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From:

Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2015 3:11 PM

To: RedHill

Subject: Red Hill fuel facilities operation: looking at less-tangible human and management factors?

Follow Up Flag: Follow up

Flag Status: Flagged

I've been intermittently involved with projects throughout Red Hill, as well as the fuel distribution piping 

system since the late 1990s. Having just received BWS' notice of public meeting and invitation for comment, I 

spent some time going through the online documents provided for reference. 

While I am impressed at the breadth of coverage in technical terms, conspicuously absent - especially to anyone 

familiar with the management style and 'policies' of the Pearl Harbor Fuels' uppermost personnel in recent years 

- was a plan to review FISC Pearl Harbor Fuels' command/control in human-resources terms, looking at loss of 

employees, level of satisfaction with treatment and policies, and other aspects that clearly can negatively affect 

the operation of the facility - and materially contribute to incidents and accidents. 

At my last count, valuable long-term personnel were in a protracted exodus from the fuels department, owing to 

barely-tolerable, extreme top-down management practices. Personal "investment" in facility projects was 

effectively and actively discouraged, as decision-making was taken out of the hands of those who had formerly 

exercised a great deal of autonomy, as if to actively discourage dedication by those personnel. Contractors, long 

aware of the inherent difficulties that traditionally come with any work in Red Hill or associated pipeline 

facilities, certainly also felt this shift towards a hostile work environment, and consequently either turned down 

opportunities to bid, or added to their prices to accommodate dealing with this new consolidation of control. 

The negative impact on morale, for those who continue to work within the complex, cannot be quantified, but is 

clearly considerable. 

It wasn't always this way. Under direction of , who retired after many years with Fuels 

ISC fuels was managed with a positive, team-spirited approach that actively supported contractors and 

empowered fuels personnel to implement better practices and procedures when warranted. The contrast between 

then and now in mood, contentment, stress amongst facility personnel, and certainly job performance, could not 

be more stark. 

 was forced to resign after a similar fuel spill in 2001/2002, whether rightly or wrongly. 

Many did not think this fair, but it happened anyway. This event almost certainly informed subsequent 

management mindset: "don't let this happen to you." Clearly the more recent trend towards tight controls by 

management has gutted morale. It is evident that, if the intent of such restrictive and controlling oversight was 

to ensure that accidents such as this most recent spill would not occur, this policy has failed dismally. 

One aspect of this that begs the question of who should/could have known about this: considering that the 

facility has enjoyed state-of-the-art electronic fuels-management technology for some years, does it not concern 

investigators that the leak was active from 9 December 2013 until 13 January 2014, over a period of almost five 

weeks? (this per par. q, p. 5, AOC) As a newly-recommissioned tank, one would expect closer-than-normal 

scrutiny during filling and putting back into service, yet clearly this was not the case. 

Has there been any attempt to gather opinions on these issues, perhaps by surveying those on the front lines? If 

not, might this not be worth review, hopefully resulting in adjustments to management structure, policy, and 

personnel? 
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Sincerely,