U A-. 12'*

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IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY:

Labor and Management

Approaches

Bulletin 1715

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Bureau of Labor Statistics Dalton & Montgomery Co.

Public Library

DEC 6

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IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY:

Labor and Management

Approaches

Bulletin 1715

Prepared for the

National Commission

on Productivity

by the Bureau of

Labor Statistics

U. S. Department of Labor

September 1971

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

J. D. Hodgson, Secretary

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

Geoffrey H. Moore, Commissioner

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Preface

The National Commission on Productivity was established by President Richard

Nixon in June 1970 to develop recommendations for programs and policies to improve

the productivity of the U.S. economy. The Commission is composed of top-level representatives of business, labor, government, and the public. In order to aid the members in

their consideration of various topics, staff papers will be prepared by government or

private industry experts in different subject matter fields. These papers serve as background material for the members but do not necessarily represent their views.

This bulletin presents examples of formal efforts by labor and management to improve

productivity. The focus is on plant level practices that are within the control of

management or unions, leaving broad economic, technological, institutional, and other

factors that affect productivity change for examination in other studies.

Most of the examples in the report involve measures developed through collective

bargaining or in special arrangements between unions and management outside the

bargaining table. A few examples lie primarily within the scope of personnel administration or industrial engineering, in which unions play a less active role. They are included

because they represent new directions that may become future issues for labor and

management.

The study is based mainly on information available from secondary sources, supplemented in a few cases by current data obtained through personal communication with

labor and management officials. A few examples, however, were based on previous field

investigations by the staff of the Bureau itself. A selected bibliography is appended to the

report.

Nineteen examples were prepared in the Bureau of Labor Statistics under the direction

of Edgar Weinberg, Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Productivity and Technology, by

the staff of the Division of Technological Studies. Most of the material on work rule settlements and methods of adjusting to change was prepared under the direction of Harry P.

Cohany, Chief, Division of Industrial Realtions, by the Division staff. Material on improving productivity in dentistry is based on information furnished by the Public Health

Service.

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Contents

Chapter I. Introduction............................................................................................................................................ 1

Chapter II. Retraining programs ............................................................................................................................ 3

Retraining of plumbers ................................................................................................................................... 3

Union sponsored retraining for printers ................................................................................................... 3

Upgrading hospital employees ...................................................................................................................... 4

Training and retraining in the maritime industry ................................................................................... 4

Improving basic education of steelworkers .............................................................................................. 5

Chapter III. Work rules settlements ................................................................................................................... 7

The music performance trust funds .............................................................................................................. 7

Centralized meat cutting and the Butchers’ Union ................................................................................ 7

The International Typographical Union and “Bogus” T ypesetting...................................................... 8

Union and management accommodation in prefabricated housing construction.............................. 9

Mechanization and modernization agreement in west coast longshoring ........................................... 10

Chapter IV. Methods of adjusting to technological change ........................................................................... 13

Attrition arrangements in the railroad industry ...................................................................................... 13

Aid to railroad workers under AMTRAK ................................................................................................ 14

Interplant transfer arrangements in the Ford-UAW agreement ........................................................... 14

Relocation allowances in auto and steel industries ................................................................................ 15

Early retirement plans ................................................................................................................................... 16

The guaranteed annual wage in New York Longshoring........................................................................ 16

Armour and Co. plant closings and the automation fund committee ................................................ 18

Chapter V. Manpower planning ........................................................................................................................ 21

Manpower planning in the telephone industry ........................................................................................ 21

Manpower planning in the Internal Revenue Service .............................................................................. 22

Chapter VI. Plantwide productivity incentive plans ...................................................................................... 23

A Profit-sharing plan in textiles ................................................................................................................... 23

The Scanlon p la n .............................................................................................................................................. 23

The Kaiser-Steelworkers long range sharing plan ................................................................................... 24

Chapter VII. Formal union-management cooperative programs ................................................................... 26

Union-management cooperation at the TV A ........................................................................................... 26

Cooperative program for worker safety in the paper industry .............................................................. 26

Union-management cooperation in the needles trades ........................................................................... 27

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Contents— Continued

Chapter VIII. Job redesign................................................................................................................................... 29

Fitting jobs to men: Human Engineering ................................................................................................ 29

Job redesign for older workers ................................................................................................................... 29

Job enlargement to reduce costs ................................................................................................................ 30

Improving productivity among dentists ................................................................................................... 31

Chapter IX. Absenteeism and hours of work ................................................................................................... 33

Control of absenteeism ................................................................................................................................ 33

The 4-day 40-hour week ........................................................................................................................... 33

Appendix: Selected bibliography........................................................................................................................... 35

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Chapter I. Introduction

Improvements in productivity are the result of many

factors. Technological innovations, greater investment in

capital equipment per worker, and improved managerial

techniques are critical. But researchers on the sources of

productivity growth also stress the great importance of

human factors: for example, improved skills and education of the work force; wider acceptance of change; and

greater flexibility and mobility. Although the influence

of these factors cannot be measured, undoubtedly their

interaction creates a climate favorable to the growth in

output per man-hour.

This bulletin describes efforts by labor and management to provide training and promotional opportunities,

to make greater use of workers’ know how, and to

establish more satisfactory work schedules, greater job

security, and more effective work incentives. Success in

improving working conditions could contribute to

reducing excessive absenteeism, tardiness, and turnover.

It could lead to greater motivation on the job, higher

quality of workmanship, and less resistance to technological change. These improvements in dealing with the

human factor of production often contribute to

advances in productivity.

Special attention has been given to several outstanding collective bargained settlements of problems of

work rules and job security. These issues arise in the

everyday conduct of collective bargaining and usually

are settled, though at times only after considerable

turmoil. Productivity is generally not an explicit issue in

negotiation, but both sides realize that cust increases

must be matched by efforts to improve efficiency.

The examples in this study are drawn from a wide

range of industries. Each case reflects efforts to meet the

special circumstances of an industry or plant and may

not be directly applicable to others. Moreover, as in

labor-management relations generally, the settlement of

a particular problem does not necessarily guarantee long

lasting industrial peace. New problems are arising constantly to test the ingenuity of labor and management in

resolving them. Nevertheless, the experiences of the

plants and industries recorded in the report will assist

others who are seeking ways of improving productivity.

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Chapter II. Retraining Programs

Retraining programs contribute to improving productivity in several different ways. Well trained workers

need a shorter time period for starting up, produce less

scrap material and cause fewer delays. Also, technological changes often modify the skills needed by

workers and require retraining which also contributes to

reducing resistance to change. Finally, training programs

lessen worker discontent by providing opportunities to

advance to jobs of higher skill and pay and of greater

interest.

The following five examples describe retraining programs for journeymen and other workers. Although

retraining of workers on the job often is regarded as

primarily management’s duty, the prominent role played

by unions in these five programs is one of the most

significant features of the cases. In three examples, the

unions initiated training to update skills of craftsmenplumbers, printers and seamen. The unions in each of

these cases have long had a leading role in apprenticeship

training. In the other two cases, unions, in cooperation

with management and government manpower agencies,

set up programs to raise the skills and knowledge of less

skilled workers—hospital workers and steelworkers.

Retraining of plumbers

A national program for updating the skills of journeymen plumbers and steamfitters was established in 1956

by agreement between the United Association of

Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and

Pipefitters Industry of the United States and Canada

(AFL-CIO) and the National Constructors Association.

Union leaders and contractors both recognized that

retraining would be necessary to meet the skill requirements of technological advances such as automation, use

of atomic energy, and the changes in space and

petrochemical industries.

The agreement set up an “International Training

Fund” financed by contributions from union contractors based on manhours paid for. Administered by a

joint board of trustees, the fund assists local committees

in purchasing equipment and in improving local training

programs under national standards. A national staff of

training coordinators is employed to assist local instructors. Each year a number of instructors attend

classes at Purdue University to learn new training

requirements created by changes in technology. The

same agreement and administrative arrangements are

used to upgrade local apprenticeship but the retraining

program for journeymen is a separate operation.

An example of a formal retraining program supported

by ITF but run locally is the National Pipeline Welding

School in Tulsa, Okla. Founded in 1965 by the local

union and contractors association, the school was

organized to retrain skilled plumbers to work on the

expanding pipeline systems in the region without the

special onsite training that had been needed previously.

A small staff of full-time instructors give classroom

training to upgrade the skills of helper trainees and

journeymen.

The ITF program has expanded from 32 programs for

about 1,000 journeymen in 1956 to 397 with an

enrollment of over 18,000 in 1967, the latest year for

which data are available. Since its inception, over 80,000

union journeymen have taken some training. Financial

assistance to local programs for journeymen and apprentices averaged roughly $1 million annually in recent

years. This covered the cost of instruction, equipment,

classrooms, etc. The program is entirely privately supported.

Union sponsored retraining for printers

A national training center, established by the International Typographical Union, provides its members

with new skills required to operate modern composing

equipment. Similar centers have been established by

other unions in the printing industry, notably the

pressmen and lithographers.

The ITU Training Center is an outgrowth of the

union’s longstanding policy of training printing craftsmen to operate the latest machinery so that it can assure

union employers an adequate supply of skilled craftsmen

and thereby maintain its jurisdiction. This was the policy

followed in the introduction of the linotype machine 80

years ago. In recent years, radically different

technologies—for example, phototypesetting, and the

application of computers to perform justification and

hyphenation operations—aroused the union’s interest in

expanding retraining of craftsmen.

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The ITU school began operations at Colorado

Springs, Colo., in January 1962 with 15 ITU members in

training. The training school cost about $2 million to

construct and equip and is financed entirely by contributions from a union fund. No funds are received from

employers. Today about 100 students are enrolled in

each class. The center offers 28 separate courses,

including electronics, photocomposition, and others. In

addition, some ITU members who have been trained at

the Colorado center, provide instruction on the latest

methods at about 100 local centers throughout the

country.

Any member of the ITU in good standing is eligible

to attend the training center. A member may register for

one or more of the 28 courses. Most courses are 3 weeks

in duration and trainees attend classes full time. Most

employees attend the school during their scheduled paid

vacation period and pay for their own room and board;

financial assistance sometimes is provided by the local

union and by the employer.

More than 2,000 ITU printers have completed training at the center. Additional thousands have received

instruction at their locals. One interesting byproduct of

the program has been the development by ITU Center

instructors of several new types of cost saving equipment

which are rented to union employers.

Upgrading hospital employees

An experimental project initiated by a union in 1967

demonstrated how low paid nurse’s aides can be trained

to take over routine nursing duties. Both registered and

practical nurses are in extremely short supply in New

York City and elsewhere.

The project was cosponsored by District Council 37,

American Federation of State, County and Municipal

Employees (AFL-CIO) and New York City’s Department

of Hospitals; training allowances were paid by the U.S.

Department of Labor’s Manpower Administration. The

project was focused on training nurse’s aides who needed

to maintain their income while in training and who

could not qualify for existing training programs for

licensed practical nurses under current educational

standards and tests for admission. Trainees worked 20

hours a week at their regular hospital jobs and attended

school about 25 hours a week; their combined salary and

training allowances about equaled their regular pay as

nurse’s aides.

The work-study program lasted 14 months. The

number of instruction hours totaled 1,500 per trainee—

about 300 more than the minimum required by the basic

curriculum for licensed practical nurses. Trainees also

received counseling and remedial social services, and

some received tutoring under a program funded by

District Council 37.

Altogether 422 nures’s aides graduated from the

work-study program and returned to their hospitals as

practical nurses; 91 percent of those originally enrolled

passed the licensing examination. Many of the aides were

disadvantaged minority workers, with limited education.

Although the training and services proved to be relatively costly, the project demonstrated the feasibility of

a career ladder for low-paid workers in a shortage

occupation.

The technique of upgrading of nurse’s aides to meet

skill shortages also has been adopted by private hospitals

in New York City. Under an agreement effective July

1969, between the National Union of Hospital and

Nursing Home Employees (a Local of the Retail Wholesale and Department Union, AFL-CIO) a jointly administered fund of about $1 million is setup for training and

upgrading union represented workers. The fund is based

on 1 percent of gross payrolls. No government contribution is involved. The agreement covers over 20,000

workers in 17 private institutions.

These upgrading programs are welcomed by many

medical care experts who believe that hospital efficiency

can be enhanced through greater use of paramedical

personnel who can be trained in a relatively short period

of time.

Training and retraining in the Maritime Industry

Training schools for seamen typically are financed by

shipping firms but operated by maritime trade unions

who contract to supply employers with an adequate

number of trained workers. As shipping activity and

shipboard modernization are accelerated, there is great

interest in expanding training and upgrading at every

level. Recent progress is exemplified by three formal

programs.

The Seafarers’ International Union (SIU) (covering

unlicensed maritime personnel) conducts, with employer

funding, the Harry Lundeberg School of Seamanship for

the Atlantic and Gulf Ports. The school conducts

advanced courses in deck, steward, and engineroom skills

for upgrading experienced seamen. About 1,500 men

also are trained annually for entry into the merchant

marines. The complete 30-day course is free. Trainees

attend classes conducted by experienced seamen and

undertake practical on-the-job training on vessels in port.

Faced with a shortage of engineroom officers, District

2 of the Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association

(MEBA) (covering licensed merchant seamen) set up the

School of Marine Engineering in New York in 1965. The

School is employer-financed. While in training, MEBA

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members receive, in addition to meals and lodging, a

weekly subsistence allowance. Courses cover the mathematical and practical knowledge required for advancement. As of early 1971, the school had qualified a total

of 390 MEBA licensed engineers for higher ratings. Also,

since 1966, MEBA District 2 and SIU have jointly

operated a 30- to 90-day training program to upgrade

unlicensed SIU members to licensed engineers ratings.

The National Maritime Union, with 45,000 members,

initiated a comprehensive retraining and upgrading program in May 1966 in New York City. The program is

financed under a jointly administered pension and

welfare plan. Every year since 1966, roughly 1,000 men,

on the average, have been qualified for higher classifications. Unlike the Seafarers’ program for entrants, the

NMU program gives instruction in the most advanced

unlicensed skills in the deck, stewards, and engine

departments in both cargo and passenger vessels. A

curriculum of 22 courses, varying in length from 3 to 12

weeks, are offered to NMU members with at least 6

months of seatime. Trainees receive a subsistence allowance in addition to meals and living quarters. A part of

the training costs are financed by grants from the U.S.

Department of Labor’s Manpower Administration under

the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962

(MDTA), and from the Military Sea Transport Service.

