i

The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service 

at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates 

who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, 

it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders 

and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage 

in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving 

national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 

security and strategic research and analysis to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between military 

and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes 

to the education of world class senior leaders, 

develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions 

to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

provides subject matter expertise, technical review, 

and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability 

operations concepts and doctrines.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic 

leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom 

grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and 

by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in 

the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional 

expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, 

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, 

conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use 

to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

iii

STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related 

to national security and military strategy with emphasis on 

geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct 

strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern 

topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of 

Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics 

of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings 

of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip 

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army 

participation in national security policy formulation.

v

Strategic Studies Institute

and 

U.S. Army War College Press

TOWARD A NATO OF THE GULF?

THE CHALLENGES OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

WITHIN THE GCC

Jean-Loup Samaan

September 2017

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. The views expressed in this monograph are strictly 

those of the author writing as an academic. They do not reflect 

the views of the National Defence College, Abu Dhabi, or the 

government of the United Arab Emirates. Authors of Strategic 

Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) 

Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do 

not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, 

or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom 

empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial 

perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. 

This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

∗∗∗∗∗

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 

101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
vi

∗∗∗∗∗

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be 

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army 

War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, 

Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

∗∗∗∗∗

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College 

External Research Associates Program. Information on this 

program is available on our website, ssi.armywarcollege.edu, at the 

Opportunities tab.

∗∗∗∗∗

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free 

of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain reports 

may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing 

an order on the SSI website. Check the website for availability. 

SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full 

with permission and appropriate credit given to the U.S. Army 

Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our 

website at the following address: ssi.armywarcollege.edu.

∗∗∗∗∗

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College 

Press publishes a quarterly email newsletter to update the national 

security community on the research of our analysts, recent and 

forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored 

by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic 

commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested 

in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at 

the following address: ssi.armywarcollege.edu /newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-770-7
vii

FOREWORD

The stability of the Gulf remains a priority of U.S. 

national security interests. Because of its importance 

both politically and economically, the region is and 

should likely remain a critical area for U.S. Armed 

Forces in the near future. But if for a long time, the Gulf 

Arab kingdoms seemed to be passive actors of their 

own region―leaving either Iran, Iraq, or Western 

powers to shape the power plays―they now reached 

an unprecedented level of strategic ambition. As 

evidenced by their active diplomatic agendas in the 

Middle East and their increased military involvement 

in regional crises, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are now players that matter.

Does this mean that the GCC could become a credible regional organization enforcing collective security 

in the Peninsula? For years, this has been a dream that 

even the most optimistic planners of the U.S. Department of Defense considered distant, if not farfetched. 

The recent new crisis between Saudi Arabia and Qatar 

reminds us that diplomatic cooperation remains fragile in the region. 

But recognizing the constraints of contemporary 

political disputes should not prevent us from discussing the idea of collective security in the Gulf. It is in 

this spirit, that in his new monograph, Dr. Jean-Loup 

Samaan looks at the operational issues behind the concept of the GCC as a security organization. Too often 

overlooked by the scholarship, topics like the building 

of a joint command, the development of a common 

military culture, or the reinforcement of maritime coordination, require a serious discussion among practitioners. In this context, based on in-depth research and 

interviews conducted in the region, this monograph 
provides us with an up-to-date evaluation of the feasibility of this project which will be beneficial not only 

for scholars, but also for the U.S. defense community.

For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute is 

pleased to offer this monograph on the challenges of 

collective security in the Gulf and the manner in which 

this major issue can impact U.S. national security 

interests.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press

viii
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JEAN-LOUP SAMAAN is an associate professor in 

strategic studies for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 

National Defense College. Prior to that, he was a 

researcher for the Middle East Faculty at the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense College in Rome, Italy between 2011 and 2016. His areas 

of expertise include Middle East strategic balance and 

Gulf security diplomacies, as well as cyber defense. He 

was a policy advisor at the French Ministry of Defense 

from 2008 to 2011, where he was responsible for several net assessment studies covering transatlantic military affairs. While working for the French Ministry of 

Defense (MoD), Dr. Samaan participated in various 

French-American strategic foresight exercises with the 

National Intelligence Council as well as with the U.S. 

Air Force. From 2009 to 2011, he was also an adjunct 

lecturer in international security at the French Institute for Political Studies, Sciences Program, and gave 

lectures to civilian and military audiences in various 

countries. In 2006, he was a visiting scholar at Duke 

University, and from 2007 to 2008, he was a researcher 

at the RAND Corporation in Washington, DC. Dr. 

Samaan has authored three books and several academic articles for various international journals such 

as Survival, Orbis, Comparative Strategy, Turkish Policy 

Quarterly, Politique Etrangère, and Internationale Politik. He is a regular columnist for the online magazine, 

Al Monitor. Dr. Samaan is a former student of Arabic 

at the French Institute of Oriental Languages and the 

French Institute for the Near East in Beirut, Lebanon. 

He graduated from the Institute for Political Studies 

in Grenoble, and he holds a Ph.D. in political science 

from the University of Paris, La Sorbonne.

xi

SUMMARY

Since the Arab revolutions started in early 2011, 

the Gulf countries have raised the level of their strategic ambitions. In various cases, countries of the Gulf 

Cooperation Council (GCC) flexed their diplomatic 

muscles―Qatar and Saudi Arabia being at the forefront 

on the Syrian file―and demonstrated military resolve―

via the interventions in Bahrain (2011), Libya (2011), 

and Yemen (2015). With traditional Arab powers like 

Egypt coping with post-revolution internal troubles, 

Gulf kingdoms seemed now to be the major players in 

the arena of the Arab League. This shift in Arab geopolitics led observers to refer to this era as the so-called 

Gulf moment.

As a result, the new assertiveness from Gulf countries in the international arena stirred a discussion 

on the prospects for stronger military cooperation at 

the level of the GCC itself. For a long time, collective 

defense was a distant prospect in the Peninsula. The 

modest size of local armed forces, the traditional reliance on the three major Western powers (the United 

States, the United Kingdom, and France) and occasional disagreements among Gulf countries concerning their strategic priorities all concurred to postpone 

progress in the field of joint military cooperation.

