ISSUE: The Army
Does Not

Have

Doctrine for
Fighting

Digitized

Units

implications for all of the ARTEP-MTP tasks. Doctrine writers need
to be aware that all collective tasks in the digital domain need to be
analyzed for back-up training requirements.

Developers of future doctrine need to consider that digital systems
will affect how units fight. Some collective functions may be
eliminated and new ones added: virtually all aspects of operations are
subject to revision.

RECOMMENDATION:

To maximize the full capabilities of digital systems:

e Ensure that doctrine development positions are
filled by personnel with experience in digital and
back-up operations.

e Address the concept of fighting doctrine very early
in the acquisition process.

e Increase the use of simulation and simulators to
first push the doctrinal envelope, and then to proof
fighting doctrine.

e Discipline the existing system to ensure doctrine
and training are fielded at the same time as the
digital systems.

Doctrine Publication
Cannot Keep Step
with Digitization

Despite advances made by making Army publications available over
the Internet and by issuing editions on compact disk-read only
memory (CD-ROM), the Army publication process is still essentially a
paper-based production system. The cited advances speed up
distribution but not production. Soldiers must have reliable, accurate,
approved, and proven materials with which to work, but the rapidly
changing needs of the digital environment cannot be accommodated
by today’s Army publication model.

The current Army method of conveying information to users has
remained essentially unchanged since World War II. It involves a
series of technical manuals (TM) for equipment operation, field
manuals (FM) for operational guidance, and soldier training
publications (STP) for critical task descriptions and individual training
guidance. Training support packages (TSP) have been initiated in
recent years to provide exportable materials that integrate training
products, materials, and management for accomplishing critical
training requirements. The common basis of all of these products is

at



fielding units. A pilot program to explore this should be a high
priority to guarantee that a workable system is in place as digital
systems proliferate (see Application B).

Eliminate stovepipe developments. Digital capabilities cross
traditional proponent venues. Where digital interests are shared, a
proactive program must be in place to make sure development
efforts do not duplicate work being performed by others.

Define the institutional role in training digital skills. Low
density digital equipment and rapid changes in technology make it
more difficult for institutions to teach system-specific skills in
resident instruction modes. Analysis must identify what
institutions should teach and how they should teach it.

Require institutions to export their training. Mixes of digital,
part digital, and non-digital forces will need corresponding mixes
of training packages for individual, crew, and collective tasks.
The demand for tailored training packages to be delivered in units
must be met by the institutions (see Application C).

Improve unit efficiency to prepare for increased training loads
brought on by digital and back-up requirements. Unit training
has to become both more effective and efficient to meet increased
digital demands. The existing model of unit training must be
critically scrutinized and revised to meet digital conditions.

Develop management and assessment tools for digital soldiers.
Digital soldiers of the 21* century need to be managed like aircraft
crew soldiers of today are. Programs of evaluation, certification,
tracking, and utilization need to follow.

Devise a plan to integrate the training pillars. There will be
increased mixing of institutional, unit, and self-development
training activities. But this must be done carefully and according
to a plan that insures the effects on soldiers are known and
understood.

Develop a self-development strategy. Self-development training
has potential for enhancing the options available in the
requirements to train digital skills. It also has some pitfalls. A
plan must define how self-development will fit into the overall
training scheme.

Consider non-training digital solutions. Training as a solution

to digital problems is only practical if considered as one of a range
of options. Training must be combined with other solutions to be

most effective.

32



¢ How should the personnel assignment system be
refined to insure soldiers with digital skills are
identified, stabilized, tracked, and assigned?

¢ Which digital capabilities should be backed-up with
redundant systems rather than with manual back-
up skills?

¢ What alternative technologies should be developed
to replace manual back-up requirements?

e Whatrisks are acceptable if systems fail and no
back-up is available?

@ What operational solutions--for example in changes
to unit operations--can back-up digital
performance?

Effects of Distance
Learning on the
Army Are Largely
Unknown

ermal

Extensive study
7s necessary ta
determine how
current training
methods will be
transferred to
distance
learning modes.

————E

Distance learning has been proposed as the answer to many of the
Army’s training issues resulting from increasing training demands and
decreasing resources. Yet a multitude of unanswered questions exist
concerning distance learning and how this relatively untapped mode of
training will be implemented. In the ADLP, the definition of distance
learning is“. . . the delivery of standardized individual, collective, and
self-development training to soldiers and units at the right place and
right time through the application of multiple means and
technologies.”””

How current training will be transferred to distance learning modes
remains to be determined. For instance, transferring lecture
instruction, paper-based instruction, and hands-on instruction all
require different strategies and resources. If distance learning is to
become a primary resource for training digital and back-up
requirements, then the Army must address some of the issues
associated with this training environment. A sample of these
questions are:

@ What types of skills can be trained via distance learning and
what skills must be trained in residence (e.g., cognitive skills,
motor skills, psychomotor skills)?

© Who will be responsible for converting existing training
programs to distance learning media?

e How will distance learning training be managed?

19 Department of the Army (3 April 1996). Army Distance Learning Plan. Fort Monroe, VA: Training
Development and Analysis Directorate, p. 1.

28



Mr. Daniel (Dan) Deter (Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired) of HumRRO served as a special resource
for this project. Despite his full time commitment to other projects, he made time to mentor and
provide input on a regular basis as well as to participate in the workshops. This report reflects
input from his review.

The final draft of this report was reviewed by senior officers from the Armor School, the Infantry
School, Forces Command, TRADOC, and Total Army Personnel Command.

The cover design for this report was created by Mr. Wil McMillen, Graphics Artist for HumRRO.
He also prepared the charts and figures in the report.

The report was composed and compiled by Laura Ford and Roy Campbell of HumRRO using
input from everyone above.

Although we tried, we were unable to identify the name of the soldier depicted on the front cover.
Even though he remains anonymous, he deserves our maximum recognition--he is the reason the
study and this report are important.

Roy Campbell
Laura Ford, Ph.D.
HumRRO
Radcliff, Kentucky
May 1998

37



ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Operational The introduction of additional digitized units into Army operations
Concepts and will have a significant effect on how the Army fights and develops its
P doctrine and training strategies for many years to come. Much has

Developmental already been discovered; much more will be learned in the future.

Issues One thing is clear: The “old ways” of doing business will not fit in
the digital Army. The study identified six particular issues that
highlight this area.

The Army Has Not With the introduction of digitization, there has been a tendency to

Addressed Back-Up __ think of changes in training only in terms of how to operate new

as a Significant
Training Issue

Consider the
soldier of the not
too distant future
who 1s. trained to
navigate by
satellite but has
never learned to
navigate using a
topographic map,
compass, OF
terrain
association.

—

equipment or software in its fully operational mode. But the
requirements need to be expanded to consider back-up skills.
Equipment reliability and the prospect of operating with mixed forces
dictate that training back-up skills will be a requirement for the
foreseeable future. Yet, this is an area currently without a
comprehensive training strategy. As capabilities and technologies
change, the characteristics of back-up training will also change. For
example, training requirements may well evolve from manual back-up
techniques to redundant digital systems.

The Army cannot assume that learning and retraining of back-up
tasks will just “be there.” Such an assumption is unwarranted. There
must exist a coherent training strategy. The problem will be
exacerbated as digital systems proliferate and “digital soldiers”
become the norm. From their earliest Army training, digital soldiers
will be oriented to perform in a digital mode, but they may never, in
peacetime, widely experience and internalize performance in a non-
digitized environment. Consider, for example, the soldier of the not
too distant future who is skilled on navigating by satellite but has
never had to rely on a topographic map, compass, and terrain
association as the basis for navigation. These nondigital skills, if they
are deemed important for battlefield success, must be addressed
during peacetime training.

Even among soldiers who have learned the back-up modes of
performance, but who operate in a digital mode, there is a problem
with skill retention and retraining. The back-up skills that soldiers
currently have will erode as the requirements are performed with less
frequency.



Internet-Based Pilot Program

This proposed information sharing effort will have wide follow-on applicability to other digital
systems throughout the Army. This Army-wide applicability underscores the requirement for

the pilot program to be jointly developed by the Armor Center and the Army Training Support
Center. Periodic program reviews, with full user representation, will facilitate tailoring the
program to fulfill user needs.

e Provide current, on-demand information e This website will provide a single point of

about digital and back-up skills to and entry for M1A2 units.
ee M1A2 units and the Armor Internet access will be made readily
or. available to all units, and sufficient to
@ Demonstrate that this application of enable on-demand access from any
Internet-based technology is viable, location.

e Security “firewalls” will be put in place to
preclude inadvertent dissemination of
classified or sensitive information.