Improving basic education of steelworkers

Union, management, and the Federal Government

have been cooperating since 1967 to provide opportunities for steelworkers to improve their skills in

reading and arithmetic. The lack of these basic educational skills prevents many steelworkers from entering

apprenticeship and other upgrading programs and

hampers them in retraining for new opportunities

opened by technological change.

The Board for Fundamental Education, a nonprofit

agency, was chosen by the union and steel companies to

provide experimental basic education classes after work

hours to steelworkers in the Baltimore and Chicago-Gary

areas. The Federal Government pays the salaries of

instructors and other costs from an allocation of funds

under MDTA. The Cooperative Steel Industry Basic

Education Program provides three levels of instruction: A

basic level for employees testing below grade 4.5 in both

word meaning and arithmetic; an advanced level for

employees testing between 4.5 and 8.0; and a special

mathematics class for employees with deficiencies in

arithmetic only. Each course is given for 20 weeks.

A total of over 2,700 workers attended at least one

class in the first year; 62 percent completed the course.

Most of the participants were men in the 35- to 54-year

age group. The courses were repeated several times and

high school level courses were begun. By February 1971,

a total of 3,300 workers had participated and graduated.

Steel plant management considers the program a

useful contribution to greater efficiency because it

improves communication, encourages workers to have an

interest in their jobs, and increases understanding of

instructions. The 1968 collective bargaining contract

renewed the program for 3 years.

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Chapter III. Work Rules Settlement

Written and unwritten work rules exist in all places of

work, whether organized or unorganized. Frequently, a

particular rule or practice may have been introduced as a

safety measure but has continued in effect even after the

reason for its adoption is hard to recall or justify. Unions

and workers are reluctant to yield work rules once they

have become the “law of the shop” ; often they fear that

such changes, initiated by employers, are not likely to

accrue to their benefit. Thus, the modification or

elimination of work rules presents a difficult problem to

collective bargainers.

The following five examples illustrate how work rules

issues were dealt with in such diverse industries as the

performing arts, retail trade, newspapers, construction,

and longshoring. Although the details of the settlement

fit only the needs of a particular situation, the cases

demonstrate the versatility of collective bargaining in

solving troublesome issues and adjusting to change.

The music performance trust funds

Since the turn of the century, the demand for Ir-c

music has fallen off steadily and the numb- ; oi job

opportunities for professional musicians nas declined

sharply. The development of the phonograph record

originally for home use, and its uncontrolled use for

commercial purposes, especially by radio stations and

juke box companies, posed a particularly seri threat

to the livelihood of musicians. The American Federation

of Musicians (AFL) protested to no avail, and the record

manufacturers were unable, through legal means, to

restrict the use of records once sold.

AFM President James C. Petrillo finally undertook in

1942 to stem the erosion of opportunities by prohibiting

musicians from making any further recordings. In 1943

and 1944, the stoppages against individual recording

companies ended through a series of agreements under

which employers agreed to pay royalties on sales into a

union administered Radio and Transcription Fund

(RTF). Income was allocated to free public service

performances. In 1947, 1948, and 1949, the fund spent

approximately $4.5 million for admission-free performances. The Taft-Hartley Act, however, necessitated

the suspension of payments at the end of 1947, and

consequently President Petrillo reinstituted the recording stoppage on January 1,1948.

Almost a full year later, on December 14, 1948,

agreement was reached on an independently administered fund, the Music Performance Trust Fund (MPTF)

which basically carried forward the same objectives as

the earlier RTF. In 1950, producers of television film

sound track agreed to a parallel fund as part of the

MPTF; from 1951 to 1958 distributors of motion

pictures for television exhibition also established trust

funds, as did producers of TV films and commercial

announcements in 1954. Under all these trusts, the

MPTF receives royalties which do not accumulate, but

are spent as currently as possible to meet the goals of the

MPTF.

For some years, recording musicians had been discontented because none of the royalties on sales were

allocated specifically to them for the contribution they

made of their talents. Following internal disputes and

the defection of west coast musicians from the union,

the AFM worked out a new settlement with the

recording companies in 1964. Payments for free music

performances were halved, and the other half was

allocated to a special payment fund which now provides

disbursements directly to recording musicians.

Almost SI00 million has been disbursed since the

MPTF reinstituted allocations in fiscal 1950, and the

amount of allocation has grown from $900,000 in fiscal

1950 to $7,370,000 in fiscal 1970. It is estimated that

$7,310,000 will be disbursed in fiscal 1971.

In recent years, over 300,000 musicians have been

employ'd annually in free admission performances. The

highest number, 396,700, were employed in fiscal 1969

for a record 35,970 performances. The first 6 months of

fiscal 1970 showed 136,000 musicians employed in

16,224 performances. Payments are made to union and

nonunion musicians a* local union scale.

Centralized meatcutting and the Butchers' Union

In the evolution of meat department operations in

retail food stores, the changeover during the 1950’s from

service to self-service is a major landmark. The butcher’s

block moved from a highly visible location behind the

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counter, where custom meatcutting under the customer’s eye took place, to the backroom where meats

are cut, packaged, and priced in a standardized operation. In this changeover, as in others, the amalgamated

Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America

(AMCBW), (AFL-CIO), bargained over the entrance of

new techniques and eventually achieved higher wages

and fringe benefits in return for greater management

flexibility.

The development of the backroom operation improved productivity and permitted volume sales, but

stores sought still further cost-cutting changes such as

the purchase of certain cuts of meat and poultry

delivered prepackaged and prepriced from packinghouses and poultry processors. The AMCBW exercised

some measure of control over changes by writing a list of

permitted cuts (the products clause) into the collective

bargaining agreement. These cuts were to be negotiable

and could be traded off for gains in wages and benefits.

Over the years, some cuts were allowed to come into

stores frozen, and others prepackaged but not prepriced.

In this way, the union was able to retain work for

journeymen meatcutters on fresh cut foods and for

weighers and wrappers on pricing.

Eventually, some chains moved towards centralized

meatcutting operations. As planned, cutting would be

done at a central chain-owned packinghouse that would

then prepackage and preprice meats and poultry for

delivery to chain outlet meat counters. In the 1971

chain store negotiations in the tri-State Philadelphia

area, the issue of centralized meatcutting by one chain

and by independent packers came up. The employer’s

goal was not accomplished fully, but some new cuts

were permitted in exchange for traditional trade-offs and

an employment guarantee.

For the first time boneless hind quarter and forequarter cuts were allowed thus, diminishing the boning

operation ordinarily performed in the backroom. In

addition, ground meat was permitted, again lessening the

grinding operation of the backroom; and finally prepackaged fresh (as against frozen) poultry was allowed

to be brought in.

These represent significant changes for one contract

term, and the tradeoff again was in wages and fringe

benefits. Journeyman meatcutters are to receive $30 a

week in 1971 and an additional $25 weekly in 1972.

Also, substantial improvements were negotiated in the

health and welfare and pension plans. Negotiators are

unable to quantify that part of the increase due to the

changes in the permissible list, but the consensus is that

the chains were more generous, as a result, in their

settlement.

The union further agreed that the chains may

introduce new methods and new products, that is, make

revisions in the contract’s products clause. In consideration for this additional flexibility, the chains agreed to

notify the union in advance of any future revision,

listing specifically all new methods and products in

writing, and in addition the companies guaranteed that

no union member’s job would be eliminated as a result

of any revision. The Philadelphia chain stores are in a

period of expansion when journeymen meatcutters are

in short supply. However, when expansion ends and the

number of stores stabilizes, the guarantee will take on

more significance than it presently has. Meanwhile, the

chains have gained flexibility and the union has won

major wage and fringe benefit gains, in addition to a

potentially valuable employment guarantee.

The International Typographical Union and "bogus"

typesetting

In the printing industry, make-work practices were

associated for many years with “bogus,” alternatively

called “reproduction,” or “resetting,” or “dead horse.”

Under the General Laws of the ITU, the “reproduction”

of certain materials in the form of type and matrices,

when they were interchanged or purchased between

newspapers or newspapers and job offices, was made

mandatory. Bogus involved the resetting of type only for

local newspaper advertisements that had already been

printed. Although the type was reset, it was not used,

but was assigned to the “hell box” where it was melted

down into lead.

Because of the question of the legality of bogus under

Taft-Hartley, the ITU conducted a questionnaire survey

of its locals in 1960 to determine their “reproduction”

practices. Of the locals that responded, 65 percent

asserted that they were no longer adhering to this

custom, 20 percent admitted that they were utilizing

bogus practices, and 15 percent stated that they had not

performed bogus work during the month under survey

although local advertisements were placed on the “bogus

hook.”

This inquiry and an ensuing survey which revealed

that only 2 to 5 percent of locals were performing bogus

work convinced IIU President Elmer Brown to seek an

amendment to the union’s constitution to shift the

“Plate Matter and Matrice Section” from the General

Laws to the Bylaws. Although the proposal was defeated

by a union referendum in October 1960, the 1967

convention did vote to endorse this proposition which

gave locals wide lattitude with publishers in the negotiations of bogus clauses. One further step was taken in

August 1969 when the international union eased the

bogus rules by allowing locals to relax or eliminate this

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right in exchange for other improvements in their

contracts.

Before the 1969 convention, some locals informally

exchanged their bogus clauses for coffee breaks, overtime, time off, sick leave, and other forms of paid leave.

With the impetus of the international union’s endorsement of more formal “trade-offs,” many locals apparently negotiated improvements in pensions and in other

economic benefits.

Union and management accommodation in prefabricated

housing construction

It is generally agreed that greater productivity could

be achieved in housing construction if industrialized

methods were adopted in place of craft methods of

construction. New laborsaving production technology

has been adopted slowly because of building codes,

marketing and financial considerations, and fear of job

losses due to lower craft barriers. In recent years,the

building trades unions have reconsidered their closely

guarded position on craft jurisdictions in the light of

changing circumstances. Several events illustrate this

trend.

The Building and Construction Trades Department of

the AFL-CIO commissioned the Battelle Memorial Institute in 1968 to conduct an in-depth study of the impact

on labor of the prefabrication and systems concept in

the building industry. One of the conclusions was that

the new technology would “ . . . appear to offer opportunities to half of the affiliates and threats to the other

half.” The report indicated that all building trades-some

more than others—would be affected by the reallocation

of work from the jobsite to the factory as prefabricated

technology expanded. Interpretation of the specific

effects, while subject to debate, indicated that an overall

loss of onsite jobs would result.

An important collective bargaining breakthrough

occurred in September 1968 with an agreement between

the Carpenters and Stirling Homex Corp of Avon, N. Y.,

a producer of modular housing. The carpenters agreed to

provide journeymen for the company’s factories. In June

1969, the agreement was extended to onsite projects.

For its part, the company agreed to employ only union

building trades labor and to pay current construction

wage scales in the areas involved.

Another important step was the joint Tri-Trades

agreement by three unions-the Carpenters, Electricians,

and Plumbers—with a number of producers of prefabricated and modular structures. These unions have

attempted to establish a firm claim to jurisdiction in the

event factory produced homes gain wide acceptance.

In November 1969, Tri-Trade locals signed an agreement with modular home producer, Prestige Structures,

Inc., of Charlotte, Mich., and requested their internationals to lend their support by guaranteeing that

units produced would be accepted by onsite craftsmen.

Subsequently, the three international unions agreed to

cooperate and to establish some uniformity in the

contracts negotiated by the locals. In addition to

Prestige Structures, 23 other prefabricated and modular

companies have signed Tri-Trades and Union Label

agreements.

The most significant aspect of the Tri-Trades agreements is the cooperation by the three unions in an

industry known for its jurisdictional conflicts. Construction locals have relinquished part of their autonomy by

accepting the internationals’ position that factory built

structures bearing a specially designed Tri-Trades label

be accepted onsite and that any onsite controversy will

be resolved by the international offices.

Among themselves the three unions agreed that

employees, depending on their jobs, would be assigned

as members of 1 o f the 3 unions. For example, a newly

hired worker primarily performing electrical work is

assigned membership in the IBEW. Although no set

formula was established, in practice approximately

60-70 percent of a plant’s work force are members of

the Carpenters, and between 15-20 percent each become

members of the Plumbers and the IBEW. Uniform

initiation fees and dues that conform to those established in manufacturing rather than in construction,

were agreed upon.

Although local agreements do not conform in all

respects, the model agreements are intended to lend

uniformity at the area level. They have been patterned

after industrial agreements. These include a grievance

procedure with arbitration as a final and binding method

of settling disputes; waiver of the right to strike during

the term of the agreements; the right of management to

hire from any source, as opposed to the union referral

system commonly used in the construction industry,

checkoff of initiation fees and dues, and paid holidays

and vacations. In return, the company guaranteed that

construction scales would be paid the employees

assigned to work on construction sites.

Wage rates for plant employees are to be comparable

with factory production rates rather than prevailing

construction scales. The highest paid production job in a

plant, filled by a journeyman from each trade, is termed

the “code coordinator,” who works in a supervisory

capacity. By accommodating to the new technology, the

unions have yielded on the issue of craft jurisdiction;

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Article VI of the Tri Trades International Agieement

states:

“Union recognizes that because of the nature of the company’s business, employees shall be expected to perform

work assigned to them, even though the work assigned may

be the work normally performed by another classification

and trade.”

Although some progress has been made in resolving

labor problems, the production of prefabricated units

has been low. Some companies have discontinued

production because of market conditions; others,

because of financial difficulties.

Nevertheless, although few in number, these agreements are significant because they indicate changes in

attitudes on the part of construction craft unions, and

the acceptance of practices which may facilitate greater

productivity in construction of low and middle cost

housing.

Mechanization and modernization agreements in west

coast longshoring

The west coast stevedoring industry was faced in

1960 with a pressing need for a new approach to

reconciling the workers’ needs for job security and

income maintenance and managements’ goals of flexibility and increased productivity. The immediate issues

centered on restrictive work rules and practices. Management asserted that the International Longshoremen’s

and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) had gained control

over both the work force and the production process.

The principal purpose of the restrictive rules was

maximization of employment, but the result was the 

highest dock costs in the United States.

The prospective decline in job opportunities in the

late 1950’s because of impending mechanization persuaded ILWU leaders of the need for longrun solutions

to job security. The union’s leadership recognized the

need for productivity improvement but felt that the

Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) should give a “quid

pro quo.”

