J-A09008-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WAYNE DAVVON BEATTY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1430 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 29, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-65-CR-0002793-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2018

Wayne Davvon Beatty appeals from the judgment of sentence of 

eighteen to forty-eight months incarceration, followed by three years 

probation, imposed following his jury trial convictions for carrying a firearm 

without a license, possessing controlled substances with intent to deliver,

possession of a controlled substance, and two summary traffic offenses. We 

affirm.

The trial court set forth the underlying facts in its suppression opinion, 

which we adopt herein.

1

 

During the Suppression Hearing, Patrolman Benick testified 

relative to his interaction with [Appellant]. Patrolman Benick 

testified that he has been employed as a police officer since 

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1 We rely on that set of facts as Appellant’s primary issue on appeal concerns 

the order denying suppression. For that issue, this Court cannot consider the 

evidence presented at trial. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013).
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January of 2008 and has received training in drug investigation. 

Patrolman Benick testified that on April 28, 2015, he was traveling 

westbound on Route 30 near the Lincoln Mobile Trailer Park in full 

uniform operating a marked police vehicle. At approximately 6:24 

p.m., Patrolman Benick observed a white Chevrolet Impala 

traveling eastbound on Route 30 in front of the trailer park. 

Patrolman Benick testified that for a brief moment Patrolman 

Benick and the Impala passed each other, and the driver looked 

at him with a surprised look on his face. When the vehicle pulled 

into the trailer park, Patrolman Benick pulled over and waited for 

the Impala to come out of the trailer park. Benick testified that 

he has made several drug arrests in Lincoln Mobile Trailer Park

prior to this stop and considers the trailer park to be a high drug 

activity area.

Patrolman Benick testified that approximately two minutes later, 

the Impala came out of the trailer park, turned left onto Route 30 

traveling eastbound, and failed to use a turn signal. After catching 

up with the Impala, Patrolman Benick also observed the Impala 

travel less than one car length behind another vehicle in the area 

of Jacktown Hill. Based on Patrolman Benick’s observations, he 

activated his police lights and initiated a traffic stop for failure to 

use a turn signal, following too closely, and suspected drug 

activity at the trailer park. The driver of the Impala was identified 

as [Appellant]. Patrolman Benick inquired where [Appellant] was 

coming from, and [Appellant] responded that he was coming from 

his house in North Versailles and traveling to Derry Township. 

[Appellant] indicated that he did not stop anywhere else other 

than his house. Patrolman Benick testified that [Appellant]

appeared extremely nervous, he spoke in a low, mumbled tone, 

he made limited eye contact, he was breathing heavily, and 

Patrolman Benick could see his heart rapidly beating through his 

shirt. 

After checking [Appellant]’s criminal history, Patrolman Benick 

learned that [Appellant] had a recent drug arrest for possession 

with intent to deliver and possession of a controlled substance. 

Patrolman Benick requested assistance from Sergeant Kari Bauer 

and her K9 partner to perform an exterior sniff of [Appellant]’s 

vehicle. After the K9 alerted, Patrolman Benick searched 

[Appellant]’s vehicle without consent and discovered contraband 

located in the vehicle.
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Order, 5/12/16, at 2-3 (citations omitted).2 

The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence, and

Appellant proceeded to a jury trial, where he was convicted of the 

aforementioned offenses and sentenced. Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal, complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement, and raises the following issues for our review: 

1. The suppression court should have granted [Appellant]’s

original motion to suppress.

a. The suppression court improperly denied 

[Appellant]’s motion to suppress where the officer 

determined to stop [Appellant] based on the way 

[Appellant] looked at him.

b. The suppression court improperly denied 

[Appellant]’s motion to suppress where Officer 

Benick lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that 

[Appellant] was involved in criminal conduct.

c. The suppression court improperly denied 

[Appellant]’s motion to suppress where 

[Appellant]’s traffic stop was unreasonably 

extended to facilitate a drug search by a canine in 

violation of Commonwealth v. Lopez and 

Rodriguez v. United States.

2. The Commonwealth failed to introduce evidence sufficient to 

convict [Appellant] of both possession of narcotics and unlicensed 

possession of a firearm.

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2 The Honorable Christopher Feliciani heard the suppression motion and filed 

this opinion. The Honorable Megan Bilik-DeFazio presided over the jury trial 

and prepared a separate Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
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Appellant’s brief.

3

“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a 

suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 

649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted). “Where, as here, the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court[.]” 

Id. The following additional principles are germane to Appellant’s arguments. 

The investigation of possible criminal activity invariably brings 

police officers in contact with members of the public. Depending 

on the circumstances, a police-citizen encounter may implicate the 

liberty and privacy interests of the citizen as embodied in both the 

federal constitution, see U.S. Const. art. IV, and our state 

constitution, see Pa. Const. art. I, § 8. The law recognizes three 

distinct levels of interaction between police officers and citizens: 

(1) a mere encounter; (2) an investigative detention, often 

described as a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 

S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); and (3) a custodial detention. 

See Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.Super. 

2005).

Commonwealth v. Mackey, 177 A.3d 221, 226–27 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(footnotes omitted). 

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3 Appellant’s “questions presented” listed the issues raised in the concise 

statement, with an explanation of which issues were withdrawn. Appellant’s 

brief at 6-9. For ease of presentation, we have reproduced the headings set 

forth within the argument section. 
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A traffic stop constitutes a seizure, and, depending on the vehicular 

offense at issue, must be supported by either reasonable suspicion or probable 

cause. 

[W]hen considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable 

cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the 

nature of the violation has to be considered. If it is not necessary 

to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle Code 

has occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to stop the 

vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a stop is necessary to 

further investigate whether a violation has occurred, an officer 

need only possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop.

Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa.Super. 2015)

Finally, a sniff of a vehicle’s exterior is search that must be supported 

by reasonable suspicion, as we explained in Commonwealth v. Green, 168 

A.3d 180 (Pa.Super. 2017).

A canine sniff is a search pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 578 Pa. 

127, 849 A.2d 1185, 1190 (2004). However, because “this type 

of search ... ‘is inherently less intrusive upon an individual’s 

privacy than other searches[,]’ ” our Supreme Court has held that 

police do not need “probable cause to conduct a canine search of 

a place.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 

454,530 A.2d 74, 79 (1987)). “[R]ather, the police need merely 

have reasonable suspicion for believing that narcotics would be 

found in the place subject to the canine sniff.” Id. 

Id. at 185–86 (footnote omitted). 

We now sequentially examine Appellant’s three separate arguments in 

support of reversal. First, Appellant alleges that suppression was required due 

to Officer Benick’s admission that he intended to effectuate a traffic stop based 

on Appellant’s behavior. Particularly, Officer Benick testified that Appellant 
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looked surprised when their vehicles crossed paths. Shortly thereafter, 

Appellant pulled into Lincoln Mobile Trailer Park, an area where drug deals 

were known to occur. The officer waited for Appellant to exit the park, and 

stopped his vehicle after seeing him commit a traffic offense. Appellant 

submits that suppression was required because Officer Benick intended to pull 

him over for the true purpose of investigating other offenses.

Courts tend not to address the issue of whether law enforcement 

may use a traffic stop as a pretext to investigate another crime 

where the officer lacks reasonable suspicion regarding the 

defendant’s criminal activity. Lopez, 609 A.2d at 182. Because of 

the record developed during the Suppression Hearing, [Appellant] 

believes the facts and procedure are ripe for the court to address 

the topic.

If this Court allows Officer Benick’s stated reason for initiating a 

traffic stop to stand, it would provide law enforcement "absolute, 

unreviewable discretion and authority to intrude into an 

individual’s life for no cause whatsoever." Commonwealth v. 

Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 96 (Pa. 2011) quoting Commonwealth v. 

Swanger, 307 A.2d 875 ([Pa.] 1973). The traffic stop was tainted 

from the moment the officer decided to stop [Appellant] based 

upon the officer’s interpretation of a look. Everything else must 

be judged from that moment forward, including any potential 

probable cause to initiate a traffic stop.

Appellant’s brief at 31-32. 

We disagree. Appellant’s assertion that courts have “tend[ed] not to 

address” whether pretextual traffic stops are permissible under the Fourth 

Amendment is incorrect. The courts have simply concluded that the subjective 

intent of police officers is irrelevant to whether a seizure is reasonable. In 

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), Whren argued that the High 

Court should adopt the rule that an unreasonable seizure has occurred when 
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a motor vehicle is stopped “unless a reasonable officer would have been 

motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws.” Id. at 808. 

The Court first reviewed related precedents and held that even admitted 

pretextual seizures did not violate the Fourth Amendment:

We think these cases foreclose any argument that the 

constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the 

actual motivations of the individual officers involved. We of course 

agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective 

enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But 

the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally 

discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, 

not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role 

in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.

Id. at 813 (emphasis added). 

Whren also rejected the proposed alternative standard, noting that the 

cases refusing to find Fourth Amendment violations based on subjective intent

were not premised on the notion that proof of subjective intent is difficult to 

establish. Instead, that intent was simply irrelevant. “Why one would frame 

a test designed to combat pretext in such fashion that the court cannot take 

into account actual and admitted pretext is a curiosity that can only be 

explained by the fact that our cases have foreclosed the more sensible option.” 

Id. at 814 (emphasis in original). Thus, Whren concluded that “For the runof-the-mine case . . . we think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional 

common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.” Id. at 

819.
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Presently, Appellant does not claim that Officer Benick lacked probable 

cause to believe that he had committed a traffic offense warranting the seizure 

pursuant to Salter, supra. Nor does he offer any argument that this is 

anything but a run-of-the-mine case. Therefore, the trial court properly 

refused to grant suppression on this basis. 

We now turn to Appellant’s second argument, which avers that Officer 

Benick lacked reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in drug 

activity.

[T]o establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must 

articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with 

reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him 

reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal 

activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in 

that activity. The question of whether reasonable suspicion 

existed at the time [the officer conducted the stop] must be 

answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to 

determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual 

stopped. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court 

must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to 

the officer at the moment of the [stop] warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 

appropriate.

Green, supra at 184 (quoting Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 

125 (Pa.Super. 2009) (alterations in Basinger)). 

The traffic code violation justified the initial seizure. The question is 

whether Officer Benick had reasonable suspicion to perform a search of the 

vehicle’s exterior with a drug-sniffing dog during the course of that seizure. 

Our Supreme Court has held that reasonable suspicion must exist to perform 
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a canine search of the vehicle’s exterior, and concluded that reasonable 

suspicion was present in that case. 

In the matter sub judice, Trooper Banovsky stated that when he 

approached the vehicle, Appellant was extremely nervous. In 

fact, Appellant was trembling so badly he had difficulty retrieving 

his license from his wallet. Also, the paperwork for Appellant’s car 

was conflicting, incomplete and in some instances plainly 

fraudulent. Furthermore, while Appellant claimed that he had just 

departed a friend’s house in Butler, he could not recall the 

address. Additionally, Trooper Banovsky noted open boxes of 

laundry supplies as well as packaging tape in the back seat of the 

car; Trooper Banovsky knew from his experience investigating 

drug offenses that these items were commonly used in the 

packaging and distribution of controlled substances.

Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189–90 (Pa. 2004).

In Green, we explained that the investigating officer had reasonable 

suspicion for an exterior search for the following reasons: 

We conclude that Trooper Conrad possessed reasonable suspicion 

to detain Green on suspicion that he was trafficking drugs. When 

Trooper Conrad approached the vehicle and made contact with 

Green, he immediately noticed that Green was “overly nervous 

just for being stopped for a traffic violation,” as Green’s carotid 

artery was pulsating and “his lips and face area around his lips 

were trembling.” Upon reviewing the vehicle’s documentation, 

Trooper Conrad discovered that the vehicle belonged to an absent 

third party, which, in his experience, raised his suspicion that the 

vehicle was being used for drug trafficking. In addition, Green 

stated that he was returning from Philadelphia, a city known to 

Trooper Conrad as a source location for narcotics. Trooper Conrad 

also performed a criminal background check on Green, which 

showed “a lengthy criminal history for ... assault and drug 

offenses.” Further, when Trooper Conrad stopped the vehicle, he 

remembered prior contacts with Green and with the subject 

vehicle. Trooper Conrad’s prior contact with Green, where Green 

was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by Trooper Conrad, resulted 

in recovery of cocaine and marijuana hidden in the engine 

compartment of the vehicle. Trooper Conrad’s prior contact with 

the tan Dodge sedan resulted in recovery of a hypodermic needle 
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in the passenger compartment. Under these circumstances, we 

agree with the trial court that Trooper Conrad possessed 

reasonable suspicion that Green was trafficking drugs.

Green, supra at 184–85 (citations omitted). 

This case shares many of these characteristics. Appellant “appeared 

extremely nervous, he spoke in a low, mumbled tone, he made limited eye 

contact, he was breathing heavily, and Patrolman Benick could see his heart 

rapidly beating through his shirt.” Order, 5/12/16, at 3. Furthermore, 

Appellant stated that he had not stopped anywhere while traveling from his 

house to his destination, which conflicted with Officer Benick’s observations. 

In Green, we deemed it relevant that (1) Green was returning from 

Philadelphia, a “city known to [the officer] as a source location for narcotics,”

and (2) that Green had a lengthy criminal history for assault and drug 

offenses.

In this case, Appellant drove into the Lincoln Mobile trailer park, stayed 

approximately two minutes, then departed. That location was known to 

Officer Benick as a high drug activity area. If it is permissible for the trial 

court to consider a defendant who is returning from Philadelphia to be 

returning from a location that is a ‘source location for narcotics,’ as we stated 

in Green, then Appellant’s visiting a trailer park with a history of drug activity 

immediately prior to the traffic stop is of much stronger inferential value, 

especially since Officer Benick had personally made several arrests in that 
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park.

4

 Additionally, Officer Benick checked Appellant’s criminal history and 

learned that Appellant had been recently arrested for possession with intent 

to deliver. 

This case does not involve any kind of paraphernalia that indicated 

distribution of drugs, as in Rogers, nor does it involve fraudulent and/or 

suspicious documentation as in Rogers and Green. Of course, each case 

must be considered based on its facts, and we are satisfied that under the

totality of the circumstances as discussed supra, Officer Benick had reasonable 

suspicion that Appellant was involved in drug activity. 

Finally, Appellant cites Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609

(2015), and Commonwealth v. Lopez, 609 A.2d 177 (Pa.Super. 1992). In 

Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer may 

not extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop in order to conduct a drug dog 

sniff. Rodriguez held that “[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks 

tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” 

Id. at 1614. While Rodriguez involves the use of a drug-sniffing dog, its 

holding is largely irrelevant to the instant case because the Fourth Amendment 

permits a dog sniff without any level of suspicion. Id. at 1612 (citing Illinois 

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4 Appellant noted that there are innocent explanations for his short stay, as 

Officer Benick did not see where he went in the park. However; “Potential 

innocent explanations for [the citizen]’s conduct do not negate the 

reasonableness of [the officer]’s suspicion of criminal activity.” 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 102 A.3d 996, 1000 (Pa.Super. 2014). 
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v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)). Thus, Rodriguez is largely inapposite, 

because the High Court was addressing only whether a completed seizure

could be prolonged for purposes of bringing a drug-sniffing dog on scene. 

Indeed, Rodriguez remanded the case to determine whether the dog sniff 

was independently supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1616. 

Likewise, Lopez deals with whether a seizure was justified beyond the 

reason for the initial stop. Thus, the case addressed “the propriety of the 

subsequent detention and investigation[.]” Lopez, supra at 181 (emphasis 

added). “Absent reasonable grounds to suspect an illegal transaction in drugs 

or other serious crime, the officer had no legitimate reason for detaining Lopez

or for pursuing any further investigation of him.” Id. at 182.

As discussed supra, we have determined that there was reasonable 

suspicion to suspect drug activity. Therefore, the continued detention for 

further investigation was justified. This is not a case, as in Lopez, where the 

justification for the seizure had dissipated. Therefore, we reject Appellant’s 

arguments and affirm the suppression order. 

Appellant’s second issue contends that the Commonwealth failed to 

present sufficient evidence to support the convictions for the possessory 

offenses respecting the drugs and gun. Appellant challenges only the element 

of possession. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine 

whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the [Commonwealth as the] verdict winner, 

there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the 
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above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts 

and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Cornelius, 180 A.3d 1256, 1259 (Pa.Super. 2018) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa.Super. 2015)

(alterations in Gonzalez)). 

Since Appellant did not possess the drugs or gun on his person, the 

Commonwealth was required to establish constructive possession, i.e. that 

Appellant had both the ability and intent to exercise control over the items. 

See Commonwealth v. Dargan, 897 A.2d 496, 503, 504 (Pa.Super. 2006). 

We explained in Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426 (Pa.Super. 2012), 

that

Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to 

deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. Constructive 

possession is an inference arising from a set of facts that 

possession of the contraband was more likely than not. We have 

defined constructive possession as conscious dominion. We 

subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to control 

the contraband and the intent to exercise that control. To aid 

application, we have held that constructive possession may be 

established by the totality of the circumstances.

Id. at 430 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Mere presence 

is insufficient as a matter of law to establish possession. Commonwealth v. 

Parrish, --- A.3d ----, 2018 WL 2995314 (Pa.Super. June 15, 2018) (holding 
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Commonwealth failed to establish constructive possession of items recovered 

from the front of the vehicle, where defendant was seated in back driver’s side 

of vehicle). 

We now incorporate the trial court’s recitation of the factual history 

regarding the subsequent search of Appellant’s vehicle, as testified to at trial.

Sergeant Bauer subsequently arrived at the scene. She instructed 

[Appellant] to close the windows on the Impala so that the K9, 

Vegas, could perform an exterior sniff. Vegas subsequently

walked around the Impala and began sniffing and scratching at it. 

[Appellant] was advised by Officer Benick to exit the vehicle so 

that he could perform a search. Once [Appellant] stepped outside 

of the vehicle, Officer Benick performed a pat down of [Appellant]

with his consent. Cash was found in [Appellant]’s pocket. 

[Appellant] also informed Sergeant Bauer that there may be a 

marijuana blunt roach in the vehicle. Subsequently, Officer Benick 

performed a search of the vehicle. Officer Benick discovered a 

black computer bag in the trunk of the car. In the bag, Officer 

Benick found three (3) clear plastic bags containing a white rock 

substance. This substance was later identified as cocaine. Officer 

Benick also found a weapon inside the computer bag with nine (9) 

live rounds in its chamber. In addition, he found a computer, 

tablet, and Nokia cell phone. It was later discovered that 

[Appellant] was listed as the owner of the tablet. . . . 

[Appellant] was thereafter placed under arrest and advised of his 

Miranda [r]ights. [Appellant] never indicated that he did not wish 

to speak with Officer Benick. Officer Benick asked [Appellant] if 

he could identify the substance that was found in his vehicle. 

[Appellant] replied that there was "a little bit of everything." 

Officer Benick also asked if [Appellant] could identify the owner of 

the firearm. [Appellant] would not identify the owner of the 

firearm because he said he does not tell on people. Officer Benick 

advised [Appellant] that the firearm was considered to be his since 

he is the owner of the vehicle and he was in possession of it. 

[Appellant] replied that he was aware of this. . . . 

. . . . 
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Sergeant Bauer instructed [Appellant] to close the windows on his 

vehicle prior to having Vegas perform an exterior scan of the 

vehicle. Once Vegas began his scan, he immediately jumped and 

hit on the seam of [Appellant]’s driver’s side door. Vegas also 

jumped and hit the passenger side window of [Appellant]’s 

vehicle. Vegas’ actions indicated that the odor of a narcotic was 

inside the vehicle. Officer Benick then began his search of the 

vehicle. Sergeant Bauer stood with [Appellant] while Officer 

Benick performed the search. She testified that [Appellant]

appeared to be very nervous when Officer Benick got to the trunk 

of the vehicle. Sergeant Bauer assisted Officer Benick with the 

search of the vehicle’s trunk.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/17, at 3-5 (footnotes and citations omitted). 

We find that this is not a case of mere presence, and that the evidence 

presented entitled the jury to find that Appellant constructively possessed the 

drugs and gun. Those items were found in the trunk of a vehicle that Appellant 

was driving and which was registered to him. See Commonwealth v. 

Haskins, 677 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa.Super. 1996) (items found in hatch area of 

vehicle which was “usually accessible only to the operator of a vehicle”). 

Additional circumstantial evidence linked Appellant to the items. Within the 

bag containing the contraband was an electronic tablet, with Appellant listed 

as the owner when the device was powered on. When questioned by Officer 

Benick about the controlled substances, Appellant said, “You know what you 

got.” N.T. Jury Trial, 5/1-3/17, at 94. With respect to the firearm, Appellant 

declined to name the owner, stating, “I ain’t saying, I don’t tell on people.” 

Id. This evidence establishes that Appellant knew of the items’ existence. 

Finally, the canine’s handler testified that Appellant became nervous when 

Officer Benick started to search the trunk. When viewing the inferences drawn 
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from this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we find 

that the jury’s finding of constructive possession was supported.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/19/2018