@ Controlled by the U.S. Army Armor Center] @ For safety reasons, the site will contain

relevant, and responsive to the needs of

(to maintain unity of effort). explicit cautions (e.g., to distinguish

@ Based on the utilization of the Internet as between “tips,” doctrine, and SOP items
the delivery means. This technology will from other units).
ensure that any computer platform e@ The website will be a “PULL” site for
available to M1A2 crews will be able to users seeking information and a “PUSH”
access and fully utilize the site.*_ site for providing rapid updates to the

© Accessible 24 hours/day, 7 days/week. force on new digital and back-up

os information (e.g., newly developed TTPs).
e Maintained by contractor personnel and

supervised by an Armor Center e Direct users to the most effective venues
proponent. for additional information on digital and/or
. back-up techniques (e.g., CD-ROM, on-

e Focused onthe M1A2 tank units line, and printed publications; on-line
stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, initially. interactive sites, etc.).

@ Linked to other relevant websites; e The website will provide on-line access to
emphasis is on integration of and subject matter experts (SMEs) and
accessibility to the most current mentors who possess specific expertise.
information.

* Minimum computer system requirements must be specified, but a wide array of systems are fully
compatible with web-based technology.

> In the near future, the program will be expanded to include Fort Carson, Colorado (coincident with the
fielding of the M1A2 Tank to the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment).

Application B: Detailed recommendation for facilitating crosstalk and feedback among digital
units.

15



© Do not lose sight of goals when embracing distance learning
as a training option. Distance learning shows great promise to
reduce training costs, standardize training, and increase training
availability. But training effectiveness is still the primary criteria.

© Study skill decay of digital and back-up task. Little is known

about skill retention, particularly in the digital area and under the
conditions the Army applies digital and back-up skills. More
knowledge will allow better informed sustainment and retraining
strategies to be developed.

33



FOREWORD

A primary mission of the Armored Forces and Infantry Forces Research Units of the
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences is to gather and
analyze data on personnel and training that will provide the Army with timely information on
which to base future planning and policy making.

Acting upon a request from Headquarters, Department of the Army, this study was
sponsored by the Department of the Army’s Director of Personnel Technologies. A
Memorandum for Record between the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the U.S.
Total Army Personnel Command, the Training and Doctrine Command System Managers for the
Bradley Fighting Vehicle System and the Abrams Tank System, and the U.S. Army Research
Institute supported this effort. This study was conducted under the Science and Technology Task
2135, “Back-up Training Requirements for the Digitized Battlefield.”

This report provides the outcomes of a study of the impact that digitization will have on
training the force. The approach was a critical examination of where the Army is and where it
needs to be heading as it embraces increasing digital capabilities. An important component of this
study was the inclusion of back-up skill requirements as an integral part of digitization. Back-up
skills are those needed by soldiers to operate when digital systems are degraded or unavailable.
The study revealed that there are major issues that must be addressed if training and personnel
considerations are to balance technological advances that typify digital applications. It identifies
back-up as a critical but currently nonexistent component of the training paradigm. Major
recommendations are matched with each issue identified.

The Army leadership and policy makers can use this report to help focus attention on
training issues and areas that require decisions and continued investigation.

ZITA M. SIMUTIS
Technical Director



Course Program (ACCP) has never been relied on for job skill
acquisition and has had a distinct RC focus. The ACCP is primarily
an adjunct to institutional courses, designed to “help bridge the
training gap between resident courses, aiding in sustaining
skills/knowledges.”"* This is quite different from the role envisioned
in the future where self-development will have a predominant place in
acquisition and sustainment of digital and back-up skills.

Until the Army defines the role of self-development and develops a
cohesive and comprehensive self-development strategy, any plans to
take self-development beyond its current manifestation cannot
succeed.

ISSUE: Therels RECOMMENDATION:
No
Comprehensive Define a self-development strategy that addresses digital
Self- and back-up issues. The strategy must address:

Development
Plan e How the content for self-development training will

be determined.

e Whowill develop, monitor, and manage self-
development programs.

e Where the time for self-development training will
come from.

e@ What incentives will be offered for soldiers to
complete self-development programs.

e How digital and back-up skills and knowledges will
be evaluated.

8 Department of the Army (24 September 1995), TRADOC Regulation 350-70, Fort Monroe, VA, p. VI-9-3.

26



The current
Army method of.
conveying.
information to
users 1S.

/ essentially
unchanged
since world
War II.

ISSUE: Doctrine
Publication
Cannot Keep
Step with
Digitization

that they must conform to the development requirements of TRADOC
Regulation 350-70 (Training Development Management, Processes,
and Products) which prescribes a very proceduralized life cycle for
product development.

All documentation is subject to lengthy production and priority
constraints under the Army-wide Doctrinal and Training Literature
Program (ADTLP) for printing and product management. The result
is less-than-timely literature. For example, the current official version
of the ARTEP 71-2 MTP (Zhe Tank and Mechanized Infantry
Battalion Task Force) carries a publication date of October 1988.
The STP, which define the critical skill domains for individual soldiers
and their leaders, are equally affected--the STP for the 19K armor
crewman is dated November 1989.

In the field of digital systems and operations, one year old operating
systems are often outdated. In the case of the M1A2, there have been
five software “drops” during the period from June 1995 (when the
first tank was issued to a using unit) and June 1997. As systems
proliferate and integrate, soldiers will be faced with the situation
where change will be constant instead of cyclical and forecasted.
Training requirements cannot be supported by the existing publication
model.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

41) Review and revise the existing model of
documentation so that it can effectively and efficiently
provide information to users in the digital Army.

2) Increase use of outsourcing, including systems
contractors, to expedite the production and delivery of
information.

3) Resource and maximize the use of information

technologies and electronic media in the development,
production, and distribution of information.

12



ISSUE: Resident
Instruction

Must Address
Digital and
Back-Up
Training
Requirements

institution may find itself in the role of teaching basic operating skills
rather than focusing on equipment specific skills.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

4) Performance requirements for digital systems must be
analyzed. Institutions must define the digital and back-
up skill training requirements (e.g., examine the
sequence and mix of training for digital skills and back-
up skills).

2) Institutions must determine which soldiers should
possess what digital and back-up skills. In other words,
match skill needs with soldiers’ future assignments.

3) Apply high transfer training strategies and
procedures for computer literacy and hands-on skills.”

4) The appropriate training environment (institution, unit,
self-development) must be determined for learning the
domain of digital and back-up skills. Criteria for making
this determination must include such considerations as
resources, system densities, skill retention factors, and
system upgrade rates.

The Institution’s
Current Role Will
Be Outmoded for the
Digital Army

Except for imparting soldierization skills at initial entry training (TET)
and where required by law, the institution is undergoing a fundamental
change in its mission. Some of this is being dictated by the realities of
budget and downsizing, but much is the result of the changing nature
of the Army, typified by the impact of digitization. As the Army
incorporates a larger variety of equipment (digital, non-digital, part-
digital) into its force mix, the training of specific systems at a central
location becomes a less efficient method of producing soldiers with
the right skills at the right time. Also, because of the rapidity of
systems development and upgrade, the present method of centralized
training can only keep a small portion of soldiers current.

12 Finley, D. L., Sanders, M. G., & Ryan, A. J., III (1996). “Application of training transfer principles in
developing the high transfer training (HITT) methodology.” Innovations in Education and Training
International, Volume 33, Number 4, pp. 232-239.

18



ISSUE: Digital
Units are
Learning;
Crosstalk

and

Feedback
Among Units
Is Lagging

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Institutionalize and formalize linkages between early
fielding units and later fielding units. For example,
develop and refine procedures with units fielding the
M1A2 and pass the procedures on to units fielding the
M2A3.

2) Formalize permanent linkages among units and
proponents which will allow cross-feeding of digital
operational discoveries. Such a system should provide
for:

Information flow in and out.

Automatic periodic updates and notifications.
Universal access by users at all levels.

Free, informal information exchange in real time.
Monitoring and overwatch.

3) Establish a protected website on the Internet in order
to operationalize linkages among units and proponents.
A pilot program for such a website is contained in
Application B.

This pilot program addresses the need for M1A2 tank
units and the proponent schools to input and access
information on digital and back-up skills. Users will
share information and lessons learned in order to
maintain the ability to successfully fight the M1A2 under
all conditions.



SR

Strategic
Analysis Issues

Examination of existing digital operations and generalization to a
coming digital Army reflects a system that is potentially so pervasive
that there is little in the Army that will not be affected by it. The
issues run from the simple to the complex. While all issues require
more detailed analysis than this study was intended to explore, there
were three issues that are, in themselves, predominantly analytic
problems.

Training Will Not
Solve All Digital
Problems

Training as a
solution will be
effective only
if applied in
conjunction with
other solutions
and used in
areas where It
7s most
effective.

ISSUE: Training
Will Not Solve
All Digital
Problems

Currently, the Army has no overall plan for what role training can best
fill in the digital and back-up operational scheme. The current study
was specifically directed at training and did not focus on non-training
issues. But training as a solution will be effective only if applied in
conjunction with other solutions and used in those areas where it is
most effective. Training is too expensive, too cumbersome, and too
unreliable to be the only approach considered.

This study did not address the compendium of non-training solutions.
But during the course of pursuing the training issues, some related
areas were identified. In the equipment field these include improved
system reliability, system redundancy, and substitution of cheap digital
systems as a link between full digital and manual back-up capabilities
(e.g., precision lightweight global positioning system [GPS] receiver
[PLGR]). In the personnel field, non-training solutions include
improving personnel selection and classification, and revamping
utilization and assignment policies. Finally, in the operational field is
the requirement to determine risk assessment and risk tolerance for
deferred or delayed training. Training should not be viewed as the
sole solution to digital and back-up issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

41) Conduct analyses to determine where training is the
most effective solution to digital and back-up problems.
The role of training must be considered as only one of
several possible solutions.

2) Explore other solution sets to be considered as
adjuncts to training solutions. They should include the
following six questions:

¢ How should the personnel selection and
classification system be used to match soldiers to
digital jobs?

27



ISSUE: Training
Development Is
Outpaced by
Digital Systems
Development

At least one program has been initiated to speed up the materiel
acquisition process. The Wartime Rapid Acquisition Program
(WRAP) was designed to accelerate the acquisition process for new
pieces of military equipment that show outstanding performance in
experimental settings such as the AWE and Battle Lab activities.*
Accelerated materiel acquisition is needed, but without a concentrated
effort to match it with training development, the process will be self-
defeating when the equipment reaches the troops.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Critically review and revise the systems acquisition
model to ensure it is compatible with the fast paced,
continuous development that is the trademark of
information age technology.

2) Incorporate early identification and integration of
training requirements into the systems acquisition model.
The model must support simultaneous and continuous
integration between training developers and technology
developers:

e Maximize creation of contractor, combat
development, and training development teams in
permanent relationships at the earliest possible
point in the procurement process.

e Enforce adherence to existing and new
requirements for training and procurement
integration.

e Maximize the use of simulation focused on the early
identification of training requirements

The Army Does Not
Have Doctrine for
Fighting Digitized
Units

The concepts of how to fight digital systems have been slow to
evolve. In 1994, Colonel John Johnston, then Director of the Armor
School, identified that “our basic fighting doctrine is changing. The
fighting formations that we know today, especially in the defense, will
likely change because digitization allows for the rapid movement and
concentration of forces.”” Almost four years later, little has been
done to define digital fighting doctrine, to include integration of
systems, degraded operations, and mixed forces operations.

8 “AWE may lead to procurement review.” Jane’s Military Exercise & Training Monitor, January-March 1997, p.

4

9 Johnston, J. C. (March-April 1994). “The Journey to Force XXI’s Mounted Component.” Armor, p. 15,



Background

INTRODUCTION

The United States (U.S.) Army has made a substantial investment and
a strong institutional commitment to harnessing the power of the
microprocessor to provide significant advantages on the battlefield.
The areas of command and control, situational awareness, target
acquisition and identification, and improved system lethality--all have
been affected and influenced by the new-found power of the
microprocessor. This entire effort has come under the heading of
“digitization.” Digitization is defined as “the application of
technologies to acquire, exchange, and employ timely digital
information throughout the battlespace, tailored to the needs of each
decider (commander), shooter, and supporter . . . allowing each to
maintain a clear and accurate vision of common battlespace necessary
to support both planning and execution.”! Digitization also impacts
the way the Army operates: the way soldiers perform their individual
and collective tasks, and the way missions are accomplished.

The need to address personnel and training issues as a part of
digitization was established by the Department of the Army’s (DA)
Director of Personnel Technologies (PerTech). The focus of the
Director’s request was the requirement to train digital skills while also
training and maintaining conventional skills to back-up degraded
digital capabilities. His challenge was that the “early identification of
issues is essential to minimize long-term program costs and avoid
potential roadblocks to implementation.”?

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences (ARI) responded to the PerTech request by directing that a
study be conducted. The study examines digital and back-up training.
It was established that the outcome should be the identification of
significant issues which may demand complex solutions.

The purpose of this report is to lay out the training situation as it
relates to the conventional-to-digital transition, to identify issues that
impact training, and to propose recommendations and suggest areas
for further examination. This report is intended to highlight and
present the conclusions of greatest impact derived from the study.
The more detailed presentation of the study itself is contained in

1 US. Amy Digitization Office (September 1997). ADO Home Page [On-line]. Available:
hittp:/Avww.ado.army.mil/smrtbook/sbgif2.htm

? MANPRINT (June 1996). Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Request Memorandum.



Dn
Training Pillar
Issues

Over the years, the Army training paradigm resulted in three pillars,
each supporting an area of training. These included the two
predominant areas of institutional training and unit training, and the
less emphasized area of self-development training. The three areas
will be redefined in the future, with much less distinctiveness. Our
examination of digital and back-up requirements identified two
training pillar issues that deserve attention.

There Is No In-Depth
Plan to Integrate the
Training Pillars

———L
Digital and back-
up requirements
must be included
In any.
realignment of
training
responsibilities.

a

A shift of responsibilities and functions between the existing training
pillars is a reality of Force XXI training. The Army Distance Learning
Plan (ADLP) makes it clear that the goal is to deliver training on-
demand, where and when it is needed. The plan states: “The three
traditional training pillars (institutional, unit, and self-development
training) will merge, placing greater emphasis on unit and self-
development training.”'® In other words, institutional-based training
will decrease and units or learning center settings will pick up the
slack. However, each of the existing pillars has fundamental
characteristics that typify it. These characteristics must be considered
during the development of training strategies and the assignment of
responsibilities. A coordinated effort is necessary, otherwise the
result may be chaotic.

As institutions cut back on their training, the effect will be a unilateral
transfer of training responsibilities. However, there is currently no
system in place to ensure that the merging of the pillars will be
accomplished multilaterally, effectively, and responsibly. This is a
high risk venture; if not properly integrated the outcome could be a
breakdown in training of soldiers and units.

16 Department of the Army (3 April 1996). Army Distance Learning Plan. Fort Monroe, VA: Training
Development and Analysis Directorate, para. 1-6.

24



Unit Issues

Units have habitually borne the bulk of the training load along with
operational requirements. But the drawdown of forces coupled with
ever changing geopolitical strategies and multi-echelon deployments
have profoundly affected how units operate. Like institutions, units
will have a new training role in the digital Army. Two specific issues
are explored.

| Units Are Not
Prepared for the

| Added Training Load
of Digitization

Because of the
differences in
equipment and
the rapid
changes in
technology, most
digital. and.
back-up training
will fall in the
unit sphere.

A benefit of digitization is that it will lead to the automation of many
tasks which are currently performed through manual or operator-
intensive means. This should simplify the demands on the soldier.
But that is the future--the transition period will have just the opposite
effect. During this extended transition period, the mix of forces and
equipment reliability issues will increase the domain of skills that
soldiers will need in order to operate. Because of the differences in
equipment and the rapid changes in technology, most of this training
will fall in the unit sphere. Units traditionally have responsibility for
some initial skill training, all sustainment training, and all collective
training. That responsibility will not change, but the requirement for
digital and back-up skills will alter the complexion of unit training.

Ever since the decentralization in the early 1970’s, unit training has
been marked by inefficiencies. These include lack of planning skills,
insufficient training tools, poor organization of training, improper
utilization of personnel, and irrelevant training content. The result is
wasted training time. If the units are to pick up additional training
requirements in the digital and back-up arena (and this is a foregone
conclusion) then such inefficiencies must be identified and eliminated.
The entire unit training strategy from the mission essential task list
(METL) concept to mandatory classes to training management must
be re-evaluated and revised.

Shifting more training requirements to units must not be a patchwork
approach nor can it be done without full realization of the areas where
units are inherently weak. These include the areas of personnel turn-
over and shortages, lack of training design expertise, difficulty of
integrating training with other activities, inexperience in training
management, nonstandard and competing missions, and inflexibility in
changing from current training models. The Army must accept that
unit training loads are going to be increased and must find a way to
accomplish this, without relying on a “more of the same” approach.

