### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00688- CR

F r ank F it z ge r ald , I II, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BELL CO UNTY, 264TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 57,571 , HO NORAB LE MARTH A J. TRUDO, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Fr ank F itz g era ld, I I I , was charg ed with the offense of possession of coc aine. B efor e trial, Fitzge rald filed a

motion to s up p re s s s eeking to exclude evide nce se ized from his car a nd statements made to the police . He c ontended that the actions of the i nvestig ating law enf orce ment office rs violated his constitutional and statutory rig hts and that any

statement s made a

nd any evidenc e seized wer e, there fore , obtained in violation of his constitutional and statutory rig hts. The dis tr ic t c ourt

ov e rr ule d th e mot ion . F itzg e ra ld p le d g ui lt y and wa s se nte nc e d to te n y e ars ’ imp ri so nme nt. On

a pp e a l, h e c omp la ins that th e tr ial court e rr e d in ov e rr uli nghis mot ion

to suppress. We will affir

m the district court’s judg ment.

BACK GR OUND At the suppression hea

ring , Detec tive L awr ence , one of the office rs involved in the
arr est , t es t ified about the e vents leadingup to Fitzger ald’s ar rest. He testified that both he and2

Detec tive Wadley

had been s ent t o Mickey ’s convenience store in Killeen, Te x as, to investigate a po ssi ble dr

ugtr ans a c tio n. He state d th a t, at arou nd ni ne in th e e ve nin g , w hil e c on ve rs ingwi th individuals involved in that inve stigation, he and Detec tive Wadley observe d a car pull into the convenie nce- store par

king lot and slowly drive across the parking lot to a g as pump. He state d that the occ upants of the ve hicle appe are d to be looking for someone . The c ar w as driven by Fitzge rald; Fitzge rald’s w ife, Sheila F itz g era ld, and Fitzge rald’s f ather , Fr ank Ga ddison, w ere passeng ers in the
car . Detec tive L awr ence testified that, althoug h the ca r pulled up to the g as pumps, none of the oc c up ants of

the ve hic le pumpe d g a s in to t he c ar; F itzg e ra ld , ho wev er, testif ie d th a t he did pump ga s into his car. De tective L awr ence testified that another car enter ed t h e p arking lot and stopped at the pumps, but none of the oc cupants of the second ve hicle g ot out to pump gas e ither. He f urther te stified that Gaddison wa lked over to t h e s ec o n d ca r and spoke to the driver of the vehicle. Howeve r, De tective L awr ence admitted that he did not hear what Ga ddison and the sec ond driver w ere talking about. Detec tive L awr ence further testified that, afte r conve rsing with Gaddison, the dr ive r o f t

he se c on d c ar g ot o ut o f t he c ar a nd ha d mo ne y

in h is h and s. Detec tive L awr ence stated that, af ter the se cond drive r g ot out o f t h e ca r, he a nd Detec tive Wadley

walked ove r to the two ca rs to investigate. He te stified that h e t h o u ght it was
unus ua l f or pe op le to pa

rk a t g a s pumps , me e t wi th on e ano the r, and ne ve r p ump any

g a s. He a lso
rec ounted that, after he and Detective W adley approa ched the two car s, he questioned F itz g era ld and Fitzge rald’s w ife, while D etec tive Wadley questioned Ga ddison and the sec ond driver.Th e re c or d is un c le ar wh eth er the c anin e un it w a s c a lle d to the c on ve nie nc e sto re in 1 re sp on se to t

he po ssi ble dr

ug tr ans a c tio n De te c tiv e s L awr e nc e and Wad le y we re or ig ina lly

se nt t o investigate or wa s called in re lation to Fitzger ald’s ca se. 3 Detec tive L awr ence testified t hat he asked F itz g era ld what his name wa s and aske d to s e e so me ide nti fi c a tio n. At the he ari ng , Fi tzg e ra ld ad mitte d that he g a ve the po lic e of fi c e r a fa lse name, told the officer his identification was inside the car, and allowed the office r to rea ch into the
car to ge t his wallet; in his wallet, Fitzger ald had a birth cer tificate be longingto the individual who F i t z g e r a l d

f a l s e l y c l a i m e d t o b e . D e t e c t i v e L aw r e n c e a dm i t t e d t h a th e r e a c h e d

h i s h an d int o Fitzge rald’s car to retrie ve Fitz g era ld’s wallet but stated that he made no attempt to search the car
a t th a t ti me . F itzg e ra ld a lso state d that De te c tiv e L awr e nc e pe rf or me d a pat- do wn

se arc h o n h im. Sometime after D etec tive L awren ce b ega nqu es t i o n i n g Fi t z ger al d , Detec tive Briga ndi
arr ived at the convenie nce store with a nar cotics dog
. Detec tive L awr ence testified that, as the dog 1 approa ched F itz g era ld’s car , the dogaler ted, indicating the pre sence of illeg al drug s inside the ca r. Short l y there afte r, the de tectives be g an sea rchingthe ca

r and f ound approximately

140 g rams of
c oc a ine . A ft e r t

he dr ug s w e re dis c ov e re d, She ila F itzg e ra ld t old

the po lic e that G a dd iso n h a d p a id Fitzge rald a

nd her to tra

nsport him and the drug s to Killeen. After the sear ch, Fitzge rald was arr ested and char g ed with the offe nse of possession of between four and 200 g rams of c ocaine , a sec ond-deg ree felony
. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a ), (d) (West 2003). After his moti on to suppress was de nied, he pled guilty and wa s
se nte nc e d to ten y e ars ’ co nf ine me nt. He a

pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of his mot ion

to s up pr e ss.Fitzge rald did not ask the district cour t to make express finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of 2 law. See State v . Cullen , No. PD-984-05, Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 1281, at *9 (Tex. Crim. App. J une 28, 2006). 4 STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW I n re vie wi ng a

tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on

to d e ny a mot ion to s up pr e ss, we “ a ff

or d a lmo st tot a l de fe re nc e to a

tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n o f t he his tor ic a l f

a c ts that the re c or d s up po rt s espec ially when the trial court’s f act f indings a re ba sed on an e valuation of c redibility and demea nor.” Gu zm an v . S

tate , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Te x . C ri m . Ap p . 1997). This same leve l of defe renc e is aff

orded to trial c ourt ruling s on “‘a pplication of law to fa ct questions’” or mix ed questions of law a

nd fac t when re solution of the questions depends on e valuations of cr edibility and demea nor. Id. (q u o t i n g Vi lla rre al v . S tate , 935 S.W .2d 134, 139-41 (Te x . Crim. App. 1996)). Howeve r, whe n the resolution of mix ed questions of lawand fa ct do not depend on a n evaluation of cr edibility and demeanor, we apply a de novo sta

ndard of revie w. See id. Acc ording ly , we r eview de novo the tria l court’s a pplication of the lawof sea rch a nd seizure to the fa cts of the c ase. Sta te
v . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Whe n a tr ia l c ourt

de nie s a mot ion to s up pr e ss a nd do e s n ot f

ile any fi nd ing s o f f

a c t, we must view the e vidence “in the lig ht most favor able to the trial court’ s ruling” and “a ssume that the trial cour

t made implicit findings of f act tha t s u p p o rt i ts ruling a s long a s those finding s are supported by

the re cord.” Id. a t 85 5; s e e P e n n y w e l l v . Sta te , 127 S. W. 3 d

1 4 9 , 1 5 2 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 03 , n o pe t.)
. I f t he tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g re g ard inga mot ion to s up pr e ss 2 is r e a so na bly su pp or te d b y the re c or d a

nd is c or re c t un de r a

ny a pp lic a ble the or y of law , we mus t5

aff irm the t rial court’s judgme nt. Ro me ro v . S tate , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543-44 (Te x . Crim. App. 1990);

se e Pe nn y we ll v . S tate , 127 S.W .3d 149, 152 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

DI SCU SSIO N On appe al, Fi t z g era ld contends that the police improperly detained him without
rea sonable suspicion of c riminal activity occur ring . Specifica lly , Fitzge rald a rgues that the police failed to pre sent fac ts which, when c ombine d w it h r ational infer ence s, would have a llowed the police to rea sonably suspect that Fitzge rald had eng ag ed, was eng ag ing, or soon would eng ag e in cr iminal
a c tiv ity . T he re fo re , h e a sse rt s th a t his de te nti on wa s impe rm iss ibl e . He a lso argue s that, a ft e r f ir st beingquestioned by

police, he w as impermissibly detained until the ca

nine unit arrive d. I n either
c a se , h e argue s th a t th e e vid e nc e ob ta ine d a nd th e st ate me nts ma de duri ngthe imp e rm iss ibl e detainments we re ina dmissibl e.

I n support of these a ssertions, Fitzge rald points to Detec tive L awr ence ’s testimony that none of the activities he obser ved p ri o r t o q uestioning F itz g era ld were violations of the law. F ur the r F itzg e ra ld p oints t o L awr e nc e ’s te sti mony that it wa s not out of the or din ary fo r pe op le to drive slowly

throug h a parking lot, to look around while drivingthroug h a par king lot, or to g et out of the c ar afte r parking at a convenie nce store. He also notes that Detec tive L awr ence admitted that
o n e r e a s o n s o m e o n e m i g h tdr i v e s l o w l y t h r o u g ha c o n v e n i e n c e s t o r e p ar

k i n g l o ti s f

o r s a f e t y. Finally , Fitzge rald points to Detec tive L awr ence ’s stat ement that he had no re ason to sear ch F itzg e ra ld’ s c ar p ri or

to t he arr iva l of

the c anin e un it.6 There a re three differ ent ty pes of inter actions betwe en police a nd citizens: (1) encounte rs, (2) de tention s , an d (3 ) seizures. Pe nn y we ll v . S

tate , 1 2 7 S. W. 3 d

1 4 9 , 1 5 2 ( T e x. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). “ An enc ounter oc cu rs when a law enf orce ment office r approa ches a

n individual in publi c to ask que stions.” Id. The o ff i ce r d o es n o t have to have a justification for initiating an encounte r, and the encounte r “trig g ers no c onstitut ional protec tions.” Id. ; se e als o F

lor ida v . B os tik, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (a s long a s encounte r re mains consensua l in n a tur e , h e ig hte ne d s c rutiny re qu ir e d b y

F ourt h A me ndme nt n e e d n ot be a pp lie d) . In o the r w or ds , the offic er doe s not ne ed probable cause or rea sonable suspicion to init iate a c onsensual enc ounter. Se e Ha y es v . S tate , 1 32 S.W. 3d

14 7, 15 1- 52 (Tex . App .— Au sti n 2 00 4, no pe t.) ; se e als o State v. Velasquez , 9 94 S.W. 2d

67 6, 67 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ) ( iss ue s o f pr ob a ble c a us e and re a so na ble suspicion do not arise whe n office r appr oache s citiz en to eng ag e in conve rsation).

I n an enc ounter, a

police off

icer may approa ch an individual and ask the individual if he is w illing to answe r some questions. Florida v. Roye r , 4 60 U. S. 4 91 , 4 97 (1 98 3) (p lur a lity op ini on ); se e als o P e te rso n v . S tate , 85 7 S.W. 2d 92 7, 93 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ) ( po lic e may a sk questions of fellow c itiz ens). How ever , the i ndividual does not have to answer any questions asked, may ref use t o listen to the questi ons, and may leave the s ituation. See R oyer , 460 U.S. at 497-98;

se e als o J oh ns on v . S

tate , 912 S.W .2d 227, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (in consensua l encounter , c iti zen fr e e to ig no re of

fi c e r a nd wa lk a wa y ). I n a c on se ns ua l e nc ounte r, po lic e of fi c e rs may

a lso ask to se e an individual’s ide ntification and ask for consent to se arc h. Johnson , 912 S.W .2d at 235;

s e e a l s o B o sti k , 5 0 1 U.S . at 435 (in enc ounter, police may ask for consent to sea

rch individual’s lugg ag e). As long as the individual ha s not be en detained, then no constitutional rig hts h av e b een7

violated. Roye r , 4 60 U. S. at 49 7- 98 (1 98 3) ; se e als o B os tik, 501 U.S. at 434 (deta inment does not
oc c ur sim ply be c a us e po lic e a

pp ro a c h a nd qu e sti on ind ivi du a l) ; Peterson , 8 57 S.W. 2d a t 93 0 ( on ly when que stioning bec omes detention mu s t o ff icer have r easona

ble suspicion). Consequently , the State may introduce a s evidenc e stateme nts an indi vidual makes in an e ncounter without violating the Four th Amendment. Roye r , 460 U.S. at 497. I n deter mining whe ther a

detention has oc curr ed, the c ritical ana ly sis is “whether, takin g int o a c c ount a ll o f t he c ir c ums tanc e s su

rr ound ingthe e nc ounte r, the po li ce con du c t w ou ld ‘have communicated to a rea sonable person that he was not at liberty to ignor e the police prese nce and g o about his business.’” Bo sti k, 5 0 1 U. S
. at 4 3 7 (q u o t i n g Michigan v. Cheste rnut , 486 U.S. 567, 56 9 ( 19 88 )) ; se e Pe nn

y we ll , 1 27 S.W. 3d

a t 15 2; se e als o Hu nte r v . S tate , 9 5 5 S. W. 2 d 1 0 2 , 1 0 4 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1997) (in deter mining whe ther de tention has occ urre d, courts must look at totality of circ umstances) . I t is only

when a n office r has convey ed that complianc e with his reque sts is required that an encounter becomes a detention. Hunter , 9 55 S.W. 2d a t 10 6; see also Johnson , 912 S.W .2d
a t 236 (se iz ure of c iti zen do e s n ot o c c ur

un til re a so na

ble pe rs on

wo uld be lie ve he wa s n ot f

re e to leave and either

yields to office r’s show of authority or has be en phy sically

forc ed to yield). We first note that the district court made no finding s of fa ct when it denie d the motion to suppress. Ther efor e, we must view t he evide nce in the lig ht most favorable to the denial and
assume that the court made implicit finding s supported by the re cord. See R oss, 32 S.W .3d at 855. Second, ther e is nothing in the r ecor d that sug g ests that the interac tion be tween Fitzge rald and the po lic e , p ri or

to t he arr iva l of

the c anin e un it, wa s any

thi ng mor e tha

n a n e nc ounte r o r t

hat F itzg e ra ld8

wa s d e ta ine d unti l th e arr iva l of the c anin e un it. Rathe r, the e vid e nc e in the re c or d is c on sis te nt w ith the rig ht affor ded police of fice rs to ask questions of their f ellow citizens. No thi ngin D e te c tiv e L awr e nc e ’s te sti mony su g g e sts that he c omm un ic a te d to Fitzge rald that F itz g era ld was not fre e to ig nore his questions a nd leave the convenie nce store
. See Pe nn y we ll , 127 S.W .3d at 152 (no e vidence sug g ests appellant wa s n o t fr ee t o ref use to answe r office r’s questions). Moreove r, in his own testimony , Fitzge rald did not state that he believe d he had to answer the detec tive’s questions or that he f elt that he was unable to le ave the premises. The re is no ev i d en ce t h at Fi t z ger al d wa n t edt o t erm i n at e t h e c o n v er s at i o nwi t hDe t ec t i v e Law re n ce , d es ired t o l e av e t h e s c e n e , o r

a t t e mp t e d

t o l e av e t h e s c e n e b u tw a s p r o h i b i t e d f r o ml e a v i n g o r

o r d e r e d t o s t ay. Simi larly , there is no evidence that Fitz ger al d y i el d ed to a show of authority by the police. F or
e xamp le , th e re is n o e vid e nc e that th e po lic e br and ish e d a f ir e arm , c a us ingF itzg e ra ld t o s ub mit to the offic ers’ reque sts.

Fur ther, a lthou gh

D e te c ti v e L a

wr e n c e a s k e d

to s e e F itzg e r a ld ’ s identification, a police officer m ay ask t o see a

n individual’s identification in a conse nsual enc ounter. See J ohnson , 912 S.W .2d at 235

. Moreove r, there is no indication t h at , after obtaining the identification, Detective L awr ence perf

ormed a war rant c heck on the iden tification or re tained the identific ation for a ny leng th of time. Compare Velasquez , 994 S.W .2d at 67 9 (c o u rt conclude d that, under totality of circ umstances, of

fice r appr oachingdefe ndant, askin g to in s p e c t d e f

e n d a nt’ s ti c ket and identific ation, and askingfor pe rmission to search lug g ag e constituted a c onsensual enc ounter) with Hay es , 132 S.W .3d at 153 (in support of its conclusion t hat appe llant had bee n detained, c ourt noted off icer took appellant’ s identification and we nt to police car to run war

rant c heck)
.9 I n addition, there is no indication that a sig nificant lapse of time occ urre d betwee n the time D etec tive L awr ence beg an questioning Fitzge rald a nd the ar rival of the c anine unit or that Fitzge rald wa s detained until the arri v al o f the c anine unit. Se e ge ne ra lly Cro c k e tt v . S tate , 803 S.W. 2d 30 8 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ) (o ff ic e r inf or me d indi vid

ua l at tr a in s tatio n th a t he ha d r ig ht t o de ta in i nd ivi du a l to c on du c t c anin e se arc h o f i nd ivi du a l’ s lu g g a g e and de ta ine d in div idu a l until canine unit a

rrived)
. Com

pa reHa as v . S

tate , 172 S.W. 3d 42 , 51- 52 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 200 5, pe t. ref ’d) ( althoug h in traff

ic stop context, cour

t note d that there is no preset time limit on t raf fic stops and re levant question is whether police diligently pursued investig ation in manner likely to confirm
or de ny su sp icions qu ic kly and that st op may

la st a s lo nga s r e a so na

bly ne c e ssa ry to e ff e c tuate purpose of stop) with Si ms v. State, 98 S.W .3d 292, 294 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (c ourt aff

irmed d en i al o f motion to s uppress in traf fic stop ca se whe re c anine unit ar rived twenty minutes after

citation g iven). Rather , the only evidenc e pre sented on the issue de monstrates that the ca

nine unit arrive d shortly

afte r the police beg an talk i n g wi t h Fitzge rald: (1) Detec tive L awr ence testified that the ca nine unit arrive d while he was still talking w ith Fitzger ald, and ( 2) Fitzge rald, in his testimony , ag ree d that he talked w ith the police for “ sever al minutes.”

F ina lly , a lth ou g h F itzg e ra ld te sti fi e d that a pat- do wn se arc h w a s p e rf or me d o n h im prior to the ar

rival of the c anine unit, nothing in the r ecor d indicate s t h at t h e pat- down led to the discovery of any incriminating evidenc e. Se e Ze igl e r v . S tate , No. 01-05-00233- CR, 2006 Tex . App. L EX I S 48 92 , * 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 06 , no pet
. h. ) (m e m. o p. ) ( pat- do wn le d to discovery of coc aine in def

endant’ s pants). According ly , we ne ed not consider whether evidenc e needs to be excluded as t he result of an impermissibl e pat- down sea rch. O n the contra

ry , it was theAs a c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio n, the c ourt

may have dis be lie ve d Fitz gerald and imp lie dly 3 found that no pat-down sear ch occ urre d. Credibility determ i n ati ons are aff

orded a lmost t otal defe renc e, se e Gu

zm an v . S tate , 9 55 S.W. 2d

85 , 89 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ), and the re is n oth ingin t h e r ec o rdt o re fu t e t h i s i mp l i edfi n d i n g. 10 appar ently

near -simultaneous aler

t by a police dog that led to the discover y of the na rcotics. Onc e the traine d narc otics dog aler ted the off

icer to the possibili ty

t h at i l l egal dr

ug s were inside Fitzge rald’s c ar, pr obable c ause e x isted to searc h the vehicle
. Se e Ha rri so n v. Sta te , 7 S.W .3d 309, 31 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 99 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; se e als o Cr oc k e tt , 803 S.W .2d at 310 n.5 (sniff of outside of vehicle by

trained c anine is not sear ch under the Four th Amendment). The ref

ore, the war rantless sea

rch of Fitzge rald’s c ar w as prope r. See H arrison , 7 S.W .3d at 311. Moreove r, g iven our standa rd of r eview, w e c a

nn o t c o n c lude that the pat-down sear ch alone e levated the encounte r to a de tention. Other than Fi t z ger al d ’s statement that a pat-down
occur red, the re is no other testimony conce rning the pat-down sear ch. There is no indication that 3 the pat-down was not the re sult of Detec tive L awr ence asking Fitzge rald for consent to be searc hed. Cf. Z eigler , 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 4892 at *4, 10 (off icer approa ched individual boar ding bus a nd, afte r conve rsing with individual, asked if he c ould searc h individual’s bag and per form pat- down
sear ch on individual; court conc luded that nothing in r ecor d sug g ests pat-down a ny thing other

than voluntary response to office r’s re quest and that intera ction was a n encounte r, not detention). For all the prec eding rea sons, w e conclude that Fitzge rald has fa iled to show that the dis trict court e rre d in denying his motion to suppress. The e vidence prese nted at the he aring demonstrates that Detec tive L awr ence approa ched F itz g era ld, asked F itz g era ld questions, and asked to see F itz g era ld’s identification. This evidenc e is c o n s is tent with permissible actions that may occurBe ca u s e we have c oncluded that the district c ourt did not err, w e nee d not consider 4 F itzg e ra ld’ s argume nts tha t th e e rr or wa s har

mf ul an d th at th e e vid e nc e sh ou ld b e e xclu de d a s “ fr uit s of the poisonous tree .” 11 in a conse nsual encounte r betwee n the police and citizens, and nothing in the re cord de monstrates that the e nc ounte r e sc a late d int o a de te nti on or that F itzg e ra ld w a s im

pe rm iss ibl y

de ta ine d to awa it the ar rival of a canine unit. The district court’s ruling is suppor ted by the re cord, a

nd we, ther efor e,
c ann ot c on c lud e tha

t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in den y in g Fitzg e ra ld’ s mo tio n to
su pp re ss. Ac c or din g ly , w e ov e rr ule his so le iss ue on

a pp e a l. 4
CO NC LU SION Havingoverr

uled Fitz g era ld’s issue on appea l, we af firm the judg ment of the district
c ourt
.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 31, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh