U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

40–697 PDF 2008

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE’S REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL 

PROTECTIVE SERVICE: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 

(110–96) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 8, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

VACANCY 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia, Chairwoman 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania, 

Vice Chair 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Goldstein, Mark L., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Government Accountability Office ................................................................................................ 3 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Altmire, Hon. Jason, of Pennsylvania .................................................................... 27 

Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, of the District of Columbia ................................. 28 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Goldstein, Mark L. ................................................................................................... 31 

vi 


40697.001
vii 


40697.002
viii 


40697.003
ix 


40697.004
x 


40697.005
(1) 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE’S 

REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE 

SERVICE: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 

Friday, February 8, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC

BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:15 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton 

[Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Ms. NORTON. Good morning. I am pleased to welcome Mark Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues at the Government 

Accountability Office, or GAO, here this morning. Mr. Goldstein 

has been a frequent witness in this Subcommittee’s hearings over 

the years, providing valuable testimony on a wide range of infrastructure and similar issues. 

This hearing was scheduled because the GAO provided the Subcommittee serious preliminary findings concerning the condition of 

the Federal Protective Service, which is charged with providing security and public safety protection to one million Federal employees. 

The GAO has concluded that FPS has deteriorated so substantially that difficulties, and here I am quoting, may expose Federal 

facilities to greater risk of crime or terrorist attack. The GAO backs 

up this conclusion with documentation, much of which we found 

shocking. The Subcommittee believes, therefore, that the preliminary report should be placed on record at a public hearing. 

In considering what the GAO has reported, we have to be mindful that Federal facilities where Federal employees work, particularly the Pentagon and the Oklahoma City Federal Building, have 

been major sites for terrorist attacks in this country. One of the 9/ 

11 planes struck the Pentagon and that became part of the worst 

terrorist disaster in our history. Federal facilities are symbols of 

the government that the terrorists want to bring down. We cannot 

forget that, in addition to Federal employees, millions of Americans 

frequent Federal facilities and depend on the FPS for protection 

against crime as well as terrorism. 

Security officials report that Federal buildings remain targets 

today. The documented history of terrorist assaults on Federal assets and the continuing threat requires high levels of vigilance to 

protect employees and visitors. The Congress has understood the 

2 

need for bolstering police protection provided in the Capitol complex by the Capitol Police would not want to underestimate the importance of attention to other Federal employees. 

Nearly a year ago, on February 13, 2007, Chairman Jim Oberstar and I sent a letter to GAO asking that GAO review how the 

scope and mission of the FPS had been affected since its transfer 

from the General Services Administration, or GSA, to the Department of Homeland Security, DHS. In addition, we asked the GAO 

to review the Federal Protective Service budget and FTE levels to 

determine if they were adequate to support the newly transformed 

FPS, which has been converted to become an inspector-based workforce instead of the protection or police agency it was when it was 

absorbed into DHS. 

Both Chairman Oberstar and Ranking Member Mica have expressed their concerns about the gravity of changes and the wisdom of pursuing the radically new policy of replacing protection 

with inspection. We asked for a comparison of experienced workforce size, retention rates, salaries, and other issues from the time 

when FPS was within GSA to now when the agency was located 

within DHS. We were looking for before and after comparison. The 

Chairman and I raised serious concerns regarding whether the effectiveness of the FPS has been compromised since its placement 

inside the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, even 

earlier, 2 years ago. 

On February 11, 2005, we wrote to the DHS Inspector General 

regarding the use of funds transferred by GSA to DHS to support 

the FPS, the Federal Protective Service. We wanted to ensure that 

DHS was in compliance with the Homeland Security Act that requires that any GSA rents and fees transferred to DHS be used 

solely for the protection of buildings and grounds owned or occupied by the Federal Government. The IG determined there was no 

particular violation of the Act then, but that the potential for violation existed and recommended that DHS and ICE identify a source 

of funds for FPS administrative costs. To the best of our knowledge, this recommendation has not been acted upon either by ICE 

or DHS. 

Later that year in June 2005, we wrote again because of increasing evidence that the placement of FPS within the ICE division 

had negatively affected the institutional integrity and law enforcement mission of the FPS. We were concerned that the separate 

funding source for FPS and its regional office command structure 

and mission were not aligned coherently with the ICE structure. 

We expressed our concern that the Department was not realizing 

the cooperation and potential savings expected after the creation of 

DHS and the placement of the Federal Protective Service in DHS. 

Yet another indication of our workforce concern was expressed in 

our letter to the Appropriations Committee on November 2, 2007, 

requesting that a minimum number of 1,200 FPS employees be required. This language was included in the appropriations. 

Most recently, at a hearing on April 18, 2007, the Subcommittee 

examined a still particularly troubling FPS proposal to drastically 

reduce FPS officers across the Nation, including providing no FPS 

officers in almost 50 cities. The Deputy Secretary of DHS then at 

the time, Michael Jackson, indicated in response to questions that 

3 

he would pursue memoranda of understandings, or MOUs, with 

these jurisdictions to make up for the absence of Federal police officers. 

In fact, in staff briefings, DHS claimed to have in the works 

about 31 MOUs with city and local agencies. The fiscal year 2008 

FPS budget called for no FPS officers in certain cities and said 

that, ′′local police support, was expected to act as a ’backstop’ for 

securing Federal facilities.′′ 

At the time, I noted my concern that local police jurisdictions 

have little reason to volunteer to assume unfunded mandates to 

protect Federal sites, particularly at the same time that local police 

departments were facing cuts in Federal programs to aid police departments. 

Today it is fair to ask, with whom have the MOUs been signed? 

What incentives have been identified for local police jurisdictions to 

take on the added burden of protecting Federal facilities in addition to their responsibilities for local law enforcement? We must 

ask as well whether we are seeing a slow disintegration of a workforce that has had a reputation as a highly effective and motivated 

police force, providing a valuable service to the Federal Government and its taxpayers. Are we witnessing the same disintegration 

of the FPS that occurred when FEMA was no longer an independent agency but became a part of DHS? 

Congress cannot afford to wait for an FPS debacle patterned on 

the decline and fall of FEMA. A primary lesson from the Katrina 

tragedy which shook DHS to its core was unprofessional staffing. 

We hold this hearing today to help us learn from our history and 

not to repeat it. 

I thank GAO for preparing testimony today and again welcome 

Mr. Goldstein and his colleagues. The Ranking Member regrets 

that he could not be here this morning. He has indicated he would 

want to submit a statement for the record. So ordered. 

Mr. Goldstein, we are prepared to receive your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MARK GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 

OFFICE 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. We are pleased to be 

here today to discuss the efforts of the Federal Protective Service 

in protecting Federal employees, the public, and Federal facilities. 

As you know in 2003, FPS was transferred from the General 

Services Administration to the Department of Homeland Security, 

and is currently tasked with providing physical security and law 

enforcement services to about 8,800 facilities owned or leased by 

GSA. 

Within DHS, FPS is part of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement component, ICE, the largest investigative arm of DHS. 

To accomplish its facility protection missions, FPS currently has a 

workforce of about 1,100 employees and about 15,000 contract 

guards located throughout the country. 

While there has not been a large-scale attack on a domestic Federal facility since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 

the 1995 terrorist attack on the Oklahoma City Federal Building, 

it is important that FPS have sufficient resources and an effective 

4 

approach to protect the over 1 million employees of the Federal 

Government as well as members of the public that work in and 

visit Federal facilities from the risk of terrorist attack, crime, and 

related activities. 

This testimony provides preliminary information and analysis on, 

one, the extent to which FPS is fulfilling its mission to protect Federal employees and facilities; and, two, the management challenges 

that FPS faces. It is based on the preliminary results of our ongoing review of FPS, which we are doing at the request of this Subcommittee and several other Congressional Committees. 

