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Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

CARTEL CAR BOMBINGS IN MEXICO

Robert J. Bunker

John P. Sullivan

August 2013

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 

academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

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Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
ii

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Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

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iii

FOREWORD

Improvised explosive devices and car bombs have 

long been identified as threats to U.S. Army personnel 

deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have gained 

considerable attention and notoriety, even infamy, 

among our troops, who have had to learn the appropriate responses and countermeasures to contend 

with the fielding of these systems against them. Far 

less recognized is the fact that a similar threat—embodied in car bombs—has emerged much closer to 

our homeland within Mexico. Since mid-2010, cartel 

car bombings have taken place in a country on our 

southern border and have been targeted against both 

the forces of opposing cartels and those belonging to 

Mexican military and law enforcement agencies. 

With the election of the new presidential Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) administration in 

July 2012, these car bombings have ceased altogether 

after rapidly escalating in their levels of employment. 

Whether this was a response to the expected shift in 

countercartel policies from the National Action Party 

(PAN) to the PRI administration that began in December 2012, simply a “strategic pause” of some sort, or an 

outcome of another casual factor is unknown. What is 

important is that the use of car bombs in Mexico by 

the cartels has the potential to threaten U.S. agents, 

facilities, and interests in that nation and could also 

conceivably spread to our border cities—though this 

would appear to be a very unlikely possibility based 

on the use of car bomb trends and analysis presented 

in this Paper. 

The authors of this Letort Paper, Dr. Robert Bunker and John Sullivan, draw upon their wealth of 

knowledge and expertise pertaining to the Mexican 
iv

cartels and organized crime and, interestingly, is 

derived from their long-standing counterterrorism 

backgrounds with regard to suicide bombing and active aggressor response. Furthermore, they are able 

to look at the context in which cartel car bombings 

are taking place in Mexico from both military (counterinsurgency) and policing (counter high intensity 

crime) perspectives. As a result, this Paper is useful 

and important not only for U.S. Army interests and 

concerns—including that of domestic force protection implications—but also because of its analytical 

implications concerning interpreting indications and 

warnings events that develop actionable strategic 

intelligence requirements.

The Strategic Studies Institute hopes the findings 

and recommendations provided in this manuscript 

will be of interest to the broader U.S strategic community and the U.S. Army organizations engaged in 

providing support to the various agencies and commands belonging to the federal government of the 

Mexican state.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
v

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ROBERT J. BUNKER is a Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He is also Adjunct 

Faculty, School of Politics and Economics, Claremont 

Graduate University. Past professional associations 

include Futurist in Residence, Training and Development Division, Behavioral Science Unit, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation Academy, Quantico, VA; 

CEO, Counter-OPFOR Corporation; Adjunct Faculty, 

School of Policy, Planning, and Development, University of Southern California; Terrorism Instructor, 

California Specialized Training Institute, California 

Office of Emergency Services; Staff Member (Consultant), Counter-OPFOR Program, National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center-West; 

Fellow, Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the 

U.S. Army; Adjunct Faculty, National Security Studies M.A. Program and Political Science Department, 

California State University, San Bernardino, CA; and 

Faculty, Unconventional Warfare M.A. Distance Education Program, American Military University. Dr. 

Bunker has delivered over 200 presentations, including papers and training, to military, law enforcement, 

and academic and policy audiences, including U.S. 

congressional testimony. He has over 200 publications 

ranging from edited books and booklets to reports, 

chapters, articles/essays, response guidance, subject 

bibliographies, and encyclopedia entries in academic, 

policy, military, and law enforcement venues. Among 

those are Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training, 

with Stephen Sloan (University of Oklahoma, 2011), 

and edited works, including Criminal Insurgencies in 

Mexico and the Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War 
(Routledge, 2012); Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries (Routledge, 2011); Criminal-States 

and Criminal-Soldiers (Routledge, 2008); Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (Routledge, 2005); and 

Non-State Threats and Future Wars (Routledge, 2002). 

Dr. Bunker holds university degrees in political science, government, social science, anthropology-geography, behavioral science, and history.

JOHN P. SULLIVAN is a career police officer. He currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. He is also an Adjunct Researcher at 

the Vortex Foundation; Senior Research Fellow at the 

Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism; Senior Fellow at the Stephenson Disaster Management Institute, 

Louisiana State University; and Senior Fellow at Small 

Wars Journal-El Centro. Mr. Sullivan is co-editor of 

Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006), and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010). He 

is co-author of Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency: A Small 

Wars Journal-El Centro Anthology (iUniverse, 2012). His 

current research focus is the impact of transnational 

organized crime on sovereignty in Mexico and other 

countries. Mr. Sullivan holds a bachelor of arts in government from the College of William and Mary and a 

master of arts in urban affairs and policy analysis from 

the New School for Social Research (Milano School). 

Note: Both authors have benefited from past involvement with a multiyear suicide bomber research 

project for a national law enforcement center focusing on terrorist group use patterns, an initial study 

of the first year of suicide bombings that took place 

during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and training 

vi
vii

and exercises involving improvised explosive devices and car bomb threats in the Los Angeles County 

operational area.

ix

SUMMARY

Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs 

began in mid-July 2010, and their use has since escalated. Not only was their significance downplayed by 

the administration of former Mexican president Felipe Calderón, but they were basically ignored in the 

September 2010 State of the Nation Report (informe). 

As one co-author has noted, the July 15, 2010, Ciudad 

Juárez car bombing represents a firebreak in terms of 

“an apparently significant acceleration of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)” for Mexican cartel violence. Given the escalatory nature of these bombings 

to the conflict taking place in Mexico, and indeed the 

close proximity of them to the United States—some 

literally within miles of the border—they should be of 

at least some interest to local, state, and federal U.S. 

law enforcement and, ultimately, to the U.S. Army and 

other governmental institutions, which are increasingly providing support to Mexican federal agencies. 

With this in mind, this Paper first seeks to provide an historical overview and analysis of cartel car 

bomb use in Mexico. In doing so, it provides context, 

insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns that 

plagued Colombia, primarily between 1988 and 1993. 

It then discusses the initial cartel car bombings that 

took place in Mexico in the early 1990s—car bombings that most researchers have overlooked—before 

highlighting indications and warnings (I&W) events 

identified in the years prior to the resumption of Mexican cartel car bombings in mid-2010. Contemporary 

car bombings in Mexico from mid-2010 through much 

of 2012 will then be discussed and analyzed. Second, 

this Paper capitalizes on the historical overview and 
x

analysis provided—from both the Mexican and earlier 

Colombian experiences—in order to generate insights 

into future cartel car bombing potentials in Mexico. 

The identification of such potentials, in one sense, offers us a glimpse into cartel “enemy intent”—a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence.

An analysis of car bombing incidents in Mexico, 

with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 

years, is then provided. Both primary and secondary use patterns are discussed, along with future car 

bombing potentials in Mexico and the United States. 

For Mexico, steady, and both slowly increasing and 

quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment currently appears unlikely. On the other hand, 

car cartel bomb use, at least on U.S. soil and directed 

at U.S. governmental personnel operating in Mexico, 

is presently far from a likely potential. If cartel car 

bombs were to be eventually deployed on U.S. soil or 

against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such 

as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of 

I&W would be evident prior to such an attack or attacks. In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive 

device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb 

deployment patterns in Mexico, especially concerning 

increases in tactical lethality and a shift toward antiinfrastructure targeting. 

The authors of this monograph conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to a) the military and the federal, state, 

and local police agencies of the Mexican state; and b) 

the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. Four the-
xi

matic areas—intelligence, organization, training, and 

equipment—are highlighted, and the extent of these 

forms of support that may be provided should be situationally derived to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs 

and overall cartel threats. Additionally, a reappraisal 

of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878—enacted in a far 

different domestic security environment bereft of 

armed and organized nonstate threat entities able to 

challenge states—is said to be required if we are to lift 

some legal restrictions on U.S. military support to U.S. 

law enforcement agencies.

Further, the authors see the challenges posed by 

cartel sicarios (gunman; essentially nonstate soldiers) 

to be a hemispheric security challenge. In addition 

to internal U.S. military efforts and U.S. support to 

Mexican military (both the Mexican Secretariat of National Defense [SEDENA] and the Mexican Secretariat 

of the Navy [SEMAR]) and law enforcement (at all 

levels: federal, state, and municipal), support should 

also be extended to Central American states facing 

cartel and gang challenges. Ultimately, they contend 

that a comprehensive U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) strategy should be developed in coordination with the Mexican government that integrates 

all elements of national power to mitigate and counter 

Mexican cartel use of car bombs and other forms of 

violence and corruption, manifesting themselves in 

Mexico and increasingly in the United States. To best 

serve U.S. national interests, however, this comprehensive strategy should also be integrated with the 

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) to create a 

Western Hemispheric strategy to combat gang, cartel, 

and other criminal insurgent threats to the Americas.
xii

GLOSSARY

AfPak Afghanistan-Pakistan

ARNORTH U.S. Army North

C-4 Composition C 

 (Plastic Explosive)

CBRNE Chemical, Biological, 

 Radiological, Nuclear, or 

 Explosive

CISEN Center for Research and National 

 Security (Centro de Investigación 

 y Seguridad Nacional)

COIN Counterinsurgency

COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf

DAS Administrative Department of 

 Security (Departamento 

 Administradora de Seguridad en 

 Proceso de Supresión)

DEA Drug Enforcement 

 Administration

DHS Department of Homeland 

 Security

DIME Diplomatic, Intelligence, 

 Military, and Economic

DIME-P Diplomatic, Intelligence, 

 Military, Economic and Police

EMS Emergency Medical Services

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FARP Armed Revolutionary Front of 

 the People (Fuerzas Armadas 

 Revolucionarias del Pueblo)

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FMSO Foreign Military Studies Office

FY Fiscal Year
xiii

GTD Global Terrorism Database

IAB InterAgency Board

I&W Indications & Warnings

IED Improvised Explosive Device

JIEDDO Joint IED Defeat Organization

LAHIDTA Los Angeles High Intensity Drug 

Trafficking Area

LAW Light Anti-tank Weapon

LVB Large Vehicle Bomb

MACTAC Multi-Assault Counter-Terrorism 

 Action Capabilities

MTT Mobile Training Team 

NGIC National Ground Intelligence 

 Center 

OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act

OPFOR Opposition Force

OPSEC Operational Security

OSINT Open Source Intelligence

UXO Unexploded Ordnance

PAN National Action Party 

 (Partido Acción Nacional)

PGR Office of the General Prosecutor 

 (Procuraduría General de la 

 República)

PRI Institutional Revolutionary Party 

 (Partido Revolucionario 

 Institucional)

RAND Research and Development

RDWTI RAND Database of Worldwide 

 Terrorism Incidents

RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade

SEDENA Secretariat of National Defense 

 (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional) 
xiv

SEMAR Naval Secretariat 

 (Secretaría de Marina)

SMEE Subject Matter Expert Exchanges 

SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and/or 

 Procedures

USAISC U.S. Army Intelligence and 

 Security Command

USNORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command

USSOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command 

VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised 

 Explosive Device
1

CARTEL CAR BOMBINGS IN MEXICO

In early September 2010, President Felipe Calderón delivered a relatively upbeat annual State of the 

Nation Report (informe) concerning the nearly 4-year 

long war being waged across Mexico against the narco gangs, cartels, and mercenaries.1

 Simply put, the 

crackdown on organized crime was said to be working. Examples of success included killing and capturing about two dozen drug kingpins and firing about 

3,200 Federal police officers—about 9 percent of the total force—in an effort to root out corruption and raise 

professional standards. Additionally, 34,515 people 

were arrested for suspected narcotics links, and over 

34,000 weapons and $2.5 billion (street value) in drugs 

were seized over the previous year.2

 While part of 

the upbeat tone of the appraisal may represent actual 

“narco war” achievements, it must be tempered with 

the knowledge that Calderón has to maintain an optimistic political façade and continually sell his policies to the Mexican people. His Partido Acción Nacional

(National Action Party [PAN]) may very likely lose 

the 2012 elections, including that for the presidency, 

to the more traditionally dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party 

[PRI]). Political expediency thus dictates that no communiqués will be issued that do not follow the “We 

are on the path of success” PAN party line.3

It would be expected, then, that the specter of 

the escalating Mexican cartel use of car bombs since 

mid-July 2010, for example, would be ignored in the 

informe. Within the executive summary of the report, 

specifically in the State of Law and Security section, 

this is what has happened—with no mention of the 

narco car bombs (coche-bombas) given at all.4

 Such 
2

bombings, the even more recent mass atrocity inflicted upon 72 migrants in Tamaulipas, and the multiple incidents of bodies hanging from bridges—sans 

genitals, index fingers, and heads in one instance, 

and arms in another—do not make for eloquent and 

polite Mexican political discourse.5

 Still, car bombings now represent a new reality for Mexico, part of 

the widening “narco nightmare” of violence, corruption, and criminal insurgency that is threatening the 

integrity and sovereignty of expanses of that country. Such bombings have amazed many researchers, 

not because they have taken place but because they 

took so long to finally come about. Car bombings in 

Mexico cannot be wished away or ignored and may 

now only be expected to continue, albeit hopefully 

in an intermittent and discriminant manner, into the 

foreseeable future. 