Additionally, the 2017 political crisis between 

Qatar and three of the GCC members (Saudi Arabia, 

the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain) obviously 

reminds us the need for a cautious evaluation of the 

prospects of collective security in the Gulf. But rather 

than detailing the numerous caveats that still exist concerning the Gulf regional security system, this monograph puts the alliance politics aside and looks at the 

security environment and the operational requirements for the GCC. In other words, it aims to discuss 
xii

the practical steps required to turn the Council into 

an effective collective defense organization. By no 

means does this approach dismiss the politics behind 

the making of the GCC. Only the resolution of local 

disputes can bring about the needed momentum for 

regional cooperation, but the political dimension too 

frequently prevents observers to discuss the concrete 

feasibility of the project.

Against that backdrop, the monograph starts by 

looking at the GCC as a regional organization. It details 

its origins, underlines the role played by the security 

environment in shaping the GCC agenda, and assesses 

its main achievements so far in the military field. The 

second part provides a detailed account of the contemporary security challenges that call for enhanced 

military cooperation: the increasing demands for GCC 

expeditionary capabilities in light of regional crisis 

such as Yemen; the maritime security in the Gulf in 

the context of Iranian assertiveness on the sea; and the 

ballistic arms race led by the same Iran. Following this 

appraisal of the contemporary security environment, 

the document looks at some of the most significant 

projects within the GCC to enhance its military cooperation: the building of a joint command; the emphasis 

on joint naval activities; and the making of a regional 

missile defense coordination structure. It also identifies some of the long-term needs for the national armed 

forces to fulfill these objectives: the need to strengthen 

education and training programs in the Peninsula and 

to foster a multilateral culture among Gulf militaries. 

Finally, it reflects on the relations with Western allies 

in that perspective. In particular, it explains how initiatives such as the U.S.-Gulf Strategic Forum and the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Istanbul Cooperation Initiative could prove instrumental to 

support GCC’s collective defense project.
1

TOWARD A NATO OF THE GULF?

THE CHALLENGES OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 

WITHIN THE GCC

INTRODUCTION

Since the Arab revolutions started in early 2011, 

the Gulf countries have raised the level of their strategic ambitions. In various cases, countries of the Gulf 

Cooperation Council (GCC) flexed their diplomatic 

muscles, Qatar and Saudi Arabia being at the forefront 

on the Syrian file, and demonstrated military resolve 

via interventions in Bahrain (2011), Libya (2011), and 

Yemen (2015). With traditional Arab powers like Egypt 

coping with post-revolution internal troubles, Gulf 

kingdoms seemed now to be the major players in the 

arena of the Arab League. This shift in Arab geopolitics 

led observers to refer to this era as the so-called Gulf 

moment. In a recent monograph from the U.S. Army 

War College, Dr. Florence Gaub from the European 

Institute for Security Studies argued that: 

the implosion of some, previously strong, regional actors 

(such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt) has given way to other 

players—all of which are now located in the Gulf. In 

terms of regional relations, the Arab world has therefore 

entered a Gulf moment, and is likely to remain in it for 

the time being.1

The expression “Gulf moment” was first coined by 

the Emirati scholar Abdulkhaleq Abdulla before the 

upheavals of 2011. In a research paper written for the 

London School of Economics, Abdulla stated:

This is the Arab Gulf moment in contemporary Arab 

history. The six mostly small but oil-rich states of Kuwait, 

Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and the United 
2

Arab Emirates (the Arab Gulf states or AGS) are taking 

the lead, influencing events, assuming greater financial 

responsibilities, projecting socioeconomic confidence, 

and becoming increasingly conscious of their newly 

acquired status as a regional power that far transcends 

the rest of the Arab countries.2

The statement, coming from an eminent Gulf 

scholar, revealed the new confident mind-set in the 

Peninsula. In several other publications after the revolutions occurred in Tunisia and Egypt, Abdulla 

reiterated his message.3 However, what the Emirati 

researcher did not anticipate with his concept was if 

and how this moment would progressively lead to a 

more cohesive security structure at the regional level. 

As a matter of fact, the new assertiveness from Gulf 

countries in the international arena stirred a discussion 

on the prospects for stronger military cooperation at 

the level of the GCC itself.

For many years, collective defense was a distant 

prospect in the Peninsula. The modest size of local 

armed forces, the traditional reliance on the three 

major Western powers (the United States, the United 

Kingdom [UK], and France) and occasional disagreements among Gulf countries concerning their strategic priorities all concurred to postpone progress in the 

field of joint military cooperation.

For the last 3 decades, each year GCC summits 

would commit the stakeholders to the building of a 

stronger regional defense organization, but it usually 

remained in the background, as economic initiatives 

were deemed more effective and less politically sensitive. The difficulties experienced by the GCC were 

nothing exceptional, as they are a reminder of the long 

struggle within the European Union to build a strong 

military component.
3

Our research question finds its origins in the latest 

developments in Gulf security and the way these events 

could lead the GCC to become a new actor of collective 

defense. In December 2012, the 35th GCC summit in 

Doha, Qatar, evidenced this trend with the announced 

creation of a joint naval force and a common counterterrorist organization. This followed earlier rumors 

that a joint Gulf command also would be established. 

Furthermore, amid the latest Saudi-led operation in 

Yemen against Houthi rebels in March 2015, the idea of 

an “Arab North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)” 

resurfaced in policy circles. Approximately at the same 

time, Arab League Secretary General Nabil Al Arabi 

called for a unified multinational Arab fighting force, 

unearthing the distant memories of the defunct Arab 

Deterrent Force that was deployed in Lebanon in 1976.4

Today, the idea of a multinational Arab force mostly 

gained traction in the Gulf, a region that remains to 

this day the most integrated one within the Arab 

World (compared to the quasi-absence of cooperation 

in the Maghreb and the Middle East).5 However, the 

road toward an Arab, or to be more accurate, a Gulf, 

NATO is full of political and operational uncertainties. 

The 2017 political crisis between Qatar and three of 

the GCC members (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain) obviously reminds us of the need 

for a cautious evaluation of the prospects of collective 

security in the Gulf. Rather than detailing the numerous caveats that still exist concerning the Gulf regional 

security system, this monograph puts the alliance politics aside and looks at the security environment and 

the operational requirements for the GCC. In other 

words, it aims to discuss the practical steps required 

to turn the Council into an effective collective defense 

organization. By no means does this approach dismiss 
4

the politics behind the making of the GCC―only the 

resolution of local disputes can bring about the needed 

momentum for regional cooperation―but the political 

dimension too frequently prevents observers to discuss the concrete feasibility of the project.

Our reference to measure the achievements in the 

Gulf will be NATO, as the organization remains today 

the most integrated military structure for regional security. NATO is by no means a perfect organization, it 

experiences many shortcomings such as regular strategic disagreements among its 28 members; a command 

structure still heavily based on a Cold War model; and 

an imbalance between American and European capabilities. Nevertheless, these limitations are also the 

very reason why the NATO analogy is worth testing. 

Because the Atlantic Alliance is not an ideal institution, 

it provides a realistic assessment on the making of a 

collective defense system.

Moreover, the purpose of this monograph is not to 

recommend a mere transposition of a NATO model 

into the Gulf context. Not only would this idea deny 

fundamental cultural differences, but also there are 

many objective parameters that limit the values of the 

analogy. These include the number of country members and the size of the territories covered by the organization; the nature of threats and challenges facing 

the actors; the general political sensitivity among 

neighbors regarding regional cooperation; and, finally, 

the level of readiness of national armed forces. Despite 

these forewarnings, some aspects of NATO structure 

can be worth exploring for the GCC: the making of its 

joint command, its training and education programs, 

and overall the Alliance’s experience in building a 

strong multilateral culture among its members’ armed 

forces.
5

Based on these elements, this monograph is divided 

into four main sections. The first section starts by looking at the GCC as a regional organization. We retrace 

its origins, underline the role played by the security 

environment in shaping the GCC agenda, and describe 

its main achievements so far in the military field. The 

second section provides a detailed account of the contemporary security challenges that call for enhanced 

military cooperation: the increasing demands for GCC 

expeditionary capabilities in light of regional crisis 

such as Yemen; the maritime security in the Gulf in 

the context of Iranian assertiveness on the sea; and the 

ballistic arms race led by the same Iran. Following this 

appraisal of the contemporary security environment, 

we look at some of the most significant projects within 

the GCC to enhance its military cooperation: the building of a joint command; the emphasis on joint naval 

activities; and the making of a regional missile defense 

coordination structure. We also identify some of the 

long-term needs for the national armed forces to fulfil 

these objectives: the need to strengthen education and 

training programs in the Peninsula and to foster a 

multilateral culture among Gulf militaries. Finally, the 

fourth part of the monograph considers the relations 

with Western allies in that perspective. In particular, 

we argue how initiatives such as the U.S.-Gulf Strategic Forum and NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 

could prove instrumental to support GCC’s collective 

defense project.

DEFINING THE GULF SECURITY SYSTEM

To discuss the topic of military cooperation in the 

Gulf, we first need to characterize its regional security system. The literature on the subject is abundant. 

Back in 1998, Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq 
6

Abdulla argued that the Gulf constituted a coherent 

regional system (nizaam iqlimi).6 This view has been 

challenged by other scholars, such as Michael Barnett and Gregory Gause III, who argued that a system 

implied regulating processes and a form of cohesion 

that do not yet exist in the Gulf. They pointed out the 

various territorial disputes, the power plays, and the 

ideological differences as obstacles to the emergence 

of such security system. For these researchers, the Gulf 

should rather be described as a “security complex,” in 

the sense given to this expression by British scholar 

Barry Buzan:

a security complex is a set of units whose major processes of 

securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked 

that their security problems cannot be reasonably 

analysed or resolved apart from one another. The central 

idea remains that substantial parts of the securitisation 

and desecuritisation processes in the international system 

will manifest themselves in regional clusters.7

In the view of Gause and Barnett, there is no institutionalized regional security system with identifiable 

political mechanisms to mitigate a potential crisis, but 

all the stakeholders share an understanding of threats, 

challenges, and alliance distribution. More precisely, 

the Gulf security complex would center on the Saudi-Iranian strategic competition, which defines all subsequent policy options. In many ways, the “Iranian 

threat” is driving the security policies of the kingdoms 

of the GCC, so that it can be characterized as a matrix 

through which all the troubles in the Gulf (discontent 

in Bahrain and insurgency in Yemen) are analyzed and 

framed.8 Although this idea is revealing, it downplays 

the distinct policy conducted at least by one of the GCC 

members, Oman, which has traditionally maintained 

closer diplomatic relations with Iran.9 Still, think tanks 
7

and media outlets frequently refer to this competition 

as a new cold war according to which the “two main 

actors are not confronting each other militarily; rather, 

their contest for influence plays out in the domestic 

political systems of the region’s weak states.”10 This 

metaphor led observers to portray the GCC as the new 

NATO of this cold war.

However, we believe that the values of a NATO 

analogy have less to do with the geopolitics than with 

the lessons regarding regional integration in the military field. Labeling the GCC as a Gulf NATO would 

run the risk of dismissing its existing structure and 

its development over the last 3 decades. This is why 

to understand the values and limitations of a NATO 

analogy in the Gulf, one needs to look carefully at the 

existing regional architecture, in particular the history 

of the GCC.

On May 25, 1981, six Arab states (Saudi Arabia, 

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab 

Emirates) gathered in Abu Dhabi to build the GCC. The 

GCC was born in a time of war in the region: in September 1980, Saddam Hussein launched an attack on 

Iran that would lead to a bloody 8-year war. Iran had 

only ended its revolution against the Shah to put into 

place a new Islamic regime with a messianic agenda. In 

the Levant, the Lebanese civil war was escalating with 

the unravelling of the remnants of Lebanon’s state and 

the strengthening of sectarian militias―of which Iran 

would soon create and support its own, the Hezbollah. 

