Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Undercover Tests 

Reveal Significant 

Vulnerabilities in 

State’s Passport 

Issuance Process 

March 2009 

GAO-09-447 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2009

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in 

State’s Passport Issuance Process

Highlights of GAO-09-447, a report to 

congressional requesters 

A genuine U.S. passport is a vital 

document, permitting its owner to 

travel freely in and out of the

United States, prove U.S.

citizenship, obtain further 

identification documents, and set 

up bank accounts, among other 

things. Unfortunately, a terrorist or 

other criminal could take

advantage of these benefits by

fraudulently obtaining a genuine 

U.S. passport from the Department

of State (State). 

There are many ways that

malicious individuals could 

fraudulently obtain a genuine U.S. 

passport, including stealing an

American citizen’s identity and

counterfeiting or fraudulently 

obtaining identification or 

citizenship documents to meet 

State requirements. GAO was 

asked to proactively test the 

effectiveness of State’s passport 

issuance process to determine 

whether the process is vulnerable

to fraud.

 

To do so, GAO designed four test

scenarios that simulated the

actions of a malicious individual 

who had access to an American 

citizen’s personal identity 

information. GAO created

counterfeit documents for four

fictitious or deceased individuals 

using off-the-shelf, commercially

available hardware, software, and

materials. An undercover GAO

investigator then applied for 

passports at three United States

Postal Service (USPS) locations 

and a State-run passport office. 

GAO’s investigation shows that terrorists or criminals could steal an American 

citizen’s identity, use basic counterfeiting skills to create fraudulent 

documentation for that identity, and obtain a genuine U.S. passport from 

State. GAO conducted four tests simulating this approach and was successful 

in obtaining a genuine U.S. passport in each case. In the most egregious case, 

an undercover GAO investigator obtained a passport using counterfeit 

documents and the Social Security Number (SSN) of a man who died in 1965. 

In another case, the investigator obtained a passport using counterfeit 

documents and the genuine SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old child GAO created 

for a previous investigation—even though the investigator’s counterfeit 

documents and application indicated he was 53 years old. All four passports 

were issued to the same GAO investigator, under four different names. In all 

four tests, GAO used counterfeit and/or fraudulently obtained documents. 

State and USPS employees did not identify GAO’s documents as counterfeit. 

Genuine U.S. Passports Obtained with Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents

Source: GAO (presentation), and the U.S. State Department (image).

GAO’s investigator later purchased an airline ticket under the name used on 

one of the four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports, and then used that 

passport as proof of identity to check in to his flight, get a boarding pass, and 

pass through the security checkpoint at a major metropolitan-area airport. 

At a briefing on the results of GAO’s investigation, State officials agreed with 

GAO that the investigation exposes a major vulnerability in State’s passport 

issuance process. According to State officials, State’s fraud detection efforts 

are hampered by limitations to its information sharing and data access with 

other federal and state agencies. After GAO’s briefing, State officials notified

GAO that they identified and revoked GAO’s four fraudulently obtained U.S. 

passports, and were studying the matter to determine the appropriate steps 

for improving State’s passport issuance process. 

View GAO-09-447 or key components.

For more information, contact Gregory D. 

Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Undercover Investigator Obtained Four Genuine U.S. Passports 

Using Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents 4 

Corrective Action Briefing 9 

Tables 

Table 1: Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents Used to 

Obtain Genuine U.S. Passports 5 

Figures 

Figure 1: Boarding Pass Used to Pass through Airport Security 6 

Abbreviations 

D.C. District of Columbia 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

SSA Social Security Administration 

SSN Social Security Number 

USPS United States Postal Service 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page i GAO-09-447 Vulnerabilities in Passport Issuance Process
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 13, 2009 

The Honorable Jon Kyl

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security 

Committee on the Judiciary 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Jon Kyl

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security 

Committee on the Judiciary 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 

United States Senate 

A U.S. passport not only allows an individual to travel freely in and out of 

the United States, but also can be used to obtain further identification 

documents, prove U.S. citizenship, and set up bank accounts, among other 

things. Because passports issued under a false identity help enable 

individuals to conceal their movements and activities, there is great 

concern that passport fraud could facilitate acts of terrorism. In fact, the 

9/11 Commission stated that “for terrorists, travel documents are as 

important as weapons,” and further noted that terrorists need to travel “to 

meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack.”1

 Further, 

passport fraud facilitates other crimes such as illegal immigration, money 

laundering, drug trafficking, tax evasion, and alien smuggling.

A U.S. passport not only allows an individual to travel freely in and out of 

the United States, but also can be used to obtain further identification 

documents, prove U.S. citizenship, and set up bank accounts, among other 

things. Because passports issued under a false identity help enable 

individuals to conceal their movements and activities, there is great 

concern that passport fraud could facilitate acts of terrorism. In fact, the 

9/11 Commission stated that “for terrorists, travel documents are as 

important as weapons,” and further noted that terrorists need to travel “to 

meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack.”1

 Further, 

passport fraud facilitates other crimes such as illegal immigration, money 

laundering, drug trafficking, tax evasion, and alien smuggling.

Malicious individuals may seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the Department 

of State’s (State) current passport issuance process, such as a lack of due 

diligence on the part of examiners who screen applications, by using 

counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents as proof of identity and

U.S. citizenship2

 to obtain genuine U.S. passports. For example, between 

July 2005 and August 2008, State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) identified 112 individuals who had fraudulently obtained U.S. 

passports by using the birth certificates of deceased Americans. 

Individuals who fraudulently obtained passports included fugitives, sex 

offenders, and delinquent taxpayers, all of whom wanted to use a U.S. 

Malicious individuals may seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the Department 

of State’s (State) current passport issuance process, such as a lack of due 

diligence on the part of examiners who screen applications, by using 

counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents as proof of identity and

U.S. citizenship2

 to obtain genuine U.S. passports. For example, between 

July 2005 and August 2008, State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) identified 112 individuals who had fraudulently obtained U.S. 

passports by using the birth certificates of deceased Americans. 

Individuals who fraudulently obtained passports included fugitives, sex 

offenders, and delinquent taxpayers, all of whom wanted to use a U.S. 

 1

 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 

Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States, Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 22, 2004). 

2

 As required by State’s instructions on the Application for a U.S. Passport, form DS-11,

applicants must provide proof of U.S. citizenship and proof of identity, along with two 

recent color photographs and funds to cover the passport application fees. 

Page 1 GAO-09-447 Vulnerabilities in Passport Issuance Process
 

passport to conceal themselves from law enforcement authorities. State

and the FBI identified these 112 individuals by matching State passport 

records against state-level death records. 

In 2005, we reported that using the stolen identities and documentation of 

U.S. citizens is the primary tactic of those fraudulently applying for U.S. 

passports, and that passport fraud is often linked to other crimes.3

 Our 

report mentioned a number of ways in which a person might fraudulently 

obtain a U.S. passport, including using an assumed identity that is 

supported by genuine but fraudulently obtained identification documents; 

submitting false claims of lost, stolen, or mutilated passports; using 

counterfeit citizenship documents; and using the identity of a deceased 

person. We also reported weaknesses in State’s information sharing with 

other federal agencies. For example, we stated that the information that 

State received and used from the Social Security Administration (SSA) 

was limited and outdated. In the report, we stated that although State and

SSA signed a memorandum in April 2004 that gave State access to SSA’s 

main database to help verify passport applicants’ identity, the 

memorandum had not been implemented as of March 2005. Moreover, we 

reported that the memorandum did not include access to SSA’s death 

records, but that State officials said they were exploring the possibility of 

obtaining these records in the future.4

In 2007 we reported on the risk of fraud that exists in the lack of State’s 

oversight of the more than 8,000 passport acceptance facilities nationwide 

that it designates to provide passport application services to the American 

public.5

 Passport acceptance facilities are located at certain United States 

Postal Service (USPS) locations, courthouses, and other institutions, and 

do not employ State personnel. The passport acceptance agents at these 

facilities are responsible for, among other things, verifying whether an 

applicant’s identification document (such as a driver’s license) actually 

matches the applicant, and sending each applicant’s proof of citizenship 

 3

 See GAO, State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud

Detection Efforts, GAO-05-477 (Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2005). 

4

 On June 29, 2005, a State official testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs that the initiative with SSA would be operational 

nationwide by early August 2005. 

5

 See GAO, Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced, but More

Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use, GAO-07-1006 (Washington, D.C.: Jul.

31, 2007). 

Page 2 GAO-09-447 Vulnerabilities in Passport Issuance Process
 

and passport application to State. Although we found that State had taken

some steps to address weaknesses identified in the training of acceptance

agents, we found that additional measures were needed to ensure 

adequate controls over the application acceptance process. 

This report responds to your request that we proactively test the 

effectiveness of the current passport issuance process to determine 

whether malicious individuals could use counterfeit or fraudulently 

obtained documents to obtain a genuine U.S. passport. To perform this 

work, we designed four test scenarios that would simulate the actions of a 

malicious individual who had access to another person’s identity 

information (a practice commonly known as identity theft). We then 

attempted to obtain four genuine U.S. passports by using counterfeit or 

fraudulently obtained documents, such as birth certificates and drivers’ 

licenses, and the Social Security Numbers (SSN) of fictitious or deceased

individuals. We created all of these counterfeit documents with off-theshelf, commercially available hardware, software, and materials. In 

addition, we used some of these counterfeit documents to obtain a 

genuine District of Columbia (D.C.) identification card, which we 

subsequently used to obtain a U.S. passport in one test. 

The fictitious identities we used in our first two tests were based on 

information and SSNs we had previously obtained from SSA for the 

purpose of conducting undercover tests. These tests were meant to 

simulate a malicious individual stealing another person’s identity and 

using it to obtain a passport. On our third test, we used the genuine SSN of 

a fictitious 5-year-old child we created for a previous investigation6

 to 

simulate a malicious individual stealing the identity of a real child to get a 

passport. Finally, on our fourth test, we used the SSN of an individual who 

died in 1965 to simulate a malicious individual using a deceased person’s 

identity to obtain a passport.7

 For three of our four tests, we submitted our 

passport applications and supporting materials at USPS locations that 

 6

 See GAO, Social Security Administration: Actions Taken to Strengthen Procedures for 

Issuing Social Security Numbers to Noncitizens, but Some Weaknesses Remain, 

GAO-04-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2003). 

7

 We did not design a test scenario to simulate a malicious individual attempting to obtain a 

passport by using the identity and SSN of a person who already had a current U.S. passport, 

as this scenario was beyond the scope of our investigation. According to information

provided to us by State for a previous report, about 28 percent of the U.S. population has a

passport. See GAO, State Department: Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve 

Passport Operations, GAO-08-891 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 25, 2008).

Page 3 GAO-09-447 Vulnerabilities in Passport Issuance Process
 

accept passport applications. For one of our four tests, we submitted our 

application and materials at State’s regional Washington, D.C., passportissuing office.8

We conducted the work for this investigation from May 2008 through 

March 2009 in accordance with quality standards for investigations as set 

forth by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

Our investigator was easily able to obtain four genuine U.S. passports 

using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents. In the most 

egregious case, our investigator obtained a U.S. passport using counterfeit

documents and the SSN of a man who died in 1965. In another case, our 

undercover investigator obtained a U.S. passport using counterfeit 

documents and the genuine SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old child—even 

though his counterfeit documents and application indicated he was 53 

years old. State and USPS employees did not identify our documents as 

counterfeit in any of our four tests. Although we do not know what 

checks, if any, State performed when approving our fraudulent 

applications, it issued a genuine U.S. passport in each case. All four 

passports were issued to the same GAO investigator, under four different 

names. 

Undercover 

Investigator Obtained 

Four Genuine U.S. 

Passports Using 

Counterfeit or 

Fraudulently 

Obtained Documents 

Our tests show a variety of ways that malicious individuals with even 

minimal counterfeiting capabilities and access to another person’s identity 

could obtain genuine U.S. passports using counterfeit or fraudulently 

obtained documents. Table 1 below shows the month of passport 

application, type of counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents used, 

and the number of days that passed between passport application and 

passport issuance for each of our four tests. 

 8

 State operates 17 domestic passport-issuing offices, where most passports are issued each 

year. These offices are located in Aurora, Colorado; Boston; Charleston, South Carolina; 

Chicago; Honolulu; Houston; Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; New York; Norwalk, 

Connecticut; Philadelphia; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; San Francisco; Seattle; and 2 

offices in Washington, D.C.—a regional passport agency and a special issuance agency that

handles official U.S. government and diplomatic passports. Fifteen of these offices are 

regional passport agencies that process in-person applications in addition to applications

received by mail. The remaining 2 facilities—Charleston, South Carolina, and Portsmouth, 

New Hampshire—are mega-processing centers with no access to the public. 

Page 4 GAO-09-447 Vulnerabilities in Passport Issuance Process
 

Table 1: Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents Used to Obtain Genuine U.S. Passports 

Test 

number

Month of 

application 

Documents submitted as

part of passport application process 

Number of days between

application and issuance 

1 July 2008 • Counterfeit West Virginia driver’s license 

• Counterfeit New York birth certificate 

• Passport application form 

8 days 

2 August 2008 • Genuine District of Columbia identification card obtained with 

fraudulent documentation 

• Counterfeit New York birth certificate 

• Passport application form 

Same day (passport issued

the date of application) 

3 October 2008 • Counterfeit West Virginia driver’s license 

• Counterfeit New York birth certificate 

• Passport application form containing SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old

child, which we obtained on a previous investigation 

7 days 

4 December 2008 • Counterfeit Florida driver’s license 

• Counterfeit New York birth certificate 

• Passport application form containing SSN of a deceased individual 

4 days 

Source: GAO.

Note: In all four tests, our investigator also submitted two color photographs and a passport 

application fee. For the second test, the investigator also submitted an e-ticket for an August 2008 

flight to Germany. 

Our investigator used a genuine U.S. passport obtained by using 

counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents to pass through airport 

security. In January 2009, our investigator purchased an airline ticket for a 

domestic flight using the fictitious name from one of our test scenarios. He 

then used the fraudulently obtained passport from that test as proof of 

identity to check in to his flight, get a boarding pass, and pass through the 

security checkpoint at a major metropolitan-area airport. Figure 1 below 

shows the boarding pass. After our investigator successfully passed 

through the checkpoint, he left the airport and cancelled his airline ticket.

Page 5 GAO-09-447 Vulnerabilities in Passport Issuance Process
 

Figure 1: Boarding Pass Used to Pass through Airport Security 

Source: GAO (presentation), and Delta Airlines (image).

Test One: Investigator 

Obtained Passport Using 

Counterfeit Identification 

Documents 

Our first test found that USPS did not detect the counterfeit West Virginia 

driver’s license our undercover investigator presented as proof of his 

identity during the passport application process. Further, State issued our 

investigator a genuine U.S. passport despite the counterfeit New York 

birth certificate he used as proof of his U.S. citizenship. In July 2008, our 

investigator entered a USPS office in Virginia and approached a USPS 

employee to apply for a passport. The USPS employee greeted the 

investigator and took his application form, counterfeit New York birth 

certificate, and counterfeit West Virginia driver’s license. On these 

documents, we used a fictitious identity and a SSN that we had previously 

obtained from SSA for the purpose of conducting undercover tests. The 

USPS employee reviewed the application materials line by line to make 

sure that the information on the application form matched the information 

on the birth certificate and driver’s license. After she completed her review

of the application materials, the USPS employee took the investigator’s 

Page 6 GAO-09-447 Vulnerabilities in Passport Issuance Process
 

birth certificate and funds to pay for the application fee. She administered 

an oath, and then told the investigator that he should receive the passport 

within 1 to 4 weeks. 

State issued a genuine U.S. passport to our undercover investigator 8 days 

after he submitted his application. About a week after State issued the 

passport, it arrived at the mailing address indicated on the application 

materials. 

Test Two: Investigator 

Obtained Passport Using a 

Genuine but Fraudulently

Obtained State 

Identification Card 

Our second test found that State did not detect a counterfeit New York 

birth certificate our undercover investigator presented to prove his U.S. 

citizenship in support of a passport application. In July 2008, our 

investigator—the same investigator as in the first test above—obtained a 

genuine identification card from the Washington, D.C., Department of 

Motor Vehicles using counterfeit documents, which he then used to apply 

for a U.S. passport. 

In August 2008, the same investigator entered State’s regional Washington,

D.C., passport-issuing office with a completed passport application form, a 

counterfeit New York birth certificate, the genuine D.C. identification 

card, two passport photographs, sufficient funds to pay for the application 

fee, and an electronic ticket (e-ticket) confirming that he had a flight to 

Germany.9

 For this test, we used a fictitious identity and SSN that we had

previously obtained from SSA for the purpose of conducting undercover 

investigations. The investigator presented his application form and 

materials to a State employee, who went line by line through the 

application form matching the information to the accompanying 

documents. The State employee provided the investigator with a number 

and instructed him to wait until his number was called. After his number 

was called, the investigator proceeded to a window to speak with another 

State employee. The second employee looked over his materials to make 

sure that he had all of the necessary documentation, took his birth 

certificate and money, and administered an oath. 

A few days later, the investigator returned to the same passport facility 

and picked up his passport. State issued the passport on the same day that 

 9

 We chose this office because it offers an expedited service—passports are usually issued 

within 1-2 days—for travelers who present a confirmed airline reservation to prove that 

they will be traveling out of the United States within 14 days. 

Page 7 GAO-09-447 Vulnerabilities in Passport Issuance Process
 

the investigator submitted his application, in the fictitious name presented 

on the fraudulently obtained and counterfeit documents. 

As with our first test, our third test found that USPS did not detect the 

counterfeit West Virginia driver’s license our undercover investigator 

presented as proof of his identity during the passport application process. 

Further, State issued our investigator a genuine U.S. passport based on a 

counterfeit New York birth certificate as proof of U.S. citizenship. In 

October 2008, our investigator—the same investigator as in the first two 

tests mentioned above—entered a USPS office in Maryland to apply for a 

U.S. passport. A USPS employee greeted the investigator and took his 

application form, as well as his counterfeit New York birth certificate and 

counterfeit West Virginia driver’s license. The application materials used 

the name and genuine SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old child, which we 

obtained from a previous investigation. However, our investigator listed 

his age as 53 on the application materials, which clearly did not match the 

date of birth associated with the SSN used in this test. The USPS employee 

reviewed the application materials, including meticulously matching the 

information on the application form to the birth certificate and driver’s 

license. After she completed her review of the application materials, the 

USPS employee took the investigator’s birth certificate and payment for 

the application fee, administered an oath, and told the investigator that he

should receive the passport within 2 to 4 weeks. 

State issued a genuine U.S. passport to our investigator, in the fictitious 

name based on the counterfeit documents, 7 days after he submitted his 

application. The passport arrived at the mailing address indicated by our 

investigator on the application materials a few days after its issuance. 

Test Three: Investigator 

Obtained Passport Using 

Social Security Number for 

a Fictitious 5-Year-Old 

Child 

Test Four: Investigator 

Obtained Passport Using 

Social Security Number of 

a Deceased Individual 

As with our first and third tests, our fourth test found that USPS did not 

detect the counterfeit identification document—a bogus Florida driver’s 

license—our undercover investigator presented to support his passport 

application. Further, State issued our investigator a genuine U.S. passport 

based on a counterfeit New York birth certificate as proof of U.S. 

citizenship. In December 2008, our investigator—the same investigator as 

in the three tests mentioned above—entered a USPS office in Maryland to 

apply for a U.S. passport. A USPS employee greeted the investigator and 

took his application form, as well as his counterfeit New York birth 

certificate and counterfeit Florida driver’s license. His application 

materials used a name and SSN that was issued to a person who died in 

1965, and who would have been 59 years old at the time of our test had he

Page 8 GAO-09-447 Vulnerabilities in Passport Issuance Process
 

still been alive.10 The USPS employee reviewed the application materials, 

matching the information on the application form to the birth certificate 

and driver’s license. After completing the review of application materials, 

the USPS employee took the investigator’s birth certificate and funds to 

pay for the application fee. The USPS employee administered an oath then

told the investigator that he should receive the passport within 4 to 6 

weeks. 

Four days after our investigator submitted his application, State issued a 

genuine U.S. passport in the fictitious name presented on the counterfeit 

documents. The passport arrived at the mailing address indicated by our 

investigator on the application materials. 

We briefed State officials on the results of our investigation. They agreed 

that our findings expose a major vulnerability in State’s passport issuance 

process. According to State officials, the department’s ability to verify the 

information submitted as part of a passport application is hampered by 

limitations to its information sharing and data access with other agencies 

at the federal and state levels. They said that some federal agencies limit 

State’s access to their records due to privacy concerns or the fact that 

State is not a law enforcement agency. In addition, they said that State 

does not currently have the ability to conduct real-time verification of the 

authenticity of birth certificates presented by passport applicants. They 

added that birth certificates present an exceptional challenge to fraud 

detection efforts, as there are currently thousands of different acceptable 

formats for birth certificates. Further, they indicated that there are 

difficulties with verifying the authenticity of drivers’ licenses. Moreover, 

they said that although State attempts to verify SSN information submitted 

on passport applications on a daily basis with SSA, the results of this datasharing process are imperfect. For example, State officials said that many 

of the mismatches identified through this verification process are actually 

due to typos or other common errors. However, they said that while these 

data checks may not identify all cases in which an applicant’s data do not

match the information in SSA’s records, in some instances—such as cases

in which an SSN is tied to a deceased individual—investigators from the

Passport Fraud Branch of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security will 

attempt to check publicly available databases to resolve the mismatch. 

Corrective Action 

Briefing 

 10 We used SSA’s Death Master File to obtain the identity of the deceased individual. 

Page 9 GAO-09-447 Vulnerabilities in Passport Issuance Process
 

State officials acknowledged that they have issued other fraudulently 

obtained passports but did not offer an estimate of the magnitude of the 

problem. In order to improve State’s current passport fraud detection 

capabilities, officials said that State would need greater cooperation from 

other agencies at both the federal and state levels, and the ability to access 

other agencies’ records in real time. Subsequent to our briefing, State 

officials informed us that they identified and revoked our four fraudulently 

obtained U.S. passports, and that they would study the matter further to 

determine what steps would be appropriate to improve passport issuance 

procedures. We did not verify the accuracy of these State officials’ 

statements. We also briefed a representative of USPS on the results of our 

investigation, who did not offer any comments at the time of our briefing.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of State and other 

interested parties. The report will also be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any 

questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6722 or 

kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations 

Gregory D. Kutz 

and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Managing Director 

Forensic Audits and Special Investigations

(192286) Page 10 GAO-09-447 Vulnerabilities in Passport Issuance Process
 

GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO 

posts on its Web site newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, 

go to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.” 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information. 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, DC 20548 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

Please Print on Recycled Paper