Filed 8/30/23 In re R.C. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re R

. C. et al.

, Person s Coming Under the Juve nile Court Law. B 322826 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22 CCJP0 1 40 4 )

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

F

. C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from order s of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet

, Temporary Judge

. A ffirmed

. Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.2 Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel an d Veronica Randazzo , Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent

.

____________________
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the agency) initiated juvenile dependency proceedings concerning R.C., who was then 15

, and her sister, A.C., who was 13. DCFS alleged that R.C . had mental and emotional problems c ausing her to attempt suicide and harm
hersel f

, and that her mother and father were unable to provide the care and supervision necessary to address those problems. The juvenile court sustained this jurisdictional allegation, declared both children depend e nts of the court, let the children remain in parental custody, and ordered DCFS to provide family maintenance services to mother, father, and the children. On appeal, mother challenges the ju venile court’s assertion of jurisdiction over R.C. and A.C. insof ar as it was premised on mother’s failure to provide adequate care and supervision. 1 She
contends that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, there was no risk of serious physical harm to the minors because she had completed a parenting class and enrolled R.C. and A.C. in therapy, R.C. had stabilized emotionally, and DCFS
recommended terminating jurisdiction with a family custody
order awarding mother sole physical and joint legal custody of
the children.

1 Father is not a party to this appeal. As set forth in D iscussion , part A, post , we nonetheless exercise our discretion to review mother’s challenge to dependency jurisdiction based on her conduct.3 We conclude that substantial evidence sup ported dependency jurisdiction over R.C. and A.C. At the beginning of DCFS’s investigation

, mother minimized the severity of R.C.’s mental and emotional problems

, and R.C. had been in therapy for only three months prior to the jurisdictional hearing. Mot her has not directed us to any evidence that upon completing her parenting course, she changed her dismissive attitude toward
R.C.’s mental and emotional challenges, which included suicidal
ideations

. As for jurisdiction over A.C., although A.C

. had not

a ttempted to harm herself, she was nonetheless exposed to substantial risk of serious physical harm because she too had mental and emotional problems and endured stressors akin to
those R.C. confronted

, that is, A.C. had witness ed mother and father engag e in acts of domestic violence , and A.C. had difficulty communicating her feelings to father. Applying our deferential substantial evidence standard o f review, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in taking jurisdiction over the children

. W e thus affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
We summarize only those facts pertinent to this appeal. In 2018, mother divorced father and obtained sole legal and physical custody of R.C. and A.C. Although the judgment of

2 We derive part of our Factual and Procedural Backgro und from undisputed portions of the parties’ appellate briefing. (See Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[B]riefs and argument

. . . are reliable indications of a party ’s position on the facts as well as the law, and a reviewing

cou rt may make use of statements therein as admissions against the party.’ ”].)4

dissolution grants a “[r]easonable right of visitation” t o father , it
does not include a visitation schedule. On April 12, 2022, DCFS filed a juvenile dependency petition concerning R.C., then 15 years old, and A.C., then 13

, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 3 section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), and (j)

. Among other things, DCFS alleged that R.C. had “ mental and emotional problems including
suicidal and self

- harming behaviors,” and that mother and father were “unable to provide appropriate parental care and supervision of the child due to the child’s mental and emotional problems.”
At the outset of DCFS’s investigation o n February 22, 2022

, R.C. told the agency she had disclosed on a form at a medical appointment that she had cut herself in the past. 4 R.C. stated her mother took her to a hospital the following day

. R.C. informed the agency that she left the hospital before t he psychiatric team could assess her because R.C. believed the process was taking too long.
R.C. told DCFS that she had “ feelings of sadness since she

was seven , ” and that “she believe[d] she h a s had feelings of wanting to hurt herself because o f her l ack of [a] close relationship with her parents and [her] feelings of sadness.” R.C.
disclosed that she tried to kill herself twice, and that she had previously cut herself on her forearms and inner thighs. R.C.
indicated that the last time she had cut herself was

3 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

4 The remainder of this paragraph and the following three paragraphs summarize certain portions of DCFS’s nondetention report filed in April 2022.5

approximately six months prior to her February 2022 hospitalization , and that the last time she “ha[d] feelings of wanting to end her life” was approximately one month prior to
her hospitalization. R.C. stated she had concealed the cuts on her body from mother and father. After this interview , the psychiatric mobile response team placed R.C. on a 72