As the pan-Arab ideology declined, Islamist extremist organizations also were becoming a major threat to 

Arab states, a phenomenon Saudi Arabia witnessed 

with the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979.11

The original agreement for the GCC did not mention these regional developments but underlined 

the “special relations, common characteristics, and 
8

similar regimes” of its members, adding the “belief 

in a common destiny and unity of objectives.”12 Subsequently, three main bodies were established. The 

Supreme Council gathers the heads of state of member 

countries with its presidency held on a rotational basis. 

It meets twice a year for normal sessions. The Ministerial Council composed of the foreign ministers prepares the meetings for the Supreme Council and meets 

every 2 months. Finally, the permanent structure of the 

GCC is its Secretariat General, with its headquarters in 

Riyadh.

Although the 1981 Charter mentioned various fields 

covered by GCC regulations (e.g., economic affairs, 

customs, education, and tourism), defense was not 

included. Interestingly, the 1981 Charter did not delve 

into the details of security cooperation. Compared to 

the NATO Treaty, the GCC Charter describes much 

more the functioning of the organization but tells us 

nothing about the strategic environment, except a brief 

mention to the Arab League. For instance, there is no 

article that would be similar to the famous Article 5 of 

NATO that epitomizes collective defense.13

However, the international security environment 

was discussed explicitly by Gulf leaders in their declarations during the founding summit in the United 

Arab Emirates capital. In addition to their refusal of 

any foreign interference in the region, the heads of state 

expressed their desire to end the Iran-Iraq war, although 

they refrained from suggesting any end-state desired.14

Apart from these statements, the message conveyed in 

1981 was that the creation of the GCC was more about 

building a common economic area than about establishing a military alliance. In that perspective, it shared 

more with the European Union project that looked 

at security only as a means to ensure prosperity than 

with NATO that was perceived as the primary agent 
9

of collective defense for the North-American European 

zone. For instance, a project for a monetary union to 

create a single currency was launched, although it is 

still struggling today with political sensitivities. All of 

these go against the idea of simply making the GCC a 

military alliance comparable to NATO.

Security and defense affairs progressively, though 

cautiously, appeared on the agenda of GCC summits.

For instance, in 1987, the Riyadh Summit approved a 

common “comprehensive security strategy”15 but it 

was an initiative led by Interior Ministers.16 The 1987 

Summit also endorsed the recommendations by GCC 

defense ministers on military cooperation. At that 

time, one of the most significant items on the agenda 

was Egyptian contribution to GCC military development. There were exchanges regarding an Egyptian 

involvement in the building of a joint Gulf arms industry, and Cairo also offered to deploy 15,000 troops to a 

joint Arab force to protect Gulf States in the context of 

the Iran-Iraq war.17

Heavily influenced by the Gulf war, in 1991, the 

annual summit increased the military rapprochement 

through joint military exercises and the creation of a 

GCC force―soon to be named the Peninsula Shield.18

Integration of national air defenses was discussed for 

the first time at the Riyadh Summit in 1993. Again, a 

new step was reached in 2000 with the joint defense 

agreement signed at the Manama Summit.19

Over the years, many specialized committees 

within the structure of the GCC dealt with security 

matters: strategic planning, counterterrorism cooperation, drug control, civil defense, and cooperation 

against nuclear and radioactive risks. As for any international organization, the inflation of new bureaucratic 

units meant more demands for interagency exchange 

and coordination.
10

Although these efforts were mostly limited and 

could not be used to depict the GCC as a military alliance, this view gained traction among pundits in the 

West that frequently portrayed the Council as a strategic united bloc against Iran and Iraq. For instance, 

Harvard professor Stephen Walt portrayed the GCC 

as an organization “intended to limit potential pressure from both Iran and the Soviet Union.”20 Walt’s 

depiction is at odds with the reality of the GCC as a 

very modest military organization.21 King Abdullah of 

Saudi Arabia famously declared at the GCC summit of 

2001:

We are not ashamed to say that we have not been able 

to achieve the objectives we sought when we set up the 

Gulf Cooperation Council 20 years ago . . . We have not 

yet set up a unified military force that deters enemies and 

supports friends.22

The statement from King Abdullah emphasized 

the long difficulties GCC countries faced in order to 

come together regarding to the objective of collective 

defense. From the outset, there was a strategic dimension to the GCC project, but several factors concurred 

to restrain it: the numerous wars in the region, the reliance on the United States as an external provider of 

security to the region, and national differences over 

the type of multilateral framework under which the 

Council should operate. Finally, as in Europe and elsewhere, Gulf leaders feared for the loss of their own 

sovereignty that a stronger GCC would bring.

Furthermore, the unequal level of readiness and 

interoperability of GCC forces is acknowledged by 

political leaders as well as by military representatives 
11

from the region, but it has to be considered in a longterm perspective. For the most part, the contemporary 

forces of Gulf countries were built after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The Gulf War led to two main 

trends: a reinforcement of bilateral military cooperation with Western allies (the United States, the United 

Kingdom, and France) and a pause regarding collective 

regional initiatives. It is worth remembering that back 

in the 1990s, GCC members still argued over territorial 

disputes: in 1992, tensions at the border between Saudi 

Arabia and Qatar led to the death of a Saudi sheikh 

and two Qatari soldiers. Qatar was also involved in 

a dispute with Bahrain regarding the sovereignty of 

the Hawar Islands, and in 1993, Oman expressed its 

disagreement over the Saudi-United Arab Emirates 

border agreement, arguing that it was covering parts 

of the Omani territory.

These two trends―reinforcing ties with Western 

allies and building modern national forces―barely left 

room for a regional framework. Over time, this generated a fair amount of skepticism among those who 

monitored Gulf security developments and witnessed 

repeated attempts to reenergize the GCC collective 

defense component.23 Therefore, caution and realism 

should prevail regarding the feasibility of a “Gulf 

NATO.” This does not mean dismissing the current 

momentum, but looking at it through its historical 

perspective and identifying the real novelty with the 

ongoing developments.

THE EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES IN 

THE GULF

In theory, collective defense is an arrangement 

committing the members to protect each other. It 

posits that the security of one is the concern of all, and 
12

therefore, the community seeks a collective response 

to the threats. This implies that countries consider 

these threats or challenges are commonly perceived 

and faced by the other members. In that context, we 

present three major challenges that affect the GCC as 

a whole. First, we look at the internal instability affecting neighboring countries (in particular Yemen), and 

how this led the GCC states to bolster their military 

power to either contain or resolve the crises. Additionally, the steady build-up of Iranian naval capabilities, 

combined with the assertiveness of the Revolutionary Guard, create a dangerous maritime environment 

in the Gulf. Finally, the missile arsenal assembled by 

Tehran puts the major urban centers of the GCC under 

the threat of a ballistic attack.

The Demands of Regional Interventions

Although a few years ago Gulf armed forces were 

described as mere symbols of national power rather 

than as active and ready militaries, regional interventions over the last years dramatically changed this 

assumption. In spring 2011, Qatari and Emirati forces 

joined NATO in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in 

Libya to protect civilians from attacks by the Gadhafi 

regime.24 Meanwhile, starting in 2014, air forces from 

Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 

conducted strikes in Syria and Iraq as part of the U.S.-

led coalition to counter the Islamic State, although 

this contribution has been statistically modest.25 The 

United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait also have 

allowed coalition members (the United States, France, 

the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Italy) to 

deploy their air assets on their military bases to launch 

strikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
13

The frequency and the format of these Gulf interventions were a major change compared to the previous deployments.26 It evidenced a new sense of 

common security interests and willingness to conduct 

joint operations. Then, in March 2015, a new step was 

reached when Saudi Arabia decided to build an international coalition to restore the rule of Yemeni President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi after his government 

had been overthrown by a competing alliance comprised of the Houthi insurgents and loyalists of former 

president Saleh. The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen―

although not a GCC intervention per se―was the first 

of its type regarding its mandate and the means assembled to conduct the operations.

Although the war started mostly as an air campaign, its scale increased dramatically to include 

ground forces. In southern Yemen, a complex amphibious operation was necessary to retake cities such as 

Aden. By the end of 2015, the three biggest contributors to the intervention were Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 

the United Arab Emirates. Although the operation was 

commanded by the Saudi leadership, the United Arab 

Emirates provided roughly two-thirds of the personnel (4,000) including 1 brigade, special forces units, 

and 2 to 3 armored battlegroups. Apart from Saudi 

and Emirati capabilities, the equipment of the coalition remained rather limited, and the participation of a 

country like Kuwait has been mostly political.27

The lessons from these recent developments are 

several fold. First, the Yemen crisis demonstrated that 

GCC countries progressively acquired the ability to 

intervene on their own in regional crisis. The political decision was taken quickly and the build-up of the 

coalition likewise.28 This constitutes a positive step that 

also demands them to sustain such capacity.
14

In the current security environment, GCC armed 

forces are more likely to be engaged in local low-intensity conflicts occurring in their direct vicinity than 

in a major regional war. As of today, the biggest risk 

for the stability of the Peninsula comes from the security vacuum in its neighboring countries, in particular 

Yemen and Iraq. In both cases, the collapse of state 

authority engendered internal strife and opened a 

window to private actors such as militias and terrorist organizations. Al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic 

State benefited from this void to plan operations in 

and from these countries. Moreover, the weakness of 

central governments also enabled Iran to meddle into 

domestic politics, supporting at different levels its local 

partners (the Houthis in Yemen and the Iraqi governments of Nouri al-Maliki and Haidar al-Abadi).

GCC countries logically are concerned about the 

potential spillover effects of these crises. For instance, 

in Kuwait, policymakers still have vivid memories of 

Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1990 and explicitly rank 

Iraq as their top security priority.29 Usually now forgotten in the United States, the 1990 invasion remains 

the central driver of Kuwaiti security strategy for the 

current generation of decision makers in the policy 

and military spheres.

However, given the geography of the area, Saudi 

Arabia is the most concerned. The kingdom constitutes 

roughly 80 percent of the Peninsula and shares borders with seven countries. Not only does the kingdom 

eye the crisis in Iraq and Yemen, but also it carefully 

observes the tremendous pressures the Syrian war has 

put on its Jordanian ally. Given its coastline on the Red 

Sea, Riyadh has also a critical interest to the stability in 

Egypt and Sudan. This explains the strong support it 

provided to the regime of Marshall Al Sisi since 2013, 
15

injecting at least $12 billion into the Egyptian government according to The New York Times.

30

In the case of the other GCC members, their small 

size and population generally make them vulnerable 

to regional shocks. As a result, the GCC leaders have 

today the choice between two approaches: containment and crisis management. Both options call for significant resources in terms of military personnel and 

financial means. For instance, it is acknowledged by 

Gulf decision makers that the eventual resolution to the 

war in Yemen will demand some form of nation-building: training the Yemeni military, restoring the central 

authority of government, and securing the borders 

against illicit trafficking.31

This new regional agenda implies for the GCC to 

build and sustain armed forces that would not only 

be required to secure their own territory, but be able 

to deploy in distant theaters. It is a challenge European forces faced after the end of the Cold War, when 

most of them had to shift from a focus on territorial 

defense to expeditionary missions.32 It requires critical 

capabilities to project power far away. Moreover, the 

GCC as a whole will have to discuss and select the scenarios driving its force structure: should its militaries 

be able to engage into one or two simultaneous small 

conflicts? Should they keep resources for a third contingency? These are delicate choices that can only be 

decided through a multilateral process.

The Issue of Maritime Security

Maritime security has always been a major concern in the Gulf. Back in the era of the British Empire, 

London allied with the leaders of the Trucial States 

to ensure stability in the area so as not to disrupt its 

sea-lane to the British Raj. In the 20th century, the Gulf 

became one of the most critical sea passages for world 
16

economy, first with the pearl trade and then with the 

oil revolution, in the following decades. Today, a good 

share of the international crude oil and liquefied fuels 

movements depend on transport through two chokepoints in the area: Bab el Mandab, located between 

Somalia and Yemen; and the Strait of Hormuz, between 

Oman and Iran.

