REDEFINING LAND POWER

FOR THE 21st CENTURY

William T. Johnsen

May 7, 1998
The views expressed in this report are those of the author an

necessarily reflect the official policy of the Department of the Ar

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This re

approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

*******

The author wishes to thank Colonel John A. Bonin, Colonel 

R. Cerami, Colonel Leonard J. Fullenkamp, Dr. Gary L. Gu

Colonel Frank R. Hancock, Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, 

Steven Metz, Colonel Everette L. Roper, Jr., Dr. Earl H. Tilford, 

Dr. Thomas-Durell Young for their comments on previous draft

report. Their comments greatly contributed to the substan

quality of the monograph, and I am in their debt. I, alone, h

remain responsible for the opinions expressed herein.

*******

Comments pertaining to this manuscript are invited and sh

forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Arm

College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA, 17013-5244. Comments a

be conveyed directly to the author at the same address or by tel

commercial (717) 245-4076 or DSN 242-4076, or by In

johnsenw@awc.carlisle.army.mil

*******

Information about the Strategic Studies Institute 

downloadable version of this and other studies are available 

Internet at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/. Copies 

monograph may be obtained from the Publications and Pro

Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133 

(717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@awc.carlisle.ar

ii
Divisive debates over the future force structures of th

Armed Forces have continued despite the Report 

Commission on Roles and Missions for the Armed Force

1995) and the more recent reports of the Quadrennial D

Review (May 1997) and the National Defense Panel (Dec

1997). Part of the reason for the bitter nature of these deb

due to parochial partisanship. Part is due to a lack o

understanding of the individual components of military po

of their collective interrelationships. This latter conclusio

be particularly true for land power.

Responsibility for this misunderstanding does not alw

at the feet of outside observers. No official definition or g

articulation of land power currently exists. And, becaus

power is self-evident to most who wear Army or Marine 

green, they see little need to explain land power to a b

audience. But, if national leaders are to have a fuller 

standing of land power, its central role in the growing inter

dence of military power, or the policy options that land p

versatility brings to security policy planning and executio

such explanations are imperative.

To help fill this conceptual gap, Dr. William T. Johnsen 

a definition of land power to meet the demands of th

century. While defining land power is his primary purp

also places land power within the overarching context o

military power. Additionally, he highlights the gr

interdependence among the components of national powe

In placing land power is such a context, Dr. Johnsen s

spark an enlarged debate about land power, the strateg

operational versatility it offers policymakers, and its 

relationships with air and sea power. To this end, the St

Studies Institute offers this contribution to the ongoing d

EARL H. TILFORD, JR.

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN joined the Strategic S

Institute in 1991 and currently serves as an Ass

Research Professor of National Security Affairs. H

held the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at th

Army War College from 1994-1997. An Infantry 

before retiring from the U.S. Army, Dr. Johnsen serv

variety of troop leading, command, and staff assignm

He also served as an Assistant Professor of history 

U.S. Military Academy, and as an arms control ana

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAP

addition to his SSI studies, he has published a num

journal articles on U.S.-European security issues. Hi

recent SSI studies include U.S. Participation in IFOR

Future Roles of U.S. Military Power and Their Implica

“More Work in the Augean Stables” in Thomas-

Young, ed., NATO’s Command and Control Structure

Force Planning Considerations for Army XXI. His c

research focuses on issues that surfaced durin

Quadrennial Defense Review, especially those affecti

Army. Dr. Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the 

Military Academy and an M.A. and Ph.D. in history 

Duke University. He also is a graduate of the Armed 

Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.

iv
FOR THE 21st CENTURY

. . . every age had its own kind of war, its own limiti

conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each peri

therefore, would have held its own theory of war . . .

Carl von Clausewitz, On War1

INTRODUCTION

Whether the United States is entering an era mar

a “revolution in military affairs” or continues i

strategic interregnum of “the post-Cold War,” a new 

of war will have to be developed to fit “the lim

conditions” and “peculiar preconceptions” tha

emerging. To develop this new theory will first r

defining land power and understanding its context w

military power in the 21st century. That a definition o

power might be needed at this point in the evolut

warfare may seem odd. Readers outside the milita

example, may be surprised to learn that such a defi

does not exist.2 To many military practitioners, esp

soldiers, the concept of land power is so ingrained th

largely transparent. It has existed since our first anc

used their fists, rocks, and sticks to defend themselve

attacks by predatory neighbors.

But the concept of land power may not be as self-e

as it first appears. For instance, the terms land p

armies, land forces, and land warfare oftentimes ar

interchangeably. But, these terms are not synony

Moreover, interpretation of these terms, like beauty

lies in the eye of the beholder, and soldiers, sailors, ai

and Marines frequently have different perceptions

within large segments of land forces, interpretation

vary considerably depending upon whether one is a s

or a Marine; has a strategic, operational, or tactical b

1
branch; or serves in a particular unit or theater. 

differing perspectives too frequently lead to divisive d

that reinforce convictions rather than clarify issue

will help make U.S. military power and its land comp

more effective.

Given these ambiguities and the dramatic geo-str

and technical changes that are influencing modern co

this is an opportune time better to define land pow

doing so, it is important to remember that definin

power is much more than an academic exercise. If tr

are entering what many refer to as a “revolution in m

affairs” (RMA), a fuller understanding of the c

dimension of land power is imperative.3 Even if 

evolutionary change in warfare is underway, graspin

land power must change will still be important. Moreo

senior military and defense advisors cannot adeq

place land power in the context of the emerging 

national security environment, national leaders m

understand how best to employ the military instrum

power. Nor may politicians be inclined to fund ne

essential capabilities for meeting anticipated deman

Defining land power also will help elucidate the gr

interdependence of air, land, and sea power. This u

standing should assist decisionmakers in determinin

best to orchestrate the key components of the U.S. A

Forces to promote and protect national interests. In 

before land power can be employed with utmost 

military advisors and political officials must under

what land power is, what it is not, and what capabil

offers in conjunction with the other components of m

power.

