ensuring that the message is consistent in tone and content

can help reduce stakeholder misperceptions and uncertainties. 

Encouraging two-way communication that facilitates an honest exchange 

with and allows feedback from stakeholders can help organizations make 

appropriate changes and create effective partnerships that are vital to the 

organization’s success. 

DOD and State developed two separate documents to guide U.S. 

government communication on the establishment of AFRICOM, but 

neither document addressed the widely varying interests among U.S. 

government, nongovernmental, and African stakeholders. DOD’s initial 

planning team on AFRICOM included in its December 2006 final report a 

section on strategic communications, but this document was focused on 

government-to-government interactions and did not include shaping public

opinion.14 DOD officials noted that negative public opinion in Africa has 

 13GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

14DOD defines strategic communication as focused U.S. government efforts to understand 

and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable 

for the advancement of U.S. government interests, policies, and objectives through the use 

of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the

actions of all instruments of national power. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations 

(Washington, D.C. September. 2006). 

Page 15 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

influenced African governments’ public responses. AFRICOM officials also

noted that this document was also focused more on process, rather than

the messages that would be communicated. State, which has a role in 

strategic communications through its Office of Public Diplomacy and 

embassies, issued an interagency strategic communications strategy in 

December 2007 for use in U.S. embassies in Africa. This document was 

issued about 10 months after AFRICOM had been announced and was 

facing significant stakeholder concerns. According to DOD officials, it 

emphasized strategic communications tools but did not provide guidance 

on how to use them. Both DOD and State officials noted that neither 

document included efforts to communicate with other U.S. government 

agencies on the establishment of AFRICOM or its mission and goals. 

According to AFRICOM officials, the command recognizes the need to

address persistent concerns and is working on a strategic communications 

approach. However, at the time our review, it was unclear what the effort

would include or how the views of State and other stakeholders would be 

incorporated. Officials told us that they plan to complete this effort in 

early 2009 but the publication date is not firm. Officials told us that the 

approach will be based on DOD-wide guidance on strategic 

communications and draw on State’s interagency strategic 

communications documents. Given the underlying concerns inside and 

outside the U.S. government about AFRICOM and its mission, we believe a 

communications strategy is an important first step in reducing 

stakeholders’ concerns, but we also recognize that it alone may not be able 

to resolve all of them. It will take time for concerns generated by the initial 

announcement to subside and will largely depend on AFRICOM’s actions. 

Until AFRICOM has a comprehensive communications strategy that 

includes all appropriate audiences, encourages two-way communication 

with stakeholders, and ensures a consistent message, the command may

continue to be limited in its ability to reduce persistent skepticism and 

garner support for the command. 

AFRICOM has taken initial steps to improve interagency collaboration, 

focusing mainly on integrating interagency personnel into the command, 

but it has not yet determined the extent of interagency representation it 

ultimately needs. DOD officials have said that embedding personnel from 

other agencies is essential to AFRICOM carrying out its mission because it

will help its plans and activities to be more compatible with other 

agencies. DOD set some initial interagency personnel goals, but they were 

notional and did not take into consideration perspectives or resource 

constraints of potential contributing agencies. AFRICOM has recently 

AFRICOM Has Not 

Determined Needed 

Interagency 

Representation 

Page 16 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

taken steps to involve stakeholders by inviting representatives to the 

command to survey the need for their personnel in achieving AFRICOM’s 

mission. This process, however, does not guarantee that other agencies 

will commit to filling interagency positions. In addition to seeking 

interagency participation at its headquarters, AFRICOM is also adjusting 

its planning to involve other agencies and better align its plans and 

activities with those agencies. Without interagency collaboration and 

synchronized effort with its U.S. government partners, AFRICOM may not 

be able to achieve the level of effectiveness it expects from its plans and 

activities. 

AFRICOM Has Some 

Interagency Personnel in 

Place, but Has Not Yet 

Fully Identified Positions 

to Be Filled by Other 

Federal Agencies 

To facilitate interagency collaboration, AFRICOM initially focused on 

integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies into the 

command, which according to DOD and AFRICOM officials, is essential to 

AFRICOM carrying out its mission. By bringing knowledge of their home 

agencies into the command, personnel from other federal agencies, such

as USAID and the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce, are 

expected to improve the planning and execution of AFRICOM’s plans, 

programs, and activities and to stimulate collaboration among U.S. 

government agencies. Unlike liaisons in other combatant commands, 

AFRICOM is integrating personnel from other federal agencies into 

leadership, management, and staff positions throughout the command 

structure.15 For example, AFRICOM’s Deputy to the Commander for CivilMilitary Activities, one of two deputies in the command, is a senior 

Foreign Service officer from State. As members of the AFRICOM staff, 

embedded interagency personnel are intended to be involved at the 

beginning of AFRICOM’s planning process to help ensure that AFRICOM’s 

plans and activities are compatible and aligned with plans and activities of 

other agencies. DOD will reimburse agencies for the salaries and expenses

for these personnel. 

As of October 1, 2008, AFRICOM had filled 13 embedded interagency 

positions with personnel from six federal agencies into the command, as 

seen in table 2. These positions constitute about 1 percent of AFRICOM’s 

authorized headquarters staff level, which is in sharp contrast with DOD’s 

original concept of a command with significant interagency involvement.

 15AFRICOM also has several non-DOD personnel in non reimbursable liaison positions, 

such as the Foreign Policy Advisor and the Humanitarian Assistance Advisor. 

Page 17 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

Table 2: Embedded Interagency Personnel on AFRICOM staff as of October 2008 

Agency 

Number of 

Positions

Filled Position Titles for Filled Positions

Department of State 2 Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military 

Activities 

Director for Outreach 

U.S. Agency for 

International 

Development 

2 Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans, and 

Programs 

Humanitarian Assistance Branch Chief 

Department of 

Homeland Security 

3 Acting Illicit Traffic Branch Chief 

Operations and Logistics Directorate 

Strategy, Plans, & Programs Directorate, 

Engagement Division

Director for National 

Intelligence 

3 Unspecified

Department of 

theTreasury 

2 Treasury Terrorist Finance Policy Advisor 

AFRICOM Liaison Specialist 

Department of 

Commerce 

1 Deputy Director for Resources 

Total 13

Source: GAO from AFRICOM data.

Establishing AFRICOM with interagency involvement is more challenging 

than establishing a command staffed only with DOD personnel because 

DOD has to rely on other federal agencies to help meet its personnel 

needs. Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data about the 

number of personnel required to meet an agency’s needs are critical 

because personnel shortfalls can threaten an organization’s ability to 

perform missions efficiently and effectively. To build a staff with the 

necessary skills and competencies to accomplish strategic goals, 

successful organizations should involve stakeholders in the workforce 

planning process and conduct systematic assessments and analysis to 

determine the critical skills and competencies needed to achieve results.

16

Involving stakeholder agencies in developing personnel goals is important 

for ensuring goals are realistic and for gaining stakeholder commitment. 

Getting buy-in is especially critical in an interagency context because DOD 

 16GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 

(Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003). 

Page 18 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

cannot compel civilian agencies to assign personnel to fill interagency 

positions in a DOD command. 

Even though AFRICOM has begun integrating interagency personnel into 

the command, it has not yet finalized the number of interagency positions 

it will ultimately need in the command. DOD set some initial personnel 

targets, but continues to revise them. Initially, DOD conceived of a 

command that had about a quarter of its headquarters staff filled with 

personnel from other U.S. government agencies.17 After recognizing that 

agencies would not be able to provide that level of personnel support, 

AFRICOM established a new goal of 52 interagency positions for fiscal 

year 2009, which is 4 percent of its staff. Both DOD and AFRICOM 

officials, however, told us that this goal will also change as they learn 

more about what skills they need and what other agencies can provide. 

According to DOD and AFRICOM officials, these initial goals were 

notional and were not based on an analysis of specific skill sets needed to 

accomplish its mission. 

AFRICOM’s personnel goals continue to change in part because DOD did 

not always involve stakeholder agencies in developing personnel targets.

As a result, personnel shortfalls in contributing agencies were not fully 

taken into consideration. State officials said that the interagency 

personnel goals were not evaluated or accepted by those agencies that 

would be providing personnel to AFRICOM and could be unrealistic in 

light of personnel shortfalls in other agencies. For example, DOD has 

requested that State fill 13 mid level positions in AFRICOM in addition to 

the two senior positions already filled. State and DOD officials told us, 

however, that DOD had requested State input only after the positions had 

been established. Moreover, State officials told us that they would not 

likely be able to provide active employees to fill the positions requested 

because they are already facing a 25 percent shortfall in mid level 

personnel. Given these shortfalls, State officials are considering 

alternatives to filling positions, such as technological tools, as a way to 

engage in AFRICOM’s plans and activities without having to physically 

locate personnel in the command in Stuttgart. 

AFRICOM has recently begun taking steps to involve stakeholder agencies

in identifying the number of interagency positions and skill sets needed in

 17AFRICOM’s initial interagency personnel goal was based on a headquarters size of 500-

600 personnel; therefore, one quarter would be approximately 125 people. 

Page 19 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

each position. Agencies are now sending representatives to AFRICOM on a 

temporary basis to develop a better understanding of the command and its 

mission, survey the need for their personnel to help carry out AFRICOM’s 

mission, and help determine their level of participation and the role their 

personnel could play in the command. These representatives work with 

the AFRICOM staff to identify the skill sets for their agencies’ personnel 

within the AFRICOM structure. DOD then sends a formal request inviting 

the contributing agency to provide personnel. While this process does 

allow other agencies to provide input into the development of interagency

positions, it does not guarantee commitments in filling those positions. 

Contributing agencies ultimately decide whether or not to provide 

personnel after weighing DOD’s request against their own resource 

priorities. 

Without taking into consideration stakeholder agencies as it determines its 

level of needed interagency representation, AFRICOM could develop 

unrealistic personnel goals that agencies may not be able to support, 

acquire skill sets that are less relevant for its mission, or be unable to 

obtain commitments from agencies to provide needed skills. Our previous 

work on effective workforce planning recognizes the need for strategies to 

address gaps in critical skills and competencies.18 If AFRICOM is not able 

to fill interagency positions or lacks necessary skill sets, AFRICOM risks 

losing the full benefit of the knowledge, skills, and expertise it can derive 

from other federal agencies’ personnel, which is the cornerstone of 

interagency collaboration for the command. And even though integrating

interagency personnel is considered essential to its mission, AFRICOM 

officials told us that they have not developed specific action plans to fill 

needed personnel slots or alternative solutions to address the growing 

likelihood of shortfalls in interagency personnel. 

 18GAO-04-39. 

Page 20 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

In addition to its efforts to integrate interagency personnel into the 

command, AFRICOM has also taken steps to reach out to other agencies in

developing its first theater strategy and theater campaign plan.

19 DOD 

strategic documents call for collaboration among federal agencies to 

ensure that their activities are integrated and synchronized in pursuit of 

common goals, and DOD guidance notes that the quality of DOD planning 

can improve with early and regular involvement from relevant U.S. 

government agencies. In developing its theater campaign plan, AFRICOM 

is one of the first combatant commands to employ DOD’s new planning 

approach to involve other U.S. government agencies at the beginning of 

the planning process and may result in a better informed DOD plan for its 

activities in Africa.20 As part of the campaign planning process, AFRICOM 

met with representatives from 16 agencies in a series of workshops in the 

summer of 2008 designed to gain interagency input on the plan’s strategic 

end states and on how to align the plan with other agencies. For example, 

participants noted that security cooperation activities to enhance African 

military professionalism needed complementary efforts from other 

agencies in law enforcement, judicial, and economic reform. However, it is 

important to emphasize that the end result of this process will be a DOD 

product and not reflect an overarching national strategy or whole-ofgovernment approach, one of many current national security system issues 

that are discussed in detail in the November 2008 report by the Project on 

National Security Reform.21

AFRICOM Is Taking Steps 

to Involve Other Agencies 

in Its Strategic Planning 

Process 

Our past work indicates that AFRICOM may encounter some challenges as 

it moves forward in seeking to align its plans and activities with U.S. 

government agencies. For example, DOD planning guidance acknowledges 

that U.S. government agencies have their own unique approaches and 

processes for planning, which may be based on different time frames and 

 19A theater strategy outlines concepts and courses of action for achieving the objectives 

established in national policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated use 

of military forces and other instruments of national power. See Joint Publication 1-02. A 

theater campaign plan encompasses the activities of a geographic combatant command and 

translates national or theater strategy into operational concepts and those concepts into

unified action. See Joint Publications 1-02 and 5-0. 

20DOD planning guidance provides for a process that enables combatant commands to

attain headquarters level involvement of other departments and agencies in DOD campaign

and contingency plans. AFRICOM is one of two combatant commands that will be the

prototype test cases for campaign planning. Guidance for Employment of the Force (May

2008). 

21Project on National Security Reform, Forging A New Shield, (Arlington, VA: Nov 26, 2008) 

Page 21 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

different purposes. Our 2007 report on stability operations also noted that 

a lack of understanding of planning processes and capabilities among 

DOD and other federal agencies and differing planning cultures and 

capacities limited the effectiveness of interagency collaboration efforts.22

U.S. Joint Forces Command reported in 2007 that military campaign 

planning assumes a starting point and an established end state, which can

be compatible with USAID’s planning process, but other civilian planning

is continuous and seeks to achieve certain thresholds, such as an 

acceptable level of criminal activity. In a 2008 report on the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership, a multi-agency program in Africa led by the 

State, we found that the program lacked a comprehensive, integrated 

strategy to guide the implementation of State, USAID, and DOD activities 

aimed at strengthening country and regional counterterrorism capabilities 

and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology in northwest Africa.23 Our 

work showed that, as a result, State, USAID, and DOD developed separate

plans focused on their respective program activities. Although these plans 

reflected some collaboration, such as in assessing a country’s development

needs, they did not constitute an integrated approach and may have

hampered the ability of key agencies to collaboratively implement their 

activities. 

In addition, different agencies involved in diplomatic, development, or 

defense activities can have varying strategic priorities based on their 

respective agency missions, and definitions of success can vary. One Joint 

Staff official said that deconflicting differing priorities among federal 

agencies has been a significant challenge over the last few years and will 

likely pose a challenge for AFRICOM in the future. Furthermore, 

according to Joint Forces Command, restrictions exist on how funding for 

many programs can be used, which can result in stove-piped funding 

streams that inhibit the integration of programs and activities into 

comprehensive solutions. Given the differences in planning cultures, 

strategic priorities and definitions of success, the outcome of AFRICOM’s 

efforts to involve federal agencies in its planning efforts and the ability of 

AFRICOM to align its plans and activities with other agencies remains to 

be seen. 

 22GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability Operations 

Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, GAO-07-549 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007). 

23GAO-08-860. 

Page 22 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

DOD cannot reliably estimate AFRICOM’s total future costs because 

decisions on the locations of the permanent headquarters and supporting 

offices in Africa have not been made. AFRICOM has already projected that 

its current plans for an interim headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, and 

expanded presence in U.S. embassies in Africa could exceed $4 billion 

through 2015. However, the location of AFRICOM’s permanent 

headquarters and its supporting offices in Africa will have a significant 

effect on AFRICOM’s total future costs. DOD initially delayed decisions on 

its command presence after concerns arose surrounding the location of 

the headquarters, the authorities under which some supporting offices 

would operate, and resistance from a number of African countries. DOD 

has since postponed decisions on command locations until fiscal year 

2012. Without deciding on the locations of AFRICOM’s permanent 

headquarters and supporting offices, DOD will be unable to estimate the 

future costs of the command. 

AFRICOM’s total future costs are still unknown but will likely be 

significant and could expand dramatically once decisions are made on the

locations of AFRICOM’s permanent headquarters and supporting offices in

Africa. Senior Office of the Secretary of Defense officials stated that 

preparing budget estimates for future fiscal years is difficult without a 

clear plan for AFRICOM’s headquarters and supporting offices because 

DOD will derive the assumptions it uses to estimate future costs from such 

a plan. 

Total Costs to 

Establish AFRICOM 

Are Uncertain, and 

Depend on the 

Location of 

AFRICOM’s 

Permanent 

Headquarters and 

Supporting Offices 

Future Costs for AFRICOM

Are Unknown but Likely 

Significant 

Current cost estimates for operating AFRICOM’s interim headquarters in 

Stuttgart, Germany, and expanding DOD’s presence in 11 U.S. embassies in 

Africa already exceed $4 billion for fiscal years 2010-2015; however, these 

estimates do not include potential cost for establishing a permanent 

AFRICOM headquarters or its supporting offices. During this time period, 

DOD projects that AFRICOM will require a total of $2.1 billion to operate 

its headquarters, pay for interagency personnel, fund improvements to 

computer and communications systems, conduct exercises and training 

for headquarters personnel, and cover operating costs in Africa such as 

leases and transportation. Facilities costs are also projected to be 

significant. DOD projects that improvements to facilities used by 

AFRICOM personnel in Africa on a temporary basis and Combined Joint 

Task Force-Horn of Africa will total $2 billion. In addition, AFRICOM 

estimates that the construction of offices and housing for AFRICOM 

personnel in Africa will cost $179 million. 

Page 23 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

The infrastructure requirements for AFRICOM’s interim headquarters in 

Stuttgart, Germany, have already proved more costly than anticipated.

Altogether, completed and future renovations for AFRICOM’s interim 

headquarters are estimated at $140 million. In fiscal year 2007, DOD spent 

more than $28 million to renovate facilities for AFRICOM’s interim 

headquarters. In fiscal year 2008, they spent an additional $62 million to 

continue renovating pre-World War II facilities to meet minimum military 

standards, such as providing adequate ventilation and asbestos 

remediation. These renovation costs were more than double the initial 

cost estimates. AFRICOM is projecting future renovations in Stuttgart will 

cost approximately $50 million more. AFRICOM plans to keep its 

headquarters in Stuttgart at least until its permanent location is 

determined in fiscal year 2012. 

Other potential costs are not included in DOD’s estimates. For example, 

these estimates do not include constructing a joint operations fusion 

center to support the headquarters and improve coordination and 

collaboration among AFRICOM and key partners, which could cost $200 

million or more to construct; the long term costs to meet health care, 

education, and housing requirements for AFRICOM’s soldiers and families; 

or the costs to establish and operate AFRICOM’s four service component 

commands and theater special operations command which are not 

included in AFRICOM’s initial cost estimates because they are considered

service expenditures. These costs are expected to be substantial, however. 

DOD Postponed Decisions 

on the Location of 

AFRICOM’s Permanent 

Headquarters and 

Supporting Offices 

DOD has scaled back its initial concept for AFRICOM’s headquarters and 

regional presence in Africa and postponed making decisions on the 

location of its permanent headquarters and supporting offices until fiscal 

year 2012. Decisions about the ultimate location of AFRICOM’s permanent 

headquarters and its supporting offices in Africa will have a significant 

impact on the command’s future costs. 

Originally, DOD intended to have a forward headquarters element in Africa

where the commander would be located, a rear headquarters element 

outside of Africa where the bulk of the staff would be located, 5 regional 

offices, and an expanded presence in 11 U.S. embassies in Africa. In 

addition, the military services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) 

and the Special Operations Command would establish headquarters 

outside of Africa to provide operational and planning support to 

AFRICOM. DOD’s initial concept for AFRICOM is illustrated in Appendix 

II. According to DOD officials, having a command presence in Africa 

would provide a better understanding of the regional environment and 

Page 24 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

African needs, help build relationships with Africa partners and regional

economic communities and associated standby forces, and promote a 

regional dimension to U.S. security assistance.24

After encountering resistance from stakeholders on its initial concept,

AFRICOM shifted its focus to maintaining an interim headquarters in 

Stuttgart, Germany, and establishing 5 new offices in U.S. embassies in 

fiscal years 2008 and 2009. These offices provide in-country management 

support and oversight for U.S. security assistance programs. Figure 3 

illustrates DOD’s near term plans for AFRICOM’s command presence, 

including its interim headquarters in Stuttgart, component and theater 

supporting commands outside of Africa, and embassy-level offices in 

Africa. 

 24 Africa has 5 regional economic communities, which are the Arab Magreb Union in the

north, the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of

Central African States, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in the east, and 

the Southern African Development Community. The African Union, a continent-wide 

intergovernmental organization, established the African Standby Force, which has 5

regional brigades corresponding to each of the regional economic communities. The 

African Standby Force is intended to conduct peacekeeping operations. 

Page 25 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

Figure 3: AFRICOM’s Plans for Interim Headquarters Location and Command Presence, as of October 2008 

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data; Copyright © Corel Corp. All rights reserved (map).

Headquarters ● Permanent headquarters location and structure

undetermined

 ● Analysis of alternatives underway for a

 command headquarters location outside of

 Africa for implementation no earlier than

 fiscal year 2012

● Interim headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany

 to serve as its central, main operating base

 through at least fiscal year 2011

 ● No headquarters element located in Africa for

 the foreseeable future

Supporting

Commands

● Establish headquarters for a Theater Special

 Operations Command and four service

 component commands (Army, Navy, Marine

 Corps, and Air Force)

 ● DOD and State are in the process of

 negotiating locations for these headquarters

 outside of Africa

Country Level ● Establish 11 new offices in U.S. embassies

by fiscal year 2012

 ● Three new offices approved by State for

 establishment in fiscal year 2008

 ● DOD and State negotiating locations for the

 remaining 8 offices

Type of

Presence Near Term Plan for AFRICOM Presence

Algeria

Botswana

Djibouti 

Ethiopia

Ghana

Kenya

Liberia

Morocco

Nigeria

Senegal

South Africa

Tunisia

Angola

Cameroon

Chad

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Gabon

Tanzania

Mali

Mauritania

Niger

Rwanda

Uganda

Existing Proposed1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1

8 12

5

7

9

10

2

11

3

41

6

8

7

9

3

2

5

4

1

6

10

11

Navy

component

Air Force

component

Special Forces

Command

Headquarters

(Stuttgart, 

Germany)

Army

component

Marine Corps

component

a

AFRICOM has not confirmed whether these 11 embassies are the same embassies in which it 

currently intends to establish offices, but is still negotiating with State. 

AFRICOM postponed decisions on the location of AFRICOM’s permanent 

headquarters and supporting offices in Africa after concerns arose among 

its U.S. government stakeholders and African partners. As DOD 

Page 26 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

coordinated its initial concept for a headquarters and regional offices in 

Africa with the State, concerns surfaced over where AFRICOM’s 

headquarters element in Africa would be located and how the AFRICOM 

commander and State would exercise their respective authorities. 

Although State officials were involved in DOD’s early planning teams for 

AFRICOM, the agencies did not reach agreement on a location for 

AFRICOM’s proposed headquarters in Africa, and State officials voiced

concerns about DOD’s regional office concept. Locating AFRICOM 

headquarters and supporting offices in Africa requires an international 

agreement with host nations; however, an international agreement may 

not be signed or otherwise concluded on behalf of the United States 

without prior consultation with the Secretary of State.25 One State official 

who participated in the planning process described selecting a 

headquarters location for AFRICOM as a contentiously debated issue 

between State and DOD. In addition, DOD and State officials said that 

State was not comfortable with DOD’s concept of regional offices because 

they would not be operating under the ambassador’s chief of mission 

authority and preferred DOD expand its presence in U.S. embassies in 

Africa.26 DOD also experienced resistance from some African nations after

it announced its intention to establish a headquarters on the continent. 

This resistance was the result of concerns over greater U.S. influence in

the region and a perceived increase in U.S. military troops in the region. 

DOD officials told us that after reviewing a number of alternatives the 

Secretary of Defense decided in October 2008 to delay decisions regarding 

AFRICOM’s permanent headquarters until fiscal year 2012. According to 

officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Africa, the Secretary determined that it was more important to build 

relationships at this stage of the command and that postponing the 

decision for three years would allow AFRICOM to better understand its 

headquarters and operational requirements. Our prior work has identified

key practices that can help agencies identify and decide between 

alternatives, such as those for headquarters’ and supporting offices’ 

locations, in a manner that promotes stakeholder buy-in, maximizes 

benefits, and minimizes costs given the constraints and barriers agencies 

 251 U.S.C. § 112b(c). 

26A Chief of Mission is the principal officer, usually the ambassador, in charge of a U.S.

diplomatic mission abroad, and has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and 

supervision of all U.S. government executive branch employees in that country. See 22 

U.S.C. § 3927. 

Page 27 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

face. These practices include conducting an analysis of potential 

alternatives to provide a basis for decision makers to use in selecting

feasible options that meet performance goals. An analysis includes 

quantitative and qualitative estimates of the expected tangible and 

intangible benefits and costs; utilizes clearly articulated criteria, 

methodology, and assumptions; considers the potential of each alternative 

to achieve desired performance goals; takes into account the full cost and

timeframes of implementation; and assesses barriers and risks in 

implementing each alternative. For example, infrastructure costs, effects 

on the effectiveness of DOD operations, and geopolitical impact on U.S. 

relationships with African partners could be taken into consideration in 

such an analysis. 

Unless DOD understands the costs and benefits of its alternatives, sets a 

long-term strategy based on that analysis, and is judicious in its 

infrastructure and other investments in the meantime, the delays in 

deciding AFRICOM’s future locations could unnecessarily drive up overall 

costs. Renovations to the interim headquarters in Stuttgart are estimated 

to cost about $140 million by the time they are completed but these 

interim facilities will not include state-of-the-art capabilities, like a fusion 

center. Until decisions are made on the structure and locations of 

AFRICOM’s headquarters and supporting offices in Africa, the total 

investment that the command will require will remain unclear and will 

make it difficult to assess the merits of additional investments and create 

uncertainty about the future of AFRICOM. 

DOD established AFRICOM with many unanswered questions about what 

role the command would ultimately play in helping to stabilize the African 

continent. The military’s large size brings the promise of increased 

resources but has also created worries among some stakeholders about 

potential encroachment into civilian responsibilities like development and 

diplomacy. On one level, AFRICOM can be viewed as an internal 

reorganization of DOD’s combatant command structure to clarify lines of 

authority and provide focus on Africa. Early on, however, DOD did not 

effectively reach out to key stakeholders in communicating its plans for 

the command and this contributes to lingering concerns today. While DOD 

has taken steps to clarify AFRICOM’s intended goals and mission, 

AFRICOM will also need to demonstrate that its actions are consistent 

with its stated mission. Given the interagency nature of the command and 

its activities, AFRICOM will need to be clear in communications with 

stakeholders, be consistent in message, and listen to stakeholders in 

crafting a message during this period. At a broader level, AFRICOM is 

Conclusions 

Page 28 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

viewed by many as a test bed for a new focus on interagency collaboration 

in promoting stability in the region. However, AFRICOM should not be 

viewed as the U.S. government’s vehicle for creating an overarching 

strategy for Africa or ensuring a whole-of-government approach to the 

region. 

This report addresses three challenges that could affect the ultimate 

success of AFRICOM. First, DOD has not yet fully allayed concerns about 

the command’s role and mission both inside the U.S. government and with 

potential African partners. Second, AFRICOM has not yet determined how 

many personnel it needs from other U.S. government agencies or what 

functions they will perform, and interagency planning processes are still 

immature. Third, DOD has not yet decided the locations for AFRICOM’s 

permanent headquarters and presence on the continent, or agreed upon 

criteria with stakeholders for making such decisions, leaving considerable

uncertainty about future costs at a time when defense budgets are 

projected to become increasingly constrained. DOD and AFRICOM are 

working to address these challenges but it is unclear when their efforts 

will be completed. Unless these challenges are addressed, the 

effectiveness of the command may suffer and costs are likely to escalate.

To establish a more effective means to communicate with all stakeholders,

clarify perceptions and create shared expectations of what stakeholders 

can realistically expect from AFRICOM; and to address personnel resource 

constraints of agencies that are intended to fill interagency positions in the 

command, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Commander, U.S. Africa Command to take the following two actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Include all appropriate audiences, encourage two-way communication, 

and ensure consistency of message related to AFRICOM’s mission and 

goals as it develops and implements its communications strategy. 

• Seek formal commitments from contributing agencies to provide 

personnel as part of the command’s efforts to determine interagency 

personnel requirements, and develop alternative ways for AFRICOM to 

obtain interagency perspectives in the event that interagency personnel 

cannot be provided due to resource limitations. 

To determine the long-term fiscal investment for AFRICOM’s 

infrastructure, we recommend the Secretary of Defense, in consultation 

with the Secretary of State, as appropriate, conduct an assessment of 

possible locations for AFRICOM’s permanent headquarters and any 

supporting offices in Africa that 

Page 29 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

• is based on transparent criteria, methodology, and assumptions, 

• includes the full cost and time-frames to construct and support 

proposed locations, 

• evaluates how each location will contribute to AFRICOM’s mission 

consistent with the criteria and methodology of the study, 

• considers geopolitical and operational risks and barriers in 

implementing each alternative, and 

• limits expenditures on temporary AFRICOM infrastructure until 

decisions are made on the long-term locations for the command. 

In written comments on a draft of this report DOD partially agreed with 

each of our three recommendations, stating that in some cases, actions 

were already underway that would address the issues identified in this 

report. State did not provide written comments on our report. In its 

written comments, USAID affirmed its support for AFRICOM and stated 

that it had met its personnel requirements in support of AFRICOM. DOD 

and USAID’s written comments appear in their entirety in appendix III. 

Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Commander, U.S. Africa Command to develop a comprehensive 

communications strategy that includes all appropriate audiences, 

encourages two-way communication, and ensures consistency of message 

related to AFRICOM’s mission and goals, DOD partially agreed and stated 

that AFRICOM has already been directed, through existing guidance, to 

develop a comprehensive communications strategy and therefore 

additional direction is not necessary. DOD noted that, subsequent to our 

draft report, AFRICOM has developed a Strategic Communications 

Roadmap and Instruction guidance and a strategic communications annex 

to its Theater Campaign Plan that is under development. DOD’s response 

also indicated that these documents had not yet been released but did not 

provide any detail about the content of these documents or the extent to

which they address the specific elements outlined in our recommendation. 

Therefore, until they are completed and released, we have no basis for 

determining whether they will address the issues raised in our report or 

the intent of our recommendation. We believe our recommendation is still 

warranted, but we modified it to emphasize that DOD’s communications 

strategy that is currently being developed should include all appropriate 

audiences; encourage two-way communication; and ensure consistency of

message related to AFRICOM’s mission and goals. 

In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Commander, AFRICOM, as it develops its interagency personnel 

requirements, to develop an action plan with contributing agencies to fill 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 30 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

agreed-upon interagency positions and, as necessary, develop alternative 

approaches to obtain perspectives and expertise from other U.S. 

government stakeholders to mitigate any interagency personnel shortfalls, 

DOD partially agreed and stated that AFRICOM has been working with all 

potential contributing agencies to fill identified positions, and therefore an

action plan is not needed. To address potential shortfalls in contributing 

agencies’ ability to fill positions, DOD commented that the command has 

directed two of its directorates to work on such issues as they arise. As 

stated in our report, we acknowledge that AFRICOM has involved other 

agencies in identifying interagency requirements and is refining its 

processes for determining interagency goals for the command. However, 

we also point out that AFRICOM’s approach does not guarantee a 

commitment from contributing agencies to fill identified positions, and 

significant personnel shortfalls exist in some agencies such as State which 

can limit their contributions to AFRICOM’s personnel requirements. 

DOD’s response provides little information as to how the department will 

obtain specific commitments from other agencies for meeting interagency 

personnel requirements or outline alternative ways for AFRICOM to obtain 

interagency perspectives. We continue to believe a more formal approach

is needed to achieve these objectives and have modified our 

recommendation to more clearly reflect our position. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, conduct an 

assessment of possible locations for AFRICOM’s permanent headquarters 

and any supporting offices in Africa that (1) is based on transparent 

criteria, methodology, and assumptions; (2) includes the full cost and timeframes to construct and support proposed locations; (3) evaluates how 

each location will contribute to AFRICOM’s mission consistent with the 

criteria and methodology of the study; (4) considers geopolitical and

operational risks and barriers in implementing each alternative; and (5) 

limits expenditures on temporary AFRICOM infrastructure until decisions 

are made on the long-term locations for the command. In its comments, 

DOD stated that it plans to use those broader criteria in its decision. 

However, DOD comments did not address how its plans to limit 

expenditures on temporary AFRICOM infrastructure until long term 

decisions are made. Given the significant and growing costs associated 

with AFRICOM’s temporary stationing and DOD’s intent to apply the 

elements listed in the recommendation in future decisions for the 

command’s headquarters and supporting offices in Africa, we believe that

our recommendation is still warranted. 

Page 31 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the 

issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretary of State; the Administrator, United States Agency for 

International Development; and the Director, Office of Management and 

Budget. The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web 

site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at

(202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

John H. Pendleton

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 32 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess DOD’s efforts to establish the United States Africa Command 

(AFRICOM) and address stakeholder concerns, we reviewed a wide range 

of Department of Defense (DOD) and command documentation including 

AFRICOM guidance, plans, directives, speeches and testimony statements, 

and reports; implementation plans and directives for creating its new 

mission organizations; and documentation related to DOD’s efforts to 

create the new command. We also spoke with various officials involved in 

the command’s implementation efforts about their roles, related plans, and 

actions. When possible, we met with the command and other

organizations’ senior leadership to discuss and obtain their views on 

various command issues. Specifically within DOD, we interviewed officials 

at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Director of 

Program Analysis and Evaluation, Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller; 

the Joint Staff; the Services; two Geographic Combatant Commands 

(European Command and Africa Command); and U.S. Joint Forces 

Command. We also interviewed officials at the Department of State’s 

Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, and the 

Office of Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, as well as the 

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to obtain 

other agencies’ perspectives regarding DOD’s process of establishing the 

command and the inclusion of non-DOD perspectives in establishing of the 

command. In these interviews, we reviewed relevant information and 

discussed implementing guidance for establishing the command and the 

range of stakeholder concerns, the interviewees’ understanding of their 

roles and responsibilities in establishing the command, progress in 

establishing the command, and challenges that have been encountered. To

gain an understanding of African perspectives, we interviewed U.S. 

government agencies that worked with representatives of African 

governments on issues related to AFRICOM. Finally, we interviewed 

InterAction, an organization that represents U.S.-based international 

governmental organizations on these organizations perspectives on 

AFRICOM’s mission and goals. 

To assess the extent to which AFRICOM has taken steps to improve 

interagency collaboration, we obtained information on its plans and goals

for integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies and on its

efforts to align its plans and activities with other federal agencies. We 

interviewed officials from DOD, the Department of State, and USAID. 

Within DOD, we spoke with officials from the AFRICOM transition team, 

the U.S. Africa and Joint Forces Command, the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Joint Staff. During these 

interviews, we obtained information on AFRICOM’s initial and current 

interagency personnel targets; the process for identifying positions and 

Page 33 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

requesting personnel from other agencies, including memorandums of 

agreement and position descriptions; personnel systems; and host nation 

agreements. We also received documentation on Joint Forces Command’s 

interagency mission analysis, including preliminary reports, and on 

AFRICOM’s Theater Campaign Plan, including briefings, guidance, and 

workshop proceedings. During interviews with the Department of State 

and USAID, we discussed their personnel resource shortfalls and their 

roles in providing input to AFRICOM’s interagency personnel goals, its 

plans and activities, and Joint Forces Command’s interagency mission 

analysis. 

To assess DOD’s plans to establish a permanent headquarters and 

supporting offices in Africa, we obtained information related to the initial 

and current plans for AFRICOM’s presence in Africa, including DOD 

implementation guidance, planning documents, budget proposals, and 

facility renovation plans. We also interviewed officials from DOD, the 

Department of State, and InterAction, an organization representing U.S.-

based international nongovernmental organizations. Within DOD, we 

interviewed officials from the AFRICOM transition team; the U.S. 

European and Africa Commands; the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Undersecretary of Defense

Comptroller, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; the Joint Staff; and 

the U.S. Army Installation Management Command. During these 

interviews, we received information on the status of DOD’s determination 

of an initial and future command headquarters location, locations for its 

components’ headquarters and its determination of a presence in Africa. 

We also discussed its process for making these determinations, its plans 

for their implementation, their anticipated budget implications, and 

feedback DOD has received from stakeholders. During interviews with the 

Department of State officials we discussed the agency’s involvement in the 

determination of AFRICOM’s command locations, its role in negotiating an 

AFRICOM presence outside of the United States, and its views on various 

alternatives for AFRICOM’s command presence. Finally, we interviewed 

InterAction, and during those interviews we discussed the positions of 

nongovernmental organizations on AFRICOM’s presence in Africa and 

relevant feedback these organizations have received from representatives 

of African nations. We did not, however, consult directly with 

representatives of African nations to elicit their views on AFRICOM’s 

command presence in Africa. 

Page 34 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
A

Headq

L

ppendix II: DOD’s Initial Concept for

uarters Location and Command 

ocations in Africa 

Page 35 GAO-09-181

Appendix II: DOD’s Initial Concept for 

Headquarters Location and Command 

Locations in Africa 

Headquarters ● Permanent headquarters location and structure

undetermined

 ● Analysis of alternatives underway for a

 command headquarters location outside of

 Africa for implementation no earlier than

 fiscal year 2012

● Interim headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany

 to serve as its central, main operating base

 through at least fiscal year 2011

 ● No headquarters element located in Africa for

 the foreseeable future

Supporting

Commands

● Establish headquarters for a Theater Special

 Operations Command and four service

 component commands (Army, Navy, Marine

 Corps, and Air Force)

 ● DOD and State are in the process of

 negotiating locations for these headquarters

 outside of Africa

Country Level ● Establish 11 new offices in U.S. embassies

by fiscal year 2012

 ● Three new offices approved by State for

 establishment in fiscal year 2008

 ● DOD and State negotiating locations for the

 remaining 8 offices

Type of

Presence

Initial plan for Africom

Command presence

Angola

Cameroon

Chad

Democratic Republic of Congo

Gabon

Tanzania

Mali

Mauritania

Niger

Rwanda

Uganda

Existing New

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1

2

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

6

11

1

2

3 41

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Algeria

Botswana

Djibouti 

Ethiopia

Ghana

Kenya

Liberia

Morocco

Nigeria

Senegal

South Africa

Tunisia

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data; map©Corel Corp., all rights reserved. 

Navy

component

Regional

office

Air Force

component

Special Forces

Command

Headquarters

(Outside Africa)

Regional

office

Regional

office

Army

component

Marine Corps

component

Regional

office

Regional

office

Headquarters

(In Africa)

Defense Management
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 38 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency

Appendix IV for International Development : Comments from the U.S. 

Agency for International Development 

Page 39 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 40 GAO-09-181

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Robert L. Repasky, Assistant 

Director; Tim Burke; Leigh Caraher; Taylor Matheson; Amber Simco; 

Grace Coleman; Ron La Due Lake and Lonnie McAllister made key 

contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Defense Management
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(351256) Page 42 GAO-09-181 Defense Management
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