In the confined waters of the Strait of Hormuz, the 

probability of incidents is high, taking into account the 

number of vessels that go through it.33 In recent years, 

Iran has shown increased boldness in the area. For 

instance, in January 2008, Iranian boats approached 

three U.S. Navy ships in the Strait, threatening to 

explode the American vessels. The U.S. forces were 

on the verge of firing on the Iranian boats when those 

boats eventually moved away. At that time, a Pentagon official said, “It is the most serious provocation of 

this sort that we’ve seen yet, the Iranian boats turned 

away literally at the very moment that U.S. forces were 

preparing to open fire.”34 The Iranian Revolutionary 

Guard Corps (IRGC) subsequently denied the U.S. version of the events, claiming that the Iranian boats were 

conducting “an ordinary identification.”35

The number of such incidents only increased in 

recent years. In December 2015, Iran fired a rocket near 

the U.S. aircraft carrier, USS Harry Truman. A month 

later, the IRGC captured 10 American sailors when 

their boats accidentally approached the waters near 

Farsi Island. In July 2016, Iran’s ships moved close to 

the USS New Orleans while the Commander of Central Command, General Joseph Votel, was aboard. 

All these cases show the assertiveness of Iran in the 

maritime domain and the risk of miscalculation that 

emerges from the repetition of these skirmishes.

In terms of capabilities, the Iranian Navy remains 

poorly equipped, most of its ships were purchased 
17

during the Shah’s era in the 1970s.36 Confrontation 

between the U.S. Navy and the Iranian Navy, as well 

as the Pasdarans’ own navy, is certainly conceivable, 

and that possibility should not be dismissed in terms 

of contingencies.37 As Tim Ripley argued, a naval confrontation between Iran and the United States would 

likely take the form of “a protracted conflict involving 

harassing attacks against U.S. forces and international 

maritime trade.”38

Closing the Strait would deny the global economy 

of approximately 25 percent of oil supplies, causing 

a major disruption of the markets. This is the reason 

why a country like the United Arab Emirates opened 

a new pipeline that runs from Habshan to the port of 

Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman to avoid shipping its barrels of crude oil through the Strait.

Generally, experts have been cautious about the 

prospects of escalation in the area and repeatedly 

pointed out that Iranian forces had not the ability to 

enforce such closure for more than a few days.39 Scenarios based on the frequent threat from Tehran to 

close the Strait of Hormuz are unlikely to occur.40 In 

an article for International Security, Caitlin Talmadge 

raised an important issue:

The question is whether Iran can harass shipping enough 

to prompt U.S. intervention in defense of the sea-lanes. 

Given that the United States has staked its credibility on 

promises to do just that, this is a threshold that Iran’s 

significant and growing littoral warfare capabilities can 

cross, even with fairly conservative assumptions about 

Iranian capabilities.41

Talmadge’s analysis provides a detailed account of 

the U.S.-Iranian standoff in the Gulf, but it does not 

really look at the capabilities of local actors, and in particular, how this could develop in the case of a confrontation, excluding―at least in the first phase―U.S. 
18

forces. If the Iranian conventional forces do not constitute a strong competitor to the forces of GCC navies, in 

particular Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 

then the IRGC has designed an asymmetrical strategy whose maritime component is rather significant. 

The naval forces of the IRGC include more than 6,000 

mines, 65 missile-armed combat warships, as well as 

anti-ship missiles, Kilo class submarines, and midget 

submarines that are superior to the capabilities of the 

GCC.42 Altogether, these capabilities support an Iranian strategy that does not aim to conquer territories 

but to deter and, if needed, deny the access to its areas 

of influence.

In light of this Iranian anti-access strategy, it is worth 

remembering that, for the last 4 decades, Iran and the 

United Arab Emirates have been engaged in a major 

territorial dispute over the three islands taken over by 

the Shah in 1971: Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser 

Tunbs. In spite of previous international commitments, 

the Shah had justified the occupation by claiming they 

belonged to Iran from ancient times until the early 20th 

century. They repeatedly called for the United Nations 

(UN) to reach a diplomatic settlement, but these efforts 

have all stumbled. Moreover, the Iranian regime not 

only ignored the Emirati demands, but also proceeded 

to use the islands for military purposes, organizing 

military exercises, and storing arsenals. In Abu Musa, 

the IRGC built an airport and upgraded the port facilities. In addition to its troops, it deployed anti-aircraft 

and anti-ship missiles. This Iranian footprint on the 

three islands is supported by the numerous bases built 

on its shores, in particular Bandar Abbas and Bandar 

Lengeh. In 2011-2012, as tensions rose in the GCC-Iran 

relations, President Ahmadinejad visited Abu Musa, 

and several officials conveyed the message that Iranian forces were ready to use force to defend its hold 
19

on these islands. This triggered a collective statement 

from the GCC supporting the United Arab Emirates in 

its claim over the territories. Because there is no end in 

sight for this dispute over the three islands, and as Iran 

gets more assertive in the maritime domain through 

its anti-access strategy, GCC armed forces will have to 

include in their planning processes the risk of miscalculation and small naval clashes that could escalate by 

accident.

The Ballistic Threat

Since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in 

1979, Iran has been developing an indigenous missile 

production capability that supports its naval strategy 

of anti-access. For instance, the country is reported to 

have launched more than 600 ballistic missiles during 

its war with Iraq in the 1980s.43 Originally, the purpose 

of its program was not Iranian ambitions vis-à-vis 

the GCC, but its concerns regarding the Iraqi arsenal. 

Throughout the 1980s, Saddam Hussein’s regime had 

become the first ballistic power in the region. In July 

1990, the CIA wrote in a memo, “Iraq has the most 

aggressive and advanced ballistic missile development 

program in the Arab World.”44 Between February 29 

and April 20, 1988, Iraq launched 190 Al Hussein missiles on Iranian cities. Overall, Iraqi missiles killed 

more than 2,000 Iranians and injured 6,000.45 The Iraqi 

ballistic strategy even made the difference and forced 

the Ayatollah Khomeini to concede the end of the war. 

In other words, Saddam Hussein used Scud missiles, 

striking Tehran as new means to compel surrender. 

Revealingly, in 1984, the Iraqi leader was explaining to 

his Air Force officers:
20

Sometimes what you get out of a weapon is when you 

keep saying, ‘I will bomb you’ [and] it is actually better 

than bombing him. It is possible that when you bomb him 

the material effect will be 40 percent, but if you stick it up 

to his face the material and the spiritual effect will be 60 

percent, so why hit him? Keep getting 60 percent!46

The following decade saw a major shift in the 

regional ballistic arms race. With the international 

embargo ensuing from the Gulf War, the Iraqi arsenal 

declined and allowed Iran to become the rising challenger in that field. The Iranians benefited from the 

same proliferation network as the Iraqis had: North 

Korea, China, and Russia. Generally, opacity surrounds the state of Iran’s current arsenal. It is said to 

include hundreds of short-range missiles such as the 

Shahab-1 and Shahab-2.47 There is contradicting information regarding another short-range ballistic missile 

(SRBM), the Quiam, which allegedly was only tested 

once in August 2010. Sources assess “the Quiam to 

be based on the Shahab-2, with a range between 500 

and 1,000 kilometers (km).”48 The Fateh-110 is another 

SRBM whose development started in the mid-1990s. 

Although Iranians claimed its range to go up to 300 

km, independent experts argue that it is likely nearer 

200-250 km.49 Iranian MRBM include the Ghadr1, a variant of the Shahab-3. The Sejil, a solid-fueled 

ground-mobile ballistic missile, was tested successfully in November 2008. Able to reach a target up to 

2,200 km, the Sejil has a payload capacity that could 

accommodate a nuclear warhead. Iran has also developed numerous rockets such as the Fajr, the Zelzal, 

and the Fateh-110.50 Finally, starting in the late 1990s, 

the U.S. intelligence community assessed that Iran was 

on the path to acquiring intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by 2015.51 Yet, this date was cautiously 

revised in recent years by U.S. analysts as the progress 
21

of the program depends on a certain level of foreign 

assistance, in particular from North Korea.

In terms of strategy, the Iranians appeared to learn 

the lesson from the so-called “war of the cities,” that 

missiles can be effective means of coercion. As the 

search for parity at the conventional level between Iran 

and the two major GCC armed forces―Saudi Arabia 

and the United Arab Emirates―became unsustainable for Tehran, its leadership invested its resources 

in asymmetric capabilities. In that perspective, the Iranian ballistic arsenal allows it to circumvent the deficiencies of its air force. It also supports its maritime 

strategy of occasional harassment and access-denial.52

Like the risk of naval escalation, the prospect of Iran 

launching missiles, loading them on its ships close to 

the maritime space of GCC countries, or displaying 

them on the United Arab Emirates occupied islands 

is of concern for the whole region. A scenario of Iran 

ostentatiously stationing long-range missiles on Abu 

Musa is a daunting one that could turn into a kind of 

“local Cuban missile crisis,” with the United States 

being forced to intervene to prevent escalation, while 

reassuring its Arab partners. As we explain in the next 

section, one of the solutions to address this threat can 

be found in the increased regional cooperation in the 

field of missile defense.

All in all, these three major challenges―security 

vacuums, maritime instability, and missile proliferation―are likely to grow in coming years, and they will 

affect the security interests of the GCC as a whole. In 

the next section, we look at how the on-going strengthening of collective defense in the Peninsula through 

specific projects could address these threats.
22

THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A 

GULF NATO

In the following pages, we analyze four recent and 

critical projects that could both address the previous 

threats identified and enhance the regional security 

architecture in the Peninsula: the making of a GCC 

united military command; the creation of a common 

naval group; the establishment of a missile defense 

coordination cell; and the establishment of a GCC 

defense college.

The Significance of a Robust United Military 

Command

The project of a Gulf joint military command has 

probably been the most discussed project regarding 

cooperation in the region. Although its existence is not 

yet mature, the project itself surfaced almost 2 decades 

ago. The first step toward a collective approach was 

reached in Manama, Bahrain, in December 2000 during 

a GCC summit where the Gulf Security Agreement 

was signed. The document indicated the willingness 

of the GCC to go from consultation and cooperation 

on defense to a genuine collective defense posture. It 

strengthened the central function of the GCC Defense 

Council’s High Military Committee and the coordinating role of the Adjunct Secretary General for Military 

Affairs. The agreement paved the way to the recent 

reinforcement of the Peninsula Shield in limited-scale 

crisis.53

Still, the idea of a united military command was 

expressed officially at the 33rd GCC summit in December 2012. The rationale for such a structure was to centralize the efforts of the GCC in military affairs. By 

that time, numerous committees were dealing with 
23

different files: military training, procurement, technology, and the Peninsula Shield. This had generated 

overlapping and loose supervision; therefore, a united 

military command was seen as the logical step to reinforce the military cohesion of the GCC.54 Foreign Minister of Bahrain Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa 

clarified the ambitions:

We want to create a central command that coordinates 

between all sub-commands and makes them work under 

one umbrella. But, the new structure [the Unified Military 

Command] won’t replace the Peninsula Shield forces.55

A year later, the project again was mentioned in the 

official documents of the 34th Summit held in Kuwait 

City, although only a few details were conveyed to the 

media. The new command would gather about 100,000 

men, half of whom were sent by Saudi Arabia.56 It 

would oversee air, land, and maritime forces of the 

GCC militaries.

Based on the information available, this GCC united 

military command might look similar to NATO’s 

Allied Command for Operations (ACO) located in the 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Mons, Belgium. ACO is responsible for the planning and execution of NATO military operations and operates at 

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Although 

its permanent structure was much bigger during the 

Cold War, the new format approved by NATO defense 

ministers in June 2011 is getting leaner. Noticeably, 

both the ACO and the Gulf projects acknowledge the 

prevailing role of the biggest defense contributors to 

the alliances: respectively the United States and Saudi 

Arabia. In the same way that the position of Supreme 

Allied Commander Europe traditionally is held by a 

U.S. flag officer, Saudi Arabia plays a central role in the 
24

united command. Not only does the country host the 

command, but also it provides by far the biggest share 

of its resources. Even though there has not been any 

official nomination yet, it is very likely that the commander would be a Saudi military representative.

