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State v. Honsch

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT HONSCH

(SC 20742)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,

Ecker, Dannehy and Moll, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of murder in connection with the disappearance and death of

his daughter, E, the defendant appealed to this court. In September,

1995, E’s body was discovered in New Britain. E’s remains were wrapped

in trash bags and sleeping bags, and, although the police were initially

unable to identify E, they collected hairs from E’s body, as well as a

hair and palm prints from the trash bags. At about the same time the

police discovered E’s body, the defendant told a family member that he

was leaving the country imminently to take a job and that E and the

defendant’s wife, M, had already departed the country. In October, 1995,

M’s body was found in Massachusetts, and the police were unable to

identify her remains at that time. In October or November, 1995, E and

M were reported missing, but authorities were unable to locate them.

In 2014, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the

defendant’s home in Ohio, where he was using his new wife’s last name,

and collected samples of his DNA and hair, as well as his finger and

palm prints. DNA tests linked the defendant to, among other things, palm

prints on the trash bags used to wrap E’s remains. The commonwealth

of Massachusetts subsequently charged the defendant with, and he was

convicted of, M’s murder. Thereafter, the state of Connecticut charged

the defendant with murdering E in Connecticut. Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the case for lack of territorial jurisdiction because

the state, which conceded that the actual location of E’s murder was

unknown, had failed to establish that E was murdered in Connecticut.

The trial court, however, applied a permissive presumption, consistent

with § 1.03 (4) of the Model Penal Code, that the death of a homicide

victim occurred in the state where the body was found and, accordingly,

denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court also denied the defendant’s

request for a jury instruction that the presence of his palm prints on

the trash bags could not establish his connection with the crime unless

it was demonstrated that the prints could have been impressed only at

the time that the crime was perpetrated. Held:

1. The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack

of territorial jurisdiction:

The state has territorial jurisdiction to enact criminal laws and to enforce

them when the criminal conduct, or the result of the criminal conduct,

occurs within its territorial limits, and, to temper the state’s burden of

proving territorial jurisdiction in murder cases, the common law recog-
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State v. Honsch

nizes a permissive presumption, set forth in § 1.03 (4) of the Model Penal

Code, that a murder took place where the victim’s body was discovered.

This court embraced that presumption as a rule of criminal procedure

and concluded that the trial court properly applied the presumption in

light of the robust public policy supporting it and its widespread use

around the country.

Specifically, the presumption ensures that the state’s interests in enforcing its criminal laws and in pursuing justice for its citizens and the

victim’s family are vindicated, while also providing the defendant with

the opportunity to rebut the presumption with evidence establishing that

the murder did not occur within the state.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention that the adoption of the presumption set forth in § 1.03 of the Model Penal Code is a question reserved

for the legislature and that the legislature did not adopt it when it revised

this state’s criminal statutes, the presumption survived the enactment

of this state’s Penal Code because it was a procedural rule, rather than

a substantive crime or defense, that existed at common law, and nothing

in the Penal Code clearly preempted it.

Moreover, the presumption did not violate the defendant’s due process

rights by shifting to him the burden of disproving an element of a charged

offense, as the location of E’s death was not an element of the crime of

murder, and the presumption applied to the trial court’s preliminary

determination of where the murder occurred, which was separate from

the subsequent determination of whether the defendant committed

the murder.

2. The evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity as the

person who murdered E:

The state offered an abundance of consciousness of guilt evidence from

which the jury could have reasonably determined that the defendant

had murdered E, as the jury could have inferred that certain fabricated

statements by the defendant were designed to conceal the fact that he

had murdered E, including those in which he deflected responsibility

away from himself for the disappearance of E and M and claimed to

have selective memory or amnesia preventing him from remembering

where he was and what he was doing around the time the bodies

were discovered.

Moreover, the jury could have inferred consciousness of guilt because,

two months after E’s murder, the defendant fled the country for almost

four years, when he returned, he assumed the last name of his new wife

and began a new life with a new family, and, despite claiming to have

loved E, he took no action for twenty years to locate her, which could
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State v. Honsch

have led to a reasonable inference that he knew she was not missing

because he had murdered her.

Furthermore, there was direct physical evidence that tied the defendant

to E’s body, insofar as the defendant admitted that he owned the sleeping

bags used to wrap E’s remains, his palm prints were on the trash bags,

and his DNA was concordant with DNA from hairs that were discovered

on E’s body and one of the trash bags.

3. The trial court properly declined to provide the jury with the defendant’s

proposed instruction that the presence of his palm prints could not

establish his connection with the crime unless it was demonstrated that

they could have been impressed only at the time that the crime was

perpetrated, as such an instruction was not reasonably supported by

the evidence adduced at trial:

This court has held that such a jury instruction is appropriate only when

the fingerprint or palm print constitutes the only or the principal evidence

of connection to the crime, and, in the present case, evidence of the

defendant’s palm prints was not the only evidence that connected him

to E’s body, as there was an abundance of consciousness of guilt evidence,

as well as certain other physical evidence.

(One justice concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment)

Argued March 18—officially released July 19, 2024*

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crime

of murder, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of New Britain, where the court, Baldini, J.,

denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss; thereafter,

the case was tried to the jury; verdict and judgment

of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender,

for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Christian M. Watson, state’s

attorney, and Christopher A. Griffin, former deputy

assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

* July 19, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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State v. Honsch

Opinion

D’AURIA, J. In this appeal, we must consider the

extent of the state’s territorial jurisdiction to prosecute

a defendant when the defendant disputes whether the

crime occurred within Connecticut’s geographical boundaries. The defendant, Robert Honsch, appeals from his

conviction of murder in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-54a (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1)

the trial court incorrectly denied his pretrial motion to

dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction because the

state had failed to establish that the murder occurred

in Connecticut, (2) the evidence was insufficient to

establish his identity as the perpetrator of the murder,

and (3) the trial court erroneously declined his request

to provide the jury with an instruction on fingerprint

evidence. We disagree with all three of the defendant’s

claims and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. At approximately 1 a.m. on September 28, 1995,

New Britain police officers responded to the rear parking area of a strip mall in New Britain to investigate

the report of a dead body. Upon arriving, the police

officers discovered the remains of a recently deceased

young woman, identified two decades later as the defendant’s then seventeen year old daughter, Elizabeth

Honsch (victim). The victim’s body was wrapped in two

partially zipped sleeping bags, one pulled over her head,

the other pulled over her feet. After removing the sleeping bags, the police officers observed black trash bags

covering the victim’s head and feet. The victim was

fully clothed, warm to the touch, and wearing a watch

that displayed the correct time. The police officers

observed a gaping head wound above the victim’s right

temple and air bubbles around her mouth evincing the

escape of residual air from her lungs, a condition that

remains visible only within several hours after death.

Bloodstains on the sleeping bags and the victim’s
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State v. Honsch

clothes were in various stages of drying, some already

coagulated and dry, others still wet.

The police officers did not find any weapons, guns,

shell casings, or other physical evidence where the body

was found. But they collected several hairs found on

the victim’s thigh, backside, and wrists, as well as one

present on the trash bags, which, along with the sleeping

bags, trash bags, and the victim’s clothing, they retained

for future scientific testing. An autopsy revealed that

the victim had died as a result of a contact gunshot

wound to the head, meaning that the gun’s muzzle was

pressed against her head when it was fired and that

she died very shortly after that. From the evidence

collected at the scene and further investigation into

reported missing persons, the police officers were initially unable to identify the victim or the perpetrator.

The defendant had married Marcia Honsch in 1977

in New York, and their daughter, the victim, was born

in 1979. The defendant, Marcia, and the victim, along

with Marcia’s four daughters from a prior marriage

(Sheila, Angelina, Debra, and Diana), lived together in

the Bronx, New York, until 1984. In 1984, the defendant,

Marcia, and the victim moved to Brewster, New York,

until 1987, when the defendant and Marcia separated.

For the next eight years, the defendant continued to

reside in Brewster, while Marcia moved around the

country with her daughters. The victim split time living

with Marcia and the defendant. In 1995, Marcia and the

victim moved back in with the defendant in Brewster

to ‘‘try to work it out.’’

In September, 1995, at about the same time that the

victim’s body was discovered in New Britain, the defendant visited Debra alone at her home in New York,

which was not something he had done before. Debra

described the defendant’s appearance as ‘‘unusual’’

because he was unshaven, ‘‘looked really stressed,’’ did
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State v. Honsch

not make much eye contact, and his shirt was wrinkled

and untucked, which was ‘‘totally unlike him.’’ The

defendant informed Debra that ‘‘his job had offered him

an opportunity to work in another country,’’ potentially

Australia, England, or in continental Africa, and that,

because ‘‘he had to make up his mind right away,’’ he

did not have time to prepare or tell anyone. He said

that, of the options, he had chosen Australia and that

he had sent Marcia and the victim ‘‘off without . . .

saying goodbye to anyone because there was no time

. . . .’’ Just a few months earlier during the summer

of 1995, the defendant, Marcia, and the victim made

surprise visits to Angelina, Debra, Diana, and Sheila at

their homes. There was no indication during any of

these visits that the defendant, Marcia, or the victim

had planned to move out of the country imminently.

To the knowledge of Diana and Debra, Marcia did not

have a driver’s license or a passport. In October or

November of 1995, Diana and Angelina reported to the

authorities in Brewster that Marcia and the victim were

missing,1 but the authorities were not able to locate

them.

In 2009, Angelina’s Internet searches led her to information that the defendant was living in Ohio and was

married to Sheryl Tyree. After years of coordination

with Sheryl, Diana finally spoke with the defendant on

the phone in November, 2013. The defendant informed

Diana that, when he, Marcia, and the victim traveled

1 Marcia also was killed, and her body was found in the Tolland State

Forest in Massachusetts on October 6, 1995. Like the victim in the present

case, Marcia was not identified until 2014. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts charged the defendant with murder in the first degree for Marcia’s

homicide, a jury found him guilty, he was sentenced to life in prison without

the possibility of parole, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

recently affirmed his conviction. See Commonwealth v. Honsch, 493 Mass.

436, 437, 440, 226 N.E.3d 287 (2024). Massachusetts did not bring an indictment in connection with the victim’s death in the present case, her body

having been found in Connecticut. See id., 440.
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State v. Honsch

to Australia, Marcia ‘‘found a new man, and she left

with the new man . . . and, of course, [the victim]

went with her.’’ Diana challenged the defendant, indicating to him that she knew this explanation to be a lie, and

the defendant responded, ‘‘I don’t know if you know,

but I have amnesia.’’ The defendant continued his conversation with Diana for approximately thirty minutes,

asking about everyone else in the family, including her

sisters, and had no trouble remembering their names.

After receiving additional information from Diana and

Angelina, law enforcement officers from New York

determined that a person using the name Robert Tyree,

and the defendant’s Social Security number, was residing in Ohio, and that he might have information about

what had happened to the victim and Marcia.

In 2014, law enforcement officers from New York,

Connecticut, and Massachusetts went to the defendant’s home in Ohio. The officers informed the defendant that they were investigating two missing persons,

and, pursuant to an Ohio search warrant, the police

collected samples of his DNA and hair, as well as fingerprints and palm prints. That day, a forensic scientist in

Ohio performed a side-by-side comparison between the

defendant’s fingerprints and palm prints, and the prints

recovered from the trash bags used to wrap the victim.

The analysis revealed that the defendant’s left palm was

the source of one palm print on the trash bag covering

the victim’s head, and the defendant’s right palm was

the source of two palm prints on the trash bag covering

the victim’s feet. Contemporaneously, a forensic scientist in Connecticut performed a DNA analysis of the

defendant’s hair that showed that two hairs that were

discovered on the victim, and one hair that was discovered on one of the trash bags that had been placed

on the victim, were ‘‘concordant’’ with the defendant’s

DNA, meaning that the defendant or another member

of the same maternal lineage could not be excluded
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State v. Honsch

as being the source of those hairs. Statistically, the

defendant’s DNA profile would be expected to appear

in 3.26 percent of the Caucasian population.

On the same day, the defendant voluntarily spoke

with the police both at his home and at an Ohio police

station, and provided the police with a handwritten

statement.2 In his interviews and statement, the defendant generally had a clear memory of his life, including

his time with Marcia and the victim, but his recollection

was ‘‘hazy’’ about events that occurred between July

and September, 1995, when Marcia and the victim were

murdered. He told the police that he had fond memories

of Marcia and the victim, and that he cared for them

and loved them. He provided the police with the specific

locations where they had lived in New York and other

locations that Marcia had traveled to, and he recalled

that he and Marcia were separated for a time but that

they reunited in 1995. When asked what they enjoyed

doing together as a family, the defendant responded

that they often went camping together with tents and

sleeping bags.

To the best of the defendant’s recollection, the last

time he had seen or spoken to Marcia and the victim

was at some point between June and September, 1995,

most likely in Brewster. He could not remember how

they became separated or what happened to them. He

said that neither Marcia nor the victim had attempted

to contact him in the past twenty years, and he did not

attempt to locate, contact, or report them as missing.

He did not independently recall a job transfer to Australia, traveling to Australia himself, sending Marcia and

the victim to Australia, or telling Debra that is what

2 The officers recorded the audio of both interviews and later created

transcripts of both interviews, which, along with the defendant’s written

statement, cumulatively more than 450 pages, were introduced into evidence

at trial.
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State v. Honsch

happened to Marcia and the victim. Rather, he told the

police that, in 1995,3 for some reason he could not recall,

he left his job as a door-to-door vacuum salesman for

Electrolux in Brewster to traverse the African conti

nent. He said that, for four years, he ‘‘wander[ed] around’’

thirty countries in Africa working ‘‘odd jobs’’ while struggling to converse with the residents. He ‘‘vivid[ly]’’ recalled

his time in Africa eating ‘‘pap and mealie-meal,’’ which

caused him to lose weight.

Upon his return to the United States in 1999, the

defendant began a new life in a new place with a new

name and a new family. In 1999, the defendant began

working at a truck stop in Illinois, where he met Sheryl

Tyree, whom he married in April, 2000. The defendant

told the police that he had changed his last name to

Tyree because he could no longer stand the last name

Honsch. The defendant and Sheryl had three sons, born

between 2001 and 2008. The jury reasonably could have

believed, from his interview with the police, that the

defendant had falsely told his new wife, Sheryl, that he

had never been married, had no children or siblings,

and that both of his parents were deceased.

The defendant claimed that, after his trip to Africa,

he had no memory of Marcia and the victim, and was

reminded of their existence only when Debra called

asking about their whereabouts twenty years later, a

conversation that prompted him to begin piecing together

‘‘[c]ertain early memories’’ of them prior to 1995. For

instance, the defendant was able to recall the years,

brands, makes, and colors of many cars that he owned

prior to 1995 but was unable to remember how or why

he lost contact with Marcia and the victim. He told the

police that his memory with respect to Marcia and the

3 During his interviews, the defendant was unable to recall the exact date

that he arrived in Africa. At trial, the parties stipulated that the defendant

arrived in South Africa on November 24, 1995, two months after Marcia and

the victim had been murdered.
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State v. Honsch

victim ‘‘just stop[s]. That’s where everything—we hit

this dead end here, where everything just blacks out.’’

When the officers questioned the defendant’s selective

memory, he responded that, although not officially diagnosed, ‘‘it’s not actually amnesia, but it’s a form,’’ and

he said someone in South Africa had told him that his

narrow loss of memory was the result of his deteriorating health caused by his minimalist diet while he was

in Africa. The defendant was unable to explain why he

did not search for Marcia and the victim for twenty

years, and he admitted that, if one of his current children

went missing for one day, ‘‘[o]f course’’ he would begin

searching for them.

The officers also pressed the defendant to explain

his connection to the physical evidence found on the

victim’s body. Regarding his palm prints on the trash

bags, the defendant explained that, because the trash

bags were his property, it was not surprising that his

prints were on them, and he detailed the precise method

he used to take out trash in 1995. Specifically, the defendant said that his practice was to remove the trash bags

from their box, flap them open, roll them back up again,

and leave them on the kitchen counter until he used

them to wrap other paper garbage bags containing trash

in case of rain. When shown the photographs of the

victim’s body wrapped in the sleeping bags, the defendant instantly recognized the sleeping bags as ‘‘[d]efinitely’’ belonging to his family. He said he must have

slept in them one thousand times and that he kept them

in a closet at their house in New York. With respect to

the presence of hairs found on the victim’s body that

had a DNA profile concordant with his DNA profile, he

explained that was not unexpected because he spent

a great deal of time with her. The defendant said it was

possible that someone had come into his house, killed

Marcia and the victim, used his trash bags and sleeping
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State v. Honsch

bags to wrap the victim, and then left their dead bodies

in different states.

After the defendant was charged with and convicted

of murdering Marcia in Massachusetts; see footnote 1

of this opinion; the state of Connecticut charged the

defendant with murdering the victim in Connecticut. A

jury found the defendant guilty, and the court sentenced

him to sixty years of imprisonment. The defendant

appealed directly to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3).

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court incorrectly denied his pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of

territorial jurisdiction because the state had failed to

establish that the victim was murdered in Connecticut.

The defendant’s main contention is that the trial court

erred by applying a permissive presumption consistent

with Model Penal Code § 1.03 (4), which provides that,

if the body of a homicide victim is found within the

state, the victim was presumably murdered within the

state. See 1 A.L.I., Model Penal Code and Commentaries

(1985) § 1.03 (4), p. 34 (Model Penal Code and Commentaries). We disagree that the trial court erroneously denied

the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the

charge against him for lack of territorial jurisdiction on

the ground that the state could not establish that the

victim was murdered in Connecticut. He argued, and

the state later conceded, that the location where the

victim was murdered was ‘‘unknown.’’ For this reason,

the state advocated that the court apply a presumption,

not yet applied in Connecticut, but applied by many

courts across the country, that the murder occurred in

the state where the body was found. The state contended further that this presumption, combined with

evidence establishing that the victim’s body was depos-
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State v. Honsch

ited in New Britain shortly after she was murdered, was

sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction.

After a two day evidentiary hearing, the court issued

a memorandum of decision in which it denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court found that,‘‘[a]lthough

the evidence conclusively established that [the victim] died

of a gunshot wound to her head, the evidence available

does not establish precisely where or when she was

shot. Specifically, the location where her body was

found was devoid of evidence such as blood splatter,

a weapon, footprints, drag marks, or shell casings; i.e.,

evidence that would tend to support a finding that the

murder took place where her body was located.’’ Nevertheless, the court found that the victim’s body was discovered in Connecticut, which triggered a permissive

presumption, applied in many other jurisdictions, that

she was murdered within the state. The court held that,

in addition to the presumption, there was ‘‘compelling

and persuasive evidence to indicate that the victim had

recently been killed’’ before she was discovered, including the ‘‘condition of her body (intact, warm to the

touch, bubbles emanating from her mouth and nose,

and blood in various stages of drying),’’ and that her

body was found in New Britain, a city centrally located

in Connecticut. The court further held that the state

had met its burden despite the defendant’s contrary

evidence—testimony by the state’s chief medical examiner that rigor mortis was fully developed when he

examined the victim’s body several hours after she was

discovered, and testimony by a detective that it was

possible the victim was murdered with Marcia in the

Tolland State Forest in Massachusetts.

On appeal, the defendant contests the trial court’s

application of the presumption to deny his motion to

dismiss. He argues that adopting such a presumption

is a question strictly reserved for the legislature, that

the statute establishing the jurisdiction of our courts,
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State v. Honsch

General Statutes § 51-1a (b), does not expressly contain

the presumption, and that the presumption violates his

due process rights by shifting the burden to him to

disprove an element of a charged offense. The state

responds that this court need not apply the presumption

because the circumstantial evidence introduced at the

hearing sufficiently proved beyond a reasonable doubt

that the victim was murdered in Connecticut and, alternatively, that this court should apply the presumption

as consistent with the common law and not proscribed

by our statutes.

Under the common law, a state has ‘‘territorial jurisdiction’’ to enact criminal laws and to enforce them

when the criminal conduct takes place, or the result of

the criminal conduct occurs, within its territorial limits.4

4 The parties and the trial court have characterized the defendant’s territorial jurisdiction challenge as involving the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Although ‘‘the distinction between territorial jurisdiction and subject

matter jurisdiction is not always clear’’; In re Teagan K.-O., 335 Conn.

745, 765 n.22, 242 A.3d 59 (2020); we view the issue of criminal territorial

jurisdiction as separate from the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See,

e.g., A. Spinella, Connecticut Criminal Procedure (1985) p. 19 (advocating

that it is ‘‘more appropriate’’ that concept of territorial jurisdiction be treated

as separate from ‘‘question of subject matter or [personal] jurisdiction’’);

see also Romero v. Commonwealth, Docket No. 0050-13-4, 2014 WL 1227696,

*10 (Va. App. March 25, 2014) (holding that territorial jurisdiction is different

from subject matter jurisdiction). Territorial jurisdiction concerns the geographical boundaries of the state’s authority to enact and enforce its criminal

laws, and to mete out punishment when those laws are violated. See State

v. Cardwell, 246 Conn. 721, 739, 718 A.2d 954 (1998) (territorial jurisdiction

‘‘limits the state’s interest in vindicating its criminal statutes to within the

boundaries of its territory’’); 4 W. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure (4th

Ed. 2015) § 16.4 (a), pp. 906–907 (issues presented as a result of ‘‘limitations

that flow from restrictions on the permissible geographical scope of penal

legislation . . . are often roughly analogous to those considered in

determining venue’’ (footnotes omitted)). On the other hand, subject matter

jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority to adjudicate the type of controversy presented in the action before it. See State v. McCleese, 333 Conn.

378, 386, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019). Subject matter jurisdiction ‘‘may not be

waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua

sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801, 810, 151 A.3d

345 (2016).
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State v. Honsch

See, e.g., State v. Cardwell, 246 Conn. 721, 739, 718 A.2d

954 (1998); 4 W. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure (4th

Ed. 2015) § 16.4 (c), pp. 925–26; A. Spinella, Connecticut

Criminal Procedure (1985) pp. 18–19. ‘‘[I]t is well established that jurisdiction over a criminal offense is determined by the place where the crime was committed.

. . . The extent of a sovereignty’s jurisdiction to

enforce its civil and criminal laws has long been viewed

as being coterminous with its territory.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lee, 229

Conn. 60, 77, 640 A.2d 553 (1994). For more than 250

years, we have recognized that the state has territorial

jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant if the conduct, or

the result of that conduct, occurs, at least in part, inside

Connecticut.5 In contrast, there is no territorial jurisdicThe state’s alleged failure to prove territorial jurisdiction—i.e., that it has

the legal authority to police the criminal conduct at issue—is an issue distinct

from the court’s authority to adjudicate the case. ‘‘The Superior Court hearing

a criminal matter acquires subject matter jurisdiction from its authority as

a constitutional court of unlimited jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Carey, 222 Conn. 299, 305, 610 A.2d 1147 (1992). Our

research has not revealed any Connecticut case in which the court’s analysis

of territorial jurisdiction has involved any of the unique characteristics

attributable to subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, we are not aware of

a decision in which a Connecticut court has held that territorial jurisdiction

may be raised by any party or by the court at any time, including after the

case has ended, or that it may not be waived and, by implication, that the

state must prove that territorial jurisdiction exists in every case, even when

it is undisputed. 5 See, e.g., State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 192, 195, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994)

(territorial jurisdiction existed to prosecute defendant for capital felony

charges when victims were kidnapped in Connecticut but murdered in Rhode

Island and their bodies were returned to Connecticut), cert. denied, 513

U.S. 1165, 115 S. Ct. 1133, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995); State v. Beverly, 224

Conn. 372, 373, 375–78, 618 A.2d 1335 (1993) (territorial jurisdiction existed

to prosecute defendant for murder of Massachusetts victim found dead in

Connecticut); State v. Pambianchi, 139 Conn. 543, 546–47, 95 A.2d 695

(1953) (territorial jurisdiction existed to prosecute defendant for stolen

automobile received in New York and subsequently taken to Connecticut);

State v. Ellis, 3 Conn. 185, 186 (1819) (territorial jurisdiction existed to

prosecute defendant for horse stolen in Rhode Island and taken to Connecticut); Rex v. Peas, 1 Root 69, 69 (1774) (territorial jurisdiction existed to

prosecute defendant for horse stolen in New York and taken to Connecticut).
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tion if both the criminal conduct and its results occur

outside the state’s territory. See State v. Volpe, 113

Conn. 288, 294, 155 A. 223 (1931) (‘‘[i]t is a general rule

of universal acceptation that one [s]tate or sovereignty

cannot enforce the penal laws of another, nor punish

offenses committed in and against another [s]tate or

sovereignty’’); see also State v. Cardwell, supra, 732,

741 (no territorial jurisdiction to prosecute defendant

for ticket scalping because he did not sell tickets to

Connecticut events in Connecticut).

In Connecticut, whether territorial jurisdiction exists

to prosecute a defendant for the crime of murder is an

issue for the court to decide. In State v. Beverly, 224

Conn. 372, 618 A.2d 1335 (1993), the defendant claimed

‘‘that the jury, not the trial court, should have made the

decision concerning the sufficiency of the facts proven

to establish territorial jurisdiction in Connecticut.’’ Id.,

378. We rejected this claim, holding that the trial court

is required to ‘‘ ‘submit to the jury all controverted questions of fact relating to an element making up [the]

crime,’ ’’ but ‘‘that the location of the site of the victim’s

death is not an element of the crime of murder.’’ Id.,

378–79; see also State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 232,

251–52, 575 A.2d 1003 (location of death is not essential

element of murder), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967, 111 S.

Ct. 430, 112 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1990). Consequently, we

concluded that, ‘‘[a]lthough some authorities have held

otherwise . . . we agree with the decisions holding

that the question of where a murder occurred generally

is not an element of the offense, but is merely an issue

of territorial jurisdiction to be decided by the court.

. . . A defendant’s constitutional right to a jury does

not extend beyond the factual issues that are relevant

to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence under the

relevant statute.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Beverly,

supra, 379.6

6 We acknowledge that ‘‘a substantial majority’’ of states treat the determination of whether territorial jurisdiction exists as, ‘‘in part, a jury issue. The
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It is well established that the state bears the burden

of proving territorial jurisdiction.7 See State v. Ross, 230

Conn. 183, 195, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513

U.S. 1165, 115 S. Ct. 1133, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995);

State v. Beverly, supra, 224 Conn. 375. It is not disputed

in the present case that the criminal conduct and the

result of that conduct occurred in the same location

because the victim died very shortly after sustaining

a contact gunshot wound to the head. Therefore, to

establish territorial jurisdiction to prosecute the defencourt decides as a matter of law whether a particular act or consequence

occurring within the boundaries of the state is sufficient to [confer] jurisdiction, and the jury then decides the factual question of whether those acts

or consequence which would be sufficient actually occurred in the state.’’

(Footnotes omitted.) 4 W. LaFave et al., supra, § 16.4 (d), pp. 935–36. The

defendant, however, does not contend that the jury should have decided

territorial jurisdiction, and he does not ask that we overrule Beverly. 7 We once again leave unresolved the question of the quantum of evidence

by which the state must prove territorial jurisdiction. In State v. Ross,

supra, 230 Conn. 195, we stated that ‘‘the Superior Court has no territorial

jurisdiction to adjudicate a charge of murder unless the state proves, beyond

a reasonable doubt, that the victim was murdered in Connecticut,’’ but this

statement was dictum. The state’s burden of proof was not at issue in Ross,

and the authorities we cited in support of this statement—§ 51-1a (b), State

v. Beverly, supra, 224 Conn. 375–76, and State v. Volpe, supra, 113 Conn.

294—did not affirmatively resolve that question. Indeed, in Beverly, we

stated that ‘‘[t]he state does not agree with the trial court that the necessary

quantum of proof was ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ It contends that its

burden was to prove territorial jurisdiction only by a preponderance of the

evidence. Because the trial court applied the higher standard in this case,

it is not necessary that we reach this issue.’’ State v. Beverly, supra, 376 n.5.

In the trial court in the present case, the state again took the position

that the correct standard of proof should be a preponderance of the evidence,

but it does not on appeal renew that argument or otherwise contend that

the burden of proof should be less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor

does the defendant argue that, with the benefit of the presumption, the trial

court’s finding of territorial jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt was

improper. Rather, the defendant limits his challenge to whether the trial court

properly applied a presumption when determining territorial jurisdiction.

Therefore, as in Beverly, we uphold the trial court’s decision applying the

higher standard—beyond a reasonable doubt—and have no occasion to

decide whether, with the benefit of the presumption, the state should nonetheless be able to satisfy its burden by proving territorial jurisdiction under

a lower standard.
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dant for murder, the state had to prove that the victim

had been shot within Connecticut’s territorial

boundaries.

To temper the state’s burden of proving territorial

jurisdiction in murder cases, the common law recognizes a permissive presumption, or a permissible inference, that the murder took place where the body was

discovered. See, e.g., People v. Kamaunu, 110 Cal. 609,

613, 42 P. 1090 (1895); Breeding v. State, 220 Md. 193,

200, 151 A.2d 743 (1959); Commonwealth v. Knowlton,

265 Mass. 382, 388, 163 N.E. 251 (1928); State v. Fabian,

263 So. 2d 773, 775 (Miss. 1972); State v. McDowney,

49 N.J. 471, 475, 231 A.2d 359 (1967); State v. Williams,

321 S.C. 327, 334, 468 S.E.2d 626, cert. denied, 519 U.S.

891, 117 S. Ct. 230, 136 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1996); Reynolds

v. State, 199 Tenn. 349, 350, 287 S.W.2d 15 (1956). This

common-law permissive presumption, recognized by

courts for many years, eventually was engrafted in

Model Penal Code § 1.03 (4), published in 1962, which

provides in relevant part that, ‘‘if the body of a homicide

victim is found within the [s]tate, it is presumed that

such result occurred within the [s]tate.’’ Model Penal

Code and Commentaries, supra, § 1.03 (4), p. 34. This

presumption is permissive because it ‘‘permits such a

finding upon proof of the location of the body,’’ and, ‘‘[i]f

the defendant wishes to defeat jurisdiction, he generally

must make some showing as to where the death or

injury took place. That showing may, in turn, lay the

predicate for a proceeding in the proper jurisdiction.’’

Id., § 1.03, comment 8, p. 64; see also 4 W. LaFave et

al., supra, § 16.4 (d), pp. 938–39 (describing Model Penal

Code § 1.03 (4) as ‘‘establishing a permissible presumption’’).

No Connecticut court has yet had occasion to apply

this presumption.8 We embrace the presumption and

8 The defendant also argues that we ‘‘twice rejected requests for judicial

adoption of such a presumption’’ in State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 198, and

in State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 (1993). The defendant is
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conclude that the trial court properly applied it here

because of the robust public policy supporting it and

its widespread use across the country.

To conceal a murder, a criminal defendant may transport the body of the victim from the scene of the murder

to a different location, sometimes across state borders.

See, e.g., State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 192, 195 (defendant murdered victims in Rhode Island and returned

their bodies to Connecticut); State v. Gojcaj, 151 Conn.

App. 183, 192–93, 92 A.3d 1056 (defendant murdered

victim in Connecticut and later left victim’s body in

New York), cert. denied, 314 Conn. 924, 100 A.3d 854

(2014). Because a murder victim is unable to provide

an account of the offense, the defendant’s actions to

coverup a murder may create inherent and even insurmountable difficulties for the state to prove the location

where the murder occurred. The presumption ‘‘endeavors to prevent abortion of the prosecution in cases

where the body of the victim is found within the state

but it is unclear where the death, injury, or conduct

occurred. It may be provable, for example, that the

body was thrown from a car driven by the defendant

at a place near the state line and that the defendant

owned the lethal weapon. That alone might make a

circumstantial case of murder, without establishing a

locus for jurisdiction.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Model Penal

Code and Commentaries, supra, § 1.03, comment 8,

pp. 63–64.

In the absence of this presumption, a murderer may

succeed in avoiding prosecution simply by moving the

body of the victim. This outcome is unjustifiable. We

repeatedly have recognized that, when ‘‘the fact that

the place of death is unknown or that there may be a

not correct because, although Ross and Stevens involved the question of

territorial jurisdiction, in neither case were we asked to adopt a presumption

similar to that of Model Penal Code § 1.03 (4).
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State v. Honsch

variance in the proof thereof . . . [n]o person should

escape punishment for murder because he is so clever

as to conceal . . . the place where the victim was

killed or died.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Weinberg, supra, 215 Conn. 252; State v. Morrill,

197 Conn. 507, 552, 498 A.2d 76 (1985). We also recognize the conundrum, applicable in some situations, that,

‘‘[i]f . . . the defendant cannot be effectively prosecuted in Connecticut, she cannot be prosecuted at all.’’

State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 738, 620 A.2d 789 (1993).

The presumption ensures that the state’s interests in

enforcing its criminal laws and in pursuing justice for

its citizens and the victim’s family are vindicated, while

also providing the defendant with the opportunity to

rebut the presumption with evidence establishing that

the murder did not occur within the state. See Model

Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, § 1.03, comment

8, p. 64.

A majority of the states apply this presumption. The

legislative bodies of at least twenty states have codified

some form of a presumption or inference in favor of

territorial jurisdiction that is congruent with Model

Penal Code § 1.03 (4).9 Seven other states have applied

9 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-108 (B) (2020) (‘‘[i]f the body of a

homicide victim is found in this state it is presumed that the result occurred

in this state’’); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-201 (2) (2023) (‘‘if the body of a criminal

homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have

occurred within the state’’); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 204 (c) (2007) (‘‘if the

body of a homicide victim is found within this State it is presumed that the

result occurred within the State’’); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 910.005 (2) (West 2014)

(‘‘if the body of a homicide victim is found within the state, the death is

presumed to have occurred within the state’’); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-2-1 (c)

(2013) (‘‘if the body of a homicide victim is found within this state, the

death is presumed to have occurred within the state’’); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 701-

106 (4) (2014) (‘‘[i]f the body of a homicide victim is found within the State,

it is prima facie evidence that the result occurred within the State’’); 720

Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1-5 (b) (West 2016) (‘‘if the body of a homicide victim

is found within the State, the death is presumed to have occurred within

the State’’); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-1-1 (c) (LexisNexis 2020) (‘‘[i]f the body

of a homicide victim is found in Indiana, it is presumed that the result

occurred in Indiana’’); Iowa Code § 803.1 (2) (2001) (‘‘[i]f the body of a
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the presumption as a matter of their common law.10 To

murder victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have

occurred within the state’’); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5106 (c) (2023) (‘‘[i]f the

body of a homicide victim is found within the state, a person who is charged

with committing the homicide is subject to prosecution and punishment

under the laws of this state for commission of the homicide’’); Ky. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 500.060 (3) (LexisNexis 2014) (‘‘[i]f the body of a homicide victim is

found within this state, it shall be prima facie evidence that the result

occurred within the state’’); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 7 (3) (Cum. Supp.

2024) (‘‘[p]roof that the body of a homicide victim is found within this State

gives rise to a permissible inference under the Maine Rules of Evidence,

rule 303 that such death or impact occurred within the State’’); Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 541.191.2 (West 2002) (‘‘[i]f the body of a homicide victim is found

in this state, it is presumed that the result occurred in this state’’); Mont.

Code Ann. § 46-2-101 (2) (2023) (‘‘[i]f the body of a homicide victim is found

within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state’’);

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625:4 (III) (2016) (‘‘if the body of a homicide victim

is found within this state, it is presumed that such result occurred within

the state’’); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-3 (d) (West 2015) (‘‘if the body of a homicide

victim is found within the State, it may be inferred that such result occurred

within the State’’); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 20.20 (2) (a) (McKinney 2018)

(‘‘[i]f the offense was one of homicide, it is presumed that the result, namely

the death of the victim, occurred within this state if the victim’s body or a

part thereof was found herein’’); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.11 (B) (West

2020) (‘‘[i]f any part of the body of a homicide victim is found in this state,

the death is presumed to have occurred within this state’’); Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 131.235 (2) (2023) (‘‘[i]f the body, or a part thereof, of a criminal homicide

victim is found within this state, it shall be prima facie evidence that the

result occurred within this state’’); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 102 (c) (West

2015) (‘‘if the body of a homicide victim, including an unborn child, is found

within this Commonwealth, it is presumed that such result occurred within

this Commonwealth’’); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.04 (b) (West 2021) (‘‘If the

body of a criminal homicide victim is found in this state, it is presumed

that the death occurred in this state. If death alone is the basis for jurisdiction,

it is a defense to the exercise of jurisdiction by this state that the conduct

that constitutes the offense is not made criminal in the jurisdiction where

the conduct occurred.’’); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (3) (a) (LexisNexis

2012) (‘‘[i]f the body of a homicide victim is found within the state, the

death shall be presumed to have occurred within the state’’). 10 See, e.g., People v. Kamaunu, supra, 110 Cal. 613; Commonwealth v.

Knowlton, supra, 265 Mass. 388; State v. Fabian, supra, 263 So. 2d 775;

State v. McDowney, supra, 49 N.J. 475; State v. Williams, supra, 321 S.C.

334; Reynolds v. State, supra, 199 Tenn. 350. Compare Breeding v. State,

supra, 220 Md. 200 (‘‘the finding of a dead body in a particular county raises

a presumption, or supports an inference, that the killing took place there’’),

with Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, 729 n.2, 521 A.2d 1216 (1987) (‘‘[a]t
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our knowledge, the presumption has not been squarely

rejected in any jurisdiction that has considered it.

That twenty state legislatures have codified the presumption statutorily does not persuade us, as the defendant argues, that the adoption of the presumption is a

question strictly reserved for the legislature. At the outset, we observe that, contrary to the defendant’s argument, the legislature has not yet considered whether

to adopt the presumption contained in Model Penal

Code § 1.03 (4). In 1963, the legislature established the

Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes (commission) ‘‘to revise and codify the criminal statutes of the

state,’’ in light of the then recently drafted Model Penal

Code and the New York Penal Law, and to ‘‘report its

findings and specific recommendations for substantive

and clarifying changes in said statutes to the [G]eneral

[A]ssembly’’ by February 1, 1965. 31 Spec. Acts 348, No.

351, § 1 (1963); see also 32 Spec. Acts 323–24, No. 315,

§ 1 (1965) (extending to February 1, 1967, deadline for

commission to report findings and recommendations

to General Assembly). In its initial report to the General

Assembly, the commission, comprised of law professors, state legislators, and attorneys, limited its recommendations to the ‘‘substantive criminal statutes, [and]

not . . . problems of criminal procedure.’’ Report of

the Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes, as

Provided by Special Act No. 351 of the 1963 Session

of the General Assembly, p. 1. In its 1967 report, the

commission did not include Model Penal Code § 1.03,

or any similar version of that section, in the draft penal

code that it submitted to the General Assembly. See

Report of the Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes (1967) pp. 3, 5–37. Although the commission considered Model Penal Code § 1.03 and the parallel

provision in the New York Penal Law, it explained that

one time, adoption of a similar provision apparently was considered but

rejected in Maryland’’).
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it did not recommend adoption of this section because

it was a procedural rule rather than a substantive crime

or defense, and, as with New York law, such procedural

questions presumably were left to existing law and the

courts. See id., p. 43 (recommending against adoption

of proposed New York Penal Law provisions limiting

applicability of Penal Code because such provisions,

‘‘while perhaps helpful, [are] not necessary for our purposes since it is obvious that the procedural rules are

not being affected’’); see also Valeriano v. Bronson,

209 Conn. 75, 92, 546 A.2d 1380 (1988) (‘‘adoption of

the comprehensive [P]enal [C]ode in 1969 . . . set out

substantive crimes and defenses’’ (emphasis added)).

Consequently, the legislature’s consideration of the

commission’s report, in connection with the overhaul

of our substantive criminal code in 1969, did not include

any legislative discussion as to whether to adopt Model

Penal Code § 1.03, or any similar version of that section,

because the commission did not recommend the adoption of that section. See State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn.

197 (although commission ‘‘apparently noted and discussed an earlier version of the Model Penal Code incorporating the same expanded view of jurisdiction . . .

that discussion did not result in any textual articulation

of legislative intent’’ (citation omitted)). It is inaccurate,

therefore, to conclude that the legislature has rejected

the presumption contained in Model Penal Code § 1.03

(4). We are not aware of, and the parties have not

directed our attention to, any legislative efforts in Connecticut since 1969 to adopt Model Penal Code § 1.03

(4) or any similar presumption in favor of criminal territorial jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding that many states have codified this

presumption by enacting a form of § 1.03 (4) of the

Model Penal Code; see footnote 9 of this opinion;

although the legislature has not taken up the question,

legislation is not the exclusive way for a jurisdiction
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to recognize the presumption. As we have stated, the

permissive presumption that a murder occurred where

a body is found was a recognized common-law principle

that existed prior to the promulgation of the Model

Penal Code in 1962 and its subsequent adoption in many

states. See, e.g., People v. Kamaunu, supra, 110 Cal. 613;

Breeding v. State, supra, 220 Md. 200; Commonwealth

v. Knowlton, supra, 265 Mass. 388; Reynolds v. State,

supra, 199 Tenn. 350; see also Conn. Code Evid. § 3-1

(presumptions are governed by principles of common

law except as otherwise required by federal and Connecticut constitutions or any rule of practice adopted

before June 18, 2014).

Additionally, it is true that the state constitution

assigns to the legislature the power to enact laws defining crimes and fixing the degree and method of punishment; see, e.g., State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 711,

998 A.2d 1 (2010); and ‘‘the comprehensive Penal Code

in 1969 abrogated the common-law authority of Connecticut courts to impose criminal liability for conduct

not proscribed by the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Leniart, 333 Conn. 88, 109, 215

A.3d 1104 (2019). The issue of territorial jurisdiction,

however, is a rule of procedure unrelated to the substantive elements of the crime. See State v. Beverly, supra,

224 Conn. 378–79; Report of the Commission to Revise

the Criminal Statutes (1967) pp. 42–43.

Even if the issue of territorial jurisdiction were considered a principle of substantive criminal liability, as

opposed to an issue of criminal procedure, ‘‘the savings

clause to the Penal Code, [General Statutes § 53a-4]

provides, and our cases recognize, that the common

law is preserved under the code unless clearly preempted; the code does not bar our courts from recognizing other principles of criminal liability or other defenses

not inconsistent with statute.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Leniart, supra, 333 Conn. 109;
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see also Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 705, 647 A.2d

324 (1994) (‘‘[a]bsent clear intent to do so, a statute

should not be construed as altering the common law

rule . . . and should not be construed as making any

innovation upon the common law which the statute

does not fairly express’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the presumption survived the enactment

of the Penal Code because it existed at common law

and nothing in the Penal Code clearly preempted it.

This is true even though not until the present case has

a Connecticut court recognized the presumption we

recognize today as part of our common law. See, e.g.,

State v. Courchesne, supra, 296 Conn. 674–82 and nn.36

and 39 (rejecting contention that ‘‘doctrine or principle

does not represent the common law of this state until

it has been expressly recognized and applied by one or

more courts of the state,’’ and adopting common-law

born alive rule recognized in other states because ‘‘reasons for recognizing the rule are compelling and because

there is no persuasive reason for not doing so’’); Carl

J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport,

243 Conn. 1, 5–6, 699 A.2d 995 (1997) (considering whether

legislature abrogated common-law rule as recognized

by other jurisdictions); see also In re Zakai F., 336

Conn. 272, 288, 255 A.3d 767 (2020) (surveying common

law of Connecticut and other states in adopting presumption that was not clearly provided for in statutory language).

In the past, when faced with an absence of legislation

governing an issue presented to us, we have found it

prudent to adopt other procedural provisions of the

Model Penal Code. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 202

Conn. 443, 450–51, 521 A.2d 1034 (1987) (adopting

Model Penal Code § 1.06 (5) concerning tolling of statute of limitations). We also have gone further, as

expressly permitted by the statutory savings clause, and

recognized principles of criminal liability and defenses
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in the absence of applicable language in our Penal Code.

See, e.g., State v. Terwilliger, 314 Conn. 618, 654, 104

A.3d 638 (2014) (self-defense); State v. Courchesne,

supra, 296 Conn. 622, 679–88 and n.44 (born alive principle); State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32, 45, 630 A.2d 990

(1993) (vicarious liability of conspirator). We are once

again compelled to recognize in our law a rule of criminal procedure that ensures that justice is done.

Nor are we persuaded that the absence of the presumption in the language of § 51-1a should impact our

analysis. That statute, entitled ‘‘Composition of Judicial

Department,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) [t]he territorial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Appellate

Court, and the Superior Court shall be coextensive with

the boundaries of the state . . . .’’ General Statutes

§ 51-1a (b). The defendant asserts that, because this

statute, concerning the jurisdiction of the courts, is

silent as to whether a permissive presumption exists

in a murder case when the body is found in this state,

the legislature necessarily rejected this common-law

rule. Although the phrase ‘‘territorial jurisdiction’’ is

present in the language, the statute plainly defines the

geographical reach of the courts of this state to resolve

all types of disputes (civil, criminal, and otherwise),

not the boundaries of the state’s power to enact and

vindicate its criminal laws. See footnote 4 of this opinion. Even if we assume, without deciding, that § 51-1a

could be read to restrict the state’s criminal territorial

jurisdiction, we cannot construe it in the present case

to prohibit the common law’s permissive presumption

that the murder occurred where the body is found

because there is no clear indication that the legislature

intended to foreclose the presumption. See State v.

Courchesne, supra, 296 Conn. 711. Thus, the fact that

our statutes are silent on the recognition of the presumption cuts against the defendant’s assertion.
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Finally, we reject the defendant’s contention that the

presumption violates his due process rights by shifting

the burden to him to disprove an element of a charged

offense. As we have recognized, the location of the

victim’s death is not an element of the crime of murder;

see State v. Beverly, supra, 224 Conn. 378–79; State v.

Weinberg, supra, 215 Conn. 232, 251; and, therefore, the

presumption in no way relieves the state of the burden

to prove any essential element to the satisfaction of the

trier of fact. Compare State v. Francis, 246 Conn. 339,

354, 717 A.2d 696 (1998) (‘‘‘[m]andatory presumptions

. . . violate the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause if they relieve

the [s]tate of the burden of persuasion on an element

of an offense’ ’’), with State v. Palmer, 206 Conn. 40,

47–48, 536 A.2d 936 (1988) (describing permissive presumption as suggesting or allowing—but not requiring—

possible conclusion to be drawn if state proves predicate facts), and State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 545–46,

679 A.2d 902 (1996) (same). The presumption applies

to the court’s preliminary determination of where the

murder occurred, an issue entirely separate from the

subsequent determination of whether the defendant

committed the murder. The permissive presumption,

which places no burden of proof on the defendant,

allows but does not require the court to find territorial

jurisdiction if the state proves that the victim’s body

was located in Connecticut. The defendant has not provided us with a case from any of the almost thirty states

that have applied the presumption, holding that it is

unconstitutional, even in the jurisdictions that submit

the question of territorial jurisdiction to the jury as an

element of the offense. See, e.g., State v. Trusty, 326

S.W.3d 582, 599–601 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010) (rejecting

claim that jury instruction permitting inference in favor

of territorial jurisdiction violated defendant’s due process rights), appeal denied, Tennessee Supreme Court,

Docket No. M2008-02653-SC-R11-CD (September 27,
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2010); see also State v. Liggins, 524 N.W. 2d 181, 185

(Iowa 1994) (same).

We recognize that the permissive presumption may

impose a burden of production on defendants to present

rebutting evidence to establish that the murder did not

occur in Connecticut, but we are not persuaded that any

difficulty they might encounter in meeting this burden

is sufficient to overcome the important policy reasons

supporting the permissive presumption. Criminal defendants face countervailing presumptions in all types of

cases. See, e.g., General Statutes § 53a-32 (e) (rebuttable presumption that ‘‘serious firearm offender poses a

danger to the safety of other persons’’); General Statutes

§ 53a-119 (15) (rebuttable presumption that ‘‘person to

whom the service is billed has the intent to obtain the

service and to avoid making payment for the service’’

in certain circumstances); General Statutes § 53a-127c

(a) (rebuttable presumption that ‘‘person is engaged in

the business for profit or economic gain of offering for

sale a decoder, descrambler or other device, equipment

or component’’ in certain circumstances); General Statutes § 53a-128 (b) (issuer of check is ‘‘presumed to

know that the check or order, other than a postdated

check or order’’ would not be paid in certain circumstances); General Statutes § 53a-282 (imposing four separate presumptions in money laundering cases).

Moreover, it is feasible for a defendant to submit evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of territorial

jurisdiction. As the defendant sought to do in the present case, an accused may attempt to present noninculpatory evidence that the murder occurred in a different

state, such as the extent of the victim’s rigor mortis in

conjunction with the time it would take to travel from

a different state, or that the victim was murdered with

a close family member outside of this state’s borders.11

11 The presumption in favor of territorial jurisdiction is not conclusive

because there is a possibility that the defendant can overcome it. Although

it may prove difficult for a defendant to muster evidence to defeat territorial
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State v. Honsch

Even if the burden of production would require the

defendant to consider proffering less than exculpatory

evidence—an undertaking the defendant might choose

strategically to avoid—the defendant has advanced no

authority for the proposition that such a burden of

production violates due process.

In sum, we disagree with the defendant that the trial

court improperly applied the presumption in favor of

territorial jurisdiction. We agree with the trial court that

the presumption, coupled with evidence establishing

that the victim’s body was recently deposited in New

Britain, was sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction.

II

The defendant next claims that the evidence was

insufficient to establish his identity as the person who

murdered the victim. He concedes that the evidence

was sufficient to establish that the victim was killed

intentionally, but he argues that the state’s circumstantial evidence—‘‘consciousness of guilt and fingerprint

evidence on the garbage bags, a common household

item’’—was insufficient to prove that the defendant had

committed the murder.12 We are not persuaded.

jurisdiction and to seek prosecution in another state, it is not as impossible

as it may seem. See, e.g., People v. Holt, 91 Ill. 2d 480, 492, 440 N.E.2d

102 (1982) (reversing murder conviction for lack of territorial jurisdiction

because defendant’s own statements, which were ‘‘only evidence of exactly

what happened,’’ showed that events occurred in another state). With

advances in technology and science, it is not difficult to imagine fact patterns—even if rare—involving forensics (where the victim’s death cannot

be explained as occurring in Connecticut) or a video recording of a homicide

(where the perpetrator cannot be identified) that would rebut any permissive

presumption that the victim was killed in Connecticut, proving that any

presumption is not at all conclusive. 12 We also reject the defendant’s argument that the state failed to present

evidence of his motive to murder the victim. The state is not required to

prove motive, as ‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that motive is not an element of the crime

of murder . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 343 Conn. 566, 603, 275

A.3d 578 (2022); see also State v. Pinnock, 220 Conn. 765, 793, 601 A.2d

521 (1992).
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‘‘[T]he question of identity of a perpetrator of a crime

is a question of fact that is within the sole province of

the jury to resolve. . . . To determine whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the essential element

of identity, we apply a two part test. First, we construe

the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining

the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the

facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn

therefrom, the [jury] reasonably could have concluded

that the cumulative force of the evidence established

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . In doing so, we

are mindful that the trier of fact is not required to accept

as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with

the defendant’s innocence. . . . The trier [of fact] may

draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts

established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable

and logical.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Patrick M., 344 Conn. 565, 574–75, 280 A.3d 461

(2022).

‘‘[W]e must focus on the evidence presented, not the

evidence that the state failed to present . . . . [W]e do

not draw a distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence so far as probative force is concerned

. . . . Indeed, [c]ircumstantial evidence . . . may be

more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence. . . . It is not one fact . . . but the cumulative

impact of a multitude of facts [that] establishes guilt in

a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Abraham, 343 Conn. 470, 477, 274 A.3d 849

(2022).

We conclude that the evidence the state offered was

more than sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity as the person who murdered the victim. Primarily,

the state presented an abundance of consciousness of

guilt evidence, consisting of the defendant’s own statements and his actions following the murder, from which
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the jury could have reasonably concluded that the

defendant murdered the victim. ‘‘[T]he state of mind

that is characterized as ‘guilty consciousness’ or ‘consciousness of guilt’ is strong evidence that a defendant

is indeed guilty.’’ State v. Moody, 214 Conn. 616, 626,

573 A.2d 716 (1990); see also State v. Rodriguez, 337

Conn. 175, 201, 252 A.3d 811 (2020) (‘‘‘a jury may infer

guilt based on consciousness of guilt evidence in conjunction with other evidence’ ’’); State v. McClain, 324

Conn. 802, 819, 155 A.3d 209 (2017) (consciousness of

guilt is ‘‘indirect evidence of the defendant’s guilt’’).

Jurors reasonably could have concluded that several

of the defendant’s statements constituted inconsistent

or partial truths manifesting his participation in the

crime or evidencing his consciousness of guilt. See State

v. Moody, supra, 214 Conn. 626 (consciousness of guilt

evidence may include ‘‘ ‘misstatements of an accused,

which a jury could reasonably conclude were made in

an attempt to avoid detection of a crime or responsibility for a crime or were influenced by the commission

of the criminal act’ ’’). For example, the state presented

evidence of the defendant’s statements to Marcia’s and

his own family members that the jury could have found

to be lies told to deflect responsibility away from himself for the disappearance of Marcia and the victim.

Specifically, he told Debra in 1995 that he took a new

job in Australia and sent the victim there ahead of him;

he told Diana in 2013 that Marcia ran off with a new

man in Australia and that the victim followed her; and

he told Sheryl that he had never been married, had no

children or siblings and that both of his parents were

deceased. Further, the state presented evidence that

the defendant had told the police that, unlike other parts

of his life that he could recall, he had no recollection

of the fall of 1995 when the victim was murdered and

that his selective memory was, as he was told, a result

of his malnourishment caused amnesia that he had sus-
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tained in Africa. The jury could have reasonably disbelieved this fanciful explanation to the police for his

inability to explain where he was and what he was

doing at about the time the police discovered the bodies

of his wife in Massachusetts and his daughter, the victim

in the present case, in New Britain. See, e.g., State v.

Diaz, 348 Conn. 750, 767, 311 A.3d 714 (2024) (lying to

police can indicate consciousness of guilt). The jury

could have inferred that these fabricated statements

were designed to conceal the fact that the defendant

had murdered the victim.

The jury also could have inferred the defendant’s

consciousness of guilt because he had fled to Africa

two months after the victim was murdered and her

body was discovered. See, e.g., State v. Patrick M.,

supra, 344 Conn. 577 (‘‘ ‘[F]light, when unexplained,

tends to prove a consciousness of guilt. . . . The flight

of the person accused of a crime is a circumstance

[that], when considered together with all the facts of

the case, may justify an inference of the accused’s

guilt.’ ’’). The defendant offered no reason why, just

after their disappearance and the discovery of their

bodies, he suddenly left his wife and child (Marcia and

the victim), whom he claimed to care for very deeply,

as well as his home and job, to ‘‘[wander] around’’ Africa

for almost four years. In the absence of an explanation,

it was permissible for the jury to infer that the defendant’s flight showed a consciousness of guilt caused

by his murder of the victim. Although the defendant

contends that the evidence of flight was insignificant

because he waited two months to fly to Africa, it was

the responsibility of the jury to weigh the significance

of that evidence. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23,

57, 770 A.2d 908 (2001) (‘‘it is the province of the jury

to sort through any ambiguity in the evidence in order

to determine whether the defendant’s flight warrants

the inference that he possessed a guilty conscience’’).
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State v. Honsch

When he returned from Africa, the defendant shed

his last name and took the last name of his new wife,

Sheryl, which also could constitute evidence of consciousness of guilt. See, e.g., State v. Sivri, 231 Conn.

115, 130, 646 A.2d 169 (1994) (consciousness of guilt

can be proven by ‘‘use of aliases upon [defendant’s]

return to the United States’’); State v. Avis, 209 Conn.

290, 310, 551 A.2d 26 (1988) (evidence that defendant

used ‘‘number of aliases . . . supported the inference

that he was conscious of his guilt’’), cert. denied, 489

U.S. 1097, 109 S. Ct. 1570, 103 L. Ed. 2d 937 (1989).

Although the defendant claimed that he changed his

last name because he did not like the name Honsch,

the jury reasonably could have inferred that he did so

to avoid detection by the authorities investigating the

victim’s murder. He began a new life with a new family,

never actively searching for the whereabouts of the

victim, his own daughter. These actions and inaction

reasonably could have led the jury to infer a consciousness of guilt. The defendant claimed to have loved the

victim, but he never noticed her disappearance from

his life and took no action for twenty years to locate

her or to determine what had happened to her. In contrast, the defendant admitted that, if one of his current

children went missing for one day, ‘‘[o]f course’’ he

would begin searching for them. The defendant’s failure

to take any action to locate his daughter could have

led to a reasonable inference that he knew the victim

was not, in fact, missing for twenty years because he

had murdered her in 1995.

The state also presented direct physical forensic evidence that tied the defendant to the victim’s dead body.

The state presented unrefuted evidence that the defendant’s left palm was the source of one palm print on

the trash bag covering the victim’s head, and the defendant’s right palm was the source of two palm prints on

the trash bag covering the victim’s feet. It was reason-
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able for the jury to conclude that the defendant had

imprinted his palm prints on the trash bags while disposing of the victim’s body after murdering her. See State

v. Rhodes, 335 Conn. 226, 240, 249 A.3d 683 (2020)

(jury is entitled to use common sense, experience, and

knowledge of human nature). The state also established

that two hairs that were discovered on the victim’s body

and one hair that was discovered on one of the trash

bags that had been placed on the victim’s body were

‘‘concordant’’ with the defendant’s DNA. Furthermore,

the defendant repeatedly admitted that he owned the

two sleeping bags used to wrap the victim’s dead body.

This direct physical evidence, combined with the indirect consciousness of guilt evidence, was sufficient to

establish the defendant’s identity as the person who

murdered the victim. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez,

supra, 337 Conn. 201–202 (state sufficiently proved identity with circumstantial and direct DNA evidence).

The defendant nevertheless contends that the existence of his palm prints on the garbage bags is explicable because he owned them, and that fact alone was

not sufficient to convict him of murder. In contrast to

the defendant’s contention, the jury was free to reject

as farfetched his explanation that his palm prints were

present on the bags because he removed, opened, and

then rerolled all of the trash bags in his home prior to

use. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 221 Conn. 713, 721, 607

A.2d 391 (jury is entitled to reject defendant’s theories),

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 872, 113 S. Ct. 207, 121 L. Ed. 2d

148 (1992).

In short, construing the evidence as favorably as possible to sustaining the guilty verdict, we conclude that

the state’s case was sufficient for the jury to find beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant had murdered

the victim.
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III

The defendant finally claims that the trial court erred

by declining to provide the jury with defense counsel’s

requested instruction on fingerprint evidence. We do

not agree.

Prior to the final charge conference, defense counsel

requested, in accordance with State v. Santangelo, 205

Conn. 578, 598, 534 A.2d 1175 (1987), that the court

provide the jury with a fingerprint evidence instruction,

stating that, ‘‘[u]nless it can be shown that the circumstances are such that the fingerprints could have been

impressed only at the time the crime was perpetrated,

the presence of the defendant’s fingerprints does not

establish his connection with the crime charged.’’ At

the charge conference, defense counsel acknowledged

that Santangelo contained the ‘‘caveat’’ that this instruction is appropriate only when the fingerprint evidence

is the primary or principal evidence of the defendant’s

connection to the crime. Defense counsel argued that

the instruction was appropriate because, although some

hairs on the victim’s body were concordant with the

defendant’s DNA, the palm print evidence was ‘‘really

the only evidence establishing [the defendant’s] connection to the [victim’s] body . . . .’’ The state responded

that the instruction was inappropriate pursuant to Santangelo because the palm print evidence was not ‘‘the

only evidence, or the principal evidence,’’ that the jury

could use to find the defendant guilty since the state

had presented evidence that he had a guilty conscience,

his DNA profile was concordant with hairs found on

the victim’s body, and she was wrapped in his sleeping

bags. The court, relying on Santangelo, denied defense

counsel’s request to instruct the jury for the same reasons that the state articulated.

‘‘In determining whether the trial court improperly

refused a request to charge, [w]e . . . review the evi-
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dence presented at trial in the light most favorable to

supporting the . . . proposed charge. . . . A request

to charge [that] is relevant to the issues of [a] case and

[that] is an accurate statement of the law must be given.

. . . If, however, the evidence would not reasonably

support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court

has a duty not to submit it to the jury. . . . Thus, a

trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with

a party’s request to charge [only] if the proposed instructions are reasonably supported by the evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ashby, 336 Conn.

452, 497–98, 247 A.3d 521 (2020). Whether the evidence

supported defense counsel’s requested charge is a question of law over which our review is plenary. See, e.g.,

Brown v. Robishaw, 282 Conn. 628, 633–34, 922 A.2d

1086 (2007).

We have repeatedly held ‘‘that a conviction may not

stand on fingerprint evidence alone unless the prints

were found under such circumstances that they could

only have been impressed at the time the crime was

perpetrated.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Santangelo, supra, 205 Conn. 598; see also State v.

Edwards, 325 Conn. 97, 139, 156 A.3d 506 (2017); State

v. Payne, 186 Conn. 179, 184, 440 A.2d 280 (1982); State

v. Mayell, 163 Conn. 419, 426, 311 A.2d 60 (1972). In

Santangelo, we held that an instruction in accordance

with this principle ‘‘is germane where the fingerprints

of an accused constitute the only evidence, or the principal evidence to convict.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v.

Santangelo, supra, 599; see also State v. Lytell, 206

Conn. 657, 663, 539 A.2d 133 (1988) (upholding trial

court’s refusal to provide jury with Santangelo instruction because, in addition to fingerprint evidence, jury

also had evidence that witness had positively identified

defendant as perpetrator of robbery, and defendant

knew that victims ‘‘kept a large sum of money in the

cafe to cash payroll checks’’).
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We agree with the trial court that the defendant’s

requested Santangelo instruction was not warranted

because the palm print evidence was not the only or

principal evidence against him. As we explained in part

II of this opinion, there was an abundance of consciousness of guilt evidence, including the defendant’s false

statements to Marcia’s family members and the police,

his unexplained flight to Africa after the murders, his

adoption of a new life and identity when he returned

to the United States, and his failure for twenty years to

search for the whereabouts of his purportedly missing

child. There also was physical evidence that the defendant’s DNA was concordant with the hairs found on the

victim’s body, and he admitted that she was wrapped

in sleeping bags that belonged to him. Consequently,

‘‘the trial court was under no obligation to give the

requested fingerprint instruction because of the significant other evidence in [the] case.’’ State v. Lytell, supra,

206 Conn. 663. Therefore, we conclude that the court

properly declined to give the jury a Santangelo instruction because the evidence did not reasonably support

that instruction.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion ROBINSON, C. J., and MULLINS,

ECKER, DANNEHY and MOLL, Js., concurred.