Opinion f iled May 27, 2010



## In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ 

### No. 11

- 09

- 00087

- CR

__________ STATE OF TEXAS , Appellant

V.

CHELSEA AURELEA REEDY , Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court N o. 4

Dent on County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. C R

- 2008

- 06123

- Y

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N O N P E T I T I O N
F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W
Pursuant to T EX

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. P . 50, our original opinion and judgme nt dated March 25, 2010, are withdrawn, and the modified opinion and judgment dated May 27, 2010 , are substituted therefor.
On December 14, 2007, the non

- record municipal court of Northlake in Denton County,
Texas , found Chelsea Aurelea Reedy guilty of fa ilure to appear/bail jumping and imposed a $197
fine. 1 The court advised Reedy that the “judgment date” would be January 9, 2008, and that
, to

1 T EX

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. § 38.10 (Vernon 2003 ) defines the offense and declares it to be a Class C misdemeanor. The punishment for a Class C misdemeanor is a fine not to exceed $500. T EX

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. § 12.23 (Vernon 2003 ).2

appeal , she must post a bond twice the amount of her fine within thirty days of this judgment date. Reedy filed an appeal bond on January 11, 2008. On August 13, 2008 , the municipal court signed a judgment. On the same date, the court administrator prepared a certified transcript of the proceedings in municipal court. The county court signed an order dismissing the cause on February 23 , 2009. We affirm

. 2

T EX

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. A NN . a rt. 45.0426 (Vernon 2006 ) provides that the filing of the appeal bond pe r fects that appeal from the municipal court to the county court. T EX

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. a rt. 45.043 (Vern on 2006 ) states that , when the appeal is filed, “all furt her proceedings
in the case in . . . municipal court shall cease.” According to the record before us, the municipal court lost jurisdiction on January 11, 2008, when Reedy filed her appeal bond.
Th e State argues that the county court erred when it su a sponte dismissed this Class C misdemeanor action for speedy trial violations when the issue of a speedy trial was not raised in the municipal court and no record was developed in the municipal court. The State characterizes the

ac tion in the county court as an “ appeal” and contends that any constitutional violation would have been a right to a speedy appellate review as opposed to trial proceeding s

. The State concludes that,
as there is no constituti onal right to a speed y appeal, the trial court erred.
While Article 4.08 and A rticle 45.0426 provide for review of the decision in a municipal court by the county court by appeal, Article 45.042(b) states that, unless the municipal court is a
court of reco rd, the county court shall conduct a trial de novo. We note that the Northlake
M unicipal C ourt is not a municipal court of record. Therefore, Reedy’s appea l bond triggered a trial de novo or new trial in the county court

. T EX

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. a rt. 4.08 (Ve rnon 2005), arts. 45.042(b), 45.0426 (Vernon 2006). The county court noted that the provisions of T EX

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. A NN . a rt. 17.151, § 1(4) (Vernon Supp. 2009 ) calls for the release of a person confined on a Class C misdemeanor
within five days and concluded that such lesser offense as Class C misdemeanors were entitled to “shorter times for rights to invoke delay.” The county court then determined that the delay from the

2 Because the fine originally assessed by the municipal court exceeded $100, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to T EX

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. art. 4.03 (Vernon 2005 ).3

January 11, 2008 appeal bond until the February 23, 2009 hearing res ulted in the failure of the State to meet speedy trial requirements. No testimony was presented at the February 23, 2009 hearing. The county court expressed concern at the delay in bringing the case to trial. Counsel for Reedy made a motion to dismiss f or failure of her righ ts to a speedy trial in the county court , and the county court granted that motion. The trial court’s determination that a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has
bee n violated is subject to appellat e review under the standards announced in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Cantu v. State , 253 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In Barker , the Supreme Court stated that appellate courts must analyze federal speedy trial claims on an ad hoc basis weighing and balancin g the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice to the accused. Barker , 407 U.S. at 530; Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 280; Zamorano v. State , 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002 )

. Texas constitutional speedy trial claims are traditionally analyzed under the Barker test. Zamorano , 84 S.W.3d at 648.
All of the factors of the Barker test must be considered together, no one factor outweighs another.
Barker , 407 U.S. at 530; Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 280. The appellate court applies a bifurcated
standard of review: an abuse of discretion standard of review for the factual components of the
Barker test and a de novo standard of review for the legal components. Cantu , 253 S. W.3d at 282;
Zamorano , 84 S.W.3d at 648 ; Johnson v. State , 954 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The record before this court reflects that the municipal court lost jurisdiction and the county court gained jurisdiction on January 11, 2008, when Reedy filed he r appeal bond and that no action was taken in the county court until the February 23, 2009 hearing where Reedy made a motion to dismiss on violation of her right to a speedy trial. We defer to the trial court’s implied findings of fact that the length of delay was from the time of the filing of the bond to the date of the hearing, that Reedy asserted her right s , and that Reedy was prejudiced by the delay . We note that the record is silent as to any reason for the delay. As to the legal components of the Barker test, the record supports the legal conclusions that Reedy timely asserted her rights at the hearing, that a delay of eight months resulted in a violation of Reedy’s federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial on the alleged Class C mi sdemeanor offense that is punishable by a fine only, and that the eight

month delay resulted in prejudice.4

The State’s arguments are overruled, and the order of the county court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

May 27 , 2010 Do not publish. See T EX

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. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., McCall, J., and Strange, J.