On October 18, 1960, the ILWU and the PMA

consummated an agreement that attempted to accommodate their divergent goals. The union accepted the

introduction of laborsaving devices and the extensive

relaxation of work rules. The employers’ association

generally achieved more control over work rules dealing

with manning and gang sizes, slingload limits, place of

rest procedures, multiple cargo handling, gear priorities,

minimum work or pay guarantees, and other rules “so as

to permit them to operate efficiently, change methods

of work (and) utilize worksaving devices. . . without

incurring speedups or encouraging onerous work.”

In return, management agreed to establish a $27.5

million fund over a 5%-year period to provide early

retirement benefits and a supplementary wage fund.

Entirely financed by PMA, the fund was instituted to

insure the regular work force (“A” men) against layoffs

resulting from changes in cargo handling, to establish

minimum weekly earning guarantees, to encourage early

retirement, and to augment death and disability benefits.

All fully registered longshoremen and clerks qualified for

36 monthly payments of $220 or lump-sum payments

up to $7,920, in addition to their regular pensions upon

normal or early retirement. Provisions were included for

mandatory early retirement at $320 a month until age

65 if work opportunities declined. When hours of work

fell below 35 a week due to modernization and

mechanization—but not because of a business decline—a

weekly wage guarantee was to become operative. In

addition, the contract stipulated death payments up to

$5,000 and disability benefits up to $7,920.

When the original contract expired in 1966, the

parties negotiated another 5-year contract. Major modifications in the agreement included: the provision of an

additional $34.5 million for the fund, a $13,000 vested

retirement benefit; pensions up to $235 a month; up to

$5,000 in death benefits and $13,000 in disability

benefits; plus improvements in vacations and in other

benefits. Perhaps the most significant change was the

elimination of the wage guarantee at the union’s behest,

since job opportunities had not declined during the term

of the first agreement. Adopting a lump-sum scheme of

wage pay and bonus, the parties distributed the Supplemental Wage Fund ($12.9 million in principal, and

interest at the time), giving $1,223 to each eligible union

member. In return, PMA secured further modifications

in work rules relating to maximum availability of

registered workers, manning scales (especially in the

elimination of men under the “unnecessary man” rule),

and slingload limitations.

In the opinion of the union, it was necessary for the

successful administration of the system to rotate hiring

of workers to provide equal “sharing” of decreased job

opportunity in combination with joint registration of

longshoremen to control the quantity of manpower

resources. The program was supported by a sufficiently

adaptable machinery to process numerous grievances and

to provide a “basis for a continuing dialogue during the

life of the agreement;” contract periods were sufficient

to stabilize the industrial relations environment by

allowing long-range planning.

Various inadequacies in the pacts also have been

noted. Some employees, such as those who pack sacks,

find their workload more onerous and mechanization,

especially relating to containerization, has resulted in

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safety problems. Some younger workers, at least in the 

earlier years, claimed the pact was an “old man’s 

contract,” providing generous retirement and pension 

benefits, but little for younger members. Smaller stevedoring firms claim that the agreement was too expensive 

and that they are unable to effectively compete with 

larger companies that invest heavily in capital equipment. The parties differed about productivity increases: 

The association believed that the union did not recognize the effect of changing capital inputs and the union 

felt that the PM A was “hiding” some of the productivity 

increases.

The union leadership admitted that it underestimated 

the pace of containerization and that the future of the 

union depends on the amount of work related to this 

process. These problems relate not to loading and 

unloading containers, but to “stuffing” (placing cargo in 

the container itself) and “stripping” (taking the cargo 

out of the container). When the second contract was 

signed in 1966, the union did not foresee the establishment of container stations located just off a dock, a 

situation that led to members of another union performing “stuffing” and “stripping” duties. At various times, 

jurisdictional disputes have arisen, mainly with the 

Teamsters.

In August 1969, the leadership of ILWU and PMA

signed a Container Freight Station Agreement (CFS), 

supplementing the M & M agreement and providing that 

“ail CFS work will be performed by ILWU members 

dispatched from ILWU-PMA hiring halls . . . (with) a 

40-hour work or pay guarantee while the job lasts. . . . 

The intent and purpose of this contract supplement is to 

have all container work brought to Container Freight 

Stations on the dock or in areas adjacent to the 

dock . . . by removing the option . . . to have this type of 

work done elsewhere.”

Jurisdictional disputes over containers stems from the 

union’s concern with the downward trend in man-hours 

and employment of longshoremen and the anticipated 

further reductions in the work force in the immediate 

years ahead. From 1960 to 1970, longshoring man-hours 

fell from 23.5 million to 19.6 million. Longshoring 

union membership (“A” and “ B” men) also declined 

significantly (15.3 percent), from 14,490 on January 1, 

1960, to 12.277 on January 1, 1971.

During the 1960’s the agreement was apparently 

sufficiently flexible to absorb the shocks generated by 

its day-to-day administration. On July 1, 1971, the long 

history of peaceful settlements was broken when the 

parties were unable to reach an agreement. As of early 

August 1971, the strike was still in progress.

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Chapter IV. Methods of Adjustment

to Technological Change

American unions generally accept technological

changes at the place of work but are very much

concerned with their effects on the job security of

workers. Most issues are resolved in normal collective

bargaining and the contract clauses which can come into

play are as varied as the agreements themselves, covering

advance notice to wage setting on new equipment,

seniority rules regarding transfers, grievance and arbitration procedures, and severance pay and retirement. In

some situations, bargaining may deal simultaneously

with methods of avoiding layoffs, easing the burden of

unemployment, and facilitating new employment.

Various arrangements worked out by the parties are

discussed briefly in the following six examples. As

noted, attrition clauses are confined almost entirely to

the railroad industry. However, interplant transfers,

relocation allowances, and early retirement benefits are

more widespread. Two examples deal with arrangements

negotiated to cover specific problems occasioned by

technological change: the guaranteed annual wage in

New York longshoring; and the Armour and Company

Automation Fund Committee.

Attrition arrangements in the railroad industry

Mergers and consolidations, technological changes,

and the growth of competitive means of transportation

have steadily reduced railway employment over the past

two decades. The railroad unions have been increasingly

concerned for their members’ job security and, in some

instances, for their own continued existence. Much of

the chronic conflict that characterizes railway labor

negotiations has been over work rules that protect union

members by preventing elimination of jobs management

no longer considers necessary.

The strong resistance of railway unions to outright

elimination of jobs, with consequent involuntary layoffs

and terminations has contributed to a wide application

of the attrition principle; employees already on the

payroll are assured of continued employment, but

unneeded jobs vacated through voluntary quits, discharge for cause, retirements, and deaths need not be

filled.

The principle of attrition in railway mergers and

consolidations was first established by the Emergency

Railroad Act of 1933, which was passed to facilitate

consolidations and to strengthen the depression troubled

industry. After the act expired in 1935, unions and

management, with Presidential urging, negotiated the

“Washington Job Protection Agreement,” in 1936. The

agreement provided that employees deprived of employment due to consolidation were afforded partial wage

protection for up to 5 years, on the assumption that

normal attrition would permit their reabsorption into

the industry within this period. The agreement is still in

effect. The Federal Transportation Act of 1940 similarly

prescribed that the ICC, in authorizing a consolidation,

require that affected employees receive full wage protection for up to 4 years.

Application of the attrition principle to jobs eliminated due to technological change began in the 1950’s.

In 1958, the Railway Clerks and Union Pacific agreed to

abolish positions effected by technological change by

attrition for 4 years. Two years later, a Railroad

Telegraphers-Chicago and North Western dispute resulted in a Supreme Court decision making attrition a

bargainable issue. Following the ruling, numerous attrition provisions were negotiated. Many of the clauses

limited annual job elimination, even through attrition, to

a specified percentage of the work force. The largest

attrition agreement, signed in 1965 between five nonoperating employee unions and a number of railways,

covered nearly 300,000 employees. Reduction in force

through attrition is limited to 6 percent of the total

number of jobs each year, although layoffs are permitted

in significant business declines.

When technological changes threaten to eliminate an

occupation entirely, as with the railroad firemen, agreement is more difficult to achieve. In 1963, Congress

established a Railroad Arbitration Board in an attempt

to settle a 4-year work rules dispute between operating

unions and three railway conferences. The Board ruled

that most firemen and helpers were not needed for

freight and yard service, and that only 10 percent of

such jobs need be retained. Employees with 10 years’

service, however, were to be given job protection for life,

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and reductions were to be effected only through

attrition. Employees who had less seniority were protected for up to 5 years or provided with severance pay.

The companies, although not fully satisfied, accepted

the Board’s award, but the unions did not, claiming the

firemen positions were needed as a safety factor.

Following expiration of the award after 2 years, the

controversy continued.

Although reduction-in-force by attrition is an effective method for coping with a surplus labor problem, it

is held to be less efficient than involuntary layoffs and

terminations, and has met with little acceptance in other

industries. The wider use of the attrition principle in the

railroad industry is a consequence of the industry’s

values and traditions, its older work force, and its

relatively generous retirement and early retirement

benefits.

Aid to railroad workers under AMTRAK

The attrition principle has recently been extended by

the Railroad Passenger Service Act of 1970 to cover

railroad workers affected by the discontinuance of

passenger service. Because of specific provisions relating

to the Federal Government’s role in protecting workers,

this program is treated in detail separately from the

programs described in the previous section.

The act was adopted to relieve railroads of the

financial burden of running unprofitable passenger

trains. It established a national railroad passenger corporation (AMTRAK) to take over passenger train service

with train operators acting as contractors to provide

passenger service between a limited number of cities. As

part of agreements with railroads belonging to

AMTRAK, the act requires employee protective arrangements which must be certified by the Secretary of Labor

as “fair and equitable.”

The plan for employee protection proposed by

AMTRAK was approved by the Secretary on May 1,

1971, when AMTRAK began operation of the Nation’s

intercity passenger trains. The plan requires railroads to

provide full wages and benefits for up to 6 years on a

monthly basis to workers displaced by AMTRAK’s

planned cut of 114 of the 300 passenger trains.

Estimates of the number affected ranged from 12,000 to

25,000. Any income a worker earned from other jobs

would be subtracted from these payments. He would be

covered for up to 6 years and would qualify for any pay

increases during the “protective” period, while still

eligible to be recalled to work. The worker also would

have the option of receiving lump sums of up to 1 year’s

salary, instead o f the monthly payments.

In addition, railroads are required to pay moving

expenses and to reimburse a worker for any loss

occasioned by the sale of his home so that he might

move to accept railroad employment elsewhere. Also, on

request, any dismissed employee would be given training

leading to reemployment, as well as priority for employment or reemployment in the railroad industry.

AMTRAK submitted its plan after the carriers and

the rail unions failed to negotiate a mutually acceptable

job protection plan. Under the law, the Secretary of

Labor has the ultimate responsibility for protecting

employees “against a worsening of their positions with

respect to their employment.”

Although the Association of American Railroads

accepted the job protection plan, the Congress of

Railway Unions, an association of railroad union presidents, termed the layoff protection plan “completely

deficient.” The unions preferred “full attrition” which

would require that no employee could be dismissed

except for cause and that only the normal process of

death, retirement, and outmigration would be utilized in

reducing the excess work force. The railroads argued for

protection for 4 years from the date of discontinuance

of rail passenger service, the minimum duration acceptable under the act. The protection, however, was

extended by the Secretary to a period of 6 years from

the date the employee is dismissed or displaced, rather

than for merely the 4 years from the date of service

discontinuance. In the Secretary’s judgment, a “fair and

equitable” standard required “greater time protection in

order to more reasonably insure that dislocated

employees might be afforded a more reasonable opportunity for railroad employment or reemployment before

their period of protection had run its course.” The

railroad unions are seeking “full attrition” and are

contesting the decision in the Federal courts.

Interplant transfer arrangements in the Ford-UAW

agreement

In recent years, major firms in the automobile

industry, including Ford, have decentralized in response

to technological change. Older plants have been replaced

by new ones located in other areas. In addition, specific

operations have been transferred from one plant to

another.

These changes inevitably have resulted in job insecurity among workers and the resolution of these

problems has become a matter for collective bargaining.

The response of the United Automobile Workers (UAW),

Ind., and Ford and other automobile companies, was to

negotiate a program of protection including interplant

transfer arrangements. The agreements provide interplant transfers in several instances. First, there may be

voluntary transfers of seniority employees (that is,

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workers who have completed a 3-month probationary 

period within 1 year following the date hired) between 

plants with the signed consent of the employee and his 

committeeman. Employees transferred on this basis are 

considered seniority employees of the new plant as of 

the date of transfer, and if affected by a reductionin-force in the new plant, they will be laid off or 

returned to their original plant, according to their 

choice.

Second, in the event of a transfer of an operation 

from one plant to another, workers with 1 year or more 

of seniority are allowed to follow their work and retain 

their seniority rights. This provision does not apply to 

partial transfers of operations incident to adjustments in 

production schedules or changes in products, but to the 

complete or partial transfer of an operation to a new 

plant from an old plant which may be closed or 

continued on a reduced employment basis.

Third, employees laid off because of permanent 

discontinuance of a group, unit, or plant are granted 

preferential hiring consideration at other company 

plants. Fourth, any employee who has exhausted his 

seniority rights within his seniority unit would be 

eligible to receive an offer of any available work in any 

plant in the same labor market area, and may even 

displace probationary employees at these plants, if there 

are no open jobs available. There is no statement 

regarding the seniority status of the employee once he 

moves. Conceivably, he retains seniority for benefit 

purposes (that is, vacations, etc.), but loses it for 

competitive purposes (that is, promotions, assignments, 

etc.). Fifth, when the cause of layoff is discontinuance 

or partial discontinuance of a classification or of a 

seniority unit or of an operation with a seniority unit, 

then the offer of available work or the right to displace 

probationary employees applies to any plant under the 

agreement without regard to area.

Interplant transfer rights, as in the second case were 

exercised in February 1971, when Ford closed an 

assembly plant at Dallas, Tex., that employed 1,600 to 

1,700 workers. The plant was old, and management had 

the alternatives either to modernize or close the plant. 

The decision to close came in January 1971.

Of the 1,600 to 1,700 workers involved, nearly 800 

initially moved to plants in Kansas City, Chicago, and 

Louisville. Many chose to return to Dallas within a short 

time, however, and take severance pay benefits, leaving, 

as of April 1971,400-500 permanent transfers.

The union views negotiated interplant transfer provisions as essential to worker security, although it 

realizes that such arrangements may encounter many 

practical problems. Although other benefits of the 

negotiated job security program, such as early retirement

and SUB payments also are important, transfer provisions can be of considerable help, as in the Dallas plant 

closing. Employment was available for every Dallas 

worker who wished to transfer, although some workers 

took lesser paying jobs in order to move to the plant of 

their choice.