- hour psychiatric hold and transported her to a hospital. During her February 22, 2022 interview with DCFS, mother told the agency tha t she did “not understand what [was] going on with” R.C., and mother expressed her beliefs that R.C. was “being very manipulative,” R.C. “only want[ed] attention,” and R.C. “ha[d] threatened to hurt herself because mother ha[d] restricted piercings/tattoos on [R.C.] and made her go to school when she did not want to.” Mother also related that (1) she asked R.C. “what [the] child is ‘depressed about’ if she has everything,” (2) R.C. responded that “she [was] traumatized because father used to hit mother,” a nd (3) mother in turn told the child that because “mother and father ha[d] separated, . . . [the] child should not be thinking about it anymore.” Similarly, R.C. informed DCFS that although “she told father once and mother multiple times” that she “has h ad feelings of sadness,” her parents responded by stat ing words to the effect
that s he has “ nothing to be sad about.” R.C. indicated that, as a consequence, “she stop[ped] talking [to mother and father] about” her feelings of sadness.
At an April 2022 h earing , the juvenile court (1) found
father is the presumed father of R.C. and A.C. ; (2) found a prima
facie case of dependency jurisdiction over the children; (3) ordered the children remain in parental custody under
DCFS’s supervision ; (4) ordered DCFS provide referrals for6

“parenting counseling for teens and individual counseling ” ; and (5) instructed the agency to provide father referrals for anger management counseling.
On August 10, 2022, DCFS filed a first amended petition reasserting the alle gations of the original petition and add ing a
count aver ring that jurisdiction was proper under section 300, subdivision (b) (1) because father expressed his desire in R.C.’s and A.C.’s presence to “terminate his parental rights

. ” On August 16, 2022, the juvenile court held the adjudication and disposition hearing. The court sustained a version of count b

- 1 of the first amended petition that the juvenile court amended by interlineation , and dismissed the remainder of the petition , including the count alle ging that father
had expressed his desire to terminate his parental rights in R.C.’s and A.C.’s presence

. As amended by the juvenile court, sustained count b

- 1
reads as follows: “The child, [ R.C.

, ] has mental and emotional problems including suicidal and self

- harming behaviors. On 02/19/2022, the child was hospitalized for the evaluation and treatment of the child’s psychiatric condition. The child’s
mother . . . and father

. . . are unable to pr ovide appropriate parental care and supervision of the child due to the child’s mental and emotional problems.” 5

5 In her appellate briefing, mother tacitly assumes the juvenile court struck the following sentence from co unt b

- 1 : “ The mother[’s] and father’s inability to provide care and supervision of the child endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the child and the child’s sibling, [ A.C.,] at risk of serious harm, damage and danger.” ( Italics adde d. ) Conversely, DCFS proceeds on the assumption that the court did not strike that sentence from count b

- 1. We need not resolve this dis crepancy7 As to the disposition phase of the hearing , the juvenile

court declared R.C. and A.C. dependents of the court, ordered the
children remain in parental custody, and ordered DCFS provide family maintenance services to mother, father, and the children

. Mother’s case plan required her to complete a developmentally appropriate parenting class and participate in (a) individual counseling to address case issues

, and (b) conjoint counseling
with father and the children

. The court also ordered DCFS provide R.C. with age

- appropriate counseling to address case
issues. Mother timely ap pealed the orders from the August 16, 2022 hearing

.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 300, subdivision (b) (1) provides in pertinent part that dependency jurisdiction is proper if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶]

. . . [t]he failure or

because mother does not challenge the facial adequacy of the version of count b

- 1 sustained by the juvenile c ourt , but

, instead

, contests only the evidentiary sufficiency of the court’s decision to assert jurisdiction over R.C. and A.C. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (See In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 [differentiating between facial and evidentiary

c hallenges to jurisdiction , and observing that “ ‘ “[i]f the jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence, the adequacy of the petition is irrelevant ” ’ ” unless “ ‘a p arent claims [the] petition fails to provide actual notice of the factual allegations’ ” ].) Mother does not contend she lacked notice that DCFS was requesting th at the juvenile court exercise dependency jurisdiction over both children.8

inability of the child’s parent or guardi an to adequately supervise or protect the child[, or] [¶] . . . [¶] [t]he willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or med ical treatment.” ( See § 300, subds. (b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(C).) 6 “[S]ection 300, subdivision (b)(1) . . . require[s] DCFS to demonstrate three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) one or more of the statutorily specified omissions in providing care for the child[;] . . . (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” ( See In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561.)

“ ‘ “The third element . . . effectivel y requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur.)” ’ [Citation.] Evidence of past conduct may be probative of current
conditions . [Citation.] To establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there ‘must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.)

6 After the Augu st 16, 2022 hearing, the Legislature enacted an amendment to section 300 that became effective on January 1, 2023. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1 [filed with Sec’y of State on Sept. 29, 2022]; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)( 1 ) [providing that th is amendment to § 300 became effective on Jan. 1, 20 2 3 ] .) That amendment did not make any substantive changes to the p rovisions of section 300, subdivision (b) (1) that

are applicable to this case. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1 [ indic ating th at the new amendment did not change the substance of the provisions of § 300, subd. (b) (1) that are quoted above ].)9 Although a juvenile court’s “jurisdictional order is not appealable[,] a challenge to [its] jurisdictional findings [may typically ] be raised in an appeal from the dispositional order

. (See In re T.W. (2011) 197 C al.App.4th 723, 729.) “ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings [of the juvenile court,]

. . . we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports
them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in th e light most
favorable to the court ’ s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the [juvenile] court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there a re sufficient facts to support the findings of the [juvenile] court. [Citations.]” ’ ” ( In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 ( I.J. ).) “ ‘The appellant has the burden to demonstrate there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings . . . .’ [Citation.]” ( In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 103 ( Lana S. ) .)

DISCUSSION

A. We Exercise Our Discretion T o Consider the Merits of Mother’s Appeal

As noted in our Factual and Procedural Background, ante
, the juvenile court sustaine d amended count b

- 1 based on
mother’s and father’s inability to supervise and properly care for
R.C. Mother acknowledges this finding and the fact that father has not appealed it. Mother states s he is challenging only “the10

allegations pertaining to her failure to provide appropriate parental care to the minors

. . . .” (Italics added.) “ ‘[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependen t if the actions of either parent bring [the minor] within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘For this reason, an appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional
fi ndings

. . . .’ [Citation.]” ( In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 308.) A reviewing court may nonetheless elect
to reach the merits of any such “[non]justiciabl e” appeal if a “single jurisdictional finding was the difference between [the parent] being an offending parent versus a nonoffending
parent

. . . .” (See id. at pp. 308

– 309, italics omitted from first quotation .) Because amended count b

- 1 was the only jurisdictional allegation sustained against mother, we exercise
our discretion to address her challenge to that finding.

B. Mother Fails T o Demonstrate that the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Finding Is Not S upported by
Substantial Evidence

M other argues that “[s]ubstantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that the minors were at current risk of harm due to mother’s purported failure to provide appropriate parental care and supervision to the minors.” (Boldface omitted.) Mother maintains that “the juvenile court
b ased its jurisdictional findings on speculation that the family would not follow through with [ R.C.’s] therapy.” She asserts that “by the time of the contested hearing in August 2022, mother had completed her p arenting class and [ R.C.] was enrolled in therapy, and doing so well[ that DCFS] actually . . . recommended

. . .11

closing . . . the case due to [ R.C.’s] emotional stability. ” Mother further claims that R.C. informed the agency that “it was mother
who took [ R.C.] to the hospital for her depression and related
behaviors

. . . one day after [ R.C.’s] need for psychiatric care was first brought to mother’s attention at the doctor’s office

. . . .” Similarly, mother insists she enrolled R.C. in therapy “almost immediately” after R.C. was released from her psychiatric hold. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude mother fails to
establish that the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency jurisdi ction over R.C. and A.C. lacks sufficient evidentiary
support.