To determine the extent to which FPS is fulfilling its facility protection mission and to identify the management challenges it faces, 

we analyzed FPS staffing data and we interviewed officers, inspectors, and administrators at headquarters and at six of FPS’s 11 regions. 

So far in our work we have interviewed more than 200 FPS employees. We also interviewed GSA, tenant agencies, and local police 

departments about FPS’s efforts to protect Federal employees, facilities, and the public. Due to the sensitivity of some of the information in this report, we cannot provide information about the specific locations of crime or other incidents that we discuss. 

My testimony makes the following points. Number one. First, 

due to staffing and operational issues, FPS is experiencing significant difficulties in fully meeting its mission. According to many 

FPS officials at regions we visited, these difficulties may expose 

Federal facilities to a greater risk of crime or terrorist attack. 

FPS’s workforce, including both operational and support personnel, 

has decreased by about 20 percent, from almost 1,400 in fiscal year 

2004 to about 1,100 at the end of fiscal year 2007. In fiscal year, 

2007 FPS had 756 inspectors and police officers responsible for law 

enforcement, and about 15,000 contract guards who were used primarily to monitor facilities through fixed post assignments and access control. 

FPS is also implementing a policy to change the composition of 

its workforce, as you mentioned, Madam Chair, whereby it will essentially eliminate the police officer position, and mainly utilize inspectors which have both physical security training and Federal 

law enforcement authority. According to FPS officials, this policy 

change will allow it to address longstanding challenges such as 

funding, and help ensure it has the right mix of staff to carry out 

its facility protection mission. 

One consequence of this change is that in many Federal facilities, FPS is not providing proactive patrol in and around Federal 

facilities in order to detect and prevent criminal incidents and terrorism-related activities before they occur. For example, at one location we visited, a deceased individual had been found in a vacant 

GSA facility that was not regularly patrolled by FPS. The deceased 

individual had been inside the building for approximately 3 months 

before the individual was found. And FPS did not find that individual; GSA found that individual. 

In addition, reports issued by multiple government agencies acknowledge the importance of proactive patrol in detecting and deterring terrorist surveillance teams which frequently use information such as the placement of armed guards in proximity to law enVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:10 May 04, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40697 JASON
5 

forcement agency stations when choosing targets and planning attacks. These sophisticated surveillance and research techniques can 

potentially be derailed by active law enforcement patrols in and 

around Federal facilities. 

Indeed, FPS has arrested individuals surveilling major government facilities. We note that FPS has also reduced its hours of operation in many locations and has not always maintained security 

countermeasures and equipment, such as security cameras, 

magnetometers, x-ray machines, radios, and building security assessment equipment at some facilities we visited, undermining protection of property and the deterrence of crime. 

Second, FPS continues to face several management challenges 

that many FPS officials say have hampered its ability to achieve 

its mission and increase the risk of criminal and terrorist activities 

on Federal employees, facilities, and members of the public. These 

include budgetary challenging, a lack of adequate contract guard 

oversight, and the absence of agreements with local police departments regarding response capabilities or jurisdictional issues at 

Federal facility. 

Historically, and recently, FPS revenues have not been sufficient 

to cover its operating costs. This revenue shortfall has been addressed in a variety of ways. For example, when FPS was located 

at GSA, it receives additional funding from the Federal Buildings 

Fund. These funds were not available after FPS was transferred to 

DHS, which caused FPS to experience a revenue shortfall and subsequently to implement cost-savings measures, as well as increase 

security fees charged to the tenants. 

For example, in fiscal year 2005, FPS faced a projected revenue shortfall of $70 million, and instituted cost savings measures that 

included restricted hiring and travel, limited training and overtime, and no employee performance awards. These measures have 

had a negative effect on staff morale and are partially responsible 

for FPS’s high attrition rates and could potentially impact the performance and safety of FPS personnel. 

Moreover, many FPS officials at regions we visited expressed 

concern about the adequacy of contract guard oversight and poor 

performance by some guards when responding to crimes and incidents at Federal facilities. For instance, more than 20 handguns 

were stolen out of one Federal Building with the assistance of a 

contract guard; and, a law enforcement surveillance trailer worth 

half a million dollars was stolen from a Federal parking lot while 

guards watching through video cameras appeared to do nothing to 

stop the theft or even report it. 

FPS has stated before this Committee and elsewhere that it is 

a covering facility protection gaps through increased reliance on 

local law enforcement. However, FPS acknowledged to us that it 

has not signed any agreements with local law enforcement agencies 

to assure local assistance or to resolve jurisdictional issues which 

could authorize local police to respond to incidents at Federal facilities. Also, local law enforcement officials in most of the cities we 

visited said that, regardless of FPS’s intentions, they do not have 

the capacity to respond to calls for service at Federal facilities, and 

would not sign agreements that would require them to take on additional responsibility. Moreover, officials at multiple local police 

6 

departments said they were not aware of FPS’s operational challenges or expected reliance on their services. 

As stated, our results are preliminary. We plan to provide this 

Subcommittee with our complete evaluation and a final report on 

FPS’s facility protection efforts in May 2008. We plan to begin our 

review of FPS’s contract guard program as requested by this Subcommittee and other congressional Committee in the near future. 

Finally, I want to recognize the assistance of the Federal Protective Service and its director, who were extremely helpful to GAO, 

in setting up dozens of interviews that allowed us to meet more 

than 200 police officers or inspectors, who everyday defy obstacles 

to protect the property and people of the Federal Government. 

This concludes our testimony, and we are pleased to answer any 

questions that you may have. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Goldstein. 

Some of that testimony is pretty hair-raising, and it inclines me 

to want to know, whether do you think the conditions you found, 

if you could elaborate on the percentage of facilities you have been 

able to visit so far and whether you think these are national concerns? I would be interested in your view of the State of the Federal Protective Service and the National Capital region, where 

about half of the Federal presence is located as well. But first, nationwide. How typical? Then the National Capital region. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Sure. I would be happy to respond. It is not possible for us to say that this is universal based on our visits, of 

course. But I must say that, in every region and in every city and 

every place that we visited, these concerns were raised. And the examples I have talked about are just a few. I would briefly provide 

a couple more for you for the record. 

Regarding issues of response time; there was a suicide in a Federal building, but FPS first had to ask for overtime authorization 

before they could respond to the event. 

Ms. NORTON. Would you elaborate on that? There was a suicide 

that occurred during working hours, after working hours? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It was basically at closing time, is our understanding. And the Federal Protective Service these days only tends 

to work regular business hours during the week. 

Ms. NORTON. You are telling me that if there is an emergency 

of some kind, that somebody has to give a police officer permission 

to use overtime to go to the emergency when he is supposed to go 

home? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The Mega Center or some other FPS officer must 

first ensure that there is an overtime authorization if those individuals have already worked their hours. That is correct. And it affects response time. 

Ms. NORTON. Is it your understanding that Federal police officers, who are the equivalent of police officers in a city, they are 

peace officers, had to have permission, overtime permission in 

order to answer such calls in the past? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Just in recent years. In previous years, when 

there was more sufficient budget and when there were more officers, this is not an issue. But we have heard about this kind of an 

issue in many places. It has occurred with respect to demonstrations, where demonstrations which were public demonstrations at 

7 

Federal facilities that were going on longer than anticipated, officers, because their shift was over, were instructed to leave. Authorization had to first be obtained before they could remain any 

longer. Yes. This is very much an issue. 

Ms. NORTON. So suppose there is an emergency. Particularly 

given what you have described as a diminishing workforce if there 

is an emergency, and there is no overtime authorization, what is 

the peace officer supposed to do, the Federal Protective Service officer supposed to do in the event of an emergency? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, the likelihood is there would not be an officer present at that point. In most facilities, particularly evenings 

and weekends, there are no Federal officers present. And generally, 

because of the reduction in the number of officers generally, FPS 

officers have to often travel great distances to oversee the buildings 

that they are responsible for and to oversee the contract guards 

they have, as much as 5 hours away. Responses can be hours late, 

they can be days late. In many instances, FPS officers and inspectors live in adjoining states to the buildings they are responsible 

for if they have a large area. 