To that end, this essay first offers an elabo

definition of land power. Second, the monograph exa

the national and military elements of land power. Th

assesses the strategic and operational versatility o

power. Fourth, the study examines the growing interd

2
offering conclusions and recommendations, the essay 

to spark an expanded debate on land power and its pot

for promoting and protecting U.S. national interests 

21st century.4

CONTEXT

Before defining land power, it is important to p

term in appropriate context. Just as military power 

one instrument of national power (the others 

diplomatic, economic, and information),5 land power 

one component of military power. At the strategic 

moreover, decisive results generally require orchest

more than one component of military power (usua

concert with other instruments of national power). 

despite the claims of their more extreme advocates, 

will land, air, or sea power, alone, be sufficient to pro

let alone protect national interests. Granted, case

arise where one form of military power may play a dom

role. But for reasons that will be explained more fully 

those occasions will be rare.

The term “conflict,” as opposed to warfare, general

appear in this monograph. Conflict is a broader term 

better describes anticipated conditions that range 

peacetime competition (e.g., economic rivalries, diplo

friction, and ideological antagonisms) through gener

(to include the use of weapons of mass destruction [W

Because modern militaries are being called upon to pe

a variety of roles to meet these wide-ranging chall

land power must be couched in similarly broad terms. 

deterring and, if necessary, fighting and winning 

undoubtedly will remain the ultimate responsibility 

U.S. Armed Forces, focusing on that narrow persp

unnecessarily constrains the application of military 

and its subordinate components. The broader connota

conflict also encompasses efforts to shape the interna

security environment. Moreover, it includes the ext

3
short of major theater war.6

In the future security environment, the employm

the U.S. Armed Forces will extend beyond co

situations. Under the current defense strategy of 

respond, and prepare, U.S. military power and forces 

times will be used in situations short of conflic

example, most shaping activities (e.g., Partnersh

Peace, combined exercises, military-to-military con

and humanitarian assistance) and many conflict prev

and resolution activities (such as arms control, conf

building measures, and many forms of peace opera

will involve the employment of military forces rathe

the application of military force. Such cases fall und

general rubric of military operations.

Modern conflict will continue to be waged predomi

in the long-standing physical dimensions of air, lan

sea. Increasingly, however, outer space and cyber-spa

assume greater importance in peace, crisis, and war. 

these two dimensions are important, they are not yet 

to be considered components of military power in the

right. Although air power advocates may argue that a

space are simply a continuum that should be referre

aerospace,7 this conclusion will remain a bone of conte

Space overarches all physical dimensions, and land a

power already exploit the possibilities inherent in 

and their use of space undoubtedly will increase.

Similarly, it is too soon to conclude definitively th

use of cyber-space will be a discrete dimension of co

Information may be viewed more appropriately as 

that supplements, complements, and, indeed, perm

the existing components of national and military pow

consider information as a separate dimension 

independent component of military power eventuall

prove counterproductive, especially if information be

an end, rather than a means to an end.8

4
CENTURY

In defining land power, a number of approaches co

used. On the one hand, specific components of m

power could be defined in terms of the types of 

employed: land forces equate to land power, air forces 

power, and maritime forces to sea power. Such an app

is far too restrictive and fosters unnecessary inter-s

squabbling. Moreover, it fails to take into accoun

capabilities of modern forces. Aircraft drop bombs 

missiles at ground targets. Army air defense sy

protect ground forces and bases, but they attack obj

the air. Amphibious assaults spring from the sea, b

directed against land objectives. Aircraft can attack t

at sea.

On the other hand, a definition could stem fro

particular medium in which operations are conducte

this approach would quickly become dysfunctiona

example, Army helicopters fly through the air, but 

fires facilitate ground maneuver. Ships sail the se

carrier-based aviation operates in the air, and sea-lau

cruise missiles strike targets on land. And, while air

fly through the air, much of their weaponry is directed 

ground.

Alternatively, a definition could focus less on w

force operates and concentrate, instead, on where the 

are realized. For example, Air Force or Marine a

perform interdiction or close air support missio

influence ground operations. Similarly, a Tomahawk 

Attack Missile (TLAM) is launched from a naval surf

sub-surface platform, but its effects are brought to b

land. And, obviously, most land force systems effect g

operations. Thus, focusing on where effects occur inc

the scope for examining land power and makes pos

more inclusive definition, to wit:

5
The explanatory words have been chosen with ca

indicated earlier, land power means more than land 

It is a broader term that synergistically subsumes a 

array of forces, organizations, and capabilities, as w

the mobilization, industrial, technological, and su

ment bases that support them. “In peace, crisis, and 

illustrates that land power has tremendous utility b

its ultimate responsibility of fighting and winning 

and suggests great versatility. “Prompt influence” sig

the critical capability for land power to respond quic

emerging crises. Obviously, “sustained influence” m

the goal if land power is to make lasting contributions

phrase “on and from land” offers two key, but distinct p

“On land” is more self-explanatory: power will be u

exert influence over people, property, and events on 

Exerting influence “from land,” on the other hand, 

that power can be exerted beyond the confines of 

firma, influencing events on the seas and in the air.

This last distinction is not a ham-fisted attempt t

“turf” away from air and sea power. As will be disc

below (Interdependence), it highlights that in the m

age the capabilities of the components of military pow

converging rather than diverging. Therefore, the 

bilities inherent in each component are able to e

beyond the bounds of their traditional medium to 

outcomes in other dimensions.

ELEMENTS OF LAND POWER

Land power stems from a wide variety of factor

convenience, these determinants will be divided in

6

The ability in peace, crisis, and war to exert

prompt and sustained influence on or from la

Land Power:
that, in aggregate, contrib

land power.

National Elements. A

national level, a broad ra

factors contribute to land p

Historically, for inst

geo-strategic conditions 

exerted considerable infl

over which component wo

the most dominant fo

military power. Contin

powers historically have 

primarily on land power.10 

or empires with extensive 

to the seas frequently main

a considerable sea-based force and sought to est

themselves as sea powers.11 At the dawn of the 21st ce

however, distinctions over whether the United Stat

continental or a maritime power are increas

irrelevant. The United States has global interests. Be

of the diverse geography and geo-strategic conditi

where U.S. national interests lie, the United State

have to possess all components of national military p

Thus, the more pertinent question is not which fo

military power should predominate, but what propor

forces and power will be most effective in meetin

specific conditions of a particular event or crisis.

Economic power obviously has a defining influen

the ability to build and sustain military power. This 

not only from the general state of the economy, but ex

into how much of that economy is devoted to military p

in general, and land power, in particular. The extent 

military and civil industrial base (especially the deg

which the civilian base can be converted easily to m

use) also will contribute to or detract from land pow

too, will the ability to generate and sustain techno

innovation over time. Finally, the economic infrastru

7

Power

National Elements

• Geo-strategic Conditions

• Economic Power

• Population

• Form of Government

• National Will

Military Elements

• Ground Forces

• Army, Marines

• Active, Reserve

Components

• Institutions

• Human Dimension
networks, will influence the ability to project land po

Population and the ability to mobilize that popu

for economic and military ends also will affect land p

Obviously, the traditional markers of size, distrib

demographics, class structure, and education will inf

the degree of economic power and personnel availa

military use.

The form of government affects the nature of land p

as well as how it may be employed. Authoritarian po

systems, for example, may depend heavily upon land 

to maintain their regimes. Thus, they pose a threat t

populations, as well as to their neighbors. This may re

bifurcated force structures capable of offensive oper

against neighbors, as well as gendarmerie or heavily 

security forces for internal control. Conversely, demo

governments may have little or no call to use their m

domestically other than for disaster relief or support 

authorities. Externally, despite the notion that demo

nations have less propensity to use military power, th

resort to force when their national interests are at 

And, they will structure their forces for offensive, as w

defensive purposes.

The national will to use land power, particularly 

modern age, will have a significant influence on its ev

employment. In sum, the best manned, equipped

trained force in the world can be largely irrelevant w

the national will to wield that potential; or, at the lea

to oppose its use.

Military Elements. The core of land power obv

stems from the ground forces (Army and Marine; acti

reserve components) that are available. But ground 

alone, do not represent the full extent of a nation’

power. Instead, land power should be conceived in te

ground forces operating jointly with the other eleme

the U.S. Armed Forces, in coalition with allies and par

in conjunction with government agencies, and in 

8
protect national interests.

The institutions that generate and sustain those 

are equally important to land power. In short, the r

ing, training, equipping, maintaining, and sust

functions that generate and undergird the capabili

the fighting force are equally essential for creatin

sustaining land power. Also important are the doc

procedures and systems that create and sustai

common cultural bias that allows forces to operate 

effectively. Less well-understood, but absolutely crit

an effectively functioning force, are the leadership, 

pline, and morale that bind the force together. Also

nation with global interests, the ability to project for

the point of crisis in sufficient time to act effectively 

sustain those forces constitutes a key element of land p

The human dimension of military power de

special emphasis.12 This category goes beyond popu

and numbers. Modern militaries, but especially thei

power components, depend heavily on the abil

innovative, adaptive individuals who can react quic

rapidly changing conditions. To be successful, land 

must recruit and retain high quality personnel, wh

trained and molded into cohesive teams. This co

stems from individual and collective morale and esp

corps that creates a synergistic whole far greater th

aggregate of individual talents.

Without this reservoir of talent, land power canno

to prevail. Indeed, land power, more than the 

components of military power, depends upon h

interaction and innovation for success. Assured

components of military power rely upon high q

personnel; but there is one key difference. Air and sea 

essentially are built around weapons systems or su

platforms which require people to operate them. 

forces, conversely, tend to recruit people and then 

them.13 In large part, this philosophical approach 

9
concerned with changing or controlling human will.

This human dimension gives land forces treme

versatility. Moreover, the human dimension inher

land power (and its forces) is vital for performing mi

and tasks that are personnel intensive or require 

human interaction (e.g., peace operations, humani

assistance, reassurance, or support to civil author

And, one must point out, air and sea forces cannot pe

many of these missions and tasks effectively, if at al

THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL

VERSATILITY OF LAND POWER

Defining land power and describing its key ele

provide only a start in understanding the concept. A 

detailed explanation of the strategic and opera

versatility inherent in land power, and the wide ra

options that it offers decisionmakers, is critical for gra

its fuller dimensions. Only by gaining such an u

standing will it be possible to place land power in its p

context within all components of military power.

First and foremost, land power can be emp

effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict (Fig

and throughout the range of military operations (Fig

from support to domestic authorities to peac

engagement activities to shaping the international se

environment, to responding to smaller-scale conting

to joint and combined operations in a major theate

Moreover, because of the ability of land forces to wor

agencies of the U.S. Government, international org

tions, and nongovernmental and private volunteer g

land forces also offer great flexibility in crises alon

lower portion of the conflict spectrum.

This versatility is best demonstrated, perhaps, i

power’s contribution to the important roles that th

military can be expected to perform in the 21st centur

10
shaping the international security environmen

instance, land power offers the highest level o

commitment to allies, partners, and friends.15 Force

contribute to land power also offer great flexibil

undertaking activities that build trust and conf

between the United States and potential adversarie

presence of air and sea power also can reassure al

deter opponents. However, although air and sea pow

viewed as important, they are also transient d

strations of U.S. resolve. Furthermore, many na

particularly continental nations or powers who do no

a long tradition of relying on air or sea power, view 

power as the ultimate guarantor.16

This is not to argue that air and sea power d

contribute to shaping activities. U.S. air and sea forc

example, are key contributors to humanitarian assi

operations. Few organizations in the world have 

capability to move massive amounts of supplies as q

and as effectively to the point of natural or man-made 

Equally, air and sea power, individually or in combin

11

Domestic

Disaster

Relief

Domestic

Civil

Support

Environmental

Operations

Peace

Making

Arms

Control

Peace

Building

Security

Assistance

Military-to-Military

Contacts

Humanitarian

Assistance

Nation

Assistance

Peace

Keeping

NonCombatant

Evacuation

Operations

Show of

Force

Counter

Drug

Peace

Enforcement

Counter

Terrorism

Raids

Strikes

Sanctions

Enforcement

Counterinsurgency

Limited

Conventional

Conflict

Major

Theater

War

Internation

War

T

Nu

Spectrum

of Peace

Spectr

of Com

Support for

Insurgencies &

Counterinsurgencies

Source: Adapted from , Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1996, p. 5. Army Vision 2010

Figure 1. The Military Spectrum of Conflic
with the other components of national military powe

promote stability in key regions of the world th

exercises, information sharing, and military-to-m

contacts. Air and sea power also provide capabilities n

to prevent or reduce conflicts and threats.

Land power will continue and likely increa

long-standing contribution to deterrence.17 This will 

largely to the fact that many regional powers tha

confront the United States are predominantly land p

And, one must recall, deterrence depends as much up

adversary’s perception as it does on friendly capabiliti

will.18 This is not to argue for land power’s domina

deterrence. Certainly, the nuclear portion of dete

provided by air and sea power will remain critical t

deterrence capabilities. And, they will continue to 

major contributions to conventional deterrence. This 

simply underscores land power’s ability to deter ac

wider portion of the conflict spectrum than may be th

with the other components of military power.

Land power offers similar versatility in fulfillin

compellence role. Land power can respond to low

conflict, conduct all missions associated with 

12

C

O

M

B

A

T N

O

N

C

O

M

B

A

T

War

Fight

&

Win

Large-scale Combat Operations:

Attack / Defend / Blockades

Deter War

&

Resolve

Conflict

Operations

Other

Than

War

Promote

Peace

Peace Enforcement / Noncombatan

Evacuation Operations (NEO) /

Strikes / Raids / Show of Force /

Counterterrorism / Peacekeeping /

Counterinsurgency

Antiterrorism / Disaster Relief /

Peacebuilding /

Nation Assistance /

Civil Support / Counterdrug /

NEO

Military

Operations

General

U.S. Goal Examples

Source: Joint Publication 3-0, , February 1, 1995, p. I-2. Doctrine for Joint Operations

Figure 2. Range of Military Operations.
as raids, strikes, or limited campaigns) or help prose

major theater war. Naturally, the effectiveness o

power’s contribution will vary with the conditions, a

those of air and sea power. The emphasis here is tha

power can compel effectively across the entire c

spectrum, providing national leaders an extensive 

options for responding to a particular event or 

Equally important is understanding that to many pot

adversaries land power represents the ultimate fo

compellence.

The importance of shaping, deterrence, and compe

roles oftentimes overshadows the support to the natio

Once again, most of these tasks fall to the force

comprise the basis for land power. The other compon

military power contribute, but the reality is tha

capabilities inherent in air and sea power an

environments in which they operate limit their abi

perform most support roles. Thus, the greatest por

these missions and tasks fall to land forces, specifica

Army.19

In sum, land forces can perform effective

anticipated roles that the U.S. Armed Forces may be 

upon to perform. Moreover, because land forces are 

effective throughout the entire spectrum of military co

they offer national officials the greatest versatil

meeting the anticipated demands of the future se

environment. Indeed, land forces can execute mission

tasks that air and sea power can

effect only marginally, if at all.

(See Figure 3.) This versatility

translates into more options

available to decisionmakers as

they formulate and execute

policies.

Of course, land power is not

without its limitations. When

13

Land power’s

versatility trans

into more option

available to

decisionmakers 

they formulate a

execute policies
projected beyond home shores or overseas bases, it de

upon air and sea power for deployment, as well as long

sustainment and support. Without friendly control of 

and seas, land force operations are difficult, 

impossible, to carry out and sustain.20 When enga

most smaller-scale contingencies and, certainly, 

theater war, land power depends heavily upo

capabilities that air and sea power bring to the confl

Employing ground forces also can present a num

obstacles. Because land forces represent the h

perceived level of U.S. commitment—domestically, a

as externally—conditions may have to reach 

proportions before adequate land power is used. Thi

inhibit earlier employment which might have 

circumstances before they erupted in full-blown cris

14

Domestic

Disaster

Relief

Domestic

Civil

Support

Environmental

Operations

Peace

Making

Arms

Control

Peace

Building

Security

Assistance

Military-to-Military

Contacts

Humanitarian

Assistance

Nation

Assistance

Peace

Keeping

NonCombatant

Evacuation

Operations

Show of

Force

Counter

Drug

Peace

Enforcement

Counter

Terrorism

Raids

Strikes

Sanctions

Enforcement

Counterinsurgency

Limited

Conventional

Conflict

Major

Theater

War

International

War

Ta

Nucl

Spectrum

of Peace

Spectru

of Comb

Support for

Insurgencies &

Counterinsurgencies

Source: Adapted from , Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1996, p. 5. Army Vision 2010

Air Power

Land Power

Sea Power

Low Effectiveness Moderate Effectiveness High Effectiveness

Figure 3. Effectiveness across the Military

Spectrum of Conflict.
aggressor to act before forces are fully capable of res

ing. Thus, the employment of land power dem

thoughtful and carefully considered policy decisio

civilian authorities.

The perceived potential for higher levels of casu

among ground forces (versus, e.g., individual pilots

may inhibit the use of land power. Certainly, conce

friendly casualties has always influenced the applica

military, but especially, land power. Since the end 

Cold War, particularly when U.S. ground forces hav

committed when less than vital national interests 

been at stake, anxiety over U.S. casualties has re

significant levels. Whether this trend will continue 

open question, but it is possible that such concerns 

spill over into crises where important or vital U.S. int

are involved.21 And, as the Khobar Towers bombing in 

Arabia (1996) and the supposedly inadvertent Iraqi 

on the U.S.S. Stark (1987) illustrate, air and sea for

not invulnerable to such casualties.

On balance, however, land power offers consid

strengths. Land power, in concert with air and sea p

can conduct prompt and sustained joint and com

operations during peace, crisis, and war. Land power 

fundamental for implementing the current (and proj

defense strategy of shaping the international se

environment, responding to the full spectrum of crise

preparing now for an uncertain future. It offers sign

contributions to the key roles of supporting the n

shaping geostrategic conditions, and deterri

compelling adversaries. Land power also offers the gr

operational and strategic flexibility across the spectr

conflict, throughout the full range of military opera

and in all roles that the Armed Forces of the United 

can be expected to perform.

15
Land power cannot be understood in isolatio

indicated earlier, the synergism that results fro

appropriately orchestrated components should gui

application of U.S. military power. This orchestrat

termed interdependence, which is best illustrated, pe

using the metaphor of a tapestry. The respective Se

represent the threads that make up the tapestry. Thu

are essential for creating the tapestry. Individual th

however, cannot create a picture. Even collectiv

picture emerges only when the threads are woven 

carefully planned and executed pattern. Extendin

metaphor to demonstrate the extensive capab

inherent in interdependent operations of the Service

number of threads and patterns can be combined to 

endless varieties of pictures.

Ironically, orchestrating these multiple capabiliti

be both easier and harder as the clear distinctions be

the components of military power continue to blu

example, from ancient times through the mid-20th ce

states exercised sea power primarily against other 

Granted, limited operations could be undertaken a

coastal fortifications and ports, and amphibious oper

occasionally were conducted. But the application 

power on land was limited to a fairly narrow coastal 

Today, carrier based aviation and cruise missiles exte

reach of sea power asymmetrically deep into the hint

and airspace of most states. Amphibious operation

reach well beyond shorelines to strike deep into l

areas, as well. Thus, sea power extends into the a

ground dimensions of military power.

16

Interdependence

Orchestrating the appropriate component

military power in ways that achieve des

results.
concerned with reconnaissance against ground f

Quickly, however, the ability to attack ground target

the air opened up the possibility of influencing 

combat.23 Eventually, the range of aircraft permitt

forces to strike deep into an opponent’s territory dire

attack its war-making potential. These capabilitie

allowed similar missions far out to sea. The adv

intercontinental bombers, atomic weapons, and m

provided air power strategic reach—in the air, on lan

at sea.

In the last half century, land power also has move

beyond the confines of ground operations. Today’s a

possess missiles that range the upper reaches 

atmosphere to counter opposing aircraft and to p

ballistic missile defense. Many armies also hold sign

air power in the form of transport and attack helico

Indeed, the dividing line between close air support of g

operations provided by fixed-wing combat aircraf

helicopters continues to blur. And, the addit

ground-to-ground missiles of increasing range, pre

and lethality may further reduce air power’s r

supporting land warfare.24 The likelihood of helicop

helicopter or helicopter to fixed-wing combat ai

engagement further smudges the dividing line betwe

and land power. Land power also provides security 

bases, and, historically, land power asymmetrical

denied enemy air forces operating bases.25

Similarly, land and sea power are interlinked. 

power historically has defeated sea power by taking e

harbors and sea ports from the land.26 Additio

ground-based anti-ship missiles have considerable 

tial to influence operations at sea; especially in the l

regions. That influence undoubtedly will increa

technology improves.27

The critical issue facing future national leader

military planners, therefore, is not identifying 

17
the future security environment. Indeed, such argu

and discussions—usually conducted with in

passion—engender much ill-will and usually are co

productive. Simply put, in most cases along the c

spectrum, more than one type of force and power w

required. The key question will revolve around how b

blend the components of military (and usually nat

power to provide the desired result?28

This broader view of military power and the re

ships among air, land, and sea power is reflected in Fig

This notional diagram conveys a number of key con

First, military power is composed of the three subor

18

Military Power

Land Power

Land

Forces

Sea

Forces

Air

Forces

Sea Power Air Power

Figure 4. The Components of Military Pow

and Their Interdependence.
force types provide the basis for component power, bu

do not automatically equate to power (i.e., land forc

subsumed within but do not equate to land power). 

the intersection of a force type with another comp

indicates that forces can contribute to other compone

military power, as well (e.g., air forces with land 

power). Fourth, the elements of power are interdepe

thus, military power stems from the synergisti

mutually supporting interaction of the three compon

Although not portrayed on the pictograph (for reas

clarity), but equally important for understandin

power can be generated and applied, are the 

instruments of national power (political, economi

diplomatic). These instruments could intersect the 

circle of military power, or one or more of the compo

depending upon the particular conditions. But, agai

message should be clear: it is the blending of suitable 

not an individual instrument, that usually leads to suc

Obviously, in such a notional chart, air or sea 

could have been depicted as the central point. The 

distribution of responsibilities would vary according 

missions, tasks, desired outcomes, and specific cond

such as: potential opponent, terrain or environment, 

at hand, time available, and national policy objectiv

attained. In certain cases, therefore, it might be possi

one type of force or element of military pow

predominate in a particular mission. For examp

conducting Operation Deny Flight over Iraq, air 

–whether land- or sea-based—plays a predominant r

Haiti, land and sea power

initially cooperated closely,

but after landing the 10th

Mountain Division, air and

sea elements switched to a

supporting role, and the

operation relied predominantly on land power. The

19

The relationship am

the components of 

tary power is dyn

and will adjust to fi

conditions of a parti

situation.
components of military power is dynamic and will ad

fit the conditions of a particular situation.

Despite the interdependence that will characteriz

modern military operations, planners still must be a

capitalize on the strengths and minimize weaknesses 

individual components of military power. To do this

must understand the capabilities inherent in each t

military power, how they best can be orchestra

produce desired outcomes, and how to prevent an adv

from exploiting potential vulnerabilities.

Under certain conditions, one element may predom

over others. For example, conflict in restricted terrai

as mountains and cities, especially where “coll

damage” is a concern, may limit most activity to land 

Similarly, within certain smaller-scale contingencies

as humanitarian assistance, peace support, 

enforcement, or counter-insurgency operations, land 

may have much more utility than technologically

forces, which may be better suited to punish or co

Equally, air and sea power have areas that will r

largely their preserve. Control of the air and sea will r

largely the functions of forces that contribute to air a

power. Large-scale air transportation will be an air 

capability, as sea transportation will depend upo

power. And, unless circumstances or technol

developments change dramatically, sea power will p

the means to carry out amphibious operations.

Notwithstanding the increased interdependence 

elements of military power, policymakers and m

practitioners must ensure that they do not tak

principle to unnecessary extremes. The ultimate objec

military power is to achieve national policy objective

greatest efficiency and, more importantly, effectiv

Pursuit of a joint operation simply to ensure that all se

get “a piece of the action” is highly counterproductiv

can be catastrophic.29 At the risk of repetitivenes

20
should drive the types of forces selected. To avoid u

essary overlap or redundancies, it should be accepta

keep all or portions of a mission within a single ser

that contributes to greater simplicity in plannin

execution.30 Where capabilities do not exist within a 

service or component of military power, then a bl

capabilities from the relevant forces should be orches

to achieve the ultimate objective(s).

Furthermore, despite the increasing interdepende

the components of military power, complete overlap w

exist for the foreseeable future. Each component will 

unique capabilities that cannot be matched complet

the other components of military power. A key requir

will be to identify which unique capabilities will be req

to determine how best to retain them, and understan

they might be applied. At the same time, where overla

capabilities exist, military officials must identify 

ones will provide needed reinforcing capabilities and 

ones can be eliminated.31

CONCLUSIONS: LAND POWER—A MEANS

TO AN END, NOT AN END

As the preceding discussion indicates, defining 

power for the 21st century is an important issue. A 

definition expands individual understanding of land p

Along with an explanation, the definition illuminate

power’s contribution to military power. A more de

understanding of land power also highlights its vers

and the options that such versatility offers national le

Defining land power from the perspective of 

effects are brought to bear increases the breadth of e

nation and understanding of the term. It also broade

concept of where and how land power might be appl

well as the extent to which land power can be ap

Moreover, it offers a better grasp of how land pow

21
power.

Of all the components of military power, land 

offers the widest application across the conflict spec

Equally, land power operates most effectively throu

the full range of military operations. These qualities e

land power to contribute significantly to all roles th

U.S. Armed Forces can be expected to perform in th

century. Given anticipated trends, of all the compo

land power is best suited for shaping the interna

security environment. And, in crisis land power 

ultimate arbiter of events on land. In sum, land power 

promote and protect U.S. national interests every d

peace, crisis, or war.

Perhaps land power’s greatest contribution to o

national military power is its inherent versatility

versatility stems from the types and range of activitie

power can undertake, and the ability of land forces q

to adapt existing organizations to meet the demand

particular mission profile or rapidly changing ta

operational or strategic conditions. This versatility 

national leaders a range of options for handling op

nities or crises that cannot be matched by the 

components of military power, which are limited b

dimensions in which they operate or the nature of 

equipment. While land power can be similarly limite

fact remains that people and the things they value res

land; only temporarily are they in the air or on the w

Land power’s versatility is especially pronounced 

the lower portions of the conflict spectrum. Here, oper

rely less on a technological response from a “syst

systems” that masses deadly effects and more on h

interaction, which land power is best-suited to supply

may be especially true for most peacetime engageme

shaping activities. Similarly, less threatening

ubiquitous low-level conflicts rely on the human capa

react quickly to a highly fluid and nuanced environm

22
scale contingencies, sometimes substantial numb

personnel may be more effective than technol

solutions (e.g., people are more effective than laser g

bombs at separating and then developing effective w

relations between formerly warring parties).

But defining land power is not an end unto itself. A 

definition also is the first step in building a conce

understanding how land power meshes with air an

power to create interdependent operations where the 

is greater than the aggregate capabilities of the three. 

while the central thrust of this analysis has been to 

land power and better to grasp its capabilities, a cons

sub-theme is that this understanding serves a h

purpose.

That sub-theme has not been to exaggerat

capabilities inherent in land power or to divide the “m

power pie” into better defined, but increasingly irre

pieces. Rather, the discussion has placed land power 

appropriate context, underscored its strengths, ack

edged its weaknesses, and elaborated its interdepen

with air and sea power. All of this is intended to 

national leaders in making informed decisions on ho

to orchestrate the components of military power to a

national and military objectives.

Rarely will such orchestration be easy. It w

necessary to strip away the more extreme or aggr

claims of advocates of a particular component of m

power, and to identify which capabilities are best sui

a particular task. Because of the dynamic nature of c

and conditions, such deliberations will be necessa

nearly every new mission. Thus, these “jurisdic

battles” will have to be fought repeatedly. And, whil

must be debated, they cannot be allowed to degenera

inter-Service “turf battles” so common over the las

century.

23
missions equate to budget authority and program

budgets remain stagnant, or more likely continue to s

inter-Service rivalries over which component of m

power can best meet the needs of the nation are unlik

abate. And, while competition can be good for the Se

and the nation, descending deeper into parochialism 

which individual component of power can domina

mediums is counter-productive. Instead, analysts n

develop a more unified understanding of the relation

between and among the components of military pow

This interdependence of the components of m

power will become increasingly pronounced, in

imperative if the United States is to respond effectiv

the anticipated demands of the 21st century se

environment. Only by thoroughly understanding lan

air and sea) power will the U.S. Armed Forces be a

move beyond the current concept of joint operations in

realm of interdependence. And, given, anticipated b

constraints and demands of the international se

environment, interdependence will be a necessity.

But in evolving toward interdependence som

cautions bear emphasis. First, interdependence do

mean the complete merging of Services or the 

pearance of unique forces. There will continue 

missions or tasks that only soldiers, airplanes, or shi

accomplish. Thus, in a drive to interdependence we 

ensure that these unique capabilities are retained.

Second, interdependence means more than sim

neous use of all forms of power. It means orchestrati

appropriate components of military power in way

achieve desired results. In some cases, this may mean 

single component of military power will dominate. In o

it will require the careful orchestration of two or 

components to achieve decisive results.

Third, the driving factor for the employment 

various components must stem from the objective 

24
that particular forces or components of power partic

Missions and tasks must be assigned based on the opt

mix of capabilities required to achieve the specified m

objective, not according to some predetermined or ar

formula. Especially, missions and tasks should not be 

out solely to ensure that each component partici

Under certain conditions, especially where the u

capabilities of ground forces are needed, land powe

predominate. Under others, it will perform a supp

role. In still others, where air and sea forces possess c

capabilities that ground forces do not, land power ma

little or no part.

Fourth, true interdependence requires keepin

components of military power, to include the force

contribute to them, in appropriate balance. This will 

easy. The combination of American infatuation 

technology and the political windfalls (i.e., well-payin

to be reaped from hundreds of billions of dollars of d

contracts may skew procurement toward high-tech

systems. The rising costs of acquiring such technolo

sophisticated equipment, when coupled with the like

of flat or shrinking defense budgets, may squeeze out 

for land forces. The fact that soldiers and their equi

usually lack similar high-tech appeal will compoun

dilemma. This could throw the components of m

power out of balance, thereby jeopardizing the ability 

military instrument to fulfill its roles.

While important, these cautions are not major hu

They can be addressed. How and when they are exa

should be part of the expanded debate over land pow

its role in interdependence. And, these debates are n

But if informed decisions are to be made by national le

it is imperative that these debates focus on the merits 

arguments and not on narrow-minded bias.

Let the real debate, not parochial posturing, begi

this proposed definition of land power.

25
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael H

and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p

2. Joint Publication 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictio

Military and Associated Terms (hereafter JP 1-02), Washingt

Government Printing Office (hereafter GPO), March 24, 1994, d

contain a definition of the term land power. A search of officia

documents reveals numerous uses of the term, but no definition. 

a search of the internet yield a definition. Although not exhaust

search indicates a gap in that needs to be filled. JP 1-02 does co

definition of “land control operations: The employment of ground 

supported by naval and air forces, as appropriate, to achieve m

objectives in vital areas. Such operations include the destru

opposing ground forces, securing key terrain, protection of vit

lines of communication, and establishment of local military sup

in areas of land operations.” Ibid., p. 211. JP 1-02 also is availabl

internet at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.

3. For overviews of the RMA, see Commander Graham Rams

“The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Primer for the Unini

Research Report 9-96, U.S. Naval War College; James R. 

“Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A G

America’s 21st Century Defense,” Progressive Policy Institute, D

Working Paper No. 3, January 1997; Elliot Cohen, “A Revolu

Warfare,”Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2, March/April 1996, pp. 3

4. This debate can be part of the dialogue called for by the N

Defense Panel. See, cover letter, Philip Odeen to Secretary of D

William S. Cohen, in Transforming Defense: National Security 

21st Century. Report of the National Defense Panel, Washingt

December 1997, last paragraph.

5. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Force

United States, Washington, DC: GPO, p. III-11. See John Span

Robert L. Wentzel, Games Nations Play, 9th ed., Washingto

Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1996, pp. 293-384 for a discussion 

instruments and their employment. Broad consensus exists 

diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power. W

information is truly an instrument of national power is still a

question in this author’s opinion.

6. This formulation conforms to the current defense strateg

is contained in Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Repor

Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC, May 1997, Sec

26
As will be discussed below, land power offers a wide range of capa

and, therefore, options to policymakers in carrying out this str

7. “Aerospace: Of, or pertaining to, Earth’s envelope of atm

and the space above it; two separate entities considered as a 

realm for activity in launching, guidance, and control of vehic

will travel in both entities.” JP 1-02, p. 7.

8. These conclusions do not diminish the importance of infor

operations or information warfare. But, information will comp

not supplant the other forms of warfare.

9. It is important to note that this language conforms 

requirements set out in Title 10 USC, Section 3062. The specific 

influence will vary from reassuring allies and friends to shap

international security environment to deterrence to compellen

necessary, absolute control of territory.

10. For example, Russia, Germany, China, India, and Fran

11. For instance, Great Britain, The Netherlands, and the 

States. Interestingly, Spain, Japan and the United States al

generated considerable land power. Britain and The Netherland

perhaps, the best example of heavy reliance on sea power, follo

the United States in the late-19th and 20th centuries. For a cri

Britain’s reliance on sea power at the expense of land power, see 

F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfa

Breitenfeld to Waterloo, Bloomington: University of Indiana 

1991, pp. 88, 162-163, 321, 338-339, 449, and 539-540 (I am inde

Colonel John Bonin for bringing this information to my atte

Traditional continental land powers include Germany, Russia, 

Hapsburg Empire. Granted, continental powers occasionally str

to sea (e.g., France in the 17th and 18th centuries and German

early 20th,) but their strategies and operations focused almost 

on land power.

12. Colonel Joseph Cerami first called my attention to the n

examining the human dimension.

13. I am grateful to Colonel Everette Roper for this insight

14. For a discussion of the future roles of U.S. military pow

William T. Johnsen, The Future Roles of U.S. Military Power an

Implications, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institut

18, 1997.

27
see the National Military Strategy of the United States of A

Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a Ne

Washington, DC: GPO, 1997, pp. 12-14. Specific examples of 

import include the preventive deployment of U.S. Army fo

Macedonia (1993 to the present) to provide stability in the Balk

well as the deployment of nearly 10,000 soldiers in Combine

Force (CTF) Kuwait.

16. As my colleague, Colonel Leonard J. Fullenkamp, aptly 

out: “What made Pax Britannica credible was not just the great 

Navy, although it was important. What made England great w

certainty that on the heels of crisis came the ‘thin red line’ of 

troops that would make good on England’s promises.”

17. For a discussion of the reasons behind this trend, see J

The Future Roles of U.S. Military Power and Their Implications, 

18. One, more modern example of the deterrent effect of lan

from the perspective of an opponent can be found in the origin

Korean War. North Korean Dictator Kim Il Jung and Soviet 

Joseph Stalin were reluctant to take overt action against South 

until U.S. ground troops had been withdrawn. The withdrawal o

in late 1949, and the invasion followed in June 1950. See W

Stueck, The Korean War: An International History, Pri

Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 31.

19. For instance, Military Support to Civil Authorities, M

Assistance for Civil Disturbances, Key Asset Protection Progra

the DoD Resources Data base.

20. The obvious case is where an opponent possesses air 

capabilities. But even when an adversary has little or no air f

power, friendly air power routinely makes critical contribution

land battle: close air support, interdictions, and strategic attac

21. As the reaction to U.S. deaths in Somalia in 1993 inf

commitment and employment of land power in Haiti and Bosn

should also recall the extensive debates over combat operation

Gulf War. However, casualties may not be as significant a d

policy as many presume. For a detailed historical discussion 

issue, see Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Histori

of Casualties in Domestic Support of U.S. Military Operations, 

Santa Monica, CA, 1996, especially “Conclusions,” pp. 99-103.

28
joint operations, which essentially is close cooperation amo

Services to achieve military and national objectives. Interdepen

also more than integration of the Services because integration 

separate parts that contribute to a greater whole. Interdepend

this author’s concept exceeds integration. Services will depen

each other for the performance of the majority of the roles, missio

tasks that the Armed Forces of the United States will be called 

perform. For a slightly different view of the interaction am

Services, see Colonel John Bonin, “Mutually Supporting Relation

Exercise Joint Warrior, Discussion Issue 6, Interrelatio

Land-Sea-Air Forces, April 1, 1998.

23. Where general air parity existed, e.g., throughout World 

the ability of aircraft to observe offensive preparations a

opponents to mass defensive forces, thereby contributing 

stalemate that marked most of the Western Front.

24. For instance, the PAC-3 version of the Multiple Launch 

System (MLRS) and the Army Tactical Missile System (AT

equipped with Brilliant Antiarmor Submunitions (BAT) and Se

Destroy Armor (SADARM) munitions.

25. The obvious examples are the Allied campaigns in North 

Italy, and Europe and the U.S. island-hopping campaigns in the 

during World War II. I am indebted to my colleagues, Colon

Bonin and Colonel Leonard Fullenkamp for this and th

observations.

26. See, e.g., J. Michael Robertson, “Sea Control Remains C

Proceedings, April 1997, p. 80. There is a long history of such ope

from the Peloponnesian Wars to Alexander the Great ver

Persians to Napoleon denying Britain bases in the Mediterrane

Baltic Seas to Union forces capturing Confederate seaports in t

Civil War to the land capture of German submarine pens in Wo

II. Once again, I thank Colonel John Bonin for bringing these c

to my attention.

27. These capabilities are not just quantitatively different f

past, where shore batteries could deny ships access to ports 

relatively narrow band of coastline. Today, land- or air-launche

missiles extend their reach hundreds (and soon, perhaps, thous

kilometers out to sea. This represents a significant qualitative ch

the land-sea power equation.

29
the National Defense Panel and General Dennis Reimer, Chief 

Army are one such example of how this question can be examin

29. The most noted recent example, is Operation Desert Cl

1980 attempt to rescue U.S. hostages held in Iran.

30. This recommendation is in line with the long-standing p

of war: simplicity.

31. Once again, the joint warfighting experiments advocate

NDP could be used to address these pressing issues.

30
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. William T. Johnsen

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

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Mrs. Rita E. Burgett

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler