PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

Nos. 19-2294 and 19-2410

_____________

JEFFREY M. NORMAN,

Appellant in 19-2410

v.

DAVID W. ELKIN; RICHARD M. SHORIN; 

ELKIN GROUP INC.; U.S. MOBILCOM, INC.

David W. Elkin 

Appellant in 19-2294

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. No. 1-06-cv-0005)

District Judge: Hon. Leonard P. Stark

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 23, 2020

Before: JORDAN, RESTREPO, and GREENBERG, Circuit 

Judges
2

(Opinion Filed: May 29, 2020)

_______________

David A. Felice

Bailey & Glasser

2961 Centerville Road – Ste. 302

Wilmington, DE 19808

 Counsel for Jeffrey M. Norman

David W. Elkin

805 Bryn Mawr Avenue

Newtown Square, PA 19073

 Pro Se

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal, the second we have been asked to decide in 

this case, marks what is, one hopes, effectively the final chapter

of a bitter dispute spanning more than 14 years and involving

state and federal courts, two different district court judges, two 

jury trials, and seemingly innumerable procedural and 

dispositive motions, both pre- and post-trial. Pursuant to our 

mandate in the parties’ prior appeal, Norman v. Elkin, 860 F.3d 

111 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Norman V”), the District Court decided

that the statute of limitations for all of plaintiff Jeffrey M. 

Norman’s claims, which include both contract and noncontract causes of action, were tolled during the pendency of a 

books and records request he initiated in the Delaware Court 

of Chancery in November 2004 pursuant to § 220 of Title 8 of 
3

the Delaware Code (the “§220 Action”). Notwithstanding 

Norman’s entitlement to §220-based tolling, however, the 

Court also concluded that all but a subset of his breach of 

contract claim was time-barred because he knew or should 

have known the facts giving rise to those claims for longer than 

the applicable limitations period before filing the §220 Action. 

Both Norman and defendants David W. Elkin, The Elkin 

Group, Inc. (“TEG”), U.S. Mobilcomm, Inc. (“USM”), and 

Richard Shorin (collectively, the “Elkin Defendants”) now 

challenge multiple aspects of the District Court’s ruling. 

With one exception, we hold that the parties’ assertions 

of error by the District Court lack merit. The single exception 

deals with Norman’s breach of contract claim based on events 

that occurred in May, July, and August of 2001. We agree with 

Norman that the District Court incorrectly determined that 

those claims were untimely. Accordingly, we will reverse that 

aspect of the District Court’s final judgment, affirm all others, 

and remand to the District Court for the limited purpose of 

entering a revised final judgment consistent with this decision.

I. BACKGROUND1

A. Factual Background

Norman and Elkin founded USM in the early 1990s for 

the purpose of aggregating “Phase 1” 200 MHZ licenses issued 

1

 We focus our statement of the factual and procedural 

background on those matters most pertinent to the parties’ 

present appeals. Additional information can be found in 

Norman V, and the District Court’s numerous opinions 

throughout this case’s extensive history. See Norman v. Elkin, 
4

by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).

2

 They 

orally agreed that Elkin would hold 75% of USM’s equity and 

Norman the other 25%. Consistent with that ownership 

structure, they also agreed that, of the $1 million required to 

capitalize USM, Elkin would contribute $750,000 and Norman 

would contribute $250,000. Norman’s role in USM was to 

acquire the initial licenses. After he successfully did so, 

“Norman’s day-to-day involvement in USM ended[,]” and 

“Elkin continued to manage USM’s affairs.” Norman VI, 338 

F. Supp. 3d at 369. 

In 1998, the FCC announced it would auction “Phase 

II” licenses. Elkin registered USM as a bidder in one such 

auction in which “USM won the rights to several Phase II 

licenses[.]” Id. Elkin subsequently transferred USM’s rights 

in the Phase II licenses to another company that he owned, 

TEG. TEG’s involvement purportedly was necessary because 

USM did not have sufficient funds on its own to participate in 

No. CIV.A. 06-005-JJF, 2007 WL 2822798 (D. Del. Sept. 26, 

2007) (“Norman I”); Norman v. Elkin, 726 F. Supp. 2d 464 (D. 

Del. 2010) (“Norman II”); Norman v. Elkin, 849 F. Supp. 2d 

418 (D. Del. 2012); Norman v. Elkin, No. CV 06-005-LPS, 

2015 WL 4886049 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015); and Norman v. 

Elkin, 338 F. Supp. 3d 361 (D. Del. 2018) (“Norman VI”).

2

 “Phase I” licenses, which were distributed by lottery, 

were the “first wave” of licenses that covered particular radio 

frequencies in specified geographic areas. Norman V, 860 F.3d 

at 116. The FCC subsequently issued “Phase II” licenses 

“through a competitive auction.” Id. Some Phase II licenses 

overlapped, but were not coterminous, with previously issued 

Phase I licenses. 
5

the auction and it was important to ensure that “a friendly 

corporation acquired the licenses that overlapped with those 

already owned by USM.” Norman V, 860 F.3d at 116. Norman 

closely monitored the auction and emailed Elkin requesting 

information on its outcome. Elkin did not respond. Id. Some 

FCC notices relating to the auction listed USM as the winning 

bidder of Phase II licenses, while others referred to TEG as the 

owner of those same licenses. Id.

At some unknown time between 1995 and 2002, Elkin 

caused USM to enter into a Shareholder Loan Agreement 

(“SLA”) with him. Under the SLA, “USM agreed to treat any 

amount Elkin contributed above his capital requirement as a 

loan.” Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 369. Elkin neither 

informed Norman about the SLA nor sought his approval for 

it, and purportedly lent USM in excess of $600,000 pursuant

thereto. 

In 2000 and 2001, USM started selling off its licenses. 

“Norman received federal income tax K-1 forms from USM

for the tax years 2000 and 2001 that declared USM had realized

a capital gain.” Id. at 370. “Those K-1 forms did not state what

had been sold, and they did not list any shareholder loans or

distributions. However, in a deposition, Norman admitted that

a capital gain, by definition ... has to be sale of a license[.]” 

Norman V, 860 F.3d at 117 (quotations omitted and alterations

in original). In a series of distributions effectuated by Elkin

from 2000 to 2002, USM paid Elkin $615,026 from the

proceeds of the license sales. Norman received nothing. 
6

After not hearing from Elkin “in ages,” (JA at 860,)3

Norman called him in the summer of 2002 (the “Summer 2002

Call”). Norman testified that Elkin was “a little bit evasive”

on the call, but admitted that licenses had been sold and that he

(Elkin) had taken a distribution. Norman V, 860 F.3d at 117. 

When Norman inquired why he (Norman) had not received any

distributions, Elkin responded, “it wasn’t your turn.” Id. 

Norman requested additional information, which Elkin never

provided. 

Perhaps spurred by Elkin’s lack of cooperation, Norman 

had his attorney send Elkin a letter in October 2002 (the 

“October 2002 Letter”) requesting information regarding “the 

sale or other disposition of any assets or stock of [USM] over 

the past three (3) years, and the distribution or use of any 

proceeds of any such sales or dispositions.” Id. (alteration in 

original). Elkin responded by letter approximately two months 

later on December 3, 2002 (the “December 2002 Letter”), 

acknowledging that USM had sold the licenses “it owned,” but 

the letter included agreements revealing TEG had sold certain

Phase II licenses. Id. “The letter also included a breakdown 

of the uses of the proceeds, including repayment of what were 

characterized as shareholder loans[.]” Id. In October 2003, 

USM responded to requests for further information by 

Norman’s attorney by sending him a letter (the “October 2003

Letter”) that included a copy of the SLA. Id. 

3

 As used herein, references to “JA” are to the parties 

Joint Appendix filed in Norman V (case numbers 16-1924 and 

16-2164), which, by Order dated February 28, 2020, we 

permitted the parties to utilize in the present appeals. 
7

B. Procedural Background

Based on the information he had obtained over the prior

two years, Norman filed the §220 Action on November 16,

2004, which was resolved in Norman’s favor on October 2,

2005. Approximately two months later, Norman filed this

lawsuit in the Delaware Court of Chancery, which the Elkin

Defendants removed to the District Court. In his complaint,

“Norman raised a wide variety of tort and contract claims

against [Defendants] including breach of contract, usurpation

of corporate opportunities, conversion, fraud, breach of

fiduciary duties, and unjust enrichment.” Norman V, 860 F.3d

at 118.

In May 2009, three of Norman’s claims – breach of

contract, fraud, and conversion – were tried to a jury. The jury

returned a verdict for him on all counts. Elkin moved for

judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Norman’s

claims were time-barred. The District Court largely agreed,

and held Norman’s claims were untimely except those based

on two breach-of-contract theories: that Elkin breached his oral

agreement with Norman regarding USM’s capitalization by

executing the SLA and by failing to make pro rata

distributions of the license sale proceeds. 

After further motions by both Norman and Elkin, the

District Court held a second jury trial on Norman’s two

remaining claims. “The jury again found in Norman’s favor

and awarded him $1 in nominal damages based on Elkin’s

execution of the SLA and $73,180.17 in compensatory

damages for Elkin’s failure to make pro rata distributions.” 

Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 368. The amount of damages

awarded indicates that the jury considered a substantial portion
8

of the funds Elkin directed to himself between 2000 and 2002

to be repayments of loans he made to USM, rather than

distributions. Elkin again moved for judgment as a matter of

law, and again the District Court agreed. Most significantly,

the District Court held that the §220 Action did not toll the

statute of limitations for any of Norman’s claims, rendering all

of his claims untimely. The Court vacated the jury’s verdict

and entered final judgement in Elkin’s favor.

Both Norman and Elkin appealed. Ultimately, we

vacated the entry of judgment in Elkin’s favor, excepting the

fraud claim. We remanded the case to the District Court for

two purposes: “(1) for the Court to reinstate the jury verdict

and award of nominal damages for Norman’s SLA-based

breach of contract claim and (2) for the Court to determine

whether §220 tolling should apply to Norman’s claims, and, if

so, whether Norman’s remaining claims are timely.” 4 Id.

4

 Surprisingly, Elkin asks us to overrule part of our 

earlier mandate based on the District Court’s conclusion on 

remand that Norman’s SLA-based breach of fiduciary claim, 

premised on the same facts as his SLA-based breach of contract 

claim, was time-barred. In making such a request, Elkin 

ignores that he had a full and fair opportunity during the first 

appeal to challenge the SLA-based breach of contract claim as 

untimely, just as he did with the SLA-based breach of fiduciary 

duty claim, but failed to do so. As we specifically noted in 

Norman V, that failure created a “confounding” situation in 

which “the statute of limitations might stand as a bar to the 

[breach of fiduciary duty claim] but not the [breach of contract 

claim].” Norman V, 860 F.3d at 128. The fact that the entirely 

foreseeable disparity we identified in Norman V came to 

fruition, a disparity that Elkin bears sole responsibility for, 
9

On remand, the District Court, applying our guidance 

from Norman V, concluded that the statute of limitations for 

each of Norman’s claims was tolled during the pendency of the 

§220 Action. The Court then proceeded to examine whether 

Norman’s claims nevertheless were untimely by assessing 

whether he had actual or inquiry notice of his claims within the 

applicable limitations period – three years for his contract 

claim and two years for his non-contract claims – before 

initiating the §220 Action. Because two of the distributions 

that Elkin made to himself occurred in 2002, the Court held 

Norman’s breach of contract claim based on those distributions 

was timely, as it was made within three years of Norman 

bringing the §220 Action. For each of Norman’s other claims, 

including breach of contract based on distributions that Elkin 

made to himself in May, July, and August of 2001, the Court 

held that Norman had at least inquiry notice of those claims 

beyond the applicable limitations period, and thus dismissed 

them as untimely. Accordingly, the District Court entered 

judgment in Norman’s favor on his breach of contract claim 

premised on distributions made in 2002 and, per our mandate, 

his breach of contract claim based on the execution of the SLA, 

but in Elkin’s favor on all other claims. 

Both Norman and Elkin moved for reargument. At the 

hearing on the motion, Elkin argued for the first time that 

Norman was not entitled to tolling relating to the §220 Action 

because he brought that action in bad faith. Elkin attempted to 

introduce purported “evidence” of that bad faith, but the 

District Court refused to consider that new evidence and denied 

does not entitle him to any relief. We reject Elkin’s request to 

revisit that, or any other, aspect of Norman V.
10

all motions for reargument. Both Norman and Elkin timely 

appealed the final judgment.

II. DISCUSSION5

A. Elkin’s Appeal

1. Tolling based on the §220 Action

Elkin’s primary contention on appeal is that the District

Court erred in concluding that the §220 Action tolled the

5

 This case was removed from the Delaware Court of 

Chancery to the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, on the 

basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise 

plenary review of an order granting or denying a motion for 

judgment as a matter of law and apply the same standard as the 

district court.” Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 

1153,1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); cf. Lake v.

Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[P]lenary review 

extends to the District Court’s choice and interpretation of 

applicable tolling principles and its conclusion that the facts 

prevented a tolling of the statute of limitations.”). “[A]lthough 

the court draws all reasonable and logical inferences in the 

nonmovant’s favor, we must affirm an order granting judgment 

as a matter of law if, upon review of the record, it is apparent 

that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient 

evidence.” Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1166. As to Elkin’s 

sufficiency of the evidence arguments, we likewise “view[ ] 

the evidence in the light most favorable to [Norman]” and will 

affirm the District Court only if there “is insufficient evidence 

from which a jury reasonably could find liability [against 
11

statute of limitations for Norman’s claims. In support of that

position, he advances several arguments, each of which fails. 

First, he makes an “order of operations” argument – that the

District Court improperly decided the issue of §220-based

tolling before determining if, and when, Norman had inquiry

notice of each of his claims. But the order in which the District

Court chose to address those discrete issues is irrelevant.6 It is

neither incorrect nor inherently inconsistent for a court to first

determine that the statute of limitations for a claim should be

tolled based on a successful §220 action but that the claim

nevertheless is untimely because the plaintiff had actual or

inquiry notice of his injury sufficiently in advance of that §220

action. To the extent the District Court utilized that approach

on remand, it did not err in doing so, even if it took what might

be a more circuitous route to resolution.

Second, Elkin says that Norman is not entitled to §220-

based tolling because of Norman’s “complete lack of inquiry”

Elkin].” Id. Finally, “[w]e review admissibility

determinations, and exclusion of evidence for an abuse of

discretion.” Quinn v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 283

F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 2002).

 

6

In that regard, Elkin appears to have misunderstood 

our instruction in Norman V for the District Court to determine 

“in the first instance” when Norman had inquiry notice of his 

claims. Norman V, 860 F.3d 127. The purpose of that 

instruction was not to dictate the structure of the District 

Court’s opinion on remand, but rather, as the Court properly 

recognized, was to ensure that the District Court would be the 

first tribunal to decide that fact-intensive issue.
12

into his potential claims before initiating the §220 Action. 

(Elkin Opening Br. at 27.) Not only is this argument flatly

inconsistent with the record, including evidence of Norman’s

efforts to obtain information from Elkin following the Summer

2002 Call, but it is legally meritless. Elkin fails to cite a single

case, and we are aware of none, involving a successful §220

action in which a Delaware court has declined to grant tolling

because of a “lack of inquiry.” Nor are we aware of a case in

which a Delaware court has even so much as suggested that

such a concern is a relevant consideration in the §220-based

tolling analysis.7 That is hardly surprising, given that “pursuit

of an action under § 220 is regarded as strong evidence that [a]

plaintiff was aggressively asserting its claims at that time[.]” 

Norman V, 860 F.3d at 124 (quotations omitted and first

alteration in original). The proper focus of a §220-based

tolling analysis is the nature of the underlying §220 action and

the results of it. While a plaintiff’s conduct before filing a §220

action may be significant for other purposes, such as

determining inquiry notice or laches, there is no support for

7 To the contrary, all of the cases to which Elkin directs 

us discuss a plaintiff’s level of inquiry in distinct contexts, such 

as determining whether they had inquiry notice of their claims 

or if their claims were barred by laches. See, e.g., Technicorp 

Int’l II, Inc. v. Johnston, No. CIV.A. 15084, 2000 WL 713750, 

at *7 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2000) (holding plaintiff was not on 

inquiry notice of claims because it was unable to discover 

wrongdoing despite diligent investigation); Fike v. Ruger, 754 

A.2d 254, 262 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d, 752 A.2d 112 (Del. 2000) 

(claims barred by laches because plaintiff’s “lack of 

knowledge was due to his failure to exercise his right to obtain 

information,” including his right to inspect the company’s 

books and records). 
13

Elkin’s assertion that it has any direct bearing on a §220-based

tolling analysis itself.

Elkin’s third contention is that the District Court erred

by failing to determine on a claim-by-claim basis whether

§220-based tolling should apply. Although the District Court

did not specifically discuss each of Norman’s claims

individually, for all intents and purposes its analysis achieved

the same purpose. The Court correctly recognized that there

was a clear nexus between the §220 Action and each of

Norman’s claims in this case, which Elkin does not, and

cannot, credibly refute. The Court similarly was right to note

that Norman succeeded in the §220 Action. According to the

Stipulated Order and Final Judgment that resolved the §220

Action, Norman secured, inter alia, access to 14 distinct

categories of documents, each of which directly relates to at

least one of his claims in this case. Moreover, we have already

recognized that what Norman obtained in the §220 Action was

“valuable information” with respect to this litigation. Norman

V, 860 F.3d at 126. Thus, given Norman’s broad success in the

§220 Action and the obvious relationship between the §220

Action and all of the claims asserted here, there was no need

for the District Court to specifically address the factors

favoring tolling on a claim-by-claim basis. The same is true

regarding any discussion of the factors weighing against

tolling, such as whether the §220 Action was prosecuted in bad

faith or for some other improper purpose, such as stalling to

lengthen the limitations period. Those inquiries, which look at

the underlying §220 action as a whole, did not warrant a claim-
14

by-claim analysis. We therefore discern no error in the District

Court’s approach.8

Fourth, Elkin contends that §220-based tolling was

inappropriate for Norman’s claims because, several years

before Norman initiated the §220 Action, there had been

widely available public information regarding the license

transfers around which his claims revolve. To the extent that

Elkin is arguing that inquiry notice forecloses §220-based

tolling, we already rejected that argument in Norman V. As we

explained, the relevant issue is not whether Norman was on

inquiry notice at all, but whether, if he was on such notice, that

notice preceded his commencement of the §220 Action by

more than the applicable limitations period. To the extent that

Elkin is arguing that Norman was not entitled to §220-based

tolling because the §220 Action was not strictly necessary to

bring his claims in light of the public information available to

8 Elkin’s reliance on Orloff v. Shulman, No. CIV.A. 

852-N, 2005 WL 3272355, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005) is 

unavailing. In Orloff, the court declined to toll the limitations 

period for certain claims, despite the fact that the plaintiffs had 

partially succeeded in a related §220 action, because the 

plaintiffs had at least inquiry notice of those claims for 

approximately 20 years before initiating their §220 action. Far 

from holding that a successful §220 action does not support 

tolling the limitations period for all related claims, Orloff 

merely stands for the proposition that §220-based tolling 

cannot revive claims that already were untimely when the 

underlying §220 action was commenced. That is in accord 

with, and in no way contrary to, our holding in Norman V and 

the District Court’s analysis on remand.
15

him, we largely rejected that argument too in Norman V. Not

only did we recognize that the inability to file suit without the

benefit of a §220 action is not a “prerequisite[]” to §220-based

tolling, we also noted that the §220 Action, at a minimum,

actually enhanced Norman’s claims through the “valuable

information” he secured. Norman V, 860 F.3d at 125–26. The

District Court properly followed our guidance in Norman V by

not treating Norman’s ability to bring suit absent the §220

Action as a condition precedent to §220-based tolling and

instead treating it as a factor to be balanced against other

relevant considerations.9 See id. (“Delaware law preserves a

court’s discretion to toll or not toll the limitations period on

claims that may be informed by the results of a § 220 action....

Courts in our Circuit should proceed with due regard for the

positive role that § 220 actions are meant to play under

Delaware law. That is especially true when, as in this case, a

Delaware court has exercised its judgment and concluded that

a § 220 action has merit.”).

We are also unpersuaded by Elkin’s final argument on

this issue, that both we, in Norman V, and the District Court, in

Norman VI, based our respective §220-based tolling

9 For the same reasons, we reject Elkin’s argument that 

the District Court erred by not denying §220-based tolling 

given the absence of bad faith conduct or fraudulent 

concealment on his part. Again, while such considerations 

may be relevant to the analysis, they are not prerequisites to 

§220-based tolling. The District Court gave appropriate 

weight to the absence of bad faith by Elkin and acted well 

within its discretion in concluding that this absence did not 

outweigh the considerations strongly supporting §220-based 

tolling.
16

discussions on a misapprehension of the extent to which

Norman succeeded in the §220 Action. More specifically,

Elkin argues that (1) our statements that the Court of Chancery

“granted” Norman broad relief are not accurate, (2) that our

reliance on the Vice Chancellor’s comments made at the end

of the §220 Action were misplaced because they do not reflect

his more recent view on the merits of that proceeding, and (3)

that our decisions overstated the connection between the §220

Action and this litigation. 

Elkin’s first contention in this regard rests on hypertechnical and ultimately incorrect semantics. At the end of the

§220 Action, the Vice Chancellor stated that he was “inclined

to ... grant[] the 220 relief in pretty broad form[,]” Norman v.

US MobilComm, Inc., No. CIV.A. 849-N, 2006 WL 1229115,

at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2006) (“US MobilComm”), but he gave

the parties the opportunity to reach their own agreement based

on that guidance before formally ruling on the matter. The

parties did reach such an agreement, in the form of a Stipulated

Order and Final Judgment, which provided Norman with broad

relief. More significantly, the Stipulated Order and Final

Judgment, as the name suggests, was the Court of Chancery’s

judgment resolving the §220 Action and was formally

approved and entered by the Vice Chancellor. Accordingly,

and contrary to Elkin’s assertion otherwise, it is evident that

the Court of Chancery did, in fact, “grant” Norman broad relief

in connection with the §220 Action. It is of no moment that

what Norman received in the §220 Action was negotiated by

the parties based on the Vice Chancellor’s clear guidance that

Norman should obtain broad relief and was not unilaterally

imposed by the Vice Chancellor.
17

Likewise meritless is Elkin’s assertion that the view the

Vice Chancellor expressed about the merits of Norman’s

claims at the conclusion of the trial in the §220 Action was later

undermined or superseded. In support of his position, Elkin

relies on cherry-picked statements from an April 2006 decision

by the Vice Chancellor addressing the entirely distinct question

of whether Norman was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees

for successfully prosecuting the §220 Action. The answer to

that question turned on whether Norman had a “clear right” to

the documents he sought in the §220 Action or whether USM

had acted in bad faith in opposing Norman in that proceeding. 

Id. at *2-5. Neither of those issues has anything to do with the

Vice Chancellor’s post-trial view that the §220 Action was

meritorious. Yet, insofar as the Vice Chancellor discussed that

view in the April 2006 opinion, he unambiguously reiterated it. 

See id. at *1 (“At the end of a one-day trial, I stated that I was

inclined to rule in Norman’s favor and grant broad relief[.]”);

id. at *2 (“At the end of trial I did not issue a ruling, but advised

the parties that ‘I’m very much inclined to be granting the 220

relief in pretty broad form.’”); id. (“[T]he parties do not dispute

that Norman prevailed in the litigation[.]”); id. at *4

(“Although I ultimately concluded Norman had a proper

purpose, I did not reach a firm decision on that issue until after

I heard the evidence at trial.”).

Finally, the connection between the §220 Action and

this litigation has not been overstated. Elkin’s assertion that

there are “blatantly false allegations in the Amended 220

Complaint that bear no connection to the allegations in this

litigation” is both conclusory and irrelevant. (Elkin Opening

Br. at 45.) Even assuming that some allegations in the §220

Action do not bear a relationship to this litigation, it is beyond

dispute that a great many of them are directly related. 
18

Moreover, the categories of information Norman secured

access to through the §220 Action have an obvious and strong

nexus to Norman’s claims here. Elkin has failed to argue or

explain how any, let alone a meaningful percentage, of the

relief that Norman obtained in the §220 Action is unrelated to

at least one of Norman’s various causes of action. In short,

Elkin’s various attempts to blunt the impact of the §220 Action

on the tolling analysis fail in their entirety. 

2. Purported evidence of Norman’s bad

faith in the §220 Action

Similarly unavailing is Elkin’s assertion that, on remand

from Norman V, the District Court wrongfully refused to allow

him to present evidence that Norman pursued the §220 Action

in bad faith. That argument rests of the incorrect premise that

“[t]he issue of Norman’s bad faith in pursuing the 220 Action

was never an issue in this litigation until this Court made it part

of the tolling calculus in Norman V.” (Elkin Opening Br. at

47.) We did not create new law in Norman V merely by

acknowledging that Delaware courts have recognized that

“deceitful, bad faith conduct[]” is relevant to determining

whether fact-gathering litigation, such as the §220 Action, can

provide a basis for tolling. Norman V, 860 F.3d at 125 (quoting

Technicorp Int’l II, Inc. v. Johnston, No. CIV.A. 15084, 2000

WL 713750, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2000)).10 That long10 Although Technicorp discussed “bad faith” conduct 

by the defendant corporation resisting a fact-gathering 

proceeding, rather than by the stockholder plaintiff, nothing in 

Technicorp suggests that bad faith conduct is significant only 

when it proceeds from the defendant. 
19

standing principle was available to Elkin throughout this

litigation, including when the District Court first addressed

Norman’s argument that the §220 Action tolled the statute of

limitations for his claims. See Norman II, 726 F. Supp. 2d at

472 (citing Technicorp). Elkin could have and should have

raised the issue long before we decided Norman V, if he

thought it had any merit. The District Court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to allow Elkin to further prolong an

already protracted litigation by belatedly raising a new issue

and offering new evidence in support of it, despite having had

ample prior opportunity to do so.11 Elkin’s arguments on

appeal are all unpersuasive.

11 Assuming Norman V did create new law, which it did 

not, the District Court still did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding Elkin’s late-offered evidence. That is because Elkin 

only presented that evidence to the Court for the first time at a 

hearing on the parties’ motions for reargument. At a minimum, 

if Elkin wished to pursue the argument that Norman undertook 

the §220 Action in bad faith, it was incumbent on him to raise 

that argument and provide supporting evidence from the outset 

of the remand proceedings. Having made the strategic choice 

only to raise the bad faith argument for the first time in 

connection with a motion for reargument, Elkin cannot 

complain that the District Court acted outside of its discretion 

in refusing to allow him to surprise the Court (and Norman) 

with new evidence produced at the last minute.
20

B. Norman’s Appeal

1. Contract-based claims

Norman first argues that the District Court erred in

concluding that the statute of limitations for his distributionbased breach of contract claim began to run at the time of each

distribution and not in May 2002 when the distributions were

completed, because the distributions were severable, rather

than continuous violations. We disagree. Under Delaware

law, “[t]he continuing breach doctrine is ‘narrow’ and

‘typically is applied only in unusual situations.’” AM Gen.

Holdings LLC v. The Renco Grp., Inc., No. 7639-VCS, 2016

WL 4440476, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2016) (quoting

Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 924–25 (Del. Ch. 2007)). 

Generally speaking, if a “plaintiff could have alleged a prima

facie case for breach of contract ... after a single incident[,]”

then the “continuing breach doctrine does not apply even when

confronted with numerous repeated wrongs of similar, if not

same, character over an extended period.” Id. at *12 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Norman’s breach of contract claim does not present an

“unusual situation.” Each individual distribution Elkin made

to himself constituted, at least in theory, a discrete and readily

determinable violation of Norman’s rights as a 25% equityholder in USM. Nevertheless, Norman contends that he has

asserted an overarching and continuous breach because his

damages from each individual distribution were “inherent[ly]

contingen[t]” on the SLA being invalidated and could not be

calculated until that time. (Norman Answering Br. at 50-51.) 

That argument, however, ignores that, as Norman himself

asserts in his Amended Complaint, the SLA’s validity and
21

Elkin’s purported failure to make proper distributions could be,

and were, adjudicated simultaneously. The lone authority

Norman now cites in support of his position, Branin v. Stein

Roe Investment Counsel, LLC, No. CV 8481-VCN, 2015 WL

4710321 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2015), is readily distinguishable. 

In Branin, an employee sought to enforce a contractual right to

indemnification against his current employer for expenses he

incurred in defending against a lawsuit by his former employer. 

Because the employee “could not have enforced his

indemnification right until the nature of his conduct underlying

the [former employer’s lawsuit] was established[,]” “the

statute of limitations on [the employee]’s indemnification

claim did not begin to run until the underlying litigation was

resolved[,]” because it would have been “inefficient” to require

the employee to sue continually before that resolution. Id. at

*4, 7. Here, there was no prior, independent litigation that

needed to be resolved before Norman could bring a breach of

contract claim. Nor are there comparable “efficiency”

considerations. The question of the SLA’s validity arose in

connection with Elkin’s defense to Norman’s breach of

contract claim, not as a condition precedent to the claim. We

reject Norman’s unsupported attempt to dramatically expand

the “narrow” continuous breach doctrine such that it reaches

defenses to claims rather than true contingencies.

We do, however, agree with Norman’s second assertion

regarding his breach of contract claim: events that occurred

prior to the May, July, and August 2001 distributions did not

provide him with inquiry notice of his claim pertaining to those

distributions. Even assuming the public records regarding the

license transfers and the 2000 Form K-1 that Norman received

should have prompted him to inquire further into what was

happening at USM, a reasonable inquiry would not have led
22

him to the discovery of his injury, i.e., distributions in breach

of his agreement with Elkin. Rather, based on the facts as

found by the jury, he would have learned that Elkin was

repaying himself the excess capital he had contributed, which

was not a violation of the agreement. Elkin cites nothing in the

record that transpired or could have come to light between such

an investigation and November 2001, the outside limitations

date for Norman’s breach of contract claim,12 that should have

prompted Norman to investigate further, and would have led to

the discovery of the violative distributions. 

For that same reason, Elkin’s argument that it is not

appropriate to simply disregard what Norman knew or should

have known prior to the date of his injury for inquiry notice

purposes misses the mark. Assuming the correctness of

Elkin’s dubious premise that one can be on inquiry notice of

an injury that has not yet occurred, his argument nevertheless

does not hold water because it fails to account for the fact that,

at least in this case, reasonable inquiry into facts known to him

before his injury would have led to Norman discovering

conduct – the repayment of loans – that did not violate his right

12 Because the District Court concluded that the statute 

of limitations for Norman’s claims was tolled from November 

2004 (when Norman commenced the §220 Action) through his 

filing of this lawsuit, and because Norman’s breach of contract 

claim has a three-year limitations period, the District Court 

viewed the operative question in determining whether

Norman’s breach of contract claim was time-barred as being 

whether he had at least inquiry notice of that claim before 

November 2001, i.e., three years before the start of the §220 

Action. Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 375. We agree with 

that approach. 
23

to a pro rata share of USM’s distributions. And that discovery

would have terminated Norman’s obligation to inquire further

on that issue absent new information. Accordingly, we will

reverse the District Court’s dismissal of Norman’s distributionbased breach of contract claim based on the May, July, and

August 2001 distributions, and will remand for the Court to

restore in full the second jury’s $73,180.17 compensatory

damages award for Norman’s distribution-based breach of

contract claim.

13

 

2. Non-contract claims

Norman contends that the District Court erred in

dismissing his conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims

as untimely. Regarding his conversion claim, Norman argues

that the District Court erred in concluding that claim accrued

when Elkin registered TEG as the applicant or owner of the

Phase II licenses, and not in 2000 and 2001 when “USM was

damaged by the failure of Elkin to deposit the Phase II license

sale proceeds into USM,” because that was the point at which

TEG’s control over the licenses was “unauthorized.” (Norman

Answering Br. at 58-59; see also Norman VI, 338 F.Supp.3d at

376.) Norman’s position before us, however, is irreconcilable

with the conversion claim he actually tried to the jury, which

was clearly based on the theory that TEG’s initial procurement

of the Phase II licenses was unauthorized. (See JA 725 (verdict

question for Norman’s “Conversion and Misappropriation

Claim” stating “Do you find ... that ... Elkin misappropriated

[USM]’s good will or status as a qualified bidder and

13 Per our conclusion herein, we leave to the District 

Court any recalculation of interest included in the judgment, as

necessitated by that restoration.
24

incumbent license holder with the Federal Communications

Commission during the 220 MHz Auction Number 18?”); JA

719 (jury instructions for Norman’s conversion claim

explaining elements as “1. [USM] possessed the status as a

qualified bidder and incumbent license holder before the

Federal Communications Commission; 2. [Elkin] or [TEG]

exercised control over that status; 3. The exercise of the control

was unauthorized; 4. [USM] was harmed as a result of the

conduct.”)). We find no error in the District Court’s

determination that Norman had inquiry notice of TEG’s

“unauthorized” procurement of Phase II licenses before

November 2002, the outside limitations date for his noncontract claims.14

 That inquiry notice was a product of the

numerous public disclosures regarding TEG’s procurement of

Phase II licenses, Norman’s close monitoring of the Phase II

auction, his failure to follow up with Elkin after Elkin declined

to provide him requested information about the auction results,

and Elkin’s disclosure during the Summer 2002 Call that

licenses had been sold and distributions made. Any of those

events should have prompted Norman to inquire further, and

reasonable inquiry would have led to the discovery that TEG

had procured Phase II licenses at USM’s expense. 

Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed Norman’s

conversion claim as untimely. 

14 The District Court’s analysis of the timeliness of 

Norman’s non-contract claims was similar to its analysis of his 

contract claim, except November 2002, two years before the 

§220 Action was filed, was the key date because of the twoyear statute of limitations for those claims. Norman VI, 338 F. 

Supp. 3d at 377-78. We again agree with the framework the 

District Court utilized to decide the timeliness issue.
25

Importantly, even if Norman was correct that his

conversion claim did not accrue until 2000 or perhaps 2001,

that claim’s disposition would remain unchanged. The

evidence in this case shows that the Summer 2002 Call alone

placed Norman on inquiry notice. That call, during which

Elkin was “evasive” and made the clearly disturbing statement

that Norman did not receive any distribution from USM’s asset

divestitures because it was not “his turn,” correctly prompted

Norman to investigate further and seek additional

information.15 In the case of Norman’s conversion claim, we

need not even infer what discoveries a reasonable investigation

would have yielded. The record shows Norman’s straightforward request for more information in fact led to, among

other things, the December 2002 Letter, which identified TEG

as the holder of Phase II licenses that he believed belonged to

USM. Therefore, Norman had inquiry notice of his conversion

claim by November 2002 because evidence of TEG’s alleged

wrongdoing could have been discovered, and was in fact

discovered, through a reasonable investigation of the

suspicious distributions that he actually became aware of

during the Summer 2002 Call.16 See U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. of

Allentown v. Bell Atl. Mobile Sys., Inc., 677 A.2d 497, 503 n.7

15 Of course, Elkin’s initial failure to respond to this 

request only heightened the need for investigation, as 

demonstrated by the fact that the failure galvanized Norman to 

seek the assistance of counsel.

16 To be clear, we are not holding that the source of 

Norman’s inquiry notice was the December 2002 Letter. 

Rather, we cite that communication as compelling evidence of 

what discoveries a reasonable inquiry initiated in response to 

the Summer 2002 Call would and did yield.
26

(Del. 1996) (“[T]he federal doctrine means limitation and

laches does not begin to run until evidence of [the alleged

wrong] is discovered or could have been discovered had

reasonable diligence been exercised, for whatever is notice

calling for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry

might have led.”) (quoting Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v.

Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 328–29 (D. Del.

1956)).

As to his breach of fiduciary duty claim based on the

execution of the SLA, Norman says the District Court was

wrong to conclude the claim was time-barred, given both our

holding in Norman V reinstating his SLA-based breach of

contract claim and the Court’s reliance on USM’s financial

information from 1998. First, as already noted, Elkin failed to

challenge the timeliness of Norman’s SLA-based breach of

contract claim. Thus, the fact that judgment was entered in

Norman’s favor on that claim says nothing about the timeliness

of his SLA-based breach of fiduciary duty claim. Second, even

if we agreed with Norman that our holding in Norman V

somehow forecloses the possibility that he had inquiry notice

of his SLA-related claimsin 1998, it is evident that the Summer

2002 Call provided such notice. Elkin’s statement during the

call that it was not Norman’s “turn” to participate in the

Company’s distributions undoubtedly should have prompted

Norman, USM’s only other stockholder, to investigate the

Company’s capital structure and understand the basis for that

statement. And, in fact, he did. The October 2002 Letter

specifically sought information “about the sale or other

disposition” of any USM stock or assets over the prior three

years, and the uses of any proceeds from those sales, which led

to Norman receiving a copy of the SLA in October 2003 and
27

notice that stockholder loans were being repaid.

17

 Norman VI,

338 F. Supp. 3d at 370. Accordingly, and exactly as with his

conversion claim, Norman had inquiry notice of his SLA

breach of fiduciary duty claim by November 2002 because

Elkin’s alleged breach could have been discovered, and was in

fact discovered, through a reasonable investigation of the

troubling statements Elkin made during the Summer 2002

Call.18 

17 Again, to be clear, we are not holding that the source 

of Norman’s inquiry notice was the October 2003 Letter. We 

rely on that letter only as evidence of what discoveries a 

reasonable inquiry initiated in response to the Summer 2002 

Call would have yielded.

18 Norman argues that we should essentially ignore the 

Summer 2002 Call because certain statements made by Elkin 

in his briefing “are an explicit withdraw [sic] or waiver of his 

past arguments that the Summer 2002 Call could have provided 

Norman with notice of certain claims.” (Norman Reply Br. at 

5.) Read in their proper context, however, it is clear that 

Elkin’s statements regarding his lack of reliance on the 

Summer 2002 Call to demonstrate Norman’s inquiry notice 

pertain only to Norman’s breach of contract claim. That is 

unsurprising, given those claims have a three-year limitations 

period and the Summer 2002 Call occurred less than three 

years before Norman initiated the §220 Action. Elkin did not, 

sua sponte, abandon the most compelling – and largely 

dispositive – evidence in the record on the question of when 

Norman had inquiry notice of his non-contract claims.
28

Third, Norman asserts that the District Court applied the

wrong standard to assess inquiry notice, based on the Court’s

statement that Norman knew “enough to put him on notice of

the need to undertake further inquiry to determine if Elkin had

wronged him.” (Norman Answering Br. at 60 (quoting

Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 375).) According to Norman,

the correct standard “is whether the allegedly notice-providing

evidence would objectively lead to the discovery of Norman’s

actual injury.” (Id. at 61.) But that argument ignores that the

standard the District Court actually applied throughout its

opinions is exactly the standard Norman advocates. A mere

one sentence later than the language Norman criticizes, the

Court held that “[i]f Norman had [undertaken further inquiry],

he would have discovered Elkin’s allegedly improper

distributions.” Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 375. Thus, it is

clear that the District Court considered it significant that

Norman knew enough information to warrant further

investigation, not for its own sake, but because such further

investigation would have led to the discovery of Norman’s

actual injury. That analysis, which the Court utilized

throughout its opinion,19 applies the correct standard. See

Pomeranz v. Museum Partners, L.P., No. CIV. A. 20211, 2005

WL 217039, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2005) (“Inquiry notice

does not require full knowledge of the material facts; rather,

plaintiffs are on inquiry notice when they have sufficient

knowledge to raise their suspicions to the point where persons

19 See, e.g., Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 377 

(conversion claim time-barred because reasonable 

investigation would have led to discovery of the injury); id. at 

379 (same regarding SLA-based breach of fiduciary duty 

claim).
29

of ordinary intelligence and prudence would commence an

investigation that, if pursued would lead to the discovery of the

injury.”).20 Norman’s position to the contrary is meritless.

Finally, Norman says that the District Court did not

properly consider the so-called “smoking gun” standard

applicable to determining inquiry notice for claims involving

fiduciaries. That argument also is unpersuasive. We have

previously recognized that, under Pennsylvania law, “the

existence of a fiduciary relationship is relevant to a discovery

rule analysis precisely because it entails such a presumptive

level of trust in the fiduciary by the principal that it may take a

‘smoking gun’ to excite searching inquiry on the principal’s

part into its fiduciary's behavior.” In re Mushroom Transp.

Co., 382 F.3d 325, 343 (3d Cir. 2004). Assuming Elkin had

the burden of producing a “smoking gun” that should have

prompted Norman to inquire into potential wrongdoing, we are

satisfied he carried that burden here. By Norman’s own

account, Elkin was “evasive” during the Summer 2002 Call,

which itself should have greatly troubled him, especially since

the reason he reached out to Elkin in the first place was that he

had not heard from him “in ages.” (Norman Answering Br. at

13; JA 860.) The substance of the call, in which Elkin

20 The District Court determined long ago that 

Norman’s non-contract claims were governed by Pennsylvania 

law. Norman I, 2007 WL 2822798, at *4. But both the District 

Court’s analysis and the parties’ briefing often rely on 

Delaware case law. Given the absence of any argument from 

the parties that Delaware and Pennsylvania law have 

meaningfully different definitions of inquiry notice, we will 

follow their lead and assume, without deciding, that the two 

laws are comparable in that regard.
30

acknowledged that licenses had been sold and that he alone had

taken distributions, without any direct notice to Norman,

should have been at least equally alarming, particularly given

Norman’s own admission that Elkin had a “checkered” history

in dealing with him. (Norman Answering Br. at 61.) Indeed,

there was no readily apparent reason that Norman, who

understood himself to be one of only two stockholders holding

the same class of common stock as Elkin, would need to wait

for “his turn” to receive a distribution.21 And if that were not

enough, Norman simply ignores that he, in fact, was

sufficiently disturbed by the Summer 2002 Call that it

prompted him to investigate further.22 Therefore, at a

minimum, the conclusion that the Summer 2002 Call placed

Noman on inquiry notice is consistent with Pennsylvania’s

“smoking gun” standard. Because the Summer 2002 Call

placed Norman on inquiry notice of all of his non-contract

21 Norman makes much of the fact that any Form K1’s he received did not identify that USM had any stockholder 

loans. However, the omission of any stockholder loans from 

USM’s Form K-1’s, whether deliberate or inadvertent, should 

only have served to heighten Norman’s suspicions as to why 

he was not receiving any distributions given the apparent lack 

of more senior securities in USM’s capital structure.

22 Elkin’s ignoring Norman’s well-founded requests 

for additional information to the point that Norman felt it 

necessary to enlist the assistance of counsel only underscores 

how patently unreasonable it would have been for him to 

continue to rely on the fiduciary nature of his relationship with 

Elkin as a justification for not investigating Elkin’s potential 

wrongdoing.
31

claims,23 the District Court properly dismissed them as barred

by the statute of limitations.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 

Court’s dismissal of Norman’s distribution-based breach of 

contract claim for the distributions that occurred in May, July, 

and August of 2001. In all other respects, we will affirm the 

District Court’s final order. Accordingly, we will remand this 

case to the District Court for the limited purpose of entering a 

further revised final judgment, which revisions to the District 

Court’s Revised Final Judgement in a Civil Case dated May 7, 

2019 shall be: (i) recalculating the damages amounts specified 

in the first paragraph and paragraph 1(b) to reflect Norman’s 

prevailing on his breach of contract claim based on Elkin’s 

failure to make pro rata distributions in May, July, and August 

2001; (ii) otherwise revising paragraphs 1(b) and 2(a) to reflect 

Norman’s prevailing on his breach of contract claim based on 

Elkin’s failure to make pro rata distributions in May, July, and 

August 2001; and (iii) identifying the proper rate of postjudgment interest.

23 This includes Norman’s claims for usurpation of 

corporate opportunities, breach of the duty of disclosure, unjust 

enrichment, and declaratory judgment.