Ms. NORTON. Are there facilities where only security guards are 

available, and they would have to call a peace officer or Federal 

Protective Service officer? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am. All the time. 

Ms. NORTON. So there are facilities where there are only security 

guards? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. There are 8,800 Federal buildings, and only 260 Federal police officers, 570 odd inspectors. [Subsequent to hearing, edited to read: 215 Federal police officers, 541 

inspectors.] So, yes, there are absolutely many Federal buildings 

without any officer present on a regular basis. They need to come 

from either adjacent buildings or often farther away. As our testimony indicates, there was an example recently in which an inspector retired some 6 months ago. His 70 facilities have yet to be reassigned, so the contract guards in those 70 buildings are without 

any supervision. 

Ms. NORTON. Would you describe what the authority of a security 

guard is. If a security guard sees a crime, if a security guard has 

an emergency; what is the difference between what the security 

guard can do and what the FPS officer can do? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Sure. Most contract guards are very limited in 

their responsibilities. They can monitor facilities, mostly through 

fixed post assignments. There are a few roving assignments, but 

most are fixed posts. 

Ms. NORTON. Does that mean the security guards do not patrol? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. It is very limited. There are 

some limited perimeter patrols, but it is quite limited. Mostly it is 

fixed patrol. Often they may stand right outside a major entryway 

to observe. But, for the most part, they do not have any capability 

to patrol the perimeter and to be proactive in trying to determine 

threats to a facility. 

Ms. NORTON. So if there were only security guards present at a 

particular facility, does that mean there would be no proactive patrolling whatsoever going on? 

8 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. If FPS follows through on their 

program to essentially reduce and eliminate the patrol officer on 

the function of the proactive patrol. 

Ms. NORTON. You say, have eliminate. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It has been eliminated in almost all places already, for all intents and purposes. 

Ms. NORTON. So where they have been eliminated, where there 

is not an FPS officer on duty, then there is no proactive patrolling 

whatsoever? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. And that would be what percentage of buildings do 

you think in the United States? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I don’t know the actual number, but it is virtually all. 

Ms. NORTON. Would you have an idea what kind of buildings the 

FPS, the universal buildings, the cross-section of buildings where 

FPS officers would generally have been assigned? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Most of the facilities that FPS would still be 

using for proactive patrolling would be the highest level, what they 

deem the highest level threats, what are called Level 4 buildings, 

where you have the most number of Federal employees, the most 

number of people in the public coming in and out, agencies of the 

government that are sort of more sensitive than others like law enforcement agencies, that sort of a thing, and major urban areas. 

That is where you would find any remnants of proactive patrol occurring. 

Ms. NORTON. What is the proportion of inspectors to Federal Protective Service? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. To police officers? 

Ms. NORTON. Police officers. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. And I have that figure. There are currently 541 

inspectors and 215 officers as of the end of fiscal 2007. 

Ms. NORTON. 513—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. 541 inspectors, 215 officers. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, these inspectors are all police officers as well? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am. But their duties are much greater. 

Ms. NORTON. Were these people doing police work before the inspector notion entered the equation? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, they were. 

Ms. NORTON. So that means we have 541? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. And they still do some police work. 

Ms. NORTON. What do they do? What proportion of their work 

is—first of all, I am going to, at some point, after this question, ask 

you to describe what an inspector who is from the Federal Protective Service does. But what, how much of the work of the inspector, 

since the inspector is an officer, how much, what portion of the 

work is inspection and what proportion is normal or traditional police work? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I can answer both this question and the next 

probably together. I think it would be helpful to you. 

Inspectors have the following responsibilities: They have to oversee the contract guards; they have to do the building security assessments for all the buildings that they are responsible for; they 

are the contracting officer technical representatives for all the conVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:10 May 04, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40697 JASON
9 

tract guard programs; they do have law enforcement response; they 

have to handle criminal investigations; they collect contract guard 

time cards; and they are the folks who also work with the building 

security committees, which are the groups of tenants inside buildings who help make decisions about security arrangement. 

And, most of the time—and there are also the K-9 officers in 

many instances as well handling the dogs that do bomb sniffing 

and the like. But most of their time is spent doing building security 

assessments and handling, increasingly, their roles as contracting 

officer technical representatives, which used to be a function but 

that function no longer exists and now it is their responsibility. 

Ms. NORTON. That sounds like an administrative function, some 

of it. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It is, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. So these peace officers are doing mostly administrative work? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Both the officers and the inspectors in the field 

had very serious concerns about the role of the inspector to be able 

to get out and into the field and to assist as backup or to assist 

in emergencies, and to do anything other than, frankly, do a lot of 

paperwork behind their desk. And that was raised in multiple 

interviews that we had. 

Ms. NORTON. I am having a hard time understanding what an 

inspector does. You go around inspecting for what? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Their principal responsibility is for the building 

security assessments. They all within their purview have to do on 

a regular basis review the security issues within the buildings they 

have. So if an inspector has 70 buildings or 100 buildings, they are 

responsible for going to those buildings and doing in-depth review 

on a regular basis. Depending on the level of the building, there 

is a requirement that that building be reassessed on either a 1-year 

or 4-year period. It is a pretty regular cycle. But these are relatively difficult to do because they are involving a lot of different 

parameters in terms of understanding countermeasures, lighting, 

posts, and the kinds of threats that occur at these buildings. 

One of the concerns we have heard is that, because of the overwhelming responsibilities now being pushed on to these inspectors, 

that both the quality of the building security assessments and the 

time that they are taking to complete them have been impacted. 

And I know of at least one agency that has actually gone out and 

asked the Army Corps of Engineers to redo their building security 

assessment because they were not happy with the assessment done 

by the Federal Protective Service. 

Ms. NORTON. If they are looking to make sure that the building 

is secure, I note in your testimony, I am quoting from your testimony, ′′had not always maintained security countermeasures and 

equipment, such as security cameras, magnetometers, x-ray machines, radios, and building security assessment equipment.′′ Now, 

if you are not going to have proactive patrolling, you would think 

at the very least these inspectors would make sure all their cameras are working and all the radios and other alternative security 

devices, alternative to perhaps some patrolling in place. When you 

say have not always maintained these, did you find that these camVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:10 May 04, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40697 JASON
10 

eras and other devices were often not working, or were they in 

working order most of the time? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We found in a number of instances that some 

measure of these countermeasures were not working. We found at 

one very large Federal building that, of 150 cameras, only 11 of 

them had the capability to record. We had another very large Federal building—— 

Ms. NORTON. Wait a minute. 150 cameras throughout the building? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. 

Ms. NORTON. And 11 were—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Were in fully functioning working order at one 

of the largest Federal buildings in the United States. 

Ms. NORTON. What would have been the reason for that, Mr. 

Goldstein? Would it have been inspection? Would it have been lack 

of funding? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Principally, a lack of funding, according to FPS, 

to fix them. 

Ms. NORTON. So FPS has reduced patrols. And what might be at 

least some kind of helpful a alternative, which is at least have cameras throughout the building, also don’t work in many instances. Is 

that your testimony? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am. We found another large Federal 

building that, while they had some cameras in place, they had decided it was not a sufficient number and they ordered a lot more 

cameras. And those cameras had, until very recently, been sitting 

in boxes for 5 years because there were not the funds to finish the 

enhancement program. 

Ms. NORTON. They were sitting in boxes for 5 years for what reason? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Because there were not funds to complete the 

program. 

Ms. NORTON. You mean they were delivered? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. They were delivered and not installed. 

Ms. NORTON. There weren’t the funds to get them installed? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is what we understand. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. Because you have to have somebody who knows 

how to install them to do it, and you have to pay them. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. And connect them to the rest of the system and 

ensure that they work. And they were sitting in boxes for a number 

of years. I might add, if I may, ma’am, that in many instances, the 

absence of these kinds of countermeasures like cameras, have prevented the FPS from investigating crime on Federal property. 

There are a number of places where crimes have occurred. Laptops 

are frequently being stolen out of Federal buildings. 

There is one Federal building where two 42-inch plasma television screens were removed from a Federal building. And I mentioned the incident earlier with the handguns that were taken. It 

was very difficult in many instances, and in some impossible, for 

FPS to investigate these crimes because there were no cameras 

working that recorded the thefts. 

Ms. NORTON. If FPS is reducing its workforce, does it mean that 

it is no longer recruiting officers. 

11 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We were told in many of the regions we went to 

that they have not been replacing people. They have not—they are 

not replacing people. I mentioned, for instance, the inspector who 

was retired some 6 months ago, and his 70 buildings have been 

just sitting out there for the last 6 months with no real oversight. 

They are not replacing people. We have heard that all over the 

agency. And there is an incredible amount of turnover. Here, in the 

National Capital region, there had been, in the last 16 months, 

there have been five regional directors of the National Capital region. 

Ms. NORTON. Five regional directors within the last how many 

months? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Roughly, 14 months. 

Ms. NORTON. So, let me ask you this. A Federal police officer who 

has had training, where are Federal police officers trained? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, recently the FPS has had no money for 

training. So they have not been training, except for very basic 

kinds of things. And they have had no money to travel, so they 

have done it right in their own offices. 

Ms. NORTON. So when was the last time there was a recruiting 

class? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I am not certain of that. I will provide that for 

the record. 

Ms. NORTON. As people retire, they are not being replaced? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. And when it comes to the police 

officer corps, they are—in many instances, we heard many stories 

that they had been actively ushered out, where the agencies is encouraging them. There are high level agency executives who have 

said, there is no future for you. We are getting rid of the police 

force. If you plan to stay at FPS, you must become an inspector. 

Otherwise, you should leave. 

Ms. NORTON. So your testimony is that you believe the intention 

of DHS, the security agency, the place to which the Federal Protective Force was transferred in order to enhance security of Federal 

agencies intends to not only reduce but eliminate the police force 

that was to be the security force. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. They plan to transform it into this inspectorbased approach and, yes, eliminate police officers per se. 

Ms. NORTON. The fact that the inspectors have police power is 

like saying that a line officer in a police department that sits at 

a desk has police power. Yes, but he is not expected to go out and 

patrol; he doesn’t do duty, and he is there to be an administrator. 

Certainly his police background is important for his work. But, of 

course, people who work in these buildings believe that they are 

being protected by people who are armed police officers. 

The vacant facility, the vacant GSA facility not regularly patrolled by FPS, so much so that a dead body was found that you 

believe had been, was it three months? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am. Three months. 

Ms. NORTON. And it wasn’t found by the FPS. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It was found by GSA, because it was a vacant 

building that GSA was trying to sell and GSA went into the building with a prospective buyer and apparently maybe literally stumbled on the body. But they are the ones who found it, not FPS. 

12 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I just want to say for the record, I would be 

the last one to say we ought to patrol a vacant building the way 

you do other buildings. But your testimony seems to be that this 

is a building that would never been patrolled. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. It is my understanding that GSA 

was paying for that building. 

Ms. NORTON. GSA was paying for the building? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. In terms of its fees to FPS, that included that 

building. 

Ms. NORTON. One doesn’t have to live in a big city to know who 

vacant buildings draw, what kinds of squatters and even thugs and 

others are drawn to vacant buildings. So that while one wouldn’t 

be patrolling in the same way you would a building where people 

are working, the notion of not patrolling them at all would be very, 

very troubling. And then it took a fire to get anybody to look at the 

building at all. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. And as an interesting add-on, ma’am. With that 

building, and this gets to the staff reduction problem, when FPS 

did respond to the dead body in this facility, they used their entire 

staff in the city to respond. They had so few people on patrol at 

the time that in responding to one incident like that, it took all the 

people they had. 

Ms. NORTON. I mean, this is a dead body. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I am not sure why. But it raises the staffing concerns that we have so shorthanded. 

Ms. NORTON. Because in order to respond to this building where 

they found a dead body, the FPS pulled people from where? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. From the entire city. And so the other places 

that they protect in this particular city were unprotected. 

Ms. NORTON. That brings me to a question on management of 

the Federal Protective Service. If you have a dwindling number of 

police officers, is there the capability to manage the police part of 

the force at this point? Your testimony that you pull everybody 

from where there are live bodies to where there is one dead body 

leads me to that question. Who is, in fact, trying to manage such 

a small police force who has jurisdiction over so many Federal facilities? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. You raise a good point, because it is interesting. 

We look back at the record. Back in 1976, the Federal Protective 

Service had 5,000 police officers, no less the rest of their staff. 

Ms. NORTON. When? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. 1976. 

Ms. NORTON. Had—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. 5,000 police officers. 

Ms. NORTON. That is pure peace officers? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. 

Ms. NORTON. That is—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. As opposed to the 215 today. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, are there more Federal facilities today than 

there were in 1976? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Certainly. 

Ms. NORTON. Many more? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I don’t know the actual number more. 

13 

Ms. NORTON. In your final report, you will include the number 

of buildings where normally there would be FPS presence and the 

increase, since that time along with the 5,000 to 215. And, if I may 

say so, post 9/11. And we are talking about the Department of 

Homeland Security. And they were transferred to this department 

because to enhance their role as a security force. 

The ironies roll out of this preliminary report. And we certainly 

did not want to be accused of sitting on it when we knew this 

much. We expect to hear more from you, but this is very troubling. 

I asked you about—there are two conversions going on here. The 

Subcommittee hasn’t generally opposed the use of security guards. 

We understand why some of the force, necessarily with the security 

guards, we understand that they have less authority, and there has 

generally not been on either side of the aisle wholesale belief that 

nothing but police should be present. At the same time, we have 

recognized what the limitations of security guards are. I would like 

you to spell out those limitations so that they are understood. 

What is it that a security guard can do, for example, one, to prevent crime; and, two, in the event of a crime? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Sure. To prevent crime, they only have their own 

eyes and ears, for the most part. They have—certainly they have 

guns. They do not have arrest or detention powers. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, they have guns. What can they do with those 

guns? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Theoretically, they can use them. However, in 

every region that we went to, one of the major concerns that FPS 

officers and inspectors shared with us was an overriding concern 

of the limitations of their contract guard force in that they believe 

and told us that contract guards are told by their firms that they 

should not get involved; that if incidents occur, that they should 

never use their firearm, they should never try to grapple with people, because the firms do not wish to encounter the liability. 

Ms. NORTON. Wouldn’t the firm be liable? Doesn’t the Federal 

Government not insure for contractors, to self-insure for contract 

guards. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I don’t know the answer to that question. We 

will look into it. But the concern raised by the officials, virtually 

all, every person we talked to out in the field, was that they would 

not receive assistance from the contract guards in emergencies. 

Ms. NORTON. So is this why the contract guards watched while 

someone was stealing? Would you recount that incident again? You 

said the contract guards witnessed some crime. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Even more to the point in our testimony is the 

incident in which in a major Federal building you had an inspector 

who was in the process of taking someone into custody who had an 

outstanding warrant. That person knew the building because they 

had been in it before. While the officer was arresting them, the individual had one hand cuffed, one wrist cuffed, got into a struggle 

with the guard. The guard, the police officer—the Federal police officer ended up ripping the guy’s shirt off. The guy went running 

through the Federal building, down through the main lobby with 

the inspector following him. And there were four—— 

Ms. NORTON. The inspector who was a peace officer? 

14 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Who was a peace officer, following him. And four 

or five contract guards, all of whom are armed, standing in the 

lobby, stepped aside. The individual went flying through the front 

doors, automatic doors, went running down the street, and was 

only apprehended by another FPS officer who happened to be in a 

car about two blocks away. This occurred about two weeks ago. 

This is a rather recent incident. And so here was an incident in 

which Federal officers would ordinarily expect to rely on contract 

guards, but they were of no assistance. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, not only contract guards. This is very troubling, it would be pathetic, when you consider that citizens, often 

when they see somebody running from the cops, will often try to 

stop them. When five different guards feel they shouldn’t intervene, 

that says to me that they have an understanding, and that that 

understanding is not only themselves but—it is not only among 

themselves and their own company, but that that understanding 

must be the understanding of the Federal Protective Service as 

well. Has the Protective Service blessed this approach, that a security guard should stand aside when he sees someone fleeing from 

the police? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I can’t answer that question specifically. But I 

can tell you that many of the people we talked to, many of the officers or inspectors were very frustrated by that. 

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask that you ask the Federal Protective 

Service what it is that the Federal Protective Service believes that 

security guards should do in the event of incidents such as you described, and whether the Federal Protective Service has said it is 

in keeping with the policy of the Federal Protective Service that 

the guards not intervene even when they see someone fleeing from 

a—obviously fleeing from an officer? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am. We will. The other concern raised 

often is that even in doing their normal duties they are not often 

adhering to post orders. 

Ms. NORTON. What do you mean? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The orders that govern how contract guards are 

supposed to operate at their fixed posts when people are coming 

into the building. Or, as we indicated earlier in our testimony, 

when a large surveillance trailer owned by a Federal agency was 

stolen, it was very clear from the videotape that contract guards 

were observing through camera this trailer being stolen but never, 

did not go out to intervene and also did not even report it. 

Ms. NORTON. What could the contract guard have done? What 

might the contract guard have done? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. They could have gone out to try to stop the individuals from busting through the Federal parking lot with this 

trailer. They could have and should have called either the Mega 

Center or the Federal Protective Service. 

Ms. NORTON. They didn’t even call? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. No, ma’am. This was not—there was no report 

and no action taken until after the law enforcement agency that 

owned this trailer, which was worth about half a million dollars because it was filled with sensitive surveillance materials. It was a 

law enforcement agency’s trailer that was worth about half a million dollars, and it was—— 

15 

Ms. NORTON. So this was a trailer that contained law enforcement information compiled by a law enforcement agency. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. And what happened is someone backed the truck 

up to this trailer, hooked the trailer up, they tried to get out of the 

gate. They tried to raise the gate of the parking lot. They could not 

raise the gate, so they simply drove through the gate. They busted 

the gate down. And this entire incident appears to have been 

watched, because there is video of the camera moving in and out 

and around as this occurred. But the contract guards never called 

the Federal Protective Service or the Mega Center or local law enforcement. And the only time they did anything, as far as we know, 

is about 3 or 4 days later the law enforcement agency realized that 

its trailer was missing and started making inquiries. And only at 

that point—— 

Ms. NORTON. So there had been no report until the agency 

that—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Lost the trailer. 

Ms. NORTON. Found it didn’t have a trailer anymore? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. 

Ms. NORTON. And how long between the theft and the discovery? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It was within 3 or 4 days. 

Ms. NORTON. We are talking about a great big trailer? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. So even the so-called guard, let’s assume the guard, 

these guards, and not policing guards. The guard function, what 

was not being, was not being—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The guard was not following the orders that they 

had. 

Ms. NORTON. The guard function was also not being followed. 

What happened as a result? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We made an inquiry to determine what happened to that contract guard, and we were told that that contract 

guard was taken off of that post but is still with that guard service 

and he is at another Federal facility, monitoring in that facility. 

I would just add, one of the concerns that officers regularly raise, 

as I was mentioning earlier, was that guards don’t follow the orders that they have. Obviously, if someone is stealing a major piece 

of surveillance equipment, you are supposed to report it. We personally witnessed in entering one major Federal building, when 

while we were doing our work, a breach. There was an individual 

directly in front of me who was carrying a large knife in a plastic 

bag into a major Federal building. It was an illegal weapon. 

There are two categories: Prohibited weapons and illegal weapons. This illegal weapon should have been taken from the individual; the individual should have been detained; the FPS should 

have been called, and further actions to understand what this individual was doing. All that the guard did was say, you can’t bring 

that weapon in here, and kicked them out of the building. And, of 

course, to let the guy either go around to another entrance or to 

do whatever he did. And so clearly was not—I mean, we saw that 

ourselves. 

Ms. NORTON. Does the training of guards occur in-house by the 

Federal Protective Service? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. No. It is done by the contract guard companies. 

16 

Ms. NORTON. So how does the Federal Protective Service know 

that it is getting trained guards? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. There are certifications that it receives from the 

contract guard companies about the kind of training that they 

have. 

Ms. NORTON. Certifications. What does that mean? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. When guards go through their training program, 

the company will provide a statement basically that these individuals have received the requisite training. 

Ms. NORTON. This is a judgment that the guards seemed to have 

received a requisite training. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We haven’t done that work yet. That is part of 

the follow-on work that we will do. But there were a lot of concerns 

raised with us about the adequacy of training and the adequacy of 

firearms training as well. And we will look into all this in the next 

part of our work for you. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, you say that police officers are being told that 

there is no future for them here. Actually, we find in the Federal 

Service that there is lots of cross recruitment of Federal police officers, and that one of the difficulties is that I think that we have 

among the Federal police is that you sometimes get people going 

because of differences, some differences that it is hard to justify. 

And, of course, last year there was some attempt to deal with that 

with I think the Congress police and the police here, just to show 

you how ancient are some of these categories. But I am wondering 

whether a Federal police officer could just as easily try to find a 

job now at another Federal police agency or police agency in local 

jurisdiction, given the training that he may have received during 

a time when training was going on at a higher quality. Are these 

officers subject to leaving in any case because they are trained officers? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The attrition rate is quite high. For officers last 

year it was 16 percent, and for inspectors it was 11 percent. With 

many of the—— 

Ms. NORTON. How does that compare with attrition rates in either other Federal police forces or in other Federal work. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We will make that comparison when we do the 

remainder of this work. We have not done that part of the work 

yet, but we will get back to you on that. 

Ms. NORTON. What about these agencies which are being patrolled? What about these agencies that are being patrolled, the socalled clients of the FPS? Do they have a view as to whether they 

are being adequately protected if you are a Federal agency head or 

Federal agency manager at one level or another? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I think there is a couple of concerns. What they 

want most is a uniformed presence. They really want a Federal police officer. They are very concerned. 

Ms. NORTON. The agency? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The agencies. That is correct. They think that 

the contract guards, the tenants think that the contract guards for 

the most part do an adequate job in the responsibilities that they 

have. But they recognize that the kind of protection they are getting is deteriorating because of all the other issues that we have 

been talking about in terms of the countermeasures, the lack of 

17 

local law enforcement, and the loss of proactive patrols. They also 

have, in most cases, not been informed by the Federal Protective 

Service that this kind of shift is coming. In fact, we met with—we 

have met with more than two dozen building security committees, 

which is the tenants in the various buildings. 

Most of them, the first time they had heard that FPS was moving to an inspector-based approach or that they were reducing 

hours with our discussion of that with them. 

Ms. NORTON. So you are saying FPS does not alert Federal agencies about the differences in transformation in the workforce, a 

workforce that they have always understood to have uniformed officers guarding the building? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. Or the impact that it might have 

on their agencies. I talked to one agency that has regular weekend 

hours in which the public comes into the building, and they were 

not aware that the Federal Protective Service was not patrolling 

that building on that weekend, and indicating whether they had to 

rethink whether they could keep the building open on the weekends, which would affect the public access. 

Ms. NORTON. We didn’t ask you to review the morale of these officers and inspectors, because that is very difficult to evaluate. But 

what you have described does lead me to ask you, what about feedback you are getting from the officers, from the inspectors? Is there 

anything you can generalize about how the workforce is viewing 

this change? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I think from our visits that we would have to 

say most of the workforce is demoralized. They don’t have equipment. They have no career path, and many have been told to leave. 

They don’t receive the training, the recognition, or the retirement 

of other law enforcement officials who do the same or similar work. 

The inspectors are overworked and overwhelmed. These are people 

who want to do a good job and are dedicated to protecting people 

and property from harm, and so they are having difficulty doing 

their job based on the kinds of challenges we mentioned, and the 

result is considerable attrition. 

Ms. NORTON. I mentioned in my opening statement my astonishment when we learned in hearing last year that there would be jurisdictions where there would be Federal facilities that would not 

be patrolled at all by Federal Protective Service. And I wonder if 

there are such cities or other places in the United States where 

there is no Federal Protective Service presence. And, if not, is there 

any presence, guard presence or any semi-protection presence in 

the facilities where there at the time we thought there would be 

as many as 50, where there is no Federal Protective Service presence. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. There would be presence within each region, and 

so there would be officers and inspectors in a large geographic area 

that would respond to incidents. But there are major Level 4 facilities in the United States. 

Ms. NORTON. You need to describe what a Level 4 facility is. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. A Level 4 facility is a facility that has at least 

450 employees, has a large amount of square footage, and has 

thousands of people coming and going every day. The larger facilities. 

18 

Ms. NORTON. This is almost the most secure facilities. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. Except for a few places in the 

United States, these are the most secure Federal properties. There 

are Level 4 facilities that have no around-the-clock or even regular 

Federal protection. There may be contract guards. But we have 

found some of those facilities have drastically—— 

Ms. NORTON. They do have contract guards? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. They have some, but they have been greatly reduced. I know of one Level 4 facility that went from seven Federal 

officers to zero, and from 30 contract guards to about six. And this 

is a facility that sees just considerable traffic both from the Federal 

workforce and the public. And I would rather not describe it any 

further, but it is at considerable risk. 

Ms. NORTON. When we say no Federal Protective presence, does 

that mean on weekdays as well as weekends? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. For facilities like the one I just described. 

Ms. NORTON. Like the Level 4 facility? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. As I mentioned, there would be 

Federal police officers in the region, somewhere else within that region that could respond, but they are not at that facility per se. But 

it could take hours for someone, for a Federal officer to respond. 

Ms. NORTON. So in the event of an emergency, now talking about 

emergency, where there are only contract guards, and here we are 

talking about contract guards at a number of Level 4 facilities. The 

facility could be left with only contract guards, and with no one 

able to respond in an emergency because, as you say, even if the 

Federal police service is chasing someone, the contract guards don’t 

feel that they can respond to an emergency in the way that a police 

officer can. Is that the case? There would be no response, no immediate response from a police officer? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is a possibility. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. In the event of an emergency? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is a possibility. I am aware of one incident 

recently at a pretty big Federal building in which, as I understand 

it, part of the roof appeared as if it was going to fall onto the sidewalk. And tenants called to have Federal Protective Service come 

and cordon off the area so that this thing would not fall and hurt 

someone, and it took an hour and a half for the Federal Protective 

Service to respond. A tenant stood outside, a building tenant, just 

a regular Federal employee stood outside for that period of time 

warning people and pushing them away. But no Federal law enforcement official. And apparently—— 

Ms. NORTON. Were there contract guards there. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. There were some contract guards. I don’t know 

why the contract guards did not cordon the area off. 

Ms. NORTON. Can a contract guard do anything? You just described a citizen. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is right. 

Ms. NORTON. Can a contract—who stepped in to do this? If a contract guard did what a citizen would do, would the contract guard 

imperil his company? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. This is part of what we want to look into for the 

other job that we will be doing for you, we need to get into these 

issues and find out exactly what—not just their responsibilities are, 

19 

but what the practical aspects of this are. Because I suspect there 

are many similar instances. 

Ms. NORTON. This is very important to you to do. For example, 

and perhaps you can describe this. Often we offhandedly talk about 

a citizens arrest. That is, a citizen, I could go up to someone and 

say, ′′I am going to hold you here until someone comes.′′ Do you believe a contract guard could do that? Or would contract guards do 

that, given what you have seen? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We have not heard about those experiences in 

our review so far. We will look into that. 

Ms. NORTON. Have you any information on whether or not there 

are any MOUs with jurisdictions where we heard testimony that 

the substitute for the Federal Protective Service would be local police who would sign on to memorandum of understanding to provide or fill in the necessary security. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It is our understanding, based on discussions we 

had in all the site visits we went to, which has been since confirmed to us by the director of FPS, that there are no memorandums that have been signed to date. They have what are called 

mutual support agreements. 

Ms. NORTON. Say that again. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. They have in place something that are called 

mutual support agreements, in which they simply have discussions 

by which they decide how to borrow each other’s equipment, whether someone might use a K-9 dog, things like that, between local law 

enforcement and FPS. But there are no memorandums of agreement or understanding regarding the kinds of things that FPS is 

talking about in which local law enforcement would essentially 

take the place of FPS due to its downsizing and its reassignment 

to the inspector force. 

Ms. NORTON. That is what they were talking about. They were 

talking about you would then call local MPD here? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. In fact, in our discussions as I 

mentioned in my testimony, most of the police parties that we 

talked to indicated that they would not sign such an MOU for a 

variety of reasons, including the liability to them, the fact that they 

are overwhelmed and wouldn’t be able to respond anyhow, and that 

they believe it is the role of the Federal Government. 

We found that in one city that we went to, most of the police departments, in fact, were not even aware that FPS wanted them to 

take on these additional responsibilities, and were not aware that 

FPS was no longer working on weekends or had reduced hours or 

had shifted to a situation in which they weren’t patrolling. 

Ms. NORTON. So not only did you find no MOUs; you found that 

in the cities where there might have been or were supposed to be 

MOUs, people hadn’t even been contacted to sign an MOU? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Right. Essentially, as we have looked at this 

work, there are four levels of protection. There is the Federal Protective Service itself. And that, as we say, has undergone significant change. There are the countermeasures which increasingly appear to be broken. There are the contract guards in which officers 

and inspectors have informed us there are significant problems 

about their performance. And then, finally, the local law enforceVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:10 May 04, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40697 JASON
20 

ment response, which appears, except for emergencies, to be something that would not work. 

Ms. NORTON. Has the contract guard workforce been relatively 

stable increased, or has it been also diminishing. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It has increased considerably, from 5,000 in 

2000 to 15,000 last year. 

Ms. NORTON. So it is a huge increase in contract guards, who 

have no authority, according to your testimony, to do much more 

than watch? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Correct. 

Ms. NORTON. Watch the buildings? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. And the number of inspectors who are required 

to oversee them have declined in that same time period. 

Ms. NORTON. They are essentially on their own then? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. In many ways, yes. Because, as I indicated, because so many of the buildings that inspectors are required to 

watch are very far away from them. They may be hours away from 

their main post, and so they know—the contract guards are only 

going to get visited now and again, and they know they are not 

going to get visited on evening and weekends because the FPS isn’t 

working. And one region indicated to us that because the inspectors 

were so overwhelmed by the work they were doing, that regional 

management told them that they should do their check and their 

oversight of the contract guards by telephone. 

Ms. NORTON. I mentioned the liability question when it comes to 

contract guards, because, after all, they are working for the Federal 

Government. It seems to me that that could be worked out. I would 

ask you to look at what I believe is a real problem for local police 

forces; that is to say, the jurisdictional boundaries of police forces 

in fact all vary. For example, even the Federal police forces, one 

Federal police force does not do what another does because of the 

law and because of how the jurisdictional boundaries are laid out. 

Now, I believe there may well be Federal law or something akin 

to that with respect to whether a local law enforcement agency on 

the basis of the MOU, which has not been blessed by Congress, can 

simply go in and cross into a Federal building or, for that matter, 

vice versa. 

For example, the Park Police is the only police force, the only 

Federal police force in the District of Columbia that has citywide 

and regionwide jurisdiction, and it does have jurisdiction to arrest 

anywhere in the city or region. And that really comes from the fact 

that these massive Federal parks are located in the region and in 

the District of Columbia. 

Rock Creek Park, for example. Anacostia Park, or Dupont Park. 

So Congress, in its wisdom, says these folks can’t patrol without 

having unusual jurisdiction, so it has given that jurisdiction. So the 

notion that by MOU, an agency can go out and say you now have 

jurisdiction to come in a Federal building raises, in my mind, frame 

of the law, whether or not there was any authority to do that in 

the first place. And I wish you would look into that matter. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We plan to, ma’am. I would add that this is one 

of the issues that is really perplexing the officers and inspectors as 

well as the local law enforcement departments, because it is such 

an unclear situation where you have some facilities with exclusive 

21 

Federal jurisdiction and some with concurrent, that they don’t 

know how to respond and what the chain of command would be. 

And they don’t also, local law enforcement realizes that in many 

instances, even if they can go into a Federal building, they need 

to be escorted by a Federal officer. But the problem of the staff 

shortages is such that if an emergency is occurring—— 

Ms. NORTON. I didn’t get that local would have to be escorted. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Right. In many instances, the local law enforcement official would have to be escorted by a Federal law enforcement official on the Federal property. If there is an emergency and 

there is only, say, one FPS officer and they need assistance and 

backup, if we are going to use local law enforcement, they would 

have to be—the FPS would have to be present. The local law enforcement just wouldn’t be able to go into the building on their own 

is what we have been told so far. Obviously, we are going to look 

at this some more. But as I mentioned earlier, that FPS office for 

that region may be two or three hours away. 

Ms. NORTON. It sounds like a patchwork that isn’t even a patchwork. I am trying to understand it. 

Now, the Subcommittee and the Full Committee Chairmen have 

been concerned about the absorption of FPS into ICE. How would 

you characterize the relationship between FPS and ICE? And perhaps compare it to its relationship when it was in GSA. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I can say that almost every single officer, inspector, and regional person we talked to out in the field indicated that 

the fit of FPS into ICE is poor, the fit of FPS into ICE is very bad. 

They almost uniformly felt that FPS belonged in one of three 

places: Either back at GSA; in part of DHS which is called infrastructure protection; or, as a stand-alone unit. 

Ms. NORTON. Why was that? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. They believed that ICE does not pay them any 

attention. Almost everyone indicated, used the kind of words: That 

they were a stepchild of ICE; that ICE did not understand the role 

of FPS and, that as a result, they did not get the kind of budget. 

Ms. NORTON. Just one moment. ICE’s mission is? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. ICE’s mission is immigration and customs enforcement. 

Ms. NORTON. So you have got to make us understand why, since 

these are Federal Protective Police, what led—putting yourselves 

in the minds of DHS, what led them to put the FPS in ICE in the 

first place? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I can’t answer that question right now; but it is 

something, as we look into these issues, we will get back to you 

about the rationale of why it was placed in ICE and where it might 

better belong. 

Ms. NORTON. Because the only thing— first thing it seems to me 

to do when you try to figure something out is not to say they are 

crazy. They must have had a reason. And the only reason I can 

think of off the top of my head is Border Patrol is in there and they 

patrol. So if you are only looking at labels, then these people patrol 

so you put them in there. Now, why doesn’t that work? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It is not working according to—— 

Ms. NORTON. Is Border Patrol a stepchild? 

22 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. No, it is not. One of the—it is a much bigger entity. FPS is relatively small by comparison. FPS has not been allowed to have some of the same kinds of training and authorizations and access even to intelligence information that the rest of 

ICE and DHS has. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, what about being in infrastructure? Why 

would that be a better fit if they weren’t in GSA, if they were in 

another part of—and you say it is called infrastructure. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Infrastructure protection. We haven’t looked at 

this yet. This is partly of what we will do. 

Ms. NORTON. In the final report? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. In the final report. 

Ms. NORTON. The final report is due? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It is due at the end of May. 

Ms. NORTON. Go ahead. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. What I am sharing with you is the frustrations 

of the officers who believe they ought to be elsewhere, and they 

were indicating places where they would have a better fit. But almost uniformly they believe it should not be in ICE. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, if you would let me know more about what 

infrastructure and protection does. It makes them believe that they 

would be better suited if they were in DHS to be in that part. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The infrastructure protection group handles the 

developing of plans to protect the infrastructure of the Nation. So 

that may be dams and nuclear facilities, it is Federal buildings, it 

is a lot of different things. And from their view, they belong in that 

area better because part of what they are doing is trying to protect 

bricks and mortar in the same way that the infrastructure protection group is looking to protect bricks and mortar. 

Ms. NORTON. That was the thought that some of us had. But, 

again, we didn’t know what was DHS’s rationale. And it is very important, it will be very important in your final report to know what 

their rationale was, whether DHS is capable of rethinking a rationale. 

I am sympathetic at one level to DHS. Here, the Congress says, 

okay, here are, what is it, almost a dozen agencies. We slapped 

them together, and then we say to DHS, okay, you figure out how 

they fit in. So it seems to me that it is not unlikely that here and 

there you make a mistake or so. That would concern me less than 

whether this agency is open to self criticism, to looking at what it 

has done and correcting it. Or, whether it just digs in because that 

is where it is and that is what it is going to be. 

So I would like to know what their rationale was in the beginning, and if that rationale continues to be in their view a valid rationale for where they have placed the agency given the continuing 

criticism. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Sure. We will be a happy to look into that as 

part of our review. 

Ms. NORTON. Let me ask you about the funding source. It is a 

very interesting way we fund GSA. It worked pretty well. Would 

you describe how the Federal Protective Service is funded. Would 

you describe how the Federal Protective Service, what its funding 

source was when it was in GSA. Then, would you describe how that 

works now that it is in DHS. 

23 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Sure. The Federal Protective Service received— 

when it was in GSA, received some funds from basic security fees 

that agencies paid. But it was never enough to cover the budget of 

the Federal Protective Service, so the GSA most years augmented 

their budget with money from the Federal Buildings Fund. 

Ms. NORTON. Say that again. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Sure. In most years, they received money 

through their fees from tenants, but has never been enough to 

cover. 

Ms. NORTON. Fees from tenants is a way of saying that if I am 

the Small Business Administration, I pay out of my budget for my 

police service? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. You pay a certain amount per 

square foot of space that you have from GSA. 

Ms. NORTON. And you are saying in your testimony that that 

amount per square foot has actually gone up? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It has been—that is correct. It has gone up 

about 65 percent in the last couple of years. It has never been 

enough to cover the costs, so those have always been augmented 

in the past by monies from the Federal Buildings Fund by nearly 

$100 million or some more than that. 

Ms. NORTON. Where does the money from the Federal Buildings 

Fund come from? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It is a revolving fund that comes from GSA, appropriated by Congress. 

Ms. NORTON. Go ahead. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. But since FPS left GSA, the Federal Buildings 

Fund has not been available to it. So they have had that shortfall, 

which always existed, manifested itself in some pretty significant 

cuts. 

Ms. NORTON. So, inevitably, there was going to be a shortfall. Let 

us understand this. We have Federal Protective Service where Congress has found a kind of neat way to fund them by giving some 

responsibilities to the agencies. So the agencies, out of its annual 

budget, acts like everybody else does, donates something to fund 

them. And then, and I would be interested in knowing what percentage. But then, of course, that was not going to be enough, and 

Congress kicked in. About what percentage came from these 

sources? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The Federal Buildings Fund made up some—I 

am looking at this—looks like out of a third. In 2000, the Federal 

Buildings Fund provided $95 billion million; in 2001, $90 million; 

$197 million in 2002. 

Ms. NORTON. This is pre—go ahead. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. And in 2003, $139 million. The last year in 

which it was in GSA, 2004, the Federal Buildings Fund provided 

$81 million. And then since then—— 

Ms. NORTON. When you say Federal Buildings Fund, you are 

talking about the Federal Government adding? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Right, to the funds that were being provided by 

tenants. And at the very next year, 2005, is when we started running into issues. The shortfall in 2005 was $70 million, and the 

shortfall in 2006 was $57 million. 

24 

Ms. NORTON. Now, the shortfall in funds came from the fact that 

it didn’t come from the Federal Buildings Fund anymore? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. Fees at that point were not rising that much. And so you have—— 

Ms. NORTON. Where did the money to cover the shortfall come 

from? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It came from a combination from cost cutting 

measures, which I indicated have had a detrimental effect in many 

ways, because those cost cutting measures have eaten into training 

and job-related travel, into equipment repairs like radios, into—if 

they haven’t had new uniforms in years or sometimes even cars. So 

it has had a detrimental effect on the agency itself. 

Ms. NORTON. On the agency? So does this mean that there is no 

regular way to in fact supplement what the agency itself pays as 

it was when the FPS was in GSA? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. They simply do not have the funds to cover the 

costs, that is correct, of providing. They do not get enough money 

out of either the building specific fees, the basic security fees, or 

the security work orders that they do to fund the agency. And so 

they have had to, in the number of years, in 2006 they had to institute $25 million in cost cutting measures, and in 2007 they instituted $27 million of cost cutting measures. 

Ms. NORTON. Is DHS authorized to augment funds when you see 

this shortfall occurring? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. In 2006, DHS reprogrammed $29 million to augment their budget in order to ensure that the agency wasn’t antideficient. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, does this mean that the ratio that was always 

understood and apparently worked in the past needs to be figured 

out with DHS as it was when the agency was in GSA? Are you telling me that this changes from year to year without any understanding about approximately how much is going to come from 

each funding source, who is going to pay for it? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I think without significant changes they are 

going to be in that situation, because they either have to raise fees 

to such an extent that the tenants are going to balk. 

Ms. NORTON. That would be the agencies, out of their budgets? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is right. Or you are going to have to find 

some other mechanism. 

Ms. NORTON. And the other mechanism before, was? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Was the Buildings Fund. 

Ms. NORTON. Which was the revolving fund. Revolving fund always has some funds. And how does it get its funds? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It gets its funds mainly through tenant fees as 

well as Congress always kicked in additional money. But that 

money usually went toward specific construction projects. 

Ms. NORTON. And, of course, agencies pay rent, as it were. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is right. 

Ms. NORTON. And agencies pay rent; that is how you get a buildings fund, yes, with some augmentation. And the agencies pay a 

fee for FPS. So at least there was some understood funding source. 

So when you came to Congress, or if you came to Congress, and I 

don’t think this was regular and necessary, but if you came to ConVerDate Aug 31 2005 17:10 May 04, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40697 JASON
25 

gress and said more money to fund, there was some way to understand why there had been a shortfall. 

And I don’t understand that there is a way to understand why 

there is a shortfall here, because it seems to me that when they 

don’t have enough money, they simply cut even vital matters like 

equipment and cameras and the like. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. That is what they have been 

forced to do. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Goldstein, would you—I am trying to get to the 

cause of this. Obviously, the Department of Homeland Security 

would not want to absorb a police force and then see it robbed of 

its police power, see it transformed from a police force that thought 

it ought to be there because it was a police force. Obviously, it 

would not want to cut equipment. 

I am wondering whether it would even desire, all things being 

considered, to convert the police force into basically an inspector 

force and leave the police work altogether. Would you say the reduction in equipment, the transformation to an inspector-based 

force, and the encouragement of officers to leave the agency all 

have essentially as their purpose to reduce costs and not a purpose 

that is related to security? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I think—— 

Ms. NORTON. Can you find a substantive reason for these radical 

changes in the police force for the protection of Federal sites and 

workers? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, I think it is twofold. I think they clearly 

want to transform FPS into a different kind of entity that is not 

reliant on police officers, in which they have a single kind of officer, 

the inspector, who can do a variety of different things. 

Ms. NORTON. Do you believe it is possible for a police officer to 

do that variety of things or that there ought to be some dedicated 

police officers? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Based on what we have heard to date, I would 

have to say that we feel that the approach they are taking does undermine security. Now we recognize that they have had a number 

of budgetary consequences over the last couple of years which have, 

in combination with this policy change, has aggravated the situation. But it is clear to us by talking with the 200-plus officers and 

inspectors we have talked to that going to an all-inspector-based 

force will simply overwhelm them. 

These inspectors talked about not having the time to do all of 

their work, not even a fraction of their work, that they could spend 

virtually all of their time just doing one part of that work. So all 

of the functions they have tend to deteriorate as a result. So it is— 

we don’t see the evidence so far that this approach would work. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Goldstein, I also would like to ask you to look 

in the final report and to find out whether one would need to be 

a peace officer to do the inspection work. Peace officers are very 

highly paid in our society for a very good reason, not just because 

they carry a gun. It is what we are asking them to do. And so police officers are usually paid better and have better pensions than 

other Federal employees. 

Now we are talking about inspectors. As DHS believes that these 

people go around inspecting all the time, that may be a valid role. 

26 

But I would like you to look into whether or not they need to be 

peace officers, whether they need to have all the powers of being 

a peace officer, which is substantial in order to be an inspector, so 

that the Congress can decide whether or not this is the way to 

achieve what the DHS wants to achieve and whether it can be 

achieved by sacrificing the patrolling and other work of Federal police service as we have known them. 

Mr. Goldstein, I appreciate that you have done what the GAO 

does in unusual circumstances. It is much like what scientists do 

in a controlled study. 

When you are doing a controlled study and you find that the 

study is, for example, telling you that people should stop taking a 

medication or I have seen a Member, maybe 10 years ago, where 

there was a controlled study—I remember the Women’s Caucus 

was delighted when there was a controlled study that found that 

some drug that was being taken, I don’t know, to prevent breast 

cancer or some such was unusually effective. So instead of waiting 

until the end of the control study, they alerted people to what they 

had found. So they alerted us from the negative end; they alerted 

us on the positive end. 

So the GAO is not here in the tradition of the GAO. We found 

something, and perhaps it was brought to the attention of Congress 

before your final study is due to bring it to our attention. You have 

done that in this case because you understood this involved security of Federal employees and visitors and simply treating it as a 

report that tells us something that we needed to know might not 

be sufficient. For that, I want to thank you very much on behalf 

of the Subcommittee and the Committee and to say that we very 

much look forward to receiving your final report. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you, ma’am. Thank you for your attention 

to the matter. 

Ms. NORTON. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

27 


40697.006
28 


40697.007
29 


40697.008
30 


40697.009
31 


40697.010
32 


40697.011
33 


40697.012
34 


40697.013
35 


40697.014
36 


40697.015
37 


40697.016
38 


40697.017
39 


40697.018
40 


40697.019
41 


40697.020
42 


40697.021
43 


40697.022
44 


40697.023
45 


40697.024
46 


40697.025
47 


40697.026
48 


40697.027
49 

Æ 


40697.028