As one co-author has noted, the July 15, 2010, 

Ciudad Juárez car bombing represents a firebreak in 

terms of “an apparently significant acceleration of 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)” for Mexican cartel violence.6

 Given the escalatory nature of 

these bombings to the conflict taking place in Mexico, 

and indeed the close proximity of them to the United 

States—some literally within miles of the border—

they should be of at least some interest to local, state, 

and federal U.S. law enforcement and, ultimately, to 

the U.S. Army and other governmental institutions, 

which are increasingly providing support to Mexican 

federal agencies. 

With this in mind, this Paper first seeks to provide an historical overview and analysis of cartel car 

bomb use in Mexico. In doing so, it provides context, 

insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns that 
3

plagued Colombia, primarily between 1988 and 1993. 

It then discusses the initial cartel car bombings that 

took place in Mexico in the early 1990s—car bombings 

that most researchers have overlooked—before highlighting indications and warnings (I&W) events identified in the years prior to the resumption of Mexican 

cartel car bombings in mid-2010. Contemporary car 

bombings in Mexico from mid-2010 through much of 

2012 will then be discussed and analyzed. 

Second, this Paper capitalizes on the historical 

overview and analysis provided from both the Mexican and earlier Colombian experiences in order to generate insights into future cartel car bombing potentials 

in Mexico. The identification of such potentials, in one 

sense, offers a glimpse into cartel “enemy intent”—a 

possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. The 

final section of this Paper offers conclusions stemming 

from the analysis provided and recommendations for 

the U.S. Army and other governmental institutions 

whose mission may somehow be impacted by the cartel car bombings now taking place in Mexico. 

CAR BOMBINGS AND LESSONS 

LEARNED IN COLOMBIA

A review of the historical literature on car bomb 

use by the Colombian cartels suggests this is an understudied area and one beset with only fragmentary 

incident information.7

 Both the RAND Database of 

Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) and Global 

Terrorism Database (GTD) are almost useless as datasets concerning such car bombings.8

 A GTD search for 

Colombian (country) explosives/bombs/dynamite 

(weapons) and bombing/explosion (attacks) yielded 

2,365 incidents between July 24, 1976, and December 
4

29, 2008, with the vast majority minor in nature and 

conducted by the various indigenous guerilla groups.9 

Further, the sheer amount of bombings conducted by 

the Medellin cartel between 1988 and 1993, most of 

which do not exist in datasets nor distinguish between 

thrown/placed bombs and car bombs, make any form 

of quantitative analysis impossible. For instance, between mid-August and mid-December 1989 alone, it 

is estimated 205 bombings, mostly small in nature, 

were carried out.10

Still, even with this fragmentary information, some 

historical observations can be made concerning Colombian cartel bombing use. The first major car bombing took place outside the U.S. Embassy in Bogota in 

November 1984 and was meant as a “shot across the 

bow” to warn the Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA) to back off from its operations against Pablo Escobar and the other Medellin cartel leaders known as 

the “Extraditables.”11 The two competing drug cartels, 

based in Medellin and Cali respectively, did not engage in the sustained use of car bombs, however, until 

open war broke out between these two organizations 

in January 1988. Differing explanations are offered for 

the origins of the war. The first is based on the Cali 

cartel creating a Mexican route to the U.S. market, via 

an alliance with the Guadalajara cartel, which threatened Medellin cartel dominance. Another explanation 

viewed the war as starting over a power struggle between the cartels over the New York cocaine market. 

A third reason was that the competing cartel bosses felt they were being disrespected by each other, neither side was willing to back down, and their honor 

had to take precedence over business.12 Whatever 

the reason for the war, a Cali cartel car bomb, which 

targeted the family of Pablo Escobar in their luxury 

eighth story apartment in Medellin and permanently 
5

damaged his daughter’s hearing, signaled open hostilities. The war raged between January 1988 and the 

death of Escobar in December 1993, with a lull while 

Escobar was sequestered in the palatial prison La Cathedral from June 1991 through July 1992. The Colombian government made a conscious decision during 

this cartel war to focus solely on the Medellin cartel, 

which was considered a far larger threat to the Colombian state and, by default, sided with the Cali cartel. 

After the demise of the Medellin cartel, the Colombian 

government, directly supported by the United States, 

would subsequently turn its attention to dismantling 

the Cali cartel. As a result, the Colombian government 

faced the direct wrath of the Medellin cartel for collusion with its enemies.

Table 1 provides an overview of some of the higher 

profile cartel car bombing incidents that took place 

during this war. Except for the initial car bombing 

that signaled open hostilities and may have been a calculated Cali cartel ploy to enrage Escobar, car bomb 

use was typically a Medellin cartel affair. Escobar had 

little concern for collateral damage resulting from 

these bombings and generally utilized good size payloads, with the December 1989 attack on the Colombian Administrative Department of Security (DAS) 

utilizing a massive 1,100-pound bomb that caused 

devastating destruction:

 ‘The explosion,’ reported the New York Times, ‘was so 

powerful that it broke windows in a building across 

the street from the United States Embassy, seven miles 

away.’ The largest car bomb ever detonated outside 

the Middle East left a 20-foot-crater in the street and 

devastated 23 city blocks. DAS commander, General 

Miguel Maza Marquez managed to survive the blast—

which he described as a ‘mini-atomic bomb’—in his 

steel plated ninth-floor office, but his secretary was 
6

killed, along with 58 other people. An incredible 1000 

workers, residents, and pedestrians were injured (250 

seriously), and at least 1500 homes and office buildings suffered significant damage. The toll might have 

been even more catastrophic had police not defused 

a second car bomb placed in front of judicial offices.13

Sources: Ron Chepesiuk, Drug Lords: The Rise and the Fall of the 

Cali Cartela; Mark Bowden, Killing Pablob; Global Terrorism Databasec

 (available from www.start.umd.edu/gtd/); and newspaper 

archives.

d

Table 1. Selected Medellin and Cali Cartel 

Car Bomb Use in Colombia.

Date City Perpetrator/Type Fatalities/

Injured Target

January 13, 1988 Medellin Cali Cartel; Car 

bomb 2/1a Pablo Escobar’s Home/Luxury 

8th Story Apartment

~ August 1988 Cali

Medellin Cartel; 

Renault with 200 

lb bomb

7/24a La Rebaja Drug Store (Cali 

Cartel owned)

May 25, 1989 Bogota Medellin Cartel 6/50a Miguel Maza (Head of DAS)

December 6, 

1989 Medellin 

Medellin Cartel; 

Car with 1,100 

lbs of dynamite

58/1000a,d

DAS Headquarters

March 1990

Cali, 

Bogota, 

Medellin

Medellin Cartel; 

Multiple car 

bombs detonated 

simultaneously

26/200a Unknown

April 11, 1990 Itagui

Medellin Cartel; 

Suspected car 

bomb

16/109c Truck Carrying Police AntiTerrorism Unit

December 2, 

1992 Medellin Medellin Cartel; 

Huge car bomb 10/3b Police by Stadium

January 30, 1993 Bogota

Medellin Cartel; 

Car with 220 lbs 

of dynamite

21/70b Civilians in Bookstore

April 15, 1993 Bogota

Medellin Cartel; 

Car with +300 lbs 

of dynamite

11/200b Civilians in busy Intersection/

Shopping Center
7

While some of the car bombs were used in an insurgency role that targeted police in 1989, 1990, and 

1992, the final car bombs used in 1993 were used 

in a terrorism role against civilian targets when 

Escobar was on the run and increasingly feared 

for his life. Dynamite was the only named explosive used in any of the car bombings with timer 

detonators (and in one instance a potential lighted fuse) 

mentioned in the incident accounts. 

The strife between the Medellin and Cali cartels extended beyond Colombia. According to 

Ron Chepesiuk:

The war spread to the United States, and, in the last 

week of August [1988], the media reported on several 

dozen bombings in New York City and in Miami.14

While professional killers were indeed being deployed to these cities from Colombia—the Cali cartel 

brought in more than 1015—and the death toll for both 

Medellin and Cali cartel operatives and associates in 

these cities may have numbered well into the dozens, 

these bombing incidents cannot be substantiated. The 

Chepesiuk quote is referenced to a New York Times article that makes no mention of actual bombings taking 

place.16 RDWTI, GTD, and city news searches yielded 

no incidents of such bombings or incendiary attacks.17

This is not surprising since sicarios (assassins) typically 

killed using small arms, with the Mac-10 (and lighter 

Mac-11 variant) machine pistol then highly favored. 

Still, both cartels easily had the resources to deploy 

bomb makers to the United States if desired, and, if 

nothing else, ad hoc Molotov cocktail attacks would 

have been relatively simple for the sicarios to utilize 
8

against those in opposing safe houses.18 Prior to the 

1988 hostilities, Medellin cartel boss Griselda “Black 

Widow” Blanco of Miami, FL, ordered numerous killings during the 1979-84 period. Her contract killer, 

Jorge “Rivi” Ayala, stated in a prison interview for 

the documentary Cocaine Cowboys that he even dynamited a house in an attempt to kill an opposing cartel 

rival.19 Still, no reference to actual car bomb use in the 

United States by either the Medellin or Cali cartel has 

been found anywhere in the scholarly literature or in 

media reports.20

The lessons learned from Colombian cartel car 

bomb use appear to be twofold. First, car bombs 

were not only used in Colombia as a warning to others but also in an anti-personnel role to kill government agents, rival traffickers, and civilians; and in an 

anti-infrastructure role to damage and destroy public, 

commercial, and private facilities and buildings. Cali 

cartel use of car bombs was more highly discriminate 

in its application and initially focused on targeting the 

family of Pablo Escobar, the leader of the rival Medellin cartel. Later, in 1993, according to Mike Davis, 

the Cali cartel capitalized on public anger and detonated two additional car bombs in front of apartment 

buildings in which Escobar’s immediate and extended 

family members were residing.21 This is in line with 

the second phase cartel attributes identified for Cali, 

based on its propensity to emphasize corruption and 

symbolic violence over indiscriminate and mass killing.22 The Medellin cartel, on the other hand, actively 

engaged in mass killing, especially later on, primarily directed at vestiges of the Colombian state and its 

citizenry. Further, it also actively targeted elements of 

the Cali cartel with little concern for collateral damage 

inflicted upon others. This pattern of car bomb use is 
9

in line with the designation of the Medellin cartel as 

a first phase “aggressive competitor” habituated to 

extreme violence and, ultimately, a major reason for 

its eventual downfall in late 1993.23 It should be noted 

that car bomb use by both cartels in Colombia did not 

exist in a vacuum and were interspersed with the more 

frequent use of thrown and placed bombs, kidnappings, and assassinations, and street level firefights.24

Second, while the Medellin and Cali narco-war of 

1988 in Colombia spread to some of the key distribution cities in the United States, the level of violence 

remained relatively restrained and never approached 

the blatant violence witnessed during the much earlier July 1979 Dadeland Mall massacre.25 In fact, while 

assassinations and intercartel killings were common 

and small scale bombings may have been relatively 

rare occurrences, no record of any cartel car bombings 

taking place in the United States have been identified. 

Some sort of psychological “firebreak” existed that 

even the more feral operatives of the Medellin cartel 

respected, thus deterring car bomb use on U.S. soil. 

Quite possibly, the specter of overwhelming U.S. law 

enforcement response locally, and the eventual blowback in Colombia at the highest governmental levels 

against the cartels, made such car bombings and the 

ensuing public and media spectacle that it would 

create a politically toxic option for someone even as 

violent as Pablo Escobar.

EARLY CAR BOMBINGS IN MEXICO

Bombs have been utilized in Mexico for politically 

related terrorist purposes, often targeted at U.S. and 

other interests, since the early 1970s. In February 1974, 

seven such devices damaged Pepsi Cola and Union 
10

Carbide plants in Guadalajara and other companies 

in Oaxaca. The perpetrators were never identified.26 A 

diverse mixture of leftist, Indian rebel, and anarchist 

bombings, with groups such as the 23rd of September Communist League, Zapatista Army, and Armed 

Revolutionary Front of the People (FARP) claiming 

responsibility, have persisted into the 2000s. These 

bombings have taken place both in urban locales, such 

as Acapulco and Mexico City, and in the countryside, 

for example, against pipelines in the states of Guanajuato and Querétaro.27

The majority of these bombings utilized small 

devices that were either placed or thrown. Three car 

bomb or vehicle borne improvised explosive device 

(VBIED) incidents, however, did take place.28The first 

incident, which even predates the 1974 spree of bombings, took place in July 1972. According to the RAND 

Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents:

A panel truck containing plastic cans filled with gasoline to which were attached dynamite caps exploded 

in front of the U.S. consulate general in Monterey, destroying the truck but causing no damage to the consulate general.29 

The terrorist group involved with the incident was 

not discovered. The second incident, which represents 

a quasi-car bomb, took place in November 1974, and 

targeted Fernando Lopez Muino, the Cuban ambassador to Mexico.30 A bomb was placed in his car by 

anti-Castro Cubans and detonated; however, the ambassador did not sustain any injuries. The last incident took place in 1986 in Mexico City. According to 

the RDWTI:
11

A caller tipped off police about a bomb in a car parked 

in front of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. The sophisticated device was defused 15 minutes before it 

was set to go off. The Simon Bolivar Anti-Imperialist 

Commando claimed responsibility for the action, linking it to the U.S. air strike in Libya.31 

The earliest Mexican drug cartel related car bombing took place 20 years after the first politically related 

terrorist car bomb incident. It can be traced back to a 

car bomb detonated outside of a house used by “El 

Chapo” Guzmán, a head of the Sinaloa cartel in Culiacán in 1992, shortly after the Arellano Felix brothers 

(Tijuana cartel) put a bounty on his head. El Chapo 

and his bodyguards were not at the residence, and no 

one was injured from the bombing.32 The next identifiable cartel related car bombing took place at a hotel in 

Guadalajara in June 1994. A newspaper account of the 

incident summarized it as follows:

A car packed with powerful explosives blew up outside a luxury hotel Saturday, killing at least five people and wounding 15. Police sources said the bombing 

may be linked to Guadalajara’s drug gangs.

The Camino Real Hotel was evacuated after the early 

morning explosion, which occurred as 300 guests were 

winding up a debutante ball for a 15-year-old-girl. Investigators at the scene, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the girl’s family is known to have ties to 

drug traffickers. 

The Mexico City newspaper Universal reported that 

police said members of the family of Rafael Caro 

Quintero, allegedly one of Mexico’s most powerful drug traffickers, were attending the party inside 

the hotel.
12

. . . Police and state officials said the automobile was 

packed with 10-22 pounds of plastic explosives and 

may have been detonated by remote control. Enrique 

Hoyos Medina, an expert at the state attorney general’s office, said the explosives were a commercial type 

sold mainly to mining companies.33

The only other reference to cartel related car bombings during the 1990s is one mentioned by Barnard 

Thompson, a long-time private security specialist in 

Mexico and Latin America and editor of MexiData.

info, who states:

With respect to the car bombing count, the fact is since 

1992 there have been at least five ‘vehicle borne improvised explosive devices’ that exploded, three of which 

appeared to be part of cartel infighting that unsuccessfully targeted Ismael ‘El Mayo’ Zambada García, 

drug kingpin of the Sinaloa Cartel. The others, one in 

Chiapas and another in Acapulco, Guerrero, against 

nearby quasi-government and military installations, 

were thought to be by small guerilla groups for supposed social causes.34

These car bombings against El Chapo Guzmán, the 

family of “El Numero Uno” Caro (the cartel leader had 

been incarcerated in April 1985), and El Mayo Zambada resulted from the dissolution of the Guadalajara 

cartel and the early wars between the Sinaloa and 

Tijuana factions. Given the excessive and indiscriminate violence utilized by the Arellano Felix brothers, 

including the use of San Diego based Logan Heights 

gang assassins who mistakenly killed Cardinal Posadas Ocampo at Guadalajara International Airport in 

May 1993,35 it is highly likely that this early phase of 

cartel car bombings was carried out solely by the Tijuana cartel. If this is the case, it would be testament 
13

to the Sinaloa cartel’s better strategic appreciation of 

the consequences of its actions and unwillingness to 

blindly engage in tit-for-tat retaliatory violence with 

its cartel competitors. 

RECENT INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS 

FOR RESUMED CAR BOMB USE IN MEXICO

With a deescalation of cartel violence between the 

Tijuana and Sinaloa cartels in the early 1990s, the use 

of car bombs ceased for over 15 years. Some sort of 

crude or mock car bomb—based on a container of 

gasoline, a false antenna, and cell phone (with either 

an inert or no detonator)—was then reported in August 2005. It had been placed in a stolen vehicle that 

was parked at a Guadalajara shopping center for 3 

days and discovered by a security guard.36 Whether 

this device was tied to Mexican cartel violence is unknown. Following the December 2006 Calderón offensive against the cartels and narco gangs in Mexico, 

violence levels once again increased. Along with this 

increase in violence, attempted and actual bombings 

using grenades and improvised explosive devices 

(IEDs), already beginning to take place, increased in 

frequency. Suspected grenade attacks in April and August 2006 were targeted against a “. . . busy restaurant 

in the Pacific coast town of Petatlán, Mexico . . .” and 

against “. . . the offices of two newspapers, Por Esto 

and Quequi Quintana Roo, in Cancun, Mexico. . .”37

In June 2007: 

. . . police deactivated two bombs in two south Mexico City subway stations after being tipped off. Both 

bombs were accompanied by packages related to drug 

traffickers.38
14

More bombings then took place, including the 

pre-denotation of a bomb two blocks from Mexico 

City’s police headquarters in February 2008—the 

dead bomber belonging to the Tepito drug gang had 

suspected links to the Sinaloa cartel and an operative 

known as “El Patron.”39 Also, the infamous Los Zetas 

linked fragmentation grenades attack, killing eight 

and injuring 101, on a crowd of people celebrating 

Mexican Independence Day in Morelia, Michoacán, 

was carried out in September 2008.40During this same 

period in July 2008, an I&W event took place related to 

the start of a new cycle of car bomb use:

Mexican drug traffickers have built make shift car 

bombs to attack police, troops and rival smugglers 

as the country’s drug war turns increasingly violent, 

police said.

Soldiers found two car bombs in a safe house in the 

city of Culiacan in western Mexico on Monday. One 

car was packed with cans of gasoline and another 

stuffed with canisters of gas, police said.

Both devices were wired to be detonated by cell 

phones, said a police official in Culiacan, capital of 

Sinaloa state, which is home to one of Mexico’s biggest 

trafficking cartels.41

Speculation exists that the car bombs may have 

belonged to a Sinaloa faction controlled by Joaquin 

“Shorty” Guzmán, who broke off from other local 

drug lords and is no longer allied to them.42 Regardless of the origins of these devices, their existence, the 

increasing patterns of violence in the Mexican drug 

wars, and the proliferation of small IED and grenade 

incidents (72 grenade attacks estimated in 2009 alone)43

suggest car bomb use would once again resume in 
15

Mexico. This time around, however, their use may not 

be confined to only one cartel and could conceivably 

follow the more brutal and less discriminate patterns 

of car bombings that were conducted in Colombia by 

the Medellin cartel beginning in the mid-1980s.

CONTEMPORARY CAR BOMBINGS IN MEXICO

Recognition that Mexican cartel violence had embraced the car bomb followed the July 15, 2010, attack 

on Federal police in embattled Ciudad Juárez. In that 

incident, a primitive IED—not the fully integrated 

VBIED variant found in Iraq and the AfPak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) theaters—was secreted inside a car. 

The ambush attack directly targeted the police and 

can be considered a classic TTP of insurgents. The attack was widely heralded as the drug war’s first car 

bombing, which historically we know is not the case, 

and spurred a semantic debate over the difference between “car bombs” and “bombs in cars.”

Four persons were killed in this well-planned, 

“bait and wait” trap near a Federal police facility. The 

attack was the first documented use of a car bomb by 

drug traffickers or their affiliated gangs since the start 

of Mexico’s countercartel offensive by Calderón in 

2006. Clearly, the use of bombs (ranging from simple 

IEDs to the more complex large vehicle bomb [LVB], 

erstwhile known as a VBIED) portends to dramatically alter the nature of Mexico’s drug wars. 

Until this assault, cartels and their paramilitary 

gangsters largely relied on small arms, limited use of 

grenades, and symbolic beheadings to neutralize competing cartel and government security forces. While 

police in Sinaloa found improvised gas canister car 
16

bombs cached for potential use in July 2008, participants in the drug war relied upon barbaric beheadings, 

bold small arms attacks (active shootings), and the 

occasional grenade or combined small arms-grenade 

attack to wage their battles. While all these means are 

a challenge to police, the potential specter of urban 

car bombings—with their attendant casualty generating capacity—poses a threat potential similar to the 

“conventional” insurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

After the July 15 car bombing, which is believed to 

have been conducted by La Línea, a narcomensaje or 

message left at the scene claimed the Juárez cartel was 

responsible for the car bombing and threatened further attacks. “We still have car bombs,” claimed the 

alleged warning.44

According to Associated Press reports: 

 . . . the La Linea drug gang—the same group blamed 

for the killing of a U.S. consulate employee and her 

husband in March 2010—lured federal officers and 

paramedics to the site of a car bomb by dressing a 

bound, wounded man in a police uniform and calling in a false report of an officer shot. . . . The gang 

then exploded a car holding as much as 22 pounds (10 

kilograms) of explosives, killing the decoy, a rescue 

worker, and a federal officer.45

While the Juárez platform was a simple car bomb, 

not a fully evolved VBIED, the debate over terminology rages. VBIED is a jargon-laden term preferred by 

military and security analysts familiar with U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some 

observers, notably STRATFOR, make it a point to distinguish between the fully evolved variant and their 

simple cousins.46 The sophistication or operational 

effectiveness of the device is only one element of the 

attack and should not be overconflated with the TTP 
17

or delivery platform. Remember, “Buda’s Wagon” 

(the first modern “car” bomb) detonated in September 1920 by the corner of Wall and Broad Streets in 

New York City was not sophisticated in terms of the 

devices encountered in Colombia, Iraq, or the AfPak 

theaters either, but it was still a car bomb.47

The Ciudad Juárez device was likely a transitional 

weapon. It is plausible that cartel bomb makers were 

experimenting and importing TTP from other conflicts 

to exploit on their own battleground. Indeed, after 

the Juárez attack, at least 18 car bomb incidents have 

been recorded in Mexico. Table 2 documents these attacks, as well as the initial Juárez incident and a precursor incident in Culiacán 2 years prior.48 As Table 2 

demonstrates, the recent use of car bombs as a tactic 

of confrontation is now more prevalent than widely 

recognized. Use of the tactic starts with one precursor interdiction in 2008, followed by no use in 2009. In 

2010, the year of the July 15 sentinel attack in Ciudad 

Juárez, five incidents were recorded. In 2011, a total of 

eight incidents were documented. One incident each 

occurred in Sinaloa and Hidalgo, two incidents in Ciudad Juárez, three incidents in Nuevo León, and four in 

Ciudad Victoria (Tamaulipas). While the offending actors are not definitively known, both Tamaulipas and 

Nuevo León are areas contested by the Zetas and Gulf 

cartels. A brief overview of these incidents follows. 

The first incident recorded after the July 15 attack targeted the headquarters of the Tamaulipas State Public Safety agency. A car bomb rocked the complex in 

Ciudad Victoria on August 5, 2010. No one was hurt, 

but two police cars were damaged.49 On August 27, 

a car bomb exploded outside the offices of Televisa in 

Ciudad Victoria, causing damage and interrupting the 

station’s broadcast, however, no one was injured.50
18

Date City Perpetrator/Type Fatalities/Injuries Target

July 14, 2008 Culiacán, Sinaloa

Unknown, possibly 

Sinaloa cartel; 2 

car bombs with gas 

canisters captured

0/0 Likely 

intended to target police

July 15, 2010 Ciudad Juárez, 

Chihuahua

La Línea; 

car bomb 4/0

Police on foot 

responding to call; 

ambush

August 5, 2010 Ciudad Victoria, 

Tamaulipas

Unknown; 

car bomb 0/0 Headquarters building; state police

August 27, 2010 Ciudad Victoria, 

Tamaulipas

Unknown;

car bomb 0/0 Televisa building

September 10, 2010 Ciudad Juárez, 

Chihuahua

Unknown;

car bomb Interdicted

Police on foot 

responding to call; 

ambush attempt

September 2010 Guadalajara,

Jalisco

Unknown;

car bomb Interdicted Unknown

January 18, 2011 Linares, Nuevo León Unknown;

2 car bombs 0/3 Police

January 22, 2011 Tula-Tepeji, Hidalgo Zetas;

car bomb

1/3 Police

March 15, 2011 Ciudad Victoria, 

Tamaulipas

Unknown;

car bomb 0/5

Police station 

(proximate to day care 

center)

September 12, 2011 Ciudad Juárez, 

Chihuahua

Unknown;

car bomb 0/0 Day care center; police (ambush attempt)

September 16, 2011 Ciudad Victoria, 

Tamaulipas

Unknown;

car bomb 0/0 Unknown, possibly 

police

October 10, 2011 Monterrey, Nuevo León Zetas assumed;

car bomb 0/0 Military patrol 

(Vehicular)

December 18, 2011 Zuazua, 

Nuevo León

Unknown;

car bomb 0/3 Police station

January 10, 2012 Ciudad Victoria,

Tamaulipas

Unknown;

car bomb Interdicted Police station

March 19, 2012 Ciudad Victoria,

Tamaulipas

Unknown; 

car bomb 0/0 Expreso newspaper 

building

April 24, 2012 Nuevo Laredo,

Tamaulipas

Sinaloa assumed;

car bomb 0/0 Headquarters building; 

police

May 24, 2012 Nuevo Laredo,

Tamaulipas

Zetas assumed; 

car bomb 0/10 Barracks at hotel; police

June 6, 2012 Ciudad Victoria,

Tamaulipas

Unknown; 

2 car bombs (arson) 0/0 Car dealership

Table 2. Contemporary Car Bomb (coche-bomba)

Incidents in Mexico.
19

Sources: English and Spanish language media reports, Borderland 

Beat, available from www.borderlandbeat.com, Blog Del Naco, available from www.blogdelnarco.com, and GroupIntel Network, available 

from www.groupintel.com.

Table 2. Contemporary Car Bomb (coche-bomba)

Incidents in Mexico. (cont.)

Then, in September 2010, two incidents took place. 

One, on September 10, took place in Ciudad Juárez 

and involved another ambush in which an explosive 

device was placed in a car next to a car containing a 

dead body, which had been reported to the local police. The device, which contained 16 kilograms of the 

explosive Tovex, apparently failed to detonate and 

was rendered safe by a Mexican military ordnance 

team. The other incident took place in Guadalajara 

sometime in September and was composed of a liquor 

bottle filled with explosives placed inside a car. The 

device was recovered prior to its detonation and was 

unique because of the Futaba radio-contoller that was 

wired to it. Such controllers, used for model aircraft, 

can be traced back to Medellin cartel VBIEDs deployed 

in Colombia 2 decades ago.51

In 2011, we start to see the acceleration of the car 

bomb TTP. In January, two car bombs were deployed 

in Linares, Nuevo León. No one was injured in the 

first attack, but three people were wounded in the 

second. Both incidents targeted police. On January 22, 

Hidalgo was brought into the equation, with the ZeJune 29, 2012 Nuevo Laredo,

Tamaulipas

Unkown; 

car bomb 0/7 City Hall; Municipal Government

July 3, 2012 Ciudad Victoria,

Tamaulipas

Unknown; 

car bomb 2/7 Private Residence; Chief Security Officer

July 31, 2012 Culiacán,

Sinaloa

Unknown;

car bomb 0/0 Gas Station
20

tas attacking the police in a bombing that killed one 

police officer and injured three. On March 15, five persons were wounded when a parked car bomb detonated outside a police station in Ciudad Victoria. The 

police station was situated next to a child-care center. 

On September 12, police disarmed a car bomb in the 

parking lot of a day care center. It is suspected that 

the device was meant to detonate when police arrived, 

but it was rendered safe. Later that month, on September 16 in Ciudad Victoria, a car bomb was detonated 

in the Colonia 7 de Noviembre in Ciudad Victoria, but 

no casualties were reported. In October, a Mexican 

army patrol was targeted in a car bomb ambush, but 

no injuries resulted. Finally, on December 18, 2011, a 

car bomb exploded outside a police station in Zuazua, 

Nuevo León, injuring three.52

The growing sophistication of Mexican cartel car 

bombs can be better understood by looking at an initial tactical analysis of the early morning October 20, 

2011, car bomb ambush directed against a Mexican 

military patrol on Avenida Revolucion in Monterrey:

. . . A cell phone detonated improvised explosive device (IED) placed inside the trunk of a small sedan is 

the most plausible—making it a VBIED (vehicle borne 

IED)—method of attack. The explosive type utilized is 

unknown but C-4 is quite probable; these assumptions 

have not been confirmed forensically and therefore are only 

speculative. A cartel vehicle was used as bait to bring a 

mounted Mexican Army patrol into the prepared kill 

zone. The VBIED was detonated prematurely with no 

soldiers or civilians injured in the ambush. Scenario 

1: The VBIED was meant to be utilized in an efficient 

anti-vehicular/anti-personnel role to produce maximum Mexican military causalities. The ambush was 

unsuccessful due to the premature VBIED detonation 

and/or the explosive yield/dynamics utilized (small 
21

yield/non-directional). Scenario 2: The VBIED was 

utilized symbolically (as a warning) to the Mexican 

military to cease/limit their operations in Monterrey...

No matter the accuracy of either scenario, this incident 

represents the first recorded use of a VBIED against 

a mounted Mexican Army patrol and a further escalation of VBIED tactical evolution taking place in the 

criminal insurgencies in Mexico. . . .53

Additional attacks were threatened in December, 

with car bombings resuming 1 month later in January 

2012, with eight total incidents taking place through 

July. In Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, the state police 

station was targeted with a car containing explosives 

in the trunk parked next to it. The car had been left 

next to the police station on the night of January 9, had 

luckily failed to detonate, and was disarmed by Mexican Federal police bomb disposal experts early the 

next morning.54 Then, on March 19, a car bomb was 

used to target the Expreso newspaper in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas. The device exploded at 8:15 p.m. 

on Monday on Avenida Los Almendros next to the 

newspaper building. No casualties resulted from the 

blast, but a couple of nearby vehicles and the building 

did suffer some property damage, and the newspaper 

website was down the next morning.55

On April 24, a car bomb was detonated in front of 

the building housing the attorney general of Tamaulipas and various state and municipal police agencies 

in Nuevo Laredo. The low yield device, suspected of 

belonging to the Sinaloa cartel, was set off at 8:00 a.m. 

on Tuesday morning. Pictures of the incident show 

minor fragmentation damage to a guard post, limiting perimeter access, and to a section of the building. 

Minor window breakage, the partial destruction of 

the actual pickup truck that contained the device, and 
22

a nearby patrol car, are also evident. No casualties 

resulted from the detonation, however, an ensuing 

firefight between Mexican soldiers and armed cartel 

gunmen was reported to have taken place right after 

the bombing.56

The next bombing also took place in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas—this time on May 24, 2012. The attack came at 5:30 a.m. on Thursday morning and was 

initiated by the Zetas against state police, who were 

barracked at the Hotel Santa Cecilia. Eight law enforcement officers and two civilians were wounded 

in what turned out to be a combined arms attack that 

began with gunfire directed against the hotel, followed by the detontation of a car bomb. Damage to 

the façade of an “L” shaped corner of a small motel 

with parking next to the rooms was evident in photos 

of the incident. Three of the officers sustained thirddegree burns, which suggests that the initial gunfire 

drew them into the killing zone right outside of their 

rooms with the bomb placed in a pickup truck parked 

next to them. A police car and a privately owned car 

were also damaged from the detonation.57

A minor car bombing incident then took place in 

Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, on Wednesday, June 

6, 2012, at a Renualt and Volkswagen car dealership. 

Two vehicles were engulfed in flames by means of 

grenades or some other explosive device, which set 

their gas tanks on fire. Rather than a targeted attack 

against law enforcement or military personnel, this 

incident appears to simply represent arson for extortion purposes being directed at the car dealership by 

either the Zetas or the Gulf/Sinaloa cartels.58 The city 

hall in Nuevo Laredo was then targeted by a bomb 

placed in a Ford Ranger pickup on Friday, June 29, 

2012. The detonation of the device took place at 11:00 
23

a.m. in the morning, injured seven people, and caused 

damage to 11 nearby vehicles, the side of the city hall, 

and local businesses. The blast was large enough for 

a plume of smoke to be seen from the U.S. side of the 

border. Of note is that the pickup was parked next to 

the mayor’s parking spot, and the incident took place 

48 hours prior to the national presidential elections 

in Mexico.59

On Tuesday, July 3, 2012, a car bomb was detonated in Ciudad Victoria in front of the private residence 

of the top security official in the state of Tamaulipas a 

few days after the national elections. The blast killed 

two police officers and wounded seven police officers 

and civilians. Damage to nearby vehicles was evident 

in an incident photo. The car bomb was said to be cell 

phone activated and was parked near the security barrier on the street just outside the official’s residence.60

Finally, on Tuesday, July 31, 2012, a bomb in a stolen car was detonated at a gas station in Culiacán, 

Sinaloa. No one was injured in the incident, and several homemade bombs were recovered from the car 

wreckage. No other information was provided in the 

news report.61

ANALYSIS AND FUTURE CAR BOMBING 

POTENTIALS IN MEXICO AND THE UNITED 

STATES

The present round of cartel car bomb deployment 

since July 2008 has been gradually increasing albeit in 

a sporadic and haphazard manner, with about 20 incidents now identified. It has been primarily directed at 

Mexican law enforcement and military personnel and 

officials. Secondary deployment against media and 

business interests has also been identified—although 
24

it is unclear if the nonmedia business establishments 

were always the intended targets, and whether incendiary attacks via hand grenade detonation of car fuel 

tanks, rather than actual explosives, were TTP utilized.62 Still, these recent cartel deployment patterns 

in Mexico suggest the following reasons for car bomb 

use have taken place. It is expected that these patterns 

will continue into the near future: 

1. Primary Use Reasons 

• Threats and Warnings 

• Psychological Warfare/Terrorism 

2. Secondary Use Reasons

• Diversion Creation

• Anti-personnel Targeting

• Anti-vehicular/Anti-materiel Targeting

To date, no direct evidence exists to suggest that 

car bombs have been used in intercartel engagements. 

Instead, the cartels have relied upon direct ambushes 

and armed assaults to combat each other, but this 

could change if a specific cartel faces an existential 

threat from another cartel (or the state). Precedent for 

a reversion to intercartel car bomb deployment can be 

drawn to the Arellano Felix and Sinaloa conflict in the 

early 1990s. Further, at varying points in the narcoconflict, it is likely that cartels will have different use 

trajectories ranging from nondeployment to some of 

the deployment patterns described previously. Cartels either confirmed or alleged to have attempted or 

conducted car bombings are the Tijuana cartel (1990s 

only), the Juárez cartel, the Gulf cartel, Los Zetas, 

and even the Sinaloa cartel—which is not normally 

thought to use such weapons:
25

The use of car bombs is a strategy used primarily 

by the Sinaloa cartel, which has allied with the Gulf 

Cartel to fight the Zetas, said a Mexican federal law 

enforcement official who asked not to be named for 

security reasons.

‘The Zetas typically use grenades, but the Sinaloans 

are a little more sophisticated when it comes to that 

and used explosives,’ the official said in Spanish. 

‘Car bombs have been employed in Nuevo Laredo, 

Monterrey, Victoria and the Tamaulipas coast city of 

Tampico, which are contested cities,’ the official said. 

‘Depending on where those groups are fighting, that’s 

where you could see’ the bombs.63

Still, even with the statement provided by the Mexican official, intercartel engagements using car bombs 

cannot be substantiated—at best, they may be targeting each other’s co-opted law enforcement proxies.

Of further note is a lack of car bomb deployment allegations directed against La Familia Michoacana and 

Los Caballeros Templarios (The Knights Templar). 

While these groups—both the initial and the successor organization—have utilized IEDs, fragmentation 

grenades, and even heavier infantry weapons such 

as rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), no attempted 

use of car bombs have been identified to date. This is 

significant because the spirituality of Los Caballeros 

Templarios appears increasingly conducive to martyrdom potentials—derived from retro-Christian “blood 

of the lamb” symbolism—which, if combined with 

the VBIED TTP, results in Mexican cartel suicide car 

bomber potentials.

Also, no evidence of present Mexican cartel car 

bomb deployment for anti-infrastructure purposes exists such as that undertaken in Colombia by the Medellin and Cali cartels. Fred Burton, Chief Security Officer 
26

of STRATFOR, provided a well-articulated analysis 

in a video report on this subject. His analysis suggests 

that while the “capability” to deploy large scale car 

bombs against public buildings presently exists, the 

“intent” to undertake such attacks by the Mexican 

cartels does not.64 One example of the capability possessed by the cartels is illustrated by the February 2009 

raid upon an explosives magazine operated by a company from Texas doing business in Durango, Mexico:

Two white Suburban-type SUV’s rolled up and 15 to 

20 masked men stepped out bearing automatic rifles.

‘The security guards were ordered at gunpoint to 

open the magazine, and the gunmen made off with a 

large quantity of Tovex brand explosives and electric 

detonators,’ reads a report by the United States Bomb 

Data Center obtained by GlobalPost. . . .

. . . The report states that 267.75 pounds or 900 cartridges of the explosives as well as 230 electric detonators were taken. . . .65

That amount of explosive material is about 10 

times the yield of the low yield car bombs deployed by 

the cartels to date. Even more explosives, “412 chubs 

(plastic sleeves) of hydrogel commercial explosives” 

were seized from the cartels along with “36 electric 

detonators and more than 11 meters of detonation 

cord” in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, in April 2011.66

It is thought by Burton and others that the cartels 

are not deploying larger yield car bombs because of 

the immense jumping of a “firebreak” such an escalatory deployment would represent. Crossing it would 

not only potentially trigger public outrage, but also 

possibly further escalate the state crackdown on the 

perpetrator cartel involved with using such a large 
27

VBIED—it might even trigger increased U.S. governmental support to Mexico over what would be considered a watershed event. Of note, however, is the 

possible recent use of hand grenade detonation of car 

fuel tanks for arson purposes. This would represent 

a more subtle form of anti-infrastructure attack that 

would limit the media effect if done after hours to an 

establishment containing few to no employees. 

Forecasting mid- and long-term cartel car bomb 

deployment patterns is more problematic. Although 

the devices employed to date are relatively crude and 

have yet to yield a high casualty count, over the last 

few years, they have increasingly been used as a tool 

of confrontation. As the conflict matures, it is plausible that the use and quality (tactical lethality) of car 

bombs will increase as a similar escalation has been 

seen in other conflicts.67

Mexico’s criminal insurgencies appear to be escalating not only with the use of car bombs, but other 

explosives including hand grenades (many apparently stolen from Central American military arsenals) 

are also being employed. Clearly, grenades are not 

new in the Mexican narco-war, with thousands being 

seized from the gangs and cartels during the Calderón presidency.68 In fact, in one well-known incident 

on September 15, 2008, sicarios tossed grenades into a 

crowd celebrating Mexico’s independence in Morelia, 

Michoacán, killing eight people and wounding more 

than 100. 

Grenades have also been used in assaults on police 

convoys and public officials, foreshadowing future 

car bomb potentials. Additionally, in the roughly 3 

1/2-year period preceding July 2010, the Mexican attorney general’s office made public the fact that 101 

grenade attacks against government buildings had 

taken place.69
28

Further concerns over increases in the tactical lethality of cartel weaponry can be witnessed by the 

appearance of more sophisticated systems such as 

claymore mines, mortar shells, and various forms of 

anti-tank munitions such as Russian RPGs and older 

U.S. LAWs.70 All of these weapons have the potential 

to be incorporated into future cartel VBIED systems 

to boost their effectiveness and/or be used in tandem 

with those systems in a combined arms manner. 

So, while a firebreak on cartel car bomb use for 

anti-infrastructure purposes presently exists, it cannot 

be considered sacrosanct. Wounded cartels, like wild 

animals, may be willing to resort to drastic measures 

(or at least threaten to undertake them) if they feel cornered. This was evident with the Juárez cartel (aka the 

Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization) following their 

July 2010 use of a car bomb ambush against responding police: 

La Linea threatened to employ a far larger IED (100 

kilograms, or 220 pounds) if the FBI and the U.S. Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) did not investigate the head of Chihuahua State Police intelligence, 

whom the VCF claimed was working for the Sinaloa 

Federation.71

The U.S. Government then went on to recognize 

the seriouness of cartel VBIED potentials in Mexico 

and deployed protective barriers at the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey on April 5, 2011.72 With this in mind, 

steady state, slowly increasing, and quickly increasing 

car bomb use potentials in Mexico exists. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment currently 

appears unlikely—especially for analysts who have 

watched the death toll steadily rise in Mexico from the 

thousands to the low tens-of-thousands to likely now 
29

over 80,000 individuals during the 6-year Calderón 

administration.73

 These use trajectories include a continuation of 

the intermittent and targeted (discrete violence) with 

low yields currently evident. The next level up is deployment patterns seen moving on to a mid-range potential where cartels employ car bombs in occasional 

and targeted high yield attacks (targeting police military and government facilities with more lethal variants of current platforms). A final and dire potential 

is frequent and indiscriminate use of car bombs (to 

kill lots of people); this represents the worst case—an 

unlikely potential scenario and representative of what 

took place back in Colombia decades ago. Thus far, 

car bombs have been used mainly in symbolic attacks 

against police—in fact, the total of all the dead and 

wounded from all cartel car bombs detonated to date 

in Mexico have not, as of yet, surpassed the casualties from the singular 2008 Morelia grenade attack. At 

best, these contemporary attacks were likely intended 

to dissuade and disrupt enforcement actions by police and military forces (or in the case of the Televisa 

and Expreso attacks, to shape reportage of cartel action). This use is largely symbolic violence with an 

instrumental purpose. Crude, small yield devices suffice to make the statement. Should the cartels seek to 

engage in higher levels of direct confrontation with 

the state (including police and military forces), they 

may seek to use more sophisticated or higher yield devices. Similar potentials have to at least be considered 

should the cartels opt to use car bombs as instruments 

of retaliation for arrests by the Mexican government 

or against other cartels—at that point, the potentials 

for Colombian level car bombing casualties in the 

hundreds may exist.
30

The specter of car bombings in Mexico’s drug war 

also raises concerns across the border in the United 

States. These concerns include fear that the extreme 

violence of Mexico’s criminal insurgency could spill 

over into the United States. Beheadings, mass executions, the use of improvised armored vehicles (narcotanks), social cleansing, and internally displaced persons suggest a macabre conflict has already emerged 

in Mexico.74 In fact, since about 2006, beheadings have 

gone from a relatively unheard of event to more than 

1,300 of them now being documented in the conflict 

between the gangs, cartels, and the Mexican state.75

Amplified by political concerns about illegal migration, some even see an alien horde ready to cross 

the Rio Grande, wreaking havoc throughout the United States, where Mexican cartels now operate in well 

over 1,000 cities.76 Since some cartels have threatened 

U.S. law enforcement officials—even at times placing 

bounties for their killing77—a concern is that cartels 

will ambush American police, potentially with car 

bombs used in an anti-personnel and/or anti-vehicular role. In one incident, a street gang member actually 

threw a fragmentation grenade into a Pharr, Texas, 

bar containing off duty officers in January 2009.78 Precedent for such an ambush scenario can be drawn to 

a June 2008 Phoenix, AZ, incident in which a cartel 

kill-team was dressed in local special weapons attack 

team (SWAT) gear (an older uniform type) and, after a successful assassination of a local drug dealer, 

attempted to draw a responding police officer into 

an ambush.79

Other scenarios include attacks on U.S. diplomatic 

personnel and consulates in Mexico, as well as attacks 

on border infrastructure or even U.S. Army posts and 

guard armories. However, the use of car bombs, at 
31

least on U.S. soil and directed at U.S. governmental 

personnel operating in Mexico, is presently far from a 

likely potential.80 Organized crime groups (including 

the Mexican cartels) are more likely to seek to evade 

or corrupt and co-opt state actors than to confront the 

state, especially as one as strong as the United States.81

Cartel behavior in Mexico, as we have seen, is an entirely different matter, however, and becomes more 

and more emboldened with success as their impunity 

grows. This concern exists especially in towns, cities, 

and regions that fall under their de facto politicial control—many of which just happen to reside close to the 

U.S. border—because it may result in “hybrid” cartel 

behavior in some sovereign U.S. territory, which is 

less brazen than that found in Mexico but bolder than 

traditionally encountered in the United States.82

If cartel car bombs were to be eventually deployed 

on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in 

Mexico such as our consulates, we could expect that 

a pattern of I&W would be evident prior to such an 

attack or attacks.83 In that case, I&W would be drawn 

from precursor events such as grenade and IED attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and 

facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico, especially concerning increases in tactical lethality and a shift toward antiinfrastructure targeting. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Essentially, the problem faced by both Mexican 

military and police agencies and U.S. police agencies 

is that combating potential high intensity/criminal 

insurgency attacks employing car bombs demands 

real-time intelligence support and superb tactical 
32

and operational command, control, and communications, all of which require new doctrine, training, 

and equipment. Basically, we are seeing the need to 

develop “intra-conflict” policing capacity. Such a capacity requires embracing “full-spectrum policing” 

where police can quickly shift from individual community policing duties into a formed unit (contact or 

fire teams and squads for close quarters battle) for 

tactical engagements against an armed and organized 

opposing force. 

While nobody likes to admit it, the very real need 

for true “combat policing” capability beyond SWAT 

focused training that pertains to stacked tactics against 

one or two lightly armed and reactive barricade suspects now exists. Initially, capability gap concerns 

were expressed pertaining to al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda 

inspired operations taking place on U.S. soil, along 

with later Hezbollah linked terrorist potentials with 

some of these concerns drawn from the Beslan middle 

school massacre that took place in September 2004 and 

resulted in the death and injury of hundreds of children.84 Recent examples of Mexcian cartel linked incidents in the United States that have prompted such 

needs being discussed include the November 2011 

incidents in which a three-vehicle Zetas commando 

got into a firefight with law enforcement near Houston, TX, and several U.S. SWAT teams were deployed 

against over a dozen armed cartel and gang members 

who had crossed the border near Escobares, TX, after 

fleeing from a Mexican military offensive.85

These new capabilities are needed in Mexico, 

throughout Latin America, and here in the United 

States. To date, Mexico’s Federal police have been 

building a force structure that emphasizes the tactical 

gendarmerie-type skill set over the community police 
33

capabilities needed to sustain urban security. Development of the full range of police capacity, at all levels 

of the Mexican state (federal, state, and municipal), 

is essential. It goes without saying that such capacity 

must be corruption-free. This necessitates sustained 

police reform and significant capacity building.

The hybrid skills demanded by “full spectrum 

policing” would benefit from enhanced law enforcement-military interaction for assessing emerging conflict, developing tactical and operational doctrine, and 

cross training. It is not simply a matter of bringing 

counterinsurgency (COIN) skills to the police service, 

but rather a reciprocal exchange of knowledge and 

experience to address “inter-conflict policing” where 

community policing and COIN converge to address 

the intersection of crime and war. At the strategic 

level, there is a need to define the role of police-military interaction for convergent threats such as transnational organized crime, criminal insurgency, and 

crime in conflict zones. This may require new force 

structures (such as expeditionary police), as well as 

integrating existing capacities (such as formulating 

the traditional Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military, and 

Economic [DIME] as DIME-P, adding the police service). Building an adaptive response capacity to address urban terrorist tactics—including car bombs—

employed in the criminal insurgencies now occurring 

in Mexico and parts of Central America is essential.86 

This requires more than explosive ordnance disposal 

(EOD) or bomb squad responses. Explosives and ambush awareness must be integrated into all police and 

emergency (fire/EMS; emergency medical services) 

response at the general service (patrol, first response) 

levels in the United States and Latin America. The lessons learned in countering car bombs and IEDs in Iraq 
34

and Afghanistan, and now Mexico, must be shared 

and integrated into evolving public safety doctrine 

and emerging police operational art.

Derived from the future cartel car bombing potentials identified for Mexico, and also those potentials 

as they pertain to U.S. personnel and facilities on 

both sides of the border, and the preceding conclusions reached concerning the need for “full-spectrum 

policing” with the inclusion of a developed “combatpolicing” capability, some initial response recommendations will be suggested. These response recommendations will be focused upon how the U.S. Army and 

the broader U.S. defense community—which have 

had recent extensive experience with IEDs, car bombs, 

and terrorist and insurgent tactics in the Iraqi and 

AfPak areas of operation—can better support both: 

a) the military and the federal, state, and local police 

agencies of the Mexican state; and, b) the various U.S. 

federal, state, and local police agencies operating near 

the U.S.-Mexican border:

These recommendations will be clustered into four 

thematic areas and will be generalized for both internal Mexican and U.S. border region requirements. The 

extent to which these forms of support may be provided should be considered situational and based on a 

determinaiton of need derived from the severity of the 

car bombing, and overall Mexican cartel, threat projected. These initial recommendations for U.S. Army 

and defense community support are as follows: 

• Intelligence. The basic historical overview of Colombian and Mexican cartel VBIED (and IEDs 

in cars) incidents and the indications and warnings (I&W) discussion prior to the resumption 

of a new wave of car bombings in Mexico can 

be greatly expanded upon via the use of infor-
35

mation beyond that provided by open source 

intelligence (OSINT). Such information, and 

the military intelligence process behind it that 

focuses on futures and enemy intent—rather 

than backwards looking criminal intelligence 

that attempts to link a perpetrator in time and 

space back to a specific crime—is vital for both 

Mexican and U.S law enforcement to better understand and plan for a tactical and operational 

environment in which car bombs, IEDs, and 

infantry weapons utilized by cartel and gang 

members exist. The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), a component of United 

States Army Intelligence and Security Command (USAISC), would be a natural candidate 

for this tasking, as potentially would be the U.S. 

Army Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) 

with its non-state threat analysis—though the 

intelligence training and products produced 

would be required to be at the unclassified, yet 

limited distribution/sensitive and non-restriction on use OSINT levels for law enforcement 

utilization. 

• Organization. Past law enforcement organizational emphasis has focused on tactical level 

applications—typically with either one or two 

officers assigned to a patrol car. SWAT teams 

in smaller cities and towns are considered a 

collateral duty, as opposed to dedicated teams 

in major cities, and at best will typically be 

composed of a 4-5 man fire team or roughly 

a 11-man squad equivalent unit with more 

advanced teams fielding a combat medic. In 

rural policing situations, a lone deputy can be 

expected to cover a wide geographic area and 
36

will be the first on scene to active shooter (agressor) incidents with no backup for long periods 

of time. For U.S. law enforcement to begin to 

gain an upper tier ‘combat-policing’ capability 

in the face of Mexican cartel threats, new organizational policing forms need to be explored. 

For border law enforcement found in the larger 

cities, this would likely include platoon size (3 

squads) manuever elements. Further, SWAT, 

bomb squad, and air resources integrated together will be required to mitigate some potential threat scenarios involving cartel kill-teams 

integrated with IEDs and/or car bomb deployment. Swarming principals—derived from the 

work of John Arquilla—which are influencing 

U.S. Department of Defense organizational 

thinking also provide immediate utility for U.S 

and Mexican law enforcement, especially in 

more rural areas where law enforcement officers will respond to an incident in a hasty and 

adhoc manner.87 Hence, the U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) would be 

of immense benefit in providing organizational 

support thinking to law enforcement on both 

sides of the border.

• Training. Law enforcement is used to functioning in an operational environment characterized by that of crime—not one characterized by 

conflict and war. As a result, law enforcement 

officers on both sides of the border do not normally understand military concepts, much less 

perceptions of an opposition force (OPFOR) 

that engages in proactive offensive operations, 

drawing upon both physical and psychological 

forms of violence, designed to eliminate armed 
37

organized resistance. Further, both authors 

have trained rooms full of law enforcement officers who, save for some reserve and former 

military personnel, were unable to identify basic 

military weaponry such as 40mm grenades for 

the U.S. M203 grenade launcher or understand 

common military acrynoms such as OODA 

loops or OPSEC. Service and joint programs, 

such as U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Joint IED Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO), can provide both basic training in 

such areas as IED/Car Bomb/Infantry Weapons 

Awareness, Basic Infantry Tactics/Force Protection, 

and Counterintelligence/OPSEC for general law 

enforcement units and more specific training 

on topics such as Insurgent IED/Car Bomb TTPs/

Countermeasures for bomb squad personnel.

U.S. SWAT teams, in some jurisdictions, are also 

now benefiting from MACTAC (Multi-Assault Counter-Terrorism Action Capabilities) training that is military inspired. This training, when combined with a 

grounding in the use of the U.S. Army Standard 9-line 

UXO Report and counter-IED awarneness, would significantly help promote increased SWAT capability 

against VBIED and ambush derived IED threats. 

• Equipment. Over a decade of U.S. Army campaigning in Iraq and Afghanistan has provided 

the organization with an intimate knowledge of 

IEDs, car bombs, and other insurgent ambush 

techniques. Specific equipment requirements 

and a vetting of COTS (commercial off-theshelf) products from lessons learned and paid 

in the blood of our service personnel has resulted in a wealth of expertise that can be directly 
38

provided to Mexican and U.S. law enforcement 

agencies to support their procurement needs. 

The best route for coordinated U.S. law enforcement support would be via the InterAgency 

Board (IAB) for Equipment Standardization and 

Interoperability, which has a special emphasis 

on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 

or Explosive (CBRNE) issues. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) should also have a 

direct role in supporting this process. Support 

to Mexican governmental authorities should 

be directed through SEDENA (Secretaría de la 

Defensa Nacional) for the Army and Air Force 

and through SEMAR (Secretaría de Marina) for 

the Navy. Both armed forces are actively engaging the cartels, with the Army being used 

for stability and support operations and the 

Navy primary engaging in more specialized 

operations against the cartel leadership. U.S. 

military equipment support to Mexican law 

enforcement, however, will be more problematic, with currently two federal agencies, 31 

state agencies, and well over 1,500 municipal 

agencies existing. 

Reappraisal of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878—

enacted in a far different domestic security environment bereft of armed and organized nonstate threat 

entities able to challenge states—is also required if 

we are to lift some legal restrictions on U.S. military 

support to U.S. law enforcement agencies.88 These 

recommendations, will, of course, also be required 

to be integrated and subordinated to ongoing U.S. 

initiatives and programs—such as Mérida Initiative 

and follow-on congressional authorizations—and 
39

ongoing U.S. domestic law enforcement support 

operations initiated by the DEA, elements of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other U.S. 

governmental agencies.89

Addressing the challenges posed by cartel sicarios

is a hemispheric security challenge. In addition to internal U.S. military efforts and U.S. support to Mexican military (both SEDENA and SEMAR) and law enforcement (at all levels: federal, state, and municipal), 

support should also be extended to Central American 

states facing cartel and gang challenges. An important initiative in this regard is the dramatic increase 

in senior leader engagements and Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEE)/Mobile Training Team (MTT) 

activities between the Mexico branch of US Army 

North’s (ARNORTH) Security Cooperation Division 

and SEDENA. These engagements and activities have 

gone from three in FY 2009 to 98 in FY 2012.90

Additionally, Mexican security agencies (the afforementioned military and police, as well as CISEN-Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, the PGR-Procuraduría General de la República, and state prosecutors) 

need the knowledge and skills to recognize, avoid, or 

contain; safely respond to; and render safe car bombs 

and other IEDs. They also need the forensic science 

skills to investigate car bomb crime scenes and prepare cases for prosecution. It is not enough to transfer 

skills to the military. Local responders are potential 

targets of attack and likely the first to respond to a 

bomb scene. Police and other local level responders 

(emergency medical services), the Cruz Rojo Mexicana 

(Mexican Red Cross), and bomberos firefighters need 

the skills to safely respond to, contain, and investigate 

car bomb attacks. This requires comprehensive civilmilitary security sector support.
40

Ultimately, a comprehensive U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) strategy should be developed in coordination with the Mexican government 

that integrates all elements of national power to mitigate and counter Mexican cartel use of car bombs and 

other forms of violence and corruption manifesting 

themselves in Mexico and increasingly in the United 

States. To best serve our national interests, however, 

this comprehensive strategy should also be integrated 

with the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) 

to create a Western Hemispheric strategy to combat 

gang, cartel, and other criminal insurgent threats to 

the Americas.91

ENDNOTES

1. Felipe Calderón, Cuatro Informe De Gobierno (4th Governance Report), Mexican Federal Government, Mexico City, 

Mexico, September 2010, available from translate.google.com/

translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=cuarto.informe.calderon.presidencia.gob.

mx/resumen-ejecutivo/&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dcalderon%2Binforme

%2B2010%26hl%3Den%26safe%3Doff%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26hs

%3DfRH%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en, English translation. 

2. Ibid.; Ken Ellingwood, “Mexico’s Crackdown on Organized 

Crime Is Working, Calderón Says.” Los Angeles Times, September 

2, 2010, available from articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/02/world/la-fgmexico-informe-20100902.

3. General elections were subsequently held in Mexico on July 

1, 2012, with the PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto winning the 

presidential election. He assumed office on December 1, 2012.

4. Calderón, Cuatro Informe De Gobierno.

5. Associated Press, “Drug War: 2 Bodies Hung from Bridge 

on Road to Acapulco,” Daily Breeze, August 24, 2010, available 

from www.dailybreeze.com/ci_15880607?source=pkg; E. Eduardo 

Castillo and Mark Steveson, “Drug Cartel Suspected in Massacre 

of 72 Migrants,” Associated Press, August 26, 2010. 
41

6. John P. Sullivan, “Explosive Escalation? Reflections on 

the Car Bombing in Ciudad Juarez,” Small Wars Journal, July 

21, 2010, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/07/

explosive-escalation/.

7. The chapter in Davis provides the best overview of Colombian cartel bombings, though, it is still very limited in nature. See 

“Los Coches Bomba,” Mike Davis, Buda’s Wagon: A Brief History of 

the Car Bomb, London, UK: Verso, 2007, pp. 108-115.

8. See RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents 

(RDWTI), Santa Monica, CA: RAND, available from smapp.rand.

org/rwtid/search.php; and Global Terrorism Database (GTD), National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 

Terrorism, University Park, MD: University of Maryland, available from www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search.

9. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) yielded one unique 

cartel car bombing in Table 1 compiled for this Paper. Neither database contained most of the major car bombings incidents highlighted. Further attempts to identify actual car bombing incidents 

in the GTD is extremely tedious.

10. Ron Chepesiuk, Drug Lords: The Rise and Fall of the Cali 

Cartel, Wrea Green Preston, UK: Milo Books Ltd., 2003. 

11. Davis, p. 110.

12. Chepesiuk, Drug Lords, pp. 134-136.

13. Davis, pp. 111-112.

14. Chepesiuk, Drug Lords, p. 129.

15. Ibid.

16. Ron Chepesiuk, The Bullet or the Bribe: Taking Down Colombia’s Cali Drug Cartel, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, p. 129; and 

Alan Riding, “Gangs in Colombia Feud Over Cocaine,” New York 

Times, August 23, 1988.
42

17. The GTD contains many of these incidents but only in 

fragmentary form.

18. Some potential historical cartel bombing incident information may reside with the New York and Miami-Dade police 

departments and/or within the institutional memory of some retired Bomb Squad personnel, but such information would not be 

made available to the public. 

19. Billy Corben, director, Cocaine Cowboys, DVD, Rakontur 

Film Venture One LLC and Magnolia Home Entertainment, Los 

Angeles, CA: Corben, 2005. Ayala is serving multiple life sentences for the cartel killings in which he was involved. In a deleted 

interview scene, he explained how he learned in Miami to use 

bombs composed of sticks of dynamite, detonator, wires, battery, 

and a timer. See deleted scene 8, “Rivi Guns and Bombs.” 

20. Numerous keyword searches for car bomb use were conducted, including those in the newspaper archives of the New 

York Times and Miami Herald.

21. Davis, p. 114.

22. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Cartel Evolution: 

Potentials and Consequences,” Transnational Organized Crime, No. 

4, Summer 1998, pp. 55-74. Note that in June 1995, the Cali cartel 

detonated a car bomb at a music festival, killing at least 30 and 

wounding 200. This was undertaken as an act of desperation as 

the Cali cartel was in the process of being eliminated, and one of 

its leaders, Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, had recently been captured. See Davis, p. 115.

23. Ibid. Ultimately, Pablo Escobar turned on many of his old 

associates who were taken to the La Cathedral prison and subsequently tortured and killed. Those associates not killed by Pablo, 

and the surviving family members of those killed by him, increasingly turned against him. See Chepesiuk, Drug Lords, pp. 152-153; 

and Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo, New York: Penguin, 2002, p. 118.

24. The Medellin cartel also blew up Avianca Flight 203, killing all 107 passengers aboard in November 1989, as part of an assassination plot, and the Cali cartel attempted to launch an opera-
43

tion in 1992 in which bombs would be dropped on Pablo Escobar 

from an airplane while he was in La Cathedral prison. Each incident reinforces the mass violence and more discriminate violence 

tendencies of these warring cartels.

25. This incident centered on Colombian cartel violence tied 

back to Griselda Blanco and others. The shooters at the mall escaped in a “war wagon” (a truck with steel plating, gun muzzle 

slots, hanging police-issue body armor for added protection, and 

14 weapons) that they later abandoned. See Guy Gugliotta and 

Jeff Leen, Kings of Cocaine, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989, 

pp. 9-16; and the film by Corben. 

26. Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson, International Terrorism: 

Chronology (1974 Supplement) R-1909-1-ARPA, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, February 1976, p. 7.

27. Anonymous, “Wave of Anarchist Bombings Strikes Mexico.” Infoshop News, October 6, 2009, available from news.infoshop.

org/article.php?story=20091006142457315; Associated Press, “IBM, 

McDonald’s Bombed in Mexican Capital; Leftists Take Responsibility,” Los Angeles Times, August 16, 1991, available from articles.

latimes.com/1991-08-16/news/mn-604_1_mexico-city; Jose Rodríguez, “Bombings in Mexico—A Sign of Upcoming Unrest?” Mexidata.info, n.d.; and Tracy Wilkinson, “Mexico City Blast Sparks 

Fears Violence Will Spread,” Los Angeles Times, January 9, 1994, 

available from articles.latimes.com/1994-01-09/news/mn-10200_1_

mexico-city-blast.

28. A terrorism database search from January 1, 1968, on with 

the keywords “Mexico” and “Bombing” was conducted using the 

RDWTI with 52 record matches. A GTD search was also conducted from 1970 to the present. The search criteria were all incidents 

regardless of doubt, weapons (explosives/bombs/dynamite), 

attacks (bombing/explosion), and country (Mexico), with 84 incident results. The RDWTI provides superior summaries of the 

incidents.

29. RDWTI, July 17, 1972, Unknown, Mexico (Record 1).

30. RDWTI, November 8, 1974, Unknown, Mexico 

(Record 18).
44

31. RDWTI, April 26, 1986, Commando Internacionalista Simon Bolivar, Mexico (Record 35).

32. Malcolm Beith, The Last Narco, New York: Grove Press, 

2010, p. 73. Incident not listed in RDWTI or GTD datasets.

33. Times Wire Services, “Car Bomb at Mexico Hotel Kills 

5; Drug Link Suspected,” Los Angeles Times, June 12, 1994, available from articles.latimes.com/1994-06-12/news/mn-3431_1_druglink-suspected. This incident is listed with only fragmentary information as GTD ID:199406130001. No subsequent car bomb entries 

for either the RDWTI or GTD datasets exist after this date.

34. Barnard R. Thompson, “The Mexican Drug War: Is It 

‘Narcoterrorism’” (Reprinted from www.mexidata.info), Open 

Democracy, August 17, 2010, available from www.opendemocracy.

net/barnard-r-thompson/mexican-drug-war-is-it-narcoterrorism.

35. This mistake cost the Tijuana cartel dearly and required 

massive bribes to be paid to Mexican government and law enforcement officials to ensure the integrity of the cartel’s leadership 

and operations. See Robert J. Caldwell, “Cartel Secrets: Top-Level 

Insider Reveals the Cartel’s Most Guarded Info,” The San Diego 

Union-Tribune, July 1, 2007, available from www.signonsandiego.

com/uniontrib/20070701/news_lz1e1cartel.html.

36. Associated Press, “Police: Crude Car Bomb Found at Mexico Shopping Center,” AP Wordstream, August 18, 2005, available 

from www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-112252641.html. 

37. GTD, 04/12/2006, ID 200604120013 and GTD, 08/24/2006, 

ID 200608240006.

38. Dudley Althaus and Marion Lloyd, “Homemade Bomb 

Explodes in Mexico City, Killing Man,” Houston Chronicle, February 16, 2010, available from www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/

world/5546550.html. 

39. Ioan Grillo, “Is Mexico’s Drug War Escalating?” Time, 

February 19, 2008, available from www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1714490,00.html; and STRATFOR, “El Patron and the 

IED,” Mexico Security Memo, March 3, 2008. 
45

40. GTD, 09/15/2008, ID 200809150001.

41. Robin Emmott and Ignacio Alvarado, “Mexico Drug Traffickers Make Car Bombs,” Reuters, July 16, 2008, available from 

uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN1652282020080716.

42. Ibid.

43. Additionally, 101 grenade attacks against government 

buildings have taken place during the last 3 1/2 years, according 

to the Mexican attorney general’s office. Nick Miroff and William 

Booth, “Mexican Drug Cartels’ Newest Weapon: Cold War-Era 

Grenades Made in U.S.,” The Washington Post, July 17, 2010.

44. Sullivan, “Explosive Escalation?”

45. Ibid.

46. See Scott Stewart, “The Perceived Car Bomb Threat in 

Mexico,” STRATFOR, April 13, 2011.

47. Davis, pp. 1-3.

48.“Mexico Drug Traffickers Make Car Bombs,” Reuters, 

July 16, 2008, available from uk.reuters.com/article/2008/07/16/ukmexico-drugs-idUKN1652282020080716.

49. CNN, “Car Bomb Rocks Government Offices in Tamaulipas, Mexico,” August 6, 2010, available from edition.cnn.com/2010/

WORLD/americas/08/05/mexico.bomb/#fbid=ytam6KHKbli&wom=fal

se; and “Car Bomb Blast in Northern Mexico, No Deaths,” Reuters, 

August 5 , 2010, available from www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/06/

us-mexico-drugs-idUSTRE67505J20100806. 

50.“Two Car Bombs Explode in Northern Mexico But No 

Casualties,” Reuters, August 27, 2010; and Center for Journalism and Public Ethics, “Car Bomb Explodes Outside Tamaulipas 

Televisa Offices,” August 30, 2010, available from www.ifex.org/

mexico/2010/08/30/televisa_tamaulipas_car_bomb/. 

51. Scott Stewart, “The Perceived Car Bomb Threat in Mexico,” STRATFOR, April 13, 2011.
46

52. Borderland Beat, “2 car bombs explode in NL,” January 

18, 2011 [Original sources Milenio/El Norte], available from www.

borderlandbeat.com/2011/01/car-bomb-explodes-in-nl.html; Borderland 

Beat, “Car Bomb Wounds 5 in Northeastern Mexico,” March 16, 

2011 [Original source EFE], available from www.borderlandbeat.

com/2011/03/car-bomb-wounds-5-in-northeastern.html; Borderland 

Beat, “Car Bomb Disarmed in Ciudad Juarez,” September 12, 2010 

[Original sources El Paso Times, El Diario de Cd Juarez, and El Agora 

de Chihuahua, available from www.borderlandbeat.com/2010/09/carbomb-disarmed-in-ciudad-juarez.html; Borderland Beat, “Car Bomb 

Disrupts Diez y Seis Celebration in Tamaulipas State Capitol,” 

September 16, 2011 [Original sources Milenio/El Norte], available 

from www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/09/car-bomb-disrupts-diez-y-seis.

html; Borderland Beat, “Monterrey: Army Attacked in Car Bomb 

Ambush,” October 20, 2011 [Original source El Norte], available 

from www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/10/monterrey-army-attacked-incar-bomb.html; Borderland Beat, “Car Bomb Explodes in Zuazua, 

Nuevo Leon; Communication Threatens 11 More,” December 

18, 2010 [Original source Mexican news broadcast], available 

from www.borderlandbeat.com/2010/12/car-bomb-explodes-in-zuazua-nuevo-leon.html; and Emmanuel Rincón, “El coche-bomba 

en Hidalgo, venganza de los ‘Zetas’ contra la policía” (“The Car 

Bomb in Noble, Revenge of the ‘Zeds’ Against the Police”), Excelsior, January 22, 2011, available from www.excelsior.com.mx/index.

php?m=nota&id_nota=706729&rss=1.

53. Robert Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #5: Indications & Warning (I&W): VBIED Anti-Vehicular/Anti-Personnel 

Ambush Capability for Los Zetas Assumed,” Small Wars Journal, 

October 24, 2011, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexican-cartel-tactical-note-5. 

54. Note: About 10 sticks of explosives are evident in a Mexican Federal police photo. Sergio Chapa, “Car Found with Trunk 

Full of Explosives in Ciudad Victoria,” ValleyCentral.com, January 

10, 2012, available from www.valleycentral.com/news/story.aspx?l

ist=~%5Cnews%5Clists%5Crecent&id=706076#.UKKQXrT3C9Y. 

See also EFE, “Explota un coche bomba frente a diario Expreso 

en Tamaulipas, norte de México” (“It Exploits a Car Bomb Set 

Against Newspaper I Express in Tamaulipas, North of Mexico”), 

Univision, March 20, 2012, available from feeds.univision.com/feeds/

article/2012-03-20/explota-un-coche-bomba-frente.
47

55. “Car Bomb Explodes Outside Newspaper Offices in Northern Mexico,” NBCNews.com, March 20, 2012, available from worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/20/10769925-car-bomb-explodesoutside-newspaper-offices-in-northern-mexico?lite. For the Mexican 

governmental statement, see “communicado de la secretaria de 

seguridad publica del estado” (“Communication of the Secretary 

of Seguridad publishes of the State”), March 19, 2012, available 

from tamaulipas.gob.mx/2012/03/comunicado-de-la-secretaria-de-seguridad-publica-del-estado-6/. 

56. “Reafirma El Chapo presencia en Tamaulipas con coche 

bomba” (“It Reaffirms The I Veneer Presence in Tamaulipas with 

Car Bomb”), Blog Del Narco, Martes, April 24, 2012; and News 

staff, “Car Bomb Explosion Followed By Shootout in Nuevo Laredo,” ValleyCentral.com, April 24, 2012, available from www.valleycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=745672#.UKPaq7T3C9Z.

57. News staff, “Photos of Damage from Hotel Car Bombing 

in Nuevo Laredo,” ValleyCentral.com, May 24, 2012, available from 

www.valleycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=758095#.UKPn4bT3C9Y; 

Chris Covert, “10 Wounded in Attack in Nuevo Laredo,” Borderland Beat, May 24, 2012, available from www.borderlandbeat.

com/2012/05/10-wounded-in-attack-in-nuevo-laredo.html; and “Estalla coche bomba en Nuevo Laredo; 8 policías y 2 civiles resultaron heridos” (“Car bomb Explodes in New Laredo; 8 Police Officers and 2 Civilians Turned Out to Be Injured”), La Jornada, May 

25, 2012, p. 16, available from www.jornada.unam.mx/2012/05/25/

politica/016n1pol.

58. Sergio Chapa, “Double Car Bombing Rocks Ciudad Victoria,” ValleyCentral.com, June 6, 2012, available from www.valleycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=762886#.UKPyMrT3C9Y.

59. Jason Buch, “Car Bomb Rocks Nuevo Laredo,” MySanAntonio.com, June 29, 2012, available from www.mysanantonio.

com/news/local_news/article/Car-bomb-rocks-Nuevo-Laredo-3673813.

php; and EFE, “Car Bomb Wounds 7 in Mexican Border City,” 

Fox News Latino, June 29, 2012, available from latino.foxnews.com/

latino/news/2012/06/29/car-bomb-wounds-7-in-mexican-border-city/.
48

60. “Two Killed in Car Bomb in Mexico; Second Such Attack 

in a Week,” Los Angeles Times, July 3, 2012, available from latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/07/two-killed-car-bomb-mexico.

html; and Associated Press, “Mexico Car Bomb Kills 2 Policemen 

Outside Home of Top Police Official,” Huffington Post, July 3, 

2012, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/03/mexicocar-bomb-kills_n_1646862.html.

61. “Mexico: Car Bomb Explodes in Gas Station,” Inforsurhoy, 

August 2, 2012, available from infosurhoy.com/cocoon/saii/xhtml/

en_GB/newsbriefs/saii/newsbriefs/2012/08/02/newsbrief-02. Original 

news sources: AFP, January 8, 2012; Jornada.unam.mx (Mexico), 

January 8, 2012.

62. Covert, “10 wounded in attack in Nuevo Laredo.”

63. Ildefonso Ortiz, “Increased Use of Car Bombs in Tamaulipas Disturbing, Former U.S. Agent Says,” Latino Times, 

July 19, 2012.

64. Fred Burton, “Mexican Cartel Bombmaking: Intent vs. 

Capability (Tearline),” STRATFOR, Video, 3:33 minutes, July 18, 

2012, available from www.stratfor.com/video/mexican-cartel-bombmaking-intent-vs-capability-tearline.

65. Ioan Grillo, “In Juarez Car Bomb, A Ruthless Trap for Police: Raids on American-Owned Explosives Could Be Behind Sophisticated Car Bomb,” Global Post, July 26, 2010, available from 

www.globalpost.com/dispatch/mexico/100723/ciudad-juarez-car-bomb.

66. Stewart, “The Perceived Car Bomb Threat in Mexico,” 

pp. 4-5.

67. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, Suicide bombings in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Land Warfare Paper No. 46W, Arlington, 

VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States 

Army, September 2004, available from www3.ausa.org/webpub/

DeptILW.nsf/byid/KCAT-6E4LEH. 

68. Patrick Corcoran “Salvadoran Defense Minister Says Stolen Grenades Were for the Zetas,” InSight Crime, June 27, 2011, 

available from www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/salvadoran-defenseminister-says-stolen-grenades-were-for-the-zetas.
49

69. Nick Miroff and William Booth, “Mexican Drug Cartels’ 

Newest Weapon: Cold War-Era Grenades Made in U.S.,” Washington Post, July 17, 2010, available from www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/16/AR2010071606252.html.

70. A number of photos of these weapons seized from the 

Mexican cartels exist. For examples of forensic analysis, see David 

A. Kuhn and Robert J. Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #10: 

Claymore Anti-Personnel Mine (and Other Military Hardware) 

Recovered in Zacatecas,” Small Wars Journal—El Centro, May 14, 

2012, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexican-cartel-tactical-note-10; and David Kuhn and Robert Bunker, “Mexican Cartel 

Tactical Note #12: Forensics of Recovered Weapons from Piedras Negras Tactical Engagement Between Los Zetas and GATE 

(Grupo de Armas y Tácticas Especiales),” Small Wars Journal—El 

Centro, May 31, 2012, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/

mexican-cartel-tactical-note-12.

71. Scott Stewart, “The Buffer Between Mexican Cartels and 

the U.S. Government,” STRATFOR, August 17, 2011, available 

from www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110817-buffer-between-mexican-cartels-and-us-government#ixzz2CJvvNfwJ. Also see note #22, where 

the Cali cartel willingly broke this firebreak out of sheer 

desperation. 

72. “EU amuralla consulado en Monterrey” (“EU Consulate 

Walls in Monterrey”), El Universal, April 5, 2011, available from 

www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/80020.html. A grenade had been 

thrown at the consulate in October 2008 and near it later in October 2010. Nick Valencia, “Grenades Explode Near U.S. Consulate in Mexico,” CNN, October 2, 2010, available from articles.cnn.

com/2010-10-02/world/mexico.us.consulate.blasts_1_consulate-mexican-officials-grenades?_s=PM:WORLD.

73. The official Mexican governmental death toll figure was 

47,515 as of January 2012. This figure does not include the tens 

of thousands of individuals who have simply disappeared and 

individuals who have been killed in Mexican states that are not 

reporting cartel related homicides. See Andrew O’Reilly, “Mexico’s Drug Death Toll Double What Reported, Expert Argues,” Fox 

News Latino, August 10, 2012, available from latino.foxnews.com/

latino/news/2012/08/10/mexico-drug-death-toll-double-what-reported-
50

expert-argues/; and Chivis Martinez, “NARCO HOMICIDES: ‘The 

Real’ Number 100-200+ Thousand,” Borderland Beat, August 19, 

2011, available from www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/08/narco-homicides-real-number-100-200.html.

74. John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Tactics and Operations 

in the Mexican Drug War,” Infantry, Vol. 100, Issue 4, SeptemberOctober 2011, pp, 20-23; and John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, 

“Narco-Armor in Mexico,” Small Wars Journal, July 14, 2011, available from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/narco-armor-in-mexico.

75. Elyssa Pachico, “Tracking the Steady Rise of Beheadings 

in Mexico,” InSight Crime, October 28, 2012, available from www.

insightcrime.org/news-analysis/tracking-the-steady-rise-of-beheadingsin-mexico. See also Marcos Muedano, “Decapitaciones se desatan 

este sexenio” (“Beheadings Are Unleashed by This Six”), El Universal, October 28, 2012, available from www.eluniversal.com.mx/

notas/879375.html.

76. National Drug Threat Assessment 2011, Washington, DC: 

National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), August 2011.

77. For example, see Kimberly Dvorak, “Mexican Drug Cartels Threaten U.S. Border Patrol Agents - Place a Bounty on Their 

Lives,” Examiner.com, April 12, 2010, available from www.examiner.com/article/mexican-drug-cartels-threaten-u-s-border-patrol-agentsplace-a-bounty-on-their-lives.

78. Fortunately, the gang member did not arm the grenade 

properly prior to throwing it into the bar. The grenade was South 

Korean made and had the same markings as grenades used 

against the U.S consulate in Monterey, Mexico, in October 2008. 

Associated Press, “Cartel Grenades May Be Coming into U.S,” 

NBCNews.com, August 3, 2009, available from www.msnbc.msn.

com/id/32272978/ns/us_news-security/t/cartel-grenades-may-be-coming-us/#.UKVW4qX3C9Y.

79. Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “Mexican Cartels and the 

Fallout From Phoenix,” STRATFOR, July 2, 2008, available from 

www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexican_cartels_and_fallout_phoenix.
51

80. For past attacks on U.S. personnel and civilians in Mexico, see Stewart, “The Buffer Between Mexican Cartels and the 

U.S. Government.” Also see the attacks on the CIA personnel 

and Mexican naval officer that took place in August 2012 on the 

dirt road known as El Capulin, in Xalatlaco, Mexico State. Chivis, 

“Mexico City: 2 Ambushed in Mexico City are CIA Agents,” Borderland Beat, August 29, 2012, available from www.borderlandbeat.

com/2012/08/mexico-city-2-ambushed-in-mexico-city.html.

81. John Bailey and Matthew M. Taylor, “Evade, Corrupt Or 

Confront? Organized Crime and the State in Brazil and Mexico,” 

Journal of Politics in Latin America, Vol. 1, 2009, pp, 3-29. See also 

Graham Turbiville, Jr., “Silver Over the Border: US Law Enforcement Corruption on the Southwest Border,” Small Wars & 

Insurgencies, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp. 835-859; and Crossing the Line: 

Corruption at the Border, Berkeley, CA: Center for Investigative 

Reporting, September 2011, available from projects.cironline.org/

bordercorruption/. 

82. See Barry R. McCaffrey and Robert H. Scales, Texas Border 

Security: A Strategic Military Assessment, Alexandria, VA: COLGEN Ltd., September 2011, available from www.mccaffreyassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Final_Report-Texas_Border_Security.pdf.

83. These concerns have been raised in a number of news reports. See Ildefonso Ortiz, “Increased Use Of Car Bombs In Tamaulipas Disturbing, Former U.S. Agent Says,” Latino Times, July 

19, 2012; and Stewart Powell, “Threat of IEDs Growing at Home,” 

Mysanantonio.Com, July 29, 2012, www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Threat-of-IEDs-growing-at-home-3745215.php.

84. These presentations to U.S. law enforcement draw upon 

works that include David Grossman, On Combat, Belleville, IL: 

PPCT Research Publications, 2007; and John Giduck, Terror at 

Beslan, Golden, CO: Archangel Group Inc., 2005.

85. Robert Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note # 7: Los Zetas Three Vehicle (SUV) Commando Engages in Offensive Action 

in Northwest Harris County, Texas: Ensuing Fire Fight with US 

Law Enforcement,” Small Wars Journal, November 26, 2011, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexican-cartel-tactical-note-7; 
52

and Robert Bunker and Sid Heal, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note # 

6: Cross Border Incursion with SWAT Teams Responding: 15 Cartel/Gang Gunmen Cross into US Near Escobares, Texas,” Small 

Wars Journal, November 15, 2011, available from smallwarsjournal.

com/blog/mexican-cartel-tactical-note-6.

86. These criminal insurgencies are viewed as a situation that 

is more dire than high intensity crime and that directly challenges 

state legitimacy and solvency. 

87. Dr. John Arquilla is a professor of defense analysis with 

the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA. His work focuses 

on netwar and swarming. See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 

Swarming and the Future of Conflict, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

2000, available from www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/

DB311.html. 

88. Powell, “Threat of IEDs growing at home.”

89. For instance, out of Texas and California, various forms of 

Mexican cartel awareness training are being provided to U.S. law 

enforcement officers. This training, provided via the Los Angeles 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (LAHIDTA) in coordination with other agencies and groups, has included focusing on 

ambush tactics used by the Tijuana cartel, saints of the drug underworld, and cartel identification. Current training being offered 

is available from www.lahidtatraining.org/. 

90. Brian Woolworth, “Enhancing North American Security 

through Military to Military Relationships,” Small Wars Journal—

El Centro, November 30, 2012, available from smallwarsjournal.

com/blog/enhancing-north-american-security-through-military-to-military-relationshi.

91. Calls for such a comprehensive strategy have been made in 

the past. For example, see the “Recommendation: Establish a multiorganizational (e.g., U.S. Army Staff, U.S. Army War College, 

Joint Staff, SOUTHCOM, and NORTHCOM, etc.) ‘Tiger Team’ to 

develop a regional security plan that includes foundational ways 

and means to achieve appropriate mindset and organizational 

change within the U.S. Army”; Dr. Max Manwaring, “The New 

Security Reality: Not Business as Usual,” Strategic Studies Institute 
53

Newsletter Op-Ed., August 20, 2012, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-New-Security-Reality-Not-Business-as-Usual/2012/08/20. See also the call for a Western 

Hemispheric strategy in Robert J. Bunker, “Strategic Threat: Narcos and Narcotics Overview,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 21, 

No. 1, March 2010, pp. 21-24.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Authors

Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Mr. John P. Sullivan

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil