. . . to Those Who Served 

Foreword

This is the second of five volumes to be published in the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR. When completed, these volumes will present a comprehensive account of U.S. Army activities in what

was once euphemistically termed a police action. Truce Tent and Fighting

Front covers the last two years in the Korean War and treats the seemingly

interminable armistice negotiations and the violent but sporadic fighting

at the front.

The scene therefore frequently shifts from the dialectic, propaganda,

and frustrations at the conference table to the battles on key hills and at

key outposts. The author presents a solid and meaningful reconstruction

of the truce negotiations; he develops the issues debated and captures the

color of the arguments and the arguers. The planning and events that

guided or influenced the proceedings on the United Nations side are thoroughly explained. The volume abounds in object lessons and case studies

that illustrate problems American officers may encounter in negotiating

with Communists. Problems encountered by the U.N. high command in

handling recalcitrant Communist prisoners of war within the spirit and

letter of the Geneva Convention are explained with clarity and sympathy.

Truce Tent and Fighting Front is offered to all thoughtful citizens–

military and civilian—as a contribution to the literature of limited war.

Washington, D.C. 18 June 1965

HAL C. PATTISON

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

vii
The Author

Walter G. Hermes received his M.A. from Boston University and his

Ph.D. in History from Georgetown University.

During World War II he served with the U.S. Army in radio intelligence

and military government assignments. After the war he attended the University of Denver and the University of California at Los Angeles.

Dr. Hermes joined the Office of the Chief of Military History in 1949.

For many years he served as Department of the Army representative on the

Department of Defense Liaison Committee with the Department of State

on the Foreign Relations of the United States series insofar as they covered

World War II and the international conferences of that period. Dr. Hermes

is at present a member of the Current History Branch of the Office of the

Chief of Military History.

He has assisted Dr. Maurice Matloff in the preparation of the volume

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 in the UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series, and has edited the volume by

Maj. Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and

War in the ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES.

viii
Preface

This volume is offered as a contribution to the politico-military history

of the Korean War. Unlike nearly all of the previous wars waged by the

United States, the conflict in Korea brought no military victory; in fact,

during the last two years of the struggle neither side sought to settle the

issue decisively on the battlefield. In this respect the Korean War had no

modern American counterpart. It resembled most the War of 1812 when

the nation had also carried on a desultory war while it attempted to negotiate a peace with the British. More important fighting, in both cases, went

on at the peace table than on the field of combat.

Although the action at the front from July 1951 to July 1953 was inconclusive, there was a definite interrelationship between the intensity of

the fighting and the status of affairs at the truce meetings. Both the United

Nations Command and its opponents tried with some success to induce

more reasonable negotiating attitudes in their adversaries through the application of limited military pressure.

Under the command system operating during the Korean War, the U.S.

Army was given executive responsibility for carrying out U.S. military

policy in Korea and for negotiating the truce agreement. Thus, the volume

crosses service and departmental lines. General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief, Far East Command, and his successor, General Mark W.

Clark, commanded U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine forces as well

as Republic of Korea units. As Commanders in Chief, United Nations

Command, they also controlled ground, air, and naval forces contributed

by some members of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war in

Korea. Although the armistice negotiations were supposed to be strictly

military in nature, political elements entered the discussions and the Army

often had to participate in formulating and carrying out the policy adopted

by the President and his advisors. Army officers, through Army channels,

frequently handled not only military relations between the United States

and the Republic of Korea, but economic and political affairs as well. The

Army story in Korea, therefore, is more than a service account; in essence,

it is the American story of the struggle for peace during the war.

For the focus of the volume, the activities of the theater commander

were chosen as the most appropriate. From this intermediate point the

author could shift to Washington for policy decisions that affected the war,

ix
or move easily to the truce tent or the fighting front in Korea to show how

the policy was carried out. The theater commander served as a moderator

between the world of policy and the world of action, leaving his imprint

on both.

The unavailability of reliable documentation of the Communist Chinese

and North Korean plans, objectives, and casualties has forced the author

to rely upon the U.S. intelligence estimates for information in these areas.

While the information contained in these estimates cannot be regarded as

firm or precise, it was the best available when the volume was written.

Since the last two years of the war produced few large-scale ground operations, battlefront coverage has been selective. Major operations are, of

course, described in some detail, but to attempt to cover the hundreds of

hill actions, patrols, and raids would require an over-sized volume cluttered

with monotonous detail. The emphasis, therefore, has been placed upon

small-scale actions involving U.S. Army units that most typically portray

the fighting of a given period.

No attempt has been made to do more than summarize the combat

operations of the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marines during the last two

years of the war, as these services have published, or are in the process of

publishing, their own detailed accounts. Similarly, the Republic of Korea

and many of the other participants in the United Nations Command have

published, or presumably will publish at some future time, accounts of their

participation. The contributions made by the other U.S. services and by

the other nations of the United Nations Command in Korea deserve full

consideration and credit, but the author felt it was quite proper to devote

the majority of his attention to U.S. Army units in the combat portions of the

volume.

The problem of dating the many radio messages exchanged between

Washington and the Far East has been met by accepting the date on the

document used. The time differences between the two areas meant that

different dates were used in each place for the same message, but it was

felt that any attempt to change all the dates to Washington time or to

Tokyo time might lead to further confusion. In most cases the difference

of a day meant little substantively and the messages can be identified and

located by number as well as by date.

In the course of researching and writing this volume the author has

received help from many sources, both within and without the Office of

the Chief of Military History, and gladly acknowledges his indebtedness.

He owes special debts of gratitude to Col. Joseph Rockis, former Chief

of the Histories Division, OCMH, and to Dr. Maurice Matloff, Chief,

Current History Branch, OCMH, for their steadfast confidence and support during the initial phases of the project. For their many helpful suggestions and wise counsel the author is also deeply grateful to Dr. Stetson

Conn, Chief Historian, Dr. John Miller, jr., Deputy Chief Historian, Mr.

x
Billy C. Mossman, General History Branch, and Dr. Robert W. Coakley,

General History Branch, all of the Office of the Chief of Military History,

as well as to Mr. James F. Schnabel, JCS Historical Division, Mr. Wilber

W. Hoare, JCS Historical Division, and Dr. Jules Davids, Georgetown

University.

Without the cheerful and efficient documentary research assistance of

Mrs. Lois Aldridge and Mrs. Hazel Ward of the World War II Division, National Archives and Records Service, the author's task would have been far

more difficult. In the Office of the Chief of Military History the personnel

of the General Reference Branch under Mr. Israel Wice and his successor,

Mr. Charles F. Romanus, have provided services too numerous to mention.

The volume was edited by Mr. David Jaffé, whose interest and professional skill were welcomed throughout the writing and revision of the

manuscript. Mrs. Marion P. Grimes performed yeoman service as assistant

editor and Mrs. Frances R. Burdette ably assisted in the preparation of the

manuscript for the printer. The index was prepared by Mr. Nicholas J.

Anthony.

The author was fortunate in having the maps drawn under the direction of Mr. Billy C. Mossman, whose knowledge of the terrains and the

records to be researched left little to be desired. The photographs were

skillfully selected by Miss Ruth A. Phillips.

It is perhaps needless to say that any substantive errors that remain in

the manuscript are solely the responsibility of the author.

In conclusion the author would be remiss if he failed to express his

appreciation of the encouragement that he received throughout the writing

of this volume from his wife, Esther Festa Hermes.

Washington, D.C.

18 June 1965

WALTER G. HERMES

xi

Contents

Chapter Page

I. INTRODUCTION ................ . 1

T h e Battleground ............... . 2

The Ideological Conflict, 1945-50 ......... . 5

The First Year, 1950-51 ............ . 9

II. THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS .......... . 15

Preliminary Arrangements ............ . 15

The Measure of the Opposition ......... . 20

Battle of the Agenda ............. . 26

Reaction at the Front ............. . 32

III. POINT AND COUNTERPOINT .......... . 35

The 38th Parallel ............... . 35

The Incidents ................ . 40

IV. A TIME FOR PREPARATION ........... . 52

Conduct of the War—The Washington Side ..... . 52

The JCS Ponder ............... . 56

Of Men and Arms .............. . 58

Developing the ROK Army ........... . 62

Maintaining U.N. Support ........... . 67

V. THE NEW WAR ................ . 73

The KANSAS-WYOMING Line ......... . 73

The Enemy ................. . 76

The UNC Takes the Initiative .......... . 80

Heartbreak Ridge ............... . 86

Advance in the West ............. . 97

Internal Changes ............... . 103

Air Operations ................ . 105

The War at Sea ............... . 108

Postlude .................. . 11 0

VI. THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ...... . 112

The Line of Demarcation ............ . 112

Opening Skirmishes on Item 3 .......... . 121

Domestic Problems and Foreign Pressures ...... . 129

xiii
Chapter Page

VII. PRISONERS OF WAR .............. . 135

Voluntary Repatriation ............. . 13 5

The Period of Reconnaissance .......... . 139

The Communists Reject Voluntary Repatriation . . . . .14 4

VIII. THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL ............ . 152

Narrowing th e Issues ............. . 15 2

Settlement of Item 5 .............. . 156

T h e Horse Traders .............. . 15 9

Screening the POW's ............. . 167

The Package Is Delivered ............ . 172

IX. "THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" ............ . 175

A Choice Is Made ............... . 175

The War of Position ............. . 178

Night Patrol ................. . 18 8

Interdiction and Harassment ........... . 192

T h e Shifting o f th e Balance ...... . .... . 19 8

X. BEHIND THE LINES .............. . 206

Improving the ROK Army ........... . 207

Relations With the ROK ............ . 214

The Japanese Take a Hand ........... . 220

Ammunition Shortages ............. . 22 4

Propaganda Assault ............... . 23 0

X I . KOJE-DO ..... . . ............. . 23 3

The Seeds Are Planted ............. . 233

T h e Time o f Ripening ........ . .... . 24 3

Bitter Harvest ........... . .... . 25 4

XII. SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION ........... . 263

Aftermath of the Package Proposal ........ . 263

Variations o n a Theme ........ . .... . 26 6

Narrowing the Choices ............. . 276

XIII. STALEMATE .................. . 28 3

Holding the Line ............... . 283

O l d Baldy .................. . 28 5

Up the Hill, Down the Hill ........... . 296

T h e Battle fo r White Horse ...... . .... . 30 3

Jackson Heights ................ . 30 7

Operation SHOWDOWN ............ . 31 0

XIV. THE AIR AND SEA WAR, MID-1952 ... . .... . 319

Strategic and Tactical Air Operations . . . . . . . .31 9

The Kojo Demonstration ............ . 328

xiv
Chapter Page

XV. PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR ..... . .... . 330

Reviewing th e Alternatives ...... . .... . 33 0

Budget, Manpower, and Resources ......... . 333

Ammunition Again ......... . .... . 33 6

The Expansion of the ROK Army ......... . 340

Crisis in the Rear ............... . 345

XVI. CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES ......... . 349

T h e Turning Coin ......... . .... . 34 9

Facets of the Artillery War ........... . 351

T h e Bulwark Grows ......... . .... . 35 7

The Reorganization of the Far East Command .... . 362

XVII. COLD FRONT ................. . 366

The Demise of Military Victory .......... . 366

Winter Action ................ . 36 7

Air and Naval Operations ............ . 397

XVIII. THE BEGINNING OF THE END .......... . 401

The Long Recess: First Phase .......... . 401

The Republicans Take Over ........... . 408

The Big Break ................ . 411

Operation LITTLE SWITCH .......... . 414

Preparations for the Return to Plenary Sessions . . . . .419

XIX. THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS ....... . 422

The Exploratory Stage ............. . 422

Give and Take ................ . 425

A Goal Is Reached .............. . 429

Residue ................... . 43 2

XX. LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION .......... . 436

A Sense of Insecurity .............. . 436

Friend or Foe? ................ . 441

The Pacification of Rhee ............ . 451

XXI. THE LAST OFFENSIVE ............. . 459

T h e Preliminaries ............... . 45 9

T h e Tempo Mounts ......... . .... . 46 5

Final Test ............. . .... . 47 0

The Tally Sheet ............... . 476

XXII. FINALE .................... . 47 9

Assurance and Reassurances ........... . 479

The Home Stretch .............. . 484

The Big Day ................ . 489

Postlude .................. . 49 0

xv
Chapter Page

XXIII. RETROSPECT. ................. . 49 8

T h e Negotiations ............... . 50 2

T h e Battlefield ................ . 50 7

Appendixes

A. Strength of the UNC Ground Fortes in Korea ...... . 513

B. Prisoners of War ................. . 514

C. Armistice Agreement ................ . 516

D. Plenary Members of the Armistice Delegations ....... . 539

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . ............... . 540

LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS .......... . .... . 54 4

LIST OF CODE NAMES ................ . 546

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS ............ . 547

INDEX ........................ . 54 9

Table

Eighth Army Estimate of Enemy Forces, 1 July 1951 ....... . 77

Charts

No.

1. Channels of Command, July 1951 ............. . 54

2. U.N. Command/Far East Command, Major Ground Forces,

1 July 1951 .................... . 57

3. Chain of Command of Enemy Forces, 1 July 1951 ....... . 78

4. Far East Command, Staff and Major Commands Organization,

1 January 1953 ................... . 364

Maps

1. The Kaesong Conference Site, 1 July 1951 .......... . 28

2. The Armistice Conference Area, 22 October 1951 ....... . 48

3. The Punchbowl Area ................. . 82

4. The Old Baldy Area ................. . 286

5. The Ch'orwon Valley ................. . 304

6. The Triangle Hill Complex .............. . 312

7. Big and Little Nori .................. . 381

8. The Nevada Complex ................. . 396

xvi
Color Maps

No. Page

I. The Line of Contact, 1 July 1951 ...................... . 73

II. The Battle Lines, 10 July-31 October 1951 ................ . 98

III. Proposed Demarcation Line, 27 November 1951 ............. . 119

IV. The Eighth Army Front Line, 30 April 1952 ............... . 283

V. The Eighth Army Front Lines, 31 October 1952 ............. . 318

VI. The Eighth Army Front: The West Sector, 31 March 1953 ....... . 370

VII. The Eighth Army Front: The East Sector, 31 March 1953 ....... . 376

VIII. The Eighth Army Front Line, 27 July 1953 ................ . 476

IX. The Demarcation Line, 27 July 1953 .................... . 490

Illustrations

President Harry S. Truman ................ . 11

Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall and General Matthew B.

Ridgway, Tokyo ................... . 12

Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet ................ . 13

Kaesong ....................... . 1 8

U.N. Liaison Officers Arrive Near Kaesong ........... . 22

U.N. Liaison Group and Communist Escort, Kaesong Rest House... . 23

Former Tea House, Site of the Kaesong Conferences ........ . 25

U.N. Delegates to First Armistice Session, July 1951 ....... . 26

Communist Armistice Delegates, Kaesong ...... . .... . 2 7

Investigating Alleged Neutrality Violation ........... . 44

General Ridgway a t th e Front .......... . .... . 6 0

President Syngman Rhee With U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio ... . 65

Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor ............... . 66

Col. Arthur S. Champeny ................. . 67

KMAG Instructor Addressing ROK Troops Through an Interpreter . . 68

Port of Pusan ..................... . 71

The Punchbowl .................... . 83

2d Infantry Division Troops on Bloody Ridge ......... . 84

Heartbreak Ridge .................... . 8 7

North Korean Rail Line After Interdiction Bombing ....... . 106

USS New Jersey 16-inch Guns ............... . 109

Truce Tents ..................... . 114

General Pien Chang-wu Arrives ............... . 115

Col. James C. Murray and Col. Chang Chun San Initial Line of

Demarcation Ma p .................. . 12 0

General Nam Il and a Staff Officer .............. . 125

Winston S. Churchill in Washington ..............13 1

xvii
Page

General J. Lawton Collins ............ . .... . 13 3

The UNC Delegates, December 1951 ............. . 154

General Yu Chae Heung, Maj. William K. Harrison, Jr., and Vice Adm.

C. Turner Joy, Panmunjom .............. . 157

UNC Delegates at Base Camp, Munsan-ni ........... . 164

White Horse Hill .................... . 179

Captured Guerrillas in Chiri-san Area ............ . 183

155-mm. Self-Propelled Gu n ........... . .... . 18 5

Evacuating Wounded ROK Soldier by Helicopter ........ . 186

Industrial Area of Ch'ongjin After Bombardment ........ . 198

ROK Army Recruits Receiving Initial Issues ..... . .... . 207

KMAG Instructor Assisting ROK Trainee ........... . 208

Korean Military Academy, Main Building ........... . 212

Antiarmistice Demonstration in Seoul ............ . 216

Unloading Rice a t Pusan ............ . .... . 21 8

POW's in a Koje-do Compound .............. . 235

POW's Learn To Work Tin ................ . 236

A Communist POW Leader ................ . 238

Brig. Gen. Francis T. Dodd ................ . 239

Stalin Portrait Displayed During POW Demonstration ...... . 241

A Koje-do Commandant Talking to POW's .......... . 244

Brig. Gen. Charles F. Colson ............... . 246

General Mark W. Clark ................. . 249

Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner ............... . 256

Weapons Seized in Compound 76 .............. . 258

Cross-Marked Grave Sites of Murdered POW's ......... . 260

A New Compound on Koje-do ............... . 261

Screening POW's on Koje-do ................ . 271

UNC Delegates at Panmunjom, 6 July 1952 .......... . 274

Flooded Bridge Crossing on Main Supply Route ......... . 294

Setting Up Barbed Wire Entanglements on Old Baldy ...... . 295

South Korean Mortar Emplacement on Capitol Hill ....... . 298

Bomb Strike on Suiho Hydroelectric Plant .......... . 321

B-29 Attack on P'yongyang ................ . 323

An 8-inch Howitzer and Crew ............... . 339

Brig. Gen. Cornelius E. Ryan ............... . 345

Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Herren ............... . 348

Salvaged Cartridge Shells ................. . 355

Korean Military Academy Cadets on Parade .......... . 359

President-Elect Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins

Near Ch'orwon, December 1962 ............. . 368

Entrance to a Communist Bunker .............. . 369

Part of 25th Infantry Division Bunker Area ........... . 371

Marine Pfc. Pulls Shrapnel From His Armored Vest ....... . 373

xviii
Page

Hot Food Being Carried to Front Lines ........... . 375

2d Infantry Division Patrol Wearing Winter Camouflage Suits .... . 380

View of the T-Bone Hill Sector .......... . .... . 383

Pongam-do POW Camp, Enclosure 1 ............ . 405

Signing Agreement for Sick and Wounded Prisoner Exchange . . . . .41 6

Communist POW Exchange Site a t Panmunjom .... . .... . 41 7

Operation LITTLE SWITCH ................. . 41 8

UNC Delegates at Panmunjom, 26 April 1953 ......... . 423

President Rhee Greets the Tasca Mission ........... . 437

Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson. ...... . .... . 45 8

T h e Armistice Building, Panmunjom ....... . .... . 49 2

Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., Arrives at the Armistice Building. . . 493

General Harrison and General Nam Il Signing the Armistice .... . 494

T h e Bound Armistice Agreement Documents ..... . .... . 49 5

General Clark Signs the Armistice Agreement .... . .... . 496

Illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

xix

CHAPTER I

Introduction

After a year of bitter combat, the war

in Korea lost momentum. By the first

of July 1951, the war of movement had

come to an end and a new, more static

phase began. As the battle lines stabilized, the impetus for a political settlement of the conflict mounted. This shift

in emphasis introduced a new set of

values and changed the complexion of

the fighting completely. For the rest

of the war, battle was to be the handmaiden of policy rather than its consort.

The first year had been quite different. When the military forces of the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

moved southward across the 38th Parallel in June 1950, the United Nations

had supported the efforts of the Republic of Korea to halt the Communist

invasion. The United States bore the

brunt of the burden as the United Nations had first contained, then driven

back the North Koreans in defeat. Only

the entry of the Chinese Communists

into the war in November had prevented the United Nations from attaining a clear-cut military victory as well

as a potential political triumph in the

unification of Korea.

But from this point on, the war had

become more complicated. The expansion of the conflict to include Red China

might also presage the entry of the

Soviet Union at a future date. Political considerations increasingly overshadowed the battleground as the

Chinese Communists forced the U.N.

units to draw back of the 38th Parallel.

To defeat the North Korean forces had

been one thing; the immense manpower

reserves of China and possibly the Soviet Union were another. After U.N.

counterattacks had pushed the Communists back to the general area of the

38th Parallel, the prospects for a military victory for either side without a

tremendous expenditure of lives and

matériel became evanescent. The time

for a reappraisal had arrived.

There could be little doubt that the

outbreak in Korea was but a segment

of the larger contest between the Soviet

Union and the United States. The major question revolved about the importance of that segment. Was Korea simply

a local test of power, a part of the continuous Communist probing for soft

spots that could be easily brought under

control by direct action? Or could it become something more serious—the first

step toward World War III if the Soviet

Union felt her basic interests threatened

by a setback in Korea? The search for

an answer to this problem was to plague

the United States and her allies throughout the war and to exert a profound

influence on the direction of political

and military affairs.
2 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

The Battleground

Before the war broke out in mid-1950,

few people in the Western World either

knew or cared to know a great deal

about Korea or its people. Under the

impact of war, knowledge became essential. Old books on the subject were

dusted and new ones were quickly

rushed to the printers. Maps of Korea

filled the newspapers and slowly some

of the strange-sounding names became

familiar to the man on the street. The

candle of indifference was replaced

by the searchlight of interest as Korean

geography and history assumed new

importance.

Korea shares a long, common frontier

with Manchuria along the Yalu and

Tumen Rivers and touches the Soviet

Union at the mouth of the Tumen.

From the northernmost bend of the Tumen,

Korea extends some 600 miles to the southern tip of the peninsula with a width varying

from slightly over 100 miles at the waist to

approximately 220 miles at its broadest

part. The dominant feature of the topography is the mountainous Taebaek chain

covering northeastern Korea and running

south along the eastern coast. As one

observer has remarked: "There is no

spot in the country in which a mountain does not form a part of the landscape."1

 The mountain slopes dip

sharply down to the sea in the east, but

are more gentle in the west. Roads,

railroads, and the communications network follow the valleys and mountain

passes in the broken terrain.

Korea is an agricultural country raising most of its dry crops in the north

and the bulk of its rice in the south.

The majority of its heavy industry and

hydroelectric development is located in

the north. Average precipitation and

mean temperatures are similar to those

in the Middle Atlantic States of the

United States, but the winters are much

colder and over 80 percent of the rainfall is concentrated in the seven months

between April and October. Floods are

fairly frequent during this period.

With such a long salt-water frontier,

fishing villages dot the coast of Korea.

Ironically, the best ports are on the

southern and western coasts, where tidal

variations are more extreme. There are

few good harbors on the Sea of Japan

which has a tidal range of only about

three feet.

Located at the strategic crossroads of

east Asia, Korea has had a long and

checkered history. For many centuries

the peninsula experienced a series of

petty wars between rival powers seeking

to establish hegemony. Finally, during

the seventh century, the kingdom of

Silla managed with Chinese aid to gain

control of most of Korea. The influence

of Chinese civilization at this time

brought about Korean acceptance of the

Confucian system of social relationships

and left a lasting imprint upon Korean

ethics, morals, arts, and literature. Despite invasions of barbarian hordes

during succeeding centuries, Korea remained faithful on the whole to its

father-son relationship with China and

regarded itself as inferior to its mentor.2

1

 E. de Schweinitz Brunner, quoted in Andrew

J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York: The

John Day Company, 1944), p. 9.

2

 An excellent account of early Korean history

and the Confucian system of association of nations

may be found in M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and

the Old Orders in Eastern Asia (Baton Rouge:

Louisiana State University Press, 1946).
INTRODUCTION 3

When the Western nations attempted

to establish commercial relations with

Korea in the mid-nineteenth century,

they encountered a steadfast resistance

to any contacts with foreigners. Unfamiliar with the Confucian tradition,

which placed Korea in the position of

a son or younger brother to China, the

West misinterpreted the relationship

and considered it a vassal state to China.

But China disclaimed suzerainty over

Korea and the Japanese later used this

admission in their efforts to detach

Korea completely from China.

Japan, whose interest in Korea had

covered many centuries, understood the

Confucian relationship perfectly, yet its

desire to extend the Japanese Empire

and to secure its flanks led to economic

penetration of Korea in 1876. By applying pressure on the Chinese, Japan secured a commercial treaty that opened

some of Korea's ports.

Six years later the United States also

concluded a treaty of peace, amity, commerce, and navigation with Korea. As a

result of this agreement the United

States sent its first military assistance

group to Korea in 1888, when several

military instructors were dispatched to

train the Korean Army. By introducing

U.S. participation in the opening of

Korea, the able Chinese statesman, Li

Hung-chang, sought to balance Japanese

political aims with American commercial interest.

As Li attempted to strengthen China's

position in Korea from 1885 to 1894, he

clashed directly with the Japanese and

the rivalry erupted into war. The Japanese emerged victorious, and by the

treaty of 1895 Korea was completely cut

off from the old familiar ties with China.

Clumsily Japan tried to adopt the orphan, but Japanese intrigue miscued in

1896 when the Korean queen, who opposed Japanese control, was murdered.

Popular reaction in Korea forced the

Japanese to desist for the time being and

the Korean king turned to the Russians

to neutralize Japanese influence.

The Russians proved to be as inept

as the Japanese as they quickly tried to

secure valuable mining, lumber, and

commercial concessions. Thus, when the

Russian representatives inadvertently

gave the king a chance to dispense with

further Russian assistance in 1898, the

latter, much to the discomfort of the

Russians, eagerly seized his opportunity.

Although both Russia and Japan were

temporarily checked in their plans for

gaining the favored position in Korea,

they watched each other jealously for

the next few years. Finally in 1904 the

Japanese decided to halt Russian maneuvering in Manchuria and Korea.

The Russo-Japanese War ended with

another Japanese triumph and this time

they were determined not to lose the

prize. Japanese administrators, officials,

and police moved into Korea and gradually increased their control. Japanese

diplomats negotiated successfully for

British and American acceptance of

their special interests in Korea. The

Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905 traded

U.S. acquiescence to Japanese suzerainty

over Korea for Japanese denial of aggressive designs upon the Philippines.

When formal annexation of Korea by

the Japanese occurred in 1910, there was

little protest except from the Koreans

themselves.

During the next thirty-five years,

Korea became a Japanese colony. There

were several Korean attempts at rebellion, but the Japanese swiftly suppressed
4 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

any opposition and tightened their control. Japanese officials and spies blanketed the peninsula and helped the

Japanese police maintain strict order. In

the meantime they exploited the country economically and attempted to assimilate it culturally. They modernized

the industrial and communications system of Korea considerably. When World

War II began, Korea became an armed

camp and an important part of the

Japanese war base.

In late 1943, Korean patriots received

their first words of outside encouragement. In the Cairo Declaration of 1

December, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill of the United Kingdom, and

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China

issued the following statement: "The

aforesaid three great powers, mindful of

the enslavement of the people of Korea,

are determined that in due course Korea

shall become free and independent." 3

The patriots might have been a little

less enthusiastic if they could have

listened to the conversation of President

Roosevelt and Prime Minister Joseph V.

Stalin of the Soviet Union at Yalta in

February 1945. In discussing a possible

four-power trusteeship for Korea in the

postwar period, Roosevelt stated that he

thought it would take twenty to thirty

years before Korea was ready for complete independence. The Soviet leader

hoped it would take less time, but he

was pleased that the President felt that

no foreign troops should be stationed in

the liberated country.4

When the Soviet Union later declared

war upon Japan in August 1945, it adhered to the Potsdam Declaration of 28

July 1945 and joined the United States,

the United Kingdom, and China in supporting the independence of Korea "in

due course."5

During the hectic days of early August

1945, the necessity for a quick decision

on the division of responsibility for accepting the surrender of Japanese forces

in Korea became pressing. The dropping

of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki on the 6th and 9th of August

and Russia's entry into the war on the

8th proved to be the final straw that

broke Japan's back. But while the Japanese were negotiating, the Russians

prepared to invade Korea. The situation

called for immediate action and U.S.

War Department planners suggested the

38th Parallel of north latitude as an

arbitrary dividing line of operations.

The Americans would receive the surrender of Japanese forces south of the

parallel and the Russians would have

the same responsibility to the north.6

By 14 August, the Army recommendation had been approved by the U.S.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the State

Department, and, finally, by President

Harry S. Truman. The next day, the

President proposed to Marshal Stalin

that the 38th Parallel be accepted as the

demarcation line between the American

and Russian operational zones of responsibility. On 16 August Stalin agreed

and orders were issued to General of the

Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander

3 in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, con- Department of State, In Quest of Peace and

Security: Selected Documents on American Foreign

Policy, 1941-51 (Washington, 1951), p. 10. 4

 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the

United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta,

1945 (Washington. 1955), p. 770.

5

 Department of State, The Conflict in Korea

(Washington, 1951), p. 2. 6

 For a detailed study of the decision to use the

38th Parallel as a dividing line, see Paul C. McGrath, The 38th Parallel Division. MS in OCMH.
INTRODUCTION 5

taining detailed instructions on procedures and arrangements for receiving

the surrender and including the provision concerning the 38th Parallel.

With Russian forces already advancing

into Korea and American troops still

some six hundred miles away on Okinawa, the 38th Parallel seemed to be

an advantageous line for the latter.

Without the zonal agreement, there was

a distinct possibility that the Russians

could occupy all of Korea before American soldiers could reach the peninsula.

There was no intention on the part of

the Americans that the 38th Parallel

should serve any purpose other than

as a temporary line of convenience.

The development of the line into a

permanent wall came later.

The line of division was arbitrary. It

cut across roads, rivers, and railroads

willy-nilly and separated the primarily

agricultural south from the more industrialized north. There were about

16,000,000 people in the 37,000 square

miles of the southern zone and 9,000,-

000 in the 48,000 square miles to the

north. As for regional differences, there

were shades of the American Civil War

period. The North Korean "Yankee"

was more likely to be independent and

hard working and to own his own farm,

while the "Southerner" was apt to be

more tractable and a tenant farmer. The

"Southerners" looked down upon their

northern countrymen as unpolished

troublemakers and the North Koreans

viewed their southern neighbors as lazy

rascals.7

These regional prejudices, under

normal conditions, might not have

amounted to a great deal, since they

exist to some degree in most countries.

Unfortunately for Korea, the conditions

that developed after the end of World

War II were not normal. The collapse

of the Axis nations brought an inevitable shifting of the balance of international power. A divergence between

American and Soviet policies had appeared even before the defeat of their

common enemies and the temporary relief from tension that the end of a war

usually brings did not follow World

War II. Instead, a period of mounting

pressure began during which the basic

conflict between the Soviet Union and

the United States became more and

more apparent. In the contest of these

titans, Korea was but one of the prizes.

The Ideological Conflict, 1945-50

When the first U.S. troops arrived at

Seoul in early September 1945, Korean

civil affairs were in a state of complete

confusion. With the country in dire

need of assistance—economic, financial,

administrative, and political—the American military commander, Lt. Gen. John

R. Hodge, decided to retain many of the

Japanese officials temporarily to provide

order and continuity in the period of

the transfer of power. In time, he felt,

they could be gradually replaced by

American civil affairs officers or by newly trained Koreans.

A quick storm of protest arose from

the politically minded Koreans. After

forty years of subjugation, they wanted

all of the Japanese removed and sent

home as soon as possible. The excitement generated by the prospects of independence would brook no halfway

measures at this point and General

7

 George M. McCune with Arthur L. Gray, Jr.,

Korea Today (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1950), pp. 58-59.
6 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Hodge was forced to speed up the process of replacing and repatriating the

Japanese officials. This successful use of

political pressure upon the American

military leaders established a pattern

that the Koreans would skillfully repeat

many times in the years ahead.

With the removal of the Japanese

under way, the American occupation

forces created a small Korean constabulary, armed with Japanese small arms

and rifles to preserve internal order.

Dozens of political parties had sprung

up overnight and each claimed to have

the support of the majority of the people. Demonstrations and altercations between the partisans became common in

South Korea as the rival factions strove

for improved positions.8 But General

Hodge soon became convinced that

none of the political parties had either

the broad support that it claimed or the

political experience necessary for assuming the tremendous task of rehabilitating

Korea. He steadfastly opposed the recognition of any provisional government

for Korea at that time.

The problem of channeling the

mounting Korean nationalism into productive areas was made increasingly difficult by the failure of the Russians to

remove the artificial barrier imposed at

the 38th Parallel. Efforts at the military

level to dispose of the political wall

proved unavailing and Secretary of State

James F. Byrnes finally took up the matter directly with the Soviet Union. At

the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at

Moscow in December 1945, he and Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav M.

Molotov agreed to establish a joint commission to consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations on

the formation of a provisional government. The commission would also submit proposals for putting into effect a

four-power trusteeship over Korea for a

period of up to five years.9

The reaction of most of South Korea's

political parties to the concept of trusteeship was violent. With the scent of

independence in the air, they were firmly opposed to five more years of foreign

control. But their vehement protests

succeeded only in providing the Soviet

Union with a political weapon. When

the Joint Commission met in March

1946, the Soviet representatives stated

that they would not consult with any

parties or organizations that had opposed the idea of trusteeship. Since this

would have eliminated all of South

Korea's important political parties, except for the Communists, the United

States refused to accept the Soviet interpretation and the meetings adjourned

sine die in May.10

In the meantime, the Russians built

up the Communist Party organization

in North Korea and brought in an

exiled Korean Communist, who called

himself Kim Il Sung after a former guerrilla hero, to assume the leadership in

late 1945. With the facade of a native

government, the Soviet Union carried

out its program and by mid-1946 had

managed to withdraw all but 10,000 of

its troops from Korea.

The split between the north and the

south became more permanent as later

8

 For the sake of convenience the American zone

of occupation and the later Republic of Korea

(ROK) will be referred to as South Korea and

the Russian zone of occupation and the later

Democratic People's Republic of Korea will be referred to as North Korea.

9

 Department of State, Korea's Independence

(Washington, 1947), pp. 18-19. 10

 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
INTRODUCTION 7

efforts of General Hodge to negotiate

with the Soviet commander in Korea

were ignored. As the north became more

oriented toward the Soviet Union politically, economically, and militarily,

the south tended to depend increasingly

upon the United States for assistance.

As President Truman pointed out in

July 1946, Korea had become "an ideological battleground upon which our

entire success in Asia may depend." 11

With both of the great powers pursuing their own goals in Korea and

elsewhere, the prospects for unification

grew more remote. The United States

began to concentrate to a greater extent

on establishing sound economic and

fiscal policies and the formation of a

trained civil administration in South

Korea. And looking ahead to the future,

the problem of creating a defense force

came in for more detailed study. By

November 1946 the native constabulary

had been expanded to 5,000 and the

basis for a South Korean army had been

laid.

Secretary of State George C. Marshall

made another effort to come to terms

with the Russians in the spring of 1947

and succeeded in obtaining a reconvening of the Joint Commission in May.

But, after a promising start, the meetings foundered once more on the exclusion of political parties opposed to

trusteeship.

Faced with the possibility of another

long impasse, the United States decided

to place the Korean question before the

General Assembly of the United Nations

in September 1947. The lack of agreement with the Soviet Union posed the

alternatives of either continuing the occupation of southern Korea indefinitely

—a course becoming more unpopular in

the United States and offering a mounting of the tensions between the South

Koreans and the occupation force—or of

withdrawal. The United States balked

at the latter action, for weakness in

Korea would probably have adverse repercussions in the Far East, especially

in Japan and China. The United Nations offered another recourse.

The Soviet Union tried to forestall

the United States by proposing that all

troops be withdrawn from Korea in

early 1948, but the Americans refused

to be diverted. After some discussion,

the General Assembly approved in principle the U.S. resolution calling for

over-all elections in early 1948 under

U.N. observation, to be followed by the

withdrawal of foreign troops after a

legal government was formed. The Soviet Union served notice that it would

neither permit U.N. observers to enter

the North Korean zone nor would it

consent to general elections.

While a U.N. commission investigated

conditions in South Korea, the United

States began to increase the Korean constabulary in preparation for the eventual

withdrawal of U.S. troops.12 The Joint

Chiefs of Staff had authorized an expansion of the police force to 50,000

men, equipped with light and heavy

weapons, and provided for additional

U.S. officers and men to train them.

After the U.N. commission completed

its inquiry in February 1948, it recommended that elections be held in as

11

 Ltr, Truman to Edwin S. Pauley, 16 Jul 46,

in S/W Korea.

12

 A short account of the problems of the United

Nations Temporary Commission on Korea may be

found in Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948

(Washington, 1948), pp. 10ff.
8 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

much of Korea as possible by May. The

General Assembly quickly approved the

commission's proposals and General

Hodge made the arrangements for the

elections. On 10 May over 92 percent

of the registered voters in South Korea

went to the polls and selected their representatives to a National Assembly. A

constitution was soon drawn up and

adopted and Syngman Rhee was chosen

the first President of the Republic of

Korea on 15 August 1948.

The Communists in North Korea had

carried on a vigorous campaign opposing the elections in South Korea, but

the failure of their attempt necessitated

another approach. On 9 September they

established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which claimed jurisdiction over all Korea. The Soviet Union

and its satellites swiftly recognized the

new government and the USSR announced that all Soviet troops would be

withdrawn from Korea by the end of the

year.

Despite the willingness of the U.S.

Army to match the Soviet plan and

withdraw its forces from Korea, neither

President Rhee nor the State Department desired such quick action. They

doubted the ability of the new South

Korean Army to maintain internal security and deter Communist aggression.

Besides, the U.S. Army had agreed to

remain until the South Korean security

forces could be trained and equipped.

Thus, at the end of 1948 some 16,000

American soldiers still were stationed in

Korea.13

The occupation of Korea was drawing

to a close, however, for the U.S. Army

desired to do away with this commitment. It saw little strategic value in

Korea and wanted to use the troops

located there in other areas. General

MacArthur believed that U.S. forces

would be dissipated in any large-scale

Communist attack on Korea. Furthermore, budgetary limitations dictated that

the Army withdraw by the end of June.

In March 1949, the United States

agreed to support a South Korean Army

of 65,000 to meet some of the misgivings of President Rhee. And when

American forces were withdrawn on 30

June, the Provisional Military Advisory

Group set up in August 1948 to train

the South Korean Army was redesignated the U.S. Military Advisory Group

to the Republic of Korea (KMAG).

About 500 officers and men were included in the group that was to complete

the instruction of the South Korean

military forces.14

KMAG faced a difficult situation. For

though the United States wanted the

new army to be able to repel Communist

aggression, it did not intend to make

it powerful enough to launch any attack

upon North Korea. Therefore, when

equipment was assigned to the Republic

of Korea Army (ROKA), tanks, heavy

guns, and aircraft were withheld. Even

the equipment allocated to the ROKA

was slow in arriving. Thus, despite expansion of the ROKA to 100,000 men

in 1950, its arms and equipment were

more suitable to a police force than to

an army. KMAG decided to train the

South Koreans in individual arms first 13

 For a good short account of the U.S. Army in

Korea from 1945-50, see Lt. Col. James F. Schnabel,

Policy and Direction: The First Year, a forthcoming volume in the series UNITED STATES

ARMY IX THE KOREAN WAR, Chapter II.

14

 See Major Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors

in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington,

1962) for a detailed account of the U.S. advisory

group and its work.
INTRODUCTION 9

and some progress was made along this

line. In the field of leadership for the

ROKA, the task proved less easy. Political appointments were customary and

resulted in weak military leadership. In

addition there were language barriers to

be overcome and a constant struggle to

secure training time for the eight South

Korean divisions that had been organized. Guerrilla activity demanded their

use in stamping out centers of Communist and bandit resistance in South

Korea. On the whole, the ROKA had

made a beginning by mid-1950, but was

far from being a well-trained or wellequipped force.

Across the 38th Parallel the Russians

had fashioned a more potent force.

Leavened with Korean veterans of the

Chinese civil war, the North Korean

Army had grown to 135,000 men by June

1950 and included some heavy arms and

equipment. Not only did the Communists have heavy artillery, armor, and

planes but they were also better trained.

Border clashes broke out along the

parallel during early 1950 and Communist political propaganda in South Korea

mounted. After the elections of May

1950 in South Korea failed to strengthen

their cause, the Communists decided

upon sterner action. They demanded

new elections, to establish a legislative

body for all Korea with unification under

the Communists as the objective. When

the South Koreans refused to accept their

proposals, the Communists launched a

full-scale attack on 25 June 1950 across

the Parallel.

The First Year, 1950-51

The United States reacted swiftly to

the North Korean invasion and immediately presented the problem to the

United Nations. Within hours of the

attack the U.N. Security Council demanded the immediate cessation of

hostilities and the withdrawal of North

Korean forces back to the 38th Parallel.15

 When the North Koreans continued to advance, the Security Council

passed a resolution on 27 June urging

U.N. members to provide military assistance to South Korea. President Truman

quickly ordered General MacArthur to

send air and naval forces to aid the ROK

troops and when these proved insufficient to halt the fast-moving Communist

battle forces, the President instructed

MacArthur to commit U.S. ground

units, too.16

Since other members of the United

Nations indicated that they intended to

send contingents to Korea, the U.N.

Security Council asked the United States

to form a unified command and appoint

a commander. President Truman accepted the responsibility of American

leadership and named MacArthur as

the first U.N. commander. MacArthur

would receive his instructions through

the Army Chief of Staff, acting as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.17 The U.N. commander appointed

15

 The Soviet member was absent from the Security Council in protest against the continuance of a

Nationalist Chinese representative on the council

instead of a Communist Chinese. 16

 The complete account of these events and the

plans and operations of the first year of the war

will be found in: (1) Roy E. Appleman, South to

the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington,

1961); (2) Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The

First Year; and (3) Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and

Flow. All in the series UNITED STATES ARMY

IN THE KOREAN WAR. The last two are in

preparation. 17

 The Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of General

of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, General J.

Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff.
10 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker and his

Eighth Army to take charge of all U.N.

ground forces in Korea. President Rhee

later placed the ROK Army units under

General Walker.

Although the United Nations sought

to bolster the South Korean cause, the

war proceeded at a disastrous pace. Taking full advantage of surprise and superior troops, the North Korean Army

overran the ROK defenses at the 38th

Parallel and reached Seoul in four days.

The South Korean forces fell back,

broken and disorganized. To slow down

the victorious advance of the North

Koreans, General MacArthur was forced

to commit his major ground units on a

piecemeal basis and trade space for time.

Finally, the U.S. and ROK defensive

lines were driven back to a narrow perimeter around the port of Pusan in the

southeastern corner of the peninsula.

As the battle lines stabilized along the

Pusan Perimeter, the initial advantage

of the North Koreans passed. They had

counted upon overwhelming ROK resistance and securing control of all of South

Korea before American aid could become effective. The extension of the conflict exposed their own weaknesses.

Their longer lines of supply and communication became more vulnerable to

U.N. air attack and their small navy was

destroyed by the U.S. naval forces which

imposed a blockade on the Korean coast.

With the arrival of U.S. reinforcements

and the reorganization of ROK troops

into effective combat units, MacArthur

was able to plan a counterattack.

Leaving Walker to carry out a co-ordinated ground attack upon the perimeter, MacArthur organized a separate

corps, the U.S. X, for an amphibious

assault behind the North Korean lines.

In mid-September, Army and Marine

forces landed at Inch'on and quickly recaptured Seoul. The Eighth Army broke

through the North Korean ring and

raced north to link up with the amphibious attack. With their rear threatened,

the Communists fell back behind the

38th Parallel as best they could—defeated but still resisting.

The status quo was restored but was

that enough? The North Koreans could

reorganize and try again. Now seemed

to be the propitious moment to destroy

the enemy army and unify Korea.

Prompted by the United States, the

United Nations gave tacit approval in

early October and the U.N. forces

pushed northward against token resistance. The goal became military victory

and political unification rather than repelling aggression and restoring the old

situation. So quickly had the modest

aims of June been expanded by the

heady successes of September.

With triumph on the horizon, the

Eighth Army rolled ahead toward the

Yalu and the X Corps made another

amphibious landing on the east coast.

The war appeared to be just about over

when reports of Chinese troops in

Korea were confirmed at the end of October. After a brief moment of doubt,

MacArthur decided to continue the advance to the Yalu. The Chinese reaction

to MacArthur's move was swift and

violent as they launched strong attacks

that halted and then turned back the

U.N. forces. By December they had

followed the withdrawing Eighth Army

south of the 38th Parallel and in early

January they retook Seoul. With the precipitous transformation of victory into a

galling reverse, a thorough reappraisal

of the situation appeared mandatory.
INTRODUCTION

PRESIDENT TRUMAN

The U.N. Command (UNC) had

gambled, even as the North Koreans had

initially, on concluding the war before

the Russians or Chinese could intervene

effectively while hoping that they would

not intervene at all. And like the North

Koreans, the U.N. Command forfeited

its wager, as the Chinese recouped the

Communist losses. Combining Confucian concepts with Communist dialectic,

the Chinese appeared to be reasserting

their ancient role of father-elder brother

to Korea and after a lapse of fifty-five

years again assumed a dominant part in

determining the destiny of Korea.18

The entry of the Communist Chinese

into the war and the retreat of the UNC

forces led to a resurgence of domestic

and Congressional pressure upon President Truman to use atomic weapons in

Korea to attain military victory. Earlier

the President had told the press on 27

July that he was not even considering

the use of atomic bombs in Korea.19

The fact that the Soviet Union had exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949 and

broken the U.S. monopoly may have had

some influence upon this decision, but

it is just as possible that the fluid nature

of the war and the moral implications

of using the terrible weapon again may

also have served as deterrents.20 At any

rate, the pressure had eased as the UNC

forces had gained the ascendancy and it

was not until late November that the

Chinese threat gave it fresh impetus.

The President, however, declared in a

press conference on 30 November that

although the use of all weapons at the

United States' disposal, including the

atom bomb, had been considered, he did

not want to see the bomb employed on

innocent people who had nothing to do

with military aggression.21 The continued reluctance of the President to use

the bomb in Korea unless it was absolutely necessary was strongly bolstered

by the obvious disinclination of its

principal allies—Great Britain and

France—to risk a possible broadening of

18

 For an absorbing account of the development

of Chinese interest in the Korean War and the

Chinese decision to enter the conflict, see Allen S.

Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to

Enter the Korean War (New York: The Macmillan

Company, 1960). Whiting maintains that the North

Korean attack was planned and directed by the

Soviet Union and that although Communist China

was probably informed of the plan late in 1949 or

early in 1950, it had no direct responsibility for its

initiation or outcome. 19

 New York Times, July 28, 1950. 20

 The influential Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

maintained in an editorial on 24 July 1950 that the

atom bomb would be utterly useless in Korea since

the destruction of the North Korean capital. for

example, would not destroy the fighting capacity of

the enemy's army. 21

 New York Times, December 1, 1950.
12 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

SECRETARY MARSHALL AND GENERAL RIDGWAY leave the Dai Ichi Building, Tokyo.

the war that the introduction of atomic

bombs might have produced. Unless

circumstances changed radically, it appeared that atomic weapons would be

kept in reserve.

By mid-January 1951, the tempo of

the war slackened. The Chinese had

outdistanced their suppliers and began

to suffer heavier casualties. Under a new

commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, the Eighth Army stiffened and

struck back at the enemy.22 But the

question of military victory was no

longer dominant. China's immense

manpower potentialities presented the

prospect of a long, costly, and expanded

war that none of the United Nations

desired. Little could be expected in the

way of U.N. reinforcements, since most

of the contributing countries had other

commitments. Without sizable increments the possibility of defeating China

appeared forlorn. As the battle lines became more stable, the United Nations

started to look upon a negotiated settlement of the Korean problem as the best

method of ending the warThe initial approach of the United

Nations to the Peiping government on

arranging a cease-fire met with no encouragement. General Ridgway soon

provided the United Nations with a

more potent persuader. Moving forward cautiously, the Eighth Army advanced for the second time toward the

38th Parallel inflicting heavy losses upon

22

 General Walker was killed in an accident in

December.
INTRODUCTION 13

GENERAL VAN FLEET

the Communist troops. Seoul was taken

again in March and constant pressure

was applied upon the Communist forces.

As the U.N. troops edged closer to the

old boundary line, resistance stiffened.

But the general situation had improved

in favor of the United Nations.

While the Eighth Army was pressing

forward, General MacArthur was relieved of the U.N. command by the

President.23 Since the entry of the

Chinese into the war, MacArthur had

voiced deep differences of opinion with

the President, his advisors, and the U.N.

members participating in Korea over the

conduct of the war. In April, President

Truman decided to replace MacArthur

with Ridgway; Lt. Gen. James A. Van

Fleet became Eighth Army commander.

Communist counterattacks in late

April and May were repulsed, but the

United States was inclined to proceed

cautiously. The JCS withheld permission for any general advance by Ridgway

without its approval. Although the U.N.

commander still had the mission of destroying the Communist armed forces in

Korea, he was instructed to accomplish

this objective subject to the overriding

considerations of the security of his forces

and his basic mission of defending

Japan. On the other hand, he was

authorized to conduct limited tactical

operations that might be desirable to

insure the safety of his command, maintain contact with the enemy, and keep

the latter off balance.24 The Eighth

Army would repel aggression and inflict

maximum personnel losses upon the

Communist forces. By this line of resistance the United States hoped to make

further Communist efforts to advance

in Korea too costly and to induce them

to consider negotiation as an alternative.

With the Eighth Army ensconced north

of the 38th Parallel for the most part,

Van Fleet shifted to the defensive in

mid-June.

The cycle was now complete. The

United States had returned to the same

position it had held so uncomfortably

in 1947-48. It wanted very much to

end the Korean commitment, but could

not withdraw without an unacceptable

loss of face both at home and abroad.

The American public was not accustomed to entering into a fight with the

current international bully and then not

23

 A full account of the relief of MacArthur will

be found in Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The

First Year. The Senate investigation of this action

is covered in Hearings Before the Committee on

Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, 82d Congress, 1st Session, Military Situation

in the Far East, 1951, Parts 1-5. 24

 Msg, JCS 90000, JCS to CINCFE. 1 May 51.
14 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

giving him a decisive beating. A stalemate or draw might not be popular in

the United States, yet the alternative

would probably be even less agreeable.

To drive the Communists out of North

Korea might entail the bombing of the

Chinese mainland and the blockade of

the Chinese coast with large expenditures of men and matériel and could lead

to the possible outbreak of a global war

with Soviet participation. In addition,

the allies of the United States in the

Korean conflict were strongly opposed

to another large-scale effort to settle the

war militarily. Although they recognized the value of Korea as a symbol of

resistance to Communist encroachment,

they had other problems and commitments to take into consideration. The

European powers were concerned over

Soviet capabilities on the European continent. While the Soviet Union and its

satellites retained the power to ignite

brush fires around the world, deep involvement in Korea seemed unwise.

They had gone along with the United

States in the endeavor by MacArthur to

settle the Korean problem on the battlefield in the hope that this would end

the troublesome affair quickly. With the

reversal in North Korea fresh in their

minds, it was not surprising that they

displayed little enthusiasm for a second

attempt. Only the Republic of Korea

was anxious to prosecute the war energetically to a successful conclusion, but,

without the assistance of the United

States, it lacked the power. The United

States might have provided the power,

but the prize did not seem to justify

the effort or the risks. The Korean War

had already had an unfortunate effect

in delaying the build-up of the newly

formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by which the United

States hoped to strengthen its defensive

position vis-à-vis the USSR. To seek

military victory now might result in further postponement in strengthening the

West's defense in Europe besides incurring prohibitive expenditure of lives

and money and the risk of World War

III. Discretion appeared the better part

of valor at this point and a negotiated

settlement preferable to military decision.
CHAPTER II

The Initial Negotiations

Despite the willingness of the United

Nations to bring the Korean conflict to a

close by negotiations, the prospects for

a peaceful settlement based on a unified,

democratic, and independent Korea appeared dim in the late spring of 1951.

The United Nations' efforts in the opening months of the year had been ignored

by the Chinese Government at Peiping

and the latter had given no indication

that it was inclined to discuss a cessation

of hostilities except on its own terms.

Since the Peiping conditions included

the withdrawal of the UNC forces from

Korea, the return of Taiwan to Red

China, and the seating of a Chinese

Communist delegate to the United Na- tions, there was little chance that the

United States would accept them. In the

face of this stalemate, patience and continued military pressure seemed to be

the most potent UNC weapon.

Preliminary Arrangements

After the Communist offensive in May

had been turned back, many U.N. observers were optimistic that the Chinese

might now find the cost of carrying on

the war too high in casualties and equipment and be more receptive to negotiations. Trygve Lie, Secretary General of

the United Nations, proffered another

peace bid in early June and U.N. diplomats sought to fashion a proposal palatable to the Communists.

The first sign of a change in the Communist position came from a radio

address by the Soviet representative to

the United Nations on June 23. Deputy

Foreign Minister Jacob Malik, speaking

on the U.N. "Price of Peace" radio program, stated that the Soviet peoples

believed that a peaceful settlement

could be achieved in Korea. As a first

step, he suggested that the belligerents

could start discussing the possibilities of

a cease-fire and an armistice "providing

for the mutual withdrawal of forces from

the 38th parallel."1 If both sides had

a "sincere desire" to end the fighting in

Korea, he felt that this would not be too

great a price to pay for peace.2

Although the Peiping government approved Malik's suggestions several days

later, it served notice that it had not

given up hope of pressing its own terms.

Yet despite the warning note from the

Chinese Communists, initial reaction to

the Soviet proposal was cautiously favorable among the United Nations. The very

1

 For literary reasons, the terms "armistice,"

"truce," and "cease-fire" have been used interchangeably throughout this volume. According to

the Office of the Judge Advocate General, "truce"

signifies a temporary interruption of fighting between local forces for some reason such as the

collection of the dead and wounded. The word

"armistice" has a similar connotation, but is utilized

to cover a temporary cessation of hostilities on a

broader scale. "Cease-fire" applies when all acts of

war are halted, bringing about an informal end to

the war and stabilizing the situation until formal

negotiations can be completed. 2

 New York Times, June 24, 1951.
16 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

existence of a disposition to negotiate

was a welcome sign and they awaited a

further amplification of the vague references to peace and of procedures acceptable to the Communists.

It did not take long. On the 27th,

Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei

Gromyko informed American Ambassador Alan G. Kirk in Moscow that the

armistice should be negotiated by the

field commanders and should be limited

to strictly military questions without involving any political or territorial

matters. In the meantime, Secretary of

State Dean G. Acheson, appearing before

the House Foreign Affairs Committee in

support of the foreign aid bill, mentioned in passing that the U.S. military

objectives in Korea would be satisfied

if the Communists withdrew behind the

38th Parallel and gave adequate guarantees against a renewal of aggression.3

It is interesting to note that each side

quickly used the reported statements of

the opposition in arguing its own position after the negotiations began.

Whatever doubt may have existed over

the authority of the Unified Command

to initiate and conduct cease-fire negotiations was soon dispelled by the U.N.

legal advisor, Abraham Feller. He informed Secretary General Lie that the

United States had the right to conclude

a cease-fire or armistice without further

authorization from the United Nations

as long as the negotiations were limited

to military matters and the end result

was reported to the Security Council.4

With the United Nations sanctioning

the leadership of the United States in

the discussions with the Communists,

General Ridgway was instructed to

broach the matter to the Commander

in Chief, Communist Forces Korea.5 On

30 June, Ridgway broadcast via radio

his willingness to establish a date for

the first meeting and suggested to the

Communist leader that a Danish hospital

ship in Wonsan Harbor might be a

suitable place.6

On the same day, Ridgway was advised on the general policy and objectives of the United States in negotiating

a cease-fire with the Communists. These

instructions provided the framework for

the American position during the negotiations.7

The principal military interests of the

United States were securing a cessation

of hostilities, assurance against the resumption of fighting, and the protection

of the security of U.N. forces. Recognizing quite clearly that the Communists

might not want to reach a permanent

political settlement in Korea, the U.S.

political and military leaders advised

Ridgway that it was essential to obtain

a military agreement that would be acceptable to the United States over an extended period of time. Severely

restricting the Far East commander to

military matters, they cautioned him

against discussing political questions and

3

 New York Times, June 27, 29, 1951. 4

 Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S.

Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council

on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 184.

5

 The U.N. leaders were not certain who was in

actual military command of the enemy forces in

Korea, therefore the title was made all-inclusive. 6

 (1) Msg, JCS 95258, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jun 51.

(2) UNC/FEC, Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC and

CofS, Jun 51. 7

 For a discussion of the making of U.S. policy

during the Korean War, see Chapter IV, below. In

general, the JCS, the Departments of Defense and

State, the National Security Council, and the President participated in the formation and approval

of political-military national policy. Ridgway's channel of communication was via the Department of

the Army and the JCS.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 17

placed not only the disposition of

Taiwan and the seating of Communist

China in the United Nations in this

category but also the 38th Parallel.

These problems should be considered at

the political level.

To provide flexibility in dealing with

the Communists, U.S. leaders held that

the U.S. negotiators could adopt initial

positions more advantageous than they

expected to obtain, but care must be

taken that a retreat to the minimum

acceptable position should remain open.

They did not want the United States to

be accused of bad faith in its negotiating.

As for specific details, the U.S. leaders

felt that a military armistice commission with equal representation from both

sides should be established. This commission should have the right of free and

unlimited access to all Korea and power

to carry out its task of insuring that the

conditions of the armistice were met.

Until the commission was prepared to

function, the armistice would not become effective. On the battlefield a

demilitarized zone twenty miles wide

should be set up based on the positions

occupied at the time the truce was

signed. There would be no reinforcement of troops or augmentation of

matériel and equipment except on a onefor-one replacement basis. In the matter

of prisoners of war, they would be exchanged as quickly as possible on a

similar basis, one for one. In the meantime, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross

should be permitted to visit all prisoner

of war (POW) camps to render such

assistance as they could until the arrangements were completed.8

After receiving these instructions,

General Ridgway delegated the responsibility for the preparation of detailed

plans and physical arrangements for the

truce talks to the Joint Strategic Plans

and Operations Group (JSPOG),

headed by Brig. Gen. Edwin K. Wright.9

Working closely with this group, Ridgway drafted an agenda and on 1 July forwarded it to the JCS, together with the

names of the representatives he had selected to represent the United Nations at

the conference table. To head the

delegation, he had chosen Vice Adm. C.

Turner Joy, Commander, Naval Forces,

Far East, a tough veteran of the Pacific

campaigns in World War II. Supporting Joy there would be: Maj. Gen.

Henry I. Hodes, Deputy Chief of Staff,

Eighth Army, who had led an infantry

regiment in the European war; Maj.

Gen. Laurence C. Craigie, Vice Commander, Far East Air Forces, who had

commanded a fighter wing in North

Africa; Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke,

Deputy Chief of Staff, Naval Forces, Far

East, also known as "31-Knot" Burke

because of his handling of destroyers at

top speed in the Pacific war; and Maj.

Gen. Paik Sun Yup, Commanding General, ROK I Corps, a young and able

Korean combat commander.10

Ridgway also informed the JCS that

he intended to send another message to

the Communists, who had not yet an8

 Msg, JCS 95354, JCS to Ridgway, 30 Jun 51.

9

 General MacArthur had established JSPOG on

20 August 1949 and staffed the group with Army,

Navy, and Air Force representatives. The group had

responsibility for high level planning in the theater

and served as the principal planning agency for the

U.N. Command during the Korean War. 10

 General Ridgway later stated that he had selected Admiral Joy personally and then he and Joy

had picked the other members of the delegation

after consultation. Interv, author with Ridgway,

11 Dec 61. In OCMH.
18 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

KAESONG

swered his first broadcast, suggesting a

preliminary meeting of liaison officers

either at Wonsan Airfield or on the main

Seoul-Kaesong highway between Kaesong and the Imjin River. The liaison officers could arrange the details of time,

place, and procedures to be followed for

the meeting of the chief delegates.11

Before Ridgway could send the second

message, the Communists broadcast a

reply. Following their customary policy

of never accepting a proposal in toto,

they suggested that the representatives

meet at Kaesong, the old capital of Korea

located just below the 38th Parallel

thirty-five miles northwest of Seoul,

sometime between 10 and 15 July. The

United Nations commander thought

Kaesong would be satisfactory, but was

disturbed at an implication that the

Communists believed that military operations would be suspended during the

negotiations. He wanted to inform them

that there would be no cessation of

hostilities prior to the conclusion of the

armistice. In addition, he desired to ask

them to advance the first meeting so

that the negotiations could get under

way immediately.12

Sensitive to the propaganda potentiality of the last request, the U.S. leaders

refused to allow the U.N. Command to

be placed in the role of petitioner. "We

must not appear eager," they told Ridg11 way, "to advance [the] date of meeting." Msg, CX 66160, Ridgway to JCS, 1 Jul 51,

DA-IN 10033. 12

 Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 2 Jul 51, DA-IN 10135.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 19

They approved his other suggestions and

told him that if he had to refer to the

Chinese commander, Peng Teh-huai, by

title, he should designate him Commanding General, Chinese Communist Forces

in Korea rather than as Commander of

the Chinese Volunteers, which the

Chinese preferred.13 On 4 July, Kim

Il Sung, as Supreme Commander of the

Korean People's Army, and Peng Tehhuai agreed to the preliminary meeting

of the liaison officers and proposed 8

July as the date.14

Although the Communists appeared

willing to initiate discussions, reports

from the front indicated that they were

gathering forces and supplies for another

major offensive in mid-July. Air reconnaissance disclosed increased sightings of

vehicular and rail traffic moving south

and made Ridgway skeptical of Communist good faith in conducting armistice negotiations. To give the U.N.

Command a stronger moral position in

the face of the enemy troop and equipment build-up, Ridgway suggested that

the deployment of a fighter-bomber wing

scheduled for movement to the theater

be deferred until a more opportune moment. But the U.S. leaders had already

taken the propaganda aspects of the

shipment into consideration and told

Ridgway that a postponement now

would only weaken the UNC posture.15

On 6 July, Ridgway informed his representatives of his personal views on

the forthcoming negotiations. Implacable opposition to communism was the

basic U.S. premise and the delegates

would lead from strength not weakness

in the truce conference. On the other

hand, he recognized that patience would

be mandatory, since lengthy and frequent propaganda speeches would be

inevitable. The wisest course, he counseled, would be to ignore them. If any

opportunity arose to detach Communist

China from the Soviet Union bloc or to

increase the tension between them without becoming involved politically, the

UNC delegation should seek to exploit

it.

In dealing with Orientals, the General went on, great care had to be taken

not to cause them to "lose face." A

"Golden Bridge" of withdrawal from a

situation was of high importance to the

Oriental. Since there might also be

some difficulty with semantics, considering that English, Chinese, and Korean

translations would be used, care would

have to be taken to insure against basic

and sustained misunderstandings arising from inaccuracies in translation.

Ridgway concluded by pointing out

that if the negotiators could cap the

military defeat of the Communists in

Korea with successful and skillful handling of the armistice conversations,

"history may record that Communist

military aggression reached its high

water mark in Korea, and that thereafter Communism itself began its recession in Asia."

 16

To buttress the military members of

the truce teams, General Ridgway intended to keep Ambassador John J.

Muccio and U.S. Political Advisor

William J. Sebald at Munsan-ni, some

13

 Msg, JCS 95438, JCS to CINCUNC, 2 Jul 51. 14

 Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 5 Jul 51, DA-IN 11098. 15

 (1) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 2 Jul 51, DA-IN

10135. (2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 5 Jul 51, DA-IN

11527. (3) Msg, JCS 95735, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Jul

51.

16

 Memo, Gen Ridgway for General and Flag

Officer Members of the U.N. Delegation, 6 Jul 51,

in UNC/FEC files.
20 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

twenty-odd miles north of Seoul, where

a tent camp had been established for

the UNC negotiators. But the Army

leaders in Washington reacted very

strongly to the suggestion that these two

well-known diplomats provide political

guidance. It might give the Communists

the impression that the talks would go

beyond the military stage, and furthermore, because of Sebald's connection

with Japanese affairs and the proposed

peace treaty, the Army was very anxious

not to associate the imminent Japanese

treaty negotiations with the cease-fire

talks. As a result, Ridgway asked Sebald

to go back to Tokyo and Muccio to

remain at Seoul.17

Before the truce talks opened, the

U.S. leaders decided to bring Ridgway's

directives up to date. They informed

him that his mission as the United

Nations commander was to inflict maximum personnel and matériel losses upon

the enemy in Korea consistent with the

security of the forces under his command. His main objective would be to

attain a settlement to terminate the

hostilities. Appropriate arrangements in

support of this included establishing the

authority of the ROK over all of Korea

south of the 38th Parallel, providing for

the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean

troops, and permitting the building of

ROK military power to deter or repel

further North Korean aggression. He

could carry out ground, amphibious, airborne, air, and naval operations in Korea

that might support his mission, insure

the safety of his command, or harass the

enemy, but certain restrictions were imposed. No air or naval operations against

Communist China, the USSR, the hydroelectric installations along the Yalu, or

Rashin (Najin) near the Soviet border

would be carried out without JCS permission. Nor could any bombing be

permitted within twelve miles of the

Soviet frontier. In case the Soviet Union

intervened in the war, the U.N. commander was to assume the strategic

defensive and report to the JCS, making

preparations for the temporary withdrawal of UNC forces to Japan.

As Commander in Chief, Far East,

Ridgway also had certain U.S. responsibilities. He would defend Taiwan and

the Pescadores by air and naval action

only and also defend Japan in the event

of a Soviet attack. The same restrictions

were placed upon him against attacking

Chinese or Soviet territory and he was

reminded that only the President had

the authority to order preventive action

against concentrations of forces on the

Chinese mainland.18

These directives supplemented the instructions on the conduct of the armistice

negotiations and together they delineated the realm of action open to

Ridgway for the immediate future.

Whether the restrictions laid down by

the Washington leaders would be lifted

or firmly adhered to would apparently

depend upon Communist behavior at

the negotiations.

The Measure of the Opposition

On 8 July, the UNC liaison officers,

led by Col. Andrew J. Kinney, USAF,

set out from Munsan-ni by helicopter.

They landed near Kaesong, where the

Communists met and escorted them to

the first meeting across the conference

17

 UNC/FEC Staff Sec, Rpt, Office of CinC and

CofS, Jul 51, p. 7.

18

 (1) Msg, JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51. (2) Msg, JCS 95978, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 21

table. Before the Communists could

forestall them, the UNC liaison officers

walked in and sat down facing the south,

causing a great deal of agitation among

their counterparts. According to oriental tradition in negotiating peace, the

conquering nation faces the south and

the defeated state the north.19

The initial exchange was formal and

without cordiality. Refreshments were

declined by the UNC party and the

amenities were quickly dispensed with.

As the first order of business, Kinney

submitted the list of UNC delegates and

requested the names of the Communist

representatives. But evidently the

enemy intended to look over the UNC

list before they revealed their own selections, for they proposed a three-hour

recess so that they could receive instructions from their superiors.

Food, liquor, and cigarettes were

again offered to the liaison group at this

time, but were refused. Kinney sent back

to the helicopters for the lunch they had

brought with them.

After the recess the Communists announced their delegation, headed by

Lt. Gen. Nam Il of the Korean People's

Army. The first meeting would take

place on 10 July in Kaesong and the

Communists would clear the road from

the outpost of Panmunjom, some six

miles east of Kaesong. UNC vehicles

would be marked with white flags and

the Communists would assume responsibility for the safety of UNC personnel

en route and in the conference area. All

members of the UNC group would wear

arm brassards for identification except

the delegates themselves. As for convoys

moving to and from Kaesong, Kinney

informed the Communists that these

would be exempt from attack provided

they were properly marked with white

flags or squares and provided that the

time and route of the convoys were communicated to the U.N. Command.

Kinney later reported that the Communist attitude had been co-operative.20

The motor convoy of the UNC delegation, bearing large white flags, was

halted at the outpost of Panmunjom, on

the morning of the 10th, while the Communists made "preparations" for their

safe conduct. When the convoy reached

Kaesong, the nature of these "preparations" became apparent. Three vehicles

filled with Communist officers in full

dress swung in front of the line and posed

as victors as the procession drove through

Kaesong. Communist photographers

gave full picture coverage to this

parade.21

On the shoulder of a hill on the outskirts of Kaesong, the convoy stopped

before a large granite mansion. This

was supposed to be the UNC resthouse

and consultation area, but since the UNC

officers suspected that the Communists

might have wired the house and might

be listening in, very little serious conversation was conducted inside the building. After a brief pause, the delegates

moved down the road to the conference

area.

19

 When the main delegations convened two days

later, the Communists took no chances on a repetition of this situation and for the remainder of the

negotiations the UNC representatives were provided with a northern exposure. See Admiral C.

Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New

York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), pp. 3-4.

20

 (1) Mtg between Liaison Officers at Kaesong, 8

Jul 51, in G-3 Liaison Officers Rpts, 8 Jul-15 Aug

51. (2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 8 Jul 51, DA-IN

12369. 21

 Col. J. C. Murray, "The Korea Truce Talks:

First Phase," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 79, No. 9 (September, 1953), p. 982.
22 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

U.N. LIAISON OFFICERS BEING MET BY COMMUNISTS who will escort them to Kaesong.

Left to right: Colonel Murray and Colonel Kinney; Lt. Col. Lee Soo Young of the ROK Army;

Lt. Richard Underwood, Korean interpreter; and CWO Kenneth Wu, Chinese interpreter for

the U.S. Army.

Before the war the teahouse chosen by

the Communists as the site of the

meetings had been a fashionable restaurant that had provided music and dancing girls. Now it was bullet scarred and

some of the buildings had been damaged.

Armed Communists guards were everywhere as the negotiators were conducted

to an inner courtyard and entered the

conference room.

General Nam sat in a high chair facing

south and Admiral Joy was provided a

low chair on the opposite side of the

table giving the Communists an advantage in the seating.22

 Even in small

things, the Communists would not allow

themselves to be outdone. When the

UNC delegation placed a small U.N.

flag in a brass stand in front of them on

the table, the Communists countered by

producing a flag in a larger stand at the

afternoon meeting.

In dress the contrast among the dele

22

 Joy, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 4-5.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 23

U.N. LIAISON GROUP and its Communist escort arrive at the rest house, Kaesong.

gates was striking. Except for General

Paik, who was clad in fatigues, the UNC

officers wore comfortable summer tans.

The Chinese wore plain, drab uniforms

without insignia, but the North Koreans with high-collar dress blouses, full

insignia, and high leather boots were the

sartorial champions.

The leader of the Communist delegation, General Nam, had other qualifications besides his neatness and correct

military bearing. Although only in his

late thirties, he was Chief of Staff of the

North Korean Army and also Vice

Premier of the North Korean state.

Educated in Manchuria, he spoke Chinese and Russian as well as KoreanAssisting General Nam at the conference table were Maj. Gen. Lee Sang

Cho, Chief of the Reconnaissance

Bureau of the North Korean Army and

a former Vice Minister of Commerce;

Maj. Gen. Chang Pyong San, Chief of

Staff, I Corps, North Korean Army, a

late addition to the Communist delegation; Lt. Gen. Teng Hua, commander

of the 15th Army Group of the Chinese

Communist Army, who had joined the

Communist Party in 1929 and made the

Long March to Yenan; and Maj. Gen.

Hsieh Fang, Chief of Propaganda of

Northeast Military District of China,

who was reported to have played a major

role in the 1936 kidnapping of Chiang

Kai-shek. Communist representatives in

most cases had as much political as

military experience and this provided

another point of difference between the

two delegations, for the UNC negotiators

were all professional military men.

In his opening address, Admiral Joy

tried to counter this political advantage.

He stated quite bluntly that the UNC

representatives intended to discuss only

military matters relating to Korea and

would not consider political or economic

subjects. Until agreement on the armistice terms was reached, he went on, and

a military armistice commission was

ready to function, hostilities would continue. He then presented the nine-point

agenda drawn up by the U.N. Command: 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2.

Location of and authority for International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC) representatives to visit prisoner

of war camps. 3. Limitation of discussion

to purely military matters related to

Korea only. 4. Cessation of hostilities

and of acts of armed force in Korea

under conditions that would assure

against resumption of hostilities and acts
24 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

of armed force in Korea; 5. Agreement

on a demilitarized zone across Korea.

6. Composition, authority, and functions

of a military armistice commission. 7.

Agreement on principle of inspection

within Korea by military observer teams,

functioning under a military armistice

commission. 8. Composition and functions of these teams. 9. Arrangements

pertaining to prisoners of war.

Nam then proceeded to state the

Communist position. Basically it called

for a return to the old status quo, with

both sides withdrawing to the 38th

Parallel and removing all foreign troops

from Korea. He proposed an immediate

cease-fire and the establishment of a

20-kilometer demilitarized zone along

the 38th Parallel. Once this was done,

the question of prisoners of war could

be discussed. The Chinese delegate,

General Teng, supported Nam on each

point.

But Admiral Joy refused to be led

into any discussion of substantive matters

at this time and asked for the Communist agenda. He pointed out that

these were political subjects and outside

the purview of the negotiations.

After the noon recess, restrictions

placed by the Communists upon the free

movement of the UNC couriers in the

conference area drew a protest from

Admiral Joy, He also broached the

desirability of bringing twenty U.N.

newsmen and photographers along with

the UNC delegation to the conference

area, since Communist photographers

were being given full access. In reply

General Nam seemed to agree that both

sides should have an equal press and picture coverage of the conference, but he

hedged on allowing UNC personnel

freedom of movement, arguing that

safety was the chief factor in imposing

the restrictions. He would contact his

superior, Kim Il Sung, on the question

of newsmen.

In presenting the Communist agenda,

Nam followed the old precept that the

best defense is an offense. He attacked

the UNC program as unduly long and

repetitious. Since the matter of ICRC

representatives visiting POW camps was

connected with the over-all POW item,

it should be taken up when the general

problem was considered. U.N. Item 3

concerning the limitation of discussions

of military matters pertaining to Korea

only was unnecessary, he continued, for

the meetings were confined to military

matters anyway. As for Items 4 and 5,

the cessation of hostilities and establishment of a demilitarized zone, they were

not concrete. They should be set forth

clearly and then the supplementary matters contained in the next three UNC

items in regard to a military armistice

commission and inspection teams could

be settled. The final subject would be

prisoners of war. In conclusion Nam

held that the shorter five-point agenda

presented by the Communists was more

proper and would allow the subjects to

be discussed in their correct order:

1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Establishment of the 38th Parallel as the

military demarcation line between the

two sides and establishment of a demilitarized zone, as basic conditions for

the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

3. Withdrawal of all armed forces of

foreign countries from Korea. 4. Concrete arrangements for the realization of

cease-fire and armistice in Korea. 5. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war

following the armistice.

Acceptance of this agenda would have
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 25

FORMER TEA HOUSE WHERE THE KAESONG CONFERENCES WERE HELD

settled the question of the 38th Parallel

and the withdrawal of foreign troops

from Korea at the outset, so Admiral

Joy refused to discuss any specific line

of demarcation. He maintained that

the U.N. Command would consider a

line of demarcation and a demilitarized

zone but not the 38th Parallel as the

demarcation line. As for the withdrawal

of foreign troops, Joy reiterated that this

was a political substantive question that

could be discussed after an armistice was

agreed upon. The first subject to be

taken up, he said, was the adoption of

the agenda and this could be followed

by Items 4 and 5 of the UNC proposal,

the cessation of hostilities and the agreement on a demilitarized zone.23

At the close of the first meeting, the

initial objectives of the Communists in

the truce negotiations seemed clear—a

return to the 38th Parallel and the

clearing of foreign troops from Korea.

Once these were attained and the

balance of military power redressed in

their favor, it would be possible for them

to carry on the remainder of the negotiations at their own pace and inclination.

23

 Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice Proposal in Korea, 10 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea, 348.
26 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

U.N. ARMISTICE DELEGATES TO THE FIRST SESSION. Left to right: General Hodes,

General Craigie, Admiral Joy, General Paik Sun Yup of the ROK Army, and Admiral Burke.

Battle of the Agenda

On the night of 10 July, U.N. newsmen at Munsan-ni set up a betting pool

on the length of the armistice negotiations. The "pessimists" guessed that it

would take six weeks,24 As it turned out,

a fortnight passed before the conferees

could reach agreement on the agenda

alone.

The second meeting on the 11th found

each side defending its own program and

attacking the opposing agenda. Admiral

Joy attempted to press the matter of

ICRC visits to POW camps as a humanitarian measure, but Nam Il quickly

picked this argument up and turned it

against the U.N. Command. Since this

was a meeting to consider military matters, not humanitarian, he could not

see what business it had on the agenda.

As long as the UNC delegation insisted

on excluding nonmilitary matters, the

Communists had a point.

There was no progress on other

agenda items. To the Communist brief

on the 38th Parallel, Admiral Joy rejoined that the U.N. Command "is completely uninterested in any imaginary

line across Korea which has no military

significance to the existing military situation." But the Communists refused to

modify their stand on this or on the

withdrawal of foreign forces.

In reply to Joy's protest on the restrictions imposed on the movement of vehicles, Nam agreed to permit free

movement of properly marked vehicles

24

 Rutherford M. Poats, Decision in Korea (New

York: The McBride Company, 1954), p. 204.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 27

THE COMMUNIST REPRESENTATIVES. Left to right: Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang and Lt. Gen.

Teng Huo of the Chinese People's Army; General Nam Il, Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, and

General Chang Pyong San of the North Korean Army.

provided the Communist liaison officers

were informed beforehand. He denied,

however, the UNC requests for granting

U.N. newsmen immediate access to the

conferences. Since General Ridgway had

assembled the newsmen at Munsan-ni on

the assumption that they would be permitted to cover all of the negotiations,

Admiral Joy refused to accept the

Communist rejection. He informed

Nam that the UNC delegation would

return with the newsmen or not at all.

This firm position surprised the Communists and placed the burden squarely

on their shoulders—either accept the

newsmen or delay the negotiations.25

When the liaison officers met the following morning at Panmunjom, the

Communists held firm, perhaps to find

out whether the U.N. Command was

bluffing or not. In any event the UNC

liaison officers informed the enemy that

the motor convoy with the newsmen

would be at Panmunjom at 0900. If the

newsmen were not allowed to pass, the

whole convoy would return to Munsanni.

Matching determination with determination, the Communists held up the

convoy and would not permit the newsmen to go to the conference area, whereupon the whole convoy returned to the

base camp. The next two days were

spent in debate at the liaison officer level,

with the Communists urging the UNC

delegation to revive the talks and the

25

 Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice Proposal in Korea, 11 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea, 348.

THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 29

latter steadfastly refusing to go back until the newsmen accompanied them.26

General Ridgway had the complete

support of his superiors in Washington

on this matter, and they also had approved his decision to insist upon full

reciprocity of treatment at the armistice negotiations. To secure this they

felt that the Kaesong area should be

completely demilitarized and armed

guards should be removed from the

Kaesong-Munsan road.27

By 15 July the Communists decided

to concede and the third plenary meeting

was arranged for the afternoon. Accompanied by the twenty newsmen, the

U.N. delegation returned to Kaesong

and promptly pressed for equality of

treatment en route and in the conference

area. A 5-mile circle should be drawn

around Kaesong and all armed personnel

should be eliminated, argued Admiral

Joy. Furthermore, freedom of vehicular

movement between Panmunjom and the

conference area without prior notice

should be recognized. The Communists,

agreeing in principle, suggested that the

liaison officers work out this problem.

(Map 1)

Since the Communists had assured the

U.N. Command that only military matters would be discussed at the meetings,

Joy agreed to drop Item 3 from the

UNC agenda. As for the visit of ICRC

representatives to POW camps, Joy informed the enemy that this could be

taken up when POW's were considered.

Thus the U.N. Command dropped two

of its nine items at the third meeting.

But the Communists clung firmly to the

38th Parallel and showed no signs of

giving ground.28

Behind the scenes the UNC staff

officers worked feverishly as they sought

to discover chinks in the enemy's negotiating armor. Each night in anticipation

of the next day's meeting two or three of

the staff officers would prepare position

papers and the other members of the

UNC delegation would sit around and

pick them to pieces. After several hours

of critical examination, the position

papers were boiled down to the bare

essentials and considered ready for presentation to the Communists. This

process of long hours of searching

examination was supplemented by informal discussions, and it also established a pattern that was to be

repeated again and again as the negotiations went on.29

The first break in the Communist

position came at the fourth meeting on

15 July. The UNC delegation had

revised its agenda and condensed it to

four points: 1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. Establishment of a demilitarized zone

as a basic condition for the cessation of

hostilities in Korea. 3. Concrete arrangements for a cease-fire and armistice that would insure against a resumption of hostilities and acts of

armed force in Korea periling a final

peace settlement, a. Military armistice

commission, including composition, authority and functions. b. Military observer teams, including composition,

authority, and functions. 4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.

26

 UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC and

CofS, Jul 51, pp. 12-15. 27

 Msg, JCS 96160, JCS to CINCUNC, 13 Jul 51.

28

 Transcript of Proceedings, Mtg, Armistice Proposal in Korea, 15 Jul 51, in G-3 Korea, 348/3. 29

 Interv, author with Brig Gen James A. Norell,

12 Jun 61. General Norell served as staff officer at

Kaesong and Panmunjom.
30 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

After a 2-hour recess to study the new

agenda, the Communists made their first

real concession. They accepted the general statement of Item 2, although they

affirmed their intent to insist on the

38th Parallel in the substantive discussions. They also agreed that Item 3 was

an improvement and they would

examine it further. As the area of disagreement narrowed, it became apparent

that the biggest obstacle remaining was

the withdrawal of foreign troops.30

On the following day the Communists

used a negotiating tactic that soon became standard—they out waited the UNC

delegates and induced the latter to speak

first, obviously hoping that they would

offer a concession of some kind that the

Communists could seize upon. After

Admiral Joy had explained the functions of the military armistice commission and the observer teams, General

Nam declared that UNC Item 3 was still

too specific. He suggested a shorter,

more general statement, which the U.N.

Command accepted on the 18th at the

sixth meeting. With agreement on

Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the UNC agenda

attained, the UNC delegation was ready

to open the substantive discussions, but

the Communists continued to insist on

the inclusion of the item on the withdrawal of foreign troops.31

Despite the adamant position of the

U.N. Command on this matter, Nam Il

returned to the attack at the next session

and with a hint of sarcasm declared:

"War is not travel and troops are not

tourists. Should the cease-fire be ordered

and armistice achieved, yet the foreign

armed forces still stay where they are, it

is clear that the intention is not possible

to let them enjoy the scenic beauties of

Korea. ... " Possibly Nam had never

seen the recruiting posters in the United

States, but, at any rate, the speech made

little impression upon the UNC delegation.32

Secretary of State Acheson issued a

strong statement to the press supporting

the UNC position on the 19th. Making

it clear that UNC troops would stay in

Korea until a genuine peace was firmly

established, he maintained that Korea's

neighbors knew that the UNC forces

posed no threat to them. "Once before," he concluded, "foreign forces were

withdrawn from Korea as a part of a

U.N. plan to reach a final settlement of

the Korean problem. The Communists

defied this effort and committed aggression against the Republic of Korea. The

Korean people can be assured that a

repetition of this act will not be tolerated."

 33

 Ridgway was pleased by the

content and timing of the Acheson statement and felt that it would have a beneficial effect the negotiations.34

At the close of the meeting on the

19th, Admiral Joy queried Ridgway as

to whether he could recess the conversations until the Communists had something new to offer. But the U.N. commander was unwilling to use this tactic

at this stage of the negotiations. The

onus for any break must fall on the

30

 Transcript of Proceedings, Mtg, Armistice Proposal in Korea, 16 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea, 348/3. 31

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice

Proposal in Korea, 17, 18 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea,

348/3.

32

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Mtg, Armistice Proposal in Korea, 19 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea, 348/3. 33

 Msg. JCS 96802, JCS to CINCUNC (Adv), 19

Jul 51. 34

 Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Jul 51, DA-IN 16716.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 31

Communists.35 He recommended, however, that the UNC delegation take a

stronger attitude toward the many discourtesies and the rudeness that the

Communists had displayed in recent

meetings. In the future, he went on,

Joy's replies, under similar provocation,

should be "terse, blunt, forceful and as

rude as his remarks may occasion."

 36

Realizing that the withdrawal of foreign troops issue might deadlock the

conference or even cause the Communists to break off negotiations, the

Washington leaders suggested that a

slightly different approach be tried. The

UNC delegation could offer a broad

agenda item that would allow the Communists to discuss the matter unilaterally

without committing the U.N. Command

to anything. If this failed, Ridgway

could agree to discussing at some future

date a mutual reduction of forces. The

Washington leaders definitely preferred

the first solution.37

Nature provided a brief interlude for

the negotiators on 20 July. The Panmunjom River flooded and damaged the

bridge so that the UNC delegation could

not cross. One of the translators, 1st Lt.

Kenneth Wu, climbed across the broken

bridge and hiked to the outpost at Panmunjom to carry the news to the Communists. Although the bridge was

repaired by the next day, it did not

bring the negotiators any closer together

mentally. At the end of this meeting,

the Communists tried another tack.

They asked for a four-day recess to allow

both sides to reconsider. Reluctantly

the UNC delegation agreed.38

When the conferees reconvened on

the 25th, the Communists made one

last attempt to place the withdrawal of

troops on the agenda, but the UNC

representatives held firm. At the afternoon session the Communists suddenly

agreed to drop this controversial subject.

Instead they proposed to add a fifth

item—Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both

sides. They announced their intention

to suggest a high-level conference to consider the question of withdrawal of

troops by stages soon after the military

agreement was reached. Although this

was vague, Admiral Joy felt that it did

indicate a desire on the part of the

Communists to get on to the substantive

discussions. He reported that Nam Il

was more intense and nervous at the

meeting and that the Chinese delegates

seemed to be taking a more active part.

As for the concession itself, he believed

that the Communists were trying to

save face by securing acceptance of the

new Item 5 at the same time they gave

in on the withdrawal issue.39

With Washington approval of the new

Communists proposal, the agenda was

complete and the first matter—the adoption of the agenda—concluded. Item 2—

35 Fixing a military demarcation line, (1) Msg, HNC 116, Joy to CINCFE, 19 Jul 51.

(2) Msg, CINCFE to CINCUNC (Adv), 21 Jul 51.

Both in UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC

and CofS, Jul 51, incls 11 and 13. 36

 Hq UNC/FEC, History of the Korean War—

Korean Armistice Negotiations (hereafter cited as

Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations),

July 1951-May 1952, vol. 2, ch. I, pp. 35-36. MS in

OCMH. 37

 Msg, JCS 96802, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jul 51.

38

 Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice

Proposal at Kaesong, 21 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea,

348/5. 39

 Msg, HNC 136, CINCUNC (Adv) to Ridgway,

25 Jul 51, in UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of

CinC and CofS, Jul 51, incl 15.
32 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

between both sides so as to establish a

demilitarized zone as a basic consideration for a cessation of hostilities in

Korea—was in general accordance with

the U.N. position and avoided mention

of the 38th Parallel. The Communists

had insisted on shortening the several

U.N. agenda proposals relating to ceasefire arrangements and Item 3 reflected

their work—Concrete arrangements for

the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition,

authority, and functions of a supervising

organization for carrying out the terms

of a cease-fire and armistice. Item 4—

Arrangements relating to prisoners of

war—had not been tampered with nor

had the Communist suggestion for Item

5. The greatest casualties in the battle

of the agenda—the question of withdrawal of foreign troops and the visit of

ICRC representatives to the prisoner of

war camps—had suffered mere flesh

wounds and would reappear later in the

substantive discussions.

Reaction at the Front

With the initiation of negotiations,

the tempo of operations on the battlefield slackened. The prospect of an early

end to the fighting made U.N. commanders and troops eager to prevent any

unnecessary loss of life. But some smallscale, limited-objective attacks were

mounted and frequent patrols were sent

out to collect information on enemy

activities and to prevent the U.N. troops

from losing their fighting edge.

General Ridgway was keenly aware of

probable deterioration in troop morale

once the shooting war stopped since he

had witnessed the soldier demonstrations in Europe at the close of World

War II.40 Foreseeing that the truce

talks might produce a similar situation,

he informed Van Fleet on 4 July of his

views. Phrases such as "Let's get the

boys back home" and "the war-weary

troops" were being used again, he

pointed out. To Ridgway's way of

thinking there could be "no greater

tragedy" for the free world than to have

a repetition of the "disgraceful" conduct

of American troops after the last war.

To forestall any recurrence, Ridgway

went on, Van Fleet should take any

steps that judgment and common sense

dictated to eliminate the development

of unfavorable attitudes. He suggested

an educational program aimed at the

"unequivocal necessity" for preparedness in Korea until satisfactory peace

terms had been "finally" agreed to by

all parties. Ridgway realized that some

people might disapprove of his action,

but maintained that if this were

"thought control," then he was in favor

of it. Otherwise the United States would

"cowardly surrender" all that it had

been fighting for. A similar message to

his superiors won assurance that they

would combat the rise of like attitudes

at home in the event a truce was signed

in Korea.41

Although an enemy offensive failed to

materialize in mid-July, intelligence

sources indicated that the Communists

were developing their potential and had

the capability to launch an attack if and

40

 At the close of World War II, American soldiers

had staged demonstrations abroad to put pressure

upon the U.S. political and military leaders to return the soldiers home quickly. 41

 Ridgway's letter to Van Fleet is quoted in Ltr,

Hodes to Brig Gen Paul F. Yount, CG 2d Logistical

Comd, 7 Jul 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning

Files, Jul 51. For the JCS exchange, see: (1) Msg,

Ridgway to JCS, 4 Jul 51, DA-IN, 10908; (2) Msg,

JCS 96032, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Jul 51.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 33

when the negotiations broke down.

Ridgway directed his air and naval commanders to use their air power to the

maximum to interdict road and rail

communications lines and to punish the

enemy wherever he might be in Korea.

At General Van Fleet's urging, Ridgway

also sought to build up the level of

ammunition in Korea to a 45-day

supply, so that Eighth Army would be

prepared to meet a large-scale enemy

offensive.42

The slowdown on the ground front

did not prevent the U.N. commander

from applying pressure on the enemy

in other ways. On 21 July he informed

the JCS that he intended to carry out a

massive air strike on the North Korean

capital, P'yongyang. After warning the

civilian population of several cities by

leaflet that an air attack would be made

on one of them, he would send his bombers and fighters over P'yongyang on the

first suitable day after July 24. The

Communists had stored considerable

quantities of supplies and equipment at.

P'yongyang and it was a key transportation center.43

The Washington leaders immediately

questioned the wisdom of a large-scale

bombing raid at this time. In view of

the serious political implications involved, they asked Ridgway to defer the

attack on P'yongyang. The U.N. commander realized that a big air assault

might have repercussions on the negotiations, but pointed out that to permit

the enemy to grow stronger than the

U.N. Command could mean a heavy loss

in American lives if the Communists discontinued the discussions and resumed

the offensive. A successful air strike

would naturally reduce the enemy capacity to attack and increase the pressure

upon him to negotiate. Although Ridgway admitted that his views were based

on the local situation rather than the

global picture, he felt obliged to inform

the JCS of the dangers in allowing the

Communists to augment their strength.44

Two days later, Ridgway advised the

Joint Chiefs that he could omit all advance warning to the civil populace since

air force attacks on military installations

in urban areas had been made previously

and the people notified. In addition, notice of the raid would permit the enemy

to improve his defense measures and reduce the tactical benefits of a strike.45

In any event the U.S. leaders reconsidered. They considered it undesirable to

distribute warning leaflets for they

thought this would give undue publicity

to the raid. They also did not want to

single out P'yongyang as a target for an

all-out strike while the conferences were

in session, since in the eyes of the world

this might appear to be an attempt to

break off the truce negotiations. However, if Ridgway would treat the mission

as a routine utilization of air power and

if he felt that P'yongyang was the most

important objective, they would consent.46

Because of bad weather, the strike was

not mounted until July 30. Even then,

weather conditions were not ideal and

all attacks planned for light and medium bombers had to be canceled.

Nevertheless the Air Force flew close to

450 fighter and fighter-bomber sorties.

42

 UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC and

CofS, Jul 51, pp. 30ff. 43

 Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 21 Jul 51, DA-IN 17293.

44

 (1) Msg, JCS 96938, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Jul 51.

(2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 23 Jul 51, DA-IN 17620. 45

 Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 25 Jul 51, DA-IN 18440. 46

 Msg, JCS 97223, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Jul 51.
34 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Smoke and heavy cloud coverage made

evaluation of the raid damage difficult.47

As the battle of the agenda came to an

end—on 26 July—the U.N. commander

toured the front lines. In a cheerful report to General J. Lawton Collins, Chief

of Staff, he described the Eighth Army

as full of confidence and in high spirits.

Training was progressing satisfactorily

and recent replacements were in good

physical and mental condition. Despite

the rainy season, logistical capacity was

unimpaired. Troop commanders had

turned up no evidence of a "going home

attitude" in their units.48

Despite the optimism occasioned by

this tour, Ridgway cautioned his commanders to be ready to meet the most

dangerous capability that the enemy

could exercise. He estimated that an offensive might come either when negotiations broke down or during the Japanese

peace conference.49

Up to this point, the outlook was hopeful. An agenda had been accepted,

morale was good, and the UNC forces

held strong defense positions. If the early

compromises by the Communists were

any indication of their desire for peace,

the outlook for a quick settlement was

favorable. But the picture was not all

rosy. The enemy was increasing his

strength steadily and could launch a fullscale offensive at any time. And although

the Communists had apparently conceded several major points on the

agenda, there was no doubt that they

would bring them up again in the substantive discussions. Behind the UNC

lines, the government of Syngman Rhee

was highly perturbed about the possibility of an armistice that might leave Korea permanently divided and had begun

to agitate against any compromise with

the Communists. The storm warnings

were clear and promised that the course

of the truce negotiators might be strewn

with obstacles. If the negotiations bogged

down, the battlefield would also be affected. A loss of confidence in the outcome at Kaesong could easily lead to an

expansion of combat operations. With

the price of failure larger casualty lists,

the center of interest continued to focus

on the negotiations as the substantive discussions got under way.

47

 FEAF Comd Reference Book, 1 Aug 51, p. 7. 48

 UNC/FEC Staff Sec, Rpt, Office of CinC and

CofS, Jul 51, p. 32. 49

 Memo for Red, 26 Jul 51, no sub, in UNC/FEC

Staff Sec, Rpt, Office of CinC and CofS, Jul 51, incl

18.
CHAPTER III

Point and Counterpoint

On the eve of the opening of the substantive discussions at Kaesong, the Soviet Union launched a new peace

offensive. The Russians suggested a fivepower peace pact to include Communist

China and the banning of atomic weapons as steps that would lead to an easing

of world tensions.1 As the United States

was in the midst of preparations for the

Japanese peace treaty conference and

also currently negotiating defensive pacts

with the Philippines, Australia, and New

Zealand, the vague Russian proposals

aroused little enthusiasm among the

American leaders.2 The confluence of

circumstances intimated that the Soviet

peace drive was mainly inspired by a

desire for favorable propaganda that

might disrupt the American undertakings.

The dovetailing of the Communist

peace movement with the armistice discussions did not cause any important

alterations in the U.S. plans for concluding the treaty with Japan or the defensive

pacts. Nor did it have any great effect

upon the Korean negotiations. For the

uncompromising position concerning

the 38th Parallel adopted by the enemy

delegates at Kaesong soon dispelled any

illusion that they were eager for a truce

except on their own terms.

The 38th Parallel

The search for a satisfactory formula

for attaining a truce was hindered by the

strong positions taken by both sides at

the outset. As soon as the agenda was

settled, General Nam quickly turned

back to the 38th Parallel. Since the

boundary had been recognized by all

nations as the dividing line before the

war, Nam urged that it be restored.

Each side held territory north and south

of the Parallel and neither would incur

any great disadvantage by re-establishing the status quo. To create a demilitarized zone, Nam proposed that a

20-kilometer strip along the parallel be

cleared of troops. Such a realignment

of forces and readjustment of territory

would be fair and just, Nam maintained.3

The UNC rebuttal followed on 27

July. Admiral Joy ended the preliminary

skirmishing and came out strongly in

favor of a truce line based on battle

realities rather than the 38th Parallel.

Pointing out that the Communist and

U.N. forces had crossed the parallel no

less than four times during the last thir1

 Other members of the pact would be the United

States, United Kingdom, USSR, and France. 2

 See article of the U.S. Ambassador to the United

Nations, Warren R. Austin, "International Unity

Against Shifting Soviet Tactics," in Dept of State

Bulletin, vol. XXV, No. 637 (September 10, 1951),

pp. 425ff. See also New York Times, August 7, 1951.

3

 Transcript of Proceedings, Tenth Session, Conf

at Kaesong, 26 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.
36 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

teen months, he argued that this fact

alone proved the unsuitability of the

parallel as a demarcation line. An effective delineation of a demilitarized zone

must be made on practical military

grounds, Joy continued, and should not

be influenced by consideration of ultimate political objectives; for a military

armistice an imaginary geographical

line such as the 38th Parallel had no

validity whatsoever.

Ruling out the parallel as a line of demarcation, Joy advanced the UNC proposal. There were three battle zones to

be considered, he maintained, the

ground zone, the sea zone, and the air

zone. Although the UNC forces occupied

definite positions on the ground, they

had superiority in the air over all Korea

and controlled the entire Korean seacoast. Since the Communists would gain

freedom of movement and be able to

rebuild within their sector of Korea

when the air and sea power of the

U.N. Command were confined by a

cease-fire and therefore would gain more

than the U.N. Command through a

truce, Joy suggested that the Communists

should compensate the UNC by making

concessions on the ground. On the map

that he presented to the enemy delegates,

UNC staff officers had drawn a demilitarized zone twenty miles wide considerably to the north of the ground positions

then occupied by the UNC forces.4 This

initial offer sought, of course, far more

then the UNC delegates expected to

secure, but even so, it was a novel approach—an attempt to break total military power into its component parts and

give them separate values for bargaining

purposes.

The Communist reaction was a swift

and rude rejection. "Ridiculous," was

Nam's comment on the 28th as he asserted that military power was the sum

total of the power of all arms of the

forces. The UNC battle lines, he went

on, were the concentrated expression of

the military effectiveness of its land, air,

and sea forces. Although the present battle lines were variable, Nam felt that the

38th Parallel approximately reflected the

current situation and should be accepted

as the line of demarcation.

After rebuking Nam for his rudeness

and bluster, Joy proceeded to defend the

UNC proposal. Ground progress did not

always indicate the status of a war, he

contended, for Japan was defeated without a single soldier setting foot on the

Japanese home islands.5

Nam refused to accept this statement.

He derided the American claim that the

United States had defeated Japan. Anyone knew, Nam said, that it was the

Korean people's struggle, the Chinese

people's war, and the Soviet Union's resistance that brought Japan to her knees.

Had not the United States fought Japan

for three years without victory until the

Soviet Army entered the war and dealt

Japan a crushing blow? "Can these

historical facts be negated lightly?" he

concluded.6

Since each side obviously was using a

different history book, Admiral Joy did

not pursue this subject. Instead he continued to point out the additional

advantages that would accrue to the

Communists if a truce was signed. They

could repair their roads, bridges, and

railroads, bring up supplies needed for

the health and well-being of their

4

 Ibid., Eleventh Session, 27 Jul 51.

5

 Ibid., Twelfth Session, 28 Jul 51. 6

 Ibid., Thirteenth Session, 29 Jul 51.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 37

troops, and restore and rehabilitate

their towns and facilities.7

The Communists were not interested

in the admiral's arguments. They clung

steadfastly to the 38th Parallel as July

passed by and the dog days of August

began. The daily sessions became routine as each side presented the same

arguments and refused to concede or

compromise. Since apparently the support of Marshall and Acheson had helped

convince the Communists that the

United States would remain firm on the

troop withdrawal issue, Joy suggested to

Ridgway that high-level backing for the

UNC position on Item 2 might also have

a beneficial effect.8 He felt that the conference could break up over this matter

for Nam would not even discuss a proposal not hinged on the 38th Parallel.9

In the midst of this impasse, a strange

incident occurred. During the lunch

hour on 4 August a fully armed company

of Chinese troops marched past the UNC

delegation house in clear violation of the

neutrality of the conference zone. This

was a double violation, in fact, for not

only were there supposed to be no armed

troops within a half mile of the conference site but also all troops within a

5-mile radius of Kaesong were to be

equipped with sidearms only. When the

conference resumed that afternoon, Joy

immediately entered a strong protest and

Nam promised to investigate.10

Whether the Communists wished to

demonstrate their control of the conference site for propaganda purposes or

simply made a mistake proved immaterial. General Ridgway decided to

adopt a strong position and informed

Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai that the

UNC delegation would not hold any further conversations with the Communists

until a satisfactory explanation of the

violation and assurances that it would

not happen again were received.

The first reply from the Communists

stated that the troops were guards responsible for police functions and that

they had passed through the area by

error. Instructions had been issued to

prevent a recurrence. But although Admiral Joy recommended that the U.N.

Command accept this response, Ridgway determined to press for an inspection team of equal representation to be

organized and to carry out a full inspection of the entire neutral zone before the

next meeting. Ridgway felt that the violation was either a deliberate attempt

to intimidate or was due to gross carelessness or lack of discipline.11

On the morning of the 6th, a second

message was broadcast in Korean, English, and Japanese by the Communists.

Although the Korean and English versions were courteous and asked that the

U.N. delegation return to Kaesong, the

Japanese broadcast had an insolent and

peremptory ending. Ridgway asked for

permission to turn down the Communist

explanation, but his superiors considered that the enemy had in effect accepted the UNC conditions. They

instructed Ridgway to broadcast his

acceptance and at the same time to warn

the Communists that the resumption of

the talks was conditional upon their com7

 Ibid.

8

 Msg, HNC 148, Joy to Ridgway, 28 Jul 51, in

FEC 387.2, bk. I, 45-D. 9

 Msg, HNC 175, Joy to Ridgway, 4 Aug 51, in

FEC 387.2, bk. I, 60-C. 10

 Transcript of Proceedings, Nineteenth Session,

Conf at Kaesong, 4 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean

Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.

11

 Msg, C 68381, Ridgway to Joy, 6 Aug 51, in

FEC 387.2, bk. 1, 65.
38 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

plete compliance with the guarantees of

the neutralization of the Kaesong area.12

Perforce Ridgway agreed, but he vented

some of his indignation at the Communists in a message to Joy. Blasting the

enemy as men who considered courtesy

a concession and concession a weakness,

he enjoined Joy to "govern your utterances accordingly and you will employ

such language and methods as these

treacherous Communists cannot fail to

understand, and understanding respect."

 13

After a 5-day hiatus, the conference

resumed on 10 August. Joy quickly informed General Nam that the UNC

delegation was through discussing or considering the 38th Parallel as a military

demarcation line. Immediately the Communists protested against this attempt

to limit the discussion, but Joy soon

pointed out that his stand governed only

the UNC response and in no way prevented the Communists from talking

about the 38th Parallel. A very curious

interlude ensued. For two hours and ten

minutes the two delegations faced each

other in frozen silence punctuated only

by the occasional nervous tapping of

Nam's cigarette lighter on the table. Finally Admiral Joy broke the sound barrier and suggested that the conferees turn

to Item 3, since no agreement could be

reached on the line of demarcation. The

Communists refused.14

Again General Ridgway urged his superiors to support a strong course of

action. He proposed to give the Communists seventy-two hours to modify

their adamant position. If they still

would not budge, then they would be

told that by their own deliberate act

they had terminated the negotiations.

But the Washington leaders disapproved.

They had no intention of presenting an

ultimatum at this stage of the discussions.

If and when the conferences were broken

off, the onus should fall squarely upon

the Communists. After all, they pointed

out, the 38th Parallel might not be the

breaking point and it would take time

for Moscow and Peiping to amend their

stand. Past experience in dealing with

the Communists had shown that long

and protracted discussions were standard

procedure. Calmness, patience, perseverance, and firmness should characterize

the U.N. delegation attitude. This approach, they concluded, would subject

the enemy to the greatest strain while

sustaining the unity and strength of the

UNC position.15

On 12 August the Communist representatives returned to the attack. "You

should know that truth is not afraid of

repetition, and needs repetition," admonished General Nam as he argued the

case for the 38th Parallel. Unfortunately

there was no common agreement on what

"truth" was or whose "truth" was more

"truthful" than the other's. Nam termed

the U.N. proposal for ground compensation "absurd and arrogant" and his

own as "reasonable," while Joy attacked

the Communists' "inflexible and unreal

stand" and defended his own "reasonable" procedure.16

 Since neither side

12

 Msg, JCS 98216, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Aug 51. 13

 Msg, C 68554, Ridgway to CINCUNC (Adv), 8

Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 68-A-1. 14

 Transcript of Proceedings, Twentieth Session,

Conf at Kaesong, 10 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean

Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.

15

 (1) Msg, C 68672, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Aug 51.

(2) Msg, JCS 98637, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Aug 51.

(3) Msg, JCS 98713, JCS to CINCFE, 11

Aug 51. All in FEC 387.2, bk. 1, 72. 16

 Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-second Session, Conf at Kaesong, 12 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2,

Korean Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 39

wished to show any sign of weakness nor

to make concessions without a quid pro

quo, the sparring in the battle of words

continued for several days with no progress.

The Communists fought hard against

a land advance of the UNC forces as

compensation. As Pravda put it, "The

Korean people have not agreed to the

negotiations in Kaesong in order to make

a deal with the American usurpers over

their own territory."

 17

 But although the

UNC delegation admitted that its proposed demarcation line was entirely

within the Communist-controlled area

and offered to make some territorial

adjustments based on the current battle

line and over-all military situation, it

held firmly to the concept of compensation.18

Finally in an effort to break the deadlock, Admiral Joy made an important

suggestion that was to have a considerable effect upon the conduct of the

negotiations. On 15 August he proposed

that a subcommittee of one delegate and

two assistants from each side be formed.

He believed that a less formal roundthe-table exchange might be conducive

to freer discussion and might produce a

feasible plan for solving Item 2. On the

following day the Communists accepted,

but not without raising the number of

delegates to two instead of one. They

nominated Generals Lee and Hsieh, and

Joy named General Hodes and later

Admiral Burke, as his representatives.

While the subcommittee attempted to

work out its recommendations, the plenary meetings would stand in recess.19

The first subdelegate discussion took

place on 17 August, and although no concrete progress resulted, the atmosphere

was more relaxed. General Hsieh seemed

to like this type of exchange. He spoke

frequently and acted as a moderator

when the comments became sharp. As

the talk flowed back and forth around the

small table, there was even a tendency on

the part of the Communists to consider

the demarcation line on the map.

At the second session the UNC delegates managed to shock the Communists

by offering to toss a coin to decide which

side should make the first new proposal.

The Communists could not imagine having an important point turn on the flipping of a coin. Nevertheless they did

bring forth a map that slightly modified

their stand on the 38th Parallel. On the

east they gave the U.N. Command about

four kilometers and they took about the

same amount in western Korea. Later

they went further. They proposed to do

away with all previous maps and to start

afresh. Although they refused to answer

several pointed questions on the 38th

Parallel, General Hodes and Admiral

Burke felt that the Communists might

be ready to discuss other solutions, provided that the U.N. Command made the

opening gambit.20

When the third session convened on

the 19th, Hodes suggested that, for discussion purposes, the conferees assume

that all air and naval effectiveness was

reflected in the battle line. The Com- 17

 Quoted in Carl Berger, The Korea Knot: A

Military-Political History (Philadelphia: University

of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), p. 144. 18

 Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-third and

Twenty-fourth Sessions, Conf at Kaesong, 13, 14

Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers,

Min of Conf Mtgs.

19

 Ibid., Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth Sessions,

15,16 Aug 51. 20

 Summary of Proceedings, First and Second Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 17, 18 Aug 51,

in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Subdelegation Mtgs.
40 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

munists were willing to talk on this basis,

but warily waited for the U.N. Command to make a definite new proposition. After two days of fruitless fencing,

the Communists retreated further from

their position on the 38th Parallel. They

indicated that if the U.N. Command

would give up the concept of compensation, they would present a proposal based

upon adjustments along the battle line.

Since this was a definite step forward,

the UNC delegates agreed to the principle of adjustment. The meeting of the

22d adjourned with the possibility of

agreement much closer at hand.21

General Ridgway was encouraged. Anticipating that the Communists might

be willing to discuss the "line of contact"

as opposed to the "general area of the

battle line," he asked and secured approval for his plan to settle on a demilitarized zone not less than four miles

wide with the line of contact as the

median.22

Unfortunately the promise of progress

in the subdelegation meetings was shortlived. A succession of incidents stemming

from alleged violations of the neutral

zone around Kaesong led the Communists to call off the meetings on the night

of the 22d.

The Incidents

Charges and countercharges of violations of the conference area and of the

neutrality arrangements had been rampant from the outset of the negotiations.

Following the Communist refusal to admit the UNC newsmen, the UNC delegation had insisted upon an agreement

on rules and regulations governing the

conference area. In brief this established

a neutral zone with a 5-mile radius centered on the traffic circle in Kaesong.

Each side agreed to refrain from hostile

acts in this zone and all military forces

except those performing and equipped

for military police functions would be

withdrawn. No armed personnel would

be stationed within a half mile of the

conference house. During daylight hours

the U.N. delegation was given unrestricted use of the road between Panmunjom and Kaesong without prior notification of the Communists. The U.N.

liaison officers had already informed

their counterparts at the first meeting on

8 July that Communist convoys to and

from Kaesong, if marked with white

crosses and if the U.N. Command was

alerted as to their time and route, would

not be attacked. These arrangements

seemed fairly clear and simple, yet alleged infractions were charged almost at

once.

On 16 July the Communists claimed

that UNC soldiers had fired in the direction of Panmunjom. Although no one

was injured or any damage committed,

the Communists stated that this was an

act of armed force within the neutral

zone. Investigation by the U.N. Command showed that some firing in the

general area of Panmunjom had taken

place, but no evidence indicated either

that the fire had entered the neutral

zone or that the UNC forces had done

the firing.23 In any event, the Communists did not pursue the matter.

21

 Ibid., Third and Sixth Sessions, 19, 22 Aug 51. 22

 (1) Msg, C 69346, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Aug 51,

in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 109. (2) Msg, JCS 99477, JCS

to CINCFE, 22 Aug 51.

23

 Rpt of Investigation, Col James C. Murray for

CINCUNC, sub: Rpt of Investigation Alleged Violation of Neutral Zone, 18 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2,

Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 41

Five days later Col. Chang Chun San,

the North Korean liaison officer, informed Colonel Kinney that UNC planes

had strafed the Communist delegation's

supply trucks marked with white flags

at Hwangju and Sariwon. But since the

Communists had not notified the UNC

of the movement of this convoy, the

U.N. Command refused to assume any

responsibility for damages incurred under such circumstances. With the enemy

using the roads between P'yongyang and

Kaesong to build up his strength, Ridgway did not intend to extend blanket

immunity to all vehicles bearing white

markings, for the UNC suspected that

the Communists might well use this device to slip through men and matériel

for the front. Furthermore, the U.N.

Command had to take the word of the

Communists that a strafing had actually

occurred, for no investigations were carried on outside the conference area.

Ridgway told Admiral Joy to inform

the enemy that unless advance warning

was given, vehicles would be attacked

wherever found.24

The first two incidents were relatively

minor and the Communists did not raise

too much fuss over them. It may have

come as quite a shock or revelation to

them when the U.N. Command strongly

protested against the already mentioned

violation of the conference area by a company of fully armed Chinese Communist

troops on 4 August and suspended the

meetings for five days until satisfactory

assurances against recurrence were received from Generals Kim and Peng.

With the U.N. Command garnering favorable publicity from the incident and

putting the Communists on the defensive, the enemy may have decided to

launch a counteroffensive.

On 8 August, while the recess continued, the Communists reported that

two UNC violations of the neutrality

arrangements had been committed the

previous day. First, UNC planes had

assaulted a supply truck marked with a

white flag at Sibyon-ni, and, second,

about forty UNC troops had closed on

the bridge at Panmunjom and several

had fired at unarmed Communist personnel. Again, but without much success,

the UNC liaison officers patiently tried

to convince their opposites that prior

notification of convoy movements was

the only guarantee of immunity. The

Communists insisted that the white

markings were sufficient. After a thorough investigation of the second charge,

Admiral Joy found that no UNC units

had been in the Panmunjom area at that

time and therefore could not have been

responsible for the shooting. Because of

a delay of twenty-eight hours by the

Communists in laying this claim, Joy

questioned its validity.25

Less than a week later, on 13 August,

another strafing attack on three Communist supply vehicles took place in the

vicinity of Sibyon-ni and again the enemy

protested. Admiral Joy's acknowledgement was brief and stated in part: "In

view of the fact that no notification of

this movement was received, no action

on the part of the United Nations Com24

 (1) Msg, HNC 133, CINCUNC (Adv) to FEAF,

25 Jul 51. (2) Msg, CX 67744, CINCFE to CINCFE

(Adv), 26 Jul 51. Both in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 35.

25

 (1) Rpts of Investigation, sub: Summary of

Protest and Replies Concerning Alleged Violation

of 7 Aug 51, no date, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation. (2) Msg, CX

68595, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 71.
42 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

mand is necessary and none is contemplated."

 26

The spate of incidents led the Communists to request that the liaison officers

meet and work out more satisfactory arrangements. In mid-August Colonel Kinney and Col. James C. Murray (a Marine

Corps officer) held a series of conferences

with Colonel Chang and reached agreement on a number of items. But even

as they sought to attain final accord,

several new incidents occurred.

One was another truck strafing, but

the second was of a more serious nature.

On 19 August a Chinese military police

platoon, patrolling near the village of

Songgong-ni in the neutral zone, was

ambushed and the platoon leader was

killed and another soldier wounded. The

Communists immediately protested and

accused the U.N. Command of breaching

the old agreement. While the UNC officers investigated the charge, the enemy

made the most of the incident. In the

subdelegation meeting on the 20th, the

Communist representatives recessed

the session early so as to attend the

funeral of the platoon leader and invited

General Hodes and Admiral Burke to

go along with them. This placed the

UNC delegates in an embarrassing position, for if they accepted, the Communists would be sure to take pictures and

publicize and probably distort the reasons for their presence. Hodes and

Burke decided to decline and hastened

to their helicopter at the close of the

meeting. Somewhat apprehensive lest

the Communists stop them en route and

escort them to the last rites, they made

it safely to the plane and took off as

quickly as possible for Munsan-ni.27

Despite conflicting testimony, investigation showed that the patrol had been

ambushed, but that no U.N. or ROK

units had been close to Songgong-ni at

that time. Since some witnesses stated

that several members of the attacking

force had worn civilian clothes and had

been seen in the area before, the UNC

officers surmised that they were partisans

friendly to the ROK but acting independently.28

 Needless to say, the Communists were not satisfied with this explanation and made full use of the

incident for propaganda purposes.

Before the furore caused by this episode had died away, the Communists

summoned Colonel Kinney from his bed

in the early morning hours of the 23d to

lodge another protest. Upon his arrival

at Kaesong, Colonel Chang and his Chinese colleague, Lt. Col. Tsai Cheng-wen,

informed him excitedly that a UNC

plane had bombed the conference site.

Despite the darkness and a driving rain,

Kinney and his associates inspected the

evidence. Although there were several

small holes, the so-called bomb fragments appeared to be parts of an aircraft

oil tank and an engine nacelle. The

Communists claimed that one of the

bombs had been napalm, but nowhere

was there any badly scorched earth

area that a napalm explosion would have

caused. After viewing the evidence, Kinney termed the whole affair "nonsense."

26

 Ltr, Joy to Nam, 14 Aug 51, no sub, Tab 7 in

Rpt of Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest . . .

Strafing at Sib Yon Ni, no date, in FEC 387.2,

Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.

27

 Interv, author with Col Howard S. Levie, Staff

Officer for Subcommittee on item 2, 7 Mar 58. In

OCMH. 28

 Rpt of Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest

... 19 Aug 51, Communist Patrol Ambushed, Communist Truck Attacked, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 43

Whereupon Chang retorted that "all

meetings from this time" were called

off.

As the UNC party drove to Panmunjom, the Communist liaison officers overtook them and urged them to return

and complete the investigation. Kinney

preferred to wait until daylight but

Chang and Tsai insisted that new evidence had been uncovered. Reluctantly

Kinney returned and was shown two

more small holes, several small burned

patches, and some pieces of aircraft

metal. There was an odor of gasoline

and a substance in one of the holes might

have been a low-grade napalm that had

not been ignited. When the U.N. investigators requested that all the evidence

remain in place until it could be inspected by daylight, the Communists refused. They intended to gather it all for

analysis and considered the investigation

over.29

There were many elements in this affair that pointed to a deliberate attempt

on the part of the Communists to arrange

an incident to suspend the negotiations.

In the first place, the Fifth Air Force

maintained that it had no planes up in

the area. Secondly, the plane that supposedly dropped the bombs had its headlights on, a procedure contrary to all

UNC practice. Thirdly, the bomb pattern of the craters was such that, in the

opinion of the UNC investigators, no

single plane could have made them. In

addition to these technical objections

and the flimsiness of the evidence, the

haste of the Communists and their eagerness to gather in the fragments for analysis and the quickness with which the

low-echelon liaison officer was able to

call off the meetings made the Communist motives suspect. As Ridgway informed the JCS, this decision must

have been made in advance and at the

highest level. As he saw it, there were

three possible reasons for the Communists action: 1. They wanted an excuse

to break off the negotiations, with the

blame falling on the UNC. 2. They

wanted to stall to mesh the timing of the

conference talks with the Japanese peace

treaty and the Russian peace offensive. 3. They desired a suspension to

strengthen their propaganda position

and to regain the initiative in the negotiations.30

Ridgway's suggestions did not exhaust

the list. There were several other interesting variations. Disappointment in the

failure of the United States to invite

Communist China to the San Francisco

peace conference on Japan was one suggestion at the time. Another theory reasoned that the Communists had thought

the UNC proposal for subdelegation

meetings meant that the U.N. Command

was ready to compromise on the 38th

Parallel and when this hope proved

false, decided to play for time while they

worked out their next move.31

Whatever the motivations might be,

the truce talks entered a long period of

suspension. The UNC rejection of responsibility for the bombing of Kaesong

29

 Rpt of Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest

and Replies . . . Bombing of Kaesong, no date, in

FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.

30

 Msg, CX 69566, CINCFE to JCS, 24 Aug 51, in

FEC 387.2, bk. II, 116. 31

 William H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjom: The

Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations

(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958), pp.

66-67.
44 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

INVESTIGATING A POSSIBLE NEUTRALITY VIOLATION. Colonel Darrow (third from

left), with U.N. and Chinese representatives, examines a pine branch allegedly broken by machine gun strafing northwest of Kaesong.

elicited many angry Communist responses but the UNC held firm. In the

meantime the Communists entered several new charges of UNC violations.

They claimed that a UNC plane had

dropped a flare in the Kaesong area on

29 August; that UNC forces had attacked

a patrol and fired shots across the bridge

at Panmunjom on 30 August; and that

UNC planes had bombed Kaesong a second time on 1 September. Investigation

of these charges by UNC officers revealed

that no UNC planes could have committed the air incidents and that partisan forces were probably responsible for

the ground action.32

Both Ridgway and Joy felt strongly

that the best way to lessen the possibility

of further incidents was to change the negotiation site. The former had recommended that a new location be proposed

in early August and after the avalanche

of incidents during that month, Joy reinforced him stoutly. The U.S. leaders

32

 Rpts of Investigation, sub: Summaries of Protest

and Replies . . . Flare Dropped Over Kaesong, etc..

no dates, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers,

Rpts of Investigation.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 45

were willing to have the U.N. Command

put forward a suggestion, but at this

point they did not wish to make a change

in site a mandatory prerequisite to a resumption of negotiations.33

The one encouraging factor lay in the

Communists' willingness to continue the

battle of words over the violations. If

they seriously intended to break off the

negotiations completely, they had created a situation in which they could have

withdrawn and blamed the U.N. Command. Despite the lack of substance in

most of their accusations, they had seized

the propaganda initiative and forced the

UNC on to the defensive. The U.N.

Command could calmly refute the Communist claims again and again, but the

flood of incidents tended to obscure the

denials. However as September wore on,

there were indications that the Communists had attained their objective,

whether it was time or the initiative, and

were prepared to reopen negotiations.34

Strangely enough, the occasion was another incident, only this time it was a

real violation of the neutral zone. On 10

September a plane from the 3d Bomb

Group strafed Kaesong through a navigational error by the pilot. Fortunately

no damage was incurred, but the Communists entered a formal protest. As soon

as the investigation disclosed that a UNC

plane had committed the attack, Admiral

Joy wrote and apologized for the infraction. This drew what could be considered

almost a friendly response from the

Communists on 19 September. In view

of the UNC willingness to assume responsibility for this violation, Kim and

Peng suggested to Ridgway that the delegates resume the negotiations at Kaesong

immediately.35

But Ridgway was unwilling to reopen

the negotiations until there was a definite improvement in the physical setup.

The Communists had previously brushed

aside his suggestion that the site be

changed, but he determined that the

conditions for a resumption must be settled at the liaison officer level and not

by the delegates. At the same time he

intended to press for a new location.36

Communist opposition to any change

in the site and to the liaison officers

working out the details of neutralizing

the truce zone threatened to lengthen

the recess. The Communists were reluctant to give their liaison officers the authority necessary for coming to an

agreement on either point. Nevertheless, Kinney reported after the first

meeting of the liaison officers on 25

September that they seemed anxious to

get the delegation together. He felt that

patience and firmness would finally

gain the establishment of satisfactory

conditions.37

In Washington, intelligence sources 33

 (1) Msgs, HNC 264 and HNC 272, CINCUNC

(Adv) to CINCFE, 24, 28 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk.

II, 118-B and 121-B. (2) Msg, C 50115, CINCFE to

JCS, 3 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 131-B. (3) Msg,

JCS 80658, JCS to CINCFE, 5 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2,

bk. II, 135. 34

 On 8 September, 48 of the 51 nations which had

been at war with Japan signed the peace treaty at

San Francisco. Only the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia failed to sign. The successful conclusion

of the treaty may also have influenced the Communists to resume negotiations.

35

 (1) Msg, CX 50634, CINCFE to JCS, 11 Sep 51.

(2) Ltr, Joy to Nam, no sub, 11 Sep 51. (3) Ltr,

Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai to Ridgway, no

sub, 19 Sep 51. All in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice

Papers, Rpts of Investigation. 36

 Msg, C 51315, CINCUNC to JCS, 21 Sep 51, in

FEC 387.2, bk. II, 147-A. 37

 (1) Msg, HNC 315, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 24 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 150. (2)

Msg, HNC 323, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 25

Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 159.
46 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

were reluctant to attach any special significance to the signs of Communist anxiety. Since the Communist position in

Korea had not deteriorated, they held

that no new line of action seemed imminent and that the Russians may have

directed a resumption for their own military or political purposes.38

In any event Ridgway and his staff

drew up a plan of action. Since Chairman

of the JCS General of the Army Omar

N. Bradley and State Department Counselor Charles E. Bohlen were in the Far

East, Ridgway submitted his proposed

policy to them and secured their approval. The plan posed three alternatives based on Communist reactions.

If they accepted a change of site, the

UNC delegation would offer a 4-kilometer demilitarized zone based generally

along the line of contact. As long as the

Communists clung to Kaesong but no

break seemed imminent, the U.N. Command would push for a new site without

categorically excluding Kaesong. The

third alternative would rise if a break

seemed likely: the U.N. commander

would send a message with a map to the

Communists indicating the proposed demilitarized zone and subdelegations

would be suggested to discuss this at a

place acceptable to both sides.39 Bohlen

later reported that Ridgway and his staff

felt that the U.N. Command had made

steady concessions to the Communists on

procedural matters and had possibly created an appearance of weakness that the

military situation did not justify. Bohlen

recommended that Ridgway be firmly

supported on the matter of a new site

even though it seemed to him to be an

artificial issue.40

While Ridgway pursued his pressure

campaign, exchanging letters with Kim

and Peng on the higher level and backing

a staunch stand at the liaison officers

meetings, several new incidents took

place. On 19 September a South Korean

invasion of the neutral zone occurred.

Four unarmed ROK soldiers with full

Red Cross insignia lost their way and

crossed the bridge at Panmunjom on a

truck loaded with DDT. The bewildered health team and the truck were

immediately taken into custody, no

doubt on suspicion of conducting biological warfare, and were only released

upon the signing of a receipt by the

UNC liaison officers.41

On 7 October a UNC B-26 crossed the

neutral zone, but no attack was made.

The crew was officially reprimanded for

the overflight. Five days later a more

serious violation drew a strong protest

from the Communists. On 12 October

a flight of UNC F-80's passed over the

neutral area en route home. One of them

cleared its machine guns and accidentally

killed a 12-year-old Korean boy and

wounded his 2-year-old brother. Although the U.N. Command accepted the

responsibility for this unfortunate affair

and tendered its deep regrets, the atmosphere at the liaison officers meeting underwent a sudden change.42

38

 JCS 1776/253, 25 Sep 51, title: Evolution of

Recent Developments Pertaining to Cease-Fire Talks

in Korea. 39

 Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 1 Oct 51, DA-IN 2201.

40

 Memo, Bohlen for Secy State, 4 Oct 51, sub:

Rpt on Trip to Japan and Korea with General

Bradley, in G-3 333 Pacific, 12. 41

 Msg, HNC 309, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE,

19 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 146-8. 42

 (1) Msg, A 4757, CG FEAF to CINCFE, 12 Oct

51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 184. (2) Msg, HNC 353,

CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 12 Oct 51, in FEC

387.2, bk. III, 199. (3) Msg, HNC 359, CINCUNC

(Adv) to CINCFE, 14 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III,

203.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 47

Until this latest episode progress had

been encouraging. The patience and

firmness of the U.N. Command had won

several concessions from the Communists. Under steady pressure the latter

had at last consented on 7 October to a

transfer of the site from Kaesong to Panmunjom, where both sides would assume

responsibility for protecting the conference area.43

 Ridgway immediately instructed Van Fleet to be ready to take

over the high ground east of Panmunjom

as soon as final arrangements for the

reopening of negotiations were concluded.44

When the liaison officers met on 10

October, the Communists refused initially to discuss anything but the time

and date of the next meeting of the delegates. Colonel Chang was rather abrupt

in his treatment of the UNC officers, but

the Chinese liaison officer, Colonel Tsai,

intervened and smoothed over the situation. He accepted the documents and

map of the neutral area offered by Colonel Murray and later escorted Murray

to the door of the tent while his senior,

Chang, stood silently by.45 Such an overt

action by the junior officer provided a

good example of where the real power

lay.

As soon as the Communists realized

that the U.N. Command was not going

to hold a meeting on higher level until

the liaison officers established the rules

and regulations, they reluctantly agreed

to work out the details at the staff conferences. Relations between the lower echelons had become comparatively cordial

and prospects for quick agreement on

the conditions for resumption appeared

bright when the 12 October incident cast

its shadow. Overnight the Communists

reverted to the old frigid formality and

tempers grew short. The following exchange between Kinney and Chang during a long and trying session on the 16th

was symptomatic of the new climate of

opinion:

Kinney: I find that it is becoming a habit of Colonel Chang to read

me a lesson on how to conduct my

portion of this particular discussion.

Chang: It seems to me that Colonel

Kinney is worrying about things about

which he should not worry. Inasmuch

as I am not in a position of being an

instructor of Colonel Kinney, I have no

responsibility for educating him.

Kinney: I am glad that you realize

that.46

Despite this turn in the personal

relationships, the points of official differences narrowed. Since the site was moving to Panmunjom, the U.N. Command

wished to limit the neutral area around

Kaesong to 3,000 yards rather than

five miles. Such a contraction would lessen the area in which incidents could

occur. But the Communists fought this

proposal strongly and would not agree

to delimitation below three miles. The

UNC representatives finally compromised and accepted this figure both for

Kaesong and the U.N. base camp at

Munsan-ni.47

43

 Msg, CX 52498, CINCFE to JCS, 8 Oct 51, in

FEC 387.2, bk. III, 179. 44

 Msg, CX 52506, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,

8 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 188. 45

 Msg, HNC 345, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE,

10 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 189.

46

 Memo for Red, 16 Oct 51, sub: Liaison Officers'

Mtg Held at Panmunjom, in FEC 387.2, Korean

Armistice Papers, Liaison Officers Mtgs. 47

 (1) Msg, C 53096, CINCFE to JCS, 16 Oct 51,

in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 206. (2) Msg, HNC 374,

CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 20 Oct 51, in FEC

387.2, bk. III, 213.


50 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

A second important item that blocked

final agreement concerned the violations

of the air space over the neutral zone.

After the many instances of UNC planes

flying over the area through navigational

error or because of the weather conditions, the UNC negotiators wished to

eliminate accidental invasion of the air

space as a violation. The Communists

insisted for some time that this was a

hostile act of armed force, but at last

agreed to compromise and recognized

that there might be weather and technical conditions beyond human control

under which aircraft might fly over the

conference area but without any intent

to attack or damage it.48

On 22 October the liaison officers

signed the new security agreement which

embodied most of the features desired

by the U.N. Command. Besides the restriction of the Kaesong area to three

miles and the provision on accidental

overflight of the neutral zone, the UNC

was also able to except itself from responsibility for the acts committed by

irregulars or partisans not under its control. This had been another troublesome

matter and the cause of several Communist complaints in the past. A 1,000-

yard circle around Panmunjom was

neutralized as was a 200-meter area on

each side of the road from Kaesong to

Panmunjom to Munsan. (Map 2) In

the Panmunjom area each side agreed

to station 2 military police officers and

15 men armed with small arms while

the conference was in session and 1 officer and 5 men during other periods.

The Communists offered to supply the

delegation conference tent and the U.N.

Command to provide flooring, space

heating, and lights for the tent. Other

wise each side would take care of its own

needs in the conference area. To help

prevent violations of the air space, the

U.N. Command agreed to set up a searchlight and barrage balloons at Panmunjom.49

Having secured the agreement, the

UNC delegates hoped to steal a march

upon the Communists. Admiral Joy anticipated that the Communists intended

to discuss the security arrangements all

over again at the delegate level, so he

dispatched a letter to Nam ratifying the

liaison officers' accord and told Nam that

he would await the Communist concurrence before resuming negotiations.

Colonel Kinney also informed Chang

that UNC security troops were moving

in to the high ground east of Panmunjom to eliminate the possibility of incidents from this quarter.50

General Nam signed the Communist

ratification on 24 October and the first

meeting of the delegates was scheduled

for the following day. Thus after two

months the truce conference resumed,

but what had happened in the meantime? There seemed little doubt that

the Communists had regained the propaganda initiative. Despite the staged incidents and the question of validity of

others, there had been enough actual

violations to provide the leaven for the

Communist case. If this were the Communist objective in suspending the meet48

 (1) Msg, HNC 374, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCFE, 20 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 213. (2)

Msg, HNC 376, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 21

Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 215.

49

 Memo for Rcd, Liaison Officers' Mtg Held at

Panmunjom, 21, 22 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean

Armistice Papers, Liaison Officers Mtgs. 50

 Msg, HNC 381. CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC,

22 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 220.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 51

ings, the mission had been successfully

accomplished. But if the Communists

had hoped to alter the UNC position

on the 38th Parallel and secure substantial concessions by this propaganda campaign, they had failed. Their action had

only strengthened the UNC determination not to concede.

On the other hand the Communist

tactics had several by-products. The delay in the negotiations led to increased

UNC pressure on the battlefield and in

the air. It provided time for additional

training of the South Korean forces and

for the National Police Reserve in Japan.

And it also allowed the United States

ample opportunity to consider the shortand long-range situations in the Far East.
CHAPTER IV

A Time for Preparation

As the Korean War entered its second

year, American policy had made a full

turn. When the Communists had

launched their attack in mid-1950, the

U.S. objective had been to contain the

enemy advance and to restore the status

quo. As the battle situation improved,

this modest goal had been expanded in

September and October to the unification

of all Korea under a democratic regime.

With the advent of the Chinese Communist forces, the bright dream of unification quickly faded and the United

States again focused upon the re-establishment of the prewar political

situation.

The fluctuation of military fortunes

at the front was reflected in the military

plans. While the UNC forces were falling

back toward Pusan under the enemy's

initial onslaught, evacuation of Korea

and a general withdrawal to Japan appeared imminent. The triumph at Inch'on had banished such pessimistic

ideas and temporarily induced a feeling

of aggressive confidence in the ability of

the UNC troops to unify the country.

But the Chinese reintroduced the possibility of evacuation as they drove the

UNC units back in November and December. The difficulties of fighting a

war across the Sea of Japan returned to

plague the planners.

The barometric changes in plans as

the battle skies clouded or cleared

reached an equilibrium in the spring of

1951. As the fighting became stabilized

close to the 38th Parallel and especially

after the relief of General MacArthur

in April, reliance on military victory in

Korea had waned. The costs had become

too high and the risks too great. Still the

war continued and had to be prosecuted

until a settlement was secured. This had

turned the thoughts of the American

leaders to the negotiation of an armistice.

Barring Soviet entry into the conflict

and the outbreak of a global war, a truce

seemed to offer the best prospect of liquidating the Korean commitment of

redressing the balance of U.S. military

aid in favor of Europe and of rebuilding

the strategic reserves at home.

War without victory posed a new and

difficult set of questions to the American

military leaders who had been taught

that victory was the objective. With the

inception of the armistice negotiations,

they no longer sought to win by a knockout, but rather on points. They had to

hurt the enemy enough to influence him

to accept the UNC terms for a settlement, yet not enough to provoke an

all-out counterattack and a possible

widening of the struggle. The United

States must win the decision, but not decisively.

Conduct of the War—The

Washington Side

The determination of the ways and
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 53

means to attain a satisfactory decision

in Korea rested ultimately with the President, of course. As Commander in Chief

of the military forces of the United

States, Mr. Truman required all but the

most routine directives on the Korean

War to pass through his office for his

approval or rejection.1 Since the United

States had been given full power by the

United Nations to form a unified command, Mr. Truman had no responsibility to clear his strategic decisions

with any U.N. agency. (Chart 1) His

close and complete control of important

decisions and plans relating to Korea

must be kept continually in mind, for

even though his role in many cases consisted mainly of approval or disapproval,

his was the final decision.

The President's chief advisory group

was the National Security Council

(NSC), composed of the President, the

Vice President, the Secretary of State,

the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources

Board. Other members of the executive

branch, such as the Secretaries of the

Army, Navy, and Air Force, could be

appointed by Mr. Truman to serve on

the council but he chose not to do so.

The principal duties of the NSC were

to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the

United States in relation to national security and then to advise the President

on the most suitable course of action to

be followed.2

On the civilian level in July 1951, the

President's foremost assistant in defense

matters was the Secretary of Defense,

George C. Marshall.3

 Under Marshall

were the three service Secretaries—Frank

Pace, Jr., of the Army; Francis P. Matthews of the Navy; and Thomas K. Finletter of the Air Force—and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. General of the Army

Omar N. Bradley was Chairman of the

JCS with General J. Lawton Collins,

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, and General Hoyt S.

Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air

Force, as the service representatives.4

As members of the JCS, Collins, Sherman, and Vandenberg were the principal

military advisors to the Secretary of Defense and the President and not subject

to the jurisdiction of the Secretaries of

the Army, Navy, and Air Force in such

matters as the preparation of strategic

plans and the strategic direction of military forces. In their service capacities as

Chiefs of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations, they were responsible to the service

Secretaries, however. General Bradley

had no vote as chairman, but he did

preside over the meetings and deliberations of the JCS and represented the

group in the meetings with the Presi1

 For an interesting discussion of the military

conduct of the war, see the article, "Truman," by

Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., in Ernest R. May, ed.. The

Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander

in Chief (New York: George Braziller, 1960). 2

 The composition and functions of the NSC are

described in the United States Government Organization Manual 1951-1952, prepared by the

General Services Administration, National Archives

and Records Service, Federal Register Division

(Washington, no date), p. 63. 3

 General Marshall, after a distinguished career as

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, in World War II and

service as Secretary of State, was recalled from

retirement in September 1950, to replace Secretary

Louis Johnson. A special waiver had to be passed

by Congress on this occasion, since Marshall still

held his General of the Army rank and the law

barred military officers from holding the post of

Secretary of Defense. 4

 Admiral Sherman died of a heart attack on 22

July. He was replaced by Admiral William M.

Fechteler on 1 August.
CHART 1—CHANNELS OF COMMAND, JULY 1951

a

 The U.N. Security Council had no command authority, but did receive biweekly reports from the U.N.

commander. b

 The Army Chief of Staff acted as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. c

 The UNC/FEC exercised operational control only over the air and naval forces under its command. d

 Although Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, had not been inactivated, it did not become operational

until I October 1952. e

 The Military Advisory Group for Korea was assigned to Eighth Army command. It continued to discharge

its mission of assisting the ROK Army and provided liaison between the Eighth Army and the ROK Army.
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 55

dent, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense.5

To insure close co-ordination between

the military and political officials who

were responsible for preparing plans and

positions of policy relating to the Korean

War, Secretary Marshall had ordered the

resumption of informal consultations between State Department and Defense

officials and instituted weekly meetings

between representatives of the State Department and the JCS.6

 Hence, proposed

military actions with political implications were discussed with the State Department and cleared with the Secretary

of State before being submitted to the

President.

Below the Defense-JCS-State Department policy and strategic directive level

came the unified commands. After World

War II the JCS had created a number of

unified commands on a geographic basis.

These operated under the strategic command of the JCS who in turn delegated

executive responsibility to the service

which was considered to have primary

interest in the command. In the case of

the Far East Command (FEC), the

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, was given

executive responsibility and within the

Army General Collins had made the

G-3 staff division his executive agent.

The latter usually transmitted the decisions and instructions agreed upon at

the higher levels to General Ridgway

and also helped to formulate the Army

position that General Collins presented

to the JCS on matters affecting the Far

East Command and its prosecution of

the war.7

Therefore, if General Ridgway and his

staff devised a plan or a course of action

that they wished to have approved, the

following procedure would customarily

be followed. Upon receipt of the Far

East Command recommendation, G-3

would pass it on to the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and to the other services for

study. G-3 would then co-ordinate with

interested staff divisions in the Army to

prepare an official Army position that

General Collins could present to his fellow members of the JCS. If the FEC

recommendation transcended military

matters, State Department officials would

be consulted and their approval would

be sought. Then the recommendation,

perhaps in a form amended by the JCS

and State, would go up to the Secretary

of Defense for his comments before it

finally reached the President's desk for

final approval. The process appeared

cumbersome, but if the need for decision

was urgent, a consultation or meeting

between the parties involved could often

produce quick agreement on the position

or positions to be set forth for the President. Thus, behind every important decision taken in the Korean War lay the

staff mechanism—gathering information,

preparing, co-ordinating, and assessing

plans and policies, and presenting recommendations that were forwarded through

channels up the military-political ladder

to the President.

Not all of the plans and proposals emanated from the theater, however, since

frequently the G-3 or JCS staffs initiated

their own. These were usually co-ordinated with the Far East Command be5

 U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1951-52,

pp. 116ff. 6

 Hoare, "Truman" in The Ultimate Decision, p.

197. The State-Defense meetings had been discontinued under Secretary of Defense Johnson.

7

 See Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First

Year, Chapter III.
56 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

fore they ascended the ladder for

comments and suggestions.

The JCS Ponder

Within the staff mechanism a number

of alternatives on the Korean War were

prepared in the early spring of 1951 and

the JCS presented them to Secretary

Marshall. Unless there was a general

war or a sudden great influx of Soviet

volunteers in Korea that might jeopardize the UNC forces, the JCS believed

that the UNC troops should stay in the

peninsula. They recognized that military

action alone would not solve the Korean

problem and that there probably would

not be any solution until world tensions

relaxed. In the meantime the American

forces should pursue their current course

of exerting pressure upon the Communists in Korea in the hope that eventually

a favorable political settlement might

result that would not sacrifice the U.S.

position on Taiwan or on a seat for

Communist China in the United Nations. The JCS also felt that South Korean forces should be created in the

interim to take over the major part of

the military burden in Korea.8

If, however, the war should spread

and the Communist Chinese expanded

their actions outside Korea, the JCS

were also prepared. In early June they

directed the Commander in Chief, U.S.

Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), at Hawaii, to

work out a plan for blockading the China

coast in case the U.N. forces were compelled to evacuate Korea. Despite Ridgway's protest that CINCPAC would

probably want naval reinforcements at

a time when Ridgway would need every

ship under his command to carry out the

evacuation, the JCS refused to divide the

responsibility for the planning of the

blockade. The command organization in

such an event would be settled on the

basis of actual conditions, they maintained, and nothing would be taken

away from Ridgway without specific JCS

instructions.9

The naval blockade might also be a

weapon if the truce negotiations broke

down. Shortly after the conferees met at

Kaesong in July, the JCS advised Marshall that increased military pressure

would have to be applied upon the enemy if he would not come to terms.

Although general war with China was

to be avoided, they recommended that:

the United States be kept ready for general war on relatively short notice; many

of the restrictions imposed on Ridgway's

ground and air operations should be

lifted if the negotiations failed; and

Japanese defense forces and South Korean military units should be developed,

trained, and equipped as quickly as possible. The United States should immediately urge the other United Nations

participating in Korea: to support a

naval blockade; to bring additional political and economic pressure upon

China; and to increase their forces in

Korea.10

After the long recess over the incidents

terminated, the JCS in early November

revised some of these recommendations.

For one thing, the Communist build-up

of fighter strength in Manchuria during

the summer and early fall ruled out the

8

 Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 5 Apr 51, sub:

Mil Action in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 167/4.

9

 (1) Msg, JCS 92847, JCS to CINCPAC, 1 Jun 51.

(2) Msg, CX 65297, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Jun 51. (3)

Msg, JCS 80240, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Aug 51. 10

 Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 13 Jul 51, sub:

U.S. Courses of Action in Korea. In OCMH.
CHART 2—U.N. COMMAND/FAR EAST COMMAND, MAJOR GROUN

Source: Hq Eighth Army, Command Report, ACofS, G-3, bk. 4, pt. 1, 1 Jul 51; DOD General Officers Assignmen
58 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

lifting of the restriction of "hot" pursuit

of Communist planes across the Manchurian border. In July this would have

been profitable; now the cost would be

excessive. However, the JCS did believe

that the growing Communist air strength

had reached a dangerous point and the

United States might be forced to move

quickly and unilaterally against specific

Chinese air bases if the scale of enemy

air activity jeopardized the security of

U.S. forces in Korea. To meet this contingency and to allow Ridgway more

freedom in planning air and ground operations in the event the negotiations

were ended, the JCS favored giving the

U.N. commander broader powers. They

realized that only substantial increases

in men and equipment could produce a

military victory, but the wider range of

discretion would allow Ridgway to exert

pressure as he saw fit with the forces at

his disposal. Pointing out that the American public might grow weary of an indecisive war if the truce talks were not

successful and might demand adoption of

measures capable of securing military

victory, the JCS recommended that the

National Security Council reconsider a

U.S. policy in case a negotiated settlement proved impossible.11

The general outlines of the JCS strategy were simple. Unless a global war

broke out, the U.S. forces would remain

in Korea and exert pressure upon the

enemy to encourage him to negotiate.

There would be no military victory in

this limited war, but the U.N. commander would have considerable latitude in the use of the military forces

under his command. Patience, perseverance, and pressure keynoted the U.S.

position, but would these be enough to

persuade the enemy to come to terms?

Of Men and Arms

It was a formidable task that the JCS

had given to General Ridgway and his

United Nations Command. The colorful

Ridgway, with his ever-present hand

grenade, had proved himself an able

combat commander and administrator.

Not only was he responsible for the

conduct of operations in Korea as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) and the defense of

the Far East Command area as Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE),

but also the administration of Japan as

Supreme Commander, Allied Powers

(SCAP), and of the Ryukyus as Governor of these islands. (See Chart 1.)

Most of the officers on Ridgway's staff

performed multiple duties as he used

them interchangeably in the UNC, FEC,

and SCAP headquarters. Lt. Gen. Doyle

O. Hickey, for example, was chief of

staff for all three commands.

The ground weapon of the U.N.

Command in Korea was the Eighth

Army under General Van Fleet, which

included ROK and UNC units participating in the war. Organized into 4 corps,

the Eighth Army had a reported strength

of 554,577 men at the end of June. Seven

of its 17 divisions were American and

the remaining 10 were ROK. In addition, there were 4 brigades, 1 separate

regiment, and 9 separate battalions.

(Chart 2) The breakdown in strength

figures showed 253,250 U.S. troops, 28,-

061 other U.N. personnel, 260,548 ROK

troops, and 12,718 Koreans who were assigned to serve with the U.S. units (Ko11

 Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 3 Nov 51, sub: U.S. Courses of Action in Korea. In OCMH.
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 59

rean Augmentation to the U.S. Army

[KATUSA]).12

During the Communist offensives in

the spring of 1951 the Eighth Army had

shown itself a highly skilled battle force

capable of absorbing the stiff punches

of the enemy and of dealing stern punishment in return. Although it did not

have sufficient strength to insure a decisive military victory in Korea, it was

fully competent to man the defense as

long as the war remained limited.

Under the circumstances General

Ridgway sought to strengthen the defensive power of his forces in Korea. With

the battle lines fairly stable, he requested

that his artillery capabilities be increased. The enemy, he pointed out to

the JCS, was particularly susceptible

to the potential of massed artillery fire

when he attacked. If five 155-mm.

howitzer, four 8-inch howitzer, one 155-

mm. gun, and two observation battalions

were added to the Eighth Army's artillery, Ridgway felt that it could inflict

even greater losses upon the enemy.13

There was little question over the desirability of this augmentation in Washington, but Ridgway's requirements

were only a part of the picture. Actually

the artillery increases when added to

Ridgway's other requests would necessitate raising the FEC troop ceiling by

57,000 spaces if all were approved. As

G-3 pointed out to General Collins, the

only way that the Army could fill Ridgway's demands completely would be by

increasing the over-all strength of the

Army establishment. Since this was not

practicable at the moment, G-3 suggested that by taking 5,000 men from

the General Reserve and 5,000 from the

shipment scheduled to strengthen the

European Command, at least part of

FEC's needs could be met.14

With the Chief of Staff's support, the

JCS on 17 August approved an increase

of five AAA battalions and four field

artillery battalions for Ridgway's command. These along with other assorted

units totaling over 13,000 men were to

be shipped in the fall.15 Thus by cutting

back the General Reserve and delaying

the European build-up, the Army leaders in Washington tried to fill some of

Ridgway's most urgent priorities.

The Washington staff was under no

illusion insofar as enemy potential was

concerned. It realized that dragging out

the negotiations through the summer had

allowed the Communists to build up

their forces. At any time, the enemy

could launch an offensive with a manpower superiority of up to 4 to 1 at the

point of contact, lasting nearly a month,

and using up to 46 Chinese and North

Korean divisions and 1,100 aircraft. To

oppose this offensive Ridgway could muster the 17 divisions in Korea, but would

this be enough to halt the enemy threat?

The situation in the United States was

not particularly hopeful. Of the 7 Army

divisions stationed at home only 3 were

fully trained in September 1951. One of

these, the 82d Airborne, was the strategic reserve; the other 2, the 28th and

12 43d Infantry Divisions, were scheduled

 DF, OCA to OCMH, 7 Oct 54, sub: ROK and

U.N. Ground Force Strength in Korea: In OCMH. 13

 Msg, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jun 51, DA-IN 7369.

The nondivisional artillery assigned to Eighth Army

on 1 July 1951 included seven 155-mm. howitzer battalions, two 155-mm. gun battalions, and two 8-inch

howitzer battalions.

14

 Summary Sheet, Maj Gen Robinson E. Duff for

CofS, 2 Jul 51, sub: Re-evaluation of FA Requirements, in G-3 320.2 Pacific, 300. 15

 Msg, G-3 to CINCFE, 22 Aug 51, DA-OUT

99608.
60 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

GENERAL RIDGWAY AT THE FRONT

to go to Europe in October and Novem- ber. The 11th Airborne would finish its

divisional training cycle in November

and go into the strategic reserve, but the

remaining 3—the 31st and 47th Infantry

and the 1st Armored Divisions—would

not be available until early 1952. Thus

an emergency in Korea would mean that

the European Command would again be

delayed in reaching its full strength.16

The thinly spread U.S. forces had to

cover strategic points around the globe

in readiness for the broadening of the

Korean War or for the outbreak of a

new conflict. It was also natural that

each major theater commander should

suffer from the disease known in World

War II as "localitis." Whenever the theater commander became so immersed

in his own problems that he tended to

overlook the world-wide responsibilities

of the military services, he was liable to

fall prey to this familiar malady. In

fairness it should be noted that General

Ridgway's case was moderate, but none- theless he worked diligently to secure

reinforcements, especially air and sea

additions, during the summer of 1951.

Ridgway was worried about the Soviet

threat to Japan and in the event of an

expanded war, he wanted to have a little

extra air and naval strength to contain

any Soviet drive and a firm commitment

from the JCS that they would replace

his air and naval losses. The JCS ex- plained that his command could be built

up only at the expense of other vital

areas and that allocations in case a war

with the USSR broke out would have

to depend on world conditions at the

time.17 But this failed to satisfy Ridgway. In September he again expressed

his concern lest the Russian reaction

over the signing of the Japanese peace

treaty and the uncertain situation in

Germany lead to an attack upon Japan.

Once more he asked for naval and air

reinforcements in vain. The JCS evidently did not feel that his anxiety over

Russian intentions warranted any major

shifts in the deployment of the U.S.

armed forces.18

As long as the international situation

held firm and the enemy in Korea con- tinued to be cautious in risking its air

power, the JCS had a point. The Far

East Air Forces, commanded by Lt. Gen.

16

 Memo, Maj Gen Reuben E. Jenkins for CofS,

12 Sep 51, sub: Reinforcement of the FEC, in G-3

320.2 Pacific, 60/23.

17

 (1) Msg, C 68161, CINCFE to JCS, 2 Aug 51,

DA-IN 1426. (2) Msg, JCS 99220, JCS to CINCFE,

17 Aug 51. 18

 (1) Msg, C 51095, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Sep 51,

DA-IN 17897. (2) Msg, JCS 82084, JCS to CINCFE,

21 Sep 51.
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 61

Otto P. Weyland, provided medium

bomber support of operations in Korea

with 99 B-29's of the Strategic Air Command based on Okinawa and Japan. For

tactical air support, the Fifth Air Force,

under Maj. Gen. Frank F. Everest, had a

light bomber wing, three fighter-bomber wings, and two fighter-interceptor

wings—all based on South Korean airfields—and a light bomber wing and a

fighter-escort wing stationed in Japan.

The bulk of the land-based 1st Marine

Air Wing was under the operational

control of the Fifth Air Force. In addition the Australians and South Africans

had each furnished a squadron of fighters.19

 Although the type of plane varied

from the propeller-driven F-51 Mustang to the F-86 Sabrejet, the UNC air

forces enjoyed air superiority over Korea. Bombers and fighters, new and old,

roamed the length of the peninsula

virtually unchallenged except at or near

the frontier along the Yalu.

Carrier-based naval air squadrons furnished additional tactical air support

from the Sea of Japan and the Yellow

Sea. On 1 July 1951, Task Force 77 of

the Seventh Fleet ranged off the northeastern coast of Korea. Under Rear

Adm. George R. Henderson, Task Force

77 contained three carriers, the USS

Princeton, the USS Bon Homme Richard, and the USS Boxer, the battleship

New Jersey, two heavy cruisers, the USS

Los Angeles and the USS Helena, and

eighteen destroyers. Planes from the

carriers not only flew close support missions for the ground forces but also

carried out reconnaissance and antisubmarine patrols and interdicted the

North Korean railroad net.

In the Yellow Sea and east coastal

waters off Korea, Task Force 95, commanded by Rear Adm. Ingolf N. Kiland,

formed the U.N. Blockading and Escort

Force. Headed by the carriers USS

Sicily and H.M.S. Glory, this force consisted of 85 ships, many provided by

other members of the United Nations

and by South Korea. Naval units supplied gunfire support along the coast

line, patrolled the offshore waters, and

controlled the sea approaches to North

Korea.

A third naval force, Amphibious Task

Force 90, under Rear Adm. George C.

Dyer, stood by in Japanese and Korean

waters to render support to any amphibious undertakings. In the meantime,

Dyer's forces worked with the blockading UNC naval units.20

Neither the Chinese nor the North

Koreans offered more than nuisance opposition to the UNC naval forces.

Although the powerful Russian submarine fleet lurked in the background

as a potential menace in case of a spreading of the war, the chief danger to the

UNC ships lay in the numerous mines

sown by the Communists along the

coasts.

Unless there was a radical change in

the global situation, the UNC air and

naval strength seemed more than adequate to cope with the enemy. Exercising complete control of the Korean air

and seaways, the U.N. Command's

greatest vulnerability was on the ground.

19

 USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Operations in

the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950-30 June

1952, pp. 84-89, 98-100. 20

 COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, an. 29 to

FEC Comd Rpt, Jul 51.
62 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Developing the ROK Army

The major weakness in the ground

forces under General Ridgway was

qualitative rather than quantitative.

Ten of the seventeen UNC divisions belonged to the ROK Army and for diverse

reasons the South Korean troops had on

occasion proved to be unreliable in time

of crisis. Since the United States intended to place more responsibility for

the defense of South Korea upon native

forces whether the negotiations were

successful or not, it became essential to

improve the caliber of the ROK Army.

At least part of the blame for the

condition of the ROK forces had to be

shared by the United States. Partially

because it had no desire to offend the

USSR and partially because of a distrust

of the political leadership in South

Korea, the United States had supported

the formation of a mobile, lightly armed

constabulary in 1945 to preserve internal

order during the occupation period

rather than a hard-core defense establishment. Even after American troops had

been withdrawn in 1949, the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of

Korea had only 500 men to help train

an army that quickly grew to 100,000

in 1950.21

The lack of adequate personnel to provide comprehensive coverage of the

South Korean Army down to the battalion level and to fully support the

Korean Army school system was but one

problem. When the advisors attempted

to explain tactics or to give the nomenclature of weapons, they were confronted

by the refusal of the Koreans to use

Japanese and by the inadequacies of the

Korean language, which had failed to

keep pace with the technological development of weapons and warfare. Names

and expressions had to be invented and

the lack of standardization of nomenclature produced confusion and delay in

training.

Since the defense assistance funds allocated to the Republic of Korea were

limited in 1949-50, heavy equipment

and weapons were not provided. As a

result, when the war broke out, the ROK

Army had little heavy armament and

encountered great difficulty in coping

with the North Korean tanks and artillery. Some ROK divisions had not even

completed the company phase of their

training by June 1950 and many soldiers

were unfamiliar with their own weapons.

To cap the tragedy, the leadership of the

ROK Army from top to bottom suffered

from political appointments and incompetency was rife from company to division level.

The North Korean invaders easily

smashed the ROK Army and forced a

complete rebuilding and reorganization

of ROK forces. In the haste to stem

the enemy advance, recruits were rushed

into uniform, given weapons but little

or no training, and then sent to the

front to plug a gap in the line. Such

hit-and-miss efforts to meet the emergency were the best that could be done

under the circumstances, but the deficiencies in training, equipment, and

leadership remained. By October 1950,

however, MacArthur had 5 ROK divisions in action and 5 more in the process

of activation and organization. He

recommended that a postwar army of

10 divisions with a total strength of

250,000 men be authorized, and the De21

 For a detailed account of the KMAG effort and

the difficulties encountered, see Sawyer, Military

Advisors in Korea.
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 63

partment of the Army and the President

approved in early November.22

Under the impact of the Chinese

Communists entry into the war the ROK

Army suffered another catastrophe. The

defects in leadership and training again

caused defeat and disintegration of the

ROK units and necessitated further reconstitution and rebuilding. Despite his

doubts as to the value of South Korean

troops, MacArthur clung to the ten-division ROK Army as sufficient to maintain order and repel aggression in the

postwar period.23

Syngman Rhee and his government

did not share MacArthur's misgivings

over the fighting capability of the ROK

soldier. After MacArthur's recall in

April, they launched a campaign in the

United Nations and in the United States

to have an additional ten divisions organized and equipped with American

arms. Unfortunately, the ROK request

was poorly timed for on 22 April a ROK

division broke and ran before inferior

enemy forces.24 This incident endangered the UNC line and caused General

Van Fleet to urge Ambassador Muccio

to take up the matter with Rhee personally.

Until the lack of leadership was remedied, Van Fleet warned, there should

be no further talk about increasing the

ROK forces. What the South Koreans

needed most were good leaders, better

training, and a greater desire to fight

for their country.25 Muccio handed Rhee

a letter covering these points on 5 May.

Evidently Van Fleet's comments made

little impression upon the ROK President, for less than two weeks later he

informed the press that if the United

States would equip his already welltrained divisions, U.S. troops could be

withdrawn from Korea. Reaction in the

Army against letting Rhee make such

obviously false statements unchallenged

was immediate. Ambassador Muccio was

told to reiterate in the strongest terms

the concern of the United States over

the issuance of damaging and flagrant

statements so contrary to the facts of the

matter.26

The reasons behind Rhee's conduct

became somewhat clearer as the armistice negotiations opened in July. He and

his government were pledged to continue the drive for Korean unification.

With a military stalemate in the offing,

the ROK Government feared that the

UNC troops might withdraw and leave

the Republic of Korea undefended.

Despite assurances from Muccio and

other official U.S. visitors to Seoul that

no such course was contemplated, Rhee

and his counselors remained skeptical.27

 ROK political opposition to the

armistice and pressure in behalf of an

expanded ROK Army represented their

response to the challenge. If an armistice was negotiated, the ROK leaders

probably wanted to be sure that they

22

 (1) C 67296, CINCFE to DA, 24 Oct 50, DA-IN

4541. (2) CX 67400, CINCFE to DA, 25 Oct 50,

DA-IN 4938. (3) Memo, Secy Army for the President, 1 Nov 50, sub: Logistic Support of Republic

of Korea Army, G-3 KMAG file, folder 2, bk. 1,

tab E. 23

 Msg, C 59376, CINCFE to DA, 5 Apr 51, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 51, G-3 sec, pt. III, tab

4.

24

 CINCFE Presentation to Archibald S. Alexander, Under Secy Army, no date, in G-3 091 Korea,

187/7.

25

 Ltr, Van Fleet to Muccio, 3 May 51, no sub, in

G-3 091 Korea, 411. 26

 JCS 1776/225, 7 Jun 51, title: President Rhee's

(ROK) Statements. 27

 Msg, 100438, Muccio to SCAP, 10 Jul 51, in FEC

387.2, bk. I, 11.
64 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

would be in a position to at least defend

themselves and possibly to finish the task

of unification on their own later.28

In the meantime, both Washington

and FEC headquarters investigated the

problem of improving the battlefield

performance of the ROK Army. The

Army G-3, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, visited the Far East Command in

early May and spoke out in defense of

the ROK forces. Everyone had been

criticizing the South Korean Army for

the lack of leadership, he reported to

General Collins, but the hasty and inadequate training that was unavoidable

under the circumstances and the absence

of proper support units might have resulted in a loss of confidence under

battle conditions. Basic training, he

pointed out, often lasted only ten days

for recruits and emphasis had been

placed particularly upon keeping units

in action. Little attention had been

given to long-range planning for the

creation of an effective ROK military

force in a year or two.29 Taylor's point

was well taken, but the press of immediate needs had permitted no other

course in the past.

In the Far East Command, General

Ridgway ordered investigation of ways

and means to bolster South Korean leadership. One way to accomplish this, Col.

Gilman C. Mudgett, Eighth Army G-3,

suggested, would be to set up a training

command similar to the Replacement

and School Command of World War

II.30 Ridgway and Van Fleet approved

the training command concept and selected Col. Arthur S. Champeny to direct

the program. After a quick survey in

Korea, Champeny flew to Washington

to look over the U.S. service schools and

training methods. Since he felt that the

South Korean Army needed infantry and

artillery officers most, he recommended

that groups of 150 to 200 ROK officers

be assigned at a time to the Infantry and

Artillery Schools in the United States.

With G-3 approval of his plan, Champeny returned to Japan to work out the

details. For fiscal year 1952, Champeny

estimated that 150 infantry and 100 artillery officers could be sent to the United

States to take a special twenty-week

course. At the end of September 1951

the first students reported to the

schools.31

While Champeny was busy establishing his Replacement Training and

School Command in Korea, Ridgway forwarded his views on the ROK Army

to General Collins on 22 July. The first

requirement for any military organization, the FEC commander began, was

an officer and noncommissioned officer

corps—competent, aggressive, and loyal.

There was no such group in the ROK

Army and it would take a long time to

develop one. If contemplated school,

replacement, and training plans were

carried out and if the war continued at

its present tempo, the ROK Army might

become completely effective in three

years. Were the armistice to be signed,

28

 See Msg, 192311, Muccio to SCAP, 19 Jul 51, in

FEC 387.2, bk. I, 24. 29

 Memo, Taylor for CofS, 15 May 51, sub: Rpt

of G-3 Visit to FEC, in G-3 333 Pacific, 10. 30

 Comment Sheet (sgd Mudgett), 4 May 51, sub:

Troop Leadership School for Senior Korean Officers,

in KMAG file AG 353, KCRC.

31

 (1) Memo, Gen John E. Hull for Secy Army, 17

Jul 51, sub: Development of ROK Officers and

Noncommissioned Officer Corps, in G-3 350.2 Korea,

4/5. (2) Msg, CINCFE to G-3, 20 Aug 51, DA-IN

7542. (2) Summary Sheet, Maj Gen Reubin E.

Jenkins for CofS and Secy Army, 2 Oct 51, sub:

ROKA Replacement Training ... . in G-3 350.2

Korea, 10/3.
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 65

PRESIDENT RHEE WITH AMBASSADOR MUCCIO

Ridgway continued, the task might be

done in two years. He went on to point

out that the ROK officer candidate

course had been lengthened from eighteen to twenty-four weeks and that each

ROK division would be given a nineweek rehabilitation program. By training ROK officers in U.S. service schools

and centralizing all ROK training installations, Ridgway hoped to make the

results of the school system more satisfactory. However, he maintained, the

Department of the Army would have to

help, too. KMAG would need more personnel to man the training installations,

and automatic weapons, artillery, and

tanks would have to be provided for

ROK units as they showed ability to use

these profitably. The ten-division South

Korean army had to develop its own

service units and these would have to

be equipped by the United States.

Finally, Ridgway recommended that

constant pressure be applied on the

ROK Government to take strict disciplinary measures against corrupt, incompetent, and cowardly officers and government officials.32

During the summer of 1951 with the

benefit of the lull on the battlefield that

succeeded the opening of negotiations,

Ridgway and his staff went ahead with

32

 Msg, CX 67484, Ridgway to Hull, 22 Jul 51,

DA-IN 17555.
66 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

GENERAL TAYLOR

their plans. New tables of organization

and equipment for the ROK units were

developed and the KMAG staff was expanded to 1,308 officers and men by the

end of September.33 The ROK school

system was revised and by the first of

October it was operating with a capacity of over 10,000 students. At the

Replacement Training Center, Champeny, now a brigadier general, had

facilities for 23,460 trainees. Schools for

training infantry, artillery, and technical

officers were in operation and the Korean

Military Academy and the Command

and General Staff School were due to

resume courses in early 1952. All of the

instruction at these schools was designed

and conducted to instill leadership and

improve the technical qualifications of

the ROK students.34 By and large there

was a general feeling that definite progress had been made and that given time

and training the ROK units would prove

to be just as capable as the North

Korean units.35

The future strength of the ROK

Army was as yet undetermined, for ten

divisions seemed to be all that the South

Koreans could develop within two or

three years. As General Taylor informed Secretary of the Army Pace in

August, the long-range requirements depended on too many intangibles to be

clearly estimated then. The outcome of

the war, the political destiny of Korea,

future U.S.-Korean policy, the success of

the short-range program, and the ability

of the United States to equip additional

divisions in view of its global requirements would help shape the long-range

plan.36

One of the by-products of the peace

negotiations, therefore, was the provision of time to strengthen the ROK

Army by proper training and instruction.

During the summer interlude, although

the Communist forces were also built up

and became capable of major offensives,

it was possible for Ridgway and Van

Fleet and their staffs to devote considerable attention to the ROK Army task

with some degree of success. At the

same time, the two leaders interested

33

 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 161.

34

 (1) Msg, CX 50942, CINCFE to DA, 16 Sep 51, DA-IN 17089. (2) Summary Sheet, Jenkins for CofS,

2 Oct 51, sub: ROKA Replacement Training and

School Comd Brochure, in G-3 350.2 Korea, 10/3. 35

 (1) Memo, Alexander for Deputy Secy Defense,

5 Sep 51, sub: Training and Equipping the South

Korean Army, in G-3 091 Korea, 354/2. (2) Memo,

Jenkins for CofS, 14 Nov 51, sub: Rpt of Field

Training, ROK Army, in G-3 333 Pacific, 15. 36

 Memo, Taylor for Secy Army, 24 Aug 51, sub:

Directives to CINCFE Respecting the ROK Force to

be Developed, in G-3 091 Korea, 187/3.
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 67

COLONEL CHAMPENY

themselves in a related problem—the

United Nations forces fighting beside the

ROK and U.S. troops in Korea.

Maintaining U.N. Support

When the war had broken out in June

1950, the United States had been anxious

to secure the support of as many U.N.

members as possible. It had welcomed

contributions, large and small, in its

desire to elicit military help and moral

sustenance against the Communist aggression in Korea.37

 Gradually combat,

support, and medical units from nineteen other U.N. countries joined the

United States and the Republic of Korea.

Ranging in size from a small battalion of

600 men to a brigade of 6,000, this

heterogeneous collection had grown to

over 28,000 ground troops by the end

of June 1951.38

The United Kingdom, Canada, and

Turkey had each shipped a brigade, and

other members of the British Commonwealth, including Australia and New

Zealand, had formed a fourth. BelgiumLuxembourg, Colombia, Ethiopia,

France, Greece, the Netherlands, the

Philippines, and Thailand provided

battalions. From India, Norway, and

Sweden had come medical and hospital

units and Denmark had sent a hospital

ship. Naval line forces were contributed

by the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Colombia, the Netherlands, New

Zealand, and Thailand and air

squadrons by Australia, Canada, and the

Union of South Africa.

Welding this complex group into a

cohesive and effective war machine

proved to be a formidable task. The

forces of each nation arrived in different

stages of combat readiness. Some, such

as the British Commonwealth troops,

presented few problems since they were

well trained and well equipped, and

soon set up their own supply lines and

oriented their own units. Since the

Commonwealth soldiers all spoke

English, there were no linguistic difficulties or major communications problems.39

37

 The one exception had been the 33,000 troops

offered by Chiang Kai-shek in June 1950. Because of

the possibility of political complications with the

Communist Chinese and the deficiencies in training

and equipment of the Nationalist forces, President

Truman decided to take the advice of his political and military advisors. He declined Chiang's proffer.

See Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols. (New York:

Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955), vol. II, p. 343. 38

 For a breakdown of U.S., U.N., and ROK

ground forces at this period, see Appendix A-1, below.

39

 A detailed account of the problems of co- ordinating the U.N. forces will be found in two

FEC studies, one by Maj. Sam F. Gaziano and the

other by Maj. William J. Fox, both entitled InterAllied Cooperation During Combat Operations.

MSS in OCMH.
68 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

KMAG INSTRUCTOR ADDRESSING ROK TROOPS THROUGH AN INTERPRETER

But when the Philippine Combat Battalion arrived in September 1950, the

need for a reception center to equip,

train, and orient new units became apparent. The following month the U.N.

Reception Center at Taegu opened and

helped to prepare the Turkish, Thai,

Indian, Dutch, French, Greek, Ethiopian, Belgian, Luxembourg, and Colombian forces for their advent into

combat.

As soon as the U.N. units were judged

ready, they were usually attached to U.S.

outfits—the battalions to U.S. regiments

and the brigades to U.S. divisions. The

British Commonwealth forces were

amalgamated into brigades and attached

to the U.S. I Corps. The parent units

provided administrative, logistical, and

operational support and guidance. By

working together on a long-term basis

both parent and attached groups developed an esprit de corps that fostered a

better team effort.

U.S. commanders used the U.N. troops

according to their capabilities for defensive or offensive missions. Since the terrain was mountainous and the winter

weather severe, some national forceslike the Greek and Turk—were easily
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 69

acclimatized, while others, like the

Thailanders who were from a flat, warm

country, had more difficulty in adjusting themselves. Many of the U.N,

military groups, such as the Filipino and

Greek, had been trained by U.S. officers

and had become accustomed to U.S.

weapons, equipment, and tactical doctrine. Others had to become familiar

with U.S. methods and machines and

the linguistic barrier did not make this

hurdle any easier.

Customs and traditions also played a

role in forging the international army.

Religious restrictions and national dietary habits made considerable accommodation of food supplies necessary. As

Moslems, the Turks would eat no pork

and the Indians who were Hindu would

touch no beef. The French, Dutch, and

Belgians liked more bread and potatoes

than the Americans and the Thailanders

had to have more rice and hot sauces.

Eventually each nation secured satisfactory rations, but only after a good

deal of improvisation and juggling of

food stores.

Although the differences in diet, training, and equipment were obstacles, they

were not insurmountable and after a period of trial and error, improvement

usually resulted. There were several

continuing problems, however, that

were not so easily solved. Despite

the fact that all of the United Nations involved in the Korean War had resisted

the Communist aggression, there was a

wide spread of opinion on the ways and

means to bring the conflict to an end.

President Truman had repudiated the

MacArthur approach which had threatened an expansion of the war to the

Chinese mainland, but there were strong

elements in the United States that still

insisted that there was no substitute for

military victory.

The chief bone of contention was

Communist China and several nations,

such as Great Britain and France, feared

that domestic pressure might lead the

United States to pursue an aggressive

policy of bombardment, blockade, and

support for an invasion of the mainland

by Chiang Kai-shek's forces.40 The initiation of the armistice talks may have allayed some of the fears, but the possibility that the discussions might fail

remained. What the American reaction

in such an event might be posed a ticklish problem, for neither the prospect of

a long war of attrition nor of an expanded conflict against Communist

China offered any occasion for cheer.

Another subject that kept raising its

head concerned the size of the U.N. units

in Korea. Although General MacArthur

initially had suggested that units of approximately 1,000 men with equipment

and artillery support be sent, both Ridgway and Van Fleet came to feel in the

late spring of 1951 that the member

nations should be encouraged to increase

their forces to not less than a regimental

combat team or brigade. Each regimental combat team or brigade should have

its own integrated artillery, logistic, and

administrative support and should be

trained prior to its arrival in Korea.41

Without doubt this would have relieved U.S. units of the bulk of their

responsibility for other U.N. forces, but

the anticipation that an armistice would

be negotiated soon changed the picture.

On the eve of the armistice negotiations,

Ridgway did a volte-face and recom40

 See Memo, D. A. (Acheson) for Bradley, 12

May 51, no sub, in G-3 091 Korea, 176. 41

 Msg, CINCFE to DA, 1 Jun 51, DA-IN 19078.
70 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

mended that no U.N. forces be materially increased until the results of the

truce discussions became apparent.42

During the summer Ridgway had difficulty in even maintaining the current

U.N. strength. Both the French and the

Belgians had to make special efforts to

provide replacements for their battalions. By August the French had rushed

fillers to Korea and were at full strength,

but the Belgian problem proved more

complex. Since only volunteers could

be sent overseas, the Belgians had to offer extra incentive pay and short tours

of duty before they could secure the additional troops. These were airlifted in

October to bring the Belgian battalion

back to its normal complement.43

A somewhat unusual supply system

sustained the UNC forces in Korea.

When the first U.S. troops landed on

the peninsula in 1950, a logistical command was established to provide base

support. Later, as supply lines lengthened, an army service area and forward

supply points were organized. Since

Korea was in effect a theater

of operations, the next step ordinarily

would have been to set up a communications zone headquarters to take over rear

area logistics and to permit the army

commander to devote full time to frontline operations. But Ridgway as Eighth

Army commander had insisted that his

responsibility begin at the shore line and

Van Fleet had made no effort to alter

this arrangement. Thus, the Eighth

Army commander exercised control over

the Korean railroad net, rear area security, civil affairs, ROKA training, and

prisoners of war as well as over his logistical support. The 2d Logistical Command, under Brig. Gen. Paul F. Yount,

with headquarters at Pusan was responsible for direct logistical support and was

the primary agency for placing requisitions upon the Japan Logistical Command. Through Pusan, the chief gateway to Korea, ran three different supply

lines—one for the United States and the

majority of the UNC forces, a second for

the British Commonwealth contingents,

and the third for the ROK units. The

United States system was the largest

by far and provided the Commonwealth

forces with perishable foods and petroleum products and the ROK forces with

war materials in addition to the total

support it gave to the American and

other U.N. troops.44

Although the United States furnished

the major portion of the supplies and

equipment for most of the U.N. contingents as well as numerous service functions, it expected eventually to be

reimbursed for these goods and services.

The approach might differ in individual

cases, but the problem of reimbursement

continued throughout the war. And the

Army had the task of keeping the books

so that when the subject came up, it

could present fair and reasonable estimates of the charges involved. The

Eighth Army had to submit weekly and

monthly reports on equipment, ammunition, and supplies furnished to the U.N.

units, plus an estimate of handling

charges. In the spring of 1951, Eighth

42

 Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 6 Jul 51, DA-IN 11527. 43

 (1) Msg, Duff to CINCFE, 6 Jul 51, DA-95739.

(2) Msg, Jenkins to CINCFE, 1 Sep 51, DA-80536.

(3) Msg, Eddleman to CINCFE, 23 Oct 51, DA84922.

44

 (1) Military History Detachment, 8086th Army

Unit, Eighth Army, Monograph, Organization of

the Korean Communications Zone, pp. 1-2. In

OCMH. (2) Eighth Army, Monograph, Logistical

Problems and Their Solutions, p. 20. In OCMH.
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 71

PORT OF PUSAN

Army attempted to set up a system

whereby the bill could be figured out on

the basis of so many dollars-per-man-perday, but this was superseded in June.

The Department of the Army decided

to substitute a cost and replacement

factor as the basis for compiling the

amounts to be reimbursed.45 The timing

of the final settlement rested with the

political and military leaders in Washington, of course, but whatever the system used to compute the bill or the

method employed to collect it, the

Eighth Army had to carry the administrative and bookkeeping burden. As

long as the war lasted and the United

States retained the responsibility for

supplying its allies, this was a job that

would have to be done.

All in all, the summer and early fall

of 1951 proved to be a time for preparation. While the U.S. leaders considered

broad plans for the prosecution of the

war if the peace negotiations failed,

General Ridgway and his staff sought

to improve the combat efficiency of the

forces in the United Nations Command

and to intensify the program for build45

 Fox, Inter-Allied Cooperation During Combat

Operations, MS, pp. 167ff.
72 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ing a more reliable ROK Army. On the

sidelines the U.N. countries with

troops in Korea watched the developments at the conference table intently

for the outcome would affect their own

plans and preparations.

Yet despite the hum of activity, a note

of uncertainty permeated the scene. The

on-again, off-again character of the peace

talks made all planning tentative. Although the United States was pursuing

a policy of constant military pressure

upon the enemy in Korea, its plans were

flexible and opportunistic rather than

firm at this point. In some ways the

trends were reminiscent of the war

against Japan in 1943-44. The United

States was attempting to build up a native army in Korea even as it had sought

to create a ground force in China. And

though the United States was supplying

the bulk of the resources and effective

manpower, there were allies to be consulted and placated just as there had

been in the Pacific war. Flexibility and

opportunism had keynoted the mid-war

period against Japan, too, but the final

objective then had been unconditional

surrender rather than a negotiated

peace. Another point of similarity was

the role of the Soviet Union waiting in

the wings. Only this time it would play

the villain's part instead of the friend in

need if it entered the war.

The air of indecision as the United

States and its allies awaited the results

of the peace negotiations was reflected on

the battlefield as well as behind the

scenes. With the opening of the truce

talks, action at the front had begun to

take its cue from the course of events

at Kaesong.

CHAPTER V

The New War

After the United Nations Command

had halted the enemy offensive in the

spring of 1951, there had been no effort

by the Eighth Army to launch a counterattack. It was not that General Van

Fleet's forces lacked the capability to

force the enemy to withdraw "far north"

of the 38th Parallel, but the question

was "how far to push in order to accomplish the greatest damage." Any advance north of the Parallel would shorten

the supply and communications lines of

the Communists and correspondingly

increase those of the Eighth Army. The

tasks of reconstituting the destroyed

transport facilities in North Korea and of

assuming civil affairs functions in that

desolated area would also be considerable. Most important of all, Van Fleet

had to keep in mind two overriding

factors: he did not have sufficient forces

to destroy the enemy by maneuver and

encirclement; and he could not advance

beyond the KANSAS-WYOMING defense lines that straddled the 38th Parallel without the express permission of the

JCS and General Ridgway.1 In view of

these restricting elements and the reluctance of the majority of the nations

composing the U.N. Command to advance again toward the Yalu, it was

hardly surprising that in June 1951 Van

Fleet concluded: "Continued pursuit of

the enemy was neither practical nor expedient. The most profitable employment for the Eighth Army, therefore,

was to establish a defense line on the

nearest commanding terrain north of

Parallel 38, and from there to push forward in a limited advance to accomplish

the maximum destruction to the enemy

consistent with minimum danger to the

integrity of the Eighth Army."

 2

The decision to strengthen the defensive lines of the Eighth Army and to

confine offensive action at the front to

limited advances marked the end of the

fluid phase of the Korean War and the

start of the new war.

The KANSAS-WYOMING Line

Line KANSAS, the defense line

selected by Van Fleet, began near the

mouth of the Imjin River twenty miles

north of Seoul and snaked its way to the

northeast on the south side of the river

through low barren elevations which

gradually gave way to higher, moderately wooded hills. (Map I) Where the

Imjin crossed the 38th Parallel, KANSAS

veered eastward and upward toward the

Hwach'on Reservoir and then angled

northeastward again across the steep. 1

 Directives restricting Van Fleet's actions appear

in: (1) Ltr of Instr, Ridgway to CG Eighth Army,

25 Apr 51, in JSPOG 411, Staff Studies on Advances North of the 38th Parallel, 9 Apr-20 Jun 51.

(2) Msg, JCS 90000, JCS to CINCFE, 1 May 51.

2

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 51, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 7-8.
74 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

forested South Taebaek Mountains until it reached the east coast some twentyfive miles north of the 38th Parallel.

The terrain from the Hwach'on Reservoir to the east coast was particularly

rugged. The mountain slopes rose

sharply, especially on the west and south

laces, and good roads were almost nonexistent. The defensive strength of

KANSAS was increased by full use of

the dominating terrain and the numerous water barriers along the route.

Guarding the approaches to KANSAS

on the western front, Line WYOMING

looped northeastward from the mouth of

the Imjin towards Ch'orwon, swung east

to Kumhwa, and then fell off to the

southeast until it rejoined KANSAS near

the Hwach'on Reservoir. In the spring

of 1951 it served as an outpost line

screening KANSAS.

Although Line KANSAS permitted

the enemy to retain control of the communication complex of the area called

the Iron Triangle (Ch'orwon-KumhwaP'yonggang), Van Fleet felt that the line

afforded the UNC forces the advantages

of a defensible terrain, a satisfactory

road and railroad net, and logistic support. In the event of a cease-fire he recommended in early June that the

Eighth Army be at least ten miles in

advance of Line KANSAS in case a 10-

mile withdrawal by both sides to form

a buffer zone be made part of the terms.

For planning purposes Ridgway agreed.3

In the meantime, Van Fleet instructed

his corps commanders to fortify Line

KANSAS in depth and to build hasty

field fortifications along the advance

Line WYOMING to delay and blunt the

force of enemy assaults before they

reached KANSAS. On the eastern end

of the front, the U.S. X and ROK I

Corps would establish patrol bases ahead

of the main line of resistance to maintain contact with the enemy. To prevent enemy agents from posing as

peasants in order to gather intelligence,

Van Fleet told his commanders to clear

the battle area of all Korean civilians,

who were to be evacuated to the rear.4

Since the terrain became more mountainous in the east and was served by

a poor communications network, Van

Fleet had deployed his four corps accordingly, with the ROK I Corps forming the eastern anchor, flanked by the

U.S. X Corps in the east central sector,

the U.S. IX Corps in the west central

area, and the U.S. I Corps defending

the broadest sector on the west. The

first three corps fronts were narrower

because of the rugged mountains and

lack of good roads. Most of the ROK

divisions were placed where the least

logistical support could be provided

since they required less to live on and

fewer auxiliary units.5

By 1 July the main fortifications of

Line KANSAS were nearly complete.

To expedite the work, Van Fleet had

sent three South Korean National Guard

divisions forward to serve as labor troops,

one to each U.S. corps. The log-andsandbag bunkers and deep, narrow

3

 (1) Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 9 Jul 51, sub:

Location of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire (Military

Viewpoint). (2) Ltr, Ridgway to CG Eighth Army,

22 Jun 51, same sub. Both in FEC, JSPOG 411,

title: Staff Studies on Advances North of the 38th

Parallel, 9 Apr-20 Jun 51.

4

 For Van Fleet's instructions, see; (1) Ltr of Instr,

Van Fleet to CG's U.S. I, IX, X Corps, 1 Jun 51, and

(2) Ltr of Instr, Van Fleet to CG I ROK Corps, 1 Jun

51. Both in FEC, JSPOG 411, title: Staff Studies on

Advances North of the 38th Parallel, 9 Apr-20 Jun

51.

5

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 51, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 8-10.
THE NEW WAR 75

trenches along the KANSAS line resembled World War I entrenchments.

Bunkers, usually adjoining and forward

of lateral trenches, housed automatic rifles and machine guns. Most of the

bunkers were dug into hillsides or saddles on the military crests with the larger

ones on the higher hills serving as forward command and observation posts.

Known as "hootchies" in the Army

vernacular, the bunkers were usually

built with solid overhead cover and separate living quarters behind the battle

stations. Each reflected the ingenuity

of its occupants in providing the comforts of home, such as cots, flooring, and

furniture.

Along the lateral trenches, the riflemen and rocket-launching crews notched

revetted bays for firing their weapons

and slightly behind them recoilless rifle emplacements were dug in and revetted with sandbags. In defilade on the

reverse slope of the hills, protected mortar firing positions were constructed and

roads were cut to permit tanks to move

up and fire from parapeted front-line

positions. Camouflage nets and shubbery

were used extensively to conceal the

bunkers and prepared positions. To delay enemy offensives barbed

wire fences were laid out and mines

were planted in patterns that would funnel attackers into the heaviest defense

fires. In the U.S. I and IX Corps sectors,

where WYOMING positions were occupied rather than KANSAS, the troops

plotted mine fields and dug the holes,

then stored the mines nearby to be

buried when and if a retreat from Line

WYOMING should prove necessary.6

Structural weaknesses soon appeared

in many of the hasty fortifications. Bunker roofs collapsed when an inadequate

number of supporting timbers were used

and the heavy July rains caved in a number of bunkers built in terrain where

erosion was swift. These were relocated

and rebuilt. Inspection and experience

revealed other defects in the defense

line. When shubbery was allowed to

wither, it clearly delineated the emplacement positions and well-beaten paths in

front of the bunkers had the same effect.

Indiscriminate clearing of trees and

shrubs in front of firing positions also

disclosed the defense line. In some

sectors improper placing of barbed wire

restricted the fields of fire and tactical

wire strung too close to front-line positions permitted the enemy to toss hand

grenades into the trench area. But most

of the deficiencies had been corrected by

the end of July and Line KANSAS was

considered strong enough to stop anything less than a full-scale enemy offensive.

Instead of the usual general and combat outpost system. Eighth Army organized its outposts as a series of patrol

bases.7 Developed initially by front-line

units across the army front while reserve

troops strengthened defense positions,

patrol bases afforded depth to the

defense line. They were established up

to ten miles in front of the main battle

line on commanding terrain and in most

cases were not mutually supporting.

6

 For a more detailed account of the KANSAS line,

see Maj Billy C. Mossman, The War in Korea,

vol. III. ch. III. MS in OCMH.

7

 General and combat outposts were organized to

provide warnings of enemy attacks and to fight

delaying actions only, while the patrol bases became outposts that were to be defended except in

the case of an all-out enemy offensive. The patrol

base was used in Italy during World War II, but

did not become standard technique until the Korean War.
76 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

They were later manned by reserve

troops, usually a reinforced company, for

distances up to 2,000 yards and by a battalion or regiment at the more advanced

bases. Operating within range of their

supporting medium artillery, patrol base

commanders could maintain contact with

the enemy, determine enemy dispositions by vigorous patrolling, capture

enemy prisoners, and provide warning of

attack by absorbing the first assaults.

Trip flares, mines, barbed wire, planned

fields of fire, as well as extra ammunition and firepower, made the patrol base

a difficult position to penetrate. The

bases were often subjected to the favorite

Chinese and North Korean tactic—the

night attack—but they were harder to

infiltrate than outpost lines and units

could withdraw intact to the main line

of resistance in the event of a major

offensive.8

The patrol base system and the lull

in operations during July caused by the

armistice negotiations gave the Eighth

Army time to improve the defenses of

Line WYOMING, too. General Van

Fleet decided to add depth to his defenses by making WYOMING a permanent line and on 30 July he told his

corps commanders that it would be regarded as the main line of resistance.

Only in the event of heavy losses would

the Eighth Army withdraw to Line

KANSAS to launch its counterattack.9

By midsummer the pattern was set.

The Eighth Army had established its

defensive positions and was prepared

either to conduct local offensive operations or to punish any attempt by the

enemy to penetrate the KANSASWYOMING lines.

The Enemy

Despite the steady build-up of Communist forces during June and July, the

expected offensive was not launched. Instead the enemy continued to bring up

supplies by rail and road and to

strengthen his defensive positions. Since

casualties were light on both sides during the early summer slowdown in the

fighting and the Communists maintained

a high flow of replacements, their offensive capability mounted.10

On 1 July the Communist forces in

Korea totaled 459,200 men, according

to Eighth Army intelligence estimates.

Of these 248,100 were Chinese and the

remainder North Korean. In addition,

there were 7,500 North Korean guerrillas operating in South Korea. (Table 1)

Technically the command of the Communist troops in Korea was vested in a

Combined Headquarters, headed by

Premier Kim Il Sung and staffed by

North Korean and Chinese officers.

Actually enemy operations appear to

have been directed by General Peng

Teh-huai, from Headquarters, Chinese

People's Volunteer Army, in Mukden.

Combined Headquarters served as a

clearinghouse and message center but the

Chinese made certain that their commanders would receive the instructions

from Mukden by using direct channels

of communication as well. At the front

the Chinese had five army group headquarters, each of which controlled two

or more armies. (Chart 3)

8

 See C. C. De Reus, "The Perimeter Pays Off,"

in Combat Forces Journal, vol. 3, No. 5 (December,

1952). 9

 Msg, GX 894 TAC, CG Eighth Army to CG's I,

IX, and X U.S. Corps, 30 Jul 51, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Jul 51, an. 4, pt. III, incl 11.

10

 UNC/FEC, Rpt, Jul 51, pp. 4-5.
THE NEW WAR 77

TABLE 1—EIGHTH ARMY ESTIMATE OF ENEMY FORCES

1 JULY 1951

a

 Besides these units, Eighth Army Intelligence officers suspected but had not as yet confirmed the presence of six other

Chinese armies and two-thirds of a seventh.

Source: Eighth Army G-2 Estimate of Enemy Strength and Locations, 1 Jul 51; Eighth Army G-2 OB Br, CCF

Army Histories, 1 Dec 64. Both in ACSI Doc Library DA.

In the Chinese military organization

the army was the principal self-sufficient

tactical unit. At full strength it had between 21,000 and 30,000 men, roughly

comparable to one and a half to two

U.S. divisions. Each army contained

three divisions and usually included an

artillery regiment, security, reconnaissance, engineer, and transport battalions,

a signal company, and an army hospital.11

Owing to battle losses during the spring

offensives the thirteen plus Chinese armies in Korea were at reduced strength

on 1 July. Seven were deployed along

11

 DA Pamphlet 30-51, September 1952, Handbook

on the Chinese Communist Army.
CHART 3—CHAIN OF COMMAND OF ENEMY FORCES, 1 JULY 1951

Source: (1) Hq FEC MIS, FEC Intel Digest, 16-30 Sep 51, p. 5. (2) Hq USAFFE (Adv), G-2 Intel Digests,

16-31 Jan 53, pp. 32-33; 1-15 Feb 53, pp. 26-28; 16-28 Feb 53, pp. 27-28. (3) Hq FEC MIS, History of the

North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52. All in ACSI Doc Lib DA.
THE NEW WAR 79

or close to the central front and the

other six were in reserve.12

The Chinese Communist infantry division was triangular and an average

regiment consisted of approximately

3,000 men. Armed with a miscellaneous

collection of Russian, Japanese, American, and domestically manufactured

copies of foreign weapons, the firepower

of a typical regiment might be drawn

from the following weapons: 180 pistols,

400 rifles and carbines, 217 submachine

guns, 60 light machine guns, 18 heavy

machine guns, nine 12.7-mm. antiaircraft machine guns, twenty-seven

60-mm. mortars, twelve 81- or 82-mm.

mortars, four 120-mm. mortars, six

57-mm. recoilless rifles, 18 rocket

launchers, and four 70-mm. infantry

howitzers. The artillery regiment,

which was attached to each division,

usually consisted of three battalions and

contained 36 pieces. Chinese artillery

weapons were of Russian, Japanese, and

American manufacture and ranged from

75-mm. guns to 155-mm. howitzers.13

The Chinese had shown themselves to

be good soldiers. During the first six

months of 1951 they had maintained a

fluid battle line and had sought to entice

the U.N. Command to overextend its

forces which they would then try to destroy in detail. Real estate meant little

to the Chinese and withdrawal was as

important a part of their tactics as was

the advance. Herein lay a deep difference between the Chinese and the North

Koreans, for the latter fought for the

land and consistently showed a strong

disinclination to abandon territory.14

Premier Kim Il Sung, the titular commander of General Headquarters,

Korean People's Army, at P'yongyang,

left direct control over the North Korean

forces to his Deputy Commander, Marshal Choe Yong Gun, and Chief of Staff,

Nam Il. On the battlefield the highest

tactical echelon of command was Front

Headquarters under Lt. Gen. Kim Ung,

an able and energetic combat leader.15

The North Korean military organization varied in several ways from the

Chinese. The corps was the main North

Korean tactical unit and customarily approximated two American divisions in

strength. But the component divisions

of the corps, unlike the Chinese Army

in this respect, varied from time to time:

the North Koreans were flexible and

shifted divisions from corps to corps as

the need arose. There were seven North

Korean corps in July 1951, and all were

in the line—three on the west coast and

four on the east. In addition to guarding the flanks against UNC amphibious

landings, they anchored the Communist

line at the front.

Although the Communist forces could

match the U.N. troops in manpower,

they were deficient in artillery and

armor. According to gun sightings and

shell reports, the enemy had about 350

artillery pieces spread along the front

in July. The majority were 75-mm. and

76-mm. with some 105-mm., 122-mm.,

12

 See Situation Map, 1 Jul 51. The 39th Army,

with the 115th, 116th, and 117th Divisions, was at

Song'chon and the 38th, with the 112th, 113th, and

114th Divisions, and the 40th, with the 118th, 119th

and 120th Divisions, were unlocated. Eighth Army

G-2 Estimate of Enemy Strength and Locations,

1 Jul 51, in ACSI files. 13

 DA Pamphlet 30-51, September 1952, Handbook on the Chinese Communist Army, pp. 37-39.

89.

14

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, sec. I, Narrative, p. 2. 15

 Hq FEC MIS, Hist of the North Korean Army,

31 Jul 52, pp. 84-95.
80 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

and a few 150-mm. guns and howitzers.

Neither the Chinese nor the North

Korean infantry units had organic armor.

All of the Chinese armored divisions

were in China and the lone North

Korean tank division was stationed on

the west coast north of P'yongyang.16

The enemy offensive capability

mounted during July despite the lack of

armor and heavy artillery and there were

indications that the Communists might

be preparing to challenge the almost

complete domination of the air enjoyed

by the Far East Air Forces (FEAF). Intelligence estimates placed total aircraft

based in Manchuria and available to the

enemy at 1,050, including 595 fighters,

175 ground aircraft, 100 transports, and

180 training and reconnaissance planes.

Some 445 of the fighters were jet-propelled and included the fast Russian

MIG-15 which was in some respects

superior to the best UNC fighters.

FEAF estimated that the Russians were

furnishing the aircraft as quickly as the

Chinese Communist Air Force trained

pilots and maintenance personnel.17

Since the enemy's passive attitude appeared to be a repetition of earlier instances when the Communists had

withdrawn behind a screening force and

prepared for the next offensive, the

Eighth Army remained alert and wary.

Van Fleet did not appear to be particularly concerned. In a conference

with the new commander of the U.S. I

Corps, Maj. Gen. John W. (Iron Mike)

O'Daniel, on 24 July, Van Fleet said:

". . . if the enemy merely assembles

what forces he has, he can only make a

limited objective attack, but if he has

brought in several more army groups

—and frankly we don't know; he could

have added up to two more army groups

—and has a good amount of supply forward, he may be able to launch an all-out

offensive. I don't think he's that strong,

but we must be prepared to meet his

maximum capability and we must be

ready to meet him if the cease-fire negotiations fail."

 18

The UNC Takes the Initiative

Although Van Fleet felt that the

Eighth Army could best meet and punish

the enemy at the KANSAS-WYOMING

line under the present conditions, he and

his staff prepared an offensive plan at

Ridgway's request. Submitted in early

July, Plan OVERWHELMING outlined

a campaign that would take the Eighth

Army to the P'yongyang-Wonsan line

starting about 1 September, provided

that certain conditions were satisfied. If

there were a major deterioration of

enemy forces or a withdrawal to the

north, if the mission of the Eighth Army

were changed, or if additional forces

were allocated to the Eighth Army, Van

Fleet thought that OVERWHELMING

might be feasible.19

On 10 July the Joint Chiefs removed

their requirement that Ridgway secure

their prior approval of all major ground

operations, but the Far East commander

took no action on OVERWHELMING.20

The rather formidable set of conditions

that Van Fleet had attached to the plan

16

 Eighth Army G-2 PIR 458, 5 Jul 51; PIR 380,

27 Jul 51; PIR 392, 8 Aug 51. 17

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, sec I, Narrative, p. 7.

18

 Quoted in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51,

sec. I, Narrative, p. 72. 19

 FEC JSPOG Study 602, Plan OVERWHELMING,

no date. 20

 Msg, JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51.
THE NEW WAR 81

coupled with the initiation of the armistice negotiations argued for a cautious

approach to any large-scale offensive at

this time. Ridgway therefore decided to

observe the course of the peace talks

before he acted on OVERWHELMING.21

Van Fleet could still launch limited

attacks on his own initiative, but the

selection of Kaesong as the truce site

eliminated one of the areas that

he planned to raid. The possibility of

an armistice, moreover, made both sides

reluctant to expend men and equipment

during most of July. Thus, it was not

until the end of the month that Van

Fleet issued his first attack order since

early June.

The Eighth Army shift from the passive defense was fostered by both external and internal developments. Since

the enemy had used the respite on the

battlefield to build up his stocks and to

bring his combat units up to strength,

Van Fleet wanted to probe the Communist defenses, determine the disposition of the enemy troops, and prevent

them from employing their mounting

offensive capabilities by keeping them

off balance.22 In addition, Van Fleet

was aware that the combat efficiency of

the Eighth Army had slipped during the

latter part of July. Patrols were conducted indifferently and failed to bring

in prisoners. Gathering intelligence became an increasingly difficult task. Even

a stepped-up training program was not

enough to restore the ability and will of

the Eighth Army to fight. Inactivity and

the hope that the armistice talks would

prove successful were a tough combination to defeat. As Van Fleet pointed

out later: "A sitdown army is subject

to collapse at the first sign of an enemy

effort. ... As Commander of the Eighth

Army, I couldn't allow my forces to become soft and dormant."

 23

In the course of disturbing the enemy's

dispositions and of sharpening the fighting edge of the Eighth Army troops, Van

Fleet also hoped to improve his own defense positions along the front. There

were several areas where the seizure of

dominant terrain would remove sags in

the line or threats to the UNC lines of

communication. One of the sags that

Van Fleet wanted to eliminate existed

in the rugged Taebaek Mountains in the

U.S. X Corps sector.

Twenty miles northeast of the

Hwach'on Reservoir lay a circular valley

known as the Punchbowl and rimmed

by hills rising sharply to heights of 1 ,000

to 2,000 feet above the valley floor.

(Map 3) The Soyang River ran south

in the valley to the east of the Punchbowl, and on the west the So-ch'on River

and one of its tributaries separated the

Punchbowl from the next series of

ridges. In July the North Koreans held

the commanding terrain ringing the

Punchbowl on the west, north, and east

whence they could observe the UNC defenses and troop movements and could

direct artillery fire upon the KANSAS

line. Seizure of the enemy positions on

the high ground would lessen the threat

of attacks developing from these heights

aimed at splitting the X and ROK I

Corps along the corps boundary which

ran to the east of the Punchbowl; it

21

 FEC G-3 Study, title: Review of Current

CINCFE Letters of Instruction in the Light of JCS

95977 and JCS 95978, 14 Jul 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd

Rpt, Jul 51, an. 4, pt. III, incl 13. 22

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, sec. I, Narrative, p. 8.

23

 Statement of Van Fleet, 30 Sep 51, in Department of State Bulletin, vol. XXV, No. 641 (October

8, 1951), p. 589.
82 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

MAP 3

would also allow the Eighth Army to

straighten and shorten its lines in the

sector and permit Van Fleet to build up

larger reserve forces.24 On 21 July Van

Fleet directed the X Corps to draw up

plans for seizing the west rim of the

Punchbowl.

In late July the U.S. 2d Division,

commanded by Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, won a foothold on the western edge

of the Punchbowl when the 38th Infantry Regiment captured and set up a

patrol base on Hill 1179 called Taeu

San.25 Unusually heavy rains that made

roads and trails impassable and restricted

air and artillery support delayed the

launching of further operations in the

Punchbowl area until mid-August.26 Diversionary raids in the U.S. I Corps sector in the west on 4 and 8 August had

encountered little enemy opposition;

most of the difficulties came from the

swollen rivers and treacherous roads.27

24

 (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, bk. 1,

CG's Jnl, 21 Jul 51. (2) Hq U.S. X Corps, Comd

Rpt, Aug 51, p. 45. (3) Hq U.S. X Corps, Comd

Rpt, Sep 51, p. 3.

25

 U.S. 2d Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 51. Hill numbers

indicate height in meters. 26

 Rainfall measured nearly twenty inches in

August. 27

 Hq U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, pp. 8-18.
THE NEW WAR 83

THE PUNCHBOWL

On 18 August the weather had improved sufficiently to permit the summer

campaign to get under way. ROK troops

from the 11th and Capital Divisions of

the ROK I Corps and from the ROK

8th Division of the U.S. X Corps attacked a J-shaped ridge that lay northeast of the Punchbowl. Hill 1031, the

highest peak of the ridge, was little more

than five miles from the northeast rim

of the Punchbowl. The ROK forces

under the command of General Paik Sun

Yup, ROK I Corps, met with stubborn

resistance from elements of the North

Korean 45th, 13th, and 2d Divisions

who were dug in on the ridge. For

eleven days General Paik's forces fought

to drive the North Koreans from their

strongly fortified positions. While troops

from the ROK 8th Division struck north

against the hook of the J, the bulk of

Paik's men swung in from the east and

southeast against the stem. The attacking troops reached their objectives on

the ridge lines, but were not reinforced

in time to withstand the enemy counterattacks that swiftly followed. The

pattern of attack and counterattack without a decision continued until General

Van Fleet visited Paik's headquarters

and pointed out his tactical mistake. In

the next attempt Paik reinforced the
84 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

20 U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION TROOPS ON BLOODY RIDGE

attack, seized the hook of the J Ridge

on 27 August and cleared the stem two

days later.28 Possession of the J Ridge

provided protection for the Eighth Army

supply route along the Soyang Valley

and permitted the ROK I Corps to observe and fire upon enemy positions and

troop movements north of the Punchbowl.

On the same day—18 August—that the

attack against the J Ridge had begun,

the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division had attempted to seize another

ridge west of the Punchbowl. Van Fleet

had directed Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers,

the new commander of the U.S. X Corps,

to eliminate important enemy observation posts that directed heavy and accurate artillery fire upon Line KANSAS

position from the ridge, some two miles

west and slightly south of Hill 1179.

Since Van Fleet believed that the South

Korean troops lacked self-confidence and

needed experience to develop faith in

their own abilities, he instructed Byers

to use ROK units in the assault.29 Byers

in turn attached the 36th Regiment to

the U.S. 2d Division.

The objective was an east-west ridge

with three peaks, the highest at the west28

 (1) Hq, Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, sec. 1,

Narrative, pp. 62-78. (2) Eighth Army, G-3 Jnls,

18-27 Aug 51. (3) U.S. X Corps, G-3 Jnls, 18-27

Aug 51. (4) Gen Byer's Diary, 18-28 Aug 51.

29

 (1) Msg, GX 1172, Van Fleet to CG U.S. X

Corps, 12 Aug 51. (2) Msg, GX 1202, Van Fleet to

CG U.S. X Corps, 14 Aug 51. Both in Hq Eighth

Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, G-3 sec., bk. 4, pt. 3.
THE NEW WAR 85

ern end rising to 983 meters. The ridge

formed the crossbar of an H-shaped hill

mass that overlooked the forward positions of the 2d Division some two miles

south of Hill 983. After five days of

repeated frontal assaults the ROK 36th

Regiment took the ridge, later called

Bloody Ridge, but then had to withdraw

under heavy North Korean pressure.30

General Ruffner, the 2d Division commander, had to commit elements of the

U.S. 9th Regiment to support the South

Koreans, but still the enemy refused to

give ground.31 The North Koreans were

protected by thick mine fields and

strongly built bunkers that resisted destruction by anything less than accurate

direct fire. With ample supplies of automatic weapons and hand grenades, they

waited in their bunkers until the UNC

artillery and air support ceased. Then,

as the Eighth Army soldiers labored up

the last few yards of the steep slopes, the

Communist troops would move out into

their firing positions and send a hail of

bullets and grenades at the attackers.

The steadily mounting casualty lists

led to a decline in morale among the

men of the ROK 36th Regiment. On

27 August some units of the regiment

broke and ran, spreading panic among

the elements of the U.S. 9th Regiment

as well.32 The deterioration of the situation on Bloody Ridge led General Byers

on 28 August to alter his approach and

he decided upon a limited advance along

the whole corps front, starting on 31

August. By applying pressure over a

broad front, Byers hoped to force the

enemy to disperse his firepower and to

halt the flow of enemy reinforcements

to Bloody Ridge. Thus, Byers rearranged divisional objectives along the

corps front. The seizure of the northwest rim of the Punchbowl was assigned

to the ROK 5th Division and the northeast rim was given to the U.S. 1st Marine

Division. While the 2d Division renewed its efforts to take Bloody Ridge,

the ROK 7th Division would attack and

capture terrain west of the ridge.

Although the 1st Marine Division and

its attached Korean Marine troops met

little opposition on 31 August as they

began their advance, the enemy forces

stiffened the following day. Yet despite

the increasing resistance the marines

were able to push forward and take

several hills on the northern rim of the

Punchbowl. By a stroke of good fortune,

the N.K. III Corps was in the process

of moving from the ROK I Corps front

and of taking over the defense of this

sector from the N.K. II Corps. As the

N.K. 2d Division began the relief of the

N.K. 1st Division, the marines hit the

latter's positions. By the time the relief

was completed, in the opening days of

September, the marines had won control

30

 The newspaper Stars and Stripes named this

action and evidently confused many of the men

who participated in the attack, since they wondered where all this excitement was taking place

and did not suspect that they were the center of

attention. They were not inclined to regard the

action as a particularly bloody operation. See Capt

Edward C. Williamson, Capt Pierce W. Briscoe,

1st Lt Martin Blumenson, and 1st Lt John Mewha,

"Bloody Ridge," August-September 1951. MS in

OCMH, p. 1. 31

 Account of the attack on Bloody Ridge is based

on: (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Aug 51 and

Sep 51; (2) Eighth Army G-3 Jnls, 17 Aug-5 Sep

51; (3) U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpts, Aug and Sep

51; (4) U.S. X Corps, G-3 Jnls, 17 Aug-5 Sep 51;

(5) U.S. 2d Div, Comd Rpts, Aug and Sep 51; (6)

Williamson et al., "Bloody Ridge."

32

 See Interv with Col John M. Lynch, CO, 9th

Inf Regt, in Williamson et al., "Bloody Ridge," p.

71.
86 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

of the northern lip of the Punchbowl.33

The 9th Infantry attacks on Bloody

Ridge at the end of August and the opening days of September, on the other

hand, failed to dislodge the enemy,

whereupon Byers and Brig. Gen.

Thomas E. de Shazo, who had temporarily taken command of the 2d Division, laid out a double envelopment of

Bloody Ridge using elements of the U.S.

23d and 38th Regiments while the 9th

continued its assault on the ridge itself.34

On 4 and 5 September the anticlimax

came. With surprising ease the 2d Division forces advanced and took over

Bloody Ridge. The North Koreans,

weakened by heavy losses, had finally

evacuated their positions and left substantial stores of supplies and over 500

dead on the heights. After almost three

weeks of fighting and over 2,700 U.N.

and ROK casualties, the Eighth Army

had won its objective. According to 2d

Division estimates, the defense of

Bloody Ridge had cost the enemy over

15,000 casualties.35

The advance by the X Corps in August

demonstrated once again the reluctance

of the North Koreans to part with any

of their territory. Taking excellent advantage of the terrain and constructing

well-placed defenses, they had fought

bitterly to hold on to their observation

posts on Bloody Ridge. Only when the

attack had been broadened to apply

pressure at several points along the corps

front, and the 2d Division had committed elements of all three of the division's regiments, and only after enemy

forces suffered severe casualties, did the

North Koreans concede and evacuate the

ridge.

Heartbreak Ridge

In any event Bloody Ridge had its

after effects. During the battle Van Fleet

had submitted an outline plan, called

TALONS, to Ridgway envisioning an

advance ranging from one to almost fifteen miles to remove the sag in the

Eighth Army's eastern front. Ridgway

had turned down more ambitious plans

for an amphibious landing near Wonsan

and for a deep advance into North

Korea, but he had no objection to a

modest ground offensive.36 Preparations

for TALONS continued until 5 September, when Van Fleet evidently took a

close look at the final casualty totals of

the Bloody Ridge fight. Since TALONS

would be on a much larger scale, Van

Fleet decided that the operation was not

worth the probable cost in lives and

matériel. Instead he informed Ridgway

that he favored sustaining his "tidying

up" on the Eighth Army right flank during the remainder of September, using

"elbowing" tactics without any definite

33

 U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, sec. 1, pp. 8-9. 34

 General Ruffner went home on normal rotation

on 1 September and Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young,

the new commander, did not arrive until 20 September. 35

 Casualties: 2d Div and attached units, 18 Aug5 Sep, killed in action, 326; wounded in action,

2,032; missing in action 414; total, 2,772. Enemy

casualties: counted killed in action, 1,389; estimated

killed, 4,288; estimated wounded, 9,422; prisoners,

264; total, 15,363. See Williamson et al., "Bloody

Ridge," pp. 203, 211. It should be remembered

that the estimated killed and wounded figures are

educated guesses and may be at considerable variance with the actual enemy casualties.

36

 (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, sec.

I, Narrative, pp. 47-48, 52. (2) Msg, GX 1174

TAC, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 12 Aug 51, in Hq

Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, G-3 sec., bk. 4,

pt. 3. (3) Msg, C 69168, Ridgway to JCS, 18 Aug

51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, an. 4, pt. III,

incl 16.
THE NEW WAR 87

HEARTBREAK RIDGE

objective line assigned. Around 1 October he would stop his offensive operations in the east, then launch an attack

in the west by the U.S. I Corps about

the middle of the month, provided the

armistice negotiations permitted. If this

I Corps maneuver were successful, Van

Fleet would follow up with an amphibious operation on the east coast near

Tongch'on. This would link up with

a land advance northeast from Kumhwa.

The quick change in plans by the

Eighth Army commander caught Ridgway by surprise, but he interposed no

objection to the continuance of the

limited objective attacks on an opportunistic basis. The proposed amphibious

assault, however, Ridgway would only

approve for planning purposes.37

Acting swiftly, Van Fleet issued a

general directive to his corps commanders on 8 September emphasizing limited

objective attacks, reconnaissance, and patrolling.38

 He followed up the directive

the same day with instructions to the

X Corps to take the ridge just north of

37

 (1) Msg, C 50314, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 7 Sep

51, Paper 17. (2) Msg, GX 1636 TAC, Van Fleet to

Ridgway, 7 Sep 51, Paper 19. (3) Msg, C 50405,

Ridgway to Van Fleet, 8 Sep 51, Paper 20. All in

Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51. 38

 Msg, CG 1656 TAC, Van Fleet to CG U.S. I,

U.S. IX, U.S. X, and ROK I Corps, 8 Sep 51, in

Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Sep 51, G-3 sec., bk.

4, incls 6-10.
88 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Bloody Ridge and another north of the

Punchbowl. Since the North Koreans

opposite the X Corps had just sustained

a defeat on Bloody Ridge, Van Fleet

thought that immediate thrusts would

keep the enemy off balance and would

gain the new ridge lines before the Communists had a chance to recover.39

The X Corps assigned the task of taking the peaks north of Bloody Ridge

to the U.S. 2d Division. The objective

was the southern tip of a long, narrow

ridge running north and south between

the Mundung-ni Valley on the west and

the Sat'ae-ri Valley on the east; spur

ridges arching east and west from the

main ridge caused one observer to describe the objective as the "spinal column of a fish, with hundreds of vertebrae."

 40

 Possession of the central ridge

would prevent the enemy from using the

adjacent valleys to attack the X Corps defense lines west of the Punchbowl.

Heartbreak Ridge, as the objective

was later named by news correspondents

covering the action, had three main

peaks. At the southern terminus was

Hill 894 which commanded the approach from Bloody Ridge, three miles

to the south; Hill 931, the highest peak

in the ridge, lay 1,300 yards to the north;

and 2,100 yards north of Hill 931 rose

the needlelike projection of Hill 851.

After withdrawing from Bloody

Ridge, the North Koreans had fallen

back to prepared bunkers, trenches, and

gun positions covering the approach

ridges to Heartbreak that were just as

strongly fortified and as well camouflaged as those previously encountered

by the 2d Division. The respite between

the end of the Bloody Ridge battle on

5 September and the assault on Heartbreak Ridge eight days later permitted

the North Koreans to strengthen their

defenses even further and to reinforce

the units guarding the ridge and its approaches. In the Mundung-ni Valley the

North Korean 12th Division of the III

Corps controlled the hills on the western

side of the Suip-ch'on River and the

6th Division of the same corps was responsible for the Heartbreak Ridge and

Sat'ae-ri Valley sectors. Aerial photos

had disclosed that the enemy had been

very active in the Heartbreak Ridge

area, grouping artillery and mortar units

in the valleys flanking the ridge. But

the heavy woods and undergrowth had

veiled the elaborate enemy fortifications

from the camera's eye and concealed the

fact that the 2d Division was again faced

with the task of breaching the enemy's

main line of resistance.

Within the 2d Division there was considerable difference of opinion on the

extent of the expected enemy reaction

to an attack on Heartbreak Ridge. Col.

Edwin A. Walker, the artillery commander, felt that the North Koreans

would "fight like hell" for it, while some

members of the staff contemplated that

the enemy response would be less vigorous. General de Shazo, the acting division commander, evidently was among

the latter group. He decided to use one

regiment—the 23d—rather than two in

39

 Msg, GX 1659 TAC, Van Fleet to CG U.S. X

Corps, 8 Sep 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt,

Sep 51, G-3 sec., bk. 4, incls 6-10. 40

 Maj Edward C. Williamson, Maj Pierce W.

Briscoe, Capt Martin Blumenson, and 1st Lt. John

Mewha, Action on "Heartbreak Ridge," p. 3. MS

in OCMH. The following account of the Heartbreak Ridge battle is based on: (1) the above account and its companion MS, Heartbreak Ridge,

September-October 1951, also in OCMH; (2) U.S.

2d Div, Comd Rpts, Sep and Oct 51; (3) Mossman,

The War in Korea, vol. III, chs. VI and VII.
THE NEW WAR 89

the assault force. Approaching from the

east across the Sat'ae-ri Valley, the 23d,

under Col, James Y. Adams, would cut

Heartbreak between Hills 931 and 851.

One battalion would then turn north to

seize Hill 851 while a second would move

south to capture Hills 931 and 894. As

soon as Hill 894 came under the control

of the 23d, the 9th Infantry, under

Col. John M. Lynch, would advance and

take Hill 728, 2,000 yards to the west

and slightly south of Hill 894.

On 13 September the elements of the

2d Division were in position and ready

to attack. The French Battalion, under

Lt. Col. Ralph Monclar, had taken over

the positions of the 38th Infantry Regiment on Hill 868, a little over two miles

east of Hill 931, and the 38th had become the division reserve with responsibility for surveillance of the KANSAS

line. The 9th Regiment was poised to

advance on Hill 728 when the 23d Regiment gained Hill 894. Direct support

for the 23d Regiment would come from

the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, under

Lt. Col. Linton S. Boatright, and its

105-mm. howitzers, while the 503d Field

Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzer),

96th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm.

howitzer), 38th Field Artillery Battalion

(105-mm. howitzer), and Battery C of

the 780th Field Artillery Battalion

(8-inch howitzer) provided general support. The 37th and 38th Field Artillery

Battalions were located about three

miles southeast of Heartbreak Ridge.

The 96th and 503rd were approximately

seven miles south and nine miles southeast of the objective respectively, while

the battery from the 780th was near

Yach'on-ni, about eleven miles south of

Heartbreak.

At 0530 the artillery preparation began and for thirty minutes the guns

pounded enemy positions on or near

Heartbreak Ridge. Then Colonel Adams, a 6-foot 6-inch West Pointer, gave

the signal to start the 23d's attack. The

3d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Virgil E.

Craven, led the way in a column of companies, followed by the 2d Battalion,

commanded by Lt. Col. Henry F.

Daniels. As the assault troops moved

north from Hill 702 up the Sat'ae-ri

Valley to reach the east-west spur ridge

that would serve as the approach

to Heartbreak, the North Koreans

spotted them. Heavy artillery and mortar fire from Heartbreak Ridge positions and from the heights around Sat'aeri town began to pour in on the men of

the 23d Regiment. Despite the growing

number of casualties, Craven's forces

pressed on, closely followed by Daniels'

men. As the 3d Battalion arrived at the

east-west spur and headed up the hill

to split the Heartbreak Ridge line, it

ran into a hornet's nest. The 1st Regiment of the N.K. 6th Division manned

a series of concealed, mutually supporting bunkers that covered the approach

ridge with machine guns and small

arms. Added to the artillery and mortar

fire that the enemy observers were directing upon the two attack battalions, the

automatic weapons and rifle fire forced

the assault force to halt and dig in on

the toe of the spur. The prospects for

a swift penetration of the enemy lines

vanished as night fell; the 23d had come

up against the main defenses of the

North Koreans and another Bloody

Ridge experience loomed ahead.

When reports of the 23d's situation

reached General de Shazo, he realized

that he had underestimated the enemy's

defensive capacity. Since the 9th Regi-
90 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ment, under Colonel Lynch, was already

in position for its contemplated attack

on Hill 728, de Shazo directed Lynch

on 14 September to use his regiment

against Hill 894 instead. A successful

seizure of Hill 894 could relieve some

of the pressure on the 23d Regiment.

The 2d Battalion of the 9th Regiment

advanced from Yao'dong up the southwest shoulder of Hill 894 on 14 September, supported by tanks of Company B,

72d Tank Battalion, the heavy mortar

company, and a battalion of 155-mm.

howitzers. By nightfall the 2d Battalion

had climbed to within 650 yards of the

crest of Hill 894 against light enemy resistance. The attack continued on 15

September and by afternoon, the height

was swept clear of the enemy. Up to this

point the 2d Battalion had had only

eleven casualties, but the next two days

cost the battalion over two hundred

more as the North Koreans counterattacked fiercely and repeatedly in a vain

effort to drive it off the crest.

Possession of Hill 894 by the 9th Regiment failed, however, to relieve the pressure on the 23d as it sought again to

cut the ridge line between Hills 931 and

851. The enemy's firepower kept the

assault forces pinned down on the lower

slopes. On 16 September Colonel Adams

ordered his 2d and 3d Battalions to shift

from the column formation they had

been using to attack abreast. Thus,

while the 3d Battalion renewed its drive

due west, the 2d Battalion swung to the

southwest and approached Hill 931

along another spur. In the meantime,

C Company of the 1st Battalion passed

through the positions of the 9th Regiment on Hill 894 and tried to take Hill

931 from the south. The three-point

attack made little headway against the

heavy curtain of fire laid down by the

enemy.

Secure in their strongly fortified bunkers, the North Korean defenders waited

until the artillery and air support given

to the 2d Division assault forces was

lifted and then returned to their firing

positions. As the 23d Regiment's soldiers climbed the last few yards toward

the crest, the North Koreans opened up

with their automatic weapons, rifles, and

grenades. Since the enemy controlled

the Mundung-ni Valley which offered

defiladed and less steep access routes to

Heartbreak Ridge, the problem of reinforcements and resupply was not difficult to resolve. In fact, General Hong

Nim, commander of the N.K. 6th Division, managed to send the fresh 13th

Regiment in to replace the 1st Regiment

on 16 September without any trouble.

For the U.S. 2d Division, the outlook

was rather grim. The narrow Pia-ri

Valley, southwest of Heartbreak, was

jammed with vehicles and exposed to

enemy artillery and mortar fire. Korean

civilian porters frequently abandoned

their loads along the trails and bolted for

cover when the enemy got too close. To

keep the front-line units supplied with

food, water, ammunition, and equipment and to evacuate the casualties often

required that American infantrymen

double as carriers and litter bearers.

The rugged terrain and the close enemy

surveillance of the approaches to Heartbreak Ridge made their jobs very hazardous and time consuming, for it could

take up to ten hours to bring down a

litter case from the forward positions

held by the 23d Regiment.

The stalemate on the ridge led

Colonel Lynch on 19 September to suggest a broadening of the attack to
THE NEW WAR 91

dissipate the enemy's concentrated

resistance. He urged General de Shazo

to let 1st Battalion of his 9th Regiment

move across the Mundung-ni Valley and

seize Hills 867 and 1024 located about

three and four miles, respectively, southwest of Hill 894. If the enemy assumed

that this attack marked the beginning of

an envelopment of Heartbreak Ridge

from the west, he might well divert men

and guns to block the challenge, Lynch

reasoned. But de Shazo rejected the

proposal since General Byers, the

X Corps commander, had earlier

directed that Hill 931 be given first

priority.

When Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, the

new 2d Division commander, arrived the

following day, he decided that Lynch's

plan was sound. He ordered Lynch to

take Hills 867 and 1024 and the 9th Infantry commander scheduled the attack

on Hill 1024 for 23 September; Hill 867

would be seized after Hill 1024 fell. In

the meantime. Van Fleet told Byers that

it would be desirable for the X Corps to

advance its western flank to bring the

front line into phase with the U.S. IX

Corps'. Thus, Byers, on 22 September, directed the ROK 7th Division to capture

Hill 1142, located about 2,000 yards

northwest of Hill 1024. The double-barreled attack upon Hills 1024 and 1142

might well cause the North Koreans to

take the threat seriously and lessen their

capacity to resist on Heartbreak Ridge.

The attacks by the 23d Infantry

against Heartbreak Ridge had continued

on 21 and 22 September with little success. The 1st Battalion, under Maj.

George H. Williams, Jr., had tried again

to take Hill 931 from the south, while

Daniels' 2d Battalion came in from the

north. Elements of the 1st Battalion

briefly won their way to the crest on 23

September, but could not withstand the

enemy's counterattack. An early morning assault from the east by a company

from the 3d Regiment, N.K. 12th Division, produced a fierce fight that decimated the 1st Battalion. When his ammunition ran out, Williams had to pull

back his men from Hill 931.41

Across the Mundung-ni Valley the diversionary attacks against Hills 1024 and

1142 by the 9th Regiment and the ROK

7th Division made good progress. On 25

September the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, cleared the crest of Hill 1024 and

the ROK 7th Division won Hill 1142 the

following day. Recognizing the threat to

neighboring Hill 867, a key terrain feature dominating the valley to the north,

the North Koreans quickly shifted the

3d Regiment, N.K. 6th Division, from

Heatbreak Ridge to defend the hill.

The North Korean deployment, however, did not help the embattled 23d

Regiment to capture Hill 931. Although

the French Battalion replaced the 2d

Battalion and tried to advance south

along the ridge line while the 1st Battalion sought to press north toward the

crest of 931, the N.K. 15th Regiment

fought them off on 26 September. The

23d's regimental tanks were able to

move far enough north in the Sat'ae-ri

Valley to send direct fire against some

of the enemy's bunkers covering the eastern approaches to Heartbreak, but could

not destroy the heavy mortars and machine guns that halted the 2d Division

attack.

After almost two weeks of futile

pounding at the enemy's defenses on

41

 The 3d Regiment remained on Hill 931 until

26 September when it was relieved by the 15th

Regiment, N.K. 6th Division.
92 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Heartbreak, Colonel Adams told General Young on 26 September that it was

"suicide" to continue adhering to the

original plan. His own 23d Regiment

had already taken over 950 casualties and

the division total for the period was over

1,670. As Colonel Lynch had the week

before, Adams favored broadening the

attack and dispersing the enemy's capacity to resist on Heartbreak. He felt that

if the North Korean forces in the vicinity

of Heartbreak were engaged and unable

to spare reinforcements or replacements

for the N.K. 15th Regiment, the 23d

could wear the enemy regiment down

and win the ridge.

By 27 September Young and the corps

commander, General Byers, had come

to agree with Adams and further assaults

by the 23d on Heartbreak were called

off. Analyzing the initial attempts of 2d

Division to take Heartbreak, Young later

characterized them as a "fiasco" because

of the piecemeal commitment of units

and the failure to organize fire support

teams. The enemy mortars were especially effective, he pointed out, causing

about 85 percent of the division's casualties up to this point.

In the new plan that the division G-3,

Maj. Thomas W. Mellon, prepared in

late September, the earlier mistakes

were to be avoided. All three regiments

of the division would launch concentrated and co-ordinated attacks, supported by all the division's artillery, by

a full-scale armored drive by the 72d

Tank Battalion up the Mundung-ni Valley, and by tank-infantry task force action

in the Sat'ae-ri Valley. When the division issued the operation order on 2 October under the code name TOUCHDOWN,

General Young assigned the following

objectives to his regiments. The 9th

Infantry would advance on the western

side of the Mundung-ni Valley and seize

Hills 867, 1005, 980, and 1040. To the

23d went the task of securing Hill 931

and the ridge line running west of that

peak. In addition, the 23d would be

ready to attack Hill 728 or to help the

38th capture it, as the case might be,

and to take Hill 520, west of Hill 851.

The 38th would secure Hill 485 and then

provide infantry support to the 72d

Tank Battalion. Target date for TOUCHDOWN was 5 October.

The preparations for TOUCHDOWN required a period of tremendous activity

on the part of the 2d Engineer Combat

Battalion and its commander, Lt. Col.

Robert W. Love. The road along the

Mundung-ni Valley was a rough track unsuitable for the medium Sherman tanks

of the 72d Tank Battalion and to get it

quickly into condition to carry the M4's

was a herculean task.42 But Love and his

men were willing to try if they had adequate fire cover while they worked.

Craters dotted the track and the North

Koreans had planted mines along the

way. At one point they had heaped large

rocks six feet high and sprinkled the pile

with hand grenades, each with its pin

pulled. The 2d Engineers put no

pounds of explosives around this roadblock and detonated the grenades when

the explosives went off. Rock from

neighboring cliff walls was blasted to

provide fill for the craters. Working

with shovels because their bulldozers

were undergoing repair and would, in

any case, have drawn artillery fire from

42

 For an interesting account of the TOUCHDOWN

operation, see the article by Lt. Col. Virgil E.

Craven, "Operation Touchdown Won Heartbreak

Ridge" in Combat Forces Journal (December 1953),

vol. 4, No. 5, pp. 24ff.
THE NEW WAR 93

the enemy on the heights further up the

valley, the engineers fashioned a usable

road. To take care of the mines along

the trail, they placed chain blocks of

tetranol at 50-foot intervals on the sides

of the track and then set them off. The

explosions detonated the mines nearby.

When the craters and mines were too

dense, the engineers shifted the road to

the stream bed, which had not been

mined, and cleared the boulders blocking the way. Bit by bit they advanced

northward up the valley.

While the engineers prepared the path

for the tank attack, the 2d Division regiments received replacements to bring

their battalions up to full strength and

built up their supplies of food, equipment, and ammunition for the upcoming

operation. The 23d Regiment pulled

each of its battalions out of the line for

forty-eight hours so that the replacements could be integrated while the unit

was in reserve rather than on the line.

The division established supply points

forward of Line KANSAS to insure that

the operation did not fail because of

ammunition shortages.

General Young also wanted to be certain that his battalion commanders

would make full use of all the firepower

at their disposal. Each battalion had to

submit fire plans showing how it intended to employ its tanks, automatic

weapons, small arms, and mortars in

TOUCHDOWN. Sand-table models of the

Heartbreak Ridge sector were used extensively in positioning the division's

weapons in the best possible locations.

Early in October, the three regiments

moved into their attack positions. The

9th was on the left flank, ready to advance upon Hill 867 while the 38th, under Col. Frank T. Mildren, was going up

the Mundung-ni Valley. The 38th

would stop near Saegonbae, southwest

of Hill 894. The 3d Battalion of the

38th was to be the division reserve and

could be used only with the permission

of General Young. The attached Netherlands Battalion, however, provided the

38th with three full battalions. On

Heartbreak Ridge the 23d Infantry

maintained two of its four battalions on

the lines between Hills 894, 931, and

851.

To protect the division's right flank in

the Sat'ae-ri Valley area and to distract

the enemy, a task force under Maj. Kenneth R. Sturman of the 23d Infantry

Regiment was organized on 3 October.

Composed of the 23d Tank Company,

the 2d Reconnaissance Company, a

French pioneer platoon, and an infantry company from the special divisional

security forces, Task Force Sturman, as

it was called, had the secondary mission

of destroying enemy bunkers on the east

side of Heartbreak Ridge and of acting

as a decoy to draw enemy fire away from

the 23d Infantry foot soldiers on the

ridge.

On 4 October forty-nine fighter-bombers worked over the divisional sector and

the Sturman force raided the Sat'ae-ri

Valley. The other units of the 2d underwent final rehearsals for the attack scheduled for 2100 hours the next night. Fire

support teams usually consisting of a

combination of mortars, machine guns,

rifles, and automatic weapons that could

be called upon by the attacking infantry

whenever the need arose were set up and

given dry runs. The additional firepower would be extremely valuable

against enemy bunkers and strongpoints.

In the late afternoon of 5 October, the

artillery preparation opened up as the
94 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

division's artillery battalions began to

pummel the defending enemy units facing the 9th and 38th Regiments in the

Mundung-ni Valley area. Deployed from

west to east the 3d Regiment, N.K. 12th

Division, occupied Hill 867; the 1st Regiment, N.K. 6th Division, was spread

from Hill 636 northwest to Hill 974;

and the 15th Regiment, N.K. 6th Division, was dug in on Hill 931. As a result

of the constant pressure exerted by the

2d Division on these units during September and early October, none of them

had a strength that reached a thousand

men. The N.K. 12th and 6th Divisions were both far understrength by

the eve of TOUCHDOWN.

Air strikes by Marine Corsairs sent

napalm, rockets, and machine gun bullets into the North Korean lines before

the attack jumped off that evening. On

the west the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry,

pressed on toward Hill 867 and by 7

October had won the crest, meeting only

light resistance. The battalion then

swung northwest toward Hill 960 while

the 1st Battalion mounted an attack

north against Hill 666. Both hills fell on

8 October. Then the 9th pushed on to

Hill 1005 northwest of Hill 666 and after

a bayonet assault took possession on 10

October. On the following day the ROK

8th Division gained Hill 1050 and the

Kim Il Sung range to the west of the 9th

Regiment.43

The 38th Regiment, in the meantime,

had also made excellent progress. Colonel Mildren's troops had had a windfall

on 4 October when they discovered that

the enemy had abandoned Hill 485, a

mile south of Hill 728. By noon on 6

October the 1st Battalion had advanced

from Hill 485 and seized Hill 728 against

only light enemy opposition. The 2d

Battalion deployed up the Mundung-ni

Valley and attacked Hill 636 which fell

on 7 October. Possession of these two

hills furnished cover for Colonel Love's

engineers, who could now complete the

tank trail for the 72d Tank Battalion's

advance. The 72d, commanded by Lt.

Col. John O. Woods, was attached to the

38th on 7 October and the regiment was

given three new objectives: Hill 605,

2,000 yards north of Hill 636; the Hill

905-Hill 974 ridge which extended

northwest from Hill 636 toward Hill

1220 on the Kim Il Sung range; and Hill

841, a thousand yards north of Hill 974.

Up on Heartbreak Ridge the 23d Regiment was also able to report encouraging news. Colonel Adams' battle plan

had directed Major Williams' 1st Battalion to exert diversionary pressure north

against Hill 851, while the French Battalion feinted south toward Hill 931.

Daniels' 2d Battalion would hit Hill 931

from the south with Craven's 3d Battalion as reserve behind Daniels. Under

cover of night and the distractions provided for the enemy by the rest of the

division, Daniels' troops moved out.

Enemy fire came in quickly upon the

battalion, but the North Koreans could

not concentrate all their attention upon

this assault. With the 3d Battalion in

support, Daniels' force slowly approached Hill 931. To preserve the element of surprise, there had been no

artillery preparation. The 37th Field

Artillery Battalion opened up on all

known enemy mortar positions as the

attack got under way. The effectiveness

of the countermortar fire helped the 23d

infantrymen as they closed with the

North Koreans after only light losses.

43

 The ROK 8th Division had relieved the ROK

7th Division on 29 September.
THE NEW WAR 95

Flame throwers, grenades, and small

arms rooted the enemy from the formidable bunkers that had blocked the 23d's

advance for so many weeks. By 0300 the

2d and 3d Battalions had won the southern half of Hill 931. The expected

enemy counterattack came and was repulsed. With the coming of daylight,

the advance was renewed. The French

Battalion moved in from the north and

the 2d and 3d Battalions pressed on to

meet it; before noon Hill 931 finally

belonged to the 23d Infantry.

Craven's 3d Battalion then pushed on

to join the 1st Battalion in its assault

against the last objective on Heartbreak

Ridge—Hill 851. In the Sat'ae-ri Valley,

Sturman's tanks sustained their daylight

raids and continued to blast away at the

bunkers on the eastern slopes of Hill 851.

On the west, in the Mundung-ni Valley,

Woods's 72d Tank Battalion awaited the

go-ahead signal from Love's engineers.

On 10 October the engineers finished

their task and the 72d's Shermans, accompanied by Company L, 38th Infantry, and an engineer platoon, began to

rumble north up the valley. By a fortunate coincidence the enemy was caught

in the middle of relieving the rapidly

disintegrating elements of the N.K. V

Corps in the Heartbreak Ridge-Mundung-ni sector. Advance elements of the

204th Division, CCF 68th Army, were in

the process of taking over positions already vacated by the North Koreans.

The tank thrust coupled with the general forward movement of the rest of the

2d Division found the Chinese still in the

open en route to their new positions.

Woods's tankers raced to the town of

Mundung-ni and beyond, taking losses

on the way, but inflicting heavy losses

upon the Chinese troops and cutting off

the supply and replacement routes up

the western slopes of Heartbreak Ridge.

At intervals of about 100 yards the

tanks, operating without infantry in the

northern reaches of the valley, were able

to cover each other and fire at targets of

opportunity. They disrupted the enemy

relief completely and made the task of

the infantry much lighter in the days

that followed. It was apparent that the

enemy had thought that tanks could not

be used in Mundung-ni Valley and the

feat of Love's engineers in opening a

road had taken him by surprise.

The battle, however, was not quite

over. The 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry,

took advantage of the tank advance to

seize Hill 605, but the 2d Battalion's

attempts to capture Hill 905 were

blunted on 10 October. The next day

the 2d Battalion overcame enemy opposition and the 1st Battalion took Hill

900. On 12 October the 1st Battalion

pushed on toward the Kim Il Sung range

and captured Hill 974. The final objective of the 38th—Hill 1220—fell on 15

October.

On Heartbreak Ridge the 23d Regiment, N.K. 13th Division, defended Hill

851, backed by its sister regiments, the

21st and 19th. The 21st was to the immediate rear and the 19th defended the

Sat'ae-ri Valley. On 10 October, Colonel

Daniels' 2d Battalion had swung down

from Heartbreak Ridge and taken possession of Hill 520, a little over a mile

south of the town of Mundung-ni. Hill

520 was the end of an east-west ridge

spur leading to Hill 851. During the

next two days, the 1st and French Battalions inched north toward the objective, bunker by bunker, taking few

prisoners in the bitter fighting. The

North Koreans and their Chinese allies
96 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

who had succeeded in joining them on

Hill 951 had to be killed or wounded

before they would cease resistance. Colonel Craven's 3d Battalion shifted to the

spur between Hills 520 and 851 to apply

pressure from the west. Finally at daybreak on 13 October, Monclar's French

troops stormed the peak and after thirty

days of hard combat, Heartbreak Ridge

was in the possession of the 23d Infantry to stay.

The costs of the long battle were high

for both sides. The 2d Division had suffered over 3,700 casualties during the 13

September-15 October period, with the

23d Regiment and its attached French

Battalion incurring almost half of this

total.44 On the enemy side the North

Korean 6th, 12th, and 13th Divisions

and the CCF 204th Division all suffered

heavily. Estimates by the 2d Division of

the enemy's losses totaled close to 25,000

men.45 Approximately half of these casualties had come during the TOUCHDOWN operation.

The increase in casualties had been

accompanied by a similar rise in ammunition expenditures. Besides the millions of rounds of small arms

ammunition that were used, the 2d Division infantrymen received the following artillery support: 76-mm. gun—

62,000 rounds; 105-mm. howitzer—

401,000 rounds; 155-mm. howitzer

—84,000 rounds; and 8-inch howitzer—

13,000 rounds. The division's mortar

crews sent over 119,000 rounds of 60-

mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-inch mortar fire

and the 57-mm. and 75-mm. recoilless

rifle teams directed nearly 18,000 rounds

at the enemy.46 Although there were

shortages in some types of ammunition

at the theater level, Van Fleet had given

the 2d Division commander permission

to fire "all the ammunition thought necessary to take the positions." When 81-

mm. mortar shells became short in

supply, the 4.2-inch were used more

frequently. To keep the 4.2-inch mortars in operation, an airlift from Pusan

brought 2,500 rounds a day for four days,

while a special rail shipment with

25,000 rounds was rushed to the front.

To supplement the artillery support

given the division, the Fifth Air Force

flew 842 sorties over the Heartbreak

Ridge area and loosed 250 tons of bombs

on the enemy.47 Against the deep bunkers of the North Koreans, anything less

than a direct hit was ineffective, but

Colonel Adams felt that the air strikes

were good for morale. He also gave the

fighter-bombers credit for neutralizing

artillery and mortar fire during a battalion relief on 27 September so that the

23d could make the shift without casualties.48

There were many points of similarity

between the Heartbreak Ridge struggle

and its immediate predecessor—Bloody

Ridge. In both cases the North Koreans

had organized strong defensive positions

in depth and had had the advantage of 44

 2d Division casualties included 597 killed, 3,064

wounded, and 84 missing. The 23d Regiment took

1,832 casualties. See Williamson et al., Action on

"Heartbreak Ridge," pp. 17n, 18n, 26n. 45

 The estimates included 1,473 counted killed,

8,389 estimated killed, 14,204 estimated wounded,

and 606 prisoners of war. See Williamson et al.,

Heartbreak Ridge, sec. III, tab D, extracts from the

CG's File, U.S. 2d Inf Div.

46

 Ibid., sec. III, tab A, Ammunition Expenditures. 47

 Ibid. 48 Williamson et al., Action on "Heartbreak

Ridge," p. 33.
THE NEW WAR 97

defiladed routes to bring in logistical

support and reinforcements. The UNC

forces had to advance over exposed routes

which the enemy artillery and mortar

fire covered very effectively. The 2d Division advance was extremely hazardous

and slow as long as the North Koreans

were allowed to concentrate their fire on

relatively few targets.

In both attacks, enemy capabilities and

will to resist had been underestimated. Each had been planned as a

small-scale advance to straighten out a

front-line sag and each had suffered from

a lack of adequate reserves to reinforce

and consolidate the objectives after they

were won. After the North Koreans

counterattacked the Eighth Army forces,

the latter had been compelled to withdraw. At Heartbreak the corps commander, General Byers, had not permitted the 2d Division to use the 38th

Regiment until Operation TOUCHDOWN,

although it was apparent long before

then that the 23d would not be able to

take the ridge as long as the enemy could

focus his attention upon Colonel Adams'

units. The 38th had remained the divisional reserve until October despite the

need for its services.

At the command level the 2d Division

had had a change in leadership during

the two operations. General de Shazo

had taken over the division while the

Bloody Ridge fight was still in progress

and he in turn had been succeeded by

Young after the Heartbreak contest was

well under way. Each had brought the

operation he had inherited to a successful

conclusion, but only after a considerable

expansion of the original battle plan.

Final attainment of the objective had

occurred when the pressure upon the

enemy had been applied at several points

rather than one. Then, unable to funnel

in replacements to all the threatened

positions or to concentrate his artillery

and mortar fire within a small area, the

enemy had reluctantly withdrawn to his

next defense line. Frequently, despite

the artillery, tank, and air support given

to the U.N. foot soldiers, the North Koreans would leave only after they had

been flushed from their bunkers by infantry weapons. The North Koreans at

Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges had

fought with determination and courage

throughout the battles until attrition

and superior strength had forced them

to yield their real estate.

With the successful conclusion of the

TOUCHDOWN operation X Corps had removed the sag in the Punchbowl area

and in the lines held by the U.S. 2d and

ROK 8th Divisions to the west of the

Punchbowl. Advances of over five miles

along this front had shortened the X

Corps' lines and had brought them into

phase with those of the U.S. IX Corps

to the west.

Advance in the West

Shortly after the Heartbreak Ridge

operation got under way in September,

General Van Fleet and his staff drew up

plans for an ambitious advance in the

U.S. I and IX Corps sectors. Since the

important Ch'orwon-Kumhwa railroad

was exposed to enemy artillery fire and

attack, Plan CUDGEL envisioned a 15-

kilometer drive forward from WYOMING

to protect the railroad line and to force

the enemy to give up his forward positions. Besides improving communications in central Korea, Van Fleet

intended to use the railroad to support

a follow-up operation in October which
98 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

he had named WRANGLER.49 The latter

was equally ambitious, for it aimed at

cutting off the North Korean forces opposing the ROK I and U.S. X Corps on

the right flank of the Eighth Army by

an amphibious operation on the east

coast. If this operation were successful,

the forward line of the Eighth Army

would run between P'yonggang and

Kojo.50 For the landing force, Van Fleet

proposed to use U.S. Marine forces with

a ROK division following them into the

Kojo beach area. The Eighth Army commander frankly recognized that this operation would be a calculated risk and

might lead to a dangerous enemy counterthrust on the west flank as the amphibious forces tried to link up with the

U.S. IX Corps along the Kumsong-Kojo

road.51

Although Van Fleet asked Ridgway

for a quick decision on CUDGEL and

WRANGLER, he discarded them himself

within a few days just as he had canceled

out TALONS earlier in the month. Consideration of the probable costs of

CUDGEL led him to accept instead a substitute plan submitted by General

O'Daniel, the I Corps commander, at the

end of September. O'Daniel outlined a

modest 10-kilometer advance by the I

Corps to a new defense line called JAMESTOWN, which would allow that corps to

strengthen its supply lines by reducing

the truck hauls during the winter

months. JAMESTOWN began on the west

bank of the Imjin River a little over 9

miles northeast of Munsan-ni, then

arched gently northeast to the town of

Samich'on on the Sami-ch'on River. For

that next 10 miles JAMESTOWN ran northeast, rejoining the Imjin River near the

town of Kyeho-dong, then hugged the

high ground south of the Yokkokch'on

for about 12 miles until it reached the

area of Chut'oso, six miles northwest of

Ch'orwon. From Chut'oso, JAMESTOWN

ran east by north for about 10 miles, ending approximately 5 miles northeast of

Ch'orwon at the village of Chungasan.

Seizure of the key terrain features along

this line would screen the Yonch'onCh'orwon Valley lines of communication

from enemy observation and artillery

fire, permit development of the SeoulCh'orwon-Kumhwa railroad line, and

allow the main line of resistance to be

advanced. (Map II) In addition, the

I Corps offensive would keep the enemy

off balance and prevent the Eighth Army

troops from getting stale.52

October was a good month for operations in the west central part of Korea,

since the weather was usually dry. This

permitted full air support and eliminated the problems of flash floods and

heavy mud. Terrain in the I Corps sector varied from low lands in the west to

small, steep hills in the center and low

rolling hills on the eastern fringes of the

corps boundary.

To carry out Operation COMMANDO,

as the I Corps advance was called, General O'Daniel planned to use four divisions from his own corps and one from

the neighboring U.S. IX Corps to prevent the development of a sag along the

49

 Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 19 Sep 51, sub;

Outline Plan CUDGEL, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl

Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper 31. 50

 Ltr. Van Fleet to CINCFE, 23 Sep 51, sub:

Ground Opns in Korea, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl

Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper 34. 51

 Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 25 Sep 51, sub: Outline Plan WRANGLER, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl

Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper 35.

52

 Msg, GX 2180 TAC, CG Eighth Army to

CINCFE, 3 Oct 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct

51, G-3 Jnl, 3 Oct 51, tab J-4.

THE NEW WAR 99

corps boundaries. On the corps' western

flank the ROK 1st Division, commanded

by Brig. Gen. Bak Lim Hang, would

leave Line WYOMING, cross the Imjin

River, and move toward Kaesong. The

British Commonwealth Division, under

General A. J. H. Cassels, was on the eastern flank of the ROK 1st and would take

the high ground between Samich'on and

Kyeho-dong. Still farther east, the 1st

Cavalry Division, under Maj. Gen.

Thomas L. Harrold, would move to the

northwest on an 8-mile front between

Kyeho-dong and Kamgol.53 On the corps'

right flank, Maj. Gen. Robert H. Soule's

3d Division would advance and capture

Hill 281, six miles northwest of Ch'orwon, and Hills 373 and 324, seven miles

west by north of the city. The 3d Division would also link up at Chungasan

with the IX Corps' 25th Division, now

commanded by Maj. Gen. Ira P. Swift,

as the 25th advanced to take over defensible terrain north of the confluence of the

Hant'an and Namdae Rivers northeast

of Ch'orwon.54

Elements, of four Chinese armies—

the 65th, 64th, 47th, and 42d—would

have to be pushed back before JAMESTOWN could be reached, but as Van Fleet

remarked to the press on 30 September,

the basic mission of the Eighth Army

was to seek out and destroy the enemy.55

When COMMANDO began on 3 October,

the enemy centered his resistance in the

1st Cavalry Division zone. The ROK

1st, 1st Commonwealth, 3d, and 25th Divisions met only light to moderate opposition as they advanced to take their

assigned objectives along the JAMESTOWN

line, but the 1st Cavalry Division units

had to battle for every foot of ground.

Elements of the 139th and 141st Divisions of the CFF 47th Army manned the

enemy's main line of resistance facing

the 1st Cavalry Division and they had

constructed defenses similar to those encountered on Heartbreak Ridge—

strong bunkers supporting each other

with automatic weapons fire, and with

heavy concentrations of artillery and

mortars interdicting the approach routes

to the hills and ridges. Barbed wire

aprons and mines guarded the trenches

and bunkers and the Chinese were well

stocked in ammunition and supplies.56

General Harrold had the 70th Tank

Battalion under Maj. Carroll McFalls,

Jr., and the 16th Reconnaissance Company operate as a task force on his left

flank. The mission of the Task Force

Mac, as it was called, was to advance

along the east bank of the Imjin River

toward Kyeho-dong, tieing in with the

1st Commonwealth Division's move to

the west and protecting the left flank of

the 5th Cavalry Regiment. The 5th Cavalry, commanded by Col. Irving Lehrfeld, and the 7th Cavalry, under Col.

Dan Gilmer, would attack abreast across

the division front. The 8th Cavalry,

with Col. Eugene J. Field in command,

was the divisional reserve. All of the

division artillery battalions would participate in the operation. The 61st and

82d Field Artillery Battalions, 105-mm. 53

 Maj. Gen. Charles D. Palmer had been rotated

to the United States in July. 54

 Eighth Army, G-3 Periodic Report, 2 Oct 51,

in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 1951, G-3

sec., incls 1-5. 55

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 31.

56

 The following account of the 1st Cavalry Division's advance is based upon: (1) 1st Cav Div,

Comd Rpt, Oct 51; (2) 5th Cav Regt, Comd Rpt,

Oct 51; (3) 7th Cav Regt, Comd Rpt, Oct 51; (4)

8th Cav Regt, Comd Rpt, Oct 51.
TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

and 155-mm. howitzers respectively,

would support the 5th Cavalry, and the

77th and 99th (-) Field Artillery Battalions— both 105-mm howitzer—would

support the 7th Cavalry. For general

artillery support, I Corps made available

to the 1st Cavalry division the following

field artillery battalion units; the 936th

Battalion (155-mm. howitzer); A Battery, 17th (8-inch howitzer); and A and

B Batteries, 204th Battalion (155-mm.

guns). The battalions were along the

main line of resistance, 4 to 6 miles from

Line JAMESTOWN.

An hour before the attack was

launched, the artillery along the I Corps

front began to soften up the enemy defense positions. Then at 0600 on 3

October the five UNC divisions moved

out. In the 1st Cavalry Division sector

the enemy response was immediate

and violent. Task Force Mac on the

left flank encountered heavy mine concentrations coupled with strong artillery

and mortar fire; by the end of the day,

it had made little progress. As Colonel

Lehrfeld's 5th Cavalry assaulted the

four intermediate hill objectives facing

the regiment—Hills 222, 272, 346, and

287—the Chinese refused to give way.

The enemy forces directed artillery

and mortar fire at the 5th's three battalions as they labored up the hills,

and as soon as the I Corps artillery

lifted, the Chinese rushed out to their

fighting positions and added heavy

small arms, automatic weapons, and

grenade fire to halt the attack. Six

attempts by the 3d Battalion won a foothold on Hill 272, but enemy pressure

forced a withdrawal later in the day.

Only against Hill 222 could the 5th register any lasting success; after a frontal

assault by the 3d Battalion, the Chinese

had to abandon the hill and fall back to

the north.

The situation in the 7th Cavalry's

area to the east was quite similar. Attacking with the 3d, Greek, and 2d Battalions abreast, Colonel Gilmer's troops

attempted to storm Hills 418 and 313

along with the ridge and high ground

extending from these points. Both the

Greek and the 2d Battalion won their

way to the ridge line only to suffer heavy

casualties from the Chinese counterattacks that followed; neither could hold

on. Many positions changed hands three

or four times during the course of the

day as bitter hand-to-hand fighting

marked the intensity of the enemy's resistance.

By the end of the first day, the supporting artillery had fired over 15,000

rounds at the enemy and the Chinese

had committed the bulk of their 2d

Artillery Division to help block the advance of the 1st Cavalry Division. The

enemy's willingness to use most of his

available artillery against the 1st Cavalry

was accompanied by bolder employment

of the artillery pieces in direct support

and counterbattery roles. In the process

enemy artillery locations were revealed

and soon began to receive attention from

both the I Corps artillery and Fifth Air

Force fighter-bombers.

Despite heavy fighting on 4 October,

there was little forward progress. Elements of the 8th Cavalry reinforced the

7th Cavalry on the right and assaulted

the ridges west of Hill 418, but the

enemy clung tenaciously to his positions.

When he was driven off, he expended

manpower freely to retake the lost

ground. Each enemy company was using

ten to twelve machine guns and large

quantities of hand grenades. The latter
THE NEW WAR 101

caused the bulk of the 1st Cavalry Division's casualties as the close combat grew

more bitter. During the day elements of

the CCF 140th Division moved up to

reinforce the 139th Division which had

been hard hit by the 1st Cavalry's continued battering of the enemy positions.

The 1st Cavalry, in its drive towards the

Yokkok-ch'on and Line JAMESTOWN,

now had to contend with the bulk of the

elite 47th Army.

The first crack in the Chinese defense

line came on 5 October, when the 1st

Battalion, 8th Cavalry, discovered that

the enemy had withdrawn from Hill 418

during the night. By afternoon the 1st

Battalion cleared the ridge 1,400 yards

to the northeast and was able to tie in

with the 15th Regiment, U.S. 3d Division. The 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry,

then moved up the ridge southwest of

Hill 418 and occupied Hill 313 without

opposition. On the following day the

2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, launched an

attack on Hill 334, 2,200 yards west of

Hill 418, and after two attempts, seized

the objective. Heavy enemy counterattacks, day and night, were beaten back.

At Hill 287, over 4,000 yards southwest

of Hill 334, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, fought its way toward the crest and

held on to part of the hill at nightfall.

Prisoners of war taken on 5-6 October

indicated that the Chinese were falling

back on new prepared defense lines 5-

7,000 yards to the northwest and that

many units had been decimated in the

opening days of the offensive; food and

ammunition stocks, they also reported,

were becoming exhausted.

On 7 October the 7th Cavalry completed the seizure of Hill 287 and sent

the 3d Battalion to take Hill 347, a little

over two miles southwest of Hill 418.

Attacking from the south and southeast,

the 3d Battalion began to clear the hill

at the end of the day. The fall of Hill

347 meant that the 1st Cavalry now dominated the high ground comprising

JAMESTOWN in the northeastern half of

the divisional sector.

The breach in the northeast had little

immediate effect upon the Chinese defense of the hills across the 5th Cavalry

front, however, and the relentless hammering of artillery, mortar, and tank

fire against the formidable bunker system failed to produce a breakthrough.

Even air strikes with napalm and 1,000-

pound bombs made little impression

upon the enemy defenders, since the

Chinese had constructed an intricate

trench system and numerous escape

routes that negated most of the effects of

the air attacks. The dogged enemy defense—in many cases to the last man

—took a heavy toll of 1st Cavalry Division forces and frequently produced a

situation in which the American assault

forces attained an objective in insufficient strength to resist the fierce enemy

counterattacks that followed.

After eight days of UNC pressure

against Hills 346, 230, and 272, the Chinese still refused to give ground. But the

incessant punishment they had absorbed

and the drain in manpower and ammunition stocks were beginning to tell. On

the night of 12 October the Chinese

abandoned Hill 272 and Colonel Field's

8th Cavalry troops took possession the

next day without contact.

Control of Hill 272 opened the eastern

approach to the key hill in the enemy's

remaining defense line—Hill 346. On

15 October a new operational plan,

called POLECHARGE, was put into effectThe 5th Cavalry was reinforced with the
102 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Belgian Battalion from the U.S. 3d Division and given the mission of taking

Hill 346 and then pushing on to Line

JAMESTOWN. The 8th Cavalry would

move in from Hill 272 and if necessary

assist the 5th Cavalry. Early on 16 October the assault got under way, but again

the enemy firepower stopped the 5th

Cavalry's advance. The 8th Cavalry's

drive northeast of Hill 346 made some

progress, yet could not flank the objective. For the next two days the 5th and

8th sustained the pressure on Hill 346

without success. Then on 18 October

the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, moved

forward and took the hill against virtually no opposition. Hill 230 fell the

same day to the 3d Battalion. By 19

October the 1st Cavalry Division had

seized the last of its objectives on the

JAMESTOWN line as the enemy retreated

north of the Yokkok-ch'on to his next

line of defense.

The sensitivity of the Chinese to the

1st Cavalry Division's advance toward

their supply base at Sangnyong-ni did

not end with the completion of COMMANDO. Although divisional patrols

could range freely some 3-4,000 yards

in front of the main line of resistance

positions on the east, the enemy reacted

strongly to every attempt to send probes

and patrols across the Yokkok-ch'on towards Sangnyong-ni. During the COMMANDO operation, the Chinese had

shown how valuable they considered the

control of the terrain in this area. For

the first time they had shifted from the

fluid defense system that formed part of

their basic tactical doctrine and had dug

in in depth. The deep bunkers, complex

system of trenches, and large stocks of

food, supplies, and ammunition stored

at the front-line positions showed that

they intended to stay and defend in

place. When the 1st Cavalry Division

tried to storm the enemy's main line of

resistance, the Chinese poured in firstclass reinforcements, freely expended

their ammunition stocks, and fought fanatically to hold on. Only when losses

in men and exhaustion of ammunition

supplies forced them to withdraw, could

the 1st Cavalry take possession of the

JAMESTOWN line. Intelligence reports at

I Corps headquarters pointed out that

there seemed to be a definite lack of

interest among the Chinese commanders

in the fate of front-line regiments which

had been ordered to resist to the end.

According to the G-2 officers, this suggested that the Chinese might have come

around to the belief that fewer troops

would be lost through these tactics than

in trying to retake lost territory with

heavy counterattacks.57

In any case the cost to the enemy had

been high. I Corps estimates of enemy

losses during the 3-19 October period

placed the total at well over 21,000 men,

including over 500 prisoners. Close to

16,000 casualties had been inflicted upon

the enemy by the 1st Cavalry Division

alone, as it reduced the crack CCF 47th

Army to half strength. But the I Corps

had not escaped untouched; it had taken

over 4,000 casualties during the 17-day

operation, with the 1st Cavalry suffering

over 2,900 of the total.58 In the process

of absorbing losses the I Corps had

improved its defensive position and kept

the enemy from launching an offensive

of his own.

While the I Corps sought to organize

57

 U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I, pp.

16-27. 58

 Hq, I Corps, Operation COMMANDO, ans. H and

K. MS in OCMH.
THE NEW WAR 103

the gains of COMMANDO, the U.S. IX

Corps made plans to launch a similar

operation toward Kumsong. On 9 October, General Van Fleet visited IX Corps

headquarters and found Lt. Gen. William H. Hoge and his division commanders eager to carry out local advances

along the corps front. The objectives

would be to improve the defensive positions of the divisions in the line and to

maintain pressure upon the enemy.

Since both of these coincided with

Eighth Army directives, Van Fleet gave

his approval.59 In case of a successful IX

Corps advance, however, there would be

one disadvantage. The sag in the X

Corps lines, which had just been eliminated, would be replaced by a bulge on

the IX Corps' front.

The U.S. 24th Division, the ROK 2d,

and ROK 6th Division were selected to

make the advance to a line about four

miles south of Kumsong, The American

division was flanked on either side by

the South Korean divisions and was expected to provide tank support for the

ROK 2d. On 13 October units of the

three divisions moved out and registered

gains of almost two miles the first day.

During the night the Chinese mounted

several counterattacks which were successfully beaten off. Despite stubborn

resistance and intense concentrations of

artillery fire, the IX Corps troops pushed

ahead slowly during the next few days

and reached the objective line by 17

October. The favorable outcome led

Hoge to direct another advance two

miles closer to Kumsong. Here the attackers would establish a strong outpost

line and patrol aggressively to maintain

contact with the enemy.

The pattern set up during the initial

phase of the IX Corps advance repeated

itself during the second phase. Hoge reported that the enemy reaction seemed

to be one of delay rather than a serious

effort to hold the line. Chinese attacks

varied from platoon to battalion size and

most frequently were launched during

the night or just before dawn. Heavy

artillery and mortar fire accompanied

the enemy drives and hand grenades

were used plentifully. By 20 October,

however, the IX Corps had won through

to its second objective line and began to

organize the defense. During the following days the 24th Division sent out several tank forays. One penetrated into

Kumsong itself and blew up several

buildings and a tunnel.60

When the action came to an end on 23

October, Van Fleet commended the 2d

and 6th ROK Divisions for their excellent showing against the enemy. They

had taken their objectives and beaten off

the Chinese counterattacks. The sensitivity of the Communists to probes and

advances in the Kumsong area was demonstrated by the severe losses that they

sustained in the 13-23 October period

while trying to delay the IX Corps offensive.61

Internal Changes

The limited offensives of the Eighth

Army petered out in late October as the

truce negotiations resumed at Panmunjom and another lull set in on the battle59

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 44-45.

60

 Ibid., pp. 50, 56, 61. 61

 Casualty estimates for the enemy listed 12,711

known killed, 16,818 additional estimated killed,

and 1,022 prisoners in the IX Corps area between

13-23 October. The UNC forces lost 710 killed,

3,714 wounded, and 73 missing. Hq Eighth Army,

Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec.I, Narrative, pp. 61-62.
104 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

field. General Van Fleet took advantage

of the respite by transferring several of

his battered X Corps divisions into reserve positions. By exchanging the U.S.

7th Division with its attached Ethiopian

Battalion from the U.S. IX Corps and

the U.S. 2d and the French Battalion,

Van Fleet was able to use the latter as

IX Corps reserves. He also switched the

ROK 5th Division over to the ROK I

Corps reserve sector and sent the ROK

3d Division to the X Corps.62

One change of particular significance

took place on 1 October. The all-Negro

24th Infantry Regiment was inactivated

and the 14th Infantry Regiment replaced

it as the third regiment of the 25th Division. During the first year of the war

some dissatisfaction had been expressed

by senior officers of the division with the

combat performance of the 24th Regiment, but the regiment had been established by law in 1866 and its disposition

presented special problems.63

The gradual shift in Army integration

policies and the exigencies of the battle

situation in Korea finally offered a solution. Since World War II a number of

studies had been made on the better

utilization of Negro personnel within the

Army and several steps had been taken

prior to the outbreak of the Korean conflict.64

 Army regulations issued in January 1950 stated that all manpower would

be utilized to obtain maximum efficiency

in the Army without regard to race,

color, religion, or national origin.65

While these regulations did not require

integration of units, they did make it

possible. In March 1950 the Army followed up by abolishing the recruiting

quotas which limited the number of Negroes that could be enlisted.66

With the outbreak of war, Negro enlistments grew and Negro units in Korea

had little difficulty in maintaining their

authorized strength. By early 1951

Eighth Army personnel officers began to

assign excess Negro personnel to understrength white units and the results

were highly gratifying on the whole.

The performance of Negroes in integrated combat organizations improved

over their past performance, and there

was no appreciable lowering of morale

among the white personnel of these

units. Fears of hostility and tension between the Negroes and white soldiers in

integrated outfits proved to be largely

groundless.67

The favorable experience in integration in Korea led General Ridgway in

May 1951 to recommend the use of a

percentage of Negro troops in all units

in the Far East Command as a means of

improving the over-all combat effective- 62

 In minor changes during the August-October

period, the 10th Philippine Combat Battalion became the 20th Philippine Combat Battalion on 6

September. In the British Commonwealth Division

the Royal Ulster Rifles were relieved by a battalion

of the Royal Norfolk Regiment on 18 October and

prepared to return to Hong Kong. See Hq Eighth

Army, Comd Rpts, Sep and Oct 51, sec. I, Narrative. In one command change, Brig. Gen. Thomas

J. Cross took over the command of the U.S. 3d

Division on 20 October as General Soule was sent

home on regular rotation. 63

 For an account of the 24th Regiment's early

battle experience, see Appleman, South to the

Naktong, pp. 190-95, 365-75, 438-41, 479-86.

64

 For a discussion of the developments before

the Korean War, see Freedom to Serve: Equality of

Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,

A Report by the President's committee, Charles

Fahy, Chairman (Washington, 1950) . 65

 Army Special Regulations 600-629-1, 16 Jan 50. 66

 Freedom to Serve, app. C. 67

 An excellent study on the Korean experience

in integration will be found in Operations Research

Office Report ORO-R-11, The Utilization of Negro

Manpower in the Army (Washington: Operations

Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1955).
THE NEW WAR 105

ness of his forces. As a first step in

eliminating the all-Negro infantry units,

he proposed to inactivate the 24th Regiment and to distribute its personnel

among all-white or integrated organizations in the Far East Command. The

Department of the Army approved on

1 July and later in the month announced

that the process of integration of combat

units in the FEC would be spread over

six months and that service-type units

would also be effected eventually.68

In addition to the integration of the

24th Regiment's personnel as of 1 October, several other all-Negro units were

split up during the late summer and

early fall of 1951. The Negroes in the

3d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment,

were distributed throughout the U.S.

2d Division and those in the 3d Battalion

15th Infantry Regiment, were integrated

with other infantry elements in the U.S.

3d Division. Some members of the 64th

Tank Battalion and of the 58th Armored

Field Artillery Battalion were sent to

white tank and armored field artillery

units in exchange for white personnel.

In some cases, the asterisks which designated an outfit as Negro were dropped

and integration took place whenever the

unit was placed in reserve and the exchanges of personnel could be easily carried out.69

Air Operations

Although the bulk of the fighting in

Korea from August to October was carried out on the ground, the Far East

Air Forces and the Navy forces under

General Ridgway both contributed a

great deal directly and indirectly to the

success of the ground operations.

The Fifth Air Force under General

Everest concentrated most of its fighter,

fighter-bomber, and light-bomber effort

on the interdiction of the Communist

lines of communications. Railroads,

bridges, highways, marshaling yards, and

supply points were hit repeatedly to slow

down the southward movement of enemy

troops and equipment. During August,

Everest inaugurated a rail interdiction

program called STRANGLE which emphasized rail cutting.70

 His pilots soon had

a new theme song — "We've Been Working on the Railroads."71

 The attention

devoted to rear area interdiction lessened the amount of close air support for

the front-line troops, but Everest felt

that a large-scale effort might uproot the

enemy's logistical setup.72 To complement the daytime strikes, the Fifth Air

Force's B-26's searched out enemy motor

transport at night. Everest hoped that

68

 (1) DA, Press Release, 26 Jul 51. In OCMH.

(2) Hq FEC Mil Hist Sec, History of the Korean

War, vol. III, Part 2, Personnel Problems, prepared

by 1st Lt Charles G. Cleaver, pp. 150ff. MS in

OCMH. 69

 Hq FEC MHS, Hist of the Korean War, vol.

III, pt. 2, Personnel Problems, prepared by Lt

Cleaver, pp. 150ff. By the end of the war in July

1953, over 90 percent of the total Negro personnel

in the Army were serving in integrated units. See

ACofS, G-1, "Utilization of Negro Manpower," in

Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1953.

MS in OCMH.

70

 The term STRANGLE had been loosely used for

rail interdiction operations from April 1951 on, but

more properly covers the August 1951-March 195.,

period. See USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns

in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 51-30 Jun 52, pp.

161-62, for a discussion of the name. It is interesting to note that STRANGLE had been used in World

War II in the Italian campaign of 1944 to cover

a similar interdiction program. See The War Reports of General George C. Marshall, General H. H.

Arnold, and Admiral Ernest J. King (Philadelphia:

J. B. Lippincott. 1947), p. 381. 71

 John Dille, Substitute for Victory (New York:

Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954), p. 62. 72

 Ltr, CG 5th AF to CG Eighth Army, 23 Aug

51, sub: Fifth AF Opns.
106 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

NORTH KOREAN RAIL LINE AFTER INTERDICTION BOMBING

his forces could weaken the Communist

forward supply chain and reduce the

enemy's capability to resist the Eighth

Army's ground attacks. And Van Fleet

was willing to let him try, since he was

still considering TALONS at the time.73

After cancellation of TALONS, Everest

and Van Fleet decided that 96 fighter

sorties a day would be sufficient to provide close air support for the Eighth

Army's limited offensives. The main

emphasis remained on the interdiction

program but the Fifth Air Force commander wanted to maintain the proficiency of his pilots and ground control

officers in close support missions.74

Constant pressure by air upon the

enemy's rail lines began to pay off in

October. Intelligence reports indicated

that the lines were being destroyed faster

than the enemy could repair them. Initially the pilots had directed most of

their attention to railroad bridges, but

73

 Msg, GX 1365 TAC, CG Eighth Army to CG

5th Air Force, 24 Aug 51.

74

 (1) Msg, GX 1691 TAC, CG Eighth Army to

CG's U.S. I, IX, X Corps, and ROK I Corps et al.,

10 Sep 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 51,

G-3 sec., bk. 4, incl 6-10. (2) USAF Hist Study No.

72, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50-

30 Jun 52, p. 199.
THE NEW WAR 107

the Communists had become skillful in

devising methods to bypass or repair the

cut bridges. They stockpiled spare sections close to the important bridges and

were able to restore service quickly. In

any event the Fifth Air Force changed

tactics and inaugurated a system of multiple cuts. By damaging or destroying

the rails at dozens of places, they slowed

down enemy repair efforts. There was

an interesting parallel between the success of this tactic and the UNC experiences at Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges.

As long as the UNC concentration of

forces at certain key points was maintained, the enemy was able to cope with

the situation. But once the U.N. Command spread its attack and applied pressure in many places, the Communists

found themselves in difficulty. They

were forced to cannibalize spur lines and

marshaling yards to keep the main lines

open. The only respite for the harassed

Communists came when the weather restricted flying.75

In the meantime the medium bombers

of the Strategic Air Command had also

assisted in the air assault upon the enemy's rear areas. After the first attack

upon P'yongyang in July had had but

modest results, General Ridgway expressed his "keen disappointment" that

FEAF had not been able to bring massed

air power to bear against P'yongyang.

He instructed General Weyland, the

FEAF commander, to prepare another

strike and urged him to take all possible

care that the weather should be suitable

this time.76

On 14 August good weather prevailed

over the target area. FEAF sent sixty-six

B-29 medium bombers and fifty-six

fighters over the enemy capital and considerable damage was effected. Although

no enemy aircraft were seen, enemy antiaircraft fire was so intense and accurate

that six fighter planes were lost.77

Ridgway also pressed for JCS permission to bomb the North Korean port of

Rashin which lay close to the Soviet border. General MacArthur had not been

allowed to raid this important town

because of the dangers of violating the

Soviet frontier through navigational error. But Ridgway told the JCS on 1

August that his air reconnaissance had

discovered extensive stockpiling of material at Rashin and he desired to destroy

the industrial area of the port by naval

shelling and aerial bombing. Not only

was the town a key highway and railway

center, he reported, but it also had extensive oil storage facilities and rail repair shops that supported the enemy

supply lines. Ridgway was convinced

that FEAF could destroy Rashin without

invading Russian territory.78

Since the United Nations commander

had but limited means for applying pressure upon the enemy, the JCS supported

his stand. They told Secretary Marshall

on 10 August that Ridgway's reasons

seemed to be perfectly valid from the

military point of view. Since they believed that a show of military strength

rather than weakness would achieve the

U.N. objectives in Korea, they advised

the Secretary of Defense that: "It would

be most desirable to take all possible

measures within the scope of operations

75

 FEAF Comd Rpt, Oct 51. 76

 Memo for Rcd, 1 Aug 51, sub: Conf on FEAF

Opns, in FEC files.

77

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, G-3 Staff Sec Rpt, Aug

51.

78

 Msg, C 68131, CINCFE to JCS, 1 Aug 51, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, an. 4, pt. III, incl

16.
108 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

in Korea to deter the Communist supply

build-up and thereby obviate the possible needless loss of lives among United

Nations Troops."

 79

Marshall and President Truman

agreed with the JCS and the path was

cleared for the bombing of Rashin. But

some restrictions still applied. The Joint

Chiefs told Ridgway he was not to use

any naval vessels to shell the city nor

would he give any unusual publicity to

the air attacks which would be carried

out by fully briefed crews and under

visual conditions only.80

In the meantime Ridgway and his

advisors concluded that the marshaling

yards in Rashin offered the most valuable targets. Rather than conduct mass

raids, the FEC commander felt that reg- ular daily efforts would utilize his B29's most effectively. Besides, weather

conditions at Rashin during this time of

the year were too uncertain to mount

major strikes.81

The first attack was made on 25 August by thirty-five B-29's under favorable weather conditions. Escorted by

twenty-four Navy fighters, the pilots of

the medium bombers claimed excellent

results and not a plane was lost.82

Although August was a quiet month

insofar as enemy air activity was concerned, there was a distinct increase in

the number of planes sighted in September. Not only were there more planes

but the Communists pilots were more

aggressive. Previously they had re- mained fairly close to their Manchurian

sanctuary, but in September they began

to roam further south in substantial

flights.

The Russian MIG-15 was the workhorse of the Communist air force. Superior to the American jet fighters in its

ability to climb, dive, and accelerate, the

MIG-15 was used with greater profi- ciency by the Chinese pilots as the fall

began. Using the sun as a backdrop to

prevent detection and the element of

surprise as tactics, the enemy aviators

became bolder. During the third week

of October they demonstrated how much

they had learned when they shot down

five B-29's and damaged eight more.

Only six of the medium bombers had

been lost during the whole war up to

this point.83

The rise in enemy air sorties and the

new aggressive spirit of the Communist

flyers reached its peak as the peace negotiators prepared to meet at Panmunjom. Whether this activity was designed

principally to influence the conference

discussions or signified that the enemy

was actually ready now to seriously challenge the UNC control of the North

Korean skies remained to be seen.

The War at Sea

Naval operations during the AugustOctober period complemented the air

and ground attacks for the most part.

Naval and Marine aircraft struck at the

Communist communications, supply

areas, and troop positions and although

weather conditions were unfavorable

during much of August, they mounted

over 7,300 sorties.

During the bombing of Rashin on 25

79

 Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 10 Aug 51,

sub: Removal of Restriction Against Attacks on

(Rashin) Najin. 80

 Msg, JCS 98632, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Aug 51. 81

 Msg, C 68643, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Aug 51, DAIN 4248. 82

 FEAF Comd Rpt, Aug 51, p. 2. 83 FEAF Comd Rpts, Sep and Oct 51.
THE NEW WAR 109

USS NEW JERSEY FIRING HER 16-INCH GUNS NEAR THE 38TH PARALLEL

August, Navy fighters escorted the B29's-the first time that this had happened during the Korean War.84

 And

when the Air Force launched its railcutting program in September, the naval

squadrons from Task Force 77 shifted

from close support and bridge interdiction operations and helped to cripple the

enemy rail transport.

With British naval aircraft assistance,

Task Force 77 struck at Wonsan on 18-

19 September and then raided Kojo on

10 October with Australian carrier

planes participating in the attack.85 Marine aviation in the meantime concentrated on close air support and provided

air strikes along the front lines for the

limited ground offensives.86

Naval surface craft also furnished aid

and assistance to the ground forces with

the resumption of naval gunfire support

in the ROK I Corps sector in August.

To create a diversion on the east coast

and draw the N.K. forces away from the

X Corps and ROK I Corps area during

the August offensive, Ridgway ordered

84

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Aug 51, pp.

2-1 through 2-6.

85

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Sep-Oct

51, pp. 1-16, 1-17. 86

 Ibid.
110 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Admiral Joy to carry out a large-scale

amphibious demonstration at Changjon.

On 31 August the amphibious forces

arrived at the target area. First the fire

support group poured high explosives on

the beach with the battleship New Jersey providing the big guns. When the

surface craft completed their task, naval

air forces followed with a rocket saturation of the beach area. Landing boats

were lowered from the transports and

the troops took their stations. After a

pass at the beach, they returned to their

mother ships and the surface craft moved

in for a few final salvos.87 The operation

was completed without any incidents or

losses and probably caused some anxious

moments among the North Korean defenders around Changjon.

Farther north the UNC naval forces

continued their seige of Wonsan. Daily

this important enemy port received naval

bombardment. Twice during August

British Royal Marine Commandos

landed near Wonsan and raided enemy

installations. On 5 October Hungnam

was also bombarded, but the resistance

to this move proved intense. During the

fight the USS Ernest G. Small, a radar

picket destroyer, was mined and suffered

heavy damage.88

Over on the west coast, UNC naval

forces mounted a special strike in the

Han River area on 3 October. Besides

the damage inflicted upon enemy installations, the raid demonstrated UNC

naval superiority quite convincingly as

the attacking elements operated in the

closed Han estuary waters and returned

without loss.89

Naval blockade along the coast, surface

raids and bombardment behind the front

lines, and naval gunfire to assist the

ground attack formed but one side of the

coin. On the other lay the close air support of the Marine squadrons, the interdiction co-operation of the Navy planes

and their service as escort fighters. And

behind the scenes, the Navy provided

amphibious training experience to the

Army divisions stationed in Japan, so

that they might be ready to enter combat quickly if the need arose.

The great question mark in the naval

situation was the Russian submarine

fleet in the Pacific. Here was the everpresent challenge to the UNC control of

the seas. While furnishing surface and

air support to the Eighth Army in Korea,

the naval command had to keep a watchful eye on the Soviet activities at Vladivostok.

Postlude

During the summer and early fall of

1951 the United States and its allies

adopted a double-barreled approach to

the problem of ending the war in Korea.

The negotiations at Kaesong provided

a politico-diplomatic method of reaching

agreement on the terms of settlement

while the outbreak of limited offensives

at the front coupled with air and naval

action exerted military pressures upon

the Communists to conclude an armistice

before their position deteriorated further.

The punishing "elbowing forward"

tactics of the Eighth Army during the

87

 (1) Ibid., Aug 51, pp. 2-11, 2-14, 2-15. (2) Msg. CX 69607, CINCFE TO COMNAVFE, 25 Aug

51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Aug

51, Paper 40. 88

 COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, Aug and

Sep-Oct 51, sec. 2. 89

 Ibid., Sep-Oct 51, pp. 2-8.
THE NEW WAR

August-October period had inflicted

heavy casualties upon the enemy forces,

both Chinese and North Korean. Despite the constant reports that the Communist logistical build-up continued,

intelligence estimates at the end of October indicated that the enemy offensive

capabilities had probably been reduced

and that there were no definite signs that

the foe intended to launch an attack in

the immediate future.90 It was evident

that the U.N. Command had seized the

battlefield initiative and forced the

enemy to go on the defensive. By keeping the Communists off balance by raids,

probing attacks, and small offensives, the

U.N. Command had neutralized the enemy's ability to mount a large-scale drive

and in the process had destroyed thousands of North Korean and Chinese soldiers. General Van Fleet's forces had

erected a stout defense line and then set

the pattern of the fighting for the new

war—the battle for dominating terrain.

The efforts of the X Corps at Heartbreak

Ridge and the reaching of the JAMESTOWN line were to be duplicated again

and again in the months ahead in grim

but monotonous fashion. In this contest

there would be no knockout blow but

rather a constant jabbing and counterpunching to wear out the opponent.

If some of the lessons experienced

during the ridge battles had proved

costly to the UNC forces as well as to

the enemy, it was to be hoped that the

same mistakes would not be made again.

The Communist tenacity and courage

in holding well-fortified positions had

been amply demonstrated and the UNC

had several times made the error of

underestimating the enemy's will and

ability to resist. Dispersion of the enemy

forces and resources paid off both on the

ground and in the air during the period

when the UNC had capitalized on the

inferior communications system of the

Communists.

Despite the military advantage that

the UNC had gained in the field, the

Communists still held the propaganda

initiative won in the battle of incidents

waged during the long recess of the truce

negotiations. The one tended to offset

the other to some degree, but as the

peace discussions resumed in late October, the improved military position of

the UNC along the front could not help

but strengthen the hand of Admiral

Joy and his staff in the coming debate

over the demarcation line.

90

 Msg, DA 85150, DA to CINCFE, 26 Oct 51, in

Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Oct 51,

Paper 27.
CHAPTER VI

The Resumption of Negotiations

As the final arrangements for the

reconvening of the truce negotiations

were made in October 1951, developments on the international scene gave

no indication that a quick settlement

of the Korean War might be in the offing. Both the United States and the

Soviet Union were engaged in strengthening their military capabilities and

those of their allies.

In the United States President Truman signed the National Security Act

on 10 October and Congress voted over

seven billion dollars for foreign economic, technical, and military aid ten

days later. The new National Security

Agency established under the act would

co-ordinate all of the foreign aid programs. The bulk of the military aid

would go to the countries in the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization to help

bolster their ability to defend themselves

against aggression. On 22 October the

members of NATO agreed to permit

Greece and Turkey to join the organization, thus broadening the NATO area

of responsibility considerably. Of the

fourteen nations now included in

NATO, eleven were contributing units

to the United Nations Command.1

The Soviet Union in the meantime

had exploded its second and third

atomic bombs in October, serving notice

that it had embarked upon an ambitious

nuclear program. Stalin publicly pledged

friendship to Communist China and received a message of thanks from Kim Il

Sung of North Korea for Russian assistance to the N.K. forces. In Moscow

Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky informed the U.S. Ambassador that the

Soviet Union would not bring pressure

upon the Communist negotiators in

Korea to modify their truce demands.

Thus, the prospects for swift action on

the conclusion of an armistice dwindled

even before the meetings resumed.

The Line of Demarcation

On 24 October a fleet of nine 21⁄2-

ton trucks moved out of Munsan-ni and

crossed the Imjin River. Loaded with

tents and equipment the convoy rolled

into the tiny village of Panmunjom and

its cluster of mud huts. Swiftly the tent

city to house the conferees rose and a

crew of forty men worked intently to

install the flooring, lighting, and heating

that the approach of cold weather now

made necessary. By the following day

the new site was ready.

The main conference area had several

large tents set aside for joint use and

three that were to be at the disposal of

the UNC delegates and the press. Half

a mile south the service echelons set up

1

 The United States, United Kingdom, Canada,

France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey were represented in the UNC. In November Italy sent a

medical unit to Korea, leaving only Iceland, which

had no armed forces, and Portugal unrepresented.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 113

the mess, communications, security, and

engineer facilities that would support

the negotiations and aid in neutralizing

the truce conference area. Overnight,

Panmunjom became famous.

When the delegates convened on 25

October in the big conference tent, it

almost seemed as though there had been

no hiatus. The Communists were formally correct and meticulous as always,

and only the presence of two new faces

on their side of the table gave evidence

of change. Nam Il introduced General

Pien Chang-wu and Maj. Gen. Chung

Tu Hwan who had replaced Teng Hua

and Chang Pyong San respectively as

Chinese and North Korean delegates.

Admiral Joy in turn presented the

credentials of Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung

Koon, head of the ROK Field Training

Command, and now the ROK representative in lieu of General Paik Sun Yup.

Since both sides had accepted the

security arrangements worked out by the

liaison officers during the long recess, the

Communists proposed that a joint office

of the liaison officers be established to

supervise the details of the agreement.

The UNC delegates agreed that the liaison officers should handle the investigation of incidents and carry out

inspections at the truce site. This minor

matter settled, Nam suggested that the

meetings of the subdelegates on the

line of demarcation be resumed. The

same four delegates, General Hodes and

Admiral Burke for the U.N. Command

and Generals Lee and Hsieh for the

Communists, were named to meet on

Item 2 that afternoon.2

During the August sessions on the line

of demarcation, it will be remembered,

the UNC negotiators had given up their

initial stand that air and naval effectiveness be reflected in the battle line and

the Communists had indicated that they

might be ready to discuss a line other

than the 38th Parallel.3 Ridgway had

won approval to settle on a demilitarized

zone not less than four miles wide with

the line of contact as the median just

before the Communists called off the

meetings.

In the interim the UNC delegation had not been idle. Joy informed

Ridgway in mid-October that he and his

staff had worked up a short paper and

had mapped out a specific demilitarized

zone based on the line of contact. He

did not intend to make the map the sole

basis of discussion, but he would not

permit any major alterations to be made

in the UNC line.4

Thus, the UNC subdelegation was

ready to present the new proposal at the

first meeting, but the initial exchanges

between General Hodes and General

Lee developed into a sparring match:

Gen. Lee: Do you have any idea about

the military demarcation line?

Gen. Hodes: We ended the last confer- ence before the suspension by asking for

your proposal. Do you have one?

Gen. Lee: We would like your opinion

first.

Gen. Hodes: We gave our opinion many

times, and asked for your proposal based

on our proposal. As it was your proposal

to have the subdelegation meeting, we ex- pected you to have a proposal. Let's have it. Gen. Lee: You said you had made a new

2

 (1) Transcript of Proceedings, 27th Session,

Mtg at Panmunjom, on the Armistice Proposal, 25

Oct 51. (2) Msg, HNC 388, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 25 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 231.

3

 See Chapter III, above. 4

 (1) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 13 Oct 51, DA-IN

6758. (2) Msg, HNC 361, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 15 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 197.
114 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

TRUCE TENTS

proposal, but we have heard nothing new

which will break the deadlock.

Gen. Hodes: That's right, you haven't.

Gen. Lee: We have established a subcommittee to break the deadlock. The

deadlock can be broken only it we have a

mutually satisfactory proposal.

Gen. Hodes: Right. What is your proposal to break the deadlock?

After the better part of an hour was

spent continuing this stimulating conversation, the UNC delegates decided

that the Communists had no proposal to

offer. Following a short recess, they

made the opening gambit—a concrete

demilitarized zone traced on the map.

In general, Hodes explained, the zone

was based upon the line of contact, but

in order to make each side's defenses

more secure the UNC forces would withdraw along the east coast and in the

Kumsong area and the Communists

would be expected to do the same in the

Kaesong area. Not unexpectedly, the

Communists rejected this proposal the

following day and countered with a map

of their own that was much more favorable to them. Their adjustments gave

the U.N. Command some indefensible

territory on the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas in return for the J-Ridge, Bloody,

and Heartbreak Ridges, the Punchbowl,

Kumhwa, and Ch'orwon. Hodes, in turn,
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 115

GENERAL PIEN CHANG-WU ARRIVES

found the Communist suggestion unacceptable, but at least a start had been

made and the enemy had not mentioned

the 38th Parallel.5

Although General Lee stoutly asserted

that the Communists were not "merchants," but rather "military men of

revolutionary spirit," when Hodes inquired whether the enemy position was

for bargaining purposes, the horse trading began. The crux of the matter was

the Kaesong area which the UNC delegates claimed was necessary to protect

the approach to Seoul. If the site for the

negotiations had not been placed at

Kaesong, the UNC forces would probably have taken the city, Hodes declared.

And besides, since the U.N. Command

would have to give up the offshore

islands that it controlled adjoining

enemy-held territory, Kaesong would be

fair compensation. Hodes pointed out

that the Communists would also benefit

from the UNC withdrawals from the

areas around Kaesong and Kumsong, but

5

 Summaries of Proceedings, Seventh and Eighth

Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 25 and 26

Oct 51, in FEC Subdelegates Mtgs on item 2, vol. I.

All meetings through 5 November will be found in

this file.
116 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the enemy wanted no part of a trade

that would involve the loss of Kaesong.6

Possession of Kaesong was important

politically and psychologically as well as

militarily since it lay south of the 38th

Parallel and the ROK Government had

been insisting upon its return. As a symbol it was worth far more than a greater

amount of territory in central or east

Korea.7

At first the Communists were willing

to barter. They were agreeable to an

exchange on the central and eastern

fronts to straighten out the line of defense. But, as the UNC delegates persisted in their demand for Kaesong, the

enemy lost interest. After several fruitless days of discussion, the Communists

proposed a 4-kilometer demilitarized

zone based solely on the line of contact.

This, they asserted, was their best and

last proposal.8

General Ridgway had thought that

the UNC map which had been presented

would be the final offer with only minor

changes permitted. But his superiors reminded him that the U.S. minimum

position was the maintenance of the

security of Line KANSAS. If KANSAS had

an adequate outpost line of resistance,

certain adjustments in the proposed line

of demarcation on the map would appear

to be practicable, they informed the Far

East commander on 30 October.9

The instructions from Washington

and the determined Communist stand on

Kaesong led Ridgway to issue new orders

on 2 November. He told the UNC

delegates to retreat to the second-line

position which placed the city in the

demilitarized zone. The last concession,

Ridgway went on, would be to concede

the Kaesong area, provided that the

Communists agreed to the adjustments

on the eastern and central fronts and

permitted the UNC forces to locate its

outpost line of resistance on the west

bank of the Imjin River.10

For the next two days Hodes and

Burke conducted a dogged campaign to

budge the Communists, but to no avail.

The enemy was firmly resolved not to

give up Kaesong. By 4 November Ridgway and Joy had decided that a settlement based on the battle line with appropriate minor adjustments would be

the best they could hope for.11

When the subdelegations met on the

following day, General Hodes presented

the UNC compromise offer. This accepted a 4-kilometer demarcation zone

based on the actual line of contact at the

time of the signing of the armistice with

"appropriate adjustments." Three officers from each side would work out the

battle line and would be prepared to

give it to the delegation prior to the

completion of the truce. In the meantime, the UNC proposal recommended

that the conferees proceed to other items,

on the agenda.12

The Communists showered a barrage

of questions on Hodes and Burke, but

their interest swiftly waned when they 6

 Summary of Proceedings, Ninth Session, Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 27 Oct 51. 7

 Msg, HNC 430, Ridgway to JCS, 8 Nov 51, DAIN 17036. 8

 Summary of Proceedings, Thirteenth Session,

Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 31 Oct 51. 9

 (1) Msg, CX 56073, Ridgway to JCS, 28 Oct 51,

DA-IN 12729. (2) Msg, JCS 85537, JCS to Ridgway, 30 Oct 51.

10

 Msg, C 56412, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv),

2 Nov 51, in FEC 387.2 bk. III, 247. 11

 Msg, HNC 423, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC,

4 Nov 51. (2) Msg C 56599, CINCUNC to American Embassy, Pusan, 4 Nov 51. Both in FEC 387.2, 12

 Summary of Proceedings, Eighteenth Session,

Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 5 Nov 51.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 117

discovered that the UNC delegation

would not rule Kaesong out of any future

adjustments that might be made. Then

General Lee launched his assault. Item

2 must be settled now, he declared, and

a military demarcation zone fixed before

discussion of other agenda items could

begin. Postponement of the matter until

the armistice was signed was out of the

question, Lee and his colleague, Hsieh,

maintained, since agreement in principle was not enough. The Communists

insisted that the current line be determined and that it should serve as the line

of demarcation, despite Hodes's assertion that the present line would have no

validity unless the truce was completed

quickly. Otherwise, a new line and

demilitarized zone reflecting changes on

the battlefield would have to be agreed

upon.13

To Admiral Joy the enemy's stand indicated that the Communists intended

to make the line of demarcation worked

out at this time a permanent rather than

a temporary settlement and he thought

that this effort should be resisted.14 In

Washington, U.S. political and military

leaders agreed, but with definite reservations. If the UNC delegation maintained a hard-and-fast stand on Kaesong

and the line of demarcation too long,

they told Ridgway, it would appear to be

a major concession when the UNC finally

accepted the Communist position. Public

opinion at home, Ridgway was told,

would not understand a breakdown of

negotiations over Kaesong, in the face

of recent Communist concessions. Therefore, if the Communists flatly rejected

the UNC proposal to postpone agreement on the line of demarcation, the

enemy's line of contact in the Kaesong

area should be accepted quickly. To prevent the Communists from making the

line of demarcation permanent, they

suggested to Ridgway that a time limit

be set for the completion of the other

agenda items. If no agreement was

reached at the expiration of the limiting

period, the demilitarized zone would be

subject to revision.15

General Ridgway did not object to

the JCS counsel on Kaesong, but he felt

strongly that agreement to the present

line of contact as a permanent line, subject only to minor adjustments, would be

a mistake. In the 8 November subdelegate meeting, Ridgway pointed out,

the Communists had indicated that they

did not think that any major change in

the battle lines had taken place since

July. If the summer and fall campaigns

of the Eighth Army were thus ignored,

then the enemy obviously intended to

cling closely to whatever line was now

determined upon. This would in itself

amount to a de facto cease-fire during

the time period set and time extensions

would doubtlessly be sought by the

Communists and granted by the U.N.

Command for the settlement of other

agenda items. A cease-fire while the

negotiations were still going on would

be to the great disadvantage of the U.N.

Command, in Ridgway's opinion, and if

he had to give up Kaesong, he wanted

to stand inflexibly upon the principle

that the line of contact on the effective

13

 Summary of Proceedings, Nineteenth Session,

Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 6 Nov 51. All meetings of the subdelegation on item 2 from 6 November-27 November 1951 are in FEC Subdelegation

Meetings, Agenda item 2, volume II. 14

 Msg, HNC 426, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 6 Nov 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 263. 15

 Msg. JCS 86291, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Nov 51.
118 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

date of the armistice must be the line of

demarcation.16

The JCS were not willing to go quite

so far. They agreed that the UNC delegation should press for acceptance of a

postponed line of demarcation, but not

that this would be the final position.

Since the Communists had made substantial concessions on the location of

the line, the JCS thought that an early

agreement satisfying the UNC major

requirements should be sought. Otherwise the enemy might even revert to its

former stand on the 38th Parallel.17

In the meantime the subdelegation

meetings had reached an impasse. The

Communists grew more adamant in their

stand for a 4-kilometer zone based on

the line of contact with no adjustments

either at the present or in the final settlement. They paid little attention to

Hodes's charge that they wanted the demarcation line settled so that they could

take their time on the other agenda

items.18

The session on 14 November was particularly spirited. After General Lee

admitted that agreement to a demarcation line now would amount to a de facto

cease-fire, Hodes attacked the concept.

General Hsieh became annoyed and then

abusive. He called Hodes "Turtle egg"

—an especially insulting term in

Chinese.19 "Only the Devil," he charged

later, could believe that the U.N. had

good faith and loved peace. Hsieh also

slurringly referred to Admiral Joy as

"the senior delegate of your delegation,

whose name I forget." 20

Although the UNC delegates ignored

the insults, Hodes evened the score the

following day in a reference to Nam Il

as "your senior delegate whose name I

trust you are able to recall." But progress

in the negotiations outside the jibe level

was slow.21

Military and political leaders in Washington were becoming impatient and on

14 November they instructed Ridgway

to accept the Communist line of demarcation in the interest of reaching an early

agreement. Since the Communist proposal not only met the U.S. basic position

on the maintenance of the security of

Line KANSAS, but also provided protection for Line WYOMING, they did not

consider that agreement amounted to

concession. By placing a time limit of

one month for the completion of the rest

of the agenda, they evidently hoped to

forestall a slowdown of operations for an

extended period of time and to spur the

enemy to greater speed in the negotiations. They told Ridgway that the military pressure upon the enemy should not

be lessened, but at the same time admitted that no major change in the line

of contact favorable to the United States

was likely during the next month. Air

and naval action, on the other hand,

would not be affected by the agreement.22

The UNC delegation earnestly sought

to eke some advantage from the enemy

as they readied their next offer, but with

little success. Each day they would relax 16

 Msg, HNC 430, Ridgway to JCS, 8 Nov 51,

DA-IN 17036. 17

 Msg, JCS 86654, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Nov 51. 18

 Summaries of Proceedings, Twenty-third and

Twenty-fifth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item

2, 10 and 12 Nov 51. 19

 According to Chinese legend, a female turtle

had to be fertilized by a snake.

20

 Summary of Proceedings, Twenty-seventh Session, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 14 Nov 51. 21

 Summary of Proceedings, Twenty-eighth Session, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 15 Nov 51. 22

 Msg, JCS 86804, JCS to CINCFE, 13 Nov 51.

(2) Msg, JCS 86969, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Nov 51.

THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 119

over a few games of solitaire or bridge

to ease the strain of dealing with their

stubborn opponents before they took up

the cudgels again. Finally on 17 November, they reluctantly presented the new

proposal which met the Communist

position on the line of demarcation, but

tacked on the thirty-day time limit.23

After several days of questions and

careful study of the UNC proposal, the

Communists were almost satisfied. Still

they held out for UNC agreement that

the line of demarcation would not be

revised until after the other agenda

items were settled. Although the expiration of the thirty-day limit without

the conclusion of a truce would witness

the termination of the line of demarcation's validity, the psychological effect of

placing it along the existing line of contact might carry over into the post-thirtyday period. The U.N. Command balked

briefly, then accepted the enemy's proposal. By 23 November the staff officers

were hard at work tracing out the battle

line.24

Disputes over the real location of the

line of contact that the staff officers could

not agree upon were referred back to the

subdelegation and in the course of one

such discussion an unusual incident took

place. As both sides claimed possession

of a particular hill in the central sector,

General Hodes arranged for a telephone

connection between the conferees and

the officer in charge on the hill in question. In Hsieh's presence he called the

unit commander and confirmed that the

U.N. Command still controlled the hill.

This annoyed Hsieh and he whispered

in Chinese to his staff officer, "never

mind. It will be ours tonight." Lieutenant Wu, the UNC interpreter overheard

this remark and when he repeated it to

Hodes later on, the UNC force on the

disputed hill was alerted for an attack.25

However, despite the warning, superior

Chinese forces drove the UNC forces off

the hill and Hodes had to admit the

next day that the enemy now had possession and had to adjust the line of contact.

By 27 November the last details were

ironed out and the demarcation line

agreed upon. (Map III) With its task completed, the subdelegation on Item 2 adjourned at the end of its thirty-seventh

session.

It had been a tortuous road that the

subdelegates had followed since 17 August when they had held their first meeting. Initially the UNC representatives

had labored to move the enemy from its

stand on the 38th Parallel and toward a

settlement along the actual line of contact. This had been successful. During

the long suspension of the talks the

Eighth Army had carried out its offensives and won improved positions along

most of the front. When the conference

resumed in late October, the UNC

delegation had an additional objective

—to secure, or at least demilitarize

23

 Summary of Proceedings, Thirtieth Session, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 17 Nov 51. According

to Admiral Burke, both he and Hodes felt that

their usefulness to the delegation had ended at this

point. After they had taken such strong stands,

Burke wrote, the order to concede would mark

them as "pushovers" in the eyes of the Communists. See Ltr, Burke to Mrs. A. A. Burke, 16

Nov 51. In OCMH. 24

 Summaries of Proceedings, Thirty-first, Thirtysecond, Thirty-third, Thirty-fourth, and Thirtyfifth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 18-23

Nov 51.

25

 Interv, Lt Col James F. Schnabel with Lt Wu,

March 1952. In OCMH.
120 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

COLONEL MURRAY AND COLONEL CHANG INITIAL A LINE OF DEMARCATION MAP

Kaesong. But this meant a departure

from the concept of the line of contact,

since the Communists still held Kaesong.

Despite all the arguments and inducements that the U.N. Command had

unveiled, the enemy remained unimpressed and became more firmly resolved to keep Kaesong.

While the United Nations Command

delegates still felt that they might get

Kaesong, they had been willing to sit

down and draw a line of demarcation

right away. But as chances for Kaesong

became slimmer, they changed their attitude and attempted to defer mapping

out the line until the armistice was ready

to be signed, in the hope that the situation would be altered and the Communists might be more amenable to giving

up Kaesong at that time.

The Communists, on the other hand,

had been more consistent. Once they

had discarded the 38th Parallel, they

had shifted to the line of contact. After

a brief flirtation with the idea of adjustments, they had been quickly disenchanted by the UNC insistence upon

adjusting the Kaesong area out of Com-
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 121

munist hands. From this point onward

the enemy delegates clung steadfastly to

an immediate settlement on the line of

contact with no adjustments other than

those involving minor terrain features.

Although the Communists had been

forced to concede on the 38th Parallel,

they had won on establishing a line of

demarcation that lasted until the closing

moments of the war.26 Admiral Joy later

wrote that he regarded this as a turning

point in the negotiations, for the United

States lacked military pressure to lever

the Communists into more reasonable

attitude after this agreement and Joy

believed that it cost the United States a

full year of war in Korea.27 Whether this

was true or not, the President and his

advisors had decided that the U.N. Command should compromise in the interests

of securing an earlier armistice and in

view of the fact that the enemy had already made considerable concessions.

With Item 2 finally out of the way, work

could now begin on Item 3, the setting

up of the machinery to administer the

truce.

Opening Skirmishes on Item 3

The early instructions to Ridgway had

been quite specific on the several points

that were to be taken up under Item 3.

They stated that the Military Armistice

Commission and its observer teams must

have free and unlimited access to all of

Korea so that they could inspect whenever necessary to insure compliance with

the terms of the armistice. They also

informed Ridgway that there should be

no reinforcing the number of personnel

or increasing the amount of war equipment during the armistice period. This,

of course, did not preclude the exchange

of individuals or units on a man-for-man

basis or the replacement of worn-out

equipment.28 These two principles in

modified form—the right to inspection

and replacement but no augmentationformed the cornerstones of the UNC

approach to Item 3.

The modifications stemmed from the

field. On 1 August Admiral Joy suggested that along with no augmentation

of troops or equipment the U.N Command should insist that there be no

construction or rehabilitation of airfields.29

 Two months later, Ridgway

attempted to clarify the UNC position

on free and unlimited inspection. Pointing out to the JCS that the enemy had

indicated its willingness to permit inspection in the demilitarized zone, but

had consistently resisted observation or

inspection in territory under its exclusive control, Ridgway questioned the

need for unlimited inspection. Insistence upon this principle might prolong

or even cause the Communists to break

off the negotiations. In the opinion of

the United Nations commander, inspection at selected ground, sea, and air ports

of entry would provide sufficient security

for his forces. Moreover, he believed

that the Communists would exploit the

right to unlimited inspection in the intelligence field to an unacceptable degree

if it were granted them. Under the circumstance Ridgway felt that the UNC

initial position on inspection should

insist upon: observation by joint teams 26

 For the discussion of the effects of the line of

demarcation upon the battlefield, see Chapter IX,

below. 27

 Joy, How Communists Negotiate, p. 129.

28

 Msg. JCS 95354, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun 51. 29

 Msg, HNC 164, Joy to Ridgway, 1 Aug 51, in

FEC 387.2, bk. I, 54.
122 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

at ground, sea, and air ports of entry

and communication centers, with freedom of movement for those teams over

principal transportation lines; joint

aerial observation and photoreconnaissance over all Korea; and complete joint

observation of the demilitarized zone.

As a final position, the UNC delegation

could concede aerial observation and

photoreconnaissance. His superiors approved the initial position several weeks

later, but reserved judgment on any

modifications until the negotiations disclosed the Communist position more

thoroughly.30 As Maj. Gen. Reuben E.

Jenkins, the Army G-3, pointed out to

General Collins, the Air Force was

strongly opposed to sacrificing aerial observation and it might turn out that the

Communists would prefer to dispense

with the ground observer teams.31

As negotiations on Item 2 drew to a

close in November, General Collins and

Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte experienced

some doubts about Communist acceptance of the inspection principle. The

real deterrent to a resumption of hostilities, they felt, lay in the maintenance of

sufficient power in the Korean area

rather than in inspection. Since the

Communists might prefer to permit the

negotiations to be broken off over this

issue, the Chief of Staff and his Deputy

Chief of Staff for Plans, General Bolte,

questioned whether inspection would

actually provide security for the U.N.

Command and how it could best be

carried out.32

Ridgway's answer on 23 November

reinforced his earlier stand. In his defense of the need for inspection he

reminded the JCS that enemy air power

had been steadily increasing. In recent

weeks it had challenged the UNC air

effort south of the Ch'ongch'on River.

If the enemy air bases were set up and

maintained in North Korea, they could

eventually pose a serious threat to Japan

in the event of a war with the Soviet

Union. For Ridgway the principle of

inspection, which the United States had

been insisting upon since the initiation

of negotiations with the USSR in 1946

over the control of atomic energy, was a

basic U.S. position and could not be discarded in Korea without having an adverse reaction upon future negotiations

with the USSR. As for the mechanics of

inspection, he believed that forty joint

teams, some located permanently at

ports of entry and others roving, could

cover Korea adequately. If the enemy

would not accept inspection, Ridgway

felt that the UNC delegation should be

authorized to break off negotiations.33

Several days later the U.S. leaders informed Ridgway that he should present

his initial position requiring inspection

on Item 3 and then modify it by conceding aerial observation and photoreconnaissance if it proved necessary. However, they were still firmly opposed to

having the onus for cutting off the

negotiations over this point fall on the

U.N. Command. Any decision to cease

30

 (1) Msg, C 52227. CINCFE to JCS, 4 Oct 51,

DA-IN 3575. (2) Msg, JCS 84817, JCS to CINCFE,

24 Oct 51. 31

 (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 11 Oct 51, sub:

Clarification of the Degree of Inspection, in G-3

091 Korea, 200. (2) General Jenkins succeeded

General Taylor as G-3 on 1 August 1951. Taylor became Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and

Administration.

32

 Msg, CSUSA (sgd Bolté) to CINCFE, 19 Nov

51, DA-87452. 33

 Msg, CX 57838, Ridgway to JCS, 23 Nov 31,

DA-IN 2085.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 123

the discussions, they declared, must be

made by the Communists.34

When the plenary session at Panmunjom resumed on 27 November, there

was one newcomer to the conference

table. Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner,

who had commanded a bombardment

division of the Eighth Air Force during

World War II and more recently had

been commanding general of the Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines, replaced General Craigie.

After Admiral Joy had presented

Turner's credentials, he immediately

broached a new subject. To save time in

the discussions that would take place on

Item 4, Joy proposed that prisoner of

war data covering the names and nationalities of all the prisoners and the

location of POW camps be exchanged

so that each side could study the information in advance of the formal meetings. Nam Il acknowledged the suggestion and then proceeded to discuss

Item 3.

In Nam's opinion, Item 3 could be

settled quite easily if the five principles

he now advanced were accepted by the

UNC delegates. The first declared that

all armed forces should cease hostilities

on the day the armistice was signed.

Within three days all armed forces

should be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone and within five days should

be cleared from the rear areas, coastal

islands, and waters of each side. These

were principles 2 and 3. Each side would

agree that there would be no armed

forces or action in the demilitarized zone

as the fourth principle, and finally both

sides would designate an equal number

of members to form an armistice commission to be jointly responsible for the

concrete arrangements and for the supervision of the implementation of the

agreement.

Basically there was little in the Communist proposal to quarrel with, as far

as it went. But Admiral Joy was quick

to point out to Nam that it failed to

cover important areas. The mechanics

for beginning a cease-fire and for clearing all the troops from the demilitarized

zone were fairly simple, Joy maintained,

but it was essential that both sides adopt

measures to reduce the possibility of a

resumption of hostilities. There were

several ways in which this could be done.

Neither side should build up its military supplies, equipment, or personnel

in Korea during the armistice and restrictions should be placed upon the

construction and rehabilitation of military facilities for offensive purposes. If

both sides accepted these conditions, Joy

went on, neither would acquire a significant advantage. To assure compliance with these limitations, Joy proposed

that a supervisory organization, with

joint observer teams, be established and

given sufficient authority and freedom

of movement to keep all Korea under

surveillance. The UNC 7-point formula

for solving Item 3 in effect broadened

and clarified the Communist five

principles.35

But the enemy soon indicated that it

would not accept the UNC extension of

the Communist proposal in its initial

form and on the 28th the attack began.

Nam centered his guns upon the UNC

34

 Msg, JCS 88226, JCS to CINCFE, 28 Nov 51.

35

 Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-eighth Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 27 Nov 51, in FEC,

Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs of the Mil Armistice Conf, 25 Oct 51-19 Feb 52, vol. III (hereafter

cited as FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III).
124 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

restrictions upon increases in forces, supplies, equipment, and facilities and the

granting of free access to all of Korea

for the joint observer teams. As far as

the Communists were concerned, Nam

declared, they believed that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea was

a necessary condition for a final peaceful

solution of the Korean problem. However, the U.N. Command insisted that

this be handled by the political conference to follow the armistice and the

matter of restrictions and reduction of

forces belonged, therefore, in the province of the political conference. Insofar

as the UNC proposal for the observer

teams was concerned, this was "entirely

unnecessary" since there would be no

restrictions applicable under the military armistice and consequently no need

for inspection. Thus, by disposing

of the restrictions, the Communists

shrugged off the inspection principle,

too.

As the UNC delegation counterattacked, Admiral Joy dismissed the Communist references to the withdrawal of

foreign troops as inappropriate. The

enemy's 5-point plan, Joy went on, was

too limited in scope to provide the

"bridge to peace" that the Communists

spoke so frequently about. He then

proceeded to explain the UNC seven

principles in more detail and pointedly

emphasized that restrictions on the

build-up of forces must be part of any

armistice that the U.N. Command would

accept.36

The main battle lines were now

plainly discernible. Since the U.N.

Command enjoyed a military advantage

in the air over the Communists, it desired to maintain the status quo and

preserve its superior air capability during the armistice period. Hence the

UNC insistence upon no increase in

military facilities, which, in essence,

meant airfields. To make sure that the

enemy did not violate this principle required that its companion, inspection,

be also included. The Communists, on

the other hand, were just as determined

to oppose any restrictions upon their opportunity to strengthen their air capability during a truce. If they could avoid

agreement upon this principle, there

would be no need for inspection.

The ensuing week witnessed a continuous maneuvering for position on

both sides. Defending its 7-point program, the U.N. Command argued that

either side could reduce its forces and

capabilities during the armistice if it so

desired, but since the length of time that

the armistice would endure was unknown, it was vital for the security of

the UNC forces that there be no upsetting of the balance of military power.37

The enemy delegates in rebuttal charged

that the U.N. Command was attempting

to prevent the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korea, and to intervene

in the internal affairs of the People's

Republic. This was quickly denied by

the U.N. Command, which asserted that

only airfields would be affected by the

restrictions. Roads, railroads, and other

facilities could be restored.38

On 3 December, the Communists

made the first concession. They offered

to expand their original five points to

seven. Principles 6 and 7 read as follows:

36

 Ibid., Twenty-ninth Session, 28 Nov 51.

37

 Ibid., Thirtieth Session, 29 Nov 51. 38

 Ibid., Thirty-second, Thirty-third Sessions, 30

Nov, 1, 2 Dec 51.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 125

GENERAL NAM IL and one of his staff

officers after the meeting of 27 November

1951.

6. In order to insure the stability of the

military armistice so as to facilitate the

holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall

undertake not to introduce into Korea any

military forces, weapons, and ammunition

under any pretext. 7. In order to supervise

the strict implementation of the stipulation

of paragraph 6, both sides agree to invite

representatives of nations neutral in the

Korean war to form a supervisory organ to

be responsible for conducting necessary inspection, beyond the demilitarized zone, of

such ports of entry in the rear as mutually

agreed upon by both sides, and to report

to the joint armistice commission the results of inspection.39

The new Communist proposals threw

the UNC delegation on the defensive as

they were unprepared for either the

drastic restrictions upon all military

forces and equipment or for the introduction of neutral nations to perform

the task of inspection.40 After a brief

recess they submitted a list of questions

to clarify the new points and then suggested that Item 3 be given over to a

subdelegation to work out a solution.41

While the UNC delegates explored the

implications of the Communist move,

there would be time to get new instructions from Washington.

On 4 December the enemy accepted

the UNC proposal for establishing a subdelegation and appointed Generals Lee

and Hsieh as members. Admiral Joy

named Generals Turner and Hodes.

When the subdelegation met that afternoon, Lee soon made it clear that there

would be no rotation of personnel or replenishment of equipment under the

Communist plan and that his side would

brook no interference with the reconstruction of facilities in North Korea,

The latter was a purely internal matter

and inspection was out of the question.

In the course of the next session, Lee also

revealed that the Communists had not

fully developed their concept of the organization and utilization of the neutral

nations group. Possibly three to five

nations would be invited by both sides,

Lee stated, and the neutral organ would

operate independently out of agreedupon ports of entry. As for the Military

Armistice Commission, its duties and

39

 Ibid., Thirty-fourth Session, 3 Dec 51. 40

 The term "neutral nations" was used very

loosely during the negotiations and usually meant

those nations that did not have military forces in

Korea. The United States would not recognize the

USSR as a neutral and the Communists undoubtedly would not have allowed Nationalist

China to be placed in this category. 41

 Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-fourth Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 3 Dec 51, FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III.
126 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

authority would be limited strictly to the

demilitarized zone.42

After studying the Communist's explanation of the neutral nations' role,

Joy and his staff were hopeful but cynical. They felt that a deal might be

worked out within a reasonable time.

Since they placed little faith in the

enemy's promises and thought that the

Communists would eventually find some

way to circumvent effective inspection

behind the lines anyway, the neutral

nations' solution might answer the needs

of the U.N. Command as well as a military armistice commission.43

 But until

guidance arrived from Washington, Joy

admitted that all the U.N. Command

could do was to delay and stall by asking

questions and criticizing the Communist

proposal. He urged the submission of a

UNC counterproposal to regain the

initiative: one that would insist upon

rotation and replenishment but would

create a neutral nations organization in

place of the Military Armistice Commission, would drop the claims of the

U.N. Command to retain coastal islands

north of the demarcation line after the

armistice, and also would cease to demand restrictions against rehabilitating

airfields, only against constructing new

airfields. In his opinion, this would give

the U.N. Command all that it required

and be very hard for the Communists to

refuse.44

General Ridgway agreed that the U.N.

Command had to take a stand soon or

face the prospect of an unfavorable reaction throughout the free world. On

7 December he pressed the JCS to at

least announce the points on which the

U.N. Command would not concede.

First and foremost of these, he held, was

the divorcement of the neutral nations'

inspection teams from the authority of

the Military Armistice Commission.

Differing sharply with the UNC Panmunjom delegation, Ridgway wanted to

reject categorically this portion of the

Communist proposal, since he felt its

acceptance would permit the injection

of all sorts of political matters foreign to

a military armistice.45

As no immediate answer to Ridgway's

message was forthcoming, the subdelegation continued to mark time. Two

new officers, Admiral Libby and Maj.

Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, sat in at

the 6 December meeting and thereafter

to gain familiarity with the issues and

Communist techniques. But until a new

policy was laid out, the discussion by the

UNC delegation had to be vague and

could not get down to cases.

It should not be assumed, however,

that the JCS were inactive during the

period. Policy had to be worked out

with the State Department and since

the United States was engaged in political and military conversations with the

British in early December, the Joint

Chiefs were inclined to be cautious.

Under the circumstances they preferred

not to take irrevocable positions at this

stage of the negotiations.46

42

 Transcripts of Proceedings, First and Second

Sessions, Subdelegates Mtgs on Agenda item 3,

dated 4, 5 Dec 51, in FEC Subdelegates Mtgs on

Agenda item 3, vol. I (hereafter cited as FEC

Transcripts, item 3, vol. I). 43

 Msg, HNC 521, Joy to CINCUNC, 5 Dec 51, in

FEC Msgs, Dec 51. 44

 Msg, HNC 523, Joy to CINCUNC, 6 Dec 51, in

FEC Msgs, Dec 51.

45

 Msgs, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Dec 51, DA-IN 7082

and 7121, in G-3 091 Korea, 213/3. 46

 Msg, JCS 88877, JCS to CINCFE, 5 Dec 51.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 127

By 7 December, after consultation

with Secretaries Marshall and Acheson,

the JCS had hammered out a new position and requested the President to approve it. Pointing out that there were

tour main issues at stake on Item 3, they

told the President that there could be

no shift in the UNC stand on rotation

and replenishment, since these were essential. Some concessions could be made

in permitting the rehabilitation of facilities, but any decision relating to airfields

under this concession would have to be

referred to Washington if it became the

last obstacle to an armistice. As a final

position, the JCS went on, the U.N. Command would agree to withdraw from

islands north of the demarcation line

and to the use of neutral teams of observers. However, the neutral nations

selected to provide the observers must

be mutually agreed to by both sides and

the teams must be responsible to and

subject to direction and supervision of

the Military Armistice Commission.47

At first President Truman objected

to a policy allowing the enemy to rehabilitate its roads, railroads, and other

facilities which the United States and its

allies had destroyed at great expense in

lives and matériel. But the JCS explained that there was a strong feeling,

particularly in the State Department,

that the armistice might be the only

agreement reached on Korea for a long

time and that it would be impossible to

prohibit rehabilitation over an extensive

period. Furthermore, the United States

itself intended to carry out a program

of reconstruction and rehabilitation in

South Korea. The President bowed to

these arguments and approved the new

instructions which were forwarded to

Ridgway on 11 December.48

On that same day there were indications that the week's delay in the negotiations might have been beneficial. The

U.N. Command had been constantly

urging the Communists to set up a subdelegation on Item 4 in order to exchange prisoner of war data and the

enemy finally agreed to meet that afternoon. General Lee and Colonel Tsai

would take over the negotiations on

Item 4 while General Hsieh and Colonel

Chang would carry on the discussions

on Item 3.

Later during the debate, Hsieh made

the first break in the deadlock when he

asked in a tentative fashion whether the

UNC would accept the idea of the neutral nations carrying out inspections if

the Communists gave in on the maintenance of forces and agreed that there be

a single directing head rather than two

organs supervising the armistice. Although Hsieh apparently was just probing the UNC position, there was now a

possibility of a compromise.49

Armed with the instructions from

Washington and the hint from Hsieh

that the Communists might be receptive

to a modification of their stand, the UNC

delegation presented a new package proposal on 12 December. It featured the

concession by the U.N. Command of

the islands along the coast and in territorial waters north of the demarcation

47 Msg, JCS 89114, JCS to Naval Aide USS Williamsburg, 7 Dec 51.

48

 Msg, President to JCS, 8 Dec 51, DA-IN 7586.

(2) Msg, JCS 89118, JCS to Naval Aide USS Williamsburg, 8 Dec 51. (3) Msg, JCS 89173, JCS

to CINCFE, 11 Dec 51. 49

 Transcript of Proceedings, Eighth Session, Subdelegates Mtgs on item 3, 11 Dec 51, in FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. I.
128 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

line and agreement to the concept that

the neutral nations acceptable to both

sides furnish personnel for the observer

teams. On the other hand, the Communists must permit rotation and replenishment and agree that the neutral

nations be under the Military Armistice

Commission. There was no change in

the UNC stand on airfields, and reconstruction and rehabilitation were still

forbidden. Since this was a package proposal, Turner told Hsieh that it must be

accepted in toto or not at all.50

Hsieh spent the next session attacking

the UNC plan, and Turner in turn

counterattacked. When Hsieh assailed

the rotation and replenishment principle, Turner pointed out that acceptance of the Communist view would in

effect constitute the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea since attrition

eventually would eliminate all but native troops. The enemy had agreed to

discuss this problem under Item 5 and

not Item 3, Turner maintained, scoring

a point.51

On 14 December Hsieh presented an

alternate suggestion which accepted the

UNC concessions and in return offered

to permit the U.N. Command to rotate

5,000 men a month. Turner ridiculed

the low figure. Upon further questioning, Hsieh admitted that even the 5,000

rotatees would have to be approved by

the Military Armistice Commission each

month and that the Communists could

conceivably veto any rotation if they so

desired since they would have equal

membership in this group. This made

the enemy's proposal even more unacceptable and the negotiations began to

bog down again.52

Thus, by mid-December, the Communists had shown a disposition to compromise on inspection—the issue which the

JCS and the UNC leaders had feared

might be the greatest stumbling block to

an agreement on Item 3. True, there

remained many details to be worked out

on the composition of the neutral nations organization and its duties and

relationship to the Military Armistice

Commission, but the principle, at least,

had been accepted. The enemy was also

willing to retreat from its extreme stand

against rotation provided a suitable quid

pro quo was offered. But the price for

this concession—freedom to develop and

rehabilitate airfields during an armistice

—was one that the U.N. Command was

vehemently opposed to.

General Ridgway flew to Korea on 17

December and after canvassing the members of the UNC delegation forwarded

an estimate of the situation to the JCS.

Concerned with the approach of the

thirty-day deadline on the line of demarcation, he told his superiors that an

extension, unless it was for a very short

period of time and the conclusion of the

negotiations was in sight, would have a

harmful effect upon his forces. He admitted that neither he nor his staff were

agreed upon what the Communists intentions were, but argued that the best

way to expose them lay in setting out

the UNC firm position in unequivocal

language. Warning that the time could

come when the UNC might have to face

a breaking off in the negotiations, he

felt that the decision to meet such a crisis

50

 Ibid., Ninth Session, 12 Dec 51. 51

 Ibid., Tenth Session, 13 Dec 51.

52

 Ibid., Eleventh and Twelfth Sessions, 14 and

15 Dec 51.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 129

should be readied in advance. Ridgway

especially deprecated the policy pursued

in the past of abandoning positions since

this had only tended to make the enemy

more obdurate and demanding.

Then, turning to the problems at

hand, he strongly urged that the U.N.

Command stick to its stand on airfields

and rotation. In addition, the U.N.

Command should insist upon neutral

aerial inspection and photoreconnaissance to watch the enemy's airfields and

tor free movement of neutral observer

teams throughout Korea over major lines

of communication. The tasks assigned

to the Military Armistice Commission

and the neutral observer teams should

be made mandatory so that the Communists could not block action by these

organs. In the opinion of himself and

his staff, the critical matter was airfields

and the making of an armistice might

well hinge on the acceptance or nonacceptance of this principle.53

Domestic Problems and Foreign

Pressures

After meeting with the State Department and securing Presidential approval,

the JCS replied to Ridgway the following day. The Washington leaders appreciated the fine effort that Ridgway

and the UNC delegation were making

despite many difficulties. But the consensus of official opinion held that a

political conference after the armistice

would probably be unsuccessful and consequently the armistice might be the

only agreement for some time. In that

event its character must provide for a

greater degree of permanency and the

conditions imposed must be of a type

that could be enforced over a long

period. The U.S. political and military

leaders felt that Communist violations

of the armistice would probably consist

of demonstrations, threats, and equivocations rather than renewed aggression.

And in their view the major deterrent

to another outbreak of hostilities in

Korea would be the Communist realization that further aggression would bring

full retribution. The United States was

working on a declaration to this effect

which would be signed by as many of

the United Nations participating in the

Korean War as could be persuaded; it

would be issued after the conclusion of

the armistice. The United Kingdom

had already indicated that it would support such a statement.

In the light of these considerations.

U.S. leaders preferred not to take final

positions on all the issues now under

discussion, as this would destroy the

ability of the United States to maneuver

or adjust if new elements were introduced by the Communists. Neither did

they care to establish a given point at

which the negotiations would be broken

off. Instead they listed the positions that

Ridgway and his staff should now support. Since it would be impracticable to

enforce the rehabilitation of airfields for

any length of time, they were willing to

permit some airfields, excluding those

suitable for jet operations, to be rebuilt

and maintained. As for aerial observation, this was desirable but not essential

and should not be a part of the UNC

final position. Either adequate rotation

of personnel should be authorized or as

long as there was no over-all increase in

forces, no limit at all should be fixed.

53

 Msg, HNC 588, Ridgway to JCS, 18 Dec 51,

DA-IN 11132.
130 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

In the matter of replenishment, the important issue was that there be no augmentation of combat aircraft. On this

Ridgway should be adamant. The

Washington leaders agreed that the neutral observer teams should be stationed

at the major ports of entry and have

freedom to move wherever their duties

demanded. It would not be necessary

to have all the observer teams in place

when the armistice went into effect, but

the Military Armistice Commission and

some of the teams should be on hand.

If the deadline of 27 December approached and progress was still being

made in the negotiations, Ridgway was

authorized to propose an extension of

up to fifteen days.54

The differences in approach to the

intricate task of negotiating with the

Communists were sharply delineated in

this exchange between Ridgway and his

superiors. The Far East commander and

his staff believed that continuing concessions could only indicate weakness to

the enemy and that the best course was

one of strength and firmness. Only when

the Communists realized that the U.N.

Command intended to cling steadfastly

to its principles and would yield no

more, would they get down seriously to

the business of fashioning an armistice.

The Washington leaders, on the other

hand, inclined toward a flexible approach based upon the practical necessities for a long armistice period. This

meant playing the Communist game of

shifting, adjusting, and maneuvering

for advantages and avoiding fixed positions that might precipitate a break in

the negotiations. Inherent in this approach were the hope that eventually a

reasonable and workable armistice agreement would be reached that would end

the hostilities in Korea, and the knowledge that as long as the U.N. Command

continued to be willing to negotiate, the

Communists would be forced to bear the

onus for a breaking off of the conference.

The influence of this latter consideration upon the thinking of the government in Washington was constant and

important.

For behind the American leaders the

pressure for an early solution to the

Korean War through a cease-fire and

armistice was mounting. By mid-December the desire to halt the growing

casualty lists and to free U.S. and U.N.

forces in Korea for redeployment elsewhere became stronger. As the negotiations dragged on, the allies of the United

States became more reluctant to apply

additional measures against Communist

China and disinclined to contribute

more troops to Korea. It was also evident

that as long as the war continued and

the United States poured resources into

a hot war, the flow of military assistance

to areas engaged in the cold war had to

be restricted. Influences at home and

abroad increasingly favored a minimum

settlement of the Korean War by means

of an armistice and the unification of

Korea by political means.

Since the National Security Council

recommended in December that the

United States adhere to the policy of

avoiding a general war with China and

the USSR and of seeking an acceptable

settlement in Korea that would not

jeopardize the U.S. positions regarding

Taiwan, a seat for Communist China

in the United Nations, or vis-a-vis the

Soviet Union, the chances that the

war would be broadened in the near 54

 Msg, JCS 90083, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 131

CHURCHILL IN WASHINGTON, January 1952. Left to right, front row: Secretary Acheson,

Mr. Churchill, Secretary Lovett, and Anthony Eden. Standing: Admiral Sir Roderick R.

McGrigor, W. Averell Harriman, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Sir Norman Brook, and

General Bradley.

future appeared small. The council preferred to continue the course now being

pursued—limited war and economic

pressure upon Red China backed by

the support of the majority of the

United Nations—until a satisfactory

armistice was concluded. This would

be followed by efforts to reach a

political settlement of the Korean problem, but in the meantime the ROK

Army would be strengthened and prepared to deter or repel a further attempt

by the Communists to take over South

Korea. The council was now convinced

that with proper training and equipment the ROK Army could eventually

bear the brunt of the defense of South

Korea. Only if the armistice negotiations failed, would the council consider

the additional measures of mobilization

and forms of military pressure to solve

the situation.

The NSC decision deferred the imposition of a naval blockade against
132 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

China and the extension of the air war

into Manchuria.55 And since the United

States did not feel that the United Nations would support a stricter economic

embargo on China at this time, there

seemed to be little profit in pursuing

that matter either.

Perhaps the case of the British may

serve as a graphic illustration of this

point. The British had been undergoing

a period of economic crisis since World

War II and were loathe to place additional restrictions upon their trade with

Communist China. It was natural that

they should also be concerned about the

exposed position of Hong Kong if more

pressure were to be applied against the

Chinese Communists and that they

should view the growing air strength of

the enemy's air force in Korea uneasily.

Under the circumstances they were most

anxious to limit the war to the Korean

Peninsula until a settlement could be

worked out at the truce table.56

British uncertainties over American

policy led to consultations in Washington during late December and January.

While British military leaders discussed

the implications of broadening U.N.

action against Communist China with

their American counterparts at the military level, Prime Minister Winston

Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden conferred with President

Truman and his advisors.

Fundamentally, divergencies in policy

stemmed from the attitudes of the two

countries toward Communist China and

Nationalist China. Since the British

had recognized the former and established trade relations, they were inclined

to regard the new regime as a permanent

one. The United States, on the other

hand, felt that as long as Communist

China remained aggressive and showed

no signs of changing its attitude toward

the West, there was no point in according the Communists the advantages that

recognition would entail, such as a seat

in the United Nations or formal trade

relations. Besides, the United States had

certain obligations toward Chiang Kaishek and the Taiwan government, which

it could not easily avoid. Since the

United States acknowledged the economic interests of the British in the Far

East, the U.S. policy planners felt that

the British must in turn realize that the

United States must bear the major responsibility for the area and supply the

power to meet this responsibility.57

Although the conferences produced no

changes in either British or American

policy, the two countries were able to

reassure each other. Neither desired an

extension of the Korean War and so long

as there was no collapse of negotiations,

their differences in regard to Communist

China could be adjusted. What might

happen if the enemy did not agree to

an armistice or breached it was also discussed, but since the United States had

not reached a firm decision on an alternate course of action, no positive information could be given to the British.58

Actually there seemed to be little

choice for the United States unless the

situation altered. For those who still believed that a military decision in Korea

was either desirable or necessary to settle

55

 JCS 2004/46, 13 Dec 51, title: Method of Curtailment of Wartime Trade with Communist China. 56

 JCS 1776/272, 27 Dec 51, title: Korea.

57

 JCS 2118/28, 28 Dec 51, title: Divergence of

U.S. and British Policies Respecting China. 58

 Msg, 130305, State Dept to SCAP, 13 Jan 52,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, G-3 sec., an. 4, pt.

III, tab 15.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 133

GENERAL COLLINS

the conflict, even if it meant taking on

Communist China, General Bolté, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, had some

sobering counsel at the end of December.

He told Assistant Secretary of the Army

Karl R. Bendetsen that the United

States had no certain current military

capability for reaching a favorable decision in the Far East and no knowledge

of how long it would take to acquire

such a capability. Only by a drastic

change in the global strategy of the

United States or through an all-out

mobilization of national resources could

the military capability be immediately

increased. As Bolté pointed out, the first

course might cause great danger to the

national security and the second would

create grave economic problems. Either

might play directly into the hands of the

Soviet Union.59

From General Ridgway came confirmation of Bolté's position. In commenting upon the apparent willingness of the

U.S. policy makers to rely upon a postarmistice U.N. declaration threatening

a spread of the war if the Communists

made a truce and then broke it, he stated

frankly that: ".. . conscience compels

me to reiterate my conviction that with

presently available military forces this

command would be incapable of imposing a threat to Communist China

sufficient in itself to deter it from renewed aggression."60

But, as General Collins pointed out to

the JCS on 10 January, the very fact

that the proposed U.N. declaration did

not necessarily restrict a future outbreak

of hostilities to Korea posed a new set

of circumstances. Under the recent

NSC decision the ROK forces would be

increased, trained, and equipped to assume the responsibility for the defense

of their own territory. Depending upon

conditions at the time, the United States

might or might not intervene again in

Korea if the Communists violated an

armistice agreement. In any event the

JCS informed Ridgway that he would

prepare only contingency plans for U.S.

intervention.61

As long as the negotiations continued,

however, the prospects for increasing the

U.S. effort in Korea appeared forlorn.

The shift foreshadowed by the National

Security Council action was toward a

gradual disengagement provided that a 59

 Memo, Bolté for Asst Secy Army (Gen Mgmt) ,

28 Dec 51, sub: Comments on Memo . . . Asst Secy

Army (Gen Mgmt), in G-3 091 Korea, 348/24. 60

 Msg, CX 61348, Ridgway to JCS. 13 Jan 52,

DA-IN 19740.

61

 (1) Memo, Collins for JCS, 10 Jan 52, sub:

Renewed U.S. Intervention in Korea . . . , in G-3

091 Korea 3. (2) Msg, DA-93080. G-3 to CINCFE,

27 Jan 52.
134 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

truce could be arranged. But meantime the Joint Chiefs were faced with the

problem of sustaining the present rate

of military build-up until the world

situation improved. Whether the President or Congress would be receptive to

further augmentation of the armed forces

while the stalemate in Korea remained

unbroken was still a moot question.

With the action on the battlefield still

at a low ebb and with little hope of

accelerating the pace, the sharpest

clashes took place over the conference

table. The airfield question limited

agreement on Item 3 and a new battle

was about to break out over the disposition of prisoners of war.
CHAPTER VII

Prisoners of War

On the surface the problem of prisoners of war seemed simple. The United

States was a signatory to the Geneva

Convention of 1949 although it had not

ratified the convention when the war

began. The North Korean Foreign

Minister had declared shortly after the

outbreak of war in 1950 that his government would abide by its stipulations.

Since the opening sentence of Article

118 of the convention clearly stated:

"Prisoners of war shall be released and

repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities," there seemed little

reason for dispute. Yet difficulties arose

at the outset of the discussions on the

exchange of prisoners and steadily

mounted as the issue became surcharged

with emotional elements. A series of

conflicts broke out between the rights of

the individual and those of the majority,

between human rights and legal rights,

and between humanitarianism and Communist Party pride. As the controversy

became very involved, a glance at the

contributing factors would appear to be

in order.

Voluntary Repatriation

Early in its history the United States

had come into contact with the principle

of voluntary repatriation or the right of

each individual prisoner to choose

whether he wanted to return home or

not. At the close of the Revolutionary

War the Treaty of Paris of 1783 had

simply stated: "All prisoners on both

sides shall be set at liberty. . . ." Thousands of British and German soldiers

decided to stay in the new country and

to live under the new form of government rather than go back to Europe.1

But this experience had been the exception to the rule. The common practice was to exchange all prisoners of war

at the end of a conflict. When the 1929

Geneva Convention was fashioned, compulsory repatriation was taken for

granted since it was generally accepted

that the great majority of prisoners

would wish to return home as soon as a

war was finished. World War II added a

new chapter to the handling of prisoners

of war when the Soviet Union retained

large numbers of German and Japanese

prisoners for a long period after the war

to assist in the rehabilitation of the

USSR. Perhaps to prevent a recurrence

of this action, the delegates to the Geneva Conference in 1949 strengthened

the article dealing with repatriation. It

became a flat statement prescribing

quick and compulsory repatriation.2

1

 See Lt. Col. George G. Lewis and Capt. John

Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization by

the United States Army, 1776-1945, DA Pamphlet

20-213, June 1955, p. 20. 2

 DA Pamphlet No. 20-150, October 1950, Geneva

Convention of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of

War Victims, Article 118, p. 129.
136 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

But in their zeal to protect the right of

each prisoner to return home swiftly,

the delegates ignored the other side of

the coin. They failed to incorporate escape provisions to cover the possible

exceptions—the prisoners who might be

afraid to go back, those who had fallen

out of sympathy with their national

regimes, and those who preferred the

ways of their captors.

The omission was soon revealed by

the Korean War. The Communists,

however, did not allow a scrap of paper

to deprive them of an advantage. As

soon as they began to accumulate prisoners in mid-1950, they set about reeducating and incorporating as many as

possible of the former ROK soldiers into

the Korean People's Army. When the

United Nations Command turned the

tables after the Inch'on landing in September 1950, no such easy solution was

permissible. Respecting the provisions

of the Geneva Convention, the UNC sent

its ever-increasing bag of prisoners, military and civilian, back to the stockades

and faithfully reported the names to the

International Committee of the Red

Cross (ICRC). It was inevitable that

some of the ex-ROK soldiers should fall

into UNC hands and many of them now

claimed that they had been impressed

into the Communist forces. This was the

initial complication.

When the Chinese entered the war in

late 1950, another element was added.

For among the Chinese troops were

many quondam members of the Nationalist armies of Chiang Kai-shek.

During the civil war there had been

wholesale desertions and surrenders and

the Communists had taken the former

Nationalists into their military organization en masse. Disaffection was widespread in their ranks and once they had

become prisoners of the UNC, many

soon demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm

for a return to Communist control.3

As the number of enemy prisoners

mounted and their composition grew

more complex, the problem of their ultimate disposition came to the fore. On

the eve of the opening of the truce negotiations in July, Brig. Gen. Robert A.

McClure, Army Chief of Psychological

Warfare, voiced his concern over the possible fate of the former Nationalist soldiers in the event of an armistice. Many

of these men, he told General Collins,

claimed that they were forced to join

the Communist army. If they were now

compelled to return, they might well be

faced with heavy punishment or even execution because they had surrendered to

the U.N. Command. To forestall this

McClure presented a clever, if somewhat debatable solution. Since the bulk

of the ex-Nationalist prisoners would

probably elect to go to Taiwan if they

were given a choice and since it could be

officially considered a part of China, he

urged the repatriation of the group to

Taiwan. In this fashion the United

States would avoid the experience of

World War II when it had consented to

the forcible repatriation of prisoners to

the Soviet Union. At the same time,

McClure went on, future psychological

warfare operations would be strengthened since if enemy soldiers were confident that they would not be repatriated,

they would be more likely to surrender.4

The McClure approach deserved fur3

 Msg, C 67842, CINCFE to CINCUNC (Adv), 28

Jul 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 1, 44. 4

 Memo, McClure for CofS, 5 Jul 51, sub: Policy

on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners, in

G-3 383.6, 4.
PRISONERS OF WAR 137

ther consideration, in Collins' opinion,

and he submitted it in expanded form

to the JCS on 6 July. Although the

United States had not ratified the Geneva Convention, Collins and the Army

Judge Advocate General felt that it was

committed to the principles expressed

therein. On the other hand, the Chief

of Staff thought that provided adequate

safeguards for the protection and safe

return of UNC prisoners were arranged,

General Ridgway could repatriate all

Chinese prisoners claiming Nationalist

sympathies to Taiwan on the technical

ground that it was still part of China.

Collins was willing to go even further.

If it could be accomplished without prejudice to the rapid recovery of UNC prisoners, he suggested that no Chinese or

North Korean prisoners should be forced

to go back to Communist-controlled territory without their full consent.5

While the Taiwan proposition complied with the letter of the Geneva Convention and could be defended, the

voluntary repatriation concept advocated

by the Chief of Staff was clearly at variance with the provisions of the convention. General Ridgway, when asked for

his comments, was quick to point this

out. The adoption of voluntary repatriation at this time, Ridgway declared,

might establish a precedent that would

work to the disadvantage of the United

States in future wars. In addition, the

Communists might make use of this

breach of the convention to formulate

adverse propaganda and influence the

borderline countries not yet committed

to communism. Despite these disadvantages, Ridgway felt that the concept had

definite merit.6

Further support for voluntary repatriation came from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the senior advisory

group to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but

the committee recommended that since

the problem transcended military considerations, it should be handled on a

higher governmental level. Final approval, the committee concluded, should

come from the General Assembly of the

United Nations. General Jenkins, the

Army G-3, disagreed strongly, for he felt

that giving the matter to the General

Assembly would result in no decision at

all on the basic policy. His arguments

won over the JCS and General Collins

was instructed to inform Ridgway that

he could develop a UNC position for

planning purposes based on the principle

of voluntary repatriation.7

During the long recess over the incidents at Kaesong, there was a gradual

change within the Defense Department.

Robert A. Lovett, who succeeded General Marshall on 17 September as Secretary of Defense, keynoted this shift.

Referring to the instructions of 30 June

to Ridgway on prisoner of war exchange,

he declared that the Communists might

not consent to negotiate on a one-for-one

basis and might well insist upon an allfor-all agreement.8

 This possibility immediately cast a pall over the doctrine of

voluntary repatriation, for the primary

consideration was to secure the speedy

return of all UNC prisoners. In a one5

 Memo, CofS U.S. Army for JCS, 6 Jul 51, sub:

Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K

Prisoners, in G-3 383.6, 4.

6

 Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul 51, DA-IN 17240. 7

 (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 7 Aug 51, sub:

Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K.

Prisoners, in G-3 383.6, 4/4. (2) Msg, DA-99024,

G-3 to CINCFE, 15 Aug 51. 8

 Memo, Lovett for JCS, 25 Sep 51, no sub, incl to

JCS 2095/5.
138 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

for-one exchange, the UNC could easily

have held back the enemy prisoners who

did not want to return to the Communists until all the UNC prisoners were

turned over. An all-for-all agreement

would void this plan completely.

General Jenkins reflected the new climate of opinion in early October when

he counseled the Chief of Staff to accept the Lovett argument that the UNC

should be ready to agree to an all-for-all

exchange if the enemy refused to deal

on any other basis. Since Ridgway's armistice instructions were about to be revised in preparation for the resumption

of the truce talks and since voluntary

repatriation was contrary to the Geneva

Convention anyway, the Army G-3 did

not think that the principle should be

reaffirmed. Collins and his JCS colleagues agreed.9

This appeared to be the end of voluntary repatriation. In Tokyo General

Ridgway had also shifted his ground.

Unless there were a one-for-one exchange, he told the JCS, he did not see

how he could hold back the prisoners

unwilling to be repatriated. The United

Nations Command had avoided the subject of nonrepatriation in its psychological warfare program and had not offered

asylum to the Communist soldiers. Instead it had promised food, medical care,

and good treatment to all, plus permission to the North Koreans to return

home as soon as practicable. And to the

Chinese troops, it had proffered the

chance to save their lives.10

Although voluntary repatriation was

now de-emphasized, some progress was

made on the reclassification of prisoners

held in the UNC camps. Among the

thousands of men captured by the

United Nations Command, there were

many who claimed South Korean residence. These fell into five general

classes: 1. Volunteers from civilian status

who joined the North Korean forces;

2. Personnel impressed into North Korean military units from civilian life;

3. ROKA personnel captured and impressed into the enemy army; 4. ROKA

personnel mistakenly taken into custody

while in a straggler status; and 5. "Innocent bystanders" who joined prisoner

of war groups or broke into the stockades

to get fed or were picked up on suspicion

of being North Korean soldiers in civilian clothes. Both the Far East Command

Provost Marshal General and Judge Advocate General felt that only classes 2

and 5 could be properly reclassified as civilian internees; the others should be

held.11

There were then about 40,000 South

Koreans in UNC custody who had earlier

been impressed into the North Korean

Army, according to Ridgway's estimates,

and with JCS approval he began to reclassify members of this group as civilian

internees. He intended to parole individuals from this category acceptable to

the ROK Government to local officials

gradually when the situation seemed opportune.12

9

 (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 9 Oct 51, sub:

Policy on Repatriation . . . , in G-3 383.6, 4/9. (2)

Decision on JCS 2095/7, 12 Oct 51. 10

 Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Oct 51, DA-IN 12414.

(2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 15 Nov 51, DA-IN 15530.

(3) JCS 2095/8, 9 Nov 51, title: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners.

11

 Memo, Lt Col D. T. Hamersley, SGS, for Asst

CofS G-1 FEC, 8 Nov 51, sub: Investigation and

Release of ROKA Personnel in UN POW Enclosures, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jul-31 Dec 51. 12

 (1) JCS 2095/8, 9 Nov 51, title: Policy on

Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners. (2)

Memo, Collins for Secy Defense, 15 Nov 51, same

sub, in G-3 383.6, 4/14.
PRISONERS OF WAR 139

After discussion of Item 3 began in

late November, Ridgway submitted his

proposed approach to the prisoner of

war problem to the JCS on the 28th.

Before he would enter into substantive

matters, he intended to insist upon delivery of names, numbers, and locations

of all UNC prisoners held by the enemy.

Initially he would attempt to secure a

one-for-one exchange. If this were successful, the U.N. Command could withhold the prisoners it desired. If, on the

other hand, the enemy refused, he would

agree to an all-for-all exchange, even

though it meant turning over suspected

war criminals, intelligence prospects, soldiers who had aided the U.N. Command,

and individuals who did not want to

go back.13

Faced with the immediate problem of

deciding whether or not to sacrifice the

unwilling repatriates, the JCS again debated the question without reaching a

solution. Torn between their natural

concern for the safety of the UNC prisoners and their humanitarian desire not

to force enemy prisoners to return to

the Communists, they could see no sure

method of safeguarding both groups. As

a suggestion they informed Ridgway that

he might try to secure an agreement providing for the screening of all prisoners

by joint teams prior to their release.

If, during the screening, a prisoner did

not wish to be repatriated, he could remain under the jurisdiction of his captor.

But there were frank indications that the

JCS did not put a great deal of faith in

the possible success of this maneuver

since they told both the Secretary of Defense and Ridgway that they would welcome any suggestion for resolving the

question. In the meantime they authorized the U.N. Commander to go ahead

on the basis of his 28 November proposal.14

By the time the subdelegation on Item

4 opened its meetings on 11 December,

the principle of voluntary repatriation

was placed in a strange position—neither

in nor out of UNC planning. To the

JCS and to Ridgway it was a desirable

objective that should be attained, but no

one was sure if or how it could be won.

On the other hand, there seemed to be

no overriding reason for adhering to the

concept in the event the Communists

balked or showed a disposition to withhold the UNC prisoners in retaliation.

As the talks began, the fate of voluntary

repatriation appeared to depend mainly

upon future Communist actions and reactions in handling the prisoner of war

problem.

The Period of Reconnaissance

The repeated efforts of the UNC delegation to initiate discussions on Item 4

concurrently with those on Item 3 finally

bore fruit on 11 December when the

Communists agreed to hold a subdelegation meeting that afternoon. Across the

conference table the familiar faces of

Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho and Col. Tsai

Cheng-wen indicated that the enemy

had assigned two of its ablest negotiators

to the task. On the UNC side, Rear

Adm. Ruthven E. Libby, who had just

replaced Admiral Burke officially, and

Col. George W. Hickman, Jr., USA, were

13

 Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 28 Nov 51, DA-IN

3785.

14

 (1) Decision on JCS 2095/10, 4 Dec 51, Policy

on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners.

(2) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 7 Dec 51, sub: Proposed Dispatch to CINCFE in Regard to PW's, in

G-3 383-6, 5. (3) Msg, JCS 89172, JCS to CINCFE,

10 Dec 51.
140 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

chosen to match wits with the Communists. Libby was a fiery sea dog with a

salty tongue who had no difficulty in

coping with the best or the worst that the

enemy had to offer. He combined quickness of mind, common sense, and spirit

in an admirable blend and made an ideal

negotiator for dealing with the Communists. Colonel Hickman was intelligent and capable, experienced in staff

work, and provided added balance to the

UNC team.15

After the credentials were presented,

General Lee made the opening move.

The prisoner of war issue could be settled very quickly, he declared, if all

POW's were released and allowed to go

home after the armistice. Provided that

the conferees could agree upon this principle, Lee thought that everything else

fell into the category of details and could

be straightened out without too much

trouble. But since, the UNC delegation

was not authorized to start the substantive discussions until the enemy furnished current lists of prisoners, Libby

ignored the Communist gambit. Instead

he pressed for the exchange of POW information and for permission for the

International Committee of the Red

Cross representatives to visit the prisoner

of war camps. In the preliminary

sparring that followed, Libby hinted

that the UNC general position on

POWs was fashioned around a fair and

equitable exchange of prisoners along

with suitable supervision to insure

that they received humane treatment

and comfort until they were repatriated.

Naturally, Libby told Lee, the U.N.

Command desired to establish a priority

for the transfer of sick and wounded

prisoners.

Lee was interested in probing the significance of some of the vague terms that

Libby had used in setting forth the

UNC approach, but the admiral was not

ready to get down to specifics at this

stage. All that Lee found out was that

a "fair and equitable exchange" meant

that neither side should gain an undue

military advantage over the other if hostilities resumed before a final peace settlement was concluded.16

After the first session was over, Admiral Joy informed Ridgway that it appeared that the Communists were going

to support an all-for-all exchange and

would oppose a one-for-one trade no matter how it might be modified.17

 At the

moment, however, Ridgway was interested in supporting the visits of ICRC

representatives to the camps and he was

trying to marshal strong backing from

his superiors. The latter were quite willing to have the U.N. Command secure

such a concession from the enemy, but

did not want the visits to become an

issue.18

The next few days were spent in exploring and establishing the lines of battle. Libby concentrated his comments

on the failure of the Communists to observe the Geneva Convention. Although

the North Koreans had promised to comply with the Geneva rules in 1950, they

had reported only no names of prison15

 Hickman later became the Army Judge Advocate General.

16

 Transcript of Proceedings, First Session, Subdelegation on item 4, 11 Dec 51, in FEC Subdelegation Mtgs, item 4, 11-25 Dec 51 (hereafter cited

as FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. I). 17

 Msg, HNC 541, Joy to CINCUNC, 11 Dec 51, in

FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 349. 18

 (1) Msg, CX 59155. Ridgway to JCS, 11 Dec

51. (2) Msg, JCS 89474, JCS to CINCFE, 12 Dec

51. Both in FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 349.
PRISONERS OF WAR 141

ers taken during the early fighting and

then ceased. The United Nations Command had been obliged to gather later

POW information via Communist news

media and radio broadcasts. Before the

general problem of prisoners could be

discussed intelligently, Libby maintained, the U.N. Command would have

to know the names, locations, and nationalities of all the prisoners in enemy

custody. He also reminded General Lee

that the convention also provided for the

visits of ICRC teams.

Lee was nothing loath to use the convention for his base of argument. The

only difference was that he had his own

favorite articles. First and foremost was

Article 118 supporting all-for-all repatriation on a compulsory basis. There was

no doubt of the Communist hostility to

any suggestion of a one-for-one exchange

and Lee sought doggedly to determine

whether the U.N. Command intended

to insist upon this. Despite Libby's successful evasion of debate, the enemy's

position was very clear. On 12 December

Lee followed up with a definite proposal

featuring the acceptance by both sides

of the all-for-all principle. Once this was

conceded, the Communists were willing

to provide POW lists and to carry out

the actual transfer of prisoners at Panmunjom. They remained adamantly opposed to any visits by ICRC representatives, however, and Lee made it plain

that these were " out of the question."

 19

In the absence of substantive discussions, the mid-December meetings were

frequently devoted to assaults upon the

opponent's position. Occasionally there

was a lighter moment. Since the Communists admitted that the POW data

were necessary yet refused to release

them, Libby accused the Communists of

wanting to take a bath without soap or

water. Lee promptly retorted that they

were ready with soap and water, but the

U.N. Command would not get into the

tub. The most important thing, Lee

claimed, was to free the prisoners and

not to worry too much about giving each

other lists.20 In any case both sides

seemed eager to take the other to the

cleaners; the big problem was to settle

which one would be cleaned.

The Communists agreed to furnish

POW data on 18 December. A four-day

recess followed to allow both sides to

check the information. For the U.N.

Command the lists submitted by the

enemy proved to be a definite disappointment. During the first months of

the war, the Communists had reported

via news releases and radio broadcasts

the capture of over 65,000 prisoners.

Yet their lists showed that they now held

only 7,142 ROK soldiers and 4,417 U.N.

personnel, or a total of 11,559 prisoners.21

 Since the ROK Army carried over

88,000 men missing in action and the

United States over 11,500 in the same

category, the discrepancy was particularly large. The disparity was even

more striking when compared with the

UNC record. Out of 188,000 men listed

as missing by the Communists, the U.N.

Command held over 132,000 prisoners of

war and in addition had another 37,000

recently reclassified as civilian internees.

When the first shock over the small

19

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Second and Fourth

Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 12 and 14 Dec

51, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. I.

20

 Ibid., Fifth Session, 15 Dec 51. 21

 The UNC POW list was broken down as follows: 3,198 U.S.; 234 Turkish; 10 French; 1 Dutch;

40 Filipino; 1 Greek; 4 South African; 919 U.K.;

6 Australian; 1 Canadian; and 3 "Japanese." The

Japanese later proved to be U.S. citizens.
142 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

number of names listed by the Communists wore off, Admiral Joy and Ridgway decided to send a cold and factual

letter to the enemy leaders requesting

an explanation. Until they received an

answer, the UNC delegation would attack the all-for-all plan and probe the

enemy position fully. It would present

no counterproposal.22

The Communists were not entirely

satisfied with the United Nations lists

either. When the meetings resumed on

22 December, General Lee charged that

there were shortages of 44,259 names on

one list and 1,456 on another. Libby

explained that the bulk of the missing

persons consisted of former residents of

the Republic of Korea who had been

taken prisoner under suspicious or hostile circumstances. During the spring of

1951 the U.N. Command had thoroughly

screened its prisoners and discovered that

a large number of them had been caught

in the flow of war or had been impressed

into the North Korean armed forces.

Prisoners in these categories had been

separated from those who had voluntarily joined the Communists and 37,000

had been reclassified as civilian internees. In addition, Libby went on, the

U.N. Command was in the process of

screening another 16,000 prisoners who

had proven to be ROK citizens and these

would not be repatriated either.

Branding Libby's arguments "cute and

strange," Lee quickly protested this unilateral action. It was not the place of

residence but the army in which a man

served that determined whether he

should be repatriated or not, Lee maintained.

Libby declined to debate the point

and instead counterattacked in another

quarter. Just how, he asked, did the

Communists propose to justify the exchange of some ten thousand prisoners

held by them for the hundred-odd thousand in UNC possession? Reminding

Lee that General Hsieh in the Item 3

discussions had clearly stated that there

should be no increase of military forces

after the armistice, Libby charged that

an all-for-all swap would add the equivalent of ten divisions to the Communist

forces. Then, turning to the POW lists,

he requested that Lee explain why only

7,142 ROK soldiers were included when

the enemy had claimed that they had

captured tens of thousands.23

From intelligence reports and POW

interviews, the U.N. Command was well

aware that the North Koreans had incorporated a large number of former

ROK Army personnel into the Communist armed forces. Although the prospects for their return were not bright,

Joy and Ridgway agreed that the UNC

negotiators would at least attempt to get

them back.24 At the same time the demand for the onetime ROK Army members would serve as a counterweight to

the enemy's request for the return of the

37,000 reclassified civilian internees.

Admiral Libby pressed the attack during the holiday meetings. He told Lee

that the Communists had not reported

all the prisoners that they held. This

drew a hot denial from his opposite.

22

 (1) Msgs, HNC 605 and 607, Joy to CINCUNC,

20 and 21 Dec 51, in FEC Messages, Dec 51. (2)

Msg, C 59779, Ridgway to CINCUNC (Adv), 21

Dec 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 385.

23

 Transcript of Proceedings, Ninth Session, Subdelegation on item 4, 22 Dec 51, in FEC Mtgs on

item 4, vol. I. 24

 Msg, HNC 618, Joy to CINCUNC, 22 Dec 51, in

FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 396.
PRISONERS OF WAR 143

The lists were small, Lee declared, because his side had re-educated and released thousands of prisoners at the

front. If this were true, Libby swiftly

rejoined, why had only 177 returned to

the UNC lines. He believed that the

lists were small because so many ROK

soldiers had been forced to join the Communist army. This was not so, Lee maintained, only volunteers were allowed to

become members of their forces.25

During this exploratory period much

of the wrangling centered about the apparent inability of either side to furnish

the other with accurate information.

The discrepancies between the numbers

missing in action and those reported as

prisoners by the Communists made the

UNC delegation question the sincerity

of the enemy lists. But the UNC was

not blameless, since it had submitted

more names of prisoners to the International Committee of the Red Cross at

Geneva than it now had on hand. As it

turned out, more than 2,000 POW's had

been sent through the processing line

twice and the later lack of co-operation

shown by many Communist soldiers in

providing identifying information had

made it difficult to correct errors. Other

enemy prisoners had escaped or disappeared, increasing the inconsistencies in

the UNC figures. Recognizing the vulnerability of the UNC position as long

as the variances persisted. Joy requested

a complete audit of all POW's so that he

could present an up-to-date, accurate,

and complete list to the enemy.26

While this census was going on, Joy

hoped to collect more information on the

attitudes of the Chinese and North Korean prisoners toward repatriation and

to find out how strongly the ROK Government felt about the recovery of ROK

civilians in enemy custody.27 Behind this

search for knowledge lay the case for

voluntary repatriation. Without an estimate of the numbers of enemy POW's

who would refuse repatriation or of the

reaction of the ROK officials toward the

principle, the U.N. Command could

place itself in an awkward and exposed

position.

As the New Year began, Admiral

Libby brought up the civilian internee

question. Although this was a delicate

matter, more political than military,

General Lee had demonstrated at an

earlier meeting that his side was not

opposed to its inclusion. In the course

of the discussion that followed the sides

agreed that after the armistice was

signed displaced civilians would be allowed to go to the area of their choice.

Libby pressed his advantage. Since the

military commanders would have the

task of supervising the movement of

the civilians, he argued successfully that

the agreement should be written into the

armistice stipulations.

Once this matter was settled, Libby

was ready to present the first UNC substantive proposal. There were three major areas of disagreement to be resolved,

he began. Both parties wanted all of the

prisoners released, but the U.N. Command wished to do this under an equitable formula. Secondly, there was the 25

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Tenth through

Seventeenth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4,

23-30 Dec 51, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vols. I and

II.

26

 Msg. HNC 682, Joy to CINCUNC, 30 Dec 51, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, G-3 Jnl, 30 Dec

51, tab J-8.

27

 (1) Msg, HNC 619, CINCUNC (Adv) to CG

EUSAK (Main), 22 Dec 51. (2) Msg, HNC 629

CINCUNC (Adv) to American Embassy Pusan, for

Muccio, 23 Dec 51. Both in FEC Msgs Dec 51.
144 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

disposition of the ex-ROK soldiers who

had been impressed into the North Korean Army. The United Nations Command desired all in this category returned to POW status. And lastly, there

was the question of what standards to

use in determining to which side a prisoner belonged: the UNC claimed that

the place of residence should be the deciding factor and the Communists maintained that the army in which a man

served when captured should establish

his nationality.

The U.N. Command proposed to solve

these differences, Libby continued, by a

fair compromise. It would accept the

concept advanced and advocated by the

Communists that a soldier who becomes

a prisoner can, upon his "release," exercise his individual option as to whether

he will return to his own army or join

the other side. The UNC wished to extend this principle to all prisoners, military and civilian. To supervise the interviews of the prisoners, Libby suggested

the ICRC. All POWs in excess of the

one-for-one exchange would be paroled

and could not fight against their captor

again. None of those who refused repatriation would be allowed to bear arms

against the other side, Libby concluded.28

It was neatly done. Since the Communists had permitted the ROK troops

captured in the early stages of the war

to join the North Korean forces or to

choose release at the front, they had

practiced voluntary repatriation. At that

time it had been to their advantage to

swell their ranks and to lighten the burden of guarding large numbers of prisoners. Now this policy was being turned

against them. They had provided the

United Nations Command with a propaganda lever and with only a comparatively small bag of prisoners to bargain

with, the Communists were placed at a

distinct disadvantage. If a large proportion of the prisoners in UNC hands refused to return to communism, the

adverse publicity would be hard to combat, no matter how it was rationalized.

Unusual as the doctrine of voluntary

repatriation might be, its humanitarian

aspects were bound to appeal to a large

part of the world. Only on legal grounds

could the principle be freely attacked

and whether this would be successful in

the face of world opinion was a matter

for conjecture.

Obversely, the United States and its

allies were now officially linked with voluntary repatriation. Although it was in

the nature of trial marriage, the possibility existed that once public opinion

had been marshaled in its support divorce might prove to be out of the question.

The Communists Reject Voluntary

Repatriation

The first reaction of the Communists

to the UNC proposal of 2 January was

not unexpected. On the following morning Lee led the assault. Calling the plan

"absurd," he insisted that it was a onefor-one exchange. In his complete rejection of the proposal, Lee waxed eloquent. "The release and repatriation

of prisoners of war is not a trade of

slaves," he charged, nor was the twentieth century "the barbarous age of slavery." He paid no attention to Libby's

explanations nor to the admiral's barbed

references to the inconsistencies of the

28

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Nineteenth and

Twentieth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 1-2

Jun 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. II.
PRISONERS OF WAR 145

Communist position in attacking a policy

that they themselves had introduced in

the Korean War.29

But Libby was not easily put off. He

twitted Lee for his concern over the possible defection of the Chinese Communist soldiers. After all, he reminded Lee,

the Chinese troops were all volunteers

according to the enemy's own avowals

and part of "an army composed entirely

of men eager to fight for the Korean People's Army." If this were true, Libby

went on, he could not understand why

the Communists were worried about any

of these volunteers not wanting to go

back home. When Lee refused to rise

to this bait, and persisted in branding

the UNC proposal a slave trade, Libby

became ironic. "Your analysis is faulty,

your arguments are specious, and your

conclusions are wrong," he told Lee,

"outside of that it was a nice piece of

work."30

Despite the spirited accusations of the

Communists, Admiral Joy detected a ray

of hope behind the façade. He noted

that although they had termed the UNC

proposal too unreasonable to discuss,

they had soon begun to argue its

merits.31

In the subdelegation meetings, Admiral Libby tried to dispel some of the

hostility of General Lee by careful explanation of the UNC proposal of 2 January. But the detailed statements had

little effect upon the Communist delegate. As January wore on, Lee became

more abusive in his attacks and Libby

had to rebuke him several times for his

slurring remarks about Syngman Rhee,

Chiang Kai-shek, and the United Nations Command.32

It did no good to point out the incongruities of the Communist opposition to

voluntary repatriation after they had introduced and practiced the principle.

Lee had no hesitation in accusing the

U.N. Command of educating the POW's

politically to influence their choice even

though he had admitted at an earlier

meeting that the Communists had reeducated many UNC prisoners and then

released them at the front. On the other

hand, even Lee could see the somewhat

distorted humor in his own arguments

at times. At the meeting on 11 January

as he defended the Communist system

of prisoner education and called it righteous and benevolent, he become so convulsed with laughter that he could

scarcely finish his remarks.33

When Libby charged that the North

Koreans had impressed thousands of

ROK soldiers into their army, Lee denied it vehemently. He asserted with a

straight face that only volunteers could

serve in the Communist forces. And despite the fact that the enemy had violated

the Geneva Convention many times since

the war began, the Communists extracted the last measure of benefit in

propaganda and argument from the

provisions that favored their own positions and blithely ignored the rest.34

There was little progress made on

Item 4 during mid-January. The efforts

29

 Ibid., Twenty-first Session, 3 Jan 52. 30

 Ibid., Twenty-second and Twenty-third Sessions, 4-5 Jan 52. 31

 Msgs, HNC 715 and 716, Joy to CINCUNC, 4

Jan 52, in FEC Msgs, Jan 52.

32

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Twenty-fourth and

Twenty-fifth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4,

6-7 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. II. 33

 Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations

(Jul 51-May 52), vol. 2, ch. III, p. 50. 34

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Twenty-sixth and

Thirty-first Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 8 and

13 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vols. II and III.
146 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

of Admiral Libby to indicate the advantages that would accrue to the Communists if they accepted the UNC proposals

were regarded with deep suspicion by

General Lee. He reminded Libby that

the U.N. Command was not doing any

favors for the Communists and could not

without betraying its own cause and interest.35

 When Libby confirmed the

Communist apprehension that the Chinese POW's would be allowed to choose

between Communist China and Nationalist China, Colonel Tsai became very

agitated. The Chinese people, he declared, "will never tolerate it and will

fight to the end,"

 36

 Under questioning,

Tsai refused to state whether he was

speaking for the Chinese Volunteers in

Korea or all the Chinese people.

In view of the static condition of the

negotiations, General Ridgway requested that the JCS approve a final

position for the UNC delegation. But

all that the JCS could provide was a

quasi-final position. On 15 January they

authorized Ridgway to agree to an allfor-all exchange provided that no forceful return of POW's would be required.

However, since this position would be

taken only as a last resort and since public pressure might influence the President to modify this stand in the interim,

there was in reality nothing conclusive

to the JCS instructions. The UNC delegation was to continue its attempts to

secure an agreement on the return of

selected U.N. and ROK civilians held by

the Communists. To convince the enemy that the U.N. Command was not

using voluntary repatriation as a pretext

for holding on to most of the prisoners

the possibility was suggested that Ridgway might conduct, under ICRC supervision, a poll of the POW's to discover

the approximate number desiring repatriation. It was also proposed that at the

proper moment Ridgway might transfer

the POW problem back to the plenary

conference and present a trade to the

enemy—the U.N. Command conceding

on the airfield issue while the Communists agreed to the UNC prisoner proposal.37

 This was the first indication of

the package deal that was to be drawn

up in April.

In his reply on 19 January the U.N.

commander agreed that it might be possible to combine unresolved issues once

these could be reduced to a minimum.

He did not favor a poll of the prisoners

since he believed that one of the strongest points of the UNC proposal was that

the POW choice would be expressed at

the exchange point in the presence of

representatives of both sides and of neutral observers. As the UNC delegation

had denied the existence of any program

to influence or coerce the decision of the

POW's, the Communists might very well

seize upon the poll as a means of prejudicing the prisoners' choice and refuse to

accept the results. If the International

Committee of the Red Cross conducted

the poll, the enemy would have further

cause to impugn its neutrality. There

was little doubt that the Communists

already regarded the ICRC as a UNC

agent and not as a neutral body anyway.

Besides, Ridgway concluded, he and his

staff did not think that the enemy had

any real concern about the numbers of

prisoners who might return to them, "it

35 is the principle which is anathema to

 Ibid., Thirty-second Session, 14 Jan 52, in FEC

Mtgs on item 4, vol. III. 36

 Ibid., Thirty-fourth Session, 16 Jan 52. 37 Msg, JCS 92059, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Jan 52.
PRISONERS OF WAR 147

them since the question of the individual

versus the state is the essential difference

between democracy and communism."

 38

To listen to General Lee as he denounced the UNC proposal in the subdelegation meetings as immoral and inhumanitarian might have confused the

casual observer into believing that the

Communists were the ones who were

concerned over the plight of the individual. But when Admiral Libby asked

him to cite an example, he dodged the

question deftly and after a long speech

wound up asking a couple of questions

of his own. The exchange that followed

illustrated the tenor of the conversations

and the Communist technique.

Admiral Libby: "You are extremely

adept at refusing to give a direct answer to

any question which our side asks; you are

also extremely adept at capping your re- fusal to answer a question with two or

three questions of your own, and then insisting that we must answer them. That is

typical of the whole spirit with which your

side approaches these negotiations. You

have made blanket charges against our proposal: that it is immoral, that it is inhumanitarian, that it is unfair, and that it is

unreasonable. When we attempt to pin you

down, to get you to show how in the simplest case—in any one particular—our proposal is any one of these things, you wiggle

out of it, you will not answer. You will not

answer because you can not answer. . . .

General Lee: "One thing we have found

through the meeting is that when you try

to delay the time of the meeting, you say

we did not give any answer, although we

really have given one; and when we

shrewdly pursue any question, you say we

make a smoke screen. . . . This seems to be

your only weapon and this is a special stunt

which you alone have. . . . But we have a

sound standpoint. We love truth and

righteousness and standing upon the truth,

we do our work; and from righteousness

and truth, we speak and insist.39

Whether the Communists were standing on the truth or trampling it was unimportant, for the key fact was that they

would not recognize the principle of voluntary repatriation. They argued steadfastly and with considerable justice that

it was in conflict with the Geneva

Convention. To provide Admiral Libby

with some counterarguments, the State

Department forwarded its interpretation

of the convention on 22 January. Under

Article 6, it pointed out, parties to a

conflict could make special agreements

covering prisoners of war as long as the

prisoners were not deprived of their

rights under the rest of the convention.

Since the spirit of the convention was to

protect individuals, the State Department felt that voluntary repatriation was

not inconsistent with its provisions.40

Thus, there was some legal as well as

abundant humanitarian justification for

the UNC position in the interpretation

of the State Department.

The Communists not only opposed

voluntary repatriation, but strongly challenged the parole features of the UNC

proposal. Since all the prisoners who

would be paroled belonged to the Communists, the enemy delegates claimed

that it was a unilateral requirement upon

their side. Admiral Joy was inclined to

agree with them and suggested that there

were two possible solutions. Either he

could be given authority to extend the

parole feature to both sides to guarantee

that repatriated POW's would not be

38

 Msg, CX 61829, Ridgway to JCS, 19 Jan 52,

DA-IN 2276.

39

 Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-first Session,

Subdelegation on item 4, 23 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs

on item 4, vol. III. 40

 Msg, JCS 92490, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Jan 52.
148 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

permitted or compelled to bear arms

against the other side or he should be

allowed to drop the parole feature entirely from the UNC position. Since the

ROK Government opposed the paroling

of prisoners and the Communists probably would not let the detail stop them

from reusing their recovered personnel,

General Ridgway agreed that Joy could

delete the requirements at his own

discretion.41

Actually concession even on minor

matters was contrary to Admiral Joy's

usual stand. Both he and Ridgway felt

that the enemy regarded concessions as

signs of weakness. In a published interview in late January 1952, Joy declared

that patience and unmistakable firmness

backed by applied military power were

the elements that influenced the Communists. In the presence of a military

stalemate, he was doing his best to negotiate an effective and stable armistice.

But unless the enemy had a change of

heart voluntarily, sufficient military

force would have to be applied to induce

such a change, Joy maintained.42

One of the stumbling blocks in the

path of the UNC negotiators during January had been the inability to present

the Communists with a complete and

accurate list of the prisoners in its hands.

The normal delays occasioned by the

necessity to check over a hundred thousand men and women were compounded

by the technical failure of the mimeographing machines which turned out

illegible copies of the lists. With the

enemy delegates constantly reminding

Admiral Libby of the UNC promise to

produce a corrected roster, the admiral

in turn sought to apply the pressure

upon Eighth Army headquarters to supply the data. But it was not until January 28 that Libby was able to hand

over the new lists. According to these,

there were 20,720 Chinese, and 111,360

Koreans, or a total of 132,080 prisoners

in U.N. custody. This was less than the

13 December roster, but the 394-man

differential was due to reclassifications to

civilian internees, Libby explained. He

also told Lee that the U.N. Command

had completed work on the 44,000 reclassified civilian internees and was ready

to exchange this information on 72-hour

notice if and when the enemy would

agree to supply similar data on the 65,-

000 prisoners captured by them.43

Although Lee ignored the last offer,

he did begin to demonstrate some signs

of resuming negotiations. On 3 February

he introduced a Communist counterproposal, designed to meet most of the UNC

requirements except on the voluntary

repatriation issue. The enemy was willing to promise that none of the POW's

would again take part in acts of war

and to allow the ICRC representatives

along with Chinese and North Korean

Red Cross members to attend the camps,

but held steadfastly to an all-for-all exchange.44

Recognizing a more co-operative attitude across the table, Libby tried to set- 41

 (1) Msg, HNC 785, Joy to CINCUNC, 22 Jan

52. (2) Msg, CX 62010, CINCUNC to CINCUNC

(Adv), 23 Jan 52. Both in FEC Msgs, Jan 52. 42

 An interview with Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy,

"Russia Calls the Turn in Korea—Chinese do the

Arguing," in U.S. News and World Report (January 25, 1952), pp. 24-25. See also Msg C 62217,

Ridgway to JCS, 25 Jan 5, DA-IN 4540.

43

 Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-sixth Session,

Subdelegation on item 4, 28 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs

on item 4, vol. IV. 44

 Communist Proposal of 3 Feb, incl to Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-second Session, Subdelegation on item 4, 3 Feb 52, in FEC Mtgs on

item 4, vol. IV.
PRISONERS OF WAR 149

tle some of the details. He told Lee that

the parole item should be made less

ambiguous. First, it should apply solely

to soldiers and not civilians, and secondly

the agreement should pertain only to

the Korean War since some of the soldiers were professionals and forbidding

them to engage in acts of war in the

future would deprive them of their living. Libby suggested that the staff officers get together and work out the

particulars. On 5 February Lee consented. He also agreed that the parole

feature should bind only the soldiers

and be valid just for the Korean War,

but warned the UNC delegation again

that the Communists would not accept

the ICRC as a neutral agency.45

As the staff officers conferences began

on 6 February, Admiral Joy submitted

a candid report on Item 4. The delegation felt that the Communists would not

offer additional lists of prisoners, but

thought that the U.N. Command could

assure that it received back all on the

present rosters by giving itself ninety

days to dispose of its larger holdings of

POW's while granting the enemy only

thirty days to return the smaller numbers in Communist custody. Provided

the U.N. Command was willing to accept the good faith of the enemy as

sufficient guarantee, the delegation

thought that provision for the return of

all ROK civilians who lived south of

the present line of demarcation and

wanted to be repatriated could be written into the armistice agreement. As for

the ex-ROK soldiers now serving in the

North Korean Army, Joy and his staff

held that this was a hopeless cause and

asked for permission to drop the matter

at an appropriate moment.46 Washington officials concurred, but stipulated

that agreements on the return of both

Korean and U.N. civilians be written

into the armistice terms regardless of

whether specific safeguards were included.47

It was evident from Joy's report and

from staff conversations with the admiral

that he had little confidence that the

Communists would conclude a satisfactory armistice in the near future. Not

only did he believe that the enemy

would never concede on voluntary repatriation, but he also felt that the U.N.

was on unsound ground in insisting

upon the principle. Most prisoners in

his opinion surrendered because they

were hungry, poorly equipped, or out

of ammunition and not because they

were promised nonrepatriation. Joy

thought that now that the Communists

had stabilized positions, good supplies,

food, equipment, and ammunition, they

would be content to maintain the status

quo and negotiate as long as time

seemed to be operating to their advantage. In the past the negotiations

had been influenced by considerations

other than military even though they

were basically a military matter. Until the armistice effort concentrated

upon a direct and simple approach

to resolve the remaining issues, Joy did

not feel that it would be successful. And

if the direct effort failed, he still was

convinced that the negotiations should

be terminated.48

45

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Fifty-third and

Fifty-fourth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 4

and 5 Feb 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. IV.

46

 Msg, CX 63013, CINCUNC to JCS, 6 Feb 52,

DA-IN 102022. 47

 Msg, JCS 900383, JCS to CINCUNC (Adv) for

Ridgway, 6 Feb 52. 48

 Msg, OT 577, Col James R. Davidson to DA,

12 Feb 52, DA-IN 104519.
150 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

As voluntary repatriation threatened

to stall progress at Panmunjom, General

McClure, one of the founding fathers of

the doctrine, suggested a new approach

which would avoid the term completely.

The U.N. Command would agree to an

all-for-all exchange but since there were

many prisoners who claimed they were

impressed or did not live in an area controlled by the Communists, and others

who might claim political asylum, prisoners in these categories would be held

and the matter referred to the governments concerned under Item 5 as essentially political rather than military.

McClure thought that this suggestion

might allow the Communists to save face

and should be broached on the staff

officer level.49

Another avenue was explored in

Washington during the early part of 1952

that offered a more daring solution to

the nonrepatriate problem. When Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl D.

Johnson and Vice Chief of Staff General

John E. Hull were in Tokyo in midFebruary, they broached to General

Ridgway the concept of unilateral release of all nonrepatriates. Once the

prisoners were freed, the U.N. Command could present the Communists

with a fait accompli and then attempt to

ride out the storm of protests that would

follow. This plan also had the advantage

of allowing the enemy to save face. But

Ridgway was not yet ready to abandon

the old approach. He looked with disfavor upon schemes to reclassify and release certain categories unilaterally.

Although he still was not enthusiastic

about screening the prisoners before they

were about to be exchanged, it it had to

be done he preferred a quick, single-day

screening that would be done openly.

Each prisoner would be informed that

the choice would be final and segregated

as soon as he made it.50

Before he resorted to screening, Ridgway wanted to try and trade off the rehabilitation of airfields for voluntary

repatriation. If this failed, he would go

ahead and screen the prisoners and then

propose an all-for-all exchange of the

remaining POW's. Were the Communists to insist, he would grant the airfield

rehabilitation as a final concession. In

his opinion, the linking of the issues

would permit a breaking off of the negotiations to occur over two points rather

than one.51

Ridgway's chief objection to the ideas

advanced for the release of the prisoners

who indicated that they would forcibly

resist repatriation stemmed from his belief that subterfuge at this time would

nullify the prestige that the UNC had

won in supporting voluntary repatriation. He feared that the UNC might be

accused of treachery and deceit such as

had characterized the enemy's dealings

and that the lives of the prisoners in

Communist hands might be endangered.

Under the circumstances he recommended that voluntary repatriation and

airfields be presented in one package

and then if the enemy refused to accept

the former, the UNC should be author49

 Memo for Rcd, by Gen McClure, sub: POW

Exchange, 16 Feb 52, in G-3 383.6, sec. I, 4.

50

 Suggestions that the nonrepatriate prisoners be

released unilaterally to break the deadlock were

advanced several times during the last year and a

half of the war and were always disapproved. See

below, Chapters VIII, XII, and XVII; also Vatcher.

Panmunjom, pp. 157-58. 51

 Memo for Rcd (sgd M. B. Ridgway), 19 Feb

52, no sub, in G-3 383.6, 5/1.
PRISONERS OF WAR 151

ized to announce its final position on no

forced repatriation.52

Despite the arguments of Ridgway,

the President decided to go ahead with

the plan to remove from POW status

the prisoners that might be expected to

resist repatriation violently because of

their fear of the consequences if they

returned to enemy control.53 If the Communists rejected a voluntary repatriation-airfield trade, Ridgway would remove the names of the violent registers

from the POW lists and indicate that the

UNC was willing to agree to an all-forall exchange on the basis of the revised

list.54 This would be the final U.S. position and one full of intriguing possibilities if it were used, for it would mean

that the U.N. Command would be

utilizing the enemy's own tactics in handling the prisoner of war problem unilaterally. How the Communists would

react to this turnabout was unknown,

but one thing was certain—they would

protest loudly and at length.

By the first of March, the negotiations

on Item 4 had been narrowed to one

issue—voluntary or forced repatriation.

The details of the exchange would be

easily settled as soon as this principle

was decided. But the Communists gave

no sign that their adamant opposition to

any form of voluntary repatriation—no

matter how it was disguised—was weakening. The UNC position, too, had

hardened during January and February.

Although the ideal objective of full voluntary repatriation seemed unattainable,

the UNC delegation had finally received

the support of the U.S. policy makers to

hold out firmly for no forced repatriation and had been further armed by

authority to effect a unilateral release of

nonrepatriates. Now it appeared to be

a question of whether the irresistible

force or the immovable object or perhaps both would have to give way.

52

 Msg, C 64383, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Feb 52,

DA-IN 109858. 53

 (1) Msg, JCS 902159, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Feb

52. (2) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 5 Feb 52, sub:

Armistice Negotiations in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea,

15.

54

 Memo, Maj Gen Clyde D. Eddleman for CofS,

4 Mar 52, sub: Status of Korean Armistice Negotiations as of 4 March, in G-3 091, Korea, 23.
CHAPTER VIII

The Package Proposal

The dramatic development of the

prisoner of war issue during the winter

months tended to obscure the questions

of a more technical nature confronting

the two delegations at Panmunjom.

Human emotions were involved in the

fate of the men confined behind the

barbed wire, while the matter of airfield

construction and rehabilitation appeared

dull and prosaic in comparison. Yet the

struggle in the conference tent over Item

3 was every bit as spirited as the dispute

over the prisoners; for the delegates of

both sides were also military technicians.

They understood only too well that the

disposition of the prisoners of war was a

transient problem which would be shortlived no matter which way it was finally

decided. The keeping of the truce, on

the other hand, seemed likely to become

a long-term affair that might plague the

Korean scene for years to come. Under

these conditions it seemed essential to assure that adequate safeguards and guarantees were written into the armistice

agreement.

Narrowing the Issues

By mid-December the discussion on

Item 3 had disclosed the main areas of

disagreement. First and foremost among

these was the knotty question of airfields

which had engendered the bulk of the

arguments. And close behind lay the

matter of rotation, the composition of

the neutral nations observer teams, and

the number of ports that were to be permitted to handle rotation and replenishment of men and supplies. These

promised to be the most difficult to settle, since the positions taken by the two

sides were so far apart.

It was at this juncture that the UNC

delegation lost another of its capable

spokesmen. General Hodes was given

another assignment just a few days after

Admiral Burke had been transferred.

Able and tough, the two men had

worked well together and proved themselves competent to match the best that

the enemy had to offer in the negotiations. Instead of Hodes, General Ferenbaugh, who had been serving his apprenticeship for several weeks, joined

General Turner on 17 December as a

full-fledged delegate.1 It was a difficult

task that faced the new Army representative for he not only had to replace General Hodes but also had to contend with

the best man on the Communist team

—the sometimes profane but always efficient General Hsieh.

1

 Ferenbaugh had served with the Operations

Division of the General Staff and as an assistant division commander of the 83d Division in World

War II. In January 1951 he had taken over as

commander of the 7th Division in Korea. Ferenbaugh's experience with political affairs during his

tenure on the General Staff provided him with a

good background for handling the negotiations.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 153

In the skirmishes that had taken place

so far the U.N. Command had adopted

an adamant position against the construction or rehabilitation of airfields

and the Communists had refused to

listen to any argument imposing restrictions on their freedom to do as they

pleased in this matter. Several times

during the debates in the latter half of

December, Hsieh had intimated that his

side would be willing to forget its objections to rotation and replenishment

if the U.N. Command would reciprocate

on the airfield issue, but his hints fell

upon barren ground.2

In an attempt to break the impasse,

the negotiators briefly turned the problem over to their staff officers for several

days to see if they could narrow the differences in a less formal atmosphere, but

this proved to be a futile hope.3 The

arrival of the thirty-day limit on the line

of demarcation on 27 December was

marked by no significant change in the

negotiations or on the battlefield. It appeared that the forebodings that the line

might become a permanent one until an

armistice was signed were well founded.

Toward the end of December the

United Nations Command offered a concession. If the Communists would accept

the restrictions on airfields, the UNC

would forego aerial observation and

photoreconnaissance flights. The enemy

reaction seemed to sustain the oftrepeated complaints of Ridgway and

Joy over the unwisdom of giving the

Communists an opportunity to get something for nothing. Hsieh accepted the

concession most willingly, but would

not budge in his stand on the airfields.

Furthermore, he told Turner frankly:

"you want to sit on top of other people's

heads, and when you come down from

that position you say that is a concession

on your part."4 The implication that

the U.N. Command had simply receded from an unreasonable and untenable position rather than offered

something of value was plain. In Admiral Joy's opinion, the weakening

of the UNC position merely hardened

the enemy's determination to secure further concession on the airfield issue.5

The Communists were well advised on

this score, for during the latter part of

December, there had been a steady deterioration in the United Nations resolution to insist upon a strict limitation of

airfield construction and rehabilitation.

This could be traced to the growing

reliance on the part of the United States

upon a "broader sanction" declaration

to be issued as soon as an armistice was

signed.6 As the emphasis shifted from

dependence upon control of local conditions in Korea to the threat of a larger

war if the armistice were violated, the

airfield question became less important,

especially since it was recognized that it

would be difficult if not impossible to

prevent the enemy from rehabilitating

and building airfields once the armistice

went into effect.

To General Ridgway this trend was

disturbing. He failed to see how the

U.N. Command could pose a deterrent

threat to a later outbreak of hostilities if

the enemy were permitted to strengthen 2

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Sixteenth and

Seventeenth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item

3, 19-20 Dec 51, in FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. II. 3

 Ibid., Seventeenth and Eighteenth Sessions, 20

and 22 Dec 51.

4

 Ibid., Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Sessions,

29 Dec 51 and 2 Jan 52. 5

 Joy, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 123-24. 6

 See Chapter VI, above.
154 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

THE UNC DELEGATES, DECEMBER 1951. Left to right: General Turner, Admiral

Libby, and General Ferenbaugh.

its air capabilities at will while the UNC

air power remained static or decreased.

He felt that the Communists sensed the

lack of a firm and final UNC position on

airfields and that newspaper reports

from the United States intimating that

the U.N. Command was considering further concessions did not help the situation.7

Ridgway's brief for a hard and fast

stand was too late. On 10 January the

U.S. military and political leaders informed him that his final position would

be the omission of any prohibition on

airfield construction or rehabilitation if

the issue became the sole obstacle to an

armistice. But until the Communists

showed that this would be their breaking

point, there should be no open concession. As a suggestion they urged that the

delegations settle all the other matters

outstanding under Items 3, 4, and 5 and

defer further discussion of airfields until

then. At that time, the U.N. Command

could drop the airfields requirements if

the Communists would sign the armistice. In this way, they argued, the concession could soon be followed by the

U.N. declaration including the "broader

sanction" of an expanded war. The

7

 Msg, C 60961, Ridgway to DA, 7 Jan 52, DAIN 17600.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 155

issuance of the declaration should counteract the propaganda value that the

enemy might attempt to gain from the

UNC retreat on airfields.8

With considerable misgivings, Ridgway agreed. He did not have the confidence that his superiors possessed in the

possible effectiveness of the U.N. declaration, but he proposed to shunt the

airfield question aside if the enemy

would consent. Under the present conditions, he was extremely dubious that the

Communists would neglect to press their

advantage. Anticipating further concessions, he believed that they would refuse

to take up new topics until the matter

was settled.9

There were no immediate effects of

the Washington instructions in the tent

at Panmunjom, for an opportune moment had to be selected for the presentation of the UNC proposal. In the

meantime, the arguments between

Turner and Ferenbaugh on the one hand

and the wily Hsieh on the other continued. The latter stood foursquare behind

the slogan "no interference in internal

affairs" whenever the UNC delegates

brought up airfields. Hsieh's concern

over the invasion of North Korea's sovereign rights led Turner to question his

sincerity. Since the North Korean air

force was depleted, whose sovereign

rights was Hsieh interested in—North

Korea's or China's, Turner asked. The

Chinese general ignored the question.10

On 9 January the Communist delegation introduced a new version of Item 3

that was closer to the objectives that the

U.N. Command sought. But as a matter

of tactics Turner attacked the weak

points and omissions in the enemy's proposal. He could not understand, he told

Hsieh, why the Communists were willing to allow the neutral nations observation teams to inspect behind the lines—

a clear case of internal interference in

his opinion—and yet balked at airfield

restrictions. But Hsieh could see no inconsistency in the two matters. The neutral nations were acceptable as a measure

to stave off foreign interference, he maintained.

There was no provision for restrictions

upon airfields in the Communist version,

but it did permit replenishment of military personnel, aircraft, weapons, and

ammunition as long as there were no

increases. Since this had been the UNC

contention from the beginning, Turner

quickly took a leaf from Hsieh's book

and termed this provision no concession

at all, but merely recognition of the justness and reasonableness of the UNC

stand. Although Turner turned down

the Communist offering because it ignored the airfield issue, the area of dispute was growing smaller.11

 The enemy's

withdrawal from a firm antireplenishment position served to compensate for

the UNC surrender of aerial inspection

and photoreconnaissance and indicated

that there was still room to bargain on

Item 3 as long as the discussion avoided

airfields.

In any event there was a gradual shift

in the UNC drive to secure modification

of the enemy attitude during mid-Janu8

 Msgs, JCS 91600, and JCS 91606 to CINCFE, 10

Jan 52. 9

 Msg, C 61348, Ridgway to JCS, 13 Jan 52, DAIN 19740. 10

 Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-fifth Session,

Subdelegation Mtg on item 3, 8 Jan 52, in FEC

Subdelegation Mtgs on item 3, 8 Jan-19 Apr 52, vol.

III (hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol.

III). 11

 Ibid., Thirty-sixth Session, 9 Jan 52.
156 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ary. The UNC delegates directed their

fire at the Communist motives in insisting upon freedom to rebuild their airfields, but the attempts to pin down

General Hsieh were unsuccessful. He

insisted that an agreement not to introduce any reinforcing aircraft into Korea

covered the UNC objections yet refused

to state categorically that the Communists would not increase their military air

capability during an armistice. This

placed the matter in the realm of good

faith and since the U.N. Command was

unwilling to lean on so slim a reed, little

progress was made.12

Hsieh was not content to remain on

the defensive, however, for he vigorously

attacked the UNC concept that the balance of military capabilities in Korea

should be maintained after the armistice.

It was a familiar argument urging that

the state of war should be eliminated

entirely and all foreign forces withdrawn from Korea; still, on the surface

at least, it sounded reasonable. The Chinese general asserted that it would be

impossible to retain the status quo during a truce since the U.N. Command

was already engaged in increasing its

postarmistice strength by expanding the

ROK Army.13 Hsieh did not mention

that the Communists were engaged in

the same task with the North Korean

forces, but he had a point.

In late January, the U.N. Command

decided that the time was propitious to

turn the problem of working out the

details on Item 3 over to the staff officers.

This would permit further discussion of

airfields to be postponed as the Washington leaders had suggested and allow the

negotiation of some of the minor differences to be given more attention. Hsieh

agreed on 27 January that the subdelegation should recess until the staff officers finished their efforts.14

 If the latter

could eliminate all issues except the

question of airfields, the U.N. Command

would then be in a better position to

offer a final trade.

Settlement of Item 5

As the staff officers began their meetings, General Ridgway and Admiral Joy

determined to suggest simultaneous discussion of Item 5 of the agenda. It will

be remembered that this had been simply stated in July as "Recommendations

to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides." The was intentionally vague, since the United States

had no desire to commit itself in advance

on political matters beyond the purview

of the military armistice.

In early December General Ridgway

and his staff had drawn up an initial position that hewed closely to the July formula. Each side would recommend to the

governments concerned a political conference to discuss appropriate matters

left unsolved by the armistice agreement.

This was a nice indefinite proposal that

would bind no one.15

Two weeks later, the President and

his advisors decided that mention should

12

 Ibid., Thirty-seventh through Forty-fifth Sessions, 10 Jan-18 Jan 52. During the 18 January

meeting, Hsieh became quite profane again, but the

U.N.C delegates had come to realize that his bark

was worse than his bite and paid little heed. 13

 Ibid., Forty-sixth and Fifty-first Sessions, 14 Jan

and 24 Jan 52.

14

 (1) Msg, C 62064, Ridgway to Collins, 23 Jan

52, DA-IN 3851. (2) Transcripts of Proceedings,

Fifty-second and Fifty-fourth Sessions, Subdelegation

Mtgs on item 3, 25 and 27 Jan 52, in FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. III. 15

 Msg, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 5 Dec 51,

DA-IN 7008.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 157

GENERAL YU CHAE HEUNG, GENERAL HARRISON, AND ADMIRAL JOY at Panmunjom.

be made of the unification of Korea under an independent, democratic government, and they instructed Ridgway to

include this in his first approach to the

Communists. If the enemy insisted upon

a reference to the withdrawal of foreign

troops, they authorized the Far East commander to put it in.16

 They cautioned

him a few days later, however, not to

make any commitment on the countries

that would participate in the political

conference nor on the form or forum of

the discussions.17 These details would be

left open to settlement on a political

level after the armistice was signed.

Ridgway initially did not question

these instructions, but by the end of

January he had some second thoughts.

Suppose the Communists tried to insert

the names of the countries that would

take part in the political talks, he asked

his superiors, should he reject all names

or accept only the North Korean and

Chinese Communist Governments? And

since the enemy probably would press for

the inclusion of a ninety-day time limit

for calling a conference, the U.N. commander felt that he could make the U.N.

16

 Msg, JCS 90083, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51. 17

 Msg, JCS 90388, JCS to CINCFE, 24 Dec 51.
158 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

proposal more palatable to the Communists by anticipating this move.18

 The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs

had no objection to the latter suggestion,

but they were still reluctant to have

names of countries mentioned in the

agreement. If it became necessary, on

the other hand, they conceded that the

recommendation to take steps at a political level to deal with matters unresolved

by the military armistice might be addressed to the specific states concerned.

The Soviet Union would be addressed

only as a member of the United Nations

and not as an individual government.19

Thus, on the eve of the reconvening

of the plenary conference in early February, the United States position on Item

5 was extremely cautious. Since the outlook for an early and satisfactory solution

of the political situation in Korea did

not appear to be encouraging, the American political and military leaders preferred to go very slowly and to operate

on an opportunistic basis. Foreseeing a

long and involved struggle with the

Communists over Korea's future, they

favored a flexible approach with few or

no advance commitments. Under these

conditions, if no final arrangement could

be reached, the chances for working out

a modus vivendi would be improved.

The Communists had insisted that the

principles involved in Item 5 be taken

up in a plenary session, and on 6 February the full delegation met once again.

Joy presented two new members of the

UNC group, Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., and Maj. Gen. Yu Chae

Heung, to General Nam. Harrison replaced General Ferenbaugh and Yu took

the place of Gen. Lee Hyung Koon.20

As soon as the amenities were disposed of, Nam introduced the Communist solution to Item 5. He proposed that

within three months after the armistice

was signed, each side should appoint five

representatives to hold a political conference. As for the topics to be discussed,

Nam listed three: 1. withdrawal of all

foreign forces from Korea; 2. specific recommendations for a peaceful settlement

of the Korean question; and 3. other

problems related to peace in Korea.21

After a three-day recess the U.N. Command made its counterproposal. Since

Ridgway felt that the differences between the two sides were not large, he

recommended that the UNC version

adopt as much of the Communist wording as possible and the JCS agreed.

Nevertheless, reference to five representatives was eliminated and the withdrawal

of "foreign troops" became "non-Korean

troops." Under the third topic the Communists had listed for discussion, the

U.N. Command had changed the wording so that it now read, "Other Korean

questions related to peace." The Republic of Korea was named along with

the United Nations as an addressee for

the recommendation of the military

commanders and the portion pertaining

to the political conference was made

more vague.22

18

 Msg, CX 62465, Ridgway to JCS, 30 Jan 52,

DA-IN 6207. 19

 Msg, JCS 900075, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Feb 52.

20

 General Harrison was the deputy commander

of the Eighth Army. He had served in the Operations Division of the General Staff and as assistant

division commander of the 30th Division during

World War II and on the staff of the Supreme

Commander, Allied Powers, in the postwar period.

General Yu was Vice Chief of Staff of the ROK

Army. 21

 Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-sixth Session,

Mtgs on the Mil Armistice Conf, 6 Feb 52, in FEC

Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III. 22

 Ibid., Thirty-seventh Session, 9 Feb 52.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 159

Most of these changes were minor but

the Communists preferred their own

proposal and a week's debate ensued.

The U.N. Command made it clear that

it did not intend to recommend that the

political authorities discuss any matter

not directly related to Korea since this

lay outside the UNC province. When

the Communists complained that the

U.N. Command did not represent all

the United Nations and that use of this

term would be incorrect, Joy countered

that the Chinese Volunteers did not represent the People's Republic of China

either. He told Nam that the UNC was

willing to drop all references to specific

governments in the recommendations if

the enemy so desired.23

Finally on 16 February, the Communists brought forth a revised proposal:

In order to insure the peaceful settlement

of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend

to the government of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3)

months after the Armistice Agreement is

signed and becomes effective, a political

conference of a higher level of both sides

be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the

questions of the withdrawal of all foreign

forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement

of the Korean question, etc.

With the understanding that "foreign" meant non-Korean forces and that

"etc." did not pertain to matters outside

of Korea, the U.N. Command accepted

the Communist version in toto on 17

February.24

As Joy informed General Ridgway,

the Communist statement afforded the

wide latitude desired by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and could be interpreted in almost any fashion since at best it was only

a recommendation.25

It had only taken eleven days to reach

an agreement on Item 5—by far the best

record of all. Even the agenda had taken

longer. Perhaps because of its very

vagueness, both sides could easily accept

such a noncommittal statement since in

essence it settled nothing and promised

little. If it later became inconvenient

or unnecessary, it could be ignored. On

the other hand, if both sides found it

worth pursuing, a conference could be

called. Regardless of the meaninglessness of Item 5, three items were now out

of the way. But the discussion on Items

3 and 4 showed no signs of a imminent

meeting of the minds and they were the

most important of all.

The Horse Traders

Since the perplexing problem of airfields had been temporarily shelved, the

staff officers on Item 3 were able to concentrate on the less troublesome details

in late January. Cols. Don O. Darrow

and Kinney of the Air Force and Lt.

Col. Howard S. Levie of the Army had

to cope with Colonel Chang of the North

Korean Army and Col. Pu Shan of the

Chinese Communist forces—all in all a

very competent group of officers.

To get these informal talks under way,

the UNC delegation had prepared a

draft armistice covering all the topics to

be considered under Item 3. Actually

there were four main areas that the UNC 23

 Ibid., Thirty-eighth through Fortieth Session,

9-12 Feb 52. 24

 Ibid., Forty-first and Forty-second Sessions, 16-

17 Feb 52.

25

 Msg, HNC 924, Joy to CINCUNC, 16 Feb 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an. 1, case 58.
160 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

staff officers hoped to settle: rotation; the

number of ports to handle rotation and

replenishment; the composition of the

neutral nations' supervisory organ and

inspection teams; and the control of

coastal islands still in dispute. The draft

armistice submitted by the U.N. Command provided a convenient point of

departure for the staff conferences.

There was a refreshing atmosphere in

the truce tent during the first meetings

that followed. On the Communist side

there was less haranguing and speechmaking; their staff officers had an air of

serious intent to make progress. They

were inclined to accept as much of the

UNC wording as possible and their suggested changes were frequently regarded

as improvements by the U.N. Command.26

Nevertheless, the Communists were

not ready to surrender, despite their

more businesslike approach. They opened the discussion of rotation by expressing great astonishment at the

"enormous" figure of 75,000 per month

proposed by the U.N. Command. It

may be remembered that earlier they

had offered to permit a monthly rotation

of 5,000 and the U.N. Command had

declared this would be totally insufficient. In the bargaining that followed,

rotation and the number of ports that

would be permitted to handle the flow

of personnel and equipment were closely

linked together. The Communist staff

officers were disposed to place the UNC

suggestion that twelve ports be used in

North Korea and ten in South Korea in

the same category as the 75,000 rotation

figure.27

Gradually the differences between the

two sides shrank. The enemy offered

25,000 for rotation and the U.N. Command lowered its figure to 40,000, provided that the Communists accepted

eight ports of entry on each side. In a

counterproposal, Colonel Chang put forward a total of 25,000, excluding personnel leaving or entering on rest and

rehabilitation passes and those on temporary duty, but he insisted on limiting

the number of ports to three for each

side.28

At this point General Ridgway and

his staff wanted to take a final position,

holding fast to the 40,000 figure and

reducing the number of ports to six.

They believed that the enemy would

give in if confronted with a firm offer.

In Washington, however, the Department of Defense and State did not wish

the negotiations to break down over such

relatively minor issues, but they agreed

to a stand at 40,000 and six ports per

side provided there were no implied ultimatum.29

By mid-February the UNC requirements had decreased to seven ports and

40,000 men, while the enemy had expanded its proposals to four ports and

30,000 men. The dickering went on for

another week and then the U.N. Com26

 Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations

(Jul 51-May 52), vol. 2, ch. II, p. 58. 27

 The North Korean ports included: Sinuiju,

Manp'ojin, Hyesanjin, Hoeryong, Ch'ongjin, Sinanju, Hamhung, P'yongyang, Wonsan, Pyoktong,

Songjin, and Haeju. The ports in South Korea

were: Seoul, Yangyang, Ch'ungju, Taejon, Andong,

Chonju, Taegu, Wonju, Sunch'on, and Pusan. See

First Mtg of Staff Officers on Details of Agreement

of Agenda item 3, 27 Jan 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff

Officers ... on item 3, bk. I. 28

 Seventh through Eleventh Mtgs of Staff Officers

... on item 3, 3-7 Feb 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff

Officers ... on item 3, bk. I. 29

 (1) Msg, CX 63438, Ridgway to JCS, 12 Feb

52, DA-IN 104463. (2) Msg, JCS 901022, JCS to

CINCFE, 13 Feb 52.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 161

mand went down to 35,000 men and six

ports and the Communists came up to

35,000 men and five ports per side.30

With only one port separating the two

sides from agreement, General Ridgway

gave Joy permission on 7 March to settle

for five ports if and when he felt that it

would encourage settlement of other

problems. Ridgway was worried at that

time about the growing indication that

the Communists intended to use the neutral nation's inspection teams to examine

classified equipment closely for the collection of technical intelligence. He felt

that the wording of the armistice agreement must insure that this would not

happen.31

This was a rather odd turnabout, since

traditionally the Communists had opposed inspection and argued that good

faith was enough. As Colonel Kinney

pointed out to Chang in the staff officer

meetings, the Communists had originally

tried to apply restrictions on all activities

of the inspection teams, but now were

insisting upon the full rights of the teams

to examine all equipment carefully.32

The aftermath to this switch on inspection laid the Communists' sincerity on

the subject open to question, however,

for when Kinney offered to settle for

five ports if the enemy would give up

detailed inspection, Chang quickly accepted on 15 March.33

 Regardless of

whether the Communists were using inspection solely for bargaining purposes

or not, the matter of rotation and ports

of entry were now agreed upon at 35,000

men per month and five ports of entry

per side.34

Insofar as the question of coastal islands was concerned, the Communists

proved to be particularly amenable. On

3 February they agreed to let the U.N.

Command retain control over the five

island groups under dispute on the west

coast of Korea.35 The U.N. Command

had expected a fight on this provision of

the draft armistice, but the enemy had

surprisingly decided not to contest it.36

There was some discussion on the

topic of coastal waters which the U.N.

Command had defined as comprising a

distance of three miles from shore at

mean low tide. The Communists were

reluctant to go into the subject, since

they felt that it did not matter what the

distance might be, provided each side

ceased naval blockade and patrol in its

opponent's waters. When the UNC

officers pressed for a 3-mile limit to prevent unintentional violations, the Communists came out in support of a 12-mile

zone. This slowed the UNC eagerness

to have a precise figure written into the

armistice, for the United States preferred not to set a precedent by accepting

a 12-mile definition of coastal waters in

30

 Fourteenth through Twenty-seventh Mtg of

Staff Officers ... on item 3, 10-23 Feb 52, in G-3

Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on item 3, bk. II. 31

 Memo, Ridgway for Joy, 7 Mar 52, sub: Armistice Negotiations, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan31 Dec 52. 32

 Forty-sixth Mtg of Staff Officers ... on item 3,

13 Mar 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on

item 3, bk. III. 33

 Forty-eighth and Forty-ninth Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on item 3, 15-16 Mar 52, in G-3 Mtgs of

Staff Officers ... on item 3, bk. III.

34

 The final list of ports included: Sinuiju,

Ch'ongjin, Hungnam (for Hamhung), Manp'ojin

and Sinanju in North Korea and Inch'on (for

Seoul), Taegu, Pusan, Kangnung (instead of Yangyang) and Kunsan (for Chonju) in South Korea. 35

 These were Paengnyong-do, Paechong-do,

Soch'ong-do, K'unyonp'yong-do, and U-do—all located below the 38th Parallel. 36

 Seventh Mtg of Staff Officers ... on item 3, 3

Feb 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on item 3,

bk. I.
162 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Korea. The upshot was that both sides

took the matter under further consideration.37

Three of the four issues that the staff

officers wished to settle had proved open

to negotiation and bargaining, but the

fourth—the composition of the neutral

nations supervisory organ and inspection

teams—soon developed into a bottleneck

second only to the airfields dispute. It

may be recalled that the original Communist suggestion that neutral nations

serve on the supervisory organ had been

general and vague. As General Lee had

defined "neutral nation," the term meant

a nation that had not participated in the

fighting in Korea. He had indicated that

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and

Sweden would qualify under this description.38

When Ridgway had asked for guidance, his superiors responded quickly

that as UNC choices, Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway would be acceptable

if they would consent to serve. As for the

possible Communist selections, there was

no real difference among the satellites

and any three would be agreed to. Under no circumstances, however, would

the USSR be considered acceptable as a

neutral nation, they warned.39 Here was

the crux of the matter, for despite the

fact that the Soviet Union had not formally intervened in the Korean War, the

United States did not doubt that she

was delivering both moral and physical

sustenance to the Chinese and North

Korean Communists. By no stretch of

the imagination could the Russians be

considered neutral in the estimation of

the American military and political

leaders, and they showed an early and

fixed determination to deny them a neutral status. The trump card in the U.S.

hand was the agreement with the Communists that the neutral nations must be

acceptable to both sides. The power of

the veto—long a favorite Russian weapon

—might now be turned against the

USSR.

Diplomatic approaches to Sweden,

Switzerland, and Norway during December drew affirmative responses and Ridgway was authorized to nominate them

as the UNC selections at an appropriate

moment.40 The opportunity did not

arise until 1 February when the U.N.

Command submitted its choices in the

staff officer meeting, but the Communists were in no hurry. Despite frequent

reminders and proddings, it was not

until the 16th that they named Poland,

Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. The

U.N. Command immediately accepted

the first two and rejected the Soviet

Union.41

Since Ridgway's superiors hoped that

the Communists would not insist upon

the inclusion of the USSR, they preferred to de-emphasize Russian participation in the war as the reason for the

UNC rejection. Unless the enemy persisted, they favored giving no reason at

all. If the enemy pressed for an explana- 37

 Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations

(Jul 51-May 52), vol. 2, ch. II, pp. 64-65. 38

 Transcript of Proceedings, Second Session, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 3, 5 Dec 51, in FEC

Transcripts, item 3, vol. I. 39

 (1) Msg, C 59130, CINCFE to JCS, 11 Dec 51,

DA-IN 8536. (2) Msg, JCS 89473, JCS to CINCFE,

12 Dec 51. This message was approved by the JCS,

State and Defense Departments, and the President.

40

 Msg, JCS 90381, JCS to CINCFE, 24 Dec 51,

DA-OUT 90381. Army and State Departments approved this message. 41

 Twentieth Mtg of the Staff Officers ... on item

3, 16 Feb 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on

item 3. bk. II.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 163

tion, the U.N. Command could fall back

upon the proximity of the Soviet Union

and its record of past participation in

Korea as disqualifying factors.42

Ridgway and Joy agreed with the appraisal so far as it went, but warned that

the staff officers suspected that the enemy

might be trying to lay the groundwork

for a trade of concessions on rotation

and ports in return for acceptance of the

Soviet Union. If this were true, then

the U.N. Command would be better off

telling the Communists unequivocally

that the USSR would never be acceptable

before the enemy involved its prestige.43

Not prepared to take this step until other

possibilities had been exhausted, the

Washington leaders told Ridgway that

the U.N. Command might offer to drop

Norway if the Communists would reciprocate on the Soviet Union.44

On 25 February the UNC staff officers

followed through on these instructions,

but Colonel Chang and his assistants

refused to bargain. Their continued insistence upon the USSR convinced Ridgway that the U.N. Command must make

a final stand on the issue. The JCS consulted with their colleagues at the Defense and State Department level and

received Presidential approval to inform

Ridgway that the United States was willing to have the UNC refusal to accept

the USSR made "firm and irrevocable."

Ridgway might proffer an alternative

solution of the problem concomitantly

with the rejection, if he thought agreement could be gained. They suggested

that both sides select nations, regardless

of their status in the Korean War, to man

the supervisory organ and inspection

teams. This would include the United

States for the UNC side and the Communists could appoint the Soviet Union if

they wished.45 Since this would divorce

the Russians from a neutral designation,

there was no objection to the Russians

serving on frankly partisan organs.

When the Communists showed no

interest in forming nonneutral groups to

conduct supervision and inspection, the

staff officers were forced to put the matter aside. Their earnest efforts had resulted in the solution of the rotation,

port, and coastal island controversies, as

well as the settlement of a number of

lesser details on Item 3. By mid-March

only differences over airfields and the

Soviet Union remained outstanding.

As the negotiations ground to a standstill in both Item 3 and Item 4, Admiral

Joy and staff took stock of the over-all

truce situation and concluded that there

were two promising methods of obtaining a satisfactory armistice from the

enemy. The more drastic solution entailed the presentation of a complete

armistice document incorporating some

concessions to the enemy along with an

ultimatum. Either the Communists

would have to accept within a stated time

limit or the negotiations would be terminated and hostilities resumed. Such a

course would require a high-level decision and willingness to open up on the

battlefield if the ultimatum were turned

down, but Joy believed that it offered

42

 Msg, DA 901353, G-3 to CINCFE, 17 Feb 52. 43

 (1) Msg, C 63913, Ridgway to JCS, 19 Feb 52,

DA-IN 107012. (2) Msg, C 63918, Ridgway to JCS.

19 Feb 52, DA-IN 107018. 44

 (1) Msg, JCS 901451, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Feb

52. (2) Msg, DA 901845, CofS to CINCFE, 23 Feb

52. Norway was selected since it had supported the

U.N. action in Korea.

45

 (1) Msg, CX 64342, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Feb 52,

DA-IN 109768. (2) Msg, JCS 902160, JCS to

CINCFE, 27 Feb 58.
164 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

UNC DELEGATES AT THEIR BASE CAMP IN MUNSAN-NI. Admiral Joy is in the

center with clasped hands.

the best hope for a quick and favorable

settlement.

The second choice would be the submission of a complete armistice document without the open ultimatum. The

enemy delegates would be informed that

this was the final UNC effort and only

minor changes in wording would be considered. The plenary sessions would recess and the United Nations Command

would decline to enter into further substantive discussions. Although there

would be no breaking off of the negotiations, since the liaison officers would be

available for consultation, the UNC

position would not be altered nor any

further concessions made.46

In brief, Joy and his associates advocated the threat of force or the combined use of the recess and an inflexible

front on the major issues to produce an

armistice. As Ridgway pointed out, both

of the suggested courses were ultimatums; the chief difference was that the

alternative course had no time limit.

Either one would bring censure to the

U.N. Command if the negotiations were

46

 Msg, HNC 1027, Joy to CINCUNC, 9 Mar 52,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1, CofS, incl

27.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 165

broken off and this would be contrary

to the JCS instructions. Despite the advantages in the Joy suggestions, Ridgway

did not think that the time was ripe for

the open or the implied ultimatum as

yet.47

This was Ridgway vis-à-vis the UNC

delegation, acting as a moderating influence and tempering the bolder and

riskier proposals emanating from Panmunjom. On the other side of the coin

was Ridgway, the theater commander,

versus the Washington policy makers.

Here was the more aggressive leader

urging the adoption of a determined

plan of action that would make the

enemy realize that the U.N. Command

would grant no more concessions. Just

one day after he told Joy that he should

continue the "present course of action"

in the truce negotiations, he sent off a

frank appraisal of the situation to the

JCS.

Neither he nor his staff knew whether

the Communists wanted an armistice or

not, he told the Joint Chiefs on 11

March, or how they really felt on the

current issues. On the other hand, it was

clear that the enemy attitude was becoming more arrogant and obdurate and

that the position of the UNC delegates

was deteriorating daily. To arrest this

trend, the U.N. Command either had to

take a public, hard and fast stand backed

by official support from Washington and

as many of the U.N. participants in

Korea as possible or apply the one influence that the Communists evidently

respected—force. Since the latter seemed

to be out of the question, he strongly

pressed for an open and flat rejection of

the Soviet Union's membership on the

neutral nations supervisory commission

as a first step in attaining a final position.48

Army staff members in Washington

supported the U.N. commander's argument for stiffening the Panmunjom

front. However, G-3 questioned the advisability of approaching the issues on a

piecemeal basis. Maj. Gen. Clyde D.

Eddleman, the Deputy G-3, told the

Chief of Staff that the impact would be

far greater if the major unsolved problems were presented in a single package.

Then if the Communists would not accept and the negotiations ended, the

U.N. Command would be in a stronger

position for having made an effort to

break the deadlock. Secretary of State

Acheson favored the idea of an over-all

proposal, Eddleman added.49 So, too, did

General Collins, his fellow Joint Chiefs

of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the

President. But before a single package

could be fashioned, they wanted the

issues reduced to an absolute minimum.

Then, when an impasse developed at the

subdelegation level and Ridgway was

prepared to segregate and reclassify the

nonrepatriate prisoners, the U.N. commander would have the plenary conference assemble. Joy would deliver a

letter from Ridgway to Kim and Peng

urging a personal meeting of the commanders. If the Communists agreed,

Ridgway would present the package on

an all-or-nothing basis. The U.N. Command would concede on airfields and

47

 Msg, C 65020, CINCFE to CINCUNC (Adv),

10 Mar 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an.

1, incl 28.

48

 Msg, HNC 1033, Ridgway to JCS, 11 Mar 52,

DA-IN 114495. 49

 Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 11 Mar 52, sub:

Courses of Action in the Korean Armistice Negotiations, in G-3 091 Korea, 3/7.
166 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the Communists would be expected to

give in on forcible repatriation and the

Soviet Union. Although there would be

no substantive debate, the Washington

proposal went on, the liaison officers

would remain available and the UNC

delegates would be willing to meet to

explain their proposal.50

Ridgway must have been taken aback

by the new proposal. He had just turned

down a similar method of approach by

Joy and then within a week to receive

from his superiors a counterpart which

he liked even less must have astonished

him. In any event he recovered quickly

and protested vigorously. A meeting of

the field commanders would imply authority which he did not believe existed

on the Communist side and would cause

untold administrative delays. Moreover,

the U.N. Command would be asking the

enemy to concede on two issues while it

yielded on a single one. As for the

segregation and reclassification of

POW's, he opposed any such action since

it might jeopardize the lives of the

prisoners in Communist hands. The

Soviet Union he was extremely reluctant

to accept on any terms, even on a frankly

partisan commission. If a package were

to be offered to the enemy, the U.N. Command should be given authority to

indicate that refusal would mean termination of the negotiations in the UNC

eyes. His own recommendations, he concluded, had not changed. First eliminate

the Soviet Union controversy—then a

package deal could be presented.51

The U.S. political and military leaders

were willing to meet some of the objections Ridgway raised. If he did not want

to confer with the Communist commanders, a plenary session of the delegates would serve. They had believed

that Ridgway's presence would help

underline the seriousness of the final

proposal and the importance that the

U.N. Command attached to it. Although

they had seen no indication of an early

solution to the USSR issue, they would

be happy to have this solved before the

package was offered. The essential factor here, they reminded Ridgway, was

not Russian participation on the supervisory commission, but designation of

the Soviet Union as a neutral nation. A

compromise that avoided the latter

would be perfectly acceptable.

With this out of the way, the Washington leaders got down to some cold facts.

They did not want an ultimatum delivered openly or implied with the

package proposal. Since the United

States and its allies had little inclination

to undertake increased military action

to back an ultimatum, it could only be

an empty gesture. If there were to be a

break over the package offer, the blame

must still fall upon the enemy.52

This was a frank admission by the JCS

that neither the United States nor its

fellow nations in Korea wanted a resumption of full-scale hostilities and had

no intention of posing an idle threat that

the Communists might challenge. Few

actions could do more danger to the

UNC cause politically than a bluff that

the enemy called. After this message,

talk of ultimatums dwindled. Ridgway

continued to oppose the USSR's participation in any capacity, but, from this

time on, he tended to support the con50

 Msg, JCS 903687, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Mar 52. 51

 Msg, C 65430, CINCFE to JCS. 17 Mar 52,

DA-IN 116955. 52

 Msg, JCS 904101, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Mar 52.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 167

cept of a package proposal as the best

hope for an armistice.53

By the first of April, the staff officers

had been in conference for over nine

weeks. Despite the real progress they

had made on the lesser problems and on

many details of Item 3, the question of

airfields and the Soviet Union still remained unsolved. So, on 3 April, the

subdelegation reconvened, with General

Harrison replacing Ferenbaugh as the

Army member. The U.N. Command

accepted Hsieh's suggestion that the

agreements reached by the staff officers

be confirmed, but this was the last

accord. The arguments took up where

they had left off and the meetings became shorter and shorter. At the 14

April session, a record time of fifteen

seconds elapsed between the opening

and closing of the meeting.54 With both

sides refusing to budge an inch, the staff

took over again on 20 April. In the

meantime the discussions on prisoners

of war had reached a new climax.

Screening the POW's

During February the staff officers had

met twenty-two times to discuss Item 4.

Despite their earnest efforts, the chief

bone of contention—forced repatriation

—still remained. Some of the details

were cleared up, but the Communists

were reluctant to settle subsidiary matters until the controlling principle was

determined. In the face of the unwillingness of both sides to retreat further

until all possibilities had been tried and

exhausted, agreement was no nearer at

the end of February than it had been a

month earlier.

The subdelegations reconvened for a

series of meetings during the first half

of March with a similar lack of success.

Admiral Libby pressed for the exchange

of sick and wounded prisoners, for the

delivery of POW packages, and for

formation of joint Red Cross teams to

visit the camps, but Maj. Gen. Lee Sang

Cho would not consider a piecemeal approach to a settlement.55

Instead, Lee attacked the U.S. stand on

"no forced repatriation," which he characterized as a verbal trick rather than a

concession by the U.N. Command. He

again charged that the United Nations

Command intended to hand over the

Chinese prisoners to the enemy of the

Chinese people—Chiang Kai-shek. And

in between his jousts with Libby on the

main topic, Lee found the subject of the

recent riots of prisoners on Koje-do

rewarding. The outbreak of violence on

18 February at the UNC prisoner camps

made good propaganda for the Communist delegate.56

In fact Lee became so enthusiastic in

his work that Libby had to ask him not

to scream at him. He was not deaf, the

Admiral declared, and, besides, he did

not understand Korean and much of the

effect of the emotional delivery was lost

in the translation.57

After two fruitless weeks of debate,

53

 Msg, C 65650, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Mar 52, DAIN 118696. 54

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Fifty-fifth through

Sixty-sixth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 3, 3-14

Apr 52, in FEC Transcripts of Proceedings, Subdelegation on item 3, vol. III, 8 Jan-19 Apr 52.

55

 Ibid., Fifty-sixth through Fifty-eighth Sessions,

Subdelegation on item 4, 29 Feb-2 Mar 52, in FEC

Subdelegates Mtgs on item 4, vol. IV, 28 Jan-7 Mar

52.

56

 For more detail on this riot, see Chapter XI,

below. 57

 Ibid., Fifty-ninth and Sixtieth Sessions, 3-4 Mar

52.
168 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the staff officers took up the task again.

The shifting of problems back and forth

between the subdelegation and staff

officers during the January to April

period was reminiscent of a café that had

two orchestras so that there would be no

interruption to the dancing. In this case,

however, both combinations featured the

same kind of music—discordant and

cacophonous—making it impossible to

dance.

In an effort to introduce a new note

to the proceedings, General Ridgway

decided to explore another line at the

staff officer level in mid-March. It will

be recalled that he had been given permission to remove prisoners who might

forcibly resist repatriation because of

their fear of the consequences from POW

status. With this object in mind Ridgway now wanted to find out whether

revised lists eliminating all in this category by overt screening might be acceptable to the Communists. The nonrepatriates could then be called special

refugees or some such name and all the

other prisoners would be exchanged. To

screen the prisoners unilaterally and

covertly, Ridgway and his staff felt,

might gravely imperil the safe return or

even the lives of the UNC prisoners in

enemy custody, but the Communists

might consent to an overt screening.58

His superiors were a little dubious,

since they feared that the enemy might

try to revise the lists of UNC prisoners

downward if Ridgway attempted openly

to prune the Communist rosters.59 On

the contrary, Ridgway rebutted, the enemy would never accept a fait accompli

brought about by secret and unilateral

action. Only by allaying Communist

suspicion of UNC double-dealing could

the United Nations Command protect

itself against retaliatory measures. He

and his staff thought that the enemy

might agree to a trial screening.60

In the staff officer meetings there were

increasing signs that the Communists

were shifting their ground. They hinted

on 22 March that there might be cases

among the prisoners that could be given

special consideration before the present

lists were checked. And they also intimated that the initiation of closed, executive sessions might promote freer

conversation. The UNC officers quickly

followed up by proposing executive

meetings until one side or the other

desired to revert to the open conference

again and the Communists agreed.61

This marked a definite turn for the

better, but the enemy soon demonstrated

that they would give "special consideration" only to the prisoners who had been

former residents of the Republic of

Korea. In no case would North Koreans

or Chinese be placed in special categories, they insisted. Their hatred of

Chiang and fear that the Chinese would

be sent to Taiwan if they were not

repatriated came through again and

again during the staff sessions in late

March.62

One of the major weaknesses of the

UNC proposals on revising the POW

lists was the fact that the UNC staff had

58

 Msg, CX 65424, Ridgway to JCS, 17 Mar 52,

DA-IN 116952. 59

 Msg, JCS 904101, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Mar 52.

60

 Msg, C 65650, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Mar 52,

DA-IN 118696. 61

 Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Mtgs of Staff Officers on Details of Agreements on item 4, 22-23

Mar 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on item 4. 62

 Thirty-sixth Mtg of Staff Officers on Details . . .

on item 4, 29 Mar 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers

... on item 4.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 169

no idea as to just how many prisoners

would refuse repatriation. Based on

guesswork, General Hickey, UNC chief

of staff, estimated that of the 132,000

military prisoners, about 28,000 would

prefer not to go home, but probably only

16,000 would resist repatriation. And of

the 37,000 civilian internees, 30,000

would elect not to return and 2,000

would put up a fight to prevent going

back. He thought that over half of the

20,000 Chinese prisoners would use

every means at their disposal to present

a solid block of opposition since they

were well organized, disciplined, and

controlled by strong leaders with Nationalist sympathies.63

Early in April, Colonel Hickman,

UNC staff officer, told his counterpart,

Colonel Tsai, that the U.N. Command

was reluctant to take a poll to form a

rough estimate of the number of military

repatriates, but about 116,000 might be

involved in an exchange.64 The figure

of 116,000 tallied with the estimate of

General Hickey which was admittedly a

guess, but it evidently intrigued the

Communists. It also may have been a

tactical error on the part of the U.N.

Command, for it misled the enemy into

thinking that they would recover approximately that number of prisoners.

At any rate, Colonel Tsai suggested on

2 April that both sides immediately

check their lists and defer the debate on

principles until this was completed. The

Communists showed a desire to get a

round figure of those who would forcibly

resist repatriation in the obvious hope

that the number would be no more than

around 16,000. Two days later Hickman agreed and asked if the Communists

would issue an amnesty statement before

the screening to reassure the prisoners

that they would not be punished when

they returned. Although the enemy officers protested that such a statement

would be unnecessary since the Communists desired nothing more than to

return the prisoners to a peaceful life,

they lost little time in providing the

U.N. Command with a florid amnesty

declaration on 6 April. This statement

was given wide publicity throughout all

the prisoner camps before the screening

to encourage as many prisoners as possible to go home.65

The insistence of the Communists

upon a round figure implied their tacit

assent to the screening process and removed most of the previous objections

to revising the prisoner lists. After Ridgway had conferred with Joy at Munsanni, he submitted his plan to carry out

the interviewing and segregating of the

POW's. The screening and separation

of repatriates from nonrepatriates would

be a one-shot operation, he told the JCS,

and no one would be allowed to change

his mind once he had made his choice.

The Communists would expect to receive whatever number was announced

by the U.N. Command, he went on, so

no downward revisions could be made

after the enemy was informed. In his

opinion, screening was inevitable sooner

or later and the quicker it was done the

63 better. He frankly admitted that an ex- Memo, Hickey for Hull, no date, no sub, in G-3

383.6, 5/1. This memo dates approximately in midFebruary 1952. 64

 Thirty-ninth Mtg of Staff Officers on Details

... on item 4, 1 Apr 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff

Officers ... on item 4.

65

 (1) Fortieth, Forty-first Mtgs of Staff Officers on

Details ... on item 4, 2 and 4 Apr 52. (2) Msg,

Tsai to Hickman, 6 Apr 52. Both in G-3 Mtgs of

Staff Officers ... on item 4.
170 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

plosive situation existed in the POW

camps and the U.N. Command did not

have the capability on hand to break up

the camps into small dispersed units to

reduce the danger.

Once the screening was finished, Ridgway intended to give the totals to the

enemy, reclassifying the nonrepatriates

and ROK residents who did not want to

go to North Korea into a status other

than POW. If the Communists accepted

these figures, he would follow up by an

effort to trade airfield restrictions for the

dropping of USSR, thus completing the

armistice. If the enemy did not accept

the figures, Ridgway would present a

package proposal with the same objectives on which the U.N. Command

would stand firm.66

Permission was received on 3 April to

start the screening at once and two days

later Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to

initiate Plan SCATTER.67 This plan was

openly designed to make the maximum

number of POW's available for repatriation. All were cautioned beforehand

not to discuss the choice they had made

with other prisoners prior to the interview lest they be subjected to violence

and injury to force a change of mind.

The final nature of the decision was

strongly stressed to make each man think

it over carefully. As each prisoner approached the interview area, he carried

his clothing and equipment with him,

so that there would be no need to return

to his former enclosure if he chose not

to return. In the interview that followed

the unarmed interrogating officer or

clerk related the disadvantages of refusal

and the uncertainties that would face

the nonrepatriates. He also warned the

prisoner of the fate that might befall his

family if he did not return. Then the

prisoner was told again of the Communist amnesty that had been offered and

asked a series of seven questions: 1. Will

you voluntarily be repatriated to North

Korea (China) ? 2. Would you forcibly

resist repatriation? 3. Have you carefully considered the impact of such action on your family? 4. Do you realize

that you may remain here at Koje-do

long after those electing repatriation

have been returned home? 5. Do you

realize that the UNC cannot promise that

you will be sent to any certain place? 6.

Are you still determined that you would

violently resist repatriation? 7. What

would you do if you were repatriated in

spite of this decision? If at any point

the POW indicated that he would accept

repatriation, the questions ceased. On

the other hand, if he mentioned suicide,

fight to the death, escape, etc., the POW

was segregated and put in a new compound.68

On 8 April Van Fleet began the

screening. For the most part it proceeded smoothly and the separation of

the nonrepatriates from those who

wanted to return was accomplished without serious incident. But there were

seven compounds containing over 37,000

determined North Korean Communists

who would not permit the UNC teams to

screen them. In one of these compounds,

an altercation between the prisoners and

ROK guards erupted into stone throwing and then to the use of machine gun 66

 Msg, HNC 1118, Ridgway to JCS, 3 Apr 52,

DA-IN 123736. 67

 (1) Msg, JCS 905426, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Apr

52. (2) Msg, CX 66469, Ridgway to JCS, 5 Apr 52,

DA-IN 124553.

68

 (1) Msg, C 66649, Ridgway to G-3, 10 Apr 52,

DA-IN 126222. (2) Msg, C 67178, Ridgway to G-3,

19 Apr 52, DA-IN 129603.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 171

fire. Before the fighting could be

stopped, there were seven dead and sixtyfive other casualties.69

Despite the opposition of the ardent

Communist elements, the results of the

first three days of screening were amazing even to the U.N. Command. With

approximately half of the 132,000 interviews completed, over 40,000 prisoners

had declared that they would forcibly

resist repatriation.70 It was a surprising

demonstration of the strength of feeling

among the POW's that must have been

heartening to the psychological warfare

experts, but it immediately cast a pall

over the prospects for an armistice. Even

were all the unscreened prisoners to

return, the total would bear little resemblance to the 116,000 the Communists anticipated.

In the days that followed the U.N.

Command made no attempt to screen

the seven recalcitrant compounds and

automatically put the prisoners in these

enclosures among the repatriates. The

remainder of the POWs and civilian

internees were sent through the interviews, and by 15 April Ridgway was able

to provide the JCS with the "round"

figure the Communists desired. Of the

over 170,000 military and civilian prisoners in UNC hands, only about 70,000

would return to the Communists without

the use of force, he told the Joint

Chiefs. Since he realized that the enemy

was not going to be happy about these

figures, Ridgway proposed to permit

either an international neutral body or

joint Red Cross teams to rescreen all of

the nonrepatriates if the Communists so

desired. If they turned this suggestion

down, then the UNC delegation would

move back into plenary sessions and

would present the package proposal.71

Although the 70,000 figure was by no

means final, the JCS agreed that the U.N.

Command should convey it to the enemy

right away rather than risk a leak to the

press. At the meeting of the staff officers

on 19 April Colonel Hickman calmly informed Tsai that 7,200 civilian internees,

3,800 ROK prisoners, 53,900 North Koreans, and 5,100 Chinese—a total of

70,000 men—would be available for repatriation. The effect was dramatic!

For once Tsai was speechless, overcome

with emotion. When he finally recovered himself enough to talk, he quickly

requested a recess ostensibly to study the

figures.72 The evident shock to Tsai intimated that the Communists were completely unprepared for such a low

estimate and the immediate recess was

probably necessary not only for him to

regain his composure but also to get new

instructions from his superiors.

The tenor of these instructions was

crystal clear the following day. The

Communists felt that they had been

deliberately deceived by the UNC's

earlier estimate of 116,000 and Tsai

mounted a full-scale assault upon the

70,000 figure. It was "completely impossible for us to consider," he cried,

and "you flagrantly repudiated what

69

 (1) Msg, C 66761, Ridgway to G-3, 11 Apr 52,

DA-IN 126801. (2) Msg, C 66838, Ridgway to G-3,

12 Apr 52, DA-IN 127294. Casualties included: 4

ROK dead, 4 wounded, 1 U.S. lieutenant wounded;

3 North Korean dead, 60 wounded. See below,

Chapter XI, for further details on prisoners' refusal

to be screened. 70

 Msg, CX 66734, CINCUNC to G-3, 11 Apr 52,

DA-IN 126732.

71

 Msg, CX 66953, Ridgway to JCS, 15 Apr 52,

DA-IN 128107. 72

 Forty-second Mtg of Staff Officers on Details . . .

on item 4, 19 Apr 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers

on ... item 4.
172 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

you said before." In a counterblast,

Hickman charged that the U.N. Command had felt the same sort of dismay

when they had been given the 11,559-

prisoner figure by the Communists

in December. The UNC had conducted

the screening in the fairest way possible and the percentage of prisoners

that the Communists would get back was

far greater than the 20 percent that the

12,000 UNC prisoners represented.73

Through the wrangling that ensued

during the next few days, one fact stood

out. The Communists had been stung

once by the screening procedure and

they would have nothing more to do with

it. They repulsed the offers to permit

rescreening by neutral or Red Cross

teams summarily and insisted that the

U.N. Command come up with a more

favorable figure.74 The screening process which momentarily seemed to be a

way to break the deadlock had merely resulted in increasing it. In justice to the

U.N. Command, they had acted in good

faith. Regrettably they had given the

enemy a rough initial estimate based on

what turned out to be incomplete and

inaccurate information. During the interviews the UNC teams had sought to

discourage the nonrepatriates as much

as possible and encourage the POW's to

go home. On the other side, it is not

difficult to understand the attitude of the

Communists and their feeling that they

had been duped and led into a propaganda trap. Their natural suspicion of

the motives of the U.N. Command

needed little impetus to assume the

worst.

The Package Is Delivered

The violent Communist opposition to

the results of the UNC screening delimited the course of events at Panmunjom. If the POW issue could have been

settled, Ridgway could probably have

exchanged the airfield rehabilitation

concession for the exclusion of Soviet

Union and completed the armistice.

Rejection of the no forced repatriation

concept meant that a package proposal

would have to include three issues and

that one side would have to give way on

two points. This complicated the matter

since it introduced a sense of imbalance

allowing an apparent advantage to the

side that secured the two concessions.

Under the circumstances it might well

have been better to have had a fourth

issue, real or manufactured, which the

U.N. Command could have used to

sweeten the pill that they now wanted

the enemy to swallow.

While the enemy was launching its

broadsides at the screening procedure,

Ridgway made his final arrangements

for presenting the package deal. He

planned to support the UNC offer with

a strong statement that might convince

the Communists that this was the final

position for the United Nations Command. Either the enemy must accept

the whole package without debate or the

responsibility for continued hostilities

would rest on its shoulders. To bolster

his stand, Ridgway asked that public

statements along this line be made by

73

 Forty-third Mtg of the Staff Officers ... on item

4, 20 Apr 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . item

4. Hickman later said that his counterattack actually

caused Tsai to blush for the first and only time

during the meetings. Interv, author with Maj Gen

George W. Hickman, Jr., 7 Mar 58. In OCMH. 74

 Forty-fourth through Forty-sixth Mtgs of the

Staff Officers ... on item 4, 21-23 Apr 52, in G-3

Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on item 4.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 173

the U.S. Government and other U.N.

participants.75

Ridgway's superiors, however, were

not willing to go quite so far. As long

as the truce meetings remained in executive session, public statements were

not possible, they pointed out. In the

second place, they did not want Ridgway

or the U.S. Government to make statements that could be interpreted as ultimatums. Uncompromising declarations

might decrease the probability of Communist acceptance of the package and

raise domestic and international expectations of quick military action if the

enemy did not accept the proposal. In

any case they moderated Ridgway's approach to eliminate the implication of

an ultimatum.76 At the same time, the

JCS and its staff worked diligently with

the political advisors to fashion a statement that President Truman could

release to support the UNC position.77

Judging from the actions of the Communists at the staff officer level, the

executive meetings were about to end.

On 24 April Colonel Tsai threatened to

return to open meetings and the following day he carried out the threat. The

Communists immediately issued a long

résumé of the April developments and

the U.N. Command countered with a

release setting forth its own version. As

the debate moved out into the open

again, Colonel Hickman requested a

recess so that the UNC could make the

last-minute arrangements for the formal

delivery of its offer.78

General Ridgway and Admiral Joy

were not concerned at this point whether

the sessions were secret or open. In their

opinion there was little need for secrecy

since the separate elements of the package deal had been fully publicized in the

press.79 But the military and political

leaders in Washington disagreed. The

open sessions generated more heat than

light, they maintained, and they therefore preferred an executive meeting of

the plenary conference. Then if the

Communists disregarded the understanding to gain the propaganda initiative or if they turned down the

suggestion for the executive meetings,

the onus for failure to reach agreement

in the negotiations would fall upon the

enemy.80

Through the liaison officers the

plenary conference was set up for April

28. When the delegates met, Admiral

Joy requested an executive session and

after a recess, the Communists agreed.81

Joy then went over the outstanding issues

carefully and set forth the UNC solution

which had been incorporated into a complete draft of the armistice. All mention

of the rehabilitation of airfields, had

been deleted and the Neutral Nations

Supervisory Commission was to be

formed of Switzerland, Sweden, Poland,

and Czechoslovakia. The paragraph referring to the disposition of POW's read

as follows:

All prisoners of war held in the custody

of each side at the time this Armistice

75

 Msg, CX 67235, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Apr 52,

DA-IN 129944. 76

 Msg, JCS 906923, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Apr 52.

This message was drafted by State and approved by

the services, Defense Department, and the President. 77

 Msg, JCS 907375, JCS to CINCFE, 26 Apr 52. 78

 Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations

(Jul 51-May 52), vol. 2, ch. III, pp. 97-98.

79

 Msg, C 67640, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Apr 52, DAIN 132562. 80

 Msg, JCS 907378, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Apr 52. 81

 Besides Admiral Joy, the UNC delegation now

consisted of Harrison, Turner, Libby, and Yu. The

Communists were represented by Nam, Hsieh, Lee,

General Pien Chang-wu, and Rear Adm. Kim Won

Mu, who had replaced Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwan.
174 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Agreement becomes effective shall be re- leased and repatriated as soon as possible.

The release and repatriation of such pris- oners of war shall be effected in conformity

with lists which have been exchanged and

have been checked by the respective sides

prior to the signing of this Armistice Agree- ment.82

In effect this meant that the U.N.

Command would swap the 70,000 repatriates that it held for the 12,000 in

enemy custody, since it intended to reclassify the nonrepatriates into a status

other than POW in the meantime.

The package proposal created as much

stir as a pebble dropped into the ocean.

Nam simply stated that "our side fails to

see how your proposal of this morning

can really be of help to the overall

settlement of the remaining issues" and

then called for an indefinite recess.83

Under the circumstances the Communists reaction was not surprising. The

UNC offer had revealed nothing that the

enemy had not anticipated as a result of

discussions in the U.S. and U.N. press

before the presentation. If it accomplished anything, it did reduce the number of issues to one—the number of

POW's who would be repatriated. The

other two soon canceled each other out,

but as long as there remained such a

wide discrepancy between the 70,000

figure that the U.N. Command had offered and the 116,000 the Communists

expected, hopes for an early armistice

would be small.

Yet despite the indifferent reception

that the enemy had given the package

proposal, this was a key moment in the

negotiations. The UNC had officially

fallen back upon its "final and irrevocable" position and the period of debate

was over. There had been no ultimatum

or threat of increased activity at the

front, but the U.N. Command had

passed the crossroads and embarked

upon a firm course. Patience and firmness—the old standbys—were to be the

chief weapons in the battles that lay

ahead rather than force. In the meantime the battle at the front would go on

as it had all winter, essentially a defensive war on both sides. Fought within

carefully defined boundaries and under

tacit rules, the war of the active defense

nonetheless continued and took its daily

toll of casualties.

82

 Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-fourth Session,

28 Apr 52, in FEC Transcripts of Proceedings, Msgs

on the Mil Armistice Conf, vol. IV, 28 Apr-3 Jun

52.

83 Ibid.
CHAPTER IX

"The Active Defense"

When the armistice negotiations resumed at the new site at Panmunjom

in late October 1951, Item 2—the line of

demarcation—was still in dispute and the

knotty problems arising from Items 3

and 4 but dimly envisioned. In the light

of past experience, however, the task of

threshing out a truce proposal acceptable

to both sides promised to become a long,

drawn-out affair.

There was little doubt that the punishment dealt out as the Eighth Army

"elbowed forward" into the enemy positions had sorely depleted the offensive

capabilities of the Communists and had

influenced them to return to the conference table. But whether they had

come back to conclude an agreement or

simply to continue the discussions remained to be seen.

Under the circumstances there were

two courses of action open to the U.N.

Command: (1) it could have the Eighth

Army sustain the pressure built up by the

summer campaigns upon the enemy

until a satisfactory settlement was

reached; or (2) it could accept the

Communist reappearance at the negotiations as a sign that the enemy was now

willing to end the fighting. If the latter

proved correct and a line of demarcation was to be established along the

general trace of the battle front, then

further sustained fighting and heavy

casualties would be wasteful and unnecessary. On the other hand, if the

Communists intended to use the negotiations to win a breathing period while

they replenished their battered forces

and strengthened their defenses, the first

course offered certain long-term advantages. It might be far less costly to

keep up the limited offensive punch already developed and maintain the

initiative until an agreement was signed

rather than to permit the enemy to regain his balance and settle down to a

long war of attrition.

A Choice Is Made

On 27 October, just three days after

the truce talks reopened, General Van

Fleet set up a plan for an advance into

the Iron Triangle on the west and beyond Kumsong on the east. Using the

U.S. I and IX Corps, he intended to take

over the high ground north of the

Ch'orwon-Kumhwa Railroad and establish a firm screen along a new defensive

line called DULUTH, south of P'yonggang

and north of Kumsong. After the IX

Corps attained the dominating terrain

around Kumsong, it would push on to

the northeast along the road to Tongch'on. In the meantime, the ROK I

Corps would move forward along the

east coastal road to Tongch'on and link

up with the IX Corps just south of the

town.1

1

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec 1, Narrative, p. 68.
176 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

The operation toward Tongch'on,

called SUNDIAL, eliminated the amphibious operation which the earlier

WRANGLER plan had envisaged for the

east coast, but the objectives were the

same—to cut off the North Korean forces

caught between the double envelopment

and to set up a new defensive line. As

things turned out, SUNDIAL was shortlived, for on 31 October Van Fleet was

instructed to postpone his attack toward

Line DULUTH until he received further

orders from Ridgway. The debate over

the line of demilitarization was the

reason for the delay, since the JCS believed that ultimately the U.N. Command might have to modify its stand

and withdraw several kilometers to the

south. If this proved to be true, there

seemed to be little reason to take casualties for territory that would soon have

to be evacuated.2

On 5 November Van Fleet again

sought permission to move toward

DULUTH, but without success. Ridgway

waited until 11 November, then canceled the operation. Without the

preliminary advance to DULUTH, SUNDIAL was automatically ruled out.3

 A

new wait-and-see policy at UNC headquarters was inaugurated with the

elimination of the DULUTH-SUNDIAL offensives.

As the line of demarcation assumed

increasing importance to the battlefield,

planning at the UNC and Eighth Army

headquarters operated on a contingent

basis. If the negotiations broke down

or became hopelessly ruined, then an

offensive might be launched. Plans for

an advance to the Wonsan-P'yongyang

line and even as far as the Yalu were

brought up to date, but Ridgway thought

that under present circumstances neither

of these offensives would be worth the

casualties they would cost.4

The lack of enthusiasm for ambitious

offensive operations while the line of

demarcation was being arranged was

clearly reflected in Ridgway's 12 November directive to Van Fleet to assume the

"active defense." Along the general

trace of present positions, the order ran,

Van Fleet would seize terrain most suitable for defense. He would, however,

limit his offensive action to the taking

of outpost positions not requiring the

commitment of more than one division.

At the same time, the Eighth Army

commander would be prepared to exploit favorable opportunities to inflict

heavy casualties upon the enemy.5

On the following day the JCS sustained the UNC approach. They considered the line of contact existing at

that time to be acceptable as the line of

demarcation and that contact expected

in the next month would not affect its

acceptability. "Ground action could still

continue even though gains and losses

would not be of significance to location

line . . . ," the JCS concluded.6 With

the JCS and Ridgway in agreement over

the unwisdom of other than minimum

operations at the front, the fighting

settled down to small-scale actions and

patrolling.

Evidently the JCS and Ridgway both

believed that the Communists were

2

 Msg, C 56283, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army

(Adv), 31 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 245. 3

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, pp. 4-5.

4

 Memo, E.K.W. [Edwin K. Wright], no addressee,

no sub, 8 Nov 51, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 410,

Feasibility of Offensive Operations. 5

 Msg, CX 57143, CINCFE to JCS, 12 Nov 51.

DA-IN 18285. 6

 Msg, JCS 86804, JCS to CINCFE, 13 Nov 51.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 177

ready to come to terms or perhaps the

wish was father to the thought. At any

rate Ridgway informed Chief of Staff

Collins that he believed the Communists

had been badly hurt by the UNC offensives and wanted the earliest possible

suspension of hostilities. He pointed to

a speech by Andrei Vishinsky, Russian

Foreign Minister, before the U.N. General Assembly on 8 November, in which

he proposed a cessation of the Korean

fighting within ten days and also to the

report of the UNC delegates at Panmunjom that the enemy seemed to want an

immediate de facto cease-fire as indication of the Communist desire for a

speedy end to the Korean War.7 Army

intelligence authorities in Washington

were cautiously inclined to agree.8

In the light of this general feeling of

optimism in Tokyo and Washington, it

was not surprising that Eighth Army

should absorb some of the complacency.

As soon as the line of demarcation was

agreed upon on 27 November, Van Fleet

told his corps commander that they

would make sure that every UNC soldier

was aware that hostilities would continue

until an armistice was signed. He then

went on to instruct them that:

Eighth Army should clearly demonstrate

a willingness to reach an agreement while

preparing for offensive action if negotia- tions are unduly prolonged to this end. A

willingness to reach an agreement will be

demonstrated by: Reducing operations to

the minimum essential to maintain present

positions regardless of the agreed-upon

military demarcation line. Counterattacks

to regain key terrain lost to enemy assault

will be the only offensive action taken unless otherwise directed by this headquarters. Every effort will be made to prevent un- necessary casualties.9

The Van Fleet order in effect hinged

Eighth Army operations upon the

enemy's actions and granted what

amounted to a cease-fire if the enemy so

desired. As the order filtered down to

the small unit level, few commanders

were willing to risk the lives of their

troops unless it became a case of necessity. But when the war correspondents

in Korea found out about Van Fleet's

instructions, they broke the story, charging that the order had "brought Korean

ground fighting to a complete, if temporary, halt."

 10

Since this charge was essentially true,

it caused embarrassment in Washington

and in the UNC headquarters. The

Associated Press implied that the halt

had come on orders possibly from the

White House itself and a strong statement was issued by the President on

29 November to counteract the impression. On the other side of the world,

Ridgway was quick to explain that

Eighth Army had assumed "a function

entirely outside its field of responsibility" and that efforts were being made

to correct any false impressions that

might have been drawn from the Eighth

Army order.11 Artillery fire began to

sound again from the UNC lines and

Ridgway reported on the 29th that 68

patrols had been sent out and 14 separate

attacks repulsed ranging from two

7

 Msg, C 57297, CINCFE to DA, 16 Nov 51, in Hq

Eighth Army Opnl Planning Files, Nov 51. 8

 Msg, DA 87685, DA to CG Eighth Army, 23 Nov

51.

9

 Msg, G 3192 TAC, EUSAK to CG 187th Abn

Regt, 27 Nov 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Nov 51. 10

 Msg, C 58327, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Nov 51, in

FEC, 387.2, bk. 4, 1951, Paper 316. 11

 (1) Ibid. (2) Msg, G 3247 THC, CG Eighth

Army to CINCFE, 30 Nov 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 4,

1951, Paper 315.
178 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

squads to a regiment in size.12 The unfavorable publicity from the news stories

put an end to the virtual cease-fire and

insured that at least lip service would be

paid to the oft-repeated avowal that

hostilities would continue until an armistice was signed.

But a choice had been made, for as

soon as the Washington leaders and the

U.N. Command had agreed to the line

of demarcation and the thirty-day deadline that went with it, they had also

tacitly recognized that further largescale offensive operations would not be

mounted unless the Communists broke

off or mired down the negotiations. As

long as the enemy continued to discuss

the matters under debate, there was

little danger that the U.N. Command

would again resort to strong ground

pressure on the battlefield. In the air

and from the sea no such limitations

applied. Here the mastery of the UNC

still prevailed and casualties could be

kept low. But the war for real estate that

might eventually be forfeited under an

armistice offered little inducement. The

winter that lay ahead promised to be

filled with frustration for the ground

soldier unless agreement at Panmunjom

followed swiftly upon the heels of the

drawing of the line of demarcation.

The War of Position

Memories of the first winter in Korea

and its hardships were still fresh in the

minds of the UNC troops. The swiftness of the advance into North Korea

and the equally rapid withdrawal that

followed in late 1950 had dislocated

the supply and distribution lines of the

U.N. Command and resulted in shortages of heavy winter clothing and equipment among some units at the front. By

the fall of 1951, with the war entering

a static phase, the situation was well in

hand. Distribution was a comparatively

simple matter and experience had led to

the modification and improvement of

many items of clothing and equipment.

The advent of the cold weather

seemed to favor the UNC forces slightly.

For the most part, the U.N. Command

held the south slopes of the hills and

mountains which were frequently free of

snow and warmed by the sun. The

enemy had to look into the sun and into

the deep shadows cast by its rays. In the

rear areas, the UNC accommodations

were much more comfortable than those

of the Communists.

Offsetting those advantages, however,

was the enemy ability to overcome the

rigors imposed by weather and terrain.

The Communist soldiers, many of whom

were already acclimated to the weather

of North Korea and North China, had

borne the harsh winter of 1950-51 with

less physical distress than the U.N. Command. Under trying conditions, they

had managed to live off the land and to

fight vigorously on rations that would

barely have provided subsistence for the

majority of the U.S. troops.13

And although the UNC forces were

adequately supplied with clothing and

cold-weather equipment, these were only

as good as the men who used them. To

remain outdoors in the often arctic cold

of the Korean mountains for any length

of time required a high degree of coldweather discipline. What good did it do

to provide the soldiers with insulated

12

 Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 29 Nov 51, DA-IN 4170. 13

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, p. 32.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 179

WHITE HORSE HILL

boots if they did not keep spare, dry

socks on hand and did not change socks

often? Among many of the UNC troops,

a winter environment team sent out

from Washington reported, there was a

fear of frostbite and a lack of knowledge

of how to prevent it. This resulted in a

high cold-injury incidence and reduced

the time that could be devoted to patrol

and ambush to an almost ineffective

level. Even the bunkers and front-line

shelters reflected a lack of ingenuity, the

team went on, and were devoid of the

simplest principles of winterization.14

As the ground became frozen, new

problems arose for the infantryman.

Ordinary entrenching tools were adequate for digging as long as the ground

was not frozen more than three inches,

but tended to break under sterner tests.

Picks and shovels were better suited to

the task, but were too ponderous to be

carried by the troops. One infantry unit

met the situation by issuing a 2-pound

block of TNT to each soldier for use in

breaking through the frozen top layer.15

The distaste of the UNC troops for

winter fighting was but an added factor

in the course of the ground war. Paramount, of course, was the disinclination

on both sides to disturb the status quo

radically during the negotiations. But

when the cold weather was combined 14

 DA, Winter Environment Team, Report on

Winter Combat Problems, December 1951-February

1952, in G-3 091 Korea, Bulky, 62/2. 15

 Ibid.
180 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

with the halfhearted ground maneuvers,

a note of restraint reminiscent of the

summer lull of July pervaded the battlefield. The policy of "live and let live"

was immediately reflected in the lower

casualty reports.

Before the agreement on the line of

demarcation on 27 November, the desire

for better positions did produce a number of minor engagements along the

front. Basically it was a battle for hills

and the pattern became all too familiar.

The experience of the ROK 9th Division

in November was repeated across the

trace of battle. Fighting for Hill 395

(White Horse Hill) northwest of Ch'orwon in the U.S. I Corps sector, the ROK

9th first lost the hill on 5 November,

then retook it the following day; lost it

again on 16 November and recaptured it

once more on the 17th.16 Counterattack!

Take the hill! Hold the hill!—these

were the key commands that dominated

the winter war.

During the daylight hours the Eighth

Army sent out its patrols and small-scale

raids which the enemy sought to intercept. Enemy action, on the other hand,

took place chiefly at night, under cover

of darkness and unhindered by air surveillance. The Communists confined

themselves primarily to patrols and

limited probes of the UNC defensive

positions.17

The principal clash during November

took place in the IX Corps sector east

of Kumsong. On 17-18 November the

ROK 6th Division, supported by two

tank companies of the U.S. 24th Infantry

Division and the attached ROK 21st

Regimental Combat Team, moved out

on a 7-mile front toward a new defense

line. Despite strong resistance from

elements of the Chinese 68th Army, the

ROK division advanced up to two miles.

Reaching the new line on the 18th, they

dug in against Chinese counterattacks

and succeeded in beating them off.18

As the discussions on the line of

demarcation came to an end in late

November, a change in Chinese tactics

was completed. As mentioned earlier,

the Chinese had begun to shift from

their customary tactics based upon fluid

warfare during the early autumn.19 The

static conditions of December allowed

them to finish their switch to fixed,

positional warfare. Adopting a defensein-depth pattern, both Chinese and

North Koreans proceeded to fortify their

lines. Digging in on hills, they set up

gun replacements and personnel shelters interconnected by communication

and supply trenches. Everything at hand

—logs, rocks, and sand—was used to

provide overhead cover and to protect

their troops against anything but a direct

hit. On the reverse slopes their trenches

followed the contours and were 5 to 6

feet deep. Small one-man shelters were

dug into the rear wall every 15 to 20

feet. Through the crown of the hill, the

Communists fashioned other trenches

leading to machine gun and rifle positions along the front and to kitchen and

ammunition supply points at the rear.

In some cases, they tunneled through

the hills and hollowed out huge underground bunkers. Using high terrain features effectively, they laid out fire

patterns and often employed personnel

shelters as alternate firing positions.

16

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, NOV 51, pp. 17-18. 17

 Ibid.

18

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, sec I,

Narrative, p. 47. 19

 See Chapter V, above.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE"

The enemy firing positions were practically artillery proof and certainly

mortar proof.20

The U.N. Command had made little

attempt to disturb the enemy's efforts to

strengthen his defenses. Not that the

thirty-day limit on the line of demarcation dictated a suspension of hostilities,

but rather a self-imposed restriction on

large-scale operations in December precluded any moves of great tactical significance. The Eighth Army "reduced its

offensive operations during the month

as a demonstration of good faith." In

turn the Communists launched mostly

company and platoon-sized attacks on

the UNC outposts. Only rarely was a

battalion-sized assault mounted.21

Lest the Eighth Army lose its edge

completely, Van Fleet instructed his

corps commanders "to keep the Army

sharp through smell of gunpowder and

the enemy" by intensifying their programs to capture prisoners of war

through ambush. If it appeared that the

peace talks would fail, new plans would

be prepared around 20 December for a

series of limited objective attacks in

January designed to strengthen defensive

positions.22 With the Communists improving their positions daily, further

"elbowing forward" might prove more

costly than it had been during the

August-October period. As for the capture of prisoners of war via the ambush

method for intelligence purposes, the

total log for December was a paltry 247,

only a quarter of what it had been the

previous month.23

As the thirty-day limit expired on 27

December, Ridgway asked Van Fleet for

a report on his plans to return to the

offensive. The Eighth Army commander's reply showed clearly the change in

the tactical situation. He contemplated

no offensive action in the near future. In

the eyes of his commanders, minor attacks to strengthen the present UNC

positions would be costly and without

value. The UNC defensive line was

strong and could be held against the

enemy. Obviously, the Communists

were now well entrenched and immune

to normal artillery preparation. Only by

bold assault could the enemy be dislodged and this could not be done at a

low cost. The benefits to be won, Van

Fleet concluded, would not justify the

casualties certain to be incurred.24

More ambitious plans for an advance

to the P'yongyang-Wonsan line met with

a similar response. The Joint Strategic

Plans and Operations Group found that

while such an operation was feasible and

could be logistically mounted, it would

probably mean that close to 200,000

UNC casualties would be registered.

General Weyland, FEAF commander,

was not in favor of extending the UNC

lines so close to the Communist air bases

in Manchuria and suggested a more

modest advance as an alternative. And

the Navy pointed out that naval vessels

and amphibious forces might suffer considerably if the enemy mounted major

air attacks from bases in North Korea.25

Under the existing conditions, there

seemed to be little possibility of more

20

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dee 51, p. 36. 21

 Ibid., pp. 2, 16. 22

 Eighth Army CofS Jnl, Dec 51, tab 4. 23

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt. Dec 51, Table 1.

24

 (1) Msg, C 60195, CINCFE to Van Fleet, 27

Dec 51. (2) Msg, G 3758 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 31 Dec 51. Both in Hq Eighth Army Opnl

Planning Files, Dec 5. 25

 JSPOG Staff Study, 10 Dec 51, in JSPOG Staff

Study No. 410, Feasibility of Offensive Operations.
182 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

than academic consideration of largescale offensive ventures at the end of

1951. The losses would be too heavy and

the reaction of the USSR uncertain. As

long as the desire to settle the war

through negotiation remained predominant, it was doubtful that other than

minor ground activity would be allowed.

The calm on the battlefield, however,

did permit more attention to be paid to

one troublesome problem that bothered

the U.N. Command almost from the beginning of the Korean War. Behind the

lines in South Korea there were over

8,000 guerrillas and bandits, 5,400 of

whom were reported armed. Concentrated mainly in the mountains of the

rugged Chiri-san area of southwestern

Korea, they were a constant thorn in the

side of the ROK Government. Although

they were chiefly of nuisance value, there

was always the chance that in the event of a

major offensive, they could pose a real and

dangerous threat to supply and communication lines and to rear areas.26

During November there was an upsurge in raiding operations as the guerrillas launched well-co-ordinated attacks

upon rail lines and installations. Fortunately, the raids were lacking in sufficient strength to follow through and

inflict serious damage, but Van Fleet

decided that the time had come to eliminate this irritation. In mid-November

he ordered the ROK Army to set up a

task force composed of the ROK Capital

and ROK 8th Divisions, both minus

their artillery units. Van Fleet wanted

the group organized and ready to stamp

out guerrilla activity by the first of

December. Since the Chiri-san held the

core of guerrilla resistance, Van Fleet

directed that the first phase of the task

force operations cover this mountainous

stretch some twenty miles northwest of

Chinju.27

On 1 December the ROK Government

took the first step by declaring martial

law in southwestern Korea. This restricted the movement of civilians, established a curfew, and severed telephone connections between villages.

On the following day Task Force Paik,

named after the commander, Lt. Gen.

Paik Sun Yup, initiated its antiguerrilla

campaign, sardonically called RATKILLER. Moving in from a 163-mile

perimeter, Task Force Paik closed on

the Chiri-san. The ROK 8th Division

pushed southward toward the crest of

the mountains and the Capital Division

edged northward to meet it. Blocking

forces, composed of National Police,

youth regiments, and security forces

located in the area, were stationed at

strategic positions to cut off escape

routes. As the net was drawn tighter,

groups of from ten to five hundred

guerrillas were flushed, but only light

opposition developed. After twelve days,

Task Force Paik ended the first phase

on 14 December with a total of 1,612

reported killed and 1,842 prisoners.28

The hunt shifted north to Cholla

Pukto Province for Phase II with the

mountains around Chonju the chief

objectives. From 19 December to 4

January the ROK 8th and Capital Divi26

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, pt. I,

Narrative, p. 8.

27

 (1) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, p. 34. (2)

Ltr, Van Fleet to CofS ROK Army, 14 Nov 51, no

sub, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Nov

51.

28

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, G-3 sec.

bk. 4, incls 1-5, p. 7.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 183

CAPTURED GUERRILLAS, CHIRI-SAN

area.

sions ranged the hills and sought to trap

the guerrillas and bandits hiding in the

rough terrain. By the end of December

it was estimated that over 4,000 men had

been killed and another 4,000 had been

captured.29

When Phase III opened on 6 January,

the task force returned to the Chiri-san

to catch the guerrillas who had filtered

back into the area after Phase I. On

19 January, the Capital Division carried

out the most significant action of the

campaign. While the ROK 26th Regiment took up blocking positions north

of the mountains, the ROK 1st and

Cavalry Regiments attacked from the

south, in two consecutive rings. Although one small group broke through

the inner ring, it was caught by the

outer circle of troops. What was believed

to be the core of the resistance forces in

South Korea perished or was taken

prisoner during this drive. When Phase

III ended at the close of January, over

19,000 guerrillas and bandits had been

killed or captured in the RATKILLER

operation.30 The last phase became a

mopping-up effort against light and

scattered resistance. The ROK 8th

Division returned to the front in early

February, while the Capital Division's

mobile units sought to catch up with the

remnants of the guerrillas. RATKILLER

officially terminated on 15 March, when

the local authorities took over the task.31

While Task Force Paik carried out its

campaign in South Korea, action at the

front was limited to the patrol clashes

and small forays that characterized the

defensive, positional war. Chinese forces

attacked ROK 1st Division positions on

the western front near Punji-ri and managed to drive the ROK forces off in

early January. Later in the month, raids

by elements of the U.S. 45th Infantry

Division south of Mabang-ni drew strong

enemy reactions.32 But there was no

major change in the line of contact.

Although there was little activity on

the battlefield, several interesting experiments were conducted during the

29

 Ibid., p. 8. 30

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, G-3 sec.,

bk. 4, incls 1-5, pp. 4-5. 31

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Feb and Mar 52,

G-3 sec., bk. 4, incls 1-5. Although there were reportedly only 8,000 guerrillas in southwestern Korea

before RATKILLER and supposedly over 9,000 were

killed and captured during the operation, Ridgway's

headquarters estimated in March that there were

still over 3,000 guerrillas left in the area. Either

there were far more guerrillas to begin with or a

great many innocent bystanders were caught up in

the dragnet. 32

 The 45th Division had just replaced the 1st

Cavalry Division. See below, p. 203.
184 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

winter months. Van Fleet was rather

disappointed in the lack of improvement

of his artillery units. He wrote Ridgway

in December that until early October

"there was not a single instance in which

a 155-mm. self-propelled gun had been

used for close direct fire destruction of

enemy bunkers, although this had been

developed and extensively used by U.S.

forces in World War II against the

Siegfried Line."

 33

Thus, in January, the U.S. I Corps

artillery mounted project HIGHBOY.

Heavy artillery and armored vehicles

were placed on the tops of hills where

they could pour direct fire into the

enemy positions and bunkers that could

not be damaged by normal artillery and

mortar fire. Van Fleet noted some progress in the system of reducing enemy

fortifications located on steep mountain

slopes, but the basic problem remained

unsolved.34

The second experiment was more

intriguing, though perhaps even less

rewarding. Designed to confuse the

Communists and lead them into miscues,

Operation CLAM-UP imposed silence

along the front lines from 10-15 February. No patrols were sent out; no artillery was fired; and no air support permitted within 20,000 yards of the front.

Theoretically this change of tactics was

supposed to arouse the curiosity of the

enemy and make him think that the

UNC troops had pulled back from their

positions. Then when the enemy sent

out his patrols to investigate, the U.N.

Command would net a big bag of prisoners by ambushing them. In practice,

the enemy was not fooled and used the

period of respite to strengthen his defensive positions. When the Eighth Army

resumed full-scale patrolling at the end

of the period, only a few prisoners were

taken.35 The stratagem was not repeated.

In a third field, the results were much

more promising. The rough terrain in

Korea had proved to be well suited for

the use of helicopters. The light and

easily maneuverable aircraft could land

in small clearings and evacuate the

wounded or bring in needed supplies to

isolated units. In Korea the Eighth Army

soon discovered another use for them.

On 11 November, Marine Helicopter

Transport Squadron 161 lifted 950

troops to the front and brought back an

equal number and the following month

it effected the relief of a second battalion.36

The performance of the Marine helicopters convinced General Ridgway that

the multipurpose craft were vital necessities in Korea. He recommended that

four Army helicopter battalions be made

available to the Far East Command to

supplement the Marine squadron. In

order to insure a steady flow of replacement craft, he suggested that procurement be started on a scale that would

permit manufacturers to expand production immediately.37

In December, Marine and Air Force

helicopters recorded another first. During the summer of 1951, the hospital

ship USS Consolation had been fitted

with a helicopter landing platform. An33

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, pp. 83-84. 34

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, G-3 sec., an. 5,

p. 5.

35

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, p. 24. 36

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Nov-Dec 51,

p. 1-10. For an interesting account of the developments and use of Marine helicopters in the Korean

War, see Lynn Montross, Cavalry in the Sky: The

Story of the U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New

York: Harper & Brothers, 1954). 37

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, pp. 88-89.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 185

155-MM. SELF-PROPELLED GUN

chored at a small port on the east coast of

Korea just above the 38th Parallel, the

Consolation received 245 patients flown

in from front-line battle aid stations

during the holiday season and early

January. These were emergency cases

in which speedy attention often meant

the difference between life and death or

the loss or saving of a limb. In as little

as five minutes the egg-beaters could

make the trip from aid station to ship

and in forty-five seconds they could unload the wounded and clear the deck.

Even in choppy seas, when small boats

could not be used, the helicopters carried

out their mission. The success of the

operation was hailed by the captain of

the Consolation as "one of the greatest

advances made in years for handling of

battle casualties."

 38

Yet despite the improved facilities

for rushing the wounded to the hospitals,

there were many who fell who were beyond medical help. The task of patrolling and probing was both monotonous

and deadly—monotonous in its dull

routine and deadly in the slow but

steady toll of casualties that it claimed.

No matter how cautious the commanders

might be in risking lives unnecessarily,

enemy artillery and mortar fire often

found their target and enemy ambushes

and probes caused the list of dead and

wounded to mount. It was a frustrating

period of the war—deadlock at the truce

negotiations at Panmunjom and stalemate at the front. In many ways the

Korean ground war in 1952 seemed to

be an anomaly—a throwback to the

Western Front of World War I rather

than a successor to World War II. The

static quality of the battlefield, the defense in depth with its barbed wire and

intricate series of trenches, the accent on

artillery and mortar fire and the everlasting patrols and raids—all harked

back to the 1914-18 period. There were

many points of difference, of course, for

the airplane had become far more important in the intervening years and

gas warfare had been shelved. Better

sanitation facilities and the discovery

of DDT made life more livable

in Korea than it had been in France. But

there was no denying the similarities and

for troops and officers trained in the war

of movement, in fluid tactics, the return

to another era necessitated a period of

adjustment and many of the lessons of

World War I had to be relearned.

38

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan 52, pp.

10-1, 10-2.
186 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

EVACUATING A WOUNDED ROK SOLDIER BY HELICOPTER

Under most circumstances the dragging out of the negotiations and the inaction at the front might have led to a

deterioration in morale, but in March

the Army G-3, General Jenkins, confirmed Van Fleet's avowal that Eighth

Army morale was high. On a trip along

the battle trace he found both commanders and troops were confident of

their ability to resist anything the enemy

could throw at them.39 Van Fleet attributed the healthy mental state of his

troops to the liberal rotation policy that

had been adopted early in 1951.40

To qualify for rotation during the

winter of 1951-52 a soldier had to have

nine months of service in the combat

zone in Korea or a total of thirty-six

points. Each month at the front was

worth four points and service elsewhere

in Korea was valued at two points a

month. From the summer of 1951 on,

increasing numbers of personnel became

eligible for relief. During the fall and

winter of 1951-52 between fifteen and

twenty thousand men were rotated each

month and this was an important factor

in sustaining troop morale. On the other

hand, rotation lowered troop efficiency

considerably, since it became difficult to

maintain training standards and to fash- 39

 Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 25 Mar 52, sub: Rpt

of Staff Visit to FEC . . . , in G-3 333 Pacific, 2. 40

 Interv with General Van Fleet, in U.S. News

and World Report, vol. XXXII, No. 13 (March 28,

1952).
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 187

ion battle-hardened teams as long as the

units remained in a state of constant flux.

The replacements had to undergo a period of indoctrination and of testing before they became battle-wise and by that

time another new group of replacements

would be on hand to be absorbed. Fortunately, the combat requirements at the

time made few demands for veteran

troops and the rotation system worked

fairly well.

The inactivity at the front did not

mean that there was a lack of planning.

On the contrary, during the winter and

early spring, Van Fleet's staff forwarded

plans to Ridgway setting forth a variety

of limited operations that might be carried out. The first arrived early in February and was called BIG STICK. It proposed to destroy the Communist supply

complex based on Sibyon-ni and to advance the Eighth Army left flank to the

Yesong River. In the process Kaesong

would be captured and four Chinese

armies dispersed at an expected cost of

over 11,000 UNC casualties. BIG STICK

could be mounted with present capabilities about 15 April and would use an

amphibious feint on the east coast by the

1st Marine Division to bolster its chances

of success.41

On Washington's birthday, Van Fleet

followed up with a second offering. This

was a more limited operation called

HOME COMING and contemplated using

only ROK troops. The objectives of

HOME COMING were similar to BIG STICK

in that the Yesong River would again be

the target, but the attack toward Sibyonni and the amphibious feint would be

omitted. Kaesong would be regained

and Van Fleet considered that the recovery of the old capital of Korea would be

an excellent tonic for his ROK forces.

If BIG STICK were ruled out, Van Fleet

wanted to try HOME COMING about 1

April.42

Since the negotiations at Panmunjom

were making some progress by the end

of February, Ridgway did not favor any

operation that would lead to a rise in

casualties. "Pending further orders," he

informed Van Fleet in early March, "offensive action will be limited to such

reconnaissance and counter-offensive

measures as necessary to provide for the

security of your forces."

 43

The lack of enthusiasm for his offensive plans at Ridgway's headquarters did

not prevent Van Fleet from trying again

on 1 April. Still anxious to use his ROK

divisions in a series of limited objective

attacks, he set up CHOPSTICK 6 and CHOPSTICK 16. The first envisaged the envelopment of the high ground south of

P'yonggang by a reinforced ROK division, and the second laid out a two-division attack to drive the enemy from the

area east and south of the Nam River

in eastern Korea. In both plans, the

ROK forces would be strongly supported

by air and artillery and could take advantage of their cross-country mobility

and gain valuable training. Ridgway,

however, did not like the terrain on the

defensive line set up for CHOPSTICK 6,

and he turned it down. He approved

the concept of CHOPSTICK 16 on 16 April

and left its execution to the discretion of

Van Fleet with the proviso that no U.S.

41

 Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 4 Feb 52, sub: Ltr

of Transmittal, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin

Files, Feb 52, Paper 7.

42

 Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 22 Feb 52, sub:

Outline Plan HOME COMING, in Hq Eighth Army

Gen Admin Files, Feb 52, Paper 68. 43

 Msg, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 2 Mar 52, in FEC

Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949-52.
188 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

troops would be used and that he would

be notified before the operation was carried out. But, as had happened so often

in the past, Van Fleet decided to suspend

CHOPSTICK 16 indefinitely on 29 April—

the day after the package proposal was

presented at Panmunjom.44 Once again

the negotiations made their influence

felt upon the battlefield.

Night Patrol

The UNC decision to forego limited

objective attacks in the spring of 1952

meant that the Eighth Army would continue to make contact with the enemy

through patrols and raids unless the

Communists changed their tactics. From

an intelligence point of view patrols and

raids often proved to be quite futile;

few prisoners were taken and frequently

no enemy contact was effected. Yet the

planning and carrying out of these activities kept the front-line troops alert and

gave them valuable experience and training under combat conditions.

In April 1952 each Eighth Army regiment at the front usually sent out at

least one patrol and set up several ambushes for the enemy every night. The

assignment to carry out the daily patrol

was rotated among the battalions and

companies of the regiment, customarily

by a prepared roster indicating the responsibility for patrols some two to three

weeks in advance. Thus in late March,

Company K, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry

Division, learned that it had drawn the

assignment for 16 April.

The 15th Infantry, commanded by

Col. William T. Moore, occupied a sector southwest of Ch'orwon and west of

Yonch'on. Company K, under 1st Lt.

Sylvanus Smith, was responsible for a

piece of the front about eight miles west

of Yonch'on, just to the west of the big

double horseshoe bend of the Imjin

River.45 In this area the terrain was

made up of small hills flanked by flat

valleys covered with rice paddies.

Since the patrol mission was to bring

back prisoners, the choice of objectives

was extremely limited. The Chinese

maintained only three positions within

patrolling distance of Company K and

the routes to these objectives were well

known to both sides. As it turned out,

the 3d Battalion commander, Lt. Col.

Gene R. Welch, selected a position

manned by what appeared to be a Chinese reinforced rifle platoon, located

about 1,500 meters north of the main

line of resistance. On a boot-shaped hill,

called Italy, some 150 meters high, the

enemy outpost kept watch over the activities of the 3d Division units to the

south. Five hundred meters to the east

of Italy across a broad rice valley with

a meandering stream lay Greece, a

many-ridged hill that resembled the

Greek peninsula in its outline.

Lieutenant Smith drew up the patrol

plan and had it approved at battalion

and regimental level. It visualized two

rifle platoons reinforced by a machine

gun section from Company M moving

out in three groups during the evening

toward Italy. The security group, composed of the machine gun section and a

rifle squad, would take its position on

Hill 128 overlooking the valley between

44

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, p. 3.

45

 The following account is based upon Hq

Eighth Army, Night Combat Patrol by Co K, 15th

U.S. Inf, 16-17 Apr 52, prepared by Majs

Robert H. Fechtman and William J. Fox. MS in

OCMH.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 189

Italy and Greece. One rifle platoon,

serving as the base of fire group, would

move forward to Italy and halt 350 meters from the Chinese outpost. Once the

base of fire group got into position, the

assault platoon would pass through and

attack the outpost from the southwest.

Each group would have a telephone

(EE-8) and a radio (SCR-300) to maintain contact with the others and with

battalion in case it became necessary to

request aid or the laying down of preplanned artillery fire along the patrol

route. The handles were removed from

the phones to eliminate the ringing and

noise which might betray the patrol's

position and the instruments were to be

spliced into the assault line running forward from the main line of resistance.

Flare signals were arranged but not used

during the patrol. To provide preparation fire, two batteries of 155-mm. guns

and one battery of 105-mm. howitzers

would fire for five minutes after the base

of fire group got into position on Italy.

Two 105-mm. howitzers would continue

to fire until the assault group was ready

to attack the objective.

Since the patrol was to be conducted

at night, the riflemen selected to go on

the mission were given intensive training

in night fire techniques. Using batteryoperated lights to simulate enemy fire,

the riflemen were taught to aim low and

take advantage of ricochets. Sand-table

models of the patrol route and objective

were carefully studied and the patrol

leaders were flown over the whole area

to familiarize themselves with the terrain. Since most of the personnel already

had been over the ground on several

occasions, the members of the patrol

were thoroughly briefed by the evening

of 16 April. They were also informed

that a regimental patrol would set up an

ambush on Greece that night.

The majority of the riflemen carried

Mi rifles with about 140 rounds of ammunition and two or three hand grenades apiece. The light machine guns

in the base of fire group were provided

with 1,000 rounds of ammunition and

the crews also carried carbines. Each

man wore a protective nylon vest for

protection against shell fragments. In

the security group heavy machine guns

were substituted for light at the last

moment, since they were to be used in a

fixed support mission and the heavier

mount would give more accurate overhead and indirect fire.

A hard rain had turned the ground

into a sea of mud on 16 April and the

night was dark, chilly, and windy with

temperatures in the mid-fifties. At 2110

hours the security group under Lieutenant Smith led the way through the

barbed wire and mine fields fronting the

company positions. Next came the assault group, led by M/Sgt. George Curry,

composed of 26 men of the 2d Platoon

and 3 aidmen and 2 communications

men from company headquarters. The

base of fire group, under 2d Lt. John A.

Sherzer, the patrol leader, completed the

column as it sloshed through the muck

down into the valley below. Sherzer had

26 men from his own 1st Platoon, 1 aidman, and 2 communications men. There

were also 12 Korean litter bearers accompanying the assault and base of fire

groups in the event of casualties.

Smith's security force had no trouble

as they climbed Hill 128 and emplaced

their machine guns. But a sudden explosion from the mine field in front of

the company positions soon halted the

assault group. Sgts. Frederick O. Brown
190 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

and William Upton went back to investigate and discovered that one of the medics and a Korean litter bearer had started

late. Losing their way in the dark, they

had wandered into the mine field and

tripped a mine. Fortunately the mine

had fallen forward into an old foxhole,

so that the blast had carried away from

the two men, who were unharmed.

Brown located the approximate spot

where the mine had exploded and notified battalion headquarters to rescue the

men.

By the time Brown and Upton joined

the waiting patrol, a half hour had been

lost. As the assault group resumed its

advance and rounded the shoulder of

Hill 128, another element of delay entered the picture. From the 1st Battalion

sector off to the right, flares went off

lighting up the two platoons as they

swung to the west up the valley leading

to Greece and Italy. Everytime a flare

illuminated the sky, the patrol hit the

ground and waited until the glare subsided. Pleas back to the battalion to

have the flares stopped were unsuccessful. The snaillike pace of the patrol was

further slowed by the practice of halting

the groups in place whenever a burnt-out

cluster of huts was encountered. Cpl.

William Chilquist, in charge of the lead

squad, checked the huts thoroughly to be

sure that none of the enemy was lurking

in the ruins. Between the flares and the

three groups of huts along the route

that had to be reconnoitered, it was well

after 2300 hours by the time the patrol

reached the last burnt-out settlement

close to the foot of Italy.

Since the assault platoon now had to

cross a broad stretch of open ground

to get to the selected approach ridge

to Italy, the base of fire group set up

four light machine guns along the bank

of the small stream traversing the valley.

With Chilquist's squad leading, Sergeant

Curry's force moved in single file across

the exposed area along the top of an

earthen paddy dike where the footing

was less sloppy. At 3-yard intervals, the

members of the platoon then began to

climb to the first small rise on Italy.

As the lead elements reached this spot,

a voice, speaking in conventional Chinese, broke the silence. A quick word of

command, a few seconds of quiet, and

then the chatter of a burp gun shattered

the night. From the lower reaches of

Greece, machine gun and rifle fire swiftly

joined in as the Chinese sprang their

ambush. Evidently the enemy had set

their trap along the north-south valley

between Italy and Greece, expecting the

patrol to approach their outpost by this

route which had been used many times

by Americans in the past. Only the fact

that the ridge rather than the valley had

been chosen as the access path prevented

a greater catastrophe.

The initial enemy burst tore through

the assault patrol and hit four men. A

rifle bullet pierced the protective vest of

Pfc. John L. Masnari, one of the BAR

men, and ripped into his chest. Mortally

wounded, he told his buddies not to

bother about applying first aid, moaned

slightly, asked for a priest, and then died

a few minutes later. He was the first

man to be killed in Korea while wearing

body armor. The other three men took

wounds in the head, arm, and leg—painful, but not critical injuries.

After the shock of the Chinese onslaught wore off, the assault platoon became angry and opened up with every

available weapon on the enemy. Ser-
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 191

geant Curry tried the phone to inform

the other groups and battalion of his

situation, but the instrument did not

work. The radio was of no assistance

either, since the aerial had been put out

of action by a Chinese slug. For the

moment, the assault platoon was completely on its own.

Back at the battalion headquarters,

Colonel Welch knew that something had

gone wrong, but refused to lay on artillery fire until the patrol's location could

be pinpointed; otherwise, he might shell

his own men. The base of fire group, in

the meantime, took cover when the enemy opened up by jumping into the

hip-deep stream, since there were no

rocks or fences and only one tree to

crouch behind. One of the machine gunners was caught by an enemy burst of

fire and took four or five bullets in his

leg—the only casualty in Sherzer's platoon.

For ten minutes the two engaged platoons from Company K exchanged brisk

fire with the Chinese, then the enemy

troops withdrew. Curry's force, with

four casualties, no communications, very

little ammunition left, and the element

of surprise gone, decided to pull back

and rejoin Sherzer's group. Since the

Korean litter bearers had dropped their

loads and headed back toward the UNC

lines at the outbreak of the fight, Curry's

platoon had to carry its own dead and

wounded. Using M1's and field jackets,

the men fashioned supplementary makeshift litters and started back down the

hill; there was no further enemy fire.

Shortly after midnight, the two platoons combined forces and communications with headquarters were re-established. The flares from the 1st Battalion

still were going off, despite the urgent

pleas of Sergeant Brown to "get the

damned flares out." This meant that

the patrol and its wounded had to drop

or be dropped quickly each time a flare

dissipated the darkness. Not only did

this delay the return of the patrol, but

the rough handling also made the trip

very painful for the wounded. The men

of the base of fire platoon, in addition,

were wet and chilly from their stay in

the stream. Nevertheless, the combined

group inched their way back toward

Company L's position, where they could

get the litters through the barbed wire

obstacles with less difficulty. At 0330

hours the weary patrol crept into the 3d

Battalion lines and gratefully gulped

down the hot coffee and doughnuts that

awaited them.

Meanwhile the regimental ambush

party set up on Greece had moved forward and covered the area used by the

Chinese to ambush Company K's patrol;

they found no signs of the enemy. In the

morning, however, a battalion raiding

group discovered a bloody cap and a

number of bloody bandages on Greece,

indicating that the 8,000 rounds of ammunition fired by the 3d Division patrol

at the enemy had found some targets.46

Since the patrol route had been

screened the afternoon before, the Chinese evidently had sent their ambush

party into position during the early evening hours. Lieutenant Sherzer recommended that a screening force be sent

ahead of the main patrol in the future

to guard against further ambushes. The

battalion commander decided that in the

next patrol action the screening force

would cover the patrol route by day and

46

 The patrol estimated that the enemy suffered

five killed and twenty wounded in the fight.
192 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

then would remain in position until it

was contacted by the night patrol.

Company K's experience was but one

of hundreds encountered by the Eighth

Army during the winter and spring of

1951-52. Some patrols were more successful and managed to bring back a prisoner. Others exchanged shots with the

enemy and inflicted casualties, but made

no close contact. Many returned with

negative reports, for they had found no

one to capture or even to shoot at.

Patrol, raid, and ambush by the Eighth

Army was matched by similar action by

the Communists, for this was the pattern

of ground fighting for the period.

Taken as a whole the ground war

from November 1951 to April 1952 produced few surprises and little change

in the defensive positions held by either

side. The Chinese dragon kept to his

caves and bunkers and appeared chiefly

at night, while the American eagle devoted his activity to the sky and hunted

mostly by day. As the pressure on the

ground subsided, the emphasis on the

war in the air mounted. The Air Force,

Marine, and Navy planes and pilots provided the main offensive punch during

the long winter.

Interdiction and Harassment

The term "offensive punch" may be a

trifle misleading in the case of the air

interdiction campaign in Korea, since

basically this was a defensive action. It

was designed as a preventive measure to

keep the Communists from building up

sufficient supplies and ammunition to

launch a general offensive rather than as

preparation or support for a UNC attack. During the summer and early fall

of 1951 both Air Force and Navy efforts

had begun to concentrate on disrupting

the enemy's supply lines with some success.47

 It was not surprising, therefore,

that when the truce negotiations resumed

at Panmunjom in October and ground

operations sputtered out, the interdiction or STRANGLE operations received top

priority.

By striking at enemy communication

lines and supply points, the U.N. Command could take full advantage of its

dominance of the air over North Korea

and make good use of the mobile firepower represented in its air forces. The

destruction of enemy equipment and war

matériel would hinder the development

of reserve stocks so necessary for a sustained offensive, and the disruption of

transportation lines would further snarl

the logistics problems facing the Communists. Even on minimum rations, the

feeding and supplying of one-half to

three-quarters of a million men represented a real challenge to the enemy so

long as UNC planes ranged constantly

overhead.

Thus, during the November to April

period, the Far East Air Forces averaged

over 9,000 sorties a month on interdiction and armored reconnaissance missions while close air support sorties

varied from 339 to 2,461 a month.48 Although the interdiction campaign was

undertaken with the approval of General

Van Fleet, the disparity between the two

efforts occasioned some comment at the

time and in this connection the FEAF

commander, General Weyland, later

wrote a defense of the distribution that

bears repeating:

47

 See Chapter V, above. 48

 (1) FEAF, Comd Rpts, Nov 51-Apr 52, vol. I.

(2) FEAF Command Reference Book, May 1952,

p 11.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 193

I might suggest that all of us should keep

in mind limitations of air forces as well as

their capabilities. Continuous close support

along a static front requires dispersed and

sustained firepower against pinpoint tar- gets. With conventional weapons there is no

opportunity to exploit the characteristic

mobility and firepower of air forces against

worthwhile concentrations. In a static situa- tion close support is an expensive substitute

for artillery fire. It pays its greatest dividends when the enemy's sustained capa- bility has been crippled and his logistics

cut to a minimum while his forces are im- mobilized by interdiction and armed re- connaissance. Then decisive efforts can be

obtained as the close support effort is

massed in coordination with determined

ground action.

Thus in the fall of 1951 it would have

been sheer folly not to have concentrated

the bulk of our effort against interdiction

targets in the enemy rear areas. Otherwise

the available fire power would have been

expended ineffectively against relatively in- vulnerable targets along the front, while

the enemy was left free to build up his

resources to launch and sustain a general

offensive. Such a general offensive, if it

could have been sustained with adequate

supplies and ammunition, might well have

been decisive. Failure to appreciate these

facts caused some adverse comment about

the amount of close support given the

Army, particularly during late 1951 and

early 1952.49

In view of the situation on the ground

in this period, there was considerable

justice in Weyland's observations. There

were no important ground offensives that

got beyond the tentative planning or

contingent phase and even limited objective attacks found little favor after

November 1951. With the enemy well

dug in and protected by heavy overhead

shelter, only accurate flat trajectory fire

or a direct hit by a bomb had any effect

upon him. Airplanes could not possibly

provide the former and found it extremely difficult to carry out pinpoint

bombing of such small and well-camouflaged targets. As long as the war remained static, interdiction seemed to be

the most efficient use of the UNC air

capability.

The other side of the coin was the

effect of the interdiction campaign upon

the enemy. As the pace of STRANGLE

quickened in November, Air Force and

Navy pilots sought to cripple the railroads of North Korea. Fighters and

fighter-bombers attacked locomotives,

railroad cars, and vehicular traffic as well

without serious challenge from the Communist air forces. Light bombers (B26's) covered the main supply routes at

night and medium bombers (B-29's)

kept the enemy airfields unserviceable in

addition to bombing marshaling yards

and flying close support missions.50 On

18 November carrier-based aircraft inaugurated a combined program of bridge

and rail destruction. Naval reconnaissance jets carrying 1,000-pound bomb

loads were sent out regularly for the first

time in the war against rail facilities and

proved to be excellent at cutting roads.

By December it often took the enemy as

much as three days to repair the railroad

breaks he had previously restored in a

single day. Yet, despite this, rail traffic

continued to move.51 The Communists

succeeded in bringing up and issuing

winter clothing to the troops even

though it often had to be hand-carried on

a piecemeal basis. Interdiction made

49

 General Otto P. Weyland, "The Air Campaign

in Korea" in Air University Quarterly Review, vol.

6, No. 3 (Fall, 1953), pp. 20-21.

50

 FEAF, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, vol. I, p. 24. 51

 COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, Nov-Dec 51,

pp. 1-3, 1-4.
194 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

transportation more difficult, but not impossible.52

One reason for the failure of STRANGLE

to live up to the expectations of the optimistic code name was the ingenuity of

the enemy in devising Countermeasures

to negate the interdiction program. At

the key railroad junction at Sunch'on,

northeast of P'yongyang, pilots reported

in early November that the railroad

bridge was still out of service since two

spans were missing. It was only after a

night photo was taken that the U.N.

Command discovered that the Communists brought up removable spans each

night and had been using the bridge

right along.53

Early in January, General Ridgway

sent his assessment of the interdiction

program to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

He was convinced that the air campaign

had slowed down the enemy's supply

operations, and raised the time required

to get supplies to the front. It had also

diverted personnel and material from

the front to maintain and protect the

line of communications. By destroying

rail and road transportation and a significant quantity of the goods carried,

interdiction had placed increased demands upon the production facilities of

Communist China and the USSR. These

were all valuable, Ridgway went on, but

under static defense conditions the Communists were still able to support their

troops adequately, and the UNC air

forces within their current resources

could not hope to prevent them from

continuing to do so. Over a period of

time the enemy could manage to stockpile supplies at the front and to build up

his forces as well, the UNC commander

maintained, and improvement of Communist Countermeasures and repair capabilities would weaken the effects of

the interdiction program in the future.54

In other words, although the enemy was

being hurt and impeded in his build-up,

Ridgway believed that unless there was

a change in the battle situation in which

the Communists were forced to increase

their expenditures of supplies and ammunition, eventually they would be in a

position to launch and sustain a major

offensive.

Contrary to the usual pattern of

events, things improved before they got

worse. During January, the carriers

Essex, Valley Forge and Antietam devoted their attention to track cutting.

Each carrier was assigned two or three

12-mile sectors to cut and naval aircraft

subjected stretches from 1,500 to 4,000

yards in length to such concentrated

bombing that almost total destruction

of the roadbed resulted. They then followed up by constant surveillance to prevent quick repair. This shift in tactics

evidently caught the enemy by surprise

and cuts remained unrepaired for as

much as ten days. During the last two

weeks in January the rail line from

Kowon to Wonsan was kept out of operation.55

To meet the UNC challenge, the enemy shifted his antiaircraft guns to the

threatened areas and began to take a

heavier toll of the attacking planes. In

turn, the naval planes sought to counteract the antiaircraft concentration. A flak

suppression strike was mounted with jets

52

 UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, Dec 51, p. 37. 53

 USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the

Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50-30 Jun 52, pp. 149-51.

54

 Msg, C 60744, Ridgway to JCS, 4 Jan 52, DA-IN

16359. 55

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan 52, pp.

1-2, 1-3.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 195

hitting the antiaircraft just before the

prop-driven planes arrived to bomb the

rail lines. This proved effective especially after photoreconnaissance had

spotted antiaircraft positions in advance.56

In addition to heavier flak concentrations, the Communists also used their

manpower resources to the hilt. The

North Korean railroad bureau had three

brigades of 7,700 men each that devoted

full time to railroad repair. At each

major station 50 men were assigned to

handle the more skilled tasks and 10-

man teams were spaced every four miles

along the tracks. As soon as a rail walker

reported a break, these units swung into

action. Local labor was rushed to the

scene to refill the holes and rebuild roadbeds. At night the experienced crews

could move in and restore the ties and

rails. The Fifth Air Force estimated that

as many as 500,000 soldiers and civilians

were engaged at one time or another in

counteracting STRANGLE.57

The increasing effectiveness of the

Communist crews and labor forces was

attested by the naval pilots in February:

"The Communists have constantly been

able to repair a given stretch of track

on a vital rail line in twelve hours or

less. On occasion repair crews were

found repairing fresh cuts while strikes

were still being made." 58 Primitive as

his tools and methods might be, the

enemy managed to restore service

quickly and that was all that counted in

this battle of machines against men.

The Communists were also making

full use of the many tunnels in the mountainous terrain to conceal their trains

during the daylight hours. Ammunition

and fuel cars were placed in the middle

section of the trains, so that UNC attempts to skip bombs into the tunnel

mouths resulted merely in temporarily

blocking the entrances. With local labor

the Communists were able to clear the

debris quickly and proceed on their way

by nightfall.59

At any rate the returns from STRANGLE

became less and less in the face of the

Communist Countermeasures and the

costs mounted. Even the weather seemed

designed to help the enemy, for as

the ground froze many of the bombs

bounced off the hard surface and exploded harmlessly in the air. Some even

sent their blast upwards and damaged

low-flying UNC planes. Finally, in

March, after the spring thaws began,

FEAF decided to initiate a new phase,

which was called SATURATE, based on the

tactics used by the Navy in January. By

focusing the destructive power of the

air forces upon a specific stretch of

roadbed on an around-the-clock basis,

FEAF hoped to wreak havoc with rail

service. An intense effort on 25-26

March against the line between Chongju

and Sinanju proved disappointing. Although 307 fighter-bombers, 161 fighters,

and 8 B-26's were used in the strikes,

the Communists repaired the breaks in

six days and in the meantime, other

portions of the rail net were free from

interference.60

The greatest weakness in the cycle of

rail attack lay in the inability of the

UNC to devise effective techniques to

56

 Ibid., pp. 1-4. 57

 USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the

Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50-30 Jun 52, 157. 58

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Feb 52, pp.

1-4.

59

 Ibid., Mar 52, pp. 2-4. 60

 USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the

Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50-30 Jun 52, pp. 153-54.
196 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

continue the bombing at night and during the foul weather. Despite the constant destruction of rail and bridges by

day, the enemy was organized to cope

with the air assault and repair the damage quickly at night and during poor

flying weather. By the end of April the

interdiction campaign had reached an

impasse. Based upon past experience, it

was evident that the air forces available

to General Ridgway could not maintain

the sustained effort required to keep the

railroads inoperable. And obversely, it

was also apparent by this time that the

large augmentations that would be

needed to do the job adequately were

out of the question.61

In assessing the value of interdiction,

Eighth Army had these thoughtful words

to pass on to Ridgway in mid-March:

The success of the interdiction program

can best be estimated by assuming its

absence. If there had been no Operation

STRANGLE the enemy would now have a rail

head in the vicinity of SIBYON-NI served

by an excellent double track line and in

the central sector he would have another

important rail head somewhere between

PYONGGANG and SEPO-RI. In this

event, his expenditure of artillery and

mortar ammunition could have been in- creased many times. The air interdiction program has not

been able to prevent the enemy from ac- cumulating supplies at the front in a static

situation. It has, however, been a major

factor in preventing the enemy from attain- ing equality or superiority in artillery and

other weapons employed at the front. Thus

it has also decreased the offensive and de- fensive capability of the enemy.62

Although the interdiction operations

in the air were more widely publicized,

naval surface vessels also contributed to

the effort, especially along the eastern

coast of North Korea. During poor flying

weather the 5-inch guns of the fleet destroyers kept the coastal railroad under

fire. The destroyer barrages could not

make the initial break in the rails, but

they could help keep the line cut by harassing fire.63

Heavy naval ships concentrated on

troop targets along the east coast. The

battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin,

the heavy cruisers Toledo, Los Angeles,

Rochester, and St. Paul, and the light

cruiser Manchester supported the ROK

I Corps during November and December close to the bomb line.64

 Farther

north British Royal Marine Commando

units carried out several raids on Tanch'on and one on Wonsan Harbor during

December. In the meantime, the Communists became active on the west coast.

Under cover of night they landed raiding

parties on offshore islands held by ROK

adherents north of the 38th Parallel.

The vulnerability of many of these islands lying close to the coast to seizure

by determined enemy efforts led Admiral Joy to seek ways and means to

strengthen the guerrilla garrisons. By

adding ROK Marine units as reinforcements to the guerrillas, Joy hoped to

stiffen their defensive capabilities.65 On

6 January the responsibility for island

defense north of the 38th Parallel was

turned over to the Navy, and Task Force

95 was given the task of providing sup61

 See below, Chapters XIV and XV. 62

 Ltr, with incls, Lt George F. Bless, AG, to

CINCFE, 19 Mar 52, sub: Air Interdiction Program,

in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Mar 52,

Paper 21.

63

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Nov-Dec 51,

pp. 2-7. 64

 Ibid., pp. 2-2. 65

 Ibid., pp. 2-3, 2-10.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 197

port for the ROK marines and guerrillas

holding the outposts.66

As the island defenses were tightened,

the Communists encountered more resistance in their amphibious operations.

In February a battalion-sized attack on

the island of Yang-do about twenty

miles northeast of Songjin on the east

coast was repulsed as United States and

New Zealand surface vessels helped the

ROK marines and guerrillas. Eleven

sampans were sunk by naval gunfire and

over 75 of the attacking forces were

killed.67 After this setback the enemy

shifted his attack back to the west coast

and in March overwhelmed the Korean

Marine garrison on Ho-do which lay

about twenty miles southwest of Chinnamp'o. Although the enemy withdrew

after three days, Ho-do was not reoccupied since it lay too close to the mainland

and was open to follow-up raids.68

While the battle for the islands went

on, the JCS considered the possibility of

introducing a more dramatic note into

the war. In early February they recommended that the Air Force and the Navy

conduct a sweep along the China coast

to spur the Chinese in the peace negotiations. But the State Department did not

want to cause Prime Minister Churchill

any further embarrassment. Since British opposition leaders had been accusing

Churchill of approving new courses of

action in the Korean War during his

January visit to Washington, the State

Department felt that a China sweep at

this time would tend to confirm these

suspicions.69

The commander in chief of the U.S.

Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, picked up the idea of a China

sweep in March, but General Ridgway,

too, had some doubts. He told Radford

that while he favored such an operation

at an opportune moment, he felt that it

would cause adverse political repercussions if it were carried out at that time.

Under the circumstances, Ridgway preferred to hold off and wait for further

developments at Panmunjom.70

The postponement of the carrier

sweep delayed the introduction of a

change in pace in naval operations until

the following month. In mid-April, however, the carriers Boxer and Philippine

Sea sent out four strikes against the important communications center of

Ch'ongjin and dropped 200 tons of heavy

bombs on the city. From the sea the

cruiser St. Paul and three destroyers

fired their 8- and 5-inch guns at Ch'ongjin for a whole day. Not only was considerable damage done to installations,

but the naval pilots also got welcome

relief from the monotonous rail interdiction campaign.71

Naval operations during the November-April period produced little major

excitement. The North Korean port of

Wonsan received its daily bombardment

and mine sweepers ploughed their way

with regularity along the coast. Almost

every month hits were scored on UNC

vessels by the Communist shore batteries,

but the damages were usually small and

the casualties low. The interdiction campaign occupied the bulk of the carrier

66 planes, but the Marine air squadrons Ibid., Jan 52, pp. 2-6, 2-7. 67

 Ibid., Feb 52, pp. 2-3, 3-6. 68

 Ibid., Mar 52, pp. 2-6, 2-7. 69

 Memo, Fechteler for Secy Defense, 8 Feb 1952,

sub: Proposed Sweep Along the China Coast, in

G-3 091 China, 4/2.

70

 Msg, CX 65327, CINCFE to CINCPAC, 15 Mar

52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1, incl 4. 71

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Apr 52, pp.

1-4.
198 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

INDUSTRIAL AREA OF CH'ONGJIN AFTER AIR AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT

managed to devote most of their attack

to close air support missions. Normal

blockade and reconnaissance operations

continued as in the past, with a close

watch on the enemy build-up. Although

there was no significant change in the use

of the Communist air potential during

the period, the danger of sudden and

powerful strikes was always a possibility

and the UNC naval forces had to remain

alert and ready for hostile air action.

The Shifting of the Balance

The paralyzing effect of the truce negotiations upon the battlefield was demonstrated time and time again during

the winter and spring of 1951-52. In

the shuffle one offensive plan after another was examined and discarded either

as being too costly in casualties or too

likely to have an adverse influence upon

the course of negotiations. Some of the

ramifications of the pursuit of the "active

defense" have already been considered

in connection with the ground, air, and

sea campaigns, but there were others

that deserve to be examined.

As soon as the war settled down into

its static phase, the number of casualties
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 199

dropped dramatically. Estimates of

Communist casualties fell from 80,000

in October 1951 to 50,000 in November,

to 20,000 a month in December and

January, and then hovered between the

11-13,000 a month mark through

April.72 During the same period the

UNC battle casualty rate decreased from

20,000 in October to 11,000 in November, to 3,000 a month in December and

January and remained under the 2,500-

a-month mark from February through

April.73

The sinking casualty figures could

have a number of end results: an expanding replacement pool; a cutback in

the number of replacements requisitioned each month to keep the front-line

units up to strength; or the initiation of

a rotation program to relieve front-line

troops. The Communists decided on the

first course of action in their desire to

improve their position vis-à-vis the U.N.

Command. From a low of 377,000 men

on 1 November, the Chinese Communists grew to an estimated 570,000 on 1

December and a total of 642,000 by the

first of the year.74 The North Koreans

evidently were not required to do more

than maintain their forces at about 225,-

000 men during the last months of

1951.75

The UNC, on the other hand, chose

the third alternative. During the six

months between 1 November and 30

April, U.S. ground force strength, including the marines, dropped from 264,670

to 260,479. Each month between 16,000

and 28,000 replacements were sent out

from the United States and men who

had served enough time at the front to

qualify for rotation were sent home. As

has been noted before, the policy helped

to sustain morale but it also served to

depress the relative strength of the UNC

ground forces vis-à-vis the Communists.

Despite a small increase in the contributions of the other U.N. countries—from

33,258 to 35,912—and an almost 60,000-

man rise in ROK ground force strength

—from 281,800 to 341,113—during the

same six months' span, enemy superiority in manpower continued to mount.76

Just how much the enemy had improved his military position since the

initiation of negotiations in July became

apparent in a comparative estimate submitted by the Army G-2, Maj. Gen.

Alexander R. Bolling, in late April. In

72

 Estimates of enemy casualties under fixed positional war conditions are difficult to confirm and

probably tend to be excessively high. During the

November-April period the UNC estimated that the

Communists suffered 88,000 dead and 40,000

wounded, a proportion of two killed to one wounded.

Contrast this rather unusual statistic with the more

normal proportion of UNC casualties during the

same period—4,600 killed, 21,000 wounded, and 800

missing in action, a ratio of one death to four other

casualties. Statistics may be found in the UNC/FEC

reports for the period. 73

 Naturally there were also many nonbattle casualties—victims of sickness and accidents—and these

were usually far more numerous than the battle

casualties. The Greek Battalion, however, after a

year in Korea, reported only 79 nonbattle casualties

as opposed to 350 battle casualties, a complete reversal of the usual ratio. Investigation revealed that

the Greeks simply held no sick call. See Memo,

Jenkins for CofS, 25 Mar 52, sub: Rpt of Staff

Visit to FEC, in G-3 333 Pacific, 2.

74

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpts, Nov, Dec 51. There were

8 Chinese armies on the front with 6 armies and 1

armored division in reserve behind the front and 3

armies and 2 infantry divisions in the rear reserve

at the end of December. In addition there were

5 artillery divisions and 35,000 security troops. See

Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, bk. 3, G-2

sec., incls 5-8. 75

 Ibid. There were still seven N.K. corps plus a

mechanized division (the 17th) and the N.K. 23d

Brigade. Only three corps—the I, II, and III—were

at the front and all were located in the east coast

sector. 76

 DF, OCA to OCMH, 31 Jul 53, sub: ROK and

UN Ground Forces Strength in Korea. In OCMH.
200 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the ten months, enemy strength mounted

from 502,000 with 72 divisions to 866,-

000 with 82 divisions. Artillery supplies quintupled from 8,000 rounds to

over 40,000 rounds and artillery units

climbed from 4 CCF divisions and some

underequipped North Korean units to

8 CCF divisions and 4 well-equipped

N.K. brigades. From practically no

armor in July, the Communists now had

2 Chinese armored divisions, 1 North

Korean armored division, and 1 mechanized division, with an estimated 520

tanks and self-propelled guns. Most of

the new material was of Russian design

or manufacture. Supply problems had

lessened for the Communist forces during the negotiation interval and the

combat efficiency of the enemy had

shown steady improvement.77 Certainly

the Communists had made good use of

the respite generated by the truce talks

and were in excellent position to continue the stalemate as long as it suited

them.

In the air a similar development had

taken place. Bolling estimated that the

Communists had raised their forces in

Manchuria from about 500 planes in

July to approximately 1,250 in April, of

which about 800 were Russian jets.

Seventy-five transports had also been

added to the enemy air fleet.78 Actually

the Communist air forces had imitated

the pattern set forth on the ground. Although their air capability had increased

steadily, they had made no serious attempt to challenge the UNC during the

winter and early spring. They flew an

estimated peak of 4,000 jet sorties in

December, but thereafter the total declined to about 2,300 in April. After 1

January they made little attempt to keep

their airfields in North Korea serviceable

and few enemy fighters strayed south of

Sinanju.79 The air potential was there,

but like the ground challenge, it seemed

to be latent rather than patent during

the dormant phase of the war.

Despite the quiescence of the enemy,

General Ridgway and his staff were worried about the growth of Communist air

power. As he told the JCS in December,

he believed that he needed a total of

eight F-86 Sabrejet wings to maintain

a bare numerical parity with the enemy

in fighter-interceptor strength.80 But his

message met with little encouragement

in Washington. The Joint Strategic

Plans Committee pointed out that Ridgway had five squadrons of F-86's or one

and two-thirds wings now. To provide

him with six and one-third more wings

was impossible, since U.S. production

amounted to only thirteen planes a

month and Canada's production of

twenty a month was committed to

NATO. The JCS realized that they

could not fill Ridgway's request, but they

attempted to work out a lesser increase.

In early January a carrier was being sent

to the Pacific and he could have that if

he wanted it; there was also one Marine

jet squadron due to arrive in the western Pacific in January that could be assigned to the Far East Command.81

These were frankly stopgap measures,

77

 Memo, Bolling for ACofS G-2, 25 Apr 52, sub:

SE-25, Communist Short Term Intentions in Korea,

in G-3 091 Korea, 59. 78

 Ibid.

79

 FEAF Comment to Staff Study, 24 Apr 52, in

JSPOG Staff Study No. 407. Korean Air Opns 12

Dec 51. 80

 Msg, CX 59092, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Dec 51, DAIN 8325. 81

 (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 14 Dec 51, sub:

Augmentation of FEAF, in G-3 320.2 Pacific, 81/2.

(2) Msg, JCS 89641, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Dec 51.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 201

but the Air Force staff examined its resources and quickly came up with several

suggestions. Three squadrons of F-94

Starfire all-weather fighters could be

spared from the Air Defense Command

in the United States although it would

mean sending pilots who had already

served a tour in Korea back again. The

Air Force also wanted to have the State

Department negotiate the release of seventy-five F-86's in the U.K. and seventyfive in Canada which could then be

shipped to Korea if crews were available.

This would cut Canadian air defense to

a minimum and delay the build-up of

NATO air forces, but under the circumstances, Army planners joined their Air

Force counterparts in supporting Ridgway's need for additional air power as

being more urgent.82

As it turned out, the upshot of all the

efforts to increase Ridgway's fighter

force was a fairly modest augmentation,

but considering the complicated factors

involved it was a good try. One squadron

of F-94's was sent to the Far East Command in February and the United States

made arrangements with the Canadian

Government to purchase sixty F-86's at

ten per month. Adding this to the U.S.

production available would enable Ridgway to achieve by June two operational

full strength F-86 wings that would be

backed by a 50-percent reserve.83

The carrier Philippine Sea arrived in

the Far East in January to fulfill the JCS

promise of another carrier, but Admiral

William M. Fechteler, the Chief of

Naval Operations, notified the JCS that

it could not remain permanently unless

the Navy were allowed to retain two

carriers due for retirement as a result of

the reconversion program then under

way. The Air Force opposed the retention since it thought that the Navy could

transfer two carriers from the AtlanticMediterranean on a temporary basis. In

the absence of agreement on this matter

among the JCS, Secretary Lovett ruled

that the Navy was justified in hanging on

to the carriers as long as there was no

sign of settlement in the Far East and

the possibility of a widening of the war

existed. If reduction was made in

American naval forces in the European

area, unfortunate political repercussions

might result. The President agreed and

Ridgway was informed that he could

keep the additional carrier until either

a truce was arranged or his air forces

were built up to a point where he could

release the carrier.84

Ridgway was less fortunate in his plea

to the Chief of Staff for additional antiaircraft battalions. It will be remembered that Collins had granted him an

increase of 5 battalions in mid-1951 and

4 of these had arrived in the theater by

November. But the growth of enemy

air power and the construction of several

UNC airfields had created new requirements for antiaircraft defense. Accordingly, in January, the Far East commander asked for 9 more battalions to

be sent as soon as possible. In this

instance, he encountered a stone wall.

There were no AAA battalions that

could be spared, Collins told him, in

view of the many world-wide U.S. commitments.85

82

 Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 27 Dec 51, sub: Air

Reinforcement for Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 219. 83

 Msg, JCS 900404, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Feb 1952.

84

 Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 5 Feb 1952, sub:

Deployment of Aircraft Carriers to the Western

Pacific, in G-3 320.2 Pacific, 2. 85

 (1) Msg, CX 61561, CINCFE to DA, 16 Jan 52,

DA-IN 945. (2) Msg, DA 92425, CSUSA to CINCFE,

18 Jan 52.
202 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Lack of action on the battlefield

dimmed prospects for large augmentations to the UNC but did permit several

shifts within the command. Without

doubt the most important of these transfers involved the movement of the U.S.

45th and 40th Infantry Divisions from

Japan to Korea to take the places of the

1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division.

On the surface this appeared to be a

routine rotation of divisions, but actually

there was considerable background to

the exchange. The 40th and 45th were

both National Guard divisions that had

been sent to Japan in April 1951 to finish

their training while furnishing extra

security for Japan. In view of the interest of Congress in the commitment of

National Guard divisions to combat, the

Army sought and received confirmation

from Ridgway in July that he did not

intend to commit either of the divisions

to combat piecemeal.86

In August the JCS informed Ridgway

that they wanted the divisions employed

in Korea when they completed their

training and the U.N. commander

agreed. But the development of the summer offensive caused Ridgway to change

his mind. He did not want to give up

combat-wise divisions for untrained

troops as long as there was any danger

of an enemy counteroffensive. Besides,

he told the JCS, a transfer would disrupt

his ability to defend Japan for a period

of three months while the transfer was

taking place.87

In Washington, the Army G-3, General Jenkins, disagreed. He thought the

risk in leaving Japan partially exposed

temporarily to be far less than the threat

in Korea. Furthermore, he pointed out

to Collins, many of the National Guardsmen in the 40th and 45th would come

to the end of their term of service in

August 1952 and would have to be sent

home. He recommended that one National Guard division be shipped to

Korea and then, at an opportune moment, one of the combat divisions could

be withdrawn and rotated to Japan.

This process could be repeated later on

with the second division. Both the JCS

and the President approved of this procedure in mid-September.88

But Ridgway was not convinced. He

held that until at least 15 November the

danger of a Soviet move against Japan

would still be possible. The Russian reaction to the Japanese peace treaty was

as yet unclear and the situation in Germany was also doubtful. He urged postponement of any movement until

November when the matter could be reviewed. In the light of Ridgway's

reclama, the JCS, with Presidential approval, rescinded their directive to effect

the National Guard transfer.89

When early November arrived, Ridgway changed his reasons for objecting to

the shift of the two divisions to Korea.

Although the Eighth Army had completed the fall offensive by this time,

Ridgway did not want to reduce its combat effectiveness in case other operations

might be carried out to put pressure

86

 Summary Sheet, Jenkins for CofS, 10 Aug 51,

sub: Employment of 40th and 45th Infantry Divs, in

G-3 320.2 Pacific, 60/15. 87

 Msg, CINCFE to DA, 3 Sep 51, DA-IN 12693.

88

 (1) Memo, Jenkins to CofS, 14 Sep 51, sub:

Rotation of 40th and 45th Divs to Korea, in G-3

320.2 Pacific, 60/18. (2) Msg, DA 81600, G-3 to

Eddleman, 15 Sep 51. 89

 (1) Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Sep 51, DA-IN

17897. (2) Msg, JCS 82084, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Sep

51.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 203

upon the enemy in the negotiations. Instead he urged that restrictions against

using the National Guard divisions for

replacements be lifted.90

General Collins would have no part

of this. In his opinion an attempt to

break up the divisions would invoke a

storm of protests from Congress and imply that the National Guard divisions

were not fit for combat duty after a year

of training. He informed Ridgway that

it appeared mandatory to use the divisions as units as soon as possible before

their time expired.91

The Chief of Staff's arguments settled

the matter. On 20 November, General

Hickey told Van Fleet that the 45th Division would begin its movement in

December to replace the 1st Cavalry Division.92

When the actual transfer began, the

Far East Command employed a technique that had been developed during

World War II in the Pacific. In 1944

the 38th Division had been shipped to

Hawaii, disembarked, and had taken

over the quarters, equipment, and weapons of the 6th Division. The 6th had

been loaded on the ships that had

brought the 38th and had then been sent

to the Southwest Pacific. By using the

same shipping for both relieving and relieved elements and swapping all heavy

equipment and supplies, all the men

would have to carry would be personal

arms and equipment. It was an economical method that obviated on- and offloading of divisional equipment and

speeded up the whole exchange procedure.93

The 45th and 1st Cavalry Divisions

began their rotation cycle in early December. As the first echelon—the 180th

Infantry Regiment—arrived on 5 December, it was assigned to the U.S. I

Corps. Two days later, the 5th Cavalry

Regiment sailed for Hokkaido to become part of the U.S. XVI Corps. On 17

December the 179th Regiment reached

Inch'on and the following day the 7th

Cavalry Regiment left for Japan. The

final echelon—the 279th Regimentcame into Korea on 29 December and on

the 30th the 8th Cavalry Regiment completed the exchange. By that time the

180th Regiment had taken its place on

the line and received its baptism of fire.94

With the experience of this shift under

its belt, the Far East Command prepared for the second step. The warning

order for the exchange of the 40th Division and the 24th Division was issued

in December and in early January the

movement commenced. The 24th Division left behind the 5th Infantry Regiment which had been attached to it in

Korea, since it was contemplated that

the 34th Infantry Regiment which was

organic to the 24th Division would rejoin

it in Japan. By early February the 40th

Division had taken over the responsibility of the 24th in the IX Corps area near

Kumsong. The smoothness of the operation was reflected in the story of the

gunner in a 24th Division artillery unit

who was engaged in carrying out a fire

mission. He reportedly passed the lan90

 Msg, C 56484, CINCFE to DA, 3 Nov 51, DA-IN

15036. 91

 Msg, DA 87224, Collins to CINCFE, 16 Nov 51. 92

 Ltr of Instr, Hickey to CG Eighth Army, 20

Nov 51, no sub, in G-3 320.2 Pacific, 80.

93

 See Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, UNITED STATES IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), p. 463. 94

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, G-3 sec.,

bk. 4, incls 1-5, pp. 4-5.
204 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

yard to his 40th Division replacement

and set out for the waiting trucks while

his guns sent a 40th Division salute to

his departure at the enemy.95

All in all, the divisional exchanges

were very efficiently carried out with a

minimum of disruption to the fighting

strength of the Eighth Army. In assessing tht performance of the 40th and

45th Divisions in April, the Eighth Army

G-3 concluded that the combat effectiveness of the two new divisions after a short

period in combat was equal to the old

divisions that had been decimated by the

rotation program.96

Although the exchange of the four

divisions was the largest during the sixmonth period under consideration, lesser

moves were also effected to take advantage of the static phase of the war. In

March the ROK 8th Division completed

its role in the antiguerrilla campaign

and relieved the 1st Marine Division on

the U.S. X Corps front. Van Fleet moved

the marines to the west flank on 25

March and pulled back the ROK 1st

Division. He felt that the marines' amphibious capability could be exploited

in the anchor position and in the meantime Seoul could be better protected.97

The rotation problem also struck some

of the United Nations units that had

been in Korea for a year or more. In

November Van Fleet established the

pattern for rotation of non-U.S. forces

in Korea. The French Government

wished to withdraw its battalion from

the line for three months while replacements were brought in and the battalion

was reorganized. But Van Fleet strongly

opposed this procedure. Instead he

urged that the participating nations

send a trained replacement unit to

Korea. After its arrival the exchange

could be carried out in the immediate

rear area with no loss of combat effectiveness to the Eighth Army.98

 Van Fleet's

recommendations were approved and

rotation of U.N. units followed this

method of relief in the future.

In late March the first increment

of an Ethiopian replacement battalion

reached Korea and the Ethiopian rotatees returned home on the same ships.

And in April the Australian Government sent a second infantry battalion—

the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian

Regiment—to join its sister 3d Battalion.99

The lull on the battlefield also permitted General Van Fleet to reconstitute

in early April the ROK II Corps which

had been eliminated after the Communists had twice overrun it, once in the

fall of 1950 and then again in early 1951.

The new ROK II Corps consisted of the

ROK 3d, 6th, and Capital Divisions and

was commanded by General Paik Sun

Yup. The corps boundaries between the

U.S. IX and X Corps were redrawn and

the ROK II assumed control of a sector

from Kumsong to T'ongson'gol, fifteen

miles to the southeast.100 (Map IV)

95

 The problems and solutions to the 40th Division-24th Division movement are set forth in Capt.

James L. Holton, "Operation Changey-Changey" in

National Defense Transportation Journal, vol. VIII,

No. 3 (May-June, 1952). 96

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, G-3 sec.,

bk. 4, incl 1-5. 97

 (1) Msg, E 4871 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 9

Mar 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin File, Mar

52. (2) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, sec.

I, Narrative.

98

 (1) Msg, DA 86544, G-3 to CINCFE, 10 Nov

51. (2) Msg, G 2932 TAC, CE Eighth Army to

CINCFE, 12 Nov 51, in Hq Eighth Army Opnl

Planning Files, Nov 51. 99

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, pp. 85-95. 100

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, G-3 sec.,

bk. 4, incls 1-5.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 205

There was little question but that rotation and realignment of troops were

made fairly simple by the absence of

activity on the ground, but the over-all

effect could only mean at best the maintenance of the status quo for the U.N.

Command. At the worst it could lead to

a weakening of Ridgway's forces as rotation drained off his experienced combat troops and replaced them with

unproven soldiers.

In the meantime the enemy had improved his defenses, increased his forces,

and stockpiled supplies. Six months of

the "active defense" had produced a

monotonous war of position with the

Communists now firmly ensconced behind well-prepared and fortified defense

lines. The patrol and the ambush, reminiscent of the Indian wars in the nineteenth century, furnished the chief action

on the ground, but even these encounters

were limited to a very small scale.

With the ground forces on both sides

carefully leashed, the center of attraction

shifted to the air war. The Communist

transport and supply network was crippled by the interdiction campaign and

enemy capabilities were sufficiently

blunted so that a major attack no longer

appeared likely.

The enemy was stronger and better

prepared by April 1952, but still not

eager to change the tenor of the war.

As long as there was no break in the

negotiations and there were no outstanding pressures on the battlefield, the Communists appeared ready to continue their

present tactics of defense at the front

and attack in the discussions and in the

propaganda field. The UNC, on the

other hand, pursued the defense all along

the line with the possible exception of

the air and sea war and even these could

be termed as much defensive as offensive.

And, behind the UNC lines, other problems, produced in part as by-products

of the static war, came to light.
CHAPTER X

Behind the Lines

A settlement of the truce negotiations

or a continuation of the hot war might

have obscured several of the problems

that became important during the winter

of 1951-52. But the absence of conclusive developments either at Panmunjom

or on the battlefield focused more attention upon the flow of affairs in the rear

areas. The lack of decision in the debates and at the front did not obviate

the need for decisions behind the scenes.

Regardless of the details of the eventual

agreement at Panmunjom, the basic

problem of the Communist threat in the

Far East would remain. By November

1951 it was evident that no military decision would be won or even sought.

What, then, would come after the armistice?

Since World War II the United States

had provided the chief opposition to the

spread of communism all over the world.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, formed in 1949, offered a nucleus

for resisting further Communist aggrandizement in Europe. By the close of

1951 the United States had built up the

American forces on the European continent to six divisions and was asking the

other NATO member nations to increase

their contributions. Progress was slow

since rearmament and upkeep of armed

forces were expensive items and the

threat of war in Europe did not appear

to be critical. In February 1952, however, an event of considerable importance for NATO took place when the

NATO conference held at Lisbon approved plans for a fifty-division NATO

ground force that would include German elements for the first time. The

news of the rearmament of West Germany and its future participation in

NATO evoked protests from the Soviet

Union, but these were rejected by the

United States, the United Kingdom, and

France. The addition of West Germany

forged another link in the European defense line, but whether this link would

be a source of strength or a weakening

liability was as yet unknown.

In the Far East, on the other hand,

the United States stood alone. The colonial commitments of Great Britain and

France in Africa and Southeast Asia

ruled out hope of major assistance from

them in the near future. Unless the

United States wanted to continue to

shoulder the burden, only one practical

alternative remained—to tap the manpower potential at hand in the Far East.

To fashion an effective force that would

have the training and equipment as well

as the will to fight against Communist

encroachments would be expensive and

time consuming, but not as costly as

maintaining large numbers of U.S.

troops in the area. Fortunately a start

had been made in the Republic of Korea, Nationalist China, the Philippines,
BEHIND THE LINES 207

ROK ARMY RECRUITS RECEIVING INITIAL ISSUE OF CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT

and Japan. Military assistance advisory

groups had begun the long-term tasks of

developing national forces to withstand

aggression. The main problem would

be to strengthen and accelerate the military aid program so that ultimately the

United States could delegate some of the

responsibility for the defense of the Far

East against Communist expansion.

Improving the ROK Army

As long as the war continued, the Republic of Korea would remain the most

critical link in the defense chain. Here

lay the direct threat to a nation sponsored and supported by the United States

—a threat that could not be ignored or

evaded without endangering the entire

U.S. position in the Far East. To meet

the Communist challenge the bulk of

the U.S. military forces in the Far East

had been committed to the war in 1950

and reinforcements from the United

States had quickly followed with a resultant drain upon the strategic reserve.

The only hope for halting this flow of

manpower seemed to rest in the substitution of Korean troops for U.S. soldiers.

But before Korean forces could take over

and successfully defend their own liberties, much remained to be done.
208 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

KMAG INSTRUCTOR CORRECTS THE BAR FIRING POSITION FOR ROK TRAINEE

The Army, as has been mentioned previously, had begun to work on the task.1

Operating through the Korean Military

Advisory Group, active steps were under

way to improve the quality and efficiency

of the ROK Army. Both the Secretary

of the Army, Mr. Pace, and the Chief of

Staff were personally interested in the

progress of the KMAG plan of action

and this helped to remove some of the

obstacles that had hampered the program.2

Basically the chief impediment had

been time. Until the pressure on the

battlefield had lessened, it was impossible to withdraw units for training or

refresher courses. Replacements frequently were rushed up to the front lines

with insufficient instruction in tactics and

weapons. It was a wasteful process, but,

under the circumstances, necessary.

When the fighting slacked off in July,

General Ridgway and his advisors began

to devote more attention to the adequate

preparation of men and units for combat.

The raw material supplied by the ROK

was good, although often undernour1

 See Chapter IV, above. 2

 Msg, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 3 Sep 51, in

Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper

9.
BEHIND THE LINES 209

ished. If properly led, the average

Korean youth showed courage, stamina,

and a great deal of native patience—all

excellent qualities, especially in a defensive war. Despite the variable performance of the South Korean forces during

the first year of the war, military observers were convinced that most of their

worst moments could be traced directly

to poor leadership and lack of training.

It was against these weaknesses that

KMAG launched its main assaults.

In the program outlined by Ridgway

in July 1951, the chief objective was

to correct the leadership problem by

re-establishing and reinvigorating the

South Korean military school system.

Now that time was available, he hoped

eventually to create a professionally competent officer and noncommissioned officer corps.3

 This did not promise to be

an easy project. The ROK Army did not

pay its officers or enlisted men more than

a pittance, considering the inflationary

trend of the South Korean economy. It

was hardly surprising that many of the

officers should try to make ends meet by

resorting to questionable expedients, but

it was not conducive to the creation of a

good army when these same officers put

personal benefits ahead of military necessity. D spite the continual pressure

that KMAG applied upon the ROK

Government to take severe disciplinary

measures against corrupt officers, the

problem was likely to remain until the

officers received sufficient compensation

to support themselves and their families.4

Another element in the complex undertaking of building a capable officer

corps was the instilling of confidence

at all levels—confidence in the officers

among the soldiers and confidence of the

officers in themselves. The average South

Korean officer was young, and in many

cases regiments were commanded by

men under thirty. Yet despite the leavening factor of youth, caution was characteristic. In the absence of higher authority or direct command, juniors were

usually reluctant to act lest they offend

their superiors. The dearth of initiative

would not be simple to compensate for.

It was a basic deficiency that arose from

the emphasis that the Koreans placed

upon rank and seniority—you bowed to

those above you and bullied those below

you. As long as this condition lasted,

few ROK officers would be willing to

risk offending their superiors by taking

independent action. To counter this

tendency, KMAG instructors would have

to exert skill and patience over a considerable length of time.5

While KMAG attempted to implant

confidence, initiative, and professional

skill in the upper echelons, a Field

Training Command was put into operation behind the lines to bolster the

morale of the soldiers. As each ROK

division was rotated through a nineweek course of basic training, refresher

instruction in weapons and tactics

helped to weld the fighting units into

better combat teams. The success of the

course of training led to the establish3

 Msg, CX 50942, CINCFE to DA, 16 Sep 51, in

Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper

28.

4

 (1) Kenneth W. Myers, The U.S. Military Advisory Group to the ROK, Part IV, KMAG's Wartime Experiences, 11 July 1951-27 July 1953, pp. 26-

27, 189. MS in OCMH. (Hereafter cited as Myers,

KMAG's Wartime Experiences). (2) Memo, Jenkins

for CofS, 9 Nov 51, sub: To Determine What Can

be Done Now to Make Better Use of Korean Manpower, in G-3 091 Korea, 187/7. 5

 Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experiences, pp. 26-27,

189.
210 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ment of three additional camps—one in

each corps area—in September 1951.6

By the beginning of November 1951

considerable progress was made in the

organization of the school and training

system. The Replacement Training and

School Command under General Champeny had acquired additional personnel

and was ready to handle large groups.7

To centralize training installations the

RTSC recommended that the Infantry

School, Artillery School, and Signal

School all be relocated at Kwangju in

southwestern Korea, about 120 miles

west of Pusan. The consolidated school

opened in early January and was given

a new name the following month—The

Korean Army Training Center. Up to

15,000 troops could be instructed at one

time at this installation.8

At the officer candidate school level

the course was extended from eighteen

to twenty-four weeks to provide extra

training for the new company grade officers. And on 1 January 1951 the Korean Military Academy reopened its

doors at Chinhae near Pusan with a full

four-year curriculum patterned after

West Point. For field grade officers a

Command and General Staff School was

established at Taegu and officially

launched on 11 December 1951.9

In the meantime 150 ROK officers

attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and another 100 took the

course at the Artillery School at Fort Sill,

Oklahoma. From this group trained in

U.S. schools the Army hoped to recruit

the future instructors for the ROK

Army, As a whole, the officers chosen

to go to the U.S. service schools were the

pick of the crop and did well at their

studies. The chief problem, as usual, was

that of language and interpreters had to

be sent along with the students, but

many of the latter took advantage of

their tour in the United States and

learned some English as well. Since few

Americans learned to speak Korean, this

was to be of great value when these

officers later returned to Korea. The

problem of communication between Korean and American soldiers was a continuing and perplexing one, especially

when technical exchanges took place.

The first group of ROK officers graduated from the U.S. schools in March 1952

and a second contingent of 250 officers

left Korea the same month to begin the

next cycle.10

The growing effort in behalf of the

ROK Army increased the demands upon

KMAG and led to a request from Ridgway that the group be augmented. On

1 November the Department of the

Army approved an expansion of over

800 spaces for KMAG, bringing its total

strength to over 1,800 officers and men.11

As the ROK Army began to improve

in quality. Acting Secretary of Defense

William C. Foster raised the question of

its ultimate quantity. On 10 November

he requested the JCS views on the mission and size of the postwar ROK defense force.12

 Since both MacArthur and

6

 Ibid., pp. 134-36. 7

 Ibid., pp. 128-31. 8

 Ibid. 9

 Ibid., pp. 201-04.

10

 (1) Ibid., pp. 174-79. (2) Memo, Jenkins for

DCofS, 21 Nov 51, sub: ROKA Students . . . , in

G-3 350.2 Korea, 5/16. 11

 Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 9 Nov 51, sub: To

Determine What Can Be Done Now to Make Better

Use of Korean Manpower . . . , in G-3 091 Korea,

187/7. 12

 Memo, Foster for JCS, 10 Nov 51, sub: PostHostilities Military Forces of the ROK, in G-3 091

Korea, 208.
BEHIND THE LINES 211

Ridgway had consistently favored a tendivision, 250,000-man army the JCS recommended that this figure be maintained

despite the fact that the President and

his advisors had decided in the meantime

to increase ROK military strength.13

The Joint Chiefs informed the Secretary

of Defense in late January 1952 that the

ROK economy did not have the capability to sustain a significant expansion of

military forces in the near future. In

their opinion, the present ROK units,

when properly trained, equipped, and

led, should constitute a sufficient deterrent to further aggression or, if the occasion demanded, could delay Communist advance until reinforcements could

be brought in.14 The ROK Government

was in the throes of a serious financial

crisis as a result of steady inflation and

hardly in a position to assume additional

heavy expenses, it is true, but this was

but one facet to the problem. It should

not be forgotten that the United States

had made commitments to supply many

of the military requirements of its

NATO allies and was about to sponsor

the renascence of the Japanese defense

forces as well. With U.S. production not

on a full war scale and with heavy demands at home and abroad to be met,

it appeared that ROK Army expansion

would have to await a more opportune

moment.

The ROK Government and its most

effective spokesman, President Rhee, did

not, of course, agree that an army of ten

divisions would be enough to defend

South Korea in the postwar period, but

the matter lay quiescent until late March

1952. During an inspection trip to Korea, Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball

discovered that General Van Fleet favored the formation of ten additional

ROK divisions. When he reported this

item to the Army Policy Council upon

his return there was considerable consternation. This was the first intimation

that the Army had received of strong

support for ROK Army expansion and

it was a little humiliating to have to get

the information from the Navy. In any

event General Hull immediately asked

Ridgway for an explanation.15

Ridgway was just as surprised as his

superiors had been and forthwith queried Van Fleet. In this roundabout manner he was finally informed by the Eighth

Army commander that the latter did believe in the expansion of the ROK Army

to twenty divisions. Van Fleet maintained that the ROK had the manpower

and the desire to fight and the United

States could support ROK troops in

Korea much more economically than

American forces. As a conclusion to a

somewhat amazing performance, Van

Fleet referred his commander to an interview he had just had published in the

U.S. News and World Report, if Ridgway desired more information on his

views.16

Whatever Ridgway's personal reaction

to this turn of events may have been,

he exercised remarkable restraint. He

told Hull that he had not seen Van

Fleet's magazine interview, but nevertheless he flatly disagreed with his subordinate on doubling the ROK Army. Not

only was the ROK economy unable to

13

 See Chapter VI, above. 14

 Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 23 Jan 52, sub:

Post-Hostilities Military Forces of the ROK.

15

 Msg, DA 905814, Hull to Ridgway, 9 Apr 52. 16

 Msg, G 5347 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 9

Apr 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1,

incl 18. See also Interv with General Van Fleet, in

U.S. News and World Report, vol. XXXII, No. 13

(March 28, 1952).
212 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

MAIN ACADEMIC BUILDING OF THE KOREAN MILITARY ACADEMY, CHINHAE

sustain additional forces, but he thought

that the development of the Japanese

defense forces should be given preference at this time. The training program

for the ROK ten-division army was just

beginning to bear fruit, he went on, but

it would take another ten months before

it was completed. If the United States

started to organize ten additional divisions it would require eighteen months

to prepare them for action and the

United States would also have to furnish

all subsistence, clothing, and pay. Although he had the utmost respect for

General Van Fleet, Ridgway informed

Hull that "His outlook, however, in this

particular case is in my opinion quite

naturally focused almost exclusively on

the Korean situation, as that situation

affects the U.S. I cannot believe due

consideration has been accorded to the

inseparable relation of the Japanese,

Chinese Nationalists, and Southeast Asia

military programs to which the United

States Government is committed, or

which it has under study."

 17

General Ridgway's disapproval was

enough to prevent an increase in the

ROK ground forces and when he left

the Far East Command in May for a

new assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, no change had been

made in the size of the army. In the

matter of ROK air and marine forces,

however, the Far East commander ran

into more difficulty. The ROK Air

17

 Msg, CX 66647, Ridgway to Hull, 8 Apr 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 19.
BEHIND THE LINES 213

Force was small and equipped with propeller-driven planes. In Ridgway's view,

a 4,000-man air force with seventeen

obsolescent fighters and twenty-nine miscellaneous craft could offer no real opposition to a future Communist air sweep

and would probably be wiped out

quickly. Maintenance of a tiny, impotent force was wasteful, Ridgway continued, since in the event of renewed

aggression the United States would still

have to provide air support for the ROK.

"A second best Air Force is worse than

none," he told the JCS.18 But the U.N.

commander found that it was next to

impossible to abolish a service once it

gained a firm foothold. The JCS showed

no disposition to tamper with the ROK

Air Force and no action was taken on

Ridgway's recommendation.

The same reception met his proposal

to dispense with a separate marine force

after the war. To his way of thinking,

a marine division would require separate

overhead and support elements that

would duplicate those of the Army and

this needless expense would have to be

borne by the U.S. taxpayer.19 The U.S.

Navy, however, had already established

both a Naval Advisory Group and a Marine Advisory Group to the ROK in

February, and Ridgway's plea went unheeded.20

Despite the mixed success of Ridgway's efforts to restrict the size of the

ROK armed forces, he and his staff did

manage to effect several internal improvements aimed at bolstering the

efficiency of the ROK troops. In November Ridgway authorized Van Fleet

to increase the strength of the Korean

Service Corps to 60,000 men. This

would permit all the laborers and carriers in the combat areas to be organized

and brought under tight control and discipline. It would also assure the fighting

corps of more reliable service support.

Eventually Ridgway planned to raise the

ceiling of the Korean Service Corps to

75,000.21

The U.N. commander also made efforts to correct one of the basic weaknesses of the ROK Army—the lack of

adequate integral artillery support. In

the past ROK divisions had been forced

to rely upon U.S. artillery support for

most of their offensive and defensive missions. Only one 105-mm. howitzer battalion was assigned to each ROK division

as opposed to three 105-mm. and one

155-mm. battalions in each U.S. division.

In addition, the latter had tank support

and more heavy mortar companies available to perform its tasks. Previously the

Eighth Army and Far East Command

staffs had argued that the rough terrain,

lack of roads, and resupply problems

added to the dearth of trained artillerymen and unavailability of equipment

had precluded expanding the ROK artillery. But as the war lengthened and

settled into its static phase, many of these

objections were overcome. In September four ROK 155-mm. howitzer battalions were authorized for activation

before the end of the year. These battalions were trained for eight weeks by

U.S. corps personnel. Three headquarters batteries and six 105-mm. howitzer

battalions were added in November and

began their training in January 1952.

18

 Msg, C 65987, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Mar 52, DAIN 121000. 19

 Ibid.

20

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Feb 52, pp.

4-2, 4-3. 21

 Msg. CINCFE to DA, 18 Nov 51, DA-IN 354.
214 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Finally in March Ridgway approved a

full complement of three 105-mm. and

one 155-mm. howitzer battalions for each

of the ten ROK divisions. In May the

Department of the Army sent interim

authorization for the Far East Command

to proceed with this program.22

The process of improving the ROK

Army was well on its way by April 1952.

Schools and training programs to raise

the leadership level and confidence of

the troops had been started and began

to produce demonstrable results. Increased service and combat support to

bolster the ROK forces in combat was

being organized and equipped. Given

time, the ROK Army could become one

of the better armies in the Far East.

Relations With the ROK

Military affairs were but one aspect of

the problem of conducting a war on the

soil of an ally. As the United States had

discovered during the World War II

campaigns in China, politics played an

important role that seemed to increase

in inverse ratio to the pressures generated at the front. If the fighting were

heavy and external crises dominated the

scene, internal politics might be played

down or overshadowed. But a static war

permitted domestic dissensions to come

to the surface and frequently required

delicate and diplomatic handling. The

situation in South Korea followed this

pattern during the armistice period and

was to occasion many a tense moment

for the U.N. Command in its efforts to

fight a war and conclude a peace at the

same time.

When the armistice negotiations were

initiated, President Rhee and his government had firmly opposed a compromise settlement with the Communists.

They had no desire to return to the

status quo that had been so unsatisfactory

in the prewar period and regarded the

time as ripe for the unification of Korea

—under ROK hegemony. As long as the

talks appeared to be making little progress, there was scant reason for vehement

action on their part. During the breakdown of negotiations in August, a ROK

spokesman had frankly welcomed the

turn of events and claimed that the Communists had simply used the discussions

as a cover for their military build-up.23

On 20 September, Rhee set forth his

terms for dealing with the enemy—terms

that the Communists could not possibly

accept without admitting defeat. First

the Chinese should withdraw from Korea and the North Koreans should be

disarmed. Then the latter would be

given full representation in the Korean

National Assembly and presumably this

would settle the whole problem. The

ROK President felt that the Communists

should be given a time limit for acceptance; otherwise the negotiations should

be concluded. In his opinion, the enemy

was using the talks to humiliate and discredit the United Nations in the eyes of

the Communist world.24

After the negotiations resumed in October, the ROK Government expressed

its dissatisfaction in many ways. A favorite method was through "spontaneous"

demonstrations similar to the one staged

by students in Pusan in early December.

Close to 500 students gathered and paraded through the city carrying signs 22

 (1) Msg, DA 909826, G-3 to CINCFE, 27 May

52. (2) Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experience, pp.

87-96.

23

 New York Times, August 24, 1951. 24

 New York Times, September 21, 1951.
BEHIND THE LINES 215

and placards bearing such anticease-fire

slogans as "No Armistice Without Unification."

 25

 These apparent popular outbursts of indignation against the truce

meetings could be mounted quickly

whenever there seemed to be a possibility of agreement at Panmunjom.

The continual ROK agitation and

hints from Rhee that the government

might not observe the terms of an armistice disturbed General Ridgway. It

may be remembered that the UNC control over the ROK armed forces rested

upon Rhee's July 1950 letter to MacArthur assigning command to the latter

and anyone he delegated for the duration

of the hostilities only. In the months

that had followed the ROK Government

had faithfully observed this pledge and

it had not been considered necessary to

seek a firm written understanding on the

matter. But by early 1952 Ridgway felt

that a formal agreement covering the

armistice period should be secured to

forestall independent action by the Republic of Korea in opposition to the

truce stipulations. Unless the ROK military forces remained under UNC control after the truce was concluded, there

was a distinct possibility that the truce

would be short-lived. Under the circumstances, Ridgway urged a high-level governmental approach to secure a written

commitment on armed forces and, at the

same time, to stop the ROK antiarmistice campaign.26

While the U.S. political and military

leaders recognized the danger, they

doubted that the proper moment had

arrived to negotiate with the ROK Government on the future control of its

military power. To reach an understanding while ROK emotions were running

high might result in the imposition of

conditions unacceptable to the U.N.

Command and jeopardize the achievement of an armistice. Therefore they

preferred to work out the terms of the

truce first and use the presence of UNC

forces in Korea and the supply and training of South Korean troops as persuasive

points to gain ROK compliance later.27

They were more sympathetic to the

suggestion that President Truman might

make an appeal to Rhee to halt the massive ROK assault on the armistice. On

4 March the President informed Rhee

of the concern of the United States over

the ROK attitude toward the truce. He

pointed out that the U.N. unity of purpose in Korea must be maintained at all

costs since divergencies might threaten

the support of the U.N. and then issued

a note of warning:

The degree of assistance which your

Government and the people of Korea will

continue to receive in repelling the aggres- sion, in seeking a just political settlement, and in repairing the ravages of that ag- gression will inevitably be influenced by the

sense of responsibility demonstrated by

your Government, its ability to maintain

the unity of the Korean people, and its de- votion to democratic ideals.28

The stress that the President laid on

the relationship between ROK actions

and U.N. assistance could not but have

its effect upon President Rhee and his

25

 Msg, 070801, American Embassy, Pusan, to SCAP,

7 Dec 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov-Dec 51, an. 1, incl 45. 26

 Msg, CX 64241, Ridgway to JCS, 25 Feb 52, DA- IN 109112.

27

 Msg, JCS 902158, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Feb 52.

This message was drafted by the State Department

and cleared with the JCS, Defense Department, and

the President. 28

 Msg, DA 902912, Eddleman to CINCFE, 6 Mar

52. This transmitted the Truman message to Rhee.
216 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

AN ANTIARMISTICE DEMONSTRATION IN SEOUL

staff. From the close of World War II

down to the outbreak of the Korean War

the United States had made substantial

contributions to the South Korean economy. When the war began in 1950, again

it was the United States which had taken

the lead in sending military and economic aid. Food, clothing, and supplies

for the thousands who were displaced

and for the sick and wounded were provided not only for humanitarian motives,

but also with the realization that unrest

and disease within the UNC area would

complicate the military operations then

under way. The United States also had

long-range plans for relief and rehabilitation that it intended to carry out under

U.N. auspices as soon as the war was

over. It had taken the lead in proposing

and supporting the formation of the

United Nations Korean Reconstruction

Agency (UNKRA) that was established

on 1 December 1950 and had provided

the new agency the bulk of its funds.29

29

 For a discussion of U.S. aid policy in Korea see

Gene M. Lyons, "American Policy and the United

Nations Program for Korean Reconstruction," in

International Organization, vol. XII, No. 2 (1958),

pp. 180-92.
BEHIND THE LINES 217

Although the prolongation of the war

delayed the effective functioning of

UNKRA, the U.N. Command set up the

U.N. Civil Assistance Command in Korea under the Eighth Army in early 1951

to prevent disease and unrest. Designed

to safeguard the security of the rear

areas, UNCACK engaged primarily in

relief work, providing consumer goods

to meet the immediate needs of the civilian population. The comparative inactivity at the front during the truce

negotiations permitted reconstruction

and rehabilitation to begin while the

fighting was still going on. By the end

of 1951, Ridgway and the UNKRA

officials had fashioned a working agreement that allowed UNKRA to start on a

limited reconstruction program subject

to the approval of the UNC.30

Thus the actual control over relief and

economic assistance to South Korea remained under UNC control as long as

military operations continued and for a

six-month period after an armistice was

concluded. This, of course, strengthened

the hand of Ridgway in his dealings with

the ROK Government. But the exigencies of war and the pouring into Korea

of U.S. money, goods, and services led to

a repetition of the U.S. experience in

China in World War II. The undeveloped economy of the ROK, disrupted

by war and essentially agricultural, could

not absorb the added purchasing power

that large military expenditures brought

into being. While the ROK Government

resorted to the printing press to meet

the demands for more currency in connection with military operations, it could

not siphon off the growing supply of

money in circulation by increasing industrial production or by larger imports of

consumer goods. U.S. aid helped somewhat, but the $150,000,000 that had been

expended by 15 September 1951, plus

fifty million dollars' worth of services

and ten million dollars in raw materials

could not stem the tide of inflation.31

By January 1952 the ROK financial

situation had become critical. Although

the deficit spending indulged in by the

ROK Government and the bank credit

expansion practices that were permitted

contributed to the inflationary trend, the

ROK officials placed the principal blame

upon the advances in Korean won made

to the UNC for military requirements.

They charged that the U.N. Command

had failed to settle in dollars for the

won issued and intimated that they

would not be able to provide more currency to the UNC after January.32

By an agreement signed on 28 July

1950 the ROK Government had pledged

itself to supply the currency needed by

the UNC and to defer the settlement of

claims arising from this procedure until

a time satisfactory to both parties. The

hint that the ROK might not meet its

obligation worried Ridgway. He had no

objection to making monthly settlements

in dollars for the won advances as long as

the UNC retained some control over

ROK foreign exchange. To help counteract inflation he proposed that the

UNC secure ROK currency by sale of

imported commodities to the Korean

people and by purchasing won at the

30

 Memo of Understanding between UNC and U.N.

Korean Reconstruction Agency, 21 Dec 51.

31

 Msg, CINCUNC to DA, 20 Sep 51, DA-IN 18653. 32

 Msg, C 62218, Ridgway to Collins, 25 Jan 52,

DA-IN 4572.
218 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

UNLOADING RICE FOR SOUTH KOREANS FROM THE ANDREW JACKSON, PUSAN

best rate through any legal source.33 In

addition, Ridgway believed that by making book settlement for UNC services,

with no actual use of money, the amount

of currency in circulation could be held

down.34

But the ROK Government balked at

permitting the U.N. Command to maintain control of its foreign exchange and

negotiations between the two came to a

halt in February. In the meantime the

UNC had drawn eight million dollars'

worth of won in January as opposed to

only six million dollars' worth in December and Ridgway asked Van Fleet to give

his personal attention to the problem of

holding down expenditures involving

the use of won.

35 The gravity of the

spiralling inflation can be easily seen in

the increase of currency in circulation

between 1 July 1951 and 1 March 1952

33

 The legal exchange rate of 6,000 won to the

dollar was not considered to be approximate to

actual value of the won. In January 1952 a rate of

12,000 won to the dollar would have been closer to

the actual value. 34

 (1) Msg, GX 60526, CINCFE to G-3, 31 Dec

51. DA-IN 15295. (2) Msg, CINCFE to G-3, 24 Jan 52. DA-IN 4192.

35

 Msg, C 63175, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 9 Feb 52,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an. 1, incl 24.
BEHIND THE LINES 219

—from 122 billion to 812 billion won.

36

The impasse in the financial negotiations and the ever-rising inflation

coupled with the ROK attitude toward

the armistice and domestic complications

in the ROK Government prompted

Ridgway and Ambassador Muccio to suggest in early March that a high-level

mission be sent from Washington to

reach an understanding on the entire

field of ROK-UNC relations.37 Impressed by the urgency of Ridgway's request, the Department of the Army

moved quickly to prepare for the dispatch of a mission. Defense and State

Department approval was soon obtained.

On 28 March the President named Clarence E. Meyer, head of the Mutual Security Administration mission to

Austria, as chief of the delegation. The

Department of State agreed to act as

monitor since the mission was given a

broad directive to negotiate "financial,

economic and other appropriate agreements between the United States or the

Unified Command and the Republic of

Korea."38

The end result was an agreement

signed on 24 May between the Unified

Command and the ROK. Considering

the political turmoil that was rampant

in South Korea and the strong feelings

expressed about national sovereignty, the

Meyer understanding represented a fair

compromise. The most important provision established a Combined Economic

Board with one Unified Command and

one ROK member to promote effective

economic co-ordination. The board

would make recommendations that

would be binding on the use of all foreign exchange and integrate it with the

UNC assistance programs. As for the

UNC won advances, the Unified Command agreed to settle up for all advances

made between 1 January 1952 and 31

May 1952 at the 6,000-won-to-a-dollar

rate. Claims for 1950-51 would be

deferred until a later date and claims

for future months would be paid for at

a more realistic rate than 6,000 to 1.

Ten percent of the amount advanced

each month would be written off by the

ROK Government as its contribution to

the war effort. In addition, the ROK

Government agreed to take internal

measures to control inflation and the

Unified Command would attempt to

draw won from the market by bringing

in as many salable goods as possible.39

If both sides made sincere efforts to

carry out the terms of this agreement,

the economic situation in Korea could

improve considerably in the near future.

Whether this might also have a favorable

influence upon the political and armistice problems was another matter. By

May 1952 the armistice negotiations had

again reached a stalemate and ROK agitation against the truce had subsided,

but President Rhee's internal conflict

with his fellow politicians threatened to

build up into another crisis. In any case

36

 Charles N. Henning, Economic and Related

Political Factors in Civil Affairs Operations, Republic of Korea, ORO Study T-211 (Washington:

Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1952), p. 43. 37

 (1) Msg, C 65015, Ridgway to CofS, 10 Mar

52, DA-IN 114192. (2) Msg, C 65121, Ridgway to

CofS, 12 Mar 52, DA-IN 115005. 38

 Draft Directive, sub: Terms of Reference for

the Unified Command Mission to the ROK, no

date, in G-3 091 Korea, 42/11. A copy of this

directive was sent to Meyer in Japan in April.

39

 Ltr, Meyer to Osborn, no sub, 24 May 1952, to

G-3, 091 Korea, 42/16. The United States agreed to

pay $75,000,000 for the January-May 1952 period

and an initial payment of $35,000,000 was made on

29 July.
220 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the U.N. Command might only have

adjusted the economic differences in

time to be dragged into the political

arena. But, at least, one thorn in ROKUNC relations had been amicably removed.

The Japanese Take a Hand

All of General Ridgway's problems

behind the lines did not involve the

Republic of Korea directly, but many

had an influence upon events taking

place on the peninsula. Across the Sea of

Japan new and complicating elements

were introduced in late 1951 and early

1952. From the outset of the war the

United States had used the islands of

Japan as a huge supply and staging base

for the UNC forces fighting in Korea.

In his role as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Ridgway could employ the

facilities available in Japan as he saw fit

to support the UNC effort. The signing

of the peace treaty in September 1951,

however, foreshadowed a period of

change as the military government

closed out its regime and the Japanese

civil authorities once more assumed control of their nation's affairs. In the interim, arrangements had to be made

defining the relationship between the

U.S. military and civil representatives

and the Japanese Government and provision had to be made for the defense of

Japan.

Under the Security Treaty signed on

8 September between the United States

and Japan, the former was granted the

right to maintain armed forces on the

islands until the Japanese could build up

sufficient strength to defend themselves.

The conditions governing the disposition of U.S. troops and the use of Japanese facilities would be worked out by an

administrative agreement between the

two countries.40

Since the end of the war in Korea

remained uncertain and the utilization

of Japanese facilities and ports appeared

necessary as long as the conflict continued, the Security Treaty afforded the

legal basis for the continued presence of

U.S. forces in Japan. Even under optimum conditions, it would take considerable time for the Japanese to organize,

train, and equip adequate units to defend Japan on their own. And the renunciation of war by the Japanese

constitution would make the development of armed forces a delicate matter.

Fortunately, insofar as Japanese defense forces were concerned, a start had

been made in mid-1950 shortly after the

Korean War began. When General MacArthur realized that he would have to

deploy the majority of his U.S. units to

Korea, he authorized the Japanese officials to set up a National Police Reserve

force of 75,000 men. Although the organization ostensibly was formed to

preserve internal order, the recruits went

through a thirteen-week basic training

course during which they became familiar with small weapons and then moved

into an eighteen-week course which

stressed small unit training and used

machine guns and rocket launchers. In

June 1951 the Police Reserve engaged

in battalion maneuvers. When the armistice negotiations got under way in July,

the force was organized into four infantry divisions of 15,200 men each, but it

lacked heavy equipment and had not had

40

 See the text of the treaty in Department of State

Bulletin, vol. XXV, No. 638 (September 17, 1951),

pp. 463-65.
BEHIND THE LINES 221

sufficient training to qualify for other

than internal security functions.41

Despite these deficiencies, in May

1951 President Truman approved planning and budgeting for sufficient material to equip ten National Police Reserve Japan (NPRJ) divisions by 1

July 1952. After studying the political

and economic factors involved, Ridgway

recommended in September that a

phased expansion to a balanced tendivision force be adopted. The difficult

part, in his opinion, would be the preparation of Japanese public opinion for

training of the NPRJ with heavy equipment and armament. This would have

to be done by the Japanese Government

and Ridgway would see Prime Minister

Shigeru Yoshida on this point soon.42

While arrangements for an increased

NPRJ went forward in Tokyo, the Department of the Army came up with

some disconcerting facts. General Collins informed Ridgway in mid-December

that a lack of funds might force the

drastic reduction of the NPRJ program.

There was no money available from the

Mutual Defense Assistance Program and

funds for the NPRJ had been cut from

the Army fiscal year 1953 budget. Under

the circumstances Collins advised Ridgway to revise his plans and endeavor to

get along on the funds already allocated.43

Ridgway was shocked, "It is to me

incredible that from a national defense

budget of $57 billion, we cannot find

the relatively meager funds required to

support the rapid establishment of a

small Japanese army... . For each dollar

expended, it is my considered opinion

that the U.S. can purchase more security

through the creation of Japanese forces

than can be purchased by similar expenditures in any other nation in the

world, including the United States."

The alternative, Ridgway went on,

would be to maintain U.S. troops at far

greater cost in the Far East. He did not

see how he could discuss the NPRJ matter any further with the Japanese until

a firm U.S. policy was forthcoming.

Vacillation on the part of the United

States would create a similar response in

the Japanese. If the United States desired to expand the NPRJ more slowly,

this might fit in very well with Japanese

desires, but Ridgway regarded the proposed cutback "as nothing less than catastrophic to the vital interests of our

country."

 44

The fervent plea of the Far East commander produced a quick reaction in

Washington, and by 23 December, Collins was able to allay Ridgway's apprehensions. Secretary Lovett had approved

the inclusion of three hundred million

dollars in the Army budget for the Japanese defense program.45

Armed with this reassurance, the

SCAP staff reviewed NPRJ planning and

recommended on 1 January 1952 that

priority during the first stage of the expansion be accorded to nondivisional

combat units, such as antiaircraft, tank,

and artillery, rather than to the formation of new divisions.46

 But further implication from Washington that the

UNC program could not be carried out

in its present form led to another round

41

 CINCFE G-3 Presentation to Asst Secy Army

Alexander, no date, in G-3 091 Korea, 187/7. 42

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, pp. 35-36. 43

 Msg, DA 89795, CofS to CINCFE, 18 Dec 51.

44

 Msg, C 59752, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Dec 51, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 4, incl 1. 45

 Msg, DA 90318, CofS to CINCFE, 23 Dec 51. 46

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, pp. 43-44.
222 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

of messages. The upshot of the affair

was that a SCAP delegation, headed by

Maj. Gen. William F. Marquat, was sent

to the United States in late January to

thresh out the matter. After five weeks

of consultation, the Army and SCAP

representatives fashioned a modus operandi acceptable to both groups. Ridgway would complete the equipping of

the four divisions already established and

see to it that they became and remained

combat-ready in the future. During the

next fiscal year the NPRJ would be increased to six divisions with supporting

units and the expansion to ten divisions

would be phased over fiscal 1954 and

1955, as funds and equipment became

available.47

Actually the decision to stretch out the

expansion program was not influenced

by the lack of money and equipment

alone. As it turned out, the Japanese

Government had no desire to move

quickly in rearming the country. Prime

Minister Yoshida would not approve an

increase of the NPRJ beyond 110,000

for the 1953 fiscal year. Although SCAP

pressed for an augmentation to between

150-180,000, Yoshida declined to make

a commitment until after general elections were held in early 1953.48

 Since

Japanese reluctance to rearm swiftly

dovetailed with U.S. financial and production deficiencies in connection with

the program, the slowdown in developing adequate Japanese defense forces

probably represented a workable compromise.

In the meantime Japanese public

opinion could be conditioned for the

return of Japan to a position of responsibility in the Far East. The United States

intended to help Japan by assisting the

nation to secure access to raw materials

and markets and by encouraging Japanese industry to provide the means by

which the country could once again defend itself. Some offshore procurement

of ammunition and equipment might be

arranged to give the Japanese munitions

industry a start, but the Department of

the Army felt that the main task had to

be accomplished by the Japanese themselves.49

The re-emergence of Japan as a sovereign nation spawned a host of other

problems as well. To General Ridgway

in his role as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, one of the most important

was the future status of the U.S. and U.N.

military forces in Japan. After the peace

treaty was ratified, the occupation would

end and SCAP would be abolished. Before the latter came to pass, Ridgway

wanted to settle the future relationship

between the UNC/FEC and the Japanese Government.

On 18 September he outlined his approach to the subject to the JCS. Ridgway pointed out that while theoretically

Japan would enjoy full political control,

its national security would depend for

some time upon both Japanese and U.S.

forces. Since this was a military reality,

the Far East commander felt that he

should have adequate authority to counteract any threat to the security of the

U.S. forces under his command and to

deal directly with the Japanese Government on all military matters. His orders

should come, as in the past, from the

47

 Msg, DA 902603, CofS to CINCFE, 4 Mar 52. 48

 Memo, Civil Affairs Sec SCAP to CofS SCAP,

28 Feb 52, sub: Conf by SCAP with Prime Minister

Yoshida, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1,

incl 11. 49

 Msg, DA 902855, DA to SCAP, 7 Mar 52.
BEHIND THE LINES 223

JCS or their superiors. He would, of

course, co-ordinate with the chief of the

U.S. diplomatic mission to Japan whenever it was necessary.50

The prospective end of military rule

in Japan and the return of civilian control, however, had a concomitant—the

restoration of normal diplomatic relations and of the pre-eminence of the U.S.

Ambassador in intergovernmental intercourse. On 22 December the Army

informed Ridgway that the JCS had

submitted most of his recommendations

to the Secretary of Defense, but that the

chief of the diplomatic mission would

take precedence over him and be the

channel for all governmental matters except those specifically of a military nature.51

During February and March, State

and Defense Department representatives

worked out further compromises in detail, but it was not until April that they

arrived at an agreement that was satisfactory to both sides and approved by

the President. It provided that the

Ambassador would be responsible for all

government relations between the

United States and Japan, but that Ridgway would not be subordinate to him in

military matters. The Far East commander could negotiate directly with the

Japanese Government on security, defense, and military assistance affairs and

was authorized to appoint the U.S. member of the newly formed Joint Committee.52

Ridgway had insisted upon receiving

his orders directly from the JCS and

their superiors and this channel of command remained as before. His authority

to select the U.S. representative of the

Joint Committee also came from the JCS

as he had desired. The Joint Committee

stemmed from the Administrative

Agreement signed on 28 February 1952

between the United States and Japan

in Tokyo. In the process of establishing

the terms under which U.S. forces would

remain in Japan and contribute to Japanese defense, a Joint Committee with

one U.S. and one Japanese member was

set up for consultation on the implementation of the agreement. Since such

complex matters as the use of ports and

facilities, custom regulations, taxes,

postal privileges, and legal jurisdiction

were covered, the Joint Committee was

held necessary to straighten out differences of opinion.53

On 28 April the occupation of Japan

ended and U.S. military forces assumed

a new and diminished position as guests

and allies rather than conquerors. But

since there would be a long period during which Japanese security would be

dependent upon U.S. forces, the Far East

commander and his staff retained considerable prestige. The need for protection until Japanese defense forces were

ready to take over the major responsibility argued that Ridgway and his successors would wield a goodly measure of

influence in Japanese affairs despite the

loss of the bulk of their powers. On the

other hand, civilian ascendancy had been

re-established and the importance of the

U.S. Ambassador was certain to increase

as military dependence upon the United

States lessened. 50

 Msg, C 50742, CINCFE to JCS, 13 Sep 51, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, an. 4, incl 10. 51

 Msg, DA 90317, G-3 to CINCFE, 22 Dec 51. 52

 (1) Msg, JCS 905965, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Apr

52. (2) Msg, JCS 907213, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Apr 52.

53

 See text of Administrative Agreement of 28 February 1952, in Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXVI,

No. 663 (March 10, 1952), pp. 383ff.
224 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

The Far East commander meanwhile

had the problem of finding out where the

Japanese forces would fit into the overall defense picture. Would they fight as

separate units or be integrated with U.S.

troops if war broke out? Would they

come under U.S. supreme command or

remain under their own leadership? As

yet, no intergovernmental arrangement

on the control of Japanese security forces

had been reached and the Administrative Agreement merely provided for consultation between the two governments

if hostilities threatened. These questions would have to be settled definitively

and quickly, General Ridgway believed,

and the development of the security

forces of Japan closely correlated with

those of the Republic of Korea lest they

get out of proper balance.54 Since the

United States was sponsoring both nations and bad feeling existed between

them, the formation of formidable military forces on one side might eventually

lead to an unstable situation unless it

were matched by a similar development

on the other. It seemed apparent by the

end of April that although the Japanese

were now officially in the game on their

own, the United States would be supplying the stakes with which they would

play. It would be part of the U.S. task

to make sure that the Japanese played

along with and not against the other

members of the team.

Ammunition Shortages

The complexities of dealing with the

ROK and Japanese Governments seem

quite simple when compared to the perplexing and tortuous labyrinth of ammunition shortages. In the spring of 1953

a Senate subcommittee conducted a

lengthy investigation of the matter and

heard from Van Fleet and Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond as well as Washington

defense officials. The testimony given

revealed the confusion that existed at

the time on the causes and effects of the

shortages.55 Much of the confusion

stemmed from the lack of background

information on the subject.56

At the end of World War II, the

United States had a tremendous inventory of ammunition on hand, but unfortunately it was not a balanced stock.

There were enormous quantities of some

types of ammunition and only small

amounts of others. The hasty demobilization that followed stripped the Ordnance Department of the military and

civilian personnel that might have properly assessed and cared for the huge

inventories of ammunition in its custody.

During the years preceding the Korean

War, powder packed in cotton bags and

fuzes made of substitute metals deteriorated. The Army drew freely upon the

big stockpile for training purposes yet

made no real effort to replace consumption or to balance the items in stock.

Lack of personnel to take a complete

inventory and the drive for economy

among the Armed Forces contributed to

this oversight. Ammunition was expen54

 (1) Msg, C 66619, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Apr 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 12. (2)

Msg, C 67740, Ridgway to DA, 29 Apr 52, DA-IN

133087.

55

 Hearings Before the Preparedness Subcommittee

No. 2 of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S.

Senate, 83d Congress, 1st session, on Ammunition

Shortages in the Armed Services, 1953. 56

 The following summary is based upon the excellent study made by the former Deputy Assistant

Chief of Staff, G-4, Maj. Gen. William O. Reeder,

after the war was over, and entitled: The Korean

Ammunition Shortage. Copy in OCMH files.
BEHIND THE LINES 225

sive and the amounts on hand seemed

adequate for years to come under peacetime conditions.

The lack of postwar orders sent the

ammunition industry into eclipse.

Manufacturers converted to civilian

goods and purchased available surplus

machine tools to service the booming demands for consumer items that the war

had held in leash. When the United

States entered the Korean struggle so

suddenly in 1950, ammunition facilities

and plants were at a low ebb and the

prosperity then prevalent made businessmen reluctant to reconvert their factories

to wartime products. Another element

that restrained a shift to the immediate

production of ammunition was the prevalent belief that the Korean War would

be short and did not warrant a sizable

dislocation of the U.S. industrial effort.

Even after this fallacy was shattered by

the entry of the Chinese into the war in

late 1950, the policy of butter and guns

continued and no large-scale mobilization of industry took placeThe sense of complacency that pervaded the nation during the early phase

of the Korean War cost dearly, for valuable time was lost in getting the languishing munitions industry back on its

feet. Under optimum conditions it took

from eighteen to twenty-four months

after funds were voted to produce finished ammunition in quantity. Since

Congress did not approve the first large

appropriation for ammunition until

early January 1951, this meant that even

under optimum conditions the end products of this money could not arrive on

the scene until late 1952 or early 1953.

In the meantime the U.S. and ROK

forces in Korea had to live off the stockpile. Fortunately, in addition to the

supply of finished rounds of ammunition, there were also large quantities of

component parts available that could be

used. Since the first months of the war

were characterized by a high degree of

mobility that required less artillery expenditure, it appeared that the shells on

hand and those that could be readily

finished were sufficient to carry the

United States and its allies through the

war.57

As the war ground to a slower pace in

mid-1951, artillery assumed a new importance. Static warfare required more

artillery missions to harass and interdict

the enemy. This meant that the day of

supply—the average number of rounds

that a gun was expected to fire daily over

a considerable period of time—had to be

raised.58 Since the day of supply in turn

determined the number of shells that

were held in reserve in the Far East

Command, an expansion in reserve

stocks followed.59 The increased demands upon the stockpiles and the

knowledge that there was no possibility

of replenishing the heavy consumption of

artillery rounds until at least late 1952

formed the backdrop to the events of the

fall of 1951.

Concern over the theater artillery situation began to arise during the battle

for Bloody Ridge in August-September

1951. 2d Division artillerymen fired

over 153,000 rounds during the fight

and the 15th Field Artillery Battalion

57

 It should be noted that small arms ammunition

was always plentiful and caused no concern. 58

 The day of supply was based upon World War

II experience. 59

 The reserve was computed by multiplying the

day of supply by the number of guns on hand and

then multiplying the result by seventy-five days,

which was the safety-level factor in case deliveries

should be halted or cut off for a period.
226 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

set a new record for light battalions by

firing 14,425 rounds in twenty-four

hours. By the end of the action artillery

supplies in the theater reserve were

greatly reduced but no rationing was

introduced except for illuminating

shells which were in very short supply.60

Despite denials from the divisions that

ammunition was wasted or misused,

thousands of rounds of 105-mm. howitzer ammunition were hurled fruitlessly

against enemy bunkers on Bloody Ridge.

The high trajectory of their fire lessened

the chances of direct hits upon the Communist strongpoints and reduced their

penetrating power. The job of knocking

out the pillboxes and bunkers had to be

done by the heavier and more accurate

8-inch howitzers with concrete-piercing

shells set for delayed firing and by flat

trajectory gun fire. It is interesting to

note that after the battle Van Fleet issued a warning against waste of 8-inch

and 105-mm. howitzer ammunition since

these were then in short supply and at

the same time the Eighth Army commander advocated the use of 155-mm.

ammunition instead.61

During the assault on Heartbreak

Ridge, however, Van Fleet imposed no

restrictions upon the 2d Division artillery. But because of the heavy expenditures, local deficits appeared. For

example, 4.2-inch mortars had to be

used when 81-mm. ammunition ran low

and air and rail shipments to the front

had to be made to keep the 4.2-inch

ammunition on hand.62 It was not surprising that the sustained barrages

quickly consumed the supplies on hand

in the firing units since original plans

for the taking of Heartbreak Ridge envisioned the task as a relatively short and

simple one.

The I Corps COMMANDO operation in

October demonstrated another phase in

the ammunition saga. When the Communists massed their artillery against

this advance, UNC guns depleted the

stores at ammunition supply points and

I Corps had to place restrictions on its

artillery units. As it pointed out later,

the I Corps did this not only to replenish

the supply points, but also to compel

units to use up the ammunition they

were stockpiling in excess of what they

were normally allowed to have on hand.63

Stockpiling was a long-established practice to guard against sudden emergencies

and to provide a cushion in case supplies

were temporarily cut off.

Although the experiences during the

August-October period had to do with

local and temporary shortages that were

due to a high volume of daily fire, General Ridgway decided to bring the matter to the attention of the JCS. The

withdrawals had left the theater artillery

reserve in a weakened condition and, in

Ridgway's opinion, had revealed the

danger in accepting World War II rates

of daily fire for the Korean War. World

War II corps had far more artillery battalions assigned to them than did the

corps in Korea and could maintain a

lesser rate of fire per gun each day to

carry out comparable missions successfully. With relatively fewer guns and

Communist artillery strength constantly

mounting, the U.S. artillery units in Korea had to fire more frequently. Ridg60

 Williamson et al., "Bloody Ridge," ch. V AugSep 51, pp. 27-28. 61

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, sec. I,

Narrative. 62

 Williamson et al., Action on "Heartbreak

Ridge," p. 32. 63 U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I, pp. 63, 75.
BEHIND THE LINES 227

way argued earnestly for an increase in

the day of supply for his 8-inch, 105-mm.,

and 155-mm. howitzers and for his 155-

mm. guns, pointing out the grim relationship between artillery and casualties:

Whatever may have been the impression

of our operations in Korea to date, artillery

has been and remains the great killer of

Communists. It remains the great saver of

soldiers, American and Allied. There is a

direct relation between the piles of shells

in the Ammunition supply points and the

piles of corpses in the graves registration

collecting points. The bigger the former, the smaller the latter and vice versa.64

The increase for his heavy caliber

howitzers and guns were but one part of

Ridgway's request. If they were granted,

he wanted to raise the reserve of these

shells from 75 to 90 days as quickly as

possible. He in turn would augment the

supplies in Korea from 30 to 40 days

and keep 20 days' supply in the pipeline

leaving only 30 days' reserve in Japan.65

But even as Ridgway sent off his request,

he informed Van Fleet that the Eighth

Army would have to live within its ammunition income in November. Since it

would take considerable time to build

up the theater reserve again, "There

must be no mental reservation that regardless of disapproval of subordinate

commanders wishes for ammunition that

such ammunition will be supplied in

case stocks get low. Your ammunition

resources, present and predicted, are as

stated above. Their increase is beyond

the capability of this theater."

 66

The approval of Ridgway's requests

on 20 October did not, of course, produce an immediate improvement in the

ammunition situation in the FEC.67 But

the end of the fall campaign and the

negotiation of the line of demarcation

stabilized the battle line and lowered the

intensity of the fighting. The possibility

that an armistice might be concluded

soon led Van Fleet to secure Ridgway's

permission in early December to bring

his ammunition level up to a forty-five

day reserve rather than thirty. Van Fleet

feared that the Communists might succeed in getting a clause freezing

ammunition stocks at their current level

written into the armistice and preferred

to bolster his own before this happened.68

At the end of 1951, the ammunition

tale took a new twist. The records of

ammunition expenditures during the

summer and fall campaigns evidently

were brought to Ridgway's attention and

disturbed him deeply. Although it was

too late to do anything about the ammunition already spent, the Far East commander decided that the phenomenal

rates of fire were due to "either extravagant waste or expenditure of ammunition, or misuse of artillery, or both."

Since excessive use of artillery shells imposed heavier demands upon U.S. industry and drained raw materials, Ridgway

told Van Fleet to maintain constant supervision lest the performance be repeated.69

64

 Msg, GX 53171, CINCFE to JCS, 17 Oct 51, in FEC G-3 471 Ammunition. 65 Ibid. 66

 Msg, CX 53155, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 17 Oct

51, in Hq Eighth Army Opnl Planning Files, Oct

51, p. 17. The Department of the Army daily rate

authorized was: 50 rounds of 150-mm., 33 rounds of

155-mm., and 20 rounds of 8-inch howitzer shells.

Ridgway had asked that these be raised to 55, 40,

and 50, respectively. 67

 Msg, DA 84571, DA to CINCFE, 20 Oct 51. 68

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov-Dec 51, CofS sec.,

an. 1, p. 8. 69

 Msg, C 60169, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 26 Dec 51,

in FEC G-3 471 Ammunition.
228 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

This was a serious charge and Van

Fleet was not inclined to let it pass unchallenged. He did not believe that

there had been either waste or misuse of

artillery and warned against rigid comparisons of World War II firings with

those in Korea. "Based on World War II

European standards," he went on, "I

estimate that the Eighth Army is short

approximately 70 battalions of field artillery. Hence, the greatly reduced intensity of field artillery battalions per

mile of front, has required more rounds

per individual tube to achieve the effectiveness required. The effectiveness of

one volley from four battalions is far

greater than four volleys from one battalion." He admitted using his artillery

freely to kill the enemy during the

offensives, but, taking a leaf from Ridgway's own book, he reminded the Far

East commander that if he had tried to

take the objectives with limited artillery

fire, the casualty lists of the Eighth Army

would have been materially higher. In

closing, Van Fleet maintained that he

kept a watchful eye on the ammunition

level and that he had conserved a considerable amount of shells during the

static October-December period.70

As the Ridgway-Van Fleet exchange

mirrored the increasing concern in the

Far East Command over the situation,

supply officials in Washington offered

little hope that there would be improvement in the calibers that were short until

late in 1952.71 Mortar ammunition and

shells for 8-inch guns and 155-mm. howitzers became less plentiful during the

winter months and there was no prospect

of relief in the heavy shell category in

the near future.72

The time lag between obligating funds

for ammunition production and the delivery of the finished shells was emphasized during early 1952. Despite the fact

that billions of dollars of contracts had

been let, the end result in many cases

was still six months or more in the offing.

In the meantime shortages in the Far

East Command became more difficult to

explain to Congress and the U.S. public.

Although little was happening at the

front in Korea and efforts were made to

restrict nonessential artillery missions,

General Collins felt that expenditures

were still too heavy. Pointing out that

two and a half billion dollars of the three

and a half requested for Army procurement in fiscal year 1953 must be spent

for ammunition, Collins asked Ridgway

on 10 March to see whether major reductions should not be made at once and

retained unless large-scale fighting resumed. Ridgway in turn assigned the

problem to Van Fleet.73

Considering the small number of casualties inflicted upon the enemy during

the early part of 1952, the Eighth Army's

expenditures of artillery ammunition appeared rather high.74

 But Van Fleet was

quick to remind Ridgway that during

70

 Msg, G 3789 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 29 Dec

51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov-Dec 51, CinC

and CofS sec., an. 1, incl 12. 71

 Memo, Magruder (G-4) for ACofS G-3, 28 Dec

51. sub: Augmentation from FEC, in G-3 320.2

Pacific, 79/1.

72

 Memo, Col Davidson, G-3, for Asst CofS G-3,

29 Feb 52, sub: Rpt of Staff Visits During Period 23

Jan-19 Feb 52, in G-3 333 Pacific, 1. 73

 (1) Msg, DA 903815, Collins to Ridgway, 10 Mar

52. (2) Msg, C 66253, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 2 Apr

52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 8. 74

 In January 1952, FEC expended 57,000 tons of

ammunition costing about $114,000,000. Estimated

enemy casualties were about 20,000, so that each

enemy casualty on the average took $5,700 worth of

ammunition before he was injured or killed. See

Check Sheet, EKW [Wright] for CofS, 31 Mar 52,

FEC G-3 471 Ammunition.
BEHIND THE LINES 229

the winter months, Eighth Army had

used less than 60 percent of the ammunition allocated it and at present rates

would expend about three-quarters of a

billion dollars worth in 1952. Heavy

mortar ammunition was under rigid allocation already and could not be reduced further, Van Fleet continued. If

savings were mandatory, the only category that he could afford to reduce was

interdictory fire. Since 66 percent of

Eighth Army's missions were interdictory, as against 19 percent for counterbattery and 15 percent for meeting

enemy actions, Van Fleet was ordering

his corps commanders to cut interdictory fire by 20 percent, but this was as

far as he could go.75

When Ridgway replied to Collins on

9 April, he had increased the estimate of

ammunition costs for 1952 to slightly

over one billion dollars, but after reporting the 20-percent reduction contemplated by Van Fleet in interdictory fire,

Ridgway struck at the heart of the matter:

It still seems to me that the most funda- mental factors in this problem are the ones

most frequently obscured by the search for

economies. Those factors are that we are at

war in Korea, and that ammunition must

be provided to meet essential requirements, both of expenditures and stock levels. Provided these requirements are reasonable, economy ceases to be a factor. The only

alternative is to effect savings of dollars by

expenditure of lives.76

By the end of April several facts were

readily apparent. The huge ammunition stockpile left over from World War

II had been a blessing and a curse. For

while it had provided a substantial backlog on which the United States could

draw to meet the demands of Korea, the

imbalance in its stocks had gone unnoticed and the very mass of the stockpile

had introduced a dangerous sense of

complacency. The expectation of a short

war had fostered this complacency and

permitted the rebuilding of the defunct

ammunition industry to be delayed.

Compounding the situation, the lack of

industrial mobilization that followed the

outbreak of the war led to further setbacks in the battle for ammunition production. In the meantime the imbalances had come to light and, as it

happened, many of these were in mortar

and howitzer ammunition that were

most in demand for the artillery war

that set in from mid-1951 on. The tremendous costs of the ammunition program that were cited in late 1951 and

early 1952 reflected the decelerated pace

of the war and served as an excuse for

reducing the rate of expenditure of ammunition. A lower rate of daily fire in

turn would help alleviate the problem

of dwindling ammunition reserves in the

essential categories. On the other hand,

restrictions in the number of rounds that

could be used each day caused the man at

the front to complain and brought the

whole matter to the attention of Congress and the public.

Despite the charges and countercharges in the ammunition free-for-all,

the principal enemy was time. Until

production could begin on a scale that

would replenish stocks as well as current

needs, the ammunition crises would go

on. The rationing which was adopted in

the winter and spring of 1952 was a

temporary expedient to bridge the gap

75

 Msg, G 5382 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 7 Apr

52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 9. 76

 Msg, C 66608, CINCFE to Collins, 9 Apr 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 10.
230 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

between the decreasing stockpile and

new production, but until the transition

was complete, shortages and expedients

would be the rule.

The disadvantages of fighting even a

small war without an adequate production base in being or capable of quick

expansion are readily discernible in the

ammunition situation of 1951 and 1952.

Feeding the hungry maw of the Far East

Command drained the reserves in the

United States and led to reductions in

allocations for the Army units in Europe.

An expansion of the war might well

have been catastrophic for no amount of

money or effort could buy the most priceless commodity—time.

Fortunately, the Communists matched

the UNC in their disinclination to press

the fight on the battlefield or to broaden

the war. It appeared that as long as the

moderate pace of the conflict continued,

U.S. ammunition supplies would be sufficient to maintain the status quo until

new production took up the slack.

Propaganda Assault

The general indisposition toward combat in early 1952 confined itself wholly

to the front and did not extend to the

battle behind the lines for world opinion. Since words had proven themselves

effective in the matter of the incidents

during the summer and fall of 1951, the

Communists began once again to increase the flow and intensity of their

propaganda. As events at the conference

table at Panmunjom revealed the basic

differences in approach to the problem

still outstanding, the enemy fell back

upon its tried and tested method of exerting pressure upon the UNC by means

of a series of new "incidents."

Although there had been several violations of the neutral zone and of the

agreements made between the Communists and the UNC on convoys to the

Panmunjom area, the enemy's reaction

to these breaches had been mild during

December and January. A B-26 light

bomber had strafed a truck in the Kaesong sector on 11 December because of

the pilot's navigational error and another pilot had unloaded a bomb on

Kaesong on 17 January instead of dropping his pylon fuel tank. On the following day a prescheduled air strike on a

bridge at Hanp'o-ri, some 18 miles north

of Kaesong, caught the Communist convoy to Panmunjom as it approached the

bridge and damaged one of the trucks.

The enemy accepted the expressions of

regret in each instance and made no attempt to use the incidents for other

purposes.77

As the negotiations began to bog down

over Items 3 and 4 at Panmunjom, indications of a new propaganda campaign

were disclosed in February. In a United

Nations meeting Soviet Delegate Jacob

Malik accused the United States of using

poison gas in Korea. While this was not

the first time the charge had been leveled, it seemed significant that Malik

had made it himself. It caused a flurry

in Washington since it might be a warning that the Communists were preparing

to employ gas warfare themselves. On

the other hand, the enemy may have

discovered that Ridgway had ordered all

his commanders to organize, equip, and

train their forces to defend themselves

against chemical, biological, and radio77

 (1) Msg, HNC 535, Joy to CINCUNC, 11 Dec

51, in FEC Msgs, Dec 51. (2) Liaison Officers Mtg

at Panmunjom, 23 Jan 52, in G-3 Liaison Officers

Mtg at Panmunjom, bk. II, 1952.
BEHIND THE LINES 231

logical attack and deduced from this that

the UNC was getting ready to introduce

new forms of warfare.78 The Ridgway

order was purely routine, but the enemy

could not be certain of this.

At any rate the Communists evidently

were taking no chances and attempted to

forestall the possible use of chemical

warfare. Actually the Far East Command was in no position to launch a gas

attack. The theater was not permitted

to stock toxic chemicals, in the first place,

and there was also a shortage of over

50,000 gas masks in the Far East. Because the individual soldier in World

War II had frequently been inclined to

discard his gas mask, none had been

issued in Korea. Instead they were

stored at depots where they could be

distributed within twenty-four hours.79

The absence of toxic materials in the

FEC and the lack of special preparation

within the theater to wage or defend

against chemical warfare belied the

Communist charges, but as so frequently

happens, accusations, no matter how

false, leave residual damage.

Before the furore over the poison gas

had completely died down, the enemy

opened a full-scale attack in another

quarter. In late February radio broadcasts from Moscow, Peiping, and P'yongyang openly charged the United States

of conducting bacteriological warfare in

North Korea and Manchuria. Enemy

newspapers picked up the story and related how UNC planes had dumped

infected insects and materials and artillery had fired shells filled with bacterial

agents into Communist areas. Complete

with pictures, one article "proved" that

on 17 February a UNC plane had

dropped a weapon north of P'yongyang

filled with hideous, infected flies that

could live and fly in snowy weather.80

Intelligence reports estimated that the

Communists were not only trying to discredit the United States through this

campaign but also were attempting to

cover up their lack of success in preventing and controlling epidemics and to

whip up new enthusiasm for the Korean

War in China and among Communist

sympathizers throughout Asia.81 In 1951

there had been extensive typhus, cholera,

typhoid, and smallpox outbreaks in

North Korea and it was quite possible

that the enemy expected reoccurrences

and desired a scapegoat.

Despite strong and immediate denials

of the use of germ warfare by Secretary

of State Acheson and other officials in

Washington, there was evidence that

some Asian countries were lending credence to the enemy's claims. Both the

State and Defense Departments began

to show concern as the attack grew more

intense and instructed Ridgway to do all

he could in the way of categoric disavowals if the subject were brought up

at Panmunjom.82 In the meantime the

State Department sent an invitation to

the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva suggesting that the United States would

78 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51. 79

 Check Sheet, JHR [Col Jacquard H. Rothschild] to G-3, 9 Feb 52, sub: Questions Arising

From Statement Made By Soviet Delegate Malik

Before U.N., in FEC G-3 471.6 Bombs, etc.

80

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, p. 31. For an

interesting discussion of the germ warfare charges

of this period, see John Clews, The Communists'

New Weapon—Germ Warfare (London: Lincoln

Pragers, 1953). See also the statement of U.S. Representative to the UN Assembly, Ernest A. Gross,

27 March 1953 and 8 April 1953, in Dept of State

Bulletin, vol. XXVIII, No. 722 (April 27, 1953) 81

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, p. 32. 82

 Msg, JCS 903060, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Mar 52.
232 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

welcome a full investigation of the Communist charges by a disinterested body

to reveal the falsity of the enemy propaganda.83

 The ICRC accepted the U.S.

offer in mid-March, but there was little

hope that the Communists would have

anything to do with representatives of a

committee that they regarded as an agent

of the United Nations Command and

not as a disinterested body.84

On 8 March Chinese Foreign Minister

Chou En-lai had hinted at another facet

of the antigerm campaign. In a broadcast he implied that if the Chinese caught

U.S. Air Force personnel engaged in

spreading disease over China, they would

be treated as war criminals. The Air

Force could not let this threat go unchallenged and the JCS told Ridgway to

issue a strong statement holding the

Communists responsible for proper treatment of prisoners of war. At the same

time he could again deny the accusations

and warn the enemy against using an

epidemic to mask ill treatment of prisoners. Army G-3 held that this would

allow the UNC to shift over to the propaganda offensive.85

As Ridgway prepared his statement,

the U.N. World Health Organization

volunteered to send technical assistance

to North Korea to help combat disease

and epidemics and the United States

quickly agreed that the WHO should

communicate directly with the Communists on this matter. If the enemy refused

to receive WHO teams, it would tend to

discredit the charges and reflect badly

upon the Communist concern for the

welfare of their people.86

Although the propaganda drive gathered momentum during March and

April with the Communists reporting

the dropping of infected spiders, fleas,

beetles carrying anthrax, voles carrying

plague, and even poisoned clams in

North Korea and in China, the rejection

of the ICRC and WHO offers to investigate the incidents and to aid in the control of disease did much to weaken the

effect of the later claims.87 Besides, the

Communists were about to be given a

far more potent propaganda weapon as

the trouble that had been simmering

for months in the UNC prisoner of war

camps reached the boiling stage.

83

 (1) Msg, DA 903096, G-3 to CINCFE, 8 Mar

58. (2) Msg, C 64368, CINCFE to DA, 9 Mar 52, DAIN 114089. 84

 Msg, JCS 903547, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Mar 52. 85

 (1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 11 Mar 52, sub:

Chinese Communist Threat . . . , in G-3 385, 8. (2)

Msg, JCS 903686, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Mar 52. This

message was drafted by the Air Force and cleared

by the JCS, Defense and State Departments, and

the President. 86

 (1) Msg, C 65348, Ridgway to JCS, 16 Mar 52,

DA-IN 116709. (2) Msg, JCS 903786, JCS to

CINCFE, 17 Mar 52. 87

 (1) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, p. 24. (a)

Clews, The Communists' New Weapon—Germ Warfare, pp. 14-24.
CHAPTER XI

Koje-do

Although the situation in the prisoner

of war camps did not attain international

prominence until May 1952, there had

been numerous indications of the potential danger prior to that time. Riots,

demonstrations, and violence had become common in the compounds housing

the Communist prisoners, but the U.N.

Command had preferred to cope with

them on a day-to-day basis. The hope

that a truce soon would be negotiated

and eliminate the need for drastic UNC

actions fostered a policy of delay. In

turn, the lack of strong UNC measures

encouraged the Communist prisoners to

become bolder and more demanding.

As UNC control dissipated, the enemy

prisoners took charge of their compounds

and began to plan for a coup that would

focus the eyes of the world upon the

whole prisoner of war problem.

This remarkable turnabout wherein

prisoners dealt with their captors on

what amounted to terms of equality

must properly begin with the landings

at Inch'on in September 1950.

The Seeds Are Planted

After the surprise attack at Inch'on

and the follow-up advance by the Eighth

Army, the North Korean Army began to

fall back. But large numbers of the

enemy were taken prisoner in the swift

maneuver and sent to the rear. The bag

of prisoners rose from under a thousand

in August 1950 to over 130,000 in November. Unfortunately, little provision

had been made for so many prisoners

and facilities to confine, clothe, and feed

them were not available. In addition,

there were not enough men on hand to

guard the prisoners nor were the guards

assigned adequately trained for their

mission.1 The quantity and quality of

the security forces continued to plague

the UNC prison-camp commanders in

the months that lay ahead.

While the prisoners were housed near

Pusan, there was a tendency for former

ROK personnel who had been impressed

into the North Korean Army and later

recaptured by the UNC to take over the

leadership in the compounds. Since

these ex-ROK soldiers professed themselves to be anti-Communist and were

usually favored by the ROK guards, they

were able to win positions of power and

control.

As the prisoner total reached 137,000

in January 1951, the UNC decided to

isolate captured personnel on Koje-do,

an island off the southern coast of Korea.

But before the move was made, the South

Korean prisoners were segregated from

the North Koreans. This left a power vacu1

 Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 2.
234 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

um in many of the compounds that were

abruptly deprived of their leaders.2

On Koje-do security problems were

reduced, but there were serious engineering obstacles to be overcome. Since

there were little or no natural water

resources on the island, Col. Hartley F.

Dame, the first camp commander, had

to build dams and store rain water to

service the 118,000 natives, 100,000 refugees, and 150,000 prisoners.3

 Construction began in January on the first

enclosure of UNC Prisoner of War Camp

Number 1 and by the end of the month

over 50,000 POW's were moved from the

mainland to Koje-do.4

Swiftly, in two rock-strewn valleys on

the north coast, four enclosures, each

subdivided into eight compounds, were

built. Originally intended to hold 700-

1,200 men apiece, the compounds were

soon jammed to five times their capacity.

Since available land was at a premium

on the island, the space between the

compounds soon had to be used to confine the prisoners too. This conserved

the construction of facilities and the

number of guards required to police the

enclosures, but complicated the task of

managing the crowded camp. Packing

thousands of men into a small area with

only barbed wire separating each compound from the next permitted a free

exchange of thought and an opportunity

to plan and execute mass demonstrations

and riots. With the number of security

personnel limited and usually of inferior

caliber, proper control was difficult at

the outset and later became impossible.

But the elusive hope of an imminent

armistice and a rapid solution of the

prisoner problem delayed corrective action.5

It is only fair to point out that although there were frequent instances of

unrest and occasional outbreaks of resistance during the first months of the

Koje-do prison camp's existence, much

of the early trouble could be traced to

the fact that ROK guards were used

extensively. Resentment between ROK

and North Korean soldiers flared into

angry words, threats, and blows very easily. Part of the tension stemmed from

the circumstance that at first the prisoners drew better rations than the

guards, but eventually this discrepancy

was adjusted. In the internecine disputes the U.S. security troops operated

at a disadvantage since they knew little

or no Korean and were reluctant to interfere. Bad blood between guards and

prisoners, however, formed only one

segment of the problem.

Although the United States had not

ratified the Geneva Convention of 1949

on prisoners of war, it had volunteered

to observe its provisions.6 The Geneva

Convention, however, was designed primarily to protect the rights of the prisoners. It completely failed to foresee

the development of hard-core, organized

prisoner groups such as those that grew

up on Koje-do in 1951-52 or to provide

protection for the captor nation in dealing with stubborn resistance. In their 2

 Samuel M. Myers and William E. Bradbury, The

Political Behavior of Korean and Chinese Prisoners

of War in the Korean Conflict: A Historical Analysis, Tech Rpt 50 (Human Resources Research

Office, George Washington University, 1958), p. 65. 3

 Interv with Col Dame, 20 Oct 59. In OCMH. 4

 Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp.

2-3.

5

 (1) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May

52, vol. II, tab F. (2) Interv with Col Dame, 20 Oct

59. (3) Interv with Col Maurice J. Fitzgerald, 2

Dec 59. In OCMH. 6

 See Chapter VII, above.
KOJE-DO 235

PRISONERS IN A COMPOUND OF THE KOJE-DO POW CAMP

zeal for defending the prisoners from

hardship, injustice, and brutality, the

makers spelled out in detail the privileges of the prisoners and the restrictions

upon the captor nation, but evidently

could not visualize a situation in which

the prisoners would organize and present

an active threat to the captor nation.7

Under these conditions every effort at

violence by the prisoners that was countered by force reflected badly upon the

U.N. Command. Regardless of the provocation given by the prisoners, the UNC

appeared to be an armed bully abusing

the defenseless captives and the Communists capitalized on this situation.

The outbreaks of dissension and open

resistance were desultory until the negotiations at Kaesong got under way.

Then the prisoners realized that their

future was at stake. Many had professed

strong anti-Communist sentiments and

were afraid to return, while others, anticipating repatriation, swung clearly to

the side of Communist groups in the

compounds. From North Korea, agents

were sent to the front lines and permitted

themselves to be captured so that they

could infiltrate the prison camps. Working through refugees, civilians, and local

guerrillas, the agents were able to keep

7

 DA Pamphlet 20-150, October 1950, Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War

Victims.
236 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

PRISONERS LEARN TO WORK TIN IN THE KOJE-DO CAMP

in touch with their headquarters and to

plan, organize, and stage incidents at

will. Inside the camps, messages were

passed visually by signals, hurled by

rocks from compound to compound, or

communicated by word of mouth. The

hospital compound served as a clearinghouse for information and was one of

the centers of Communist resistance. Although the agents wielded the actual

power in the compounds, they usually

concealed themselves behind the nominal commanders and operated carefully

to cloak their identities. And behind the

agents stood their chiefs, none other than

Lt. Gen. Nam Il and Maj. Gen. Lee Sang

Cho, the principal North Korean delegates to the armistice conference.8

 The

close connection between Panmunjom

and the prison camps provided another

instance of the Communists' untiring

efforts in using every possible measure

8

 Hq UNC/FEC MIS, The Communist War in

POW Camps, 28 January 1953, pp. 6-8. This account is based upon seized enemy documents,

interviews with prisoners and captured enemy

agents, and intelligence reports.
KOJE-DO 237

to exert pressure upon the course of the

armistice talks.

As the Communists struggled for control of the compounds, a defensive countermovement was launched by the

non-Communist elements. Former Chinese Nationalist soldiers and North Korean anti-Communists engaged in bloody

clashes with their opponents. When oral

persuasion failed, there was little hesitancy on both sides to resort to fists,

clubs, and homemade weapons. Kangaroo courts tried stubborn prisoners and

sentences were quick and often fatal.

Since UNC personnel did not enter the

compounds at night and the prisoners

were usually either afraid or unwilling

to talk, the beatings and murders went

unpunished.9 It should also be noted

that even if the beaten prisoners had

been willing to give evidence against

their attackers, as sometimes happened,

the camp commander was not in a position to prosecute. He was not permitted

by his superiors in Washington to institute judicial procedures against the culprits. Deprived of this weapon of

disciplinary control, the prison command

was forced to operate under a distinct

disadvantage.10

Another instance in which higher

headquarters contributed unwittingly to

the discontent of the prison camp

stemmed from an information and education program instituted in 1951 to

keep the prisoners occupied profitably.

For the Communists the orientation

course became the chief target of criticism and abuse. Although attendance at

these lectures was purely voluntary, the

subject matter contrasted the advantages

of democracy with the fallacies of communism in an unmistakable manner and

the Communists protested vehemently.

It should be noted that by far the greater

portion of the education program aimed

at assisting the prisoners in developing

vocational and technical skills to help

them after their release.11 The Communists readily accepted the instruction in

metalworking and soon began to produce

weapons of all varieties instead of sanitation utensils, stoves, and garden tools

and used these arms to gain interior

control in the compounds whenever they

could.

In September 1951 fifteen prisoners

were murdered by a self-appointed people's court. Three more were killed

when rioting broke out on the 19th in

Compound 78. Troops had to be rushed

in to restore order and remove two hundred prisoners who were in fear of their

lives. As unrest mounted, the 2d Logistical Command, in charge of all prison

camps, asked Van Fleet for more security

personnel. Pointing out that protracted

confinement, uncertainty over the future,

and Communist agitation against the

UNC information and education program had combined to produce increasing tension among the prisoners, the

chief of staff of the 2d Logistical Command also reminded Van Fleet that the

caliber of the guard troops left much to

be desired.12

The September disturbances led to a

visit by Van Fleet and a reinforcing and

9

 Ibid., pp. 26-28. 10

 Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol.

II, tab E.

11

 Msg, C 50603, CINCUNC to DA, 21 Jun 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS,

Supporting Docs, tab 83. 12

 (1) Ltr, Col Albert C. Morgan to CG Eighth

Army, 18 Sep 51, sub: Security for POW's in Hq

2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol. II, tab

A-10. (2) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May

52, vol. II, tab H.
238 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

A COMMUNIST POW LEADER, KOJE-DO

reorganization of the prison security

forces. From the opening of the camp

in January down to mid-September when

Col. Maurice J. Fitzgerald assumed command, there had been eight different

commanders or about one a month. As

Fitzgerald later commented, "Koje-do

was a graveyard of commanders."

 13

 Van

Fleet's recognition of the difficulties of.

the problems led to the activation of the

8137th Military Police Group in October. Besides three assigned battalions,

four additional escort guard companies

were attached to the group. In November one battalion of the 23d Infantry

Regiment was made available for duty

on Koje-do and by December over 9,000

U.S. and ROK personnel were stationed

on the island. This was still some 6,000

fewer then the number requested.14

During December the rival factionsCommunist and anti-Communist—vied

for control of the compounds with both

sides meting out beatings and other punishment freely. A large-scale rock fight

between compounds on 18 December

was followed by riots and demonstrations. Fourteen deaths and twenty-four

other casualties resulted from this

flare-up.15

The acceleration of violence could be

attributed in large part to the inauguration of the screening process in the prison

camps. General Yount, commanding the

2d Logistical Command, later told the

Far East commander: "Until the inception of the screening program, American

personnel had full access to compounds

and were able to administer them in a

satisfactory manner although never to

the degree desired."

 16

In November and December over 37,-

000 prisoners had been screened and reclassified as civilian internees.17

 As more

prisoners indicated that they did not

wish to be repatriated or evinced antiCommunist sympathies, the sensitivity

of the Communist prisoners to screening

intensified. Thus, when the commander

of Koje-do camp decided early in January 1952 to give the civilian internees

a second screening, the basic ingredients

for trouble were on hand. The object of

the second round of interviews by ROK

civilian teams was to correct the mistakes

13

 Interv with Col Fitzgerald, 2 Dec 59. In OCMH.

14

 Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol.

II, tab 3, pp. 8-9; tab G, Chart 3. 15

 Msg, CX 69250, Clark to CofS, 28 May 52, DAIN 144360. 16

 Gen Yount's Statement to Gen Clark, no date,

in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File. 17

 See Chapter VII, above.
KOJE-DO 239

GENERAL DODD

made in the first series and also to segregate the nonrepatriates from the staunch

Communist elements.

Despite numerous incidents all the

civilian internee compounds were

screened during January and early February except for the 5,600 inmates of

Compound 62. Here the Communists

had firm control and refused to permit

the teams to enter. The compound

leader stated flatly that all the members

of Compound 62 desired to return to

North Korea and there was no sense in

wasting time in screening. Since the

ROK teams were equally determined to

carry out their assignment, the 3d Battalion of the 27th Infantry Regiment

moved in during the early hours of 18

February and took up positions in front

of the compound.18 With bayonets fixed,

the four companies passed through the

gate and divided the compound into four

segments. But the Communists refused

to bow to the show of force. Streaming

out of the barracks, they converged on

the infantry with pick handles, knives,

axes, flails, and tent poles. Others hurled

rocks as they advanced and screamed

their defiance. Between 1,000-1,500 internees pressed the attack and the soldiers were forced to resort to concussion

grenades. When the grenades failed to

stop the assault, the UNC troops opened

fire. Fifty-five prisoners were killed immediately and 22 more died at the hospital, with over 140 other casualties as

against 1 U.S. killed and 38 wounded.

This was a high price for the Communists to pay, but human life counted for

little. In any event the Communists won

their point, for the infantry withdrew

and the compound was not screened.19

The fear that the story might leak out

to the Communists in a distorted version

led the U.N. Command to release an

official account placing the blame

squarely on the shoulders of the Communist compound leaders. The Department of the Army instructed Ridgway

to make it clear that only 1,500 of the

inmates took part in the outbreak and

that only civilian internees—not prisoners of war—were involved.20

 In view of

18

 The 27th Regiment of the 25th Infantry Division was called the Wolfhounds and had been

moved to Koje-do during January to bolster the security forces.

19

 (1) Msg, G 71528, Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 19

Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an. 1,

incl 11. (2) Msg, G 71542, Van Fleet to CINCUNC,

19 Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an.

1, incl 12. (3) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt,

May 52, p. 7. 20

 (1) Msg, G 4615 TAC, Van Fleet to CINCFE,

20 Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, an. 1, incl 14.

(2) Msg, DA 901675, CSUSA to CINCFE, 20 Feb

52. (3) Msg, DA 901709, CSUSA to CINCFE, 22

Feb 52.
240 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the outcry that the Communist delegates

at Panmunjom were certain to make over

the affair, this was an especially important point. Civilian internees could be

considered an internal affair of the ROK

Government and outside the purview of

the truce conference.21

But Communist protests at Panmunjom were not the only results of the battle of Compound 62. On 20 February

Van Fleet appointed Brig. Gen. Francis

T. Dodd as commandant of the camp to

tighten up discipline, and the following

week Van Fleet received some new instructions from Tokyo:

In regard to the control of the POW's at

Koje-do, the recent riot in Compound 62

gives strong evidence that many of the com- pounds may be controlled by the violent

leadership of Communists or anti-Com- munist groups. This subversive control is

extremely dangerous and can result in

further embarrassment to the U.N.C. Armistice negotiations, particularly if any

mass screening or segregation is directed

within a short period of time. I desire your

personal handling of this planning. I wish

to point out the grave potential conse- quences of further rioting, and therefore

me urgent requirement for the most effec- tive practicable control over POW's.22

Although the orders from Ridgway

covered both Communists and antiCommunists, the latter were co-operative

in their relations with the UNC personnel and ruthless only when they encountered Communist sympathizers in their

midst. The hatred between the two

groups led to another bloody encounter

on 13 March. As an anti-Communist

detail passed a hostile compound, ardent

Communists stoned the detail and its

ROK guards. Without orders the guards

retaliated with gunfire. Before the ROK

contingent could be brought under control, 12 prisoners were killed and 26

were wounded while 1 ROK civilian and

1 U.S. officer, who tried to stop the shooting, were injured.23

April was a momentous month for the

prisoners on Koje-do. On 2 April the

Communists showed their interest in

finding out the exact number of prisoners that would be returned to their

control if screening was carried out.

Spurred by this indication that the enemy might be willing to break the deadlock on voluntary repatriation, the U.N.

Command inaugurated a new screening

program on 8 April to produce a firm

figure.24 During the days that followed,

UNC teams interviewed the prisoners in

all but seven compounds, where 37,000

North Koreans refused to permit the

teams to enter. As noted previously, the

results of the screening amazed even the

most optimistic of the UNC when only

about 70,000 of the 170,000 military and

civilian prisoners consented to go back

to the Communists voluntarily. The

enemy, on the other hand, was at first

stunned and then became violently indignant, having been led to expect that a

much higher percentage of repatriates

would be turned up by the screening.

Negotiations at Panmunjom again came

to a standstill and the Communists renewed their attack upon the whole concept of screening. In view of the close

connection between the enemy truce

delegates and the prison camps, it was 21

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1. 22

 Memo, Maj Gen Bryan L. Milburn, G-1 FEC,

for Gen Van Fleet, 29 Feb 52, sub: Planning for

POW's ... , in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952

Corresp.

23

 (1) Msg, CX 65213, CINCUNC to JCS, 14 Mar

52, DA-IN 115842. (2) Msg, CX 65281, CINCUNC

to JCS, 14 Mar 52, DA-IN 115919. 24

 See Chapter VIII, above.
KOJE-DO 241

PICTURE OF STALIN DISPLAYED DURING A POW DEMONSTRATION, KOJE-DO

not surprising that the agitation of the

Communists over the unfavorable implications of the UNC screening should

communicate itself quickly to the loyal

Communist compounds.

During the interviewing period, Van

Fleet had informed Ridgway that he was

segregating and removing the antiCommunist prisoners to the mainland.

Although the separation would mean

more administrative personnel and more

equipment would be required to organize and supervise the increased number

of camps, Van Fleet felt that dispersal

would lessen the possibility of incidents.25

 Segregation and dispersal, however, had a negative side as well, for the

removal of anti-Communists and their

replacement by pro-Communists in the

compounds on Koje-do could not help

but strengthen the hand of the Communist compound leaders. Relieved of the

necessity to conduct internecine strife,

they could now be assured of wholehearted support from the inmates of

their compounds as they directed their

efforts against the U.N. Command. An

25

 Msg, GX 5410 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 13

Apr 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal

Msg File, 1949-52.
242 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

energetic campaign to discredit the

screening program backed by all the

Communist compounds was made easier

by the transfer of the chief opposition to

the mainland and the alteration of the

balance of power on the island.

In addition to the general political

unrest that permeated the Communist

enclosures, a quite fortuitous element of

discontent complicated the scene in early

April. Up until this time responsibility

for the provision of the grain component

of the prisoners' ration had rested with

the ROK Army. But the ROK Government informed the Eighth Army in

March that it could no longer bear the

burden and Van Fleet in turn told the

2d Logistical Command that it would

have to secure the grain through U.S.

Army channels. Unfortunately, the U.N.

Civil Assistance Command could not

supply grain in the prescribed ratio of

one-half rice and one-half other grains

without sufficient advance time to fill the

order. Instead a one-third rice, one-third

barley, and one-third wheat ration was

apportioned to the prisoners in April

and this occasioned an avalanche of complaints.26

The 17 compounds occupied by the

Communist prisoners at the end of April

included 10 that had been screened and

7 that had resisted all efforts to interview

them. There was little doubt in Van

Fleet's mind that force would have to

be used and casualties expected if the

recalcitrant compounds were to be

screened.27 As he prepared plans to use

force, Van Fleet warned Ridgway on 28

April that the prisoners already screened

would probably demonstrate violently

when UNC forces moved into the compounds still holding out. In anticipation

of trouble Van Fleet moved the 3d Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment to

Koje-do to reinforce the 38th Infantry

Regiment and ordered the 1st Battalion

of the 15th Infantry Regiment and the

ROK 20th Regiment to Pusan. Barring

accident, he intended to begin screening

shortly after the 1st of May.28

Confronted with almost certain violence, Ridgway decided to ask for permission to cancel forced screening:

These compounds are well organized and

effective control cannot be exercised within

them without use of such great degree of

force as might verge on the brutal and re- sult in killing and wounding quite a

number of inmates. While I can exercise

such forced screening, I believe that the

risk of violence and violence involved, both to U.N.C. personnel and to the inmates themselves, would not warrant this

course of action. Further, the unfavorable

publicity which would probably result . . . would provide immediate and effective

Communist material. . . .

29

This request and Ridgway's plan to

list the prisoners in the unscreened compounds as desiring repatriation were approved. Although failure to interview

all the inmates in these enclosures might

well prevent some prisoners from choosing nonrepatriation, Ridgway's superiors held that if the prisoners felt

strongly enough about not returning to

Communist control, they would somehow make their wishes known.30

26

 Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol.

II, pp. 13ff. 27

 Msg, GX 5410 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 13

Apr 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal

Msg File, 1949-52.

28

 Msg, GX 5637 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 28

Apr 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl

73.

29

 Msg, CX 67750, CINCFE to JCS, 29 Apr 52, DAIN 133133. 30

 (1) Msg, JCS 907528, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Apr

52. (2) Msg, JCS 908093, JCS to CINCFE, 7 May 52.
KOJE-DO 243

As forced screening was cast into

limbo, the prospects for a relaxation of

tension on Koje-do should have improved. But in early May, after a tour of

inspection, Col. Robert T. Chaplin, provost marshal of the Far East Command,

reported that there was a dangerous lack

of control within the Communist compounds, with the prisoners refusing even

to bring in their own food and supplies.

The possibility of new incidents that

might embarrass the U.N. Command,

especially at Panmunjom, led Ridgway

to remind Van Fleet that proper control

had to be maintained regardless of

whether screening was conducted or

not.31 As it happened, Van Fleet was

more concerned over the fact that Colonel Chaplin had not informed Eighth

Army of his impressions first than he

was over the prisoner-camp situation.

There was no cause for "undue anxiety"

about Koje-do, he told Ridgway on 5

May.32

Actually Eighth Army officers admitted freely that UNC authorities could

not enter the compounds, inspect sanitation, supervise medical support, or work

the Communists prisoners as they desired. They exercised an external control only, in that UNC security forces

did prevent the prisoners from escaping.33

 Thus, on 7 May the Communist

prisoners and the UNC appeared to have

reached a stalemate. The former had

interior control, but could not get out

without violence; and the latter had exterior control, but could not get in without violence. With the cancellation of

forced screening, the U.N. Command

indicated that it was willing to accept

the status quo rather than initiate another wave of bloodshed in the camps.

The next move was up to the Communists.

The Time of Ripening

It did not take long for the Communist

prisoners to act. As investigation later

revealed, they had become familiar with

the habits of General Dodd, the camp

commandant, during the spring and by

the beginning of May they had readied

a plan. Well aware that Dodd was anxious to lessen the tension in the camp,

they also knew that he often went unarmed to the sally ports of the compounds and talked to the leaders. This

system of personal contact kept Dodd in

close touch with camp problems, but it

exposed him to an element of risk. Only

the guards carried weapons on Koje-do

and there were no locks on the compounds gates, since work details were

constantly passing in and out. Security

personnel were not authorized to shoot

save in case of grave emergency or in

self-defense, and were not permitted to

keep a round in the chamber of their

guns. In the past the Communists had

successfully kidnapped several UNC soldiers and although they had later released them unharmed after Communist

complaints had been heard, the practice

was neither new nor unknown. Since

the technique had proved profitable in

previous instances, the enemy prisoners

evidently decided to spread their net for

the biggest fish of all—the camp com31

 Msg, CX 67988, Ridgway to CG Eighth Army,

5 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, an. 1,

incl 56. 32

 Msg, GX 5746 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 5

May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal

Msg File, 1949-52. 33

 Extract, Visit to Eighth Army Headquarters with

Col Chaplin, 8 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

May 52, an. 1, incl 58.
244 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

A KOJE-DO COMMANDANT TALKING TO POW's at a compound gate during a demonstration.

mandant. Taking advantage of his willingness to come to them, they made careful plans.34

On the evening of 6 May members of

a Communist work detail from Compound 76 refused to enter the enclosure

until they had spoken to Lt. Col. Wilbur

R. Raven, commanding officer of the

94th Military Police Battalion and the

compound. The prisoners told Raven

that guards had beaten members of the

compound and searched them for contraband. When he promised to investigate the charges, they seemed satisfied,

but asked to see General Dodd on the

next day to discuss matters of importance. Raven was noncommittal since

he did not wish the prisoners to imagine

that they could summon the commandant at will, but he promised to pass the

message on to the general.35

Since the prisoners indicated that they

would be willing to let themselves be

listed and fingerprinted if Dodd would

come and talk to them, the trap was

34

 Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp.

12ff. The compound leaders were afraid that the

UNC would transfer them to another area if they

left the safety of their own compounds. This made

them reluctant to go to Dodd's office and if Dodd

wanted to talk to them, he had to go to the compound.

35

 Statement of Col Raven, 12 May 52, before a

Board of Officers at Koje-do, in FEC Gen Admin

Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers.
KOJE-DO 245

shrewdly baited. Dodd had just been instructed to complete an accurate roster

and identification of all the remaining

prisoners of war on Koje-do and the

chance to win a bloodless victory was too

good to be missed.

Colonel Raven finished his discussions

with the leaders of Compound 76 shortly

after 1400 on 7 May and Dodd drove

up a few minutes later. As usual they

talked with the unlocked gate of the sally

port between them and the Communists

launched a whole series of questions concerning items of food and clothing they

felt they should be issued. Then branching into the political field they asked

about the truce negotiations. Several

times they invited Dodd and Raven to

come inside and sit down so that they

could carry on the discussion in a more

comfortable atmosphere. Raven turned

down these suggestions bluntly since he

himself had previously been seized and

held. More prisoners had meanwhile

gathered in the sally port and Dodd permitted them to approach and listen to

the conversation. In the midst of the

talk, a work detail turning in tents for

salvage came through the sally port and

the outer door was opened to let them

pass out. It remained ajar and the prisoners drew closer to Dodd and Raven

as if to finish their discussion. Suddenly

they leaped forward and began to drag

the two officers into the compound.

Raven grabbed hold of a post until the

guards rushed up and used their bayonets to force the prisoners back, but

Dodd was hauled quickly inside the compound, whisked behind a row of blankets

draped along the inner barbed wire

fence, and hurried to a tent that was

prepared for him. The prisoners told

him that the kidnapping had been

planned and that the other compounds

would have made an attempt to seize

him if the opportunity had arisen.36

With the successful completion of the

first step disposed of, the Communists

lost no time in carrying out the second

phase. Within a few minutes of Dodd's

capture, they hoisted a large sign announcing—"We capture Dodd. As long

as our demand will be solved, his safety

is secured. If there happen brutal act

such as shooting, his life is danger."37

The threat was soon followed by the first

note from Dodd that he was all right

and asking that no troops be sent in to

release him until after 1700.38 Apparently General Dodd felt that he could

persuade the prisoners to let him go by

that time.

In the meantime word had passed

swiftly back to General Yount, the commanding general of the 2d Logistical

Command, and through him to Van

Fleet, of the capture of Dodd. Van Fleet

immediately instructed Yount not to

use force to effect Dodd's release unless

Eighth Army approved such action.

Yount in turn sent his chief of staff, Col.

William H. Craig, by air to Koje-do to

assume command.39 Repeating Van

Fleet's injunction not to use force, Yount

told Craig: "We are to talk them out.

Obviously if somebody makes mass break

we most certainly will resist. . . . But

unless they attempt such a thing, under

no circumstances use fire to get them

out. Wait them out. One thing above

all, approach it calmly. If we get them

excited only God knows what will hap36

 (1) Ibid. (2) Statement of Gen Dodd, 14 May

52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceedings of Board

of Officers. 37

 Exhibit O4(1), in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits. 38

 Exhibit N4(1), in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits. 39 Ibid.
246 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

GENERAL COLSON

pen."

 40

 The fear of a concerted attempt

to break out of the compounds and the

resultant casualties that both the UNC

and prisoners would probably suffer

dominated this conversation and mirrored the first reaction of Dodd's

superiors to the potential explosiveness

of the situation. A major uprising would

mean violence and unfavorable publicity

that the enemy would exploit.

Dodd's actions in Compound 76 complemented this desire to localize the

incident. He consented to act as go-between for the prisoners and relayed their

demands to the outside. A telephone was

installed and upon Dodd's recommendation, representatives from all of the other

compounds were brought to Compound

76 for a meeting to work out the demands that would be submitted to the

U.N. Command. Colonel Craig attempted to use one of the senior North

Korean officers, Col. Lee Hak Koo, to

talk inmates of Compound 76 into releasing Dodd, but Lee, as soon as he was

permitted to enter the compound, remained and became the spokesman of

the prisoners.41

As the Communist representatives met

on the night of the seventh, Dodd urged

that no troops be employed to get him

since he did not think he would be

harmed.42 This was a reasonable assumption, since if anything happened to

Dodd, the Communists would have nothing to bargain with. In any event,

Dodd's plea coincided with the wishes

of Yount and Van Fleet at this point.

Colonel Craig, stalling for time, agreed

to sit tight. With the UNC troops under

general alert orders, the night of 7 May

passed uneasily.43

One fact seemed evident—the Communists had won the first round. Not

only had they managed to kidnap Dodd,

but they had also succeeded in using

him to open negotiations. Playing upon

the UNC fears of a general breakout of

prisoners and the concern over Dodd's

life, they pressed their advantage to the

hilt.

As the prisoner representatives reconvened the next day, they presented Dodd

with a list of their demands. The chief

preoccupation of the prisoners during

this early phase concerned the formation

and recognition by the UNC of an associ40

 Hq ad Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p.

21.

41

 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 42

 Exhibits M4(2) and M4(4), in FEC Gen Admin

Files, Exhibits. 43

 Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52,

pp. 23-24.
KOJE-DO 247

ation of the prisoners with telephone

facilities between the compounds and

two vehicles for intracompound travel.

Dodd consented to most of the items of

equipment that the prisoners were insisting upon even though he had no command authority to make any agreements.

After the meeting concluded, the representatives wanted to return to their

compounds and report to the rest of the

prisoners; thus another delay ensued.

General Yount refused to allow them to

leave until Van Fleet overruled him late

in the afternoon. By the time the representatives discussed events with their

compound mates and returned to Compound 76, evening had begun.44

While the prisoners were carrying on

their conversations, Colonel Craig sent

for trained machine gun crews, grenades,

and gas masks. The 3d Battalion of the

9th Infantry Regiment boarded an LST

(landing ship, tank) at Pusan and set

out for Koje-do. ROK Navy picket boats

ringed the island in case of a major escape attempt and Navy, Marine, and Air

Force planes remained on alert. Company B of the 64th Medium Tank

Battalion was detached from the 3d Infantry Division and started to rumble

toward Pusan. And from the U.S. I

Corps, Van Fleet sent Brig. Gen. Charles

F. Colson, chief of staff, to take charge

of the camp and get Dodd out. The

selection of a combat leader to resolve

the crisis indicated that a military solution would now be tried. Colson had no

knowledge of conditions on Koje-do

until he was chosen and only a sketchy

acquaintance with the issues being discussed at Panmunjom.45

As Colson assumed command, Van

Fleet confirmed this impression that military measures would now be employed.

His first instructions to Yount set forth

the steps to be followed quite clearly.

First official written demands were to be

delivered to Compound 76 asking that

Dodd be freed immediately. At the same

time the prisoners would be informed

that Dodd no longer was in command

and could make no decisions. If they

refused to let him go, Yount would set

a time limit and warn the Communists

that they would be held responsible for

Dodd's safety when force was used. As

soon as the deadline expired, Yount

would enter the compound by force, release Dodd, and gain full control.46

Yount passed Van Fleet's orders on to

Colson late on 8 May.

There were other factors that had to

be considered as the drama unfolded.

Within the compound Dodd was treated

royally. The prisoners did all they could

to provide him with small comforts and

permitted medicine for his ulcers to be

brought in. They applied no physical

pressure whatsoever, yet they left no

doubt that Dodd would be the first casualty and that they would resist violently

any attempt to rescue him by force.

Under the circumstances they expected

Dodd to co-operate and help them reach

a bloodless settlement and Dodd decided

to comply.

Early on the morning of 9 May Colson

sent in his first official demand for

Dodd's safe deliverance and six hours

later he issued a second order. When

Col. Lee Hak Koo finally responded, he

countered with the statement that Dodd

44

 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 45

 Interv, author with Gen Colson, 4 Oct 59. In

OCMH.

46

 Msg, GX 5775 TAC, CG EUSAK to CG 2d

Logistical Comd, 8 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files,

Exhibits.
248 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

had already admitted that he had practiced "inhuman massacre and murderous barbarity" against the prisoners.

Recognizing Colson as the new camp

commander, Lee asked him to join Dodd

at the compound meeting.47 Obviously,

the Communists had no intentions of

letting Dodd go until they had resolved

their differences with the U.N. Command.

The refusal of the prisoners to meet

Colson's order should have led to the

presentation of an ultimatum with a

time limit, but Colson decided to wait

until the tanks arrived from the mainland before he tried force. Since the

tanks would not arrive until late on the

9th, the action to bring the compound

into line could not begin until the following morning. Both Yount and Maj.

Gen. Orlando Mood, chief of staff of the

Eighth Army, agreed to this postponement.48

 In the meantime Colson intended to put a halt to further

concessions to the prisoners; his first

move in this direction was to stop the

POW representatives from circulating

back and forth between their compounds

and Compound 76.49

Perturbed by the stiffening attitude of

Colson and the apparent preparations

for action around the compound, the

Communists evidently became nervous

and had Dodd ask Colson whether they

could hold their meeting without fear

of interruption. They again promised

that Dodd would be freed after the meeting if all went well. Since the U.N.

Command was not going to make a move

until 10 May anyway, the prisoners were

informed that they could meet in

safety.50

As the prisoners convened on the 9th,

the capture of Dodd assumed a new perspective. They informed their hostage

that they were going to discuss the alleged brutalities committed against their

members, repatriation and screening, as

well as the prisoner of war association.51

Whether the expansion of the Communists' objectives was spurred by their

success in using Dodd and the willingness

of the UNC to negotiate or was a planned

development is difficult to determine—

it may well have been a combination of

these elements that emboldened them to

press their luck.

Setting themselves up as a people's

court, the prisoners drew up a list of

nineteen counts of death and/or injury

to compound inmates and had Dodd

answer to each charge. Although they

were generally disposed to accept his

explanations and dismiss the accusations,

the spectacle of prisoners, still captive

and surrounded by heavily armed troops,

trying the kidnapped commanding officer of the prison camp on criminal

counts and making him defend his record was without parallel in modern military history.52

While the Communists sat in judg47 ment upon Dodd, Colson had the 38th (1) Ltr, Colson to POW Compound 76, 9 May

52, Exhibit E4(6). (2) Ltrs, Lee to Colson, 9 May 52,

Exhibits E4(2) and E4(4). Both in FEC Gen Admin

Files, Exhibits. 48

 Teleconf, Mood and Yount, 9 May 52, in 2d

Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May52, tab 20. 49

 Teleconf, Colson and Yount, 9 May 52, in 2d

Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May 52,

tab 28.

50

 Teleconf, Gen Dodd and Col Alvin T. Bowers,

G-2, 2d Logistical Comd, 9 May 52, in 2d Logistical

Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May 52, Tab

34.

51

 Teleconvs, Colson and Dodd, 9 May 52, in 2d

Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May

52, tabs 38 and 39. 52

 Ibid.
KOJE-DO 249

GENERAL CLARK

Infantry Regiment reinforce the guards

on all the compounds and had automatic

weapons set up in pairs at strategic locations. He directed Lt. Col. William J.

Kernan, commanding officer of the 38th,

to prepare a plan for forcible entry into

Compound 76, using tanks, flamethrowers, armored cars, .50-caliber multiple

mounts, tear gas, riot guns, and the like,

with a target date of 1000 on 10 May.53

In the early afternoon, Van Fleet flew

into Koje-do for a conference. He had

discussed the situation with Ridgway and

his appointed successor, General Mark

W. Clark, who had just arrived in the

Far East, and they were all agreed that

no press or photo coverage of the emergency would be permitted.54

 They

wanted Colson to be sure to give every

opportunity to nonbelligerent prisoners

to surrender peaceably while he engaged

in battle for control of the compound.

Van Fleet added that he did not think

that U.S. troops should go into the compound, until firepower from the outside

had forced obedience and driven the

prisoners into small adjacent compounds

that had been constructed in the meantime. If necessary he was willing to grant

the prisoners' request for an association

with equipment and communication facilities, but he reminded Colson that he

had full authority to use all the force

required to release Dodd and secure

proper control and discipline. Regardless of the outcome of this affair, Van

Fleet wanted dispersion of the compounds carried out. He left the timing

of the Compound 76 operation in Colson's hands, but the negotiating period

should end at 1000 on 10 May.55

Dodd's trial dragged on through the

afternoon as the translation process was

slow and laborious. By dusk it was evident that the proceedings would not

finish that night and Dodd phoned Colson asking for an extension until noon

the next day. He felt that they would

keep their promise to let him go as soon

as the meeting finished. But Eighth

Army refused to alter the 1000 deadline

and Colson passed the word back to

Dodd. It was at this point that the

Communists asserted that they had in53

 Ltr of Instr, Colson to Staff, 8137th Army Unit

et al., 9 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers. 54

 General Clark served as U.S. commander in Italy

during World War II, then became American High

Commissioner for Austria after the war. He was

Commanding General, Army Field Forces, prior to

his assignment as CINCFE.

55

 CG Conf at 091340 May at Koje-do, tab 55, in

2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15

May 52.
250 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tended to conduct meetings for ten days,

but in the light of the UNC stand they

would attempt to complete their work

in the morning.56

During the night of 9-10 May, twenty

tanks, five equipped with flamethrowers,

arrived on Koje-do and were brought

into position. Extra wire was laid and

the sixteen small compounds were ready

to receive the prisoners of Compound 76.

All of the guns were in place and gas

masks were issued; the last-minute preparations were completed and the troops

tried to get some rest. When Dodd and

Colson spoke to each other for the last

time that night, they said goodbye, since

neither expected Dodd to be alive when

the operation was over.57

There was another dampening note as

heavy rain began shortly after dark and

came down steadily all night. As dawn

signaled its arrival, fog obscured the

compounds. Yet Colson was ready to go

in despite the weather. He held out

little hope to Yount that the Communists

would release Dodd since this would be

"silly" on their part and he placed little

trust in their good faith.58

But as daylight broke on the tense

island the prisoners' latest demands

reached Colson. Since he and Dodd had

already agreed to most of the eleven

requests on the prisoner of war association, the Communists wasted little time

on this matter. Instead they directed

their attack against UNC prisoner policy,

repatriation, and screening. Although

the English translation is awkward and

some of the phrases difficult to understand, this bold demand deserves quotation in full.

1. Immediate ceasing the barbarous be- havior, insults, torture, forcible protest with

blood writing, threatening, confinement, mass murdering, gun and machine gun

shooting, using poison gas, germ weapons, experiment object of A-Bomb, by your com- mand. You should guarantee PW's human

rights and individual life with the base on

the International Law. 2. Immediate stopping the so-called illegal and unreasonable volunteer repatria- tion of NKPA and CPVA PW's. 3. Immediate ceasing the forcible investigation (Screening) which thousands of

PW's of NKPA and CPVA be rearmed and

failed in slavery, permanently and illegally. 4. Immediate recognition of the P.W.

Representative Group (Commission) con- sisted of NKPA and CPVA PW's and close

cooperation to it by your command. This

Representative Group will turn in Brig.

Gen. Dodd, USA, on your hand after we re- ceive the satisfactory declaration to resolve

the above items by your command. We will

wait for your warm and sincere answer.59

The Communist objectives were now

fully in the open, for admission by the

U.N. Command of the validity of the

first three demands would discredit the

screening process and repatriation policy

backed so strongly by the UNC delegation at Panmunjom. If the UNC was

violating the Geneva Convention and

conducting a reign of terror in the prison

camps, as the Communist prisoners

charged, then how much reliance could

the rest of the world place in the screening figures released by the United Nations Command?

56

 (1) Teleconvs, Yount, Bowers and Colson, Yount

and Mood, 9 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon

File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May 52, tabs 48 and 49. (2) 2d

Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 35. 57

 Interv, author with Colson, 4 Oct 59. In OCMH. 58

 Teleconv, Yount and Colson, 9 May 52, in 2d

Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May

52, tab 57.

59

 Msg No. 2, Lee to CG Koje-do PW Camp, 10

May 52, Exhibit E4(8), in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits.
KOJE-DO 251

Colson had already sent a final request

to Compound 76 to free Dodd, but the

receipt of the four demands and of two

other pieces of information gave him

pause. A disturbing report from his intelligence officer indicated that the

other compounds were ready to stage a

mass breakout as soon as he launched

his attack and, as if to substantiate this

item, the native villages near the compound were deserted.60

 The prospect of

a large number of casualties, on both

sides, including General Dodd, decided

Colson. Since the UNC had not committed most of the charges leveled by the

prisoners, he called Yount and simply

told him that Colson could inform Dodd

that the accusations were not true. Colson was willing to recognize the POW

association, but had no jurisdiction over

the problem of repatriation. If Yount

could get authority to renounce nominal

screening, Colson thought he could fashion an answer acceptable to the prisoners. General Mood felt that nominal

screening could be dropped and gave his

approval to Yount to go ahead.61

Naturally the Communists wanted

Colson's answer in writing and this destroyed any hope of meeting the 1000

deadline. For some reason the translator

available to Colson was not particularly

quick or accurate and this slowed down

the negotiating process.62 At any rate,

Colson postponed taking action and sent

off an answer to the prisoners:

1. With reference to your item 1 of that

message, I am forced to tell you that we are

not and have not committed any of the of- fenses which you allege. I can assure you

that we will continue in that policy and the

prisoners of war can expect humane treat- ment in this camp. 2. Reference your item two regarding

voluntary repatriation of NKPA and CPVA

PW, that is a matter which is being dis- cussed at Panmunjom, and over which I

have no control or influence. 3. Regarding your item three pertaining

to forcible investigation (screening), I can

inform you that after General Dodd's release, unharmed, there will be no more

forcible screening of PW's in this camp, nor will any attempt be made at nominal

screening. 4. Reference your item four, we have no

objection to the organization of a PW

representative group or commission con- sisting of NKPA and CPVA PW, and are

willing to work out the details of such an

organization as soon as practicable after

General Dodd's release.

Colson added that Dodd must be freed

by noon and no later.63

With the exception of the word

"more" in Item 3, Colson's reply was

noncommittal and the Communists

refused to accept it or release Dodd.

Always opportunistic, they were determined to win more from the U.N. Command before they surrendered their

trump card. The haggling began in the

late morning and lasted until evening as

the prisoners argued about the wording

of Colson's answer.64

60

 Interv, author with Colson, 4 Oct 59. In OCMH. 61

 Teleconvs, Yount and Colson, tab 60, Yount and

Mood, tab 61, 10 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd,

Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May 52. 62

 See Teleconv, Bowers and Murray, 10 May 52,

in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May15 May 52, tab 85. It was unfortunate that a firstclass translator was not called in until too late to

help in these intricate negotiations, but it should

be remembered that the decision to negotiate did

not come until the morning of the 10th.

63

 Ltr, Colson to Compound 76, 10 May 52, in 2d

Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May

52, tab 55.

64

 Msgs Nos. 4 and 5, Lee to Colson, 10 May 52,

Exhibits E4(6) and E4(12), in FEC Gen Admin Files,

Exhibits.
252 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

As the antagonists on Koje-do wrangled over the details, Ridgway and Van

Fleet encountered increasing difficulty in

finding out what was going on. When

news of the four demands seeped back

to UNC headquarters, Ridgway had attempted to forestall Colson's reply, but

had been too late. He realized the propaganda value of an admission of the

prisoners' charges, but Van Fleet had assured him that Colson's answer carried

no implied acknowledgment of illegal

or reprehensible acts.65 As the afternoon

drew to a close and no report of Colson's

negotiations arrived in Tokyo, Ridgway

became impatient. Pointing out that incalculable damage might be done to the

UNC cause if Colson accepted the prisoners' demands, he complained of the

lack of information from Koje-do. "I

have still been unable to get an accurate

prompt record of action taken by your

camp commander in response to these

latest Communist demands. I am seriously handicapped thereby in the issuance of further instructions."

 66

Actually Van Fleet knew little more

than Ridgway at this point. Colson had

been so busy that even Yount was not

completely abreast of all the developments. When the noon deadline passed

without incident, Dodd phoned Colson

and presented the prisoners' case. He argued that there had been incidents in

the past when prisoners had been killed

and Colson's answer simply denied everything. Most of the difficulties stemmed

from semantics, Dodd admitted, but until these were cleared up, the Communists would not free him. With the

prisoner leaders sitting beside, him,

Dodd passed on their and his own suggestions for preparing Colson's reply in

an acceptable form and then offered to

write in the changes that the prisoners

considered mandatory. Colson agreed

and informed Yount in general terms of

the prisoners' objections.67

After a second version failed to satisfy

the Communists, Colson attempted to

meet their demands clearly so that there

would be no further excuse for delay:

1. With reference to your item 1 of that

message, I do admit that there has been in- stances of bloodshed where many PW have

been killed and wounded by UN Forces. I

can assure in the future that PW can ex- pect humane treatment in this camp ac- cording to the principles of International

Law. I will do all within my power to

eliminate further violence and bloodshed. If such incidents happen in the future, I

will be responsible. 2. Reference your item 2 regarding voluntary repatriation of Korean Peoples

Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army

PW, that is a matter which is being dis- cussed at Panmunjom. I have no control or

influence over the decisions at the peace

conference. 3. Regarding your item 3 pertaining to

forcible investigation (screening), I can in- form you that after General Dodd's release, unharmed, there will be no more forcible

screening or any rearming of PW in this

camp, nor will any attempt be made at

nominal screening. 4. Reference your item 4, we approve the

organization of a PW representative group

or commission consisting of Korean Peoples

Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer

Army, PW, according to the details agreed

to by Gen Dodd and approved by me.

65

 Teleconv, Hickey and Van Fleet, 10 May 52,

in FEC, Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File. 66

 Msg, C 68268, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 10 May 52,

in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File.

67

 (1) Testimony of Colson before Board of Officers, 12 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers. (2) Teleconv, Yount and

Colson, 10 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon

File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May 52, tab 74.
KOJE-DO 253

The release hour was advanced to

2000 since so much time had been consumed in translating and discussing the

changes.68

By the time the final version had been

translated and examined by the prisoners, it was evening and the Communists

endeavored to add one last oriental touch

to what Yount called the "comic opera."

They wanted to hold Dodd overnight so

that they might hold a little ceremony in

the morning. In recognition of his services Dodd was to be decked with flowers

and escorted to the gate. But Colson had

had enough and would concede no more.

He demanded that Dodd be brought out

that night as agreed and the Communists

decided that they could afford to give in

now that they had won their main objectives. At 2130 Dodd walked out of

Compound 76 and was immediately

taken to a place where he could be

kept incommunicado.69

The "comic opera" with all the overtones of a tragedy reached its climax

with the release of Dodd, but the aftermath promised to be just as exciting.

Before the repercussions of the incident

are discussed, however, a brief analysis

of the affair might be helpful.

There is little doubt that the conditions on Koje-do were clearly known by

Ridgway and Van Fleet before the kidnapping took place. For several weeks

UNC personnel had not been permitted

to enter many of the compounds and the

possibility of violence was no secret.

Koje-do was like a chronic appendix;

the Far East Command and Eighth Army

knew it would have to undergo radical

treatment sooner or later, but they preferred to postpone the operation until

the situation became acute.

Since the prisoners had set up a definite plan to capture Dodd, they probably

would have seized him eventually. His

contacts with the prisoners laid him open

to kidnapping and as long as they refused

to come out of the compounds to talk to

him, it meant that unless he used force

to bring the prisoner leaders out, he had

to go to them or break off relations with

them. In view of his orders to complete

the fingerprinting and rostering of the

prisoners and the disinclination to employ violent means, Dodd had little

choice. Better security procedures, locks

on the gates, a screen of guards between

Dodd and the prisoners during the talks,

might have prevented the kidnapping,

but Dodd was careless in this respect and

placed too much confidence in the prisoners' sincerity and good faith.

Actually the seizure of Dodd in itself

might have been relatively unimportant.

It was only when the Communists skillfully used Dodd as a pawn and then

backed his capture with the threat of a

mass breakout that they were able to

practice extortion in so bold a fashion.

Despite the fact that there were over

eleven thousand armed troops supported

by tanks and other weapons and despite

the instructions from Ridgway and Van

Fleet to employ force if Dodd was not

freed, the Communists carried off the

honors. What had begun as a military

problem to be solved by military means

68

 (1) Testimony of Colson before Board of Officers, 12 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers. (2) Transcript of Conference in Office of DCofS FEC, 18 May 52, in FEC

Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File. Colson had confused his second and third letters in his earlier

testimony. The version quoted above was the third

and final letter accepted by the Communists. 69

 (1) Teleconvs, Craig and Yount, 10 May 52,

tab 81 and tab 97; Yount and Mood, 10 May 52, tab

103. All in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol.

I, 7 May-15 May 52.
254 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

became a political problem settled on

the prisoners' terms. The Communists

had seized the initiative and never relinquished it. Using the menace of massive resistance as a club, they successfully

blocked the use of force and played upon

the desire of Colson to bring the affair

to a bloodless conclusion.

During the last day of negotiations

Dodd's role as intermediary became

more vital. Given a new lease on life by

the postponement of action, he labored

zealously to help work out a formula that

the prisoners would accept. Under these

circumstances, the concessions that he

urged upon Colson tended to favor the

Communist position on the controversial

items. The pressure of time and of translation added to confusion. It is evident

that the Communists knew what they

wanted and that Dodd and Colson were

more interested in preventing casualties

than they were in denying political and

propaganda advantages to the enemy.

Unfortunately the hurried and continual negotiations cut down the flow of

information to higher headquarters or

the statements open to distortion or misinterpretation might have been caught

in time and excised. As it turned out,

Colson traded Dodd's life for a propaganda weapon that was far more valuable

to the Communists than the lives of their

prisoners of war.

It would not be fair to close without

mentioning two matters that were bound

up in the Dodd incident and in the

events that followed. If force had been

employed, there was the distinct possibility that reprisals might have been taken

against the UNC prisoners under Communist control. And secondly, the attainment of Communist aims in these

negotiations may very well have softened later resistance in the prison

camps. While it is impossible to judge

the importance of these probabilities,

they should not be forgotten or overlooked.

Bitter Harvest

Although Van Fleet tended to discount

the value of the Colson letter, Clark and

his superiors in Washington were quite

concerned. They realized the damaging

implications that the Communists would

be certain to utilize. Phrases like "I can

assure in the future that PW can expect

humane treatment" implied that the

prisoners had not received humane treatment in the past. The promise that there

would be "no more forcible screening

or rearming of PW in this camp . . ."

conveyed an entirely erroneous impression since there never had been any rearming of prisoners and forcible screening had been canceled.70

Since the press was becoming impatient for more information. Clark decided to publish a statement on the

incident. He included both the prisoners' demands and Colson's reply. Dodd

also met the press and issued a brief account of his capture and release.71

 In

general the response to the affair and the

letter was unfavorable and at Panmunjom the Communist delegates made full

use of the propaganda value of the epi70

 (1) FEC Memo for Rcd, Teleconv, Clark and

Van Fleet, 12 May 52. (2) DA-CINCFE Teleconf,

13 May 52. Both in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen

Clark's File. 71

 Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954) , pp. 45-46.

Colson later stated that he never understood why

Clark published his letter and aggravated the situation. See interview of the author with General Colson, 4 October 1959. In OCMH.
KOJE-DO 255

sode to discomfort the UNC representatives.

At 2d Logistical Command headquarters, Yount established a board to investigate the matter and it found Dodd and

Colson blameless. This did not satisfy

Van Fleet, who felt that Dodd had not

conducted himself properly nor had his

advice to Colson been fitting under the

circumstances. He recommended administrative action against Dodd and an administrative reprimand for Colson.72

Clark was even more severe; he proposed

reduction in grade to colonel for both

Dodd and Colson and an administrative

reprimand to Yount for failing to catch

several damaging phrases in Colson's

statement.73

 The Department of the

Army approved Clark's action.

The quick and summary punishment

of the key officers involved did not solve

the problem of what to do about Colson's statement or the more basic question of how to clean up the long-standing

conditions in the prison camps. Although the Washington leaders did not

want to "repudiate" the letter, they told

Clark to deny its validity on the grounds

that it was obtained under duress and

Colson had not had the authority to

accept the false charges contained in the

Communist demands.74 The first count

was no doubt true but the second was

certainly moot.

Denial was not enough for the press,

and on 27 May Collins gave Clark permission to issue a concise and factual

release. The Chief of Staff felt that the

U.N. Command had always abided by

the Geneva Convention and allowed the

ICRC regular access to the camps.

Clark's account, he went on, should stress

this and emphasize that the incidents

stemmed from the actions of the fanatical, die-hard Communists. In closing,

the Far East commander should outline

the corrective measures being taken.75

In the wake of Koje-do came a series

of actions. The stiffening attitude of the

UNC revealed itself first at Prisoner of

War Enclosure Number 10 at Pusan for

hospital cases. Among the patients and

attached work details, 3,500 in Compounds 1,2, and 3 had not been screened

and segregated. Hoping to forestall concerted action, the camp commander, Lt.

Col. John Bostic, informed the prisoners

on 11 May that food and water would be

available only at the new quarters prepared for them. He planned to screen

and segregate the nonpatients first as

they moved to the new compounds and

then take care of the sick. Although he

had two battalions of infantry in positions around the three compounds, only

Compound 3 made any attempt to negotiate conditions under which they

would be screened and moved. Bostic

refused to treat with the leaders of Compound 3; the other compounds simply

remained indifferent to his order.76

After a deceptively quiet night, the

prisoners became restive. Signs were

painted, flags waved, demonstrations

mounted, and patriotic songs sung as

feelings ran high. Infantrymen of the

15th Regiment surrounded the com72

 See: (1) Rpt of Board of Officers, 12-15 May 52;

(2) Memo, Van Fleet for CINCFE, 16 May 52, sub:

Proceedings of Board of Officers. Both in FEC Gen

Admin Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers. 73

 Ltr, Clark to TAG, 20 May 52, sub: Proceedings

of Board of Officers, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen

Clark's File. 74

 (1) Msg, JCS 908789, JCS to CINCFE, 15 May

52. (2) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 46.

75

 Msg, DA 909857, CofS to CINCFE, 27 May 52. 76

 Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp.

56-57.
256 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

GENERAL BOATNER

pounds with fixed bayonets and a couple

of tanks were wheeled into positions, but

no attempt was made to start the screening.77

Despite complaints from the prisoners,

they made no effort to comply with Bostic's instructions. Compound 3 set up

sandbags during the night of 12 May

but no further violence occurred. On the

next day, loudspeakers started to hammer home the UNC orders over and

over again, yet the prisoners laughed at

offers of hot food and cigarettes available

to them in the new compounds.78

A few stray shots were fired on the

14th and the prisoners hurled rocks at

the guards, but the deadlock continued.

To break the impasse, Van Fleet permitted several ICRC representatives to

interview the prisoners. Compound 1

requested the first conference with the

Red Cross men and then the other compounds followed suit. The prisoners became quieter after the ICRC talks, but

they were not ready to obey Bostic's

orders. On 15 May Yount won Van

Fleet's approval to put the emphasis on

control rather than screening, with the

prisoners not screened to remain unrostered until a settlement was reached at

Panmunjom. Armed with this authority

and with ICRC help, Bostic reached an

agreement with the leaders of Compound 1 on 17 May. There was no

screening and the prisoners moved without incident to their new compound.79

Hope that the other two compounds

would follow the example of Compound

1 proved forlorn. On 19 May, Van Fleet

approved the use of force to clear the

recalcitrant compounds. After a brief

announcement the following morning

warning the prisoners that this was their

last chance to obey, infantry teams entered Compound 3 and advanced against

mounting resistance. Armed with stones,

flails, sharpened tent poles, steel pipes,

and knives, the defiant prisoners

screamed insults and challenges. The infantry maintained excellent discipline,

using tear gas and concussion grenades

to break up the prisoners' opposition.

Herding the prisoners into a corner, the

U.N. troops forced them into their new

compound. Only one prisoner was killed

and twenty-nine were wounded as

77

 Teleconv, Bostic and Yount, 12 May 52, in 2d

Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May

52, Tab 172. 78

 Teleconvs, Bostic and Murray, SGS; Bostic and

Col Morton P. Brooks, 2d Logistical Comd, Bostic

and Murray; 13 May 52. All in 2d Logistical Comd,

Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May 52, tabs 179, 181,

191.

79

 Ltr, Craig to CO 93d Mil Police Bn, 17 May 52,

sub: Segregation of Personnel, in 2d Logistical

Comd, Comd Rpt, vol. II, May 52, tab 2.
KOJE-DO 257

against one U.S. injury. The example of

Compound 3 evidently was borne home

to Compound 2, for on 21 May they

put up no resistance as the infantrymen

moved them into new quarters without

casualties to either side.80

Whether the prisoners were screened

or not became secondary after the Dodd

incident. Van Fleet was most anxious

to regain control over all the compounds

and he had his staff examine the situation carefully in mid-May. They submitted three alternatives on 16 May: 1.

Remove all prisoners from Korea; 2. Disperse the prisoners within Korea; and

3. Combine 1 and 2 by removing some

prisoners and dispersing the rest. If all

of the POW's were transferred out of

the country, the Eighth Army commander would be free to concentrate on

his primary mission and be relieved of a

rear area security problem. Under the

third alternative, at least some of the

prisoners would be shifted and the

Eighth Army responsibility lessened.

Van Fleet preferred the first, but found

the third more desirable than the retention of all of the prisoners in Korea.

Dispersal within Korea would ensure

better control, to be sure, but it would

entail more logistic support and more

administrative and security personnel.

But Clark did not accept the movement

of any of the prisoners out of Korea and

he instructed Van Fleet to go ahead with

his dispersal plan as quickly as possible.

He was willing to send the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team to Van

Fleet to aid in the operation. Additional

tank support would have to be supplied

by Eighth Army if it were required.81

Besides the reinforcement of the Kojedo forces, Van Fleet intended to

construct barricades and roadblocks at

strategic points until he was prepared to

deconcentrate the prisoners. The new

enclosures would be located on Koje-do,

Cheju-do, and on the mainland and he

estimated that twenty-two enclosures,

each holding 4,000 prisoners and at least

one-half mile apart, would be sufficient.

Compounds would be limited to 500

men apiece with double fencing and concertina wire between compounds.

When the new camps were finished, Van

Fleet was going to try to use the prisoners' representatives to induce them to

move voluntarily. But if resistance developed, as he expected it would, food

and water would be withheld and the

prisoners would receive these only at the

new compounds. As a last resort, he

would employ force. Both Clark and his

superiors agreed that although the plan

might incur unfavorable publicity and

had to be handled carefully, the Communist control on Koje-do had to be broken.82

Van Fleet accepted the recommendations that ICRC assistance be utilized as

much as possible and that other UNC

contingents be added to the forces on

Koje-do. He had the Netherlands Battalion already on the island and he would

send a U.K. company, a Canadian Company, and a Greek company to provide

80

 (1) Memo for Rcd, by Col Craig, 21 May 52,

sub: Opns at No. 10, in 2d Logistical Comd, Comd

Rpt, vol. II, May 52. (2) Hq 2d Logistical Comd,

Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 60-61.

81

 (1) Msg, C 68728, Clark to CG Eighth Army,

20 May 52, in FEC Prisoners of War. (2) Hq 2d

Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 62-64. 82

 (1) Msg, CX 68852, Clark to JCS, 17 May 52,

DA-IN 140107. (2) Msg, JCS 909231, JCS to CINCFE,

20 May 52.
A FEW OF THE WEAPONS SEIZED IN COMPOUND 76
KOJE-DO 259

a U.N. flavor. As for the press, normal

coverage facilities would be provided.

 83

To supervise the difficult task of moving the prisoners, Van Fleet appointed

Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, assistant

division commander of the 2d Division,

as the new commander of Koje-do.84

Using infantrymen as well as engineers,

Boatner pushed the construction of the

smaller, stronger enclosures by working

his troops in two twelve-hour shifts. He

also moved over 6,000 civilians away

from the camp and off the island.85

By early June Boatner was prepared

to test his plan for securing control of

the Communist compounds. Despite repeated orders to remove the Communist

flags that were being boldly flown in

Compounds 85, 96, and 60, the prisoners

ignored Boatner's commands. On 4

June, infantrymen from the 38th Regiment supported by two tanks moved

quickly into Compound 85. While the

tanks smashed down the flagpoles, the

troops tore down signs, burnt the Communist banners, and rescued ten bound

prisoners. Half an hour later they repeated their success at Compound 96

and brought out seventy-five prisoners

who wished to be freed of Communist

domination. The only enemy flags still

aloft were in Compound 60 and the infantry did not need the tanks for this

job. Using tear gas, they went in and

chopped down the poles. Not a single

casualty was suffered by either side during these quick strikes.86

 Although the

prisoners restored the flagpoles the following day, the experience gained in the

exercise seemed helpful.

Satisfied by this test run, Boatner decided to tackle the big task next. On the

morning of 10 June, he ordered Col. Lee

Hak Koo to assemble the prisoners of

Compound 76 in groups of 150 in the

center of the compound and to be prepared to move them out. Instead the

prisoners brought forth their knives,

spears, and tent poles and took their

positions in trenches, ready to resist.

Crack paratroopers of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team wasted

little time as they advanced without

firing a shot. Employing concussion grenades, tear gas, bayonets, and fists, they

drove or dragged the prisoners out of the

trenches. As a half-dozen Patton tanks

rolled in and trained their guns on the

last 300 prisoners still fighting, resistance

collapsed. Colonel Lee was captured and

dragged by the seat of his pants out of

the compound. The other prisoners

were hustled into trucks, transported to

the new compounds, fingerprinted, and

given new clothing. During the two-anda-half-hour battle, 31 prisoners were

killed, many by the Communists themselves, and 139 were wounded. One U.S.

soldier was speared to death and 14 were

injured.87 After Compound 76 had been

cleared, a tally of weapons showed 3,000

spears, 4,500 knives, 1,000 gasoline grenades, plus an undetermined number of

clubs, hatchets, barbed wire flails, and

hammers. These weapons had been fash83

 Msg, G 6001 TAC, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE,

21 May 52, in FEC Prisoners of War. 84

 Msg, G 5849 TAC, Van Fleet to Clark, 13 May

52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File. 85

 Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 66.

86

 Teleconf, Lt Hall and Maj John E. Murray, 4

Jun 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,

tab 1. 87

 Hq 2d Logistical Comd; Comd Rpt, Jun 52, vol.

I, tab 5.
260 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

CROSS WHERE MURDERED POW's WERE FOUND IN A DITCH. Two more crosses

mark similar burying places.

ioned out of scrap materials and metaltipped tent poles by the prisoners.88

The aftermath proved how quickly the

lesson was learned. After leaders of

Compounds 78 and 77 had witnessed the

fight, they swiftly agreed to move whereever Boatner wanted them to. In Compound 77 the bodies of sixteen murdered

men were found. The show of force was

effective in eliminating the core of Communist defiance and paved the way for

the relatively uneventful transfer of the

other compounds on Koje-do to their

new stockades during the rest of June.

With the dispersal plan successfully

completed, Clark decided to remove the

POW problem from Eighth Army jurisdiction. On 10 July the Korean Communications Zone was established under

the Far East Command and took over responsibility for rear area activities from

the Eighth Army.89 One of the lessons

that had to be relearned during the Kojedo affair was that an army commander

should not be burdened with the administration of his communications zone, 88

 UNC Rpt No. 47, 1-15 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting

Docs, tab 76.

89

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52.
KOJE-DO 261

ONE OF THE NEW COMPOUNDS ON KOJE-DO, showing the double rows of barbed wire

surrounding each enclosure. An evacuated village in the background is being burned to prevent

the exchange of information between prisoners and villagers.

since the distraction could not fail to detract from his efficiency in carrying out

his primary mission—to fight the enemy. There were other lessons that were

brought home during this period. In

most cases, after a prisoner was captured,

he might attempt to escape and this was

about as far as he would go. With the

Communists a new element of experience was added. The Communist

prisoner's service did not end with his

capture but frequently became more

important. In the prison camp his responsibilities shifted from the military

to politico-military duties. Easy to organize and well-disciplined, the loyal

Communist prisoners required strict control or they would exploit their position

for propaganda purposes. Death or injury was readily accepted if the ends

were worthwhile and soft treatment

merely made them more insolent and

disobedient. Only force and strength

were respected, for these they recognized

and understood. As for the administration of the Communist prison camps, the

necessity for high quality personnel at

all levels was plain. Unless the leadership and security forces were well briefed

politically and alert, the Communist
262 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

would miss no opportunity to cause trouble. At Koje-do the lack of information

of what was going on inside the compounds pointed up another deficiency.

Trained counterintelligence agents had

to be planted inside to keep the camp

commander advised on the plans and

activities of the prisoners and to prevent

surprises like the Dodd capture from

happening.

In assessing the effects of the Koje-do

incidents, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that they seriously weakened the

international support that the UNC

Command had been getting on its screening program and on voluntary repatriation. In Great Britain, questions were

raised in Parliament implying that the

screening in April had been improperly

or ineffectively carried out. Japanese

press opinion reflected a growing suspicion that the U.S authorities had lost

control of the screening process and permitted ROK pressure to be exerted directly or indirectly against repatriation.

As General Jenkins, Army G-3, pointed

out to General Collins early in June:

"The cumulative effect of sentiment such

as that reflected above may tend to obscure the UNC principle of no forcible

repatriation, and appear to make the

armistice hinge on the questionable results of a discredited screening operation."

 90

The presence of International Committee of the Red Cross representatives

during the clean-up activities at Pusan

and Koje-do did little to enhance the

reputation of the UNC prisoner of war

policies. Although the ICRC could offer

little constructive advice on how the

UNC could regain control and admitted

that the prisoners were committing

many illegal acts, they protested vigorously against the tactics of the UNC.

Violence, withholding food and watereven if these were available elsewhere—

and the use of force on hospital patients

were heavily scored and the reports that

the ICRC submitted to Geneva were

bound to evoke an unfavorable reaction

in many quarters.91

Despite the fact that focus shifted from

Koje-do as the dispersal program

brought the Communist prisoners under

tighter controls, the mushroom cloud of

doubt and suspicion that hovered over

the Koje-do episode could not help but

make the task of the UNC delegates at

Panmunjom more complex. 90

 Memo, DA 145230, Jenkins for CofS, 3 Jun 52,

sub: International Concern over UNC Prisoners

Screening Opns, in G-3 091 Korea, 8/33. 91

 Msg, CX 69236, Clark to JCS, 28 May 52, DAIN 144163. This forwarded a letter from Dr. Otto

Lehner of the ICRC to Clark.
CHAPTER XII

Summer of Frustration

At the outset Admiral Joy and his

fellow delegates paid little attention to

the kidnapping of General Dodd. They

were preoccupied with the difficult task

of convincing the Communists that the

package proposal of 28 April was a firm

and final offer and not just an interim

UNC position. Moreover, there were no

indications at the start that the abduction represented more than another incident in the prisoner of war camps.

Not until the contents of the Colson

letter were revealed did the full impact

of the Communist coup affect them.

For the enemy the riots at Koje-do

and the Colson letter provided a custommade weapon to discredit the basic stand

of the United Nations Command on the

only issue that remained—repatriation.

The Communists eagerly seized the opportunity to weaken the UNC position

in the eyes of the world and in the process to strengthen their own case of the

repatriation of all prisoners of war.

Aftermath of the Package Proposal

The relentless attack on the UNC concept of no forced repatriation was

scarcely interrupted by the presentation

of the package proposal. Actually there

had been little hope that the Communists would concede on two issues while

the U.N. Command gave in on only one,

so that the enemy's rejection had not

been unexpected. The net result of the

proposal was to eliminate the question

of the rehabilitation of airfields and the

USSR as a member of the supervisory

commission as issues and to focus the

spotlight of attention unswervingly upon

the disposition of prisoners.

Although the prospects of enemy acceptance of the UNC proposal were remote, General Ridgway felt that they

could be materially improved by resolute

backing of his position at the highest

level in the United States and among the

other United Nations participating in

Korea. He recommended a strong statement that would bluntly inform the

Communists that this was the final offer.1

But neither the military services, the

State Department, nor the United States'

allies wished to go so far. They were

perfectly willing to issue communiques

demonstrating their support of the UNC

stand and implying that this was the last

and best offer, but not to put it so baldly

that it could be interpreted as an ultimatum. If a break in the negotiations

were to occur, they still desired to let

the Communists bear the onus.2

The President, however, did not want

1

 (1) Msg, CX 67235, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Apr 52,

DA-IN 129944. (2) Msg, C 67655, Ridgway to JCS,

28 Apr 52, DA-IN 132680. 2

 Msg, JCS 907676, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Apr 52.
264 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

to prevent Joy from using the terms

"final" and irrevocable" in the statements on the package deal, but his own

official statement on 7 May reflected a

more moderate approach. It contained

no flat assertion that this was the end of

bargaining and left the door open to future maneuvering.3

With the Communist delegation holding firm on their counterproposal for the

exchange of the 12,000 prisoners of war

in their custody for the 132,000 held by

the U.N. Command, both Ridgway and

Joy became convinced that there no

longer existed any reason for meeting

in executive session. On 6 May Joy told

General Nam that the UNC desired to

return to open meetings and the Communists give their consent.4

The reversion to open sessions the

following day had no effect upon the proceedings. The Communists would have

nothing to do with the UNC's offer to

permit rescreening of all the nonrepatriates by Red Cross or neutral agencies,

and charged the UNC with intent to

prevent 100,000 prisoners from returning home.5

At this juncture the Dodd incident

and the Colson letter supplied the enemy

with fresh ammunition for its assault on

the UNC screening procedure. On 16

May, Nam launched the following broadside:

As long as your side does not change this

peremptory attitude and give up your un- reasonable proposal, our side will continue

to expose at these conferences the absurdity

of your proposal. Since you are insisting

upon your absurd proposition, you will

not be able to escape the inevitable conse- quences of your such [sic] insistence. The

so-called screening is totally absurd and

impermissible. The so-called result of your

so-called screening is doubly absurd and

wholly concocted by your side. The com- mandant of your prisoner-of-war camp has

already declared to the whole world the

utter bankruptcy of your proposition.6

Four days later he lodged this accusation with the UNC delegates:

The unshakable fact is that our captured

personnel would rather die than yield to

your design of retaining them as your can- non fodder. The unshakable fact is that

public confessions of the commandant of

your prisoner-of-war camp have killed and

buried the myth that our captured per- sonnel refused to be repatriated. In spite of

all your threats and violence, our captured

personnel rose in heroic and just resistance

against your forced screening. The com- mandant of your prisoner-of-war camp

could not but confess before the whole

world your inhuman treatment and mur- derous violence against our captured per- sonnel, and the criminal and unlawful acts

committed by your side in screening and

re-arming war prisoners by force.7

These samples of the continuous attack sustained by the Communists during

May were difficult to refute and, internationally, the damage to the UNC

position on repatriation and screening

3

 (1) Msg, JCS 907937, JCS to CINCFE, 2 May 52. (2)

Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 460-61.

4

 (1) Msg, HNC 1211, Joy to CINCUNC, 2 May 52,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS

sec., incl 30. (2) Msg, C 67976, Ridgway to CINCUNC (Adv), 4 May 52, in same place, incl 31. (3)

Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-ninth Session of

Mil Armistice Conf, 6 May 52, in FEC Transcript of

Proceedings, Mtgs on Mil Armistice, 28 Apr-3 Jun

52, vol. 41 (hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts,

Plenary Conf, vol. 4. 5

 Transcript of Proceedings, Fifteenth Session of

Mil Armistice Conf, 7 May 52, in FEC Transcripts,

Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

6

 Ibid., Fifty-ninth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 16 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4. 7

 Ibid., Sixty-third Session of Mil Armistice Conf,

20 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 265

was considerable. Although the situation on Koje-do provided the bulk of

the grist for the Communist mill, the

enemy produced a steady stream of

additional charges. On 11 May, Nam

stated, UNC planes bombed a Communist prisoner of war camp and injured a number of UNC personnel.

The next day, Nam informed Joy,

supply trucks en route to Panmunjom

were strafed, and on 14 May parachute flares were dropped on the neutral

conference area and strafing carried out.8

While the UNC representatives denied

responsibility for some of these accusations, there were enough infractions to

place the UNC delegation constantly on

the defensive.

In the midst of the Communist barrage, Admiral Joy's tour as chief spokesman at Panmunjom came to an end.

In his farewell speech on 22 May, Joy

managed to strike back at the enemy.

Recalling that on 10 July 1951 he had

stressed that "the success or failure of

the negotiations begun here today depends directly upon the good faith of

the delegations present," he pointed out

that that hope had proved to be forlorn.

The Communists had caviled over procedural matters, manufactured spurious

issues, denied agreements, and indulged

in abuse and invective- when all else

failed, the admiral charged. Comparing

the records of the two sides, he noted

that "they are as different as night and

day. No amount of propaganda, however oft repeated, can hide your ignoble

record." Joy urged the acceptance of the

package proposal, then concluded: "After ten months and 12 days I feel there

is nothing more for me to do. There is

nothing left to negotiate. I now turn

over the unenviable job of further dealings with you to Major General William

K. Harrison, who succeeds me as Senior

Delegate of the United Nations Command Delegation. May God be with

him."

 9

Joy had done well in a difficult situation. Despite frequent harassment he

had restrained himself and maintained

the dignity of his office under trying circumstances. Yet whenever weak points

in the Communist arguments had appeared, he had hit hard. During the

ten months that he had led the delegation, all of the issues under discussion

had been settled with the exception of

repatriation of prisoners. And even on

this thorny problem, the debate was

over. One side or the other would have

to give in before an armistice agreement

could be reached. As Joy left the Far

East, he could contemplate his accomplishments with some satisfaction. The

deadlock on repatriation was not his responsibility and all other matters had

been successfully negotiated. In many

instances he had attained more than expected and if, in some cases, the United

States also had had to surrender more

than it had bargained for, this was a

normal part of negotiating and certainly

no vital objectives had been given up.

There was little doubt that Joy had

often grown restive at the caution exercised by his superiors in their dealings

with the Communists and wished to

adopt a firmer position. Yet despite his

personal conviction that continued

haggling with the enemy would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and

8

 Ibid., Fifty-eighth Session of Mil Armistice Conf,

15 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

9

 Ibid., Sixty-fifth Session of Mil Armistice Conf,

22 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.
266 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

indecision by the Communists, he had

suppressed his own feelings and carried

on the negotiations with patience and

forbearance.

The composition of the UNC delegation underwent several other changes

during the latter part of May. As General Harrison moved up to assume the

duties of chief delegate, Brig. Gen. Frank

C. McConnell took over his position as

Army representative.10 On 28 May, Brig.

Gen. Lee Han Lim replaced Maj. Gen.

Yu Chae Heung as ROK Army delegate.

The replacements in both instances were

of lower rank than their predecessors,

possibly because there remained little to

be done and major generals could be

better utilized elsewhere. At any rate,

the rotation of personnel had little effect

upon the UNC policies and attitudes in

the truce tents.

Variations on a Theme

While the Communist delegates

probed for weak spots in the UNC defenses, the internal conflict over a stiffer

approach to the enemy continued. General Harrison staunchly supported Joy's

pleas for avoiding any signs of weakness.

In their opinion daily sessions with the

enemy could only lead the Communists

to believe that the UNC was still ready

to bargain. Actually both Joy and Harrison would have preferred an immediate indefinite suspension of the

negotiations until the Communists indicated that they were prepared to accept

the UNC proposals.11

General Clark soon came to agree with

his negotiators at Panmunjom. He

granted the argument that regular meetings with the enemy did provide the

UNC with ample opportunity to remind

the Communists and, of course, the rest

of the world of the fairness of its 28

April proposal. Obversely, however, he

pointed out, they also afforded the enemy an excellent means of exploiting

the deterioration of the UNC position

after the Koje-do incident. The Communist attack was constantly being refueled by fresh charges and thus was

more dramatic and newsworthy. Constant repetition of the UNC formula

—no matter how attractive the original

concept might be—had only resulted in

diminishing returns in press coverage

and had allowed the enemy to retain the

initiative.12

To counter the present Communist

advantage and convince the enemy that

the U.N. Command would not alter its

stand, Clark suggested at the end of May

several possibilities that might be

adopted as alternatives to indefinite suspension of the truce talks. These included: turning over the problem of

rescreening to the liaison officers; one

week recesses; delaying tactics by postponing meetings shortly before they were

scheduled to convene; and launching a

strong propaganda counterattack against

10

 General McConnell had spent a great part of

his career in organizing and training troops. During

World War II he had devoted himself to the preparation of antiaircraft units for combat and after the

war he assisted in training Philippine ground forces.

11

 (1) Msg, HNC 1236, Joy to CINCUNC, 12 May

52, in UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and

CofS sec., incl 35. (2) Msg, HNC 1277, Harrison to CINCUNC, 30 May 52, in same place, incl 50. 12

 (1) Msg, JCS 908988, JCS to CINCFE, 16 May

52. (2) Msg, C 69351, Clark to JCS, 31 May 52, DAIN 145230.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 267

the enemy. But Clark did not recommend them. Instead he felt that the

UNC should meet as infrequently as possible with the Communists until it had

completed its final rosters of all those

who were willing to return to the control

of the enemy. When the lists were ready,

the new firm figures should be presented

and if the Communists did not accept

them, the UNC would recess unilaterally

until they did.13

The use of the expanded repatriation

lists led to another point of debate during May between U.S. leaders in Washington and the U.N. Command. As

rescreening proceeded during late April

and early May, it became apparent that

not 70,000 but over 80,000 prisoners and

civilian internees wished to be sent back.

The obvious disadvantage in revealing

the increase to the enemy immediately

lay in the fact that the Communists

would probably assume that this was another interim figure and adopt a policy

of delay anticipating further augmentation of the repatriate totals. On the

other hand, knowledge of a 2-percent

boost might well spur Communist acceptance of the UNC offer. Admiral Joy

and General Harrison wanted to submit

the revised estimate to the enemy

through the liaison officers, but their

superiors were less inclined to act in

haste. They pointed out that since many

of the prisoners included in the new

figures were members of compounds that

were completely unscreened because of

the threat of violence, a considerable

number might refuse to be repatriated

at the time of exchange and the Communist would deem this a breach of

faith.14

After the Koje-do affair, the Washington leaders felt even more strongly about

informing the enemy of the 80,000-plus

figure. In their opinion, it could only

strengthen the Communist allegation

that the initial screening had been conducted improperly and had no validity.

This, in turn, could weaken the support

that the United States was receiving

from its allies and the neutral nations.15

The refusal of the Washington leaders

to release the new figure limited the

UNC negotiators to a defense of the 28

April proposal. On 23 May—the second

day of Harrison's assumption of the role

of chief delegate—the Communists presented him with an opportunity to call a

three-day recess to the talks. Despite the

expressed Washington desire that daily

sessions be held as long as the Communists wished them, Harrison postponed

the next meeting until 27 May. This

contrary action brought a query from the

U.S. leaders, but Clark held it was per13

 Msg, C 69351, Clark to JCS, 31 May 52, DA-IN

145230.

14

 (1) Msg, HNC 1214, Joy to CINCUNC, 5 May

52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and

CofS sec., incl 38. (2) Msg, CX 67989, CINCUNC to

CINCUNC (Adv), 5 May 52, in same place, incl 39.

15

 Msg, JCS 909104, JCS to CINCFE, 18 May 52.

Eighth Army tallies as of 16 May had produced the

following results on those to be repatriated:

In addition there were 3,500 unscreened personnel

at Pusan. See Msg, CX 68567, Clark to JCS, 16 May

52, DA-IN 139602.
268 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

fectly proper under the circumstances

since the enemy had agreed to the recess.

Technically, the U.N. Command had a

point and soon won permission to ask for

additional recesses on this basis in the

future provided that none was longer

than four days.16

Although the approach of the Washington political and military chiefs to the

Communists might have seemed overcautious or perhaps oversolicitous under

other conditions, there were several factors on the international scene that

strongly influenced their actions during

the hectic month of May 1952. As they

informed Clark in early June, the strong

support that the UNC had won for the

principle of nonforcible repatriation had

been undermined by the incidents on

Koje-do. Many of the United States'

principal allies were urging that some

type of rescreening take place now rather

than prior to the armistice. If the United

States invoked a unilateral indefinite

suspension of the talks at this juncture,

the Soviet Union might take advantage

of the opportunity and bring the matter

before the U.N. Security Council. In the

opinion of the Washington chiefs, the

question of the number of prisoners to

be returned appeared to be all-important. They felt that a total of 100,000,

if it included all of the Chinese, might

be acceptable to the Communists, but a

figure in the eighty thousands would

only cast further doubts on the original

screening process.

To restore confidence in the UNC's

position, they suggested a step that might

alleviate the situation. A group of

countries not participating in the conflict

might be requested to send representatives to interrogate the nonrepatriates

prior to the armistice. This could be

accomplished with Communist observers

on hand and with both sides agreeing to

abide by the results. If the enemy refused to participate, the U.N. Command

could proceed unilaterally and present

the corrected figures to the Communists.

If they did not accept these, the UNC

would recess indefinitely.17

On the same day—6 June—that the

Washington leaders forwarded this explanation of the difficulties facing them

at home and their suggestions for possible solution of the impasse, they also

informed Clark that they were going to

inaugurate an intensified campaign to

counteract the increased flow of Communist propaganda. The enemy was engaged in a world-wide "Hate America"

attack, they maintained, using biological

warfare and prisoner of war charges as

the chief ingredients. If Clark agreed,

they were prepared to set up an Interdepartmental Watch Committee with

representatives of Defense, State, and

Central Intelligence Agency to work on

quick exchange of information and the

development of Countermeasures to the

enemy's sowing of doubt and suspicion.18

General Clark was quite willing to

have the committee established, but he

felt that the strongest weapon that the

U.N. Command could employ against

the enemy was truth. The removal of

the "shroud of secrecy" from all matters,

save those vital to military security, and

the prompt release of full and factual

information to the press would be the

best method to insure domestic and

16

 (1) Msg, CX 68975, Clark to DA, 23 May 52, DAIN 142347. (2) Msg, JCS 909747, JCS to CINCFE,

26 May 52.

17

 Msg, JCS 910484, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Jun 52.

18

 Msg, JCS 910473, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Jun 52.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 269

world support in the long run, he believed. He pointed out that although

many of the stories emanating from

Koje-do had not reflected credit on the

UNC, the situation was improving and

the freedom accorded to the press was

producing increasingly favorable results.19

The Communist propaganda campaign produced one side effect that the

enemy probably did not anticipate.

While there appeared to be a chance

that an armistice might be concluded

during March and April, Ridgway had

decided to hold all civilian internees

until a final settlement was reached. He

did not wish to endanger a quick agreement by releasing prematurely the civilian internees desiring to remain in the

Republic of Korea. But as the prospects

for agreement receded in May, the

reasons for delaying action on the civilian internees became less important.

The primary deterrent to immediate release—the adverse effect upon the negotiations—was no longer considered valid

in view of the depressed state of affairs

at Panmunjom.

As Harrison informed Clark in early

June, the Communists had already accorded the civilian internees special

status when they accepted the prisoner

lists of 18 December. He felt there was

little risk that the enemy would break

off the negotiations over the freeing of

these people nor would the Communists

retaliate by holding on to UNC prisoners

since this would violate the principle

they had been defending so staunchly.

Doubtlessly, Harrison continued, the

Communist propaganda machine would

attempt to make full use of this

unilateral action as delaying or preventing an armistice, but at this stage the

propaganda was being issued at such a

rapid rate that a little more or less would

make no difference. Clark, in informing

the JCS of his intention to make the

release, agreed with Harrison's analysis

and went on to add that the continued

detention of the internees had been a

constant source of irritation to Rhee and

the ROK people. He did not think that

letting the internees go free would have

any impact upon the internal crisis in

the ROK Government at this time and

it would materially reduce the logistical

burden imposed upon the Far East Command and result in a savings of vitally

needed administrative personnel.20

With the Army supporting Clark's

argument, the JCS, the State Department, and the President consented on

10 June to the release of the civilian internees.21

 Two days later Clark forwarded his schedule and his plans to

co-ordinate the discharge of some 27,000

internees with the ROK Government.

The rate of release, he noted, would depend upon the ability of the Republic

of Korea to receive the internees, but a

minimum of sixty days would be necessary to do the job in an orderly fashion.

Responsibility would rest with the 2d

Logistical Command for drawing up lists

and providing transport and subsistence

en route with the UNC Civil Assistance

Command furnishing liaison with the

ROK Government, insuring that no

interference with military operations re19

 Msg, C 69888, Clark to JCS, 9 Jun 52, DA-IN

148276.

20

 Msg, CX 69687, Clark to JCS, 5 Jun 52, DA-IN

146933. For the ROK internal crisis, see Chapter

XIV, below. 21

 (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 6 Jun 52, sub: Pro- posal by CINCFE to Release Civilian Internees, in

G-3 383.6, 24. (2) Msg, JCS 910811, JCS to CINCFE,

10 Jun 52.
270 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

suited, issuing thirty-day rations to each

internee as he was freed, and assisting

the ROK Government in the task of

distributing the civilians to their areas

of residence. Clark thought that the

unscreened internees should and could

be screened before the 27,000 were discharged lest the release influence the

choice of those left unscreened. On 13

June the Clark plan was approved.22

Screening the recalcitrant civilian internees was but one aspect of the problem facing Clark during June. On

Koje-do General Boatner was still engaged in wresting control of several of

the compounds from the enemy prisoners. Clark wanted this task to be completed as quickly as possible and the

remainder of the unscreened prisoners

of war to be polled. Once this was finished, the U.N. Command would be in

possession of more accurate figures on

the number of repatriates. If the United

States desired eventually to have the nonrepatriates rescreened by neutral nations

before the armistice, Clark declared, the

job would be much simpler since all

the hard-core Communists would be in

the repatriate compounds and would not

have to be rescreened.23

The U.S. leaders agreed and Clark

informed them of the Eighth Army plan

for concluding the segregation of prisoners. In general, the procedure paralleled that followed in April. Prisoners

would be rostered and fingerprinted first,

then taken to the interview tent. If a

prisoner refused to answer the questions

or indicated he would not resist repatriation violently, he was placed on the list

to be repatriated and assigned to a repatriate compound.24

By the end of June the last compound

had been screened and a new total of

slightly over 83,000 repatriates segregated.25

 The question of whether to disclose the revised figures to the enemy

immediately came under discussion

again. General Bradley evidently felt as

Clark and Harrison did on the subject.

The danger that the Communists would

learn of the corrected total through a

leak or via their quite competent intelligence system argued for a quick presentation of the figures at Panmunjom,

but the Department of the Army was

still reluctant. The possibility of further

discrediting of the original screening

process at this time and the lack of decision over a later rescreening by neutral

nations prompted G-3 to urge that the

U.N. Command confirm the 83,000 figure only in the event that it were discovered by the Communists.26

On 3 July the Washington leaders effected a compromise between the two

positions. Clark was authorized to

22

 (1) Msg, CX 50051, Clark to JCS, 12 Jun 52, DAIN 149495. (2) Msg, JCS 911250, JCS to CINCUNC,

13 Jun 52. 23

 Msg, CX 50050, Clark to JCS, 12 Jun 52, DAIN 149501.

24

 Msg, GX 50636, CINCUNC to JCS, 22 Jun 52,

DA-IN 153229. 25

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, p. 69. The complete breakdown was as follows:

26

 (1) Msg, CX 51050, CINCUNC to JCS, 28 Jun

52, DA-IN 155625. (2) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 30

Jun and 1 Jul 52, sub: Proposal to Submit to the

Communists a New Final Figure ... , in G-3 091

Korea, 8/37.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 271

SCREENING POW's ON KOJE-DO, JUNE 1952

divulge the revised numbers to the

enemy, but only if the Communists insisted upon discussing them.27

In the meantime, Clark and his staff

completed their preparations for the return of the internees to civilian life. On

23 June Harrison quietly announced at

Panmunjom that the UNC intended to

release 27,000 internees in the near future. As expected, the Communists bitterly protested this action as unilateral

and designed to delay the fashioning of

an armistice. But Harrison made no effort to explain or defend his statement.

As far as the UNC was concerned, he

told Nam, this was an internal matter

and passed on to the enemy as a point of

information and not as a subject for debate.28

 One week later the first group of

1,800 internees were moved from Yongch'on to their homes throughout South

Korea and by mid-July about 10,000 had

been set free.29

On the whole, June was an uneventful

month at Panmunjom. Harrison resorted several times to three-day recesses

despite Nam Il's remonstrations but

there was little change in the course of

27

 Msg, JCS 912791, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52.

28

 Transcript of Proceedings, Eighty-eighth Session

of Mil Armistice Conf, 23 Jun 52, in FEC Main Delegate's Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul 52. 29

 Msg, G 74961, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 2

Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and

CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 63.
272 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

negotiations.30 The recess from 8 to 10

June drew a letter of protest from Kim

and Peng and a brief, firm response from

Clark affirming the right of either side

to request recesses in the event there

were no new proposals to discuss.

Whether the enemy was worried and

feared that the U.N. Command might

be preparing to break off relations, as

Clark and Harrison asserted, or simply

did not want to lose the daily forum for

its complaints and charges, was difficult

to assess, but in either case the recess

could do little harm to the UNC cause.31

There were two changes in the composition of the UNC delegation in late

June and early July. On 22 June fiery,

capable Admiral Libby attended his last

meeting at Panmunjom and was replaced

the following day by Rear Adm. John

C. Daniel.32 At the beginning of July

another veteran member of the team finished his service as a negotiator.

General Turner, who had so often

clashed with Hsieh Fang on airfields and

other Item 3 matters, was rotated and

replaced by Brig. Gen. Joseph T. Morris,

USAF.33 With the departure of Turner,

Harrison became senior in length of service on the delegation as well as chief

delegate.

The lack of progress and prospects at

Panmunjom was reflected in a plan that

Harrison presented at the end of June

to Clark. He recommended that the revised figures be given to the Communists.

If they refused to accept a settlement on

the basis of these totals, then an attempt

to secure rescreening by neutral nations

should be carried out. Were the enemy

still reluctant to conclude an armistice

after rescreening was finished and firm

and final figures furnished, then the U.N.

Command would simply release and parole all prisoners except those desiring

repatriation. The negotiations would

remain at recess until the Communists

conceded the fait accompli and signed

an armistice.34 The resuscitation of the

concept of unilateral release of nonrepatriates met with little encouragement

from Harrison's superiors but the possibilities were intriguing. Although the

Communists would have protested vociferously, it might well have permitted

them to save face and eventually to give

in more gracefully on repatriation.

As July began there was a brief flurry

of excitement at Panmunjom. Both

sides had agreed on every article of the

draft armistice except Article 51. At the

meeting on 1 July Harrison discussed

this article and urged the enemy to accept it as written: "All prisoners of war

held in the custody of each side at the

time this Armistice Agreement becomes

effective shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible. The release and

repatriation of such prisoners of war

shall be effected in conformity with lists

which have been exchanged and have

been checked by the respective sides

prior to the signing of the Armistice

Agreement." The interest of the Com30

 The meetings recessed from 8 to 10 June, from

18 to 20 June, and from 28 to 30 June.

31

 (1) Msg, CX 69901, Clark to JCS, 10 Jun 52,

DA-IN 148567. (2) Msg, JCS 910892, JCS to

CINCFE, 10 Jun 52.

32

 Admiral Daniel had seen extensive service as

a destroyer commander during World War II and

had organized and commanded the Navy's first

underwater demolition team for the Sicily invasion

of 1943.

33

 General Morris was an engineer who had com- manded the VIII and later the XII Air Force

Service Commands during World War II and more

recently had served as commanding general of the

Spokane Air Depot.

34

 Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations

(May 52-Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 54-55.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 273

munist delegation was immediately

stirred, for they evidently considered

that the U.N. Command, in bringing

this matter up, was about to alter its

basic position. Harrison, on the other

hand, became very optimistic that the

more conciliatory attitude evidenced by

Nam Il meant that the enemy really

wanted an armistice. Since the enemy

desired more than 100,000 repatriated,

Harrison proposed to juggle the figures

and permit the Communists to save face.

83,000 would be repatriated directly,

26,000 internees were then being released, and there were 11,000 South

Koreans that would be released. This

would give a total of 121,000, but only

83,000 actual repatriations to the Communists need be made.35

Neither Clark nor his superiors in

Washington shared Harrison's feeling

that the Communists were ready to

change their stand and advised him to

secure further elaboration from the

enemy delegation. As the Washington

leaders noted, there was as yet no solution to the question of the disposition of

the Chinese prisoners and this was basic

to any final agreement.36

One effect of the discussion of Article

51 was immediately noticeable; the propaganda attack on the UNC faded to a

whisper. On 3 July the Communists

asked for executive sessions the next day

so that the article could be thoroughly

considered and the UNC consented. But

the inception of the closed meetings soon

revealed how far apart the two delegations were on Article 51. Both agreed to

the article as it was written, but the

interpretations accorded were widely divergent. The phrase "held in custody

of each side at the time this Armistice

Agreement becomes effective" was the

crux of the matter. The U.N. Command

contemplated changing the nomenclature or categories of the prisoners who

did not desire repatriation and removing

them from prisoner status prior to the

effective date of the armistice. To the

Communists, the phrase included all

prisoners on the 18 December lists.

They were willing to except the

prisoners living below the 38th Parallel,

but all others must be returned. As soon

as they discovered that the UNC envisioned submitting new lists based upon

the screening results, the Communists

quickly became disenchanted. Nam told

Harrison frankly on 6 July that if the

UNC could come up with a figure approximating 110,000 and including all

the Chinese prisoners, an armistice could

easily be concluded.37

Although the sparring continued for

several days, neither side gave ground.

The Communists were waiting for a

UNC concession and had no interest in

juggling figures—they wanted 110,000

bodies returned to them.38 After another

week of stalemate, Clark and Harrison

concluded that presentation of the 83,000

figure offered the only hope to break the

35

 (1) Transcript of Proceedings, Ninety-third Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 1 Jul 52, in FEC Main

Delegates Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul 52- (2) Msg, HNC 1364, Harrison to CINCUNC, 3 Jul 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS sec.,

Supporting Docs, tab 32. 36

 (1) Msg, C 51299, Clark to CINCUNC (Adv),

3 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and

CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 33. (2) Msg, JCS

912791, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52.

37

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Ninety-fourth

through Ninety-seventh Sessions of Mil Armistice

Conf, 3-6 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs,

vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul 52. 38

 Msg, HNC 1371, Harrison to CINCUNC, 6 Jul

52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS

sec., Supporting Docs, tab 38.
274 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

THE UNC DELEGATES AT PANMUNJOM, 6 JULY 1952: Generals Lee Han Lim

(ROK Army), Morris, Harrison, and McConnell and Admiral Daniel.

impasse. The leaders in Washington finally agreed provided that the UNC did

not express the number in such a way

as to preclude later expansion in case

of rescreening by an impartial agency.39

On 13 July Harrison informed Nam

that revised tallies showed that 76,600

Koreans and 6,400 Chinese desired repatriation and suggested that new, upto-date lists be prepared. After a five-day

recess to study the figures, Nam completely rejected them. He was perfectly

willing to have the lists rechecked as

long as the final total approximated

110,000, he added.40

The Communists refusal to accept the

UNC figures evidently occasioned some

second thoughts in Washington. G-3

forwarded a suggestion that the release

of civilian internees be suspended so that

the final list of persons to be repatriated

might be increased. In his reply Clark

could find little to recommend in this

concept. To the enemy the important

prisoners were the Chinese and not the

39

 (1) Msg, C 51780, Clark to JCS, 11 Jul 52, DAIN 159939. (2) Msg, JCS 913383, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Jul 52.

40

 Transcripts of Proceedings, 104th and 105th

Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 13 and 18 Jul 52,

in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul

52.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 275

Koreans, he noted, and the Communists

did not appear to be too concerned over

the fate of the internees. On the other

hand, Clark went on, interruption of the

release program would cause the ROK

Government to become upset, the internees to turn restless, and the Communists

to have a propaganda holiday.41 The

Army did not pursue the subject further.

From Washington also came a proposal that the U.N. Command free all

Chinese prisoners and permit the enemy

to send representatives to persuade them

to return home. No force would be allowed, of course, and neutral observers

would be invited to watch the operation.

When Harrison learned of this scheme,

he protested strongly. To his way of

thinking, the enemy agents would swarm

over the prisoners and it would be extremely difficult to rid the camps of

them. If the Communist agents were

successful in getting a large number of

prisoners to return, Harrison argued, it

would reflect very badly upon the UNC

defense of screening and nonforcible repatriation.42

While Clark also had serious doubts

about the feasibility of this plan, he was

willing to try it in the event that the

alternatives previously advanced failed.

To cut down on some of the dangers inherent in the proposal, he advocated that

reindoctrination of the nonrepatriates by

enemy representatives be attempted

after an armistice was effective with a

specific time limit and a ceiling upon

the number of Communist representatives to be sent. Recalling his World

War II experience, he reminded the

JCS that the Russians had carried out a

similar operation in Austria when the

war ended. Their teams had invested

displaced person camps and used every

subversive means available, including espionage. In their wake violence and a

wave of suicides had followed and Clark

feared that this might well be repeated.43

The incidence of fresh suggestions reflected the realization that the Communists were less than happy over the

revised figures submitted. With the end

of the brief era of good feeling on 18

July, the Communist attack on the UNC

at Panmunjom and via press and radio

recommenced. One week later, Nam Il

asked that the executive meetings of the

delegates be ended on the 26th and that

the staff officers resume their conferences

on the details of the armistice.44

Since there seemed to be little point

in holding executive sessions while the

enemy remained in an uncompromising

frame of mind, Clark's superiors consented to a return of open meetings.

They then inaugurated a new stage in

the UNC handling of the repatriations

by giving Clark and Harrison permission

to propose and carry out immediately,

if necessary, a seven-day recess in the

plenary meetings as soon as they saw

fit.45

Harrison wasted little time. On 26

July he advised the enemy delegates that

the staff officers' meetings could begin

again, but that the plenary session should

41

 (1) Msg, DA 913958, G-3 to CINCFE, 18 Jul 52.

(2) Msg, C 52204, Clark to G-3, 19 Jul 52, DA-IN

162816.

42 52 (1) Msg, JCS 913758, JCS to CINCFE, 18 Jul . (2) Msg, HNC 1410, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 18 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 52.

43

 Msg, CX 52284, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul 52, in

UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS,

Supporting Docs, tab 53. 44

 Transcript of Proceedings, 112th Session of Mil

Armistice Conf, 25 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates

Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53. 45

 Msg, JCS 914523, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Jul 52.
276 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

take a seven-day recess in the meantime.

When Nam opposed a break in the highlevel discussions, Harrison made a few

brief, but cutting remarks:

In these meetings we have been restrained

in our statements and have tried to be ac- curately factual. Your statements, on the

other hand, have demonstrated utter hy- pocrisy. You have said we want to retain

your personnel. What we know and what

the world knows as a fact is that those

prisoners are afraid to be returned as slaves

to the tender mercies of Communist con- trol.

You have said we violate the Geneva

Convention—a covenant intended to protect

the rights of individual human beings, not

the tyranny of totalitarian rulers. Probably

no government or armies have more con- sistently ignored or violated the Geneva

Convention than you have. You have no

moral right to raise the issue or the ques- tion of the Geneva Convention. You have

made utterly false statements about our ac- tions. Such lies are recognized by everybody

as typical of Communist propaganda.

Finishing his speech, Harrison added

that the UNC delegation would return

on 3 August. Then he and his staff rose

and walked out of the tent without giving Nam a chance to reply.46

As the era of the one-week recesses

began, three months of frustrating bargaining ended. The 28 April proposal

had resulted in narrowing the three outstanding issues to one, but settlement of

the prisoner of war problem was no

closer in July than it had been in April.

A year of negotiation had produced an

estimated 2,000,000 words of discussion

and nearly 800 hours of meetings.47

Many troublesome questions had been

dealt with through compromise, but now

both sides had maneuvered themselves

into positions that severely limited negotiations. Yet the search for a solution

continued, for the pressures to conclude

the Korean conflict increased as the war

dragged on indecisively and the casualties continued to grow.

Narrowing the Choices

Although many plans were proffered

and alternate approaches were advanced

during the summer by individuals and

nations for ending the Korean War, none

of the proposals presented an answer

that would satisfy both sides and none

could as long as they remained diametrically opposed in their principles.

What then remained to be done? In

Munsan-ni, Tokyo, and Washington this

question was accorded mounting attention during the waning weeks of the

summer.

At the truce site there were four

plenary meetings during August—one

every eight days starting on the 2d.

Aside from name-calling indulged in

by the Communists and the unsuccessful

attempt by Harrison to drive a wedge

between the Chinese and the North Koreans by stressing the inequity in the importance granted the Chinese prisoners

and the casual way in which the fate of

the North Koreans was being handled,

the sessions contained little of note.48

The U.N. Command deliberately

spaced the meetings at these intervals

and made no effort to introduce anything

46

 Transcript of Proceedings, 113th Session, Mil

Armistice Conf, 26 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates

Mtg, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53. 47

 Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations

(May 52-Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 1, p. 67.

48

 Transcripts of Proceedings, 114th-117th Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 3, 11, 19, 27 Aug 52,

in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15

May 53.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 277

new. And while the U.N. Command

sought to convince the Communists

through this procedure that their stand

was firm, Clark did his best to apply

maximum air pressure against enemy

targets.49 Only routine publicity was

given to the air strikes and they were

justified on military grounds alone. The

U.S. leaders did not wish to engage Communist prestige so seriously that agreement to an armistice might be further

delayed.

 50

In line with the build-up of pressure

upon the enemy, Clark investigated the

possibility of releasing the 11,000 South

Koreans who were still in the custody of

the UNC. His judge advocate informed

him in early August that the only legal

basis for taking such action lay in Article

5 of the Geneva Convention which covered doubtful cases. The holding power,

in this instance the UNC, could convene

a "competent tribunal" according to

Article 5 to determine the status of these

doubtful cases. If the tribunal found

that these prisoners should not be classified as POW's, then they might be freed.

Under the circumstances, Clark told

Harrison, there were three simple criteria for recommending release of a

prisoner: 1. residence south of 38th

Parallel prior to 25 June 1950; 2. after

screening, election not to return to Communist control; and 3. profession of allegiance to the Republic of Korea.

The tribunals, Clark went on, could

be composed of U.S. and ROK personnel

or include other U.N. representatives if

this could be arranged. As for telling

the Communists, the UNC delegation

could either make a perfunctory announcement, explaining the legal basis

for the action or not raise the matter

at all. If the enemy protested under

the latter plan, Harrison could use the

argument employed in the case of the

civilian internees, that this was a purely

internal affair. Harrison preferred this

approach.51

On 25 August Clark embarked upon

the more difficult task of securing approval of his plan in Washington. As

it happened, his request arrived while

the State and Defense Departments were

considering the significance of the SinoSoviet talks at Moscow and the issuance

of a Presidential statement. The State

Department was reluctant to consent to

anything that might prejudice such a

statement.52

After the decision to discard the

project for a Presidential release in

early September, the State Department

dropped its objections. A State-JCS

meeting on 8 September concluded that

the South Koreans should be let go before the U.N. Command presented new

suggestions on prisoner exchange to the

Communists. One week later Clark was

instructed to go ahead, but not on the

basis of the tribunal system. Instead, in

the interest of speed, he should follow

the policy set up during the release of

the civilian internees. As the Army G-3

had pointed out, if Clark reclassified the

11,000 immediately as civilian internees,

then he could quickly screen and release

49

 Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 7 Aug 52, sub: Re

Armistice Negotiations in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea,

8/44. For air pressure, see Chapter XIV, below. 50

 Msg, JCS 915579, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Aug 52.

51

 (1) Msg, CX 53436, CINCUNC to CINCUNC

(Adv), 10 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug

52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 29. (2)

Msg, HNC 1472, Harrison to CINCUNC, 10 Aug

52, in same place, tab 30. 52

 (1) Msg, CX 54177, Clark to JCS, 25 Aug 52,

DA-IN 176419. (2) Msg, DA 917089, G-3 to

CINCFE, 27 Aug 52.
278 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

them without bothering with the cumbersome tribunals.53

Clark waited until after the plenary

session of 20 September was over before

he announced that 11,000 South Koreans

who had been improperly classified primarily because of the great dislocation of

population in late 1950 and early 1951

were now in the civilian internee category. Their release would begin about

1 October and take about six weeks to

complete.54 As planned, the delay in publicizing this action prevented the Communists from using the 20 September

meeting for their protests, but Nam sent

a strong letter decrying this unilateral

disposition of prisoners of war to Harrison on 24 September.55

 The UNC

ignored Nam's warnings against carrying

out the plan.

While the U.N. Command was applying military and political pressure

upon the enemy through the air campaign and the release of civilian internees, Clark and his staff began to sift

through the various solutions put forward for resolving the POW question.

These ranged from rescreening the prisoners by neutral nations teams to the

outright discharge of all the nonrepatriates, as suggested by Harrison in June.

As Clark saw the situation in August,

it was time to assemble all the alternatives acceptable in the UNC and present

them to the Communists in a final package proposal. If the Communists turned

them all down, then the UNC could

either recess indefinitely or terminate

the negotiations.56

When Clark consulted him, Harrison

had a number of reservations on the

type of proposal that should be made to

the enemy. He did not want to include

any plan that might leave the nonrepatriates to the mercy of a nation on which

the Communists might apply pressure.

Neither did he desire a postarmistice

political conference to determine a prisoner's fate—all issues should be worked

out before a truce was signed. If the

Communists persisted in refusing to

swallow nonrepatriation in its various

guises, Harrison still felt that the UNC

should let all the nonrepatriates go free.57

Although Clark was not ready to

accept Harrison's last suggestion, he evidently did come to agree that the prisoner problem should not be handed over

to a later political conference. On 1

September he forwarded his recommendations for a final approach to the Communists. The keynote remained UNC

firmness backed by public and international opinion. Pointing out that most

of the proposals made since 28 April

were similar to or modifications of the

plans already rejected by the enemy,

troducing new variations could only

make the Communists think that the

Clark maintained that to continue inU.N. Command had as yet not reached

its final position.

53

 (1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 11 Sep 52, sub:

Release of 11,000 Anti-Communist South Korean

POW's, in G-3, 383.6, 28/5. (2) Msg, JCS 918515,

JCS to CINCFE, 15 Sep 52. This message was approved by the JCS, Defense and State Departments,

and the President. 54

 Msg, CX 55410, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Sep 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS,

Supporting Docs, tab 25. 55

 Ltr, Nam to Harrison, 24 Sep 52, no sub, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 27.

56

 Msg, C 53390, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv),

9 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC

and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 35. 57

 Msg, HNC 1473, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 20 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 36.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 279

Therefore, at one plenary session, he

went on, Harrison would preface his presentation of the last UNC offer with

some carefully chosen remarks on the

differences between the UNC and Communist attitudes and performances on

POW matters and note that most of the

controversy had hinged on the disposition of 14,000 Chinese, presumably

volunteers. After his opening remarks,

Harrison would review the choices previously offered and turned down by the

enemy and then set forth the other alternatives acceptable to the UNC. All

of the latter were contingent upon the

signing of the armistice first and, of

course, the acceptance of the principle

of nonrepatriation.

In Clark's opinion, five merited

consideration: (1) All nonrepatriates

would be delivered to the demilitarized

zone and released from military control.

There would be no screening or interview and the ex-prisoner would then go

to the side of his choice. Observers could

be military or civilian, participants or

neutrals, as the Communists wished.

(2) All nonrepatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone and

turned over to representatives of impartial nations for disposition with both

sides agreeing to abide by the decisions

of this body. (3) Both sides would agree

that the supervision, control, and responsibility for the determination of the ultimate disposition of all nonrepatriates

would pass to a group of impartial nations once the armistice was signed. (4)

Both sides would maintain custody of

their nonrepatriates until a group of

mutually acceptable impartial nations

decided on their disposition. (5) Nonrepatriates would be delivered to custody

of impartial nations either in or outside

of Korea and disposed of by this group.

The last four proposals, Clark went on,

would require time limits to insure that

disposition was concluded before a political conference was convened. Harrison,

after finishing his presentation, would

recess unilaterally to give the Communists time to study the alternatives

thoroughly. In the meantime wide publicity and strong U.S. and U.N. support

should be accorded to the UNC proposals. Were the enemy to refuse this offering, then the UNC would recess indefinitely until the enemy either accepted

or submitted new solutions in writing.

As far as Clark was concerned, Communist rejection would signify the end

of military negotiations since further

discussion would be pointless. If the

UNC plan were carried out in this manner, he concluded, the Communists

would have to demonstrate whether they

really wanted an armistice or not.58

It was evident that neither Clark nor

Harrison believed that the enemy would

accept any of the alternatives. But both

were convinced that it would be very

unwise to permit the matter of the prisoners to be handed over to a postarmistice political conference. While the fate

of the prisoners was decided on the political level, the Communists could improve

their military position substantially and

the U.N. Command would be unable to

employ its air and naval power to induce

a quicker settlement.59

Thus, when the JCS informed Clark

on 9 September that a proposed Department of State plan involving the

58

 Msg, C 54499, Clark to JCS, 1 Sep 52, DA-IN

179066. 59

 Msg, HNC 1503, Harrison to CINCUNC, 6 Sep

52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and

CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 10.
280 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

exchange of 12,000 UNC prisoners for

83,000 Communists with the nonrepatriates to be left for subsequent repatriation was again under consideration,

Clark was not enthusiastic. If such a

plan were to be used, Clark told the

JCS two days later, then it should be

brought forward as a last resort only

after the other alternatives had been rejected. Although the State Department

had not accepted four of Clark's five

alternatives for turning over nonrepatriates to impartial nations for disposition, it was more receptive to his suggestion for bringing the nonrepatriates to

the demilitarized zone, releasing them

from military control, and then letting

them choose their own side without interview or screening.60

Clark's objections to "subsequent negotiations" after an armistice were supported by the JCS and the Secretary of

Defense in mid-September. During

meetings between State and Defense Department officials, Secretary Lovett and

Admirals Fechteler and Libby opposed

the suggestion of State that the President

issue a proclamation based upon the

Mexican recommendation urging the exchange of those desiring repatriation and

the deferral of further consideration of

the nonrepatriates problem until a later

date. Fechteler and Libby felt that once

an armistice was signed, the U.S. public

would increase pressure upon the government to bring the boys back home and

the U.S. military position in Korea

would deteriorate while the Communists improved their capabilities. By the

time subsequent negotiations got under

way, the enemy would have attained a

decided advantage militarily and could

use this as a club to gain its objectives.61

Since efforts to reconcile the StateDefense differences were unsuccessful,

President Truman had to make the decision on 24 September and he approved

the Defense view, ruling out the possibility of postponing the nonrepatriate

question to the postarmistice period.

The following day G-3 prepared new

instructions for Clark and the President

accepted them.62

The general procedure set forth in

the message approved by the President

followed closely that recommended by

Clark on 1 September. But the discard

of the proposals to handle the nonrepatriates either by handing them over to a

group of impartial nations or to a subsequent conference for disposition narrowed the number of new choices to

three.63 In presenting them to the enemy, Clark told Harrison, he should

exercise care not to make a commitment

that the Chinese prisoners would not be

permitted to go to Taiwan.64

Mr. Truman sent a personal word of

encouragement to Clark the day before

the meeting at Panmunjom. He expressed his hope that the UNC proposal

would be made "with utmost firmness

and without subsequent debate." If the

Communists failed to accept the UNC

offer and indefinite recess was invoked

by the UNC delegates, it would be essential that "the military pressure should

60

 (1) Msg, JCS 917910, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Sep 52.

(2) Msg, CX 55003, Clark to JCS, 11 Sep 52, DAIN 182579.

61

 Memo of Conv, 17 Sep 52, sub: State-Defense

Conf on Korean Armistice Negotiations. 62

 Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 6 Oct 52, sub: Summary of Actions with Respect to the Armistice

Negotiations, in G-3 091 Korea, 70. 63 64 Msg, JCS 919368, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Sep 52. Msg, CX 55856, CINCUNC to CINCUNC

(Adv), 26 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep

52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 18.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 281

not be lessened" during the period

ahead, the President concluded.65

On 28 September, just five months

after the package proposal of April had

been delivered, Harrison opened the session with a brief restatement of the previous plans brought forward by the U.N.

Command breaking the POW deadlock.

He then proceeded to the alternatives,

all of which were dependent upon the

prior formal acceptance of an armistice:

(a) All prisoners would be brought to

the demilitarized zone, identified, and

checked off by one or a combination of

Red Cross and joint military teams.

They would then be considered as fully

repatriated. If a prisoner stated at this

time that he desired to return to the side

that had detained him, he would be free

to so do. In that case, he would assume

civilian status and would not be employed again in acts of war in the Korean

conflict. (b) All prisoners desiring repatriation would be exchanged expeditiously. All nonrepatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small

groups, released from military control,

and then interviewed by representatives

of countries not participating in the

Korean hostilities. This could be done

with or without military representation

and under the observation of the ICRC,

joint Red Cross teams, or joint military

teams, as the Communists desired. (c)

All prisoners wishing repatriation would

be exchanged as quickly as possible. All

nonrepatriates would be delivered to the

demilitarized zone and freed from military control. Then, without questioning,

interview, or screening, each individual

so released would be free to go to the

side of his choice. This plan also could

be carried out under military or civilian

observers if the Communists so wished.

To give the enemy delegates time to

consider the new choices, Harrison proposed a ten-day recess, but Nam asked

that the meeting reconvene that afternoon. At that time he expressed his

disappointment in the UNC proposals.

"You have only used different forms and

ways to decorate the unreasonable

demand upon which your side has persistently insisted," he charged. The

Communists would continue to demand

full repatriation, he concluded, but were

agreeable to a recess of ten days so that

the U.N. Command might reconsider its

basic stand.66

The meeting on 8 October repeated

the Communist rejection of the UNC

offering. After Nam finished, Harrison

began a thirty-four minute speech in

which he covered the Communist responsibility for starting the war in Korea

and the UNC's many efforts to reach a

reasonable settlement. The UNC had

now reached the end of the trail; it had

no further proposals to make. Furthermore, the UNC did not intend to come

to Panmunjom merely to listen to the

abuse and false propaganda issued by

the Communist delegation. Therefore,

Harrison continued, the UNC was declaring a recess until the Communists

were willing to accept one of the UNC

plans or submit in writing a constructive

proposal of its own. With that, Harrison

and the rest of the UNC delegation rose

and left the conference tent.67

The talking stage was over; it was

65

 Msg, Truman to Clark, 27 Sep 52, in FEC Gen

Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949-52.

66

 Transcript of Proceedings, 121st Session, Mil

Armistice Conf, 28 Sep 52, in FEC Main Delegates

67 Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53. Transcript of Proceedings, 122d Session, Military Armistice Conf, 8 Oct 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53.
282 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

now a matter of "fish or cut bait." But

the prospects for an armistice appeared

no closer than they had been after the

April proposal. As long as the UNC

persistently opposed no forcible repatriation and the Communists stubbornly insisted upon full repatriation, compromise appeared impossible without one

side conceding political defeat. Neither

the United States nor the Communists

seemed willing to apply sufficient force

to insure a military victory that might

have produced conditions amenable to a

political defeat. At the front the defense

lines grew stronger each month and although the air assault was a constant

thorn in the side of the enemy, there

was considerable doubt whether it alone

could provide sufficient pressure to make

the Communists desire an armistice.

Without a powerful stimulus, the enemy

had no special incentive to seek peace

other than on its own terms. Operating

within a fairly rigid set of restrictions,

the U.N. Command had a complex task

—just how much military pressure could

and should be applied against the enemy

to induce him to make concessions and

yet not provoke a resumption of largescale war.

CHAPTER XIII

Stalemate

I emphatically disagree with so-called

military experts who say that victory was

ours for the taking at any time during my

period of command with the limited forces

at our disposal and without widening the

scope of the conflict. We never had enough

men, whereas the enemy had sufficient manpower not only to block our offensives, but

to make and hold small gains of his

own. . . . To have pushed it [the war] to

a conclusion would have required more

trained divisions and more supporting air

and naval forces, would have incurred

heavy casualties and would have necessi- tated lifting our self-imposed ban on at- tacks on the enemy sanctuary north of the

Yalu.1

So argued General Clark some months

after the signing of the armistice. What

he was saying, in effect, was that there

was no disposition in Washington toward

undertaking the risks or the losses that

military victory would have demanded

during the year when he was in command. The limitations within which the

Far East Command had to operate and

the strength ceilings imposed upon the

Eighth Army insured that no all-out effort against the enemy could be

mounted. On the other hand, the Communist forces of Kim and Peng evidently

labored under similar restrictions. They

made no attempt to strike at the Japanese base area, giving it the same inviolability that the UNC granted Manchuria.

At the front, Communists troops reacted

strongly to attack, yet showed no signs

of preparing to resume major offensive

operations of their own. The rules were

tacit, but nonetheless observed in mid1952; this was a sparring match and not

a fight for the championship.

Holding the Line

Across the front the two opponents

were fairly evenly matched. Stretched

from the west coast to the Taebaeks lay

eight Chinese armies numbering an estimated 207,800 men and there were

three North Korean corps anchoring the

eastern end of the line with 83,000

troops. (See Map IV.) Four U.S. Army

divisions, the 1st Marine Division, the

Commonwealth Division, and nine ROK

divisions, totaling 247,554 soldiers, faced

the enemy. In depth of manpower the

Communists enjoyed a much greater advantage, for an estimated 422,000

Chinese, 185,300 North Koreans, and

10,000 Soviet or satellite troops disposed

throughout North Korea supported the

front-line forces. Thus, the 617,300

enemy troops in the immediate and general reserve plus the 290,800 on the firing line formed an estimated grand total

of 908,100 Communist soldiers in North

1

 Mark W. Clark, "The Truth About Korea,"

Colliers, vol. 133, No. 3 (February 5, 1954), pp.

34-35.
284 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Korea on 1 May 1952.2 The average

strength of UNC forces in South Korea

during May was a little less than

700,000.3

The presentation of the package proposal in late April occasioned no interruption in the general pattern of

operations at the front. Characterized

by patrols, probes, raids, and limitedobjective attacks, the active defense generated only a low level of ground action.

It was a contest of light jabs and feints

with neither side attempting to sting the

other into a violent, large-scale reaction.4

Since the lull on the battlefield imposed no severe strain upon the Eighth

Army's combat troops, Van Fleet instructed his corps commanders in midMay to take full advantage of the respite

to improve their defensive positions.

Noting that many of the present deficiencies stemmed from the haste in planning

and setting up the installations, he ordered special attention to be given to

relocating bunkers below the topographical crest of hills, to resiting automatic

weapons to obtain maximum grazing and

flanking fires, and to strengthening bunkers to withstand light artillery and mortar fire. In addition, he wanted more

tactical wire laid down and increased

consideration devoted to the problem of

draining communications trenches and

bunkers before the rainy season arrived.5

Intelligence reports indicated that the

enemy was carrying out similar action.

Although prisoner of war interrogations

revealed no Communist preparations for

an imminent offensive, the enemy was

engaged in improving the quality of his

bunkers, planting mines, and stringing

more barbed wire. The enemy defensive

positions in many places extended

twenty miles to the rear with adequate

lines of communication.6

Perhaps more significant was the

steady growth of enemy artillery firepower during the spring of 1952. From

a total of 710 active pieces in April the

enemy by June increased the number

along the front to 884. The chief mission of the Communist artillery was to

provide close support for the infantry on

offense and defense and gradually

enemy fire had become more accurate.

Using eight to ten pieces, enemy massedfire techniques also improved. The

Communists employed deceptive measures such as the firing of alternate,

widely spaced guns, numerous firing positions, and a number of roving guns to

make the task of accurate location of

pieces more difficult for UNC units. By

moving his artillery frequently and not

concentrating the guns for long in any

one sector, the enemy hindered effective

counterbattery fire by the U.N. Command. Intelligence estimated that the

Communists had about 500 prepared positions opposite the ROK II Corps alone

in May.7 Also impressive was the steady

climb in the number of rounds directed

at UNC positions. From a daily average

of 2,388 rounds in April, the enemy almost tripled his fire in June to 6,843

2

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 52, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 7.

3

 Ibid., p. 44. The breakdown was as follows:

Eighth Army, 229,893; U.S. Marines, 26,843; Fifth

Air Force, 35,951; U.N. Forces (less U.S. and

ROK), 34,026; ROK, 366,466; total, 693,179. 4

5 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 13. Msg, GX 5831 TAG, CG EUSAK to CG I U.S.

Corps et al., 11 May 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd

Rpt, May 52, bk. 4, pt. 2, incl 11.

6

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 29. 7

 Ibid., May 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 18-20.
STALEMATE 285

rounds a day.8 The increase in ammunition fired demonstrated that the enemy

had over a period of months gradually

increased his forward supply levels.

To counteract the mounting effect of

Communist artillery fire, Clark investigated the feasibility of utilizing two

280-mm. battalions, then being organized in the United States, to provide the

Eighth Army with more firepower and

longer-range weapons. Unfortunately

these battalions would not be available

until the end of 1952 and the Joint

Chiefs were loath to make a definite

commitment so far in advance.9

The enemy was not alone in improving his artillery techniques during the

spring. As the Communists conducted a

series of nightly probes in the ROK 1st

Division sector in May, the troops began

to practice a ruse designed to inflict heavier enemy casualties. When the Chinese

attacked, the ROK soldiers resisted for

five to ten minutes, then withdrew

slightly. After giving the enemy time to

occupy the evacuated positions, artillery,

previously zeroed in on the outposts,

opened up. Within a half hour to an

hour the Chinese usually withdrew and

although the forces involved were

seldom large, enemy losses were comparatively high.10

Old Baldy

Operations along the Eighth Army

front during May were confined to smallscale actions that were quickly broken

off by both sides when the exchanges

threatened to grow to larger proportions.

(Map 4) In early June, however, the

tempo began to pick up.

The U.S. 45th Division of the I Corps

manned main line of resistance positions

from Hill 281, five miles northeast of

Ch'orwon, to the village of Togun-gol,

about eleven miles east of Ch'orwon.

Except for Hill 281, all of the 45th

Division front lines lay south of the

Yokkok-ch'on which meandered through

a rice paddy valley overlooked by lowlying, forested hills. Elements of the

CCF 38th and 39th Armies controlled

the dominant terrain to the north and

in many cases were close enough to the

45th Division's main lines to enjoy

excellent observation of the division's

activities and to have convenient bases

for dispatching their nightly raids and

probes. The enemy's advantages became a matter of concern to Maj. Gen.

David L. Ruffner when he assumed command of the division in late May, for

they pointed up the lack of a strong outpost line of resistance. If the 45th Division could establish a chain of strong

outposts across its front, it could deny

enemy observers the use of much of the

surrounding terrain dominated by the

outposts and could also provide additional defensive depth to the division's

lines.

In early June General Ruffner and

his staff selected eleven outpost sites situated at strategic locations in front of

the division and decided that these sites

would be taken and occupied on a 24-

hour basis beginning on the night of

6 June. A twelfth objective would be

raided and the enemy positions destroyed later during the two-phase

operation, which was to be called

8

 Ibid., Apr and Jun 52, sec. I, Narrative.

9

 (1) Msg, CX 69787, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Jun 52, DA-IN 147813. (2) Msg, JCS 911155, JCS to

CINCFE, 13 Jun 52. 10

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 52, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 29.
286 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

H. C. Brewer, Jr.

MAP 4

COUNTER.11 Anticipating that the enemy

might react quickly and strongly

to the UNC move, Ruffner instructed his

regimental commanders to carry out the

operations after dark and to follow up

immediately with sufficient reinforcements to fortify the outposts before daybreak.

The 279th Infantry Regiment, under

Col. Preston J. C. Murphy, held the

eastern half of the divisional front, and

would take and hold objectives 1-6 and

the 180th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Ellis B. Ritchie,

would seize and occupy objectives 7, 9,

10, and 11. Objective 8, known as Outpost EERIE, would be taken at a later

date.12

Opposing the 45th Division from east

to west were elements of the 338th and

339th Regiments, 113th Division, CCF

38th Army; 350th and 349th Regiments,

117th Division, CCF 39th Army; and the 11

 Opnl Instr No. 58, in Hq 45th Div, Comd Rpt

Jun 52, G-3 sec., bk. VI. 12

 Ibid.
STALEMATE 287

344th Regiment, 115th Division, CCF

39th Army. The other infantry components of the 113th, 115th, and 117th

Divisions were in reserve, as was the

116th Division, CCF 39th Army. The

Chinese had over ten battalions of artillery positioned along the front in direct

or general support roles.13

Several air strikes on known enemy

strongpoints close to the outpost objectives took place during the daylight

hours of 6 June. Then, after dark,

Murphy and Ritchie sent out their units,

ranging from a squad to almost a company, to take possession of the outposts.

Evidently the enemy had not anticipated

the operation, for the attack units encountered little opposition except at

Outpost 10 on Hill 255 and Outpost 11

on Hill 266. The former, which was to

become better known as Porkchop Hill,

was taken by two platoons from I Company, 180th Infantry, after a 55-minute

fire fight with two Chinese platoons. On

Hill 266, which had won the name of

Old Baldy when artillery and mortar

fire destroyed the trees on its crest, two

squads from A Company, 180th Infantry,

exchanged small arms and automatic

weapons fire with two enemy squads,

then withdrew and directed artillery fire

upon the Chinese.

Pfc. James Ortega, a forward observer

for the 171st Field Artillery Battalion,

jumped into a trench and directed the

artillery concentration which pounded

the top of the hill with 500 rounds.

When the artillery ceased, the men from

A Company again probed the enemy's

positions. Meeting intense fire, M/Sgt.

John O. White took a squad, reinforced

by a BAR and machine gun, and made

a sweep to the rear of the enemy. "We

saw a group of soldiers and thought they

were our own men at first," he later

reported. "We advanced to within 25

feet of them when we heard Chinese

voices. Then we opened up and saw

five men run out and get hit." As the

enemy resistance crumbled, the infantrymen from A Company pushed their way

toward the crest of Old Baldy. Enemy

artillery immediately began to come in.

"There were no bunkers or trenches to

get into," M/Sgt. Gerald Marlin related

afterward," so we started digging while

the shells burst all around us. I almost

crawled into my helmet." Despite the

enemy fire, the A Company squads hung

on and took possession of Old Baldy

shortly after midnight.14

Once the outposts were seized, the task

of organizing them defensively got

under way. Aided by Korean Service

Corps personnel the men of the 279th

and 180th Infantry Regiments brought

in construction and fortification materials and worked through the night.

They built bunkers with overhead protection so that their own artillery could

use proximity fuze shells when an enemy

attack drew close to the outpost. They

ringed the outposts with barbed wire and

placed mines along the avenues of approach which were also covered by

automatic weapons. Whenever possible,

they sited their machine guns and recoilless rifles in positions where they

could provide support to adjacent outposts. Signal personnel set up communications to the rear and laterally to other

outposts by radio and wire and porters

13

 (1) U.S. 279th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,

S-3 Jnl. (2) U.S. 180th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun

52, pp. 9-10.

14

 (1) U.S. 180th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,

POR 178, 7 Jun 52. (2) 45th Division News (13

Jun 52), pp. 1, 4.
288 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

brought in stockpiles of ammunition.

Back on the main line of resistance, infantry, tank, and artillery support weapons had drawn up fire plans to furnish

the outposts with protective fires and a

prebriefed reinforcing element was prepared to go to the immediate assistance

of each outpost in the event of enemy

attack. By morning the new 24-hour

outposts were ready to withstand counterattacks, and garrison forces of from 18

to 44 men were left behind as the bulk

of the forces from the 279th and 180th

Infantry Regiments withdrew to the

main line of resistance.15

Chinese probes and attacks on the

outposts during the next few days met

with no success despite an increase in

their artillery and mortar support. At

Porkchop Hill the outposts of the 180th

Infantry Regiment repulsed several

enemy drives of up to a company in

strength.

On 11 June General Ruffner directed

that the second phase of Plan

COUNTER be carried out the following

day. While two platoons of the 245th

Tank Battalion mounted a diversionary

raid along the Yokkok-ch'on valley from

Chut'oso westward to the town of Orijong, the 180th Infantry would use up

to three rifle companies to seize and

hold Outpost 8 (EERIE) and to destroy

enemy installations in the vicinity of the

town of Pokkae (Objective A).16

Two platoons from B Company, 245th

Tank Battalion, under the command of

1st Lt. Eugene S. Kastner, launched the

raid toward Orijong at 0600 and ran

into difficulty. Six tanks were disabled

by enemy mines en route, but the remainder fired at enemy bunkers and gun

positions on the hill mass west of Orijong and then withdrew. Five of the

disabled tanks were later recovered.17 In

the meantime, K Company, 180th Infantry, under Capt. Richard J. Shaw, and

one platoon of the regimental tank company moved north to the Pokkae area

and engaged the enemy. The infantry

closed in to hand grenade range, but

found that the Chinese had honeycombed the heights east of the town

with bunkers, trenches, and tunnels.

Since there was little hope of penetrating

and destroying the strong enemy installations on the hill, the raiding party broke

contact and returned to the main line

of resistance. Losses were light, with

four men wounded and one tank disabled for the raiders, while the enemy

suffered an estimated sixty-five casualties.18

After an air strike by Fifth Air Force

fighter planes and an artillery and

mortar barrage on EERIE, E and F

Companies, 180th Infantry, under 1st Lt.

John D. Scandling and Capt. Jack M.

Tiller, respectively, attacked from the

southeast against heavy small arms, automatic weapon, artillery, and mortar fire

and took the objective. G Company,

180th Infantry, quickly moved up under

the command of 1st Lt. Richard M. Lee

to reinforce its sister companies before

the expected enemy counterattack took

place. The Chinese came back strongly

and casualties were heavy on both sides,

but the 180th Infantry units hung on

tenaciously until the enemy broke off the 15

 See U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G-3

sec., bk; VI, tab 11. 16

 Opns Order No. 29, Plan COUNTER (Phase

II), 12 Jun 52, in U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun

58, G-3 sec., bk. VI.

17

 245th Tank Bn, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, S-3 sec. 18

 U.S. 45th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G-3

sec., POR 283, 13 Jun 52.
STALEMATE 289

engagement. During the next two days

the Chinese attempted fruitlessly to

drive the 45th Division from EERIE.19

From a Chinese document captured

later came an entirely different account

of the action in this section:

From 0500 hours on 12 June 52, the

enemy [the UNC] fought against us on

Hill 190.8 and battled heroically for 5 days.

The result of the fighting on the 16th was

2300 enemy casualties and 9 tanks de- stroyed. We had an honorable victory as

above. At 0550 hours on 12 June 52, enemy at- tacked our positions on Hill 190.8 with a

force of 7 companies and 74 tanks which

were covered by airplanes against our 1st

Co, 50th Co. We met the attackers and killed and in- jured them. At 0900 hours, they finally occupied Hill 190.8. About 5-6 squads of the

1st Co., the defending force on Hill 190.8

began tunnel warfare. At 2237 hours, the

3d Co. counterattacked against the enemy

under cover of heavy artillery barrage and

reoccupied the position. Casualties in- flicted against the enemy amounted to 772

personnel and 8 tanks destroyed. In the dawn of the 13th the enemy attacked our 1st Co. positions on the 1st, 2d

and unknown hill with a force of 5 companies and 15 tanks which were given air

cover by 12 planes. The intense battle continued until 1500 hours. We counterattacked with the 2d Co, 5th Co and the 1st

Co. Enemy casualties were 600 personnel

and 2 tanks destroyed.

For 2 days from 14th to 15th, the enemy

attacked the 2d unknown hill continuously

but the enemy was repulsed. The enemy

casualties were 56 personnel. On this night of the 15th, our 50th Co

and 51st Co counterattacked in large force

against the enemy who occupied both of

the hills by attacking with a force of 7

companies which were covered by artillery

fire and tanks. After bombarding the posi- tions for 35 minutes, we made a sudden

attack upon them. At approximately 0130

hours on June 16th, the battle ended vic- toriously.

An estimated enemy force of over 1000

men who attacked both of the hills were

annihilated. Meanwhile, in another spot, 4 squads

making up the main force bravely resisted

the enemies in tunnel warfare and achieved

victory.20

The Chinese resort to tunnel warfare

led to the sealing of tunnel entrances by

the UNC troops. According to later

prisoner of war interrogations, Chinese

officers had killed a number of soldiers

in the tunnels because the latter had

wished to dig their way out and

surrender to the U.N. Command. After

the 45th Division forces secured the hills,

they opened the tunnels and captured

the Chinese who were still alive and

willing to give up.21

On 16 June the 179th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Joseph C.

Sandlin, relieved the 180th on the line

and took over the outpost positions on

Old Baldy, Porkchop, and EERIE. Enemy

attacks during the next ten days ranged

from platoon to battalion strength, demonstrating the Communist determination

to eliminate these outposts. By the same

token the 45th Division's repulse of

the many enemy efforts along this line

attested to the division's equal determination not to be dislodged.22

The contest for Old Baldy became

very heated on 26 June. The hill was

19 lbid., POR's 283 and 284, 13 and 14 Jun 52.

20

 Document Captured by 11th ROK Regiment

During the Action on Hill 168, in 45th Inf Div,

Comd Rpt, ACofS G-2 sec., an. 2 to PIR 191, 30

Jun 52. 21

 See 45th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, ACofS

G-2 sec., POW Interrogation Rpts, 17 Jun 52. 22

 See U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,

S-3 Jnl, 16-25 Jun 52.
290 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the high point of an east-west ridge and

dominated the terrain to the north, west,

and south. Almost 1,000 feet west of the

crest the Chinese had established positions that posed a constant threat to the

45th Division outpost and the 179th Infantry Regiment's troops in the area.

Colonel Sandlin decided to destroy the

enemy strongpoints. Early in the morning the 179th Infantry Regiment vacated

its outpost on Old Baldy to permit air

strikes and artillery and mortar barrages

to be placed on the enemy positions.

Eight fighter-bombers from the Fifth Air

Force dropped bombs and loosed rockets

and machine gun fire; then 45th Division artillery and mortar units began to

lay concentrations on the enemy strongpoints.

C Company (Reinforced), 179th Infantry, under 1st Lt. John B. Blount, and

F Company, 180th Infantry, commanded

by Captain Tiller, which was attached to

the 179th, attacked after the artillery

and mortar fire. With C Company moving in from the left and F Company,

supported by a tank, coming in from the

right finger of Old Baldy, the assault

forces soon ran into heavy small arms

and automatic weapons fire from the

two Chinese companies who comprised

the defense force. After an hour of fighting the Chinese suddenly pulled back

and directed artillery and mortar fire

upon the attacking units. When the fire

ceased, the enemy quickly came back and

closed with the men of C and F Companies in the trenches. A Company, 179th

Infantry, under 1st Lt. George L.

Vaughn, came up to reinforce the attack

during the afternoon, for the enemy machine guns were making it difficult for

men of C and F Companies to move

over the crest of the hill. The attack

force regrouped, with F Company taking

over the holding of the left and right

fingers of Old Baldy, C Company holding the old Outpost 11 position, and A

Company working its way around the

right flank of the enemy defenders. For

two hours the battle continued as the

Chinese used hand grenades and machine guns to repel each attempt to drive

them from their positions. Late in the

day two tanks lumbered up the hill to

help reduce the enemy strongpoints; one

turned over and the second threw a track,

but they managed to inflict some damage

before they were put out of action.

Gradually the enemy evacuated his positions and the 179th was able to send engineers and several more tanks up to the

crest.23

During the night of 26 June and the

following day the three companies dug

in to consolidate their defense positions

on Old Baldy. On the afternoon of 27

June L Company, 179th Infantry, under

1st Lt. William T. Moroney, took over

defense of the crest and F Company,

180th Infantry, moved back to a supporting position. C Company and elements of A Company held the ground

northwest of the crest which had been

won from the enemy.

When night fell, enemy activity

around Old Baldy increased. Mortar

and artillery fire began to come in on

the 179th Infantry Regiment's positions

and enemy flares warned that the Chinese were on the move. At 2200 hours

the enemy struck the defenders of L

Company from the northeast and southwest. An estimated reinforced battalion

pressed on toward the crest until it met

23

 (1) U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,

Jnl, tab 7. (2) U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,

G-3 sec., POR's 296 and 297, 26 and 27 Jun 52.
STALEMATE 291

a circle of defensive fire. From the main

line of resistance, artillery, mortar, tank,

and infantry weapons covered enemy

avenues of approach. L Company added

its small arms, automatic weapons, and

hand grenades to the circle which kept

the Chinese at bay. Unable to penetrate

the ring, the enemy withdrew and regrouped at midnight.

The second and third attacks followed

the same pattern. Each lasted over an

hour during the early morning of 28

June and each time the enemy failed to

break through the wall of defensive fires.

After suffering casualties estimated at

between 250 and 325 men, the Chinese

broke off the fight. The 179th Infantry

reported six men killed and sixty-one

wounded during the three engagements.

 24

Late in the evening of 28 June, the

Chinese artillery and mortar fire on Old

Baldy signaled the approach of another

attack. Four enemy squads reconnoitered the 179th positions at 2200 hours,

exchanging automatic weapons and small

arms fire. About an hour later the main

assault began with a force estimated at

two reinforced battalions moving in from

the northeast and northwest behind a

very heavy artillery and mortar barrage.

This time the Chinese penetrated the

perimeter and hand-to-hand fighting

broke out. Shortly after midnight a

UNC flare plane began to illuminate the

battle area and the defensive fires from

the main line of resistance, coupled with

the steady stream of small arms and automatic weapons fire from the three companies of the 179th on the hill, became

more effective. By 0100 on 29 June the

Chinese disengaged to the north, having

suffered losses estimated at close to 700

men. In return the enemy had fired over

4,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire

and the 179th Infantry had suffered 43

casualties, including 8 killed in action.25

As June ended, the 45th Division, despite the lack of combat experience of

many of its troops, had acquitted itself

well on the battlefield. In the fight for

the outposts the division had withstood

more than twenty Chinese counterattacks

and inflicted an estimated 3,500 casualties on the enemy. It had also won a

commendation from Van Fleet.26 The

enemy made one more attempt to wrest

control of Old Baldy from the 45th Division's possession on the night of 3-4

July. Three separate attacks—the last in

battalion strength—met the same fate as

their predecessors as the concentration of

defensive firepower first blunted and

then forced the Chinese to desist in their

assaults.27 The thorough manner in

which the division had organized the

defense of the outposts and the skill with

which it had used its positions during

the fighting were a testimonial to the

leadership on all levels and to the courage of its troops.

The 45th Division was less successful

in another field. On 8 June Clark directed Van Fleet to prepare a plan for

capturing Chinese prisoners in the Ch'orwon area. Clark wanted to discover the

identity of the enemy forces in that sector and learn more of their role. Several

24

 (1) U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,

Jnl, tab 7. (2) U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,

G-3 sec., POR 298, Jun 52.

25

 (1) U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G-3 sec.,

POR 299, 29 Jun 52. (2) U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd

Rpt, Jun 52, Jnl, tab 7. 26

 Msg, G 6671 KGO, CG Eighth Army to

CINCUNC, 27 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

G-3 Jnl, 29 Jun 52. 27

 U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, G-3 sec.,

Jnl.
292 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

days later Van Fleet submitted two plans,

one envisaging the use of a regiment

from the ROK 9th Division and the

second a reinforced battalion from the

45th Division. The latter contemplated

tank, air, and artillery support and the

45th Division was authorized to carry it

out as quickly as possible.28

Early on 22 June, the 2d Battalion,

279th Infantry Regiment, set out to capture enemy prisoners on the north bank

of the Yokkok-ch'on. The difficulty encountered by the battalion in taking

Chinese prisoners was later succinctly

related by the Eighth Army historian:

"The raiding party had destroyed enemy

positions, inflicted numerous casualties

and captured three prisoners. The prisoners, however, were not interrogated:

two of them died of wounds inflicted by

enemy troops as the prisoners were being

brought to the MLR and the third was

killed when he attempted to throw a

grenade after being captured." Despite

other efforts on a smaller scale to take

prisoners, the 279th Regiment's total bag

for the month of June was but six prisoners.29

The experience of the 279th Regiment was by no means isolated. In combat the Communist soldier could be

killed or wounded, but seldom taken

prisoner during this period. The fact

that General Ruffner issued a letter to

his troops in June providing for a special

rest and recuperation leave in Japan to

any soldier capturing an enemy prisoner

amply demonstrated the problem.30

Nevertheless, in July Clark approved

another attempt, this time by the ROK

11th Division of the ROK I Corps, to

capture North Korean prisoners. BUCKSHOT 16, as the plan was dubbed, sent a

reinforced battalion into the sector west

of the Nam River on 8 July. The battalion suffered casualties of 33 killed,

157 wounded, and 36 missing as against

estimated enemy losses of 90 killed and

82 wounded. Not a prisoner was taken.31

The results of these abortive raids convinced Clark that the UNC losses in

their efforts to take prisoners were not

worthwhile. On 19 July he turned down

Van Fleet's request for a similar operation in the 1st Commonwealth Division

area. If the Eighth Army did not feel

an enemy attack was imminent, Clark

did not think the high UNC casualty

rate incurred in such raids was warranted.32

For General Van Fleet, who may have

hoped that the change-over in commanders from Ridgway to Clark might result

in less restriction upon his activity along

the front, June and July may have been

disillusioning. Van Fleet's plans for the

IX U.S. Corps to advance to new positions north of P'yonggang and secure

control of all the Iron Triangle met with

little enthusiasm from Clark in late

June. To the Eighth Army commander's

arguments that the operation would provide intelligence of enemy positions, give

28

 (1) Msg, C 69843, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,

8 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, an 4, pt. II,

J-6, 8 Jun 52. (2) Msg, 50431, CINCFE to CG

Eighth Army, 18 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

an. 4, pt. II, J-15, 18 Jun 52. 29

 (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec.

I, Narrative, p. 63. (2) 279th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt,

Jun 52, p. 23.

30

 Ltr, Hq 45th Inf Div, 18 Jun 52, sub: Rest

and Recuperation in Japan, in Hq 45th Inf Div,

Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G-3 sec., tab 32. 31

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, pp. 4-5. 32

 (1) Ibid., p. 5. (2) Memo, Col J. B. Crawford,

SGS, for CofS, 11 Jul 52, no sub, UNC/FEC, Comd

Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab

21.
STALEMATE 293

the UNC troops experience, destroy enemy stockpiles, and utilize U.S. firepower

and ROK Army mobility, Clark listed

corresponding disadvantages. The possibility of adverse effects upon the negotiations, the numbers of friendly casualties involved, the lack of UNC

reserves if a heavy enemy counterattack

followed, and the unprofitable nature of

an advance beyond P'yonggang without

further exploitation, Clark told Van

Fleet in disapproving the plan, exceeded

the advantages.33 It was evident that the

new commander would be as reluctant

as Ridgway had been to step up the pace

of the ground war merely to gain real

estate.

Behind Clark's disinclination to approve even limited objective attacks lay

his realization that the enemy ground

and air strength had almost doubled

since the initiation of negotiations. The

Communists' divisions along the front

were at full combat strength and their

air forces based in Manchuria now numbered about 2,000 aircraft of which approximately half were jets. In addition,

the enemy had an increased number of

rocket launchers and field artillery,

around 400 tanks, an improved supply

situation, and stronger defense lines.

Under these circumstances, Clark felt

that the best way to punish the Communists lay in letting the enemy take the

offensive and not vice versa.34

Thus it was not surprising that the

Far East commander became disturbed

over Van Fleet's instructions to his corps

commanders on 18 July. Van Fleet told

them there were indications that, in

some sectors, the enemy had shifted

forces and evacuated a number of forward positions. When this occurred, he

desired contact with the enemy maintained and the evacuated positions to be

occupied for at least twenty-four hours.

Commanders should be ready for a violent Communist reaction, Van Fleet continued, and complete fire plans should

be made and communications insured.35

As soon as Clark heard of this directive,

he instructed his staff to determine

whether the Eighth Army should be allowed to carry out such a procedure. His

own reaction was that all plans for raids

by units of battalion size or larger should

be approved by the Far East Command

first.36 In late July, he told his staff that

he intended to discourage attacks against

hills like Old Baldy in the future. Clark

wanted the U.N. Command to confine

itself to patrolling and let the enemy do

the attacking.37

The concern of the United Nations

commander over the merit in seizing

terrain features like Old Baldy was

caused by the resurgence of activity in

that area in mid-July. The enemy had

not attempted to take the hill again until

the U.S. 2d Division relieved the 45th

Division during mid-July. All of the

Eighth Army's corps followed a policy

of rotating their divisions periodically on

33

 (1) Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 10 Jun 52, sub:

Limited Objective Attacks, in FEC G-3 Completed

Actions. (2) Msg, CX 50832, Clark to Van Fleet,

25 Jun 52, DA-IN 154621. 34

 Msg, C 50218, CINCFE to JCS, 15 Jun 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS,

Supporting Docs, tab 40.

35

 Msg, GX 7022 KGO-O, CG Eighth Army to

CG I U.S. Corps et al, 18 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting

Docs, tab 28. 36

 Memo, Crawford for CofS, 19 Jul 52, no sub, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS Supporting Docs, tab 23. 37

 Memo, Crawford for CofS, 26 Jul 52, no sub,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS,

Supporting Docs, tab 26.
294 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

FLOODED BRIDGE CROSSING ON THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE, CH'ORWON VALLEY

the line and the 45th had spent over six

months at the front. The Chinese took

advantage of the relief as they mounted

two attacks on the night of 17-18 July

in strengths exceeding a reinforced battalion. Through quick reinforcement of

the Old Baldy outpost and heavy closedefensive fires, E and F Companies,

23d Infantry Regiment, who were defending the hill managed to repel the

first enemy assault. But the second won a

foothold on the slopes which the enemy

reinforced and then exploited. Chinese

artillery and mortar fire became very

intense; then the enemy infantry followed up swiftly and seized the crest.

Counterattacks by the 23d Regiment

supported by air strikes and artillery and

mortar fire, did not succeed in driving

the Chinese from the newly won positions. By 20 July the 2d Division elements had regained only a portion of the

east finger of Old Baldy. The onset of

the rainy season made operations exceedingly difficult to carry out during the rest

of the month.38

As the torrential downpours converted

the Korean battleground into a morass

in the last week of July, the U.N. Command counted its losses on Old Baldy

during the month. Through 21 July

the tally showed 39 killed, 234 wounded,

38

 (1) U.S. 2d Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, G-3 sec.,

Jnl. (2) 23d Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jul 52.
STALEMATE 295

SETTING UP BARBED WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS ON OLD BALDY

and 84 missing for the UNC and an estimated 1,093 killed and wounded for the

Chinese.39 Although the totals were not

unusually high considering the intensity

of the fighting and the artillery exchanges, it is not difficult to understand

General Clark's concern over the casualties suffered in the fight for one more

hill.

Six consecutive days of heavy rain

flooded the streams and rivers and swept

away bridges. As the water seeped into

the ground, landslides began and roads

were blocked or washed away. The task

of resupply became a distinct challenge

to surmount nature's obstacles.40 Since

the Communists had to cope with similar

problems both sides devoted their main

efforts against the common enemy and

tactical operations were strictly limited.

When the rain eased off at the end of

July, the 23d Infantry Regiment again

sought to secure complete control of Old

Baldy. Since the Chinese had an estimated two platoons on the crest, the 23d

sent two reinforced companies up the

slopes after artillery and mortar preparatory fires on the enemy positions. Edging toward the Chinese defenses, the 2d

Division forces used small arms fire and

39

 Hq Eighth Array, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 75. 40

 Ibid., p. 52.
296 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

hand grenades as they reached the enemy

trenches. After bitter hand-to-hand combat, the two companies finally gained

the crest early on 1 August and dug in to

prepare for the customary counterattack.

Two hundred flares were distributed

around the friendly positions and fortytwo air sorties were flown during the day

in support. That night the enemy sent

first mortar, then artillery, fire at the

crest, dropping an estimated 2,500

rounds on the 23d Regiment elements.

But counterattacks were driven off.

Mines, bunkers, and additional wire

helped to strengthen the UNC hold on

Old Baldy on 2 August and extremely

heavy and effective artillery fire broke

up another enemy assault on 4 August.

For the remainder of the month, the

Chinese refrained from further attempts

on Old Baldy.41

In mid-September, the enemy employed two reinforced companies, supported by artillery and mortar fire and

two tanks, in another desperate effort to

regain control of the controversial hill.

Infiltrating groups fought their way into

2d Division positions on 18 September

and hand-to-hand fighting broke out.

Under the pressure of the assault, the

defending forces withdrew more than

400 yards from the crest and regrouped.

Elements of the 38th Infantry Regiment

tried unsuccessfully to envelop the Chinese defenders on 20 September, but the

following day a platoon of tanks moved

up and supported a second two-pronged

drive that forced the enemy to withdraw

once more.42

The fight for Old Baldy was typical

of the battles waged during the summer

and fall of 1952, a savagely contested,

seemingly endless struggle for control of

another hill. And there seemed to be

little hope that there would be any significant change in the pattern.

Up the Hill, Down the Hill

The renewal of activity at the front

and the lack of great expectations from

Panmunjom produced several intelligence estimates during the summer of

1952 that were discouraging in tone. In

Washington and in the Far East the

planners and intelligence experts foresaw little change in the tenor of the war.

The enemy, in his estimate, was

strongly entrenched, had expanded his

air and ground strength, and showed no

signs of accepting an armistice on UNC

terms. On the other hand, the Communists evidenced no disposition to return

to large-scale fighting and seemed content to rest on their increased defensive

strength, confident of their ability to

wait out the UNC. Unless the United

Nations Command mounted a major offensive and broadened the geographical

limits of the war, the intelligence officials

did not believe that sufficient military

pressure could be applied upon the enemy to bring about a swift conclusion to

the war. Since there was small likelihood

of securing substantial troop augmentations for the U.N. Command that would

have to precede any major offensive, or

of gaining approval of more than limited

objective attacks, the prospects of a dramatic shift in the tempo of the conflict

appeared remote. As long as the Communists made no attempt to alter the

status quo, the outlook was for more of

the same type of hill warfare that had

41

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 67-69. 42

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 75.
STALEMATE 297

characterized the second year of the

war.43

Although the fight for Old Baldy had

received the bulk of the publicity during

the summer months, sporadic excitement had flared up in other sectors. In

early July on the U.S. I Corps front the

ROK 1st Division had carried out a successful battalion raid against Chinese

positions south of Sangnyong-ni, approximately seventeen miles southeast of

Ch'orwon. Two days later, on 3 July,

the 1st Marine Division sent a company

raiding party against the Chinese positions at Punji-ri, three and a half miles

northeast of Panmunjom. The marines

destroyed enemy troops and bunkers,

then withdrew to the main line of resistance.44

Other forays were not quite so fortunate. On the ROK II Corps front, the

ROK Capital Division's attempts to take

over Communist hill positions near Yulsa-ri, fifteen miles northeast of Kumhwa,

were repulsed. The ROK 5th Division,

ROK I Corps, also met determined

North Korean resistance when it tried to

drive the enemy from a hill close to

Oemyon, seven miles south of Kosong

on the east coast. The North Koreans

mounted a retaliatory attack on 10 July

against a nearby hill controlled by the

ROK 5th Division and held it for four

days before they were forced to withdraw.45

In August the limited ground pressure

applied by the UNC to help its negotiators at Panmunjom led to the outbreak

of several bitter, small-scale battles for

favorable terrain features. Four miles

east of Panmunjom elements of the 1st

Marine Division on 9 August lost an outpost to the Chinese on Hill 58. The position changed hands five times during the

next two days, but the enemy eventually

gained the upper hand. The marines

then shifted their attack to nearby Hill

122 which dominated Hill 58 and caught

the enemy unawares. From 12 to 14

August a reinforced Marine company

turned back Chinese counterattacks of

up to a battalion in strength. Despite

the failures of these attempts, the enemy

tried again on 16 and 25 August, sustaining heavy casualties and no success in its

efforts to drive off the marines. Hill 122

won a proud name in these encountersBunker Hill.46

About seven miles east of Kumsong,

on the ROK II Corps front, the ROK

Capital Division became embroiled in

another fierce struggle. Overlooking the

division's positions stood a hill, later to

be known as Capitol Hill, where the enemy maintained outposts. On the night

of 5-6 August elements of the Capital

Division infiltrated and captured two of

the outposts. The response was immediate. Building up from a reinforced platoon to two companies, the Communists

hurled their troops against the ROK's

manning the positions. For the next four

days control seesawed back and forth,

but the ROK 26th Regiment stubbornly

fought back and drove the enemy off.

On 10 August, the Communists broke

off the attack, having suffered casualties

of 369 dead, an additional 450 estimated

43

 (1) Memo, J. Weckerling, G-2, for ACofS G-3,

28 Jul 52, sub: Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea,

64. (2) JSPOG Memo, 9 Aug 52, sub: To Obtain a

Military Victory in Korea . . . , in JSPOG Staff

Study No. 410. 44

 (1) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, Narrative.

(2) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, p. 22. 45

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, pp. 22-23. 46

 Ibid., Aug 52, an. 4, G-3 sec., p. 2.
298 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

A SOUTH KOREAN MORTAR EMPLACEMENT ON CAPITOL HILL

dead, and 190 wounded. The ROK 26th

Regiment lost 48 killed and 150

wounded during the action and won a

commendation from Van Fleet for its

courageous defense.47

While the negotiators at Panmunjom

were meeting once a week in August

and the Korean rainy season continued,

activity along the front eased. Then in

early September the weather improved

and the Chinese hit Capitol Hill again.

They gained possession of the crest temporarily until the ROK 26th Regiment

joined forces with the ROK 1st Regiment to retake the hill on 9 September.

Up to three enemy companies sought to

fight their way back to the top at a time,

but the ROK units refused to be dislodged again.48

Two miles west of Capitol Hill lay a

long, finger-shaped ridge, which unsurprisingly soon came to be known as

Finger Ridge. Held as an outpost by the

Cavalry Regiment of the Capital Division, the position was overrun by the

enemy on 6 September—the same day it

launched its assault on Capitol Hill. The

Cavalry Regiment struck back, but had

to withdraw as the enemy increased his 47

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 72. 48

 Ibid., Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 71-72.
STALEMATE 299

defending forces. Up the hill, down the

hill went friendly and hostile forces as

they wrestled for control during the rest

of September and well into October.

By mid-October, Finger Ridge was once

more in the hands of the Capital Division.49

After the heavy rains of August came

to an end, the Chinese renewed the Battle of Bunker Hill (Hill 122) in the 1st

Marine Division sector. On 5 September

the Marine positions were first subjected

to a heavy artillery concentration and

then to an assault by an enemy battalion.

For two hours the contest for the heights

swung back and forth, but the marines

would not give in. Finally the Chinese

began to disengage. Over the next ten

days the enemy sent a number of raids

and harassing expeditions against

Bunker Hill with the marines successfully defending their outposts on each

occasion.50

The Chinese probing for soft spots in

the UNC lines continued in mid-September. In the U.S. 3d Infantry Division

sector of the JAMESTOWN line there were

a series of outposts manned by forces

varying from a squad to a company in

strength on the low-lying hills in front

of the main line of resistance. One of

these was Outpost KELLY, situated three

miles south of Kyeho-dong and about

one mile west of the double horseshoe

bend of the Imjin River. On 17 September C Company, under the operational

control of the 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry, defended KELLY.51

Facing the 65th Regiment in the area

around KELLY were the 2d and 3d Battalions, 348th Regiment, 116th Division,

CCF 39th Army. There had been an

increase in the number and aggressiveness of enemy patrols in the entire 65th

Regiment sector during September and

also an increase in the frequency of

enemy mortar fire. These signs usually

heralded an impending enemy attack.

On the night of 17 September an estimated enemy company from the 2d

Battalion, 348th Regiment, probed Outpost KELLY'S defenses. When C Company requested reinforcements to fight

off this probe, Col. Juan C. Cordero,

commanding officer of the 65th, ordered

B Company to relieve its sister company

on KELLY. B Company took over KELLY

and passed to the operational control of

the 2d Battalion commander, Lt. Col.

Carlos Betances-Ramirez, early in the

morning of 18 September.

The enemy mortar fire on KELLY continued throughout the day and 1st Lt.

William F. Nelson, B Company commander, in the early evening requested

that the artillery supporting his position

be prepared to fire variable time fuze

shells in the event of an enemy attack.

Less than an hour after his request an

estimated two companies from the 2d

Battalion, 348th Regiment, attacked the

outpost from the southwest, northwest,

and northeast. The northeast attack

evidently surprised Lieutenant Nelson

and his men, for the Chinese swept across

the hill and took the B Company machine gun position on the northwest

corner of the hill from the rear. Killing

the gunner, the enemy advanced along

the trenches and closed in hand-to-hand

combat. The sergeant in charge of the

machine gun position managed to escape

after he sustained arm injuries in the

49

 (1) Ibid., Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 73-74. (2) Ibid., Oct 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 59-60. 50

 Ibid., Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 71. 51

 The following account is based upon: (1) 65th

Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Staff Sec Jnls and Bn Jnl's,

Sep 52; (2) 3d Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Sep 52.
300 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

fight. Communications between KELLY

and battalion headquarters were cut off

and the situation was very confused by

midnight, but reports of Chinese herding

American prisoners down the slopes of

KELLY indicated that the position had

been lost. There were also reports that

some of the Chinese were wearing U.S.

uniforms, but it was not clear whether

the enemy had donned the American

clothes before or after the attack.

To find out whether the enemy intended to occupy the outpost, the regimental intelligence officer ordered the

2d Battalion to send a platoon as quickly

as possible from E Company to reconnoiter the hill. The patrol cleared the

main line of resistance shortly before

daylight on the 19th, but soon ran into

machine gun and rifle grenade fire as it

advanced up the hill.

Convinced that the Chinese planned

to remain, Colonel Cordero made an assessment of the situation. The heavy

mortar fire and the attack that had followed had badly depleted B Company,

although there might be some remnants

of the company still on the hill. He

assumed that the enemy now held the

position with small arms, light machine

guns, and light mortars. There was a

waist-deep, circular trench that ringed

the military crest of the hill completely

and four bunkers. At the base of the

hill, on the approaches, the Chinese had

established combat outposts of squad

size.

Colonel Betances, the 2d Battalion

commander, ordered two platoons from

E Company to advance on KELLY on the

morning of 20 September. By late afternoon one platoon under the company

commander, 1st Lt. Harold L. Gensemer, had fought its way to the top. The

second was still on the porters' trail moving forward slowly. The Chinese, however, had no intention of surrendering

possession of KELLY for they quickly sent

reinforcements to bolster their defending forces. Lieutenant Gensemer's platoon began to take casualties from the

small arms, machine gun, and mortar

fire, and the second platoon was forced

to fall back as it encountered similar

enemy opposition on its way to the crest.

Faced with the Chinese determination

to hang on to the outpost and the mounting casualty list, the two platoons withdrew to the main line of resistance.52

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion,

commanded by Maj. Albert C. Davies,

prepared to counterattack through the

2d Battalion's positions. During the evening of 20 September, A Company,

under 1st Lt. St. Clair Streett, Jr., moved

forward to take up the attack from the

south and C Company, under 1st Lt.

Robert E. Stevens, advanced to the base

of the hill on which KELLY was located.

The enemy mortar and artillery became

very heavy as the men crossed the valley

floor en route to the hill approaches.

As the two companies began their ascent, B Company moved forward toward

the outpost line to support the attack.

Mortar fire came in swiftly and with

deadly effect as casualties cut the

strength of B Company to twenty-six

men and forced the cancellation of the

company mission.

The Chinese small arms, machine gun,

and mortar fire was also taking its toll of

A and C Companies. In addition, the

Chinese used time-fuzed artillery fire as

the 1st Battalion troops edged their way

52

 E Company reported 33 casualties when it

closed at the assembly area.
STALEMATE 301

to the top. The airbursts over the heads

of A and C Company were demoralizing

and caused panic. Lieutenant Streett

had to fall back and reorganize A Company, while Lieutenant Stevens clung to

a finger of the hill with two platoons.

The forces under Streett and Stevens totaled about 60 men each at this juncture,

while the enemy had an estimated 100

men on the hill and was reinforcing

freely.

A UNC artillery barrage pounded the

Chinese positions on KELLY early in the

morning of 21 September. But when

the remnants of A and C Companies

tried to close in on the Chinese positions,

the enemy again met them with small

arms and hand grenades. Two squads

from C Company almost reached the

crest of KELLY shortly before noon only

to receive mortar concentrations that

forced them to fall back to the trenches.

No sooner had the enemy mortar fire

ceased when the Chinese counterattacked and forced C Company to pull

out completely. In the early afternoon

Major Davies ordered A, B, and C Companies to return to their company areas.

They had suffered over seventy casualties

in the fight for KELLY. That night the

1st Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion

and the action around KELLY slowed

down for several days.

As the 3d Battalion took over responsibility for the 1st Battalion positions,

Lt. Col. Lloyd E. Wills, who had assumed

command of the 3d Battalion on 20 September, and his staff, drew up an attack

plan to recapture KELLY. Since the previous efforts by forces ranging from one

to four platoons had failed to dislodge

the enemy, Colonel Wills received approval to use his three rifle companies.

K Company, under Capt. William C.

English, would attack from the east and

L Company, under 1st Lt. Frederick Bogell, would come in from the west. 1st

Lt. Ben W. Alpuerto's I Company would

be the reserve.

At 0520 on 24 September the 105-mm.

howitzers of the 58th Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Mario

DeMaio, opened up on the Chinese positions on and around KELLY for thirty

minutes. Meanwhile a platoon of tanks

from the 64th Tank Battalion rumbled

into position to support the 3d Battalion

attack. Artillery and tanks sent 25,000

rounds against the Chinese in support of

the attack. K and L Companies were in

their attack positions by 0540 and

launched their assault half an hour later.

As Captain English and his K Company

troops approached KELLY, the Chinese

opened up with intense small arms, machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire and

soon had K Company pinned down. The

heavy enemy concentration of firepower

and the growing list of casualties led to

panic and confusion in the company.

With control of the company disintegrating and the casualties mounting,

English asked for permission to pull back

and reorganize. Colonel Cordero at 0700

ordered that this request be denied

and that the company continue its

attack. Shortly thereafter contact with

K Company was lost. The artillery forward observer managed to hold together

ten men from the company, however,

and Colonel Wills, the battalion commander, instructed him to continue the

attack on KELLY with his small force.

On the western slopes of KELLY, L

Company assaulted the Chinese positions

at 0635 hours. Despite heavy mortar fire,

one squad reached the top at 0720 and

quickly asked for tank fire. Clinging to
302 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the trenches on the south slope of KELLY,

the L Company squad was unable to

move forward against the stubborn enemy resistance. Chinese artillery and

mortar fire continued to be very heavy.

Since contact with K Company had

not been regained by 0800 hours, Colonel Cordero ordered I Company to move

to the rear of Hill 105, 800 yards east

of KELLY, and to prepare to take over

K Company's zone. Lieutenant Alpuerto

moved his men toward Hill 105, but the

enemy artillery zeroed in on the company and scored several direct hits. The

men began to scatter and drift back to

the main line of resistance. Colonel

Wills sent his S-3, Capt. Paul O. Engle,

to help reorganize the company, since

contact with Lieutenant Alpuerto had

been lost after the enemy artillery concentrations had begun. Colonel Wills

left at 0900 hours to take over the reorganization of both I and K Company

stragglers as they returned to the main

line of resistance without weapons or

equipment.

With only the remnants of L Company still on KELLY, and the other two

companies depleted and demoralized, the

situation appeared grim. The two

squads from L Company hung on to one

of the trenches on the south slope and

at 0920 hours Colonel Cordero ordered

them to stay there at all costs.

When Colonel Wills finally regained

contact with Lieutenant Alpuerto at

1000 hours, I Company had reorganized

and had two platoons intact; the remainder of the company's whereabouts was

unknown. Colonel Wills telephoned the

assistant division commander, Brig. Gen.

Charles L. Dasher, Jr., and informed

him that the battalion had approximately two platoons available for combat. General Dasher told Wills to cease

to attack and to continue the reorganization of the battalion, which had suffered

141 casualties in the action. By early afternoon the squads from L Company had

been withdrawn and the stragglers reassembled. But the division commander,

Maj. Gen. Robert L. Dulaney, decided

that the battalion and the regiment

should not resume the battle for KELLY.

The 3d Battalion went into reserve positions on the night of 24 September and

the 65th Regiment confined itself to routine patrolling until the ROK 1st

Division relieved the 3d Division on 30

September.

During the action between 17 and 24

September for KELLY and the surrounding outposts, the 65th Regiment suffered

casualties of approximately 350 men, or

almost 10 percent of its actual strength.

Yet the casualties alone do not serve to

explain the weaknesses that arose when

the regiment went on the offense. Colonel Cordero in his command report for

the month attributed the poor performance of his combat units to the rotation

program.

During the nine-month period January—September 1952, Colonel Cordero

stated, the regiment had rotated almost

8,700 men, including close to 1,500 noncommissioned officers. Only 435 noncommissioned officers had been received

to replace the losses, and company commanders had been forced to assign inexperienced privates first class and privates to key positions in many rifle platoons. Out of an authorized strength of

811 noncommissioned officers in the

upper three grades, the 65th Regiment

had only 381 and many of the latter had

been developed from recent replacements. The lack of experienced platoon
STALEMATE 303

sergeants and corporals had affected the

combat efficiency of the regiment, Colonel Cordero went on, despite the high

esprit de corps shown by the many

Puerto Rican members of the regiment.

In many cases, as soon as the company

and platoon leaders became casualties,

the inexperience and lack of depth at

the combat company level became readily apparent. There was a failure to

sustain the momentum of the attack and

a tendency to become confused and disorganized after the leaders became casualties. Colonel Cordero recommended

that his regiment be provided with a

monthly quota of 400 replacements including a fair proportion of the upper

three grades so that he could remedy

this basic weakness.53

Although Colonel Cordero did not

mention the language barrier, it should

not be overlooked that the great majority

of enlisted men in the regiment spoke

only Spanish, creating a problem of communication between the continental

English-speaking officers and the enlisted

men from Puerto Rico.

On the other side of the coin had been

the determination and skill with which

the Chinese 348th Regiment had defended Outpost KELLY. The enemy had

used his artillery, mortars, automatic

weapons, and small arms fire extremely

effectively and had sent in reinforcements liberally to blunt and turn back

the 65th Regiment's attacks. Thus, the

failure of the 65th Regiment to take

KELLY could be attributed both to its

personnel weaknesses and the enemy's

strong performance and skill in using

his weapons.54

The Battle for White Horse

Communist activity along the front

increased in the early fall of 1952 as the

enemy sought to improve his defensive

positions before the onset of winter. The

fight for Outpost KELLY was but one of

several contests for hill positions waged

by the Eighth Army. Perhaps one of

the most dramatic came in early October

in the U.S. IX Corps sector west of

Ch'orwon.

On 3 October the Eighth Army

learned through interrogation of a Chinese deserter that the enemy proposed

to attack White Horse Hill (Hill 395),

which was five miles northwest of Ch'orwon on the ROK 9th Division front.

White Horse was the crest of a forested

hill mass that extended in a northwestsoutheast direction for about two miles.

Overlooking the Yokkok-ch'on Valley, it

dominated the western approaches to

Ch'orwon. (Map 5) Loss of the hill

would force the IX Corps to withdraw

to the high ground south of the Yokkokch'on in the Ch'orwon area, would deny

the IX Corps use of the Ch'orwon road

net, and would open up the entire Ch'orwon area to enemy attack and penetration.55

Since other intelligence sources supported the prisoner's story, IX Corps

reinforced the ROK 9th Division, under

Maj. Gen. Kim Jong Oh, with additional

tanks, artillery, rocket launchers, and antiaircraft weapons to be used in a ground

53

 65th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. VI.

54

 U.S. 3d Div, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, an. 1.

55

 Unless otherwise specified, the account of the

White Horse action is based upon the following

sources: (1) Hq IX U.S. Corps, Special After Action Rpt, Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain), 6-15

Oct 52; (2) Hq IX U.S. Corps, Comd, Rpt, Oct 52,

bk. I; (3) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 52,

sec. I, Narrative.

STALEMATE 305

role. General Kim stationed two battalions of infantry on the threatened hill

and held a regiment plus a battalion in

ready reserve. On the flanks of White

Horse he positioned the tanks and antiaircraft guns to cover the valley approaches. Searchlights and flares were

distributed to provide illumination at

night and a flare plane was made available to supply additional light on call

during the hours of darkness. From the

Fifth Air Force came extra air strikes

against enemy artillery positions adjacent to White Horse. As the hour of the

attack approached, the ROK 9th and its

attached units were well prepared.

Just before the Chinese began their

advance on White Horse on 6 October,

they opened the floodgates of the Pongnae-Ho Reservoir, which was located

about seven miles north of the objective,

evidently in the hope that the Yokkokch'on which ran between the ROK 9th

and the U.S. 2d Division would rise

sufficiently to block reinforcement during the critical period. Although the

water level rose several feet, at no time

did it present a tactical obstacle. But the

Chinese did not rely upon nature alone.

They threw a battalion-sized force at

Hill 281 (Arrowhead), two miles southeast of White Horse across the valley,

to pin down the French Battalion astride

the hill and to keep the 2d Division

occupied. Before the night was over six

additional companies joined in the action. The French held firm and inflicted

heavy casualties upon the attackers. Two

later assaults on 9 and 12 October met

with similar responses. As a diversion to

the main attack on White Horse, Hill

281 proved effective but expensive.

In the meantime, two battalions of

the 340th Regiment, 114th Division,

CCF 38th Army, moved up to the northwest end of the White Horse Hill complex. After heavy artillery and mortar

fire upon the ROK 9th Division positions on the heights, the Chinese tried

three times to penetrate the ROK defenses. Each time they were hurled

back by troops of the ROK 30th Regiment, suffering an estimated 1,500

casualties the first night as against only

300 for the defenders. Notwithstanding

the heavy losses, the Chinese committed

the remnants of the original two battalions and reinforced them with two fresh

battalions from the same division the

following day. Cutting off a ROK company outpost, the Chinese pressed on

and forced the elements of the ROK

30th Regiment to withdraw from the

crest. Less than two hours after the loss

of the peak, two battalions of the ROK

28th Regiment mounted a night attack

that swept the enemy out of the old ROK

positions. Again the enemy losses were

heavy and a Chinese prisoner later related that many of the companies committed to the attack were reduced to less

than twenty men after the second day

of fighting.

By the third day Chinese diversionary

attacks elsewhere along the corps front

decreased and the main enemy effort

concentrated on Hill 395. Chinese artillery and mortar fire averaged 4,500

rounds a day in support of the infantry

assaults, and the enemy continued to

assemble fresh troops to renew the battle. On 8 October two battalions from

the 334th Regiment, 112th Division, and

one from the 342d Regiment, 114th Division, relieved the depleted Chinese

forces around White Horse. Elements of

the 542d fought their way to the crest

during the afternoon, only to lose it to a
306 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ROK 28th Regiment counterattack that

night.

Nothing daunted, the Chinese committed another battalion to the attack

on the following day. General Kim, the

ROK 9th Division commander, moved

two battalions of his 29th Regiment over

to Hill 395 to help the 28th Regiment.

Throughout the day the battle seesawed

as first one side controlled the peak, then

the other. Early on 10 October, the 29th

Regiment reported that it was in possession of the crest.

The UNC forces apparently were fortunate on 9 October, for a Chinese prisoner later related that Fifth Air Force

planes had caught elements of the 335th

Regiment, 112th Division, in an assembly area north of Hill 395, had inflicted

heavy casualties upon the regiment, and

had delayed its commitment to the attack.

By 10 October the pattern of the fighting was well established. Regardless of

casualties, the enemy continued to send

masses of infantry to take the objective.

Evidently, once given a mission, Communist commanders adhered to it despite their losses. On White Horse, the

Chinese kept funneling their combat

troops into the northern attack approaches where Eighth Army artillery,

tanks, and air power could wreak havoc.

The enemy's determination to win

White Horse made sitting ducks out of

the Chinese infantry as the IX Corps

defenders saturated the all-out assaults

with massed firepower of every caliber.

On 12 October there was a break in

the bitter struggle. The 30th ROK Regiment passed through the dug-in 29th

Regiment and counterattacked. In the

morning the 28th Regiment moved up

through the 30th and pressed the assault.

Leapfrogging the battalions of the leading regiment and substituting attack regiments from time to time, the ROK 9th

Division began to inflict extremely large

casualties on the enemy. By 15 October

the battle for White Horse was over.

Although the Chinese had used a force

estimated at 15,000 infantry and 8,000

supporting troops during the ten-day

contest, they had failed to budge the

ROK 9th Division. Despite ROK losses

of over 3,500 soldiers during the nine

ROK and twenty-eight Communist attacks, the 9th Division and its supporting

troops had exacted a heavy toll from the

Chinese 38th Army. Seven of the 38th

Army's nine regiments had been committed to the White Horse and Hill 281

battles and taken close to 10,000 casualties.

Throughout the fight, the timely injection of fresh troops by General Kim

on both offense and defense had sparked

the ROK effort. The ROK units had

withstood the determined drive of the

Chinese infantry and taken over 55,000

rounds of enemy artillery during the

battle. The performance of the ROK

9th Division under fire provided an excellent testimonial to the type of leadership, skill, and experience that the ROK

Army was capable of developing and

won high praise from Van Fleet.56

The ROK 9th Division received outstanding support from the air, armor,

and artillery units that backed up the

division. During the daylight hours, the

Fifth Air Force had dispatched 669 sorties and another 76 sorties had been sent

out on night bombing missions. In ten

days the tactical air support had dropped

56

 Msg, GX 30376 KGO-O, CG EUSAK to

CINCUNC, 28 Oct 52, in IX U.S. Corps, Comd

Rpt, Oct 52, G-3 sec., bk. V, tab 13.
STALEMATE 307

over 2,700 general-purpose bombs and

358 napalm bombs and launched over

750 5-inch rockets at enemy concentrations and positions. From IX Corps

artillery alone, 185,000 rounds of artillery ammunition had been hurled at

the Chinese. Tanks and antiaircraft

quad-50's had protected the flanks of

the hills and prevented the enemy from

dispersing its attacks. At White Horse,

prebattle preparation, made possible by

effective intelligence, added to welltrained troops, skillfully employed, and

backed by co-ordinated air, armor, and

artillery support, demonstrated what

might be accomplished on defense.

White Horse seemed a prime example

of the kind of action that General Clark

had argued for earlier in the summer.

Jackson Heights

In addition to the diversionary attack

on Hill 281, the Chinese had attempted

to disperse the ROK 9th Division forces

by threatening the ROK outpost positions on Hill 391 almost seven miles

northeast of White Horse Mountain on

the eastern divisional front. Sporadic

and indecisive fighting continued from

6 to 12 October when the enemy made

a serious effort to storm the hill. After

the ROK units pulled back, a reinforced

company from the U.S. 7th Division attempted in vain on 13 October to regain

the lost positions.57

Once the White Horse issue was settled, the ROK 9th Division sent a battalion from the 28th Regiment to clear

Hill 391 on 16 October. The battalion

won through to the crest and was able

to maintain control until 20 October,

when enemy counterattacks regained

possession of the hill for the next two

days. On 23 October, after a bitter handto-hand encounter, elements of the

ROK 51st Regiment drove the Chinese

off again, repulsed a counterattack, then

withdrew. On the following night the

65th Infantry Regiment relieved the

ROK 51st on the line.58

Since the unsuccessful battle for Outpost KELLY the 65th Regiment had been

undergoing a vigorous program of training under a new commander, Col. Chester B. De Gavre. Two weeks of intensive

training, however, could not remedy the

basic weakness of the regiment—the lack

of experienced noncommissioned officers at the infantry platoon level—but

the unit was again assigned to assume

responsibility for a portion of the main

line of resistance.59

On the night of 24-25 October, G

Company, under Capt. George D. Jackson, took over the defense of the high

ground immediately south of Hill

391.60 Jackson Heights, as it was soon to

be called, had enough bunkers to house

the command posts of the three rifle platoons, the company headquarters, and

the forward artillery observer, but none

of these was adequate for fighting off

an attack. Captain Jackson's plans for

improving his defenses had little chance

for early success, since the Chinese artillery and mortar fire upon the heights

was accurate and the enemy had excellent observation of the G Company

57

 U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, bk. I, p. 21.

58

 lbid., p. 22. 59

 The following account of the action at Jackson

Heights is based on: (1) 65th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt

and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (2) 3d Inf Div, Comd

Rpt and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52. 60

 Stars and Stripes named the hill after Captain

Jackson.
308 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

movements from the surrounding hills.

Facing the company were elements of

the 3d Battalion, 87th Regiment, 29th

Division, CCF 15th Army. The 87th

Regiment was commanded by Hwueh

Yiang-hua. On the afternoon of the 25th

the artillery supporting the 87th Regiment began to send direct 76-mm. gunfire against the Jackson Heights positions

from Camel Back Hill, 2,800 yards to

the northwest. Enemy 82-mm. and 120-

mm. mortars followed and by dusk G

Company had received 250 rounds of

mortar and artillery fire and suffered 9

casualties.

During the night the enemy sent out

patrols that probed G Company's dispositions and continued to send harassing artillery and mortar fire onto Jackson

Heights. Captain Jackson used his own

60-mm. mortars and supporting mortar

and artillery fire to break up the Chinese

probes.

Late in the afternoon of 26 October

the enemy sent over 260 rounds of direct

76-mm. gunfire from Camel Back Hill

and caused 14 more casualties. From

the company listening posts that night

came frequent reports of the enemy

moving about and digging in. Two Chinese approached within hand grenade

range of one of the listening posts on

the southwest flank. The men at the

post were given permission to use grenades against the interlopers. As the

two men hastily withdrew, mortar fire

was called in to speed their departure.

An enemy platoon probed the northern approach to Jackson Heights shortly

after midnight, then fell back under interdicting artillery and mortar fire. Another platoon advanced from the north

an hour later and closed to hand grenade

range. After a 15-minute fire fight, the

Chinese pulled back, taking an estimated

17 casualties with them.

The next eight hours were relatively

quiet. Then, about 0930 hours on 27

October, the 76-mm. guns on Camel

Back Hill opened up again. One enemy

round scored a direct hit on the mortar

ammunition supply and blew up all but

some 150 rounds. By nightfall the Chinese firepower had reduced the mortar

platoon to two mortars and seven men

and the second platoon had lost both its

platoon leader and sergeant. Captain

Jackson reported to 2d Battalion that

he needed aid for his wounded and

wanted smoke laid about the heights to

obstruct the enemy's ability to pinpoint

the company's movements. He was told

to be calm, that smoke and aid were on

the way.

So were the Chinese. An hour after

Jackson called, they loosed a heavy concentration of artillery and mortar fire on

G Company's positions and then sent an

estimated company in from the north.

Using the remaining mortars, automatic

weapons, small arms, and hand grenades,

Captain Jackson and his men beat off

this attack.

The second enemy assault of the evening came after the Chinese artillery and

mortar crews had fired an estimated

1,000 rounds at Jackson Heights within

half an hour. One estimated Chinese

company struck from the north and a

second from the south. Jackson called

for final defensive fire on the area until

the situation clarified. His ammunition

dump had been hit again and the enemy

attack had fanned out and become general on all sides.

At this point the company communications sergeant evidently reported that

there were only three men left in the
STALEMATE 309

platoon in his area and asked battalion

for permission to withdraw. Whether

the sergeant acted on his own or not was

unclear, but Colonel Betances, the battalion commander, assumed that the request was from the company commander

and ordered G Company to withdraw.

When Captain Jackson learned of the

withdrawal order, he attempted to verify

it, but the communications lines were

out and radio contact proved unsatisfactory.

At any rate, Captain Jackson passed

the order to withdraw back to his platoon

leaders. The first and second platoons

went down the east side of the heights

and Captain Jackson went with the third

platoon down the western slope. His

platoon ran into heavy enemy small arms

fire on the way and he was separated

from his men during the action, finally

rejoining them on the trail back to the

main line of resistance.

When Colonel De Gavre learned of

G Company's withdrawal, he quickly ordered that A Company, commanded by

1st Lt. John D. Porterfield, be placed

under the operational control of Colonel

Betances for a counterattack to regain

Jackson Heights. A Company was to be

used for the attack phase only and F

Company, commanded by Capt. Willis

D. Cronkhite, Jr., would take part in the

attack and then would man the outpost.

C Company, under Lieutenant Stevens,

would prepare to pass to the operational

control of the 2d Battalion, if it were

necessary to back up the attack.

As daylight broke on the 28th, Captain

Cronkhite led F Company toward Jackson Heights. The Chinese platoon defending the hill resisted with small arms,

automatic weapons, and hand grenades,

but F Company won control of the crest

by 1000 hours. In the meantime, progress

by Lieutenant Porterfield's A Company

had been slowed down by artillery and

mortar fire. Despite the enemy fire, two

platoons pushed on and joined F Company on the heights; the remaining platoon was pinned down by mortar fire at

the base of the hill.

The operation seemed to be well in

hand, until the Chinese artillery put all

of A Company's officers on the hill out of

action. One platoon leader was killed by

a direct hit and then a shell landed in

the middle of the company command

post killing Lieutenant Porterfield and

the forward observer and wounding the

one remaining platoon leader. The loss

of leadership became immediately apparent, for enlisted men in both A and

F Companies began to "bug out." Slipping away from the heights alone or in

groups, the men drifted back toward the

main line of resistance. By late afternoon only Captain Cronkhite and his

company officers remained on the hill;

all of his men had left along with those

of A Company.

Efforts by the 2d Battalion to round

up the stragglers and send them back to

Jackson Heights met with no success.

The men by this time evidently regarded

the hill as a suicide post and refused to

return. When night fell, Colonel Betances ordered Captain Cronkhite and

his fellow officers to withdraw from the

hill.

On the following day the 65th Regiment made one more effort to take Jackson Heights. Colonel De Gavre put

Major Davies, the 1st Battalion commander, in charge of the operation.

Davies sent C Company, under Lieutenant Stevens, to Jackson Heights in the

morning of 29 October. The company
310 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

moved up and took possession of the hill

without encountering any enemy resistance. Again all seemed well. The enemy artillery was quiet and no counterattack developed. Suddenly fear set in

and the enlisted men left en masse.

Lieutenant Stevens and his fellow officers

found themselves alone with a handful

of men.61 Once more the stragglers were

gathered together and ordered back up

the hill and over 50 refused. Major Davies finally recalled Lieutenant Stevens

and his little group to the main line of

resistance.

This proved to be the last attempt of

the 65th Regiment to take Jackson

Heights. Maj. Gen. George W. Smythe,

the division commander, ordered the

15th Infantry Regiment to take over

responsibility for the 65th's sector beginning that same night.62

 In November the

65th Regiment returned to an intensive

training program. General Smythe requested that a combat-trained regiment

be either assigned permanently or for at

least four months while the 65th Regiment underwent its retraining. If

neither of these alternatives were possible, Smythe went on, he favored the

reconstitution of the regiment with 60-

percent continental personnel and the

assignment of the excess Puerto Ricans

to other infantry units.63

At any rate, the U.S. 15th Regiment

took over the defensive positions of the

65th in late October. Outposts set up on

Jackson Heights were subjected to frequent probes by the enemy throughout

the first half of November. By the middle of the month only a couple of outposts at the base of Jackson Heights

remained in the possession of the 3d Division. Although the Chinese exerted

considerable pressure upon the outposts

during the remainder of November and

overran them several times, elements of

the 15th Regiment managed to maintain

their precarious positions at the end of

the month.64

Operation SHOWDOWN

As the indications that the Communists were seizing the initiative on the

ground became more apparent in late

September and early October, General

Van Fleet grew concerned. In his letter

of 5 October to Clark urging the approval of a limited objective attack on

the U.S. IX Corps front, he commented:

"It is extremely desirable that we take

the initiative by small offensive actions,

which will put the enemy on the defensive in order to reverse the present situation. Our present course of defensive 61

 Colonel De Gavre suggested later that the pres- ence of many dead bodies on the hill and the lack

of good NCO's to counteract the fear may have

been responsible for the "bug out." See 65th Infantry Regiment, Command Report, October 1952. 62

 This was not the end of the affair, however,

for during November and December, the only remaining officer of A Company, twenty-nine members of F Company, and thirty-eight members of C

Company were charged and the majority were tried

at general courts-martial. The officer received a sentence of 5 years and the men tried received sentences

varying from 6 months to 13 years for their conduct during the operation. 65th Inf Regt, Comd

Rpt, Nov, Dec 52.

63

 Ibid., Nov 52, an. 1. The 65th did not return

to the line until 22 December when it took over the

15th Regiment's sector for a few days before the relief of the 3d Division by the ROK 2d Division. In

early 1953 the bulk of the Puerto Rican personnel

were transferred to other Eighth Army units and

integrated. Some 250 Puerto Ricans remained with

the regiment and were integrated with the new

replacements. See 3d Infantry Division, Command

Reports, November 1952-April 1953. 64

 U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, bk. I, pp.

17-19.
STALEMATE 311

action in the face of the enemy initiative

is resulting in the highest casualties since

the heavy fighting of October and November 1951."

 65

To offset this trend, Van Fleet recommended the adoption of the IX Corps

plan, called SHOWDOWN, that was designed to improve the corps defense lines

north of Kumhwa. Less than three miles

north of this city, Van Fleet pointed out,

IX Corps and enemy troops manned positions that were but 200 yards apart. On

Hill 598 and Sniper Ridge, which ran

northwest to southeast a little over a

mile northeast of Hill 598, the opposing

forces looked down each other's throats

and casualties were correspondingly

high. If the enemy could be pushed off

these hills, Van Fleet went on, he would

have to fall back 1,250 yards to the next

defensive position. Counting on maximum firepower, consistent with ammunition allowances, and maximum close

air support, the Eighth Army commander was optimistic about the possibilities of SHOWDOWN.66

Although Clark had voiced his opposition to hill-taking expeditions in the

past, he evidently decided that SHOWDOWN offered a better than average

chance for winning its objectives without

excessive casualties. If all went according to plan, two battalions, one from the

U.S. 7th Division and the other from the

ROK 2d Division, would be sufficient to

accomplish the mission. The field commanders estimated that the operation

would take five days and incur about 200

casualties. With sixteen battalions of

artillery mounting some 280 guns, and

over 200 fighter-bomber sorties in support, the infantry was not expected to

encounter serious obstacles.67 At any

rate, Clark approved SHOWDOWN on 8

October, but cautioned Van Fleet to give

the operation only routine press coverage and to stress the tactical considerations arguing for the seizure of the hills.68

Efforts to treat SHOWDOWN as a routine

operation were doomed from the start

by the Chinese. Although the five days

of preparatory air strikes had to be reduced to two because of the demands of

White Horse Hill and because the artillery support also had to be curtailed, the

Chinese were ready for the attack and

soon demonstrated that they intended to

hold on to the Hill 598-Sniper Ridge

complex.

Hill 598, the objective of the American troops, was V-shaped with its apex

at the south. (Map 6) At the left extremity of the V lay Pike's Peak and on

the right arm were two smaller hills

christened Jane Russell Hill and Sandy

Ridge, from north to south. The resemblance of the Hill 598 complex to a

triangle soon led to the designation of

the area as Triangle Hill. On 14 October 1952 the hill mass was defended by a

battalion of the 135th Regiment, 45th

Division, CCF 15th Army, one of the

Chinese elite armies. As usual, the enemy was well dug in, had adequate ammunition supplies, and defiladed reinforcement routes.

Maj. Gen. Wayne C. Smith, the 7th

Division commander, assigned the mis65

 Ltr, Van Fleet to Clark, 5 Oct 52, no sub, in

FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp. 66

 Ibid. SHOWDOWN was submitted by General

Jenkins, former Army G-3, who succeeded Lt. Gen.

Willard G. Wyman as corps commander on 9

August 1952.

67

 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 78-

79.

68

 Msg, C 56547, Clark to CG Eighth Army, 8

Oct 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files,

Oct 52.
312 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

D. Holmes, Jr.

MAP 6

sion of taking Triangle Hill to the 31st

Infantry Regiment, commanded by Col. Lloyd R. Moses. Although the original

plan had called for the use of one battalion in the assault, Colonel Moses and

his staff estimated that enemy resistance

would be greater than previously anticipated and that it would be impossible

for one battalion commander to control

all the forces operating in the entire

objective area. Thus, he assigned the

task of seizing the right arm of Triangle

Hill to his 1st Battalion, under Lt. Col.

Myron McClure, and the mission of gain- ing possession of the left arm to the 3d

Battalion, commanded by Maj. Robert

H. Newberry. The forces committed to

the assault had doubled before the operation began.69

69

 The account of the U.S. Army participation in

Operation SHOWDOWN is based upon the following

sources: (1) 31st Inf Regt, After Action Rpt, Opn

SHOWDOWN; (2) 31st Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and

Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (3) 32d Inf Regt, Comd

Rpt and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (4) 17th Inf Regt,

Comd Rpt and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (5) 7th Inf

Div, Comd Rpt, Oct 52.
STALEMATE 313

After the air strikes and artillery preparations had placed tons of explosives on

Triangle Hill, Major Newberry sent the

3d Battalion in a column of companies to

take the apex of the hill complex. L

Company, commanded by 1st Lt. Bernard T. Brooks, Jr., moved out first, followed by K Company, under 1st Lt.

Charles L. Martin. In reserve, ready to

assist either of its sister companies, was

I Company, commanded by Capt. Max

R. Stover.

As Lieutenant Brooks led his company

out of the assault positions, he ran into

immediate trouble. From a strongpoint

on Hill 598 the Chinese sent hand grenades, shaped charges, bangalore torpedoes, and rocks to disrupt L Company's

attack. In less than half an hour, Lieutenant Brooks and all his platoon leaders

became casualties and the remainder of

the company was pinned down in a small

depression below the enemy strongpoint.

After the assault bogged down, Lieutenant Martin moved K Company forward. Securing tank fire to knock out

the Chinese strongpoint that had dominated the fight thus far, Martin rallied

L Company and got the men again moving ahead.

A few men from the two companies

managed to work their way into the

outlying trenches on Hill 598, but the

Chinese evidently had no intention of

withdrawing from the crest. They

hurled numerous hand grenades and

liberally expended small arms ammunition, shaped charges, and torpedoes to

repel the 3d Battalion.

With the casualty list mounting and

the attack again slowing down, Major

Newberry committed I Company to the

battle. Captain Stover took his men up

Sandy Ridge, which had been captured

by the 1st Battalion, and then moved

southwest along the ridge line toward

Hill 598. Since the Chinese were well

dug in, I Company had to proceed slowly,

rooting the enemy out of the holes and

trenches. As night fell, Captain Stover's

men began to meet with increasing artillery and mortar fire. Enemy troops were

spotted massing for a counterattack

and Stover called for defensive fire.

Disregarding the artillery and mortar

concentrations laid down by the units

supporting the 3d Battalion, an estimated two companies from the 135th

Regiment passed through the fire and

hit I Company with small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades.

The fierce enemy resistance and the

growing casualty list led to a consultation

between Colonel Moses and Major Newberry early in the evening. They decided

to pull back all three rifle companies to

the main line of resistance. By 2100

hours, the 3d Battalion had reassembled

and taken up blocking positions.

On the 1st Battalion front, Colonel

McClure selected A Company, reinforced, under 1st Lt. Edward R. Showalter, Jr., to lead the attack against

Jane Russell Hill and Sandy Ridge. B

and C Companies, commanded by Capts.

William B. Young and Roy W. Preston,

respectively, would be in reserve.

Part of the experience of the 3d Battalion was repeated as the 1st Battalion

attacked. An enemy strongpoint on Jane

Russell Hill quickly pinned down Lieutenant Showalter's men with small arms

and automatic weapons fire. Showalter

became an early casualty during the action and had to be evacuated. Colonel

McClure had to commit B Company,

then C Company, to reinforce the assault

and to get the troops moving forward
314 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

again. By early afternoon members of

B and C Companies had fought their

way to the crest of Jane Russell Hill and

began to prepare defensive positions to

ward off the expected enemy counterattack.

They were not disappointed. In a very

violent reaction to the loss of Jane Russell Hill, the Chinese mounted four

counterattacks to regain possession. Each

was preceded by heavy concentrations of

artillery and mortar fire. By the end of

the third enemy assault, Colonel McClure's men were in trouble, because

their supply of ammunition was running

low and the Korean supply carriers were

extremely reluctant to run the gauntlet

of enemy fire on the hill.

As a reinforced battalion from the

135th Regiment began the fourth counterattack, a strange event occurred. The

Chinese assault troops moved right

through both their own artillery and

mortar fire and the final protective fire

called for by the 1st Battalion. With a

disregard for their own safety that suggested to some observers of the battle

that they might have been under the

influence of drugs, the Chinese closed in

on the trenches in hand-to-hand combat.

By this time the 1st Battalion had run

out of ammunition and Colonel Moses

decided to pull his troops back to the

main line of resistance. Carrying their

casualties and as much equipment as they

could bring out, the remnants of the

three companies returned to the main

line shortly after midnight.

At the end of the first day of fighting,

the Chinese had shown that they intended to hold Triangle Hill and were

willing to pay the costs. They had

blunted and then repelled the two-battalion attack launched by the 31st Regiment despite heavy casualties. The next

move was up to the 7th Division.

On 15 October General Smith committed two fresh battalions to take Triangle Hill. The 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, was placed under the

operational control of the 31st Regiment

and given the mission of taking Jane

Russell Hill and Sandy Ridge. For the

attack on Hill 598 Colonel Moses had

his 2d Battalion, commanded by Maj.

Warren B. Phillips.

Major Phillips decided to use the same

plan employed by Major Newberry the

day before. The battalion would attack

in a column of companies, with E Company leading off, followed by F and G

Companies.

After artillery and mortar preparatory

fire had been laid on the hill mass, 1st

Lt. William C. Knapp led E Company

toward the crest. Against light enemy

artillery and mortar fire, Knapp and his

men reached the outlying trenches and

started to clean out the bunkers and

strongpoints. They won possession of

Hill 598 without meeting strong resistance and then pushed on to the base of

Pike's Peak where they found the Chinese entrenched in deep caves and tunnels capable of holding entire units.

In the meantime, Capt. Joseph V.

Giesemann took F Company through E

Company positions on Hill 598 and advanced along the northeast arm toward

Sandy Ridge. G Company moved up to

the crest of Hill 598 to reinforce its sister

companies in case of trouble and to help

prepare the defensive positions for Chinese counterattacks.

Maj. Seymour L. Goldberg, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry

Regiment, also employed a column of

companies against Jane Russell Hill. A
STALEMATE 315

Company, under 1st Lt. Rudolph M.

Tamez, spearheaded the attack, followed

by C Company, commanded by Capt.

James E. Early. B Company, under 1st

Lt. John H. Green, was the reserve company.

The attack started auspiciously as A

Company, supported by elements of B

Company, met only light resistance. As

they neared the crest, a reinforced battalion from the 135th Regiment swept

down and counterattacked vigorously.

The enemy assault forced the 1st Battalion to withdraw and regroup. I Company of the 31st Regiment was placed

under Major Goldberg's operational

control. The 1st Battalion (+) then

joined the 2d Battalion, 31st Regiment,

on Sandy Ridge to prepare for the enemy

counterattack.

Late on 15 October operational control of the 3d Battalion, plus I Company,

passed to the 32d Regiment, commanded

by Col. Joseph R. Russ. Colonel Russ,

therefore, became responsible for the

direction of the fight for Triangle Hill

at this point.

Heavy artillery and mortar barrages

were laid on the American positions on

Triangle during the night of 15-16 October, but the Chinese attacks were platoon size and repulsed without difficulty.

On the morning of 16 October General Smith approved the attachment of

the 2d Battalion (less F Company), 17th

Regiment, to the 32d Regiment for another assault upon Jane Russell Hill that

afternoon. Under Maj. Louis R. Buckner, the 2d Battalion won possession of

the hill without meeting serious opposition.

On the left arm of Triangle Hill, however, the 2d Battalion, 31st Regiment,

had made no progress in its efforts to

take Pike's Peak. With the approach of

darkness on 16 October, the Chinese

began a series of counterattacks on the

2d Battalion positions abutting the peak.

During one of these, the gallant commander of E Company, Lieutenant

Knapp, lost his life. The 2d Battalion

fought off the Chinese attempts to dislodge it, but in turn could not budge

the enemy from Pike's Peak on 17

October.

The situation at this juncture found

Colonel Russ with three battalions atop

Triangle Hill. His own 1st Battalion

was on Hill 598; the 2d Battalion, 31st

Regiment, was on the left arm facing

Pike's Peak; and the 2d Battalion (-) ,

17th Regiment, occupied Jane Russell

Hill. The Chinese, in the meantime,

had committed the 134th Regiment,

45th Division, to the fight. They still

held the well-fortified Pike's Peak positions.

On the afternoon of 17 October the

3d Battalion, 17th Regiment, under Lt.

Col. James L. Spellman, relieved the 2d

Battalion, 31st Regiment, in place. At

the same time the 1st Battalion, 32d Regiment, was withdrawn from Triangle

Hill. Colonel Russ, therefore, was in

operational control of two battalions of

the 17th Regiment as the fight entered

its fifth day.

Colonel Spellman's battalion took the

task of seizing the one remaining objective—Pike's Peak—on 18 October. After

heavy preparatory fires were laid on the

Chinese positions, L Company, under

1st Lt. William E. Cantrell, fought its

way to the top and began to organize the

defense. I Company, commanded by

Capt. Joseph H. Hoffman, passed

through L Company and tried to drive

the Chinese, entrenched on the fingers,
316 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

off the hill. Again the Chinese showed

that they would not be ousted and forced

I Company to break off its attack.

During the early evening hours of 19

October two companies from the 134th

Regiment stormed into Company L's

trenches and hand-to-hand combat ensued. Prisoners later reported that they

had been ordered to fight to the death.

Colonel Spellman quickly asked for a

reinforcing company, since Lieutenant

Cantrell, the company commander, had

been hit and the enemy had rewon possession of Pike's Peak. Platoons from M

and H Companies, 17th Infantry, were

rushed up to the aid of L Company,

which by this time had lost all of its

officers and was falling back southeastward toward Hill 598. To make matters

worse, artillery and mortar fire supporting the 3d Battalion began to land

uncomfortably close to the withdrawing

troops and had to be lifted until the

situation became more stable.

Two companies from the 1st Battalion,

32d Regiment, were dispatched by Colonel Russ to succor the beleaguered 3d

Battalion and all available artillery and

mortar fire was directed against the left

arm of Triangle Hill to break up the

fierce enemy attack. The reinforcements

and the intense firepower finally slowed

and then stopped the Chinese. About

0600 on 20 October, Colonel Spellman

reported that some of the enemy troops

were beginning to "bug out." He

asked that the heavy concentrations of

artillery and mortar fire be continued on

the withdrawal routes to Pike's Peak.

As the "bug out" became general, Spellman requested regimental headquarters

to "hit Pike's Peak with everything we

have." A parenthetical note following

this entry in the 3d Battalion Journal

stated simply, "complied with."

 70

 In any

event, the Chinese pulled back to their

caves and tunnels on Pike's Peak.

In the lull that followed, the 1st and

3d Battalions, 32d Regiment, relieved

the 17th Regiment's forces. On 22 October the 2d Battalion, 32d Regiment,

under Maj. John W. Szares, relieved the

1st Battalion on the left arm of Triangle Hill. The 3d Battalion, commanded by Maj. Thomas W. Brown,

defended the right arm.

On 23 October the action picked up

when the Chinese made another attempt

in force to clear the 32d Regiment's

forces from the hill complex. Shortly

after nightfall the Chinese artillery and

mortar units opened up and pounded

the 32d Regiment's positions on Triangle Hill for an hour. Then a force estimated at from three to six companies

from the CCF 45th Division advanced

from Pike's Peak on F Company's defensive positions, using small arms, automatic weapons, machine guns, and hand

grenades as they closed in. For almost

an hour an intense fire fight went on.

Elements of G Company had to move up

and reinforce F Company before the

Chinese attack faltered.

Over at Jane Russell Hill an estimated

two Chinese companies had launched an

attack at the same time as the assault on

the 2d Battalion. Only a slight penetration was made in the 3d Battalion lines

and this was quickly restored as reinforcements counterattacked.

As the ROK 2d Division relieved the

7th Division on 25 October, the Chinese

still held Pike's Peak. Twelve days of

combat had involved 8 of the division's

9 infantry battalions and cost the division

70

 17th Inf Regt, Oct 52, 3d Bn Staff Jnl, 20

Oct 52.
STALEMATE 317

over 2,000 casualties, mostly in these 8

battalions.

Many of the lessons in Operation

SHOWDOWN had been learned before in

the battles for other hills, General

Smith's report on the action revealed.71

The rehearsal of an operation over similar terrain with all arms and services

participating so that each man and each

unit would know their objectives was

vitally important to the success of the

operation. The value of closing quickly

with the enemy and of keeping the attack moving was also stressed by General

Smith. If the attack leaders would not

allow the troops to become pinned down,

fewer casualties would result in the long

run. Once the men had won the objective, General Smith went on, they must

dig in quickly and provide adequate

overhead cover for their defensive positions. The enemy's ability to bring

heavy concentrations of artillery and

mortar fire quickly upon positions newly

won from him and to counterattack

swiftly made rapid organizations of the

defense and the setting up of overhead

cover mandatory.

To keep his troops at the front fresh

and to prevent battle losses from seriously affecting morale, General Smith

had rotated his battalions frequently

during the fight for Triangle Hill, much

as General Kim had done at White Horse

Mountain. He believed that the use of

fresh forces had proved effective in winning most of the hill complex and in

repulsing the enemy counterattacks. Reserve forces must be kept close to the

front in the difficult terrain of Korea, the

7th Division commander noted, since

they could not travel long distances at

night, when the Chinese usually attacked, and arrive in time to reinforce

the threatened positions. Finally, leadership, especially by officers and men

known to the attacking unit, was a key

factor in fighting the troops effectively.

Operation SHOWDOWN had an ironic

ending. The ROK 2d Division, which

had taken over the U.S. 7th Division's

positions on 25 October, had engaged in

a bitter and frustrating fight for Sniper

Ridge. Attack and counterattack had

followed as the Chinese and South Koreans had struggled for possession, but

neither could win complete control of

the ridge. Thus, when the ROK 2d Division assumed responsibility for Triangle Hill, it was still engaged on Sniper

Ridge.

On 30 October three Chinese battalions swept the ROK defenders from the

crest of Hill 598 and on 1 November the

enemy seized Jane Russell Hill after an

attack in force. The Chinese then beat

off the ROK counterattacks until the

mounting casualty lists caused the corps

commander, General Jenkins, to suspend

further attacks on Triangle Hill on 5

November.

The Sniper Ridge battle continued

until 18 November when the ROK units

took part of the ridge for the fourteenth

time since the initiation of SHOWDOWN.

At this point the Chinese pressure slackened and the probes and light attacks

against the ROK forces during the remainder of the month were repulsed.

Thus, after six weeks of hard fighting,

the UNC forces controlled a portion of

Sniper Ridge and none of Triangle Hill.

The original two-battalion attack lasting

five days and costing 200 casualties had

drawn in over two divisions and cost over

9,000 casualties. Although estimates of 71

 See 7th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, pp. 71ff.
318 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Chinese losses ran to over 19,000 men,

the enemy had no shortage of manpower.

The Chinese time and time again had

shown themselves willing to incur heavy

casualties in order to hold on to key

terrain features during the past year. At

Triangle Hill they gained face as their

tenacious defense reversed the offensive

defeat at White Horse and forced the

U.N. Command to break off the attack.

The heavy fighting begun in the middle of October subsided in November.

As cold weather approached, the front

settled back to the previous pattern of

patrolling, probes, and small-scale attacks. Surprisingly enough, despite the

increase of activity in the combat zone

during October, the Communists actually had fewer forces on the front line

than they had had in May. (Map V)

During the six-month period the Chinese reserves had been built up and enemy armies in the areas behind the lines

now contained an estimated 36,000 men

each. Four additional artillery regiments swelled the number of guns and

crews available to the Communists. But

on the front there were over 80,000 less

soldiers facing the UNC forces at the

end of October.72 What this reduction

might signify in terms of future Communist strategy was not clear. Although

no indications of a shift to the offensive

on a large-scale were evident, the enemy

over-all strength had increased by over

60,000 during the same time period.

Should it be offense or defense during

the winter ahead, the enemy had the

manpower on hand.

72

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, May and Oct

52, sec. I, Narrative.

CHAPTER XIV

The Air and Sea War, Mid-1952

Strategic and Tactical Air

Operations

On the ground the Communist advantage in manpower was substantial, but

the U.N. Command still had control of

the air space over North Korea. Despite

the build-up of the enemy air strength

in Manchuria, the Communists made no

serious effort to challenge the UNC dominance aloft during the spring of 1952.

Fighters and bombers roamed at will

with only occasional brushes with the

enemy.

But a significant change in UNC aircombat operations policy came about in

May. The rail interdiction program had

reached the same status as the truce negotiations. As fast as the UNC pilots

disrupted the rail system, Communist

repair crews put them back in operation

again. It was apparent that "to continue

the rail attacks would be, in effect, to pit

skilled pilots, equipped with modern,

expensive aircraft, against unskilled oriental coolie laborers, armed with pick

and shovel."1 If military pressure was

to be maintained upon the enemy to

influence the Communists to agree to a

truce, then a shift from the diminishing

returns of rail interdiction seemed in

order.

Accordingly, in early May the scope of

interdiction operations was broadened.

Along the front, the Fifth Air Force's

fighter-bombers concentrated their attacks upon enemy supplies, equipment,

and personnel massed within striking

distance of the battlefield, while medium

bombers began to devote their attention

to airfields, railway systems, and supply

and communications centers, in that

order. One of the first endeavors of the

change came on 8 May when 485 fighterbombers descended on Suan, about forty

miles southeast of P'yongyang, and over

a 13-hour period caused widespread damage to buildings, supplies, trucks, and

gun positions in the biggest single attack

of the war up to that time.2

The North Korean Power Complex

As interest in rail interdiction lessened, the search for profitable targets

soon led the air planners back to the

important, undamaged hydroelectric

complex in North Korea. The location

of certain dams and plants, such as that

at Suiho on the Yalu, made them sensitive targets, since they furnished power

to the Chinese as well as to the North

Koreans. To avoid giving the Chinese

an excuse to intervene, U.S. leaders had

placed a ban upon the bombing of dams

and plants along the Yalu on 6 Novem1

 USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the

Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52-27 Jul 53, p. 26. 2

 Ibid., p. 87.
320 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ber 1950 and it had never been rescinded.3

 Later, when the truce negotiations began, the restrictions on Yalu

power plant bombing had been repeated,

but no mention had been made of the

remainder of the power complex.4

Fearing that an effort to destroy the

power installations might have an adverse effect upon the armistice proceedings, Ridgway had been reluctant to

permit the Air Force to bomb them. In

March 1952, he informed General Weyland that if the Communists appeared

to be deliberately delaying an agreement

and strengthening their offensive capabilities, he might change his mind, but

in the meantime, he would not recommend an attack.5

 It seemed to him that

as long as the primary use of the power

facilities was for the civilian economy,

their destruction was not justified.6

General Weyland did not agree. In

response to a request for his views on the

matter from the Air Force planners in

Washington, he stated that the disruption of electric power would complement

other air attacks. By cutting off this

power, the U.N. Command could make

it difficult for the enemy to carry out repair work that was done in small establishments and in railway tunnels.

Through reduction of small-scale production, Weyland went on, added pressure

might be put on the Communists and

spur them to speed up the negotiations.

As for the means, Weyland estimated

that 500 fighter-bomber and 80 medium

bomber sorties could do the job over a

period of several good flying days.7

It was not very surprising that Weyland's views should be communicated

swiftly to the JCS by the Air Force or

that Ridgway showed a little annoyance

when the JCS questioned him on the divergence between Weyland and himself

on the subject. The U.N. commander

informed his superiors that there had

been no unusual circumstances that

would necessitate them to direct an attack upon the hydroelectric installations

rather than follow the normal procedure

of waiting for a recommendation from

him. He was keeping a close watch on

the situation, Ridgway concluded, and

he did not want an attack unless he

decided that it was warranted and opportune.8

On 12 May, Clark took over as Ridgway's successor. Shortly thereafter, he

surveyed the situation and decided to

intensify the air pressure campaign as

much as possible. One of the most lucrative targets, he discovered, was the

untouched hydroelectric complex. Although he did not have the authority to

bomb the Yalu installations, he instructed Weyland to prepare plans for

destroying all other major hydroelectric

facilities. The Air Force would be the

co-ordinating agent and the Navy would

participate in the initial attack which

was to be staged as soon as possible.9

When the Joint Chiefs learned of

Clark's desire to strike the hydroelectric

targets, they approached the Secretary of 3

 Ibid., pp. 27-30. 4

 Msg, JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51. 5

 Memo, EKW [Wright] for CofS, 2 Apr 52, sub:

N.K. Hydroelectric Power Installations, in FEC

G-3 091 Korea, folder 1, Jan-Feb 52. 6

 Memo, MBR [Ridgway] for CofS FEC, 26 Apr

52, no sub, in FEC G-3 091 Korea, folder 1, JanFeb 52.

7

 Msg, VCO 118, CG FEAF to Hq USAF, 29 Apr

52, 5285. 8

 Msg, CX 67909, CINCFE to JCS, 2 May 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, an. 4, incl 2. 9

 Msg, CX 50328, CINCFE to COMNAVFE and

CG FEAF, 17 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

Jun 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 15.
THE AIR AND SEA WAR, MID-1952 321

BOMB STRIKE ON SUIHO HYDROELECTRIC PLANT BY CARRIER-BASED PLANES

Defense to secure Presidential approval

that would remove the restrictions on

the Suiho plant, since this was the largest

and most important installation in North

Korea. President Truman's consent

opened the entire complex to air destruction and the JCS told Clark to go ahead

at his own discretion. The JCS warned

that the ban on operations within twelve

miles of the Soviet border still applied

and care should be exercised not to bomb

Manchurian territory inadvertently.10

Vice Adm. Joseph J. Clark, who had

assumed command of the Seventh Fleet

on 20 May, was anxious to have naval

air units take part in the Suiho attack

as well as those against other power targets.11

 He flew to Seoul and easily convinced Maj. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus that

he should allow Navy dive bombers and

fighters to join the Fifth Air Force assault force.12

 Thus, on 23 June, 35 Navy

attack bombers (AD-Skyraiders) and 35

10

 (1) Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 19 Jun

52, sub: Removal of Restriction on Attacks Against

Yalu River Hydroelectric Installations. (2) Msg,

JCS 911683, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jun 52.

11

 Clark succeeded Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe,

who was appointed Commander, Naval Forces, Far

East, on 4 June when Admiral Joy was rotated. 12

 General Barcus took over command of the Fifth

Air Force on 30 May from General Everest.
322 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Panther jet fighters (F9F's) from the

carriers Princeton, Boxer, and Philippine Sea hit the Suiho plant while squadrons of Air Force Sabrejets (F-86's)

provided overhead cover. The Navy

dive bombers dropped their bombs

while the Panthers provided antiaircraft

suppression. As soon as the Navy planes

completed their mission, 79 Thunderjets

(F-84's) and 45 Shooting Stars (F-80's)

followed and dropped their loads. Over

200 Communist fighters, perched on airfields across the Yalu, made no attempt

to halt the attack; many of them took

off in haste and flew inland.

During the next three days the Fifth

Air Force mounted over 700 fighterbomber sorties and over 200 counterair

sorties while the Navy launched well

over 500 sorties against the power system.

Suiho was badly damaged, according to

the pilot reports, and ten other plants

were made unserviceable. Two installations suffered less vital hits. For two

weeks a power blackout existed in North

Korea with only gradual restoration

thereafter.13

The bombing of the hydroelectric installations drew immediate fire in Great

Britain from the Labour Party and from

the press. Since the British Defence Minister, Lord Alexander, had but recently

visited Clark, the British were upset that

he had not been informed of the proposed strikes. Actually the Clark request

had not been approved by the JCS until

after Alexander had left Korea on 18

June, but it was difficult to convince the

British on this score. The Churchill government narrowly survived a Laborite

motion of censure after Secretary of State

Acheson admitted in London that the

United States had been at fault and

should have consulted the British beforehand. Although there was no compulsion for the United States to keep the

British informed, Acheson said that

they should have been told about the

power plant operations as a matter of

courtesy.14

Most of the British concern seemed to

rest in the fears that the power plant

destruction might lead the Chinese to

break off the truce negotiations or to

attempt retaliation. Clark later stated

that he was somewhat surprised by the

furor the attacks had caused in Britain,

but was determined to repeat them,

wherever profitable, until an armistice

was concluded.15 It should be noted that

although the Communist negotiators

complained that the bombings were wanton, they neither ended the meetings nor

sought revenge.

In the United States, the reaction was

quite the reverse of that in the United

Kingdom. The question of why the

power complex had not been bombed

earlier was raised in Congressional and

other quarters. Clark could do little to

help the JCS answer this query since he

saw no reason why they should have been

spared so long. On 19 July, Mr. Lovett

told a congressman that seven factors

had forestalled prior efforts to strike the

13

 Msg, CX 50733, CINCFE to JCS, 24 Jun 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS,

Supporting Docs, tab 18. For more complete accounts of these raids, see: (1) R. Frank Futrell,

The United States Air Forces in Korea, 1950-1953,

(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), pp.

451-52; (2) James A. Field, Jr., History of the

United States Naval Operations, Korea (Washington, 1962), pp. 436-39; (3) Malcolm W. Cagle and

Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), pp. 441ff.

14

 Dept of State, Press Release No. 516, 30 Jun 52,

in Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXVII, No. 681

(July 14, 1952), p. 60. 15

 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 72-74.
THE AIR AND SEA WAR, MID-1952 323

B-29 ATTACK ON P'YONGYANG

power targets: 1. the postwar reconstruction problem; 2. the knowledge that

some of the plants had been dismantled

and only recently reconstructed; 3. the

status of excess capacity in the plants;

4. possible losses of UNC air forces; 5.

use of North Korean power in Manchuria and in the USSR and possibility

that destruction of the plants might invite a Communist offensive; 6. estimated

effect upon the armistice talks; and 7.

other priority targets.16 As it turned out,

some of these factors had obviously been

overrated or had become obsolescent.

One by-product of this flurry was the

appointment of a British representative

on the UNC staff. This had been discussed previously and rejected, since

Ridgway had felt that making an exception in favor of the United Kingdom

would lead to similar requests for representation from other U.N. countries participating in Korea. When Alexander

visited Korea, Clark told the JCS that

he was willing to accept a British staff

officer despite the possible disadvantages.

To counteract opposition criticism that

had led to the censure motion, Churchill

16

 (1) Msg, JCS 912750, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52.

(2) Msg, C 51395, Clark to JCS, 5 Jul 52, DA-IN

157923. (3) Msg, JCS 914021 to CINCFE, 21 Jul 52.
324 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

announced on 1 July that a representative would be named shortly. Actually,

it was not until the end of the month that

Maj. Gen. Stephen N. Shoosmith was

designated as a deputy chief of staff of

the U.N. Command. His directive, however, made it clear that his appointment

was solely as a normal staff officer and

that liaison between the United States

and the United Kingdom would be carried on through normal political and

military channels as it had been in the

past, both in Korea and in Washington.17

At any rate, the bombing of the hydroelectric system became an accepted part

of the air campaign. Suiho was subjected

to a B-29 raid on 11-12 September and

other plants were hit whenever they

seemed to be getting back into operation.

P'yongyang

During May the Far East Air Forces

also proposed to mount another attack

upon the North Korean capital of

P'yongyang. New military targets near

the city had been uncovered and could

be destroyed, Weyland told Clark. The

latter was not averse to a strike on

P'yongyang, but he was worried about

Prisoner of War Camp No. 9 which the

Communists had placed close to the city.

Since air reconnaissance had not located

this camp, Clark wanted the Far East

Air Forces to conduct the attack by visual

means or with the assistance of shortrange navigational beacons so that the

prisoner camp would not be bombed.18

On 5 July, subject to these conditions,

Clark approved the operations against

P'yongyang. In the course of eleven

hours on 11 July, 1,254 sorties were

flown. Fifth Air Force Sabrejets and

Thunderjets, ROK and Australian fighters, British Meteors, and Navy Panthers

and Corsairs from the Seventh Fleet vectored in three waves to hit the forty-odd

targets in and around the city. When

night fell, B-29's arrived to bomb targets specially reserved for them. Supply

depots, factories, billeting areas, railway

centers, and gun positions were destroyed and damaged and the Communist radio claimed that 1,500 buildings

had been leveled and 900 others had

suffered harm from the 1,400 tons of

bombs and 23,000 gallons of napalm

dropped on the capital. Despite heavy

and accurate antiaircraft fire, only one

air force and two naval fighters were

lost. Eight air force planes, however,

were seriously damaged.19

On 4 August the Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers hit P'yongyang again with

273 sorties, bombing buildings, a fuel

dump, gun positions, and military personnel. A third huge effort against the

city came on 29 August. Clark and Weyland decided that a psychological air

blow should be struck while the Soviet

and Chinese representatives were conferring in Moscow. In another three-wave

assault, 1,403 Air Force and Navy sorties

blanketed the capital and inflicted additional damage. After this pounding

P'yongyang possessed too few worthwhile

17

 (1) Msg, C 50318, Clark to JCS, 17 Jun 52, DA

151297. (2) Msg, DA 914543, Jenkins to CINCFE,

26 Jul 52. 18

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, an. 4, pt. I, p.

20.

19

 (1) USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 July 1932-27 July

1953, pp.88-99. (2) Futrell, United States Air

Force in Korea, 1950-53, pp. 481-82. (3) Cagle and

Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp. 450-53.
THE AIR AND SEA WAR, MID-1952 325

targets to warrant major strikes for a

time.20

Air Pressure and Air-Ground Support

General Clark realized that although

there was little he could do to increase

the ground pressure against the Communists in Korea, he could give the Air

Force and Navy full encouragement to

step up the pace of the air campaign.21

The attacks on the power plants and on

P'yongyang were the most spectacular

during the summer of 1952, but by no

means the only ones that were launched.

In late July 63 B-29's mounted their

greatest single-target effort thus tar

against the Oriental Light Metals Company, an aluminum alloy plant within

five miles of the Yalu River. Enemy jet

and propeller-driven night fighters provided but slight and ineffective opposition to this raid, which inflicted heavy

damage on the plant.22

On 27 July naval aircraft from the

Bon Homme Richard attacked a lead

and zinc mine and mill at Sindok and

others from the Princeton bombed a

magnesite plant at Kilchu the next day.

On 1 September, carrier aircraft from

the Essex, Princeton, and Boxer struck

the oil refinery at Aoji, just eight miles

from the Soviet border. Special permission from the JCS enabled the Navy to

send over 100 fighters and fighter-bombers against the previously undisturbed

oil supply center and reports indicated

that the destruction was extensive.23

Despite the nearness of many of the

Air Force and Navy operations to the

Chinese border during the summer and

the impressive fighter strength of the

Chinese Air Force located just across the

Yalu, enemy air activity was conspicuous

by its absence. The MIG-15's generally

avoided combat and the majority of the

aircraft losses was due to antiaircraft fire.

As the bombing of industrial targets increased in July and August, enemy

aircraft began to be sighted more frequently, but they showed little disposition to fight. When they did, the

Sabrejets usually took a heavy toll of

Communist planes.24

The reluctance of the Communist

fighters to defend their troops, cities,

and plants offered a contrast to the efforts of the UNC air forces to afford their

ground forces support during the summer of 1952. However, there had been

complaints from ground force commanders regarding the Van Fleet-Everest

agreement which had specified that 96

close air support sorties a day would

meet Eighth Army requirements under

conditions of limited ground activity.25

In December 1951, Van Fleet himself

had sought in vain to have one squadron

of fighter-bombers assigned to each of

his corps, maintaining that this would

improve close air support operations.

The parceling out of air combat units

20

 (1) USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in

the Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52-27 Jul 53, p. 99. (2)

Futrell, United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-5),

pp. 483, 489. 21

 Msg, CX 53391 CINCFE to CG FEAF and

COMNAVFE, 8 Aug 52, in JSPOG Staff Study No.

410.

22

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, p. 28.

23

 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp.

454-59. 24

 Futrell, United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-

53, pp. 477-78. 25

 (1) USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in

the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50-30 Jun 52, pp. 206ff.

(2) USAF Historical Study No. 127, USAF Opns

in the Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52-27 Jul 53, pp.

184ff.
326 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ran counter to Air Force doctrine and

had been firmly rejected on the grounds

that such a system would be inflexible

and wasteful inasmuch as the squadrons

could not be shifted to the more active

fronts as necessity arose. But Van Fleet

was not easily dissuaded. After Clark

became commander in chief, he tried

again. Early in June he suggested that

the 1st Marine Wing be placed under

the operational control of the Eighth

Army.26

Van Fleet's plan was essentially the

same as it had been six months earlier.

He would put one squadron under each

corps commander and establish a joint

operations center to control the use of

the Marine units at each corps headquarters. To counteract the Air Force

argument that this system would be inflexible, he intended to retain sufficient

control at Eighth Army level to divert

aircraft not being used adequately to

other corps or back to the Fifth Air

Force. The chief benefits, the Eighth

Army commander maintained, would be

to reduce the time lag between the request for support and its arrival; to allow

the pilots to become familiar with the

terrain that they would be called upon

to attack and the ground personnel they

would be working with; to increase the

number of sorties per day by having the

aircraft stationed close to the corps front

lines; and to insure better control of air

strikes by eliminating the spotter aircraft

that now directed them.27

Although Clark sympathized with Van

Fleet's approach, he had no desire to stir

up the old feud between air and ground

forces on the role of tactical aviation.

On 1 July he turned down the Eighth

Army commander's proposal and directed his staff to improve procedures for

carrying out air-ground operations doctrine.28

Six weeks later Clark issued his plan

for improving conditions. He did not

find anything basically wrong with the

present system. One of the difficulties,

he maintained, was a lack of understanding at subordinate levels of the limitations of the air arm and of the fact that

air policies were only arrived at after

consultation between the Air Force and

Army commanders. Clark felt that

ground commanders frequently called

for air strikes when their organic artillery could do the job better. After all,

he went on, the air forces in the FEC

had only limited forces and had many

tasks to perform. The Army could not

afford to adopt the Marine air-ground

team system because it was not designed

for the same kind of operations and had

entirely different allocations of artillery

to carry out its missions.29 Actually,

Clark suggested, the tactical air forces

were engaged in three types of action—

antiair, antimatériel and installations,

and antipersonnel. Ground support was

not the least of these, although it seemed

26

 Msg, G 6262 TAC, Van Fleet to Clark, 6 Jun

52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg

File, 1949-52. 27 Ibid.

28

 (1) Memo, for CofS, 1 Jul 52, no sub, in UNC/

FEC, Comd Rpt, G-3 Jnl, J-3, 12 Aug 52. (2)

Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 91-92. 29

 The 1st Marine Division had the 11th Marine

Regiment as its artillery regiment. The regiment

had basically the same armament as the four separate battalions employed by the Army to support

divisions—three battalions of 105-mm. howitzers

and one battalion of 155-mm. howitzers. In Korea,

it was part of a corps and received corps artillery

support. Ordinarily, however, Marine divisions did

not have corps artillery at their disposal to take

care of the long-range, heavy-duty artillery tasks,

and Marine air support was often used as a substitute.
THE AIR AND SEA WAR, MID-1952 327

always to be mentioned last. He thought

that co-operative training between the

air and ground forces would do much

toward eliminating many of the misconceptions that existed and proposed that

steps be taken to allow more understanding of mutual problems.30

In the meantime, Van Fleet had consulted with General Barcus, Fifth Air

Force commander, in June about applying the maximum air effort to destroy

the enemy air offensive potential close to

the battle front. He feared that the

build-up of Communist strength close to

the front might portend a possible offensive before the rainy season, so he

urged de-emphasis of the rail interdiction program and increase in close air

support. In addition, Van Fleet asked

Clark to let the B-29's, which were running into mounting enemy night fighter

opposition on their raids close to the

Manchurian border, hit Communist personnel, supplies, and material close to

the front lines by employing night radarcontrolled bombing techniques.31

Barcus was willing. He informed Van

Fleet that the air effort from the main

line of resistance to areas forty miles

behind the enemy front was growing

substantially. But there were difficulties,

he continued. Personnel and supply

bunkers were extremely hard targets to

destroy since the enemy was so well dug

in.32 Admiral Clark, Seventh Fleet commander, was also eager to help. After

a tour of the Eighth Army front in May

and talks with Van Fleet, he came to the

conclusion that naval aircraft were particularly well suited for the type of pinpoint attacks that would be necessary to

hit enemy personnel and supply bunkers.

Van Fleet and his ground commanders

were all in favor of naval air aid and the

Seventh Fleet staff began to lay plans for

joining in the close combat support program.33

As the number of air support missions

increased, fighter-bombers and medium

bombers (B-29's) began to unload their

bombs and guns on targets in the enemy's

immediate rear. Van Fleet was encouraged. During the rainy season in July,

he was successful in securing light

bomber and medium bomber support

from Barcus and Weyland, who were

eager to co-operate if suitable targets

could be uncovered for the heavier aircraft.34

There is little doubt that the end of

the rail interdiction campaign opened a

new and—to the ground forces—more

satisfactory phase of the air war. The

growing numbers of aircraft overhead

meting out punishment to the enemy

across the lines could not help but boost

front-line morale. During the bitter bat30

 Ltr, Hq FEC to CG Eighth Army et al., 11

Aug 52, sub: Air Ground Opns, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, G-3, Jnl, J-3, 12 Aug 52. See discussion

in Chapter XVII, below, of the results of the experiments ensuing from this plan. See also USAF Hist

Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict,

1 Jul-27 Jul 53, pp. 197ff. 31

 (1) Msg, G 6267 TAC, Van Fleet to CINCFE,

7 Jun 52. (2) Msg, G 6390, Van Fleet to CINCFE,

12 Jun 52. (3) Msg, GX 6490, Van Fleet to Barcus,

17 Jun 52. All in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin

Files, Jun 52, Papers 20, 28, and 38.

32

 Msg, CG 117, CG Fifth AF to CG EUSAK, 19

Jun 52, in Hq Eighth Army Gen Admin Files, Jun

52, p. 43. 33

 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp.

461ff. The naval support program did not get

under way until October. See Chapter XVII, below. 34

 (1) Msg, G 6644 TAC, Van Fleet to Clark, 25

Jun 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files,

Jun 52, Paper 82. (2) Msg, GX 7229 KCG, Van

Fleet to CINCFE, 31 Jul 52, in FEC G-3 Completed Actions. (3) Msg, GX 52915, Clark to Van

Fleet, 1 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52,

CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 17.
328 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ties of October, the U.N. Command air

force flew almost 4,500 close support

sorties against enemy personnel, equipment, supplies, and strongpoints, and of

these over 2,200 were in support of Operation SHOWDOWN alone. General Jenkins, the IX Corps commander, sent his

"grateful thanks" for the Fifth Air

Force's outstanding assistance.35

As the ground and air force officers

began to swap visits to the front and to

the air control centers, some of the misunderstanding between the two groups

started to fade. The ground troops

learned that they could help the pilots

by using proximity fuzes before air

strikes to suppress antiaircraft fire. Since

losses of friendly planes had mounted

during the close support campaign because of heavy flak, the efforts of the

artillery to reduce the hazard were appreciated by the air force. Another symptom of the change for the better,

according to the official Air Force historian, came from Van Fleet himself. By

fall he no longer was urging that air

squadrons be assigned to his corps.36

This in itself seemed to denote an overall improvement.

The Kojo Demonstration

Naval surface operations during the

summer of 1952 consisted mainly of routine patrol and blockade of the Korean

coast, mine sweeping operations, and the

shelling of targets along the coast to

harass and interdict the enemy's lines of

communication. For the ROK I Corps

the naval surface guns provided splendid

artillery support whether on offense or

defense.

But the biggest naval operation was

the demonstration at Kojo on the east

coast of Korea. In July Clark had asked

Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe, the naval

commander, whether it might not be

wise in the interest of economy to hold

a landing exercise in connection with the

movement of the 1st Cavalry Division's

8th Regimental Combat Team to Korea.

Owing to housing difficulties in Japan,

Clark had decided to rotate the three

RCT's of the 1st Cavalry to Korea, one

at a time. Since the first team was scheduled to be transferred from Japan in

October, Clark felt that the opportunity

for alarming the Communists should not

be missed.

Admiral Briscoe was heartily in favor

of some action and suggested that an

amphibious demonstration be mounted.

This could conceivably lure enemy reinforcements out on the roads and expose

them to attack by air and surface craft.

In addition, the training would be excellent for all the UNC forces involved,

Briscoe concluded. Encouraged by this

reception, Clark told his naval commander to go ahead with the planning

and to co-ordinate with Eighth Army and

XVI Corps staffs on the role of the 1st

Cavalry Division units.37

Under Admiral Clark, the Seventh

Fleet commander, Joint Amphibious

Task Force Seven was set up and 15 October established as the target date. The

demonstration was scheduled for the

area near Kojo and planning for the

land, sea, and air phases proceeded at a

swift pace. For purposes of deception,

only the highest echelon of command 35

 USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the

Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52-27 Jul 53, p. 188. 36

 Futrell, United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-

53, pp. 505-07. 37

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, p. 5.
THE AIR AND SEA WAR, MID-1952 329

knew that the maneuver was to be only

a demonstration.38

Although the 187th Airborne Regiment was to be withdrawn and prepared

for an airdrop and Eighth Army was to

prepare for an offensive to link up with

the amphibious forces, Clark told Van

Fleet this was simply to confuse enemy

intelligence and no more than limited

land objectives would be attacked.39

On 12 October rehearsal operations

held at Kangnung ran into high surf

conditions and had to be broken off. For

the next three days, FEAF and naval

planes hit the enemy positions around

Kojo and naval surface craft, led by the

battleship Iowa, shelled the beach area.

The assault troops climbed down to the

assault landing craft in the early afternoon of 15 October and made a pass at

the shore. Sudden high winds made recovery of the boats a difficult task, but

there were no serious casualties.

The enemy response to the elaborate

scheme was disappointing. Little evidence of significant troop transfers came

to light and the Communist shore batteries threw only a few answering shells

at the assault force. Whether this denoted a lack of mobility to respond

quickly or perhaps a preference to wait

until the UNC troops had landed and

then to launch a counterattack was impossible to surmise. Evidently the discovery that the operation was only a

feint added to the frustration of all the

UNC personnel who had not been in on

the secret. The realism of the planning

and mounting of the operation had built

up UNC expectations and although the

training was adjudged valuable, the damage to morale served to balance this off.40

As operations tapered off in the fall,

the results of the fighting during the

May-October period remained open to

speculation. Although the air pressure

campaign had evoked some protests from

the Communists at Panmunjom, it had

in no way softened their attitude toward

an early armistice on the UNC terms.

On the ground the hill battles had caused

the enemy more casualties than the

UNC had suffered, but gains on both

sides had been minor and neither could

claim a victory. Communist attrition in

men, supplies, matériel, and installations

was considerable during the six-month

span, but they showed no sign of cracking

or of submitting to a truce. From every

aspect it was still a stalemate and no end

38 was in sight. Ltr, Clark to Collins, 4 Sep 52, no sub, in FEC

Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp. 39

 Ltr, Clark to Van Fleet, 13 Sep 52, no sub, in

FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.

40

 See Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea,

pp. 391-96.
CHAPTER XV

Problems of Limited War

The frustrating conditions at Panmunjom and on the battlefield in Korea could

not fail to affect domestic affairs in the

United States during mid-1952. As long

as the objective in Korea had been military victory, opposition to the expenditures of American lives, funds, and resources had not been difficult to cope

with. But a slow process of reaction had

set in, once the decision to end the war

through negotiation was taken. The

political and military leaders of the

United States had to deal with a phenomenon new to them—limited war—and all

its ramifications. With the passage of

time and the failure to reach an agreement on a truce, criticism of the conduct

of the war, set off by the Congressional

investigation of the dismissal of General

MacArthur in 1951, mounted.

To many people it seemed that the

conflict in Korea had served its purpose.

The North Koreans had been pushed

back of the 38th Parallel and the Communists now knew that the United States

would fight in the event of outright aggression. On the other hand, the United

States and its allies had learned not to

underestimate Chinese military strength.

From all indications, both sides desired

peace since little further gain could be

expected from the stalemate. Only the

principle of repatriation lay between the

increasing casualty lists and the signing

of an armistice.

How this obstacle was to be surmounted remained unclear, but it was

inevitable that the settlement of the

Korean problem should become the outstanding issue of the Presidential campaign of 1952. The debates, personalities, and political maneuvers of the race

for the White House had but little effect

upon the war itself, yet it was against

this backdrop that events of the period

unfolded. Both General of the Army

Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican

candidate, and Adlai E. Stevenson, his

Democratic opponent, made peace the

keynote of their platforms. The slackening of interest in military victory and

the avowed intentions of both political

parties to make an end of the Korean

commitment meant that requests for

additional manpower, expenditures, and

resources would be closely scanned by

both the executive and the legislative

branch. In view of the election year

atmosphere that fostered criticism of the

administration's policies and the possibility—of which the Army was well

aware—that there might be a change in

the direction of the war if the Republicans proved victorious, mid-1952 was

characterized by caution.

Reviewing the Alternatives

A radical change in the course of action being pursued in Korea was impos-
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 331

sible under the circumstances. Although

the military leaders in the field might

chafe under the restrictions imposed

upon them, there was little prospect that

these would be altered except in detail.

They could not be, in fact, without augmenting the military forces at the disposal of General Clark. It had been

patent since July 1951 that, as presently

constituted, the Eighth Army could hold

the line and punish the enemy, but that

was all. Limited war meant limited

forces. One of the assumptions that military planners in Washington and the

Far East had to contend with constantly

in plotting courses of action was the dictum that the military strength of the Far

East Command would remain substantially as it was.1

 Only a return to fullscale warfare by the Communists or a

breaking off of the negotiations could

have caused a shift from this policy and,

as noted earlier, the enemy seemed content to maintain the status quo.

Thus, the studies produced by the

Joint Chiefs in Washington reflected the

static conditions in Korea and the political atmosphere in the United States.

The Joint Staff Planners frankly admitted that the war in Korea could not be

brought to a successful conclusion with

the currently authorized force levels in

the three services. If increased forces

were sent to Korea, the strategic reserve

in the United States would be depleted

and allocations for Europe would have

to be cut back. The alternative was an

accelerated mobilization effort and this

appeared to be out of the question. To

maintain successfully the military pressure then being exerted upon the Communists seemed to warrant increases in

ground, sea, and naval forces in the estimation of the Joint Planners, but, until

decisions on a national level established

the long- and short-range objectives of

the United States in Korea clearly, even

this limited support was impossible. As

they stated in May 1952: "At the present

time we are faced with a set of conditions

in Korea which preclude, from a military

point of view, a conclusion which can

be termed satisfactory. Under these unfavorable conditions, it is necessary to

determine what immediate objectives

and lines of action can be taken which

will be least damaging to our national

security, international prestige, and longrange objectives."

 2

The Washington planners seemed

doomed to the same kind of frustration

that hobbled their counterparts in the

Far East Command. Unless the Communists erupted militarily in Korea or

cut themselves off completely from the

negotiations, intensification or broadening of the war, except in its air phase,

was not likely to be considered. In the

event the Eighth Army could not contain

an enemy offensive, the conflict would

probably no longer be limited to Korea,

but might well become global in nature.

If the Communists refused to continue

the truce talks, however, the question of

increased military pressure might again

become vital and herein lay the weakness of the U.S. military position, for it

did not have the strength in being to

insure Communist acceptance of an armistice on UNC terms without leaving

the United States and Europe unaccept- 1

 See Memo, Col John T. Hall, G-3, for Chief

Training Br G-3, 13 May 52, sub: The Effect on

the Army of Possible Resumption of Hostilities in

Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 77.

2

 JSPC 853/106, 9 May 52, title: U.S. Courses of

Action in Korea.
332 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ably exposed. And any attempt to secure

the additional personnel and means

would have taken at least a year and required some additional industrial and

manpower mobilization as well as a

change in the global concept of placing

the defense of Europe first.3

To be sure, the United States retained

its atomic superiority, but the question

of use of nuclear weapons in a mountainous area like North Korea which

offered few worthwhile targets was still

moot. In addition, the moral issue of

whether the United States should employ atomic bombs again unless it were

attacked had not been settled. It was

doubtful that the United States would

have initiated atomic warfare against a

stubborn, but static enemy in Korea.

This, then, reduced the U.S. position in

Korea to a gamble that the Chinese did

want peace and that the limited military

pressure that the FEC forces could apply

would secure that peace. In the meantime, the ROK and Japanese defense

forces would be built up in the hope that

they eventually would be capable of

handling the Communist threat by themselves. This was the insurance policy

that the United States took out against

an interminable prolongation of the

Korean affair. Eventually, whether an

armistice was concluded or not, the nonKorean forces would be gradually withdrawn from the peninsula.4

Under these circumstances, planning

for military victory appeared to be an

academic exercise. The Joint Staff

worked up plans and consulted with

Clark's headquarters. In Tokyo the Far

East Command examined ambitious outlines of operations that would increase

the military pressure on the enemy or

carry the Eighth Army through to victory. But the hard fact remained that

none of these plans could be carried out

by the forces then at Clark's disposal.

To a JCS query on 23 September for his

comments on possible courses of action

if the negotiations failed, Clark said that

he could do little more on the ground

front.

We confront undemoralized enemy

forces, far superior in strength, who occupy excellent, extremely well-organized de- fensive positions in depth and who con- tinue to provide themselves with sufficient

logistic support. Under these conditions, it

appears evident that positive aggressive ac- tion, designed to obtain military victory

and achieve an armistice on our terms, is

not feasible by this command with current

forces operating under current restrictions. Only with increased forces and the removal

of certain restrictions could the FEC mount

intensified operations with some hope of

winning success without "highly unpalat- able personnel costs."

Clark did not think that the United

Nations Command should take the losses

inherent in decisive offensive operations

unless it intended to carry the fight to

the Yalu. Intermediate objectives would

be costly and undecisive, he felt.5

Although Clark did not believe that

the USSR would enter the Korean War

if the UNC drove to the Yalu, his concept of military victory had no chance for

acceptance on the eve of the elections

or thereafter. It ran squarely against the

trend that favored the quick liquidation

of the Korean commitment by political 3

 Ibid.

4

 Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 12 May 52, sub:

Courses of Action in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea,

29/11.

5

 (1) Msg, JCS 919187, JCS to CINCFE, 23 Sep

52. (2) Msg, CX 56022, CINCUNC to JCS, 29 Sep

52, in Transcript of Briefings G-3 091 Korea, 78.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 333

action. It was well for Clark to be ready

in the event of an unexpected change of

conditions, but the possibilities for such

a shift were remote. The alternatives to a

continuation of the policy of seeking

a political settlement backed by limited

military pressure in the field meant more

men, more casualties, more expenditures, and more resources. By 1952 it

was obvious that the era following the

outbreak of the war when men, money,

and matériel had been supplied on a

comparatively liberal basis was over and

the time for retrenchment was at hand.

In this climate of opinion, broadening

or intensifying the war to any great degree would appeal to but few.

Budget, Manpower, and Resources

The Presidential budget message in

January 1952 had foreshadowed the time

of austerity. In previous estimates the

JCS had hoped to build up military

forces to what might be considered acceptable defense levels by 1954. Presidential budget restrictions now made

this impossible for the Chief Executive

cut back the funds requested by the services. By lowering the allocations he

stretched the period of preparedness

from 1954 to 1956. This meant that, in

the opinion of the JCS, if the Soviet

Union attacked in full force before 1956,

the United States capacity to resist successfully would be reduced. Although

the cuts would affect the Air Force's

attainment of 126 modern combat wings

primarily, the Army would also have to

draw in its belt.6

In some respects, the lower budget

request for the armed services was deceptive, for it was predicated upon the

hope that the Korean War would be over

by the end of the fiscal year. Extension

of the war beyond 30 June 1952 meant

that supplementary appropriations

would have to be requested later on to

take care of deficiencies. General Collins

and his staff had found it difficult to plan

their fiscal estimates on this restricted

basis and in May he asked the JCS to

press the Secretary of Defense again for

consideration of the assumption that hostilities would continue through the next

fiscal year, subject to review at the beginning of each fiscal quarter. In late

June, Secretary Lovett agreed that the

JCS could assume that the war would last

until 30 June 1953 insofar as planning

for fiscal year 1954 estimates was concerned.7

Nevertheless the original Army estimate of 22.2 billion dollars for fiscal

year 1953 had been tapered down by the

President and his budget advisors to 14.2

billion dollars and Congress had lopped

off nearly two billion dollars more in

July. This would mean that the combat

readiness date for the Army would be

postponed until fiscal year 1956 and the

expanded production base for items such

as trucks, tanks, and artillery would be

reduced. In addition, Army personnel

requirements would have to be lowered.8

In Secretary Lovett's opinion, the

Army had only itself to blame for the

budget cuts. He told Secretary of the

Army Pace that Congressional commit6

 JCS 1725/175, 20 May 52, title: Information for

the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate

Armed Services Committee.

7

 (1) Memo, CofS for JCS, 21 May 52, sub: Assumption of Termination of Hostilities in Korea,

in G-3 091 Korea, 1/15. (2) Memo, Lovett for

JCS, 24 Jun 52, no sub, incl to JCS 1800/195. 8

 Draft Statement of Secy Army before the Senate

Appropriations Committee . . . , ca. 10 Jun 52, in

G-3 110, 10.
334 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tees invariably asked Army witnesses

why they had not obligated the funds

already advanced if the need for matériel were so great. Evidently the witnesses had not answered these questions

satisfactorily, he went on, and could not

as long as undelegated funds continued

to pile up and production was not accelerated to turn the money into usable

goods. He found the excuse of "no

funds" offered by the Army "tiresomely

threadbare."

 9

The failure of the Army to obligate

all the funds previously voted by Congress was due in part to the administrative delays inherent in arranging and

concluding large contracts with hundreds of firms. In this case the care and

caution exercised by the Army in negotiating contracts redounded to its disadvantage. Instead of having all the

moneys deemed necessary on hand at the

beginning of the fiscal year, it seemed

that the Army would again have to depend upon supplemental appropriations

to cover future deficiencies in carrying

on the war.

This piecemeal approach to financing

the war on a contingent basis made it

difficult for the Army planners to formulate firm programs, for frequently it took

eighteen months to two years to secure

production of many items and few could

guess how long the war would drag on.

But the knowledge that money could be

gotten if the need could be demonstrated

was at least comforting. In the field of

manpower, the situation was more serious and the prospects were less encouraging.

During the remainder of 1952, most

of the men called into service during

1950 would have completed their two

years of duty and would be eligible for

discharge. Almost three-quarters of a

million trained troops were scheduled to

be released and an estimated 650,000

raw recruits would replace them. To

train this tremendous number of men,

the Army would have to devote about

25 percent of its total manpower to this

task alone. If hostilities did not end

shortly, the effective strength of Army

forces in the United States would be limited to one airborne division because of

the influx of the untrained troops. Other

divisions would be undermanned and

would have to be utilized as replacement

and training divisions. To cope with the

problem, General Collins urged the JCS

in June to support his request for an

increase of 92,000 men for overhead for

the Army.10 Although Mr. Lovett tried

to secure this augmentation, he ran into

opposition from the Bureau of the Budget and the National Security Resources

Board and was unsuccessful. From a

total of almost 1.7 million in April 1952,

Army personnel steadily shrank to about

1.58 million at the end of October.11

Cuts in personnel required reduction

of officer strength as well. In the Far

East Command the Army officer strength

was to be cut by almost six hundred officers because of the budget limitations.

Clark protested vigorously but G-3 informed him in June that the reduction

on a world-wide basis had amounted to

5 percent. In the case of the FEC, Korea

9

 Memo, Secy Defense for Secy Army, 15 Aug 52,

incl to Summary Sheet, Eddleman for CofS, 15

Oct 52, in G-3 091 Korea, 36/3.

10

 Memo, CofS for JCS, 14 Jun 52, sub: Assumption of Termination of Hostilities in Korea, in

G-3 091 Korea, 1/28. 11

 (1) Memo, Jenkins for Taylor, 11 Jul 52, sub:

Implication of Continued Hostilities in Korea, in

G-3 091 Korea, 1/32. (2) STM-30, Strength of the

Army, 30 Apr and 31 Oct 52.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 335

had been excluded and the actual cut

had been made on the officer strength

in Japan and the Ryukyus; otherwise it

would have been more.12

At the end of July, G-3 suggested to

Clark that he might be able to decrease

the number of officers training the Japanese defense forces and give additional

responsibility to Japanese instructors at

battalion level and below. If U.S. officers

could be confined to the higher echelons,

the saving would help meet the anticipated over-all shortage of officers. Clark,

in his reply, asserted that the Japanese

forces would experience a large turnover

in trained personnel in late 1952 as twoyear enlistments expired and were also

about to undergo training in heavy armaments that would preclude a reduction

of U.S. officers for the present.13

In a frank letter to Clark on 1 August,

General Collins discussed Army personnel prospects for the year ahead. The

loss of half of the strength of the Army

and the huge problem of training all the

new replacements would sharply affect

the status and quality of the reserve

forces in the United States. Each month,

Collins continued, the Army had to send

40,000 replacements overseas and this

demand could be met until November.

After that, FEC would receive its full

quota, but other areas would go understrength. Collins felt that this would be

a difficult period and much would depend upon the character of leadership at

all echelons, if the Army were going to

weather it successfully.14

The tone of Collins' letter left no

doubt but that the Army manpower situation would deteriorate further. As

ROK forces became trained and demonstrated their ability to take on further

responsibility, they would replace the

U.S. troops in the line. If the status quo

in Korea continued, the U.S. contribution would be gradually diminished.15

The changing attitudes to U.S. funds

and manpower were also reflected in the

distribution of resources during the mid1952 era. When General Clark in May

voiced his concern over a possible Communist air build-up in North Korea once

an armistice was concluded, and asked

that his fighter force be increased by

four F-86 fighter-interceptor wings and

eight automatic weapons battalions to

counter this threat, the Joint Chiefs were

sympathetic. But after carefully surveying F-86 production and the availability

of antiaircraft units, they could only offer

limited support. By October, the JCS

informed Clark in early July, the F-86

Sabres that had been promised him in

February would be delivered. In addition, 65 Sabrejets and 175 F-84's would

be diverted to the FEC from other commitments to bring all FEAF fighter

wings up to full strength and provide a

50-percent reserve. To help out on the

defense of Japan, the JCS continued, one

Strategic Air Command fighter wing of

60 F-84's would be deployed to Japan

on a rotational basis. As for the antiaircraft battalions, one 90-mm. gun and two

12

 (1) Ltr, TAG to CINCFE, 14 May 52, sub:

Military and Civilian Personnel Authorization, in

G-3 091, 46. (2) Msg, CINCFE to DA, 22 May 52,

DA 141852. (3) Msg, DA 911831, G-3 to CINCFE,

22 Jun 52. 13

 (1) Msg, DA 914690, G-3 to CINCFE, 30 Jul

52. (2) Msg, C 53302, CINCFE to DA, 8 Aug 52,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, and CinC and

CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 47

14

 Ltr, Collins to Clark, 1 Aug 52, no sub, in

FEC G-3 320.2 Strength No. 1. 15

 Memo, Pace for Secy Defense, 16 Oct 52, sub:

Reduction of U.S. Manpower in Korea, in G-3

320.2 Pacific, 13.
336 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

automatic weapons battalions could be

provided by taking them from the continental United States defense forces.16

Although the provision of these air and

antiaircraft units and equipment involved some risk in spreading out very

thinly the forces not involved in the

Korean War, the JCS attempted to

scrape together at least part of what the

FEC requested.

Ammunition Again

One of the problems that continued to

plague the Army during the summer and

fall of 1952 was the supply of ammunition. As noted earlier, there was little

expectation that conditions would improve noticeably before the end of the

year.17 And if the war waxed hot in

Korea once more, even an increase in

production would do little more than

replace the rounds expended.

At a briefing in late April, the Army

chiefs in Washington were informed that

in the five major deficient categories—

60-mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-inch mortars,

105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers—the

situation was especially serious. If war

broke out in Europe on 1 January 1953,

the United States would only be able to

supply six divisions with these five types

of rounds and a year later the total that

could be kept in action would be fifteen

divisions. Current U.S. ammunition production facilities by early 1953 would

have reached their maximum capacity

and it would take another year and a half

before new ones could be brought into

production. When Secretary of the Army

Pace heard about this, he directed that

the entire question of expanding the

ammunition production base be re-examined.18

Early in May another discordant note

sounded from. Korea. A newspaper story

claimed that the American soldiers were

fighting with secondhand equipment and

a shortage of ammunition. When the

Army asked the Far East commander to

comment, he replied that ammunition

was plentiful and rationing was a normal

military precaution. Since this information seemed diametrically opposed to

the stand then being taken by General

Collins before Congress to secure additional funds for ammunition, G-3 asked

FEC to explain further. As it turned out,

the theater staff had based its estimates

upon action on the battlefield continuing

at the limited pace of the April-May

period. If the action should quicken, the

ammunition situation might alter radically. The one round whose supply did

appear to be in a precarious position considering proposed production schedules

in the United States was the 155-mm.

howitzer shell, the theater staff concluded.19

The dependence upon restricted operations at the front to maintain ammunition levels came to the fore again in early

June. When Van Fleet toured his corps

headquarters, he discovered that it had

been necessary to limit deliveries of 105-

mm. and 155-mm. howitzer shells to the

other corps in order to provide the U.S.

I Corps with adequate quantities for its

16

 (1) Msg, CX 68196, CINCFE to JCS, 9 May 52,

DA-IN 136993. (2) Msg, JCS 913020, JCS to

CINCFE, 8 Jul 52. 17

 See Chapter X, above.

18

 (1) G-3 Memo for Rcd, 22 Apr 52, sub: Ammunition Supply Situation, in G-3 470, 4. (2)

Memo, Col H. C. Hine, Jr., for Jenkins, 29 Apr 52,

sub: Ammunition Supply Situation in FY 1953, in

G-3 337, 23. 19

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 129-30.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 337

missions. The corps commanders were

aware that the situation would become

even more complicated as additional

ROK battalions were activated and supplied.20

By the end of June Clark had become

gravely concerned over supplies of the

155-mm. howitzer shell. The Communists had almost doubled their artillery

and mortar fire during the month and

the Eighth Army had to increase its expenditures in self-defense. As mentioned

earlier, the 105-mm. howitzer was not

effective against enemy bunkers and

lacked the range for counterbattery fire.

Clark pointed out that when the 6 ROK

155-mm. battalions became active, the

FEC would have to supply 486 pieces

instead of 378. Although the authorized

day of supply was 40 rounds per tube,

Clark had had to restrict the expenditures to a bit over 15 rounds a day. If the

scheduled delivery of 155-mm. ammunition during the summer were maintained, only 140,000 rounds would arrive

in the FEC and this would require further limitations. By 1 September, Clark

concluded, theater stocks would be reduced to about 350,000 rounds or only

62 days supply instead of 90.21

General Collins recognized that the

situation in the Far East Command was

far from ideal, but he relayed several

hard production facts to Clark in early

July. At the present, only about 100,000

rounds of 155-mm. ammunition were

coming off the lines each month and this

would gradually climb to 650,000 rounds

a month in approximately a year. To

provide Clark with the full 40 rounds

a day for 486 pieces would require about

583,000 rounds a month, a rate that

would not be reached until March 1953,

Collins continued. The most the Army

could provide, without leaving Europe

critically short and eliminating firing in

training, would be on the order of 400,-

000 to 500,000 rounds during the 1 July

-31 October 1952 period. Of course,

Collins went on, in the event of a major

attack, the Eighth Army could fire whatever was necessary to halt it, but it would

take time to replace ammunition expended at a higher daily rate than 15

rounds. If the steel strike, which had

begun on 2 June, lasted for a considerable length of time, Collins felt that

improvement in the situation would be

delayed further.22

Actually the Christie Park plant at

Pittsburgh which produced over 60 percent of the 155-mm. shell forgings had

already lost production of 60,000 forgings during the first month of the strike.

Secretary Pace urged Mr. Lovett on 5

July to bring this loss to the attention of

both labor and management in the hope

that further damage might be averted.23

The urgency of the 155-mm. shell situation was reflected at the army and corps

level in Korea several days later. Van

Fleet informed his subordinates that the

resupply rate through October would

amount to about six to eight rounds per

day and therefore the Eighth Army

would employ its 155's only on the most

remunerative targets, using other caliber

20

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 139-41. 21

 Msg, CX 51020, Clark to Collins, 28 Jun 52, in

Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jun 52, Paper

53.

22

 Msg, DA 912775, Collins to Clark, 3 Jul 52.

The strike was not settled until 25 July 1952 and

endured fifty-four days in all. 23

 Memo, Pace for Secy Defense, 5 Jul 52, sub:

Opening of Christie Park Plant ... , in G-3

470. 7.
338 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

weapons and tactical air wherever possible as substitutes.24

On 13-14 July, Collins and his deputy

assistant chief of staff, G-4, General

Reeder, visited Eighth Army and assured

Van Fleet that he would get a minimum

of five rounds of 155-mm. ammunition

per day per tube including the tubes in

the new ROK battalions. To help out

during the emergency, Reeder suggested

to Van Fleet that he might convert some

of his 105-mm. to 8-inch howitzer battalions since tubes were available and

ammunition was plentiful.25

Clark was not willing to let the daily

rate rest at such a low figure and he

authorized Van Fleet in early August to

expend fifteen rounds of 155-mm. howitzer shells a day per tube. General Collins was able to secure approval of this

rate later in the month by curtailing

other allocations severely.26

To help alleviate the shortage, Clark

had asked for permission to procure 600,-

000 rounds of 155-mm. ammunition (less

explosives) in Japan. But when the

Army discovered that the cost would be

more than 60 percent over the U.S. rate,

it turned down the request.27

However, the Army did agree in midAugust to replace ammunition expended

in Korea. This would mean that a ninety-day level for the Korean area at the

full rate of forty rounds per day per tube

would be sought. When this was attained, Clark would only requisition

ammunition on the basis of the number

of rounds actually fired.28

As the action on the front mounted

in September and October, ammunition

expenditures on both sides climbed. In

one week in September the UNC artillery and mortar units hurled over 370,-

000 rounds at the enemy and received

over 185,000 in return. During the fierce

battles of October, the Eighth Army sent

423,000 rounds of 105-mm. howitzer and

108,000 rounds of 155-mm. howitzer

shells at the Communists in a six-day

period.29

The sharply accelerated rate of fire

per tube per day from less than 8 rounds

of 155-mm. in September to 18 in October posed a new worry for General

Clark. If the rate should continue,

theater stocks would be reduced to 26

days of supply instead of 60 by the end of

November.30 The prospect led him to

urge the Army to review its efforts to

expedite deliveries and rebuild the

theater stocks. Clark also pointed out

that the 155-mm. howitzer shells were

not the only cause for concern. 81-mm.

high explosive light shells for mortars

and 155-mm. high explosive gun shells

had been slow in arriving and what was

more serious, only 355 fragmentation

hand grenades had been shipped to the

FEC between 15 August and 7 October.31

24

 Msg, GX 6904, CG EUSAK 10 CG I U.S. Corps

et al., 10 Jul 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin

Files, Jul 52, p. 15. 25

 Memo, Mudgett for Clark, 15 Jul 52. sub: Items

of Personal Interest to CINCFE . .., in UNC/

FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 16. 26

 (1) Msg, CX 53249, Clark to CofS, 7 Aug 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS,

Supporting Docs, tab 62. (2) Memo, Ralph J.

Watkins for Bendetsen, 28 Aug 52, no sub, in FEC

Gen Admin Files. 27

 Msg, DA 915309, G-4 to CINCFE, 7 Aug 52.

28

 Msg, DA 915951, G-4 to CINCFE, 14 Aug 52. 29

 (1) Memo, Eddleman for DCofS Opns and

Admin, 29 Sep 52, sub: Statistical Data, in G-3 091

Korea, 93/3. (2) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52,

p. 32. 30

 Msg, CX 57223, Clark to DA, 18 Oct 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, CinC and CofS,

Supporting Docs, tab 51. 31

 Ibid.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 339

AN 8-INCH HOWITZER AND CREW

In its reply the Army assured Clark

that it was doing all it could to improve

the situation and that the supply picture

was steadily becoming better.32 Some

production was lost in the 155-mm. howitzer shell because of the steel strike and

this had held down the delivery rate of

this critical round. Yet in this and in

the other rounds that were in short supply, the FEC got the lion's share. The

real danger, General Reeder commented

later on, lay in the precarious position

of theater stocks in Europe. If hostilities had broken out there, the situation

would have been disastrous.33

There were two points that should

be kept in mind in considering the ammunition situation during the last two

years of the war. First, there were no

shortages of more than a temporary nature in the hands of the troops. Whenever it was necessary, the Eighth Army

could use whatever ammunition it

needed to protect itself. Secondly, despite the restrictions on the rounds per

32

 Msg, DA 922080, G-4 to CINCFE, 25 Oct 52.

33

 Reeder, The Korean Ammunition Shortage,

ch. VI, p. 9.
340 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

day during the more quiescent periods,

the Eighth Army consistently fired far

more ammunition than it received from

the Communists. And this did not include the bombs, gun, and rocket fire

launched by the UNC air forces. The

troops could not fire as much as they

desired all the time, it was true, but the

picture was not all black. The bleakest

spot was in the U.S. global ammunition situation rather than in Korea.

Provided that Korean demands remained fairly stable, this condition

would not be alleviated until production

facilities reached their peak in 1953. In

the meantime, restrictions would remain

in effect and the dispute over shortages

would continue.

The Expansion of the ROK Army

Discussion of the domestic problems

of budget, manpower, and availability

of resources for the Korean War could

hardly avoid the closely related subject

of the role of indigenous forces in the

conflict. Since the United States wished

to decrease gradually its commitments

in the Far East, the contributions of the

ROK, Japanese, Chinese Nationalist,

and the armed forces of the other free

nations in the area became more important. U.S. funds invested in native

troops produced multiple returns, for

the same amount of money would train,

equip, and maintain more Far East nationals than Americans and by the same

token should permit the United States

eventually to reduce its responsibilities

and its manpower in the theater.

Whether the additional quantities of

indigenous soldiers would also succeed

in attaining a high degree of quality

was as yet undetermined, but the improvement in the performance of some

ROK units during the mid-1952 period

was definitely encouraging.

With the replacement of General

Ridgway by General Clark in May, there

had been a change of attitude toward

the enlargement of the ROK Army.

Both MacArthur and Ridgway, it will

be remembered, had favored a ten-division force of 250,000 men as a desirable

size and strength. But Clark was inclined from the start toward an expanded ROK Army. Several times during the first two weeks of his assumption

of command, he remarked that the bigger the ROK Army was, the better he

would like it.34

In reality the ROK Army had grown

steadily above the 250,000-man level and

had long been overstrength. Just before

Ridgway had left the theater, he had

submitted a new troop list totaling over

360,000 spaces, covering the additional

artillery, tank, and security forces being

organized and providing for ten additional infantry regiments.35

 The tendivision ceiling had been retained, but

the independent regiments could be

used as cadres for new divisions if and

when this became desirable.

Clark was thoroughly in accord with

the expansion of the troop list. As he

pointed out in June to the Washington

staff, the ROK Army had supplanted the

National Police in the corps areas and

had taken on increased security duties

in guarding prisoners of war and in suppressing guerrillas in the rear. In addition, the replacement and training

34

 Memo, Moorman for CofS, 26 May 52, sub:

Expansion of the ROK Forces, in FEC Gen Admin

Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp. 35

 Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experiences, pt. IV,

pp. 43-44.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 341

system which produced seven hundred

ROK soldiers a day had begun to pile

up surpluses because of the low attrition rate at the front. To disrupt this

smoothly functioning process, Clark reasoned, would not be wise, since it formed

insurance against a period of heavy action. It should not be forgotten, Clark

concluded, that there were 30,000 patients carried on the rolls because the

ROK had no veteran's organization to

care for them. Under these conditions,

he felt that the Army should grant him

authorization for 92,100 bulk personnel

and 19,458 to form six separate regiments.36

Four days later, Clark followed up

with another request. He wanted to add

two more ROK divisions to the troop

list and increase the total for logistical

support from 363,000 to about 415,000.

With the creation of the new divisions,

Clark maintained, the number of Asians

fighting communism would rise and the

number of American casualties would

decline. The ROKA replacement system would sustain the extra divisions

and the six separate regiments, and help

make the best use of South Korean manpower.37

As it turned out, the movement for

expanding ROKA ground forces was not

opportune. The Korean Ambassador to

the United States, You Chan Yang, was

at the time urging the State Department,

the Air Force, and Congress to adopt a

three-year plan for building up the ROK

Air Force tactically.38 As already indicated, Ridgway had opposed the existence of a small, ineffective ROK

air force which he thought would be annihilated at the outset by superior Communist air power.39

 The objections to an

augmentation of the ground forces

stemmed from altogether different reasons. Owing to the shortages in artillery

equipment and ammunition, ROK

Army increases in these categories could

be supported only by equivalent reductions in U.S. or U.N. forces that were

being currently maintained. If there

were to be an expansion in the ROK

Army, both G-3 and G-4 preferred the

increase to be in separate regiments that

would not require additional artillery

support rather than in divisions.40

The JCS, however, were not yet prepared to approve an augmentation of

the ROK armed forces. At the end of

June they decided to hold to the tendivision, 250,000-man Army and the

existing Navy and Air Force.41

When General Collins visited Korea

in mid-July, he approved raising the

Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army

(KATUSA) to 2,500 men per division,

but this was as much as he could do at

the time. Clark had to inform Van Fleet

not to activate further separate light

infantry regiments and that ROK Army

strength could not exceed 362,945 men.

To insure that the replacement and

training system did not cause the total

strength to go over this figure, Clark told

the Eighth Army commander to take

action to separate the physically dis36

 Msg, C 50459, Clark to DA, 19 Jun 52, DAIN 152025. The bulk allotment included patients,

trainees, interpreters, general prisoners, etc. 37

 Msg, CX 50698, Clark to JCS, 23 Jun 52, DAIN 153560. 38

 Ltr, You Chan Yang to Bradley, 18 Jun 52,

no sub, in G-3 091 Korea, 82.

39

 See Chapter X, above. 40

 Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 7 Jul 52, sub:

Strength, Organizational and Logistical Support of

Wartime ROK Army, in G-3 091 Korea, 74. 41

 Decision on JCS 1776/281, 30 Jun 52.
342 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

abled and other nonuseful members of

the ROK Army from the service.42

The Collins tour and his discussions

with Clark and Van Fleet bore fruit in

early August. The Chief of Staff overrode his staff by approving the requested

bulk allotment of 92,100 men and directing Army support for a two-division

augmentation for the ROK Army. As

Collins envisioned the divisional expansion, it would be progressive and fitted

within current budget guidelines and

availability of logistical resources. He

felt it would be desirable to capitalize

on the ROK capability to supply trained

manpower economically and to pave the

way for the eventual withdrawal and

redeployment of U.S. Army forces.43

While the JCS studied the implications of adding two divisions to the ROK

Army, the strength of this army grew to

over 350,000 men in August.44 Since

KATUSA was not included in the

ROKA totals, Van Fleet asked Clark to

seek a further increment in KATUSA

strength to a ceiling of 27,000.45 Clark

agreed and urged the Army to permit

up to 28,000 KATUSA soldiers to be

distributed among the UNC units. Not

only would the South Koreans bolster

the fighting strength of the UNC organizations, he argued, but they would also

receive the training that would make

them the finest cadres.46

The FEC requests for augmenting the

ROK Army and KATUSA were passed

along to the JCS together with a third

Clark recommendation covering the enlargement of the ROK Marine forces

from 12,376 to 19,800.47 The Joint

Chiefs also were reconsidering whether

to allow the ROK Air Force to grow as

Ambassador You had suggested in June.

In mid-September, they determined to

hold firm to their earlier position and

maintain the ROK Air Force as it was.48

The following week the JCS approved

Clark's plan for increasing the ROK

Army, Marine forces, and KATUSA,

lifting the troop ceiling for the ROK

Army and marines to 463,000. In their

memorandum to Secretary Lovett, the

JCS admitted that to supply and equip

the ROK increments would mean that

the continental U.S. forces would have to

go on operating under a 50-percent ceiling on critical items, that 105-mm. howitzers would have to be diverted from

NATO programs, and that other critical

items would have to be withdrawn from

42

 (1) Memo, Mudgett for Clark, 15 Jul 52, sub:

Items of Personal Interest to CINCFE . . . , in FEC

Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp. (2) Msg, C

52744, CINCFE to Van Fleet, 29 Jul 52, in UNC/-

FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, an. 4, pt. III, incl 3. 43

 Memo, Brig Gen John C. Oakes, SGS, for

ACofS G-3, 8 Aug 52, sub: Additional Logistical

Support of War Time ROK Army, in G-3 091

Korea, 71/5. 44

 The strength figures broke down as follows:

10 divisions, 144,420; corps troops, 16,004; Army

troops, 101,113; bulk allotment, 92,100; total,

353.637. See Msg, CX 54184, CINCFE to DA, 25

Aug 52, DA-IN 176440. 45

 At 2,500 men per division, KATUSA strength

could reach 20,000 since there were 8 divisions—6

U.S. Army, 1 Marine, and 1 Commonwealth. The

other 7,000 would be placed in combat support

units. See, Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 52,

sec. I, Narrative, p. 90.

46

 Msg, C 55066, Clark to DA, 12 Sep 52, DA-IN

183011. 47

 Msg, CX 54489, CINCFE to JCS, 1 Sep 52, DA

179035. 48

 Memo, Brig Gen Charles P. Cabell for Secy

Defense, 19 Sep 52, sub: A Three Year Plan for

the ROK Air Force, in G-3 091 Korea, 60/5. It

should be noted that this decision was somewhat

deceptive, for the U.S. Air force had added twenty

more fighter planes to the ROK Air Force between

the JCS decision of 30 June and the end of September. See Ltr, Col C. C. B. Warden, TAG FEC,

for JCS, 30 Oct 52, sub: Peacetime ROK Air Force,

Marine Corps and Navy, in G-3 091 Korea, 74.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 343

mobilization reserve stocks. Despite

these disadvantages, the JCS felt that

the opportunity to add more Asians to

the fight against communism made the

program worthwhile.49

On 1 October, on the heels of the JCS

memo, Clark sent an urgent request for

decision on the expansion of the ROK

armed forces. The efficient replacement

and training machine that was feeding

the ROK Army seven hundred recruits

a day was working all too well. In July

the Eighth Army had tried a subterfuge

to hold down the flow of recruits by

carrying all the new trainees as civilians

until they had completed basic training;

otherwise the ceiling would have been

exceeded in August. Rather than

disrupt the steady input into the induction stations, the Eighth Army decided

to gamble that the requests for ROKA

increases would be approved ultimately

and resorted to civilian trainees. If and

when the augmentation were granted,

the men would be trained and ready

to go into the new units as they were

organized.50

There were certain advantages to this

procedure since it permitted the physically unfit and undesirables to be

weeded out before they were sworn into

the Army. But the delay in the decision

at Washington had led to a crisis. The

training cycle was only eight weeks long

and by September the first civilian trainees were finishing the course and beginning to funnel into the Army officially.

With casualties still at a moderate level,

the new influx would soon send the

ROKA total above the present ceiling.

If the ROK Army were not going to be

enlarged, Clark told the JCS, he would

have to cut back the number of replacements to the current attrition level.51

Before the Secretary of Defense gave

his support to ROK expansion, however,

he wanted to know more about the impact of the program upon NATO, the

Japanese defense forces, the Chinese Nationalist Army, and military assistance

to the countries of Southeast Asia. General Bradley quickly informed him that

deliveries of critical items like 105-mm.

and 155-mm. howitzers and 75-mm. recoilless rifles to other nations would be

delayed by two months and that the

necessity to supply ammunition for these

weapons, if they were assigned to the

ROK Army, would further limit the

capability of the United States to provide

ammunition for Europe and the zone of

interior. As for other items that

would be required, these could be furnished from Army mobilization and

depot stocks.52

On 25 October, Mr. Lovett forwarded

to the President his recommendation

that the ROK forces be expanded with

a new ceiling of 463,000 men and five

days later Mr. Truman approved the

proposal.53 In the meantime, the Republican candidate, General Eisenhower,

had made his famous announcement

that he would go to Korea if he were

49

 Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 26 Sep 52,

sub: Augmentation of the Wartime ROK Army

and Marine Corps, in G-3 091 Korea, 66. 50

 (1) Memo, GCM [Mudgett] for CINC, 20 Sep

52, sub: Strength of the ROK Army, in FEC G-3

320.2 Strength No. 1. (2) Msg, CX 56149, Clark

for JCS, 1 Oct 52, DA-IN 190069.

51

 Msg, CX 56149, Clark to JCS, 1 Oct 52, DAIN 190069. 52

 (1) Memo, Deputy Secy Defense Foster for JCS

8 Oct 52, sub: Augmentation..., incl to JCS 1776/-

322. (2) Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 10 Oct

52, sub: Augmentation . . . , in G-3 091 Korea, 66/8. 53

 (1) Ltr, Lovett to the President, 25 Oct 52, no

sub, in G-3 091 Korea, 66/17. (2) Memo, Lovett

for JCS, 30 Oct 52, sub: Augmentation ... , G-3,

Korea, 66/16.
344 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

elected and had urged that the ROK

forces be increased. On 29 October, at

a political speech, he had read excerpts

of a letter from Van Fleet to his former

chief of staff, General Mood, in which

the Eighth Army commander expressed

his familiar theme that the ROK Army

should be doubled from ten to twenty

divisions so that U.S. forces could be released.54

 Whether the political pressure

of the campaign had an appreciable effect upon President Truman's decision

would be difficult to ascertain, but it was

possible that it might have speeded up

favorable action.

At any rate, the first big step toward

building a more formidable ROKA

force had been taken and Eisenhower's

victory at the polls in early November

indicated that this move was only the

forerunner of further developments

along the same line.

The drive for expansion had garnered

the major share of the attention during

the summer and fall of 1952 and tended

to throw into the shadows the other developments in the ROK Army. During

April the ROK 1st Field Artillery Group

of two 105-mm. howitzer battalions completed its training and in May moved

into the line in support of the ROK 6th

Division. By October eight of the

ROKA artillery groups were available

for duty and the remaining two would

be ready before the end of the year. In

the field of armor, four ROKA and one

Korean Marine tank companies were operational by the close of October and

three others were awaiting the arrival

of tanks from the United States.55 The

cadres of the six ROKA 155-mm. howitzer battalions authorized were sent out

in June—one to each U.S. division. By

November they were ready to take their

battalion firing tests.56

The assignment of ROKA artillery

battalions to U.S. artillery units in the

combat zone complicated the problems

of the latter considerably. In addition

to surmounting the language barrier, the

U.S. artillery commanders had to devote

a great deal of time to the training of

the ROKA outfits and to the finding of

suitable firing positions for the ROKA

pieces in their often crowded sectors.

To improve the caliber of the ROKA

officer corps, Clark requested the Army

in June to raise the allocations of student

spaces in U.S. service schools to 581 for

fiscal year 1953. Three months later, he

asked that 100 spaces in the Artillery

School and 150 spaces in the Infantry

School be made available for ROKA

officers in the session that was to begin

in March 1953.57

Under Brig. Gen. Cornelius E. Ryan

the Korean Military Advisory Group

(KMAG) had almost 2,000 U.S. personnel assisting in ROK training by October, but the lifting of the troop ceiling to 463,000 betokened additional

duties. Van Fleet levied twenty-four

officers from his corps and divisions and

channeled sixty-eight more from his

pipeline into KMAG. Unfortunately,

losses to rotation deprived KMAG of

many officers and enlisted men during

54

 New York Times, October 30, 1952. 55

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, May and Oct 52,

sec. I, Narrative, pp. 41-42 and pp. 62-64, respectively.

56

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, June and Oct

52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 73 and 63, respectively. 57

 (1) Msg, CX 50924, CINCFE to DA, 26 Jun 52,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, an. 4, pt. II,

J-17, 27 Jun 52. (2) Msg, CX 55484, CINCFE to

DA, 20 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52,

CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 55.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 345

GENERAL RYAN

the last half of 1952 and imposed a heavy

burden upon the KMAG staff.58

In mid-September, Van Fleet asked

the ROK Army to increase the Korean

Service Corps (KSC) from 75,000 to

100,000. He planned to form six new

regiments and bring the existing units

up to strength. Since members of the

KSC served six-month terms, the ROK

Army would have to bring in 4,000 personnel each week to keep the program

at full strength.59

Crisis in the Rear

In addition to the support and training functions behind the lines, the ROK

Army had to cope with security problems

as well. Prisoners of war and the safeguarding of the lines of communication

were two facets of this function. ROKA

units joined other UNC forces in providing personnel to watch over the prisoner camps as they were dispersed in

May and June. In the rural areas,

guerrillas or bandits—it was difficult

to distinguish one from the otherformed a constant threat to the lines of

communication. In some sections the

roads were unsafe during the hours of

darkness and many farmers were afraid

to cultivate their land even under the

protection of guards during the daytime.60

Although guerrilla activity was mainly

of nuisance value only, the bands operating in the important Pusan port sector assumed an important role in the

development of the internal crisis in the

ROK Government during the spring of

1952. The basic cause for the rise of

domestic dissension lay in the conflict

between President Rhee and the members of the National Assembly who opposed him. With the national elections

destined to be held in the summer, Rhee

determined to have the constitution

changed so that the President could be

elected by popular vote rather than

chosen by the Assembly. His foes Were

equally resolved to keep this function in

the legislative branch.61

On 24 May matters came to a head.

Rhee placed Pusan under martial law

and had some of his opponents in the

Assembly arrested. Evidently he intended to dissolve the Assembly and have

a new one elected to amend the constitution so that there would be a bicameral

legislature and popular election of the

President. At any rate, he charged the

58

 Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experience, pt. IV,

pp. 8-10. 59

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 105-06. 60

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 204. 61

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, pp. 46-47.
346 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

arrested assemblymen with complicity

in treason in a Communist conspiracy

and justified the continuation of martial

law as a measure to counteract guerrilla

operations in the Pusan area.62

The consternation caused by Rhee's

actions was immediate both within and

outside Korea. Political and military

representatives of the U.N. and the

United Nations Command sought to dissuade him from further steps that might

result in weakening Korean democratic

institutions and might endanger military operations at the front. Since the

problem was primarily political, Clark

and Van Fleet preferred to let the State

Department handle the affair, although

Van Fleet did go to see Rhee on 28

May, together with General Lee Chong

Chan, the ROKA Chief of Staff, in an

effort to persuade the President to lift

the martial law edict.63 Rhee promised

to consider this, but took no action.

In the meantime, Van Fleet took precautionary steps to safeguard the UNC

personnel and installations. Security

guards were reinforced and plans prepared to protect UNC troops, vehicles,

and property from mob violence. Since

the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry

Regiment was engaged in prisoner of

war duties at Pusan, Van Fleet ordered

the unit pulled back to the United Nations Reception Center at Taegu to act

as a mobile reserve. He warned General

Yount of the 2d Logistical Command

that extreme care should be taken to

avoid participation in civil disturbances

where no danger to the U.N. Command

existed.64 As an added safety measure

the JCS authorized Clark to divert up

to a regimental combat team from Japan

if the political situation deteriorated.65

The chief concern of the UNC rested

in the uninterrupted flow of supplies to

the front, since Pusan was the major

port of South Korea and handled the

bulk of shipments for the Eighth Army.66

But the State Department requested full

support from the UNC in its efforts to

alter Rhee's stubborn stand on martial

law and the National Assembly and Collins instructed Clark to back the U.S.

political representatives firmly.67

On 2 June President Truman sent a

note to Rhee deprecating the loss of

confidence in Korean leadership that was

taking place and asking him to defer

further action until Ambassador Muccio

returned from the United States.68 Truman's request may have given Rhee

pause, for although he did not lift martial law, he evidently decided not to

dissolve the National Assembly.

The impasse between Rhee and his

legislature eased as they began to negotiate a compromise during June. It took

the form of a constitutional amendment

on 3 July that among other things provided for the popular election of the

President and Vice President and the

establishment of a second legislative

chamber. Despite the clear-cut victory

over his opponents, Rhee did not end

martial law until 28 July.69

62

 Ibid., p. 48. 63

 Msg, LC 893, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 28 May

52, in Hq Eighth Army, Opn Planning Files, May

52, item 106A.

64

 Msg, GX 6155, CG Eighth Army to CG 2d

Logistical Comd, 30 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd

Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS, incl 27. 65

 Msg, JCS 910146, JCS to CINCFE, 30 May 52. 66

 Msg, C 69322, Clark to DA, 30 May 52, DA-IN

145040. 67

 Msg, DA 910149, CSUSA to CINCFE, 31 May

52.

68

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, p. 47. 69

 Ibid., Jul 52, pp. 54-55.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 347

During the tense moments in late

May and early June, the U.N. Command carefully watched the effects of

the crisis upon the military supply lines

and on the ROK Army. Since the political parties had abstained from interference in military logistics and Van

Fleet had taken a firm stand against

political tampering with the leadership

of the ROK Army, Clark and Van Fleet

were inclined to remain aloof and let

the Koreans work out their own internal

problems.70 They had supported the

U.S. political representatives faithfully,

if without great enthusiasm, in the efforts to end the Korean political war.71

While the guerrilla threat that Rhee

had used as a reason for imposing martial law had not posed a significant challenge to either the ROK Government

or the UNC, small-scale action of

a bandit nature mounted during June.

On 24 June guerrillas or bandits blew

up a train in southwest Korea, destroyed

eleven coaches, and killed over forty

passengers.72

ROK Army and police units waged a

constant skirmish with these predators—

whose chief objectives seemed to be food

and clothing. But despite the toll that

the ROK forces exacted, the guerrilla

bands managed to gain new recruits and

to carry out harassing raids. In July the

ROK 1st Division was pulled out of the

line and sent to southwestern Korea to

help eliminate the nuisance. This had

been tried before with only moderate

success and the ROK 1st Division had to

undergo a similar experience. As the

division moved through the mountainous Chiri-san region with National Police units attached, it met no organized

resistance. The guerrillas followed the

same pattern of dispersion and evasion

that they used before. Breaking up into

small groups until the ROK forces passed

them by, they came together again afterwards and resumed their depredations.

After a campaign of more than three

weeks chasing the elusive bandits, the

ROK 1st Division returned to the front

and the National Police again resumed

responsibility for the rear areas. From

August to October, about three to four

hundred guerrillas were reported killed

and a hundred or so were captured each

month, yet the over-all guerrilla strength

declined very slightly.73

It was evident that the problem did

not admit of an early solution and would

probably continue. In Clark's opinion,

however, hunting of guerrillas, like the

settlement of political squabbles, was an

internal ROK affair and in September

he told Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Herren,

commander of the newly formed Korean

Communications Zone, that American

soldiers could be used to guard prisoners,

safeguard property, and protect supply

routes and U.N. nationals, but not to

chase bandits.74

Although the United Nations com70

 (1) Msg, GX 74495 KCG, Van Fleet to Clark,

17 Jun 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal

Msg File, 1949-52. (2) Memo, Col Walter R.

Hensey, Jr., G-5, for SGS, 19 Jun 52, no sub, in

FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp. 71

 (1) Msg, GX 6632, Van Fleet to Clark, 24 Jun

52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personel Msg

File, 1949-52. (2) Msg, GX 51399, CINCUNC to

JCS, 5 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52,

CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 15. 72

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 204.

73

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Jul 52, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 6; Aug 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 80-

81; Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 118; Oct 52, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 66. 74

 Msg, C 54962, CINCFE to CG KCOMZ, 10 Sep

52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and

CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 6.
348 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

GENERAL HERREN

mander was able to remain neutral in

the ROK domestic situation, he found

it difficult to avoid participation in the

republic's embroilment with Japan. Relations between the two countries,

embittered by the controversy over Japanese claims to vested properties in

Korea, were aggravated by the Japanese

practice of fishing off the Korean coast.

In September the ROK Navy seized several Japanese fishing vessels that had

violated ROK territorial waters and tension mounted. Clark was forced to establish a sea defense zone on 22 September

off the Korean coast, ostensibly to secure

the UNC lines of communication and to

prevent enemy agents from being

landed, but in reality designed to form

a buffer area between the ROK and Japanese vessels.75

Hardly had this uneasy moment passed

when Rhee decided to put an end to the

UNC practice of employing about 2,000

Japanese in Korea. Most of the Japanese

were working in port areas, installing

equipment and training Korean replacements. But ROK resentment at the presence of its former overlords in positions

of responsibility led Rhee to direct the

arrest of all Japanese who came ashore

without the permission of the ROK Government. Clark countered by instructing

all Japanese employees to remain on

shipboard except in case of absolute necessity. Since the Department of the

Army did not wish Clark to make an

issue of the matter, Collins told him to

intensify his efforts to replace the Japanese with Koreans and to work out a

program for doing this that Rhee might

approve.76 In early October Clark passed

these instructions on to General Herren,

advising him that the emphasis should

be put upon training Koreans quickly

as replacements and upon an amicable

solution of the altercation.77

75

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, pp. 44-46. 76

 (1) Msg, DA 919564, DA to CINCFE, 27 Sep 52.

(2) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, pp. 46-49. 77

 Msg, CX 56725, CINCUNC to CG KCOMZ, 9

Oct 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, CinC

and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 55.
CHAPTER XVI

Conservation of Resources

The return of sporadic activity on the

battlefield in November 1952 and the

suspension of other than liaison officer's

meetings at Panmunjom forecasted a

long, uneventful winter. With raids, patrols, and small-unit actions characterizing operations at the front and with

bickering over incidents and infractions

of the neutrality of the conference area

highlighting the contacts between the

negotiators, the problems of limited war

continued to receive a considerable share

of attention during the winter of 1952-

53. In Washington and in the Far East

the accent remained on conserving and

protecting the most precious commitment of the United States to the war—its

manpower. Since military victory was

no longer at stake, there seemed to be

no reason why American lives should be

expended needlessly nor for the burden

of fighting to be carried on by the old

hands. Under static conditions along the

battle lines, more ROK troops could be

trained and utilized and units could be

rotated more frequently. This would

allow U.S. forces to be placed in reserve

more often and decrease the number of

U.S. casualties. The United States could

not end the Korean War nor could it

withdraw its troops from the peninsula,

but it could trim its losses and equalize

the risks that each soldier would have to

take.

The Turning Coin

Paradoxical though it may seem, rotation was both the main strength and the

chief weakness of the Eighth Army in

late 1952. As a bolster to morale, rotation played a vital and necessary role in

sustaining the ground forces through the

depressing and frustrating conditions

created by a deadlocked battle situation.

By rotating units in and out of the lines

at regular intervals, the monotony of routine patrolling and defensive warfare

was broken and a change of pace provided. But even more important was

the point system that promised a quick

return home to the individual as soon as

he had served his time at the front.

Before September 1951, a soldier in

Korea had to have a minimum of 6

months in a combat division or 12

months in a support unit to be eligible

for rotation. New criteria were drawn

up in August establishing the point system. For each month in the close combat

zone, a soldier received four points. For

service in the rear areas two points were

earned, and duty in the rest of the FEC

merited one point. In September the

requirements were 55 constructive

months service (CMS) for officers and

43 for enlisted men.1

1

 Under these standards, eleven months in the

close combat zone (11 x 4) would be enough to

make an enlisted man eligible for rotation.
350 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

As Army strength increased in the fall

of 1951 the criteria were lowered to 40

CMS for officers and 36 for enlisted men.

The officer standards were raised to 45

CMS in December to cope with an expected shortage of officer replacements

scheduled for early 1952.2

March 1952 witnessed an overhauling

of the rotation system. Effective 1 April,

four points were still awarded for a

month in the close combat zone, but only

three were given to the troops in the

divisional reserve, now called the intermediate combat zone. By June requirements stood at 37 CMS for officers and

36 CMS for enlisted men.3 Generally,

slightly less than a year in Korea in a

combat division would suffice to put a

man on the rotation list and it was small

wonder that the point score became the

chief topic of conversation among the

combat troops.4 There could be no

doubt of the value of this bright side of

the coin in maintaining the fighting

spirit of the Eighth Army during the

last year of the war.

But the reverse side disclosed some of

the disadvantages in adhering to the

practice rigidly. To supply the Far East

Command with the 20,000 to 30,000 replacements a month that were necessary

to meet rotational demands imposed a

severe strain on the Army's manpower

resources. As General Hull told Clark

in early October, drastic levies on the

zone of interior units and installations

were going to be necessary to meet the

FEC quotas during the coming months.

Personnel shortages in the European

Command, he went on, had already resulted and overseas tours in all other

theaters had been extended six months.5

To keep the point total at 36 for the

combat zone during the winter, Clark

had to transfer combat troops from Japan

and Okinawa to the Eighth Army and to

increase the point requirements for the

rear areas, first to 38, and later, to 40

points.6

To Clark's request for additional replacements to cover the rotational needs,

General Collins replied in December

that the Army's ability to furnish replacements was determined by the

budget, Army strength ceilings, and by

draft calls. The point system, he continued, was devised to establish priority of

individuals for rotation and not to set up

the rate at which the Army was supposed

to supply replacements. Collins, however, was able to offer some comfort, for

he informed Clark that the shipments

of replacements in January and February

would be well over 30,000 and this would

permit some of the November and December deficits to be made up.7

At the front, rotation also had an adverse effect upon combat efficiency. By

October 1952, most of the junior officers

with World War II experience had returned home as their tours expired and

their replacements usually had little or

no acquaintance with the battlefield.

Many of the troops sent over from the

United States lacked field training and

2

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Oct and Dec 51,

sec. I, Narrative, p. 10 and p. 13, respectively. 3

 (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, G-1

sec., p. 3. (2) Ibid., Jun 52, sec. I, Narrative,

p. 83. 4

 Memo, Watkins for Bendetsen, 28 Aug 52, no

sub, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Aug 52. It should

not be inferred that the service units at the rear

were uninterested in the point score, but there was

less at stake here—time not life.

5

 Msg, DA 920367, Hull to Clark, 7 Oct 52. 6

 (1) Msg, C 57617. Clark to Collins, 24 Oct 52,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, incls 1-89, incl

32. (2) Msg, C 58392, Clark to Collins, 6 Nov 52,

in same place, incl 33. 7

 Msg, DA 925905, CSUSA to Clark, 10 Dec 52.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 351

had to learn the hard way under combat

conditions. By the time the new men

became proficient soldiers, they had

amassed enough points to qualify them

for rotation and the process had to start

all over again. Proficiency standards

were extremely difficult to maintain and

the artillery and the technical services

were especially hard hit. General Van

Fleet complained that the artillery had

lost the ability to shoot quickly and accurately and blamed this on the rotation

program that had stripped the artillery

units of their veteran gunners.8

There were other unfortunate byproducts as well. In a defensive war

such as in Korea in 1952, strong fortifications in depth, with carefully laid out

fire patterns for supporting weapons,

well-planned mine fields, and barbed

wire entanglements to prevent or delay

enemy access to strongpoints or outposts

were required. The enemy had developed a high degree of skill in establishing his defensive lines and in providing

for their protection. In many instances,

enemy units defending the forward areas

had remained in the same sectors for

long periods and become thoroughly familiar with the terrain. Spurred by the

knowledge that they would stay in position for some time, they took every

possible step to increase the strength of

their defenses.

For the UNC troops, the opposite was

often true. Since they did not usually

man a given sector of the front for any

considerable length of time, the tendency was to lay as few mines and as little

barbed wire as possible so that the patrols would not have to worry about these

hazards. Terrain familiarization was difficult as the outfits constantly shifted in

and out of the line.

The enemy also used the terrain much

more adeptly. While UNC positions

were often located on the crest of hills

and ridges or on the forward slopes,

where they were more exposed to enemy

fire, the enemy used the reverse of slopes

for his sleeping and supply bunkers and

dug tunnels deep into the hills. When

the enemy built his trenches, they were

angled and parapeted with raised firing

positions; the UNC trenches, on the

other hand, too frequently were deep,

straight, and difficult to fire from. All

too often enemy soldiers could infiltrate

and sweep a long straight trench with

automatic weapons fire.9 The difference

between the enemy and UNC attitude

toward defense during this period was

similar to that between a homeowner

and an overnight guest at a hotel. The

enemy became well-acquainted with the

neighborhood and took every precaution

to protect his property, while the UNC

forces adopted the short-term, casual approach of the transient.

Facets of the Artillery War

With rotation as the carrot dangling

before his eyes, the individual soldier's

main concern was to stay alive until his

year of combat service expired. Neither

officers nor enlisted men were particularly interested in taking undue chances

under these conditions and an air of

caution arose. As the reluctance to jeopardize lives grew, the effort to substitute

firepower for manpower increased. In

8

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 68-69.

9

 FEC G-3 Staff Study, Sep 52, title: Defensive

Capabilities of Eighth Army, in UNC/FEC, Comd

Rpt, Sep 52, an. 4, pt. III, Paper 3.
352 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

October and November, UNC gunners

fired eight rounds of artillery and four

rounds of mortar fire for every enemy

round received. By December, although

the mortar ratio dipped to three to one,

the preponderance in artillery rounds

favored the UNC by nineteen to one.10

The attempt to bury the enemy under

tons of explosive hardware generated

some interesting experiments.

General Van Fleet was quite concerned over the Eighth Army's use of

artillery during the fall of 1952. After

conferring with his corps commanders

in September, he decided to alter the

ratio of 155-mm. guns to 8-inch howitzers. The Eighth Army had forty-four

8-inch howitzers and twenty-eight 155-

mm. guns in September and was in the

process of converting a battalion of 155-

mm. guns to 8-inch howitzers. Van Fleet

halted this conversion and ordered the

conversion of a 105-mm. howitzer battalion to 8-inch howitzers instead. When

the change-over was completed, the

Eighth Army would have forty-eight 8-

inch howitzers and thirty-six 155-mm.

guns. Van Fleet believed that this ratio

would provide his army with a better

balance in heavy artillery and allow it to

get maximum benefit from its superior

firepower.11

Once he had reorganized the heavy

artillery, Van Fleet determined to try

out his plan to concentrate heavy firepower against the enemy's artillery.

Choosing the Triangle Hill-Sniper

Ridge area in the U.S. IX Corps sector

as the locale for the test, Van Fleet attached the 1st Observation Battalion

and major elements of two 8-inch howitzer and two 155-mm. gun battalions

from the U.S. I and X Corps to the IX

Corps artillery. During the long and

difficult struggle for control of this hill

complex, Van Fleet wrote to Clark, each

time that the UNC forces had gained

the top, intense artillery and mortar fire

had made retention of the crest too expensive. When the enemy forces had

moved onto the heights, the UNC artillery had forced them to withdraw. The

only way to break this sequence, Van

Fleet went on, was to destroy the enemy

artillery. Then, the ROK 2d Division

could seize and hold on to the hardcontested hill mass.12

Clark was willing to permit Van

Fleet's counterbattery program to proceed and to countenance the extra expenditure of ammunition for a five-day

period, but he did not want the ROK

2d Division to renew the battle for Triangle until he was sure the results would

be commensurate with the risks. If excessive casualties or abnormal ammunition outlays were going to be required

to keep Triangle, Clark was opposed to

the move.13

Using aerial photography and sound,

flash and radar plots, supplemented by

shelling reports, the IX Corps artillery

10

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 1, gives the following figures:

11

 Ibid., Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp.

61-65.

12

 Ltr, Van Fleet to Clark, 3 Nov 52, no sub, in

FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp. 13

 Msg, C 58517, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 8

Nov 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files,

Nov 58.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 353

staff compiled a target list of enemy

weapon locations. On 3 November the

experiment began as the greater part of

three 8-inch howitzer and three 155-mm.

gun battalions fired single guns and salvos at the Communist gun positions.

During the next week the heavy artillery

shot close to 20,000 rounds in an effort

to eliminate the enemy's artillery in the

vicinity of Sniper Ridge and Triangle

Hill. But the success was only limited.

Artillery observers estimated that it took

approximately 50 rounds of accurate fire

to achieve destruction of an enemy artillery piece because of the Communist's

skillful use of caves, tunnels, and heavy

overhead protection. During the test

period over 250 enemy gun emplacements were damaged or destroyed, but

only 39 artillery and 19 antiaircraft

pieces were put out of action. The Communist artillery was not silenced and the

battle for the hills continued.14

General Clark was not averse to the

continuance of a counterbattery program, but he told Van Fleet on 10 November that it would have to be carried

on within the normal ammunition allocations assigned to the Eighth Army—at

least, until the over-all supply of heavy

artillery shells increased.15

Better success attended a second experiment conducted in September and

October on the IX Corps' front. The

Fifth Air Force commander, General

Barcus, requested a flak-suppression effort by Eighth Army artillery units in

conjunction with close support strikes by

his fighter-bombers. He believed that

the use of artillery against enemy antiaircraft artillery weapons before and

during the strikes would help cut down

Fifth Air Force plane losses to AAA fire.

Van Fleet approved a thirty-day test period that began on 25 September. As

the fighter-bombers approached the target in the IX Corps sector, the artillery

fired proximity fuze shells at the known

enemy AAA positions in the area. When

the planes closed on the target, the artillery switched to quick-fuze ammunition

and continued to fire until the air attack

was over. At the conclusion of the experiment on 25 October the Fifth Air

Force reported only 1 plane had been

lost and 13 had been damaged by enemy

antiaircraft fire during the test. A total

of 1,816 sorties had been flown and, according to statistics based on previous

experience, the losses should have

been between 4 and 5 planes destroyed

and about 64 damaged. No Fifth Air

Force plane had been hit by IX Corps

artillery fire during the test. In view of

the favorable outcome of the experiment

under static ground front conditions,

Barcus and Van Fleet instructed their

units to make the flak-suppression program standard operating procedure in

the future.16

The heavy expenditure of ammunition during the October fighting stimulated a suggestion from Under Secretary

of the Army Johnson in the latter part

of the month. Impressed by the magnitude of the task of providing adequate

105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzer ammu- 14

 Report of Counter Battery Destruction Program IX Corps Artillery, 3-10 November 1952, in

Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, bk. 8: Artillery, tab 2. 15

 (1) Ltr, Clark to Van Fleet, 10 Nov 52, no sub.

(2) Ltr, Van Fleet to Clark, 15 Nov 52, no sub.

Both in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.

16

 (1) Ltr, Fifth AF to CG Eighth Army, 11 Nov

52, sub: Results of Thirty Day Flak Suppression

Experiment ... (2) Ltr, Eighth Army to CG

U.S. I Corps et al., 13 Nov 52, sub: Artillery Fire

During Air Strikes. Both in Hq Eighth Army,

Comd Rpt, Nov 52, bk. 8: Artillery, tab 2.
354 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

nition for the Eighth Army, Johnson

requested General Collins to investigate

the feasibility of substituting mortar fire

for artillery fire whenever possible. Not

only were mortar shells easier to produce

and transport, Johnson pointed out, but,

he claimed, they also were causing the

bulk of the casualties in Korea.17

When Collins passed Johnson's proposal on to the Army Field Forces, they

made a quick rebuttal. While granting

that two more 81-mm. mortars might

profitably be added to each infantry

battalion, they stated that both artillery

and mortars were designed for particular missions. To use mortars, which were

meant for close-in support, to replace

artillery, which handled the longerrange tasks, would result in an over-all

loss of firepower and battlefield effectiveness. The Field Forces staff doubted that

the mortars were producing more casualties than artillery fire, for the statements

of prisoners of war indicated just the

opposite.18

The Under Secretary's concern over

the slow progress of ammunition production was reflected in Secretary of Defense Lovett's message to Clark on 21

November. Noting that the problem had

been a continuing one for two years

despite large appropriations and attempts to expedite the program, Mr.

Lovett informed Clark that he would

use all his powers to insure that the

shortages did not affect the U.S. forces

in combat. He had already ordered a

maximum effort to move the necessary

stocks to meet FEC needs, including diversion of shipments for other theaters

if it proved necessary. To help him

correct deficiencies in the United States,

Lovett asked Clark to send a complete

appraisal of the UNC ammunition situation and its effects.19

In his reply two days later, Clark maintained that the currently authorized

ninety-day level of supply for the FEC,

at the Department of the Army approved

day-of-supply rates for ammunition, was

quite adequate.20 The trouble, Clark

went on, was that many of the items

were below the ninety-day level and that

the shipments scheduled for the remainder of the year would not make up the

deficits. Since a high rate of artillery

fire resulted in lower friendly casualties,

he deplored the need to reduce the allocations of 155-mm. howitzer ammunition

from 15 to 9.4 rounds per day. The

necessity to watch and hoard ammunition had also curtailed the ability of his

command to retain the initiative by

launching limited objective attacks,

Clark continued, and worse than that,

made the U.N. Command particularly

vulnerable to critical shortages in the

event of a general offensive by the Communists. Under the circumstances, he

concluded, the only prudent solution was

to increase ammunition production as

soon as possible to the point where the

FEC could be supported at the authorized Department of the Army rate.21

Secretary Lovett promised Clark that

the Army would deal with the shortages

17

 Memo, Under Secy Army Johnson for CofS, 23

Oct 52, sub: Employment of Mortar vs. Artillery

in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 103. 18

 AFF Staff Study, 21 Nov 52, title: Employment

of Mortars vs. Artillery in Korea, in G-3 091

Korea, 103/2.

19

 Msg, DEF 924436, Lovett to Clark, 21 Nov 52. 20

 If the day-of-supply rate was 50 rounds for a

particular caliber gun, the number of guns in the

FEC of that caliber would be multiplied by 50 and

then that total would be multiplied by 90 for

ninety days of supply. 21

 Msg, C 59373, Clark to Lovett, 23 Nov 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, incls 1-89, incl 67.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 355

COLLECTION POINT FOR SALVAGED CARTRIDGE SHELLS

in ammunition as though the United

States were under full production mobilization and that overriding priorities

would be granted as needed. One way

in which the FEC could help, Mr. Lovett

said, would be in returning brass cartridge cases from expended 105-mm.

rounds, since this had become a chokepoint in production. Clark immediately

asked Van Fleet to aim as close as

possible at a 100-percent return of reusable cartridge cases. "While we are

still a long ways from being 'out of the

woods,' " he told Van Fleet, "I am convinced that our repeated requests for

increased supply have finally struck

home and that the ammunition supply

road ahead will be considerably

smoother."22 As the appropriations

voted in 1951 for ammunition production expansion finally began to bear fruit

in late 1952 and early 1953, the prospects

for some relief in the ammunition situation would become much brighter.

In the meantime, the Far East Command and Eighth Army resorted to substitutions to tide themselves over the

period of shortages. When the supply of

81-mm. mortar shells became low in

January 1953, the Eighth Army units on

the line were directed to fire 4.2-inch

mortars or to use artillery fire until thea22

 Msg, C 59528, Clark to Van Fleet, 1 Dec 52,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, inch 1-89, incl

68.
356 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ter stocks could be replenished.23 To

lessen the drain on 155-mm. howitzer

ammunition, Clark again sought to convert two of his battalions to 240-mm.

battalions, since there supposedly was

sufficient ammunition of this caliber

available to sustain two battalions at a

rate of fifteen rounds per day. The Department of the Army informed him

that equipment and spare parts would

arrive in March.24

As the ammunition situation began to

improve in early 1953, General Van

Fleet returned to the United States to

retire. In March and April he appeared

several times before Congressional committees for questioning on conditions in

Korea. His statements that he had been

handicapped during his twenty-two

months of command by shortages of ammunition brought the subject out into

the open and the Army had to defend

publicly its handling of the problem.25

General Collins quickly asked Clark

to prepare a statement and on 16 March

the Far East commander complied. His

assessment of the situation was as follows:

There has been no shortage of small arms

ammunition in the theater; stocks of other

ammunition as indicated below have been

less than they should have been. However, such shortages were mostly in theater stocks

and the pipeline and not in forward area

combat units. As far as I have been able to

determine Eighth Army has never been

'out' of ammunition nor denied authority

to shoot ammunition in adequate quanti- ties when required by the tactical situation. Insofar as can be determined, no unit in

Korea was refused ammunition for an

essential mission.

While Eighth Army was never 'out' of

ammunition the shortage limited the com- bat potential of theater forces. The con- tinued increase in enemy artillery activity

with a corresponding increase in friendly

casualties required an increase in Eighth

Army's counterbattery effort which in- cluded the employment of the Corps and

Division artillery 155mm Howitzer material

and therefore necessitated the expenditure

of a critical type of artillery ammunition. In addition, the attack of targets character- istically dug-in at considerable depths

required increased expenditures to accom- plish their neutralization or destruction. With the knowledge of shortages of critical

types of ammunition and their limited pro- duction, the amount of ammunition avail- able for day to day operation was

necessarily restricted and care was taken to

hold down expenditure whenever possible

without denying their use when necessary. Had the enemy launched and sustained an

all-out offensive during the periods of am- munition shortage, theater stocks would

have been reduced dangerously low since

this type of operation always results in the

expenditure of 3 or 4 times the DA day of

supply of ammunition and therefore would

have placed us in an unfavorable position

in our capability of striking back hard at

the most opportune time and place.

He listed the types that had been in

short supply at various times and then

went on to state that he considered the

present levels of ammunition in the theater to be adequate for maintaining current operations and to counter a general

Communist offensive if it should materialize, provided "on-hand assets are

maintained at the 90-day level'' 26

23

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 126. 24

 (1) Msg, CX 59611, CINCFE to DA, 3 Dec 52,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incl

46. (2) Msg, DA 925751, G-3 to CINCFE, 7 Dec 52.

The 159th Field Artillery Battalion and the 213th

Field Artillery Battalion were converted to 240-

mm. battalions on 20 March 1953. 25

 For a detailed account of the matter, see U.S.

Senate Committee on Armed Services, 83d Congress, 1st session, Hearings on Ammunition Supplies

in the Far East.

26

 Msg, C 61525, Clark to Collins, 16 Mar 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1-72, incl 37.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 357

The complexities of the ammunition

story made the accuracy of the shortage charges extremely difficult to evaluate. But it was doubtful whether more

ammunition in the critical categories

would have substantially influenced the

battle situation in the last two years of

the war, for the restrictions on offensive

operations were not dependent upon the

ammunition supply, but rather upon the

political and military objectives of

the United States and its U.N. allies at

the time. As long as they preferred to

settle the war at the conference table and

to delimit the Korean commitment, even

full stocks of ammunition could have

made no real difference in the outcome.

The Communist disregard for the loss of

lives involved in protracting the war argued that a few thousand more casualties

alone would not have impelled them

more quickly toward a settlement of the

dispute.

The Bulwark Grows

As already related, one way in which

the United States could limit the commitment in Korea was by building up

the ROK fighting forces. Shortly after

President Truman approved the expansion of the ROK Army to 12 divisions in

late October, the ROK 12th and 15th

Divisions were activated, along with 6

separate regiments. The Eighth Army

estimated that the 12th Division and 3

separate regiments would be operationally ready by the end of December and

the 15th Division and the other 3 regiments would be prepared for action a

month later.27

Thus as early as November, the ROK

ground forces had a strength ceiling of

463,000 men.28 But a twelve-division

army was only a stopgap measure, in

Clark's opinion, and he submitted a plan

and schedule on 1 November for augmenting the total to 20 divisions by

August 1953. The number of ROK

Army Corps would be increased from

2 to 6 to handle the additional divisions.

With a 16-week training period set up

for the new divisions, the last one activated would be ready for combat before

the close of 1953. As the ROK units were

organized, equipped, and trained, Clark

informed Collins, 1 U.S. or other U.N.

division could be placed in reserve for

each 2 new divisions prepared. By

May 1953, he could begin to release the

U.S. divisions—one at a time—for employment elsewhere. If all went well, up

to 4 U.S. divisions and 2 corps headquarters could be redeployed by mid-1954.

ROK Army expansion, Clark cautioned, also had its negative side. The

Military Advisory Group would have to

be enlarged to carry the increased load

and over five hundred officers and enlisted men would have to come from

outside the theater. If U.S. forces were

withdrawn from the line and eventually

from Korea, pressure from other UNC

countries to decrease their commitments

27

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 44-46.

28

 Msg, CX 58179, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,

1 Nov 52, in FEC G-3 320.2 Strength No. 1, gives

the following breakdown:
358 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

could also be expected. And as ROK

troops began to assume more responsibility for manning the front lines, the

United States would have to turn over

more and more matériel and equipment

to them and this could never be recovered regardless of the outcome of the

war. Much of this would come from the

FEC's strategic reserve and would affect

the growth of the Japanese defense

forces. If the ROK Army were expanded

to double its present size, its combat efficiency would suffer as cadres were taken

from the present units, Clark continued.

To counter this watering-down, he recommended that the balance of the program be implemented as U.S. logistical

capabilities permitted, with the emphasis being laid on the development of

sound forces as well as U.S. personnel

savings.29

In Washington, the Army G-3 approved Clark's note of caution. ROK

manpower, General Eddleman pointed

out, was not a limiting factor, but the

scarcity of competent leaders from noncommissioned officers up to the corps

level would restrict the effectiveness of

the newly formed units. Since the

United States would have to provide the

bulk of the logistic support, including

initial equipment, the Mutual Defense

Assistance Program and NATO augmentation would both incur delay. Eddleman urged that Clark's moderate

approach to the ROK Army expansion

be adopted and that the problem of

budgeting the cost of the program—

which could not be absorbed by the U.S.

Army under present limitations—be

taken up by the Joint Staff.30

Secretary of the Army Pace and General Collins agreed that the time had

come to consider the ultimate goal for

ROK forces. On 17 November Pace

passed the matter on to Secretary Lovett,

as the implementation of the twentydivision program was beyond the purview of the Army. The broader aspects

of such an increase would involve the

over-all conduct of the war in Korea,

governmental relations with nations who

were recipients of Mutual Defense

funds, and the structure of the federal

budget, Pace declared, but the Army favored the establishment of a ROK capability to man the entire battle line as

quickly as possible.31

Although Mr. Lovett turned the problem over to the JCS early in December,

there was small chance that a decision

would be reached until the new administration took over in January. Both

President-elect Eisenhower and his designated Secretary of Defense, Charles

E. Wilson, were briefed in the interim

on the implication of raising a twentydivision ROK Army. General Collins

pointed out that 105-mm. and 155-mm.

howitzers and certain types of ammunition were the most critical items of

equipment and supply that would have

to be considered, but the main question 29

 Ltr, Clark to CofS, 1 Nov 52, sub: Expansion

in ROKA, in G-3 091 Korea, 77/2. Although Clark

did not mention comparative costs in maintaining

U.S. and ROK divisions, a study by the Eighth

Army in November estimated that the monthly pay

and rations for a U.S. division amounted to $6,104,-

164 as against $76,745 for a ROK division. See Hq

Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I, Narrative,

p. 55.

30

 (1) Summary Sheet, Eddleman for DCofS, 3

Nov 52, sub: Proposed Two Year Program ... .

in G-3 091 Korea, 75. (2) Memo, Eddleman for

CofS, 4 Nov 52, sub: Development of Wartime

ROK Army, in G-3 091 Korea, 73/3. 31

 Memo, Pace for Secy Defense, 17 Nov 52, sub:

Further Expansion of ROK Forces, in G-3 091

Korea, 76.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 359

CADETS OF THE KOREAN MILITARY ACADEMY ON PARADE

remained that of financing the program.

In the past, the Chief of Staff declared,

there had been no specific Congressional

authority for the Army's support of ROK

forces. There was, however, tacit approval; Congress had been informed and

had voted appropriations for the Army

to provide replacement of equipment

furnished the Republic of Korea. Collins felt that the expansion program

was feasible: if the current stalemate

continued and the enemy did not increase his forces appreciably; if a supplementary two billion dollars were

added to the Army budget for fiscal year

1954 and the cost of supporting twenty

divisions were budgeted far in advance;

and if estimated delays in the completion

of the NATO program and in the provision of normal artillery strength of

four battalions for all the ROKA divisions were accepted.32

32

 (1) Memo, Collins for Bradley, 26 Nov 52, no

sub, in G-3 091 Korea, 82. (2) Briefing for the Secy

Defense Designate by the CofS, ca. mid-Dec 52, in

G-3 337, sec. IV, 64.
360 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

As the Republicans under President

Eisenhower took over control of the government in January and began to weigh

the pros and cons of the ROKA expansion, events in Korea provided an additional impetus to their deliberations.

The ROK induction machine, still working in efficient fashion, had continued

to train replacements at a brisk pace.

By mid-January Clark had informed the

JCS that if the present induction rate

were maintained, all major ROKA units

would be overstrength by the end of the

month. It was basically the same problem as before; curtailment would interrupt the flow of trainees and entail a

loss of time if the operation were to be

resumed at a later date. Since cadres

and replacements for two more divisions

were now available, Clark recommended

approval of the activation of two divisions in January and the raising of the

strength ceiling to 460,000, exclusive of

KATUSA. If possible he would like to

have the entire ten-division augmentation approved in principle and theater

stocks expended in outfitting the eleventh and twelfth ROK divisions expeditiously replaced.33

While the decision was pending, the

JCS told Clark that he should proceed

under the assumption that favorable action would be taken in Washington.34

On 31 January Clark instructed Van

Fleet to go ahead with the formation of

the 20th and 21st ROK Divisions and

three days later official permission came

from the President for fourteen divisions

and six separate regiments. Including

KATUSA and marines, the new ceiling

would be 507,880. On 9 February Van

Fleet activated the two new divisions.35

The pattern for permitting the ROK

induction machine to generate pressure

for the formation of additional organized

units seemed likely to continue. Since

the Eisenhower administration favored

the increased use of indigenous forces in

order to lessen the eventual demands

on the United States, the chief problems in the future, as in the past, would

center upon the timing and the financing

of the expansion. In the meantime, the

ROK Army began to take on the proportions of a well-rounded force. By January, five of the ten original divisions had

been assigned organic artillery of three

105-mm. and one 155-mm. howitzer battalions, and the other five were being

supported as they entered the line by a

full complement of four ROK artillery

battalions. Seven ROK tank companies

were operational and each had twentytwo M36 medium tanks mounting 90-

mm. guns. The eighth and ninth tank

companies were expected to become operational in March and April.36

Although Clark and Van Fleet were in

favor of adding a second Korean Marine

regiment (less one battalion) and another 105-mm. howitzer battalion to provide a Marine force of 23,506 men, they

opposed further expansion. The small

ROK Navy did not have the personnel

or sea transport to support a larger Marine Corps, they maintained in February

1953, and there were no known or anticipated requirements for such a force. If

33

 Msg, CX 60941, Clark to JCS, 14 Jan 53, DAIN 226714. 34

 Msg, JCS 929141, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jan 53.

35

 (1) Msg, EX 40140, Clark to Van Fleet, 31 Jan

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, G-3 sec., pt.

III, tab 5. (2) Msg, JCS 930325, JCS to CINCFE, 3

Feb 53. (3) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53,

sec. I, Narrative, p. 45. 36

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Jan and Mar

53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 42-43 and p. 53, respectively.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 361

equipment were committed for developing more Marine units, they went on,

the ROK infantry division program

would be delayed.37 Clark also urged

that the ROK Air Force strength of

8,600 men and one F-51 fighter wing

be maintained. The JCS agreed in February that the ceiling should be 9,000

personnel rather than the 11,550 desired

by the ROK Government.38

The growing military strength of the

Republic of Korea was matched by its

mounting economic instability. As more

of its resources, both human and material, were devoted to the prosecution and

support of the war, inflation increased.

The large U.S. demands for advances of

ROK currency to sustain the UNC

forces were the main target of ROK

complaints on the shaky status of the

South Korean financial position, but as

already indicated, this was but one cause.

To help stabilize the Korean economy,

the United States went on making its

dollar payments during the winter. In

December, Clark paid the ROK Government over $8,500,000 for the won

advances of October and November,

bringing the total of payments to over

$74,000,000.39

Although the unofficial rate of exchange was over 20,000 won for one dollar, the ROK officials insisted upon

maintaining the old 6,000 to 1 rate in its

dealing with the U.N. Command. Negotiations between the ROK and UNC

in January 1953 found the former striving to gain a settlement of $87,000,000

for all advances up to 16 December 1952.

In the agreement reached in late February, the United States agreed to pay a

total of $85,800,000 for advances through

7 February, but secured ROK agreement

to a quarterly adjustment of rate of exchange that could more accurately reflect

the actual value of the ROK currency.40

The influx of American dollars, coupled

with a ROK currency conversion in February that forced the South Koreans to

turn in all their won for new whan at a

100 to 1 rate, was expected to ease the

crisis somewhat, at least for the time

being.41 But the indications grew as

spring approached that the ROK Government intended to push for increased

U.S. support of the South Korean war

effort to alleviate the internal economic

situation.42

Across the Sea of Japan, the efforts of

the United States to strengthen its bulwarks met with a different response. The

Japanese seemed content to hold their

defense forces at the four-division, 110,-

000 man level until the political climate

of opinion became favorable to a change

in the Constitution that would permit

armed forces to be raised legally. In the

meantime, the funds set aside for equipping the proposed ten-division Japanese

defense forces were held in abeyance,

pending the conclusion of a Japanese37

 (1) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, pp. 36-37.

(2) Msg, GX 2084 KGO, CG EUSAK to CG AFFE,

10 Feb 53 in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files,

Jan-Jun 53. (3) Msg, CX 61365, CINCFE to DA,

28 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls

1-88, incl 30. 38

 Msg, JCS 931029, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Feb 53. 39 Hq FEC, Press Release, 12 Dec 52.

40

 (1) Msg, CX 60997, CINCUNC to DA, 21 Jan

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67,

incl 56. (2) Msg, CX 61338, CINCUNC to DA, 25

Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls

1-88, incl 48. The payment was made to the

Korean Ambassador in Washington on 10 March.

41

 Msg, CX 61258, CINCUNC to DA, 17 Feb 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88, incl

51. 42

 Msg, AX 73181, CG KCOMZ to CINCUNC,

28 Mar 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls

1-72, incl 41. See Chapter XX, below.
362 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

U.S. bilateral agreement.43 By February

1953, the Department of Army estimated that only $350,000,000 of the

$528,600,000 allocated for Japan would

be expended by the end of the fiscal

year, because of the Japanese reluctance

to build up their forces further.44 Under

these circumstances, the lion's share of

the available equipment went to the

ROK and the imbalance between Japanese and ROK armed strength became

greater. The Japanese lack of enthusiasm only provided a stronger stimulus

for the growth of the military power of

the Republic of Korea.

The Reorganization of the

Far East Command

Since the winter of 1952-53 reflected

in many ways the eagerness of the United

States leaders in Washington and in the

Far East to conserve manpower at the

front, it was not surprising that retrenchments in the administrative and housekeeping functions in the rear should also

be considered. Shortly after Clark assumed command, he decided to make a

careful study of the command organization of the FEC.

The Koje-do crisis had demonstrated

the weakness of the Eighth Army commander's relationship with his rear areas

and one of the first steps that Clark had

taken was to establish a separate Korean

Communications Zone on 10 July 1952.

By relieving Van Fleet of concern over

his lines of communications, logistical

support, prisoners of war, and civil affairs, Clark hoped to give the Eighth

Army commander more time "to fight

the war without having to look over his

shoulder to keep tabs on what was happening in the rear areas."

 45

With headquarters at Taegu the Korean Communications Zone, under General Herren, extended over the southern

two-thirds of the Republic of Korea. Its

new responsibilities included the prisoner of war camps, supply movement

and stockpiling, maintenance of ports

and railroads, and co-ordination of relief

and reconstruction work insofar as was

possible under the divided authority existing between the UNC and other U.N.

agencies.46

As the separation of combat and service functions on the Korean peninsula

got under way, Clark decided to reorganize his Tokyo headquarters into a truly

joint command. Under MacArthur and

Ridgway, the Far East Command staff

had consisted almost entirely of Army

officers and enlisted men. Ridgway had

considered the possibility of setting up

a joint staff, but had not gotten around

to putting the plan in effect before his

departure.47

As noted in the previous discussion of

the channels of command, there was a

U.S. Army Forces, Far East, on paper,

in 1951, but it had no staff and was

not operational. (See Chart 1.) Instead

the Eighth Army operated on the

same level as the Naval Forces, Far East,

and the Far East Air Forces, despite

the fact that it was technically below

them in the chain of command. To

dispel any resentment that this ar43

 Incl to Memo, G-3 for JSPOG, ca. 10 Dec 52,

sub: U.S. Military Assistance to Japan, in FEC

G-3 322.01, Commanders and staffs. 44

 Msg, DA 931246, G-3 to CINCFE, 13 Feb 53.

45

 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 145-

46.

46

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 205-07. 47

 See USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in

the Korean Conflicts, 1 Nov 50-30 Jun 52, p. 72.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 363

rangement may have incurred among

Navy and Air Force commanders, Clark

decided to staff the Army Forces, Far

East headquarters, and place it on a

par with the top naval and air commanders. He would remain Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Far East,

as he had been before, to avoid the

necessity for putting another four-star

general senior to Van Fleet in the position. When Clark informed the JCS of

his intention on 20 August, he noted that

the Army Forces, Far East (AFFE) command would eventually replace the

Japan Logistical Command. This would

make possible the elimination of subordinate commands, such as the Northern,

Central, and Southwestern Commands as

well as the Headquarters and Service

Command in Tokyo.48

On 1 October the Japan Logistical

Command was discontinued and all of

its functions were transferred to AFFE.

At the same time the Northern Command of the Japan Logistical Command

was also abolished.49 Clark appointed

General Harrold as his deputy in command of AFFE, and staff sections from

the Far East Command were assigned

to perform similar functions in the new

organization. Later in the month, Clark

set up a manpower board to survey

the requirements of AFFE and the rest

of the joint FEC staff. He estimated

that the reorganization would take until

the end of the year and would release

initially over 1,100 military spaces for

reallocation in addition to saving a considerable number of U.S. and Japanese

civilian spaces.50

With the establishment of AFFE,

Clark proceeded to the second task of

making the Far East Command a joint

organization in the hope that if the other

services shared the top assignments and

the personnel burden, "it would increase

the effectiveness of the team play that

was so needed in Korea."

 51

 His first inclination was to assign the J-1 (Personnel) , J-3 (Operations), and J-5 (Civil

Affairs) slots to Army officers, the J-2

(Intelligence) position to an Air Force

officer, and the J-4 (Logistics) task to a

Navy officer.52 But when the Joint Staff

began its operation on 1 January 1953,

J-1, J-2, and J-3 were filled by the

Army and J-4 and J-5 were manned by

Navy officers. It was not until after the

armistice was signed that an Air Force

general took over the operations job.

Three deputy chiefs of staff, one from

each service, were set up under General

Hickey, the chief of staff, to provide additional triservice representation.53

(Chart 4)

Thus the FEC entered the last stages

of the war with an organization that

finally conformed to the concept of a

joint command. Whether the change

would have a real effect upon the conduct of a static war would be difficult to

determine, since the prospects for facing

48

 Msg, C 53964, Clark to JCS, 20 Aug 52, in UNC/

FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CINCUNC and CofS,

Supporting Docs, tab 3. 49

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, p. 3. Although

the Headquarters and Service Command was also

eliminated in early 1953, the Central and Southwestern Commands both endured to the end of

the war and beyond.

50

 Msg, C 57646, Clark to DA, 23 Oct 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, CINCUNC and

CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 45. 51

 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 133. 52

 Msg, C 54992, Clark to JCS, 11 Sep 52, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CINCUNC and

CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 1. 53

 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 133-

34.
CHART 4—FAR EAST COMMAND STAFF AND MAJOR COMMANDS ORGANIZATION, 
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 365

major challenges seemed remote. Nonetheless, the arrival of Navy and Air Force

officers to fill positions on the Joint Staff

meant that the Army could expect further personnel savings in this area. And

if the battlefield erupted in grandiose

fashion, General Clark's team might be

in better shape to organize its defenses

and prepare for the counterattack more

quickly.
CHAPTER XVII

Cold Front

After the bitter fighting of October

and early November 1952, the approach

of another winter witnessed a rapid decline in the scale of operations at the

front. The enemy retired into his deep

bunkers and caves to hibernate, and action settled down to the old routine of

raids, patrols, and small unit skirmishes.

Waiting patiently for a break in the recessed armistice negotiations, both sides

seemed content to watch each other

warily along the battle lines and to conserve their energy. The slackening of

operations permitted the enemy to replenish his supplies and to bring up

replacements, despite the efforts of the

UNC air forces to destroy Communist

depots and communications lines. But

the build-up appeared to be perfunctory

and not directed toward the resumption

of large-scale fighting. As the cold

weather set in, its influence dominated

the front.

The Demise of Military Victory

Despite the stalemate, General Clark

had not given up all hope of mounting a

large-scale operation against the enemy.

During the flare-up of activity in October, he had voiced his concern to the

Chief of Staff that the UNC failure to

achieve an armistice stemmed from the

lack of sufficient military pressure upon

the Communists. With the forces presently at his disposal, Clark told Collins,

positive aggressive action was not feasible, but he had developed an outline

plan of action that would compel the

enemy to seek or accept an armistice. If

the JCS would approve the outline plan,

he went on, the FEC staff could draw up

supporting plans.1

In mid-October, a task force of three

FEC officers arrived in Washington to

explain and defend Clark's proposal.

Basically it was a drive to the P'yongyang-Wonsan line in three phases, each

lasting about twenty days. It included

enveloping drives by ground forces, a

major amphibious assault, airborne action as opportunities developed, and air

and naval action against targets in China.

To expand the war would require an

accompanying augmentation of the FEC

forces and the tally was impressive.

Three U.S. or U.N. divisions (1 infantry,

1 airborne, and 1 Marine), 2 ROK divisions, 2 Chinese Nationalist divisions, 12

field artillery battalions, and 20 antiaircraft artillery battalions would be required in addition to those already in

the U.N. Command to sustain the offensive successfully.2

According to Clark's later account,

1

 Ltr, Clark to Collins, 9 Oct 52, no sub, in G-3

091 Korea, 8/56. 2

 G-3 Staff Study, ca. 21 Jan 53, title: Capability

of U.S. Army to Implement CINCUNC Operations

Plan 8-52, in G-3 381 Pacific, 4/4.
COLD FRONT 367

every subordinate commander in the

FEC "heartily endorsed this course of

action." With the possibility of a change

in the political administration in the

United States and the elevation of a military man to the leadership of the

country's affairs, the prospects of an additional effort to wind up the Korean

War did not seem to be far-fetched. As

Clark remarked later on, "I knew we

had to be ready with the plan if the turn

of events called for a more vigorous prosecution of the war.3

The military leaders of the FEC were

doomed to disappointment. Presidentelect Eisenhower arrived in Korea on 2

December with a large and distinguished

party, including the Secretary of Defense-designate, Charles E. Wilson,

General Bradley, and Admiral Radford.

He toured the front and visited President Rhee, talking with a great many

people on the scene, but never once did

he bring up the matter of seeking a

military victory in Korea. Speaking to a

press conference at Seoul on the last day

of the visit—5 December—the Presidentelect admitted that he had "no panaceas,

no tricks" for bringing the war to a

close. The most significant thing about

Eisenhower's visit, in Clark's opinion,

was that he, Clark, was given no opportunity to set forth the detailed estimate

of forces required and the plans formulated to increase the military pressure

upon the enemy. The conversations

with General Eisenhower clearly demonstrated to Clark that the new President would follow the course set by Mr.

Truman and seek an honorable peace.4

Thus died the last hope for a military

settlement to be won by the force of

UNC arms; it was evident that the

political leaders, whether they were

Democratic or Republican, intended to

negotiate an end to the conflict.

Winter Action

As long as the desire to negotiate was

not matched by a willingness to concede,

the future course of the war seemed

likely to be a repetition of what had

gone before. The enemy had taken

losses in October that had cut its estimated strength from 1,008,900 to 972,-

000 at the end of the month.5 But when

the fighting tapered off in November,

the enemy total began to climb slowly

once again.

Reports from the front indicated that

the Communists were digging in to stay.

Although it took from three to five

months to excavate their large caves,

they steadily hollowed out space for

squads and platoons in the bowels of

strategic hills. Here, protected from

UNC air and artillery as well as cold

weather, the enemy could comfortably

sit out the winter. Interrogation of prisoners revealed no knowledge of a general

offensive, and the disposition of enemy

forces along the front gave no indication

of other than a usual defensive alignment. On the immediate front there

were 7 Chinese armies with 166,000 men

and 2 North Korean corps of 49,700 soldiers on 1 November 1952; the latter

anchored the extreme eastern end of the

line. (See Map V.) Ten Chinese armies containing over 350,000 troops and

3

 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 81.

4

 Ibid., p. 233.

5

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 5. CCF strength declined from 732,300

to 705,200 and the North Korean Army dipped

from 266,000 to 257,000.
368 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

PRESIDENT-ELECT EISENHOWER AND GENERAL JENKINS NEAR CH'ORWON

4 North Korean corps with about 140,000

soldiers were in reserve positions where

they could either reinforce the front or

defend against possible amphibious landings by the UNC. Facing them were

eighteen UNC divisions and their supporting troops totaling about 350,000

men.6

As the ground operations fell off in

mid-November, Communist road traffic

mounted as the enemy strove to rebuild

his stocks. More enemy aircraft began

to appear over North Korea, but they

showed little sign of increasing aggressiveness. Of the 1,227 planes sighted

during the month, only 395 engaged

UNC aircraft with estimated enemy

losses of 21 destroyed, 4 probably destroyed, and 19 damaged.7

The enemy made one major relief in

November, moving the CCF 47th Army

into the Imjin River sector and the 39th

Army back into reserve. On the UNC

side, the U.S. 25th Division took over

the positions of the U.S. 7th Division

on 12 November and the ROK 9th Divi6

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I,

Narrative, Figure 2.

7

 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
COLD FRONT 369

ENTRANCE TO A COMMUNIST BUNKER

sion relieved the ROK 2d Division on

24 November; both of these changes

were routine as the U.S. IX Corps rotated its divisions on the line.

The IX Corps

The U.S. IX Corps had taken the

brunt of the Chinese attacks at White

Horse, Triangle Hill, and Jackson

Heights during October, but the pressure along the corps front eased after

mid-November. Only in the Sniper

Ridge sector north of Kumhwa did the

Chinese continue to demonstrate their

sensitivity to ROK possession of outposts

on the hill.

On 2 December an enemy platoon

probed the ROK 9th Division outposts

on Sniper Ridge and a second platoon

joined in the action. Intense fire from

artillery and mortars was exchanged for

a time, and then the Chinese advanced

and took over the crest. But the UNC

artillery concentrations soon made enemy possession of the newly won positions too costly. As the enemy withdrew,

the ROK forces returned to the outposts.

A brief respite followed, then a second

Chinese attack led to a hand grenade

duel. Once again the ROK defenders

fell back. On the next day two ROK

platoons carried on a seven-hour battle

with the enemy before regaining the

crest. During the ensuing ten days, the

Chinese launched 40 probes against

Sniper Ridge without success. It is interesting to note that of the 114 probes

reported along the corps front during

December, the Chinese directed 105

against the ROK 9th Division.8

The pattern held steadily through

January as the Chinese sent frequent

probes of up to three platoons in

strength against the Sniper Ridge outposts with no success. Outside the ROK

9th Division area, the Chinese were hard

to find. The IX Corps divisions sent out

2,668 night patrols during the month of

January and reported only 64 engagements initiated by these patrols.9

In February and March the corps dispatched over 2,500 patrols to raid, ambush, or reconnoiter and fewer than a

hundred made any contact with the enemy. All of March witnessed the capture

8

 U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, G-3 sec.,

pp. 13-14.

9

 U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, G-3 sec., pp.

11-12. It is quite possible that neither the UNC

nor the enemy patrols were searching too. intently

for the opposition during the cold winter nights.
370 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

of only one prisoner of war by a patrol.10

Neither side showed any inclination to

disturb the quiet state of affairs on the

central front and IX Corps was able to

effect two routine division reliefs—one

at the end of December when the ROK

2d Division moved into the U.S. 3d Division positions and the other a month

later when the U.S. 3d came back into

the line and permitted the U.S. 25th

Division to pull back into corps reserve

—without incident. (Map VI)

What was life like in the average infantry company during the last winter?

I Company, 35th Infantry Regiment,

25th Division, was a typical example.11

About six miles northeast of Ch'orwon,

the 3d Battalion of the regiment manned

main line of resistance positions, with

B Company, 1st Battalion, attached,

holding the left flank, I Company the

middle, and K Company the right flank

of the battalion front. I Company's positions extended 1,500 yards from the

broad floor of a valley to the crest of a

north-south ridge more than 100 meters

above the valley. Because of the wide

front, all three rifle platoons were stationed on the main line. This meant

that the company headquarters and mortar crews were the only force located on

the reverse slopes of the hilly portion of

the front and had to assume the counterattack role usually assigned to a support platoon.

Elements of the 130th Regiment, 44th

Division, CCF 15th Army, controlled the

higher terrain to the north of I Company

and enjoyed excellent observation of all

the company positions, especially those

located on the valley floor. In the hilly

area on the eastern end of the company

front, the Chinese positions were only

500 yards distant. As usual, the enemy

had constructed the bulk of his bunkers

and trenches on the reverse slopes and

carefully camouflaged the openings on

the forward slopes whence he fired his

weapons.

Since October 1952 1st Lt. Travis J.

Duerr had commanded the company and

he was one of the few officers in the unit

who had some combat experience. Under him were 5 officers, 174 enlisted men,

and 48 KATUSA's. One officer and 13

enlisted men were Negro, 10 were

Puerto Ricans, one was a native Irishman, and one a native Hawaiian.

Lieutenant Duerr distributed the

KATUSA personnel along the front line,

assigning each Korean to an American

"buddy." The "buddy" system enabled

the Americans to train and supervise

the Koreans in U.S. methods, care of

weapons, and at the same time to teach

his "buddy" some words of English. For

the most part, the language barrier prevented the two from becoming close

friends and, in I Company, many Americans adopted a paternalistic or patronizing attitude toward their "buddies."

The company had 39 bunkers placed

at intervals across the front; 34 contained

automatic weapons and 5 were used as

living quarters only. Many of the fighting bunkers were divided into fighting

and living quarters housing from two to

seven men. Eighty percent of each

bunker was underground and could be

entered from the trenches which linked

the entire front in this sector. Thick

logs and sandbags covered by a burster

layer of loose sand, stones, and sticks

10

 U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Feb and Mar 53, G-3, Sec. pp. 7-8 and p. 7, respectively. 11

 The following account of I Company is based

upon the study by 2d Lt. Joseph J. Comps, Eighth

Army Historical Unit, A Rifle Company in Winter Defensive Positions. MS in OCMH files.

COLD FRONT 371

PART OF THE BUNKER AREA OF THE 25TH U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION

protected the bunker roofs from artillery and mortar hits. In some instances

the bunkers had been originally located

close to the topographical crests of the

hills rather than on the military crests

and had not been moved. In others the

steep, uneven nature of the terrain permitted the automatic weapons sited in

these bunkers only limited fields of grazing fire.

Since I Company defended an extended front, it had additional automatic

weapons on hand to cover the enemy

approach routes. One .50-caliber, six

.30-caliber heavy, and twelve .30-caliber

light machine guns were backed by fifteen automatic rifles in the bunkers.

Three 57-mm. recoilless rifles, three 3.5-

inch rocket launchers, and two M2 flame

throwers were located in open emplacements. The .50-caliber machine gun,

five of the heavy .30's, and six of the

light .30's, sited to provide interlocking

bands of fire, were sector weapons and

I Company would leave them in place

when it left the area. The added

strength in automatic weapons permitted Lieutenant Duerr to throw "a sheet

of steel" at the enemy when he attacked.

Three tanks from the regimental tank

company with firing positions on the

ridge line and on the reverse slopes provided antitank defense from approximately the center of the company front.

The tanks were M4's with 76-mm. rifles.

Besides the 60-mm. company mortars,
372 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the 60-mm. mortars of L Company, the

81-mm. mortars of M Company, 4.2-

inch mortars of the 27th Infantry Regiment, and the 105-mm. howitzers of the

64th Artillery Battalion could be called

upon for direct support.

From one to four double aprons of

barbed wire guarded the approaches to

I Company's positions, and Duerr placed

bands of triple concertina wire in front

of and behind the aprons for increased

protection. Four combat outposts

lay athwart the Chinese approach trails

along the company front. Each consisted

of four two-man foxholes arranged in a

diamond shape with the point toward

the north. Concertina, double aprons of

barbed wire, mines, and trip flares surrounded the combat outposts, which

were manned only at night by 3 relief

teams, of 1 noncommissioned officer, 2

riflemen, and 1 automatic rifle crew of

2 men in each outpost. The outposts

stayed in place if they were attacked and

fought until ordered to pull back.

Because most of the riflemen in the

company were inexperienced, they carried M1 rifles rather than carbines.

Lieutenant Duerr felt that new men unaccustomed to fire fights often had "a

tendency, often a fatal tendency, to fire

all their ammunition in the first two or

three minutes of a firefight." Since the

M1 ammunition clips held fewer cartridges than the carbine clips, they could

not be expended so rapidly. Each platoon had two snipers with rifles equipped

with telescopic sights. All weapons were

test fired daily, and the riflemen stripped

and cleaned their weapons every day to

make sure they would be ready to meet

an enemy attack.

Next to his weapons, the most important item to the infantry soldier was his

armored vest. In I Company, the majority preferred the Marine-type vest,

which fitted more comfortably and appeared to provide more protection to the

wearer. The Marine vest was sleeveless,

had nylon padding around the upper

chest and shoulders, and had plates of

Fiberglass bonded with resin that covered

the lower chest, back, and abdomen.

The Army vest relied upon layers of

basket-weave nylon to take the impact

of shell fragments. Neither vest could

stop a bullet at close range, but both

could help decrease the number of casualties caused by mortar and artillery

fire and hand grenade fragments. There

was general agreement in I Company

that the vests had saved the lives of the

men on the lines on many occasions.

The men of I Company also liked the

mountain sleeping bag and the insulated

rubber combat boot called the "Mickey

Mouse." Both afforded excellent protection against the Korean winter

weather.

Nightly, the three rifle companies of

the 3d Battalion, 35th Infantry, sent out

patrols. Col. Autrey J. Maroun, the regimental commander, and his staff

planned the patrols one day in advance.

They set up the sector, route, objective,

mission, strength, time of departure, and

equipment to be carried if anything unusual were to be taken along on the

patrol. Lt. Col Victor G. Conley, the

3d Battalion commander, frequently

briefed the patrol leader, who had been

selected by Lieutenant Duerr, on important missions. One company of the battalion furnished the combat patrol on a

rotational basis and the other two provided screening patrols. In some cases,

the combat patrol probed 1,000 or more

yards in front of the main line of resist-
COLD FRONT 373

MARINE PFC. PULLS PIECE OF SHRAPNEL FROM HIS ARMORED VEST

ance while the screening patrols rarely

went more than 500 yards.

No soldier went on a patrol until he

had been on the line for at least ten

days; then, under average conditions he

could expect patrol duty once every

seven to ten days. The rest of the time

he would serve as a guard in the

trenches, man a fighting bunker or combat outpost at night, hack trenches in

the frozen ground, or erect tactical wire

along the slopes. Since there was a 50-

percent alert, two men shared one sleeping bag to discourage any shirking of

night chores. Eighty percent of the company's work was accomplished at night.

Living conditions depended upon

each man's own ingenuity. Since few of

the bunkers' living quarters exceeded

five feet by eight feet in size, double

and triple bunks constructed out of logs,

steel pickets, and telephone wire were

the norm. Plastic bags used for packing

batteries served as windows, straw matting covered the floor, and candles shed

their pale light in the bunkers at night.

Oil stoves provided heat in most cases,

but charcoal and wood stoves sunk into

the earth to keep the ground warm were

also used.

Breakfast and dinner were hot meals

served in the two mess areas, while the

noon meal consisted of C-rations. The

company jeep carried the hot food in

marmite cans from the kitchen to the

mess area. Since I Company had twenty
374 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Korean Service Corps personnel assigned

to it, the latter performed all kitchen

police (KP) duties.

To insure cleanliness, each man had

to shower at least once every five days.

By groups the soldiers rode to the battalion shower point and got a complete

change of clean clothes after the shower.

Every man was required to change his

socks daily to guard against trench foot;

in addition, the company aidmen inspected the feet of all members of the

unit each day. The aidmen also sprayed

the bunkers with disinfectant once a

month and spread rat poison to control

the rodent problem.

Although the biggest morale booster

among I Company troops was the rotation system, there were several other

programs to provide the men with a

change of pace at the local level. A

warm-up bunker behind the lines served

as a day room for reading, writing letters, washing clothes, and getting a haircut. Normally a man could spend several

hours in the warm-up bunker every three

or four days. Ten men per day left for

the Regimental Service Company area

to the rear for a 24-hour rest period.

During a tour of duty with I Company,

every man could generally count on one

5-day rest and recuperation (R and R)

leave in Japan being granted. These

privileges helped to make the waiting

for rotation home a little easier.

When an I Company soldier approached the magical mark of thirty-six

points which qualified him for rotation,

he usually stopped going on combat patrols. There were two reasons for this:

first, consideration for the soldier whose

time was "getting short"; and second,

consideration for the other men in the

patrol, since the high-point man tended

to become cautious and less dependable

in combat.

Considering that each company rotated its platoons on the line, that each

battalion rotated its companies, and so

on right up to the corps level, the chances

for an individual to survive during the

period of comparative inaction on the

battlefield were fairly good. This prospect could not fail to have a favorable

effect upon most of the combat troops

of the Eighth Army.

The limited nature of the war and the

static conditions at the front had an unfavorable side as well. The absence of

enemy air operations imparted a false

sense of security that might well have

been disastrous had the Communists

mounted a large-scale air sweep of the

battlefield and the supply lines and centers to the rear. Lulled by the lack of

enemy air activity over South Korea, the

troops tended to become careless in their

use of camouflage and in their massing

of supplies and equipment at the major

ports and depots. Fortunately, the Communists did not exploit this weakness,

but the possibility always existed of a

swift and bitter lesson in the advantages

of dispersion and concealment.

Another mixed blessing was the presence of the Korean Service Corps. In the

process of relieving the combat troops of

many of the distasteful tasks of soldiering, the KSC had a spoiling and softening effect upon the men in the same

fashion that the provision of Italian and

Polish displaced persons and prisoners

of war had had upon U.S. units in Europe during World War II. At another

time there might not be any servants

available to perform the unpleasant

chores.

A third by-product of the stationary
COLD FRONT 375

KOREAN SERVICE TROOPS CARRYING INSULATED CONTAINERS OF HOT FOOD to

U.S. troops.

front was the quantity of possessions that

the average unit and individual began to

collect after a period in the combat zone.

Extra equipment and clothing could

easily be kept on hand even though they

went far beyond the amounts called for

in the tables of organization and equipment. As long as mobility was not essential, the surplus might not prove

detrimental. But the necessity to shift

a unit quickly to meet an enemy threat

demonstrated the disadvantages of having too much. During the Triangle Hill

battle, one 7th Division artillery battalion took three days to move all its unit

and personal impedimenta from the

Ch'orwon sector to the Kumhwa area.

The loss of mobility indicated that

front-line inspections and inventories of

unit and individual equipment should

have been held frequently to restrain

unwarranted accumulations.

X Corps, ROK I and II Corps

Only one important encounter with

the enemy in the U.S. X Corps sector

had taken place during November. In

the Heartbreak Ridge area, on Hill 851,

the 2d Battalion, 160th Infantry Regi-
376 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ment, U.S. 40th Division, manned the

Eighth Army lines. The terrain north

of the 2d Battalion's defensive positions

was held by the 14th Regiment, 1st Division, N.K. III Corps. In the opening

days of November the North Korean

artillery and mortar units devoted increasing attention to the Hill 851 area,

and intelligence information gleaned

from a deserter and from papers taken

from a dead North Korean indicated

that the enemy intended to attack the

2d Battalion's positions. (Map VII)

Lt. Col. Robert H. Pell was the commanding officer of the battalion and had

deployed his own E and F Companies

and attached C and A Companies from

west to east along the battalion front.

The 143d Field Artillery Battalion, one

platoon of 4.2-mm. mortars, H Company's 81-mm. mortars, and one platoon

from the 140th AAA Battalion provided

direct fire support to the 2d Battalion.

G Company and attached B Company,

1st Battalion, were in reinforcing positions south of Hill 851.

On 3 November the enemy artillery

and mortar fire became intense. Approximately 4,500 rounds were hurled

at the 2d Battalion during the night.

At 2030 hours a reinforced battalion

from the N.K. 14th Regiment attacked from the north in a general

assault along the 2d Battalion front.12

Proceeding along the ridge which ran

north and south and up the draws that

led to the 2d Battalion's positions, the

North Koreans closed and made slight

penetrations in the E, F, and C Company sectors. Based on later evidence

from POW interrogations, the enemy

apparently intended to seize, hold, and

reinforce Hill 851, then strike south

against Hill 930.

The North Korean attack failed as the

four front-line companies threw back the

enemy assault without calling for reinforcements. Direct fire from the supporting units helped to disrupt and

decimate the North Korean ranks.

When the enemy broke contact four

hours later, he had suffered 140 counted

casualties and 7 prisoners of war had

fallen into the 2d Battalion's hands. The

160th Regiment had taken 73 casualties,

including 19 dead, in the fight.

After a relatively quiet interval of patrols during the rest of November and

most of December, the Communists

chose Christmas Day to make their next

serious attack. On Hill 812, five miles

north of the Punchbowl, K Company,

179th Infantry Regiment, U.S. 45th Division, manned the outpost positions on

the northern slopes of the hill. Early on

Christmas morning the North Korean

guns and mortars opened up and sent

about 250 rounds on the K Company

positions. During the bombardment, a

reinforced company from the N.K. 45th

Division advanced from Luke the Gook's

Castle, a rocky hill nearby, and overran

the forward positions defended by K

Company. Capt. Andrew J. Gatsis, the

company commander, called for artillery

and mortar defensive fires.13 Tanks from

the 179th Tank Company joined with

the artillery and mortar to halt the enemy advance.

Captain Gatsis then sent the second

platoon, under 2d Lt. Russell J. Mc12

 The account of the attack upon the 2d Battalion is based on: 160th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and

Bn Jnls, Nov 52.

13

 The account of the Hill 812 action is based

upon: (1) 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Jnls,

Dec 52; (2) 45th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, bk.

VII.

COLD FRONT 377

Cann, to counterattack. McCann's platoon closed with the North Koreans and

pushed them back. In the hand-to-hand

fighting in the trenches, Lieutenant McCann was killed. Col. Jefferson J. Irvin,

the regimental commander, approved

the attachment of A Company to K Company, and L Company was also on hand

to reinforce K Company's positions, if

necessary. During the early morning

hours, the North Koreans sent three platoon-sized attacks and over 2,000 rounds

of mixed mortar and artillery fire against

the K Company defenders, but failed to

dislodge Captain Gatsis and his men.

The company suffered 25 casualties in

the holiday fighting, including 5 dead,

while the enemy incurred an estimated

36 casualties.

On 27 December the newly organized

ROK 12th Division began to take over

the 45th Division's sector and the relief

was completed on 30 December.14

The ROK 12th Division received its

baptism of fire some two weeks later

when a North Korean battalion launched

a surprise attack against outpost positions on Hill 854, seven miles northeast

of the Punchbowl. Three enemy companies advanced against elements of the

51st Regiment and made some progress

on the left flank. Pushed back by a

counterattack, the North Koreans tried

once more, then withdrew. Over 19,000

rounds of UNC artillery, mortar, and

tank fire were hurled into the enemy

zone of attack and the ROK units reported that over 200 casualties were

suffered by the North Koreans.15

In early February the North Koreans

returned to Hill 812 again. On the night

of 2 February, the 37th Regiment of the

ROK 12th Division reported enemy

troops concentrating for an attack. Intense artillery fire poured into the assembly area, but a North Korean battalion pushed on toward the hill. Within

fifty yards of the ROK positions, a savage hand grenade battle broke out and

lasted until a reinforcing ROK company

turned the tide. The North Koreans

used close to 7,000 rounds of mixed explosive ammunition in this heaviest action of the month and suffered over a

hundred estimated casualties. They received over twice as many rounds from

the UNC artillery.16

During the remainder of February

and the following month, operations in

X Corps sector were more or less routine. Patrols were sent out regularly,

but contacts with the enemy were on a

small scale and no sizable attacks took

place.17

The North Korean forces had meanwhile been more active on the ROK I

Corps front along the east coast of Korea. The ROK main line of resistance

positions rested on Anchor Hill (Hill

351), less then four miles south of Kosong. On 9 November, two North Korean battalions struck Anchor Hill and

pushed the ROK 5th Division defenders

off the crest. It was only after two counterattacks marked by hard close fighting

and backed by intense artillery and mortar support that the ROK troops were

able to eject the enemy and restore

their positions. At the same time, further to the south, the North Koreans

14

 U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, p. 7. 15

 U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, p. 6.

16

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 36. 17

 There was one major relief during the first

three months of 1953. The U.S. 45th Division returned to the line without incident and assumed

responsibility for the positions occupied by the

U.S. 40th Division.
378 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

dispatched platoon-sized groups to assault Hills 268 and 345, less than two

miles south of Anchor Hill. On the

former they won a brief foothold but

were driven off on 10 November. Close

defensive fires dispersed the enemy attack force as it approached Hill 345.

Nothing daunted, the North Koreans

hit both hills again on 11 November

with a larger force and engaged the

ROK troops for an hour and a half

before they withdrew.18

The failure of this effort marked the

beginning of a period of comparative

calm on the ROK I Corps front. Active

patrolling and small skirmishes occurred

frequently, but the over-all situation was

not affected. In early January patrols

from the ROK 5th Division located a

tunnel entrance and ventilating shaft

near Anchor Hill, where the enemy was

digging his way close to the ROK positions. After the enemy's work detail

entered the tunnel on 7 January, a ROK

patrol blew up the entrance and sealed

the shaft with explosives. Within a few

days the enemy had reopened the entrance, so the South Koreans called for

an air strike and closed it once again.19

Little unusual activity marked the

ROK I Corps sector until the end of

March. The ROK 15th Division completed its organization and training period in late January and moved into the

ROK 5th Division's position on the

northeastern tip of the battle line.

On 30 March the 13th Regiment of

the ROK 11th Division carried out two

raids on enemy hill positions just west

of the Nam River. The regiment took

the crest of Hill 350, which was

less than a mile south of Sindae-ri, with

the aid of about 6,000 rounds of mortar

fire, then withdrew to the main line of

resistance at dusk.20

The ROK II Corps had patrolled vigorously during November and December, but operations had remained on a

small scale. Its greatest challenge arose

in mid-January when an increase in enemy artillery and mortar fire on a platoon outpost on Hill 394, three miles

southeast of Kumsong, alerted the ROK

6th Division to the possibility of imminent attack. The commanding general

of the division alerted his artillery units

and had three tanks move into supporting positions.

On the night of 17 January the enemy

guns hurled over 5,000 rounds of mixed

artillery and mortar fire at the ROK

positions in the vicinity of Hill 394.

Close on the heels of the barrage, four

Chinese platoons advanced to engage

the ROK defenders. When the ROK

artillery and tanks opened up on the

enemy and threatened to halt the attack, the Chinese sent in two more reinforced platoons. So great was the volume and accuracy of ROK fire that only

seven Communist soldiers reached the

ROK lines and they were killed or captured in hand-to-hand combat. After

regrouping, the enemy tried again with

like results. The ROK soldiers estimated that they had killed 125 Chinese

in this fray as compared to losses of 3

killed and 14 wounded for their own

side.21 After this brief but bitter action,

activity on the corps front settled back

into its familiar routine and contacts

18

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 41-42. 19

 Ibid., Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 39-40.

20

 Ibid., Mar 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 51-52. 21

 (1) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, ROKA Combat

Units, ROK II Corps. (2) Hq Eighth Army, Comd

Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative, p. 16.
COLD FRONT 379

occurred infrequently and involved very

small groups of men.

The U.S. I Corps

Over on the western flank the U.S. I

Corps had not encountered a great deal

of opposition during the last two months

of 1952. U.S. 2d Division outposts on

Porkchop defended by the Thailand

Battalion were attacked twice in the first

part of November, once by a Chinese

company and the second time by two

companies. On 7 November a heavy

artillery and mortar concentration on

Porkchop heralded the Chinese advance. After a 45-minute fire fight the

enemy broke off and regrouped, then

stormed back again and was repulsed.

Four days later, the Chinese bombardment of Porkchop announced the second

assault. Approaching from the north,

east, and southwest, two enemy companies reached the Thailand trenches

before they were thrown back. Later

that night the Chinese made two further

attempts to penetrate the Porkchop positions and then disengaged completely.22

The 1st British Commonwealth Division came in for a bit of excitement on

18 November when a sudden increase

in Chinese artillery and mortar fire signaled forthcoming enemy action. After

shelling the positions of the 1st Battalion, King's Liverpool Regiment, as a

diversion, the Chinese quickly shifted

their efforts to a hill known as the Hook.

The Hook was part of an east-west ridge

four miles northwest of the confluence

of the Sami-ch'on and Imjin Rivers and

was held by the 1st Battalion of the

Black Watch. Forty-five minutes of

heavy firing followed; then an enemy

company sought to close with the Black

Watch. But the Commonwealth forces

took cover in nearby tunnels and directed an artillery concentration on the

assault troops. As soon as the artillery

ceased, the Black Watch seized the initiative, and drove the Chinese off the

Hook. While the Communists tried to

regroup on adjacent ridges, artillery and

tank fire forced them to disperse.

On the following day the Chinese

brought up reinforcements and sent two

companies against the Hook. Commonwealth tanks and reinforcements moved

up and after a hard-fought exchange that

witnessed hand-to-hand combat, the British forces turned the Communists back.

Again the Chinese reorganized and dispatched a company to pierce the Black

Watch line. The third try effected a

penetration of 100 yards before it was

contained. Finally, the 3d Battalion of

the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light

Infantry mounted a counterattack and

in close combat ejected the enemy troops.

There were 100 counted Chinese dead

on the battlefield after the engagement

and 85 Commonwealth casualties.23 Evidently convinced that the British intended to hold the Hook, the Chinese

made no further serious attempts to

seize the hill until the following March,

after the U.S. 2d Division had taken

over the Commonwealth Division's sector.

The first ten days of December gave

little indication that the enemy intended

to test the ROK 1st Division's defense

in the vicinity of the double horseshoe

22

 U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, pp. 20, 26-27.

23

 (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 42-43. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt,

Nov 52, pp. 37-38.
380 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

2D U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION SQUAD ON PATROL IN CAMOUFLAGE SUITS

bend of the Imjin River. On the west

bank of the river, as it began its first

horseshoe turn, lay a low hill complex

known as Nori; Big Nori formed the

western half of the ridge and Little Nori

the eastern half. (Map 7) The ROK

15th Regiment maintained outposts on

these hills and also on Hill Betty, about

three-quarters of a mile south of Little

Nori, and on Hill 105, approximately a

mile southwest of Little Nori. The Chinese controlled outposts on the terrain

to the north and west of Nori, but had

remained fairly inactive in that sector in

early December.

On the 11th, however, two battalions

of the 420th Regiment, 140th Division,

47th Army, closely followed 800 rounds

of artillery and mortar fire in an attack

upon the ROK outposts on Little Nori,

Betty, and Hill 105. The main weight

fell on Little Nori as two enemy companies sought to dislodge the men of the

ROK 15th Infantry. After a bitter 3-

hour exchange at close range, the ROK

defenders were ordered to pull back to

Hill 69, 300 yards to the east of Little

Nori. After regrouping, the ROK 15th

launched two counterattacks, but the

two platoons committed failed to drive

the enemy off the heights. The Chinese

waited until the attack forces neared

their defensive positions, then hurled

hand grenades and loosed a withering

artillery, mortar, and small arms fire.

Later in the morning, however, a small

force from the ROK 11th Regiment,

which had relieved the 15th Regiment,
COLD FRONT 381

D. Holmes, Jr.

MAP 7

reoccupied Little Nori without opposition.

In the meantime, the ROK units on

Betty had held, but those on Hill 105

had to fall back temporarily. Evidently

the Chinese movement against Hill 105

was only a diversion, for the enemy left

shortly thereafter and the ROK forces

reoccupied the positions without incident.

On the night of the 11th, the Chinese

first launched a two-company drive

against Little Nori, then increased the

attacking force to a battalion, and the

ROK's again withdrew to Hill 69. Air

support was called in and six B-26's

dropped over one hundred 260-pound

fragmentary bombs on the hill. Twelve

battalions of artillery poured a continuous hail of shells on the Chinese, but

four counterattacks by the ROK 11th

Regiment on 12 December failed. Despite the punishment administered by

large and small arms and the mounting

toll of losses, the Chinese refused to be

budged.
382 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

The artillery concentrations went on

during the night of 12-13 December

and when morning arrived, a battalion

from the ROK 11th Regiment moved in

with two companies in the attack. Fighting steadily forward, they won their way

back to Little Nori, but met with little

success in their efforts to clear Big Nori.

On the evening of the 13th, the South

Koreans dug in and awaited the expected

enemy counterattacks. Two Chinese

companies vainly attempted to penetrate

the ROK positions during the night and

as the morning of 14 December dawned,

the contest resolved itself into a stalemate.24

Although this encounter lasted but

four days, the statistics are quite significant. The entire action on Big and

Little Nori took place in an area 300

yards wide and 200 yards deep. During

the engagement the UNC artillery fired

120,000 rounds, and the mortar crews

over 31,000 while tankmen added over

4,500 90-mm. shells to the deadly concentration. Supporting aircraft flew 39

missions of 177 sorties to bomb and strafe

the enemy positions with napalm, high

explosives, and rockets. In return the

ROK's received over 18,000 rounds of

mixed artillery and mortar fire from the

Chinese guns. Not counting the aerial

contribution, the UNC forces took one

round for every eight they hurled at the

Communists. It was an excellent example of air, artillery, and tank co-ordination in support of the infantry. As for

casualties, the ROK's suffered about 750,

including 237 dead, while the estimated

total for the enemy ranged between

2,290 and 2,732. According to a deserter

from the Chinese 420th Regiment in

January, the regiment was removed from

the line because of the heavy casualties

it took in the battle and placed in reserve.25

Action in the Nori sector settled down

to patrols and raids during January. The

enemy dispatched two platoon-sized

probes during the month and on 23 January the ROK 11th Regiment sent a

three-platoon raiding party against Big

Nori. Air strikes, artillery, and mortar

fire, and fire from twelve supporting

tanks enabled the raiders to gain the

crest, destroy enemy bunkers, and then

withdraw safely.26

After a 6-week period of comparative

quiet, the Chinese chose Christmas Eve

to launch an attack upon the outposts of

the U.S. 2d Division on T-Bone Hill.

(See Map 4.) The southern tip of TBone, which contained the outposts of

EERIE and ARSENAL, lay approximately

two miles northeast of Porkchop Hill.

On 23 December, two platoons from B

Company, 38th Infantry Regiment,

manned ARSENAL, located about 600

yards north of EERIE. On the terrain to

the north two battalions of the 338th

Regiment, 113th Division, CCF 38th

Army, held the enemy lines.

A message intercepted that morning

indicated that the Chinese might stage

an attack either on the night of the 23d

or the morning of the 24th, so all battalions were alerted. Despite the warning, the enemy achieved the element of

surprise when the 7th, 8th, and 9th

24

 The account of the Nori battle is based upon: (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 41-42; (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt,

Dec 52, pp. 6-10; (3) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Dec 52,

ROKA Combat Units, Jnl, 1st ROK Div.

25

 U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, p. 25. 26

 (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 33. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt,

Jan 53, p. 7.
COLD FRONT 383

VIEW OF THE T-BONE HILL SECTOR

Companies, 338th Regiment, opened

their attack about midnight. The

Chinese departed from their customary

tactic of heavy preparatory artillery and

mortar fire before the assault.27 Instead

they infiltrated the B Company outposts

on ARSENAL, cutting through the barbed

wire and successfully bypassing the listening posts. Approaching from several

directions, the Chinese reached the

communication trenches and closed in

hand-to-hand combat with the defenders of B Company. To prevent the 1st

Battalion, 38th Regiment, commanded

by Lt. Col. Roy I. Brooks, from reinforcing ARSENAL, the enemy placed a blocking force between EERIE and the main

line of resistance and sent over 2,000

rounds of artillery and mortar fire

against nearby 38th Regiment outposts.

Evidently the Chinese hoped to isolate

the ARSENAL-EERIE outposts until they

could gain possession of the hill complex.

In this they were disappointed, for

Col. Archibald W. Stuart, the commander of the 38th Regiment, quickly

alerted Lt. Col. George C. Fogle, his

3d Battalion commander, to move his

four companies forward to reinforce the

1st Battalion. Two squads from EERIE

advanced to reinforce ARSENAL, in the

meantime, and a platoon from C Company reinforced EERIE.

The battle in the ARSENAL trenches

had also turned against the Chinese at27

 The account of the ARSENAL action is based

upon the 38th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Bn Staff

Jnls, Dec 52.
384 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tackers. B Company had requested close

defensive fires to deter the enemy from

reinforcing the infiltrators and then set

about to wipe out the Chinese already

in the outpost positions. How successful

the defensive fires and the stout defense

mounted by B Company proved to be

was graphically illustrated by the following intercepts of enemy messages

during the early morning hours of 24

December.

0026 hours. Send reinforcements quick.

There are around 30 enemy coming now—

pause—lots of enemy coming now. 0040 hours. How soon will the reinforcements arrive?

Very soon. They are running over. They

got plenty of prisoners now, but they can't

find a way to get back. 0050 hours. Our reinforcements haven't

reached No. 25 yet. They won't be able to

get down themselves even without the

prisoners. 0052 hours. Can you come down?

No. Try if situation allows. We don't have a

chance without reinforcements. 0120 hours. Where are the reinforcements now? I am sure they will reach your

place pretty soon. Now there are too many

enemy. We are all surrounded. I don't

think our reinforcements can break through

and come up either. Our situation is pretty

dangerous, besides we have to watch the

prisoners. In time of emergency what shall

we do with the prisoners?

0130 hours. If it's possible, your people

had better just come down yourselves, as to

the PW's or wounded, just bring any num- ber you can or leave them there. This is an

order. You must come down or we won't

contact you anymore. 0132 hours. Send more reinforcements or

we won't be able to come back with

the PW's. 0217 hours. Our 900 dollars [9th Company] probably has been annihilated. One

of the men in the 900 dollars escaped and

reported this. 0435 hours. Check how many men we

have. I have already checked the 700 dol- lars [7th Company] has 17 back. 800

dollars [8th Company] has 13 back. 900

dollars unknown.

Two hours later the enemy had gotten

back two more men from the 8th Company, but there was no news from the

9th Company. The Chinese battalion

had been heavily hit with 11 counted

killed in action and estimated casualties

of 500 more. The 38th Regiment suffered 47 casualties, including 6 killed in

action.

When Brig. Gen. James C. Fry, the

2d Division commander, learned of the

high ratio of enemy casualties to those

of the 38th Regiment, he commented:

"Very nice piece of work." He enjoined

his unit commanders to "mention what

happens when you stand in your trenches

and fight."

 28

The men of B Company had fought

bravely and systematically cleaned out

the enemy infiltrators. Yet without the

superb defensive fire that had been provided by the artillery, mortar, tank, and

AAA units in direct support of the 38th

Regiment, the infantrymen might not

have fared so well. The enemy had

wanted desperately to reinforce his attacking forces on ARSENAL, but had

been unable to get them through the

curtain of fire laid down by the direct

support crews. The success could justly

be shared by infantrymen and gun-crew

members alike.

On 29 December the U.S. 7th Division completed the relief of the 2d

Division in this sector and the Chinese

evidently decided to take advantage of

the change-over. A reinforced enemy

28

 Briefing Notes, 24 Dec 52, in 38th Inf Regt,

Dec 52, Comd Rpt, Regtl Opnl Jnls.
COLD FRONT 385

company that night hit an outpost at

Chongjamal, two miles southwest of Old

Baldy, and forced the defenders to pull

back. Since the U.S. artillery units had

the co-ordinates of the outpost, they began to zero in on the Communists and

the punishment finally forced the Chinese to evacuate the position.29

The 7th Division took part in an experiment in air-tank-artillery-infantry

co-ordination in late January that produced loud repercussions in the United

States. In mid-December a joint ArmyAir Force conference at Seoul had discussed the carrying out of General

Clark's direction that a series of airground operations experiments be

mounted.30 Three experiments were

planned: A. An air strike by 24 fighterbombers with briefing and observation

of the target by air force personnel before the operation; B. An air strike by 8

fighter-bombers, without prebriefing,

which would be controlled by the tactical air control party at the divisional

level; and C. An operation similar to B

above, but with 4 fighter-bombers.

When Eighth Army G-3 officers approached General Smith of the 7th Division on the matter, he suggested using

the air effort in conjunction with a tankinfantry raid to capture prisoners. The

task of preparing the operations plan

fell upon the 31st Infantry Regiment

and the S-3, Capt. Howard H. Cooksey,

on 15 January drew up what was to be

called Operation SMACK.

The objective selected for the test was

called Spud Hill and was an enemy

strongpoint on the eastern side of the

shank of T-Bone Hill, about 1,300 yards

north of EERIE. After the Air Force had

launched 125 fighter-bomber sorties and

8-12 radar-controlled light and medium

bomber sorties on selected targets in the

T-Bone area, the artillery would carry

on the bombardment. One field artillery battalion and elements of 6 others

with 78 light and 32 medium artillery

pieces would fire in direct and general

support of the raiding party, from their

positions behind the main line of resistance. For the attack force 1 platoon

from the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry Regiment and 3 platoons of medium

tanks, mounting 90-mm. guns, were designated. Two additional platoons of infantry, 1 light tank company, and 6

platoons of medium tanks would act in

a supporting role.

During the period 12-20 January, the

57th Field Artillery Battalion, alone in

direct support of the 31st Regiment,

poured close to 10,000 rounds of 105-

mm. fire into the T-Bone complex, seeking to destroy enemy bunkers, mortars,

and automatic weapons in preparation

for the attack. As D-day—25 January—

approached, Air Force officers visited the

7th Division command post and received

their briefing and reconnoitered the

target area.

Since the experiment promised to be

of interest to both air and ground officers,

General Barcus and members of his Fifth

Air Force staff arrived at the battle locale and were joined by General Smith

and Lt. Gen. Paul W. Kendall, the I

Corps commander, along with some of

his staff. Also present were about a

dozen members of the press. To help

these visitors understand the schedule

and purpose of the exercises, the 7th

Division had prepared a combination

29

 U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, p. 12. 30

 The following account, unless otherwise stated,

is based upon Hq Eighth Army, Mil Hist Detachment, Operation SMACK, by 2d Lt Samuel M. Kind.

MS in OCMH.
386 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

itinerary, description of the experiment,

and a scenario outlining the main events.

The cover for this six-page collection of

information was in three colors, showing

a 7th Division black and red patch superimposed on a map of Korea in blue.31

The choice of a tricolor cover and use of

the word "scenario" was unfortunate, as

it turned out.

On 24 January the Air Force dropped

136,000 pounds of bombs and 14 napalm

tanks on the target complex. The next

morning, as the infantry and tankers

gathered in the assembly areas, the Air

Force began the first of eighteen strikes.

Carrying two 1,000-pound bombs each,

eight F-84 Thunderjets swept over the

cross of T-Bone and unloaded their

cargo. By midmorning, 24 more Thunderjets, in flights of eight, had bombed

enemy positions on T-Bone. Then came

a mass strike by 24 Thunderjets, with

48,000 pounds of bombs. This completed experiments A and B. Twenty

additional Thunderjets in 2 flights hit

the objective before the tanks and infantry began to move out.

Diversionary tank movements and fire

to confuse the enemy began as the assault

troops made their final preparations.

Then the 15 supporting tanks from the

73d Tank Battalion (M) crossed the line

of departure. While the tanks rumbled

forward to their positions, Experiment

C was attempted by two flights of four

F-84 Thunderjets each. The first flight

missed Spud Hill with its bombs and the

second flight put on the target only one

of the eight napalm tanks that the planes

carried. Shortly after the last strike

by the Air Force, eight F4U Marine Corsairs attempted to lay a smoke screen in

front of the tanks and infantry to conceal their approach, but some released

the bombs too soon and others failed to

place them where they would shield the

attack force.

Once the air phase was completed, the

supporting artillery, mortars, AAA, and

automatic weapons along the main line

of resistance opened fire. As the supporting tanks reached their firing positions close to Spud Hill, they joined in

the bombardment of the enemy strongpoints and trenches. To co-ordinate the

available firepower, a communications

network had been set up between all

supporting units, fire direction centers,

the 2d Battalion command post, and the

infantry Fire Support Co-ordination

Center. Major Phillips, the 2d Battalion

commander, directed the operation from

his command post and had an artillery

liaison officer at his side.

For the assault of the hill, Major Phillips had ordered E Company to furnish

the platoon and the company commander had chosen his 2d Platoon, under 2d Lt. John R. Arbogast, Jr., for the

task. The platoon had rehearsed the

operation nine times on similar terrain

and knew what it had to do. To increase

the possibilities for success, two flamethrower teams had been added to the

platoon for the operation.

Since the infantry had to wait until

the air strikes were completed, the attack was not set up for a prescribed time,

but rather was to begin on Major Phillips' order. Unfortunately, a radio failure caused a fifteen-minute delay in the

receipt of the attack order and Arbogast

and his men were late in crossing the

line of departure. As they moved forward to the base of Spud Hill in person31

 Msg, G 1733 KCG, Van Fleet to Clark, 29 Jan

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67,

incl 8.
COLD FRONT 387

nel carriers, the supporting tanks and

artillery continued to pound the objective and enemy positions in the surrounding areas.

Arbogast's platoon dismounted quickly when it reached the foot of the hill

and divided into two groups. Two

squads began to climb up the northern

finger and the remaining two squads

took the southern finger of Spud Hill.

During this ascent, the supporting weapons, with the exception of the three tank

platoons, shifted their fire to targets

north of the objective.

Desultory fire from small arms and

automatic weapons greeted the 2d Platoon as it headed for the crest. It was

not until the squads neared the point

where the two fingers met, reuniting the

attacking troops, that the Chinese started

to react strongly. Then, suddenly, the

machine gun fire became intense, driving

the men of the 2d Platoon into a defiladed hollow between the two fingers.

The depression gave Arbogast's men

respite from the chattering machine

guns, but exposed them to another danger. Boxed in in a small area, they fell

easy prey to the hand grenades that the

Chinese lobbed into the hollow from

their trenches on the crest of the hill.

As grenade after grenade fell into the

midst of the hemmed-in platoon, the

casualty list mounted. Lieutenant Arbogast was hit in the arm, but refused to

leave. With grenade fragments filling

the air, the litter bearers found it difficult to keep up with the growing number of wounded.

In an attempt to break up the grenade

attack, the two flame thrower teams were

called forward. A rifle bullet instantly

killed one of the operators as he worked

his way toward the crest. The second

operator managed to get off one short

burst before the machine malfunctioned.

Flames engulfed the Chinese trenches

for a few seconds and halted the flow of

grenades briefly. After the fire died

out, however, the Chinese sent increasing numbers of grenades into the hollow

and the list of wounded grew.

Seeing that the assault platoon was

pinned down, Major Phillips ordered

the 1st Platoon to reinforce Arbogast's

remaining troops. The 1st Platoon followed the same route up the fingers and

enemy machine guns soon forced it to

take cover. Efforts by the supporting

tanks to silence the enemy's automatic

weapons met with little success since

smoke and dust obscured the tankers'

view. Every half hour four Thunderjets

dropped bombs on the T-Bone complex,

but they, too, had little influence upon

the fight on Spud Hill.

Lieutenant Arbogast tried to get his

men moving out of the trap. But even

as he sought to organize a charge, he

was again hit by grenade fragments, this

time in the face and eye. Although he

refused to be evacuated at first, the seriousness of his injuries soon forced him

to give in. His platoon sergeant and

several of the squad leaders had already

been put out of action.

With two platoons now pinned down

short of the objective, Major Phillips

decided to commit the 3d Platoon to the

attack, but the end result proved to be

the same. The stream of automatic

weapons and rifle fire coupled with the

grenades from the enemy trenches

halted the advance of the 3d Platoon

and inflicted numerous wounds on its

members.

When Col. William B. Kern, the regimental commander, learned of the fate
388 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

of the 3d Platoon, he called off the

attack and ordered the men remaining

on the approaches to Spud Hill to withdraw. By this time all three platoon

leaders had been wounded and the casualty total had reached 77 men.

The expenditures in ammunition for

Operation SMACK had also been rather

costly. Besides the bombs and napalm

dropped the day before the attack, the

Air Force had loosed 224,000 pounds

of bombs and eight napalm tanks on 25

January. The supporting artillery fired

over 12,000 rounds of 105-mm. and 155-

mm. and nearly 100,000 rounds of .50-

caliber and 40-mm. ammunition. From

the tanks came over 2,000 rounds of

90-mm. and over 75,000 rounds of lesser

caliber. A heavy mortar company added

over 4,500 rounds of mortar fire to the

attack and the infantry assault force shot

over 50,000 rounds of machine gun and

small arms ammunition and threw over

650 hand grenades at the enemy. Even

if the highest estimate of enemy casualties was accepted, all of this potential

death and destruction cost the Chinese

fewer than 65 men, while the enemy,

using but a fraction of this amount of

ordnance, had inflicted greater losses

upon the 7th Division force. To top it

off, since the infantry had not closed with

the enemy, not a prisoner had been taken.

What went wrong? In review, one

might say—everything. The air bombardment evidently had little effect

upon the enemy in his deep, protected

bunkers and caves and the strikes attempted to hit too many targets peripheral to the infantry objective. Secondly,

the infantry's late start in setting out for

the objective after the strikes allowed

the enemy time to prepare for the attack. By confining the assault to a narrow front, as was the case in the earlier

Bloody Ridge-Heartbreak Ridge operations, the enemy could concentrate on

containing the small attack force. The

latter was fairly green and its leadership

was impaired early in the fight through

the effective enemy use of hand grenades

while the platoon was pinned in. In

addition the available flamethrowers

which might have saved the situation

malfunctioned and some of the automatic weapons jammed. The assault

platoon had rehearsed the operation

many times and felt overrehearsed, while

the two supporting platoons that had

been thrown in late had not been adequately rehearsed or briefed. All in

all, Operation SMACK was a fiasco.

Yet since the entire exercise was on a

small scale insofar as the number of infantrymen and tanks engaged was concerned, it might well have been chalked

up to experience and quietly passed over,

but for a zealous member of the press.

Although the correspondent had but recently arrived in Korea and had not

been present at the scene of action, the

attendance of high-ranking officers of the

Air Force and Army at the experiment

and the use of the three-color cover

and the term "scenario" for the information sheets assumed roles of importance in the story that he wrote. The

implication that a show involving needless loss of life had been put on for the

visiting brass created a furore in the

United States and led to a brief Congressional investigation.32

An official statement by Van Fleet's

headquarters and appearances by Gen- 32

 (1) Msg, DA 392127, CINFO to CINCFE, 28

Jan 53. (2) Msg C 61077, CINCFE to DA, 30 Jan

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67,

incl 9. (3) Msg, DA 393167, CINFO to CINCFE, 31

Jan 53.
COLD FRONT 389

eral Collins before Congressional armed

services committees served to put the

SMACK operation in proper perspective

as a test of methods of co-ordinating a

combined attack on enemy outposts and

not as a "gladitorial" exhibition staged

in the Hollywood style to entertain visitors.33

 Congressional leaders accepted

the Army's explanations and the ill-fated

SMACK incident was closed. It was an

expensive lesson that demonstrated again

that firepower in itself, whether dropped

from above or hurled from the ground,

was not enough to neutralize an enemy

well dug in and that the advantage in

this limited war lay on the defensive side.

Elsewhere on the U.S. I Corps front,

the action was confined chiefly to small

raids during January. A platoon from

the Marine 7th Regiment on 8 January

took Hill 67, which was a mile and a

half east of Panmunjom, with the aid of

air, artillery, and seven flame-throwing

tanks, then withdrew. A week later three

platoons from the same regiment hit this

hill and another close by for three hours

before breaking off the fight. On 24 January two platoons of the Ethiopian Battalion attached to the U.S. 7th Division

seized a hill south of Old Baldy after a

45-minute battle and fought off a counterattack. Both the enemy and the Ethiopians built up their forces the following

day, as two Chinese companies tried to

win back the hill from four platoons of

Ethiopians. The latter made a good

showing and did not break contact and

withdraw until they were ordered to.34

Toward the end of the month, General Clark warned Van Fleet that there

were indications the enemy might try

to take advantage of the period before

the ground thawed to launch an offensive

toward Seoul. During the winter the

Communists had built up their forces

in Korea to an estimated total of 1,071,-

080 by 1 February and had been stockpiling ammunition and rations at the

front. In January three Chinese armies

and one North Korean corps had been

replaced on the line by fully equipped

and combat-trained units and the

strength of the remainder of the divisions at the front had been increased

from reserve elements. It was, of course,

quite conceivable that the Communist

preparations were only defensive in nature since considerable publicity had

been given to the possibility that the

new Republican administration in the

United States might change the tenor of

the Korean War and go over to the

offensive.35

Van Fleet was not worried. He was

going ahead with the divisional reliefs

scheduled for the closing days of January and told Clark that the Eighth Army

was in better condition insofar as reserves were concerned than ever before

in the war. He was sure that Eighth

Army could handle anything that the

enemy could throw at it.36 In his last

33

UNC/FEC Msg, Z 35701, CINCFE to Hull, 30 Jan 53, in , Comd Rpt, Jan 53, Incls 1-67, incl 10. 34

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 33-34.

35

 (1) Msg, GX 61016, CINCFE to CG AFFE et al.,

24 Jan 53, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495. (2) Hq

Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative,

pp. 5-8, 21. 36

 Msg, GX 1607 KCG, CG EUSAK to CG AFFE,

25 Jan 53, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin files,

Jan-Jun 53. The four reliefs were: the U.S. 45th

Division for the U.S. 40th Division in the X Corps

area; the U.S. 2d Division for the 1st Commonwealth Division in the U.S. I Corps sector; the

U.S. 3d Division for the U.S. 25th Division in the

IX Corps front; and the ROK 15th Division for

the ROK 5th Division along the ROK I Corps

battle line. These were all completed by 31 January

without incident.
390 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

days as commander of the Eighth Army,

Van Fleet remained confident that the

force he had helped build up into an

efficient and reliable army could meet

the Communists head on at any time and

emerge victorious. Despite the frustrations of fighting a limited war, the energetic and aggressive old warrior had lost

none of his drive or desire to deal the

enemy a crippling military blow. He

had frequently shown his impatience at

being forced to play a waiting, defensive

game, but had never wavered in his

efforts to maintain Eighth Army

at peak efficiency in case either the

United States or the Communists decided to alter the complexion of the

conflict. As he left for retirement and

home in February 1953, his contributions to the maintenance of his command

as one of the better armies fielded by

the United States were beyond question.

Notwithstanding Van Fleet's assurances, Clark told General Weyland to

have his air reconnaissance planes intensify their observations of Communist

ground forces, supplies, and equipment

along the P'yongyang-Kaesong route.

The Far East commander was concerned

over the mounting ability of the enemy

to stage an air offensive and ordered his

subordinates to take all possible passive

air defense measures to absorb hostile

air attacks. If trouble developed, Clark

wished every precaution possible taken

to lessen the blow and he was ready to

move the 1st Cavalry Division and 187th

Airborne RCT back to Korea in the

event of an emergency.37 As Clark

pointed out to the JCS in early February,

the Communists' recent expansion in

men and planes might well be only defensive, but the publicity given UNC

ammunition shortages, personnel deficiencies, weakness in reserve divisions,

and difficulties in building up NATO

strength, coupled with predictions of

UNC augmentation and offensive action

because of the change in political administration, could influence the enemy

to use his offensive strength.38

The growth of Communist air power

featured the addition of jet bombers and

fighters which gave the enemy a broad

air capability. If the Chinese carried out

a surprise low-level attack with the

MIG's escorting the jet bombers, Clark

felt that they might knock out the UNC

interceptor bases and gain a respite during which they could repair the North

Korean airfields. This, in turn, could

lead to a ground offensive, backed by

piston fighters, bombers, and ground attack planes. Under the circumstances,

Clark asked for permission to attack the

Chinese air bases if the security of the

UNC forces seemed to be threatened.39

As in the past, the American leaders

in Washington were sympathetic but

noncommittal. They recognized the potential danger, but told Clark that they

wished to be informed of the immediate

situation before they gave their authorization.40

Clark's air chief, General Weyland,

shared his commander's concern over

37

 (1) Msg, CX 61087, CINCFE to CG FEAF, 31

Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls

1-67, incl 41. (2) Ltr, Clark to CG AFFE et al,

4 Feb 53, sub: Communist Offensive . . . , in

JSPOG Staff Study No. 495.

38

 Msg, CX 6115?, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Feb 53, in

JSPOG Staff Study No. 495. 39

 Msg GX 61172, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Feb 53, in

JSPOG Staff Study No. 495, in JSPOG files. The

estimate of Communist air strength in Manchuria

was 830 jet fighters, 250 piston fighters, 220 piston

light bombers, and an estimated 100 jet bombers. 40

 Msg, JCS 931744, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Feb 53.
COLD FRONT 391

the Communist air threat, but had no

doubt about the ability of the UNC

forces to turn the enemy back. "I have

no fears," he told Clark on 11 February,

"that the enemy could take the Seoul

complex if faced with concerted and

aggressive counteroperations. In fact, I

believe that an attempted air and ground

offensive by the Communists can be

made a most costly venture for him and

would provide opportunity for an outstanding UN victory."

 41

As February progressed and no larger

enemy attacks developed, Clark's anxiety diminished. On 11 February, Lt.

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor took over General Van Fleet's post as Eighth Army

commander and began to make his own

impression upon his troops.42 He

stressed the need for planning and rehearsing patrols; for providing a complete eight-week training program for

reserve divisions before they re-entered

the line; for moving artillery battalions

frequently to maintain their basic mobility; and for better concealment measures for troops on skyline positions. He

also decided to drop the designation of

"Korea" from the Eighth Army. In the

future, the title would simply be Eighth

U.S. Army.43

Although the pattern of fighting underwent little change during early February, the enemy reacted strongly to any

challenge. On 3 February a tank-infantry force from the 5th Marine Regiment

followed air strikes and artillery fire in

a raid on Hill 101 and Un'gok, ten miles

north of Munsan-ni. The marines destroyed installations and beat off several

determined counterattacks until they

were ordered to withdraw. Estimate of

enemy killed during the engagement ran

to about 400 men while the marines lost

15 killed and 55 wounded.44

On 20 February the Chinese sent two

companies along the shank of T-Bone

Hill to attack Outpost EERIE and ran

into a 7th Division ambush patrol. Reinforcements from the 17th Infantry

Regiment were rushed forward to bolster the patrol and finally a platoon of

tanks moved forward to screen the battlefield and help evacuate the wounded.

Although all the members of the patrol

were either killed or wounded, they had

evidently staved off a battalion-sized assault on ARSENAL and EERIE.45

Across the valley at the lower Alligator's Jaw, which was located a mile and

a half northeast of EERIE, another Chinese company caught a 7th Division

combat patrol and subjected it to heavy

fire on 24 February. Before the engagement finished, the entire 20-man patrol

became casualties. The day before, on

the 1st Marine Division front, a tankinfantry patrol was surrounded by the

enemy at Hill 90, two miles east of Panmunjom, and a reinforcing platoon had

to be dispatched to help them break

through the Chinese circle. Hand-tohand combat ensued as the marines bat41

 Ltr, Weyland to CINCFE, 11 Feb 53, sub:

Communist Offensive ... , in JSPOG Staff Study

No. 495. 42

 General Taylor had commanded the 101st Airborne Division in World War II; had served as

superintendent at West Point until 1949; was commander in Berlin from 1949-51; and lately had

been G-3, Department of the Army, and Deputy

Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration. 43

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 28, 29, 62.

44

 (1) Ibid., p. 32. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt,

Feb 53, p. 11. (3) First Marine Div, Comd Diary,

Feb 53, p. 4. 45

 (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec.

I, Narrative, pp. 32-33. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd

Rpt, Feb 53, p. 10.
392 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tled their way back to the main line of

resistance. On 25 February a Marine

patrol started out to capture prisoners

of war and destroy installations on Hill

Detroit, a little over a mile southwest of

the Hook, and encountered a reinforced

enemy company. The marines used

flame throwers in the caves and bunkers

to root out the Chinese and a bitter

45-minute fight took place before the

raiders disengaged.46

The growing Chinese sensitivity to the

I Corps raids was the prelude to a shift

in the enemy's tactics. As March began,

the Chinese went over to the offensive

again—on a limited scale, to be sure.

Dropping the passive role of the early

winter period, the enemy started to take

advantage of the prethaw season. As the

Chinese sent out larger forces in an effort to regain the initiative, pressure

along the I Corps front mounted.

On 1 March, a Communist company

struck at the positions of the French

Battalion after an intense artillery and

mortar preparation. The French were

attached to the U.S. 2d Division, now

manning the section of the line formerly

held by the 1st Commonwealth Division.

They met the Chinese attack and beat it

off after a brief hand-to-hand encounter.

Two days later, the Chinese overran a

38th Regiment outpost on the Hook.

On 6 March the scene moved to the

ROK 1st Division line where the Chinese launched two fruitless companysized attacks on the outposts of the 11th

Regiment. That same evening, a

combat patrol from the 31st Infantry

Regiment of the U.S. 7th Division intercepted an estimated enemy battalion apparently on the way to attack Porkchop

Hill and the surprise contact disrupted

the Chinese plans. The Communists

gunners dropped 8,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire on Porkchop during

the night, but the enemy infantry made

no serious attempt to push on toward

the 7th Division's outposts.47

There was brief lull along the front

with the advent of the late winter rains.

Mud restricted the movements of vehicles but did not deter the enemy from

resuming the attack shortly after the

middle of March. Hill 355, located

about three and a half miles southwest

of the Nori Hill complex, was also

known as Little Gibraltar. Defended by

elements of the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Division, Hill 355 received a

battalion-sized attack on 17 March. The

enemy breached the wire entanglements

and pushed through the mine fields into

the trenches of the 9th Infantry Regiment. One platoon's position was overrun but the remaining platoons held firm

in their blocking positions until reinforcements arrived. As the Chinese began to disengage, 2d Division artillery

fire interdicted their route of withdrawal. The action cost the 9th slightly

over 100 casualties, but enemy losses

were estimated at over 400 men.48

The 2d Division came in for a bit

more action four days later when two

enemy companies fell on a patrol near

the Hook. While the patrol tenaciously

fought off the Chinese attackers, artillery

and mortar fire were called in and rein46

 (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 33-34. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt,

Feb 53, p. 15. (3) First Marine Div, Comd Diary,

Feb 53, p. 10.

47

 (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, sec.

I, Narrative, pp. 41-42. (2) U.S. 7th Inf Div, Comd

Rpt, Mar 53, pp. 23-25. 48

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 43.
COLD FRONT 393

forcements rushed up. The Chinese

pulled back the next morning.49

On 20 March the 7th Division had

indications that the enemy contemplated

an attack in the Old Baldy-Porkchop

area. The increase in artillery and mortar rounds on the division's positions on

these long-contested hills usually signified a Communist offensive move, and

the capture of two deserters in the sector

strengthened the belief that action would

soon be forthcoming.50

The Old Baldy-Porkchop area was

held by the 31st Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Kern, and its

attached Colombian Battalion. Colonel

Kern had deployed his 2d Battalion on

the left, the Colombian Battalion in the

center, which included Old Baldy, and

the 3d Battalion on the right in the Porkchop Hill sector. One rifle company

from the 1st Battalion manned blocking

positions behind each of the three frontline battalions.51

Elements of two Chinese armies faced

the 7th Division. The 141st Division,

CCF 47th Army, manned the enemy

positions opposite Old Baldy and to the

west and the 67th Divisions, CCF 23d

Army, defended the terrain from the

Porkchop Hill area to the east.

On the evening of 23 March the Chinese staged a double-barreled attack on

both Old Baldy and Porkchop. A mixed

battalion from the 423d Regiment, 141st

Division, attacked Old Baldy and caught

the Colombian Battalion in the middle

of relieving the company outpost on the

hill. The Chinese closely followed an

intense artillery and mortar concentration upon Lt. Col. Alberto Ruiz-Novoa's

troops and fought their way into the

trenches. To reinforce the Colombians,

Colonel Kern placed B Company, 31st

Regiment, under Colonel Ruiz' operational control. 1st Lt. Jack M. Patteson,

B Company commander, led his men

toward Old Baldy at 2130 hours, approaching from Westview, the next hill

to the southeast. As B Company drew

near the outpost, the Chinese first called

in intense artillery and mortar fire along

the approach routes and then took Patteson's men under fire with small arms,

automatic weapons, and hand grenades.

B Company slowly made its way into the

first bunkers on Old Baldy at 0200 hours

and began to clear them out one by one.

As the company came up against the

main strength of the Chinese on Old

Baldy, however, progress lessened and

then ground to a halt.

In the 3d Battalion sector on Porkchop

Hill, Lt. Col. John N. Davis' L Company had been attacked by two companies from the 201st Regiment, 67th Division. As in the Old Baldy assault, the

Chinese had laid down heavy mortar

and artillery concentrations on the L

Company positions before they advanced. 1st Lt. Forrest Crittenden, the

company commander, and his men

fought until their ammunition began to

run low, then had to pull back from the

crest of the hill and await resupply and

reinforcement. Proximity fuze fire was

laid directly on Porkchop while ammunition was brought forward and A Com49

 lbid., p. 46.

50

 Believing that the men would fight better if

they knew what they were about to accomplish,

the Communists discussed the operation on the

lower levels before an attack. The knowledge that

an attack was to be carried out often led some of

the Communist soldiers to desert. 51

 The account of the Old Baldy-Porkchop Hill

action is based upon: (1) 31st Inf Regt, Comd

Rpt and Staff Jnls, Mar 53; (2) 32d Inf Regt,

Comd Rpt and Staff Jnls, Mar 53; (3) 7th Inf

Div, Comd Rpt, Mar 53.
394 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

pany, under 1st Lt. Gerald Morse,

advanced to the aid of L Company. Elements of I Company were ordered to

secure Hill 200, a mile southeast of

Porkchop, which had also been reported

as under attack.

Colonel Davis had to wait until the

early morning hours of 24 March before

he could launch a counterattack against

Porkchop. Lieutenant Morse's company,

en route to join L company, was pinned

down for two hours by proximity fuze

fire. Attacking abreast with A Company on the right, the two companies met

only light resistance from the few Chinese left on the crest. They reported

that Porkchop was a shambles with many

of the bunkers aflame and many dead

and wounded. Colonel Davis dispatched

the ammunition and pioneer platoon to

repair the damage and sent aidmen and

litter bearers to clear the dead and

wounded from the hill.

In the meantime, Maj. Gen. Arthur G.

Trudeau, who had just assumed command of the 7th Division, had arrived

at the 31st Regiment's command post

and had taken charge. He ordered the

1st Battalion, 32d Regiment, under Lt.

Col. George Juskalian, to move forward

and placed it under the operational control of the 31st Regiment. The 1st Battalion with B Company, 73d Tank Battalion, in support, would carry out a

counterattack to regain Old Baldy. The

tanks would fire from positions in the

valley to the northeast of the hill.

B Company, 32d Regiment, under 1st

Lt. Willard E. Smith, led the 1st Battalion's attack from the southwest on the

morning of 24 March. Two platoons

from the 73d Tank Battalion and one

platoon of the 31st Tank Company supported the assault. The Chinese met the

assault with artillery and mortar fire as

B Company approached and then

opened up with small arms and automatic weapons, inflicting heavy casualties on Lieutenant Smith's men. The 1st

Battalion's assault stalled on the southwest finger of Old Baldy.

Colonel Juskalian reorganized his

forces and sent B Company and A Company, under 1st Lt. Jack L. Conn, in a

second attack during the afternoon of

the 24th. The two companies reached

Lieutenant Patteson's B Company, 31st

Regiment, positions and passed through

them. By nightfall they had won back

one quarter of Old Baldy, but were

forced by enemy resistance to dig in and

hold. Lieutenant Patteson suffered a

broken jaw during the fighting and had

to be evacuated.

At 0430 hours on 25 March, Colonel

Juskalian sent C Company, under 1st

Lt. Robert C. Gutner, around the right

flank to attack up the northeast finger of

Old Baldy. Again the Chinese used their

individual and crew-served weapons effectively and reinforced their units on

Old Baldy to halt the 1st Battalion

attack. By 0930 Juskalian reported that

B and A Companies were one-third the

way up the left finger, halted by small

arms and hand grenades. C Company

was "pretty well shot up" and had to be

withdrawn and reorganized. Some members of the company were still pinned

down on the right flank of Baldy and

could not get out. Colonel Juskalian

called for tank support to knock out the

Chinese bunkers being used to pin down

the 30 to 40 C Company men left on the

hill.

Despite the tank support, the 1st Battalion's situation had not improved by

1315 hours. Colonel Juskalian's three
COLD FRONT 395

rifle companies were clinging to their

positions, but A Company had only 2

officers and 14 men; B Company and C

Company had 2 officers and 40 men between them. The colonel asked for

smoke and medical aid so that he could

evacuate his casualties.

With the 1st Battalion's effective

strength reduced to less than sixty men,

Colonel Kern ordered Juskalian to withdraw his men from Old Baldy during

the night of 25-26 March. Air Force,

Navy, and Marine fighters and bombers

mounted air strikes against nearby hills,

strongpoints, and supply routes during

the night and then hit Old Baldy the

next morning after the 1st Battalion had

cleared the hill. From reports made

later by Colombians who had hidden in

bunkers during the Chinese domination

of the heights, it appeared that the enemy troops left Old Baldy when the air

strikes came, and this, incidentally,

had enabled the Colombians to make

their way back to the UNC lines on

16 March.

General Kendall, I Corps commander,

ordered another attack to regain Old

Baldy to be scheduled for either 27 or

28 March after rehearsals had been

held. To carry out the assault, General

Trudeau selected the 2d Battalion, 32d

Infantry Regiment. The battalion held

two rehearsals on terrain similar to Old

Baldy in the closing days of March and

was prepared to execute the attack. On

30 March, however, General Taylor, the

Eighth Army commander, arrived at

General Trudeau's headquarters for a

conference. After considering the psychological, tactical, and doubtlessly the

casualty aspects of the planned operation, General Taylor decided that Old

Baldy was not essential to the defense

of the sector and that consequently no

attack would be carried out.

The two days of fighting for Old Baldy

and Porkchop had been costly for the 7th

Division. Casualties had run over 300

dead, wounded, and missing in action.

Although Chinese losses were estimated

at between 600 to 800 men, the enemy

had committed his troops freely to maintain possession of Old Baldy. The Chinese willingness to expend their manpower resources offered a clear contrast

to the UNC reluctance to risk lives for

tactical objectives of questionable value

at this stage of the war.

On the 1st Marine Division front the

Chinese had also accelerated the tempo.

An outpost of the Korean Marine regiment was overrun by two enemy platoons

on 18 March and the following day the

Chinese threw two company attacks

against 5th Marine Regiment outposts.

The latter were beaten off and the marines quickly mounted a counterblow—

a raid into the enemy's positions. This,

in turn, elicited retaliation from the Chinese. On the night of 22 March they

sent two companies supported by 1,700

rounds of artillery and mortar against

the 1st Marine Regiment's outposts and

main line of resistance positions at Hill

Hedy and Bunker Hill, four miles east

of Panmunjom. Hand-to-hand combat

and a brisk fire fight ensued before the

Chinese began to disengage. During the

encounter a UNC flare plane and searchlights lit up the battlefield and enabled

the marines to spot the enemy's movement.52

The biggest engagement of the month

took place in the closing days of March.

52

 (1) First Marine Div, Comd Diary, Mar 53,

p. 9. (2) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53,

sec. I, Narrative, pp. 44-45.
396 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

D. Holmes, Jr.

MAP 8

After a series of diversionary squad attacks on 1st Marine Regiment outposts,

the 358th Regiment, 120th Division,

CCF 40th Army, launched an assault upon combat outposts of the 5th Marine

Regiment, 10 miles northeast of Panmunjom and between 2 to 3 miles southwest of the Hook. Outpost VEGAS was on

Hill 157; Outpost RENO was on Hill 148,

less than half a mile to the west; and

Outpost CARSON was on an unnumbered

hill 700 yards south of RENO. (Map 8)

Prisoners of war and other intelligence

sources later indicated that the mission

of the 358th was to seize and hold the

three outposts before an expected UNC

spring offensive could get under way.

On 26 March, the Chinese overran

VEGAS and RENO after heavy, close fighting. The marines fell back and hastily

prepared blocking positions between the

lost positions and the main line of resistance. Despite the arrival of reinforcements during the night, efforts to rewin

VEGAS and RENO failed because of intense enemy artillery, mortar, and small
COLD FRONT 397

arms fire. A battalion from the 7th

Marine Regiment was placed under the

operational control of the 5th Regiment

on 27 March, but even with the additional troops, the counterattacks made

little progress. As the day wore on, 3

light battalions, 2 medium battalions, 2

8-inch batteries, 1 4.5-inch rocket battery, 2 companies of 4.2-inch mortars,

and 1 battalion of 25-pounders pummeled the enemy positions, and close

air support sought to destroy Chinese

strongpoints. Over 100,000 artillery

rounds, 54,000 mortar shells, 7,000

rounds of 90-mm. tank ammunition, and

426 tons of explosives were directed at

the Communists during the fight, while

the Chinese sent back about 45,000 at

the marines. The decision was made

not to recapture RENO for the time being

and the Marine units, increasing the attacking force to the infantry strength of

two battalions, concentrated on VEGAS.

Not until the afternoon of 28 March

were the marines able to battle their way

back to the top, for the Chinese fire was

heavy and deadly.

Enemy counterattacks followed each

other swiftly during the night of 28-29

March, but were broken up by defensive

fires. Despite the Chinese pressure, the

Marine defenders worked hard to

strengthen their hold on VEGAS. When

the Communists moved forward to the

assault, the marines called for boxing

fires, and flare planes exposed the enemy

to Marine automatic weapon and small

arms fire. One Chinese concentration

was neutralized by rocket fire before it

could organize its attack. Before the

enemy broke off the fighting on 29

March, the marines had repelled several

battalion-sized attacks and inflicted over

1,300 estimated casualties upon the

enemy. Marine losses were 118 killed,

801 wounded, and 98 missing in action,

figures which testified to the bitterness

of the battle.53

Air and Naval Operations

The uneven tenor of ground operations was reflected in the type of activity

that the air and naval forces carried out

during the winter of 1952-53. During

the sporadic fighting of November 1952,

the Far East Air Forces devoted over

3,000 sorties to close combat support and

a lesser amount of its effort to interdictory missions. Bomber components of

the command continued to work over

rail lines and bridges, storage facilities,

repair shops, supply centers, and troop

concentrations in addition to their

strikes against strongpoints along the

battle line.

According to the basic FEAF operations policy that was in effect until the

end of 1952, the air forces were trying:

to maintain pressure on the Communist

military units; to influence the armistice

negotiations, so that UNC could obtain

the most favorable terms; to retain the

capability for other operations, in the

event of a general emergency; to prevent

or minimize enemy air attacks against

the U.N. Command; to furnish air support to the UNC, including close combat

support; and to interdict the enemy's

logistical and communications system.

First priority went to the task of maintaining air superiority and second to the

close support of ground operations,

whenever the tactical situation required

53

 (1) First Marine Div, Comd Diary, Mar 53, pp.

10-12. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, pp.

28-37. (3) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, sec. I, Narrative, p. 49.
398 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

it.54 The emphasis on close support and

the successful suppression of antiaircraft

fire during the FEAF strikes by friendly

artillery promoted better air-ground relationships during the winter months.

Navy and Marine planes also contributed greatly to the support of the ground

forces during November. Task Force 77

devoted half of its combat effort to

"Cherokee" strikes on behalf of the

Eighth Army. A Cherokee strike was a

prebriefed operation against a specific

target in front of friendly ground positions and differed from regular close air

support in that it was not directed by

spotters. Usually a control plane was

assigned by the Air Force, however, to

assist in locating the target and for assessing the damage caused by the strike.

In addition to the Cherokee operations, Navy planes pounded industrial

centers in northeastern Korea. On 17-

18 November, they bombed Ch'ongjin,

Kilchu, Kyongsong, and other coastal

rail facilities, factories, and mines. During these operations separate targets

were assigned to the air groups of each

carrier to eliminate the impromptu exchanges between group leaders who,

when they were assigned to the same targets, normally did their co-ordination in

the air. The Ch'ongjin attack found five

air strikes co-ordinated with the concentrated firepower of the battleship Missouri and the cruiser Helena. On the

18th, Task Force 77 sent 64 attack

planes, 16 piston-type fighters, and 24

jet fighters against Hoeryong on the

Yalu River. The synthetic oil plant,

supply buildings, power plant, iron factory, and other facilities in this border

town were all bombed by means of

visual methods.55

On 9 December the carriers Oriskany,

Bon Homme Richard, and Essex sent

350 sorties to blast rail facilities at Rashin, Musan, Hyesanjin, and Hunyung—

the latter was the northernmost raid of

the Korean War. One week later, planes

from the same carriers traveled to the

Manchurian border to reach hitherto undamaged rail targets at Yuson-dong.56

Although intelligence reports pointed

to a steady increase of Communist air

strength in Manchuria, enemy air activity remained at a low ebb during the

closing months of the year. In December

reconnaissance planes observed a growing number of Soviet-built I1-28, twinengine jet bombers close to the border

and the threat of a surprise attack against

UNC airfields ballooned. This, coupled

with the statements of UNC pilots that

their MIG opponents seemed to be getting more competent in their attempts

to intercept the F-86 Sabrejets, aroused

some concern. But the Communists, as

noted earlier, demonstrated no enthusiasm for aggressive operations either on

the ground or in the air. By the end of

1952, Air Force and Navy pilots were

once again devoting the bulk of their

combat effort to the North Korean rail

and highway network.57

Typical of the air assaults of the period was the bombardment of the Sinanju complex beginning on 9 January.

54

 FEAF Comd Rpt, Nov 52, vol. II. 55 (1) COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, OctNov 52, sec. 1-1, 1-15. (2) Msg, CX 58908, CINCFE

to DA, 17 Nov 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov

52, G-3 sec., pt. III, tab 3.

56

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Dec 52, sec. 1-1, 1-2. 57

 (1) FEAF Comd Rpt, Dec 52, vol. I, pp. 1, 2,

8; vol. II. (2) COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt,

Dec 52, sec. 1-1, 1-6.
COLD FRONT 399

Seventeen B-29's launched the attack

and then, for the next six days, Fifth

Air Force fighter-bombers raided the

important freight yards and bridge approaches daily. Flying 1,243 sorties in

support of the program to knock out

Sinanju's transportation system, the

fighter-bombers managed to render all

the bridges into the town unserviceable

by 14 January. Rail traffic between Sinanju and P'yongyang was severed for

about eleven days and the Communists

had to strain their truck transport system

to take up the slack.58

During the Sinanju raid period, the

Sabrejets ran into a number of MIG's

and on 14 January the F-86's claimed

a banner day. They reported that 8

enemy planes had been knocked down,

2 others probably destroyed, and 8 had

been damaged. But outside an exceptional occasion like the foregoing, the

Chinese air forces evidenced little

change in their indisposition toward

combat in January.59

A month later, on 16 February, the

Navy celebrated the completion of the

second year of the longest effective siege

in United States naval history. Almost

daily since February 1951, Navy aircraft

had swarmed over the key port of Wonsan and surface guns had added to the

destruction. On 31 January and on 9-

10 February, the carriers Kearsarge,

Philippine Sea, and Oriskany mounted

large-scale air attacks on Wonsan, with

the battleship Missouri and other surface vessels also taking part in the January operation.60

When the concern voiced by General

Clark over the possibility of a Communist air attack coupled with an attempt to take Seoul before the spring

thaw proved groundless, the Air Force

and Navy commanders continued

to press the campaign to make the continuance of hostilities as expensive as

possible to the Communists. On 18-

19 February 511 Air Force and Marine

fighters and fighter-bombers raided the

tank and infantry school near P'yongyang with 541 tons of high explosives,

and 24 fighter-bombers hit Suiho again

in a surprise low-level attack. Despite

the intense antiaircraft concentrations

around Suiho, not a plane was lost or

damaged.

Twenty-four Thunderjets from the

Fifth Air Force made an 800-mile round

trip to Ch'ongjin, some sixty-three miles

from the Soviet border, to bomb the

city's industrial facilities on 5 March.

Only sixteen days later, planes from

three Navy carriers hit the same town

again with 169 sorties, causing huge

secondary explosions in the ammunition

storage area. In the meantime, the Fifth

Air Force sent twenty-six B-29's to destroy a troop and factory complex near

Sinuiju on 17 March. The bombardiers

claimed 147 buildings, 4 warehouses, and

1 manufacturing plant were wiped out

in this raid.

Emphasis continued on air interdiction during the December-March period, but it was not the same type that

the air forces had tried unsuccessfully

in the STRANGLE rail cutting program of

the previous year. Rather the air forces

aimed at striking and destroying vulnerable enemy targets that would not only

impede the Communist supply effort but

also apply pressure on them to end the

58

 FEAF Comd Rpt, Jan 52, vol. I, pp. 11-12;

vol II, Opns, tab 3. 59

 Ibid., vol. I, p. 13. 60

 COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan-Feb 53,

sec. 1-1, 1-12.
400 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

hostilities. By the destruction of communications centers and supply facilities,

such as factories, warehouses, and depots, the task of supporting the enemy's

troops at the front became a bit more

complicated every day. But the quietness along the battle lines during most

of the period did not require extraordinary expenditures of matériel and

ammunition and, despite the air forces'

efforts, the Communists were able to

stockpile supplies to sustain themselves

from thirty to forty-five days in the forward areas.61

As the enemy increased his ground activity during March, both the Air Force

and Navy began to put more stress upon

close air support and Cherokee-type

missions. The outbreak of fighting at

Old Baldy and VEGAS brought a spate of

calls for air operations against Chinese

strongpoints, supply dumps, and personnel concentrations close to the front. On

Old Baldy, FEAF provided 483 fighterbomber, 87 light-bomber, and 11 medium bomber sorties during the last

week of March. The FEAF planes

dropped about 400 tons of bombs on the

enemy ground positions, and Navy and

Marine aircraft added 77 tons of bombs

and 66 tons of napalm to the assault.62

The advent of spring and the accelerated tempo of enemy operations at the

close of March seemed to presage a departure from the somewhat uneventful

pattern of the winter months. From

time to time the actions had grown

warmer during the period, but the

fighting had never decided more than

the temporary possession of another hill.

Air and sea operations had provided a

measure of pressure upon the enemy as

towns and installations were destroyed

or damaged, but the Communists' powers of recuperation had been adequate to

readjust to these losses and irritations.

As April arrived, the military situation

remained essentially unchanged—neither side was vitally hurt nor willing to

risk a vital hurt. The sparring match

continued as both opponents awaited an

opportune moment to end the contest

on terms favorable to their own cause.

In view of this reluctance to seek a military decision, the truce tent still appeared to offer the only arena in which

a settlement would be effected.

61

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I,

Narrative, p. 24.

62

 FEAF Comd Rpts, Feb and Mar 53, vol. I, pp.

1-2 and 1-3, respectively.
CHAPTER XVIII

The Beginning of the End

When General Harrison and his associates walked out of the tent at Panmunjom on 8 October, they neither knew

when they would return nor if they

would come back at all. The possibility

that the Communists would alter their

attitude toward repatriation appeared

extremely unlikely at that time and the

military pressure that the U.N. Command could hope to muster gave no

promise of producing a change in the

enemy's stand. Since the UNC had

fallen back upon its final negotiating position, the discussion phase and the period of maneuvering were at an end.

Until a break occurred in the adamant

fronts presented by both sides, the prospects for a settlement remained remote.

The liaison officers meanwhile continued to meet at Panmunjom and furnished one point of contact for reflecting

a shift in the situation. The activity on

the battlefield, especially during the

October-November operations, provided another. And in the air over

North Korea, the Far East Air Forces did

its best to help speed up the enemy's desire to reach an agreement. To counter

the application of military pressure, the

Communists reverted to their old standbys—political and psychological warfare.

But the efficacy of either the UNC or

the enemy method was doubtful, since

both had been tried before and found

wanting.

The Long Recess: First Phase

The first nonmilitary attack by the

Communists in October was aimed at the

UNC tactics at Panmunjom. As soon

as the Harrison team left the tent, the

enemy began to charge that the UNC

had broken off the negotiations. Since

the onus for a collapse in the talks had

always been a sensitive point to the political and military leaders in Washington,

they quickly instructed Clark not to use

the term "indefinite recess" in the UNC

statements. They informed him that

there was no desire to have the armistice

negotiations debated in any forum other

than that of Panmunjom and that all

the efforts of the United States in the

U.N. General Assembly were directed towards facilitating an agreement at the

meetings in the tents.1

As the letters flew back and forth between the liaison officers in October,

the courses adopted by the opponents

became clear. The UNC stand rested

upon the conclusion that the Communists had neither accepted any of the

plans offered by the U.N. Command nor

proffered any of their own that were new

or reasonable; therefore, the UNC delegation would wait until the enemy satisfied one of the two conditions listed

above before it would reconvene. Har1

 Msg, JCS 920838, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Oct 52.
402 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

rison and Clark denied repeatedly that

the UNC had ended the negotiations.2

The Communists, on the other hand,

pursued two tactics. While they pressed

their accusations that the UNC had

ended the truce talks, they missed no

opportunity to cite UNC violations, real

and alleged, of the neutral zone around

Panmunjom. And as the incidence of

violence in the prisoner of war camps

started to increase again, the enemy negotiators strongly censured the UNC

for its treatment of the Communist

prisoners.3

To lessen the impact of the enemy's

charges and to explain the UNC position

in the negotiations to the rest of the

world, Secretary of State Acheson addressed the U.N. Political Committee on

24 October. Tracing the beginnings of

the talks and the development of the

issues, he admitted that the growth of

the conflict over repatriation had been

"wholly unexpected" and "surprising"

to the U.N. Command.4 He pointed out

the inconsistencies of the position

adopted by the USSR in opposing the

concept of no forced repatriation in

Korea when it had on various occasions

previously upheld the right of the prisoner of war to choose or refuse repatriation. In closing he stressed that the

UNC was ready to reconvene the meetings at Panmunjom at any time that the

Communists were willing to accept the

"fundamental principle of nonforcible

return."

 5

While the debates in the General

Assembly over the U.S. resolution

against forcible repatriation were going

on, other suggestions and resolutions

were brought forth. One of these was an

informal Canadian proposal that the

UNC seek a cease-fire in Korea and leave

the nonrepatriate problem to later negotiations. Both Army and State Department staffs objected to this procedure. To remove the threat of military

compulsion would amount to a surrender of the UNC's most potent weapon,

they maintained, while, at the same

time, the Communists would keep their

trump card—the UNC prisoners. The

enemy could protract the discussions on

the disposition of prisoners and in the

meantime rebuild its airfields, roads,

bridges and restock its supply dumps.

If the talks proved fruitless and hostilities again broke out, the Communist

military position could be greatly improved and UNC morale would be sadly

depressed.6

Several weeks later when the Joint

Chiefs forwarded their views on the

matter to the Secretary of Defense, they

endorsed the Army-State staff arguments. There could be no justification

for giving up the UNC air superiority

in Korea, they told Mr. Lovett, unless the

2

 (1) Ltr, Harrison to Nam, 15 Oct 52, no sub.

(2) Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 19 Oct 52. Both

in G-3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan

Mun Jom, 1952, bk. II.

3

 Ltrs, Nam to Harrison, 16 and 29 Oct 52, no

sub, in G-3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at

Pan Mun Jom, 1952, bk. II. 4

 From the context it is evident that Secretary

Acheson used the term "UNC" loosely, encompassing the political and military leadership in the

U.S. and other allied U.N. countries. As already

noted, General Ridgway had had misgivings about

the UNC position on voluntary repatriation before

it became the official stand. See Chapter VII, above.

5

 Department of State Publication 4771, The

Problem of Peace in Korea, a report by Secretary

of State Dean Acheson, October 24, 1952 (Washington, 1952). 6

 G-3 and State Dept Staff Paper, no title, no

date (ca. 28 Oct 52), in G-3 091 Korea, 3/22.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 403

Communists accepted the concept of no

forced repatriation.7

On 17 November the Indian delegation presented its plan to end the Korean War to the United Nations. The

Indian resolution recognized the U.S.

contention that no force should be used

to prevent or effect the return of

prisoners to their homeland. Yet in deference to the Communist stand, it

suggested that a repatriation commission, composed of two Communist and

two UNC nations, be set up to receive

all the prisoners in the demilitarized

zone. There they would be classified

according to nationality and domicile,

as the Communists had wished, and be

free to go home. Each side would have

the freedom of explaining to the prisoners their rights, and all prisoners who

still had not chosen repatriation after

ninety days would be referred to the

political conference recommended in

the armistice agreement. In case the

four members of the repatriation commission could not agree on the interpretation of the details of handling the

prisoners and their disposition, an umpire would be named by the members or

the General Assembly to break any deadlock.8

Although many of the United States

allies favored the Indian proposal, at

least in principle, the U.S. official reaction was quick and adverse. Most of the

objections voiced by the United States

concerned the vagueness of the duties

and responsibilities that the repatriation

commission would carry out and the indefinite procedure for handling nonrepatriates. Not only was the time limit

of ninety days too long for the interrogation period, but the U.S. still opposed turning over the nonrepatriates to

a political conference.9

But the Communist response proved

to be even stronger. Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky roundly denounced the

Indian plan in the United Nations, and

Chou En-lai rejected it by stating on 28

November that the Russian-sponsored

proposal calling for forcible repatriation

was the only reasonable one. When it

came to a vote on 3 December, the U.N.

voted down the USSR's resolution, 40

to 5, and adopted the Indian plan, 54 to

5. Only the Communist bloc supported

the Russian and opposed the Indian proposal. The latter provided that if the

peace conference did not settle the nonrepatriates' fate in thirty days, the prisoners would be turned over to the

United Nations for disposition.10

There was small chance that the Communists would pay much heed to the

action of the General Assembly in the

matter beyond attacking it vigorously.

But the bitter assault that they launched

on the Indian suggestion served two

purposes: it alienated public opinion in

some of the neutral countries that had

supported this solution; and it helped

obscure the milder disapproval evidenced by the United States.

The unfavorable publicity garnered

by the Communists on this score, however, was soon to be matched by the

gathering storm of unfortunate events

7

 Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 17 Nov 52,

sub: U.S. Position on Korea. . . . 8

 Msg, DA 924505, G-3 to CINCFE, 22 Nov 52.

9

 (1) Msg, DA 924551, G-3 to CINCFE, 23 Nov

52. (2) U.S. Reaction to India's Proposal on Prisoners of War, Statement made by Secretary Acheson,

in Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXVII, No. 702

(December 8, 1952), pp. 910ff. 10

 Text of Resolution on Prisoners of War, 3 Dec

52, in Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXVII, No. 702

(December 8, 1952), pp. 916-17.
404 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

taking place in UNC prison camps. Although the Communist prisoners had

been relocated in smaller, more manageable groups and scattered on a number of islands to lessen the threat of concerted action, the hard-core leaders and

their followers had shown no disposition

toward ending their fight in the compounds.

As already indicated, the problem of

maintaining order and discipline in the

Communist enclosures was fraught with

pitfalls. A policy of leniency and laxness would allow the zealous partisans

full opportunity to control and administer the compounds as they saw fit. On

the other hand, a ruthless, hard policy

with tight control and discipline meant

continual clashes and bloodshed. The

Communists seemed to welcome violence and—even more—to encourage it.

For every man that the UNC was inveigled into wounding or killing meant

another propaganda advantage to the

enemy. The Communist prisoners acted

therefore as a double weapon since they

forced the UNC to maintain strong

guard forces in the rear and since their

agitation placed the UNC constantly on

the defensive to justify its repressive

measures.

When the Joint Strategic Plans and

Operations Group suggested in early

October that the UNC Armistice Delegation should seek to forestall Communist

propaganda gains by charging the enemy

with instigation of the disturbances in

the camps each time one occurred, the

delegation agreed that this approach had

merit. But it pointed out that seizing

the initiative would probably neither

deter the Communists from causing the

disorders nor from magnifying them to

suit their purpose. The delegation felt

that if the UNC intended to accuse the

enemy of fomenting trouble, concrete

evidence of such activity would have to

be presented to substantiate the charges.

This would mean that intercepted

orders, confessions, plans that were uncovered, and other proof of enemy direction would have to be produced and

publicized.11 The concern of the Far

East Command with the enemy's techniques in exploiting the situation in the

prison camps was to produce results

later on, but for the time being nothing

was done.

Meanwhile the enemy seldom attended a meeting of the liaison officers

without citing a violation of the Geneva

Convention in regard to the treatment

of prisoners or an infringement of the

neutral zone around Panmunjom by

UNC aircraft or ground troops. On 30

November the Communists alleged that

the UNC had wounded thirty-two prisoners at Koje-do five days earlier and

then went on to claim that during October and November a total of 542 Communist prisoners had been killed or

wounded.12 By the end of the year,

General Nam charged that the UNC had

caused 3,059 casualties among the Communist internees since July 1951 and

noted that the Communists had lodged

45 protests on this score since February

1952.13

11

 Ltr, Col S. D. Somerville, Exec to UNC Delegation, to Chief JSPOG, 14 Oct 52, sub: Letter on

POW Incidents, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan31 Dec 52. 12

 Memo for Rcd, sub: Liaison Officers' Mtgs, 30

Nov 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, incls

1-89, incl 1. 13

 Ltr, Nam to Harrison, 30 Dec 52, no sub, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incls 1

and 2.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 405

ENCLOSURE 1 OF THE POW CAMP AT PONGAM-DO

The growing toll in the prison

camps caused UNC leaders a great deal

of uneasiness as December began. Direct disobedience of orders was a common occurrence and was usually countered by direct application of force.

Indications from the UNC Prisoner of

War Command pointed to considerable

planning among the prisoners for a mass

breakout from the camps in early December and one of the worst trouble

spots was at the civilian internee compounds on Pongam-do, a tiny island not

far from Koje-do.14

It was difficult to understand why

Pongam-do had been chosen for a prison

camp site. The island was small and

compounds had to be located on the

side of a steeply terraced hill. Since the

prisoners were placed on the upper terraces and access could only be gained

by proceeding level by level up the hill,

the Communist internees were given all

the advantages of terrain. For some

time, the prisoners at Pongam-do had

been getting bolder and bolder. They

organized and conducted military drill

in defiance of UNC orders and mounted

demonstrations at will. Among the 9,000

inmates on the island were many of the

prisoners who had been participants in

the February 1952 outbreak on Koje-do.

They were guarded by one ROK security

14

 Msg, CX 59869, CINCUNC to DA, 8 Dec 52,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incl 6.
406 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

battalion and some U.S. administrative

personnel.

On 14 December matters came to a

head. Around 3,600 internees in six

compounds were ordered to disband

their drilling and to cease causing a

commotion. Instead they formed three

ranks on the upper terrace and locked

arms. Others gathered behind this protective screen and began to hurl rocks

and debris on the ROK troops as they

ascended the hill to enforce the order.

Ordinarily concussion grenades and nontoxic gas would have been used, but, in

this instance, the prisoners could throw

the grenades back down the hill and a

strong cross-wind ruled out the employment of gas. Thus, when orders and

warning shots were disregarded, the

ROK soldiers began to take aim at the

solid, defiant ranks above them. At close

range the bullets opened gaps in the

human chain and resistance collapsed.

But when the melee was over, 85 prisoners lay dead, 113 were hospitalized,

and there were over 100 minor injuries.

Only four ROK personnel received major wounds.15

The affair at Pongam-do again led

to a flurry of activity on POW matters.

Clark told Van Fleet to have available

one U.S. infantry battalion that could be

shifted to the Korean Communications

Zone on twenty-four hours' notice and

authorized General Herren to utilize one

battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division on

the prisoner of war mission. When Herren asked that helicopters be furnished

so that tear gas grenades could be

dropped on rioters to disperse them

without casualties, Clark approved his

request.16 These measures would help

to cope with the results of the prisoner

agitation if not with the causes.

To strengthen his hand against further outbreaks in the prison camps,

Clark pressed anew for authority to

establish a U.N. military commission to

try prisoners charged with postcapture

offenses. His urgings in July and August

had elicited no positive action, despite

the support of General Collins, but

with the example of Pongam-do fresh in

the news, Clark reminded his superiors that the lack of appropriate judicial

machinery weakened the disciplinary

powers of the camp commanders.17 In

view of the legal and political complications involved in conducting trials of

prisoners of war, the U.S. political and

military leaders had been reluctant to

use this weapon in the past, but Clark's

plea reopened the matter. Speedy action approving such authority, however,

appeared to be out of the question,

since the JCS intended to have the entire POW problem reviewed at the highest level.18

 This meant consideration by

the new President and his advisors and

would take time.

Pongam-do produced protests from

the Communists and criticism by the International Committee of the Red Cross

of the methods used by the U.N. Command. The latter complaint was more

difficult to cope with, for the ICRC was

highly regarded throughout the non15

 Msg, CX 60206 and CX 60301, CINCUNC to

DA, 15 and 18 Dec 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

Dec 52, incls 1-78, incl 8.

16

 (1) Msg, CX 60234, CINCFE to CG Eighth

Army, 16 Dec 52. (2) Msg, CX 60303, CINCFE to

CG Eighth Army, 18 Dec 52. Both in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incls 9 and 10. 17

 Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 19 Dec 52, sub:

Trial of POW's for Post-Captive Offenses, in G-3

383.6, 64. 18

 Msg, JCS 928298, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jan 53.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 407

Communist world. In answer to the Red

Cross allegation that the UNC control

of prisoners had been overly strict and

the members of the security forces had

been unnecessarily harassing the prisoners, Clark issued a statement defending the UNC actions and attacking the

Communist prisoners' behavior. He reminded the ICRC representatives that

the UNC had voluntarily observed the

Geneva Convention while the Communists had ignored it. When it came to

deliberate disobedience, marked by

mutiny, riots, or refusal to carry out orders, on the one hand, and terrorism

in the camps, on the other, the UNC had

used force, but only after all other

methods had been tried. Clark pointed

out that the UNC had constantly sought

to improve the physical facilities and

supply procedures for the camps and

that only the pro-Communist enclosures,

whose inmates had never accepted their

nonbelligerent status as prisoners, had

turned to organized violence.19

Despite the voluminousness of the

enemy's protests during the latter part of

1952, Clark did not believe that the

Communists had any intention of terminating the negotiations. The continuous barrage of enemy grievances

seemed designed, in his opinion, to play

upon the fears of the United States' allies

and to create sympathy for the Communist position on prisoners of war.20

Nevertheless, the Far East commander took steps to lessen the opportunities of the prisoners to incite unrest. To

eliminate the necessity for visiting the

latrines at night, the prison command

installed facilities in each barracks. In

the corridors between the compounds

guards were armed with shotguns so that

prisoners moving around in disobedience

to the camp curfew could be identified

by the buckshot they absorbed, but not

killed or seriously injured.21

In early January, the Department of

the Army and the Far East Command

decided that the time had come to expose the Communist methods and techniques of stirring up trouble in the

prison camps. The Military Intelligence

Section, G-2, of the FEC was assigned

the task of compiling a report on the

organization, control, and methods used

by the enemy to exploit their faithful

followers and to demonstrate the problems facing the U.N. Command as it attempted to deal with the matter. The

end result was the study entitled The

Communist War at POW Camps, published in late January.22

 The press reaction in the United States to the release of

this report was highly favorable, but

complete copies were not available there

and full advantage of the study could

not be attained.23

The enemy seemed to hold the upper

hand in the battle of indirect pressures

as 1953 began. However, the UNC still

retained several weapons that it had not

19

 (1) Msg, C 60412, CINCFE to DA, 21 Dec 52,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incl

19. (2) Msg, CX 60820, CINCUNC to CSUSA, 5

Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls

1-67, incl 16. 20

 Msg, CX 60789, CINCFE to JCS, 2 Jan 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67, incl 15.

21

 (1) Msg, CX 60811, CINCUNC to Herren, 3

Jan 53. (2) Msg, AX 72028, Herren to Clark, 8

Jan 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53,

incls 1-67, incls 17 and 18. 22

 Msg, DA 928223, DA to CINCFE, 9 Jan 53. 23

 (1) Msg, ZX 35682, CINCFE to DA, 28 Jan 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67, incl

23. (2) Msg, DA 930068, DA to CINCFE, 30 Jan

53.
408 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

used. In mid-December, Col. Charles W.

McCarthy, senior UNC liaison officer,

had urged that the UNC strike back. In

a letter to the Joint Strategic Plans and

Operations Group he pointed out that

the UNC pilots were allowing the Communists to utilize the P'yongyang-Kaesong road for convoys to the truce area

every day. In effect, what this meant, McCarthy continued, was that the enemy

had a main supply route open all day despite the fact that the negotiations were

in recess. He proposed that the UNC cut

back the number of convoys permitted

the enemy to three or less a week and

require the Communists to adhere

to a tight timetable for each trip allowed. Such action would strike a blow

at the enemy and perhaps let the people

back home know that the UNC was not

adopting a passive approach to the Communists' behind-the-scenes tactics.24

Thus, when the liaison officers met

on 15 January, Colonel McCarthy's successor, Col. William B. Carlock,

informed Col. Ju Yon, who had recently

taken Colonel Chang's place, of the

new UNC policy. Starting on 25 January, the Communists would be allowed

to run only two convoys a week as long

as the negotiations were in recess. One

would leave P'yongyang and the other

Kaesong every Sunday morning; both

would be required to finish their journeys by 2000. To the protest by the

Communists that the UNC could not

unilaterally break the agreement of November 1951, Colonel Carlock informed

Ju that there was no "agreement" on

the immunity granted the Communists,

since the enemy had not extended any

like consideration to the UNC.25

The Republicans Take Over

When Dwight D. Eisenhower became

President of the United States on 20 January, John Foster Dulles succeeded Dean

Acheson as Secretary of State and

Charles E. Wilson became Secretary of

Defense. Yet, as noted above, there was

no basic change in U.S. policy insofar as

the Korean War was concerned. The

new administration had no panacea for

ending the conflict expeditiously and no

intention of expanding the military

pressure to force a settlement upon

the Communists. On the whole the Republicans adopted the policy of watchful

waiting pursued by the Truman administration.

The new President quickly changed

one of the procedures followed by Mr.

Truman during his term of office. No

longer were all the important messages

concerning the Korean War routed

across his desk for final approval. This

task now fell largely to the Secretaries

of State and Defense and Mr. Dulles'

role in the making of Korean policy increased during the early months of 1953.

In one substantive respect, too, President Eisenhower swiftly divorced himself from the course followed by his

predecessor. In his State of the Union

message to Congress on 2 February, Mr.

Eisenhower revealed that he had decided to end the U.S. naval blockade of

Taiwan.

24

 Ltr, McCarthy to Col Donald H. Galloway,

Deputy Chief JSPOG, 16 Dec 52, no sub, in FEC

SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan-31 Dec 52.

25

 (1) Ltr, Carlock to Ju, 15 Jan 53, no sub. (2)

Ltr, Ju to Carlock, 21 Jan 53, no sub. (3) Liaison

Officers Mtgs, 21 Jan 53. All in G-3 File, Liaison

Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53,

bk. III.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 409

No longer would the U.S. Seventh

Fleet serve as a screen for the Chinese

Communists and prevent Chiang Kaishek from attacking the mainland, the

President affirmed. As might be expected, reaction to this shift was loud

and varied. General MacArthur, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, Chiang Kaishek, and President Rhee all supported

the rescinding of the restriction, while

leading Democrats and prominent newspapermen in Great Britain and India

immediately voiced their concern lest

the act provoke an extension of the war

into the Taiwan area. Backers of the

President hailed the "unleashing" of

Chiang's forces and praised Eisenhower

for having seized the initiative in the

battle with communism. But if it were

true that the enemy might be confused

and forced to guess at the next move that

the United States might make, it was also

fair to state that the sword was twoedged. It was also conceivable that the

Communist Chinese might attack Taiwan.

British Foreign Secretary Eden was

quite cool to the "unilateral" decision

taken by the new government without

consultation with its allies and warned

that the move might "have very unfortunate political repercussions without

compensating military advantages." In

India, one newspaper accused the President of "hunting peace with a gun."

 26

Despite the excitement generated by

this announcement, there was no sudden

outbreak of operations in the Taiwan

sector. The Nationalist Chinese forces

had but few landing craft and only a

small number of their troops were amphibiously trained. Without greater

support in equipment from the United

States and the preparation of more divisions for assault landings, the Nationalist threat could become little more than

a threat. The principal result of the

"unleashing" was to stir up the political

and diplomatic waters of the world,

while those about Taiwan remained

militarily serene. As the historian of

the Far East Naval Forces remarked:

"Despite internal uneasiness over the

decision, it did not have the immediate

strategic significance expected, and, tactically, had no effect on the operation

of the Formosa Patrol."

 27

Gradually the Eisenhower administration became more familiar with the

problems in Korea and began to consider

what positive steps could be taken

within the accepted political framework

to break the impasse. Once again the

concept of unilateral release of the nonrepatriates and the presentation to the

Communists of a fait accompli was revived and Clark was asked to comment

on this approach. Because of the sensitivity of the matter, Clark sent a member

of his staff, Lt. Col. Arthur W. Kogstad,

to Washington to present his views.

Meeting with Washington officials in

early March, Kogstad informed the

group that Clark was fully in favor of

releasing the Korean nonrepatriates and

did not think that such a move would

have an appreciable effect upon the

UNC's prospects for an armistice in Korea. As for the Chinese nonrepatriates,

their disposition would require careful

attention, since it would have political

implications. Kogstad later reported

that the tenor of opinion among the 26

 The reaction to the 2 February speech may

be found in the New York Times, February 3, 4

1953.

27

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan, Feb 53,

p. 4.
410 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

conferees attending the meeting had

been favorable to Clark's recommendation, but other factors were at work. Mr.

Dulles, who had a major hand in making

policy in Mr. Eisenhower's administration, was busy with the U.N. General

Assembly and unable to devote his time

to the POW question in early

March. Then, too, the sudden demise

of Joseph Stalin of a cerebral hemorrhage on 5 March had injected any number of new elements into the world

political picture, and time was required

to assess them before bold ventures

were embarked upon.28 At any rate time

overtook the concept of unilateral release insofar as the U.N. Command was

concerned and the next time it reared

its head, it bore the visage of Syngman

Rhee.29

The rash of incidents in the prison

camps meanwhile continued unabated.

Clark decided in February to sound out

the new political chiefs on the old question of trial of prisoners for their postcapture offenses. Pointing out that the

publication of the study of the Communist prisoners had raised questions

among the press and his own troops as

to why no disciplinary action had been

taken against the prison leaders, Clark

requested immediate consideration for

this pressing problem.30

The Far East commander received

some solace in late February. In cases of

flagrant attack against UNC security

personnel, the JCS told him, Clark

might bring the offenders to justice, but

no undue publicity would be given to

the trials. This was only a halfway

measure. Clark immediately protested,

since most of the violence had been directed at fellow prisoners rather than at

the U.N. Command. In the face of this

reclama, the JCS secured authority for

the UNC to try prisoners charged with

offenses committed after June 1952

against other prisoners.31

Despite this apparent victory, events

conspired to delay the trial and punishment of the Communist troublemakers

in the prison camps. Before the Far

East Command brought the first cases

to court, the State Department wanted

to line up judicial support and participation in the trials from the United

States' allies in Korea. By the end of

March, however, only four nations had

agreed to serve on military commissions.32

 This reluctance to share the

responsibility for trying prisoners of

war for postcapture offenses and the

swift flow of developments on the negotiating front in late March seemed to

offer small hope that the ringleaders of

violence would ever come to trial.

The Communist threat to Seoul in

February, discussed in the preceding

chapter, produced several exchanges between Tokyo and Washington concerning the neutral city of Kaesong. Under

the October 1951 agreement, Kaesong

was protected from UNC attack. Yet,

Clark told the JCS in early February, the

28

 A good account of the Kogstad mission will be

found in Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 52-Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 271ff. See

also Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 262. 29

 See Chapter XX, below. 30

 Msg, CX 61135, CINCUNC to DA, 4 Feb 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88, incl 15.

31

 (1) Msg, DA 931969, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Feb

53. (2) Msg, CX 61323, CINCUNC to DA, 24 Feb

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88,

incl 17. (3) Msg, JCS 932476, JCS to CINCFE, 28

Feb 53. 32

 (1) Msg, JCS 933135, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Mar

53. (2) Msgs, CX 61627 and CX 61647, CINCUNC

to G-3, 25 and 27 Mar 53. Both in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1-72, incls 13 and 14.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 411

enemy was using the town for restaging

troops, for resupply, and as an espionage

headquarters. If and when he became

convinced that a major Communist offensive was in the offing, Clark wanted

authority to abrogate the 1951 agreement and attack Kaesong. On 9 February, just two days after his initial request, the United Nations commander

asked for permission to open up Kaesong

to assault.33

When Clark's recommendation came

up for discussion in Washington, Mr.

Dulles urged that the U.N. Command

should unilaterally abrogate the security

agreement of 1951 as of a specific date

and remove Kaesong and Munsan, but

not Panmunjom, from a neutral status,

if an enemy offensive of division size or

larger seemed imminent. The JCS, in

passing the decision on to Clark, pointed

out that such an action would help alleviate an adverse military situation,

while lessening the political implications that the negotiations were being

completely broken off.34 As it turned

out, the large-scale Communist offensive

failed to materialize and Clark did not

have to retract Kaesong's immunity.

The Big Break

Amidst the search for ways and means

to apply pressure upon the enemy and

to strengthen General Clark's hand in

the conflict, the UNC made a rather perfunctory gesture that, at the time,

seemed to offer little chance of a favorable response. Back in December, Clark

had read a news despatch from Geneva

which reported that the Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies had passed a resolution on 13 December calling for the immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.

Clark suggested that, although he did

not think the Communists would agree

to such an exchange in the light of their

previous reaction to similar proposals, he

felt that the UNC should support the

resolution for its psychological and publicity value.35

No action was taken on his suggestion

until February. Then the State Department learned that the question of an

exchange of sick and wounded would

probably be raised when the U.N. General Assembly met on 24 February. The

political advantage in having the United

States propose and support a resolution

of this nature was obvious and the State

Department had little difficulty in securing the approval of the JCS and of

Clark.36

On 22 February the Far East commander thus sent a letter to Kim and

Peng requesting an immediate exchange

of sick and injured prisoners. He believed they would turn it down, as they

had earlier efforts along this line.37

The matter lay fallow during the remainder of the month and most of

March. In the meantime, the enemy

33

 Msgs, CX 61160 and CX 61173, CINCUNC to

JCS, 7 and 9 Feb 53, in JSPOG Staff Study No.

495, in JSPOG Files. 34

 (1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 12 Feb 53, sub:

Abrogation of Security Agreement Re KaesongPanmunjom-Munsan, in G-3 091 Korea, 12/4. (2)

Msg, JCS 931311, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Feb 53.

35

 Msg, CX 60418, CINCUNC to 6-3, 21 Dec 52,

DA-IN 220029. 36

 (1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 16 Feb 53, sub:

Proposal to Exchange Sick and Wounded POW's,

in G-3 383.6, 13/4. (2) Msg, JCS 931724, JCS to

CINCFE, 19 Feb 53. (3) Msg, CX 61281, Clark to

DA, 19 Feb 53, DA-IN 239084. 37

 (1) Msg, CX 61281, Clark to DA, 19 Feb 53,

DA-IN 239084. (2) Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng,

22 Feb 53, no sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers

Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.
412 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

sustained the flow of complaints on prisoner of war incidents, infringements of

the vital area by UNC aircraft, and even

resurrected the charge that the UNC

was resorting to germ warfare. On 24

February Clark issued a statement refuting the Chinese claim that captured

American personnel had admitted the

employment of germ warfare. He

pointed out that Communists evidently

expected new outbreaks of disease during the spring and were trying to cover

up the inadequacy of their own health

service to cope with epidemics. In conclusion, he reaffirmed that the U.N. command had never engaged in germ warfare in Korea.38

As March opened, events began to

change the world situation dramatically.

Stalin's successor, Georgi M. Malenkov,

assumed the reins of government on 5

March and another transition period for

world communism was inaugurated.

Whether the policies of the new controlling group surrounding Malenkov would

differ radically from those of Stalin was

unknown, but that there would have to

be a period of consolidation to establish

Malenkov and his associates in power

seemed self-evident. Under the circumstances, the United States and its allies

cautiously awaited indications of the direction that the Malenkov regime intended to take.

Although the Communist prisoners of

war seemed little affected by Stalin's

death and mounted an attack on the

prison commandant on the island of

Yoncho-do on 7 March, which resulted

in the death of twenty-three prisoners

and the wounding of sixty more, there

were signs that a shift in Soviet strategy

might be approaching.39 On 21 March

Moscow radio, for the first time since

the close of World War II, admitted that

the United States and Great Britain had

played a role in the defeat of the Axis

Powers. The Russians also agreed to

intervene to obtain the release of nine

British diplomats and missionaries held

captive in North Korea since the outbreak of the Korean War. In Germany,

the Soviet reaction to the West German

ratification of the European Defense

Community treaty was fairly mild.40 The

possibility that a new Communist peace

offensive was in the making evoked a

spirit of hope in diplomatic circles

throughout the non-Communist world.

The big break came on 28 March.

Replying to Clark's request for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners,

Kim and Peng said that they were perfectly willing to carry out the provisions

of the Geneva Convention in this respect

and then went on to state: "At the same

time, we consider that the reasonable

settlement of the question of exchanging

sick and injured prisoners of both sides

during the period of hostilities should

be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners

of war, thereby achieving an armistice

in Korea for which people throughout

the world are longing."

 41

What the Communist leaders meant

by their vague reference to a "smooth

settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war" was a matter of conjecture,

but their acceptance of the sick and

wounded exchange promoted optimism.

38

 Msg, Z 35882, CINCFE to DA, 24 Feb 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88, incl 7.

39

 Msg, EX 13138, CG AFFE to DA, 9 Mar 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1-72, incl 16. 40

 New York Times, March 20, 21, 25, 1953. 41

 Ltr, Kim and Peng to Clark, 28 Mar 53, no

sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan

Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 413

Clark immediately told the JCS that he

would go ahead with the arrangements

for the sick and wounded through the

liaison officers, but would decline to resume plenary sessions until the enemy

either came forward with a constructive

proposal or demonstrated willingness to

accept one of the offers that the UNC

had made.42 In their reply, his superiors

suggested that Clark's letter imply that

the Communists intended to meet in

substance the UNC position on prisoners if the negotiations were reconvened.

In this way the burden would be placed

upon the enemy to either agree to that

assumption or admit publicly that there

was no change in their stand on repatriation. In no case, the Washington leaders

concluded, would the resumption of negotiations be tied in as a condition for

the exchange of the sick and wounded.43

Clark followed the instructions and dispatched his response to Kim and Peng

on 31 March.44

While Tokyo and Washington pondered the significance of the Communist

move, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of

Communist China, provided a measure

of clarification. On 30 March he issued

a statement covering the course of the

negotiations and the agreements already

reached. Chou then went on to the prisoner of war problem and offered what

apparently was the key concession, as he

urged that both sides "should undertake

to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of

war in their custody who insist upon

repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral

state so as to ensure a just solution to the

question of their repatriation." Lest

the U.N. Command assume that the

enemy had surrendered its views on repatriation, Chou strongly affirmed that

the Communists believed that the prisoners of war had been filled with apprehensions and were afraid to return home

"under the intimidation and with oppression of the opposite side." He was

confident that once explanations could

be tendered to the prisoners, they would

quickly decide to be repatriated.45 At

any rate, the Chou proposal, which was

quickly seconded by Kim Il Sung the

following day, presented the brightest

hope of settling the Korean War since

screening in April 1952.

The initial reaction to Chou's communication in Washington was continued caution. While not denying that it

held promise, the U.S. leaders maintained that the Communists still had

to come forward with a detailed plan

for implementing their proposal. They

could foresee a number of questions that

would have to be answered such as:

What did Chou mean by a "neutral"

state? Where would the neutral state

take over control of the prisoners—in or

outside of Korea? Who would make the

explanations? Who would determine

the final disposition of the nonrepatriates? If the Communists went forward

with the exchange of sick and wounded

and produced a detailed statement indicating their good faith in desiring a settlement of the over-all problem, the

American leaders were willing to permit 42

 Msg, CX 61673, Clark to JCS, 29 Mar 53, DAIN 252152. 43

 Msg, JCS 935136, JCS to CINCUNC, 30 Mar 53. 44

 Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 31 Mar 53, no

sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at

Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.

45

 Statement of Chou En-lai, 30 Mar 53, in G-3

file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom,

Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.
414 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

concurrent discussion of Chou's proposal

during the exchange.46

Clark agreed fully that the enemy

must produce a concrete plan for discussion before the plenary sessions could

reconvene and that the Communist performance in following through on the

sick and wounded trade would provide

a demonstration of their good faith. In

a letter to the enemy leaders on 5 April,

he proposed that the liaison officers meet

the following day and requested that

Kim and Peng furnish the UNC with

more particulars on the Communist

method for disposition of the nonrepatriation question.47

In preparation for the first meeting of

the liaison officers on the arrangements

for the transfer of the sick and wounded,

Clark and his staff formulated a UNC

plan. It contemplated that each prisoner

to be exchanged would be brought to

Panmunjom, furnished with a medical

tag on his condition and treatment and

given unmarked, serviceable clothing.

No incapacitated prisoner accused of

postcapture war crimes would be held

back for this reason, since it did not appear probable now that war crimes

trials would ever be held. To insure that

the enemy return the maximum number

of UNC personnel, Clark told Harrison

to avoid the use of the term "seriously"

sick and wounded. As for the treatment

of the prisoners turned back to the UNC

through the exchange, Clark wanted to

permit the members of the press and

other news media to observe the whole

process, but to restrict their numbers to

fifty at Panmunjom and to allow interviews only with the prisoners selected by

medical personnel as physically and mentally up to being questioned.48

Operation LITTLE SWITCH

Admiral Daniel and General Lee Sang

Cho led the liaison officers groups when

they gathered at Panmunjom on 6 April.

Relieved of the task of lodging and refuting charges and complaints, the representatives quickly got down to business

and Admiral Daniel launched into an

account of the UNC proposal. The

United Nations Command was ready

to start immediate construction of the

facilities necessary for the delivery and

receipt of the sick and wounded at Panmunjom and to begin delivery of 500

prisoners a day within seven days of the

agreement on procedures. To expedite

matters Daniel suggested that each side

turn over its lists of names and nationalities of the prisoners to be exchanged

and that officers be appointed to discuss

administrative details. Lee pointed out

that the Communists wanted to repatriate all sick and wounded eligibles under

Articles 109 and 110 of the Geneva Convention.49

46

 Msg, JCS 935344, JCS to CINCUNC, 1 Apr 53.

The message was drafted by the State Department

and approved by the Services, General Bradley, and

the Department of Defense. 47

 (1) Msg, C 61723, Clark to JCS, 3 April 53,

DA-IN 253841. (2) Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng,

5 Apr 53, no sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers

Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.

48

 (1) Msgs, CX 61741 and 61743, Clark to JCS,

4 Apr 53, DA-IN's 254454 and 254434. (2) Msg,

CX 61751, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 4 Apr

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256,

incl 7. (3) Msg, CX 61767, Clark to DA, 6 Apr 53,

in same place, incl 48. 49

 First Meeting of Liaison Group for discussing

arrangement for repatriation of sick and wounded

captured personnel, 6 April 53, in G-3 file, Transcript of Proceedings, Meetings of Liaison Group,

6 April-2 May 1953. All the meetings of the group

are in the above file and will be henceforth referred to only by number and date.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 415

After some hesitation, while the UNC

checked the Geneva Convention carefully, Daniel informed the Communists

on 7 April that his side was prepared to

repatriate all prisoners eligible under

the two articles, subject to the proviso

that no individual would be repatriated

against his will. Daniel stressed that the

UNC would give the broadest interpretation possible to the term "sick and

wounded."

 50

The effort of the United Nations

Command to encourage the enemy to

return as many prisoners as possible met

with a disappointing response. When

Lee announced the total on 8 April of

450 Korean and 150 non-Korean sick and

wounded, Daniel called the figure "incredibly small." Actually, considering

that the enemy was returning 600 of the

12,000 prisoners under its control, or 5

percent, the figure compared favorably

with that presented by the UNC. For

the latter intended to transfer 700 Chinese and 5,100 Koreans over to the enemy out of the 132,000 prisoners in its

custody and this averaged out to

only about 4.5 percent. Nevertheless,

Daniel again asked the Communists to

be more liberal in their classification of

the sick and wounded.51 As he told Clark

after the meeting, the enemy liaison officers relaxed their strained attitudes

visibly after the UNC disclosed its figures and he felt that he should press

strongly for an increase in the totals the

UNC would receive.52

In the succeeding days the details were

gradually worked out. Security guards

at Panmunjom were increased to thirty

for each side during the exchange period

and the UNC agreed to let the Communists move the prisoners up to the

conference area in convoys of five vehicles over routes that were clearly marked

out.53

The agreement that was signed on 11

April completed the general arrangements. Within ten days the exchange

at Panmunjom would begin, with the

enemy delivering 100 and the UNC 500

a day in groups of 25 at a time. Rosters

prepared by nationality, including name,

rank, and serial number would accompany each group and receipts would be

signed for a group as it was turned over

to the other side.54

April 20 was established as the date

for initiating LITTLE SWITCH, as the U.N.

Command dubbed the operation, and in

the interim trucks and trains began to

transport the Communist prisoners north

from Koje-do and the other offshore islands. On 14 April, twenty-three vehicles

left the North Korean prison camps with

the first contingent of UNC sick and

wounded. Five days later the first trainload of enemy prisoners set out from

Pusan to Munsan. But even as the Communist invalids prepared to go home,

they sought to embarrass the UNC.

Some refused a new issue of clothing

because the letter "P" for prisoner had

not been stenciled on the shirts. Others

would not permit UNC personnel to

dust them with DDT powder. Demonstrations broke out, with chanting and

singing, until camp authorities warned

the leaders that failure to obey orders

50 would result in loss of their opportunity Second Mtg, Liaison Group, 7 Apr 53. 51

 Third Mtg, Liaison Group, 8 Apr 53. 52

 Msg, HNC 1611, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 8 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

Apr 53, incls 1-256, incl 20.

53

 Fourth and Fifth Mtgs, Liaison Group, 9-10

Apr 53. 54

 Sixth Mtg, Liaison Group, 11 Apr 53.
416 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

SIGNING THE AGREEMENT FOR THE EXCHANGE OF SICK AND WOUNDED PRISONERS,

Panmunjom, 11 April 1953.

for repatriation. As the prisoners rode

to the waiting LST for shipment to the

mainland, they threw away their rations

of tooth powder, soap, and cigarettes

with hand-printed propaganda messages

cached inside, charging the United States

with "starvation, oppression and barbarous acts against the Korean people." At

Pusan they demanded the right of inspection of hospital facilities before they

debarked and had to be told they would

be forcibly removed unless they complied with instructions. Some of the

Chinese went on a hunger strike for

several meals because they claimed that

the food had been poisoned. When the

time came for the final train ride from

Pusan to Munsan, many of the prisoners

cut off buttons, severed the half-belts of

their overcoats, and removed their shoelaces in an attempt to create the impression that they had been poorly treated.55

As the U.N. Command gathered all of

the Communist prisoners eligible for

return, it discovered that there were

more than 5,800 who could be repatriated. The question immediately arose

whether to include the additional 550

Communists in the exchange or to adhere to the original tally. General Clark

felt that the advantages of demonstrating

55

 Msg, PWCG 4-386, POW Comd to AFFE, 19

Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls

1-256, incl 106.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 417

THE COMMUNIST POW EXCHANGE SITE AT PANMUNJOM

the good faith of the UNC and of possibly spurring the enemy to increase its

total of returnees outweighed the disadvantages of introducing a new figure and

his superiors agreed.56

A new element was injected into the

situation after LITTLE SWITCH got under

way on 20 April. When the UNC sick

and wounded were delivered to Panmunjom they were rushed back to Munsan

for initial processing. Some were then

flown to Japan for rest and treatment

preparatory to shipment home, while the

ROK patients were transferred to base

hospitals in South Korea. As the press

descended upon the prisoners for accounts of their experiences while in

Communist hands, stories arose of other

ill and injured prisoners still remaining

in the enemy camps. Harrison quickly

suggested that the UNC use the 550

extra Communist prisoners as a lever to

pry more UNC personnel away from the

enemy. But Clark preferred that Harrison simply ask the Communists to reexamine the matter, since many prisoners might not be in a fit condition to

be moved.57

56

 (1) Msg, HNC 1634, CINCUNC to DA, 20 Apr

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256,

incl 111. (2) Msg, JCS 936993, JCS to CINCFE,

20 Apr 53.

57

 (1) Msg, HNC 1637, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 21 Apr 53. (2) Msg, C 62028,

CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv) , 22 Apr 53. Both

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256,

incls 114 and 117.
418 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

OPERATION LITTLE SWITCH. Left, a wounded U.N. soldier is repatriated. Right, a

wounded Communist is carried by a North Korean soldier.

Whether the enemy was influenced by

the UNC revelation that it was going

to turn over 550 more patients than

originally estimated, or by the uproar

that the press stories of the UNC sick

and wounded reportedly still in Communist custody occasioned in the

United States, was difficult to ascertain.

On 23 April, however, the Communists

did announce that they would also exceed the 600 figure that they had submitted.58

Hoping to encourage further relaxation of the Communists' standards, the

UNC added more enemy prisoners to its

list, but on 26 April General Lee abruptly stated that his side had completed its share of the exchange. When

Admiral Daniel protested that evidence

in UNC possession showed that there

were still about 375 UNC sick and

wounded who could be repatriated, Lee

termed it a groundless accusation and

refused to consider the matter. Faced

with an unyielding stand, the U.N. Command on 3 May finished delivering the

last group of Communists that it intended to turn over.59

58

 (1) Msg, C 62042, Clark to DA, 23 Apr 53. (2) The final tally of deliveries disclosed

Msg, HNC 1639, Harrison to CINCUNC, 23 Apr

53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls

1-256, incls 121 and 122.

59

 Tenth and Eleventh Mtgs, Liaison Group, 1

and 2 May.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 419

that the UNC had relieved itself of

5,194 North Korean and 1,030 Chinese

soldiers and 446 civilian internees,

for a total of 6,670. Of these patients

357 were litter cases. In return the

enemy had brought 684 assorted sick

and wounded, including 94 litter cases,

to Panmunjom.60

Perhaps the Communists had not

been as liberal as many had hoped,

but at least they had carried out their

part of the bargain and thrown in a

small bonus. In the light of this performance and the apparent disposition

of the enemy to put an end to the shooting war in Korea, the resumption of

plenary negotiations seemed to be in

order.

Preparations for the Return to

Plenary Sessions

While the Communists were evidencing their sincerity in following through

with the LITTLE SWITCH exchange, General Clark and his advisors sought to

find out more about the intent and extent of the concession that Chou had

offered on 30 March. As already

pointed out, the Chinese statement had

produced a mixed atmosphere of hope

and caution throughout the non-Communist world, but it had been couched

in such vague terms that it generated

more questions than it answered.

Clark's letter to Kim and Peng on 5

April had asked for further details and

clarification.

The response came from Nam Il

rather than his superiors on 9 April.

Repeating in essence the same line that

Chou had used about the Communist desires to find a peaceful solution to the

conflict and to permit the prisoners to return home quickly, Nam went on:

It is precisely on the basis of this prin- ciple of repatriation of all prisoners of war

that our side firmly maintain that the de- taining side should ensure that no coercive

means whatsoever be employed against all

the prisoners of war in its custody to ob- struct their returning home. . . . The

Korean and Chinese side does not acknowl- edge that there are prisoners of war who

are allegedly unwilling to be repatriated. Therefore the question of the so-called

'forced repatriation' or 'repatriation by

force' does not exist at all, and we have al- ways opposed this assertion. Based on this

stand of ours, our side maintains that those

captured personnel of our side who are

filled with apprehensions and are afraid to

return home as a result of having been sub- jected to intimidation and oppression, should be handed over to a neutral state, and through explanations given by our

side, gradually freed from apprehensions. . . .61

Based on Nam's reply, the problem

was quite simple—if the U.N. Command

would stop trying to detain the prisoners forcibly and would hand them

over to a neutral nation, the Communists would soon convince the so-called

nonrepatriates of the needlessness of

their fears and all would be glad to go

home. It was a glib attempt to save

face and dismiss their concession as only

procedural and not substantive.

Although Nam's letter failed to answer the questions that the Washington

leaders had raised earlier on the identity

of the neutral nation or on the treat- 60

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, app. I, p. 51.

A breakdown of the UNC and Communist repatriates and nonrepatriates involved in the prisoner of

war exchanges in 1953-54 will be found in Appendixes B-1 and B-2.

61

 Ltr, Nam to Harrison, 9 Apr 53, no sub, in G-3

file, Transcripts of Proceedings, Mtgs of Liaison

Group at Pan Mun Jom, 6 Apr-2 May 53.
420 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ment of the nonrepatriates once they

were surrendered to the neutral nation,

these were details that the plenary conference would have to settle. But to

maintain the initiative, the UNC notified Nam on 16 April that since his letter

had not offered concrete proposals, it

assumed that the Communists were

either ready to accept one of the UNC's

earlier plans or to offer a constructive

one of their own. To prepare the enemy

with some idea of what the UNC considered constructive, Harrison cited

Switzerland as a neutral state in view of

its long tradition in this respect and

urged that the neutral state take custody

of the nonrepatriates in Korea itself.

As for the time limit for persuading the

nonrepatriates to come back home, sixty

days appeared sufficient. In closing

Harrison warned that if the plenary

meetings did not give promise of an acceptable agreement within a reasonable

time, the UNC would recess them

again.62

On the eve of the LITTLE SWITCH operation, Admiral Daniel proposed 23

April as a date for the resumption of

plenary conferences, but the Communist

representative preferred 25 April.

Later on they postponed the opening

date to 26 April.63

The few days before the first meeting

proved a busy period of last-minute

preparations and instructions. Clark told

Harrison to reject the Soviet Union or

any of its satellites as candidates for the

neutral state role and to insist upon the

retention of the nonrepatriates in Korea.

In response to the Far East commander's

request for acceptable nominations for

the neutral state, his superiors advanced

Switzerland and Sweden in that order.

They felt that he could agree to a 90-day

limit for the custody of the nonrepatriates by neutral nations. As a talking

point, General Collins told Clark that

the U.N. Command should emphasize

the fact that it had the absolute legal

right to grant asylum and was making

a major concession in permitting a neutral nation to assume control of the

nonrepatriate prisoners.64

To acquaint Clark with current policy on a Korean settlement, the JCS

forwarded some basic instructions on 23

April for his guidance. The first two

items were direct inheritances from the

previous administration and reaffirmed

that it was to the interest of the United

States to obtain an acceptable armistice,

yet not at the expense of a compromise

on the principle of no forced repatriation. Until proved to the contrary, the

instructions stated, the Communist proposal would be taken at its face value;

however, the United States would not

countenance long and inconclusive haggling. Since the UNC had seized the

initiative through the Harrison suggestions of 16 April, it should strive to retain this favorable position to keep the

enemy on the defensive. Any of the

former plans submitted by the UNC

would be satisfactory as a basis for agreement, but it might be desirable to

confine the task of processing nonrepatriates to the Chinese and to release the

62

 Ltr, Harrison to Nam, 16 Apr 53, no sub, in

G-3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun

Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III. 63

 Seventh Mtg, Liaison Group, 19 Apr 53.

64

 (1) Msg, C 62022, CINCUNC to DA, 22 Apr

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256,

incl 182. (2) Msg, JCS 937205, JCS to CINCUNC,

23 Apr 53. (3) Msg. DA 937371, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 24 Apr 53.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 421

North Koreans without further processing, the instructions concluded.65

Thus, in the six months of recess, the

top political personnel in the United

States had been replaced, but the politics

lingered on. The new leaders had tried

several minor expedients to induce the

Communists to halt the fighting in Korea and the enemy had reciprocated with

its own brand of pressure. Under ordinary circumstances, this game could have

been played indefinitely, without reaching a decision. But, with the death of

Stalin, the balance shifted to the advantage of the U.N. Command. It would

appear from Soviet actions in March and

April that the removal of external distractions such as the Korean affair with

its drain on Russian resources acquired a

new sense of urgency during the period

of consolidation of power. As part of

the new peace offensive, or as Secretary

Dulles termed it, peace "defensive,"

launched after Stalin's demise, the Communists' concession on the nonrepatriate

question dangled the hope of a settlement before the eyes of the United States

and its allies.66 Based on past experience, however, the UNC was properly

cautious as it prepared to discover just

what the Communists had in mind. The

brightening prospect for an armistice

was tempered by the rising tide of opposition in South Korea to any agreement

that accepted a disunited Korea. In the

critical days that lay ahead the UNC

might well find it more difficult to deal

with the dissension behind its lines than

with the enemy.

65

 Msg, JCS 937205, JCS to CINCUNC, 23 Apr 53.

66

 For Dulles' views on the Soviet shift in tactics,

see his address of 18 April 53, reprinted in the

Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXVIII, No. 722 (April

27, 1953), pp. 603-08.
CHAPTER XIX

The Communists Come to Terms

Against a backdrop of heightening tension stemming from the bitter opposition

of the ROK Government to an armistice,

the plenary sessions of the negotiations

reconvened at Panmunjom on 26 April.1

The UNC delegates found themselves

confronted with the doubly difficult task

of reaching an agreement with the Communists in the face of open ROK threats

to continue the war alone if the solution

failed to satisfy their objections. Doubt

over the future intentions of President

Rhee and his followers hung like a pall

over the UNC truce tents. With the

enemy enjoying the United Nations' embarrassment in being unable to control

its agitated fosterchild, the delegations

assembled to discover whether the last

obstruction—repatriation—could be overcome.

The Exploratory Stage

Since the last meeting in October

1952 a large personnel turnover had

taken place on both sides. The redoubtable Hsieh Fang with his scurrilous

tongue was no longer a member of the

enemy delegation and General Pien

Chang-wu of the Chinese Volunteer

Army and Maj. Gen. So Hui of the

North Korean forces had been given

other assignments. But the new faces

joining Nam Il and Lee Sang Cho were

not all unfamiliar. Former liaison

officers Chang Chun San and Tsai

Cheng-wen had been promoted to general officer rank and elevated to the

plenary delegation. Only General Ting

Kuo-yu, replacing General Pien, was a

newcomer to the negotiations. Both

Chang and Tsai had been involved in

the conferences from the outset and

were thoroughly acquainted with the

issues at stake.

The UNC situation at the table was

in definite contrast. General Harrison

and Admiral Daniel were joined by

three officers who had had no previous

part in the proceedings. Generals Lee

Han Lim, Morris, and McConnell were

replaced by Maj. Gen. Choi Duk Shin of

the ROK Army, Brig. Gen. Edgar E.

Glenn, USAF, and Brig. Gen. Ralph M.

Osborne, USA.2 Thus, the experience

1

 An account of the ROK efforts to prevent or

delay the armistice will be found in the next

chapter.

2

 General Glenn had been chief of staff to Maj.

Gen. Claire L. Chennault and the Fourteenth Air

Force in China during World War II and had had

considerable experience as an air attache in Latin

America. General Osborne had been director of

the Research and Development Division, Army

Services Forces, in World War II and served later

as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, in Washington.

General Choi had been Commanding General, 11th

ROK Division; Commandant, ROKA Infantry

School; and Deputy Commanding General, ROK

I Corps, before being appointed as liaison officer

between the ROK Army and the U.N. Command

in December 1952.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 423

UNC DELEGATES AT PANMUNJOM, 26 APRIL 1953: General Glenn, Admiral Daniel,

General Harrison, General Choi Duk Shim (ROK Army), and General Osborne.

level of the Communist delegation in

the intricacies of negotiations was much

higher than that of the UNC group.

After the introduction of his new associates Nam Il wasted little time in presenting the Communist proposal for

solving the POW question. There were

six points in all: (1) Within two months

after the armistice agreement became

effective, both sides would repatriate all

the prisoners desiring to return home.

(2) During the following month all nonrepatriates would be sent to a neutral

state and turned over to its jurisdiction.

(3) Then, for a period of six months,

the nations to which the nonrepatriates

belonged should have the opportunity

and facilities to talk to and persuade

them to come back. (4) All prisoners

changing their minds during this time

would be repatriated. (5) Disposition of

any prisoners remaining in the hands of

the neutral state at the end of the sixmonth explaining period would be

decided by the political conference provided for in the armistice agreement.

(6) All expenses of the nonrepatriates

in the neutral state would be borne by

the nation to which the prisoners belonged.

To the UNC two features of the Communist plan were unacceptable and Gen-
424 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

eral Harrison immediately turned it

down. There was no justification, he

told Nam, for removing the nonrepatriates from Korea to the neutral state for

the exorbitant period of six months to

persuade the prisoners to go home.

Sixty days should be ample for this purpose and the neutral state could take

over custody in Korea itself, he went on.

Noting that the Communists had not

nominated a nation to perform the neutral function, Harrison suggested that

Switzerland would be the obvious

choice.3

Nam was just as quick in rejecting

Switzerland. Since the U.N. Command

had already selected this country as one

of its nominees on the Supervisory Commission, Nam stated that it would be

unsuitable for the neutral nation role.

He defended the need for six months to

eliminate the prisoners' fears on the

ground that these apprehensions were a

result of their long detention and time

would be required to neutralize them.4

By the end of the second session, the

differences between the two sides were

quite clear. The selection of the neutral

power, the place of custody, the duration

of the custody, and the disposition of the

nonrepatriates after the explaining period remained to be settled. Although

the Communists had frowned upon

Switzerland, they showed no inclination

to produce a nomination of their own.

The enemy continued to insist upon a

long period of captivity for the nonrepatriates while the explanations went on

and preferred to have the prisoners transported out of Korea to the territory of the

neutral. If plans of the Communists

went off as well as they expected, there

would be no further problem with nonrepatriates since, they maintained, once

they had an opportunity to talk to the

recalcitrant prisoners, all would be willing to go back home.

The U.N. Command held otherwise.

After the waiting and uncertainty of the

past two years, the UNC did not want

to move the nonrepatriates into a strange

country and then subject them to another six months of doubt and detention

while the Communist persuaders sought

to break down their resistance. Sixty

days, the UNC argued, was enough time

for the enemy to talk and the explanations could be made in Korea.

Thus, the initial positions were assumed and the delegations settled down

to the chore of finding out how much

the other side was willing to concede.

General Harrison felt that the Communists were ready to bargain and wanted

the UNC to submit a counterproposal.

But his Washington and Tokyo superiors decided to do nothing until the

neutral state was selected. This was the

first issue, they believed, and discussion

should be confined to eliciting agreement from the enemy on a nation acceptable to both sides.5

On 29 April the Communists gave

their first indication of preference by

stating that the neutral nation should be

Asian, but refused to submit specific

names. Nam also revealed that the sixmonth explaining period might be "discussed" in view of the UNC objections to

3

 Transcript of Proceedings, 123d Session of Mil

Armistice Conf, 26 Apr 53, in FEC Main Delegates

Mtgs, vol. VI. 4

 Ibid., 124th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 27

Apr 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

5

 (1) Msg, HNC 1647, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 28 Apr 53. (2) Msg, C 62139,

CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 28 Apr 53. Both

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to

app. I, incls 205 and 206.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 425

its length. Since the UNC delegation

could make no counterproposal until the

neutral nation was selected, Harrison

came back the following day to prod

the enemy. Pointing out that the Communists had "released" large numbers

of personnel at the front during the

early stages of the war, Harrison suggested that it would now be appropriate

and humane to release all the prisoners

who desired to remain in South Korea.

Needless to say, Harrison's proposal met

with no encouragement from Nam Il,

but the Communists were apprised of

the possibility of eventual UNC action

along this line if the negotiations threatened to bog down again.6

The enemy lines held firm until the

2 May meeting when Nam offered the

names of India, Burma, Indonesia, and

Pakistan as suitable Asian neutrals. Before he would commit the Communists

to support any one of these four, however, Nam tried to persuade the U.N.

Command to send the nonrepatriates

to the neutral state chosen.7 This maneuver failed.

Although the United States would

have preferred Switzerland or Sweden,

it was willing to accept Pakistan as the

neutral state. When the session reconvened on 4 May, Harrison told Nam that

the UNC nominated Pakistan.8

It took two more days of fruitless discussion before the enemy became convinced that the UNC would do nothing

until the neutral state was selected.

Finally, on 7 May, the Communist delegation brought forward an expanded

eight-point plan that contained several

concessions.

Give and Take

In the new proposal the enemy

dropped the earlier requirement that

the nonrepatriates be transported physically to the neutral state and reduced

the explaining period from six months

to four. To handle the nonrepatriates,

Nam suggested that a Neutral Nations

Repatriation Commission with five

members—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, and India—be set up.

Each of these countries would provide

an equal number of armed personnel

and would share in the task of maintaining custody of the nonrepatriates in

their original places of detention. If

their plan were adopted, the Communists desired all of its terms communicated to the prisoners.9

Since the Communists had yielded on

the most objectionable features of their

first proposal, President Eisenhower and

some of his top political and military

advisors met in Washington to discuss

the latest offer. Encouraged by the spirit

of compromise reflected in the 7 May

plan, they agreed that it represented

a significant shift in the enemy position

and provided a basis for negotiating an

acceptable armistice. They found in the

plan close resemblance to the Indian

resolution in the General Assembly, but

several matters required clarification.

Chief among these were fixing a limit

6

 Transcripts of Proceedings, 126th and 127th

Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 29 and 30 Apr 53,

in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI. 7

 Transcript of Proceedings, 129th Session of

Mil Armistice Conf, 2 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI. 8

 (1) Msg, DA 938041, G-3 to CINCFE, 2 May

53. (2) Transcript of Proceedings, 130th Session of

Mil Armistice Conf, 4 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

9

 Transcript of Proceedings, 133d Session of Mil

Armistice Conf, 7 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates'

Mtgs, vol. VI.
426 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

upon the length of time to be accorded

to the political conference for deciding

the disposition of the nonrepatriates

and the problems certain to arise from

the stationing of Communist troops in

the rear of the UNC forces. The President and his counselors did not consider

these insurmountable and they felt that

the selection of India as the fifth member

of the repatriation commission was acceptable if the other four members

acquiesced.10 While the political and

military chiefs mulled over the broad

pros and cons of the enemy proposition,

the UNC delegation explored the details.

Harrison asked Nam for more information, especially on the connection between the political conference and the

final fate of the nonrepatriates and on

the manner in which the repatriation

commission would operate. In his reply

Nam reiterated that once the Communists had opportunity to talk to the nonrepatriates, there would be no problem

since all would return. As for the operation of the repatriation commission,

Nam felt that it should reach decisions

by majority vote and work out its own

operating procedures.11

As the arguments developed during

the ensuing few days, it became evident

that the Communists thought that the

next move should come from the U.N.

Command. They dismissed the objections and questions of Harrison as small

points that could be ironed out later and

accused the UNC of employing dilatory

tactics designed to block an armistice.12

Actually the two sides were fairly close

on most points by this time. On 10 May,

General Collins told Clark that if the

UNC could secure Communist agreement on the following matters, the

United States would be willing to conclude the prisoner of war issue. First,

the repatriation commission should conduct its business on the basis of unanimity, except in procedural affairs when a

majority vote would suffice. Secondly, a

time limit of thirty days should be imposed upon the political conference for

settling the nonrepatriates' future. After this period the prisoners would be

released and given civilian status.

Thirdly, India should supply all the

armed forces and operating personnel to

handle the custodial task and should

act as supply chairman and executive

agent of the commission. And lastly, although up to ninety days could be

allowed for the Communist explanations

to the prisoners, the United States preferred restricting the period to sixty.13

As the UNC labored to fashion its

counterproposal, developments in South

Korea took a serious turn.14 Syngman

Rhee had become disturbed by the trend

of events that pointed toward the probable conclusion of an armistice in the

near future. With agitation mounting

in the ROK Government and demonstrations reaching new peaks of intensity in South Korean cities, Clark decided to see Rhee in person. On 12 May

he flew to Korea and had a frank dis10 cussion with the ROK President. From

 Msg, DA 938429, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 7 May

53. General Hull attended the meeting with the

President on 7 May and reported its conclusions

to Clark. 11

 Transcripts of Proceedings, 134th and 135th

Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 9 and 10 May 53,

in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

12

 Ibid., 136th and 137th Sessions of Mil Armistice

Conf, 11 and 12 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates'

Mtgs, vol. VI. 13

 Msg, DA 938571, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 10

May 53. 14

 See Chapter XX, below.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 427

the conference two facts emerged that

Clark reported to Washington. First,

Rhee was "in dead earnest" about his

rejection of the release of the Korean

nonrepatriates to another state or group

of states, particularly if any were controlled by the Communists. And second,

Rhee did not consider India to be a neutral state and did not want Indian troops

to set foot on any part of South Korea.

In the light of Rhee's strong feelings and

in sympathy with his position, Clark

urged the JCS to allow the UNC delegation to propose that the Korean nonrepatriates be released as soon as the

armistice was effective. He felt that this

would be the only solution to the problem and that the Communists would accept it if the UNC supported it firmly.

Release of the Korean nonrepatriates

would also lessen the number of custodial personnel required to care for the

non-Korean nonrepatriates and might

eliminate some of Rhee's opposition.15

Although the response from Washington was swift, it granted Clark permission to present release of the Korean

nonrepatriates as a tentative position

only. In the meantime, the policy

makers would study the question further.16

Thus, when the U.N. Command disclosed its counterproposal on 13 May, release of the Korean nonrepatriates was

included. In addition, it advocated that

India supply the chairman and operating force of the repatriation commission; that the explaining period be

limited to sixty days; and that all nonrepatriates remaining at the end of the

explaining period be released.17

The enemy's reaction to these points

was less than warm. Having yielded on

several controversial issues, the Communists evidently expected that their

adversary would reciprocate. Instead

the UNC had taken a leaf from the

Communist book, accepted the concessions, and then pressed for more.

Nam and his fellow delegates moved in

to attack this "incooperative" attitude of

the UNC and were particularly critical of

the attempt to secure release of the Korean nonrepatriates. This was "a backward step" and another effort at "forced

retention," Nam charged. When Harrison again referred to the 50,000 UNC

personnel that the Communists had released at the front, Nam dismissed his

remarks as groundless, irrelevant, and

unworthy of refutation.18

Since the Communist response was

not unexpected, Harrison marked time

until 16 May. By then, the military

and political leaders in Washington and

in the Far East had begun to concentrate

on the preparation of the final UNC position. While they readied this last offer,

Harrison first asked for a four-day recess

and when this proved insufficient he requested and secured a five-day extension

to 25 May.19

In the event that the enemy did not

accept the final terms and another long

15

 Msg, HNC 1678, CINCUNC (Adv) to JCS, 12

May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls

1-194 to app. I. 16

 Msg, JCS 938704, JCS to CINCUNC, 13 May

53

17

 Transcript of Proceedings, 138th Session of Mil

Armistice Conf, 13 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates'

Mtgs, vol. VI. 18

 Ibid., 139th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 14

May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI. 19

 (1) Msg, C 62435, CINCUNC to American

Embassy, Pusan, 15 May 53. (2) Msg, C 62449,

same to same, 16 May 53. (3) Msg, CX 62496,

CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 19 May 53. All

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1-194 to

app. I.
428 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

recess developed, Clark laid plans to expand air operations, to remove Kaesong's

immunity, and to engage in limited

ground operations around Kaesong

later on. He also urged his superiors to

agree to the unilateral release of the

35,000 North Korean nonrepatriates if

the stalemate at Panmunjom remained

unbroken.20

Clark felt that the time had come to

take positive steps to make the Communists choose between accepting an armistice or demonstrating their bad

faith. In his comments of 16 May on the

content of the final UNC position, he

urged that the five-nation repatriation

commission be dropped and that either

Sweden or Switzerland be given custody

of the nonrepatriates. Possibly an Asian

neutral might be added, if the Communists insisted, to take charge of the

Chinese nonrepatriates either in or outside of Korea. At the end of ninety days

of explanations, the political conference

would be given an additional thirty days

to reach agreement on the disposition of

the remaining nonrepatriates. If it failed

to meet or reach an agreement, the prisoners would be released. Clark believed

that the U.N. Command should present

this proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

He would then recess unilaterally until

the enemy accepted or came up in

writing with a new plan in detail.21

On 23 May the policy makers in

Washington completed and forwarded

their conclusions to the U.N. commander

through the JCS. Other considerations

and pressures evidently had exerted a

great influence upon their decision, for it

bore little resemblance to Clark's plan.

In the first place, they did not want the

UNC to imply that this was to be final

or an ultimatum. Therefore, Harrison

was to present the proposal at a closed,

secret session. Secondly, since the United

States had supported the Indian resolution of 3 December, its allies had applied "intensive pressure" upon the U.S.

leaders to adhere closely to the principles embodied therein. Hence the

UNC final offer would embrace terms in

general consonance with the Indian resolution, so that if the enemy rejected

them, the UNC would be in the "strongest possible position to terminate negotiations."

There were six important elements

that the President desired to have presented at Panmunjom when the conference resumed on 25 May. The U.N.

Command would accept the five-nation

custodial arrangement if all armed

forces and operating personnel were

provided by India. This represented no

change from the 13 May proposal.

However, the UNC would discard its insistence upon the immediate release of

the Korean nonrepatriates when the armistice became effective and instead

would agree to turn these prisoners over

to the repatriation commission.22 In

matters requiring decision by the repatriation commission, the UNC would

consent to the Communist argument for

a majority vote rather than unanimity.

The treatment of the prisoners while

they were in the custody of the repatriation commission was a fourth field of

interest. To insure that no threats or

20

 Msg, C 62419, CINCUNC to JCS, 14 May 53,

in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495. 21

 Msg, CX 62456, Clark to JCS, 16 May 53, DAIN 268196.

22

 The United States preferred the term "custodial commission" to "repatriation commission,"

but to save possible confusion "repatriation commission" has been used throughout.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 429

coercion were used, limitations were to

be imposed upon the number of Communist explainers permitted access to

the prisoners. In addition, the UNC

observers were to be present at the interviews along with members of the repatriation commission. As for the period

allowed to the persuaders, the President

desired to hold it to ninety days. Lastly,

the UNC would agree either to turn disposition of the nonrepatriates over to a

political conference with a thirty-day

time limit and then release them, or alternatively let the U.N. General Assembly determine their final fate.

If the Communists failed to accept the

UNC proposal or to provide a basis for

further discussion, the JCS informed

Clark, the negotiations would be terminated and the immunity granted the

conference area withdrawn. But, they

continued, such a decision should and

would be made in Washington, if it

proved necessary, and not by Clark or

Harrison.

In defense of the administration's

abandonment of support for the release

of the Korean nonrepatriates, the JCS

explained that the measure "is not an

essential element of our position on no

forced repatriation and has failed to

command any support outside Korea. It

is not an issue on which we can permit

negotiations to break down." Only in

the case that the Communists rejected

the UNC plan and negotiations were terminated would all the nonrepatriates be

promptly released.23

There was little doubt that Syngman

Rhee and his government would be

highly disappointed with the concessions

contained in the final position and

especially with the provision turning

over the Korean nonrepatriates to the

repatriation commission. Therefore,

Clark and Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs

received instructions to meet with the

ROK President on the morning of 25

May to inform him of the contents of

the UNC proposal and to attempt to

soften the blow.24 This promised to be

a delicate matter, since each effort to placate the Communists was certain to increase the intensity of ROK opposition.

Even if the enemy could be induced to

reach agreement on the issues remaining, there was still no guarantee that

Rhee would permit the fighting to cease.

A Goal Is Reached

Despite the risks involved in attaining rapprochement with the enemy on

the armistice terms at the cost of alienating its strongest supporter in the conflict, the United States was determined to

make a serious effort to end the Korean

commitment. When the negotiators

met at Panmunjom on 25 May, Harrison

asked that the meeting be conducted as

a closed or executive session "to reinforce the solemn, nonpropaganda character of the proceedings." After a brief

recess, the Communists consented.25

Harrison prefaced his remarks by emphasizing the UNC intention to adhere

firmly to the concept of no forced repatriation, then launched into a discussion

of the four major concessions that the

U.N. Command was now willing to

23

 Msg, JCS 939673, JCS to CINCUNC, 23 May

53.

24

 See Chapter XX, below. 25

 Nam presented the replacement for Maj. Gen.

Chang Chun San after the recess. This was Rear

Adm. Kim Won Mu of the North Korean Navy

who had served an earlier tour on the delegation

in 1952.
430 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

make. In consenting to the enemy arguments for turning Korean nonrepatriates

over to the repatriation commission, for

allowing more time for the explaining

period, for submitting the disposition

of nonrepatriates to a political conference after the explaining period, and

for permitting decisions on the repatriation commission to be by majority vote,

Harrison maintained that the UNC had

done all that it could to reach agreement

with the Communist proposal of 7 May.

However, there were certain matters

that remained in dispute, which he proceeded to set forth. There must be no

force or threat of force used against the

prisoners and India must supply all

armed forces and operating personnel.

Only 90 days would be permitted for the

explanations and the political conference would be given but 30 days to dispose of the nonrepatriates. Thus, Harrison concluded, 120 days after the custodial force assumed control of the nonrepatriates they should be released or

the problem should be turned over to

the U.N. General Assembly.

After an hour-and-a-half break, Nam

and his associates returned. They

limited their comments to the UNC

proposition that either nonrepatriates

be released after 120 days or the question of their fate be given to the General

Assembly. Neither of these solutions

was permissible, since the former was

still "forced retention" while the latter

was "inconceivable" since the United

Nation was one of the belligerents in the

affair. The other provisions of the UNC

offer required further consideration,

Nam went on, and he suggested meeting

again on 29 May. But Harrison insisted

that the enemy give the proposal thorough study and take until 1 June to insure full consideration. Nam finally

agreed.26

To underline the importance that the

U.N. Command attached to this offer,

Clark followed it up with a letter to Kim

and Peng on 27 May. After strongly

urging the two leaders to accept the

terms put forward by the UNC as a

"just solution to the prisoners of war

question," Clark finished on a note of

warning. "I believe you are aware that it

is not our purpose to engage in prolonged and fruitless repetition of arguments. It is our earnest hope that you

will give urgent and most serious consideration to our delegation's alternative proposals regarding the sole issue

on which an armistice still depends. If

your Governments' stated desire for an

armistice is in good faith, you are urged

to take advantage of the present opportunity."

 27

It was not until 4 June that the

plenary sessions reconvened, for the

Communists had requested a three-day

extension of the recess for what they

called "administrative reasons." In the

meantime, the ROK delegate to the conference, General Choi, had expressed

his opposition to the 25 May formula

publicly and the tenor of feeling

throughout South Korea was being

fanned to fever pitch by the ROK Government. Despite this ominous trend,

the Communists showed that they were

ready to conclude the armistice. It was

true that Nam had a revised version of

the UNC proposal which he presented

26

 Transcript of Proceedings, 142d Session of Mil

Armistice Conf, 25 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII. 27

 Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 27 May 53, no

sub, in G-3 Misc Material, Jan 53-Dec 53.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 431

on 4 June, but basically it did not differ

greatly from the original.

There was, however, some question

over the exact meaning of the Communist provision for the nonrepatriates left

over after 120 days. It read: "Thereafter, according to the application of

each individual, those who elect to go to

neutral nations shall be assisted by the

Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and by the Red Cross Society of

India." In Harmon's mind this phrasing did not make clear whether the

Korean nonrepatriates could stay in

Korea, but the Communists refused to

amplify this sentence. Clark's superiors,

in commenting on the enemy revision,

advised him to assume that the text

meant what it said and that the UNC

should not seek clarification at this

time.28

In Washington, it was the consensus

of the State and Defense Department

policy makers that the Communist proposal afforded the Chinese a face-saving

device to cover their actual acceptance

of voluntary repatriation. Except for

several items relating to the number of

explainers that would be permitted access to the prisoners refusing to go back

and the number of communications

personnel that the enemy intended to

introduce into South Korea, the StateDefense group felt that the Communist

plan was satisfactory.29

During the next two meetings at Panmunjom the negotiators worked on the

last important points at issue. The

Communists had asked for a total of ten

explainers for each thousand nonrepatriates, arguing that it would take this

number to talk the prisoners out of their

ingrained fears of repatriation. Although the UNC would have preferred

the more modest figure of five per thousand, it was willing to settle for seven.

After surprisingly little haggling the

enemy agreed. As for the size of the

communications team that would service the Communist personnel at the

prison camps, the enemy stated that one

team of six men would suffice for each

location where the explaining representatives were quartered. If all the nonrepatriates were brought together in

one place, then a maximum of two

communications teams would be adequate.30

On 7 June the staff officers were given

the task of straightening out the final details of the terms of reference for handling prisoners of war.31

 Since the remaining differences were minor and the

disposition on both sides now favored a

quick settlement, the staff officers were

able to finish their assignment and to

present the document for the signatures

of the chief delegates on 8 June.32

After a year and a half of debate, in

and out of the conference tent at Panmunjom, punctuated by the long recess

during the winter of 1952-53, the

troublesome question of the right of a

prisoner of war to determine whether he

would return home or not had been settled. Regardless of how it was disguised

28

 (1) Transcript of Proceedings, 143d Session of

Mil Armistice Conf, 4 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII. (2) Msg, DA 940674, CSUSA

to CINCUNC, 4 Jun 53. 29

 Msg, DA 940728, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 5 Jun

53.

30

 Transcripts of Proceedings, 144th and 145th

Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 6 and 7 Jun 53,

in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII. 31

 The complete terms of reference will be found

in Appendix C. 32

 Transcript of Proceedings, 146th Session of

Mil Armistice Conf, 8 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII.
432 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

or negatively acknowledged in the final

instrument, the principle of no forcible

repatriation had been recognized on the

international level by the Communists.

Previously they had used the concept

when it had been to their interest and

ignored it when their own nationals had

been involved, as in World War IL The

establishment of the precedent had been

a long and costly venture for the U.N.

Command, since thousands of casualties had been suffered in the interim in

the fight to protect the defectors from

communism. On the other hand, the

UNC had kept faith with the nonrepatriate prisoners and won a psychological victory. The efforts of the Communist prisoners to discredit the UNC

approach through disobedience, riot,

and rebellion had taken some of the

luster from this victory, but the Korean

example of permitting prisoners to decide whether to go home or not was

bound to have an influence upon future

conflicts and their settlement. The concept of no forcible repatriation now became a part of the body of international

law and the next time a similar situation

arose, Korea could be invoked and argued as a case in point. Whether the

Communists would yield a second time

on the principle remained moot, but, at

least, their armor, once pierced, might

henceforth prove to be more vulnerable.

Residue

With repatriation resolved there

seemed to be little standing in the way

of bringing the war to an end insofar

as the enemy was concerned. The rising

rumblings of discontent from the ROK

Government gave warning of serious

trouble ahead, it was true, but in the

effort to complete the negotiations, both

sides chose to ignore the threat.

Among the matters intrinsic to the

truce that still had to be settled was the

setting up of the line of demarcation and

the demilitarized zone. When the original line was established back in November 1951, it was agreed that it would be

valid for thirty days. If the rest of the

armistice terms were completed within

that time, the line would not be redrawn. On the other hand, if the discussions dragged on for more than thirty

days, the line would be renegotiated

prior to the signing of the armistice.

Shortly before the agreement on prisoners of war was reached, General Harrison suggested to the Communists that

since the changes that had taken place

in the battle line during the preceding

year and a half were relatively minor in

nature, the old line of demarcation

should be retained. This would simplify

and expedite the task of concluding the

armistice, Harrison pointed out.33 But

the enemy delegation was noncommital

and indicated only that it would study

the UNC proposal.34

On 9 June the Communists expressed

their views. In keeping with the November 1951 agreement, Nam stated, his

side desired to have the line revised and

brought up to date so that it would

correspond with the current battle positions. However, Nam continued, the

Communists were willing to postpone

33

 In a message to the JCS on 18 April, Clark

had informed them that the line of contact at that

time was south of the November 1951 line in

twelve places by from one to two-and-a-half kilometers and north of the line in only one place by

one kilometer. See Msg, C 61971, Clark to JCS, 18

Apr 53, DA-IN 258819. 34

 Transcript of Proceedings, 145th Session of

Mil Armistice Conf, 7 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates, Mtgs, vol. VII.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 433

the actual revising of the line until after

the armistice was signed. Harrison

quickly demurred. If the enemy wished

to negotiate, the UNC was ready to go

ahead with the task at once. He appointed the capable and experienced

Colonel Murray of the Marine Corps to

head the UNC staff group for determining the line of demarcation. After a

mild effort to secure reconsideration of

the Communist suggestion, Nam consented the next day to the immediate

initiation of work on the project by the

staff officers. He named Col. O Hung

Song of the Korean People's Army and

Col. Huang Chen-chi of the Chinese Volunteers as the Communists' representatives.35

On the night of 10 June the enemy

opened up a limited offensive principally on the ROK II Corps front in

Central Korea with the evident intention of improving the Communist positions.36

 It was against this background

that the staff officers met on 11 June and

sought to reach agreement on a new line

of demarcation. In the areas where the

battle line was stable, they had little

difficulty in compromising their differences. The fluid portions of the

front where the action was taking place

occasioned more discussion. As Colonel

Murray told his counterparts on 15 June:

"Attack begets counter-attack, and counter-attacks in turn lead to further

counter-attacks. The action of any one

side in seeking to improve the position

during the negotiation of the Demarcation Line could easily lead to a situation

which would delay the determination of

the line indefinitely. We think it preferable to settle the line on the basis of the

present dispositions."

 37

By 16 June the Communist offensive

came to a halt and the staff officers were

able to finish their task. All in all, the

altercations had been minor and a spirit

of give and take had prevailed. The

bargaining had indicated that when the

Communists wanted to come to terms,

they could unbend and compromise.38

On the following day the plenary conference met and ratified the line of demarcation that the staff officers had

fashioned. The latter were given a word

of praise by Nam Il and then were instructed to go ahead and delimit the demilitarized zone.39

The imminent conclusion of the armistice meanwhile focused attention upon

the necessity for securing the quick acceptance of the nations agreed upon for

membership on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

On 9 June, Sweden had announced that

it would serve on both commissions, but

Switzerland had proved to be less eager.

The Swiss Government did not want to

send its citizens into Korea unless all

the belligerents, including the Republic

of Korea, agreed to observe the terms of

the armistice. In rebuttal, the United

States pointed out to the Swiss authorities that the ROK forces were under the

35

 Transcripts of Proceedings, 147th and 148th

Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 9 and 10 Jun 53,

in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII. 36

 See Chapter XXI, below.

37

 Transcript of Proceedings, Fifth Mtg of Staff

Officers To Renegotiate the Military Demarcation

Line, 15 Jun 53, in G-3 File, Transcripts of Proceedings To Renegotiate the Military Demarcation

Line . . . , Jun-Jul 53. 38

 The 11-16 June meetings of the staff officers

will be found in the G-3 file mentioned in the

previous footnote. 39

 Transcript of Proceedings, 149th Session of

Mil Armistice Conf, 17 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII.
434 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

command of the U.N. commander who

had full authority to negotiate an armistice with the Communists. Furthermore, all of the prisoners of war were

held by the UNC and not by individual

belligerents. After some hesitation, the

Swiss Federal Council voted to accept

membership on the two neutral nations organizations. Switzerland's agreement arrived on 13 June and was

based on the proviso that Swiss members

would be allowed to carry out their

functions satisfactorily by both sides.40

In view of the ROK actions which

were demonstrating the strong antiarmistice feeling prevalent in the country in

early June, Clark and Ambassador

Murphy called in the Indian Ambassador to Japan and informed him of the

problems that would face India if it decided to serve as chairman of the repatriation commission. ROK hostility to

India as a member of the commission

and to any introduction of Indian troops

into Korea had been unmistakably expressed in this period and Clark and

Murphy felt it only fair that the Indian

Government have adequate warning

of the potential explosiveness of the

situation. Despite the threatening

signs, however, the Indians conveyed

their official acceptance of the difficult

assignment confronting them to the

State Department on 13 June. Two days

later the Polish and Czech Governments

also signified through their embassies in

Washington that they were willing to

become members of the repatriation

commission.41

Once all the acceptances had been

received, the main question became

when and how the neutral personnel

could be transported to Korea. The

gathering together of the military and

civilian staffs depended entirely upon

the five neutral nations, of course, and

the United States could only recommend

that these be assembled as quickly as

possible so that they could assume their

responsibilities when the armistice was

concluded. In the days following the

signing of the prisoner of war terms of

reference there was a sense of urgency

and concern on the part of Clark and his

staff lest there be too much of a gap between the beginning of the truce and the

arrival of the members of the supervisory and inspection teams. If the

Communists were given considerable

time free of both UNC air observation

and inspection by the neutral nations

groups, they might easily build up their

airfields, stocks, and the like. On 11 June

Clark asked that the United States make

every effort to expedite the arrival of

the supervisory commission staffs, since

there was a serious risk involved in having an armistice without the inspection

teams being in place and ready to carry

out their duties.42

The news from Washington was not

encouraging on this score. Although

the Department of State was urging the

Swiss and Swedish Governments to send

their representatives as quickly as they

could, the advance parties would not be

able to leave until 21 June and the main

bodies would follow about 1 July, all on

U.S. air transports. Since both groups

would travel via the United States, the

40

 Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations

(May 52-Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 425ff. 41

 Ibid., pp. 431-34.

42

 Msg, CX 62984, Clark to DA, 11 Jun 53, in

UNC/FEC 150, incl 34, Com . Seed also Rpt: (1 , Ju)n Msg 53, Sourc , V 0399 e Papers , FEA,F 1 toCINCFE, 14 Jun 53, incl 96; (2) Msg, COMNAVFE

to CINCUNC, 14 Jun 53, incl 97; (3) Msg, G 6069

KCG, Taylor to Clark, 16 Jun 53, incl 98.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 435

prospects of their arrival in Korea before

8 July were small. Clark estimated that

it would take another week before the

Swedes and Swiss became briefed and

oriented, which would mean that 15

July would be the earliest date that their

inspection teams could be prepared to

go into action. However, it appeared

that the Poles and Czechs would not be

on hand until approximately the same

time anyway; therefore it would not

make much difference whether the

Swedes or Swiss arrived earlier or not.43

By this time—mid-June—Clark had

changed his mind about the dangers of

having a hiatus between the signing of

the armistice and the advent of the

supervisory personnel on the scene. In

the interests of securing an earlier truce,

he was now willing to take the risk that

the enemy might bring in reinforcements in the interim. In explaining his

volte-face to the JCS, the United Nations

commander commented: "As I see it,

the matter is largely academic. The

Communists could easily circumvent the

provisions of the armistice agreement,

particularly with respect to aerial reinforcements, even if the Neutral Nations

Inspection Teams were in place and

functioning. Furthermore, if the Neutral agencies were to detect Communist

reinforcements of personnel and materiel including air forces, it is unlikely

that such violations of the Armistice

Agreement would result in a resumption of hostilities." Under the circumstances, he requested permission to

accept an interval of up to twenty days

between the cease-fire and the inception

of inspection.44 Although the U.S. leaders in Washington agreed to this contingency, later developments were

to make the question "largely academic."

 45

With the Communists behaving in an

almost agreeable fashion and the end of

the war apparently within hailing distance, the focus of attention shifted

dramatically in mid-June to the last

roadblock in the way of the armistice.

The oft-mentioned opposition building

up in the Republic of Korea was about

to reach its climax and to cause the

member nations of the UNC some uneasy

moments. Faced with the possibility of

a truce contrary to the aspirations of his

young republic, the formidable Syngman Rhee found himself in a difficult

situation that appeared to call for desperate measures.

43

 (1) Msg, DA 941357, G-3 to CINCUNC, 13 Jun

53. (2) Msg, DA 941369, G-3 to CINCUNC, 14

Jun 53. (3) Msg, CX 63109 CINCUNC to DA

16 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source

Papers 1-150, incl 104.

44

 Msg, CX 63109, CINCUNC to DA, 16 Jun 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers

1-150, incl 104. 45

 Msg, JCS 941491, JCS to CINCFE, 16 Jun 53.

See Chapter XX, below.
CHAPTER XX

Leader of the Opposition

"During the hectic final four months

before the cease-fire in Korea," General

Clark commented in his memoirs, "the

U.N. Command was confronted almost

literally with a crisis a day. Never, it

seemed to me, was it more thoroughly

demonstrated that winning a satisfactory peace, even a temporary one, is

more difficult than winning a war."

 1

It was perhaps ironic that the majority of the problems to which the U.N.

commander referred emanated from the

actions of the ROK Government and its

shrewd chief, Syngman Rhee, rather

than from the machinations of the

enemy. But such was the case. Although

none of the political, economic, and

military questions that were at the bottom of the ROK agitation were arising

for the first time, there was a new sense

of urgency on the scene. With the UNC

and the Communists on the verge of

composing their differences, the ROK

Government felt it had to find the answers to the problems considered vital

to the future of the nation before the

war ended or its bargaining powers

would be materially lessened.

Conceivably the UNC could sign a

military armistice without the concurrence of the ROK, but how long would

it last? If the Rhee Government decided to fight on alone or to create a

succession of provocative or embarrassing incidents, a paper truce would be of

little value. The United States had too

much at stake in Korea to abandon its

investment lightly. On the other hand,

the Republic of Korea depended and

would continue to depend heavily upon

economic, financial, and military assistance from the United States for its

existence as a nation. It was clear that

each needed the other. The uncertainty

centered on whether Rhee would come

to terms or refuse to accept the conditions of the armistice. If he chose the

former course the price for his acquiescence might come high in financial and

economic aid. If he elected to carry on

the war on his own, the cost in UNC

casualties and prestige might be even

less palatable. This was a turning point

for the Republic of Korea; a wise or a

hasty decision might make or break its

future.

A Sense of Insecurity

The roots of ROK resistance to the

armistice rested in a bed of insecurity

and frustration. As the United States and

its U.N. allies had shown less and less

interest in the active prosecution of the

war, President Rhee and his advisors

had seen their hopes for a Korea unified 1

 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 257. by force become more and more un-
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 437

PRESIDENT RHEE GREETING DR. TASCA and members of the Tasca mission at the

President's residence, Seoul.

attainable. They had no way of knowing what role the United States would

assume in Far East affairs during the

years ahead; it was quite possible that

the United States might again decide that

Korea lay outside its area of strategic

concern and abandon the ROK after the

truce was arranged.2 Of course, there

was still the political conference stipulated in the truce agreement, but, in the

light of past experience with the Communists, few realists expected that such

a meeting would produce results of any

importance.

On the bright side, the ROK was receiving from the United States financial

and economic help that enabled the

country to fight the tide of inflation

and to begin the task of reconstruction.

The ROK Army was expanding and

was better trained and equipped than

it had ever been before. But the inescapable fact remained to plague the

ROK leaders—all of this depended upon

the United States and they had no

guarantee of the future policy of the

2

 In January 1950 Secretary of State Acheson had

declared that the United States would fight to defend Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, omitting

both Korea and Taiwan as strategic objectives of

vital concern to the United States. Department of

State Bulletin, Vol XXII, No. 551 (January 23,

1950), pp. 111ff.
438 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

United States in the postwar period.

During the spring of 1953, the ROK

search for security formed the backdrop

to the action taking place on stage.

There were evidences of ROK feelings of doubt and uncertainty even

earlier. In February General Clark

heard that the ROK Government

wanted to move its seat back to the capital city of Seoul. During the two-anda-half years of war the government had

spent most of its time in Pusan. The

instability of the battle situation had

argued against the re-establishment of

the administrative and legislative functions so close to the lines, and the U.N.

Command had opposed placing such a

tempting target within reach of a Communist offensive again. Besides, as

Clark had pointed out in his request for

U.S. support to block a move to Seoul,

if the ROK Government returned, it

would mean that thousands of people

would flow into the capital and dozens of

buildings would have to be rehabilitated.3

While Clark was protesting, the ROK

Government asked the U.N. Command

to transfer its headquarters from Tokyo

to Seoul. Rhee also wanted the economic reconstruction organizations,

such as UNKRA, to move to Seoul along

with the UNC. In view of his mission as

Far East commander, which precluded

leaving Japan, and the lack of adequate

housing and communications facilities

in the South Korean capital, Clark rejected the suggestion. He felt that

Rhee's dislike of Japan had inspired this

recommendation .

4

The U.S. political and military leaders

supported Clark's stand against bringing the governmental machinery back

to Seoul. In early March the U.N. commander was able to approach Rhee on

the matter and secure his assurance that

the chief ROK ministries would remain

in Pusan.5 Yet the desire of Rhee and

his followers to bolster the feeling of

governmental stability by a return to

Seoul and their jealousy of Japan's

status reflected the tenor of the times.

On the economic front ROK newspaper stories in mid-January claimed

that the prisoners of war were fed more

adequately than the ROK Army security

forces guarding them. As the accounts

were picked up by the U.S. news services,

President Eisenhower became concerned

over the situation. He remembered that

during World War II he had encountered a similar problem in Europe. The

German prisoners, living off U.S. rations,

had fared far better than the French

and British soldiers who comprised the

custodial troops. The President wanted

to know what measures were being

taken to remedy the discrepancies and

whether U.S. surplus foods might help.6

Actually the ROK Government was

responsible for the food consumed by

its own troops, Clark commented, but

frequently, because of poor distribution

facilities and command failures, the

ROK soldiers had not always received

their quotas. The United States fur3

 Msg, CX 61134 and CX 61225, CINCUNC to

DA, 4 and 14 Feb 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd

Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88, incls 57 and 58. 4

 Msg, C 61247, CINCUNC to DA, 16 Feb 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88, incl 45.

5

 (1) Msg, JCS 932503, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Feb

53. (2) Msg, C 61511, CINCUNC to JCS, 13 Mar

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1-72,

incl 47. 6

 (1) Msg, CX 61237, CINCUNC to CSUSA, 15

Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls

1-88, incl 40. (2) Msg, DA 932033, Secy Army

Stevens to Clark, 22 Feb 53.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 439

nished only the materials for making

biscuits and for canning purposes. He

did not think that malnutrition was the

primary cause of the poor physical condition of many ROKA troops, but rather

it was secondary to the chronic diseases,

such as tuberculosis, which had gone undetected during the initial physical

examination of recruits. As spring approached, Clark noted, the availability

of fresh produce would increase and the

ROKA rations would improve. The

Eighth Army, meanwhile, would study

the matter and help set up a food supervisory service for the ROKA.7

Clark suspected the motivation behind the publicity accorded the ROKA

and prisoner of war rations, for he surmised that the objective sought was

more financial aid from the United

States.8 At the end of March he received

a confirmatory report from General Herren, the Korean Communications Zone

commander. Although Herren felt that

the ROK Government was seeking

greater financial aid without accurately

appraising its own assets or attempting

to rectify its deficiencies, he estimated

that the United States would have to provide more assistance in its drive to build

up the armed forces and yet maintain

reasonably stable economic conditions.9

Early in April the President decided

to get a firsthand report on the economic situation in South Korea. On 9

April he named Dr. Henry J. Tasca to

carry out a full investigation of ways

and means to strengthen the Korean

economy and to make recommendations

as to the amounts and types of assistance

that should be provided by the United

States.10 Dr. Tasca arrived in mid-April

and spent the next seven weeks in surveying the scene. When he returned to

the United States in June, he submitted a

bulky and comprehensive report on existing conditions and suggested a number of remedial actions that could be

taken. The initial recommendations

called for the expenditure of a billion

dollars over a period of three years and

urged the reorganization of U.S. economic activities under a single head to

promote more co-ordination and efficiency in the spending of funds.11

 The

Tasca mission offered evidence that the

United States contemplated a long-term

financial investment in the Republic of

Korea and served to allay some of the

ROK's fears about its economic future.

In the military field, meanwhile, the

efficient mechanism established to produce recruits for the ROK Army continued to dominate the making of policy

on ROKA expansion. Feeding some 7,-

200 inductees a week into the training

units during a period of low casualties at

the front inevitably led to a rapid increase in the over-all strength of the

ROK Army. In early April Clark reported that the induction machine's

pace would send the ROK Army beyond

7

 Msg, C 61376, CINCFE to DA, 2 Mar 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1-72, incl 39. 8

 (1) Msg, CX 61237, CINCUNC to CSUSA, 15

Feb 53. (2) Msg, CX 61259, CINCFE to DA, 17

Feb 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53,

incls 1-88, incls 40 and 41. (3) Clark, From the

Danube to the Yalu, pp. 182-84. 9

 Msg, AX 73191, CG KCOMZ to CINCUNC, 28

Mar 53, UNC/FEC, in Comd Rpts, Mar 53, incls

1-72, incl 41.

10

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, pp. 46-47. Dr.

Tasca had formerly served as Treasury Attache in

Italy and more lately as deputy for economic matters to the Special U.S. Representative in Europe,

William H. Draper, Jr. 11

 Discussion of the Tasca mission and its report

will be found in the UNC/FEC Command Reports

of June and July 1953. Study and revision of the

report was still going on when the armistice was

concluded.
440 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

its authorized strength of 460,000 before

the month ended.12 Since he was still reluctant to curb the flow of replacements,

Clark suggested that he be granted

authority to build up to a balanced,

twenty-division force of approximately

655,000 men. At the present rate, this

total would be reached around late

August and would constitute the ultimate strength of the ROKA. He

pointed out that if permission were

given now, he could cut back promptly

on the men assigned to training duties

when the time arrived and could activate the additional divisions quickly

as they were needed. As an extra inducement for approval of his request,

the U.N. commander mentioned that

when the seventeenth of the twenty

ROKA divisions attained the halfway

mark in training, he would be able to

release the first U.S. division from

Korea.13

Two days later, on 9 April, Clark asked

for authorization to activate two new

ROK divisions. He desired that the Department of the Army replenish theater

stocks used to outfit the thirteenth and

fourteenth ROK divisions and provide

enough equipment to take care of

the two new ones. Despite the possibility of a cease-fire, he urged the continuance of the twenty-division program. As he pointed out, if the war went

on, the expanded ROK Army could

either contribute toward the winning of

a military victory or make possible the

eventual withdrawal of U.N. forces and,

if the fighting stopped, it could help to

guarantee ROK independence. The Secretary of Defense granted Clark permission on 17 April to raise the total of

activated ROK divisions to sixteen and

G-3 informed him that an increase of

65,000 in the ROKA ceiling strength

was under consideration.14

Behind the gradual, piecemeal approach to ROK Army augmentation

adopted by the Eisenhower administration lay the hope that the promise of

further expansion might reassure President Rhee. Clark was concerned lest the

enemy seek to block the growth of

ROK forces through stipulations written into the truce agreement and in

May he again pressed for approval of

the twenty-division program.15 General

Collins supported Clark's request and

on 14 May the President approved the

twenty-division, 655,000-man ROK

Army. Activation of the last four divisions was left to Clark's discretion, but

Collins warned him that certain critical

items of equipment such as artillery

might not be available until later.16

In view of the increasing tension of

the ROK situation in late May, Clark

deferred action on the augmentation.

When he finally decided to bring up the

matter again in early June, the JCS informed Clark that if he decided to go

ahead with the increase, then he should

make it clear to Rhee that the expansion would be effected on the assump12

 The ROKA had 438,000 men at this time, plus

75,000 trainees and 16,000 KATUSA, for a total of

over 529,000 men. 13

 Msg, CX 61791, CINCFE to Secy Army, 7 Apr

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-110,

incl 38.

14

 (1) Msg, CX 61837, CINCFE to DA, 9 Apr 53.

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-110, incl

39. (2) MSG, DA 936843, G-3 to CINCFE, 17 Apr

53.

15

 Msg, CX 62372, Clark to Collins, 12 May 53,

DA-IN 266645. 16

 Msg, DA 938886, CSUSA to CINCFE, 14 May

53.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 441

tion the ROK would co-operate with the

U.N. Command.17

As it turned out, the difficulties that

the UNC continued to have with the

ROK Government led to the deferment

of the activation of the additional divisions until after the armistice was

signed.18 The strengthening of the

ROK Army, in this case, was delayed by

the unwillingness of the ROK Government to accept the conditions attached.

It was, of course, another effort by the

United States to bolster the security of

the Republic of Korea and to prepare

the young nation for the task of eventually defending itself, but the build-up

had to await a more opportune moment.

In the matter of Marine, Navy, and

Air Forces, the ROK Government fared

somewhat better. President Rhee had

expressed a personal interest in the

status of the augmentation of the ROK

Marine Corps to Clark in late April and

the U.N. commander in turn told the

JCS that a favorable answer might be

helpful in mitigating ROK discontent.

In mid-May the Secretary of Defense informed Clark that an increase in the

ROK Marine Corps to 23,500 had been

approved by the President, along with

new personnel ceilings of 10,000 for the

ROK Navy and 9,000 for the ROK Air

Force.19

But the planned growth of ROKA

forces and the economic assistance that

the United States hoped would provide a

firmer base for the future security and

development of the Republic of Korea

were not enough. President Rhee and

his advisors were deeply concerned over

the present and with what they could

salvage from the dying embers of a

three-year war.

Friend or Foe?

During the long winter recess ROK

opposition to the armistice had lain

dormant. There seemed to be little

purpose in beating a dead horse. But

when the Communists indicated in late

March that they would be willing to

resume negotiations and to settle the

prisoner of war question, the ROK

Government quickly awoke to the implications of what this could mean to its

national aspirations.

Within a week of the Communist offer

Rhee and his staff had reopened their

campaign to block a truce that did not

meet their terms. The ROK National

Assembly adopted a resolution in the

opening days of April urging the United

States to avoid any plan not guaranteeing the complete unification of Korea.

On 5 April Rhee addressed the soldiers

of the ROK II Corps on their first anniversary. He called for military victory

and a drive to the Yalu rather than a

truce along the present lines. In Seoul,

on the next day, 50,000 people attended

a rally that featured a succession of

speakers denouncing the armistice and

posing five demands as prerequisites to

a settlement in Korea. First on the list

came the matter of ROK representation

in the United Nations; second, the total

disarmament of North Korea; third, the

removal of all Chinese forces from

North Korea; fourth, ROK representa17

 (1) Msg, CX 62955, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jun

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, an. 3, sec

II, tab J-66. (2) Msg, JCS 941344, JCS to CINCFE,

12 Jun 53. 18

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 90-93. 19

 (1) Msg, C 62181, Clark to JCS, 30 Apr 53,

DA-IN 262924. (2) Msg, JCS 938796, JCS to

CINCFE, 14 May 53. The 10,000 for the ROK

Navy was 6,000 less than Clark had requested.
442 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tion at all meetings discussing Korean

problems; and last, cessation of support

of North Korea by certain U.N. members.20

As the full weight of the ROK drive

against the armistice began to make itself felt, Clark and his advisors started

to worry. General Herren warned of

stubborn resistance ahead which should

not be discounted. When the U.N. commander communicated his anxiety to

his superiors in Washington, they admitted their own concern over the situation.21

On 10 April 50,000 students paraded

in Pusan displaying "Unification or

Death" posters in great numbers as they

wended their way through the city. The

theme of national unification by force

was repeated by public officials on every

level. As General Herren pointed out to

Clark on 14 April, the motivation behind the rising clamor linked the strong

national desire for unification with the

feeling of insecurity stemming from the

1950 aggression, with the reality of

political pressure of the Russo-Chinese

powermass, and with the fear that the

United States would not again come to

the ROK's aid in the event of future

aggression. Herren was afraid that Rhee

might do something rash to achieve his

objectives, since the ROK President

seemed to be in a position to channel

"public opinion" in whatever direction

he desired. To prevent hasty action by

Rhee, Herren suggested that an approach be made along the lines of a bilateral security pact, which the ROK

Government appeared to desire very

much, coupled with postwar economic

aid and the promise of U.S. support of

Korean unification by peaceful means

and of ROK participation in the political conference.22

Clark shared Herren's anxiety over the

deterioration of the situation, but did

not think that the United States should

offer Rhee a bilateral security pact under pressure. One of the weaknesses of

the UNC's position, he informed the

JCS on 18 April, lay in the fact that

under the present arrangements Rhee

could make independent use of the

ROK forces after the armistice was

signed, since no agreement on UNC

control in the posttruce period existed.

He did not think, however, that it was

the proper moment to raise this matter

either.23

As it happened, Clark did not have to

bring up the problem. On 21 April the

ROK National Assembly passed resolutions in support of Rhee's position on

the military unification of Korea by an

advance to the north. Rhee followed

this move by having Ambassador You

deliver a message to the State Department three days later. The message informed Mr. Eisenhower that Rhee was

preparing to withdraw ROK forces from

the U.N. Command if the latter made

any arrangement permitting the Chinese Communists to remain south of the

Yalu. Under such circumstances, the

20

 (1) Msg, G 3731, Taylor to Clark, 5 Apr 53.

(2) Msg, G 3756, Eighth Army to AFFE, 6 Apr

53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls

1-256 to app. I, incls 222 and 223. 21

 (1) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 261.

(2) Msg, C 61736, CINCFE to DA, 4 Apr 53, UNC/-

FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to app. I,

incls 218 and 216. (3) Msg, JCS 936213, JCS to

CINCUNC, 10 Apr 53.

22

 Msg, C 61949, CINCFE to DA, 16 Apr 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to app.

I, incl 230. 23

 Msg, CX 61976, Clark to JCS, 18 Apr 53, DAIN 258833.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 443

ROK armed forces would fight on—

alone if necessary.24

The arrival of this brief document

created consternation in Washington

and Tokyo, for with the plenary sessions

about to reconvene the threat of ROK

non-co-operation loomed large. Since the

timing of the withdrawal of ROK forces

was the critical point, Clark told General Collins that he intended to see

Rhee immediately and discover when

the ROK President intended to pull out

his troops from the UNC. If Rhee

would wait until after the posttruce

political conference was held, arrangements could be made to disengage other

U.N. units and Clark could retain a

large measure of control over the ROK

forces by restricting their logistical support. On the other hand, if Rhee made

his move as soon as the armistice was

signed and initiated action against the

enemy, the UNC would be caught in the

middle.25

Word came quickly from Washington

for Clark to delay his visit until Ambassador Briggs turned over a message from

Eisenhower to the ROK President. In

this missive, Mr. Eisenhower attempted

to reassure Rhee. The United Nations

he pointed out, had successfully repelled

the Communist invasion and would continue to press for the peaceful unification of Korea. But it had not and would

not commit itself to achieving this latter

objective through war. The U.S. President urged Rhee not to attempt to block

the armistice, for such a course could

conceivably lead to the loss of all that

the Republic of Korea had gained at

such terrific cost.26

On 27 April, Clark flew to Seoul to

talk to the ROK President. Rhee was

"calm, dispassionate and unemotional,"

the U.N. commander reported, and expounded his views "in a friendly manner." But these views had not changed

a whit. What Clark did discover during

the course of the conversation was that

Rhee was not thinking of taking the

ROK forces away from UNC control except as a last resort. The ROK President told Clark that he would pull out

his troops only after "thorough and

frank discussions" with the U.N. commander. After talking privately for

over an hour with Rhee, Clark felt that

the old man was bluffing and would not

go it alone without giving the matter

long and careful consideration.27

One of the topics that Rhee had

stressed in the dialog with the U.N. commander was the feasibility of the simultaneous withdrawal of both Chinese

Communist and U.N. forces. By 30 April

the ROK leader had thought over this

question and decided that only if certain safeguards were applied could the

U.N. troops be removed. The conditions

laid down by Rhee included in part: a

bilateral defense pact; U.S. guarantees

of immediate help in the event of Soviet

aggression; the continuance of the naval

blockade and air defense until peace was

24

 (1) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p.

261. (2) Msg, G 4404 KGI, Eighth Army to AFFE,

26 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls

1-256 to app. I, incl 237. 25

 Msg, C 62098, Clark to Collins, 26 Apr 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to app.

I, incl 250.

26

 Ltr, Eisenhower to Rhee, 23 Apr 53. From p.

182 of THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: MANDATE

FOR CHANGE, 1953-1956, by Dwight D. Eisenhower. Copyright (c) 1963 by Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Reprinted by permission of Doubleday & Company,

Inc.

27

 (1) Msg, C 62143, Clark to Collins, 28 Apr 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to

app. I, incl 255. (2) Clark, From the Danube to

the Yalu, pp. 261-62.
444 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

firmly established; and the expansion

and strengthening of ROK armed forces

in the meantime.28

Behind the adamant front presented

publicly by the ROK President on unification and the ousting of the Chinese

Communists, therefore, lay a disposition

to bargain. He wanted the U.N. Command to remain to bolster the ROK position even though this was clearly inconsistent with his stand on the Chinese

forces. But, unfortunately, his speeches

and press releases were leaving him very

little room to maneuver without making important concessions. The parades

and demonstrations went on unabated

even while he cautioned his people

against improper acts that might be

interpreted abroad as malicious in their

intentions.29

During the early part of May another

facet of the problem of relations with

the ROK Government came into

sharper focus. Rhee and his counselors

had stated on several occasions that they

would never permit the Korean nonrepatriates to be transferred to a neutral

state.30 When the Communists dropped

their demand on 7 May that the nonrepatriates be physically moved out of

the country, the ROK Government entered a new spate of objections. Both

the Communist and UNC plans for

disposing of the nonrepatriates were

predicated upon the stationing of custodial personnel and troops upon ROK

soil. General Choi, the ROK delegate,

quickly introduced a counterproposal

amending the UNC plan. Provided that

Switzerland was selected to serve as

chairman of the repatriation commission

and furnished all of the custodial forces,

which would be concentrated on the

island of Cheju-do, more than 50 miles

south of the mainland, the ROK Government would be willing to agree to a

neutral nation taking over control of the

nonrepatriates in Korea.31

On 12 May Clark again visited Rhee

to discuss the ROK attitude toward the

repatriation Commission and found him

"in dead earnest" about not turning over

Korean nonrepatriates to any state or

group of states having Communist inclinations. During this meeting Rhee

asked Clark about the possibility of his

having the ROK security troops guarding the Korean nonrepatriates release

them without involving the U.N. commander. Clark reminded Rhee that the

ROK security forces were under the

UNC and the ROK President did not

pursue the subject. In this matter Clark

admitted his sympathy with Rhee's desire and urged the JCS to insist upon the

release of the Korean nonrepatriates as

soon as the armistice was signed.32 As

has been mentioned above, the Washington policy makers allowed Clark's

stand on the release as an initial position

only and later gave way to the Communists' objections. But it was a clear

28 indication of the seriousness of the sit- Ltr, Rhee to Clark, 30 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to app. I, incl 253. 29

 (1) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p.

263. (2) Msg, AX 73675, KCOMZ to CINCFE, 27

Apr 53. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-

256 to app. I, incls 247 and 245. 30

 (1) Msg, AX 73525, KCOMZ to CINCFE, 16

Apr 53. (2) Msg, C 62143, Clark to Collins, 28

Apr 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53,

incls 1-256 to app. I, incls 103 and 255.

31

 Msg, HNC 1680, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 12 May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

May 53, incls 1-194 to app. I. 32

 Msg, HNC 1678, Clark to DA (JCS), 12 May

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1-194

to app. I. For Clark's account of the meeting and

his views on the release of the nonrepatriates see

Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 262-65.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 445

uation in ROK eyes and foreshadowed

later developments.

Since he had received no encouragement in his efforts to gain unification by

force, to secure the eviction of the

Chinese Communists, or to arrange for

the release of the Korean nonrepatriates,

Rhee cast his line into other waters. After the 12 May talk with Rhee, the U.N.

commander relayed his impressions of

the course that the ROK leader was following: "I feel Rhee realizes that, in

spite of some of his heated objections,

we will go ahead and obtain an armistice

if we can get one that does not sacrifice

the principle of no forced repatriation.

He is bargaining now to get a security

pact, to obtain more economic aid, and

to make his people feel he is to have a

voice in the armistice negotiations."

Clark saw no reason why a mutual security arrangement could not be worked

out as quickly as possible to satisfy this

ROK goal. And he had suggested to

Rhee that the staff of General Choi, the

ROK representative at Panmunjom, be

increased by several administrative officers to magnify the role of the ROK in

the negotiations. Rhee had agreed and

on 20 May three assistants of general officer rank joined Choi in the conference area.33

Although the threat of ROK action

to prolong the war by fighting on alone

diminished in early May, the Eighth

Army staff dusted off the plans prepared

during the ROK domestic crisis of a

year earlier for safeguarding UNC

forces and supplies in the event of internal disturbances. The situation had

altered a great deal, of course, for now

the chief concern lay in the observance

of the armistice once it was signed.

Much would depend upon the response

of the ROK Army and populace to an

actual appeal from Rhee to continue

the conflict, and plans were hinged to

the various degrees of co-operation that

might be given to Rhee by his people.

The task of disengaging UNC forces

from the battle line during active hostilities between the ROKA and the

Communists would present the most

acute problem if it arose, and instructions were issued to the major commanders involved to cover such an eventuality.34

The possibility that the U.N. Command and the ROK Government would

be able to reconcile their differences

without serious incident lessened after

the middle of May. When the Communists rejected the 13 May UNC proposal

at Panmunjom, policy makers in Washington began to prepare the final UNC

position. The abandonment of the stand

on the release of the Korean nonrepatriates and the acceptance of India as chairman and supplier of custodial forces

would be extremely difficult for the Republic of Korea to accept in the light of

the strong declarations by Rhee and his

fellow-leaders condemning such concessions. As the UNC gravitated closer

to the Communist views on the outstanding issues, it drifted as a matter of course

farther away from ROK desires.

Since the United States realized that

the final UNC position would be dis33

 (1) Msg, CX 62406, CINCFE to JCS, 13 May

53. (2) Msg, G 5100 KCG, Taylor to CINCFE, 19

May 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53,

incls 1-194 to app. I.

34

 (1) Eighth Army, Plan EVERREADY, 4 May 53,

in G-3 381 Pacific, 15/3. (2) Memo, Brig Gen

James A. Elmore, Chief Opn Div, for Gen Eddleman, 4 May 53, sub: CINCUNC Plans ... , in

G-3 091 Korea, 34/3.
446 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tasteful to Rhee, officials in Washington

fashioned a statement in the form of a

personal message from President Eisenhower designed to reassure the ROK

Government that the United States

would not desert it in the days ahead.

Clark and Briggs were instructed to deliver and discuss this with Rhee on 25

May. Perhaps the most important item

at the moment was the bilateral security

treaty, but because of ROK agitation

against the armistice, the United States

was not ready to negotiate a pact. The

disinclination of the Washington policy

makers to conclude a mutual security

arrangement puzzled Clark, for he believed that Rhee attached great importance to this matter. Without a security

agreement they would have little to

offer Rhee that would serve to soften

the impact of the concessions that the

United States was about to make.35

Nevertheless, while the UNC delegation was presenting the new offer at

Panmunjom on 25 May, Clark and

Briggs met with Rhee and informed

him of the terms that were being proffered to the Communists. They then

informed Rhee in effect that the United

States would support the Republic of

Korea militarily, economically, and

politically provided Rhee accepted and

co-operated in carrying out the conditions agreed upon in the armistice. To

bolster the prospects of peace after a

truce, a "greater sanctions" statement by

the U.N. countries participating in the

Korean War would be issued immediately following the conclusion of the

cease-fire. A bilateral security pact, however, could not be considered at the

present, for it would weaken the U.N.

aspects of the Korean efforts and might

be hard to justify to the U.S. Congress

under current circumstances.

The aftermath of this interview was

hardly surprising. Since Rhee had not

been consulted on the formulation of the

final position and was kept in the dark

on the extent of UNC concessions, Clark

and Briggs were merely apprising him of

the fait accompli. At the same time, to

make matters worse, they had to tell him

that he was not going to get a security

treaty now and if he did not behave he

might also not get all the assistance that

had been promised him. According to

the two U.S. representatives the armistice

proposals came as "a profound shock" to

Rhee. He immediately declared them

unacceptable to his country and said

therefore he could give none of the

assurances of co-operation which the

United States desired. Rhee did, however, ask that the points covered by Clark

and Briggs be submitted in writing.

What Rhee would do to retrieve the

situation remained unknown, but Clark

warned his superiors shortly after the 25

May meeting of one dangerous possibility:

... he may either covertly or overtly

initiate action to cause the release of all

Korean non-repatriates. He has the capa- bility, and should he attempt this action, there are few effective steps that I can take

to counter it. Accordingly, I am bringing

this matter to your attention, for such an

eventuality would be most damaging to the

UNC cause. It would be practically im- possible to avoid charges of UNC duplicity, not only from the Communists but from

our allies as well.36

35

 Hq UNC/FEC Korean Armistice Negotiations

(May 52-Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 129ff.

36

 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pages

268-71, contains a detailed account of this meeting.

See also, Msg, C 62630, Clark to JCS, 26 May 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1-194 to

app. I.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 447

It was true, Clark continued, that he

could replace the ROK security battalions with U.S. troops, but this might aggravate an already delicate state of

affairs and might also result in placing

the U.S. forces in a position of having to

employ force against the nonrepatriates

if they attempted to escape. Since the

only motive of these Koreans was to resist

return to Communist control, it would

be "particularly unfortunate" if U.S. personnel had to use violent means to avert

a breakout. He had discussed the problem with his subordinate commanders

and all were alerted to the potential

explosiveness of the prisoner of war situation. They would take what preventive measures they could under the

circumstances, but these might well be

inadequate.37

During the interim between the presentation of the 25 May proposal to the

Communists and the next meeting of

the plenary conference, the tempo of

ROK denunciations of the UNC offer

increased. On 27 May the major points

of the plan found their way into the

ROK newspapers, apparently leaked by

governmental sources. The ROK National Assembly listened on the next day

to Foreign Minister Pyun Yung Tai attack the concessions granted and then

lined up solidly in support of President

Rhee. From General Choi, the ROK

representative at Panmunjom, came a

blast at the provisions for turning over

the nonrepatriates to the repatriation

commission, for holding the prisoners

until either the political conference or

the U.N. General Assembly could dispose of them, and for permitting Communists to enter ROK territory.38

When Choi's statements were given to

the press, thus violating the executive

nature of the plenary meetings, Harrison

remonstrated with him in vain. After

Choi declared that he would not attend

further executive meetings and refused

to promise compliance with the security

rules, Harrison had little choice but to

halt the flow of classified information to

the ROK representative and his staff.39

As emotions began to run high, especially in ROK official circles, and warnings of trouble streamed in from U.S.

military and diplomatic sources, the

leaders in Washington wondered

whether they might not have been too

hasty in denying Rhee a mutual defense

pact. On 29 May, Secretary of State

Dulles and Secretary of Defense Wilson

agreed that Clark could offer Rhee a bilateral security treaty if the U.N. commander thought that this might stave

off a dangerous situation. Mr. Eisenhower approved on the following day.40

The belated decision had only one

drawback—there was no guarantee that

Rhee would accept the bargain now.

Neither Clark nor Briggs were sure of

the reception that Rhee might give the

tardy offer, but both felt that it should

be held in abeyance until the Communists responded to the UNC 25 May

proposal and Rhee had an opportunity

37

 (1) Msg, 250610, Clark to JCS, 25 May 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1-194 to app.

I. (2) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp.

272-74.

38

 Msg, HNC 1706, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 29 May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

May 53, incls 1-194 to app. I. 39

 Msg, HNC 1711, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 1 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

May 53, incls 1-194 to app. I. 40

 Memo for Rcd (sgd Eddleman), 1 Jun 53,

sub: Conf on the Current Difficulties with the

ROK Govt . . . , in G-3 091 Korea, 46.
448 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

to react to the Communists' reaction.41

Before the Communists could enter

the picture again, however, Rhee sent

an answer to the President's message of

25 May. Surprisingly enough, this letter

was mild in tone and omitted all reference to the controversial matters of the

Korean nonrepatriates and the repatriation commission. Instead the ROK

leader concentrated upon what he considered the four major conditions that

would make an armistice acceptable to

the ROK people. First, the United

States would conclude a mutual defense

pact with the Republic of Korea and, second, would pledge military and economic support to strengthen ROK defenses. Third, the U.N. and Chinese

Communist forces would withdraw simultaneously from Korea and, fourth,

U.S. air and naval forces outside Korea

would remain in the area to act as a deterrent to further aggression. As Clark

pointed out to the JCS on 2 June, the

U.N. Command could satisfy all of these

conditions except for the question of

withdrawal of all non-Korean forces.

This would have to be taken up at the

political conference unless the Communists would agree to include it in the

armistice. Clark did not think that they

would, but admitted that Rhee's answer

was encouraging and showed no disposition toward undertaking rash acts.

Nevertheless, Clark and Briggs still

wanted to wait until after the next

plenary session before they talked to

Rhee again.42

Approval for deferring the visit arrived from Washington the following

day. Collins informed Clark that he and

Briggs could use their own discretion on

whether to bring up the matter of the

pact.43 In the opening days of June

everything hinged upon the Communist

acceptance or rejection of the UNC proposal. Despite the fact that both Rhee

and the UNC expected the enemy to

agree to the 25 May offer, they preferred to wait and make sure before

taking the next step.

During this brief interlude there was

one development that was quite significant in the light of later events—Rhee

appointed Lt. Gen. Won Yong Duk, a

trusted henchman, to the command of

the Provost Marshal General's office.

This command was directly under the

Minister of National Defense rather than

under the ROKA Chief of Staff and

placed all military police at Rhee's disposition.44

When the Communists signified on 4

June that they would go along with

most of the UNC suggestions, the ROK

antiarmistice machine gathered fresh

momentum. But it was operating now

on two levels. On the level below Rhee,

speeches, parades, and demonstrations

continued to be inflammatory in tone,

while the ROK President himself proceeded at a more cautious pace. At the

meeting with Clark and Briggs on 5

June, Rhee attacked the armistice as appeasement, a Communist victory, and as

the first step toward World War III. On

the other hand, he hedged on ROK future action and refused to commit him- 41

 (1) Msg, GX 5478 KCG, Eighth Army to

CINCUNC, 30 May 53. (2) Msg, CX 62747,

CINCFE to JCS, 30 May 53. Both in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1-194 to app. I. 42

 (1) Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-

1956, p. 183. (2) Msg, Eighth Army to CINCUNC,

2 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53,

Source Papers 1-150, Paper 149. (3) Msg, CX

62781, Clark to JCS, 2 Jun 53, DA-IN 273323. 43

 Msg, DA 940543, CSUSA to Clark, 3 Jun 53. 44

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 46.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 449

self on whether a mutual defense treaty

would counterbalance his objections to

the truce. Clark and Briggs decided not

to make the definite offer of a pact until a more favorable moment arose.45

Rhee issued a public statement on 6

June that was very similar in content to

the letter he had sent Clark on 30 April.

He proposed a simultaneous withdrawal

of all non-Korean forces from the peninsula after a mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea had been concluded. The

pact would guarantee U.S. military assistance, support in the event of aggression, and the retention of U.S. air and

naval forces in the Far East area. If such

an arrangement were not possible, then

the ROK troops would fight on.46 It

was Rhee's wish that the UNC delegation

introduce the matter of non-Korean

troop withdrawal at Panmunjom, but

there was little chance that his desire

would be gratified at a time when the

UNC and Communists were so close to

finishing up the truce arrangements.

Shortly after Rhee released this statement, President Eisenhower decided to

try again. In his letter, delivered on 7

June by Clark, Eisenhower defended

the negotiating of the armistice and then

went on to again pledge U.S. supportpolitical, military, and economic—in the

posttruce period. The message seemed

to have little effect upon Rhee. Clark,

reporting on his meeting with the ROK

President, noted: "I have never seen

him more distracted, wrought up and

emotional." During the interview Rhee

indicated that he and his people would

never accept the armistice and that from

now on he would feel free to take whatever steps were necessary. He refused to

elaborate on what he would do or when

he would act, causing Clark to conclude:

"He himself is the only one who knows

how far he will go, but undoubtedly he

will bluff right up to the last."

 47

The first measures adopted by Rhee

came on 7 June when "pseudo-extraordinary" security restrictions were imposed on all of South Korea and all

ROK officers on duty in the United

States were ordered home. By the time

the terms of reference on prisoners were

signed on 8 June at Panmunjom, the

ROK campaign was in full swing.48

There were three principal themes

stressed in the speeches, slogans, and

placards: the unification of Korea; the

release of the anti-Communist prisoners

of war; and the use of military force to

prevent the entry of the "so-called"

neutral nations forces that were to take

over custody of the prisoners.

In the midst of the wave of increasing

internal excitement, General Taylor

called on Rhee and introduced an alleviating factor into the situation. After a

diatribe against the armistice Rhee reiterated his intention of continuing the

struggle alone. Taylor proceeded to

point out that the ROK Army still suffered from many deficiencies and

needed time to convert itself into a bal45

 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 274-

76.

46

 Msg, CX 62854, CINCUNC to JCS, 6 Jun 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers,

151-297, Paper 157.

47

 (1) "Public Papers of the Presidents," Dwight

D. Eisenhower, 1953 (Washington, 1960), pp. 377-

80. (2) Msg, CX 62876, CINCUNC to Eighth

Army, 7 Jun 53. (3) Msg, CX 62890, CINCUNC

to JCS, 7 Jun 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

Jun 53, Source Papers, 151-297, Papers 163 and

166.

48

 Robert C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee (Rutland, Vermont, Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., 1960), p. 160.
450 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

anced force capable of defending South

Korea. Evidently the thought that the

truce and the political conference would

provide time to allow completion of the

twenty-division program had not

occurred to Rhee. In a more temperate

tone, he told Taylor that he needed assurances to convince the Korean people

of the palatability of the armistice.

These would include: 1. the limiting

of the political discussion, preferably to

sixty days; 2. a mutual security treaty

with the United States; 3. the expansion

of the ROKA to twenty divisions and the

development of the ROK Navy and Air

Force; 4. the barring of Indian and

Communist representatives from Korean soil. However, Rhee went on, he

was not yet ready to take a final stand

on this matter and wanted to think it

over a bit more. Taylor received the

impression that the ROK President was

out on a limb because of the extreme

position he had assumed on the withdrawal of foreign troops and was casting desperately for a means to save face

while extricating himself.49

The uncertainty reflected in Rhee's

conversation with Taylor was mirrored

in the domestic events of the second

week in June. Demonstrations in Seoul

led to the injury of some high school

girls and unfavorable publicity for the

U.S. Military Police, even though they

were not responsible for the cuts and

bruises suffered. Yet, at the same time,

many Koreans were weary of war and

realized the futility of fighting on

alone.50

On 12 June Secretary of State Dulles

sent a letter to President Rhee suggesting that the latter come to Washington

for high-level talks with the President

and himself. Although the offer reportedly pleased Rhee, he turned it down

because of the press of affairs. Apparently the ROK President was not yet

ready to come to terms; instead he asked

Dulles to visit him in Korea, where

he would have the psychological advantage. This time Dulles had to decline.

As an alternative he proposed sending

Assistant Secretary of State Walter S.

Robertson, who had the full trust of

Eisenhower and Dulles, in his place. On

17 June Rhee told Briggs that he

would be delighted to see Robertson

when he arrived.51

On the same day, 17 June, Rhee called

Briggs back and gave him his answer to

Eisenhower's letter of 6 June. While

expressing appreciation at the U.S. offers

of assistance and a mutual security pact,

Rhee did not feel that these could be

accepted if they entailed ROK consent

to the armistice.52 Later in the day he

addressed a group of U.S. and ROK officers at ROK II Corps headquarters and

became quite emotional in his speech

denouncing the armistice and repeating

the ROK intention to carry on the fighting by itself.53

The vague threats and hints of ROK

action to block the truce cropped up

again in Rhee's talk to the ROK officers,

49

 Msg, G 58155 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 9 Jun 53,

in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jan-Jun 53. 50

 Msg, A 6661, FEAF to CINCFE, 16 Jun 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers 151-

297, Paper 178.

51

 (1) Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-

1956, p. 184. (2) Clark, From the Danube to the

Yalu, p. 279. 52

 (1) Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-

1956, p. 185. (2) Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice

Negotiations (May 52-Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 223-25. 53

 Msg, G 6092 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 17 Jun 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers,

151-297, Paper 199.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 451

but the U.S. officials could do little to

forestall a hostile or embarrassing act

without aggravating the situation. By

the same token Rhee faced a similar

dilemma, for he was personally friendly

to the United States and appreciated the

help it had given South Korea. Yet his

implacable opposition to the armistice

could not be suddenly altered without

loss of face in his own land. And any

daring move that might save his face

was bound to produce strained relations

between his country and the United

States. Rhee's choice was a difficult one,

but it had to be made.

The Pacification of Rhee

On 18 June Rhee revealed his decision and confirmed the worst expectations of General Clark. The UNC

press release issued was brief and succinct:

Between midnight and dawn today, ap- proximately 25,000 militantly anti-communist North Korean prisoners of war

broke out of the United Nations Command

prisoner of war camps at Pusan, Masan, Nonsan, and Sang Mu Dai, Korea.

Statements attributed to high officials of

the Republic of Korea now make it clear

that the action had been secretly planned

and carefully co-ordinated at top levels

in the Korean Government and that out- side assistance was furnished the POW's in

their mass breakout. ROKA Security units

assigned as guards at the POW camps did

little to prevent the breakouts and there is

every evidence of actual collusion between

the ROK guards and the prisoners. . . . U.S. personnel at these non-repatriate

camps, limited in each case to the camp

commander and a few administrative per- sonnel, exerted every effort to prevent to- day's mass breakouts, but in the face of

collusion between the ROKA guards and

the prisoners, their efforts were largely unavailing. The large quantities of non-toxic

irritants employed proved ineffective be- cause of the great number of prisoners

involved in the nighttime breakouts. Nine

prisoners were killed and 16 injured by rifle

fire. There were no casualties among U.S. personnel. As of 1 o'clock this afternoon 971

escaped POW's had been recovered. ROKA Security Guard units which have

left their posts at non-repatriate camps are

being replaced by U.S. troops.54

Despite the celerity with which the

U.S. security units took over their duties

at the prison camps, they were forced

to operate at a distinct disadvantage. In

the event of mass escapes the custodial

troops were authorized to use riot control measures but not gunfire. The

United States was especially reluctant

to use force against the anti-Communist

prisoners and thus could only employ

nontoxic gases and other nonlethal

methods of control. Although the bulk

of the prisoners gained their freedom on

18 June, mass attempts continued and

hundreds more broke out in spite of the

presence of U.S. guards. On 17 June

there had been around 35,400 Korean

nonrepatriates in the compounds; by the

end of the month, only 8,600 remained.

The price of liberty had become more

costly, however, for 61 prisoners had

died and 116 had been injured in the

escape attempts.55

The uproar caused by Rhee's unilateral action did not center on whether

the freeing of the prisoners was justified

or not; it concerned itself rather with

the effects of the ROK coup upon the

54

 Msg, ZX 36907, CINCFE to DA, 18 Jun 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers,

151-297, Paper 217. The number of prisoners still

at large on 18 June was 25,131. 55

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 46.
452 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

negotiations. Although Clark had

known that Rhee was in a position to

release the nonrepatriates at any time,

he told the ROK President that he was

"profoundly shocked" at the abrogation

of the personal commitment that Rhee

had previously given him not to take unilateral action involving ROK troops

under UNC control without informing

Clark. A message from President Eisenhower echoed Clark's charge and intimated that unless Rhee quickly agreed

to accept the authority of the U.N.

Command to conclude the armistice,

other arrangements would be made.56

Actually the accusation by Clark was

not entirely pertinent. The promise

made by Rhee had applied to the withdrawal of ROK forces from UNC control. After Rhee had appointed General

Won as Provost Marshal, he had placed

the security troops at the prison camps

under him. Won, in turn, was responsible to the ROK Minister of National Defense and Rhee rather than to the

ROKA Chief of Staff and the UNC. As

for giving Clark prior warning of the

plan to free the prisoners, Rhee pointed

out: "Under the circumstances, if I had

revealed to you in advance my idea of

setting them free, it would have embarrassed you. Furthermore, the plan

would have been completely spoiled." 57

Although the ROK Government

wanted to let all of the Korean nonrepatriates go, Rhee made no effort to

use force. Neither he nor the U.S.

officials wished to have armed clashes

between the ROK and UNC troops. In

response to Clark's request that Rhee

promise not to free the Chinese nonrepatriates and any of the Communist

prisoners, the ROK President agreed not

to take any action along this line.58

The uncertainty over Rhee's next

move and the delicate situation in the

nonrepatriate prison camps made the

latter part of June a very unsettled

period. The escaped prisoners, for the

most part, were integrated with the

local population and were nearly impossible to recapture because of the assistance furnished them by the ROK

authorities. In the newspapers, stories of

UNC collusion on the prisoner escapes

appeared and Clark had to issue a strong

statement on 21 June denying that he

had known about or abetted the release

of the nonrepatriates.59

To forestall similar charges from the

Communists, Harrison had informed

Nam Il immediately on 18 June of the

breakouts and placed the responsibility

squarely on the shoulders of the ROK

Government. But the enemy refused to

believe that the U.N. Command had not

known about the plan in advance and

had not "deliberately connived" with

Rhee to carry it out. Despite this, the

Communists did not threaten to break

off negotiations as they might well have

done. Instead they posed several perti56

 (1) Ltr, Clark to Rhee, 18 Jun 53, quoted in

Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations

(May 52-Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 239-40. (2) Msg, CX

63164, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 19 Jun 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers,

151-297, Paper 221. (3) Eisenhower, Mandate for

Change, 1953-1956, pp. 185-86. 57

 Ltr, Rhee to Clark, 18 Jun 53, quoted in full

in Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations

(May 52-Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 246-47.

58

 (1) Msg, CX 63216, CINCUNC to Taylor, 20

Jun 53. (2) Msg, CX 63230, CINCUNC to DA, 20

Jun 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53,

Source Papers, 151-297, Papers 227 and 233. 59

 (1) Msg, DA 941831, Parks to Clark, 19 Jun 53.

(2) Msg, C 63212, CINCFE to CINFO, 20 Jun 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers,

151-297, Paper 237. (3) Msg, C 63242, Clark to

JCS, 21 Jun 53, in same place, Paper 240.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 453

nent questions that struck at the heart of

the matter. Is the United Nations

Command able to control the South

Korean government and army? If not,

does the armistice in Korea include the

Rhee group? If the Rhee group is not

included, what assurance is there for the

implementation of the armistice agreement on the part of South Korea?60

The Communists had a right to know

the answers to these queries, but the

UNC was in no position to provide

them. Only Rhee could supply this information and he seemed disinclined to

be helpful.

At a meeting with Taylor on 20 June

the ROK President appeared surprised

that the Eighth Army commander had

not gotten an official reaction to the four

points he had made on 9 June.61 He had

evidently forgotten that he had not been

ready at that time to present them as

an official position. During this conference he gave notice that the signing of

an armistice would automatically free

him for further unilateral action,

though he refused to commit himself on

what this action might be.62 The mixture of threat, on the one hand, with

interest in further horse trading, on the

other, indicated that he had not closed

the door to bargaining.

When Clark visited Rhee two days

later, he found him nervous and tense,

but very friendly. Both Clark and

Taylor, when they compared impressions, felt that the adverse comments of

the world press on Rhee's unilateral release of the prisoners was making an

impact on him. The U.N. commander

got straight to the point and told the

ROK leader that he must accept the

premises that the United States was determined to sign an armistice under

honorable terms and would not try to

eject the Communist troops from Korea

by force. Moving on to the four points

of 9 June, Clark said he thought

that there should be a time limit on the

political conference; that the United

States could sign a security treaty, but

would never agree to come to the aid of

the ROK if the latter were the aggressor; and that the ROK forces would be

built up. As for the last point, Clark

aired his purely personal view that some

modification in the prisoner of war

agreement might be worked out. The

8,600 Korean nonrepatriates might

remain in U.N. custody and the ROK

representatives might be given full opportunity to explain the terms of reference to them. When the time came

to turn these prisoners over to the

repatriation commission they could be

moved to the demilitarized zone and

ROK representatives might sit in as

observers while the Communists explainers carried on their sessions. The

Chinese non-Communist prisoners could

be turned over to the custody of a

neutral state for final disposition. Such

an arrangement, Clark told Rhee, would

eliminate the need for Indian or Communist personnel to enter ROK rear

areas.

Turning to another subject, Clark

gave his frank opinion on the status of

60

 (1) Ltr, Harrison to Nam, 18 Jun 53, in G-3

file, Liaison Officers' Mtgs at Pan Mun Jom, Jan

53-Jun 53, bk. III. (2) Ltr, Kim and Peng to

Clark, 19 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs,

vol. 7. 61

 These had included a time limit on the political conference, a mutual security pact, expansion

of the ROK armed forces, and the barring from

Korea of Indian and Communist representatives. 62

 Msg, GX 6228 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 20 Jun

53, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, JanJun 53.
454 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the ROK Army. It could not fight on

its own, offensively or defensively, at the

present and needed time to prepare for

the assumption of larger tasks.

Throughout the discussion Rhee had

listened intently, Clark noted, and he

had appeared to be interested in the

tentative solution that the U.N. commander had proposed. Although Rhee

would not commit himself, Clark felt

that he made one very significant remark. Despite the fact that he could not

sign an armistice, since this would be

an admission of the division of Korea,

the ROK leader had indicated that he

could support it. Clark requested quick

guidance as to whether the United

States desired him to continue further

along the avenue he had suggested to

Rhee.63

Before an answer could arrive from

Washington, Clark forwarded an

amendment to one of his proposals: instead of turning over the Chinese nonrepatriates to a neutral country, he

advocated transporting them to the

demilitarized zone in the same fashion

as the Korean nonrepatriates and

delivering all of the prisoners who were

unwilling to return home to the repatriation commission.64

By this time the President and his

advisors had decided to send Assistant

Secretary of State Robertson and Army

Chief of Staff General Collins to Korea.

Clark had been told to discuss the matter

of armistice modifications with the

emissaries upon their arrival. The conference in Tokyo between U.S. military

and diplomatic leaders in the Far East

and Robertson and Collins took place

on 24 June. All agreed that the armistice

should be signed as quickly as possible. Clark and Murphy felt that the

enemy would accept an armistice even

though the UNC could not specifically

guarantee that Rhee would live up to all

of its provisions.65

At a meeting held in Washington the

same day the report of this conference

arrived, Mr. Eisenhower told his counselors that since Clark was on the spot

and in the best position to assess the

situation, he should be given wide authority to go ahead and conclude the

armistice. In the instructions sent to

Clark on 25 June he was told that as

long as he did not compromise the principle of no forced repatriation and did

not imply that the UNC would force

the Republic of Korea to accept the

armistice terms, he could handle the

rest of the arrangements on his own.

There should be no UNC commitment

to withdraw from Korea, the Washington leaders stated, but if Clark thought

it would be helpful, he could let the

ROK leaders think that the UNC intended to pull out.66

After the demonstrations and

speeches attendant upon the celebration

of the third anniversary of the war's outbreak were over, Robertson conferred

with Rhee on an almost daily basis. His

chief mission was to clear up the misunderstandings that threatened to disrupt U.S.-ROK unity and to reassure

President Rhee of U.S. friendship and

63

 (1) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp.

282-84. (2) Msg, Clark to JCS, 22 Jun 53, DA-IN

280121. 64

 Msg, Clark to JCS, 23 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 151-297, paper

250.

65

 (1) Msg, DA 942047, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 22

Jun 53. (2) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu,

pp. 284-85. 66

 (1) Msg, JCS 942368, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Jun

53. (2) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p.

289.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 455

concern for the future of the Republic of

Korea. He immediately encountered

the deep fear of the ROK Government

that the United Nations might be weary

of the war and might be ready to sacrifice Korea. As Robertson later reported,

the bitterness found in the United States

and among its allies over the release of

the prisoners was duplicated in South

Korea by a bitterness "distilled of their

fears."

 67

Although at the meeting of 27 June

Rhee admitted that President Eisenhower had met all of the conditions he

had laid down and requested that they

be given to him in writing, agreement

was fleeting. Rhee added new conditions and modified his assurances.68

While the private conferences between Rhee and Robertson continued,

Clark acted on the permission he had

received to go ahead with the effort to

wind up the armistice agreement. In

his letter of 29 June to Kim and Peng,

Clark attempted to answer the questions

asked by the Communists. He pointed

out that the UNC did command the

ROK Army, but did not exercise control

over the Republic of Korea, which was a

sovereign nation. As to whether the

armistice included the government of

Rhee, he reminded his opposites that

the armistice was a military agreement

between the military commanders.

Since the co-operation of the ROK Government was necessary in this case, however, the UNC and the U.N. governments concerned would make every effort to obtain ROK co-operation and

would also set up military safeguards

insofar as possible to insure observance

of the terms. Clark suggested that the

delegations meet immediately and discuss the final arrangements.69

Both Clark and Harrison became impatient as the diplomatic talks dragged

on into early July. They felt that it was

time to stop letting the ROK Government call the turn. General Clark believed that Mr. Eisenhower had made

maximum concessions to Rhee and that

it was time to let him know that there

would be no more. In accord with the

permission he had gained on 25 June to

give the impression that the UNC intended to withdraw from Korea, Clark

told the Secretary of Defense on 5 July,

he had been pursuing a campaign of

counterpressure upon the ROK. He

had held conferences with his senior

commanders, carried out some troop

movements, consolidated the camps of

the Korean nonrepatriates, slowed down

the movement of supplies and equipment to Korea, and suspended the shipment of equipment for the activation

of the last four ROKA divisions. In the

future, he intended to curtail projects

employing indigenous labor and reduce

the use of Korean hwan. Military and

naval activity would be aimed at fostering the belief that the UNC was preparing to pull out of Korea. As the indications that the UNC was leaving

mounted, Clark thought that they would

have a considerable impact upon Rhee

and his advisors.70

67

 Radio Address of Dulles and Robertson, July

17. 1953, reported in Congressional Record, July

18. 1953, vol 99, pt. 7, p. 9128. 68

 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 286-

87.

69

 Msg, HNC 1796, CINCUNC (Adv) to JCS, 29

Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source

Papers, 151-297, Paper 264. 70

 (1) Msg, HNC 1800, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 4 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

Jul 53, incls to app. I, 1-143, incl 2. (2) Msg, CX

63500, CINCUNC to Secy Defense, 5 Jul 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,

incls 144-286, incl 176.
456 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

On the same day—5 July—one of the

facets of Clark's campaign produced encouraging results. In an interview with

the press, General Taylor remarked

that he could extricate the U.N. forces

from the battle line amicably if the

ROK Government decided to continue

the fighting after the armistice. He went

on to note, however, that the Eighth

Army was like a twenty-cylinder automobile with a complex system of wires

and cogwheels. If the U.N. forces were

taken away, the ROK troops that remained would have to fashion a completely new automobile, Taylor concluded.71

 The implication was clear

that the ROK Army would face a major

problem of reorganization in the event

it fought on alone.

The evident U.S. determination to go

on with the armistice negotiations was

matched by Robertson's patience and

tact with Rhee behind the scenes. As

President Eisenhower has noted: "Day

by day he argued with this fiercely patriotic but recalcitrant old man on the

futility of trying to go it alone. He gave

assurance of United States support if

Rhee would be reasonable."

 72

 To satisfy

Rhee's fears that a postarmistice political conference might be carried on indefinitely to breed uncertainty and to

serve as a cover for infiltration of hostile

propaganda in South Korea, Robertson

agreed that if it turned out that way, the

United States would try to end the conference "as a sham and a hostile trick."

 73

While Robertson worked to allay the

ROK President's doubts, the Communist liaison officers on 8 July delivered

the long-awaited answer to Clark's request for the resumption of negotiations.

Kim and Peng were still highly suspicious of the role the UNC had played in

the escape of the prisoners of war and

bitterly critical of the actions of Rhee

and his government. Despite their detailed reservations about accepting the

UNC explanations, the key sentence

came in the last paragraph: "To sum

up, although our side is not entirely

satisfied with the reply of your side, yet

in view of the indication of the desire of

your side to strive for an early Armistice

and in view of the assurances given by

your side, our side agrees that the delegations of both sides meet at an

appointed time to discuss the question

of implementation of the Armistice

agreement and the serious preparation

prior to the signing of the Armistice

agreement."74 Although this was a

long-winded way of saying "yes," the

fact that the Communists were willing

to proceed in spite of the uncertain

status of the ROK situation demonstrated how much they wanted an

armistice.

The enemy's agreement to return to

Panmunjom and the UNC counterpressure campaign evidently combined

to have an effect upon Rhee. During the

next three days Robertson was able to

wind up his conversations with President Rhee. When Robertson left Korea

on 12 July he had a letter signed by

Rhee expressing his appreciation of

Robertson's performance and "his fine

71

 (1) Msg, CX 63524, CINCFE to DA, 7 Jul 53,

in UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,

incls 144-286, Incl 178. (2) New York Times,

July 6, 1953, p. 3. 72

 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956,

p. 187. 73

 Radio Address of Dulles and Robertson of

July 17, 1953, reported in Congressional Record,

July 18, 1953, vol 99, pt. 7, p. 9128.

74

 Msg, HNU 7-1, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 8 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incl 7.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 457

MR. ROBERTSON

spirit of consideration and understanding." Rhee also assured President

Eisenhower that "he would not obstruct

in any way the implementation of the

terms of the armistice" despite "his

misgivings over the long-term results."

 75

In return for this promise Rhee

obtained five main pledges from the

United States: 1. the promise of a U.S.-

ROK mutual security pact after the

armistice; 2. assurance that the ROK

would receive long-term economic aid

and a first installment of two hundred

million dollars; 3. agreement that the

United States and the Republic of Korea would withdraw from the political

conference after ninety days if nothing

substantial was achieved; 4. agreement

to carry out the planned expansion of

the ROK Army; and 5. agreement to

hold high-level U.S.-ROK conferences

on joint objectives before the political

conferences were held.76

These were important concessions, to

be sure, but in the process of negotiation

Rhee had dropped many of his previous

demands. Through his agreement not

to obstruct the armistice, he abandoned

his insistence upon the withdrawal of

Chinese Communist Forces from Korea

and for the unification of Korea before

the signing of the armistice. He also

gave up his objections to the transportation of Korean nonrepatriates and

Chinese prisoners to the demilitarized

zone for the period of explanations, provided that no Indian troops were landed

in Korea.

This was not the end of the Rhee

story. During the closing days of the

truce negotiations his presence was felt

even as it had been before, but to a

lesser degree. The reservations he had

attached to his promises not to impede

the armistice allowed him some room

to maneuver and he caused the United

States and its allies several anxious moments up to the end. But the period of

his dominance of the negotiation was

over when he agreed in writing to go

along in general with the conclusion of

the truce terms.

What the old warrior had accomplished by his fight was difficult to

assess immediately. He had not succeeded in gaining United States support

75

 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956,

p. 187.

76

 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 287-

88.
458 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

for his drive to unify Korea by military

force nor had he carried the day for his

plan to have the Chinese Communists

withdraw from Korea before the armistice was signed. On the other hand, he

had won the pledge of a bilateral security pact with the United States

coupled with economic and military assistance; he had freed thousands of

Korean nonrepatriates from the prison

camps; and he had blocked the entry of

Indian and Communist personnel into

South Korea. Because of the delicate

situation vis-à-vis the Communists at

Panmunjom, the United States had been

forced to cater to Rhee's desires in several instances to prevent further incidents and Rhee had gained face among

his own people on these occasions. He

had also shown the world that the Republic of Korea was not a puppet state.

At the same time his tactics in blocking

the arrangement of a cease-fire in Korea

could not help but cause him to suffer a

loss of friends and confidence among the

other nations around the globe who

desired an end to the fighting and the

casualties. The use of speeches and

mass information media such as the

radio and press to fan public emotion

and the organization and encouragement of demonstrations and parades to

make clear ROK opposition to the armistice were quite effective, but in the

long run may have cost Rhee more than

they gained. The United States was willing to meet all reasonable demands to

compensate the ROK for its acceptance

of the truce; the campaign of open

pressure merely made it more difficult

for the United States to yield gracefully.

In retrospect, it appeared that through

diplomatic bargaining Rhee could have

had all that he eventually won and

could have avoided giving the Communists a chance to gloat over the falling

out of allies. No one could belie his devotion to the national objectives of his

country or his sincerity in pursuing

them, but his tactics and judgment in

attaining these goals were certainly open

to question.
CHAPTER XXI

The Last Offensive

While the U.N. Command was attempting to allay the doubts and fears

of Syngman Rhee and his government

over the armistice, the Communists had

not been idle. The disturbed state of

affairs behind the UNC lines offered the

enemy an opportunity to reap psychological and propaganda advantages by

exploiting the differences. In addition,

the winter lull in the fighting had enabled the Communists to build up their

stockpiles of ammunition and matériel

and to bring their combat units up to

full strength despite the constant efforts

of the Fifth Air Force to interdict the

lines of communication. With a plentiful supply of well-fed, well-equipped,

and battle-hardened troops at their disposal, the Communists were in a good

position to launch a military offensive

as well. If they could conclude the

fighting with a successful assault upon

the UNC lines, the general impression of

a Communist military victory in the war

might, in the eyes of the Asian community, be sustained. But there were difficulties that the enemy would have to

surmount if he determined to pursue

such a course, particularly in timing the

offensive and in selecting the objectives.

Unless the victory could be tied in

closely with the conclusion of the truce,

the Communist claims could be discounted. As for the seizing of terrain,

the question was more complicated. Obviously the offensive must be on a large

enough scale to merit Communist assertion of a military victory, yet on the

other hand not so large as to threaten

the loss of more territory along the front

than the UNC was willing to sacrifice.

As later developments showed, the problems of when to launch the assault and

where to delimit it probably demanded

much attention by enemy military planners in the spring of 1953.

The Preliminaries

During the month of April, while the

negotiators at Panmunjom were arranging the details for the exchange of the

sick and wounded and for the resumption of the plenary conferences, the

tempo of operations had slackened. The

flurry of activity in March had been

superseded by a return to the smallscale probes and raids so characteristic

of the winter months. Seldom was an

enemy attack mounted with more than

two companies; more often it was one or

less. Since April was the spring thaw

period, the sloppy condition of the

ground helped to restrict the scale of

operations; the uncertain status of the

negotiations was also a factor. Eighth

Army intelligence reports estimated that

the enemy would continue to employ the

active defense with the twenty-nine divisions available in or near the front line
460 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

and would not stage a general offensive in the near future.1

 (See Maps VI

and VII.)

For the U.N. Command the resumption of the talks at Panmunjom had

some side effects, especially upon strategic air operations. General Weyland

had intended to mount a high altitude,

B-29 night attack upon the Yangsi target complex near the mouth of the Yalu

River in mid-April and Clark gave his

personal approval on 12 April. But his

superiors decided that since the sick and

wounded prisoners were going to be assembled in that general area for movement to Panmunjom, the operation

should be postponed. They did not wish

to give the Communists any excuse not

to go through with the prisoner exchange.2

 Another attack, upon facilities

at Koksan, fifty miles east of P'yongyang,

was postponed for the same reason ten

days later.3

In the matter of close air support, the

negotiations played a less important

role. Air Force, Navy, and Marine

fighters and fighter-bombers continued

to strike enemy troops and strongpoints

whenever opportunity arose. During

April, Navy and Marine pilots concentrated on Cherokee-type missions

against targets that were out of reach of

the artillery. They discovered that

making successive runs in the same

area for several days allowed them to become familiar with the terrain and

tended to muzzle the antiaircraft fire in

that vicinity. Evidently the Communists gunners could not be resupplied

quickly and once they had fired the

shells on hand were forced to sit and

watch the attacks helplessly.4

On 21 April naval force jet pilots

were given a chance to select their targets. The flyers on the U.S. carrier

Oriskany chose the Hamhung highway

bridge in northeast Korea and succeeded in demolishing two spans and

damaging a third in their attack. From

the naval night fighter patrol along the

rail lines of northeastern Korea came an

interesting report of two fighter flights

chasing two fast-moving enemy trains into opposite ends of a short tunnel.

Shortly after the trains vanished from

sight there was a rush of steam and

smoke pouring from the mouth of the

tunnel that indicated a probable collision and damage to both trains.5

With the completion of the sick and

wounded prisoner of war exchange and

the initial plenary conferences at Panmunjom, the main reasons for restricting the UNC air forces disappeared.

Since the meetings showed that the

Communists were not going to come to

terms quickly, Clark approved Weyland's request to increase the air

pressure upon the enemy by striking

sensitive targets in North Korea. On 10

May, 8 Thunderjets bombed the Suiho

power plants again in the face of heavy

antiaircraft fire, but did not succeed in

knocking out the two generators still

functioning. The attack on the Yangsi

complex, deferred by the prisoner trade,

was staged on the night of 10-11 May

1

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 55, pp. 19,

30.

2

 (1) Msg, A 4390, FEAF to CINCFE, 11 Apr 53.

(2) Msg, CX 61886, CINCFE to JCS, 122 Apr 53.

Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-

110, incls 1 and 3. (3) Msg, DA 936440, CSUSA

to CINCUNC, 14 Apr 53. 3

 Msg, CINCFE to CG AFFE, 24 Apr 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-110, incl 10.

4

 COMNAVFE, Comd and Rpt, Apr 53, sec. 1-3,

1-10. 5

 Ibid., sec. 1-4, 1-5, 1-23.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 461

by 39 B-29's, and eight days later 18

B-29's returned and dropped another

load of bombs on the area.6

One of the most dramatic strikes of

the war came on 13 May. About twenty

miles north of P'yongyang lay the big

Toksan irrigation dam with a threesquare-mile lake behind it. Air Force

planners had long realized that destruction of irrigation dams would have a

serious effect upon the rice crop of North

Korea, but humanitarian considerations

had argued against the bombing of such

targets. As the war progressed, however, more and more of the rice crop

found its way into military and international barter channels and this knowledge decreased the objections against

destroying the dams. The Toksan dam

was an especially strategic target for it

was close to the main Sinanju-P'yongyang rail line and to a major northsouth highway as well. Thus, 59 F-84

Thunderjets of the 58th Fighter-Bomber

Wing set out in four waves to eliminate

the dam on 13 May. The first 4 skipbombed the exposed face of the 2,300-

foot dam and a second 4 loosed their

bombs on the water side. Then 12 jets

raced along the length of the dam and

let go their loads. The fourth wave

flew in close to the water side of the

dam and tried to use the hydraulic

pressure caused by the bomb explosions

to complete the task, but as the planes

returned to their base, the dam still

held. Sometime during the night, however, the weakened dam succumbed to

the pressure of the lake. Floodwaters

poured forth and left a trail of havoc.

Over six miles of rail lines and five rail

bridges were damaged or destroyed and

two miles of highway and five highway

bridges suffered the same fate. Buildings, crops, and irrigation canals were

all swept away in the devastating torrent.

Elated by the success of the Toksan

mission, the Fifth Air Force followed

up on 15-16 May and breached another

dam north of P'yongyang at Ch'osan,

thereby cutting a second railroad line

and washing away three rail bridges. A

third attempt to break through the dam

at Kuwonga, also north of P'yongyang,

on 21-22 May revealed that the enemy

was now ready to counter the attack. As

soon as the B-29's dropped their loads,

the Communists lowered the water level

by twelve feet and reduced the water

pressure. A later raid forced the enemy

to drain the lake completely in order to

make repairs, so that although there was

no flood damage, the reserve water supply was dissipated. Both of the rail lines

north from P'yongyang were out of

commission until 26 May and this probably placed a temporary strain upon

the enemy's lines of communication.7

The Communists had learned their

lesson by this time and efforts in June

to repeat the earlier success at Toksan

found the enemy quickly draining the

reservoirs under attack. The water was

lost, but flood damage was averted.8

Retaliation by the Communist air

forces was always a possibility during

the last months of the war since Russian

jet bombers were made available to the

Chinese Communists. Yet no effort to

strike back materialized. The enemy

carefully hoarded his air forces in the

6

 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea

1950-1953, p. 684.

7

 (1) FEAF Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 1-6. (2)

Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea

1950-1953, pp. 624ff. 8

 FEAF Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 3.
462 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Manchurian sanctuary as he had previously and made no serious attempt to

challenge UNC domination of the Korean skies.

Instead the Communists adhered to

the type of pressure that had been applied so frequently in the past—the

ground assault. After a quiet first half

of May, the enemy launched a series of

limited objective attacks ranging in

strength from company to regimental

size; eighteen of these drives were of

battalion size or larger. Despite the increase in tempo at the front, there were

still no indications that the Communists

intended to broaden the scale of operations into a general offensive. Rather

they seemed to be concentrating upon

winning dominating terrain features

along the line to improve their positions

both on the battlefield and at the truce

tents at Panmunjom.9

The most ambitious enemy offensive

came in the closing days of May in the

U.S. I Corps sector. When the U.S.

25th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen.

Samuel T. Williams, had shifted over

to the I Corps in early May in exchange

for the U.S. 2d Division, it had promptly

relieved the 1st Marine Division on the

line. The new 25th Division sector was

generally east of Panmunjom and northeast of Munsan-ni. On low hills, approximately ten miles northeast of Panmunjom and the same distance north of

Munsan-ni, lay a series of outposts

called the NEVADA complex. (See Map

8.) General Williams assigned the responsibility for the defense of these positions and neighboring outposts, BERLIN and EAST BERLIN, to the attached

Turkish Armed Forces Command under

Brig. Gen. Sirri Acar on 5 May.10

Facing the Turkish forces were the

three regiments—358th, 359th and

360th—of the 120th Division, CCF 46th

Army. Since the enemy seizure of Outpost RENO in March, the area had remained quiet except for the customary

probes and patrols. But the Chinese

capability of mounting a large-scale attack upon Outposts VEGAS, ELKO, and

CARSON from RENO and other nearby

hills posed a constant threat that demanded constant vigilance.

Tactically, possession of NEVADA complex by the enemy would mean

improved observation of the I Corps

main line of resistance positions that lay

south and east of the outposts. Since I

Corps regarded these defensive positions

as critical, the Turkish forces were instructed to hold them against all enemy

attacks. This promised to be a difficult

task if the Chinese were determined to

take the outposts, for the latter were at

a considerable distance from the main

line of resistance and the enemy's approach routes were easier than those of

I Corps.

It was not until 25 May, after the U.N.

Command had made its final offer at

the truce talks, that the Chinese artillery

began to open up on the NEVADA complex. For the next three days the shells

came in with growing frequency and

enemy troop movements in the area increased. General Acar secured artillery

support from I Corps and the 1st Marine

Division artillery, in addition to that

9

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 1, 8.

10

 The following account is based upon: (1) Hq

Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 50-57; (2)

U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 18-28; (3)

U.S. 25th Div Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 9-10;

(4) U.S. 14th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, May 53.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 463

which the 25th Division could provide,

to counter the Communist concentrations. From the 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 34 tanks rolled into position to

funnel direct fire support to the outposts.

When the first attack came on the

evening of 28 May, the Turkish units

defending the outposts were well dug in

and adequately armed. Barbed wire,

trip flares, and mines were in place and

automatic weapons sited to cover the

enemy approach routes. There were

140 men at VEGAS, 44 at CARSON, 33 at

ELKO, 27 at BERLIN, and 16 at EAST

BERLIN.

On the heels of an intense artillery

and mortar preparation, the 120th Division sent four battalions forward—two

to the east against the main objective,

VEGAS, one to the south against CARSON

and ELKO, and one in a diversionary attack against BERLIN and EAST BERLIN.

The last was halted and broken off early

in the evening.

Over on VEGAS the Chinese succeeded in taking one small finger of the

hill and clung tenaciously despite the

heavy automatic weapons, small arms,

artillery, and mortar fire at them. The

Turks sent a reinforcing platoon in to

bolster the defenders and it arrived in

time to help throw back a three-pronged

enemy assault on the outpost. After reorganizing, the Chinese again sent a

force estimated at two battalions to take

the position. Ammunition began to

run low and the Turkish 2d Battalion

commander sent another platoon accompanied by Korean Service Corps personnel to resupply the embattled troops.

After a brief respite in the fighting, the

enemy tried again and this time the

Chinese pushed through and hand-tohand combat broke out in the trenches.

Meanwhile the Chinese had added a

second battalion to the assault on CARSON and ELKO and closed upon the

Turkish positions. Bayonets and hand

grenades were used freely as the Turks

managed to throw back the attack. The

battalion commander sent an engineer

platoon, then committed the rest of the

engineer company to the defense of

CARSON. Shortly after midnight the

pace slackened, but observers reported

that a third enemy battalion was assembling to join in the assault. Fire

support from the 1st Battalion of the

Turkish force and the U.S. 35th Infantry

Regiment helped to disperse this reinforcing enemy battalion.

As the night wore on, ELKO held out

against continuing Chinese attacks, but

the Turkish soldiers on CARSON were

dying one by one. A few managed to

slip over and join their comrades on

ELKO, but the majority died in the

trenches and bunkers from enemy fire.

By morning CARSON belonged to the

Chinese.

Convinced of the Chinese determination to take the NEVADA outposts, General Williams placed the 1st Battalion of

the U.S. 14th Infantry Regiment under

General Acar so that the latter could

commit his reserves to the counterattack.

Gradually the enemy gained control

of the northwest portion of VEGAS and

Turkish casualties were increasing. In

a desperate effort to blunt the Chinese

drive, the Turks began a counterattack to clear the hill. Savage in-fighting

followed as the Turks slowly swept the

enemy off of VEGAS.

Nothing daunted, the Chinese regrouped and reinforced their offensive

units, then came back again. They
464 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

edged their way up VEGAS and met the

indomitable Turks, who refused to be

budged. Late in the morning of 29 May,

the Turks launched a four-platoon attack that cleared VEGAS with cold steel.

But the enemy in turn would not accept

defeat and sent wave after wave of men

against the Turkish stone wall, as casualties on both sides increased sharply.

The struggle for ELKO continued

throughout of the night of 28-29 May,

as the enemy increased his pressure

against the remnants of the Turkish

force on the hill. General Acar ordered

Lt. Col. Carl E. Mann, the commander

of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, to

send one of his companies to reinforce

ELKO and to retake CARSON on the

morning of 29 May. Company B approached ELKO from the southeast, overran the Chinese holdings around the outpost, and secured the objective after a

25-minute fight.

Using two platoons in the attack and

two in the support roles, Company B

then advanced west on CARSON. Midway

between ELKO and CARSON, the company

began to receive heavy automatic weapons, artillery, and mortar fire, and the

assault slowed, then halted. Withdrawing to ELKO, Company B tried twice to

gather momentum enough to break

through the Chinese wall of fire on CARSON. Each time it failed and had to turn

back. UNC artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons could not silence the

Chinese weapons nor dislodge the

enemy defenders.

After the third assault ground to a

halt, the Chinese retaliated. Six times

they crossed from CARSON to ELKO and

on several occasions managed to advance

within hand grenade range. Company

B, stoutly supported by artillery, tank,

mortar, and automatic weapons fire,

forced the enemy to break off the attack

each time and ELKO remained in UNC

possession.

By midafternoon, General Williams

and I Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Bruce

C. Clarke evidently felt that the Chinese

intended to remain on the offensive until the outposts were taken. The

strength on VEGAS was down to 40-odd

men, many of them wounded, and to

20-odd on ELKO. Over 150 men had

been killed and 245 had been wounded

in the defense of the NEVADA complex.

On the other hand, the Chinese casualties were estimated roughly at 3,000

men. The question was: Should the

U.N. Command hang on to the outposts

while the losses on both sides mounted,

or should the terrain be evacuated and

more UNC lives be conserved? Under the

circumstances the commanders decided

that the outposts had served their main

purpose in uncovering and delaying

the enemy attack. Early in the evening

of 29 May orders went out for the Turks

to withdraw from VEGAS and for the

U.S. troops to leave ELKO.

It had been a bitter struggle as the

losses on each side attested. Over 117,-

000 rounds of artillery fire and 67 close

air support missions had aided the UNC

ground units in withstanding the determined assaults of the Chinese. The

enemy had sent 65,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire in return, up to

this point an unprecedented volume in

the Korean War.

The tenacity of the enemy attack following the submission of the UNC 25

May proposal at Panmunjom indicated

that the Communists were beginning to

jockey for improved positions along the

front in anticipation of an armistice.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 465

Undeterred apparently by the casualties

incurred, the enemy now seemed ready

to use personnel and carefully hoarded

supplies of ammunition with a free

hand as the negotiations entered the

final phase.

The Tempo Mounts

To General Taylor, as he watched

the enemy gather strength for offensive

action in the early days of June, the

weakest links in the Eighth Army line

lay in the U.S. I and IX Corps areas. As

he pointed out to Clark on 2 June, the

UNC positions north of the Imjin and

Hant'an Rivers had not been chosen

for their defensive strength. Relatively

shallow penetrations would force the

UNC to pull back behind the rivers and

the enemy had the capability to push

the Eighth Army troops back if he desired to expend the effort. In this event,

Taylor continued, he would have to face

the alternative of conceding the lost

territory or of making costly counterattacks to regain the positions. Taylor

was ready for an offensive and had

alerted the reserves, increased photoreconnaissance by the Fifth Air Force,

and enlarged the stockage of ammunition, but the problem of how long the

Eighth Army should cling to present

battle lines in the face of intense pressure remained to be settled.11

The Communists, however, did not

choose to take advantage of the defensive weaknesses of the Eighth Army in

the west. Instead they began to attack

the eastern and central sectors of the

line, where the ROK forces were concentrated. The enemy seized Hill 812,

four miles northeast of the Punchbowl,

from the ROK 12th Division, U.S. X

Corps, on 1 June and Anchor Hill on the

ROK I Corps front three days later. Despite heavy ROK counterattacks, the

North Koreans accepted the casualties

involved and continued to reinforce the

holding forces. In view of the growing

toll of ROK losses, the U.N. Command

halted the attacks to regain Anchor Hill

and sealed off Hill 812. By tying in all

the positions abutting Hill 812 and then

concentrating heavy artillery fire and

close air strikes on the 1,000-squaremeter area held by the North Koreans

atop the hill, the UNC reportedly forced

the enemy to use about seven battalions

during the period 7-15 June to maintain possession of this small piece of

terrain.12

Following the agreement on 8 June

on the terms of reference for the exchange of prisoners, the Communists

mounted their biggest drive since the

spring of 1951. Again the chief targets

of the enemy assault were the sectors

guarded by ROK forces. Beginning on

10 June the Communists shifted their

offensive threats from the east flank to

the ROK II Corps and western X Corps

lines in the Eighth Army center.

According to later reports, the enemy

followed a customary pattern for the offensive. Before the attack, detailed

plans were drawn up and carefully rehearsed on terrain similar to the contemplated objectives. Before the actual

assault, heavy concentrations of artillery

and mortar fire saturated the objective,

then small forces moved up quickly to

carry out a frontal attack. Other units 11

 Msg, G 5558 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 2 Jun 53,

in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jan-Jun

53.

12

 (1) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 16. (2) U.S.

X Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 1-3.
466 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

joined in on the flanks of the objective

until the pressure caused a penetration

or breakthrough. Once an advantage was

won, the Communists would seek to exploit it rapidly.13

The enemy's objective was the bulge

in the Eighth Army lines that began

roughly about 3 miles northeast of

Kumhwa, extended northeast to the

hills south of Kumsong, leveled off to the

east for about 10 miles, then dipped to

the southeast for some 13 miles to the

village of Mundung-ni, northwest of

Heartbreak Ridge. Since the terrain

was very rough, ranging from hills 400

to 600 meters high in the west to somewhat over 1,000 meters at the eastern

end of the bulge, the ROK troops defending the sector had great difficulty in

maintaining lateral lines of communication. Five ROK divisions manned positions in the bulge, with the ROK Capital Division of the U.S. IX Corps on the

left flank, the 6th, 8th, and 5th Divisions

of the ROK II Corps in the center, and

the ROK 20th Division of the U.S. X

Corps on the right. The ROK 3d Division was II Corps reserve.

Facing the ROK forces were three

Chinese armies. During the early days

of June the enemy had brought in the

CCF 68th Army and placed it between

the 60th and 67th Armies. In addition,

the Chinese had strengthened the 60th

Army by attaching to it the 33d Division.

Thus, the enemy had available for the

attack on the bulge four new divisions

that had been training on a similar type

of terrain in the rear.14

For the first ten days of the month the

enemy had been deceptively quiet on

the central front. Then, on the evening

of 10 June, the artillery fire became intense and the Chinese followed up with

co-ordinated attacks ranging from a battalion to a regiment in strength on the

sector held by the ROK 5th Division.

Using elements of both the CCF 68th

and 60th Armies, the Communists began to build up the pressure. Smashing

through the outposts, the Chinese seized

Hills 973 and 882, ten miles northwest

of Heartbreak Ridge and part of the

main line of resistance.15 ROK II Corps

quickly released the 22d Regiment of

the ROK 3d Division to the operational

control of the ROK 5th Division to redress the enemy inroads on 11 June.

Elements of the ROK 35th Regiment

counterattacked to recapture Hill 973,

but were only partially successful.

Enemy units swiftly moved to the offensive again and forced the ROK troops to

pull back 1,000 meters south of Hill 973.

Two battalions of the 22d Regiment attempted to regain Hill 882 that same

day and were able to approach the crest

and dig in. Using the 22d, 27th, and 35th

Regiments to launch counterattacks on

12 June, the ROK 5th Division was unable to drive the Chinese off the hills.

Heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms

13

 U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 34. 14

 In addition to those already mentioned, the

following major deployment changes had taken

place prior to the outbreak of the June offensive.

For the enemy the CCF 1st Army replaced the

CCF 47th Army on the western front. For the

UNC, the ROK 5th Division relieved the ROK 3d

Division in the ROK II Corps area on 18 April

and the U.S. 40th Division relieved the ROK 20th

Division in the U.S. X Corps sector on 25 April.

Two days later the U.S. 2d Division had passed to

the operational control of the U.S. IX Corps. On

16 May the ROK 20th Division had relieved the

ROK 7th Division at the front in the U.S. X Corps

area. 15

 The account of the mid-June enemy attack is

based upon the following sources: (1) Hq Eighth

Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 36ff. (2) U.S. X

Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 4-8. (3) KMAG,

Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 11ff.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 467

fire, coupled with the enemy's willingness to reinforce his units and counterattack the ROK assault forces, prevented

the UNC troops from recouping their

terrain losses.

The Chinese broadened the pressure

upon the ROK II Corps on 12 June by

attacking elements of the ROK 8th Division on the left flank of the ROK 5th

Division. In the Capitol Hill sector, six

miles northwest of Hill 973, which was

defended by the 21st Regiment, the

Communists used two companies initially, reinforced later with three more,

and penetrated first the outposts and

then the main line positions of the regiment. Two battalions of the ROK 10th

Regiment moved up to counterattack

early on the morning of 13 June, but

were unable to restore the original line.

Another enemy attack by an estimated

two companies during the afternoon

forced the abandonment of a company

outpost and further withdrawal by the

ROK forces.

The next morning the Chinese continued the offensive, employing several

companies to sustain pressure against

the 21st Regiment. Although the ROK

units fought off these drives, disaster

struck on the evening of 14 June. First

a reinforced battalion enveloped the 3d

Battalion of the 21st, causing it to break

up into small groups fighting independently to regain UNC lines. Two enemy

companies then hit the main line positions of the 1st Battalion and forced it to

pull back. A third attack by a reinforced battalion succeeded in enveloping

the 2d Battalion. Assembling behind

the lines, the remnants of the 21st managed to establish a new main line of resistance that was to prove short-lived.

On the right flank of the ROK 5th

Division, the ROK 20th Division of the

U.S. X Corps, guarding the sector

known as Christmas Hill, four miles

southeast of Hill 882, had also been subjected to enemy attack. On 10 June two

enemy companies from the CCF 33d

Division captured a company outpost on

the approaches to Hill 1220, part of the

Christmas Hill area. The ROK 61st

Regiment counterattacked, rewon, and

then relost the outpost. Further action

to regain the position was suspended as

the gravity of the situation on the ROK

5th Division front increased. When the

Communists showed that they intended

to retain possession of Hills 973 and 882,

which were located on the main ridge

leading to Hill 1220 from the west, the

X Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Isaac D.

White, moved up the ROK 7th Division,

the corps reserve, and placed it on the

left flank of the ROK 20th Division.

While the ROK 7th Division was advancing north, the 61st Regiment made

several efforts to relieve some of the

pressure on the ROK 5th Division. The

Chinese reacted quickly and managed

to blunt each attack.

On 14 June the CCF 33d Division

renewed the offensive against the ROK

5th and ROK 20th Divisions and forced

the former to fall back south of the Pukhan River. This withdrawal exposed

the flank of the ROK 7th Division,

which had just reached its defensive

lines. Fortunately, the Chinese this time

failed to reorganize their attacking force

quickly enough. X Corps artillery and

Fifth Air Force close air support were

concentrated on the enemy units facing

the ROK 5th Division while the ROK

7th readjusted its front-line positions to

tie in with the new ones established by

the ROK 5th. On the other flank of the
468 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

5th, the ROK 8th Division also had to

retreat over a mile to tie in its main line

of resistance with its sister division on

15 June.

The two remaining regiments of the

ROK 3d Division were ordered on 15

June to assume responsibility for the sector east of the 8th Division along the

south bank of the Pukhan River, where

they served to strengthen the left flank

of the ROK 5th. As the ROK 3d Division took over its defensive positions, the

ROK 22d Regiment reverted to the

control of its parent unit. At the same

time the ROK 5th Division was attached to the X Corps, which became

responsible for the ground east of the

Pukhan. The corps immediately made

efforts to speed supplies and equipment

forward to the ROK 5th and to replace

its personnel losses. Since lateral roads

were scarce, twelve H-19 helicopters

were allocated to help out and they

lifted a quarter of a million pounds of

material forward to the front. On 16

June the ROK 11th Division shifted

over from the ROK I Corps area to become ROK II Corps reserve.

The action tapered off during the

next few days. In the ROK 8th Division territory west of the Pukhan on 16

June the enemy overran an outpost of

the ROK l0th Regiment on Finger

Ridge, two miles east of Capitol Hill,

but the Chinese units broke contact and

withdrew that evening. The ROK 21st

Regiment repelled several companysized attacks during the day. Later,

aided by the 19th Regiment of the ROK

6th Division, the 21st Regiment

mounted a counterattack and the enemy

pulled back. Two Chinese companies

penetrated the main line positions of

the ROK 16th Regiment, 8th Division,

southeast of Finger Ridge, but did not

attempt to follow up the breakthrough.

By the evening of 16 June, enemy operations on the 8th Division front had become sporadic.

During the next two days, the Chinese

launched several minor assaults on the

ROK 20th and 8th Divisions, effecting slight penetrations. By 18 June

the situation began to be stabilized and

the Eighth Army had an opportunity to

survey the damage of the nine-day offensive.

The enemy had driven the ROK

forces back an average of 3,000 meters

along a 13,000-meter front and in the

process had taken over a series of hill positions east of the Pukhan River. As a

result of the Chinese drive, three ROK

divisions had been redeployed in reinforcing and counterattacking roles.

During the action the ROK units had

taken a total of over 7,300 casualties

while enemy losses were estimated at

over 6,600. In close support of the

UNC defense, Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft had flown 810 sorties in

the nine-day period and the strategic

air program had been delayed.

Elsewhere along the Eighth Army

front, the Chinese had mounted a series

of diversionary attacks on the U.S. IX

Corps lines to keep the corps fully occupied while the main offensive was in

progress. In the ROK 9th Division sector, the 70th Division of the CCF 24th

Army launched a three-company drive

on 11 June at outposts on Sniper Ridge.

The next day 2 enemy companies penetrated main line positions of the division

four miles west of Sniper Ridge in the

area known as Boomerang. During the

action the Chinese were reinforced with

several additional companies and the
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 469

ROK's brought up 6 infantry companies

and 1 tank company before the enemy

broke off the engagement. On the night

of 13 June the Chinese committed 3

battalions of the 70th Division in the

same sector and returned the following

night with elements of 3 more battalions.

On each occasion the enemy made no

effort to hold on to the terrain gained;

the Chinese withdrew before daylight

to their own lines. The three-day assault

on Boomerang proved to be costly for

the 70th Division for its casualties were

estimated at over 2,200 and close to

2,000 of these were killed and tallied by

the ROK forces.16

The U.S. 3d Division on the left flank

of the ROK 9th also received its share of

attention. On 10 June the CCF 74th Division opened a succession of assaults

against Outpost Harry, two-and-a-half

miles southeast of Jackson Heights.

Beginning with a company, the Chinese

added two battalions and penetrated

the position. Counterattack was followed by counterattack with the U.S.

forces emerging on top on the morning

of 11 June. The enemy came back with

an estimated regiment that night and

the pattern of the preceding encounter

was repeated. There was a small-scale

probe on 14 June and then a twobattalion assault on 18 June, but the end

result was the same. The 3d Division

estimated that the Communist efforts to

take Harry had cost over 4,200 casualties during the nine-day period.

Over in the Arrowhead (Hill 281)

sector, five to six miles northwest of

Ch'orwon, the ROK 2d Division experienced a company-sized attack on 11

June. The enemy took three outpost

positions in the White Horse Hill area

the next day, using a force estimated at a

battalion, but did not retain possession

long. In the morning hours they pulled

back to their own lines.17

The U.S. I and ROK I Corps sectors

were quiet during the big offensive,

with only small unit actions, patrols,

and probes. After 18 June the whole

Eighth Army front settled back to the

old pattern.

It was on this same date that Syngman Rhee released the Korean nonrepatriates and introduced a new note of

uncertainty into the truce negotiations

and into the course of military operations as well. If the Communists had

geared their offensive operations to coincide with the last days of the war, as

some UNC officers believed, so that

they might reap the political and psychological advantages of ending the long

struggle on a high note, the ROK

Government's provocative action that

threatened to postpone the conclusion

of the armistice must have been disconcerting.18

 If the cease-fire were unduly

delayed, the June effort by the Communists might well become ancient history

and the enemy might have to mount

another offensive close to the end of the

war. Thus, the possibility existed that

the fighting might flare up again later

on.

Since the ROK Army had been the

chief target of the recent enemy attack

and might also have to bear the brunt

of future Communist pressure, the question of its efficiency and reliability under

fire was of considerable significance.

During the course of the enemy assault,

16

 U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 8-10.

17

 Ibid., pp. 3-6. 18

 See U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp.

31-32.
470 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the Korean Military Advisory Group

personnel had ample opportunity to observe the progress of the ROK Army

under heavy enemy attacks. They concluded that the size and intensity of the

Chinese assault accounted for the initial

enemy successes in the battle. Although

hard hit, in many cases ROK units had

continued to fight and had inflicted

many casualties upon the foe. When

pressure had increased, they had

promptly taken up blocking positions

behind the line to stem further advances. On the other side of the ledger,

KMAG reported, there was a tendency

among ROK officers to depend too

heavily upon one type of communication. When this broke down, units often

lost contact with their companion and

supporting forces, making co-ordination

between them difficult or impossible.

The question of "face" continued to

play an important role in the ROK

Army, KMAG went on, since officers

delayed informing their superiors

quickly and fully about unfavorable developments that might cause the officers

to lose face. Thirdly, the ROK leaders

frequently placed too much reliance

upon artillery fire when small arms and

mortar fire would be more appropriate.

KMAG reported that it was attempting

to remedy these defects immediately.19

Despite the deficiencies, the ROK

Army appeared to be far more mature

and effective than it had been during

the spring of 1951 under comparable

conditions. The training and experience acquired in the interim were beginning to pay off. Whether or not the

ROK forces could stand by themselves

against an all-out offensive was still a

moot question, but there could be little

doubt about their improvement.

Final Test

The brief respite on the battlefield

ended on 24 June and the Communists

disclosed their decision to devote special

attention to the ROK divisions along

the front. Concentrating on the eastern

and central sector of the line, they evidenced their intention to demonstrate

to the South Koreans that continuation

of the war would be a costly business.

First to feel the effects of the resumption of operations was the ROK 9th

Division. In the Boomerang area, northwest of Kumhwa, the CCF 70th Division

sent two separate company-sized attacks

against the main line positions of the

ROK 29th Regiment and then rapidly

reinforced them to battalion size during

the night of 24-26 June. The ROK

forces fought off these attempts to pierce

their lines until the Chinese broke off

the fight and withdrew, carrying an estimated 700 casualties with them. In the

Sniper Ridge area, the ROK defenders

were less successful. A reinforced

Chinese company drove them from an

outpost and refused to be ejected in

turn. On 25 June the Chinese tried

again to seize a neighboring outpost, but

the ROK troops clung tenaciously to

their positions despite the loss of over

240 dead and wounded. In repulsing the

Communist drive, the 29th Regiment

estimated that the Chinese casualties

were more than double their own.20

Southeast of the confluence of the

Imjin and Yokkok Rivers in the U.S. I

Corps sector lay a series of outposts

19

 KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 17. 20

 U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 10-12.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 471

manned by the ROK 1st Division. The

increase in vehicle traffic and in artillery

fire from the enemy in front of these

outposts warned the I Corps that the

Chinese were preparing for an offensive late in June but gave no indication

of the scale. On 25 June elements of two

regiments of the 7th Division of the

CCF 1st Army, supported by heavy artillery fire, struck the outposts on Bak,

Hannah, and Hill 179 and mounted

diversionary attacks against five other

strongpoints. The ROK 1st Division received orders from the U.S. I Corps to

hold on despite the strength of the offensive units, and artillery fire started

to interdict the enemy lines of approach

to the defensive positions. Gradually

the Chinese pushed their way into the

trenches and bunkers where bitter handto-hand combat broke out. Grenades

flew back and forth. Bit by bit the

ROK troops were forced to pull back

until the enemy won the crests of the

hills. By the morning of 26 June the

Chinese were in possession of Bak, Hannah, and Hill 179. The ROK 12th Regiment moved up to reinforce the ROK

15th, which had borne the brunt of the

battle, and they launched two battalionsized drives on Bak on 26 June and one

on Hill 179 on 27 June. Neither was

able to regain the outposts.

The Chinese moved forward against

nearby Outpost Queen on 28 June and

penetrated ROK positions on this hill.

Counterattacks against the determined

Chinese forces on Queen, Hill 179, and

Bak on the same day were all repulsed.

When the I Corps commander, General

Clarke, broke off the efforts to retake the

lost outposts on 29 June, the enemy remained in control.

After the action General Clarke

voiced his objections to the practice of

attempting to cling unyieldingly to isolated points far in front of the main line

of resistance. The garrison could not be

reinforced easily because of the distance

and terrain between the outposts and

the main line, whereas the enemy's task

was much simpler. Once the enemy

closed in, artillery, mortar, and air

strikes were of little value because of

the danger of hitting friendly forces.

Under conditions like these, the outcome could only be a high cost of casualties far above the worth of the outposts,

Clarke declared.21

Over on the ROK II Corps-U.S. X

Corps front the quiescent period had

been spent in reorganizing the battered

ROK 5th Division. By 26 June the ROK

5th was adjudged ready for action once

again and control of the division was

returned to the ROK II Corps. In the

meantime the ROK 7th Division had

taken over the ROK 20th Division's positions on the right flank of the ROK

5th.22

During the night of 26 June the 179th

Division of the CCF 60th Army dispatched one regiment against elements

of the ROK 5th east of the Pukhan River

and a second regiment against units of

the ROK 7th Division on the main ridge

leading to Hill 1220. Heavy artillery

and mortar fire accompanied the attacks and the Chinese pressed on vigorously despite a staunch defense by both

ROK divisions. As the ROK 5th stubbornly gave ground and retreated to the

next terrain line, the ROK 7th also had

to pull back to protect its left flank. The

Chinese pressed on and managed to penetrate the ROK 7th's positions on Hill

21

 U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 10-12, 29. 22

 U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 6.
472 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

938 just northwest of Hill 1220. For

several days the ROK 7th counterattacked to regain Hill 938, but the enemy

refused to yield possession. The Chinese held the hill with a small force and

permitted the ROK troops to move in,

then directed heavy artillery and mortar

fire on the area and counterattacked in

mass. After several experiences along

this line and study of the growing list

of ROK casualties, Lt. Gen. Isaac D.

White, the corps commander, shifted

to a policy of containment on 3 July.

Terrain to the rear was readied for defense and helicopters rushed up materials and ammunition to prepare the

new fortifications for further attacks.

The Chinese made two attempts on 4

July to move in closer to Hill 1220, but

the ROK 7th fought off both of these

assaults.23

The intensification of enemy operations and the reports from intelligence

sources that the enemy intended to

launch a major offensive in the ROK

II Corps-U.S. X Corps sectors, with the

Hwach'on Reservoir as the objective, led

General White to redeploy his forces in

an effort to buttress the right flank of the

ROK II Corps. Beginning on 1 July he

sent the U.S. 45th Division westward to

relieve the ROK 20th and one regiment

of the ROK 7th Division. The latter

became responsible for a smaller segment of the front and was placed under

the ROK II Corps. On 10 July the ROK

20th Division relieved the U.S. 40th Division in the Heartbreak Ridge area and

the 40th Division displaced west to

strengthen the right flank of the 45th

Division. The X Corps was also reinforced by the movement of the U.S. 5th

Regimental Combat Team from the IX

Corps on 1 July. While the X Corps

was shifting its forces the action on the

corps front fortunately subsided to a

level that did not interfere with the redeployment.

To bolster the rear areas and the security of the prisoner of war camps,

Clark in late June ordered the 24th

Infantry Division, under Maj. Gen.

Charles L. Dasher, Jr., to prepare for a

temporary move from Japan to Korea.

Moving by air and water the 34th Regimental Combat Team ( —) arrived in

the Korean Communications Zone on 3

July; the 19th Infantry Regiment followed on 11 July; and the 21st Infantry

unloaded at Pusan on 12 July.24

In the first days of July the Communists carried out few attacks in strength,

but the Eighth Army had no illusions

about the future. Reports of troop

movements, heavy traffic, and stockpiling behind the enemy lines alerted all

commanders that the Communists were

preparing to strike again in force. Enemy counterreconnaissance screens made

it difficult to ascertain how much

strength the Chinese were massing, but

the concentrations were greatest on the

central front around Kumsong.25

The first offensive, however, came in

the Ch'orwon rather than in the Kumsong sector. On 6 July elements of the

CCF 73d Division attacked through the

defensive positions of the CCF 69th

Division and struck two ROK 2d Division outposts on Arrowhead. For over

thirty hours the defenders had to repel

the Chinese forces, often at close range.

The Communists drew back on 8 July

to regroup, but that night they returned

23

 (1) Ibid., pp. 7-8. (2) U.S. X Corps, Comd

Rpt, Jul 53, p. 3.

24

 U.S. 24th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 1-8. 25

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 25-26.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 473

in the wake of 6,500 rounds of artillery

and mortar fire, and won possession of

the north slope of one of the ridges.

A ROK counterattack on 9 July failed

to oust them and action became intermittent. Early on 11 July, two ROK

companies, in a fight lasting almost three

hours, forced the Chinese to pull back.

During the battles for Arrowhead the

ROK commander rotated his assault

troops. In the 11 July encounter he used

four battalions to exert maximum pressure and to provide a continuous flow of

fresh troops. The six-day struggle for

Arrowhead caused over 500 casualties for

the ROK 2d Division while the estimated Chinese losses were slightly over

750.26

In the Porkchop Hill area, the U.S.

7th Division met an attack from its opposite number in the Chinese Army on

6 July. An unknown number of enemy

soldiers fought their way up the slopes

of Porkchop and took up squatter's

rights on a part of the crest. The 17th

Regiment quickly reinforced its defenders at the outpost with two additional

companies. On the night of 7-8 July

the U.S. troops launched two counterattacks to drive the Chinese from the crest

with no success. The enemy struck back

on the next evening and the U.S. 7th

Division tried to counterattack again on

9 July, but neither could dislodge the

other. On the following day the Chinese

executed a series of assaults, ranging

from company to battalion size, which

the U.S. forces again withstood.

Generals Taylor, Clarke, and Trudeau, the army, corps, and division commanders respectively, conferred on the

night of 10 July and decided that the

Chinese disregard for casualties and obvious intent to hold on to the outpost on

Porkchop outweighed the tactical value

of UNC retention of the position. The

Eighth Army commander believed that

the withdrawal should be carried out

by night, but the 7th Division G-2, who

had recommended the move, pointed

out that the Chinese were accustomed

to the daily sight of armored personnel

carriers taking ammunition and supplies to the troops on the hill. Since the

carriers were inclosed, the G-2 went on,

the enemy had no way of knowing what

they contained. A daylight evacuation

using the carriers would avoid the hazards of a night operation and would

keep the Chinese in the dark to boot, he

concluded. After hearing these arguments, General Taylor agreed.27

On the afternoon of 11 July, after the

carriers moved up over the usual route,

the troops climbed aboard and rode

back without incident. From intelligence sources the I Corps later learned

that the Chinese had thought that the

vehicles were moving forward to support

another attack rather than a withdrawal.

When nearly two days after the evacuation they realized what had happened

and advanced to occupy the hill, they

were hit with all the artillery at the

disposal of the 7th Division and had to

contend with a great number of booby

traps as well.28

The resumption of armistice negotiations at Panmunjom on 10 July and the

apparent pacification of Syngman Rhee

during early July provided an incentive

for the last Communist offensive. With

the end of hostilities at long last in sight,

26

 U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 2, 27, 28.

27

 Interv of author with Col Leonard G. Robinson, 6 December 1960. Colonel Robinson was G-2

of the 7th Division at that time. 28

 U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 23-24.
474 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the enemy was faced with its final opportunity to give the world a convincing

display of Communist military might;

to teach the upstart ROK forces another

lesson; and to improve defensive terrain

positions in the bargain. The June offensive had accomplished these aims to

some degree, but much of the Kumsong

salient still remained.29 Furthermore,

the ROKA units had bent but not broken under the Communist assault; perhaps this time the Chinese might really

give them a trouncing.

By evening of 13 July the Communists

had moved elements of five Chinese armies into attack and support positions

along the central sector that encompassed the Kumsong salient. Facing

them from west to east lay the ROK

9th and Capital Divisions of the U.S. IX

Corps and the ROK 6th, 8th, 3d, and

5th Divisions of the ROK II Corps.

The increase in the tempo of artillery

and mortar fire on 13 July corroborated

earlier intelligence reports from prisoners, deserters, agents, and reconnaissance that the Communists were about

to launch a major drive aimed primarily

at ROK units on the central front. After

darkness descended, the Chinese forces

moved forward en masse. A reinforced

regiment from the 72d Division of the

CCF 24th Army struck the ROK 9th

Division's right flank while the 203d

Division of the CCF 68th Army smashed

into the ROK Capital Division guarding

the left shoulder of the Kumsong bulge.

Friendly outposts were overrun as wave

after wave of Chinese joined the assault.

By midnight, enemy units had penetrated the main line of resistance up to

1,000 meters in some places. In the

Sniper Ridge sector—long a bone of contention—friendly forces had to pull back

to avoid being cut off. Throughout the

night the pressure continued, with huge

expenditures of artillery and mortar fire

from both sides.30

In the ROK 6th Division area adjacent to the Capital Division, four battalions from the 204th Division of the CCF

68th Army hit a company-sized outpost

of the ROK 19th Regiment. By the

morning of 14 July, they had penetrated

the main line positions of the regiment

and surrounded one friendly battalion.

Elements of the 204th Division moved

through the ROK 6th Division sector

and then swung to the west and joined

in the attack upon the Capital Division.31

To the east the Chinese on 13 July

sent four companies to surround an outpost in the ROK 8th Division lines and

a battalion against a company outpost in

the ROK 3d Division area on the right

shoulder of the Kumsong salient. They

also attacked the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions to keep them occupied while the

main assault was in progress.

By the morning of 14 July the pattern

of the Communist offensive attack had

developed as the enemy increased the

weight of his pressure upon the ROK

3d Division. Battalion and two-battalion

attacks accompanied by heavy artillery

and mortar support broke through the

ROK 3d outpost system and drove into

the main line positions. The 22d and

23d Regiments received assault after assault, but with the aid of the 18th Regi29

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 25-

26.

30

 U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 3-4,

30-32. 31

 The account of the July offensive is based on

the following sources: (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd

Rpt, Jul 53; (2) U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53;

(3) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jul 53; (4) G-3 Opns Jnls,

13-20 Jul 53.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 475

merit in blocking positions managed to

hold on. Then four enemy companies

filtered in through the adjacent ROK

5th Division sector and swung in behind the 23d Regiment. When the indication of a double envelopment

became apparent, the ROK 3d began

to pull back.

As the Chinese pierced the ROK lines

along the central front and cut off units

from their parent organizations, the sit- uation became confused. Soldiers from

the 6th, 8th, and Capital Divisions found

themselves defending strongpoints together. Lateral and front-to-rear lines

of communications were soon out of commission and radio and foot messengers

became the chief means of sending and

receiving instructions and information.

Sister regiments were often out of con- tact and unaware of what the other was

doing. Reports trickling in from the

front were often delayed and usually

incomplete as the ROKA commanders

displayed their customary unwillingness

to forward unfavorable news that would

cause them to lose face.

Despite the lack of details, it was apparent after the first day of the Chinese

assault that the enemy's use of major

elements of six divisions had made serious inroads in the ROK Capital and 3d

Divisions' sectors. Since these guarded

the shoulders of the salient, the ROK

6th and 8th Divisions were in danger of

having their flanks exposed to a double

envelopment. General Taylor, therefore, on 14 July ordered the ROK Capital, 6th, 8th, 3d, and 5th Divisions to

fall back south of the Kumsong River

line at the base of the bulge. This would

straighten out the defensive line and

shorten the front to be covered. In the

process of complying with Taylor's instructions, however, the ROK commanders lost contact with and control of some

of their units, with the result that many

of them did not stop at the Kumsong

line. Instead they continued to retreat

farther south replacing the bulge with

a sag in the Eighth Army lines.

The intensity and determination of

the Chinese offensive impressed Clark

and Taylor to the point that they decided to fly reinforcements from Japan

to Korea to bolster the front. The U.S. 187th Airborne RCT was rushed to

Korea and on 14 July Taylor attached

the unit to the U.S. 2d Division. The

latter took over the U.S. 3d Division's

positions, and the airborne troops re- lieved elements of the ROK 9th Divi- sion, permitting the ROK's to narrow

their front and to strengthen the left

flank of the retreating Capital Division. In the meantime, the U.S. 3d Division

shifted over into blocking positions behind the Capital Division to stem the

enemy advance. As the Capital's units

fell back, they passed through the 3d

Division and were reorganized and rehabilitated in the rear. On 15 July the

3d took over responsibility for the Capital Division's sector and assumed operational control of the division.

In the ROK II Corps area, Taylor

released the ROK 11th Division to the

corps commander, Lt. Gen. Chung Il

Kwon, who dispatched the division forward to relieve the ROK 3d Division.

The ROK 6th Division was also withdrawn from the line and, along with the

ROK 3d, was reorganized and reconstituted. Thus, on 15 July, the Eighth

Army had the ROK 9th, the U.S. 3d

with the remnants of the Capital Division, the ROK 11th, 8th, and 5th Divisions on the front lines from west to
476 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

east to check the Communist offensive.

On 16 July the ROK II Corps received

orders to counterattack and restore the

Kumsong River line. The enemy offensive had slowed by this time and the

Chinese were engaged in the involved

task of organizing the defense of the

terrain they had taken and in replacing the heavy casualties they

had suffered in breaking through the

ROKA positions.

The ROK 11th, 8th, and 5th Divisions, attacking abreast, launched the

counteroffensive the same day. Against

variable enemy opposition they edged

forward toward the Kumsong River east

of Kumhwa. Between 16-19 July the

three divisions, with the 6th, 3d, and

7th ROK Divisions in blocking positions

in reserve, attained the high ground

south of the river. On 19 July the ROK

6th Division passed through the 5th Division and assumed responsibility for its

sector. Efforts to cross the river and take

defensive positions on the north bank of

the Kumsong met with increasing enemy

resistance and were abandoned after 20

July. For the last week of the war the

ROK II Corps held the Kumsong River

line against minor enemy pressure.

Despite the gains of the counteroffensive, the Chinese had removed the Kumsong salient and straightened out their

lines on the central front. Their penetration had been approximately six

miles and the weight of their assault had

cut off and disorganized many of the

ROKA units facing them. It had taken

nine ROK and U.S. divisions in blocking

and counterattacking roles to halt the

Communist advance and to regain some

of the lost terrain. The enemy offensive

had also provided additional grist for

the Communist propaganda mill, which

loudly claimed military victory for its

side. On the other hand, the price that

the enemy had paid to sustain a major

drive was extremely high; the Eighth

Army estimated that over 28,000 casualties had been inflicted upon the Chinese

during their breakthrough and its aftermath.32

While the ROK II Corps was carrying

out its counteroffensive, the Communists

exerted pressure upon several scattered

points along the Eighth Army line in an

effort to take long-contested hills and

outposts prior to the signing of an armistice. The reasons behind this pressure

were difficult to fathom, since all of the

threatened points fell in the demilitarized zone and would have to be abandoned by the UNC forces anyway. As it

turned out, the Communists had to surrender possession of their new gains

shortly thereafter.

The operations along the front during the last week of the Korean War

subsided again to small-scale probes and

patrols, as each side now anticipated that

the armistice soon would be signed.

The Tally Sheet

A recapitulation of enemy activity in

the final months might prove helpful in

assessing the military situation when

hostilities ended.33 (Map VIII)

The close relationship between the

Communist military operations and the

truce negotiations at Panmunjom were

apparent through the April-July period.

As the two sides moved toward settle32

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 17,

51, 58. 33

 The statistics in the following section have

been extracted from the Headquarters, Eighth

Army, Command Reports, for April, May, June,

and July 1953.

THE LAST OFFENSIVE 477

ment, the intensity of the enemy's operations varied according to the prospects

for reaching final agreement. Beginning

in late March, the Communists assumed

an increasingly offensive attitude at the

front and displayed a willingness to employ their forces more lavishly than they

had in the past.

While the negotiations dragged in late

April and early May, the tempo of enemy action slackened again. In the closing days of May, after the 25 May UNC

proposal, which seemed to offer the possibility of a truce within the near future,

the Communist attacks commenced to

pick up impetus once again. The agreement on prisoners of war on 8 June was

followed by the large-scale assaults of

10-17 June which succeeded in attaining

better terrain positions, cowing the

growing ROK opposition to the armistice, and providing the Communists

with a propaganda mantle of military

victory.

The dramatic release of the Korean

nonrepatriates by Syngman Rhee on 18

June reintroduced the elements of uncertainty into the situation and ground

operations again declined until the truce

meetings resumed on 10 July. Then,

in their largest offensive since the spring

of 1951, the Communists sought to repeat the June objectives on a more

grandiose scale.

As Clark later commented: "There is

no doubt in my mind that one of the

principal reasons—if not the one reason

—for the Communist offensive was to

give the ROK's a 'bloody nose,' to show

them and the world that 'PUK CHIN'—

Go North—was easier said than done." 34

Of some significance was the fact that

the enemy used Chinese rather than

North Korean troops during most of the

important attacks and that the bulk of

the offense was directed against the

ROK forces. It suggested that the Communists desired to improve the relative

strength of the North Korean and ROK

forces prior to the truce. If this were

their hope, they were doomed to disappointment, for despite the losses of the

period, the ROK ground forces rose

from 537,350 at the end of March to

590,911 at the close of July, while the

North Korean ground forces remained

close to 260,000 during the four-month

span.35

The following table of casualties and

artillery expenditures serves to depict

more graphically the intensification of

combat activity between April and July:

a

 Highest total during the Korean War.

The Communists established two artillery records for themselves in July,

the highest total for any month and the

highest total for a ten-day period—

197,550 rounds during the 11-20 July

span. The freedom with which enemy

troops expended artillery and mortar

34

 General Mark W. Clark, "The Truth About

Korea," Collier's, vol. 133, No. 5 (March 5, 1954),

p. 48.

35

 The ROK totals includes ROKA combat, service, and security troops, KATUSA, and the ROK

marines while the North Korean figures include

combat, security, and support troops.
478 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

shells demonstrated clearly that their

supply situation had improved greatly

and that they were willing to fire the

rounds necessary to support their attacks. Even after the drains of June and

July, there were no shortages of ammunition except on a local basis.

Thus, at the close of the shooting war

the Communists were in fairly good condition, militarily speaking. Despite the

large personnel losses of June and July,

there were over a million Chinese and

North Korean soldiers under arms in

Korea. They were eating three meals

a day as compared to two during the

earlier stages of the war and were adequately clothed. The enemy transportation and communications systems had

been continually bombed and harassed

during the conflict, but the prodigious

use of manpower, on the one hand, and

camouflage, deception, and subterfuge,

on the other, had permitted the Communists to maintain their forces at the

front and to create stockpiles as well.

The enemy armies were in a position to

continue the limited type of warfare of

the 1951-53 period for a considerable

length of time if the need had arisen.

Fortunately, the developments at Panmunjom during July obviated this eventuality, at least for the nonce.
CHAPTER XXII

Finale

Amid rumbles of ROK discontent and

the mounting roar of Communist cannon warning of the impending offensive

at the front, the plenary session of the

truce conference reconvened at Panmunjom on 10 July. The ominous signs in

the background were offset somewhat by

the simple fact that the enemy was willing to resume the armistice discussions.

After the ROK President had effected

the release of the Korean nonrepatriate

prisoners, the Communists might well

have broken off the talks completely on

the grounds that the U.N. Command

had not kept faith with the tentative

understandings already reached. Nevertheless, they had returned. Whether

they now intended to use the negotiations as a forum for their complaints on

this score or earnestly desired to conclude the arrangements for a cease-fire

could not be presaged, but at least the

possibility of a settlement had not been

entirely ruled out. If the Communists

proved to be seriously interested in finishing the military phase of their Korean

experiment, the chief task of the United

Nations Command delegation might

well be to allay the misgivings of the

enemy over the future conduct of the

government of Syngman Rhee.

Assurances and Reassurances

General Clark was well aware of the

problem. Before the truce teams met at

Panmunjom, he asked his superiors in

Washington for confirmation of the

power granted him in late June to terminate the conflict with or without assurances of co-operation from the ROK

Government. The reply on 8 July reaffirmed his authority but, at the same

time, cautioned him against implying to

the Communists that the UNC would

employ force to insure ROK compliance with an armistice.1

Since the U.N. Command could not

guarantee that it would use force if necessary to prevent the ROK forces from

violating the truce, Clark approached

the question from another direction. On

9 July he suggested to the JCS that if

Harrison were pressed by the Communists, the senior delegate might inform

them that the UNC would immediately

withdraw all logistical and military support from any ROKA unit that sought to

contravene the armistice through aggressive action. General Collins quickly advised him that the State Department

objected to such a commitment since it

would restrict Clark's freedom of action.2

 Thus, on the eve of the resump1

 (1) Msg, CX 63548, CINCUNC to JCS, 8 Jul

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app.

1-143, incl 12. (2) Msg, DA 943508, CSUSA to

CINCFE, 8 Jul 53. 2

 (1) Msg, CX 63567, CINCUNC to JCS, 9 Jul 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,

1-143, incl 12. (2) Msg, DA 943508, CSUSA to

CINCFE, 9 Jul 53.
480 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tion of plenary sessions, Clark and

Harrison found themselves in an awkward situation. The only answers that

they could offer to the specific and

pointed questions certain to be posed by

the enemy would have to be phrased in

vague and general terms.

The first plenary conference exposed

the weakness of the UNC position.3 In

his opening statement Nam Il harked

back to Clark's letter on 29 June to Kim

and Peng. He wanted to know what

steps had been taken to recapture the

prisoners released by Rhee and what

measures had been adopted to prevent

further moves by the ROK Government

in the same vein. Did the armistice include the ROK Government and Army,

he went on, and what guarantees could

the UNC provide to insure that the

South Korean forces would abide by its

terms? In view of the inflammatory

statements made by Rhee against both

the personnel of the United Nations

Commissions and the Communist side,

how could the UNC protect these people

in the pursuit of their postarmistice responsibilities, Nam continued. "If an

armistice does not include the South Korean Government and Army, the war in

Korea will not actually stop even if the

representatives of the United Nations

Command undertake to sign the Korean

Armistice. . . . Therefore, in order to

insure that the Armistice Agreement

can become truly effective, your side has

the inescapable responsibility for putting forward concrete and effective

measures in regard to the various questions mentioned above and putting

them into effect," he concluded.

In his reply Harrison could only state:

We assume that Republic of Korea

Forces presently under the command of the

United Nations Command will remain so

after an armistice and that they will carry

out the instructions of the United Nations

Command and withdraw from the part of

the demilitarized zone in which they are

now deploying in accordance with the

Armistice Agreement. As stated in General Clark's letter of 29

June, the United Nations Command will

make every effort to abide by the provisions

of the Armistice Agreement. We cannot

guarantee that the Republic of Korea

Government will lend full support to it, but the United Nations Command shall

continue to do everything within our power

to cause them to cooperate.

Harrison went on to promise police

protection for the members of commissions and Red Cross teams to insure their

safety. Then, using the risk factor presented by ROK opposition, he took the

opportunity to bring up the suggestion

that all the nonrepatriate prisoners be

moved to the demilitarized zone and

turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Although this

would impose heavy logistical burdens

upon the U.N. Command, Harrison declared that the commission personnel

could operate unmolested in the demilitarized zone. Possibly this matter could

be handled after the armistice through

the Military Armistice Commission, he

said.4

3

 The composition of the delegations had not

changed since the last meeting on 20 June, but

two of the delegates were relatively new. Maj.

Gen. Kim Dong Hak of the North Korean Army

had replaced Rear Adm. Kim Won Mu on 17 June

and Maj. Gen. George G. Finch, USAF, had replaced

General Glenn. General Choi of the ROK Army did

not attend the meetings after 16 May. General Finch

had been a lawyer and had organized the first Air

National Guard wing in 1946.

4

 Transcript of Proceedings, 151st Session, Mil

Armistice Conf, 10 Jul 53, in FEC Min Delegates

Mtgs, vol. VII.
FINALE 481

While the Communists studied the

UNC statements, Harrison and Clark

sought to strengthen their position at

the conference. Harrison had been encouraged by the attitude of the enemy

delegation during the meeting. The

questions asked by the Communists had

been logical and pertinent and their behavior was calm, matter of fact, and not

aggressive, he reported. In view of the

reasonable approach of the Communists,

both he and Clark felt that they should

offer more concrete assurances at the

next meeting. If the ROK forces should

violate the armistice, they thought that

the enemy was entitled to know where

the UNC would stand. The policy makers in Washington, however, were still

unwilling to be too specific. After consultation with Defense and State Department representatives, the JCS informed

Clark that although he had the power to

withdraw logistical support from the

ROK forces, they preferred that a more

general answer be offered to the enemy.

They suggested the following response:

"The UNC will not give support during

any aggressive action of units of ROKA

in violation of the armistice. In saying

this we do not imply that we believe

any such violation to be probable."

 5

At the 11 July meeting the Communists dismissed the UNC statements of

the previous day as "full of contradictions" and "not satisfactory." Nam

pressed again for definite "yes" or "no"

answers to his queries without success.

In responding, Harrison pointed out the

measures adopted by a side to fulfil its

armistice obligations were internal matters to be determined by that side alone.

He did, however, inject into the record

the general declaration proposed by the

State-Defense group the day before.

But the enemy delegates wanted more;

they insisted that the commanders on

each side should order and enforce the

complete cessation of hostilities by all

units under their control.6

The inability of the U.N. Command

to relieve adequately the Communists'

doubts about the future conduct of the

ROK armed forces led Clark to cast

about for another expedient. He found

one in the Rhee letter of 9 July to Robertson wherein the ROK President

stated that he would not obstruct the

truce. But Robertson pointed out that

he had agreed not to release this letter

publicly pending further negotiations.

On the other hand, Robertson saw no

reason why Harrison could not tell the

Communists that suitable assurances had

been received from the ROK Government that it would work during the posthostilities period in close collaboration

with the UNC for common objectives.7

On 12 July Harrison passed this information on to the Communist delegation and told them that the UNC, which

included the ROK forces, was prepared

to carry out the terms of the truce. After

a recess, Nam commented that while the

UNC statement was "very good" and

"helpful," it still was not quite enough.

The rest of the session witnessed a series

of thrusts and parries, with the enemy

pressing for definite pledges and the

UNC shunting aside the demands and

5

 (1) Msg, CX 63583, Clark to Collins, 10 Jul 53,

DA-IN 285965. (2) Msg, JCS 943567, JCS to

CINCUNC, 10 Jul 53.

6

 Transcript of Proceedings, 152d Session, Mil

Armistice Conf, 11 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates

Mtgs, vol. VII. 7

 (1) Msg, CX 63627, Clark to JCS, 11 Jul 53,

DA-IN 286476. (2) Msg, CX 63635, CINCUNC to

CINCUNC (Adv), 12 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd

Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incl 29.
482 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

standing pat on the general assurances

already given.8

To assess whether the Communists

were genuinely worried about the ROK

threats at this point or had simply decided to delay a settlement until the

results of their July offensive were determined, would be difficult. Probably

both factors entered into their calculations, since the disturbing press releases

attributed to Rhee indicated that the

old warrior viewed the truce merely as

a temporary rather than a long-term halt

in the fighting. This, of course, ran

counter to the soothing statements made

by the UNC at Panmunjom arid might

well have made the Communists suspicious. On the other hand, the July offensive had been planned for some time and

it was unlikely that the enemy would

have come to terms before its completion regardless of whether Rhee had

been silent or even co-operative. At any

rate, the Communists used the uncertainty over Rhee's actions as a convenient

screen—real or fancied—for the deferment of final agreement.

After the 13 July meeting the enemy

clearly was awaiting the outcome of its

operations at the front. During this session Harrison gave some frank answers

to the questions previously raised. He

told the Communists that the U.N.

Command would turn over the rest of

the nonrepatriates to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to quiet

their anxiety lest the ROK Government

seek to release additional prisoners in

this category. The UNC was prepared

to insure that the ROK forces observed

the cease-fire and withdrew from the demilitarized zone. It would guarantee the

safety of the personnel connected with

the various commissions and of the Communists engaged in carrying out postarmistice duties in South Korea. If the

ROK forces violated the truce and

the Communists took counteraction, the

UNC would continue to maintain the

state of armistice and would give no

support in equipment and supplies to

the ROK units carrying out the aggressive operations.9

 It was true that the

UNC would not promise to use force

to secure ROK obedience to the truce,

but it must have been obvious to the

enemy that no ROK offensive could have

been successful for long without UNC

assistance.

Nam, however, was not prepared to

accept the UNC responses as yet. He

reverted to the matter of the escaped

nonrepatriates despite the fact that there

was little hope of recovering them at

that late date. Then he proceeded to

press Harrison for a reconciliation between the ninety days, mentioned in

Rhee's recent speeches as the length of

time that he had agreed to for not obstructing a truce, and the armistice,

which specified no such time limit. Harrison repeated several times that the

UNC recognized that there was no time

limit to the cease-fire and would act in

conformity with this knowledge.10

When this meeting was over, Harrison urged that the U.N. Command recess the conferences, unilaterally if

necessary, until the Communists realized

that no more promises or pledges would

be made. He regarded the enemy tac8

 Transcript of Proceedings, 153d Session, Mil

Armistice Conf, 12 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates

Mtgs, vol. VII.

9

 Transcript of Proceedings, 154th Session, Mil

Armistice Conf, 13 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates

Mtgs, vol. VII. 10

 Ibid.
FINALE 483

tics of the succeeding days as plainly

harassing while the Communists

watched the progress of the actions on

the central front.11

By 14 July Clark and his superiors

had come to agree with Harrison and

they gave him authority to walk out of

the discussions the following day if the

enemy persisted in pursuing its policy

of procrastination.12 The UNC delegation left the tent on 15 July after pointing out that the scale of the Communist

offensive belied their sincerity in reaching agreement on an armistice. But

before the UNC recessed the conference

for a longer period, Clark suggested that

Harrison give the enemy a more explicit

answer on the ROK position as it had

been developed in the Rhee-Robertson

talks. Clark wished to inform the Communists that the ROK President had

given the UNC "written assurances" that

he would not obstruct the truce, but the

political and military leaders in Washington modified the phrase to "necessary

assurances."

 13

As it turned out, the change in wording made little difference. On 16 July

the Communist delegation stole a march

on the UNC and suggested a two-day

recess in the negotiations.14 They later

asked that it be extended to 19 July

and the UNC agreed. In the meantime

the enemy consolidated its gains along

the front and halted the UNC counterattack in the ROK II Corps area.

Clark flew to Korea on 17 July and

conferred with Harrison at Munsan-ni.

They informed the JCS that they intended to reject further enemy demands

for the return of the escaped prisoners

and for firmer pledges on ROK future

behavior. If the Communists requested

a renegotiation of the demarcation line

because of the current military operations, the U.N. Command would agree

and then recess unilaterally for four

days. The Washington leaders concurred in this course of action, provided

that the Communists consented to naming a date on which the armistice would

be signed and insisted upon renegotiation of the demarcation line.15

When the conferees returned to Panmunjom on 19 July, the enemy offensive

was over and the battle line had been

stabilized once again. The Communists

were now ready to go ahead with the

final arrangements for the cease-fire,

Nam declared, although they were not

yet completely satisfied with the UNC

guarantees. They reserved the right to

bring up the problem of the released

prisoners at the postarmistice political

conference. And since the ROK Government had refused to admit the Indian

forces into their territory, Nam demanded that the truce conference settle

the matter of handing over the remainder of the nonrepatriates to the repatriation commission now rather than

committing the task to the Military

Armistice Commission. As Clark and

Harrison had anticipated, Nam also

asked for renegotiation of the demarcation line. He evaded the efforts of Har11

 Msgs, HNC 1819 and 1821, CINCUNC (Adv)

to CINCUNC, 13 and 14 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143,

incls 38 and 43. 12

 Msg, JCS 943836, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Jul 53. 13

 Msg, JCS 943913. JCS to CINCFE, 15 Jul 53. 14

 Transcript of Proceedings, 157th Session, Mil

Armistice Conf, 16 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VII.

15

 (1) Msg, C 63749, CINCUNC to JCS, 17 Jul 53

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,

incls 144-286, incl 273. (2) Msg, JCS 944074, JCS

to CINCFE, 17 Jul 53.
484 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

rison to establish a target date for the

signing of the truce.

The UNC senior delegate tried to

discover when the Communists expected

the Czech and Polish contingents for the

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to arrive, by announcing that the

Swiss and Swedish advance components

would be prepared to function shortly.

If all went well, Harrison stated, the

details could be concluded within five

days and he urged that the effective date

of the cease-fire be twelve hours after

the signing. The supervisory commission should be ready to take over as soon

as the armistice went into effect, he went

on, and until that time each side should

be responsible for the safety of the members it had nominated.

The Communists agreed that the

plenary sessions should be suspended

and that the staff officers should now

begin at once to settle all the points still

in dispute. For the U.N. Command,

Harrison informed Nam, Col. Douglas

W. Cairns, USAF, would replace Colonel

Darrow and join Colonel Murray on the

staff group on the renegotiation of the

demarcation line and revision of the

armistice agreement. Col. Louis C. Friedersdorff, USA, would head the UNC

officers discussing the repatriation of

prisoners, and Col. John K. Weber,

USA, would be in charge of the UNC

staff group considering physical arrangements and rules of procedure pertaining

to the functioning of the Military Armistice Commission.16

Late in the afternoon the plenary conference finished its penultimate session.

After 158 meetings spread over more

than two years, the original ten members

of the delegations had dwindled to two

—Nam Il and his fellow countryman,

Lee Sang Cho, who had helped to sustain

the fiction that the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea was directing the

truce discussions for the Communist

side. Despite the loss of continuity occasioned by the rotation of personnel,

the major issues had finally been solved

and the prospects for peace became

brighter.

Now the task of reaching agreement

on the minor problems descended upon

the shoulders of the staff officers as it

frequently had in the past. They would

have to work their way through the maze

of petty details that would determine

when the fighting officially would come

to a halt.

The Home Stretch

There were four areas in which the

two sides still had to come to an agreement: the line of demarcation and demilitarized zone; the place of delivery

of the nonrepatriate prisoners; the inception of activities by the various

commissions established under the armistice; and the physical arrangements for

the actual signing of the truce document. Negotiations on the staff level

began almost immediately on these matters and continued, in at least one case,

until the final day of the war.

On 20 July Colonel Murray and his

opposite, Col. Huang Chen-chi of the

Chinese Communist delegation, set to

work on the revision of the demarcation line. In many places the job was

relatively simple, since there had been

little or no action in the locale and the

line of contact was easy to determine.

16

 Transcript of Proceedings, 158th Session, Mil

Armistice Conf, 19 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VII.
FINALE 485

In others, where recent fighting had

shifted the front line, the problem became more complex. Here bargaining

proved to be necessary, as each side

sought to retain possession of as much

favorable terrain as possible. Indeed,

on occasion both sides claimed more

than they had a right to, since it was

apparent that the Communists and the

U.N. Command could not both control

a particular hill simultaneously. But, on

the whole, the sessions were without

rancor and even had their moments of

humor. On 22 July Murray tried to end

the haggling over several points in dispute along the line by making a package

compromise offer. Colonel Huang, in

typical fashion, accepted only the portion favorable to the Communists, leading Murray to comment: "In other

words, in the interest of getting agreement, I offered you the shirt off my

back. In place of accepting it gracefully,

you returned to the conference table and

asked for my drawers." Nevertheless,

the horse trading continued until early

the next morning, when all differences

had been settled. Murray and Huang

then initialed the copies of the maps to

be printed and included with the armistice agreement.17

Before the staff officers took up the

disposition of the nonrepatriates, Harrison and Clark decided that the expressed

desire of the Communists to settle the

place of delivery before the armistice

went into effect should be exploited. To

accomplish this, they instructed Murray

to introduce an amendment to the draft

agreement for consideration at the opening session on 22 July, proposing that

the Communist prisoners who did not

wish to return home should be turned

over to the repatriation commission

in the southern part of the demilitarized

zone.18

Col. Ju Yon, senior staff officer for the

Communists, accepted the suggestion in

principle, but dismissed the idea that an

amendment would be necessary. Instead he proposed that a temporary supplementary agreement be used covering

the terms of admission for the nonrepatriates and the administrative personnel

into the demilitarized zone. The

Communist draft permitted each side to

use its own half of the demilitarized zone

for turning over nonrepatriates to the

repatriation commission and for establishing the facilities required to handle

the prisoners of war. Since the substance

rather than the form of the understanding was the important thing, Clark and

Harrison approved the enemy's alternative. The Communists, in turn, agreed

that, to save time, the supplementary

proposal should be typed up and signed

separately instead of being printed and

added to the text of the armistice agreement. By 25 July the staff officers had

worked out the details and ordered the

interpreters to go ahead with putting

the terms into final shape.19

17

 Transcripts of Proceedings, Eighth through

Tenth Mtgs of Staff Officers To Renegotiate the

Military Demarcation Line, 20-22 Jul 53, in G-3

File, Transcripts of Proceedings To Renegotiate

the Military Demarcation Line . . . , Jun-Jul 53.

18

 (1) Msg, HNC 1833, CINCUNC (Adv) to

CINCUNC, 19 Jul 53. (2) Msg, C 63821, CINCUNC

to CINCUNC (Adv), 19 Jul 53. Both in UNC/-

FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-

143, incls 70 and 71. 19

 A copy of the supplementary agreement is reproduced in Appendix C. (1) Msg, C 63904,

CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 23 Jul 53. (2)

First through Fourth Mtgs of Combined Staff Officers, 22-25 Jul 53. All in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incls 88, 83,

89, 93, and 96.
486 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

During the staff meetings the Communists had on several occasions evidenced great interest in learning the

exact number of prisoners that were to

be repatriated directly and of those that

would be given over to the repatriation

commission. The U.N. Command refused to supply other than round figures

to the enemy, reasoning that there

might well be some last-minute changes

and that it would be simpler not to have

to explain them to the Communists.

Thus, leaving some margin for shifts in

loyalty or homesickness, the UNC announced on 21 July that there would be

69,000 Koreans and 5,000 Chinese returning to Communist control. Three

days later the UNC followed up with

the release of the totals on the nonrepatriates—14,500 Chinese and 7,800 Koreans. In contrast, the Communists

evidently had made up their minds on

the exact figure they would deliver to

the United Nations Command. The tally

came to 12,764, including 3,313 U.S.

and 8,186 Korean personnel.20 Since the

enemy totals were not too far off from

the numbers the UNC had estimated

they could expect, Clark recommended

they be accepted and his superiors

agreed.21

The staff committee on repatriation

of prisoners, headed by Colonels Friedersdorff and Lee Pyong Il of the North

Korean Army, had the task of determining the rate of delivery for the repatriates. To a large degree the rate

depended upon the transportation facilities and the administrative capacity

of each side to handle the prisoners.

At first, the UNC had calculated that

it would be able to bring 1,800 repatriates a day to Panmunjom plus 360 sick

and wounded. When Friedersdorff

passed the information on to Lee, the

latter immediately asked for 3,000 a day,

in addition to the sick and wounded.

As it was, the UNC would be transferring more than seven times as many

prisoners over to the Communists each

day than it received. For Lee disclosed

that his side would turn over only 300

a day because of the paucity of transportation facilities and the fact that the

Communist prisoner camps were distant

and scattered. On 26 July a reassessment

of UNC capabilities revealed that it

could bring daily to Panmunjom 2,400,

plus the 360 sick and wounded, but the

enemy clung to its earlier figure.22 At

that rate the U.N. Command would repatriate all of the prisoners in its custody

desiring to return home in about thirty

days, while the Communists would

spread their deliveries over a forty-day

period.

Meanwhile, over in the committee

considering the preparations for the

functioning of the Military Armistice

Commission, Colonel Weber and his associates presented the UNC plans for the

rules and modus operandi on 20 July.

20

 Msg, CX 63970, CINCUNC to CG AFFE, 25

Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to

app. I, incls 144-286, incl 227. The remaining

UNC personnel were broken down as follows:

U.K., 922; Turkey, 228; Philippines, 40; Colombia,

22; Australia, 15; Canada, 14; France, 13; South

Africa, 6; Belgium, 1; and Greece, 1. Three Japanese were also to be returned, according to the

Communist tally, to total 12,764 in all. For the

final figures on repatriation, see Appendix B. 21

 (1) Msg, CX 63929, CINCUNC to JCS, 23 Jul

53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app.

I, incls 1-143, incl 102. (2) Msg, JCS 944523, JCS

to CINCUNC, 24 Jul 53.

22

 Second and Fourth Meetings of Staff Officers

on the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of

War, 23 and 26 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,

Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incls 104 and

105.
FINALE 487

Clark had already selected Maj. Gen.

Blackshear M. Bryan, USA, Deputy

Chief of Staff, FEC, as senior UNC member and established headquarters for the

group at Munsan-ni on 20 June. During

the succeeding month General Bryan

had gathered his staff together and was

ready to take up his duties as soon as

the armistice went into effect.23

The Communists did not have any

basic objections to the UNC recommendations, but showed no disposition

toward haste. They agreed that the

Military Armistice Commission should

hold its first meeting on the day after the

armistice was signed. Once the sessions

got under way, they went on, the staff

members could arrange the details of

the operation.24

As one item after another was settled,

the question of timing assumed greater

importance. From the outset, the UNC

staff officers had sought to have the armistice take effect twelve hours after the

signing. The Communists, estimating

that the personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission might not

arrive in Korea and be able to exercise

their functions for at least a week after

the signing, had proposed that the effective date be seven and a half days later.

In his rebuttal, Colonel Murray argued

that even if the supervisory groups did

not begin to carry out their responsibilities for a week, the agreement not to

augment forces should become effective

twelve hours after the cease-fire. On 22

July the enemy representatives stated

that although the UNC interpretation

was at variance with the provisions of the

armistice agreement in some respects,

they were willing to accept it.25 Whether

the Communists would scrupulously observe the restrictions imposed by the

truce during the interim week was a

matter for conjecture, but at least the

casualty lists would not be increased by

an extra seven days of fighting.

The first target date for the signing of

the cease-fire had been 24 July, since

five days had been adjudged sufficient

to take care of the details and the physical arrangements. But complicating

factors soon made this choice appear

unduly optimistic—the demarcation

maps had to be printed and checked after the line had been settled, the building for the signing ceremony had to be

constructed and outfitted, and a difference in opinion had broken out over

the signing procedure.

The debate over this formality produced the final enemy effort to eke out

political advantage during the conflict.

In the initial exchange on the ways and

means that might be adopted, the Communists stated on 20 July that, in view

of the uncertain ROK situation, they

did not think it wise for the military

commanders to attend and sign in person. Colonel Ju suggested that the commanders affix their signatures before the

ceremony and then the senior delegates

could countersign at Panmunjom.26

Clark looked with disfavor upon the

enemy plan, for he strongly felt that the

23

 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, app. I, pp. 313-

14.

24

 First, Second, and Third Mtgs of Committee

for Making Preliminary Arrangements for the

MAC, 20, 22, and 26 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd

Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144-286, incls

252, 253, and 255.

25

 (1) Liaison Officers Mtg, 21 Jul 53. (2) First

Combined Mtg of Staff Officers, 22 Jul 53. Both

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,

incls 1-143, incls 111 and 83. 26

 Liaison Officers Mtg, 20 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-43, incl

74.
488 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

commanders should show their good

faith by personally signing the armistice,

thus lending prestige to the agreement.

When Murray pressed the Communist

representatives on 21 July to change

their position, however, he met with

little encouragement.27 Nevertheless he

returned to the fray two days later and

sought to assure the enemy that all possible precautions would be taken at Panmunjom to guarantee the safety of the

commanders during the ceremonies.

The U.N. Command, Murray said,

would be willing to increase the number

of guards, to limit and carefully screen

all the representatives admitted to the

conference area, and to provide immunity from attack for the Communist commanders en route to Panmunjom. But

Colonel Ju pointed to the disconcerting

statements that Rhee and other members of the ROK Government were still

making as prejudicial to personal appearances by the commanders. To

answer some of the UNC objections to

the Communist proposal, Ju continued,

his side was willing to have the senior

delegates sign the armistice first and to

have the truce go into effect twelve hours

later. Thus any delay in securing the

commanders' signatures would not hold

up the actual cease-fire.28

At the liaison officers meeting on 24

July, Ju offered a third alternative. If no

representatives of Syngman Rhee and

Chiang Kai-shek were admitted to the

conference area and if the number of

personnel permitted to witness the signing were restricted to 100 for each side

and included no press members, the

Communists might reconsider and have

their military commanders sign in person.29

Clark's initial reaction to the latest enemy suggestion was to accept even

though he knew that the press would

be very unhappy over being excluded

from the signing room. General Taylor

had conversed with Rhee and discovered

that the ROK leader did not desire to

send a representative to Panmunjom, so

this potential obstacle was removed.

But after further study of the enemy's

demands, Clark changed his mind. He

had no intention, he told the JCS, of

banning ROK and Chinese Nationalist

correspondents from the conference site

area as the Communists insisted. If the

enemy refused to allow the ROK and

Nationalist newsmen to be present at the

signing, he would settle for the senior

delegates holding the ceremony first,

with the commanders countersigning

later.30

When the liaison officers convened

their meeting on 25 July, Colonel Murray made several fervent pleas in behalf

of the ROK and Nationalist press members, but they fell upon deaf ears. Ju

would not consider their being in the

area during the signing. If the UNC

consented to their exclusion, Marshal

Choe Yong Gun, Kim's deputy, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the

Chinese People's Volunteers, would

come to Panmunjom on 27 July at 1000

to sign for the Communists, Ju de27 Liaison Officers Mtg, 21 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143,

incl 111. 28

 Liaison Officers Mtg, 23 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143,

incl 119.

29

 Liaison Officers Mtg, 24 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143,

incl 112. 30

 (1) Msg, CX 63963, CINCFE to JCS, 24 Jul 53.

(2) Msg, CX 63969, CINCFE to JCS, 25 Jul 53.

Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to

app. I, incls 1-143, 144-286, incls 121 and 277.
FINALE 489

dared. Otherwise, he went on, his side

would not allow any press representatives to be present.31

The adamant stand by the enemy

against ROK and Nationalist participation decided Clark. Early on 26 July he

instructed Harrison to go ahead and sign

at Panmunjom; he would countersign

afterwards at Munsan-ni since President

Eisenhower wanted him to do this on

Korean soil.32

At the liaison officers conference later

that day, Murray and Ju completed the

arrangements. Each side would be given

350 spaces in the Panmunjom area, but

only 150 persons would be granted access to the signing building. Newsmen,

photographers, and cameramen would

be included in the 150 figure. The conference site would be divided into two

sections and all personnel from one side

should remain in its own half. Additional security guards would be on hand

to preserve order and prevent disturbances. As previously suggested, the ceremony would be held at 1000 on 27 July.

Murray and Ju encountered little difficulty in straightening out these matters.

But an attempt by Murray to simplify

the exchange of documents after they

were signed by the commanders met

with immediate suspicion and rejection

by his opposite number. Since only 6

of the 18 copies of the truce were to

remain in UNC possession, Murray suggested that the Communists take 6 copies

to Kim and Peng while the UNC had

the 12 copies intended for enemy possession countersigned by Clark. This

procedure would necessitate only one

exchange, Murray explained. Ju insisted

upon absolute equality right to the end;

each side would have 9 copies for countersignature despite the fact that two

exchanges would be required under this

method. In arguing for the Communist

view, Ju discounted the time lost under

his scheme as unimportant, causing Murray to retort: "Do I understand you correctly in that the strong point of your

proposal is that it takes a long time to

carry it out?" Ju ignored the thrust and

early on 27 July Murray agreed to the

Communists' proposal to end the matter.33

The Big Day

Although there were occasional puddles in low-lying spots and a heavy cloud

cover, the sun managed to break through

intermittently on 27 July. A strong wind

whipped across Panmunjom stirring up

little whirls of dust here and there. In

the background the sound of artillery

served as a reminder that the war was

not quite over.

The building constructed for the ceremony had had a deletion and an addition in recent days. A UNC complaint

had succeeded in securing the removal

of two Communist peace doves from the

gables of the peace pagoda and General

Clark had insisted upon the provision

of a south entrance to the structure. In

the original plan the only door lay on

the north side and this would have required all of the UNC entourage to pass 31

 Liaison Officers Mtgs, 25 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC,

Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143,

incls 122 and 97. 32

 (1) Msg, DA 944648, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 25

Jul 53. (2) Msg, CX 64002, CINCUNC to

CINCUNC (Adv), 26 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd

Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incl 126.

33

 Liaison Officers Mtgs, 26 and 27 Jul 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,

incls 1-143, incls 127 and 136.
490 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

through the enemy section to enter the

building.34

Along the south approach to the pagoda a UNC honor guard composed of

members of the nations that had fought

in Korea lined the walk, with only the

Republic of Korea not represented.

Smartly turned out in white gloves,

scarves, and helmets, the guard added

a dash of color to the scene. On the

north side the Communists, clad in olivedrab fatigue uniforms and canvas shoes,

were busily cleaning up the area near

the entrance.

A half hour before the ceremony the

spectators began to drift into sight.

Correspondents and cameramen went

into the building and took up their stations, followed soon after by the military

officials from each side assigned to act

as observers. In severe contrast to the

casual, informal entrance and appearance of the UNC officers, the Communists were stiff and disciplined as they

filed into the hall and took their seats.

Both Chinese and North Koreans "sat

straight and rigid like students at a graduation ceremony, sized and posed."

Upon one of the tables at the head

of the room lay nine blue-bound copies

of the agreement and a small U.N. flag

and upon another, nine maroon-colored

copies and a North Korean flag.

At 0957 the associate delegates of the

plenary conference came in and sat down

at the front. As the minute hand signaled the hour, Generals Harrison and

Nam briskly walked in from opposite

ends of the building and took their

places behind the tables. Not a word of

greeting was exchanged between the

two men as they began to write their

signatures on the documents. The atmosphere was marked by cold courtesy

on both sides. At 1012 the task was completed and Harrison allowed himself a

small smile at the cameras. As he and

Nam rose to leave, they locked glances

for a moment, but neither spoke. Harrison went out and chatted with the

newsmen for a few minutes, then left

for Munsan-ni by helicopter. Nam and

his group climbed into their Russianbuilt jeeps and drove out of the area.

The armistice but for twelve hours was

finally a fact. (Map IX)

Postlude

Surrounded by his top military advisors, including a ROKA representative,

General Clark countersigned the bluebound copies on the afternoon of 27

July at Munsan-ni. In the speeches that

followed, the U.N. commander cautioned that the armistice was only a

military agreement to cease fire while

the opposing sides sought a political solution to the conflict. Until the diplomats

negotiated a permanent conclusion,

Clark warned, there could be no UNC

withdrawal from Korea nor any lessening of alertness and preparedness.35

While Clark was speaking, the guns

along the front continued to bellow out

their lethal salutes. Ground activity had

come to a halt, but artillery and mortar

fire lasted until the end. In the air the

UNC planes pounded North Korean airfields, rail lines, and road systems in a

34

 The description of the ceremony is based on

UNC/FEC, Command Report, July 1953, Appendix

I, pages 134ff.

35

 (1) ZX 37264, CINCFE to CG AFFE et al, 26

Jul 53. (2) Msg, C 64152, CINCUNC to JCS, 31

Jul 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls

to app. I, incls 144-286, incls 159 and 156.

FINALE 491

last-ditch effort to curtail Communist

activities until the supervisory commission and its inspection teams could begin

to function. The air program, carried

out by Air Force, Navy, and Marine

aircraft, had been intensified during the

last week of the fighting, but unfortunately, inclement flying weather had permitted the enemy to bring a number of

airplanes into Korea before the armistice

was signed.36 On the sea naval warships

bombarded Kosong and finally ended

the longest naval siege in history by

shelling Wonsan for the last time.37

When the clock hands reached 2200 the

guns fell silent across Korea and the

shooting war was over.

How long the truce would last was

uncertain. When Taylor had gone on

the eve of the truce to inform Rhee that

it would be signed on the morrow, the

ROK President had seemed relieved

that the long and trying struggle was

almost over.38 During Clark's visit with

Rhee on 27 July the latter had told the

U.N. commander that he would tell his

people that the ROK would co-operate

with the armistice and that he would

prepare a message to be read to the nonrepatriate prisoners to reassure them.

In the course of their chat, Clark told

the ROK President of an offer from

Eisenhower to make 10,000 tons of food

available immediately to the civilian

population. The rations would be distributed through the Korean Civil Assistance Command in conjunction with

the ROK authorities, if the latter were

agreeable to the acceptance of the gift.

Rhee seemed glad to receive the news

and gave his consent, Clark reported.39

Despite these favorable signs, Rhee

and his aides in their public utterances

and interviews continued to indicate that

the truce might not last long and that

the ROK forces might again resort to

arms if and when the political conference

failed.40 It was impossible to estimate

whether these threats might be serious

or were simply delivered for home consumption to soften the blow of ROK

acquiescence to the armistice. But they

did inject into the situation a note of

uneasiness that would have to be eliminated if the cease-fire were to be other

than temporary. The United States

could only hope that when fulfilled the

pledges of military and economic assistance made to the ROK Government

would overcome its objections to the

truce and induce the ROK leaders to

halt their agitation for a resumption of

hostilities in the future.

The inability of the UNC participants

to depend upon Rhee's behavior made

them very hesitant about issuing the

joint declaration, agreed upon earlier,

providing for "greater sanctions" in the

event the Communists began anew the

fighting in Korea. As long as there was

reasonable doubt about Rhee's intentions, the U.N. countries who had joined

in the war preferred not to give broad

publicity to their commitments under

the agreement. Instead they decided to 36

 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea,

1950-1953, pp. 639-40. 37

 Hq UNC, Communiqué No. 1689, 28 Jul 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls

144-286, incl 158. 38

 Msg, G 7445 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 27 Jul 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,

incls 144-286, incl 206.

39

 Msg, GX 7452, CINCUNC to JCS, 27 Jul 53, in

UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls

144-286, incl 286. 40

 Msg, GX 7608, Taylor to Weyland, 31 Jul 53,

in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,

incls 144-286, incl 209.
492 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

THE ARMISTICE BUILDING, PANMUNJOM

issue notice of the warning through a

special report that the U.N. commander

would submit to the United Nations on

the armistice about a week after it was

signed. Thus, in place of an independent statement which would have been

given wide distribution, the following

item was included in Clark's summary

of the negotiations presented to the U.N.

on 7 August:

We the United Nations members whose

military forces are participating in the

Korean action support the decision of the

Commander-in-chief of the United Nations

Command to conclude an armistice agree- ment. We hereby affirm our determination

fully and faithfully to carry out the terms

of that armistice. We expect that the other

parties to the agreement will likewise

scrupulously observe its terms.

The task ahead is not an easy one. We

will support the efforts of the United Na- tions to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles

which have long been established by the

United Nations, and which call for a

united, independent and democratic Korea. We will support the United Nations in its

efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war. We declare again our faith in the prin- ciples and purposes of the United Nations,

our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the

Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests

of world peace, that if there is a renewal
FINALE 493

GENERAL HARRISON TAKES SALUTE FROM HONOR GUARD on his way to the

Armistice Building.

of the armed attack, challenging again

the principles of the United Nations, we

should again be united and prompt to re- sist. The consequences of such a breach of

the armistice would be so grave that, in all

probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of

Korea. Finally, we are of the opinion that the

armistice must not result in jeopardizing

the restoration or the safeguarding of peace

in any other part of Asia.41

Regardless of the manner of presentation, the commitment was made and no

less noted for having been slipped into

Clark's report. Whether the Communists would heed the warning or not,

only the future could reveal. It was

possible that Syngman Rhee might take

the decision out of their hands and place

both sides in a quandary. In the meantime an armed truce during which the

opponents could seek to improve their

relative positions offered a modus vivendi less costly than open war.

The organizations which the U.N.

Command and the Communists had designed to prevent one side from improving its military position significantly

during the truce quickly assumed their

duties and enjoyed some initial success.

On 28 July the Military Armistice Com41

 Unified Command's Special Report on Korean

Armistice, in the Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXIX,

No. 739 (August 24, 1953), p. 247.
494 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

SIGNING THE ARMISTICE—GENERAL HARRISON AND GENERAL NAM IL

mission held its first meeting and the

proceedings were conducted in a businesslike manner. Arrangements were

made in subsequent sessions for the withdrawal of troops from the demilitarized

zone, the conduct of salvage operations,

the removal of hazards such as mines,

and the matter of credentials and identification of personnel entering or working

in the zone. But the era of co-operation

was soon shattered by a series of incidents in August which arose from the

Communist Red Cross activities in the

UNC prisoner of war camps. The atmosphere at the MAC meetings grew

strained and charges and countercharges

again became the order of the day. Each

side denied the accusations of the other

and the joint observer teams set up to

investigate violations of the demilitarized zone usually had to submit split

reports.42

Even more important were the experiences of the Neutral Nations Supervisory

Commission and its inspection teams.

The latter were stationed at the ten ports

of entry specified in the truce agreement

to observe and report on the arrival and

departure of personnel and the replacement of combat matériel. In North Korea the inspection teams soon ran into

difficulties, and the UNC charged that

the enemy was violating the spirit and

letter of the agreement by using other

ports of entry to introduce more men

and equipment. Little could be done to

enforce the maintenance of the status

42

 UNC Summary of the Implementation of the

Armistice Agreement in Korea, Part Two, no date.

In OCMH.
FINALE 495

THE NINE BOUND COPIES OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

quo under the circumstances, the UNC

concluded, and the Communists would

continue to gain in strength as long as

the UNC closely observed the provisions

of the truce.43 Whether the apparent enemy build-up was offensive or defensive

in nature or simply opportunistic, only

time would reveal.

Another of the armistice's creations—

the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission—also suffered its share of frustrations. Shortly after the truce was

signed, the flow of prisoners north and

south got under way. Between 5 August

and 6 September the U.N. Command

transferred over 75,000 prisoners of war

directly to the Communists in the demilitarized zone and the enemy sent

back over 12,000 to the UNC.44 Then,

on 23 September, the United Nations

Command turned over more than 22,000

nonrepatriates to the Neutral Nations

Repatriation Commission in the demilitarized zone; the Communists delivered

over 350 UNC nonrepatriates to the

NNRC the following day.45

The Communists soon complained

that the facilities provided them for persuading their nonrepatriates to return

43

 Ibid.

44

 See Appendix B for a breakdown of the statistics on prisoners of war. 45

 The following account is based upon the Interim Report, 28 December 1953, and the Final

Report, no date, of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the United Nations Command

Report on Operations of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, no date. All in OCMH.
496 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

GENERAL CLARK COUNTERSIGNS THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AT MUNSAN-NI, while

Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe and Vice Adm. Joseph J. Clark look on.

home were inadequate and it was not

until 15 October that they began their

explanations. Between this date and 23

December, when the ninety-day period

agreed upon for explanations expired,

they utilized only ten days for explanations. Large groups of the prisoners refused to listen to the enemy representatives at all and the number of those who

chose repatriation after hearing the explanations amounted to only a little over

600 out of the 22,000 involved. The

NNRC retained custody of the remainder until the 120 days stipulated in the

truce agreement was up and then returned them to the UNC. In the early

part of 1954 the Korean nonrepatriates

were released and the Chinese were

shipped by plane and boat to Taiwan,

except for some 86 who chose to go with

the Custodial Forces of India when they

sailed for home.46

Of the 359 UNC nationals who had

decided not to be repatriated, two of the

Americans and eight Koreans changed

their minds before the 120-day period

was up and two Koreans elected to go to

India with the custodial forces. The

remainder were turned back to the Communists in January 1954.

When the American prisoners of war

were interviewed after their repatriation, disturbing charges of collaboration

and moral and physical softness were

leveled at many of the returning soldiers.

Criticism of the U.S. prisoner of war

behavior became widespread in the press 46

 See Appendix B.
FINALE 497

during the fall and winter of 1953-54.

Over 500 of the repatriated prisoners

were investigated, but only a few were

convicted of misconduct. The Secretary

of Defense did, however, appoint a tenman Advisory Committee on Prisoners

of War to investigate the matter. As a

result the committee drafted a new code

of conduct for the armed services, which

President Eisenhower signed on 17 August 1955. It was hoped that the code

would prevent a recurrence of the Korean experience.47

Since the war had never been declared, perhaps it was fitting that there

should be no ending. In late August

1953 the U.N. General Assembly had

welcomed the holding of a political conference which the truce agreement had

recommended, but it was not until February 1954 that the Foreign Ministers of

the United States, the United Kingdom,

the Soviet Union, and France agreed to

participate in a conference at Geneva

to discuss the peaceful settlement of the

Korean question.48

Delegations from the Republic of

Korea and from all the nations participating in the United Nations Command

except the Union of South Africa met

with delegations from the USSR, Communist China, and North Korea on 26

April 1954 in Switzerland.49 The fundamental differences in the approaches of

the two groups to the unification problem quickly demonstrated that agreement would be impossible unless one

side made wholesale concessions. The

UNC nations proposed free elections

throughout Korea under U.N. auspices

after the Chinese Communist forces had

been withdrawn from the country. To

the Communists, the U.N. was one of

the belligerents and could not act as an

impartial international body; they were

willing to have free elections but only

under the auspices of a body composed

of equal representation from both sides

wherein they would have veto privileges.

To the UNC delegations the Communist proposals seemed to offer the prospects for elections only after long delays

and on the Communists' terms. After

nearly two months of discussions, the

conference came to a close in mid-June

with neither side willing to accept the

other's solution. A negotiated unification of Korea appeared to be as distant

in 1954 as it had been in 1948.

47

 New York Times, August 18, 1955. The justice

and validity of the charges have been discussed in

detail in postwar writings. For the arguments upholding the thesis that the prisoners did collaborate

excessively with the enemy and demonstrated signs

of moral and physical weakness, see Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One (New York: W. W.

Norton and Co., Inc., 1959). For a convincing

rebuttal of the thesis, see Albert D. Biderman,

March To Calumny (New York: The Macmillan

Co., 1962). 48

 See Department of State, The Record on

Korean Unification, 1943-1960 (Washington, 1960),

p. 25.

49

 For the record of the proceedings at the

Geneva Conference see Department of State, The

Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April

26-June 15, 1954 (Washington, 1954).
CHAPTER XXIII

Retrospect

What had the war in Korea accomplished? While it may still be too soon

to view the conflict in proper perspective,

some of the immediate consequences are

not difficult to discern.

Despite the claims of the enemy, there

had been no victory—political or military—in Korea. At best, the outcome

could be called a draw. Yet several developments were momentous. Facing its

sternest test, the United Nations had

weathered a challenge, which, if unanswered, might have resulted in disaster

and eventual disintegration. Under the

U.N. flag, the original objective of the

intervention in Korea—halting Communist aggression—had been successfully

carried out and the independence of its

foster child, the Republic of Korea, had

been preserved. This practical demonstration of how the United Nations could

function when peace was threatened

greatly enhanced the prestige of the organization and established a precedent

for future U.N. military action if the

need should again arise.

The effort had not been given unanimous support by U.N. members, it is

true, but twenty-one nations had contributed forces of one kind or another

to sustain the U.N. decision. Although

many of these countries had supplied

only small token units, the mere fact

that they had participated at all was encouraging, since it indicated their belief

in the U.N. and their willingness to put

teeth in the enforcement provisions of its

charter. The Korean War marked a real

departure from the dismal experience of

the League of Nations in this respect.

For the United States the Korean War

was also a crucial test. The United

States had entered World Wars I and II

at a relatively late date and as a member

of a coalition. At the conclusion of

World War II, however, the realignment of power had placed the United

States in a position of dominance and

cloaked it with the mantle of leadership

of the non-Communist world. When the

foe threw down the gauntlet by invading

South Korea, the responsibilities that

went with the new position of power

became agonizingly apparent. No longer

could the nation rely upon some other

country to battle the aggressor until it

was ready to join the fray. Now only

the United States had the resources to

do the task. Fortunately, it had responded quickly, meeting force with

force. By working within the framework

of the U.N., it had at the same time

helped give increased stature to that organization. The amazingly swift recourse to armed action had shown the

Communists that the United States had

accepted its role of leadership and would

not permit outright aggression on their

part to go unchecked. In an instance

when failure to act might well have led
RETROSPECT 499

to a repetition of the tragic events following Hitler's uncontested march into

the Rhineland, the United States had

won its spurs as the champion of the

anti-Communist powers.

In the course of leading the UNC

team during the hostilities, the United

States had to devote far more attention

to Pacific-Asian affairs than it had in

preceding years. Before the war the emphasis had been placed upon Europe,

and the NATO pact had linked many

of the nations of Europe to the United

States. This policy had been rewarded,

for most of them had sent forces to serve

with the U.N. Command. Under the

impetus of war the United States decided to expand its system of alliances

and began to conclude security pacts

with the countries in the Pacific-Asian

area. New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea entered defensive alliances with the United States

during or shortly after the war and others, such as Nationalist China, followed

later. The Korean experience demonstrated that allies are helpful in marshaling favorable world opinion and that

their contributions in men, matériel,

and political support are very valuable

in the search for peace. The multiplication of U.S. politico-military ties with

non-Communist nations throughout the

western Pacific and on the Asian mainland was a direct consequence of the war.

In the Far East, two nations had

emerged from the conflict stronger than

before. The armed forces of the Republic of Korea had increased sixfold

during the three-year period and at the

conclusion of the truce totaled close to

600,000 men. The bulk of these troops

were trained and equipped and had

steadily improved in battle efficiency.

In forces in being, the ROK units had

a considerable advantage over the North

Koreans at the end of the war. With

further training and development of the

officer and noncommissioned officer

corps, the ROK forces could eventually

become a bulwark against future Communist aggression or, conversely, an instrument for the fulfillment of the ROK

dream—the unification of Korea—when

the Chinese Communists withdrew from

Korea.

The other state that had added to its

status as a result of the war was Communist China. From the stout defensive

and offensive capabilities that the Chinese had displayed throughout the fighting, the United States and its allies had

learned the hard way that Communist

China was a formidable foe who bore

little resemblance to the feeble nation

of World War II. With a tremendous

pool of manpower at its disposal and

energetic leadership, Communist China

had also won its spurs on the battlefields

of Korea and appeared ready to assume

its place as the leader of the Communists

in the Far East and western Pacific

areas.

In the passage at arms in Korea the

United States and the Chinese had an

opportunity to test each other's mettle

and to learn each other's strengths and

weaknesses. Both had discovered that

the price of military victory was more

than they were prepared to pay and

neither was likely to underestimate the

immense task that a further resort to

arms with military victory as the goal

would entail.

The rise of Communist China also

raised some intriguing questions concerning the future role of the Soviet

Union in the Far East. Before the war
500 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the Russians had exercised a controlling

interest in the affairs of North Korea.

With the entry of Communist China

into the struggle, the USSR had seemingly been content to provide much of

the war matériel for both the North

Koreans and Communist Chinese and to

support their proteges vigorously in the

United Nations debates. During the

negotiations the North Koreans appeared to take their cue from the Communist Chinese, and the Soviet influence

in the making of policy became difficult

to discern. But the growth of Communist Chinese power and prestige could

not fail to have an adverse effect upon

Soviet leadership of Communist elements in the Far East. As the voice of

Peiping gained in strength, Moscow's

could not help but diminish. What the

long-range consequences of this shift in

power would be upon Sino-Soviet relationships were impossible to forecast,

yet it seemed evident that there would

be an immediate elevation in the position of Communist China in the Communist hierarchy. For the first time

since 1917 a potential rival for the leadership of the Communist world had appeared upon the scene.

In an indirect fashion both Communist China and North Korea had benefited diplomatically from the lengthy

truce negotiations. Although the United

States recognized neither of these regimes officially and the U.S. representatives had acted in behalf of the United

Nations when they negotiated and

signed the armistice, it was difficult to

dismiss the argument that the United

States had given them a sort of de facto

recognition in the process. In the meantime the Communists throughout the

discussions had refused to grant either

the ROK or the Chinese Nationalist

Governments any official status whatsoever. The advantage in this field lay decidedly with the Communists.

On the other hand, the United States

had established the precedent for no

forced repatriation of prisoners of war,

although this victory had been tarnished

by the spate of outbreaks of violence in

the camps that tended to discredit the

screening process. Nevertheless, the

United States had clung firmly to the

concept for fifteen months, refusing to

consider a settlement on any other terms.

Alternatives had been proposed, including the 1952 suggestions by Harrison

and others to simply free the nonrepatriates as Rhee did with many in June 1953.

Such a fait accompli approach to a solution by the U.N. Command might well

have afforded the Communists their easiest way out, since they could have

charged the UNC with unilateral action

and might have avoided the loss of face

that came from having to meet the problem directly. But until the archives at

Peiping are opened to researchers, the

Chinese reaction to such a move in 1952

will remain merely a matter for conjecture.

The long-term effects of no forced

repatriation may also be a matter for

conjecture, but the fact that 50,000 prisoners had taken advantage of the UNC

stand and had rejected return to Communist control cannot be disputed. Yet

the humanitarian approach in protecting

nonrepatriates had been expensive. To

safeguard their rights had cost over

125,000 UNC casualties during the fifteen-month period while the enemy lost

well over a quarter of a million men—

killed, wounded, and captured—according to Eighth Army estimates. Viewed
RETROSPECT 501

from this angle, the precedence given

the 50,000 nonrepatriates and the

12,000-odd prisoners held by the enemy

over the hundreds of thousands of soldiers at the front raised a complicated

question. In negotiating a military truce,

should the prime consideration be for

the men on the line and in action or for

those in captivity? Such a decision would

always be difficult to make. Comparatively speaking, the casualties incurred

during the fifteen-month span were but

a small part of the over-all total suffered

during the war. The UNC suffered over

500,000, including more than 94,000

dead.1 For the Communists the estimates reached over 1,500,000, including

prisoners of war. The monetary costs

were more difficult to compute, especially on the Communist side, but one

U.S. expert figured that the war and its

by-products had cost the United States

over 83 billion dollars by 1956, placing it

second to World War II in this department.2

Since the territorial adjustments in

Korea had been minor in character, the

absence of a clear-cut winner, frustrating

as it might have been to the participants,

was not necessarily a poor solution

under the circumstances. Both sides had

sought an armistice and the compromise

that had resulted had not generated a

disgruntled loser seeking revenge.

Syngman Rhee might be unhappy over

the truce, but as long as he was dependent upon the United States for military assistance, it might be difficult for

him to rekindle the flame of military

conflict.

In addition to these international consequences, there were several significant

domestic developments. In the course

of fighting this indecisive bout in

Korea the United States had begun to

overhaul and strengthen its own military machine once again. The deterioration of the once-powerful U.S. military

organization after World War II had

been checked and rebuilding and renovation had been started. In this respect,

the Korean experience had been salutary and the failure to defeat the enemy

served to remind leaders and public

alike that the country could not afford

to relax its vigilance or its capability to

act in the face of future challenges.

After the armistice there was no effort

to disband the armed forces, to junk the

implements of war, and to return to the

military status quo, as there had been

after World Wars I and II. The Korean

War helped to convince most of the U.S.

leaders that military spending on a large

scale to provide adequate forces and

weapons in a state of readiness to counteract the growing Communist threat

must be sustained. In the postwar period the huge sums allocated to the defense budget were stark evidence that

the need for preparedness had not been

promptly forgotten.

The United States had also gained valuable experience in the difficulties of

fighting a limited war. The lack of definite military objectives had complicated

1

 U.S. losses: 33,629 dead, 103,284 wounded, 5,178

missing or captured—total, 142,091.

2

 Raymond E. Manning, Cost of U.S. Wars, prepared by the Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, 1956. Manning deducts the costs

which would presumably have been incurred regardless of whether there had been a war or not

and includes the cost of expanding U.S. forces at

home and abroad, foreign aid, stockpiling, etc.,

which grew out of the war and the atmosphere it

created.
502 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the task of military planners, since all

plans for large-scale operations had to

be placed on a contingency basis. As the

war dragged on, the problem of budgeting its costs followed the same pattern.

The length of the conflict argued

strongly for the maintenance of a liberal

rotation program that was uneconomical

and inefficient as a practical solution, but

valuable as an answer to the morale

problem.

The desire to minimize the war in

Korea politically made it hard for the

U.S. administration to convince the nation's manufacturers that they should

convert to war production on what

might well have turned out to be a

short-term basis. Since war conversion

was expensive and domestic civilian consumption was at a high level, the manufacturers were very reluctant to disrupt

normal production. In this instance,

the need for a war production base sustained in peacetime by regular orders

and capable of immediate expansion was

demonstrated once again. The inescapable fact that it took eighteen months

to two years to develop and get new

production into the fighting areas was

clearly shown by the ammunition situation, yet only limited mobilization of

industrial resources was put into effect.

The civilian economy was scarcely disturbed by the butter and guns policy.

Perhaps it was only by making it as easy

as possible upon soldiers and civilians

alike that the United States was able to

be so patient in the negotiations at Panmunjom. Excessive hardship upon

either category might have generated

strong sentiment for an end to the war

either through direct action or through

further concessions on the prisoners of

war.

The Negotiations

The initiation of the negotiations in

July 1951 was in many ways a turning

point in the war. As long as fluid conditions had prevailed on the battlefield

during the first year of the conflict, the

United States, which had been supplying the bulk of the forces and carrying

the financial burden of supporting the

war, had largely determined the policy

pursued by the U.N. Command with

only token opposition. After the static

phase began, however, the UNC allies

and the Republic of Korea became less

reticent. The length of the armistice negotiations gave ample opportunity for

the disagreements to be aired privately

and publicly. Disturbed by the drains of

the Korean commitment, some of the

European members of the United Nations Command became anxious to redirect the attention of the United States

towards the needs of NATO. But until

the war was concluded, there was little

hope for a shift in emphasis. Thus,

NATO national interests dictated that

an armistice be negotiated quickly, so

that they could devote their efforts to

their own domestic and colonial problems and, at the same time, secure more

sympathetic consideration, militarily

and economically, from the United

States. For the ROK Government, the

opposite was true. A truce would mean,

in all probability, the end of ROK

aspirations for a united Korea and the

eventual waning of U.S. concern for

Korean affairs.

With pressure mounting from both

groups, the United States had to play the

role of mediator. Self-interest argued for the liquidation of the Korean

diversion and a return to the primary
RETROSPECT 503

task of safeguarding the NATO community, but the protection of South

Korea and Japan was a responsibility

that could not be denied. For two years,

therefore, the United States sought an

equitable solution that would permit the

attainment of both objectives. The continuing effort to end the fighting in

Korea was matched by the concomitant

drive to establish in the ROK and in

Japan adequate defense forces that one

day would be capable of resisting the

Communist threat effectively. As has

been noted, the expansion of the ROK

forces was far more significant than that

of the Japanese, but this was not the

fault of the United States; the Japanese,

for a number of reasons, had chosen to

move cautiously down the road to rearmament.

The dissension from within the alliance was all too usual in coalition warfare. With so many diverse national objectives involved, agreement upon a

common goal was but the initial step.

Generally all could agree that the enemy

must be stopped, contained, or defeated,

as the case might be. The debates on

the means and methods, however, were

quite another thing and even in general

war, such as World War II, were likely

to occasion some heated and tense

moments. The Korean War was no exception to this rule, despite its limited

nature.

After the United States had decided to

open negotiations with the Communists, it had refused to be hurried by its

U.N. allies into an agreement or to

be deflected from its objective by

ROK opposition to an armistice. Fortunately the enemy had shown no disposition toward seeking a military solution

during the negotiating period, although

limited pressure had been applied by

both sides to induce swifter consent to

a truce. But extreme measures had

been shunned. The U.N. Command had

not wilfully violated the Manchurian

sanctuary nor had the United States

pushed strongly for sterner military or

economic steps against the rest of Communist China. The enemy in turn had

made no hostile moves against the Japanese base or even against the crowded

port of Pusan. To localize the war

politically and militarily both sides had

voluntarily imposed limitations upon

their military operations.

The manner in which the United

States opened the negotiations has been

attacked by some critics as overhasty.

Admiral Joy felt that the quick response

given by the United States to Malik's

offer of June 1951 created the impression

that this country wanted or needed a

cease-fire badly and that this was interpreted by the Communists as a sign

of weakness.3 Perhaps the United

States might have avoided the injection

of a sense of urgency into the atmosphere

by a slower and more devious approach

and deprived the enemy of a psychological and propaganda edge. But it is

doubtful whether the truce would have

been concluded any sooner in the long

run, since the UNC actions at Kaesong

and on the battlefield during the summer of 1951 must have quickly dispelled

any illusions that the enemy might have

had concerning the UNC need for an

armistice.

Among the UNC delegates and newsmen who attended the first meetings at

Kaesong, there had been an initial note

of optimism on the length of time that

3

 See Joy, How Communists Negotiate, p. 165.
504 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

it would take to arrange a truce. Just

three days after the negotiations opened,

Admiral Burke wrote to his wife and

closed with: "Hope I'm not in this orchard [at Munsan-ni] when the apples

ripen." But, by the end of the battle of

the agenda in late July, he sent a far

different postscript: "Maybe leave in a

year or so if things don't break soon." 4

Exposure to Communist demands and

tactics had quickly induced the admiral

to discard his expectation of a fast settlement.

Perhaps there might have been a relatively swift truce if the discussions had

been limited strictly to military affairs.

Originally the United States had intended to bar political questions and to

restrict the delegations to the military

considerations inherent in a cease-fire.

There was to be no debate on the disposition of Taiwan nor on the seating of

Communist China in the United Nations

and these matters had been successfully

avoided. Recognizing that a political

settlement in Korea might not be possible in the near future, the United States

had sought a long-term truce and the

Communists had not contested this

point. The U.S. proposal for a Military

Armistice Commission had been accepted, although the Communists had

inserted the Neutral Nations Supervisory

Commission and its inspection teams as

the instruments to carry out the supervisory functions outside the demilitarized zone. Surprisingly enough, the

Communists had permitted the concept

of inspection, on a limited basis to be

sure, to be written in the final agreement. How closely they would observe

their promise not to increase their nonKorean troops or to build up material

in Korea from outside sources was unknown, but they had made a paper

pledge. The enemy had narrowed the

demilitarized zone to four kilometers as

opposed to the U.S. desire for a broad

twenty-mile strip. On the other hand,

the Communists had given up their insistence upon a return to the 38th Parallel and settled for the line of contact.

Eventual withdrawal of non-Korean

troops from the country, which the

United States had maintained was a

political question, had also been shelved.

It was impossible to shun the political

aspects of many of these points in the

discussion, for there could be no real

separation of political and military matters. The Communists were keenly

aware of the relationship and they let

no opportunity pass to make political,

psychological, or propaganda capital out

of the causes they espoused. Before the

negotiations began, Ridgway had accurately predicted that the enemy would

make many propaganda speeches that

would require rare patience on the part

of the UNC delegates. The performance

of the Communist delegates, who had

had far more extensive political experience than their UNC counterparts, had

borne him out.

Yet it had not been the enemy that

had introduced the very touchy subject

of voluntary repatriation, with all of its

political implications, into the negotiations. The Communists had wanted to

effect a simple all-for-all exchange of

prisoners and it was the United States

who decided, for combined humanitarian and political reasons, to insist upon

letting the prisoners have the right of

self-determination.

The reluctance of the enemy to accept 4

 Ltrs, Adm Burke to Mrs. Burke, 13 and 27 July.

In OCMH.
RETROSPECT 505

defection from the Communist world

on a wholesale scale was hardly astonishing, for it constituted a direct admission

that life in the free world was better

than that under the Communist system.

From the beginning of the truce meetings the enemy had been extremely

sensitive to any suggestion of inequality.

The rapidity with which they had produced a flag and stand to match the

UNC flag at the first plenary session had

been followed up by swift construction

of colorful sanitation facilities to outdo

those erected by the UNC and by the importation of a sedan from Russia to provide transportation for Nam Il comparable to Admiral Joy's. This attitude had

lasted until the very end when the Communists had persisted in their demand

that each side sign nine copies of the

armistice agreement.

Despite the Communists' strong denials that they were horse traders, their

actions had belied their words. Back in

the spring of 1951, an old China hand

had offered some sage counsel to the

Army high command on this score. Col.

David D. Barrett, military attache to

Nationalist China, had warned of the

hazards of bargaining with the Chinese.

If the U.N. Command would set its price

and then calmly sustain a firm position,

the Chinese might howl, bluster, and

threaten, but they would finally give in,

Barrett declared. If, on the other

hand, the U.N.C. showed weakness or

vacillation, the Chinese would persist in

haggling until they won their point. It

was only when they informed you calmly

and without bluster, Barrett concluded,

that you would be sure that they definitely had made up their mind not to

accept your price.5

The validity of these observations was

sustained during the negotiations. Time

after time the Communists waited out

the UNC delegation, so that they could

accept the advantageous portions of the

UNC proposal and probe for more concessions. Eventually, if the UNC refused

to yield further, the Communists would

produce a counteroffer that surrendered

a corresponding part of the Communist

demands. As long as both sides could

give in on an equal number of items,

a compromise agreement could be

reached. The quickest results had come

when the UNC had been able to balance

the give-and-take in its final offer on an

item and then had refused to discuss the

matter further. For until the enemy

delegates were convinced that they were

not going to get a better deal, they would

continue to delay and argue tirelessly.

As Barrett had cautioned, the Communist tactics had run the gamut. Admiral Burke gave his impression of their

impact early in the negotiations. "No

amount of reading about Communists'

tactics in conferences," he commented,

"can ever prepare a man completely for

the rude shock he is bound to receive

when he is first exposed to those tactics."

 6 Overnight they could shift from

the harsh, brow-beating, name-calling

attacks of a Hsieh Fang, which were

designed to harass or to secure further

concessions, to a quiet, reasonable, and

businesslike approach to a problem

they were ready to settle. The flow of

propaganda could become a trickle if

they scented a UNC concession or a

veritable flood, if things were going

badly for them.

Since the Communist dialectic per5

 Msg, AT 174, Barrett to DA, 17 May 51, in

FEC 387.2, bk. 1.

6

 Ltr, Adm Burke to Comdr Alan Brown, USN,

13 Aug 51. In OCMH.
506 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

mitted the ends to justify the means, the

enemy had no hesitation in employing

any method calculated to achieve success

in the negotiations. The distortion of

history, the manufacturing of false

charges, and the creation of incidents in

the prisoner of war camps were as much

a part of the Communist arsenal as the

yelling, cursing, insults, and discourtesy

in the conference tent. They were all

part of the game to discompose the opponent through every kind of pressure.

If the UNC delegates became emotional, they might make mistakes. The

cold war at the truce table complemented the hot war at the front, such

as it was.

In this battle of nerves, Admiral

Burke noted:

It is essential, of course, in dealing with

these people that you have no personal

feelings whatsoever. Emotion can never af- fect a conference at all. The only possible

way of winning, in such a conference as

this, is by coldly calculating every move and

every statement and exercising the maxi- mum amount of patience, calmness and

stamina. Once in a while, after a partic- ularly long series of sessions in which these

qualities have been displayed, the Com- munists appear to be a little bit perturbed.7

Both Joy and Harrison had done an admirable job in displaying these characteristics despite the constant Communist

provocations and had resisted, except on

rare occasions, the temptation to lash

back at the enemy in kind.

The lack of language qualifications of

the UNC delegates, except for the ROK

member, was a blessing as well as a disadvantage. Since they could not understand the loud harangues until they

were translated, and since some of the

flavor and harshness of the original

speech was usually lost in the process,

the effect was diminished. On the other

hand, the semantic difficulties were considerable. General Ridgway had

warned the delegation of this pitfall and

advised the groups to take great care

about possible misunderstandings. Because of the contrasts in tradition, background, and training, words like "logic,"

"reason," "injustice," and "democracy"

meant entirely different things to each

side and literal interpretation served

only to complicate the problem. Only

when these terms were meticulously

spelled out and clarified, could they take

on intelligible meaning to the other

side.

As the negotiations wore on, the two

delegations began to sound more and

more like each other. "The peace-loving

peoples of the world" were always

solidly lined up behind the UNC or the

Communist proposal, as the case might

be, since the sincerity and reasonableness of the proposal as a "bridge to

peace" was unmistakable. Sentences

like "Your logic is untenable, while ours

is reasonable" were freely used by both

delegations. After several weeks of conferences, Admiral Burke warned his

wife that: "We all will have difficulty

in the future, I imagine, in writing

statements without superlative adjectives. Unjust, unfair, unreasonable are

becoming standard usage in our vocabularies."

 8

The semantic bouts with the enemy

illustrated the necessity for thorough

staff work prior to negotiations in order

to investigate the exact meaning of each

7

 Ibid.

8

 Ltr, Adm Burke to Mrs. Burke, 4 Aug 51. In

OCMH.
RETROSPECT 507

word in translation and so prevent misinterpretation. The enemy was quick

to notice and take advantage of lapses

when he desired to prolong the haggling.

In all the verbal encounters in the

truce tents, the key qualities of patience

and firmness appeared to be the most

essential ones for the UNC delegates.

They needed patience to endure all the

attacks, slurs, false charges, and the like,

that the Communists emitted to erode

an opponent's resistance, and they also

had to have firmness to present the

UNC stand in a manner that could not

be misinterpreted when the final or

minimum position was reached. If the

delegation weathered the storm of invective, the half truths, and distortions

convincingly, the enemy eventually

would come up with a better offer or

even with acceptance of the UNC proposal. For representatives of a people

that have frequently been accused of excessive impatience, the U.S. delegates, despite their personal feelings, acquitted

themselves extremely well in the negotiations.

The Battlefield

During the last two years of the war

the battlefield received its cue from the

negotiations. The first reaction of the

UNC to the policy of delay adopted by

the Communists in the summer of 1951

at Kaesong had been a resort to military

pressure. Without question, the limited

operations that had followed represented the best military effort of the

UNC during the last two years of the

war. In October 1951 the Eighth Army

had inflicted upon the enemy the highest monthly total of casualties for the

negotiations period and had won valuable defensive terrain as well. Moreover, there was little doubt that the

UNC success on the battlefield was a

factor in the enemy's decision to resume

negotiations.

But this success not been won lightly.

The hard fact that 40,000 UNC casualties

had been suffered in the offensive could

not be ignored. For the remainder of

the conflict the dominating element in

making military decisions was the estimated cost in personnel losses. The development of the "active defense" in November 1951 was an outgrowth of this

sentiment as well as of the resumption

of negotiations, and Ridgway and Van

Fleet disapproved or discarded several

ambitious offensive plans during the fall

and winter because of the high estimates

of casualties involved.

The wisdom of relaxing the ground

pressure upon the enemy and of fixing

a provisional line of demarcation in November was later questioned by some

observers, who maintained that this

course of action permitted the enemy

to strengthen his lines and deprived the

U.N. Command of the means to induce

the Communists to take more reasonable positions at Panmunjom.9

Whether or not sustained ground

pressure would have persuaded the

enemy to come to terms sooner is an academic matter. Continued heavy losses

might have altered their attitude toward

negotiating, but human life was one of

the Communists' most abundant resources and was freely used during the

war. And it should not be forgotten

9

 (1) Joy, How Communists Negotiate, p. 129.

(2) Memo, Kinney for CINCUNC, no date, sub:

Armistice Negotiations, in FEC Gen Admin Files,

CofS, 1952 Corresp, Paper SGS 3718.
508 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

that maintaining the offensive would

have meant a rapidly growing list of

casualties for the Eighth Army as well.

With mere terrain rather than military

victory as the objective, how long could

the Eighth Army have sustained a

costly offensive before stern criticism

arose in the United States?

It was evident that the thirty-day acceptance of the demarcation line late in

1951 had resulted in a de facto cease-fire

that lasted until October 1952. The low

casualty rate on both sides during the

December 1951-September 1952 period attested to this fact, with the UNC

averaging less than 3,500 and the enemy

less than 15,000 (estimated) per month.

By way of comparison, the totals in October 1951 showed almost 20,000 for the

U.N. Command and over 80,000 (estimated) for the Communist forces.10

Given the strait jackets that the opponents had voluntarily donned for the

last two years of the war, the struggle

resolved itself into a pushing and shoving contest with a ten-mile strip of

Korea as the arena. With both parties

keeping one eye on the truce tent, the

attritional battles at the front, punctuated by long and frequent pauses

between the rounds, went on inconclusively. For the greater part of the

fight, neither side made efforts to expend large amounts of men and

matériel simply to take the terrain,

since this process had proved to be extremely costly. The one ground effort

of any proportion mounted under General Clark—the expensive Triangle Hill

venture—had been a suction pump type

operation that had gone far beyond its

original plan. After this test of the formidable strength and depth of the Communist lines, Clark remained strictly on

the defensive.

Only at the end of the war did the

ground front return to the fore. In the

spring of 1953 the Communists decided

to use the battlefield to apply pressure

upon the negotiations and to prepare

some basis for their claim of military victory. They had little hesitation in expending lives to take a few more hills

when the sacrifice seemed to promise a

future political gain.

The UNC renunciation of major

ground operations led to the attempt to

substitute air for ground pressure in late

1951 and most of 1952. The valiant efforts by Air Force, Navy, and Marine

pilots in the air campaigns hurt the

enemy considerably, to be sure, but, because of the lesser logistical demands of

the static war, not enough to force concessions on the vital prisoner of war

issue.

How great a role the military operations of both sides played in influencing

the course of negotiations would be difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy. It is far easier to show the direct

relationship between the negotiations

and the battlefield than to demonstrate

the indirect effects of combat operations

upon the truce settlement.

Nevertheless, the stalemate on the

ground did establish conditions which

were far-reaching in other respects, such

as the very real problem of morale at

the front. The liberal UNC rotation

policy and the rest and recreation program in Japan helped to ease some of

the frustration, but as General Taylor

pointed out in May 1953, one factor

10

 Casualty figures are based on UNC/FEC, Comd

Rpts, Jul 51-Jul 52 and Hq Eighth Army, Comd

Rpts, Aug 52-Jul 53.
RETROSPECT 509

tended to spoil the otherwise excellent

morale situation.

That factor stems from the fluid, un- certain political circumstances which exist

through the world, and which are apparent

in a unique fashion in Korea. Political

objectives hold little appeal and are not

highly evaluated generally by soldiers in

battle positions, whereas a clearly defined

physical objective constitutes a goal, attain- ment of which tends to hold promise of a

cessation of conflict, physical hazards, and

the other unpleasant facts of war. Particu- larly to the American soldier, the mission

of occupying or defending a static line

during an extended period tends to create

an impression of futility, as well as uncer- tainty regarding an ultimate outcome.11

Here was the crux of the matter in the

field—the lack of meaningful battle

objectives that could not help but build

frustration and impatience, especially

among the military commanders.

Despite its lack of purpose during the

truce negotiations, the Eighth Army had

performed well. There were several instances when components of the UNC

forces conducted themselves less than

nobly, but these were exceptions and not

the rule. The Eighth Army, as rebuilt

by Ridgway and later strengthened by

Van Fleet and Taylor, had impressed observers as an excellent field army. It

had been tested defensively and had

managed to blunt the limited enemy

assaults and to counterattack effectively.

But the Eighth Army had not had a real

opportunity to prove how good it was

offensively during the last half of the

war, because of restrictions on its scale

of operations. The outline plans for

launching major attacks northward had

all encountered the same fate—oblivion

—and the war had ended, as it had begun, on a defensive note.

With the infantry confined to trenches

and bunkers for the most part, the artillery arm had taken on additional importance. In December 1952, Van Fleet

had characterized the war as an artillery

duel and told an observer team from

the United States that he placed 90 percent of the task of defeating the enemy

upon the UNC artillery.12 Through

huge expenditures of artillery ammunition the U.N. Command helped to compensate for the enemy's superiority in

manpower and to hold down its own

losses. This was especially true when the

Communists employed their "human

sea" attacks to overwhelm UNC positions. Out in the open the enemy was

completely vulnerable to co-ordinated

firepower and suffered heavy losses. In

addition, counterbattery, interdictory,

and harassing fire served to continue

pressure upon the Communists, to inflict

damage and casualties, and to lower enemy morale while bolstering that of the

UNC forces.

However, as long as the Communist

troops remained in their well-prepared

field fortifications, they were extremely

difficult to hit. During the relatively inactive month of April 1953, the UNC

artillery had fired over a million and a

quarter rounds at the enemy and Communist battle casualties from all causes

had been estimated at 10,500 men.13

Even assuming that all of the casualties

had resulted from the artillery fire—

which they did not—the ratio would still

11

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 55-

56.

12

 Summary Sheet, Eddleman for CofS, 17 Dec

52, sub: Survey . . . Artillery Units in Korea, in

G-3 091 Korea, 109. 13

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 53.
510 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

be well over a hundred rounds per

casualty.

The UNC advantage in artillery lay

in better fire control equipment and

techniques and in the supply of ammunition, rather than in numbers of battalions and pieces. The Communists

had over twice as many battalions in

Korea as the UNC had and a considerable edge in the number of guns as well.

The big difference stemmed from the

number of rounds fired by each gun and

here the UNC, with more ample stocks

and a speedier resupply system, had the

advantage. In this respect, the UNC air

interdiction campaign did yeoman service, for it made the enemy task of

bringing ammunition to the front especially hazardous and laborious. By restricting the number of rounds on hand

at the front, the air forces helped to

curtail enemy operations and to save

UNC lives.

Control of the air over Korea and of

the sea approaches gave the U.N. Command other advantages as well. It

meant that all of the enemy's supplies

had to come in on the limited overland

route and the strain on the line of communications was greatly increased. On

the other hand, the UNC had a free rein

in using both sea and land lines to supply its own forces. The air and sea

domination also provided a valuable

psychological advantage, for the threat

of a major enemy attack from the air

and on the water, although it was always

a possibility, never materialized and the

challenge offered to the Communists to

break the UNC control was ignored.

This was perhaps very fortunate since

areas like Pusan were very vulnerable

to surprise attacks.

As the war became more static, the

Communists were able to improve their

supply situation. Despite the air attacks

on enemy lines of communication, stockpiles of ammunition grew and enemy

fire techniques became more skilfull.

Artillery fire in June and July 1953 was

both heavy and accurate in support of

their final offensives.

The greater supply of ammunition

enjoyed by the U.N. Command and its

control of the air meant that the Communists had to construct field fortifications that would be able to take severe

poundings from artillery and air attack.

In organizing the defense, the enemy

troops dug deeply, using overhead cover

effectively to absorb heavy punishment,

and then carefully camouflaged their

positions. As one senior observer later

commented, they built their fortifications much closer to the specifications

set forth in the U.S. Army field manual

than most Eighth Army soldiers did.14

Only a direct hit by a large bomb or

from a flat trajectory weapon could

penetrate the enemy's defense bunkers

and gun positions, in most cases. Many

outfits in the Eighth Army were not so

thorough and built their bunkers and

shelters without adequate interior support or overhead cover. After a heavy

Korean rain, cave-ins were all too common, especially before the winter of

1952-53. The Chinese Communist concept of

tactics had in the past embraced a fluid

rather than a positional type of warfare,

and the shift had been rapid and adept.

Fortifying their lines in great depth, the

Chinese defended their positions skilfully. And, within the framework of

positional defense, they still clung to

14

 Conversation of author with Maj Gen Patrick

H. Tansey, 11 Feb 60.
RETROSPECT 511

vestiges of the fluid concept. Often

when a UNC attack was launched, they

would fall back quickly, let the UNC

take over an objective, and then mount

a swift counterattack.

In late 1952, the U.S. 2d Division

compiled a volume of data on the

Chinese in battle, which the Eighth

Army considered worth reproducing.

The following excerpts are from this

study:

a. The enemy makes good use of the ter- rain during an attack. He maneuvers his

troops regardless of the size of the unit and

habitually attacks from more than one direction.

b. When using artillery and mortar support in the attack the Chinese follow their

preparatory artillery and mortar fires close- ly. This is done to the extent of accepting

some casualties from their own fire. c. Positive steps must be taken to protect

and to insure communications. Heavy

Chinese bombardments prior to an attack

have usually rendered our communications

useless. d. The Chinese employ a system of

mutually supporting strong points in the

defense. The areas between and the ap- proaches to their positions are covered with

fire.

e. The Chinese soldier digs in quickly

and deeply which effectively protects him

from all UN bombardments. He immedi- ately takes up his fighting position to de- fend his sector when the shelling subsides. f. Chinese patrols are well planned, have

a definite purpose, i.e., reconnaissance of

UN positions to determine strength and

disposition of weapons. He also watches

our patrol routes and habits in preparation

for ambush patrols. g. The enemy's implementation of ma- neuver also applies to his patrols. Elements

of Chinese patrols move to the flanks and

rear of our patrols in an attempt to en- circle them. h. The enemy makes a determined effort

to police the battlefield of material and

both his own and friendly dead and

wounded. Therefore, we must control the

scene of a battle when the fight is over.15

The report then sums up:

The Chinese soldier is not a superman. He is well and courageously led at the

small unit level and the results of actions

at this level offer definite proof that he is

thoroughly disciplined. His industry is

shown by his thorough fortifications. His

conduct of the defense is accomplished in

spite of UN air superiority, UN liaison air- craft, lack of his own liaison aircraft and

inferior communications equipment. He

is operating on a shoestring basis as is

evidenced by the hodge-podge of equipment

picked up on the battlefield after every

encounter.16

To these encomiums might be added

the observation that the enemy was not

only brave and resourceful, but also

tough. Growing up in an underdeveloped nation, where famines were common, the Chinese could subsist on very

little and endure great privation. They

had to be tough to survive in an atmosphere where life was held so cheaply.

And the comment about "operating on

a shoe-string basis" could be applied to

the whole Chinese effort in Korea in

many respects. Pitted against opponents

who had attained a high degree of technological skill and who were able to

bring superior matériel into play against

them in the air, on the ground, at sea,

and in matters of communication and

transportation, they still managed to

hold their own by the prodigious use

of manpower. Lacking construction

equipment, Chiang Kai-shek had used

hand labor to construct the airfields for

U.S. planes in World War II and had

successfully completed the huge task.

15

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, sec. I,

Narrative, pp. 25-27. 16

 Ibid.
512 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

In Korea the Chinese again demonstrated how manpower could be used

in quantity to take the place of machines. Although this process might be

uneconomical and wasteful in principle,

it was effective as an expedient and as

a countermeasure. In this case superior

technology, far from leading to an easy

victory, produced no victory at all.

But the enemy's armor was not without weaknesses and the Chinese were by

no means "supermen." Their practice

of informing the troops of the objectives

before an attack and discussing the operation in open session frequently led

to desertion by soldiers who had decided that their chances for surviving

the action were not particularly good.

From these deserters the U.N. Command was sometimes forewarned of an

approaching assault and had time to prepare a warm reception for the enemy.

It was on such occasions that another

flaw in the Chinese system appeared.

Once the orders for an attack were issued, a certain amount of inflexibility

crept in. Unit leaders persisted in trying

to carry out the original plan even when

it became clear that unpredictable factors had entered the picture and had

made the execution of the plan impossible.17

 The failure to use initiative and

to cancel the operation led to some of

the heaviest enemy casualties of the twoyear period, as the battle for White

Horse Hill bore witness.

Neither the strengths nor the weaknesses of the UNC or the Communists

are absolute, and a second encounter,

even if limited in nature, might find an

entirely different set of circumstances in

operation and might result in an outcome quite unlike the first. The frantic

efforts to industralize Communist China

might remedy some technological deficiencies, only to breed others in their

place. As industrial development moves

forward, weapons and tactics would

probably change and the relative capabilities of the opposing sides would shift

as well.

On the other hand, a later clash might

prove to have a great deal in common

with the Korean venture. Even if much

of the military experience had to be

scrapped because of the growth of the

new weapons and tactics, the knowledge

of the foe gained in Korea would help

to formulate future plans and strategy

and should avert the possibility of again

underestimating the opponent. And

since the Communist objective of eventual world domination is not likely to

change, regardless of the variety of

means adopted to achieve this end, the

political experience with the Communist techniques obtained in Korea could

turn out to be invaluable in working out

a settlement if it came to open conflict

again or to counteracting Communist

efforts on the political level. It would

indeed be unfortunate if the hard-won

lessons learned in the Korean War, both

on the battlefield and in the negotiations, should be ignored or forgotten

because of the absence of victory. 17

 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 10.
Appendix A

Strength of the UNC Ground Forces in Korea

Appendix A-1

a

 Includes Marine and Navy personnel under operational control of U.S. Army. b

 Includes KATUSA, ROK marines under operational control of U.S. Army, and civilian

trainees. c

 See Appendix A-2 for distribution by country.

Source: Comptroller of the Army Summary, ROK and U.N. Ground Forces Strength in

Korea, 7 Oct 54. OCMH Files.

Appendix A-2

a

 Contribution consisted of noncombat medical units only. b

 Includes Luxembourg detachment of approximately forty-four men.

Source: Comptroller of the Army, Summary, ROK and U.N. Ground Forces Strength in

Korea, 7 Oct 54. OCMH files.
Appendix B

Prisoners of War

Appendix B-1—Repatriates

a

 Included 446 civilian internees, of which 3 were female and 18 female POW's. b

 Included 60,788 male POW's, 473 female POW's, 23 children, and 8,899 civilian internees. c

 Included 1 female POW.

Source: See Hq, U.S. Army, Pacific, Mil Hist Office, The Handling of Prisoners of War

During the Korean Conflict, by John A. McReynolds, pp. 67, 89. MS in OCMH.
APPENDIX B 515

Appendix B-2—Nonrepatriates

Held by UNC

Held by Communists

a

 Final action completed on 19 Feb 54.

Source: Final Report of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, no date, in OCMH.

Hq, U.S. Army, Pacific, Military History Office, The Handling of Prisoners of War During the

Korean Conflict, by John A. McReynolds, pp. 97-98. MS in OCMH.
Appendix C

ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED

NATIONS COMMAND, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE SUPREME

COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COM- MANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER

HAND, CONCERNING A MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, on

the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and

the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the

interest of stopping the Korean Conflict, with its great toll of suffering and

bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice

which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed

force in Korea until a final peace settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the

conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in

character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

ARTICLE I

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone

between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a

buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached

map.

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary

as indicated on the attached map.

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by

the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders

of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary

between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the
APPENDIX C 517

Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of

both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is

controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated

on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access

to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the

Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military

Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless

specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry

is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration

and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice

Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone

which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of

the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration

and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military

Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander

of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are

permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no

case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand

(1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to

be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission.

Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by

the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the

Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with

their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants,

and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to

enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the

military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points

within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads

lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.
518 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ARTICLE II

CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE

A. GENERAL

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control,

including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective

twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63

hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice

Agreement).

13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate

the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a

political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides

shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes

effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the

Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel

of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to

exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of the military forces

therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be

reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side

whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be

cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the

seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice

Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for

unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage

operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a

police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be

permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective,

withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and

coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are

not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and

valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action

which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term

"coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by

one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands

lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme

Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese

People's Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N,
APPENDIX C 519

124°40'E), TAEGHONG-DO (37°50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46'N,

124°46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38'N, 125°40'E), and U-DO (37°36'N,

125°58'E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-inchief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying

south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military

control of the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command.

c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel;

provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea

of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel

after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted

within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of

units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of

duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from

Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more

than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy.

No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of

that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement

to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures

from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice

Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall

include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or

departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission,

through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and

inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports

of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat

aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on

the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into

Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In

order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons,

and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports

concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military

Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such

reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being

replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed

only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral

Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams,

shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft,

armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of

entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.
520 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of

the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.

f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves

are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side

to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes

effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of

proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased

military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific

procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be

determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the

opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining

to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the

Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations

Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the

carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and

accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters

of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon

by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory

Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have

been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of

alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the

main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and

the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the

Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations

Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the

proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces

under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the

Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which

naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to

the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall

not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air

forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of
APPENDIX C 521

Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and

provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their

successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish

within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure

complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their

commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military

Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in

requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of

this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and the

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared

equally by the two opposing sides.

B. MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior

officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-chief, United

Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the

Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall

be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be

major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use

staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary

administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the

Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such

other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the

Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized

personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean,

and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with

and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced

by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4)

nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by

the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be

appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and

the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as

drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the

functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.
522 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to

supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through

negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57'29"N,

126°40'00"E). The Military Armistice Commission may relocate its headquarters

at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and the Han River Estuary.

e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all

reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other

reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory

Commission.

h. Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the

Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the

Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall

not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating

with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint

Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels,

used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military

Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this

Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River

Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side

thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations

of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone

or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one-half of

the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of

either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side

thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to

conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized

Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have

occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of
APPENDIX C 523

this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation

to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of

this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report

to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. GENERAL

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to

exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides;

provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice

by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military

Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing

sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military

Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall

make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be

required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the

reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The

Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each

side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the

Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to

this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those

designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four

(4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN

and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral

nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's

Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND

and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined

as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in

Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of

the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to

attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to

attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever

the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side
524 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated

by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These

staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations

Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish

a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary

record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams,

which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides

on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams

shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of,

the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less

than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the

neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by

the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of

the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations

Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In

order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less

than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated

by the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall

be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the

Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers,

may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers,

clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may

be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the

Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the

territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of

the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided,

however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of

which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to

carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation,

as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to

report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation

to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military

Armistice Commission.
APPENDIX C 525

b. Adopt such rules of procedures as it may, from time to time, deem

necessary.

c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection

Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and

13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph

43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph

28 hereof at those places where violations of the Armistice Agreement have been

reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles,

weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be

such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft,

armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into

Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations

of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle,

weapon, or ammunition.

d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection

Teams.

e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry

enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military

control of the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command; and five (5)

Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph

43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme

Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese

People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations

Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters

of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced

by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice

Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection

Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the

senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct

without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement,

including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement

as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior

member of either side on the Commission.

g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral

Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft,

and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following

ports of entry:

Territory under the military control of

the United Nations Command

INCHON (37°28'N, 126°38'E)

TAEGU (35°52'N, 128°36'E)

PUSAN (35°06'N, 129°02'E)

KANGNUNG (37°45'N, 128°54'E)

KUNSAN (35°59'N, 126°43'E)

Territory under the military control of

the Korean People's Army and the

Chinese People's Volunteers

SINUIJU (40°06'N, 124°24'E)

CHONGJIN (41°46'N, 129°49'E)

HUNGNAM (39°50'N, 127°37'E)

MANPO (41°09'N, 126°18'E)

SINANJU (39°36'N, 125°36'E)
526 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of

movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on

the attached map.

3. GENERAL

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses

of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be

terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral

Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice

Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in

English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports

concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the

Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed

necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be

submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more

individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more

individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams

shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations

Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received.

They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the

earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice

Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not

take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has

been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of

the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to

appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the

senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate

files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other

reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon

eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned

over to each side.

49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or

additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should

generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof,

shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice

Commission.
APPENDIX C 527

ARTICLE III

ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of

each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected

in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to

the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes

effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and

hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on

repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of

this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each

side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total

numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of

prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters,

prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or

military serial number.

b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are

not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand

them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in

accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for

Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of

three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other

side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation"

in English, " " (SONG HWAN) in Korean, and " " (CH'IEN

FAN) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such

prisoners of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean

conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into

effect of this Armistice Agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation

shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured

medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of

war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph

51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this

Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its

custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is the place designated where prisoners of war will be

delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary,

by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom
528 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

shall be appointed by the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, and

three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the

Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of

both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to

the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to

coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery

and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoners of war camps of both sides;

to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with

regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to

coordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57

hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the

implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of

war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange for

security at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry

out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners

of war.

b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately

refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in

proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved

by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of

repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint

Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies

of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one

hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's

Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross

teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this

Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war

specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the

performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the

welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross

teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war

by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and

shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war

and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the

prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of

war while en route from prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and

reception of prisoners of war.

b. The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:
APPENDIX C 529

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten

(10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist

oinf deliver the deliverin y and receptio g and receivin n of prisoner g of prisoner s of wars o. Thf wa e chairmanshi r by both sidep os af thi ths tea e place(s m shal)l

alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two

sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee

for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty

(30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit

the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army

and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners

of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery

and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the

People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty

(30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit

the prisoners of war camps under the administration of the United Nations

Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route

from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of

prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing

forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team,

sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from this team, with an

equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances

require.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and

such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform

their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, to the team

operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides

on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased,

subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red

Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the

security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his

military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team

operating in the territory under his military control.

d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the

program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph

51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the

other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this

Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning

prisoners of war:
530 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped

since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality,

rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial,

of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the

supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to

the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War,

the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph

58a thereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of

prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for

disposition.

59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-chief,

United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the

Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if

they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-chief,

United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes

effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander

of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's

Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return

home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean

People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to

return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander

of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout territory

under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph,

and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance

and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.

b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice

Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the

Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the

Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under

the military control of the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, be

permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the

time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the

military control of the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, shall,

if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme

Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese

People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of

each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory

under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph,
APPENDIX C 531

and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance

and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed

to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph

59b hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this

Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

d. (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of the Displaced Civilians

is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade,

two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the

Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the

Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for

coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the

above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of

all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the

above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make

necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and

coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the

crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the

Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s);

and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return

of the above-mentioned civilians.

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its

responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians

shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for

decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall

maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military

Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians

shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its

mission.

ARTICLE IV

RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED

ON BOTH SIDES

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the

military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of

the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the

Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of

a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively

to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign

forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.
532 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ARTICLE V

MISCELLANEOUS

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain

in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments

and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph

12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953,

in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

(Signed)

KIM IL SUNG

Marshal, Democratic

People's Republic

of Korea

Supreme Commander,

Korean People's Army

(Signed)

PENG TEH-HUAI

Commander, Chinese People's

Volunteers

(Signed)

MARK W. CLARK

General, United States

Army

Commander-in-chief, United Nations

Command

PRESENT

(Signed)

NAM IL

General, Korean People's Army

Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's

Army and the Chinese People's

Volunteers

(Signed)

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR. Lieutenant General, United States

Army

Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation

ANNEX

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR

NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

(See Sub-paragraph 51b)

I

GENERAL

1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland,

Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to

appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall

be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in

the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish its
APPENDIX C 533

headquarters within the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and

shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations

Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation Commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both sides shall

be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Commission and

its subordinate bodies to include explanations and interviews.

2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to

assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132

of the Geneva Convention, and shall also be chairman and executive agent of

the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Representatives from each of

the other four powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to

exceed fifty (50) each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations

is absent for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and authority. The

arms of all personnel provided for in this Paragraph shall be limited to military

police type small arms.

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war

specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no

violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 below).

This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation

Commission. This Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all

times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the

Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that Convention.

II

CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation

following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released from the

military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the effective date

of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detaining side

shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding

Paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of India.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5 above, the detaining side

shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order

in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and

for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed

forces) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion

against locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.
534 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, nothing in this

agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Neutral

Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary

jurisdiction.

III

EXPLANATION

8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and

taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right

to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety

(90) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the

custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom

and facilities to send representatives to the locations where such prisoners of

war are in custody to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these

nations their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return

to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a

peaceful life, under the following provisions:

a. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven

(7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorized shall not be less than a

total of five (5);

b. The hours during which the explaining representatives shall have

access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral Nations Repatriation

Commission, and generally in accord with Article 531 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;

c. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of

a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation

Commission and a representative from the detaining side;

d. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be prescribed by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and will be designed

to employ the principles enumerated in Paragraph 3 above and in this Paragraph;

e. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall

be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless

communications. The number of communications personnel shall be limited

to one team per location at which explaining representatives are in residence,

except in the event all prisoners of war are concentrated in one location, in

which case, two (2) teams shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not

more than six (6) communications personnel.

9. Prisoners of war in ils custody shall have freedom and facilities to make

representations and communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations

Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter

concerning the prisoners of war themselves, in accordance with arrangements

made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.
APPENDIX C 535

IV

DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations

Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall

make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by

the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission or one of its subordinate bodies

so as to determine immediately by majority vote the validity of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated by the Commission or

one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall immediately

be transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready

to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral

Nations Repatriation Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of

war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of

the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access

of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above,

shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who

have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice

Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days,

during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to

civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be

repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral

Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral

nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and

the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be completed within

thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation

Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution.

After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the

authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting

them in returning to their fatherland.

V

RED CROSS VISITATION

12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral
536 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in accordance

with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VI

PRESS COVERAGE

13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall insure freedom of

the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as enumerated

herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the Neutral Nations

Repatriation Commission.

VII

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the

area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral

Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity

of each prisoner of war installation.

15. The cost of repatriating prisoners of war to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange

point by the side on which said prisoners depend, in accordance with Article 118

of the Geneva Convention.

16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing such

general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as required by the

Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical

support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall

provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Neutral Nations

Repatriation Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive

treatment or Hospitalization. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

shall maintain custody of prisoners of war during such hospitalization. The

detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment,

prisoners of war shall be returned to a prisoner of war installation as specified

in Paragraph 4 above.

18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from

both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties

and tasks, but both sides shall not under any name and in any form interfere

or exert influence.

VIII

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEUTRAL NATIONS

REPATRIATION COMMISSION

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the

personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the
APPENDIX C 537

area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal

basis to such support within the Demilitarized Zone. The precise arrangements

shall be subject to determination between the Neutral Nations Repatriation

Commission and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph 23 for the Neutral Nations

Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the

vicinity of but not within each of the locations where the prisoners of war are

in custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible

for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations

where the prisoners of war are in custody.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such

services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

IX

PUBLICATION

22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody

of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.

X

MOVEMENT

23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation

Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of communication as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the Neutral

Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing side and the Neutral

Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such personnel, except within

locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and

escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken;

however, such movement shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion.

XI

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations

Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission,

and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by
538 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of

the majority vote.

25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly

report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in its

custody, indicating the number repatriated and remaining at the end of each

week.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five

powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the Armistice becomes effective.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June 1953, in

English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

NAM IL

General, Korean People's Army

Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's

Army and the Chinese People's

Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR. Lieutenant General, United

States Army

Senior Delegate, United Nations Command

Delegation
Appendix D

Plenary Members of the Armistice Delegationsa

United Nations Command Delegation

Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, USN

Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, USA

Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, USN

Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie, USAF

Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, ROKA

Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, ROKA

Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner, USAF

Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, USA

Rear Adm. Ruthven E. Libby, USN

Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., USA

Maj. Gen. Yu Chae Heung, ROKA

Brig. Gen. Frank C. McConnell, USA

Brig. Gen. Lee Han Lim, ROKA

Brig. Gen. Joseph T. Morris, USAF

Rear Adm. John C. Daniel, USN

Brig. Gen. Ralph M. Osborne, USA

Brig. Gen. Choi Duk Shin, ROKA

Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Glenn, USAF

Brig. Gen. George M. Finch, USAF

10 July 1951 - 22 May 1952

10 July 1951 - 17 December 1951

10 July 1951 - 11 December 1951

10 July 1951 - 27 November 1951

10 July 1951 - 24 October 1951

24 October 1951 - 6 February 1952

27 November 1951 - 5 July 1952

17 December 1951 - 6 February 1952

11 December 1951 - 23 June 1952

6 February 1952 - 27 July 1953

6 February 1952 - 28 May 1952

22 May 1952 - 26 April 1953

28 May 1952 - 26 April 1953

5 July 1952 - 26 April 1953

23 June 1952 - 27 July 1953

26 April 1953 - 16 May 1953

25 April 1953 - 20 June 1953

20 June 1953 - 27 July 1953

North Korean and Chinese Communist Delegation

Lt. Gen. Nam Il, KPA

General Teng Hua, CCF

Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, KPA

Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang, CCF

Maj. Gen. Chang Pyong San, KPA

General Pien Chang-wu, CCF

Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwan, KPA

Rear Adm. Kim Won Mu, KPN

Maj. Gen. So Hui, KPA

General Ting Kuo-yu, CCF

Maj. Gen. Chang Chun San, KPA

Maj. Gen. Tsai Cheng-wen, CCF

Admiral Kim Won Mu, KPN

Maj. Gen. Kim Dong Hak, KPA

10 July 1951 - 27 July 1953

10 July 1951 - 24 October 1951

10 July 1951 - 27 July 1953

10 July 1951 - 26 April 1953

10 July 1951 - 24 October 1951

24 October 1951 - 26 April 1953

24 October 1951 - 28 April 1952

28 April 1952 - 11 August 1952

11 August 1952 - 26 April 1953

26 April 1953 - 27 July 1953

26 April 1953 - 25 May 1953

26 April 1953 - 27 May 1953

25 May 1953 - 17 June 1953

17 June 1953 - 27 July 1953

a

 In this appendix the tour of duty of a delegate is concluded on the date that

his replacement is officially accredited in a plenary session, even though in many

cases the delegate may have been relieved and reassigned while the meetings were

in recess.
Bibliographical Note

This volume was written primarily

from records kept by the Department

of the Army and subordinate commands

during the Korean War, interpreted

with the help of a number of other

sources, principally armed forces' histories, reports, and monographs. Unless otherwise specified, the primary

materials discussed below may be found

in the collections in the custody of the

National Archives and Records Service

of the General Services Administration,

Washington, D.C.

Primary Sources

For the Washington side of the narrative, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,

Operations, official central correspondence file, arranged according to the

Army decimal system, forms the most

complete and useful Army collection of

high-level policy and planning papers.

Since G-3 acted as the executive agent

for the Chief of Staff, most of the important letters, memorandums, reports,

and studies pertinent to the direction of

the war in Korea passed through this

office.

G-3 also maintained a special collection of the official transcripts, letters, and

other documents pertaining to the truce

conference. The minutes of meetings of

the plenary, subdelegate, liaison, and

staff officers sessions and the correspondence between the delegations will be

found in this collection.

The bulk of the correspondence between the JCS/Department of the

Army and the Far East Command/

United Nations Command was carried

on by radio communication. A complete

file on the messages sent and received

by the JCS/Department of the Army

to the UNC/FEC is kept in the Staff

Communications Center, Office of the

Chief of Staff, DA.

Messages exchanged between UNC/

FEC and subordinate commands in the

field are available in The Adjutant General's files, FEC, at the Federal Records

Center, GSA, Kansas City, Missouri, and

in the files cited in the footnotes of the

text.

For the theater story the most valuable sources are the command reports

submitted on a monthly basis by each

major command. The narrative sections of the reports provide an excellent

guide to the major activities of the

month; the accompanying staff section

reports, annexes, appendices and

inclosures amplify the narrative sections

and include copies of many of the

basic documents discussed. The UNC/

FEC and the Eighth Army Command

reports were especially helpful in the

preparation of this volume.

Theater files on plans, operations,

command, administration, and the

armistice are in several collections. Far

East Command files covering 1951 and

1953 activities in these departments and

a small group of numbered binders originating in the Joint Strategic Plans and

Operations Group are in the custody of

the National Archives and Records Service. But the FEC G-3 and General
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 541

Administrative files for 1952 are at the

Kansas City Records Center, as are the

Eighth Army Operational Planning and

General Administrative files.

The combat story is based principally

upon battalion, regimental, and divisional journals and reports. These

contain both narrative accounts of the action and much of the raw materials that

provided the basis for the narrative.

The journal entries and transcripts of

exchanges were especially helpful.

During and shortly after the war,

members of the Historical Detachments

attached to the Far East Command and

to the Eighth Army produced a number

of monographs, studies, and after action

reports on different phases of the conflict. Covering the armistice, small unit

actions, logistics, and a myriad of other

subjects, these manuscripts are invaluable, especially the comprehensive fourvolume study on the armistice negotiations. Copies of the FEC and Eighth

Army monographs are in the Office of

the Chief of Military History files.

The records of the interviews conducted by the author and the correspondence between the author and

various participants in the events covered in the volume will also be found in

OCMH files.

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke graciously

turned over to the author a number of

personal letters written during his tour

as a member of the armistice delegation. These letters are in OCMH files.

Secondary Sources

The following list is by no means

complete but notes the works the author

found most useful.

Books

Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong: North to the Yalu. UNITED

STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN

WAR. Washington, 1961.

Barclay, Brigadier C. N. The First

Commonwealth Division: The Story of

British Commonwealth Land Forces in

Korea, 1950-1953. London: Aldershot,

Gale and Polden, Ltd., 1954.

Berger, Carl. The Korean Knot: A

Military-Political History. Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957.

Biderman, Albert D. March to

Calumny. New York: The Macmillan

Company, 1963.

Cagle, Malcolm W., and Frank A.

Manson. The Sea War in Korea. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957.

Chung Kyung Cho. Korea Tomorrow: Land of the Morning Calm. New

York: The Macmillan Company, 1959.

Clark, Mark W. From the Danube to

the Yalu. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954.

Clews, John. The Communists' New

Weapon—Germ Warfare. London: Lincoln Pragers, 1953.

Department of State. The Conflict in

Korea. Washington, 1951.

Department of State. In Quest of

Peace and Security: Selected Documents

on American Foreign Policy, 1941-1951.

Washington, 1951.

Department of State. Korea, 1945 to

1948. Washington, 1948.

Department of State. Korea's Independence. Washington, 1947.

Dille, John. Substitute for Victory.

New York: Doubleday and Company,

Inc., 1954.

Field, James A., Jr. History of U.S.
542 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Naval Operations: Korea. Washington,

1962.

Futrell, R. Frank. The United States

Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. New

York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961.

Goodrich, Leland M. Korea: A Study

of U.S. Policy in the United Nations.

New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956.

Grajdanzev, Andrew J. Modern Korea. New York: John Day Company,

1944. Joy, Admiral C. Turner. How Communists Negotiate. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955.

Kinkead, Eugene. In Every War But

One. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,

Inc., 1959.

Lyons, Eugene M. Military Policy

and Economic Aid: The Korean Case,

1950-1953. Columbus: The Ohio State

University Press, 1961.

McCune, George M., with Arthur L.

Gray, Jr. Korea Today. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1950.

Marshall, S. L. A. Pork Chop Hill.

New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1956.

Montross, Lynn. Cavalry in the Sky:

The Story of the U.S. Marine Combat

Helicopters. New York: Harper and

Brothers, 1954.

Montross, Lynn, Maj. Hubard D. Kuokka, and Maj. Norman W. Hicks.

"U.S. Marine Operations in Korea,

1950-1953," Vol. IV. The East-Central

Front, Jan 1951-March 1952. Washington, 1963.

Nelson, M. Frederick. Korea and the

Old Orders in Eastern Asia. Baton

Rouge: Louisiana State University

Press, 1946.

Office of the Chief of Military History,

Department of the Army. Korea 1951-

1953. Washington, 1956.

Oliver, Robert T. Verdict in Korea.

State College, Pennsylvania: Bald Eagle

Press, 1952.

Poats, Rutherford M. Decision in

Korea. New York: The McBride Company, 1954.

Sawyer, Maj. Robert K. Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and

War. Washington, 1963.

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Years

of Trial and Hope, vol. II. New York:

Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956.

United Nations and Far East Command, The Communist War in POW

Camps. Tokyo: United Nations and

Far East Command, 1953.

United States Senate, 83d Congress,

1st Session, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services on Ammunition Supplies. Washington, 1953.

Vatcher, William H., Jr. Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military

Armistice Negotiations. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958.

White, William L. The Captives of

Korea: An Unofficial White Paper of the

Treatment of War Prisoners. New

York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses The

Yalu, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960.

Articles

Bradley, General of the Army Omar

N. "The Question of War or Peace in

Korea," in Department of State Bulletin,

vol. XXVIII, No. 716 (March 16, 1953).

DeReus, C. C. "The Perimeter Pays

Off," in Combat Forces Journal, vol. 3,

No. 5 (December, 1952).
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 543

Holton, Captain James L. "Operation

Changey Changey" in National Defense

Transportation Journal, vol. VIII, No.

3 (May-June, 1952).

Kinney, Col. Andrew J. "Secrets From

the Truce Tent," in This Week Magazine, New York Herald-Tribune (August 31, 1952).

Lyons, Eugene M. "American Policy

and the United Nations Program for

Korean Reconstruction," in International Organization, vol. XII, No. 2

(1958). Murray, Col. James C. "The Korea

Truce Talks: First Phase," in U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 79, No.

9 (September, 1953).

Studies

Henning, Charles N. ORO Study

T-211, Economic and Related Political

Factors in Civil Affairs Operations, Republic of Korea. Washington: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins

University, 1952.

Operations Research Office, Report

ORO-R-11, The Utilization of Negro

Manpower in the Army. Washington:

Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1955.

Manuscripts

Mossman, B. C. Ebb and Flow. In

preparation for the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN

WAR.

Schnabel, Lt. Col. James F. Policy

and Direction: The First Year. In

preparation for the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN

WAR.
List of Abbreviations

AAA

Abn

ACSI

Admin

AFF

AFFE

an.

AU

BAR

Bn

Br

CCF

CG

CinC

CINCFE

CINCPAC

CINCUNC

CINFO

CMS

Cmte

CofS

COMNAVFE

Comd

Conf

Cong

Corresp

DA

DA-IN

DCofS

Dept

DF

EUSAK

FA

FEAF

FEC

G-1

G-2

G-3

G-4

G-5

Hist

ICRC

Instr

Antiaircraft artillery

Airborne

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Administration

Army Field Forces

Army Forces, Far East

Annex

Army unit

Browning automatic rifle

Battalion

Branch

Chinese Communist Forces

Commanding general

Commander in chief

Commander in Chief, Far East

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

Chief of Information

Constructive months service

Committee

Chief of Staff

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East

Command

Conference

Congress

Correspondence

Department of the Army

Incoming message

Deputy Chief of Staff

Department

Disposition Form

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea

Field artillery

Far East Air Forces

Far East Command

Personnel section of divisional or higher staff

Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff

Operations and training section of divisional or higher staff

Logistics section of divisional or higher staff

Civil affairs section of divisional or higher staff

History, historical

International Committee of the Red Cross

Instructions
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 545

Intel

Interv

IRQ

J-1

J-2

J-3

J-4

J-5

JCS

Jnl

JSPOG

KATUSA

KCOMZ

KMAG

KSC

LST

MAAG

MAC

MIS

NATO

NPRJ

NSC

OCA

Opnl

Opns

ORO

PIR

Plng

POR

POW

Rcd

RCT

ROK

ROKA

RandR

SCAP

Sec

sec.

Secy

Sess

SGS

TAC

TAG

Teleconf

UNC

UNKRA

Intelligence

Interview

International Refugee Organization

Joint Staff personnel section

Joint Staff intelligence section

Joint Staff operations section

Joint Staff logistics section

Joint Staff civil affairs section

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Journal

Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group

Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army

Korean Communications Zone

United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of

Korea

Korean Service Corps

Landing ship, tank

Military Assistance Advisory Group

Military Armistice Commission

Military Intelligence Service

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

National Police Reserve Japan

National Security Council

Office, Comptroller of the Army

Operational

Operations

Operations Research Office

Periodic Intelligence Report

Planning

Periodic Operations Report

Prisoner of war

Record

Regimental combat team

Republic of Korea

Republic of Korea Army

Rest and recuperation

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

Section (office unit)

Section (document)

Secretary

Session

Secretary of the General Staff

Tactical Air Command

The Adjutant General

Telephone conference

United Nations Command

United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
List of Code Names

BIG STICK

BUCKSHOT 16

CHOPSTICK 6

CHOPSTICK 16

CLAM-UP

COMMANDO

COUNTER

CUDGEL

DULUTH

EVERREADY

HIGHBOY

HOME COMING

JAMESTOWN

KANSAS-WYOMING

LITTLE SWITCH

OVERWHELMING

POLECHARGE

SATURATE

SCATTER

SHOWDOWN

SMACK

STRANGLE

SUNDIAL

TALONS

TOUCHDOWN

WRANGLER

Operation plan to destroy the Communist supply complex

based on Sibyon-ni, to advance Eighth Army left flank to

the Yesong River, and regain Kaesong.

Operation by 11th Division, ROK I Corps, to take North

Korean prisoners.

Plan for envelopment of the high ground south of P'yonggang by a reinforced ROK division.

Plan for a 2-division attack to drive the enemy from the

area east and south of the Nam River.

Operation to delude the Communists which imposed silence

along the front lines from 10 to 15 February 1952.

Operation plan for offensive to establish the JAMESTOWN

line.

Plan for 45th Division, I Corps, to capture strategic outpost

sites.

Plan for advance from WYOMING line in the U.S. Army I

and IX Corps sectors.

Line of defense to be established by operation SUNDIAL.

Plan covering eventualities of ROK domestic disturbances

and disengaging UNC forces.

U.S. I Corps artillery operation to bring direct fire onto

enemy positions and bunkers not accessible to other artillery and mortar fire.

Limited operation plan offered as substitute for BIG STICK.

Defensive line to be established by Operation COMMANDO.

Defense lines in the vicinity of 38th Parallel.

Operation for repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners

of war.

Plan for offensive by Eighth Army to the P'yonggangWonsan line.

Operational plan for capture of hill objections on JAMESTOWN line during Operation COMMANDO.

Plan for interdiction bombing of North Korean railroads.

Screening plan for repatriation of prisoners of war.

Operation plan designed to improve IX Corps defense line

positions north of Kumhwa.

Operation plan for combined air-tank-infantry-artillery test

strike.

Air operations to disrupt North Korean logistics by interdiction bombing.

Operation plan to establish DULUTH defensive line.

Outline plan for ground offensive to bolster Eighth Army's

eastern front.

Operation to gain control of Heartbreak Ridge.

Plan to follow up CUDGEL with an amphibious operation on

the east coast.
Basic Military Map Symbols

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply

point.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery

Armored Command

Army Air Forces

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery

Cavalry, Horse

Cavalry, Mechanized

Chemical Warfare Service

Coast Artillery

Engineers

Infantry

Medical Corps

Ordnance Department

Quartermaster Corps

Signal Corps

Tank Destroyer

Transportation Corps

Veterinary Corps

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing

symbol with the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery

Airborne Infantry
Size Symbols

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad

Section

Platoon

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral)

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force

Wing

Division or Command of an Air Force

Corps or Air Force

Army

Group of Armies

EXAMPLES

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137th Infantry

8th Field Artillery Battalion.

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division.

Observation Post, 23d Infantry

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry

Weapons

Machine gun

Gun

Gun battery

Howitzer or Mortar

Tank

Self-propelled gun
Index

Acar, Brig. Gen. Sirri (Turkish): 462-64

Acheson, Dean G.: 16, 30, 37, 127, 165, 231-32, 322,

402, 408, 437n

AD-Skyraiders: 321-22

Adams, Col. James Y.: 89, 90, 91-92, 94, 96, 97

Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War: 497

Aerial bombardment. See Bombardment, naval;

Strategic air support, carrier- and land-based;

Strategic air support, enemy; Tactical air support, carrier- and land-based; Tactical air support, enemy.

Aerial observation. See Reconnaissance, aerial.

Agriculture: 2

Air build-up

Chinese Communist Forces: 293, 319, 398, 399

Communist forces: 80, 200, 368, 390

Far East Command: 335-36

United Nations Command: 32-34, 107-08, 128-29,

153-55, 194, 200-201, 320

Air Defense Command, U.S.: 201

Air Force, Fifth: 43, 60-61, 96, 100, 105-07, 195, 288,

289, 290, 305, 321-22, 324, 326-28, 353, 385-86,

398-400, 459, 461, 465, 467-68

Air Force, ROKA. See Republic of Korea Air Force.

Air-ground co-ordination: 385-89, 398

Air operations. See Bombardment, naval; Photography, aerial; Strategic air support, carrierand land-based; Strategic air support, enemy;

Tactical air support, carrier- and land-based;

Tactical air support, enemy.

Air sorties. See Strategic air support carrier- and

land-based; Tactical air support, carrier- and

land-based.

Air superiority: 36, 60-61, 192, 319, 510

Air support, strategic. See Strategic air support,

carrier- and land-based; Strategic air support,

enemy.

Air support, tactical. See Tactical air support,

carrier- and land-based; Tactical air support,

enemy.

Airborne Divisions

11th: 59-60

82d: 59-60

Airborne Infantry Regiment, 187th: 257, 259, 329,

390, 475

Aircraft. See also by type or designation.

diversion to Korea: 200-201

losses: 107, 108, 324, 353

production of: 200

types in UNC: 60-61

Aircraft carriers

retention of: 201

units in UNC: 61

Aircraft production: 200

Airfields

attacks on: 319, 490-91

restrictions on rebuilding: 123-30, 152-74

Airlifts: 70, 184, 475

Alexander, Lord: 322-24

Alligator's Jaw: 391-92

Almond, Lt. Gen. Edward M.: 224

Alpuerto, 1st Lt. Ben W.: 301-02

Ambush actions: 181, 184, 188, 191, 369-70, 391

Ambush actions, enemy: 190-92

Ammunition. See Artillery ammunition; Ammunition shortages; Ammunition stocks; Mortar Ammunition.

Ammunition shortages

causes: 224-25

charges of: 336-37

Congressional hearings on: 224, 356

Ammunition stocks: 33, 96, 224-30, 336-40, 354-57

Amphibious operations

Changjon: 109-10

east coast: 97-98, 175-76, 187

enemy: 197

Kojo: 328-29

support for: 61

Tongch'on: 87

training for: 110

Wonsan: 86

Anchor Hill (Hill 351): 377-78, 465

Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 140th: 376

Antiaircraft defenses: 201, 335-36

Antiaircraft defenses, enemy: 107, 194-95, 353

Antiaircraft weapons, in ground support: 303-05,

307, 376, 384, 386

Antietam: 194

Antisubmarine patrols: 61

Aoji: 325

Arbogast, 2d Lt. John R., Jr.: 386-87

Armies, Chinese Communist Forces

First: 466n, 471

Twelfth: 77

Fifteenth: 77, 308, 311, 370

Twentieth: 77

Twenty-third: 393

Twenty-fourth: 468-69, 474

Twenty-sixth: 77

Twenty-Seventh: 77

Thirty-eighth: 77, 285, 286, 305, 306, 382
550 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Armies, Chinese Communist Forces—Continued

Thirty-Ninth: 77, 285, 286-87, 299, 368

Fortieth: 77, 396

Forty-second: 77, 99

Forty-sixth: 462

Forty-seventh: 77, 99-100, 102, 368, 380, 393, 466n

Sixtieth: 77, 466-67, 471-72

Sixty-third: 77

Sixty-fourth: 77, 99

Sixty-fifth: 77, 99

Sixty-seventh: 466

Sixty-eighth: 95, 180, 466, 474

Armies, U.S. See Eighth Army.

Armistice negotiations

agenda, discussions on: 26-34

airfields and forces, restrictions on: 123-30, 152-74

armistice, legal definition: 15n

attitude of UN troops toward: 32

casualties during: 500-501, 507-08

coastal islands, control of: 161-62

commission membership changes: 17, 21, 113, 123,

126, 139-40, 152, 158-59, 173n, 266, 272, 422,

429n, 445, 480, 484

commission proposed: 17

Communist bargaining tactics: 505-07

Communist build-up during: 66-67, 81, 122, 130,

149, 199-200, 402, 407-08, 433, 434, 459, 464-65,

483, 490-91, 494-95, 507-08

Communist insults: 118, 505-06

concessions as weakness: 130

concluding ceremony: 489-91

contact made: 20-21

demilitarized zone, discussions on: 17-20, 24-32,

36-40, 45-47, 112-21, 123, 153, 176-77, 432-33,

485, 504, 507-08

domestic pressures affecting: 130

effect on Eighth Army: 177, 198-99

effective date of armistice: 487-91

Foreign Ministers conference on: 497

foreign troops, discussions on: 24, 28-32, 123-24,

504

inspection teams, discussions on: 121-30, 153, 155,

161-63, 165

international developments, effect on: 1, 13-14, 52,

112, 129-34

JCS policies and directives: 17-20, 46, 117-19, 121- 23, 126-30

military operations, relation to: 476-78, 507-09

military operations ended: 490-91

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission: 173-

74, 504

neutrality violations, alleged and real: 36, 40-51,

129, 230, 402, 411-12

NSC viewpoint: 130

package proposal: 152-67, 172-74, 263-66

policy papers, preparing: 29

political affairs incident to: 156-59, 421, 504

ports, restrictions on use: 160-61

POW issues. See Prisoners of war, enemy.

Armistice negotiations—Continued

press correspondents at: 24-29, 488-90

propaganda gains emanating from: 17-23, 37-38,

42-45, 111, 115-16, 155, 167-68, 268-69, 273, 275-

76, 401-02, 404, 459, 476-77, 489-90, 504-05

recesses of: 275-76, 401-02, 420, 456-57, 479, 483-

84

ROK opposition to: 422

ROKA training during: 66-67

rotation and replacements, restrictions on: 160-61

security arrangements: 50-51, 488-89

semantic difficulties: 19-20, 506-07

sites chosen: 16-23, 44-50, 112-13

Soviet role in: 15-16, 112

38th Parallel issue: 35-40, 504

as turning point: 502

UNC declaration on: 492-93

U.S. leadership in: 16

Armor support. See Tank Battalions; Tank Companies; Tank fire support; Tank fire support, enemy; Tank-infantry actions; Tank strength,

enemy.

Armored Division, 1st: 59-60

Armored Divisions, North Korean

4th: 77

5th: 77

105th: 77

Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 58th: 105

Armored vest: 189-91, 372

Army budget, cuts in: 333-34

Army Field Forces: 354

Army Forces, Far East (AFFE): 362-63

Army Policy Council: 211

Army Training Center, ROKA: 210

Arrowhead (Hill 281): 98-99, 285, 305-06, 307, 469,

472-73

ARSENAL outpost: 382-85, 391-92

Artillery, Communist: 79-80, 199-200, 284

Artillery ammunition. See also Ammunition short- ages; Ammunition stocks,

day of supply: 225

enemy expenditures: 284-85, 291, 305-09, 338, 351-

52, 376-78, 382, 392, 396-97, 464-65, 472-73, 477-78

industry's production capacity: 225, 229-30, 336-

37, 354-55

limitations on expenditures: 96, 224-30, 354-59

mortar ammunition as substitute: 354

rounds expended: 96, 225-26, 228-29, 338, 351-53,

377, 382, 385-88, 396-97, 464-65, 477-78, 509

stockpile fluctuations: 75-76, 93, 96, 288, 313-14,

336-40, 510

Artillery build-up: 53-55, 213-14, 284-85, 344, 360

Artillery Division, CCF, 2d: 100

Artillery fire support: 82, 84-85, 89-90, 92-95, 97,

99-101, 103, 183-85, 187-89, 191, 226-27, 284-9

294-95, 299-301, 306-08, 311, 313-16, 352, 355-

56, 369, 376-79, 381-89, 391-94, 397, 462-68, 471, 473-74, 509
INDEX 551

Artillery fire support, enemy: 81-82, 84, 88-89, 97,

99-100, 199-200, 284, 287-91, 293-96, 298-303,

305, 307-09, 313-16, 318, 375-80, 383, 392-97, 462-64, 466-67, 471-75, 510-11

Associated Press: 177. See also Press correspondents. Atomic weapons

banning of: 35

first use: 4

potential use: 332

pressure to use: 11-12

Soviet acquisition: 112

Atrocities, alleged: 264-65, 404

Australia: 35, 499

Australian Air Force: 60-61, 67

Australian Army forces: 67

Australian Navy: 67

Automatic rifle fire: 74-75, 287

B-26 Marauder: 46-47, 105-06, 193, 195-96, 230, 381

B-29 Superfortress: 60-61, 107-09, 193, 324-28, 398-

400, 459-61

Bacteriological warfare. See Biological warfare, alleged. Bak Hill: 471

Bak Lim Hang, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 98-99

Bangalore torpedoes: 313

Barbed wire obstacles: 75-76, 284, 287-88, 295-96,

371-72, 383, 392, 462-63

Barbed wire obstacles, enemy: 99, 189, 284

Barcus, Maj. Gen. Glenn O., USAF: 321-22, 326-28, 353, 385-86

Barrett, Col. David D.: 505-06

Bathing facilities: 374

Bayonet attacks: 94, 463-64

Belgian forces: 67-70, 101-02

Bendetsen, Karl R.: 132-33

BERLIN outpost: 462-63

Betances-Ramirez, Lt. Col. Carlos: 299-300, 308-09

Betty Hill: 380-81

BIG STICK: 187

Biological warfare, alleged: 230-32, 268-69, 411-12

Blockade operations: 110

against Communist China, proposed: 56, 131-32

against Nationalist China: 408-09

Blockading and Escort Force, UNC: 61

Bloody Ridge: 84-88, 96-97, 106-07, 114-15, 225-26,

388

Blount, 1st Lt. John B.: 290

Boatner, Brig. Gen. Haydon L.: 257-61, 270

Boatright, Lt. Col. Linton S.: 89

Body armor: 189-91, 372

Bogell, 1st Lt. Frederick: 301

Bohlen, Charles E.: 46

Bolling, Maj. Gen. Alexander R.: 199-200

Bolte, Lt. Gen. Charles L.: 122, 132-33

Bombardment, aerial. See Strategic air support,

carrier- and land-based; Tactical air support,

carrier- and land-based.

Bombardment, naval: 108, 110, 196-97, 398, 490-91

Bombardment Group, 3d: 45

Bon Homme Richard: 61, 325, 398

Booby traps: 473

Boomerang Hill: 468-71

Boot, combat: 372

Bostic, Lt. Col. John: 255-56

Boxer: 61, 197, 321-22, 325

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N.: 46, 53-55,

270, 343, 367

Bridge repair and construction, enemy: 106-07

Bridges, air attacks on: 105-07, 194, 397-99, 460-61

Briggs, Ellis O.: 429, 443, 445-48, 450-51

Briscoe. Vice Adm. Robert P.: 321n, 328

British Army forces: 67

British Commonwealth forces. See Infantry Battalions, British; Infantry Division, British Commonwealth; Infantry Regiments, British.

British Navy. See Royal Navy, British.

Brooks, 1st Lt. Bernard T., Jr.: 313

Brooks, Lt. Col. Roy I.: 383

Brown, Sgt. Frederick O.: 189-91

Brown, Maj. Thomas W.: 316

Bryan, Maj. Gen. Blackshear M.: 486-87

Buckner, Maj. Louis R.: 315

BUCKSHOT 16: 292

"Buddy" system: 370

Bunker defenses: 74-75, 178-79, 284, 287-88, 295-96, 307, 370-71, 373, 509-11

Bunker defenses, enemy: 84-85, 88-90, 94-97, 99, 101-02, 180-81, 284, 288, 370, 391-92, 510-11

Bunker Hill (Hill 122): 297-89, 395

Bureau of the Budget: 334

Burke, Rear Adm. Arleigh A.: 17, 39-40, 42, 118,

116-17, 119n, 139-40, 152, 504, 505, 506

Burma: 425

Byers, Maj. Gen. Clovis E.: 84-86, 90-92, 97

Byrnes, James F.: 6

C rations. See Rations. Cairns, Col. Douglas W., USAF: 484

Cairo Declaration: 4

Camel Back Hill: 308

Camouflage measures: 75, 374-75

Camouflage measures, enemy: 88, 370, 510

Canada

aircraft from: 200, 201

cease-fire proposal by: 402

Canadian Air Force: 67

Canadian Army forces: 67, 257, 379

Canadian Navy: 67

Cantrell, 1st Lt. William E.: 315, 316

Capitol Hill: 297-98, 467

Carbine: 189, 372

Carlock, Col. William B.: 408

CARSON outpost: 396, 462, 463, 464

Cassels, General A. J. H. (Br.): 99

Casualties Chinese Communist Forces: 96, 102, 103, 477, 478

Communist forces: 86, 198-99, 500-501
552 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Casualties—Continued

concern over: 292-95

during armistice: 500-501, 507-08

Eighth Army: 89, 90, 92, 96, 102

enemy guerrillas: 183, 347

evacuation methods: 90, 185, 191

helicopter evacuation: 184-85

North Korean: 86, 96

ROKA: 86

UNC: 86, 103n, 198-99, 477, 500-501, 507, 508

Cavalry Battalions

1st, 5th Cavalry: 101-02

1st, 7th Cavalry: 101

1st, 8th Cavalry: 101

2d, 7th Cavalry: 100-101

2d, 8th Cavalry: 101

3d, 5th Cavalry: 100-102

3d, 7th Cavalry: 100-101

Cavalry Division, 1st: 98-102, 202-03, 328, 390, 406

Cavalry Regiment, ROK: 183, 298-99

Cavalry Regiments

5th: 99-102, 203

7th: 99-101, 203

8th: 99-102, 203, 328

Cave defenses: 314-15, 353, 367-68, 392

Cease-fire talks. See Armistice negotiations.

Central Command, Japan Logistical Command: 362-

63

Central Intelligence Agency: 268

Champeny, Brig. Gen. Arthur S.: 64-66, 210

Chang Chun San, General (NKPA): 40-43, 47, 50-

51, 127, 159-61, 163, 408, 422, 429n

Chang Pyong San, Maj. Gen. (NKPA): 23-24, 113

Changjon: 109-10

Chaplin, Col. Robert T.: 243

Cheju-do: 257, 444

Chemical warfare, alleged: 230-31, 250

Chemicals, nontoxic, use authorized: 406, 451

Cherokee air strikes: 398, 400, 460

Chiang Kai-shek: 4, 23, 67n, 69, 132, 145, 167, 168, 409,

488, 511

Chief of Staff. See Collins, General J. Lawton.

Chilquist, Cpl. William: 190

China, Communist. See also Chinese Communist

Forces; Communist forces.

attacks on forbidden: 20, 130

biological warfare, charge of: 411-12

blockade of, proposed: 56, 131-32

emergence, effect on Far East: 499-500

entry into war: 1, 10-11

industrial potential: 512

interest in Korea: 10-11

knowledge of, future application: 512

naval sweep of, proposed: 197

recognition, tacit: 500

sanctions against, proposed: 130-32

and UN membership: 15, 16-17, 56, 130, 132, 504

China, Empire of: 2-3

China, Nationalist: 15-17, 20, 56, 130

China, Nationalist—Continued

aid from declined: 67n

impressment of Nationalists into Communist

forces: 136

and invasion of mainland: 69, 409

naval blockade ended: 408-09

nonrecognition by Communists: 500

POW repatriation to: 136-37, 167-68, 280, 495-96

security pact with U.S.: 499

Chinese Communist Air Force: 80, 325

Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). See also Communist forces.

air build-up and losses: 293, 319, 325, 398-99

artillery armament and organization: 79

callousness to human life: 395, 507-08

casualties: 96, 102, 103, 477, 478

combat effectiveness: 79, 293, 478, 499

in demilitarized zone: 476

estimate of Chinese soldier: 511-12

human sea attacks: 306, 474, 509

infantry armament and organization: 79

leadership, faults in: 512

lines of communication: 12

manpower, exploitation of: 511-12

matériel, paucity of: 511-12

Nationalists impressed into: 136

number and organization: 76-79

pressure on ROKA: 470-71, 473-74, 477

supply system: 293, 477-78, 510

tactics employed: 79

tank strength: 293

tenacity of troops: 100-101, 102, 111, 292

troop unit strength: 318, 367-68

Chinese People's Volunteer Army. See Chinese Communist Forces.

Chinhae: 210

Chinju: 182

Chiri-san: 182-83, 347

Choe Yong Gun, Marshal (NKPA): 79, 488-89

Choi Duk Shin, Maj. Gen. (ROKA): 422-23, 430-31,

444-45, 447, 480n

Cholla Pukto Province: 182-83

Ch'ongch'on River: 122

Chongjamal: 384-85

Ch'ongjin: 197, 398, 399

Chongju: 195

Chonju: 182-83

CHOPSTICK 6 and 16: 187-88

Ch'orwon: 74, 98-99, 114-15, 180, 188, 285, 303, 370,

375, 472-73

Ch'orwon-Kumhwa railroad: 97-98, 175

Ch'orwon Valley: 98

Ch'osan: 461

Chou En-lai (Chinese): 232, 403, 413-14, 419

Christie Park plant, Pittsburgh: 337

Christmas Hill: 467

Chung Il Kwon, Lt. Gen. (ROKA): 475-76

Chung Tu Hwan, Maj. Gen. (NKPA) : 113, 173n

Chungasan: 98, 99
INDEX 553

Churchill, Winston S.: 4, 132, 197, 323-24

Chut'oso: 98, 288

Civil disturbances: 441-42, 450, 457-58

Civilians

control of: 182

evacuation of: 74

internees. See Prisoners of war, enemy. CLAM-UP: 184

Clark, Vice Adm. Joseph J.: 321-22, 327, 328

Clark, General Mark W. and air support: 320, 322-27, 335-36, 459-61

and ammunition stocks: 336-39, 354-57

and armistice negotiations: 271-72, 275, 277, 401- 02, 407, 419-20, 435, 436, 445, 448-49, 451-56, 479-83, 486-93

and artillery support: 285, 352-53

and biological warfare allegation: 411-12

and combat effectiveness of ROKA: 453-54

concept of victory: 283, 332

concern over casualties: 292-95

concern over enemy offensives: 335, 389-91, 399, 410-11, 435

conference with Rhee: 443

and control of ROKA: 480-81, 483

and demilitarized zone: 483

and economic aid: 491

and enemy propaganda campaign: 268-69, 477

and expansion of ROK forces: 340-44, 357-61, 439- 41

and financial crises: 361, 438-39

and Japanese in ROK: 347-48 and limited offensives: 292-94, 311, 465

and manpower resources: 334-35, 350

and military settlement: 366-67, 427-28

and naval support: 328-29

and package proposal: 266-68 and political situation: 346-48, 438, 442-43

and POW issues: 249, 254-55, 257, 260-61, 269-81,

291-92, 406-07, 409-17, 426-30, 434-35, 444-47,

451-53, 483, 485-86

and press correspondents: 488-89

and rations of ROKA: 438-39

reorganized FEC: 362-65

and security of ROK: 445-49, 453, 455-56

and SHOWDOWN: 310-11

and transfer of UNC headquarters: 438 and unification of Korea: 445

and withdrawal of ROK forces: 442-44, 452

and withdrawal of UNC support: 445, 455-56, 490-

91

Clarke, Lt. Gen. Bruce C.: 464, 471, 473

Close air support. See Tactical air support, carrier- and land-based; Tactical air support, enemy. Clothing, changes of: 374

Code of conduct: 496-97

Cold-weather discipline: 178-80

Collins, General J. Lawton: 34, 53, 64, 122, 202, 262,

366, 443

and AA artillery augmentation: 201

Collins, General J. Lawton—Continued

and ammunition stockpiles: 228-29, 336-38, 356 and armistice negotiations: 177, 454, 479

and Army budget: 333 and Army staff position: 55

and escalation of conflict: 133 and Japanese in Korea: 348

and Japanese National Police Reserve: 221

and KATUSA: 341-42

and martial law: 346

and mortars as substitute for artillery: 354

and National Guard commitment: 203

and package proposal: 165

and POW issues: 137, 255, 406

and POW repatriation: 136, 426

and Rhee's ROK defense proposal: 448 and ROKA combat efficiency: 208

and ROKA expansion: 357-59, 440 and rotation and replacements: 350

and SMACK: 388-89

at Tokyo conference: 454

and troop unit strength: 59, 334-35

Colombian Army forces: 67, 68, 393, 395

Colombian Navy: 67

Colson, Brig. Gen. Charles F.: 247-55, 263, 264

Combat effectiveness

Chinese Communist Forces: 79, 293, 478, 499

Communist forces: 199-200

CONUS divisions: 59-60

Eighth Army: 34, 58-59, 81, 284, 350-51, 389-90,

391, 509

insistence on: 177, 181, 350-51

ROKA: 62-64, 71-72, 84, 208-09, 306-07, 469-70

UNC: 67

Combined Economic Board: 219

Command and General Staff School. ROKA: 66, 210

Command and staff

Communist forces: 76-79

FEC: 362-65

North Korean: 79

UNC: 58-59

Commander in Chief, Far East. See Clark, General

Mark W.; MacArthur, General of the Army

Douglas; Ridgway, General Matthew B.

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) : 56

COMMANDO: 98-103, 226

Communications, tactical: 74, 188-89, 287-88, 308-

09, 386-87, 475, 511

Communist forces. See also Chinese Communist

Forces.

air build-up and losses: 80, 200, 368, 390

aircraft supplied by Soviet Union: 80, 461

armament deficiencies: 79-80

armor strength: 79-80, 200

artillery armament: 79-80, 200

build-up during armistice: 34, 59-60, 66-67, 81,

122, 130, 149, 199-200, 402, 407-08, 433, 434, 459,

464-65, 483, 491, 494-95, 507-08

casualties: 86, 198-99, 500-501
554 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Communist forces—Continued

combat effectiveness: 80, 199-200 command and staff structure: 76-79

impressments into: 138, 143-45, 150

lines of communication: 73

manpower superiority: 59-60

and military settlement: 503 as naval threat: 61

reinforcements: 85

supply system: 399-400

troop unit strength: 76-77, 199-200, 283-84, 367- 68, 389

Congressional hearings on ammunition shortages: 224, 356 on foreign aid: 16

on SMACK: 388-89

Conley, Lt. Col. Victor G.: 372

Conn, 1st Lt. Jack L.: 394

Consolation: 184-85

Constabulary forces, ROK: 6, 7, 8, 62

Convoys, motor, attacks on: 105

Cooksey, Capt. Howard H.: 385

Cordero, Col. Juan C.: 299-300, 301-03

Corps, Artillery

I: 184, 352

IX: 352-53

X: 352

Corps, North Korean I:77

II: 77, 85-86

III: 77, 85-86, 88, 375-76

IV: 77

V: 77, 95

VI: 77

VII: 77

Corps, ROKA

I: 74, 81-86, 97-98, 103-04, 109-10, 196-97, 292, 297, 328, 377-78, 389n, 465, 468-69

II: 204, 284-85, 297-98, 378, 433, 441-42, 450, 465-

68, 471-72, 474-76, 483

Corps, U.S. I: 68, 74, 75, 80, 82, 86-87, 97-100, 102, 203,

226, 247, 285, 297, 336-37, 379-97, 462-65, 469,

470-71, 473

IX: 74, 75, 91, 97-99, 102-04, 180, 203-05, 292- 93, 303-07, 311, 328, 352-53, 368-75, 465-66, 468- 69, 472, 474

X: 10, 74, 81-84, 86-88, 90-91, 97-98, 102-04, 109-

10, 111, 204, 375-77, 389n, 465-68, 471-72

XVI: 203, 328

Cost of war: 500-501

COUNTER: 285-88

Counterattacks: 294, 305-06, 309, 317, 377-78, 379,

380-81, 394, 395, 397, 463-64, 466-67, 468, 469,

471, 472, 473, 476

Counterattacks, enemy: 95, 97, 101, 103, 180, 288-89,

290-91, 295-96, 297, 301, 307, 313, 314, 315, 317, 382, 388, 391, 397, 461, 466-67, 471-72, 511

Counterbattery fire: 100, 284, 352-53, 356, 509

Craig, Col. William H.: 245-47

Craigie, Maj. Gen. Laurence C., USAF: 17, 123

Craven, Lt. Col. Virgil E.: 89, 94-96

Crittenden, 1st Lt. Forrest: 393-94

Cronkhite, Capt. Willis D., Jr.: 309

Cross, Brig. Gen. Thomas J.: 104n

CUDGEL: 97-98

Currency inflation: 217-19

Curry, M/Sgt. George: 189-91

Czechoslovakia: 162, 173-74, 425, 434-35, 484

Dame, Col. Hartley F.: 234

Dams, air attacks on: 319, 461

Daniel, Rear Adm. John C.: 272, 414-15, 418, 420, 422-23

Daniels, Lt. Col. Henry F.: 89, 91, 94-96

Darrow, Col. Don O., USAF: 159-60, 484

Dasher, Maj. Gen. Charles L., Jr.: 302, 472

Davies, Maj. Albert O.: 300-301, 309

Davis, Lt. Col. John N.: 393-94

Deceptive measures. See Ruses; Tactical lessons.

Defense, Department of: 53-56. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lovett, Robert A.; Marshall, General of

the Army George C.; Wilson, Charles E. Defensive plans: 13-14, 73-75, 80-82, 465

De Gavre, Col. Chester B.: 307, 309

DeMaio, Lt. Col. Mario: 301

Demilitarized zone

CCF operations in: 476

discussions on: 17-20, 24-32, 36-40, 45-47, 112-21,

123, 153, 176-77, 432-34, 484-85, 493-94, 504, 507-08

influence on operations: 175-81

Democratic People's Republic of Korea. See North

Korea. Demolition operations: 92-93, 378

Denmark: 67

Department of Defense. See Defense, Department of.

Department of State. See State, Department of.

De Shazo, Brig. Gen. Thomas E.: 85-86, 88-91, 97

Detroit Hill: 391-92

Diet, differences in: 69

Division Artillery

2d: 225-26

7th: 375

Dodd, Brig. Gen. Francis T.: 240, 243-55, 263-64

Duerr, 1st Lt. Travis J.: 370-72

Dulaney, Maj. Gen. Robert L.: 302

Dulles, John Foster: 408-11, 421, 447, 450

DULUTH defense line: 175-76

Dumsong: 115-16

Dyer, Rear Adm. George C.: 61

Early, Capt. James F.: 315

EAST BERLIN outpost: 462-63

Economic aid: 215-16, 437-38, 491. See also Foreign

aid.

Eddleman, Maj. Gen. Clyde D.: 165-66, 358
INDEX 555

Eden, Anthony: 132, 409

EE-8 (telephone): 189

EERIE outpost: 285-89, 382-83, 391-92

Eighth Army. See also Taylor, General Maxwell D.;

Van Fleet, General James A.

antiaircraft defense build-up: 59-60

artillery support structure: 59-60, 352, 355-56

assessment of strategic air support: 196

casualties: 89-92, 96, 102-03

combat effectiveness: 8, 34, 58-59, 81, 284, 350-51,

389-90, 509

controls UN forces: 9-10

defensive plans: 13-14, 73-75, 80-82, 465

drive to Yalu: 10-11

effect of armistice negotiations on: 177, 198-99

"Korea" designation dropped: 391

language barriers: 303

limited offensives: 73, 74, 76, 86-88, 103-04, 106- 07, 110, 141, 175-78, 180-81, 187, 292-93, 311, 330-32, 465, 488-90, 501-02, 507-09

lines of communication: 73, 98

morale: 32-33, 186-87, 508-09

Negroes, integration of: 104-05

noncommissioned officers, paucity of: 302-03, 307

offensive plans: 80-81, 86-88, 97-99, 101-02, 176

order of battle shifts: 103-04

organization and strength: 58-60

outpost system: 75-76

point system: 186-87, 349-50, 374

Puerto Ricans, integration of: 310n

reinforcements: 59-60, 93, 475

reports on supply expenditures: 70-71

repulses invasions: 10-13 reserve forces: 82

retreat to 38th parallel: 10-11

rotation and replacements: 186-87, 199, 201-04, 302-03, 317, 349-51, 357, 374, 508-09

supply routes and methods: 73, 82-84, 90, 93, 98

training program: 81

troop unit strength: 199

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 330-31, 343-44

and armistice negotiations: 443, 449, 451-55, 488- 89

becomes President: 408

conference with Rhee, proposed: 450 and economic aid: 491 and economic situation: 439 and expansion of ROK forces: 358-60, 440

and military settlement: 367, 408-10 and political situation: 409, 442-43 and POW issues: 409-10, 425-26, 428-29, 438 and security of ROK: 445-51, 455-56

signs code of conduct: 497 and Taiwan blockade: 408-409 and withdrawal of ROK forces: 443 and withdrawal of U.S. support: 456

ELKO outpost: 462-65

Engineer Combat Battalion, 2d: 92-93

Engineer support: 92-95

Engineers, as infantry: 463

Engle, Capt. Paul O.: 302

English, Capt. William G.: 301-02

Entrenchments. See Trench systems.

Equipment: 374-75. See also Matériel

Ernest G. Small: 110

Escalation of conflict, efforts to avoid: 13-14, 56-58,

69, 130-33, 153-55

Essex: 194-95, 325, 398

Ethiopian Army forces; 67-68, 204-05

Ethiopian Battalion: 103-04, 388-89

European Command: 59-60, 350

European Defense Community: 412

Everest. Maj. Gen. Frank F., USAF: 60-61, 105-07,

325

F4U Corsair: 324, 386

F9F Panther: 321-22

F-51 aircraft: 60-61, 360-61

F-80 Shooting Star: 46-47, 322

F-84 Thunderjet: 200-201, 322, 324, 335-36, 386-87, 399, 460-61

F-86 Sabrejet: 60-61, 200-201, 321-22, 324-25, 335- 36, 398-99

Far East, U.S. policy in: 499

Far East Air Forces: 60, 79-80, 105-07, 192-93, 195- 96, 329, 335-36, 362-63, 397-98, 400-401

Far East Command (FEC). See also Clark, General

Mark W.; MacArthur, General of the Army

Douglas; Ridgway, General Matthew B. AAA build-up: 335-36

air build-up: 335-36 command and staff reorganized: 362-65

control by Chief of Staff: 13, 55-56, 80-81

cuts in officer strength: 334-35

Negroes, integration of: 104-05

Puerto Ricans, integration of: 310n

reorganization: 362-65

Fechteler, Admiral William M.: 53n, 201, 280

Feller, Abraham: 16

Ferenbaugh, Maj. Gen. Claude B.: 126, 152, 155, 158,

167

Field, Col. Eugene J.: 99, 101

Field Artillery Battalions. See also Armored Field

Artillery Battalion, 58th.

15th: 225-26

17th: 99-100

37th: 89, 94-95

38th: 89

57th: 385-86

58th: 301

61st: 99

64th: 371-72

77th: 99-100

82d: 99-100

96th: 89

99th: 99-100

143d: 375-76

171st: 287
556 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Field Artillery Battalions—Continued

204th: 99-100

503d: 89

780th: 89

936th: 99-100

Field Artillery Group, ROKA, 1st: 344

Field Artillery Observation Battalion, 1st: 352

Field Training Command, ROKA: 209-10

Fields of fire. See Fire patterns; Fire patterns, enemy.

Fifth column activities: 74

Fighter-Bomber Wing, 58th: 460-61

Finch, Maj. Gen. George G., USAF: 480n

Finger Ridge: 298-99, 468

Finletter, Thomas K.: 53

Fire control equipment: 510

Fire patterns: 75-76

Fire patterns, enemy: 180-81

Fire support co-ordination center: 386

Fitzgerald, Col. Maurice J.: 237-38

Flame throwers: 94-95, 371, 386-89, 391-92

Flares: 189, 291, 295-96, 304-05, 371-72, 395, 397,

462-63

Flares, enemy: 290-91

Fleet, Seventh: 61, 321-22, 324, 327, 409

Fogle, Lt. Col, George C.: 383

Foreign aid. See also Economic aid.

Congressional hearings on: 16

legislation on: 16, 112

Foreign Ministers conference: 496-97

Foreign troops, withdrawal of: 8, 24, 29-32, 123-24,

156-57, 443-44, 447-49, 455-57, 504

Formosa. See China, Nationalist.

Fortifications: 74-75, 284, 287-88, 351. See also

Bunker defenses; Bunker defenses, enemy;

Trench systems. Fortifications, enemy: 88, 96-97, 180-81, 284, 351,

510-11

Forward observers: 287

Foster, William C.: 210

France: 69

French Army forces: 67-70, 88-89, 91-96, 103-04, 204,

305, 392

Friedersdorff, Col. Louis C.: 484, 486

Frostbite: 178-79

Fry, Brig. Gen. James C.: 384

Gas masks, shortage of: 231

Gatsis, Capt. Andrew J.: 376-77

General Headquarters, Far East Command. See MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas; Ridgway,

General Matthew B.

General Headquarters, United Nations Command.

See MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas;

Ridgway, General Matthew B.

Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers: 497

Geneva Conventions: 135-38, 140-41, 145, 147, 234-

35, 255, 275-77, 404, 406-07, 412, 414-15

Gensemer, 1st Lt. Harold L.: 300

Germ warfare. See Biological warfare, alleged.

Germany

enters EDC: 412

unstable conditions in: 60

Gieseman, Capt. Joseph V.: 314-15

Gilmer, Col. Dan: 99-100

Glenn, Brig. Gen. Edgar E., USAF: 422-23, 480n

Glory: 61

Goldberg, Maj. Seymour L.: 314-15

Great Britain. See also British Commonwealth forces

by nationality and arm. Army forces: 67

fear of escalation: 69

interests in Far East: 131-32

and POW screening: 262

reaction to air bombardment: 322

representation on UNC: 323-24

in support of armistice: 129

and Taiwan blockade: 409

Greece: 112

Greece Hill: 188-91

Greek Army forces: 67-69, 100, 257-59

Green, 1st Lt. John H.: 315

Grenade attacks: 94-95, 288, 290-91, 295-96, 308, 369,

377, 387-88, 463, 471

Grenade attacks, enemy: 75, 84-85, 90, 100-101, 103,

290, 300-301, 309, 313, 316, 380, 387-88, 393-94

Grenade stocks: 338

Gromyko, Andrei: 16

Guerrillas, enemy: 76

attacks by: 182, 345-48

casualties and prisoners: 183, 347

number behind UNC lines: 182

operations against: 182-83, 204

RATKILLER: 182-83

Guerrillas, friendly: 196-97

Guns. See also Howitzers; Mortars; Recoilless rifle;

Rifles.

25-pounder: 396-97

75-mm.: 79-80

76-mm.: 79-80, 96, 308, 371-72

90-mm.: 382, 385, 387-88, 396-97

105-mm.: 79-80

122-mm.: 79-80

150-mm.: 79-80

155-mm.: 59, 99-100, 188-89, 226-27, 338, 352-53

Gutner, 1st Lt. Robert C.: 394-95

H-19 helicopters: 468

Hamhung: 460

Han River: 110

Hannah Hill: 471

Hanp'o-ri: 230

Hant'an River: 99, 465

Harrison, Lt. Gen. William K., Jr.

in armistice negotiations: 158, 167, 265, 271-72, 275-77, 401-02, 420, 422-23, 429, 455, 479-84,

490, 506

and control of ROKA: 480-83

and demilitarized zone: 432-33, 483
INDEX 557

Harrison, Lt. Gen. William K., Jr.—Continued

and package proposal: 266-68

and POW issues: 267, 269-81, 414, 417, 419-20,

423-31, 447, 452-53, 480-83, 485, 500

and security of commission members: 480-81

and session recesses: 401-02, 482-83

Harrold, Maj. Gen. Thomas L.: 99, 363

HARRY outpost: 469

Headquarters and Service Command, Japan Logistical Command: 362-63

Heartbreak Ridge: 86-97, 99, 106-07, 110-11, 114-15,

225-26, 375-76, 388, 472

Hedy Hill: 395

Helena: 61, 398

Helicopters

in casualty evacuation: 184-85

formation of units: 184

suitability to operations: 184

in supply role: 468, 471-72

Henderson, Rear Adm. George R.: 53-55

Herren, Maj. Gen. Thomas W.: 347-48, 362, 406,

438-39, 442

Hickey, Lt. Gen. Doyle O.: 56-57, 168-69, 203, 362-63

Hickman, Col. George W., Jr.: 139-40, 169, 171-73

HIGHBOY: 183-84

Highways. See Road Construction and Repair; Road

systems; Roads, air attacks against.

Hill 58: 297

Hill 67: 388-89

Hill 69: 380-81

Hill 90: 391-92

Hill 101: 391

Hill 105: 302, 380-81

Hill 122. See Bunker Hill.

Hill 128: 188-90

Hill 148: 395-96

Hill 157: 395-96

Hill 179: 471

Hill 190.8: 289

Hill 200: 393-94

Hill 222: 100

Hill 230: 101-02

Hill 255. See Porkchop Hill.

Hill 266. See Old Baldy.

Hill 268: 377-78

Hill 272: 100-102

Hill 281. See Arrowhead.

Hill 287: 100-101

Hill 313: 100-101

Hill 324: 98-99

Hill 334: 101

Hill 345: 377-78

Hill 346: 100-102

Hill 347: 101

Hill 350: 378

Hill 351. See Anchor Hill.

Hill 355. See Little Gibraltar.

Hill 375: 98-99

Hill 391: 307. See also Jackson Heights.

Hill 394: 378

Hill 395. See White Horse Hill.

Hill 418: 100-101

Hill 485: 92, 94

Hill 520: 92, 95-96

Hill 598. See Triangle Hill.

Hill 605: 94-95

Hill 636: 93-94

Hill 666: 94

Hill 702: 89

Hill 728: 88-90, 94

Hill 812: 376-78, 465

Hill 841: 94

Hill 851: 88-90, 92-96, 375-76

Hill 854: 377

Hill 867: 90-94

Hill 868: 88-89

Hill 882: 466-67

Hill 894: 88-91, 93

Hill 900: 95

Hill 905: 94-95

Hill 930: 376

Hill 931: 88-95

Hill 938: 471-72

Hill 951: 95-96

Hill 960: 94

Hill 973: 466-67

Hill 974: 93-95

Hill 980: 92

Hill 983: 84-85

Hill 1005: 92, 94

Hill 1024: 90-91

Hill 1031: 82-84

Hill 1040: 92

Hill 1050: 94

Hill 1142: 90-91

Hill 1179: 82-84

Hill 1220: 94-95, 467, 471-72

Hiroshima: 4

Hitler, Adolf: 498-99

Hodes, Maj. Gen. Henry L: 17, 39-42, 113-19, 125-26,

152

Hodge, Lt. Gen. John R.: 5-8

Ho-do Island: 197

Hoeryong: 398

Hoffman, Capt. Joseph H.: 315-16

Hoge, Lt. Gen. William M.: 102-03

HOME COMING: 187

Hong Kong: 131-32

Hong Nim, General (NKPA): 90

Hook, the: 379, 392-93

Howitzers

8-inch: 59, 89, 96, 99-100, 225-28, 338, 352-53,

396-97

105-mm.: 89, 96, 99-100, 188-89, 225-27, 301, 336-

38, 343, 352-54, 358-60, 371-72, 385-88

150-mm.: 79-80
558 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Howitzers—Continued

155-mm.: 53-55, 89-90, 96, 99-100, 225-28, 336-39, 342-43, 352-56, 358-60, 387-88

240-mm.: 355-56

Hsieh Fang, Maj. Gen. (Chinese): 23-24, 39, 113,

116, 118-19, 125-28, 142, 152-56, 167, 272, 422,

505-06

Huang Chen-chi, Col. (Chinese): 432-33, 484-85

Hull, General John E.: 150, 211-12, 350

Human sea attacks: 306, 474, 509

Hungnam: 110

Hunyung: 398

Hwach'on Reservoir: 73-74, 81-82, 472

Hwangju: 40-41

Hwueh Yiang-hua (Chinese): 308

Hyesanjin: 398

Iceland: 112n

Il-28 aircraft: 398

Illumination, battlefield: 304-05, 371-72, 395, 397

Imjin River: 17-19, 73, 98-99, 112-13, 116, 176, 299,

368-69, 379-80, 465, 470-71

Inch'on: 10, 52, 233

India

forces in Korea: 67-69

as POW custodial force: 426, 431, 434, 496

Indonesia: 425

Industry

air attacks on: 324-25, 398-400, 459-61

ammunition production capacity: 225, 229-30,

336-37, 354-55

Communist China's potential: 512

short-term conversion difficulty: 502

Infantry

CCF armament and organization: 79

typical life of: 370-75

Infantry Battalions. See also Cavalry Battalions.

1st, 9th Infantry: 90-91, 94

1st, 14th Infantry: 463-64

1st, 15th Infantry: 190-91, 242, 346

1st, 23d Infantry: 90-91, 94-96

1st, 31st Infantry: 311-14, 393-95

1st, 35th Infantry: 370

1st, 38th Infantry: 94-95, 382-85

1st, 65th Infantry: 299-301, 309-10

1st, 160th Infantry: 376

1st, 179th Infantry: 290, 376-77

2d, 9th Infantry: 89-90

2d, 17th Infantry: 315-16

2d, 23d Infantry: 89-92, 94-96, 293-94

2d, 31st Infantry: 314-16, 385-87, 393

2d, 32d Infantry: 316-17, 395

2d, 38th Infantry: 94-95

2d, 65th Infantry: 299-300, 307-11

2d, 160th Infantry: 375-76

2d, 179th Infantry: 290

2d, 180th Infantry: 290-91

2d, 279th Infantry: 291-92

Infantry Battalions—Continued

3d, 9th Infantry: 94, 105, 242, 247

3d, 15th Infantry: 188, 191

3d, 17th Infantry: 315-16

3d, 23d Infantry: 89-90, 94-96

3d, 27th Infantry: 239, 371-72

3d, 31st Infantry: 311-15, 393-94

3d, 32d Infantry: 316-17

3d, 35th Infantry: 369-73

3d, 38th Infantry: 93, 95, 383

3d, 65th Infantry: 301-02

3d, 179th Infantry: 290-91, 376-77

3d, 180th Infantry: 287-88

Infantry Battalion, Canadian, Princess Patricia's 3d

Light: 379

Infantry Battalions, British

1st, Black Watch: 379

1st, King's Liverpool Regiment: 379

Infantry Battalions, CCF

2d, 348th Regiment: 299-300

3d, 87th Regiment: 308

3d, 348th Regiment: 299

Infantry Battalions, Philippine

Combat: 67-69

10th: 104n

20th: 104n

Infantry Brigades, North Korean

26th: 77

63d: 77

Infantry Divisions. See also Airborne Divisions; Cavalry Divisions; Marine Division, 1st.

2d: 82, 84-86, 88-89, 92-97, 103-05, 293-97, 305,

379, 382-84, 389n, 392-93, 461-62, 466n, 475, 511

3d: 98-99, 101-02, 188, 191, 247, 299-303, 369-70,

389n, 469, 475-76

6th: 203

7th: 103-04, 307-17, 368-69, 384-89, 391-95, 473-74

24th: 102-03, 180, 201-04, 472

25th: 98-99, 103-04, 368-70, 389n, 461-63

28th: 59-60

31st: 59-60

38th: 203

40th: 200-204, 375-76, 377n, 381, 389n, 466n

43d: 59-60

45th: 183, 201-04, 285-94, 376-77, 389n, 472

47th: 59-60

Infantry Division, British Commonwealth: 98-99,

104n, 283-84, 292, 379, 390n, 392

Infantry Divisions, CCF

29th: 77, 308

31st: 77

33d: 466-68

34th: 77

35th: 77

44th: 77, 370

45th: 77, 311-12, 315-16

58th: 77

59th: 77

60th: 77
INDEX 559

Infantry Divisions, CCF—Continued

67th: 393-94

69th: 472-73

70th: 468-71

72d: 474

73d: 472-73

74th: 469

76th: 77

77th: 77

78th: 77

79th: 77

80th: 77

112th: 77, 305-06

113th: 77, 285-87, 382-83

114th: 77, 305

115th: 77, 285-87

116th: 77, 287, 299

117th: 77, 285-87

118th: 77

119th: 77

120th: 77, 395-96, 462-63

124th: 77

125th: 77

126th: 77

139th: 99-101

140th: 77, 100-101, 380

141st: 99, 393

179th: 77, 471-72

180th: 77

181st: 77

187th: 77

188th: 77

189th: 77

190th: 77

191st: 77

192d: 77

193d: 77

194th: 77

203d: 474

204th: 95-96, 474

Infantry Divisions, North Korean

1st: 77, 85-86, 375-76

2d: 77, 82-88

3d: 77

6th: 77, 88-91, 93-94, 96

7th: 471

8th: 77

12th: 77, 88, 91, 93-94, 96

13th: 77, 82-84, 95-96

15th: 77

18th: 77

19th: 77

23d: 77

24th: 77

27th: 77

32d: 77

37th: 77

45th: 77, 82-84, 376-77

Infantry Divisions, North Korean—Continued

46th: 77

47th: 77

Infantry Divisions, ROKA

Capital: 82-84, 182-83, 204-05, 298-99, 465-66,

474-76

1st: 98-99, 183, 204, 284-85, 302, 335, 379, 392,

470-71

2d: 103, 311-17, 352, 368-69, 469, 472-73

3d: 103-04, 204-05, 465-68, 474-76

5th: 84-86, 103-04, 297, 377-78, 389n, 465-68, 471-

72, 474-76

6th: 103, 180, 204-05, 344, 378, 465, 468, 474-76

7th: 85-86, 90-91, 466n, 467-68, 471-72, 474-76

8th: 82-84, 94, 97, 182-83, 204, 465, 467-68, 474-75

9th: 291-92, 303-07, 368-69, 468-71, 474-76

11th: 82-84, 292, 378, 468, 475-76

12th: 357, 377, 465

15th: 357, 378, 389n

20th: 360, 465, 466n, 467-68, 471-72

21st: 360

Infantry Regiments. See also Airborne Infantry Regiment, 187th; Cavalry Regiments; Marine Regiments.

5th: 203-04, 472

9th: 84-85, 88-94, 98

14th: 104n

15th: 101, 105, 188, 255-56, 310-11

17th: 316, 391-92, 473

19th: 472

21st: 472

23d: 85-86, 88-97, 237-38, 292, 295-96

24th: 103-05

31st: 313, 385-86, 392-94

32d: 315

34th: 203-204, 472

35th: 463

38th: 82, 85-86, 88-89, 92-95, 97, 242, 248-49, 259,

296, 383-85, 392

65th: 302-303, 307

160th: 376

179th: 203-04, 289-91

180th: 203-04, 285-89

279th: 203-04, 285-88, 291-92

Infantry Regiments, British

Royal Norfolk: 104n

Royal Ulster Rifles: 104n

Infantry Regiments, CCF

87th: 308

130th: 370

134th: 315-16

155th: 311-15

201st: 393-94

334th: 305

335th: 306

338th: 285-87, 382-84

339th: 285-87

340th: 305

342d: 305
560 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Infantry Regiments, CCF—Continued

344th: 285-87

348th: 303

349th: 285-87

350th: 285-87

358th: 395-97, 462

359th: 462

360th: 462

420th: 380-82

423d: 393

Infantry Regiments, North Korean

1st: 89-90, 93-94

3d: 91, 93-94

13th: 90

14th: 375-76

15th: 91-94

19th: 95-96

21st: 95-96

23d: 95-96

Infantry Regiments. ROKA

1st: 182-83, 298

10th: 467-68

11th: 380-82, 392

12th: 471

13th: 378

15th: 380, 471

16th: 468

18th: 474-75

19th: 468, 474

20th: 242

21st: 180, 467-68

22d: 466-68, 474

23d: 474-75

26th: 183, 297-98

27th: 466-67

28th: 305-07

29th: 306, 470-71

30th: 305

35th: 466-67

36th: 84-85

37th: 377

51st: 307, 377

61st: 467

Infantry-tank actions. See Tank-infantry actions.

Inflation, control of: 217-20

Inspection teams, neutral: 121-30, 153, 155, 161-63,

165, 173-74, 263. See also Prisoners of war,

enemy, inspection by neutrals.

Intelligence estimates arid reports: 102, 106-07, 110-

11, 142-43, 176-77, 231, 284, 304-05, 307, 375-76,

396-98, 459-60, 472-74

Interdepartmental Watch Committee: 268-69

International Committee of the Red Cross: 17, 23-

29, 136, 140-41, 143-44, 146-49, 167, 171-72, 231-

32, 255-59, 262, 264, 280-81, 406-07, 480-81

International political developments: 1, 13-14, 52,

112

Iowa: 329

Iron Triangle: 74, 175-76, 292-93

Irvin, Col. Jefferson J.: 376-77

Italy: 112n Italy Hill: 188-90

J Ridge: 82-84, 114-15

Jackson, Capt. George D.: 307-09

Jackson Heights: 307-11, 369

JAMESTOWN defense line: 98-102, 110-11, 299

Jane Russell Hill: 311-18

Japan

as air base: 60-61

interest in Korea: 3-4

National Police Reserve: 220-22

nationals in Korea: 347-48

occupation ended: 223

peace treaty with: 35, 43, 45n, 60, 220

and POW screening: 262

rearmament sponsored by U.S.: 211-12

removal from Korea: 5-6

ROK opposition to: 347-48, 438

security of: 56, 220-24, 334-35, 361-62, 502-08

security pact with U.S.: 220, 499

surrender by: 4-5

threats to: 20, 60, 122, 202, 283, 503

UNC relations with: 222-23

U.S. responsibility to: 498-99, 502-03

Japan, Sea of: 2, 52, 61

Jenkins, Maj. Gen. Reuben E.: 122, 137-38, 186, 202,

262, 311n, 317-18, 327-28

Johnson, Earl D.: 150, 353-54

Joint Chiefs of Staff

and air build-up: 200-201, 335-36

air directives by: 33-34, 107-108, 320-23, 325, 390

on airfields build-up: 153-55

armistice, policies and directives on: 16-20, 46, 117-

19, 121-23, 126-30

and artillery build-up: 53-55, 284-85

blockade of China, proposed: 56

composition and mission: 9n, 53-55

and constabulary forces: 7-8

control of CINCFE: 13, 56, 80-81

and control of ROKA: 480-81, 483

control of unified commands: 55-56

and demilitarized zone: 176-77, 483

and expansion of ROK forces: 210-13, 341-43,

358-61, 440-41

and inspection teams: 162-63

and Korean unification: 4, 156-57

and National Guard troops: 202

and naval sweep of China: 197

operations plans: 56-58

and package proposal: 165-67, 173

and political situation: 442

and ports, restriction on use: 160

and POW issues: 136-39, 146, 149-50, 171, 269-71,

273-75, 277-80, 402, 406, 410-14, 420, 427-29,

435, 444-45

and ROK political crises: 348

and rotation and replacements: 160
INDEX 561

Joint Chiefs of Staff—Continued

and security of ROK: 445-48

and UNC build-up: 60, 133

and withdrawal of foreign troops: 156-57

and withdrawal of ROK forces: 443

and withdrawal of UNC forces: 454

Joint Commission on Korea: 6-7

Joint Strategic Plans Committee: 200

Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group: 17, 181-

82, 404, 407-08

Joint Strategic Survey Committee: 137

Joy, Vice Adm. C. Turner: 196-97, 263, 265, 504-05

in armistice negotiations: 17, 22-31, 37-38, 50-51,

113, 118, 265-66, 503, 506

on building of airfields: 123-24, 126, 153, 158-59

on demilitarized zone: 35-39, 113, 116-18, 121, 123

on foreign troops withdrawal: 123-24

on inspection teams: 121, 126, 162-63

and neutrality violations: 41-42, 44-45

and package proposal: 163-66, 173-74, 263-66

and ports, restrictions on use: 160-61

and POW issues: 140-43, 145, 147-49, 169-70, 267

and resolution of political affairs: 156, 159

Ju Yon, Col. (NKPA) : 407-08, 485, 487-89

Judge Advocate General: 136-37

Juskalian, Lt. Col. George: 394-95

Kaesong: 17-21, 27-29, 37-38, 40-50, 56, 71-72, 80-

81, 98-99, 110, 114-18, 120-21, 187, 230, 390, 407-

08, 410-11, 427-28, 503-04, 507

Kaesong-Munsan road: 27-28

Kamgol: 98-99

Kangnung: 329

KANSAS defense line: 73-75, 80-82, 84, 88-89, 93, 116,

118-19

Kastner, 1st Lt. Eugene S.: 288

Kearsarge: 399

KELLY outpost: 299-303, 307

Kendall, Lt. Gen. Paul W.: 385-86, 395

Kern, Col. William B.: 387-88, 393, 395

Kernan, Lt. Col. William J.: 248-49

Kiland, Rear Adm. Ingolf N.: 61

Kilchu: 325, 398

Kim Dong Hak, Maj. Gen. (NKPA): 480n

Kim Il Sung, General (NKPA)

and armistice negotiations: 271-72, 419, 455-56, 489

and POW issues: 411-14, 430

return to Korea: 6-7

and Soviet aid: 112

as supreme NKPA commander: 17-19, 24, 37, 41,

45-46, 76-79

Kim Il Sung Range: 94-95

Kim Jong Oh, Maj. Gen. (ROKA) : 304-307, 317

Kim Ung, Lt. Gen. (NKPA) : 79

Kim Won Mu, Rear Adm. (NKPN): 173-74, 429n,

480n

Kimball, Dan: 211

Kinney, Col. Andrew J., USAF: 20-21, 41-43, 45-47,

50-51, 159-61

Kirk, Alan G.: 16

Kitchen police: 373-74

Knapp, 1st Lt. William C.: 314-15

Kogstad, Lt. Col. Arthur W.: 409-10

Koje-do: 167-68, 404, 415-16. See also Prisoners of

war, enemy.

guard-prisoner relations: 234-35

physical plant: 233-34

Kojo: 97-98, 108-109, 328-29

Koksan: 459-60

Korea. See also North Korea; Republic of Korea.

Chinese Communist interest in: 10-11

climate and weather: 1, 36

division of: 5-7

history: 2-5

as Japanese colony: 3-4

localizing war to: 13-14, 56-58, 69, 130-33, 153-55

republic proclaimed: 7-8

Soviet influence in: 3-7, 499-500

Soviet troops withdrawn: 8

topography: 2

unification: 4, 7, 15, 156-57, 214, 442-45, 449, 457-

58

U.S. influence in: 3-7

U.S. objectives in: 1, 32-53, 56-58

U.S. responsibility to: 498-99, 502-03

U.S. troops, arrival and departure: 5, 8, 62

Korea, People's Republic of. See North Korea.

Korea, Republic of. See Republic of Korea.

Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA): 58-59, 341-43, 370

Korean Civil Assistance Command: 491

Korean Communications Zone: 260-61, 347-48, 362,

406, 438-39, 472. See also Herren, Maj. Gen.

Thomas W.

Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG)

established: 8

number in force: 62, 64-66, 210, 344-45, 357-58

role in ROKA training: 208-09, 469-70

Korean People's Army. See North Korean People's

Army.

Korean Service Corps: 213, 287-88, 344-45, 373-74,

463

Kosong: 490-91

Kowon: 194-95

Kumhwa: 74, 86-87, 114-15, 311, 369, 375, 465-66

Kumsong: 102-03, 114-15, 175-76, 180, 203-05, 465-

66, 472-74, 476

Kumsong-Kojo road: 97-98

Kumsong River: 475-76

Kuwonga: 461

Kwangju: 210

Kyeho-dong: 98-99, 299

Kyongsong: 398
562 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Language barrier: 69, 303, 506

Leadership, deficiencies in

in CCF: 512

in ROKA: 62-65, 209-10, 474-75, 499

League of Nations: 498

League of Red Cross Societies: 411

Lee, 1st Lt. Richard M.: 288-89

Lee Chong Chan, General (ROKA) : 346

Lee Hak Koo, General (NKPA): 246-48, 259

Lee Han Lim, Brig. Gen. (NKPA): 266, 422-23

Lee Hyung Koon, Maj. Gen. (ROKA): 113, 127, 158

Lee Pyong Il, Col. (NKPA) : 486

Lee Sang Cho, Maj. Gen. (NKPA): 23-24, 39, 113-

18, 125-26, 139-49, 162, 167-68, 235-36, 414-15,

418, 484

Lehrfeld, Col. Irving: 99-100

Levie, Lt. Col. Howard S.: 159-60

Li Hung-chang (Chinese): 3

Libby, Admiral Ruthven E.: 126, 139-49, 167-68,

272, 280

Lie, Trygve: 15-16

Limited offensives: 73, 74, 76, 86-88, 103-04, 106-07,

110, 141, 175-78, 180-81, 187-88, 292-93, 310-11,

330-32, 465, 488-90, 501-02, 507-09

Lines of communication: 465-66, 474-75

CCF: 12-13, 284

Communist forces: 73

Eighth Army: 73, 98

enemy, air attacks on: 105-06, 192, 319, 510

North Korean: 96-97

UNC: 81-82, 96-97

Lisbon conference: 206

Little Gibraltar (Hill 355): 392

LITTLE SWITCH: 414-21

Logistical Commands

Japan: 70, 362-63

2d: 70, 237-39, 242, 255, 269-70, 346

Logistical system. See also Supply system; Supply system, enemy. Eighth Army: 74

enemy, air attacks on: 105-08, 192-93, 324, 397-98,

510

UNC: 70, 510

Los Angeles: 61, 196-97

Love, Lt. Col. Robert W.: 92-94

Lovett, Robert A.: 137-39, 165-66, 201, 221, 280, 322-

23, 333-34, 337, 342-44, 354-55, 358-59, 402

Luke the Cook's Castle: 376-77

Luxembourg forces: 67-68

Lynch, Col, John M.: 88-92

Mabang-ni: 183

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas: 220

and drive to Yalu: 10-11

on effectiveness of U.S. forces: 8

and escalation of conflict: 69

establishes JSPOG: 17n

and expansion of ROK forces: 63, 210-11, 340

MacArthur, General of the Army DouglasContinued

and expansion of UN forces: 69-70

and Japanese surrender: 4-5

named UN commander: 9-10

relieved: 13, 52, 330

and Taiwan blockade: 409

McCann, 2d Lt. Russell J.: 376-77

McCarthy, Col. Charles W.: 407-08

McClure, Lt. Col. Myron: 311-14

McClure, Brig. Gen. Robert A.: 136-37, 150

McConnell, Brig, Gen. Frank C.: 266, 402

McFalls, Maj. Carroll: 99

Machine gun fire support: 74-75, 93-94, 287-90, 371,

387-88

Machine gun fire support, enemy: 89, 91-92, 100-101,

290, 300-301, 316, 387

Malenkov, Georgi M.: 412

Malik, Jacob: 15-16, 230-31, 503

Manchester: 196-97

Manchuria: 2, 56-58, 79-80, 131-32, 181-82, 200, 283.

293, 319-23, 326-27, 398-99, 503

Mann, Lt. Col. Carl E.: 463-64

Manpower

CCF exploitation of: 511-12

Communist superiority: 59-60

conservation of: 349

shrinkage in: 334-35

U.S. resources: 334-35, 350-51

Marine Advisory Group: 213

Marine Air Wing, 1st: 60-61, 325-26

Marine Corps

ground units of: 97-98

strategic air support by: 399, 490-91, 508-09

tactical air support by: 94, 108-10, 197-98, 326,

386, 395, 398, 400, 460, 468

Marine Corps, ROK. See Republic of Korea Marine

Corps.

Marine Division, 1st: 85-86, 187, 204, 283-84, 296-

99, 391-92, 395, 461-63

Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron, 161st: 184

Marine Regiments

1st: 395-96

5th: 391, 395-97

7th: 388-89

Marlin, M/Sgt. Gerald: 287

Maroun, Col. Autrey J.: 372

Marquat, Maj. Gen. William F.: 221-22

Marshall, General of the Army George C.: 7, 36-37,

53-56, 107-08, 127

Martial law, declaration of: 182-83

Martin, 1st Lt. Charles L.: 313

Masan: 451

Masnari, Pfc. John L.: 190-91

Matériel. See also items by name.

CCF paucity of: 511-12

U.S. shortages: 178

Matthews, Francis P.: 53
INDEX 563

Mechanized Divisions, North Korean

9th: 77

17th: 77

Mellon, Maj. Thomas W.: 92

Mess systems: 373. See also Diet, differences in.

Meteor's: 324

Meyer, Clarence E.: 219

MIG-15's: 79-80, 108, 325, 390, 398-99

Mildren, Col. Frank T.: 93-94

Military Academy, ROKA: 66, 210

Military advisors, first in Korea: 3

Military Armistice Commission. See Armistice negotiations.

Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Far East:

206-07. See also Korean Military Advisory

Group.

Military police: 237-38, 450

Military police, ROKA: 448

Mine clearing: 92-93

Mines

enemy: 84-85, 92-93,-99, 100, 189-90, 284, 288

marine: 61

UNC: 75, 76, 287, 296, 372, 392, 463

Mine sweeping: 197-98, 328

Missouri: 398-99

Molotov, Vyacheslav M.: 6

Monclar, Lt. Col. Ralph (French) : 88-89, 95-96

Mood, Maj. Gen. Orlando: 248, 250-51, 343-44

Moore, Col. William T.: 188

Morale

decline in ROKA: 85

effect of air strikes on: 96-97

in Eighth Army: 32-33, 186-87, 508-09

in UNC: 32-33

Moroney, 1st Lt. William T.: 290-91

Morris, Brig. Gen. Joseph T., USAF: 272, 422-23

Morse, 1st Lt. Gerald: 393-94

Mortar ammunition

expenditures by enemy: 351-52, 382, 392, 464-65

expenditures by UNC: 96, 351-52, 382, 388, 397

shortage: 96

as substitute for artillery ammunition: 354

Mortar fire support: 89-90, 93-94, 101, 185, 287-91,

293-96, 308, 313-16, 353-54, 369, 371-72, 375-78,

382, 384-88, 392-93, 463-64, 471, 474

Mortar fire support, enemy: 88-89, 91-92, 97, 99-

100, 103, 288-91, 295-96, 299-303, 305, 307-09,

313-16, 375-80, 383, 392-97, 464-67, 471-75, 511

Mortars

4.2-inch: 96, 226, 336, 355-56, 371-72, 375-76,

396-97

60-mm.: 96, 308, 336, 371-72

81-mm.: 96, 226, 336, 338, 353-56, 371-72, 375-76

82-mm.: 308

120-mm.: 308

Moscow Foreign Ministers conference: 6

Moscow radio: 231

Moses, Col. Lloyd R.: 311-14

Motor convoys, attacks on: 105

Muccio, John J.: 19-20, 63-64, 219, 346

Mudgett, Col. Gilman C.: 64

Mukden: 76-79

Mundung-ni: 95-96, 465-66

Mundung-ni Valley: 88, 90-95

Munsan-ni: 19-21, 26-29, 42, 47-50, 98, 112-13, 411,

415-17, 462, 483, 486-91

Murphy, Col. Preston J. C.: 285-87

Murphy, Robert D.: 434, 454

Murray, Col. James C., USMC: 41-42, 47, 432-33, 484

85, 487-89

Musan: 398

Mutual Defense Assistance Program: 221, 858

Nagasaki: 19-20

Nam Il, Lt. Gen. (NKPA): 79, 113, 504-05

in armistice negotiations: 21-27, 31, 50-51, 118, 

24, 271-72, 275-76, 419, 422, 480, 484, 490

atrocity charges by: 264-65, 404

contact with POW: 235-36

and control of ROKA: 480-82

and demilitarized zone: 36-39, 432-34, 483-84 and package proposal: 173-74, 263-64

and POW issues: 264, 270-75, 278, 281, 418-19,

422-27, 430-31, 452-53, 480, 482-84

stand on 38th Parallel: 35-40

Nam River: 187-88, 292, 378

Namdae River: 98-99

Napalm attacks: 94, 101, 306-07, 324, 382, 386-88, 400

National Guard, ROK. See Republic of Korea National Guard.

National Guard troops: 202

National Police, ROK. See Republic of Korea National Police.

National Police Reserve Japan: 220-21

National Security Act: 112

National Security Council: 56-58

armistice, viewpoint on: 130

on build-up of ROK forces: 130, 133

composition and mission: 52-53

escalation, attitude on: 130

National Security Resources Board: 334

Naval Advisory Group: 213

Naval Forces, Far East: 362-63, 409

Naval gunfire support: 61, 107-10, 196-97, 328-29,

398-99

Naval operations: 20, 108-10, 197-98, 328-29

Naval support: 328-29. See also Strategic air support,

carrier- and land-based; Tactical air support,

carrier- and land-based.

composition and strength: 61, 67

nations represented: 67

reinforcements in: 60

in UNC: 61

Navy, ROK. See Republic of Korea Navy.

Negroes, integration of: 104-05

Nelson, 1st Lt. William F.: 299-300

Netherlands forces: 67-69, 93, 257-59

Netherlands Navy: 67
564 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission: 419-20,

423-35, 444-45, 453, 480-84, 486-87, 494-96

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission: 173-74,

487, 494, 504

Neutrality violations, alleged and real: 36, 40-51, 129,

230, 402, 411-12

NEVADA outpost complex: 462-65

New Jersey: 61, 109-10, 196-97

New Zealand: 35, 499

New Zealand forces: 67

New Zealand Navy: 67, 197

Newberry, Maj. Robert H.: 311-15

Night actions: 188-92, 285-88, 304-05, 369

by enemy: 76, 103, 180, 196-97, 284-85, 290-91,

293-94, 305, 308, 379, 382-85, 397

training for: 189

Noncommissioned officers, paucity of: 302-03, 307

Nonsan: 451

Nori, Big and Little: 380-82, 392

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 14,

112, 200-201, 206

armistice, importance to: 502

dissension in: 502-03

Germany admitted: 206

impact of ROKA expansion on: 343, 358

link to U.S.: 499

North Korea

Communist Party build-up: 6-7

Democratic People's Republic established: 8

invasion by: 1, 9-10

recognition of, tacit: 499-500

North Korean People's Army. See also Communist

forces. armament and training: 9

casualties: 86, 96 command and staff structure: 79

impressment into: 138, 142

lines of communication: 96-97

matériel losses: 86

numbers and organization: 9, 76-77, 79

reinforcements: 90

supply system: 90

tenacity of troops: 97

troop unit strength: 199, 367-68, 477

Northern Command, Japan Logistical Command:

362-63

Norway: 162-63

Norwegian forces: 67

Nuclear weapons. See Atomic weapons.

O Hung Song. Col. (NKPA) : 432-33

Observation battalions: 59

Observation posts, enemy: 84, 285, 308, 370

O'Daniel, Maj. Gen. John W.: 80, 98-99

Oemyon: 297

Offensive plans. See also Limited offensives.

Eighth Army: 80-81, 86-88, 97-99, 101-02, 176

UNC: 175-76

Officers, reduction in numbers: 334-35

Okinawa: 5, 60-61

Old Baldy (Hill 266): 285-97, 392-95, 400

Ongjin Peninsula: 114-15

Operations plans, strategic. See Defensive plans; Offensive plans; Strategic plans.

Oriental Light Metals Company: 325

Orijong: 288

Oriskany: 398-99, 465

Ortega, Pfc. James: 287

Osborne, Brig. Gen. Ralph M.: 422-23

Outpost positions: 75-76, 285-88, 299, 307, 310-11,

369, 371-72, 376-77, 379-80, 382-85, 395-96, 461- 76. See also by name. Outpost positions, enemy: 300, 380

OVERWHELMING: 80-81

Pace, Frank. Jr.: 53, 66, 208, 333-34, 337, 358

Paik Sun Yup. Maj. Gen. (ROKA): 17, 22-23, 82-84, 113, 182-83, 204-05

Pakistan: 425

Palmer, Maj. Gen. Charles D.: 99n

Panmunjom: 21, 27-29, 31, 40-41, 43-44, 46-51, 108,

112-13, 122-23, 141, 401-02, 411, 414, 417, 462

Panmunjom River: 30-31

Panther aircraft: 324

Paris Treaty (1783): 135-36

Patrol actions: 74-76, 81, 87-88, 102-03, 178, 180

185, 188-92, 300, 369-70, 372-73, 374, 377-78, 391-93, 469

Patrol actions, enemy: 180, 184, 299, 308, 376-77, 382, 511

Patrol actions, naval: 61, 328

Patrol base system: 75-76, 82

Patrol duty, frequency of: 373

Patteson, 1st Lt. Jack M.: 393-95

Peace negotiations. See Armistice negotiations.

Peiping radio: 231

Pell, Lt. Col. Robert H.: 375-76

Peng Teh-huai. General (Chinese): 19, 37, 41, 45-

46, 76-79, 271-72, 411-14, 419, 430, 455-56, 480,

488-89

Personnel carriers: 386-87

Pescadores Island: 20

Pest control: 374

Philippine Sea: 197, 201, 321-22, 399

Philippines: 35, 499

Phillips, Maj. Warren B.: 314-15, 386-87

Photography, aerial: 88, 194-95, 352-53

Pia-ri Valley: 90

Pien Chang-wu, General (Chinese): 113, 173n, 422

Pike's Peak: 311-12, 314-17

Plans, operational. See Defensive plans; Offensive

plans; Strategic plans.

Point system: 186-87, 349-50, 374. See also Rotation and Replacements.

Pokkae: 288

Poland: 162, 173-74, 425, 434-35, 483-84

POLECHARGE: 101-02

Pongam-do: 405-07
INDEX 565

Pongnae-Ho Reservoir: 305

Population: 5

Porkchop Hill (Hill 255): 287-89, 379, 392-95, 473-

74

Porterfield, 1st Lt. John D.: 309

Ports, restrictions on use: 160-61

Portugal: 112n

Potsdam Declaration: 4

Power plants, air attacks on: 319-24, 398, 460-61

Pravda: 38

Press correspondents

at armistice negotiations: 24-29, 488-90

Clark's attitude toward: 488-89

and POW issues: 414, 417-18, 438, 447, 452-53

and SMACK incident: 385-86, 388-89

Preston, Capt. Roy W.: 313

Princeton: 59, 321, 325

Prisoners of war, enemy: 101, 181, 438

atrocities against, alleged: 264-65, 404

chemical warfare against, alleged: 250

chemicals, nontoxic, authorized against: 406, 451

classification and screening: 138-39, 141-43, 148,

150-51, 167-72, 238-40, 242-43, 250-51, 255-57,

262, 264-70, 272, 275, 277-79

defectors among: 495-96, 504-05

demands by: 246-54

dispersal of compounds: 257-61

disturbances by and among: 170-71, 233, 235-40,

243, 255-57, 259, 263-66, 270, 403-07, 410-12, 415-16, 451

indoctrination of: 237, 275

infiltration of agents into: 235-36

inspection by neutrals: 140-41, 255-59, 262, 268,

275, 278-81. See also Neutral Nations Repatri- ation Commission,

interrogations of: 284, 289, 303, 306, 367, 375-76,

382, 392-93, 396-97, 512

kidnappings by: 243-53

lessons from incidents: 260-62

LITTLE SWITCH: 414-21

murders among: 237-39

Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission: 419-

20, 423-35, 444-45, 453, 480-84, 486-87, 494-96

numbers captured and delivered: 141-43, 148, 168-

72, 233-34, 291-92, 369-70, 418-19, 486, 494-96,

500-501

paroles of: 147-49

polling: 143-44, 146-47, 168-69

and press correspondents: 414, 417-18, 438, 447,

452-53

questionnaire sample: 170-71

rations, complaints against: 242, 438-39

repatriation of: 17, 23-24, 26-32, 122-23, 127, 135-

51, 167-74, 240, 263-64, 266-67, 269-75, 277-82,

402-03, 411-35, 444-47, 451-53, 480, 484-86, 493-

96, 500, 504-05

report compiled by G-2, FEC: 407, 410

reporting on, by UNC: 136, 140-43, 148-49

restrictions on disciplining: 237

Prisoners of war, enemy—Continued

ROKA collusion with: 451-52, 454-55

SCATTER: 170

security measures and forces: 237-39, 242, 247-

50, 253-57, 345, 405-07, 410, 415, 451-52

segregation of: 233-34, 241-42

stress on capture of: 291-93

weapons improvised by: 237, 239, 256, 259-60

Prisoners of war, UNC

defectors among: 495-96

impressment into NKPA: 138, 142

indoctrination by enemy: 136, 145

misconduct among: 496-97

numbers captured and delivered: 141-43, 148, 168-

72, 418-19, 486, 494-95

reporting on, by enemy: 136, 140-43, 148-49

Propaganda, Communist: 17-19, 37-38, 42-45, 111,

115-16, 154-55, 167, 232, 268-69, 273, 275-76,

401-02, 404, 459, 476, 477, 489-90, 504-05

Provost Marshal General, ROKA: 448

Proximity fuzes: 287, 328, 353, 393-94

Pu Shan, Col. (Chinese): 159-60

Puerto Ricans, integration of: 310n

Pukhan River: 467-68, 471-72

Punchbowl: 81-88, 97, 114-15

Punji-ri: 183, 296-97

Pusan: 10, 52, 70, 96, 214-15, 233, 247, 255, 345

415-16, 437-38, 442, 451, 472, 503, 510

P'yonggang: 97-98, 196, 292-98

P'yongyang: 33-34, 40-41, 74, 79-80, 107-08, 175-76,

181-82, 187-88, 324, 366-67, 390, 398-99, 407-08

P'yongyang-Kaesong road: 407-08

P'yongyang radio: 231

Pyun Yung Tai: 446-47

QUEEN outpost: 471

Radar plotting: 352-53, 385

Radford, Admiral Arthur W.: 197, 367

Radios, tactical: 188-89, 287-88, 386-87

Raid actions: 82-84, 180, 183, 185, 196-97, 285-87,

292, 296-97, 369-70, 378-79, 382, 385, 388-89,

392

Raid actions, enemy: 196-97, 285, 288, 298-99, 369,

382

Railroads

air attacks on: 61, 105-08, 192-96, 319, 324, 397-99,

460-61, 481-82

enemy construction and repair: 195-96, 319

Korean network: 74

Rashin (Najin): 20, 107-09, 398

Rations: 375

components for enemy POW: 242

enemy POW complaints: 242, 438-39

ROKA complaints: 438-39

RATKILLER: 182-83

Raven, Lt. Col. Wilbur R.: 244-45

Reception Center, UNC: 68, 346
566 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Recoilless rifle

ammunition, expenditures of: %

fire support: 74-75, 287-88, 871

supply of: 343

Reconnaissance, aerial: 19, 61, 107, 192-93, 324, 385,

465

Reconnaissance, ground: 87-88, 369-70

Reconnaissance, ground, by enemy: 472-73

Reconnaissance Companies

2d: 93

16th: 99

Red Cross, Communist: 493-94

Red Cross, International. See International Committee of the Red Cross. Reeder, Maj. Gen. William O.: 339

Regimental combat teams. See Cavalry Regiments;

Infantry Regiments; Marine Regiments.

Rehabilitation by UNC: 217

Reinforcements. See Rotation and replacements.

RENO outpost: 395-97, 462

Replacement and School Command, ROKA: 64

Replacement Training Center, ROKA: 65-66

Replacement Training and School Command,

ROKA: 64-65, 210

Replacements. See Rotation and replacements.

Republic of Korea. See also Rhee, Syngman. armistice, opposition to: 215-16, 422

and armistice negotiations: 215-16, 422, 435-37,

441-42, 445-46, 448-49, 455, 502-03

civil disturbances: 441-42, 450, 457-58

constabulary force: 62

economic aid to: 215-16, 437-38, 491

enemy guerrillas in: 76, 182-83, 204, 345-48

expansion of armed forces: 130, 133, 210-13, 340-

45, 357-61, 439-41

financial crises: 217-20, 361, 439

Japanese in: 347-48

martial law declared: 182

military police force: 448

nonrecognition by Communists: 500

opposition to Japanese: 347-48, 438

political crises: 62, 345-48, 441-42, 444

security of: 8, 54, 63-64, 445-49, 453, 455-56

unification aspirations: 441-45, 502

withdrawal of forces: 449-52

Republic of Korea Air Force: 212-13, 324, 341-43, 360-61, 441

Republic of Korea Army (ROKA)

Army Training Center: 210

artillery units formed: 344, 360

casualties: 86

CCF pressure on: 470-71, 473-74, 477

collusion with POW: 451-52, 454-55

combat effectiveness: 62-64, 71-72, 84, 208-09,

306-07, 453-54, 469-70

Command and General Staff School: 66, 210

control of: 215, 480-81, 483

divisions in UNC: 62-63

Republic of Korea Army (ROKA)—Continued

expansion of: 56, 210-13, 840-45, 357-62, 487-41, 457, 477, 499

Field Training Command: 209-10

impressment of POW's into NKPA: 138, 142

improvement program: 207-14

KMAG role in training: 208-09, 469-70

leadership deficiencies: 62-65, 209-10, 474-75, 499

Military Academy: 66, 210

morale, decline in: 85

numbers, armament and training: 8-9, 62-67, 199,

340-41, 357, 360, 477, 499

placed under UN: 9-10

rations, complaints about: 438-39

reorganization of units: 65-66

Replacement Training Center: 65-66

Replacement Training and School Command: 64-

65, 210

security problems: 345

Service Corps augmentation: 213

service schools: 64-65, 210, 344

training during armistice negotiations: 66-67

training program, over-all: 209-10, 213-14, 343-44

training at U.S. service schools: 64-65, 210, 344

Republic of Korea Marine Corps: 85-86, 196-97, 212,

213, 342-44, 360, 395, 441

Republic of Korea National Guard: 74-75

Republic of Korea National Police: 182-83, 347

Republic of Korea Navy: 61, 247, 341-42, 347-48,

360-61, 441

Rest areas: 374

Rhee, Syngman: 145, 367. See also Republic of Korea. and armistice negotiations: 215-16, 422, 435-37, 441-42, 445, 448-58, 481-83, 487-88, 491, 501

conference with Clark: 443

conference with Eisenhower, proposed: 450

conference with Taylor: 449-50

conferences with Robertson: 454-55

elected President: 8

and expansion of armed forces: 211, 440-41

and military settlement: 441-42, 491-94, 501

and national unification: 214-15, 442-44, 449,

457-58

opposition to Japanese: 347-48

and political crises: 345-46

and POW issues: 269, 426-27, 429, 434, 444-49,

451-52, 456-57, 469, 477, 478-80, 500 and ROKA combat effectiveness: 63

and security of ROK: 8, 34, 63-64, 445-57 and Taiwan blockade: 409 and transfer of government seat: 438

and transfer of UNC headquarters: 438

and withdrawal of foreign forces: 443-44, 447-49,

455-57 and withdrawal of ROK forces: 442-44, 449-52

Rhineland: 498-99

Ridgway, General Matthew B. abilities proved: 58

and air support: 33-34, 107-08, 194, 200-201, 320
INDEX 567

Ridgway, General Matthew B.—Continued

and ammunition stocks: 33, 226-29

and antiaircraft defenses: 201

appointed SACEUR: 212

and armistice negotiations: 16-20

and blockade of China: 56

and build-up of airfields: 128-29, 153-55

on capability for general war: 133

and CHOPSTICK 6 and 16: 187-88

as CINCFE: 55-58

as CINCUNC: 13, 58, 129-30

and control of ROK forces: 215 and CUDGEL: 97-98

and demilitarized zone: 16-20, 26-33, 36-41, 43-

47, 113, 116-19 and DULUTH-SUNDIAL: 176 as Eighth Army CG: 12-13, 70 and expansion of ROKA: 210-13, 340-41

and financial crisis: 217-19

and helicopters: 184

and inspection teams: 121-23, 126, 128-29, 160, 162-63, 166-67

and Japanese security: 220-24

and limited offensives: 176-78, 187, 507

and National Guard troops: 202-03

and naval sweep of China: 197

and Negro integration: 104-05

and OVERWHELMING: 80-81 and package proposal: 163-67, 172-73, 263-64

and ports, restrictions on use: 160-61

and POW issues: 137-43, 146-48, 150-51, 166, 168-

71, 241-43, 249, 252-54, 269

propaganda, warns of: 504

and ROK Air Force: 212, 213, 341

and ROKA artillery expansion: 213-14

and ROKA training: 64-65, 208-09

and rotation and replacements: 160

as Ryukyus Governor: 58

as SCAP: 58, 220, 222

and semantics barrier: 506

on size of UNC units: 69-70 and TALONS: 86-88 and troop morale: 32-33

and WRANGLER: 98

Rifles

automatic: 74-75

carbine: 184, 372

M-1: 372

recoilless: 74-75, 96, 287-88, 343, 371

Ritchie, Lt. Col. Ellis B.: 285-87

Road construction and repair: 74-75, 92-95

Road systems: 74, 105-06, 398, 490-91

Roadblocks, enemy: 92-93

Roads, air attacks against: 105-06, 398, 490-91

Robertson, Walter S.: 450, 453-57, 481, 483

Rochester: 196-97

Rocket fire support: 75, 94, 109-10, 289-90, 303-05,

306-07, 371, 382, 396-97

Rocket launchers, enemy: 293

Rockets, 4.5-inch: 396-97

Rodent control: 374

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 4

Rotation and replacements

Communist forces: 85

Eighth Army: 59-69, 93, 160, 186-87, 199, 201-04,

302-03, 317, 349-51, 357, 374, 475, 508-09

North Korean: 90

restrictions on during armistice negotiations: 160-

61

UNC: 201-05

Royal Marine Commandos, British: 110, 196-97

Royal Navy, British: 67, 108-09

Ruffner, Maj. Gen. Clark L.: 82, 84-85, 86n, 285-88,

292

Ruiz-Novoa, Lt. Col. Alberto (Colombia): 393

Ruses: 284-85, 473

Ruses, enemy: 284, 314, 472

Russ, Col. Joseph R.: 315-16

Ryan, Brig. Gen. Cornelius E.: 344-45

Saegonbae: 93

St. Paul: 196-97

Salvage, battlefield, by enemy: 511

Samich'on: 98-99

Sami-ch'on River: 98, 379

San Francisco peace conference: 43, 45n

Sanctions, proposed against Communist China:

130-32

Sand tables, use of: 93, 189

Sandlin, Lt. Col. Joseph C.: 289-90

Sandy Ridge: 311-15

Sang Mu Dai: 451

Sangnyong-ni: 102, 296-97

Sanitation methods: 374

Sariwon: 40-41

Sat'ae-ri: 89, 93

Satae-ri Valley: 88-89, 91-96

SATURATE: 195

Scandling, 1st Lt. John D.: 288-89

SCATTER: 170

SCR-300: 188-89

Sea, control of: 510

Searchlights: 305, 395

Sebald, William J.: 19-20

Seoul: 5, 10-13, 115-16, 204, 367, 385, 389-91, 399, 410-11, 437-38, 441-42, 450

Seoul-Ch'orwon-Kumhwa railroad: 98

Seoul-Kaesong highway: 18-19

Sepo-ri: 196

Service schools, ROKA: 64-65, 210, 344

Shaw, Capt. Richard J.: 288

Sherman, Admiral Forrest P.: 53-55

Sherzer, 2d Lt. John A.: 189, 191-92

Shoosmith, Maj. Gen. Stephen (British): 323-24

Showalter, 1st Lt. Edward R.: 313-14

SHOWDOWN: 311-18, 327-28

Sibyon-ni: 41-42, 187, 196

Sicily: 61
568 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Siegfried Line: 184

Silla: 2

Sinanju: 195-96, 200, 398-99

Sinanju-P'yongyang railroad: 460-61

Sindae-ri: 378

Sindok: 325

Sinuiju: 399-400

Sleeping bag: 372

SMACK: 385-89

Small arms ammunition, expenditure of: 372

Smith, 1st Lt. Sylvanus: 188-90

Smith, Maj. Gen. Wayne C.: 311-12, 314-17, 385-86

Smith, 1st Lt. Willard E.: 394

Smoke, tactical use: 386, 394-95

Smythe, Maj. Gen. George W.: 310

Sniper Ridge: 311, 317-18, 352-53, 369, 468-71, 474

Snipers: 372

So Hui, Maj. Gen. (NKPA): 422

So-ch'on River: 81-82

Songgong-ni: 42-43

Soule, Maj. Gen. Robert H.: 98-99, 104n

Sound-and-flash plotting: 352-53

South African forces: 60-61, 67

South Korean Army. See Republic of Korea Army

(ROKA). Southwestern Command, Japan Logistical Command: 362-63

Soyang River and Valley: 81-84

Spellman. Lt. Col. James L.: 315-16

Spud Hill: 385-88

Staff. See Command and staff.

Stalin, Joseph V.: 4, 112, 409-10, 412, 421

Stars and Stripes: 85n

State, Department of. See also Acheson, Dean G.;

Dulles, John Foster.

and armistice negotiations: 126-27, 129, 479-80

on control of ROKA: 481

on diversion of aircraft to Korea: 200-201

and foreign troops withdrawal: 8

and inspection teams: 163 and Korean unification: 4

meetings with Department of Defense: 53-56

and naval sweep of China: 197

and package proposal: 263

and ports, restrictions on use: 160

and POW issues: 147, 269-70, 277-80, 402, 410-11,

431, 434

and ROK political crises: 346

and rotation and replacements: 160

Steel strike: 337, 339

Stevens, 1st Lt. Robert E.: 300-301, 309-10

Stevenson. Adlai E.: 330

Stover, Capt. Max R.: 313

STRANGLE: 105-06, 192-96

Strategic Air Command (SAC): 60-61, 335-36

Strategic air support, carrier- and land-based: 20,

33-34, 105-10, 192-95, 197-98, 319, 397-400, 459-

60, 490-91, 510

aircraft losses: 108, 324

Strategic air support, carrier- and land-based—

Continued

against airfields: 319, 490-91

assessment of: 192-94, 196, 322, 324

against bridges: 105-07, 194, 397-99, 460-61

against combat points: 397-98

enemy Countermeasures: 194-95

against dams: 319, 461. See also Power plants, air

attacks on.

against industry: 324-25, 398-400, 459-61

against lines of communication: 105-06, 192, 319,

510

against logistical facilities: 105-08, 192-93, 324,

397-98, 510

near Manchuria: 181-82, 398

by Marine Corps: 399, 490-91, 508-09

against motor convoys: 105-06

number of sorties: 192, 322, 324, 398-99

against power plants: 319-24, 398, 460-61

purpose: 397-98

against railroads: 61, 105-08, 192-96, 319, 324, 397-

99, 460-61, 481-82

replacement of losses: 60-61

restrictions by JCS: 20, 107-08, 320-21

against roads: 105-06, 398, 490-91

against troop quarters: 324

Strategic air support, enemy: 60, 108

Strategic plans: 52-56, 129-34. See also Defensive

plans; Offensive plans.

Streett, 1st Lt. St. Clair, Jr.: 300-301

Strongpoints, enemy: 511

Stuart, Col. Archibald W.: 383

Sturman, Maj. Kenneth R.: 93

Suan: 319

Suiho: 319-22, 324, 388-89, 399, 460-61

Suip-ch'on River: 88

Sunch'on: 194

SUNDIAL: 175-76

Supply system. See also Logistical system.

airlift in: 96. See also Helicopters.

difficulties in: 294-95

by hand-carry: 90, 286-87

helicopters in: 468, 471-72

railroads in: 96

reports on expenditures: 70-71

routes and methods: 84, 90, 93

in UNC: 70, 510

Supply system, enemy

air attacks on: 395

CCF: 399-400, 478, 510

by hand-carry: 193

Surprises, tactical, by enemy: 382-83

Sweden: 162, 173-74, 420, 425, 428, 433-35, 483-84

Swedish forces: 67

Swift, Maj. Gen. Ira P.: 98-99

Switzerland: 162, 173-74, 419-20, 423-25, 428, 433-

35, 444-45, 483-84

Szares, Maj. John W.: 316
INDEX 569

Tactical air support, carrier- and land-based: 60-61,

82, 84-85, 90, 93-94, 96-97, 100-101, 108-09,

187-88, 193, 287-92, 294-96, 304-07, 311-13,

325-28, 381-82, 385-89, 391, 395-98, 400, 460, 465, 467-68, 471

against AAA weapons: 353

aircraft losses: 353

bomb tonnages expended: 96-97, 386-88, 400

Cherokee strikes: 398, 400, 460

doctrine, understanding on: 326-28

by Marine Corps: 94, 108-10, 197-98, 326, 386,

395, 398, 400, 460, 468

number of sorties: 96-97, 106-07, 192, 306, 327-28,

353, 382, 385, 397-98, 400, 464-65, 468

against supply system: 395

against tunnels: 578

Tactical air support, enemy: 374

Tactical lessons: 97, 316-17

Tactical methods, enemy: 465-66, 510-12

Taebaek Mountains: 2, 73, 81-82, 283-84

Taegu: 68, 210, 346, 362

Taeu San: 82

Taft, Robert A.: 409

Taft-Katsura agreement: 3

Taiwan: 408-09, 503-04. See also China, Nationalist. TALONS: 96-S8, 98, 105-07

Tamez, 1st Lt. Rudolph M.: 314-15

Tanch'on: 196-97

Tank, medium, M4 (Sherman): 92-93, 95, 371-72

Tank Battalions 1st Marine: 462-63

64th: 105, 247, 253

70th: 99

72d: 89-90, 92-95

73d: 386, 394

245th: 288

Tank Companies 23d: 93

31st: 394

179th: 376-77

Tank fire support: 75, 90-91, 93, 97, 101, 103, 192, 288, 290-92, 296, 301-02, 307, 371-72, 377-79, 382, 384-85, 387-88, 391, 394-95, 462-64

Tank fire support, enemy: 199-200, 296

Tank-infantry actions: 92-95, 103, 288, 385-87, 391-

92

Tank losses: 288, 290

Tank strength, enemy: 79-80, 200, 293

Tasca, Henry J,: 439

Task Force, 7th Amphibious: 61, 328

Task Force Paik, ROKA: 182-83

Task Forces, Army

Mac (McFalls): 99-100

Sturman: 93-95

Task Forces, Navy

77th: 61, 108-09, 398

95th: 61, 196-97

Taylor, General Maxwell D.: 64, 66-67, 475-76

and armistice negotiations: 488, 491

Taylor, General Maxwell D.—Continued on combat effectiveness: 391

conference with Rhee: 449-50, 488, 491

as Eighth Army CG: 390-91

and limited offensives: 465, 508-09 and Old Baldy: 395

and Porkchop Hill: 473

and security of ROK: 449-50, 453

and withdrawal of UNC forces: 455-56

T-Bone Hill: 382-83, 385-87, 391

Technology, enemy manpower versus: 511-12

Telephone (EE-8): 189

Teng Hua, Lt. Gen. (Chinese) : 23-24, 113

Thailand forces: 67-69, 379

Thailand Navy: 67

38th Parallel: 35-40, 504

Tiller, Capt. Jack M.: 288-90

Ting Kuo-yu, General (Chinese) : 422

Togun-gol: 285

Toksan: 460-61

Toledo: 196-97

Tongch'on: 86-87, 175-76

T'ongson'gol: 204-05

Topography: 2, 73-74, 98

TOUCHDOWN: 92-94, 96-97

Traffic jams: 90

Training

in amphibious operations: 110

Eighth Army program: 81

North Korean Army: 9

in ROKA: 8-9, 62-67, 208-09, 215-14, 340-41, 348-

44, 357, 360, 499

UNC program: 68-69, 71-72, 199, 288-84, 367-68

Treaties, defensive: 35

Trench systems: 370-71, 509

enemy: 180-81, 288, 300, 351, 370

improving: 284

weapons emplacements in: 75

Triangle Hill (Hill 598) : 311-18, 352-53, 369, 375,

508

Trip flares: 75-76

Troop quarters, air attacks on: 324

Troop unit strength:

CCF: 318, 367-68

Communist forces: 199-200, 283-84, 367-68, 389

Eighth Army: 199

North Korean Army: 9, 76-77, 199, 367-68

U.S., in prewar Korea: 8

Truce line. See Demilitarized zone.

Truce negotiations. See Armistice negotiations.

Trudeau, Maj. Gen. Arthur G.: 394-95, 473

Truman, Harry S.

and air operations: 108, 201, 321 and armistice negotiations: 121, 127, 215

and atomic weapons: 11-12

Churchill-Eden conference: 132

as Commander in Chief: 53

on complacency: 177

and escalation of conflict: 69
570 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Truman, Harry S.—Continued

and expansion of ROK forces: 343-44, 357

and Japanese defense forces: 221

and Korean unification: 4, 7, 156-57

and military settlement: 408

and National Guard troops: 202

and package proposal: 165-66, 173, 263-64

and POW issues: 151, 269-70, 280-81

reaction to invasion: 9-10

and ROK antiarmistice stand: 215-16

Tsai Cheng-wen, General (Chinese): 42-43, 47, 127,

139-40, 145-46, 169, 171, 173, 422

Tumen River: 2

Tunnel defenses: 195, 288-89, 314-15, 352-53, 379

Turkey: 112

Turkish Armed Forces Command: 67-69, 462-65

Turner, Maj. Gen. Howard M., USAF: 122-23, 125-

28, 152-53, 155, 272

Un'gok: 391

Unified commands

control of: 55-56

parochialism in: 60

roles and missions: 55

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): 2

and aid to Communist bloc: 112, 499-500

aircraft supplied to Communist forces: 80, 461

armistice negotiations, role in: 15-16, 112

atomic weapons development: 11-12, 112, 122

attacks on forbidden: 20

influence in Korea: 3-7, 499-500

as neutral: 157-58, 162-63, 165-67, 420

peace overtures by: 15-16, 35, 43, 176-77, 412, 421

as potential belligerent: 1, 52, 56, 60, 72, 122, 130

332-33

and POW issues: 402-03, 412

submarine threat: 61, 110

troops withdrawn: 8

United Kingdom. See Great Britain. United Nations

and armistice negotiations: 402, 496-97

Chinese Communist membership in: 15-17, 56,

130, 132, 503-04

combat forces of. See Eighth Army; United Nations Command.

declaration on armistice, proposed: 130

dissension in NATO: 502-03

on escalation of conflict: 153-55

forces of, control by Eighth Army: 9-10

and Korean independence: 7-8

and POW issues: 137, 402-04, 425-26, 428, 430

prestige enhanced: 498-99

reaction to invasion: 9

ROKA placed under: 9-10

support from requested: 56

United Nations Civil Assistance Command: 217, 242, 269-70

United Nations Command (UNC). See also Clark,

General Mark W.; Eighth Army; Far East ComUnited Nations Command—Continued

mand; MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas; Ridgway, General Matthew B. acclimatization of troops: 68-69

advance to Yalu: 73

aircraft types in: 60-61

airlift of units: 70

armistice, attitude toward: 32, 491-93

assignment of units: 68

Blockading and Escort Force: 61

British representation on: 323-24

build-up of forces: 60, 69-70, 133

casualties: 86, 198-99, 478, 500-501

combat effectiveness: 67

command and staff structure: 58-59

control of inflation: 217-20

customs and traditions: 68-69

headquarters transferred: 438

language barriers in: 68-69

limitations on operations: 330-32

lines of communication: 81-82, 96-97

logistical system: 70, 510

and military settlement: 503

military units. See Eighth Army; see also by type

or nationality.

morale status: 32-33

nations represented: 67, 112, 498

naval units: 61

offensive plans: 175-76

reception center: 68, 346

relations with Japan: 222-23

relief and rehabilitation mission: 217

ROKA divisions in: 62-63

rotation and replacement: 201-05

size of units: 67, 69-70

supply system and routes: 70, 510

training program: 68-69, 71-72

troop unit strength: 199, 283-84, 367-68

withdrawal of forces: 454-56

withdrawal of support: 445, 455-56, 490-91

United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency

(UNKRA): 215-17, 438

United States

armed forces, postwar rebuilding: 501

armistice negotiations, leadership in: 16

capability for general war: 132-34, 330-33

contribution to Korean economy: 215-16, 437-38

CONUS divisions, combat effectiveness: 59-60

cost of war to: 500-501

defensive treaties: 35

Far East policy: 499

influence in Korea: 3-7

limited war, lessons gained from: 501-02

link to NATO: 499

objectives in Korea: 1, 52-53, 56-58

political settlement, pressures for: 330-33

reimbursement for supplies: 70-71

responsibility to Korea and Japan: 498-99, 502-03

security pacts concluded: 220, 499
INDEX 571

United States—Continued

sponsors Japanese rearmament: 210-12

troop strength in prewar Korea: 8

troops, number in Korea: 5, 62

troops withdrawn after World War II: 8

Upton, Sgt. William: 189-90

U.S. News and World Report: 211

USSR. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Valley Forge: 194-95

Van Fleet, General James A.: 46-47

and air support: 106-07, 192-93, 325-28

and ammunition stocks: 33, 96, 224-29, 336-38,

354-56 and antiguerrilla operations: 182

and artillery fire support: 183-84, 352-53, 509

on basic mission: 99

combat effectiveness, insistence on: 177, 181, 350-

51 and CUDGEL: 97-98

and DULUTH: 175-76

as Eighth Army CG: 13, 58-59, 70, 390

and expansion of ROK forces: 211-12, 341-45, 360

and Iron Triangle: 175-76

and limited offensives: 177, 187-88, 292-93, 507

and morale status: 32-33, 186, 390

and OVERWHELMING: 80-81

and POW captures: 291-92 and POW issues: 170-71, 240-43, 245-49, 252-59,

406 on pursuit of enemy: 73 and ROK combat effectiveness: 63, 84

and ROK political crises: 346-47 and rotation and replacements: 204

and SHOWDOWN: 311

on size of UN units: 69-70

and SMACK: 388-89

as tactician: 389-90

and TALONS: 123

and WRANGLER: 97-98

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., USAF: 53-55

Vaughn, 1st Lt. George L.: 290

VEGAS outpost: 395-97, 400, 462-66

Vests, protective: 189-91, 372

Vishinsky, Andre.: 112, 176-77, 403

Vladivostok: 110

Walker, Col. Edwin A.: 88-89

Walker, Lt. Gen. Walton H.: 9-10, 12n

War, U.S. capability for: 132-34, 330-33

Weapons fabrication by POW: 237, 239, 256, 259-60

Weapons types. See entries for various types.

Weather, effect on operations: 33-34, 82-84, 98, 107-

08, 178-80, 189, 195-96, 294-95, 298-99, 392,

510-11

Weber, Col. John K.: 484, 486-87

Welch, Lt. Col. Gene R.: 188, 191

Westview Hill: 393

Weyland, Lt. Gen. Otto P., USAF: 60-61, 107, 181-82,

192-93, 320, 324, 327-28, 390-91, 459-61

White, Lt. Gen. Isaac D.: 467, 471-72

White, M/Sgt. John O.: 287

White Horse Hill (Hill 395): 180, 303-07, 311, 317-

18, 369, 469, 512

Williams, Maj. George H., Jr.: 91, 94

Williams, Maj. Gen. Samuel T.: 461-65

Wills, Lt. Col. Lloyd E.: 301-02

Wilson, Charles E.: 358-59, 367, 408, 431, 440-41,

447, 496-97

Wire, communications improper placement: 75

installation, field: 287-88

Wisconsin: 196-97

Won Yong Duk, Lt. Gen. (ROKA): 448, 451-52

Wonsan: 16-19, 80, 86-87, 108--10, 176, 181-82, 194- 98, 366-67, 399, 490-91

Woods, Lt. Col. John O.: 94-95

World Health Organization: 232

World War I, similarities to: 185

World War II, experience from: 203

WRANGLER: 97-98, 175-76

Wright, Brig. Gen. Edwin K.: 17

Wu, 1st Lt. Kenneth: 31, 119

Wyman, Lt. Gen. Willard G.: 311n

WYOMING defense line: 74-76, 80, 97-99, 118-19

Yach'on-ni: 89

Yalta Conference: 4

Yalu River: 2, 10-11, 20, 60-61, 176, 320, 398, 441-42,

459-60

Yang-do Island: 197

Yangsi: 459-61

Yao'dong: 89-90

Yellow Sea: 61

Yesong River: 187

Yokkok River and Valley: 98, 100-102, 285, 288, 291-

92, 303, 305, 470-71

Yonan Peninsula: 114-15

Yoncho-do: 412

Yonch'on: 188

Yonch'on Valley: 98

Yongch'on: 270-71

Yoshida, Shigeru: 221-22

You Chan Yang: 341-43, 442-43

Young, Maj. Gen. Robert N.: 86n, 90-93, 97

Young, Capt. William B.: 313

Yount, Brig. Gen. Paul F.: 70, 238-39, 245-53, 255-

56, 346

Yu Chae Heung, Maj. Gen. (ROKA) : 158, 266

Yulsa-ri: 297

Yuson-dong: 398

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1992 O - 304-306 : QL 3