NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-4742

___________

STEPHEN COREY JAMES,

Appellant

v.

SUTLIFF SATURN, INC.

_______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-1081

(Honorable William W. Caldwell)

______________

Argued January 10, 2012

Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: March 15, 2012)

LISA JO FANELLI-GREER, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

2806 Sunset Court

P.O. Box C

Grantham, Pennsylvania 17027

Attorney for Appellant

SCHAUN D. HENRY, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

RICHARD L. ETTER, ESQUIRE

McNees, Wallace & Nurick

100 Pine Street

P.O. Box 1166

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101

Attorneys for Appellee
2

ELIZABETH E. THERAN, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E., 5th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20507

Attorney for Amicus-Appellant,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

_________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_________________

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.

Stephen Corey James appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on 

race and disability discrimination claims he brought against Sutliff Saturn, Inc., under 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human 

Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et seq. We will affirm the District 

Court’s judgment on the race discrimination claim but vacate and remand on the 

disability claim.

I.

James, who is African-American, was hired in 1999 as an appearance technician at 

Sutliff’s Carlisle Pike facility. Over the next five years, James was disciplined three 

times. In 2005, he was transferred to Sutliff’s Harrisburg location. On November 7, 2005, 

Sutliff granted James medical leave to undergo knee surgery. During his absence, Sutliff 

promoted a white technician to fill James’s position. When James returned to work on 

March 7, 2006, Sutliff terminated his employment.
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As a result of his termination, James filed pro se a charge of race discrimination 

with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) and the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on March 16, 2006. After obtaining 

counsel, James sought to amend his charge to include a claim for disability 

discrimination. On September 2, 2006, James contacted the PHRC through counsel to 

request the amendment, which Randall R. Smedley, a Human Relations Representative, 

acknowledged by letter on November 3, 2006. Smedley’s response directed James to 

complete an intake questionnaire, which was not an official PHRC form, but rather a 

printout from the PHRC’s internal case management system. James completed the form, 

signing and dating each page. The completed printout and a cover letter were handdelivered to Smedley on December 22, 2006. In the letter, James’s counsel asked 

Smedley to contact her if he required any further information. 

James received no further communication from the PHRC or the EEOC until the

EEOC’s Philadelphia Office sent a letter, dated March 5, 2009, notifying James of the 

dismissal of his discrimination charge and his right to sue in federal or state court. James 

contacted the PHRC and was informed that his state charge had been dismissed in 2008. 

James then obtained a copy of the PHRC’s 2008 Letter of Determination, which did not 

state any grounds for the dismissal. Shortly thereafter, James learned that Smedley had 

retired from the PHRC without processing his amendment. The disability charge had 

never been added to his race discrimination charge. 

James filed suit in federal court on June 6, 2009, alleging race and disability 

discrimination. The District Court granted Sutliff’s motion for summary judgment on the 
4

race discrimination claim, finding that James failed to show that Sutliff’s proffered 

legitimate explanation for the discharge was a pretext for discrimination. The court also 

granted summary judgment on the disability claim, reasoning that James failed to 

properly verify the amendment as required by statute.1

II.

A.

We analyze James’s discrimination claims according to the familiar burdenshifting approach of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See 

Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2000).2

This appeal challenges the District Court’s application of the last stage of the 

burden-shifting framework and requires us to determine whether James put forth 

sufficient evidence of pretext. On summary judgment, James may meet his burden by 

Under this approach, the 

plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case. The burden then shifts to the employer to 

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. If the defendant does 

so, the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still 

prevail by showing that the employer’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for 

discrimination.

 1 The District Court had original jurisdiction over the Title VII and ADA claims under 28 

U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the PHRA claims under 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(a). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a grant of 

summary judgment de novo. Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2008). 

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 2 We apply the McDonnell Douglas framework because, despite his claims to the 

contrary, James offers no direct evidence of discrimination. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont 

de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1071 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
5

“providing evidence that would allow a fact finder reasonably to (1) disbelieve the 

employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory 

reason was more likely than not the motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s 

action.” Sarullo v. United States Postal Service, 352 F.3d 789, 799-800 (3d Cir. 2003) 

(citations and internal quotations omitted).3

Sutliff claims James’s employment was terminated because his position was ably 

filled by another technician while he was absent on extended medical leave, and when 

James returned from leave there was not enough work to support two appearance 

technicians on staff. Sutliff claims it chose to retain James’s replacement because he was 

an exemplary employee. 

Disputing this proffered explanation, James points to evidence that he argues casts 

doubt on Sutliff’s reasons. First, James asserts his own belief that he was fired on account 

of his race. Second, James alleges that a previous disciplinary incident reflected racial 

animus since he was disciplined for a mess in the detailing shop even though he had been 

away on leave, while two white co-workers, who had been present, were not disciplined. 

Third, James alleges that the General Sales Manager reprimanded him without cause 

when he visited the facility five days before his discharge. Fourth, James claims the Vice 

President of Sales and Marketing made light of his discharge and told him over the 

phone, “You’re outta here.” Finally, James cites the circumstances of his discharge: that 

he was one of only three African-American employees at the Harrisburg facility; that he 

was discharged immediately upon his return from medical leave, while a white employee 

 3 To the extent the District Court said otherwise, this is the standard we apply on review. 
6

was permitted to return to work after several months of leave; and that he, with six years 

of experience, was replaced by a white employee with significantly less experience.

James’s evidence of pretext is insufficient. James’s unsupported belief that he was 

fired for discriminatory reasons “falls far short of establishing pretext.” Sarullo, 352 F.3d 

at 800. The comments made by members of management shortly before and after James’s 

discharge may betray interpersonal tensions or insensitivity, but they carry no hint of 

racial animus. Nor do the circumstances of James’s discharge discredit Sutliff’s 

explanation. The bare fact that James’s replacement was white and had less experience 

does not support an inference that race motivated the decision, particularly where James’s 

disciplinary record does not compare favorably with that of his replacement. Likewise, 

the contrast James draws between his experience and that of a white employee who 

returned to work after a leave of absence does not support an inference of discrimination. 

Because the white employee worked as an administrative assistant, not as an appearance 

technician, her experience does not cast doubt on Sutliff’s explanation that there was not 

enough appearance technician work to retain James. Finally, James’s own statements 

undercut his claim that race was a motivating factor in his discharge. In his deposition, 

James acknowledged that he believed the prior disciplinary incident was unfair because 

he had been absent on leave, not because the discipline was based on race. Further, when 

pressed to give a reason why he believed his manager fired him because of race, James 

could only offer that his manager did not seem to like him.

Accordingly, we conclude that James submitted insufficient evidence to allow a 

reasonable factfinder to conclude that Sutliff’s explanation of the discharge was a pretext 
7

for discrimination. The District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the race 

discrimination claim was proper. 

B.

James also contends the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on his 

disability claim. The court declined to consider the disability claim, finding that James 

failed to follow the procedural requirements for prosecuting a charge of discrimination 

under the ADA. To bring such a claim in court, an employee must first exhaust his 

administrative remedies by filing the charge “in writing under oath or affirmation” with 

the EEOC and equivalent state agency where appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The 

regulations clarify that the charge must “be in writing and signed and verified,” defining 

“verified” to require that the charge be sworn to under oath “or supported by an unsworn 

declaration in writing under penalty of perjury.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9; 29 C.F.R § 

1601.3(a).4 James’s original race discrimination charge satisfied this verification 

requirement. The intake questionnaire James filed to add a claim of disability 

discrimination did not.5

Our decision in Hicks v. ABT Associates, 572 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1978), presented 

similar but not identical circumstances. There, we vacated the grant of summary 

judgment, holding the case raised a genuine issue of whether the charging party had 

reasonably attempted to file an amendment to his discrimination charge, which was 

 4 The PHRA similarly requires a charging party to file a “verified complaint, in writing,” 

43 P.S. § 959(a).

5 The regulations do not specify whether an amendment to a verified discrimination 

charge must itself be verified. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b); 16 Pa. Code § 42.35. For 

purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that it must. 
8

improperly rejected by the EEOC. Id. at 964. We reasoned that “[o]nce the charging party 

has done all that he can reasonably do to amend his charge in accordance with the 

Commission’s regulations, the statutory policy of providing the EEOC with an 

opportunity to reconcile the grievance has been fulfilled.” Id. In short, “[t]he individual 

employee should not be penalized by the improper conduct of the Commission.” Id. at 

964-65. The District Court distinguished Hicks with respect to only one of its two 

holdings,

6

In September 2006, James contacted the PHRC through counsel, requesting an

amendment to his claim and asking Smedley, the PHRC case manager, how to proceed. 

Instead of sending James the PHRC’s standard intake form, which includes language 

intended to satisfy the verification requirement, Smedley sent a two page printout from 

the agency’s internal case management software, which contained no verification 

language, and directed James to answer the specified questions “in any format.” After

complying with these instructions, James reasonably believed that his amendment was 

being processed. Our analysis in Hicks applies here. James only failed to verify his 

indicating the decision was inapposite because in that case, unlike this one, the 

initial discrimination charge was broad enough to encompass both theories of 

discrimination alleged by the plaintiff. But this purported distinction has no bearing on 

whether James made a reasonable attempt to amend his charge. 

 6 In Hicks, we also considered the possibility that the plaintiff did not file any amendment 

with the EEOC. Assuming this were the case, we held that if the additional charge was so 

related to the acts that constituted the charge actually filed with the EEOC, such that the 

EEOC’s investigation could reasonably be expected to encompass both bases of 

discrimination, then the additional charge should be cognizable in a subsequent lawsuit. 

Hicks, 572 F.2d at 965-67. In distinguishing Hicks, the District Court cited this portion of 

the opinion.
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amended charge because he was misdirected by the PHRC’s express filing instructions. 

By complying with those instructions, James satisfied the statutory policy of providing 

the PHRC with an opportunity to reconcile the grievance. He should not be penalized for 

the PHRC’s error. On these facts, we conclude that James’s failure to verify the 

amendment does not bar his disability discrimination claim.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment on 

James’s race discrimination claim, vacate the grant of summary judgment on James’s 

disability discrimination claim, and remand to the District Court to consider the merits of 

that claim.