[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 

re A.G., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-3306.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-3306

IN RE A.G.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as In re A.G., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-3306.] 

Juvenile delinquency—The merger analysis set forth in State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio 

St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, applies to juvenile delinquency 

proceedings to protect a child’s right against double jeopardy. 

(No. 2014-2190—Submitted December 15, 2015—Decided June 9, 2016.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 101010, 2014-Ohio-4927. 

_________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

The merger analysis set forth in State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 

34 N.E.3d 892, applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings to protect a 

child’s right against double jeopardy. 

_________________ 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

LANZINGER, J. 

{¶ 1} In this case we are asked to determine the extent of double-jeopardy 

protections in juvenile delinquency proceedings. We reaffirm that juveniles are 

entitled to the same constitutional double-jeopardy protections as adults, and we 

hold that juvenile courts must conduct the same double-jeopardy analysis in 

delinquency proceedings that other courts apply in adult criminal proceedings. 

I. Case Background 

{¶ 2} In June 2012, a person approached a man as the man was opening his 

car door after obtaining money from an ATM inside a store. The person pulled a 

gun out of his pocket and told the man that he would shoot him unless the man got 

into the car. The man did not comply but ran to his home nearby and lost track of 

the assailant. Police later took fingerprint samples from the car and found a 

fingerprint identifying A.G., who was 15 years old at the time of the event, as the 

assailant. 

{¶ 3} A complaint was filed in juvenile court alleging that A.G. was 

delinquent for engaging in conduct that if committed by an adult would have 

constituted aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and kidnapping 

in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), with firearms specifications as to each. A.G. 

entered an admission to the allegations in the complaint. After finding the 

allegations proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the juvenile court ordered that A.G. 

be committed to the Department of Youth Services for minimum terms of one year 

each for the aggravated robbery and kidnapping adjudications. The court merged 

the firearm specifications into a single specification and imposed a one-yearcommitment term for that specification. The court ordered all the terms to be served 

consecutively, for a total minimum commitment of three years, with the maximum 

commitment lasting until A.G turned 21 years old. 

{¶ 4} A.G. appealed and raised two assignments of error. First, he argued 

that the juvenile court erred in failing to merge his adjudications for aggravated 
January Term, 2016 

3

robbery and kidnapping as “allied offenses of similar import” and that the failure 

to merge the adjudications violated the double-jeopardy protections contained in 

the United States and Ohio Constitutions. 2014-Ohio-4927, 21 N.E.3d 355, ¶ 6 

(8th Dist.). Second, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise the allied-offenses issue. 

{¶ 5} The Eighth District Court of Appeals concluded that the aggravated 

robbery and kidnapping admitted to by A.G. would constitute allied offenses of 

similar import under R.C. 2941.25 if committed by an adult. Nevertheless, it 

reasoned that criminal statutes, including R.C. 2941.25, do not apply in juvenile 

delinquency proceedings. The court of appeals accordingly concluded that this 

court’s decisions illustrating how R.C. 2941.25 should be applied are inapplicable 

to juvenile delinquency proceedings. The court instead turned to the test from 

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), 

which requires comparing the elements of the offenses at issue “without regard to 

the evidence to be introduced at trial.” 2014-Ohio-4927, 21 N.E.3d 355, at ¶ 25. 

Relying on this decision, the Eighth District held that the juvenile court did not err 

in refusing to merge the adjudications for aggravated robbery and kidnapping, and 

it accordingly overruled A.G.’s first assignment of error and concluded that his 

second assignment of error regarding ineffective assistance of counsel was moot. 

{¶ 6} A.G. appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction over his 

proposition of law: “The merger analysis set forth in State v. Johnson applies to 

juvenile delinquency proceedings to protect a child’s right against double 

jeopardy.”1

 142 Ohio St.3d 1464, 2015-Ohio-1896, 30 N.E.3d 973. 

 

 

1

 Although A.G. argues that the analysis set forth in State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-

Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, should apply in juvenile delinquency cases, our analysis focuses on 

this court’s more recent statements regarding the law of merger. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

II. Analysis 

{¶ 7} A.G. argues that the merger analysis set forth in this court’s decisions 

explaining how R.C. 2941.25 should be applied also applies to juvenile delinquency 

proceedings to protect the juvenile’s right against double jeopardy. In so arguing, 

he asserts that R.C. 2941.25 is the codification of the constitutional merger principle 

rather than simply an enhanced statutory protection. The state counters that R.C. 

