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[House Report 111-144]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

111th Congress                                            Rept. 111-144
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     Part 1

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EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR DESIGNATION OF JUNE 10TH AS ``NATIONAL PIPELINE 
                              SAFETY DAY''

                                _______
                                

June 9, 2009.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

Mr. Oberstar, from the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                       [To accompany H. Res. 484]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, to whom 
was referred the resolution (H. Res. 484) expressing support 
for designation of June 10th as ``National Pipeline Safety 
Day,'' having considered the same, report favorably thereon 
without amendment and recommend that the resolution be agreed 
to.

                       PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

    House Resolution 484 supports the designation of June 10 as 
``National Pipeline Safety Day.''

                  BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

    June 10, 2009, marks the 10th anniversary of the deadly 
Olympic Pipe Line explosion in Bellingham, Washington, which 
caused the release of about 237,000 gallons of gasoline into a 
creek that flowed through Whatcom Falls Park. The gasoline 
ignited, sending a fireball about 1.5 miles down the creek, 
which took the lives of two 10-year-old boys, Stephen Tsiorvas 
and Wade King, and an 18-year-old young man, Liam Wood. Eight 
additional injuries were documented. A single-family residence 
and the city of Bellingham's water treatment plant were 
severely damaged.
    According to the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB), which investigated the accident, a number of events and 
conditions set the stage for the June 10, 1999 rupture. First, 
IMCO General Construction, Inc. damaged the pipeline in the 
vicinity of the rupture during excavation activities related to 
the construction of a nearby water treatment plant. The NTSB 
found that had the pipeline not been weakened by the excavation 
damage, it would have been able to withstand the pressure that 
occurred on the day of the rupture, and the accident would not 
have happened. Although the damage was detected during 
subsequent in-line inspections of the pipeline in 1996 and 
1997, Olympic did not excavate and inspect the pipeline to 
repair the damage.
    Second, during construction of the Bayview products 
terminal, pressure relief valves were installed that were found 
to be improperly configured or adjusted, and the actions taken 
by the company to test and correct the valve settings were 
ineffective. When the Bayview terminal came on line about six 
months before the accident, controllers discovered operational 
issues that they believed resulted from the proximity of the 
Bayview terminal to a previously existing pumping station. The 
controllers said they did not believe they were adequately 
trained or otherwise prepared to deal with these operational 
issues. The controllers reported these issues, but they were 
never corrected. Finally, on the day of the accident, the 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system that 
controllers used to operate the pipeline became unresponsive, 
making it difficult for controllers to analyze pipeline 
conditions and make timely responses to operational problems.
    As a result of Olympic Pipe Line's failures, the Department 
of Transportation's (DOT) Research and Special Programs 
Administration announced that it was seeking a $3.05 million 
penalty against the pipeline operator. According to the press 
release:

          Today we are seeking the largest civil penalty in the 
        history of our pipeline safety program. In cases like 
        this, where a pipeline operator fails to take 
        appropriate actions to ensure safety, we will penalize 
        the company to the fullest extent possible to ensure 
        full compliance with federal safety rules.

    Five years later, DOT settled the fine for $250,000, a 92 
percent reduction.
    The tragedy did, however, lead to the creation of the 
Pipeline Safety Trust, a safety organization based on the 
efforts and recommendations of SAFE Bellingham and the families 
of the children who were killed in the 1999 explosion. On June 
18, 2003, a U.S. district court judge ordered that $4 million 
of Olympic Pipe Line's criminal fines imposed as a result of 
the Bellingham tragedy be awarded as an endowment to fund the 
Pipeline Safety Trust. Since that time, the Pipeline Safety 
Trust has worked with Congress, safety advocates, the industry, 
and the public to enhance pipeline safety for the betterment of 
communities and a healthier environment.
    A year after the Bellingham accident, on August 19, 2000, 
another serious accident occurred on a natural gas transmission 
pipeline operated by El Paso Natural Gas Company near Carlsbad, 
New Mexico. The released gas ignited and burned for 55 minutes. 
Twelve persons who were camping near the pipeline were killed 
and their three vehicles destroyed. Two nearby steel suspension 
bridges for gas pipelines crossing the river were also 
extensively damaged. The NTSB determined that the probable 
cause of the rupture and subsequent fire was a significant 
reduction in pipe wall thickness due to severe internal 
corrosion. The severe corrosion had occurred because El Paso's 
corrosion control and pipeline inspection program failed to 
prevent, detect, or control internal corrosion within the 
pipeline.
    Although most shipments of natural gas and liquid petroleum 
move through the pipeline system safely and without incident on 
a daily basis, pipeline accidents, such as the accidents in 
Bellingham and Carlsbad, are not isolated events. According to 
the Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(PHMSA), which now oversees the safety of the nation's 2.2 
million miles of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, 2,888 
significant pipeline incidents occurred between 1999-2008, 
resulting in 173 fatalities, 632 injuries, and $2.7 billion in 
property damage. However, pipelines generally have a better 
safety record (deaths, injuries, fires/explosions) than other 
modes of transportation. For example, compared to the pipeline 
record, there are 87 times more oil transport truck-related 
deaths, 35 times more oil transport truck-related fires/
explosions, and twice as many oil transport truck-related 
injuries.
    In 2002, Congress enacted the Pipeline Safety Improvement 
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-355), which addressed many of the 
concerns that were raised following the Bellingham and Carlsbad 
accidents. The bill provided for State enforcement of the one-
call notification program; increased penalties for violations 
of safety standards; required the development of qualification 
programs for employees who perform sensitive tasks; 
strengthened pipeline testing requirements; established a 
public education program for communities that live around 
pipelines; required government mapping of the pipeline system; 
and enhanced whistleblower protections.
    In 2006, Congress furthered pipeline safety by enacting the 
Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act 
(PIPES Act) (P.L. 109-468).
    The PIPES Act required DOT to issue a rule ensuring that 
all low-stress hazardous liquid pipelines are subject to the 
same standards and regulations as other hazardous liquid 
pipelines. It also strengthened DOT's enforcement by increasing 
the number of Federal pipeline safety inspectors from 90 to 100 
in 2007, 111 in fiscal year 2008, 123 in fiscal year 2009, and 
135 in fiscal year 2010--a 50 percent increase in inspectors by 
2010.
    The PIPES Act also strengthened PHMSA's authority to order 
pipeline operators to take corrective action to remedy a 
condition that poses a threat to public safety, property, or 
the environment. It strengthened the DOT's authority to help 
facilitate the restoration of pipeline operations during 
manmade or natural disasters, and it required implementation of 
a number of NTSB recommendations regarding worker training, 
fatigue, the installation of excess flow valves, and standards 
for SCADA systems.
    In addition, the PIPES Act required operators of natural 
gas distribution pipelines to implement a pipeline integrity 
management program with the same or similar integrity 
management elements as the hazardous liquid and natural gas 
transmission pipelines. Distribution pipelines make up 1.8 
million miles of the 2.2 million miles of pipelines in the 
United States. They distribute gas to local towns, businesses, 
and homes, and are responsible for the majority of pipeline 
deaths and injuries.
    To increase accountability among pipeline operators and 
their senior executives, the PIPES Act required the 
certification and signature of annual and semi-annual pipeline 
integrity management program performance reports by a senior 
executive officer of the company operating the pipeline. In 
addition, the PIPES Act increased transparency by requiring 
monthly public summaries of all gas and hazardous liquid 
pipeline enforcement actions taken by the DOT, and required the 
Secretary to review incident reporting requirements for 
operators of natural gas pipelines to ensure that the data 
collected is accurate.
    Despite these significant measures, much work remains. It 
has been more than two years since enactment of the PIPES Act 
and DOT has not implemented many of the statutory mandates 
required by the legislation. The list of regulations required 
by the PIPES Act that have not been issued by PHMSA includes 
the following:
     final regulations for low-stress hazardous liquid 
pipelines;
     regulations prescribing minimum standards for 
integrity management programs for distribution pipelines and 
the use of excess flow valves;
     regulations requiring pipeline operators to 
develop and implement a human factors management plan designed 
to reduce risks associated with human factors, including 
fatigue; and
     regulations implementing the NTSB's SCADA 
recommendations.
    With regard to security, the PIPES Act required the DOT 
Inspector General to conduct an assessment of the actions taken 
to implement the annex to the memorandum of understanding 
between the DOT and the Department of Homeland Security 
relating to pipeline security.
    On May 21, 2008, the DOT Inspector General released the 
results of the assessment, entitled ``Actions Needed to Enhance 
Pipeline Security,'' which found that PHMSA and the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have taken initial 
steps toward formulating an action plan to implement the 
provisions of the annex; however, further actions are needed 
because the current situation is far from an ``end state'' for 
enhancing the security of the nation's pipeline system.
    The Committee intends to hold further hearings on the 
implementation of the PIPES Act and to continue to promote 
pipeline safety.

                       SUMMARY OF THE LEGISLATION

    H. Res. 484 expresses support for the designation of June 
10th as ``National Pipeline Safety Day''; encourages state and 
local governments, safety groups, industry, and other pipeline 
stakeholders to promote pipeline safety; and urges individuals 
across the nation to become more aware of the pipelines that 
run through their communities, and to take appropriate safety 
measures to prevent damage to underground pipelines.

            LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

    On June 25, 2008, the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, 
and Hazardous Materials held a hearing on Implementation of the 
Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 
2006.
    On May 21, 2009, Congressman Rick Larsen introduced H. Res. 
484, expressing support for designation of June 10th as 
``National Pipeline Safety Day''.
    On June 4, 2009, the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure met in open session to consider H. Res. 484. The 
Committee ordered H. Res. 484 reported favorably to the House 
by voice vote with a quorum present.

                              RECORD VOTES

    Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires each committee report to include the 
total number of votes cast for and against on each record vote 
on a motion to report and on any amendment offered to the 
measure or matter, and the names of those members voting for 
and against. There were no recorded votes taken in connection 
with consideration of H. Res. 484 or ordering the resolution 
reported. A motion to order H. Res. 484 reported favorably to 
the House was agreed to by voice vote with a quorum present.

                      COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

    With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(1) of rule 
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the 
Committee's oversight findings and recommendations are 
reflected in this report.

                          COST OF LEGISLATION

    With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(2) of rule 
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H. Res. 484 
is a resolution of the House of Representatives, and therefore 
does not have the force of law. As such, there is no cost 
associated with this resolution for fiscal year 2009, or for 
any fiscal year thereafter.

                    COMPLIANCE WITH HOUSE RULE XIII

    1. With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(2) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and 
section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the 
Committee advises that the resolution contains no measure that 
authorizes funding, so no comparison of the total estimated 
funding level for the relevant programs to the appropriate 
levels under current law is required.
    2. With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(4) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the 
Committee advises that the resolution contains no measure that 
authorizes funding, so no statement of general performance 
goals and objectives for any measure that authorizes funding is 
required.
    3. With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and 
section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the 
Committee advises that the resolution contains no measure that 
authorizes funding, so no cost estimate nor comparison for any 
measure that authorizes funding is required.

                     COMPLIANCE WITH HOUSE RULE XXI

    Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives, H. Res. 484 does not contain any 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI 
of the Rules of the House of Representatives.

                   CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

    With respect to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, H. Res. 484 is a resolution of 
the House of Representatives, and therefore does not have the 
force of law. As such, clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII does not 
apply.

                       FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

    H. Res. 484 contains no federal mandates.

                        PREEMPTION CLARIFICATION

    Section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
requires the report of any Committee on a bill or joint 
resolution to include a statement on the extent to which the 
bill or joint resolution is intended to preempt state, local, 
or tribal law. The Committee states that H. Res. 484 does not 
preempt any state, local, or tribal law.

                      ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act are created by this 
resolution.

                APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

    The Committee finds that the resolution does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (P.L. 104-1).

         CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

    H. Res. 484 makes no changes in existing law.

                                  
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