21



Each issue is accompanied by specific recommendations. Because the selected issues were
complex, most of the recommendations address broad policy decisions. However, the expert
groups also recognized the need to make recommendations that could have an immediate
discernible impact. Therefore, three examples of detailed, practical recommendations are
included.

Utilization of Findings:
The purpose of this report is to lay out the training situation as it relates to the
conventional-to-digital transition, to identify issues that impact training, and to propose

recommendations and suggest areas for further examination. This report is intended to highlight
and present the conclusions of greatest impact derived from the study.

viii



ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TRAINING THE DIGITAL FORCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Study Requirements:

Digitization is the future of the Army. Along with digitization come training and
personnel implications. Acting on a request of the Department of the Army’s Director of
Personnel Technologies, the United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences sponsored a study to identify the training issues associated with digitization, specifically
those that address the need to train and maintain back-up skills along with digital skills.
Knowledge of back-up procedures is required for soldiers to accomplish tasks when digital
systems are degraded or unavailable.

Procedure:

Using the M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank and the M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle as
exemplar systems, the study explored issues that were applicable to a wide range of digital
applications and training situations. The study utilized a series of expert groups to define the
issues and formulate recommendations. These groups included users, developers, researchers,
and trainers with a wide spectrum of experiences and viewpoints. The expert group input was
used to identify the issues or impacts that the Army faces as it transitions from a conventional to a
digital force. Subsequent expert groups analyzed the issues and suggested possible solution sets.
The solution sets were researched and analyzed by staff analysts in order to synthesize
recommendations for each issue.

Findings:

Fifteen primary issues associated with the digitization of the battlefield were identified.
These digital and back-up issues are those that warrant high level Army attention and are
generalizable to a wide range of digital systems. The 15 issues were organized into the following
categories:

© Operational Concepts and Developmental Issues - addresses six issues arising from the
introduction of digitized units into Army operations and the resulting requirement for
back-up training.

© Institutional Issues - focuses on two issues facing institutional training as digital and
back-up skill requirements emerge.

© Unit Issues - presents two issues regarding units’ new role in training the digital Army.

© Training Pillar Issues - addresses two issues that need to be considered as the Army
redefines the institutional, unit, and self-development pillars.

© Strategic Analysis Issues - describes three analytic areas associated with digitization
that require further analysis.



"the fighting
formations that
__we know today
pa. WITT
likely change
because
digitization
allows for the
rapid movement.
and
concentration
of forces.”

= COL John Johnston
————

Figure 1. Increasing
system effectiveness.

One conclusion of the expert groups assembled for this study was that
doctrinal advances have not been made because the approach has been
to retrofit digital operations into current doctrine without considering
the full capability or potential of the digital systems. The true
exploitation of digital systems will come only when developers rethink
how digital systems can significantly increase operational
effectiveness. So far, digital “how to fight” doctrine is not keeping
pace with the capabilities of the new systems.

The graph in Figure 1 represents the potential increase in weapon
system effectiveness with the introduction of doctrine that specifically
addresses the capabilities that digital systems afford. Using
conventional doctrine for digital systems does little to increase
operational effectiveness.

Initial concepts of small unit operations, company and task force,
were first put forth in special text and supplemental material
publications in December 1995'° and January 1996," respectively.
These manuals contain many theoretical generalizations of how units
should fight but are short on particulars. Relatively little has been
done to update them.

HOWTO.
MAXIMIZE THE DELTA IN
INCREASED WEAPONS
‘SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS?

System Effectiveness

+++++ Nondigital systems with existing doctrine
~ Digital systems with existing doctrine
+ Digital systems with digital doctrine

— es
Time

The techniques of fighting in a degraded digital mode (back-up) are
also lacking in digital doctrine. An analysis of back-up requirements
specifically considered the potential impact of these requirements on
collective tasks. Looking at the Army Training and Evaluation
Program-Mission Training Plan (ARTEP-MTP) for tank platoon
through battalion/task force operations, the study identified back-up

| 10 U.S, Army Armor School (December 1995). The Digitized Battalion Task Force Headquarters, FKSM 72-2-1,

| Fort Knox, KY.

"U.S. Army Armor School (January 1996). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Digitized Company
Team, ST 71-1-1, Fort Knox, KY.

10



Training Pillar Issues .........ssccscssessssseesseeeessetessssneessssees 24
There Is No In-Depth Plan to Integrate the Training
i 24
There Is No Comprehensive Self-Development Plan 25
Strategic Analysis ISSues .........cssssscsssscesseeesnnecesneeesees 27
Training Will Not Solve All Digital Problems ...............- 27
Effects of Distance Learning on the Army Are Largely
UNKNOWN ou. esesesesssssesecseeeseseseseeeneteneeeeenenenensnseeees 28
Effects of Skill Decay on Digital and Back-Up Tasks
Are UnKnOwn.......s.scscscsssssesesesesereseneneneseneeeseassescscess 29
Summary and
Conclusions 31
Summary... 31
COMCIUSIONS ......e.sseeessssesssseessseessseecsneessecesseceuecneneensneesneess 31
Methodology 34
Study Method oc eeccssssesssssesssssssssssneseenneeecnnecennensane 34
Acknowledgments 36
Sample
Applications Application A: Training Requirements Analysis..............+++ 7
Application B: Internet-Based Pilot Program ............s+0 15
Application C: Commander’s Integrated Training Tool
(CITT) 20
Figures Figure 1: Increasing system effectiveness ............sssssessesee 10
Figure 2: The study method .......ccsssssecsessssseseessesessesseneenee . 34



Proponent
Interaction Is Not
Effective

There is too
much commonality
in the digital
future to allow
Stovepipe
developments to
predominate.

—

ISSUE: Proponent
Interaction

Is Not

Effective

The armor and infantry communities are embarked on similar but
differently timed efforts in the development and refinement of digital
systems for the tank and infantry fighting vehicles. Because of
habitual cross attachment requirements, no two systems share more
operational commonality than these two. Although the design
specifications for the M1A2 and the M2A3 stipulate engineering
interoperability, the armor and infantry proponents have been slow to
interface and share lessons learned on important aspects of training,
how-to-fight doctrine, and back-up requirements.

The problem extends beyond the armor and infantry communities.
There is a profusion of digital initiatives in various developmental and
operational stages in the areas of fire support, intelligence, command
and control, and combat service support. Not only will many of these
systems eventually be required to interface, but there are many
development, usage, and back-up problems that are being discovered
independently and repeatedly.

The stovepipe operation of proponents is not the way to do business.
A probable cause of this lack of informal coordination is the reduction
in manpower and expertise at the individual proponents. However, it
is exactly because of these reductions that it is essential to find an
effective solution, without additional personnel demands. There is too
much commonality in the digital future to allow stovepipe
developments to predominate.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Require formation of working groups of relevant
proponent representatives focused on specific, shared
issues (e.g., common back-up training requirements,
common systems usage, common doctrinal publications).

2) Maximize use of modern information technologies and
electronic media to facilitate shared development issues.

16



Issues and Recommendations:
Training the Digital Force

Roy Campbell, Laura Ford, Michael Shaler, and
Robert Cobb
Human Resources Research Organization

[BING QUALITY INePDCTED 1

United States Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

August 1998

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

C70 10608001



© Degraded operation. No system is 100% reliable. Degraded
and compromised operations include mechanical, electrical,
electromagnetic, and software failures due to battle damage,
environmental conditions, or intentional disruption by the enemy.
Redundancy is expensive and very often an engineering
challenge.

© Mixed equipment and capabilities. Forces generally operate at
the lowest common denominator that unites them. For the
foreseeable future, the Army’s inventory of vehicles, equipment,
systems, and devices will contain a variety of capabilities ranging
from completely digitized to completely manual. For example,
out of the total inventory of about 7000 Army tanks in the year
2015, only 1079 will be M1A2 and M1A2 System Enhancement
Program (SEP) tanks. In the year 2009, approximately 1600 out
of 6500 BFVs will be the M2A3 digitized version. While the
interface between systems will inevitably improve, a completely
compatible, digitized force will probably not be achievable in the
twenty-year projection.

Main Battle Tank
~ Year 2015

Bradley Fighting Vehicle

f ss y ae Be ben
5030 M1 Y
z (nondi ital 1078 gta te

<< + Year 2009
4900 BEVs
(nondigital)

e Training up and training down. With the drawdown of
military units, the emphasis for force projection is on the rapid
deployment of forces without their heavy equipment, followed by
the issuance of equipment in the deployment area. Often the pre-
positioned equipment does not match the equipment the unit
trained on before deployment. The requirement then, is to cycle
between training “up” to more sophisticated systems and training
“down” to older or more basic systems.



Analysis of Emerging Digital and Back-Up Training Requirements
(in preparation).

Scope The ARI approach for this study was to identify and examine back-
up training issues by utilizing two digitized systems as examples: the
MIA2 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT), which is a fielded system,
and the M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), which is a system
currently in development with unit fielding scheduled to begin in the
year 2000.

The fielding of the M1A2 tank provided a logical avenue of
investigation. This digital vehicle has been through operational
testing and evaluation and has been in the hands of troops since mid-
1995. Therefore, many concerns have already been explored or
uncovered by the M1A2 program. Both the M1A2 and the M2A3
are exemplar systems in that they affect multiple levels of
employment--individual operator through battalion--and interact with
all battlefield operating systems (BOS). Many of the issues and
recommendations for this report came about through the study of
these exemplar systems.

The study was never intended to limit the scope or findings to just
those systems. Therefore, this report reflects the training impact that
the Army as a whole faces as it moves toward increased digitization.

Operational Digitization of the battlefield will require that individual and
. collective digital tasks and functions be defined. Digital skills will
Requirements of encompass tasks ranging from operation of new devices to new
the Digital tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Although digitization
Force Include will lead to the automation of many tasks that are currently

. performed through manual or personnel intensive means, there is still
Back-Up Skills a requirement for soldier-in-the-loop performance. Operational
requirements dictate that for the foreseeable future there will be a
need for both digitized and back-up or conventional operations.
Back-up skills are those needed by soldiers to operate when digital
systems are degraded. Outlined below are three primary
circumstances that generate the need for maintaining back-up skills.

3 Ford, L. A., Campbell, R., & Cobb, R. (in preparation). Analysis of Emerging Digital and Back-up Training
Requirements (ARI Study Report). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences.



assembled. The first group met at Fort Knox, Kentucky in November
1996. Panel members included military and civilian personnel with
background in armor operations and special expertise in digital
operations, training development and research, training technologies,
NET, institutional and unit training, and Army doctrine and trends.
Their mission was to generate a listing of the most significant digital
training issues and requirements.

The second group met at Fort Benning, Georgia in April 1997.
Again, participants included military and civilian experts in the areas
listed above, although their backgrounds were primarily in infantry
rather than armor. Their objectives included validation and
clarification of the issues and requirements identified by the first
group, as well as augmentation of the list based on their own
experience and background.

Once those issues had been defined and researched, a third group of
experts was assembled to validate the digital and back-up issues and
recommend solutions. This group was similar in composition to the
first two groups, representing backgrounds in both armor and infantry
operations, digital operations, Army doctrinal matters, and
institutional and unit training. Additionally, the group was expanded
to include targeted expertise in training technologies, distance
learning, skill retention, and learning theory. The group included
representatives from TRADOC, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), the Armor Center and Infantry Center,
1st Cavalry Division, the M1A2 NET Team, Force XXI Training
Program, the Institute for Defense Analysis, and ARI. Meeting for
two days in July 1997, the group discussed each issue and the
associated indicators and provided the input used to formulate the
recommendations contained in this impact study report.

35



ISSUE: Units
Need

Soldier
Assessment
Capabilities

digital and back-up domain.

Secondly, units must have a quick, reliable internal assessment tool for
digital and back-up skills. The model of the current Tank Crew
Gunnery Skills Test (TCGST) is a start point because it is both
standardized and current. A similar tool, customized to specific
digital systems and operator levels, would provide units the capability
for conducting initial and periodic assessments. Such an instrument or
set of instruments must be reliable, current, standardized, and easily
administered and scored. Unlike the TCGST, it may need to go
beyond the assessment of discrete skills. An early experience of
working in a digital environment led one leader to observe: “Training
with information systems increasingly demands innate intelligence and
computer literacy, so that soldiers can accommodate changes, so they
can handle rapid operations, and think on their feet. The M1A2 task
force will place continuing emphasis on quality training of quality
soldiers.”””

RECOMMENDATIONS:

4) Begin a pilot program that tracks M1A2 crewmen
skills. A goal should be to adapt and apply the program
to the M2A3. Such a program should:

e Identify the realm of digital and back-up tasks.

e Explore technology for recording and transmitting
individual skills data.

e Identify unit needs and uses of information.
e Track personnel across assignments.
e Evaluate the effectiveness of a tracking system.

2) Develop and pilot a digital and back-up skills test,
based on the M1A2. Evaluate the concept and expand to
other digital systems and applications.

1S Nowowiejski, D. A. (January-February 1995). “Achieving Digital Destruction: Challenges for the M1A2 Task

Force.” Armor, p 24.

23



ISSUE: Units Are RECOMMENDATIONS:
Not Prepared
forthe Added 1) Determine the most effective and efficient balance
Training Load _ between the decentralized model of unit training anda
of Digitization more controlled approach.
2) Realistically appraise the preparation and delivery of
unit training. Identify and provide the necessary training
tools.
3) Develop more effective training links between units
and institutions.
Units Need Soldier In the early 1980s, armor crewmen in SL 1 through 4 were
Assessment responsible for 200 individual tasks."* In 1996, armor crewmen in the
Capabilities same SL had a task domain of 567 individual tasks."* Moreover, the
earlier list reflected operation on three different types of tanks while
the 1996 list reflected primarily operation on the M1A1 tank. The
digital soldier will be faced with an even more complex array of task
requirements for digital and back-up operations on an increasingly
wider array of equipment. How realistic is it to assume skill mastery
Units need on the current list, much less on an expanded and perhaps ill-defined
efficient list?
methods to

assess soldier
skills:

- skill profiles
for each soldier

= Assessment
tools for
digital and
back-up skills

When soldiers are newly assigned to a unit there are generally two
widespread approaches to assimilation. The first (often applied to
officers and NCOs) is to assume that the soldier is more
knowledgeable than he or she actually is. The second (often applied
to junior enlisted) is to assume the soldier knows next to nothing.
Very often, both approaches will be ongoing simultaneously within a
unit. Both approaches are ineffective and inefficient.

Two needs are apparent. First, soldiers need to come to a unit with a
profile that reflects their training, equipment and operational
experience, and skills inventory and mastery. Old systems such as the
Job Books were inaccurate and did not work. New systems such as
the Army Company Information System (ACIS) need to reflect more
than just formal training records. The profile must be accurate,
descriptive, and easy to use and interpret by first level supervisors.
Moreover, it must be specifically tailored to meet the expanding

3 Department of the Army (July 1982). M48-M60 Armor Crewman Soldier’s Manual, FM 17-19E1/2/3/4,

Washington, DC.

“ Department of the Army (July 1995). Master Task List, CMFI9/BC 12, Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army Armor

School.

22



Contents

Introduction !
Background ......scsesessscsssssseeesssssseeecsssneeecensnnmeeseeeennnney 1
SCOPE vosssecsssscccessesesesssssssnsunseccesssinsessssunsseessnnneeeecessnnenet 2
Operational Requirements of the Digital Force
Include Back-up Skil s ..........ccsssssseeeseeeeeeeeeeeeeseees 2
Environment, Restrictions, and Parameters................ 4
Report Organization... 4
Issues and
Recommendations 5
Operational Concepts and Developmental Issues..... 5
The Army Has Not Addressed Back-Up as a Significant
Training Issue ...........seccsessesseesseeseeeneeneeeneesneeneenseesnes 5
Training Development Is Outpaced by Digital Systems
Development............sccsescesesseeneceecteseeeeeeneeneeteenensees 8
The Army Does Not Have Doctrine for Fighting
Digitized Units ...........cccsesseeseeceeseceeereeneseneeserssessies 9
Doctrine Publication Cannot Keep Step with
Digitization .........scceccseccsessesseesseeseeseeneeeneenteeneesseceees 11
Digital Units are Learning; Crosstalk and Feedback
Among Units Is Lagging 13
Proponent Interaction Is Not Effective 16
Institutional Issues 0.00.2... eccessteeeceneeeennneeees 17
Resident Instruction Must Address Digital and Back-Up
Training Requirement .............c.csccseseieeeeteetereeene 17
The Institution’s Current Role Will Be Outmoded for
the Digital Army ... 18
Unit Issues ................ 21
Units Are Not Prepared for the Added Training Load of
Digitization 0.0... 21
Units Need Soldier Assessment Capabilitie: 22



Digital Units Are
Learning; Crosstalk
and Feedback Among
Units Is Lagging

ee
very few digital
procedures,
techniques,
policies, tasks,
and standards

for the MIA2
have been
formalized,

The Army’s move to digitization is characterized by an increasing
variety of systems, each developed and fielded independently.
Because of low initial purchases or limited basis of issue (BOT), many
of these systems are fielded in relatively low numbers. Units that have
received new systems have adapted to their capabilities and, in effect,
developed a pragmatic doctrine for employment. But this rich source
of information is not being used to full advantage.

In mid-1995 the first M1A2 tanks were issued to units at Fort Hood,
Texas. Equipment issue was accompanied by a new equipment
training (NET) team but with minimal operational and employment
guidance. What followed was a true discovery learning period on the
part of M1A2 units. As units experiment and gain experience with
digital operations they discover, and solve, many problems. These
learning experiences range from equipment operation to tactics to
back-up procedures. While some of these procedures are being
incorporated into unit standard operating procedure (SOP), most
became just a way of doing business. This knowledge is limited to a
core group of mostly junior officers and noncommissioned officers
(NCOs). Within units, Officer Professional Development (OPD) and
NCOPD sessions serve to promulgate solutions. Outside of units, no
similar mechanism for capturing this exists. Very few of these
procedures, techniques, policies, tasks, and standards have been
formalized. Fewer still have found their way back to the proponent
institution charged with developing digital and back-up operational
guidance.

Experience with the M1A2 is not unique in this regard. Anecdotal
information out of the EXFOR AWE indicates many like instances of
resourceful officers, NCOs, and operators developing innovative
solutions to problems that systems developers did not even know
existed. Examples cover the full range of performance such as
button-pushing functions, overcoming system failures, and making
entire operating systems work more effectively. Such experiences go
far beyond the stated purposes of the experiments and beyond the
formalized lessons learned that are often the cited outputs from these
efforts. However, there is no formal mechanism established to
systematically gather, analyze, generalize, and incorporate these
experiences into a feedback process to other users. Notably, selected
TRADOC schools have recently provided liaison personnel to gain
from Fort Hood’s digital experience.

13



"pigital skills
are relatively

perishable! crews |

must practice
continually to
attain default
proficiency.”

== MAJ Edwards III

ISSUE: Effects
of Skill Decay
on Digital and

Back-Up
Tasks Are
Unknown

and retraining of digital and back-up skills.

Back-up skills by their very nature are a unique skill area. By
definition they are sporadic, infrequent, isolated, and often occur
under circumstances of stress. Even if the back-up task is the same as
a manual task, the conditions for back-up performance, including the
recognition of when it is necessary, can have a profound effect on
recall and sustainment training. Moreover, human skills and modes,
such as decision-making and voice communications, may set the
conditions for digital task performance. There is not currently an
effective model of this type of behavior that fits the military setting.

Digital skills are a new area for the Army. To start with, there is no
definition of digital skills or inventory of proficiencies or knowledges
that are expected of soldiers in a digital environment. Anecdotal
reports indicate that digital skills may require special treatment. An
officer at an NTC rotation for digital applications observed: “Digital
skills are relatively perishable! Crews must practice continually to
attain default proficiency.””? However, little empirical evidence has
been obtained on learning, sustaining, and forgetting in the conditions
under which the Army operates. While the advantages of digital
operations are substantial, they can be negated if operator failures are
frequent or at critical junctures.

RECOMMENDATION:

1) Pursue research to determine skill decay of both
digital and back-up tasks with a focus on the operational
conditions of employment. Develop models for
maintaining proficiency, retraining, and relearning of
digital and back-up skills. Skill retention effects should
drive future training strategies for digital and back-up
training.

2) Extend work on practical guides for retention
training” to digital skills and back-up skills for more
efficient training management.

2 Edwards, O. T, III (May-June 1995). “Digital battlefield training and insights of a user (NTC Rotation 94-07).”

Armor, p. 13.

2 Wisher, R. A., Sabol, M. A., & Ozkaptan, H. R. (May 1996). Retention of “Peace Support Operations” during
Bosnia deployment: A basis for refresher training (ARI Special Report). Alexandria, VA: US. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

30



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

The effects of digitization are profound. Eventually, many tasks that
once were done manually will be done automatically, with greater
accuracy, and in a fraction of the time, than was ever envisioned a few
years ago. But the move towards digitization is generating new skill
demands and, consequently, the need for new training strategies and
designs. Early identification of training and personnel issues is
essential to ensure that long-term program costs are minimal and
roadblocks to implementation of needed changes are avoided.

Conclusions

To ensure a viable and productive transition to digitization, the Army
must:

Develop a back-up training strategy. Digital and back-up
development must go hand in hand. Back-up must be integrated
into the process that derives digital training and digital strategies
(see Application A).

Align the systems acquisition model with information age
development. Rapid changes are a trademark of digital
technology. The acquisition model, and in particular those parts
of it concerned with training identification and development, must
match the speed and complexity with which technology evolves.

Develop digital doctrine to match digital technology. New
doctrine must be in place to guarantee that increases in capabilities
are supported by appropriate doctrine. Soldiers must not be
required to fight 21* century technology with 20" century
doctrine.

Ensure that knowledge transfer matches digital developments.
The publications model of providing information to soldiers
through TMs, FMs, ARTEP-MTP, etc., must be critically
examined and eventually streamlined. The fast-paced changes that
are predicted for digital development demand a publication system
to match.

Improve information to and from the soldiers who make a
difference. Units that field new digital systems are gold mines of
“how-to” information. Steps must be taken to institutionalize and
formalize direct linkages between early fielding units and later

31



ee
The entire
concept of.
training needs
to change from
course-orjented
to mission-based
training. » =

ISSUE: The

However, shifting course requirements from the institution to the unit
will not be a simple solution. Units currently face a variety of
missions conducted with a variable array of equipment and forces.
This dynamic situation is likely to continue. Therefore, the entire
concept of training needs to change from course-oriented to mission-
based training focused on specific equipment. For example, future
training events may need to focus on a specific deployment (¢.g.,
Southwest Asia) for a particular mission (e.g., defense-urban combat)
for particular equipment (e.g., SEP-conventional mix). Units will
need institutional support and assistance if they are to successfully
increase their training load.

Specifically, the requirement is for a wide variety of training tools for
both individual and collective training. These tools should reside in
“libraries” that can be quickly accessed by units, or can be quickly
produced and dispatched to meet a particular training need. Materials
must be complete, accurate, timely, and validated as effective. This is
a substantial shift from the institution’s current role and it cannot be
met by simply converting existing courses to an export medium. The
requirement is for tailorable training. Institutions will be required to
radically rethink the way they do business to meet this need in the near
future.

RECOMMENDATION:

Institution’s
Current Role
Will Be
Outmoded for
the Digital
Army

The primary mission of institutions must undergo a
fundamental change in order to fulfill digital and back-up
training requirements. The institutions must change from
conductors of training to exporters of training.

e The training strategy must emphasize the
exchange of information between units and the
institution.

e Training must be mission-based and focus on
specific equipment.

e The training must be developed by the institution
(much of it under contract) and then exported to
units. The training support package must allow
units flexibility in its application. An example of
how such training can be developed is detailed in
Application C.

19



Study Report 98-06

Issues and Recommendations: Training the
Digital Force

Roy Campbell, Laura Ford, Michael Shaler, and Robert Cobb
Human Resources Research Organization

Armored Forces Research Unit
Barbara A. Black, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

August 1998

Army Project Number : Personnel and Training
20465803D730 Analysis Activities

iii



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was performed by the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) as part of
their Advanced Distributed Training Program located at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Ms. Charlotte
Campbell was Program Manager and her contributions to this project went far beyond project
supervision. She was involved in all project decisions, participated in various workshops, and
served as a reviewer of this report.

Colonel (U.S. Army, Retired) Michael (Mike) Shaler was the Project Leader, performing in this
capacity while on Special Consultant status with HumRRO. Colonel Shaler was responsible for
accomplishing the goals of the project, in line with the direction provided by the contracting
officer’s representative (COR) from ARI. He performed in all aspects of the project: serving as
facilitator for the work groups; conducting visits and interviews; and contributing to this report.
Three full time HumRRO employees completed the study staff: Mr. Roy Campbell, Dr. Laura
Ford, and Mr. Robert (Mike) Cobb.

The COR for the project was Dr. Barbara Black from the Armored Forces Research Unit
(AFRU), ARI, at Fort Knox. Dr. Black was an active member of the project in all aspects of the
study, providing input and counsel throughout. She was a full participant in the study workshops.
Also from the AFRU was Dr. Carl Lickteig, who served as the project Assistant COR (ACOR)
and provided a working liaison to the project staff. Ms. Margaret (Marnie) Salter, from the
Infantry Forces Research Unit (IFRU), ARI, at Fort Benning, Georgia also served as a project
ACOR. She was also a full participant in all aspects of the study, most notably as the guide and
counsel during the infantry related parts of the study. A report prepared by Salter and Black (in
preparation) titled Back-up Training Requirements for the Digitized Battlefield: An Overview
serves as the basis and framework under which this study was conducted. In their report, Salter
and Black address the background and the broad implications of digitization. The fourth ARI
participant who deserves special recognition is Dr. Kathleen (Kathy) Quinkert, AFRU. As head
of the AFRU Future Battlefield Conditions Team, she participated in the workshops and provided
an invaluable link to other related work efforts.

The findings and recommendations in this study were facilitated by the proceedings at three
separate work groups conducted at Fort Knox, Fort Benning, and in Louisville, Kentucky. These
workshops were only possible because of the 45 people, representing all Army interests, who
voluntarily participated. It is primarily their candid, straightforward, realistic, and sometimes
visionary ideas and observations that are represented in this report. Their participation was
supplemented by input and interviews with soldiers and civilians from Fort Hood, Texas, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas; Fort Monroe, Virginia; Fort McPherson, Georgia; and within various Army
activities in Washington, DC and Alexandria, Virginia. Everyone contacted was helpful and
forthcoming. No one requested anonymity for his or her views; only the number, and the concern
of omitting someone, precludes listing them by name. To everyone whom we contacted, the
study staff is profoundly indebted.

36



One of the participants in the initial digital operations Advanced
Warfighter Experiment (AWE) (Desert Hammer) observed: “Our
soldiers can learn digital proficiency but require continual emphasis
on default proficiency. Soldiers default to their comfort zone in
times of high stress.” *

RECOMMENDATION:
ISSUE: The Army
Has Not Digital and back-up training must go hand-in-hand.
Addressed Back-up analysis must become part of the mindset of
Back-Up as___ decision makers from conceptualization of digital
a Significant systems through implementation. Back-up
Training consideration must be integrated into:
Issue e Procurement and development processes
e Doctrine development

e Task analysis (individual and collective)--See the
example of back-up requirements analysis for the
M1A2 in Application A

e Training development

4 Edwards, O. T, III (May-June 1995). “Digital battlefield training and insights of a user (NTC Rotation 94-07).”
Armor, p. 13.



Training
Development Is

Outpaced by Digital

Systems
Development

"we can't decide

to buy a sys tem

for a 20-year life
span because the

hardware and

software turnover.
is at 20 times the

20-year life
Span."

COL ‘Tom Metz

A dominant characteristic of information age technology is how
rapidly it changes. Hardware and software are evolving at a pace
heretofore unknown in the military equipment and systems acquisition
cycle. Colonel Tom Metz from the TRADOC Experimental Force
(EXFOR) Coordination Cell stated it most clearly: “In the industrial
age you were able to describe an end state, and over a long period of
time you were able to achieve it in a very sequential way. In the
information age, on the other hand, you don’t necessarily know what
the end state will be because you’re learning so much through the
process. We can’t decide to buy a system for a 20-year life span
because the hardware and software turnover is at 20 times the 20-year
life span.”*

The development of training for new systems is currently dependent
on the Army Life Cycle Model (LCM), which “. . . outlines the life
cycle of the Army acquisition system and materiel concept
investigation, through development and acquisition, until ultimate
phase out and disposal. Materiel acquisition initiates training
requirements.”* This acquisition model is based on a series of discrete
and sequential steps that culminate with a final, fielded product.
Throughout the acquisition process, TRADOC proponents are
responsible for ensuring that training developers provide input and
that the input is considered early in the acquisition cycle. This process
implies a fixed endpoint in acquisition. However, the time-consuming
process of “bending metal” is no longer necessary to change the
functionality of a system. New software alters system capabilities,

and in turn training requirements, in a fraction of the time required to
manufacture a system in the industrial age. The fixed endpoint of
acquisition is being replaced by one of continuous development. The
LCM cannot accommodate the fast-paced, continually changing
environment of digital technology.

Compounding compressed development times is the fact that
programs that have been put in place to maximize performance of
soldier-machine systems, such as Manpower and Personnel
Integration (MANPRINT), are not always being utilized
appropriately. Proponent agency training developers are supposed to
“be involved in the training aspects of MANPRINT during systems
development.” Yet, many times these requirements are waived and
compromised for new systems to be developed rapidly on tight
budgets.

5 TRADOC News Service (4 March 1997). Release No.: 97-03-02, Author: J. Caldwell, Ft Monroe, VA.
© Department of the Army (24 September 1995). TRADOC Regulation 350-70, Fort Monroe, VA, p. IV-3-3.

7 ibid.



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (from. . . to)
August 1998 Final August 1996 - May 1998
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER
Issues and Recommendations: Training the Digital Force DASW01-94-D-0011
5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
465803
6. AUTHOR(S) 5c. PROJECT NUMBER
Roy Campbell, Laura Ford, Michael Shaler, and Robert Cobb D730
5d. TASK NUMBER
2135
Se, WORK UNIT NUMBER
HO1
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO)
66 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 400
Alexandria, VA 22314
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 140. MONITOR ACRONYM
USS. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral
and Social Sciences ARI
ATTN: TAPC-ARL-IK 11, MONITOR REPORT NUMBER
5001 Eisenhower Avenue :
Alexandria, VA_22333-5600 Study Report 98-06

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Contracting Officer’s Representative: Dr. Barbara Black

14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):

Digitization is the future of the Army. However, along with digitization come training and personnel implications. This
report discusses training issues associated with digitization, specifically those that address a need to train and maintain back-
up skills along with digital skills. Back-up skills are those needed by soldiers to operate when digital systems are degraded or
unavailable. Using the M1A2 Abrams Main Battle tank and M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle as exemplar systems, the study
explores issues that are applicable to a wide range of digital applications and training conditions. The study employed a series
of expert groups to define issues and formulate recommendations. These groups included users, developers, researchers, and
trainers with a wide spectrum of experience and viewpoints. The results are 15 primary issues and accompanying
recommendations that are selected for presentation in this report. The issues selected are those that warrant high level Army
attention.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
digital, digitization, back-up, unit training, institutional training, self-development training, skill decay, MI1A2, M2A3,
expert groups

=

19. LIMITATION OF | 20. NUMBER 21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON
ABSTRACT OF PAGES (Name and Telephone Number)
16. REPORT 17. ABSTRACT | 18. THIS PAGE Dr. Barbara Black, DSN 464-3450
Unclassified | Unclassified | Unclassified | Unlimited 51



ISSUE: Effects of
Distance
Learning on

the Army Are
Largely
Unknown

© Who will maintain the database (i.e., central database or
proponent database)?

e How will student participation and evaluation be measured?
© What is the feasibility of updates for different media?

e How will the Army evaluate whether distance learning
accommodates different types of learners (e.g., computer
literate or not)?

e How will soldiers be motivated to use distance learning?

© How much time does it take to convert existing training
materials to distance learning training?

e Is distance learning as effective as conventional training?

e How will updates to the distance learning programs be
implemented?

RECOMMENDATION:

Conduct a thorough assessment of distance learning
implications:

e Include pilot trials to determine effectiveness of
distance learning for different skills training.

e Establish and enforce the policy that distance
learning decisions will be based on demonstrated
training effectiveness in meeting standards and on
cost savings.

Effects of Skill Decay
on Digital and Back-
Up Tasks Are
Unknown

A research area with a high potential for payback concerns the skill
decay characteristics of military tasks. While there have been some
advances made in this area,” there are significant explorations that
need to be undertaken. The potential for application is immense: If
sustainment and retraining of tasks were based on known factors and
conditions of decay and performance, the savings in training
efficiencies would be significant." Moreover, the impact of skill
decay on combat effectiveness and mission accomplishment is
incalculable. There is currently inadequate information on which to

20 Wisher, R. A., Sabol, M. A., Sukenik, H. K., & Kern, R. P. (June 1991). Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Call-
up: Skill Decay (ARI Research Report 1595). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences.

21 “PRACTICE: The Foundation of Training” (Spring 1995). ARI Newsletter, pp. 9-10.

29



Institutional
Issues

The system of service schools and proponents that evolved during the
40 years of cold war (and is embodied in the current TRADOC
organization) served well a large, industrial age Army with a relatively
clear strategic mission. Mainly because of resource constraints, that
system is in the process of being dismantled and its mission redefined.
What will emerge is not yet clear; much will be driven by changes in
other spheres. There are two distinct digital and back-up issues that
are identified with the institutional role in training soldiers.

Resident Instruction
Must Address Digital
and Back-Up
Training
Requirements

Computer skiTITs

| training and

understanding of
systems wi LT
become a
component. of.

= being a soldier.

Just as resources are getting tighter, the Army is faced with increasing
training demands generated by the advances in digitization. The
transition to digital operations will be characterized by an assortment
of digital, part-digital, and non-digital equipment. Rapid changes in
technology also compound the institutions' instructional role. Since
many institutional courses are traditionally equipment oriented,
TRADOC must re-look the way it prepares its soldiers. Teaching
multiple systems is an inefficient and expensive approach to the
problem. Given that resources, particularly time, are an ever precious
commodity, institutions must carefully analyze their missions and
capabilities and determine how digital and back-up training will best
take place.

The typical approach to specialized training needs has been to add
institutional courses that deliver the required training. An example is
the 40-hour add-on course for the M1A2 at skill level (SL) 1. While
this course has fulfilled a very vital role in preparing soldiers to go to
MIA2 units, it may not be the most responsive way to address unit
needs for entry level soldiers. And add-on courses for low density
systems are not a very cost-effective way to train soldiers. Unit
training may be an alternative for all or part of this training.

At the same time, there are roles that only the institution can fulfill.
Key aspects of “soldierization” can only be effectively instilled in
individuals in the atmosphere of resident instruction. Many simulators
and training devices only become cost-effective when they are
centralized in high-use locations, rather than when they are dispersed
and ineffectively utilized.

Computer skills training and understanding of systems will soon
become a fundamental component of being a soldier. There is an
underlying assumption that everyone under the age of 25 has these
skills, but that may not prove to be the case. Increasingly, the

7



U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

A Directorate of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director

Research accomplished under contract
for the Department of the Army

Human Resources Research Organization
Technical Review by

Margaret S. Salter
Carl W. Lickteig

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this Study Report has been made by ARI.
Please address correspondence concerning distribution of reports to: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Attn: TAPC-ARI-PO, 5001
Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-5600.

FINAL DISPOSITION: This Study Report may be destroyed when it is no longer
needed. Please do not return it to the U.S. Army Research for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences.

NOTE: The findings in this Study Report are not to be construed as an official
Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.



Where does the training for digital and back-up requirements fit into
this merging training structure? The total impact of digital and back-
up training requirements has not yet been fully felt, because
digitization currently affects only a small part of the force and because
some training requirements are not yet addressed (e.g., back-up
requirements). But digital and back-up requirements must be included
in any realignment of training responsibilities.

ISSUE: Therels RECOMMENDATION:
No In-Depth
Planto Develop a detailed plan for digital and back-up training
Integrate the __ that establishes policies and procedures for integrating
Training self development, unit, and institutional segments of
Pillars training. Such a plan must:
e Establish authority and responsibility.
Ensure compatibility between efforts.
e Require that the impact of transferring training
from one pillar to another is evaluated.
e Direct that training effectiveness be the primary
criterion for allocation of training.
e@ Maximize the use of electronic media.
There Is No Self-development is continuously cited as an integral part of the Force

Comprehensive Self -
Development Plan

untTl the Army.
defines the role
of self-
development. . .
any plans to
take self-
development
beyond its
current state
cannot succeed.

XXI training program and is specifically projected as a way for
soldiers to acquire and maintain digital and back-up skills. However,
the concept is undeveloped. There is no plan detailing how self-
development training initiatives will be developed, implemented, or
evaluated. The ADLP contains few references to self-development.
For example, it states that “WARRIOR XXI is the institutional and
self-development component of AT XXI” and that the “. . . (student)
group consists of soldiers voluntarily pursuing self-development
training and education.” '” But there is no overarching strategy that
specifies how this will work.

Historically, the Army’s self-development pillar has not been robust.
It consists of primarily independent, proponent-specific
correspondence course programs, a reading list for junior officers,
and a broad blanket inclusion of civilian education pursuits facilitated
by Army endorsements and accessibility. The Army Correspondence

1” Department of the Army (3 April 1996). Army Distance Learning Plan. Fort Monroe, VA: Training
Development and Analysis Directorate, paras. 1-9, 2-5.

25



METHODOLOGY

Study Method

Figure 2. The study
method.

To determine the effects of digitization on training, the study used
two approaches: examination of existing program documentation and
collection of input from experts. Figure 2 illustrates the methodology
that was used. The process is described in detail below.

Document ss

anaes \ | Sty

Current

Training pat
Groups

Programs

[Review end Monitor Literature and Publications >

Defining how digitization affects training the force necessitated an
assessment of needs and the capabilities of the existing training base,
and the identification of new skill requirements for all levels of
performance.

The existing armor and infantry training bases were examined to see if
means and resources (existing and projected) are adequate to support
both digital and back-up training requirements. This process included
documentation of the present training programs for soldiers and
leaders; a thorough review of existing M1A2 digital tasks, both
individual and collective; and an analysis of the back-up requirements,
individual and collective, that are necessary when M1A2 digital
systems cannot be fully utilized.

Throughout this study current literature and publications were
reviewed. Topics monitored included Army training, future plans
(e.g., ADLP), digital experiments (e.g., AWEs), and additional digital
system developments. Several issues and problem areas were
identified as a result of these reviews.

However, the majority of the discussion points in this report focus on
strategic level digital and back-up training issues. These issues were
identified in the course of expert group discussions involving
individuals who were in, or had recently been in, positions closely
affiliated with digital training. Two such groups of experts were

34



Program M ager ar id TRADOC Systems Menge: for
ofa Commander's Integrated Traini

CITT Features

The CITT is intended to enable commanders and unit trainers to make optimal use of CCTT.
By means of PC-based or Internet-based tools, CITT will assist users in five ways:

14 Provide a gateway to CCTT information, including descriptions of CCTT functions and
capabilities and access to PC-based training on CCTT workstations and manned
modules

2 Provide a reference library of available exercises and associated TSPs that contains:
Identification of target training audience and specific tasks trained with each exercise
Specifications of time and support (personnel) requirements for each exercise
Description of the mission and major events contained in each exercise

Methods for downloading an appropriately configured TSP for conducting selected
exercises

3 Provide methods for making modifications to existing exercises and associated TSPs:
@ Make “search-and-replace” changes to tailor unit designations, times, call signs, etc.

e Assist the user to keep the TSP materials internally consistent by pointing out or
flagging components that are affected by changes in locations, sectors, task
organization, etc.

4 Provide guides and “wizards” to assist users in preparing new exercises and TSPs, with
the ability to use selected components of existing TSPs as appropriate

5 Provide information to trainers on using CCTT for digital training

Application C: A model of an exportable tool that allows unit trainers to utilize existing training
exercises or tailor exercises according to specific training needs.

20



CN -

Environment,
Restrictions,
and Parameters

The recommendations resulting from this study were developed and
refined with regard for the parameters within which the Army must
operate--now and in the near future. While Army resources are
decreasing and military and civilian personnel are being downsized,
training requirements are increasing; technologies are changing
rapidly and units are being deployed to increasingly complex
operating environments.

The impact of these factors on the Army results in the requirement to
do more with less. Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC)
institutions are facing, and may continue to face, sizable cuts in their
training resources. Units are likewise confronted with increasing
operational commitments and decreasing training resources.

The contributors to this study were cognizant of such real life
constraints throughout. Solutions requiring high dollar expenditures,
increases in manpower levels, or inordinate time requirements were
considered unsuitable and unrealistic.

oe
Report
Organization

This report summarizes an effort that explored many facets ofa
complex problem. It is intended to provoke thought, discussion, and
activity. Fifteen issues and corresponding recommendations are
presented under the following five topic headings:

@ Operational Concepts and Development Issues
Institutional Issues

Unit Issues
Training Pillar Issues

Strategic Analysis Issues

These issues and recommendations are followed by a summary of the
study conclusions and a description of the study methodology.



171-126-1130

Digital
performance
requirements:

Digital systems
used:*

Back-up
requirements:

(POS/NAV).

2 Intervehicular Information System (IVIS), Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV),
Driver’s Integrated Display (DID), Gunner's Control Display Panel (GCDP), Position Navigation

Individual/Crew--M1A2 Task

Send and Receive Tactical Reports/Overlays on the Commander's
Integrated Display (CID)

| The CID and Intervehicular Information System (VIS) are used to

ion Lightweight GPS | Receiver (PLGR)
inoperable digital teports/overlays can
igitally nor. can they b ceived.

126-1042 Prepare < a Sketch Rang
01-5700.01-0001 Communicate on a Tactical Radio
051-196-3009 Prepare a Route Reconnaissance Ov

id Coordinates

301-348-1050 Report Information of Potential |

Application A: Detailed example of back-up training requirements analysis recommended for all
digital tasks.