2941.25 is a protection statute that applies only to adults because the statute 

addresses the merger of “convictions” and argues that the General Assembly’s 

decision not to afford juveniles the protections given to adults in R.C. 2941.25 

illustrates the legislature’s intention to allow cumulative commitment periods for 

juveniles. 

{¶ 8} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, which applies to Ohio citizens through the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 

794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), provides that no person shall “be subject 

for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Article I, Section 

10 of the Ohio Constitution likewise provides, “No person shall be twice put in 

jeopardy for the same offense.” We have noted that 

[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three abuses: (1) “a 

second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,” (2) “a 

second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,” and (3) 

“multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. 

Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), 

overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 

S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). 

State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 10. 
January Term, 2016 

5

{¶ 9} Noting that there “is little to distinguish” an adjudicatory hearing in a 

juvenile delinquency case from a traditional criminal prosecution, the Supreme 

Court of the United States has held that jeopardy attaches during adjudicatory 

hearings. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530-531, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 

(1975). In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that similarities between 

criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings militate in favor of providing full 

double-jeopardy protections to juveniles: 

We believe it is simply too late in the day to conclude * * * 

that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is 

to determine whether he has committed acts that violate a criminal 

law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma 

inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for 

many years. 

Id. at 529. In addition to recognizing the stigma attached to a delinquency 

determination, the court noted that juveniles in delinquency proceedings bear 

essentially the same heavy pressures and psychological and physical burdens that 

are borne by adults in criminal cases, so that adults and juveniles alike should be 

subjected to only one such experience for the same offense. Id. at 530. We 

accordingly acknowledge that both the federal and Ohio Constitutions protect 

juveniles subject to delinquency proceedings from double jeopardy in the same 

fashion as they do adults. See In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 

897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 26. 

{¶ 10} Because juveniles receive constitutional protection from double 

jeopardy, the question before us is: To what extent do the Constitutions protect 

juveniles from the third type of double jeopardy mentioned previously, multiple 

punishments for the same offense? The state argues that the merging of allied 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

offenses of similar import constitutes “enhanced statutory protection” that does not 

stem from either the United States or Ohio Constitutions. A.G. argues that the 

merging of allied offenses is rooted in the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both 

Constitutions and that R.C. 2941.25 accordingly represents a codification of a 

constitutional principle. 

{¶ 11} We agree with A.G. In discussing R.C. 2941.25 in Ruff, we have 

recently stated, “The General Assembly in codifying double-jeopardy protections

has expressed its intent as to when multiple punishments can be imposed.” 

(Emphasis added.) 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, at ¶ 12. 

Rather than providing enhanced double-jeopardy protections, R.C. 2941.25 

codifies the protections established by the Ohio Constitution. And because the 

protections contained in R.C. 2941.25 encapsulate constitutional double-jeopardy 

protections, the language and principles of that statute can be applied to juveniles 

as well. 

{¶ 12} It follows that under the Ohio Constitution, a juvenile’s doublejeopardy protections are violated when that juvenile is subjected to multiple terms 

of commitment for conduct constituting allied offenses of similar import. Just as a 

judge in adult court would do to determine if conduct constitutes allied offenses of 

similar import, a juvenile judge must evaluate three separate factors: the juvenile’s 

conduct, the juvenile’s animus, and the import of the offenses. Ruff at paragraph 

one of the syllabus. The Ruff test for allied offenses accordingly applies to juvenile 

delinquency proceedings. A juvenile whose conduct supports multiple offenses 

may be subject to terms of commitment for all the offenses if any one of the 

following is true: “(1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import, (2) the 

conduct shows that the offenses were committed separately, or (3) the conduct 

shows that the offenses were committed with separate animus.” Id. at paragraph 

three of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2016 

7

{¶ 13} Application of the Ruff test—rather than the Blockburger test 

developed by the United States Supreme Court—is necessary to both provide 

juveniles with proper double-jeopardy protection under the Ohio Constitution and 

to ensure that juveniles receive the same constitutional double-jeopardy protection 

as adults. Indeed, if we were to approve the Eighth District’s application of the 

Blockburger comparison-of-the-elements test to juveniles, the practical 

consequence would be that merger would occur very rarely in juvenile courts, even 

when merger would occur in cases with identical facts involving adults. We have 

disavowed the application of an abstract, comparison-of-the-elements test in Ohio. 

See Ruff at ¶ 16. We no longer follow the test set forth in State v. Rance, 85 Ohio 

St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699 (1999). See State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-

Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, at the syllabus (overruling Rance). Similarly we 

again disavow application of the test in the juvenile context. 

{¶ 14} We note that our decision today fully comports with what we have 

termed “heightened goals of rehabilitation and treatment” of the juvenile court 

system in Ohio. State v. D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, 

¶ 38. By applying double-jeopardy protections to juveniles in a manner that ensures 

that they will receive only one term of commitment, rather than multiple terms of 

commitment, for conduct constituting allied offenses of similar import, juveniles 

who are fully rehabilitated and treated can be released at the conclusion of their 

minimum term, rather than be forced to serve a second, duplicative term for the 

same conduct for which they have been rehabilitated and treated. While juvenile 

judges in cases like A.G.’s will retain the discretion to extend the commitment 

period until the juvenile turns 21 years old, the merging of terms of commitment 

allows for the individualized, case-by-case treatment that is appropriate for juvenile 

cases. 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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III. Conclusion 

{¶ 15} We hold that the merger analysis set forth in State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio 

St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, applies to juvenile delinquency 

proceedings to protect a child’s right against double jeopardy. We accordingly 

reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the Eighth 

District to apply our holding to the facts of this case and for consideration of A.G.’s 

remaining assignment of error, if necessary. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

O’DONNELL, J., dissents with an opinion that KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ.,

join. 

_________________ 

O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 16} Respectfully, I dissent. 

{¶ 17} The majority today takes a criminal law statute related to whether 

allied offenses of similar import should be merged for purposes of criminal 

sentencing and applies that law to civil proceedings in juvenile court, taking another 

step toward characterizing proceedings in the juvenile court system as criminal in 

nature while upending settled constitutional principles regarding double jeopardy. 

The General Assembly did not intend that the allied offenses statute should apply 

to juveniles who are not criminals and who have not been convicted of any crimes. 

The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. 

Plain Error Review 

{¶ 18} A.G. did not object to the consecutive commitments to the 

Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) on the adjudications for delinquency for 

acts constituting aggravated robbery and kidnapping if committed by an adult. 

Failing to raise the allied offenses issue in the trial court forfeits the matter for 
January Term, 2016 

9

appellate review, except for plain error. State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-

Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 21-22. 

{¶ 19} Although appellate courts have discretion to correct “[p]lain errors 

or defects affecting substantial rights,” Crim.R. 52(B), the juvenile court’s failure 

to apply the allied offenses statute in this case is not a “plain error.” We have 

explained that error is not “plain” at the time the trial court committed it if this court 

had not yet recognized the error in a “definitive pronouncement” and Ohio appellate 

courts were divided on the issue. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 28, 759 N.E.2d 

1240 (2002). 

{¶ 20} Before today’s decision, this court had not held that the allied 

offenses statute applied to juvenile delinquency proceedings. And Ohio appellate 

courts had recognized that R.C. 2941.25 is a criminal statute that does not apply to 

juvenile delinquency proceedings, which are civil in nature. E.g., In re M.P.R., 

12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-10-209, 2015-Ohio-3102, ¶ 15, fn.1; In re M.C., 6th 

Dist. Erie No. E–12–031, 2013-Ohio-2808, ¶ 21; In re S.S., 4th Dist. Vinton No. 

10CA682, 2011-Ohio-4081, ¶ 29; In re H.F., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94840, 2010-

Ohio-5253, ¶ 13; In re Bowers, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2002-A-0010, 2002-Ohio6913, ¶ 23; but see In re T.L., 186 Ohio App.3d 42, 2010-Ohio-402, 926 N.E.2d 

346, ¶ 46 (9th Dist.) vacated in part on other grounds, 127 Ohio St.3d 9, 2010-

Ohio-4936, 935 N.E.2d 840. 

{¶ 21} Thus, there is no plain error in these circumstances, and as we have 

explained, “if a forfeited error is not plain, a reviewing court need not examine 

whether the defect affects a defendant’s substantial rights; the lack of a ‘plain’ error 

within the meaning of Crim.R. 52(B) ends the inquiry and prevents recognition of 

the defect.” Barnes at 28. 

The Allied Offenses Statute 

{¶ 22} The allied offenses statute, R.C. 2941.25, provides, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed 

to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 

indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, 

but the defendant may be convicted of only one. 

(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more 

offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or 

more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or 

with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may 

contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be 

convicted of all of them. 

{¶ 23} When the words of a statute demonstrate that “ ‘the General 

Assembly has plainly and unambiguously conveyed its legislative intent, there is 

nothing for a court to interpret or construe, and therefore, the court applies the law 

as written.’ ” In re I.A., 140 Ohio St.3d 203, 2014-Ohio-3155, 16 N.E.3d 653, 

¶ 12, quoting State v. Kreischer, 109 Ohio St.3d 391, 2006-Ohio-2706, 848 N.E.2d 

496, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 24} Notably, R.C. 2941.25 uses the words “defendant,” “offenses,” 

“indictment or information,” and “convicted.” These are terms that specifically and 

expressly relate to and are consistent with adult criminal prosecutions. They have 

nothing to do with juvenile adjudications, which do not refer to juveniles as 

defendants, do not involve offenses or indictments or informations, and do not 

result in convictions. 

{¶ 25} A defendant, we have explained, is “ ‘the accused in a criminal case,’ 

” State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 118, 552 N.E.2d 913 (1990), quoting Black’s 

Law Dictionary 377 (5th Ed.1979), that is, “one indicted or charged” in connection 

with a crime, Wickline at 118. The word “offense” means “crime.” State v. Rose, 

89 Ohio St. 383, 386, 106 N.E. 50 (1914). In Ohio, criminal offenses are charged 
January Term, 2016 

11 

by indictment or information. Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution; R.C. 

2941.021. And we have explained that for purposes of R.C. 2941.25, “a 

‘conviction’ consists of a guilty verdict and the imposition of a sentence or 

penalty.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 

922 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 24. 

{¶ 26} The allied offenses statute is wholly inconsistent with proceedings 

in juvenile court. A juvenile is not a defendant or an accused but is a “child.” R.C. 

2152.02(C)(1), 2152.021; State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 728 N.E.2d 1059 

(2000). A juvenile delinquency case is not commenced by indictment or 

information, but rather it is the filing of a complaint that invokes the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction. R.C. 2152.021; Juv. R. 2(F) and 10; In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 

2012-Ohio-4538, 978 N.E.2d 164, ¶ 21. “Ohio juvenile proceedings do not result 

in criminal convictions—a juvenile court proceeding is a civil action, * * * and 

juveniles are ‘adjudicated delinquent’ rather than ‘found guilty’ * * *.” State v. 

Adkins, 129 Ohio St.3d 287, 2011-Ohio-3141, 951 N.E.2d 766, ¶ 10, quoting State 

v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000). And a juvenile receives 

a “disposition,” not a sentence. R.C. 2152.16, 2152.19. 

{¶ 27} And this distinct terminology reflects that 

[t]he juvenile courts were premised on profoundly different 

assumptions and goals than a criminal court, * * * with a focus on 

the state’s role as parens patriae and the vision that the courts would 

protect the wayward child from “evil influences,” “save” him from 

criminal prosecution, and provide him social and rehabilitative 

services. 

In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 66, citing In 

re T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 15, 556 N.E.2d 439 (1990), Children’s Home of Marion 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

Cty. v. Fetter, 90 Ohio St. 110, 127, 106 N.E. 761 (1914), and Ex parte Januszewski, 

196 F. 123, 127 (C.C.Ohio 1911). 

{¶ 28} When the legislature has intended juvenile adjudications to be 

treated as criminal convictions, it has expressly stated its intent. See, e.g., R.C. 

2923.13(A), 2950.01(B), and 2901.08(A). But in regards to allied offenses, the 

General Assembly did not make R.C. 2941.25 applicable to juvenile delinquency 

adjudications; thus, we are obliged to apply that law as written, and nothing in the 

statute authorizes or requires the juvenile court to merge delinquency adjudications 

that would be allied offenses if committed by an adult. 

Double Jeopardy 

{¶ 29} Notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, the majority 

focuses on dicta in State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 

892, ¶ 12, that referred to R.C. 2941.25 as “codifying double-jeopardy protections.” 

This court was not asked in that case to decide whether the statute codifies 

constitutional rights against double jeopardy; instead, we considered “what 

‘import’ means within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25.” Id. at ¶ 9. 

{¶ 30} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution affords protections against the imposition of multiple criminal 

punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings. Hudson v. United 

States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997); State v. Raber, 134 

Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, 982 N.E.2d 684, ¶ 24. As the Seventh Circuit 

Court of Appeals recently explained in Boyd v. Boughton, 798 F.3d 490, 497 (7th 

Cir.2015), fn. 5, “the Double Jeopardy Clause outright forbids multiple 

punishments for a single offense only when those punishments are imposed in 

successive proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 31} However, when multiple punishments are imposed in the same 

proceeding, the Double Jeopardy Clause does nothing more than prevent the 

sentencing court from imposing greater punishment than the legislature intended. 
January Term, 2016 

13 

Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 793, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985); 

Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983); 

Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, at ¶ 16. In this way, 

the Double Jeopardy Clause embodies the basic principles that the power to define 

criminal offenses and prescribe punishment is vested in the legislative branch of 

government and that courts may impose sentences only as provided by statute. 

Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980); 

Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). 

{¶ 32} The Double Jeopardy Clause therefore does not curtail the General 

Assembly’s discretion in providing for multiple sanctions for the same offense. It 

is well settled that the legislature may require a fine and imprisonment as the 

sentence for a single crime. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139, 101 

S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). Nor does the Double Jeopardy Clause preclude 

the legislature from establishing multiple punishments when the same conduct or 

transaction results in the commission of multiple offenses. Garrett at 793. This is 

so because the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against excessive

punishments prescribed by the legislature and imposed by a court in the same 

proceeding. Rather, protections against arbitrary, disparate, and disproportionate 

punishment emanate from the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, 

and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment 

and excessive fines. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450; 

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 

(1991); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-673, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 

(1977). 

{¶ 33} Accordingly, the question posed in this case is solely one of 

legislative intent, and in Ohio, “[a]bsent a more specific legislative statement, R.C. 

2941.25 is the primary indication of the General Assembly’s intent to prohibit or 

allow multiple punishments for two or more offenses resulting from the same 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

conduct.” State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 

661, ¶ 11. And R.C. 2941.25 provides “ ‘a clear indication of the General 

Assembly’s intent to permit cumulative sentencing for the commission of certain 

offenses.’ ” (Emphasis added.) State v. Cooper, 104 Ohio St.3d 293, 2004-Ohio6553, 819 N.E.2d 657, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Bickerstaff, 10 Ohio St.3d 62, 66, 461 

N.E.2d 892 (1984), fn. 1. 

{¶ 34} The majority’s inference that the allied offenses statute codifies 

double jeopardy protections is therefore faulty, because the Double Jeopardy 

Clause affords no protection against the imposition of multiple punishments 

prescribed by the legislature for the same offense in the same proceeding, and the 

merger of allied offenses is required only as provided by R.C. 2941.25. 

{¶ 35} Tellingly, the majority does not hold that the Fifth Amendment 

requires the merger of allied offenses—the majority rejects the use of the test 

established by the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 

284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)—but rather the majority 

claims that 

R.C. 2941.25 codifies the protections established by the Ohio 

Constitution. And because the protections contained in R.C. 

2941.25 encapsulate constitutional double-jeopardy protections, the 

language and principles of that statute can be applied to juveniles as 

well. 

It follows that under the Ohio Constitution, a juvenile’s 

double-jeopardy protections are violated when that juvenile is 

subjected to multiple terms of commitment for conduct constituting 

allied offenses of similar import. 

Majority opinion at ¶ 11-12. 
January Term, 2016 

15 

{¶ 36} The question whether the Ohio Constitution forbids the imposition 

of multiple punishments for the same offense in the same proceeding has not been 

specifically briefed or argued in this case. Although A.G. asserted in the appellate 

court that the United States and Ohio Constitutions require the merger of his 

delinquency adjudications, no argument was presented that the Ohio Constitution 

affords greater protections than the United States Constitution provides. The 

memorandum in support of jurisdiction that A.G. filed did not even mention the 

Ohio Constitution. See State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 

N.E.2d 422, ¶ 11 (declining to address an issue that was not presented in the 

memorandum in support of jurisdiction); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 128 Ohio St.3d 

68, 2010-Ohio-6279, 941 N.E.2d 1187, ¶ 40 (same). And the relevant argument in 

A.G.’s opening brief to this court is limited to the statement that “[t]he Ohio 

Constitution also provides Double Jeopardy protections.” 

{¶ 37} Because A.G. has not argued that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 

Constitution provides greater protection against multiple punishments than the 

Fifth Amendment, we should not raise this question on our own initiative. 

{¶ 38} But in any case, as Justice Lanzinger recently wrote for the court in 

State v. Broom, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-1028, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 21, 

“Ohio’s constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy, Article I, Section 10, is 

coextensive with the federal clause.” We have consistently adhered to this view 

that the Ohio Constitution affords no greater double jeopardy protections than the 

Fifth Amendment. State v. Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 

N.E.2d 284, ¶ 14; State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398, 2002-Ohio-6661, 780 

N.E.2d 250, ¶ 7; State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432, 668 N.E.2d 435 (1996). 

{¶ 39} And our cases reviewing whether Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 

Constitution bars multiple punishments for the same offense in the same proceeding 

have accorded with decisions from federal courts applying the United States 

Constitution; we have held that “appellate review is limited to ensuring that the trial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

court did not exceed the sentencing authority which the General Assembly has 

permitted the judiciary.” State v. Moss, 69 Ohio St.2d 515, 518, 433 N.E.2d 181 

(1982); accord State v. Williams, 124 Ohio St.3d 381, 2010-Ohio-147, 922 N.E.2d 

937, ¶ 12; State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 634-635, 710 N.E.2d 699 (1999), 

overruled on other grounds, State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, syllabus; State v. Delfino, 22 Ohio St.3d 270, 272, 490 

N.E.2d 884 (1986). 

{¶ 40} The legislature’s intent is manifest. R.C. 2941.25 does not apply to 

juvenile delinquency adjudications. Moreover, R.C. 2152.17(F) vests the juvenile 

court with discretion to impose separate consecutive commitments to DYS in these 

circumstances, as long as the total commitment does not exceed the child’s 

attainment of 21 years of age. 

{¶ 41} The majority loses sight of the fact that the General Assembly has 

granted the juvenile court judges of this state discretion and flexibility because 

rehabilitation of the delinquent child—not punishing the child for committing 

crimes—is the ultimate goal of the juvenile court. State v. D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 

540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, ¶ 54. By superimposing yet another 

requirement of criminal procedure on juvenile courts, the majority blurs the focus 

on rehabilitation and threatens the flexibility and discretion that distinguish juvenile 

dispositions from criminal sentencing, all to the detriment of juvenile offenders 

who could benefit from services provided during commitment. 

{¶ 42} And the majority’s effort to apply the adult allied offenses statute to 

juvenile proceedings is a broad attempt to judicially impose what the legislature has 

chosen not to do and violates the separation of powers doctrine by legislating from 

the bench. This is a matter of policy for the General Assembly—not this court—to 

decide. 

 
January Term, 2016 

17 

Conclusion 

{¶ 43} The consecutive commitments to DYS imposed in this case do not 

violate either the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution or the allied 

offenses statute. According to its plain language, R.C. 2941.25 applies only to adult 

criminal convictions, not to juvenile delinquency adjudications that might 

constitute convictions for allied offenses if the acts had been committed by an adult. 

{¶ 44} Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Timothy McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gregory 

Ochocki and T. Allan Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Charlyn Bohland, Assistant 

Public Defender, for appellant. 

_________________