Relocation allowances in autos and steel industries

Relocation allowances are an important part of the 

protection offered to employees subject to technological 

displacement, since their adequacy often will determine 

whether an employee will accept or reject an offered 

interplant transfer. Even when jobs are available in other 

plants, displaced workers may find it difficult or even 

impossible to pay the cost of moving. The problem of 

these expenditures is compounded by the risk that the 

worker may not like the new job or that he and his 

family may not like the new location. Under such 

circumstances, conceivably he could be forced to assume 

the additional cost of a return move. The worker also 

may be unwilling to chance substantial loss in the sale of 

his home.

By availing themselves of moving allowances, workers 

at least in part are compensated for some of the costs of 

relocating. At present, relocation allowance provisions 

are most prevalent in the primary metal and automobile 

industries, where displacement and permanent layoff 

due to plant closings and relocations have been important since World War II, and in the transportation 

(primarily trucking), utility, and communication industries where the nature of business operations, or 

changes in the demand for services, make frequent 

transfers of personnel necessary. Although these five 

industries accounted for less than one-half the major 

agreements having interplant transfer provisions, and 

slightly less than seven-tenths of the workers so covered, 

they accounted for more than three-fourths of all 

relocation allowance clauses, and nearly nine-tenths of 

the protected workers.

The Ford Motor Co.-United Automobile Workers 

contract is among those agreements which provide 

relocation benefits for displaced workers. As in most 

agreements, the amount depends on the distance of the 

move and the marital status of the employee. Lump-sum 

allowances for single employees range from $220 when 

the new location is 50 to 99 miles away, to $475 when 

the plant is 1,000 miles or more distant. For married 

employees, the amounts range from $570 to $1,020. 

Other agreements provide for payments more closely 

related to actual expenses incurred. The Ford agreement, 

however, goes further than most in that it allows 

workers to return to the city from which they transferred if they dislike the new location or the new job. In

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this respect, the Ford-UAW clause is similar to the 

provision found in the Armour Co.-Amalgamated Meat 

Cutters contract. The Ford provision requires a minimum of 1 year of seniority if the worker has been laid 

off as a result of a discontinuance of operations, but no 

minimum seniority in a transfer of operations.

Few provisions protect the worker from the risk of 

loss in the sale of his home. When U.S. Steel closed an 

obsolete plant at Donora, Pa., in 1962, however, it 

offered to purchase the homes of employees who 

transferred to jobs at other company facilities, primarily 

the Joliet, 111. plant. Although most of the 5,000 

displaced workers chose not to accept transfer and 

accepted instead severance pay, SUB payments, or early 

retirement, several hundred did transfer and took 

advantage of negotiated relocation allowances. Of these, 

a few accepted the company’s offer to purchase their 

homes for the current appraised value, less 4 percent for 

appraisal and real estate fees. The contract between 

Western Electric Co. and the Communications Workers 

of America contains a similar provision.

Early retirement plans

Plans containing early retirement provisions covered 

about nine-tenths of all active workers who participated 

in private pension plans in 1969, the latest period for 

which data are available, compared with about threefourths during the early 1960’s. The prevalence of early 

retirement provisions in multiemployer plans and in 

noncontributory plans increased at a faster pace over the 

period than in either single employer or contributory 

plans, but the prevalence of early retirement provisions 

is still greatest in single employer plans. A worker must 

meet an age requirement, a service requirement, or both 

to retire under an early retirement provision. In addition, under many plans, early retirement depends on the 

employer’s approval. The most frequent service requirement for early retirement is 10 years; 15 years is almost 

as common. Two-thirds of all workers covered by plans 

with early retirement could qualify with 15 or fewer 

years of service, and almost three-fourths of these after 

10 years of service.

In some cases, the worker can be retired involuntarily 

before reaching the normal retirement age provided 

under the plan. Plans with such special early retirement 

clauses typically also have regular early retirement 

provisions.

Special early retirement provisions are found in plans 

covering about 17 percent of the workers, and are 

concentrated in single-employer noncontributory plans 

in the manufacturing industries. They are most common 

in plans negotiated by the Auto Workers, Steelworkers, 

and Meat Cutters unions. Under these plans an employee

may be retired early at the employer's request oi under 

“mutually satisfactory conditions.” In oihei plans, 

workers whose employment is terminated because of the 

closing of a department or plant or who have been on 

long layoff may be eligible for special early retirement.

The minimum age and service requirements most 

frequently specified are age 55 and 10, 15, or 20 years 

of service. In the primary and fabricated metals industries most plans provide special early retirement if 

the combination of age (55 or older) plus service equals 

70, or if age (under 55) plus service equals 80.

The problems created because of changes in a firm’s 

economic situation or because of the introduction of 

new technology permitting sustained or higher levels of 

total output with fewer workers have been resolved in 

many ways. Typically, the work force is reduced by 

laying off workers with least seniority and retaining 

those with the greatest seniority. In other cases, however, those with high seniority, chiefly older workers, are 

encouraged to retire early, thus permitting the firm to 

retain its younger employees. The encouragement typically used to enhance early retirement includes benefits 

larger than regular early retirement benefits, such as 

special early retirement benefits, cash bonuses to those 

electing early retirement, and other sweeteners to the 

early retirement benefit. These extra benefits often are 

made available only to those choosing to retire during a 

specified period.

Supplementary benefits to early retirees for example, 

were used widely during the 1950’s and 1960’s in the 

petroleum industry. Many firms in this industry had 

large numbers of excess workers because of technological change. The early retirement program inducements used by these firms (Humble, Shell, Sinclair, 

Ethyl, Phillips, and Gulf, among others) substantially 

reduced—and in some cases eliminated-the need to lay 

off workers. Similar techniques have been utilized also 

on other industries. Kaiser Aluminum and Dow Chemical, for example, have encouraged older workers to elect 

early retirement by substantially raising benefits payable 

to those who retired during the period the firm was 

trying to reduce employment.

The guaranteed annual wage.in New York longshoring

Although labor relations between the New York 

Shipping Association and the International Longshoremen’s Association (AFL-CIO) have never been characterized as “peaceful,” the parties have been able to 

negotiate a historic agreement which provided for a 

guaranteed annual wage and greater flexibility in manpower utilization. The agreement evolved over many 

years.

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The New York waterfront typically has had a surplus

of labor (nearly 40,000 men competing for about

17,000 jobs) which, in turn, has spawned kickbacks,

favoritism, loansharking, and many other unethical

practices. Following investigation by the New York

State Crime Commission, a Bi-State Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor was set up in 1953 to

“clean up” the port by (a) registering and licensing the

entire labor force, including hiring agents, (b) eliminating the shape-up methods of hiring and replacing it with

hiring centers, and (c) decasualizing (removing from the

register and thus from waterfront employment) those

with a marginal attachment to the industry. Despite

steady criticism by the union and shippers, the Waterfront

Commission has managed to survive and was a major

factor in achieving some stability in the port by 1960.

Its continued presence had a bearing on the bargaining

situation in the 1960’s.

The events leading to the guaranteed annual wage

originated in a prolonged stoppage in 1962-63, finally

settled by a Board of Mediation chaired by Senator

Wayne Morse. According to the “Morse Award,” the

Department of Labor was requested to conduct an

extensive study of “manpower utilization, job security

and all other related issues which affect the longshore

industry.” The results of in-depth surveys in New York

(as well as in other Atlantic and Gulf ports), were

released in joint meetings with the parties during 1964.

Management’s key demand—greater flexibility in manpower utilization—was clearly interlocked with union

demands for job security, since the former, if rapidly

and extensively implemented, could result in considerable loss of jobs for longshoremen. Yet a maze of

restrictive work rules had grown up during periods of

unemployment and had become entrenched under a

“customs and practices” clause in the agreement.

As provided by the Morse Award, the Department of

Labor made the following major recommendations to

the parties:

1. Management should have the right to reduce the

number of men in each gang from 20 to 17.

2. In addition, it should be permitted to exercise greater

flexibility in the assignment of men and the use of

equipment, particularly in transfers from gang to gang,

between hatches and between ships.

3. An end to so-called “frozen details,” that is, fixed

assignments and refusals to do other work (for example,

automobile checkers refusing to check in or out other

cargoes).

4. In return, the workers were to receive an income

guarantee of “no less than 75 percent of [a worker’s]

average annual gross earnings including vacation and holiday

pay in the contract years 1963-64 and 1964-65.”

The parties negotiated on the basis of these recommendations during the summer and fall of 1964, but

were unable to reach a settlement until February 1965

after the Taft-Hartley emergency procedures were

invoked. As provided in a 4-year agreement, the union

agreed to reduce the minimum gang size from 20 to 18

on April 1, 1966, and to 17 men on October 1, 1967,

and further to eliminate “frozen details.” In return, the

union obtained, in addition to liberalized pension

benefits, and hourly rate increases, unprecedented

guarantee of annual income of 1,600 hours of straighttime rates for every longshoreman who worked at least

700 hours during the year April 1, 1965 to March 31,

1966. Finally, and this was seen as an important

innovation, the contract also provided for a “Human

Relations and Implementation Committee” to address

itself to such issues as:

1. A review of existing seniority arrangements so as to

increase labor mobility.

2. A system of penalties and other methods of dealing

with absenteeism and tardiness.

3. The establishment of a variety of specific standards

necessary to implement the GAW.

Not all issues agreed to by the parties were implemented peacefully. In some areas of the port, manpower

changes were, at times accompanied by wildcat strikes.

Nevertheless, the contract provisions are now a fact of

life on the New York waterfront.

Following the agreement, a computer hiring system

was instituted by the parties and the Waterfront Commission that permits accurate recordkeeping to determine credits and debits for purposes of the guarantee. It

also has made possible better information on work in

other sections of the port, thus enhancing labor

mobility.

Despite hopes for a new era in labor relations

following the 1964 agreement, negotiations in 1968

again broke down and a strike occurred, primarily over

the issue of containerization. Nevertheless, the guaranteed annual wage was firmly established; effective

April 1, 1969, the number of hours guaranteed was

increased to 2,080 per worker. Also, the agreement

provided improved pension benefits of $300 a month,

early retirement if the employee chooses to do so within

one of two option periods at $250 a month at age 55 if

he had 20 years of service, with the amount to be

increased to $300 at age 62.

Despite much improvement on the New York docks,

many problems remain, particularly the need for a

revised and truly port-wide seniority system to replace

the sectional priority system now in operation and an

effective program to control absenteeism.

Progress typically has been with the help of outsiders

—the Waterfront Commission, Taft-Hartley and other

Boards, arbitrators, etc. Whether the parties can come to

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terms peacefully on their own will be tested on October

1,1971, when the current contract expires.

Armour and Co. plant closings and the automation fund

committee

As a result of changes in methods of production,

processing, marketing, and distribution, Armour and Co.

closed nine of its plants in the late 1950’s and was

planning to close six more. During this period, small

producers located in rural areas, who were paying

nonunion wages and using up to date production, with

transportation and marketing methods were making

noticeable inroads into the market. Large producers

reacted by closing plants in large urban areas and

opening smaller, highly automated plants in rural communities.

Recognition by union and Armour and Co. officials

of the effect of these changes on workers led to an

agreement, in 1959, to seek means to assist displaced

employees. A nine-member automation fund committee

was established: four from the company, two each from

the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen

and the United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers,

and a neutral chairman. Broad powers to consider any

programs to aid workers affected by the plant closings

were granted. The committee’s only specific responsibilities were to initiate and administer training and

interplant transfer programs. This was financed by a

$500,000 company fund.

The committee decided early on a flexible policy

since it faced the difficult task of finding jobs for

disadvantaged workers in labor markets with high

unemployment rates. The displaced work force was

characterized by a low education level, advanced age,

and a long attachment to a particular industry and plant.

Few of the skills involved in meatpacking were transferable to other industries. The 10 percent of the work

force that did possess identifiable skills was employed

largely in maintenance. Minority group members varied

from 5 percent at Sioux City to 75 percent of the

company’s work force at Kansas City. Women were 12

to 15 percent of the work force and generally had a

higher average age than men.

The majority of the plant closings involved displacing

all the employees at the same time, thereby eliminating

standard methods of easing the effects of change, such as

attrition. Therefore, large numbers of workers with

similar characteristics were seeking work at the same

time in a specific labor market. Because of the large

number involved, it was not possible to deal with all

older, high-seniority employees on a corporationwide

basis, to avoid displacement. An alternative approach,

more feasible under the circumstances, was to increase

the employability of the displaced workers through

retraining and an active campaign to find new job

opportunities. For each plant closing, the committee

developed programs based largely on labor market

opportunities, the characteristics of the displaced

workers, and the experience gained from previous

closings.

Pre-shutdown planning, facilitated by a 90-day

advance notice of closing negotiated in the 1961

agreement, and extended to 6 months in the 1967

agreement, proved to be important to the success of the

adjustment program. It provided time to adjust for both

the workers who are to be terminated and for those

administering the assistance programs. Adequate lead

time permitted the manpower agencies to assess the

skills and desires of the workers and the community

opportunities. Time also is provided to establish private

and Federal education programs and to arrange early

termination to accept alternative employment or to

enter training programs.

Starting in 1960, the committee became the focal

point of efforts to facilitate the adjustment process in

the city in which a major plant closure was scheduled.

Transfers of workers from plants being closed to other

company facilities were not successful when first tried in

1961. Of the 800 Fort Worth employees eligible for

transfer, only three transferred permanently when the

plant closed in 1962. A major factor limiting the number

of transfers, in this and other cases, were large lump-sum

separation payments to workers who did not transfer.

These payments ranged from an average of $2,840 at

Fort Worth to $1,800 at Omaha; the overall average was

$2,000 for employees accepting these payments. Separation pay-accepted by more than two-thirds of all

displaced workers—was offered to workers with 1 year

or more of seniority who did not transfer or were not

eligible for, or chose not to accept, a pension.

Another important hindrance to transfer was the

reluctance of people to sever their community ties and

relocate somewhere else. This was particularly true for

members of racial minorities who faced moves to

all-white rural areas.

Following the Fort Worth experience, “flowback

rights” were introduced which allowed workers to

reconsider and take separation pay and moving expenses

to their former location, if they so desired after a few

months of employment at the new plant. With this

arrangement, the transfer plan was more successful in

the 1963 Sioux City closing. In Sioux City, 183 of the

approximately 1,040 eligible employees made permanent transfers. After the closure of the Kansas City

plant in 1964, 229 of the 1,616 potential transferees

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exercised this option; 182 of them remained at the new

location. In Omaha, following the 1968 shutdown, 215

permanent transfers out of 1,230 eligible employees

occurred.

The Omaha shutdown saw the increased use of a

special monthly retirement payment, 50 percent larger

than the normal amount, to employees 55-62 years of

age having 20 years or more of service. At the time of

the Omaha closing, the minimum payment under this

plan was $150 a month.

The committee’s activities and wide array of measures

significantly reduced the hardships caused by the

closings. Workers with marketable skills were helped

immediately by a good placement program, others with

limited opportunities were retrained or given early

retirement benefits, and the transfer option was available

for those who wished to stay with the company. In the

Omaha shutdown, where 1,600 workers were displaced,

approximately 500 workers accepted interplant transfers

or pensions, and another 500 made the transition into

the local labor market without filing for unemployment

compensation benefits.

Despite these efforts, many displaced workers did not

find new employment or accepted employment at wages

below those received in the meatpacking industry. This

inability to maintain the income of displaced workers is

attributable largely to factors beyond the control of the

fund.

Recognizing that only a small proportion of the

affected workers had been protected, the union is

seeking an end to plant closures. It urges a change in

government tax policies which tend to encourage

companies to close older plants and open smaller

automated ones. The union has supported the

committee’s efforts, and endorses the advance notice

and severance pay provisions as helpful, if not always

adequate. It believes that the transfer plan has worked

“fairly well” and could be improved by liberalizing the

seniority rights offered to transferees.

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Chapter V. Manpower Planning

Manpower planning, involving projections of labor

requirements and supply, is being increasingly used as a

tool to improve the development and efficient

utilization of the labor force. BLS manpower projections

provide educators, manpower agencies, and officials with

a framework for policy development at the national and

local levels. The use o f manpower forecasts at the plant

and company levels for recruitment and training also is

becoming more widespread. A few companies use

manpower projections to facilitate adjustment to

technological change. Projections at the plant level

provide a basis for the use of attrition as a measure of

avoiding layoffs of workers when laborsaving changes are

planned. In this way, manpower planning helps to foster

a climate favorable to change and productivity

improvement.

The following two examples illustrate the use of

manpower planning at the plant level to adjust to

productivity change. Although many of the adjustment

methods described in the previous section are applied

here, the systematic approach to handling manpower

changes is unique. One study describes the practices used

in the telephone industry to coordinate technical and

manpower changes. Also, the long range manpower

projections of the industry, sponsored by the

Communications Workers of America, is illustrative of

its use in planning union policies on automation. The

second study reviews the experience of the Internal

Revenue Service in planning large scale manpower adjustments to automation without layoffs. Both studies highlight the importance of advance notice and communication, and of planning a variety of adjustment measures

to meet the needs of different groups of workers.

Manpower planning in the telephone industry

The conversion of the telephone system to long

distance direct dialing drastically reduced requirements

for telephone operators in local offices throughout the

country. The Bell System therefore has formulated

procedures for anticipating the manpower effects of

these changeovers and for avoiding, as far as possible, lay

off of operators whose jobs have been eliminated. This

type of manpower planning has contributed to a general

acceptance of changes to improve productivity.

Attrition, advance notice, and transfer—the same steps

as those used in the earlier changeover to local

dialing—are featured. Collective bargaining, however, has

modified seniority and related practices. Also, the

Communications Workers of America, itself, sponsored a

study in 1965 by a leading management consultant of

the long range effects of automation as a basis for

planning its collective bargaining policies.

The Bell System’s general program for coordinating

technical and manpower changes has three objectives:

Retain as many permanent employees as possible;

provide suitable transfer to other offices; avoid

downgrading employees; and avoid a surplus work force.

In practice, local management must adapt the general

policy guidelines to fit local circumstances.

A BLS study of changes at four offices found that

notice of the planned changes was given to the union

and employees many months before the change was

scheduled. Collective bargaining contracts provided for

early notice and negotiation of force reduction moves.

Also, employees were interviewed to inform them of

displacement possibilities and transfer and training

opportunities. These practices were particularly helpful

to older employees by allowing them time for

adjustment to change.

The use of attrition was planned carefully. As early as

2 years before changeover, each office estimated the

number of operators who would be needed after

dialization and the number who would have to be

transferred to other local or nearby offices or retire. To

reach the lower employment level as much as possible

through attrition, hiring permanent employees was

stopped as early as 1-year before conversion. As losses

from quits and retirements reduced the regular work

force, temporary employees were hired, over time was

scheduled, and vacations, retirements, and leaves of

absence were postponed until after the changeover.

When the change was made, the number of regular

employees who had to be transferred or laid off was

minimized.

Despite efforts to retain all employees and a relatively

high rate of voluntary turnover among women workers,

displacement of a few employees was unavoidable.

Transfers to other offices were offered to all regular

employees. But for a few women who could not relocate

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because o f family responsibilities, the only other option

was lay off with severance pay. These women, however,

were given preference in rehiring.

Manpower planning in the Internal Revenue Service

Manpower planning by the Internal Revenue Service

has been a key factor in the conversion over a 9-year

period to a nationwide computer system, accompanied

by a minimum of hardships on employees. Ten percent

more tax returns can be handled and checking tax

documents can be done more completely. An estimated

15,000 additional positions would be required to do

manually the work now being accomplished by the

computer system. The jobs of nearly 11,000 district

office employees were eliminated or shifted to seven

new regional service centers, the number of involuntary

transfers or separations was minimal.

IRS managers began planning the manpower and

technical phase well in advance of the change. A full

time high-level planning committee was set up at IRS

national headquarters. The IRS announced early in the

conversion that it would avoid layoffs and reductions in

force.

Several planning steps were taken during the

conversion to carry out this job security policy. First,

the post conversion employment level and occupational

structure were projected to obtain an early estimate of

the magnitude of the effect on employees. Such

information was essential for planning resources for

training and other adjustments. Throughout the

conversion, IRS officials kept employees informed and

maintained communication with union representatives.

The emphasis was on encouraging employees whose

jobs were to be eliminated to transfer to other work in

district offices or to new regional service centers. Those

who chose to transfer were provided liberalized travel

and moving expenses and house selling expenses, and

were given an opportunity to visit the new location to

look for housing. IRS manpower experts also made an

inventory of each employee’s skills and tried to match

their characteristics with the requirements of job

openings. A full-time staff provided instruction for a

wide range of occupations to prepare employees for the

new positions.

Considerable attention was given to the problems of

individual employees. The Civil Service Commission

granted special authority during the changeover to relax

qualification standards for some positions and to extend

the time period for temporary appointments. This

flexibility greatly assisted manpower specialists in

making placements.

Further automation, such as elimination of

keypunching, is expected to have a significant effect on

IRS productivity. The experience with the computer

conversion is being used to deal with the personnel

problems of clerical employees whose jobs will be

eliminated.

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Chapter VI. Plantwide Productivity Incentive Plans

The search for a system of wage payment at the plant

level most conducive to productivity improvement is

going on constantly. About 30 percent of all production

and maintenance workers in manufacturing are covered

by some form of individual or small group incentive plan

relating pay to results. This proportion has remained

fairly stable in recent years. Output incentives tend to be

used in highly competitive industries, such as apparel,

where labor costs are high, technology is less advanced,

and production bottlenecks are likely to occur. They are

also widely used in the steel industry. With the trend

away from man paced toward machine tending and

service jobs, the applicability of individual output

incentives is being questioned. Accordingly, interest is

growing in incentive plans that are based on total plant

performance.

The following examples deal with three different

approaches to plantwide incentive plans for greater

productivity. The first covers the experience of a textile

company that has operated a profit sharing plan under a

collective bargaining agreement for the past 30 years.

The second reviews the Scanlon plan type of plant

incentive program, which also involves joint committees

to enlist employee cooperation in a search for

productivity improvements. The third example describes

the experience at the Kaiser Steel Company in revising

its incentive plan to promote greater productivity.

A profit sharing plan in textiles

The American Velvet Co., the last major velvet

producer in New England, has operated a profit sharing

plan for over 30 years. The company employs about 500

workers and has an agreement with the Textile Workers

of America (AFL-CIO). The company’s record was 1 of

the 12 cases studied by the National Planning

Association in its 1956 report, Causes o f Industrial Peace.

The profit sharing plan was instituted by the company

after a long strike in 1939, when the company increased

each weaver’s task from two looms to four. In 1956,

after more than 15 years of bonus payments under

profit sharing, the weaver’s load was increased by mutual

agreement from four looms to six; in 1963, the load

went from six to eight. Although the workload has been

extended, the new looms that have been introduced in

the textile industry in the past two decades have

generally been more automatic, requiring less human

attention and physical effort. In each case of change at

American Velvet, union opposition was brief and

directed primarily at securing technical improvements to

facilitate the change.

Briefly, the profit sharing plan provides that about 30

percent of net profits (before taxes) be paid into a fund

from which an annual bonus is distributed to all

employees who have worked at least 160 hours and had

not quit or been discharged for cause. The funds are

distributed proportionately on the basis of each

employee’s earnings during the year. The plan is

included as part of the collective bargaining agreement.

The results of the plan, according to a 1968 appraisal

by Professors Herbert R. Northup and Harvey A. Young,

“continue to be remarkable. Profits have been made

each year since 1939 and thus bonuses (or ‘earnings’)

have always been paid on a steady basis.” No strike or

unauthorized walkout has occurred since 1939 and no

grievance has gone to arbitration.

Company officials attribute their success in the face

of Southern, low wage competition, to “tight”

management, the high level of employee effort, and the

workers’ cooperative attitude. The possibility that the

plant would be relocated if unprofitable has been, in the

opinion of Professors Northup and Young, a powerful

incentive to productivity improvement.

An important key to cooperative labor relations at

American Velvet has been the effective way the firm has

communicated its plans and prospects to its employees.

Management introduced changes only after taking care

to win local union officers over to them. Professors

Northup and Young note: “ . . . once the union is made

aware of the competitive needs for the new policy it

communicates this need to the work force and helps the

company install the changes.”

The Scanlon Plan

The Scanlon Plan is a special type of plant incentive

system that features cooperative relations between union

and management and employee participation in solving

problems of efficiency. Gains in the company’s

productivity are shared by management and workers

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according to a formal plan. Joe Scanlon, an official of

the Steelworkers Union who developed this approach to

greater productivity in the 1930’s, rejected individual

incentive systems on the grounds that they fostered

secrecy and internal competition and resulted in below

optimum plant efficiency.

Two of Scanlon’s associates estimate that 120-130

companies were using the plan in 1968 and 300-500

others were using some version of the Scanlon plan. In

contrast to earlier years, large as well as small companies

are represented and participants are generally

prosperous.

The principal impetus for increased productivity

comes from employees’ ideas on production problems.

These suggestions are examined by joint committees of

union and management representatives, first at the

department in “production committees” and later at the

company level in a “screening committee.” Management

retains the right to reject or accept the suggestion. Also,

some Scanlon committees discuss company goals,

analyze cost factors, and review problems of the market.

Incentive payments to workers are based on the

measured productivity of the plant as a whole. The

amount is determined by comparing the ratio of total

payroll to sales value of production in a current month

with the ratio in a base period. A reduction in the ratio

provides a pool for paying monthly bonuses. Part of this

pool is set aside in a reserve for paying bonuses in deficit

months. The rest is divided: 25 percent is the company’s

share and 75 percent is paid out to employees as that

month’s performance bonus.

A 1970 case study of the Parker Pen Co. which has

contracts with the Rubber Workers and the Machinists,

reported that bonuses have been paid for 142 out of 168

months. The highest yearly average has been 20 percent;

the lowest 5 Vi percent. Management believes the

greatest benefit has been a willingness by workers to

accept change and increased worker efficiency.

In their 1960 assessment of Scanlon Plans, Professor

Slichter and his associates found several administrative

problems, but concluded that the plans have produced

many useful results such as a large number of laborsaving

suggestions; willingness of workers to accept

technological change; a better pace of work; greater

interest in the quality of workmanship; and greater

cooperativeness among workers.

The Kaiser-Steelworkers Long-Range Sharing Plan

The Kaiser-Steelworkers Long Range Sharing Plan,

first established in March 1963, developed out of

complex problems that had been present since the

company’s Fontana plant opened in 1943. These

problems became critical during the late 1950’s, due to

an unsatisfactory profit position. One source of trouble

was the incentive program, which resulted in earnings for

some relatively unskilled incentive workers that were far

above those of skilled nonincentive workers. These

disparities caused morale problems, high labor turnover,

and many grievances and wildcat strikes. Since only 40

percent of the work force was on incentives, compared

with an average 75 percent for the basic steel industry,

further extensions of this unsatisfactory system seemed

imminent. Kaiser also was faced with the necessity for

reducing costs to meet the industry’s growing problem

of competition from foreign producers and substitute

metals. Modernization in turn, reduced manpower

requirements and caused union and employee concern

over job security.

During the long 1959 industry strike, Kaiser and the

union concluded that there must be a “better way” than

strikes to settle their labor problems. Consequently,

Kaiser broke with the other steel companies and signed a

separate agreement which, among other provisions,

established a 9-man tripartite committee to formulate a

long-range plan for sharing in the company’s future

progress, encouraging needed company expansion, and

protecting employee job security and income.

After more than 2 years of study and discussion, the

committee presented a plan that provided employees

displaced by technological improvements with a virtual

guarantee of continued employment through placement

in other jobs or in “Employment Reserve,” and

maintenance of previous levels of earnings. Overall

reductions in the work force were to be accomplished

through attrition. A new group incentive system

provided that participating employees would receive

32.5 percent of any reductions in the per-unit cost of

steel production, including reductions in material and

supply costs. The 32.5 percent figure was derived from

the average proportion labor costs bore to total steel

production costs over a 10-year period. Allowance was

made for cost-of-living and material price increases. Part

of the fund was to be paid as a monthly bonus and the

remainder placed in reserve to match wage and benefit

gains negotiated by other producers. Should the reserve

prove inadequate, Kaiser Steel was obligated to make up

the difference.

In return Kaiser management was to gain greater

flexibility in introducing new cost saving machinery and

methods, and to be able to phase out gradually the

incentive system. No new individual incentives were to

be created, but employees already on incentives were

not required to participate in the sharing feature of the

plan. A lump sum bonus equal to 2 years’ incentive

payments (to be repaid from employee bonuses) was

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made available for workers electing to abandon

incentives. For those electing to remain on incentives,

the maximum incentive yield was set at 135 percent of

the base rate, but differential payments protected the

earnings of employees whose incentive levels had been

higher. Although work rules provisions in the collective

bargaining agreements were not eliminated, management

did not anticipate any serious problems in modernizing

its facilities. The plan, to run for 4 years, with annual

tripartite committee reviews, was approved by an

employee vote of nearly 3 to 1 and placed in operation

on March 1,1963.

Initial results under the plan were gratifying. Unit

costs declined substantially, and during the first year

participating employees received cash distributions

averaging about 18 percent of the standard hourly wage

rates, including sums placed in the reserve fund. Almost

30 percent of the incentive workers elected to transfer

to the plan, raising plan coverage from 4,000 workers in

March 1963, to over 5,000 at year’s end. Most

participating workers, having a direct stake in lowering

unit costs, cooperated with management in effecting

changes and discouraging waste; many changes, in fact,

were suggested by hourly and clerical employees. Kaiser,

with a $5.2 million loss in 1962, recorded a 1963 profit

of $11.3 million. Wildcat walkouts and grievances

declined.

Despite some modification o f the plan, enthusiasm

cooled during the 1964-67 period as monthly bonuses

declined to lows of 5.28 percent o f standard hourly rates

in 1965, and 6.56 in 1967. In part, this drop was

traceable to the departure o f senior workers on the

initial rounds of the then newly effective extended

vacation program. In part, too, subsequent industrywide

basic steel wage and benefit settlements required Kaiser

to place larger proportions of the employees’ share of

cost-reduction savings in the reserve account.

As the bonuses declined, many workers who had

relinquished incentive earnings voluntarily and recently

hired workers, found themselves working side by side

with higher paid workers who had elected to remain on

incentives. Grievances multiplied, and the company was

obligated to return a substantial number of workers to a

modified individual incentive system.

In 1967, to counter dissatisfaction with the plan the

Committee proposed major revisions, and the employees

voted, by nearly a 2-1 margin, to continue it until

February 1972. The revised plan discontinued the

reserve fund thereby making available the entire share in

unit cost savings, with minor exceptions, to the

employees. Kaiser Steel currently assumes the total

obligation to match industry gains, and charges the

added expense as a labor cost. Another revision

permitted former incentive crews participating in the

plan to transfer, for a limited period during July 1968,

to a modified individual incentive program. This feature

was designed to eliminate the discontent created by

incentive and cost-savings plan employees working

together while receiving different amounts in earnings.

Hourly bonuses at first increased as expected, to

15.27 percent o f standard hourly earnings in 1968, and

to a high of 18.42 percent in 1969, thereby minimizing

the number of workers choosing to return to individual

incentives. In 1970, low profit margins, rapidly rising

costs, and decreased volume reduced amounts available

for monthly bonuses, which declined to 12.31 percent

of the standard hourly wage rates in 1970. Although no

payment was generated in February 1971, a moderate

recovery is expected for the remainder of the year.

Despite its initial success, the LRS Plan has failed in 8

years of operation, to supplant the older incentive

systems. The proportion of workers participating in the

plan gradually has declined from a high of nearly 73

percent in 1965 to a little over 57 percent in 1970. One

factor working to the plan’s disadvantage is the more

direct relation between effort and increased earnings

under the older incentive programs. When cost-savings

plan bonuses deadline, despite employee effort,

participants tend to regard this as a pay cut and pressure

for return to incentives increase.

Although there have been problems, it should be

noted that earnings o f Kaiser employees over the period

generally have exceeded the steel industry average, and

through most o f the period the company has prospered.

Crisis bargaining has been avoided. The employment

reserve and displacement differential features of the plan

have lessened resistance to modernization, particularly

among clerical and technical workers, at very modest

cost to the company. Management has achieved some

success in reducing crews on existing equipment. Despite

qualified success, the plan has not been adopted by

other major steel companies; only one other smaller

concern—Alan Wood-has established a similar plan.

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Chapter VII. Formal Union-Managemant

Cooperative Programs

Although unions and management do not frequently

make formal cooperative arrangements to improve

productivity directly, many collective bargaining

agreements contain pledges by unions to assist in

achieving greater efficiency, eliminating accidents and

waste, maintaining quality, etc. Very few, however,

establish machinery to enlist the active cooperation of

unions and their members in these production problems.

Only during World War II were joint committees set up on

a wide scale to speed defense production. This is not to

say that union and management officials do not sit

together informally at the plant level to solve production

problems that arise in daily operations. The formal

committee type of cooperation, however, focuses

continuous attention on productivity problems and

affords workers some opportunity to participate in

decisionmaking.

The following examples describe three different

formal union-management cooperative programs at the

plant level. The first deals with the joint efforts at

Tennesse Valley Authority to make use of the

knowledge and skill of its employees to solve work

problems and improve efficiency. The second example

features the extensive system of joint committees in the

Pacific Coast pulp and paper industry to improve job

safety. The unique approach taken by the needle trade

unions and employers is outlined in the third example.

Union-management cooperation at the TVA

Formal cooperation between unions and management

to improve productivity at the Tennessee Valley

Authority was developed early by local craft union

leaders who sought to win status for their organization

in a public agency. Provision for union-management

cooperation is written into agreements with the 16

unions representing construction, operating, and

maintenance men and the 5 unions representing

white-collar workers. TVA employs about 19,500

persons.

The agreements spell out several areas of mutual

interest that bear directly on productivity improvement:

conserving manpower, materials, and supplies; improving

quality of workmanship and services; and eliminating

waste. Other objectives such as strengthening morale,

improving communications between employees and

management, promoting education and training, etc.,

indirectly improve efficiency.

The key features o f TVA’s plan are the formal

cooperative committees to encourage, collect, and pass

on suggestions for improving operations. A central

policymaking committee of management and union

representatives provides guidelines for the program as a

whole. The 115 local cooperative committees at the

plant, office, project, or department level meet monthly

and act on solutions proposed by employees and

supervisors. The committees do not deal with pay and

other matters subject to negotiations and they do not

handle grievances or jurisdictional disputes.

No cash awards are made for approved suggestions.

By joint agreement, employees are recognized by

publicizing their solutions to work problems throughout

the TVA. In the past 4 years, over 2,500 suggestions

were accepted, about 43 percent of the total submitted.

The largest proportion deal with improving efficiency on

the job; others concern safety and health, training,

morale, the work environment, and similar matters.

Suggestions result in savings ranging from an hour’s labor

to thousands of dollars.

TVA’s cooperative, problem-solving approach is

supported strongly by management and labor.

Management states that the “ . . . continuous dialogue in

areas of mutual interest. . . engenders positive attitudes

and relationships . . . (that) have a positive influence on

productivity___ ” Union officials recognize that

beyond the bargaining process there is an area of mutual

interest in TVA’s efficiency. A 1965 study by the

University of Michigan Institute of Social Research

found that cooperative committees foster among

employees a strong sense of identification with TVA’s

purposes and a willingness to accept job changes, which

favors improvement in the organization’s productivity.

Cooperative program for worker safety in the paper

industry

Joint labor-management committees have been found

to be useful in communicating safety know-how and

developing broad participation in plant safety programs.

Provision for cooperative efforts are included in many

major collective bargaining agreements. A BLS study of

contracts in effect in 1970 covering 5,000 workers or

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more, reported that 71, covering a total of 1,226,250

workers, contained provisions for labor-management

safety committees. By promoting safe performance, they

contribute to increasing the efficiency of plant

operations.

One o f the most successful cooperative programs is

one operated in paper mills belonging to the Pacific

Coast Association o f Pulp and Paper Manufacturers,

which has over 25,000 employees. These mills have

collective bargaining contracts with the Association of

Western Pulp and Paper Workers (Ind.). Between 1945

and 1968, the combined injury-frequency rate of these

mills fell more than 86 percent to less than half the 1968

national paper industry average of 14.0 disabling injuries

per million man-hours worked. One company in the

program reported a combined injury-frequency rate of

only 3.51 in 1969, and another mill achieved the

ultimate safety objective of a zero disability-frequency

rate.

The program developed out o f a union proposal for a

series of educational conferences on safety.

Union-management safety committees subsequently

were established at each participating mill. These

committees meet regularly to review reports of plant

inspections and accident investigations; discuss unsafe

work methods and practices, safety suggestions, and

safety rules; encourage safety consciousness through

bulletins, posters, and meetings; and serve as a forum for

new ideas, complaints, and recommendations. Since

1965, about 8,000 employees-both labor and

management—have completed a 5-hour safety course,

developed with the assistance of two trained consultants.

The course had first been given to over 300 management

and labor discussion leaders.

The association also has sponsored a hearing

conservation program. This has involved seminars with

noise experts, joint educational conferences, and noise

prevention devices, such as sound absorbing enclosures

on machines.

To encourage interest in safety, the Association

publishes monthly data on injury-frequency rates of

member mills. Competition among the mills is fostered

by awards presented at annual conferences, based on the

lowest 5-year injury-frequency rate, the lowest

frequency rate for that year, and the lowest rate in each

of the three State.

Conferences are co-chaired by a labor and a

management representative. By agreement, these

meetings are reserved for consideration of suggestions

and ideas that can be used by individual delegates to

improve their plant safety programs.

Union-management cooperation in the needle trades

Union-management cooperation to improve

efficiency in the needle trades has contributed to the

survival of firms threatened by low wage nonunion

competition. Joint efforts have involved expert help,

either from the union or from outside consultants, to

reduce costs and safeguard jobs. The industry is made up

of many small, owner-operated firms, operating on

narrow profit margins and subject to severe fluctuations

in activity, because of style and market changes. Having

a broad, industry wide outlook, the International Ladies’

Garment Workers’ Union and the Amalgamated Clothing

Workers play a dominant role in stablizing economic

conditions.

The best examples of efforts to improve efficiency

come from the work of the ILGWU’s Industrial

Engineering Department. The major function of the

Department’s technicians is to help union representatives

handle wage rate problems. Also, since the ability of

piece work operators to earn a decent wage often

depends on management’s ability to schedule and

allocate the work, the Department has developed a

program to assist union employers, at their request, to

improve their efficiency. This aid is extended principally

to union firms in high cost markets facing competition

from nonunion low cost producers and to newly

organized firms which are not able to pay union wage

increases because of substandard productivity. In these

cases, the union experts may advise the employer on

how to improve his plant layout, inventory and cost

controls, or work scheduling so that he can pay higher

piece rates without raising unit labor costs or reducing

employment. The experts also may advise union

members to accept certain changes in the interest of

long-term job security.

Another type of joint approach is exemplified by the

Industry Development Fund setup in 1966 by the

ILGWU and the Knitted Outerwear Manufacturers

Association of Pennsylvania. Financed by employer

contributions, the Fund is used to make engineering

studies of improved methods of space utilization,

operations, materials handling, and quality control and

to conduct training courses for upgrading workers.

Recommendations for improvements by the Fund’s

experts are made available to all members of the

Association who may or may not adopt them. The

Union plays an advisory role, especially in training of

operatives.

In these examples, the rank and file members o f the

union do not participate actively. The outside

technicians do not become an integral part of the plant’s

organization. Nevertheless, such union-management

cooperation has proven helpful in improving

productivity at firms in the needle trades threatened by

closing.

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Chapter VIII. Job Redesign

New concepts about the relation of job design to

productivity improvement have come from recent

studies in the fields o f engineering, psychology, and

management. The traditional industrial engineering

approach features job standardization, specialization,

and simplification which result in mass production and

productivity improvement but also much repetitive work

and little job satisfaction. Human engineering, an

approach that developed out of experience with military

equipment, seeks to relieve physical and mental stress on

the job, by giving much weight to human factors in the

design of machinery. More recently, research on the

nature of satisfaction in work has led to reexamination

of the value of extreme job specialization and to paying

greater attention to designing jobs with greater variety

and responsibility and chances for achievement.

Although only a few companies and unions have shown

much interest in providing motivation through the work

itself, the potential for higher productivity is believed to

be substantial.

The following four examples illustrate the application

of various approaches to job design and redesign in

different industries. The first two describe applications

of human engineering: one, a formal program by a large

company; the other, informal uses to relieve job stress

on older workers. The third example deals with job

enlargement which resulted in greater productivity as

well as greater job satisfaction. The fourth reviews the

recent changeover from the individual to the team

approach in the practice of dentistry.

Fitting jobs to men: Human engineering

Human engineering is the study of the physical and

mental demands of jobs and the application of this

knowledge to design jobs and machines so that the

worker is not compelled to work beyond the limits of

his capacities. This interdisciplinary field is also called,

“ergonomics.” Some large companies have set up human

engineering programs to improve worker performance

and safety. Unions rarely are involved in these efforts.

The human engineering approach assumes that the

efficiency and reliability of machines depend not only

on built-in technical features but also on the ability of

the worker to control them easily. Such ability is

influenced by the degree of human force and accuracy

required to operate the machines; the placement of

controls and levers to regulate them; and the extent of

heat, noise, and other stresses in the environment.

Human engineers try to adapt machines, work places,

and working conditions to the worker for maximum

productivity. More and more, knowledge of human

factors is considered essential in eliminating hazardous

conditions in the work environment for greater

occupational safety and health.

An outstanding example of this approach is the work

done by the Human Factors Group at the Eastman

Kodak Company. The group draws on experts in

medicine, psychology, physiology, safety, and industrial

engineering. It is consulted at the intial design stage of

new processes and modifications of equipment.

The Group has studied a variety of tasks in the

company, such as inspection requiring considerable

perceptual activity; operation of complex equipment for

long periods under stress o f rapid decisionmaking; and

production of sensitized film products demanding skilled

work in low light. Also, since many jobs involve doing

several tasks simultaneously, there is considerable

research on ways of modifying the job as far as possible

and of selecting individuals who can perform such work

with a minimum of stress.

In jobs that place heavy physical loads on employees,

the Human Factors Group applies new techniques of

studying work physiology. The points of stress in any

job on the worker’s cardiovascular and respiratory

systems are determined, and the duration and frequency

of rest breaks and other possible improvements in the

way of accomplishing the task without such effects are

devised.

The location of instruments, work pieces, and

controls which promotes the most comfortable work

position is another subject of investigation. Careful

measurements of the worker’s arm reach and motions

while working are made for the purpose of designing

work places that minimize discomfort and stress. The

efforts of the Human Factors Group are said to payoff

in increased productivity as well as in reduced fatigue

and injury.

Job redesign for older workers

Redesigning a job to fit a worker’s abilities has been

recommended by manpower experts as an effective way

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of maintaining the productivity of workers whose

physical capacities are diminished because of age or

physical disability. Job redesign is considered more

effective than reassignment or early retirement because

it minimizes retraining and other difficult readjustments

for older workers and allows them to utilize their skills

in a familiar setting, without stress or loss of morale.

Examples of this practice were presented in a BLS

report on Job Redesign for Older Workers prepared in

1966 as part of an international study conducted by the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD). Out of 500 large industrial

corporations canvassed by the BLS, only a handful

reported that they had redesigned jobs specifically for

older workers. Many companies, however, reported that

in the normal course of mechanizing jobs to improve

efficiency, fatiguing tasks often are eliminated to the

benefit of both old and young workers.

Examples of job redesign for older workers were

found in plants, ranging widely in size in a variety of

manufacturing industries. Many o f the workers affected

were machine operators, some were highly skilled

craftsmen and a few were laborers and porters. The

typical case involved job redesign by managers on an

informal basis to improve the efficiency o f a specific

worker or group o f workers whose physical capacity was

declining or who suffered an illness. Unions typically

had a limited role in these situations. In several cases a

substantial rise in output per man-hour was recorded. In

no case did productivity decline.

One case involved 20 older women who worked as

top stitchers at a shoe factory. Before the change, their

job required frequent stooping, squatting, bending, and

stretching. When absenteeism and complaints began to

increase and productivity declined, the plant manager

decided to remove the physically demanding tasks and

assigned them to two younger service workers. The older

top stitchers continued to work at their stitching

machines uninterruptedly, absenteeism and complaints

declined, and productivity rose significantly.

Another case dealt with changes in the job of a

56-year old skilled operator of an electric locomotive

crane. Before job redesign, the operator had to push and

pull long handled levers manually, using arm, leg, and

back muscles constantly. On the worker’s return to this

job after a long illness which affected his strength and

ability to stand constantly, the plant manager replaced

the original brakes and controls with more easily

operated air powered levers. These improvements were

quickly installed at a total cost of only about $500. The

new equipment enabled the operator to sit at his job

most of the day, and required much less physical

exertion. The company was able to retain an

experienced and productive operator who was difficult

to replace.

Job enlargement to reduce costs

Job enlargement—the broadening of job skill, variety,

and responsibility—has been adopted by several

companies to counteract some of the negative aspects of

extreme job specialization. The results generally have

been favorable for productivity as well as for employee

satisfaction.

Job enlargement is defined as the redesign of job

content to enlarge worker discretion over the pace,

quality, and method of operation. Programs of job

enlargement prior to the mid-1950’s-such as those at

IBM and Detroit Edison—were concerned primarily with

long-run improvement of the attitude and morale of

employees in highly repetitive and specialized jobs, with

the hope that eventually productivity would be

increased. More recently, researchers have found that job

enlargement also has potential for immediate tangible

savings in manufacturing costs.

According to a 1966 University o f Michigan survey,

41 of the 210 companies that provided information

reported some type of job enlargement projects.

Manufacturing plants, transportation companies,

utilities, and life insurance firms reported that this

technique had been adopted primarily for the purpose of

reducing costs; other goals included improved employee

attitude and morale and better quality. A majority rated

their experience as satisfactory.

The potential for tangible cost savings was

investigated at a firm manufacturing pump assemblies

for home washing machines by Professor Maurice

Kilbridge of the University o f Chicago School of

Business. Before job enlargement, pumps were assembled

on a six-man and later on a four-man production line

with annual labor costs (based on 1,500 pumps

assembled daily) of about $20,000 for each line. After

pump assembly was shifted to four one-man work

stations, at which each employee did a greater variety of

tasks, total annual costs for the same level of output

declined by more than $2,000. Although costs of

training and facilities were higher in the one-man work

stations, direct labor costs dropped from about 1.77

minutes per pump, under each assembly line operation,

to 1.49 minutes in the one-man work stations—a decline

of 16 percent. A two-thirds reduction in nonproductive

handling time was the major source of the labor savings.

Job enlargement appears to have applicability to

many repetitive jobs involving batch work with idle time

between operations, and material handling jobs where

costs are high. Jobs that are machine paced offer less

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potential for job enlargement. Researchers recommend

careful advance planning before introduction of job

enlargement, including advance notice and training as

essential to increasing employee and union acceptance.

Improving productivity among dentists

A change in the job structure, involving the use of

dental assistants is resulting in impressive improvements

in the productivity of the dental profession in meeting

its rapidly increasing patient load. Until a few years ago,

the traditional practice was for the dentist, standing at

his dental chair, to work with little or no direct

assistance in the provision of treatment services. But

studies made by the Public Health Service in the 1950’s

showed possibility of improving productivity of dentists

from 35 to 75 percent by the use of one or two auxiliary

workers.

To change traditional practices, the Public Health

Service chose to train dental students in new methods of

practice, rather than focusing on retraining practicing

dentists. First on a pilot basis in 1957, and then on a

grant’s program in 1961, the Public Health Service with

the cooperation of the American Dental Association,

assisted dental schools to develop formal continuing

programs of classroom and clinical instruction in the

effective use of chairside assistants. In these programs,

the new mode of practice has come to be known as “sit

down four handed dentistry.”

The Dental Auxiliary Utilization program has been

adopted by all dental schools. Moreover, instruction in

how to utilize auxiliary staff has become an official

requirement for dental school accreditation. About

30,000 dental graduates—nearly a third of all dentists in

practice-have had such training. By 1975, the Public

Health Service estimates that about half of all

professional dentists will have been trained in these

techniques.

Recent Public Health Service studies suggest that

further substantial improvements in dental productivity

is possible by delegating selected additional procedures

to trained auxiliary workers. In a new program recently

started, students will be taught to work with, manage,

and supervise a team of dental auxiliary workers trained

in additional procedures. Twenty-two States already have

liberalized their dental practice acts to permit the

broader delegation o f duties envisioned in this advanced

program.

Although full evaluation of this change has not yet

been completed, the experience of the Indian Health

Service where the new system, along with other

management improvements, has been put into effect

shows impressive productivity gains. Between 1957 and

1970, dental services increased by 195 percent; at the

same time only 102 percent in dental office and staff

increased, some o f the increase in dental officers went

into administration and training. By 1970, the Indian

Health Service had achieved a ratio of 1.4 dental

assistants per dental clinician.

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Chapter IX. Absenteeism and Hours of Work

Absenteeism often has a disruptive effect on plant

productivity, especially where the production process

involves sequential work and requires the presence of all

team members for efficiency. Although no definitive

data are available on the extent, trend, and causes, the

general impression is that absenteeism has risen in recent

years. Accordingly, there is a constant search for more

effective ways of reducing the rate. In part, growing

interest in the 4-day workweek has been stimulated

by a concern about absenteeism. Since absenteeism is to

some extent a symptom of dissatisfaction with working

conditions, many measures discussed in other parts of

the report also have a bearing on its control.

The following two examples are concerned with two

aspects of the absenteeism problem: a review of methods

used by management to control excessive absenteeism,

including a recent development in collective bargaining

and a review o f the trend toward the adoption of the

4-day week.

Control of absenteeism

Many plant managers are deeply concerned about the

harmful effects of excessive absenteeism on

productivity, work scheduling, and overtime labor costs.

A reasonable amount o f absenteeism due to bona fide

illness, family emergencies, transportation breakdowns,

etc.—the major causes—generally is recognized as beyond

the employee’s control. But when absenteeism becomes

critical (for example, when sick pay is grossly misused)

many companies try to work out special control

procedures.

Disciplinary measures, according to a 1969-70 survey

o f personnel directors by the Bureau of National Affairs,

were considered by the respondents to be the most

effective. This procedure often follows a progressive

pattern: for example, oral reprimand by the employee’s

supervisor for three absences in a year; written warning

for five absences; warning and probation for seven

absences; and discharge and termination for more than

seven. Enforcement, however, requires attendance

records on each employee. Other difficult administrative

tasks are defining excessive absenteeism and applying the

formula with flexibility in regard to the reasons for

absences.

Another frequent approach, sometimes coupled with

the first, provides for counselling and education of

employees about the importance o f adhering to a

reasonable attendance standard. The union’s help is

sometimes enlisted to good advantage. For example, at

one company the supervisor warns and counsels the

employee in the presence of the department manager

and the union steward. The 1970 contracts between the

General Motors Corporation and the Ford Motor

Company and the United Auto Workers provide for

union participation in orientation talks to new

employees where the importance of regular attendance is

stressed.

A few companies use incentive awards such as cash

bonuses for perfect attendance or full pay for unused

sick leave. One company paid a $10 a month perfect

attendance bonus for certain types of unskilled labor

with good results. Another cut Monday and Friday

absenteeism substantially by having a lottery on those

days; the workers were required to be present to collect.

Finally, many companies try to show concern about

absenteeism by publishing absenteeism statistics, training

supervisors, and investigating causes of poor attendance.

One company uses closed circuit TV for training while

another applied a computer to tabulate records and

developed for supervisors a package program for control

purposes.

The 4-day 40-hour week

The adoption of a 4-day workweek by a number of

companies has attracted recent attention because of its

effects on leisure time and worker productivity. A 1970

study located 27 companies on the 4-day week, mainly

in manufacturing. Only five were unionized. A July

1971 article reported 367 firms, in industries including

manufacturing, retail trade, advertising, banking,

hospitals, and government. While the typical plant is

relatively small, some large organizations, such as

Amour, IBM, and the Social Security Administration are

installing the 4-day week in some plants or studying its

possibilities.

Typically, this innovation means a reallocation of 40

hours from 5 to 4 days, and no change in pay. The work

day is usually lengthened but employees enjoy a 3-day

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weekend. A few companies in the 1970 study shortened

the workweek by 4 hours in lieu of a pay raise and one

paid overtime for over 8 hours in a day.

Management usually initiated the 4-day schedule. In

some cases, however, the change was installed after a

vote of approval by employees. The principal

management objectives were to recruit a better labor

force; to reduce absenteeism, tardiness, and turnover;

and to cut labor costs. In a few cases, the new schedule

was adopted to handle peak work loads or sales.

The experience of a small New England

manufacturing plant illustrates some conversion

problems. Union members voted by a large margin to

adopt management’s proposed 4-day week. Factory

workers were put on a 9-hour day; office workers, on an

8 Vi hour day. Both groups were paid for 40 hours.

However, the factory workers no longer have coffee

breaks, and washup time was reduced by half.

A western, nonunion manufacturing plant instituted a

4-day week: the day shift reports a 7 a.m. and leaves at 5

p.m., Monday to Wednesday; on Thursday, 7 a.m. and 4

p.m. In weeks when a holiday falls on a Monday, the

workweeks begin Tuesday and run through Fridays.

Employees receive 40 hours’ pay plus the holiday if the

holiday is a scheduled paid one, not on a Monday. Four

formerly paid holidays have been discontinued; the

company still pays for 5 holidays.

Generally, companies reported in the 1970 study,

greater gains then originally anticipated. Many reported,

shortly after the change, lower turnover and less

absenteeism. Some reported unexpected gains in output

with fewer man-hours. An auto executive sees the 4-day

week as a possible key to improving worker motivation

and thereby quality control.

Some companies, however, discontinued their plans

because of the inability to service customers adequately,

less time to promote sales, and employee dissatisfaction.

Also, some managers in industries that run on a

round-the-clock basis are concerned that two 10-hour

shifts would leave costly equipment idle for 4 hours a

day.

Workers’ reactions were mixed: many valued the

longer weekend and lower commuting costs. But a few,

mostly women, reported greater fatigue and

inconvenience in tending to family needs. Unions

express little interest in the 4-day week itself unless

coupled with fewer hours or more pay. Some officials

fear increased moonlighting would sharpen competition

for jobs with unemployed workers. The Chrysler

Corporation and the United Auto Workers, however,

agreed to study the feasibility of the 4-day week and to

set up pilot operations to test it.

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Appendix Selected Bibliography

Retraining of Plumbers

United Association Construction Agreement. International Training Fund: Facing the Craft

Challenges o f Tom orrow , Washington, D. C., 1969.

UA Jou rnal (United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting

Industry of the United States and Canada) March 1967, pp. 9-10.

1 9 6 9 Instruction Training Program Conducted by the UA Training Department, Purdue University,

Lafayette, Ind., August 10-15,1969.

Union Sponsored Retraining for Printers

International Typographical Union, Executive Council. M odern Printing. Colorado Springs, Colo.

1969.

T ypographical Jou rnal Official paper of the International Typographical Union. Various issues.

Upgrading Hospital Employees

Medical and Health Research Association of New York City, Inc. T ow ard A Career in Nursing:

Upgrading N u rse’s A id es to L P N ’s Through A W ork-Study Program (Final Progress Report, April

1967-May 1970). Under contract with the Manpower Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.

Rosen, Sumner. “Union Management Cooperation: Is There an Agenda for Tomorrow,” in

Proceedings o f th e T w en ty-first A nnual Winter M eeting, Industrial Relations Research Association,

December 29-30,1968, Chicago, 111.

Training and Retraining in the Maritime Industry

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. M ajor C ollective Bargaining A greem ents:

Training and R etraining Provisions (BLS Bulletin 1425-7 appendix B. Washington, D.C., 1969), pp.

31-33.

Improving Basic Education of Steelworkers

Doeringer, Peter B. Programs to E m p lo y the Disadvantaged. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,

Inc., 1969, pp. 130-143.

“Steelworkers Forge a Better Future ’’ M anpower, July 1969, pp. 21-24.

The Music Performance Trust Funds

American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada (AFL-CIO). M usic is Your

Business. New York, 1970, pamphlet.

Music Performance Trust Funds. F orty-th ird R e p o rt and S tatem en t, M usic Perform ance Trust F unds,

January 1 ,1 9 7 0 ; June 3 0 ,1 9 7 0 . New York, September 1970.

Music Performance Trust Funds. M usic! L ive and Free! New York, 1970, pamphlet.

Music Performance Trust Funds. T ru stee’s Regulations: R ecording Industries, Revised July 1, 1970,

New York, 1970.

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Centralized Meat Cutting

Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America (AFL-CIO). Sum m ary o f

S elected B enefits in K roger C u tting Plants. Chicago, 111., 1971.

The International Typographical Union and "Bogus" Typesetting

Fogel, Walter and Archie Kleingartner, editors. C on tem porary L abor Issues. Belmont, Calif.:

Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1966.

Jacobs, Paul. D ea d H orse an d th e F eatherbed. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of

Democratic Institutions, 1962.

Kelber, Harry and Carl Schlesinger. Union Printers an d C on trolled A u to m a tio n . New York:

Collier-Macmillan and Free Press, 1967.

Leiter, Robert David. F eatherbedding and Job Security. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1964.

Porter, Arthur. Job P roperty R ights: A S tu d y o f th e Job C ontrols o f th e In ternational Typographical

Union. New York: King’s Crown Press, 1954.

Union and Management Accommodation in Fabricated Housing Construction

“Developments in Industrial Relations,” M on thly L abor R eview , August 1969, pp. 73-74.

“History-Making Prefabrication Study is Enthusiastically Received,” Building an d C onstruction

Trades Bulletin, March 1968.

Joint News Release of the United Association (Plumbers) and American Standard, Inc., February 2,

1970. (Issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.)

“Modular Housing Program Fades Away,” Business Week, March 14,1970, pp. 55-57.

National Concrete and Building Products Agreement with the Laborers’ International Union of North

America (AFL-CIO), effective March 16,1970.

Tri-Trades Agreement with Prestige Structures, Inc., effective October 1, 1969, and Tri-Trades

Agreement with Mobile and Modular Homes Division of Concord Homes, Inc., effective May 1, 1970.

United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 1106, Agreement with Stirling

Homex corp., effective September 23,1968.

International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union Mechanization and Modernization

Agreement

Fairley, Lincoln. “The ILW-PMA Mechanization and Modernization Agreement,” Proceedings o f the

IR R A Spring M eeting, May 4-5,1961, pp. 664-680.

Goldberg, Joseph P. “Containerization as a Force for Change on the Waterfront,” M o n th ly L abor

R eview , January 1968, pp. 8-13.

Hartman, Paul. C ollective Bargaining and P ro d u ctiv ity: The Longshore M echanization A greem ent.

1969.

Horvitz, Wayne L. “The ILWU-PMA Mechanization and Modernization Agreement,” Proceedings o f

the T w enty-first A nnual Winter M eeting, IRRA, December 29-30,1968, pp. 144-151.

Kossoris, Max D. “ 1966 West Coast Longshore Negotiations,” M on th ly L abor R eview ,, October 1966,

pp. 1067-1075.

Ross, Philip. “Distribution of Power Within the ILWU and the ILA,” M on th ly L abor R eview , January

1969, pp. 1-7.

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Attrition Arrangements in the Railroad Industry

Abies, Robert J. “History and Experience Under Railroad Employee Protection Plans,” in R e p o rt,

U.S. Presidential Railroad Commission, Appendix Vol. 3, Washington, D.C., 1962, pp. 107-191.

Cottrell, Fred. Technological Change and L abor in the R ailroad Industry. Lexington, Mass.: D.C.

Heath and Co., 1970.

Dunand, George. “Technological Progress and Job Security on the U.S. Railroads,” International

L abor R eview , May 1964, pp. 482-495.

Levine, Morton. “Adjusting to Technology on the Railroads,” M on th ly L abor R e view , November

1969, pp. 3642.

Aid to Railroad Workers under AMTRAK

S ta tem en t o f th e S ecretary o f L abor on E m p lo yee P ro tective A rrangem ents u nder th e R a il Passenger

Service A c t o f 1970, before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 93d Congress, 1st

Session, April 28,1971.

Railroad Passenger Service Act of 1970. Section 405, Protective Arrangements for Employees.

Interplant Transfer Arrangements in the Ford-UAW Agreement

Killingsworth, Charles C. C ooperative A pproach es to Problem s o f Technological Change. Lansing,

Mich.: Michigan State University, School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Reprint Series No. 59,

1963-64.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. M ajor C ollective Bargaining A greem en ts: Plant

M ovem ent, Transfer, and R elocation A llow ances, (BLS Bulletin 1425-10, Washington, D.C., 1969).

Weber, Arnold. The Inter-Plant Transfer o f D isplaced E m ployees. For the Armour Automation Fund

Committee, Chicago, 111., 1961.

“When an Auto Plant Closes Up: Ford’s Dallas Plant,” Business Week, February 14,1970, pp. 24-25.

Relocation Allowances

AFL-CIO. A d ju stin g to A u tom ation . AFL-CIO Publication No. 144, Washington, D.C., January 1969.

International Association of Machinists. M eeting the P roblem s o f A u to m a tio n Through C ollective

Bargaining. Washington, D. C., December 1960.

Schnitzer, Martin. “Relocation Allowances and Labor Mobility,” in F ederal Programs f o r the

D evelo p m en t o f H uman Resources, Vol. 1. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 90th

Congress, 1968, pp. 224-231.

Early Retirement

Davis, Harry E., and Arnold Strasser. “Private Pension Plans, 1960-69: An Overview,” M o n th ly L abor

R eview , July 1970, pp. 45-56.

Greene, Mark R. and others. E arly R etirem en t: A S urvey o f C om pany Policies and R e tire e s*

Experiences. Eugene, Oreg.: University of Oregon, College of Business Administration, 1969.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. R e c e n t C ollective Bargaining and

Technological Change. (BLS Report 266, Washington, D.C., 1964).

New York Longshoring: The Guaranteed Annual Wage

Groom, Phyllis. “Hiring Practices for Longshoremen,” M o n th ly L a b o r R eview , November 1965, pp.

1289-1296.

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Jensen, Vernon H. “Decasualization of Employment on the New York Waterfront,” Industrial and

L abor R elation s R eview , July 1958, pp. 534-550.

------ , -------. “Computer Hiring of Dock Workers in the Port of New York,” Industrial and L abor

R elation s R eview , April 1967, pp. 414-432.

Stowe, David H. “Problems of Collective Bargaining and Dispute Settlement in the East and Gulf

Coast Longshore Industry,” Proceedings o f the 1 9th A n nu al M eeting, N ation al A c a d em y o f

A rbitrators, 1966. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1967.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. N ation al E m ergency D isputes:

Labor-M anagem ent R elation s (T aft-H artley) A c t, 194 7 -6 8 (BLS Bulletin 1633, Washington, D.C.,

1969).

Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor. A n nu al R ep o rts, 1953-54 to 1969-70. New York.

Armour Automation Fund

Killingsworth, Charles C. C ooperative A pproach es to P roblem s o f Technological Change. Lansing,

Mich.: Michigan State University, School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Reprint Series No. 59,

1963-64.

Shultz, George Pratt and Arnold R. Weber. Strategies fo r the D isplaced Workers. New York: Harper

and Row, 1966.

Stern, James L. “Manpower Planning for Displaced Workers,” M o n th ly L abor R eview , December

1969, pp. 21-28.

Weber, Arnold R. The Inter-Plant Transfer o f D isplaced E m ployees. For the Armour Automation

Fund Committee, Chicago, 111., 1961.

Manpower Planning in the Telephone Industry

The Diebold Group, Inc. A u to m a tio n : In p u t and Im p lica tio n s-F o cu s on D evelopm en ts in the

C om m unications In dustry. For the Communications Workers of America, April 1965.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. M anpow er Planning fo r Technological Change:

Case S tudies o f T elephone O perators (BLS Bulletin 1574, Washington, D.C., 1968).

Manpower Planning in the Internal Revenue Service

Rothberg, Herman. “A Study of the Impact of Office Automation in the IRS,” M on th ly L abor

R eview , October 1969, pp. 26-30.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Im p a ct o f O ffice A u to m a tio n in the Internal

R evenu e Service ( BLS Bulletin 1364, Washington, D.C., 1963).

A Profit Sharing Plan

Northrup, Herbert R. and Harvey A. Young. “The Causes of Industrial Peace Revisited,” Industrial

and L abor R elation s R eview , October 1968, pp. 31-47.

Paul, George S. A m erican V elvet C om pany and T extile Workers Union o f A m erica. Case Study No.

11 in Series on Causes of Industrial Peace under Collective Bargaining. Washington, D.C.: National

Planning Association, 1953.

Tarneja, Ram S. P ro fit Sharing and Technological Change. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin,

School of Commerce, Center for Productivity Motivation, 1964.

The Scanlon Plan

Lesieur, Fred G. and Elbridge S. Puckett. “The Scanlon Plan: Past, Present, and Future,” in

Proceedings o f th e T w en ty-first A n nu al Winter M eeting, Industrial Relations Research Association,

December 29-30,1968, pp. 71-80.

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Lesieur, Fred G. and Elbridge S. Puckett. “The Scanlon Plan Has Proved Itself,” Harvard Business

R eview , September-October 1969, pp. 109-118.

McKersie, Robert B. “Wage Payment Methods of the Future,” British Journal o f Industrial R elation s,

June 1963, pp. 191-212.

Slichter, Sumner H., James J. Healy, and E. Robert Livernash. The Im p a ct o f C ollective Bargaining on

M anagem ent Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960, pp. 864-877.

Kaiser Long-range Sharing Plan

Balsley, Gerard E. “The Kaiser Steel Plan,” in C on tem porary L abor Issues, Walter Fogel, ed. Belmont,

Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1966, pp. 347-352.

The L o n g Range Sharing Plan: K aiser S tee l Corp. an d U nited S teelw orkers o f A m eric a -E x tra E ffo rt,

E xtra Earnings. Fontana, Calif.: Kaiser Steel Manufacturing Division, 1967.

Macllwaine, C. A. “Appraisal of Kaiser’s Sharing Plan,” M on th ly L abor R eview , April 1964, pp.

401404.

Pollara, Frank. “Automation and Retraining: The Steelworkers-Kaiser Steel Experience,” in

Proceedings o f N e w Y ork U n iversity’s 16th A n nu al C onference on Labor. New York: Matthew

Bender and Co., 1963, pp. 73-80.

“Recommendations of Kaiser-United Steelworkers Long-Range Committee,” M on th ly L abor R eview ,

February 1961, pp. 137-138.

Stieglitz, Harold. “Kaiser-Steel Union Sharing Plan,” in S tudies in Personnel P olicy (No. 187). New

York, N. Y. National Industrial Conference Board, 1963.

Union-Management Cooperation at the TVA

Massey, John E. “A Search for Trust Within a Public Agency,” Public Personnel R eview , July 1965,

pp. 130-134.

Patchen, Martin. “Labor-Management Consultation at TVA: Its Impact on Employees,”

A dm in istrative Science Q uarterly, September 1965, pp. 149-170.

------ , -------. Participation, A chievem ent, and In volvem en t on the Job. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:

Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.

T w en ty-secon d A nnual V alley-w ide M eeting o f TVA Union-M anagement C ooperative C om m ittees.

Speeches and panel discussion. Panel members: John T. Dunlop, John McConnel, Milton Derber.

Chattanooga, Tenn., May 24-25, 1967.

Cooperative Program for Labor Safety

“Papermaking Made Safer in Pacific Coast Mills,” S a fety Standards, September-October 1970, pp.

10-13ff.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Characteristics o f A greem en ts Covering 5 ,0 0 0

Workers o r M ore. (BLS Bulletin 1686, Washington, D.C., 1970).

Union-Management Cooperation in the Needle Trades

Braun, Kurt. Union-M anagement C ooperation. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1947.

International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union. R e p o rt o f the G eneral E xecu tive Board. New York,

1968, pp. 85 and 170. Also see R e p o rt for 1959, pp. 65-67; 1962, pp. 161; and 1965, p. 176.

Slichter, Sumner H., James J. Healy, and E. Robert Livernash. The Im pact o f C ollective Bargaining on

M anagem ent. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960, pp. 844-851.

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Fitting Jobs to Men: Human Engineering

Davis, Harry L., Terrence W. Faulkner, and Charles I. Miller, M.D. “Work Physiology,” Human

F actors, April 1969, pp. 157-166.

“Fitting Job to Man is Job of Kodak Human Factors Group,” K o d a k Highlights, February 1971,

Rochester, N.Y.: Eastman Kodak Company, pp. 4-5.

Job Redesign for Older Workers

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Job R edesign an d O ccupational Training

fo r O lder Workers: Final R eport. Paris, 1965.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Job R edesign and O ccupational Training

fo r O lder Workers: S u p p lem en t to th e Final R e p o r t Paris, 1965.

Rey. Paule. Various Cases o f J ob R edesign fo r O lder Workers, Report No. 3 of International

Management Seminar on Job Redesign and Occupational Training for Older Workers. Paris:

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1965.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Job R edesign fo r O lder Workers: Ten Case

S tu dies (BLS Bulletin 1523, Washington, D.C., 1967).

Job Enlargement to Reduce Costs

Conant, Eaton H. and Maurice D. Kilbridge. “An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Job Enlargement:

Technology, Costs, and Behavioral Implications,” Industrial and L a b o r R elation s R eview , April 1965,

pp. 377-395.

Kilbridge, Maurice D. “Reduced Costs through Job Enlargement: A Case,” The Journal o f Business,

July 1960, pp. 357-362.

Schoderbek, Peter P. and William E. Reif. Job Enlargem ent: K e y to Im p ro ved Perform ance. Ann

Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, Graduate School of Business Administration, Bureau of

Industrial Relations, 1969.

Improving Productivity Among Dentists

McClellan, T. E. and J. L. Cox. “An Evaluation of Dental Officer-Dental Assistant Team Training in

Efficient Dental Management,” A m erican D en tal A ssociation Journal, March 1968, pp. 548-553.

Weiss, Jeffrey H. “How Auxiliaries Increase Productivity of Dentists,” M on th ly L abor R eview , April

1971, pp. 63-64.

Control of Absenteeism

Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. A bsen teeism a n d Its C o n tro l Personnel Policies Forum, Survey No.

90, Washington, D.C., 1970.

Johnson, Jr., E. H. “Control o f Sick Leave,” Personnel A dm inistration, January 1969, pp. 35-39.

Kearns, J. C. “Controlling Absenteeism for Profit,” Personnel Journal, January 1970, pp. 50-51.

Sternhagen, C. J. “Medicine’s Role in Reducing Absenteeism,” Personnel, November 1969, pp. 28-35.

U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Labor Standards Administration. F acts A b o u t Women's

A bsen teeism an d L a b o r Turnover. Washington, D.C., August 1969.

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4-day 40-hour week

4 Days, 40 Hours. Edited by Riva Poor with foreword by Paul Samuelson. Cambridge, Mass.: Bursk 

and Poor Publishing, 1970.

Lewis, Albert. “The 4-Day Week," NAM Reports, November 23,1970.

“The Leisure Class: Firms, Workers Cheer as the 4-Day Week Makes Some Inroads,” The Watt Street

Journal, October 15,1970.

Wheeler, Kenneth E. “Small Business Eyes the Four-Day Workweek,” Harvard Business Review,

May-June 1970, pp. 142-147.

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