1. Mother fails to demonstrate that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that R.C. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm as of the date of the jurisdictional hea ring
As we explained in our Factual and Procedural Background, ante
, the nondetention report shows that at the beginning of the case, mother minimized t he danger presented by R.C.’s mental and emotional problems. For instance, mother
intimated that R.C. c laimed to have suicidal tendencies only because she wanted attention, and R.C. indicate d that she stopped talking to her mother and father about her feelings of
sadness after they told her she has nothing to be sad about.
Based on this evidence

, the juvenile court reasonably could have
found that absent DCFS’s and the court’s intervention, there was a substantial risk that mother would not have taken the steps necessary to protect R.C. from her suicidal and self

- harming behaviors. (Cf. Georgeann e G. v. Superior Court (2020)

53 Cal.App.5th 856, 858

– 859, 865 [holding that “a parent ’ s lack of insight may be considered by the juvenile court when assessing12

whether a child may safely be returned home,” italics & capitalization omitted].) In her reply, mother seems to argue that her statements downplaying the gravity of R.C.’s mental and emotional problems amount to nothing more than “old, sta l e evidence

. ” Specifically,
mother contends that “by the time of the August 2022 hearing,”
R.C. “had stabilized emotionally, the minors were safe and happy in [mother’s] care, ” mother had “enrolled the minors in therapy,”

“ and [mother] had voluntarily completed a parenting class.” Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s contrary
conclusion.
T he parentin g class to which mother refers is the
Los Angeles County Office of Education’s “ Parent Project Parenting c lass

. . . . ” The record contains a letter dated July 15, 2022 from the instructor for the program, wherein the
instructor stated that mother w as “enrolled and attending the Parent Project Parenting class,” and mother “ [ was ] set to complete the parenting class [on] July 20, 2022 ,” meaning she
would have attended “a total of 10 sessions” on that date. Furthermore, at the August 16, 2022 hearing, mother’s counsel represented that her client had “completed her parenting

program ”; counsel was presumably referring to the aforesaid Parent Project Parenting class.
Ass uming arguendo that mother actually did complete this parenting course, that fact does not undermine the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding. Mother does not direct us to any
evidence that by virtue of completing this class, she had changed
her perspe ctive and thereby ceased minimizing R.C.’s mental and
emotional pro blems

. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from mother’s13

completion of th is course is that her prior statements were “old”
and “stale.” (See I.J

. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 [ holding that under the substantial evidence standard, a reviewing court

“ ‘ “draw[s] all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orde rs of the dependency court” ’ ”].)
W e acknowledge that R.C. and A.C. reported they felt safe in mother’s care, and that mother told DCF S on March 23, 2022
that R.C. and A.C. had each been scheduled for a therapy

assessment in mid

- April 2022

. We further acknowledge that in a last minute information report filed on August 10, 2022, DCFS suggested that R.C.’s emotional stability had improved by that point , and the agency recommended “terminating jurisdiction with a Family Law Order granting mother . . . full physical custody and joint legal custody

. ” 7 Yet, the record also contains a letter dated July 15, 2022
from R.C.’s mental health provider, wherein the therapist stated : (1) R.C. had been diagnosed with “Major Depressive Disorder,” (2) R.C. began receiving “mental health services on 05/09/2022” and participating in weekly therapy sessions “from 07/08/22 until present,” and (3) R.C. and her “caregiver would benefit from
contin uation of mental health services in order to assist with restoring [R.C.’s] functioning.” Given that th e juvenile court held

7 Mother relies upon the following passage from the last minute information report: “Due to the current linkage and emotionally stability [ sic ] of [ R.C.], [DCFS] recommends terminating jurisdiction with a Family Law Order granting mother . . . full physical custody and joint legal custody.”

We further note that “a social service agency’s recommendation is not binding on [a juvenile] court.” (See In re N.O. (201 9) 31 Cal.App.5th 899, 924 .)14

the jur is dictional hearing approximately one month after the
date of this letter ( see Factual & Procedural Background, ante ),
the court reasonably could have found that the substantial risk of serious physical harm arising from R.C.’s mental and emotional problems had not yet aba ted

. Furthermore, the record indicates that R.C. and A.C. began therapy after DCFS became involved in this matter in February 2022

. Given the evidence that mother minimized the severity of R.C.’s mental and emotional problems

, and the early
stages o f R.C.’s participation in therapy at the time of the hearing

, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to find that absent DCFS and court involvement, there was a substantial risk
that mother would not ensure that R.C. received the care she
needed to refrain from harming herself. ( See § 364 , subd. (b) [indicating t hat a juvenile court asserts dependency jurisdiction over a child for the purpose of “elimina ting the conditions or factors requiring court supervision”].) In sum, mother has not shown that by the August 16, 2022 jurisdiction al hearing, R.C. was no longer exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm.

2. Mother fails to establish that dependency jurisdiction over A.C. was improper

DCFS argues on appeal that A.C. “also was at risk because she too suffered from feelings of sadness and her physician note d [she had] mild depression.” Passages from the nondetention report supply s ubstantial evidence support ing this contention. 8 In particular, on February 22, 2022, A.C. told the agency she had

8 The remainder of this paragraph discusses relevant portions of the nondetention report.15

“feelings of sadness due to not being able to talk to her
fath er

. . . .” A.C. “began to tear” as she informed DCFS that
father had yelled at her and he refused to listen to her when she
told him to “make more time” to see her and R.C. A.C. stated she stopped talking about that issue with father when “she observe[d] he [was] upset.” A.C. also told the agency that on “ multiple
occasions” “ when she was ‘little’ father used to hit mother and
mother used to hit him back to defend herself.” Additionally

, a

r ecord from A.C.’s February 19, 2022 visit with a medical provider indicated that the child had “Mild Depression.”
M other bears the burden of demonstrating that the juvenile
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over A.C. was not supported by
substantial evidence

. ( Lana S.

, supra , 207 Cal.App.4th at

p. 103

. ) Y et
, in her reply brief, m other fails to respond to DCFS’s
argument that evidence of A.C.’s sadness and mild depression supported the court’s jurisdictiona l finding

. Instead of addressing this evidence, mother observes that at the jurisdictional hearing , the children’s counsel “ask[ed] for [ A.C.] to be dismissed from the petition because she [was] not at risk.”
Because “ ‘unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence ’ ” (see Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276, 281, fn. 5), this remark from the minors’ attorney does not establish “ ‘there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial
nature to support the finding . . . .’ [Citation .]” (See Lana S.

, at p. 103.) Furthermore, t he record shows that A.C. was exposed to

stressors akin to t hose R.C. endured

. Recall that R .C. had also
witnessed instance s in which father hit mother

, and R.C. decided
to conceal her feelings of sadness in response to statements made by her parents. (See Factual & Procedural Background, ante .)16

R.C.’s depression and sadness had already manifested in two suicide attempts and cuttings to her forearms and inner thighs, 9
and A.C. too suffered depression and sadness after being exposed

to similar stressors. The juvenile court could reasonably consider the similarities in R.C.’s and A.C.’s circumstances in determining
whether to assert dependency jurisdiction over them. (See
I n re Y.G. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 109, 115

– 116 [“[E]vidence of a parent’s misconduct with another child is admissible at a hearing

on the section 300 petition. . . . [¶ ]

. . . Implementation of th[e] purpose [of dependency law] requires the trial court to c onsider a broad class of relevant evidence in deciding whether a child is at substantial risk from a parent’s failure or inability to adequately protect or supervise the child.”].) 10
A lthough the no ndetention report shows that A.C. told the agency “she h as never tried hurting herself nor has she ever had any thoughts of doing so,” “ ‘ [t]he court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the

9 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that R.C. “has mental and emotional problems including suicidal and self

- harming behaviors

, ” nor does she contest evidence that R.C. was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder

, and that R.C. attempted suicide on two occasions and cut her forearms and inner t highs.

10 We acknowledge that the nondetention report indicates R.C. disclosed that her maternal aunt’s husband had “touched her private areas” “during an isolated incident” when she was five years old, and that A.C. told the agency “she has never been

s exually abused by . . . any

. . . adult.” Mother, however, does not argue that the absence of any sexual abuse to A.C . demonstrates that A.C. was not at substantial risk of serious physical harm as of the date of the jurisdictional hearing.17

steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.] ” ( In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 848.) T he severity of the potential
harm

, here, suicide and cutting one’s body

, counsels in favor of a finding of substantial risk. (See In re S.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 204, 207 [“The Supreme Court has held that ‘ “even

. . . a low degree of probability” ’ can give rise to a substantial risk if ‘ “the magnitude of the harm is potentially great[,]” ’ ” quoting I.J.

, supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 778] .) Additionally, mother’s prior statements downplaying R.C.’s mental and emotion al health issues suggest that she would have the same minimizing attitude toward her younger daughter if A.C. developed self

- harming
behaviors like her sister. In sum, the similarities between A.C.’s and R.C.’s
ci rcumstances
, along with mother’s dismissive attitude toward
R.C.’s mental and emotional challenges

, constituted substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency jurisdiction over A.C. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1).

DISPOSITION

We affirm the juvenile court’s August 16, 2022 orders

. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD , P. J. CHANEY , J.