Some of the major obstacles NATO structures faced 

would not be relevant in the Gulf context. For instance, 

within the military structures of the Atlantic Alliance, 

standardization has always been a challenge. NATO 

countries for a long time have organized their own 

procurement policies, their own force generation processes, and their own doctrines. There is not exactly 

one NATO military culture, but rather the aggregation of 28 different ones. This meant for the ACO that 

commanding an operation involving a dozen of different armed forces was a daunting task. Standardization within NATO has never been an easy endeavor 

because it challenges national prerogatives. Moreover, 

the fact that NATO standardization practically implies 

American standardization led some European countries eager to protect their national defense industries 

and their doctrinal traditions to impede such process.

Another problem of NATO allied commands 

relates to the language constraints. It could sound a 

mundane issue, but for many European allies, finding mid to high-ranking officers able to operate and 

to hold critical command responsibilities in English is 

not an easy task. This linguistic factor certainly played 

a role to hinder the building of the NATO command 

structure.

Within the GCC, these issues would not represent 

the same problems. First, the language constraint does 

not exist, as all members share Arabic. Second, the standardization process is likely to be less difficult. Most 

of the military platforms of GCC members are bought 
25

from the United States and the United Kingdom or 

France and, therefore, could operate under similar processes. This also means that doctrines and military cultures could adapt more easily. Additionally, although 

there is a growing indigenous defense industry (in the 

United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia), it would not 

be affected by a standardization process the way European military companies (Airbus and Finmeccanica, 

among others) are within NATO.

The Importance of Maritime Coordination

As the Kuwait City Summit of 2013 reaffirmed the 

creation of a united command, it also announced the 

foundation of a coordination center for maritime security, to be hosted by Bahrain. As mentioned earlier, the 

threats and challenges GCC countries face in the waters 

of the Gulf are demanding a collective response.

The choice of Bahrain is a sound one in terms of 

geography but also in terms of international cooperation. The kingdom already hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet 

that is responsible for naval forces in the Gulf, the Red 

Sea, the Arabian Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean. 

Given its size and its missions, the Fifth Fleet is a major 

hub not only for U.S. operations, but also for multilateral operations and exercises in the area. Moreover, 

the Royal Navy also is building its own naval base in 

Manama that will cover all British maritime activities 

in the area, a major move from London that reinforces 

the position of Bahrain as the hub for maritime cooperation both within the GCC and with Western allies.

Beyond the coordination center, in order to build 

a sustainable regional naval force, the GCC will need 

to address the same challenges NATO has been struggling with, that is, to allocate sufficient capabilities to 
26

the national navies. There has sometimes been a gap 

between NATO initiatives and the resources that its 

members are able or willing to offer. Gulf navies are 

still nascent forces whose ability to project power is 

limited. Only the United Arab Emirates naval forces 

so far have been able to conduct complex operations as 

evidenced by their long deployment in Yemen, including amphibious landing in several cities in the south of 

the country between 2015 and 2016. Emirati maritime 

maneuvers in Yemen left American counterparts “surprised and impressed.”57 The operation indicated a 

level of effectiveness that equaled one of the European 

navies, but (except for Saudi Arabia) this is not yet the 

case of the other Gulf navies.58 For the other countries 

(Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman), naval means are 

more limited, logically proportional to the small size of 

their overall militaries.

This imbalance between Gulf navies is not the central issue. The challenge for a collective naval force 

would be to identify the sufficient level of forces it 

needs to integrate in order to deter any aggression or, 

if a crisis erupts, to deploy means swiftly. This would 

also require defining an acceptable division of labor 

among Gulf navies.

Eventually, the solution to this equation depends 

on the scenarios of engagement selected by GCC leaders. Would a future naval coordination center monitor 

only low-intensity activities such as patrolling the sea 

against piracy, or would it progressively go as far as 

to become the maritime body in charge of any major 

crisis in the Gulf? A major question that is worth asking 

through that process is the place conferred to cooperation with Western allies: should local navies build their 

force structure, assuming allies would not intervene or 

would have left the area? This is the kind of security 
27

dilemma Europeans have faced vis-à-vis the Americans for a long time. Frequently accused of free-riding, 

European governments have decreased their defense 

expenditures steadily as they faced a financial crisis 

since 2008. The fact that U.S. military commitment 

remained stable did not provide any incentive for 

Europeans to invest in their own forces. GCC leaders 

could face the very same dilemma. On one hand, planning with a U.S. naval presence is not likely to encourage countries with lesser means to invest more. On the 

other, planning without a U.S. naval presence assumes 

the Americans would not fulfil their commitment to 

its partners, something that remains in both cases―in 

Europe and in the Gulf―highly hypothetical (and contradicting current policies).

One way or another, the building of a strong 

GCC naval component will take time. It is a matter of 

decades, not just a few years. In all regions, procuring 

ships and deploying platforms with trained sailors are 

long endeavors.

A Regional Missile Defense Coordinating Cell

Given the pace and scale of Iran’s ballistic arsenal, 

it is no surprise that GCC countries have been eager 

to procure U.S. missile defense systems. As of today, 

Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia 

have been at the forefront of these purchases. In 2013, 

Abu Dhabi bought Patriot missile batteries as well as 

two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 

batteries. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia procured the biggest and the oldest missile defense capability. As a 

matter of fact, Riyadh started investing into this field 

following the Gulf War of 1990. The use of SRBMs and 

cruise missiles by Saddam Hussein against the country 
28

was an obvious wake-up call for its leadership. Today, 

according to independent surveys, the Saudi kingdom 

has acquired and deployed various systems: Hawk 

surface-to-air missiles (MIM 23B I-Hawk and MIM J/K 

Hawk) and Patriot batteries, which include Pac-2 and 

Pac-3. As they were getting old, the Pac-3 batteries are 

currently going through a process of upgrading.59 In 

recent years, there have been speculations that Saudi 

Arabia would go further into deploying its missile 

defense capabilities by purchasing Aegis destroyers 

and the THAAD system that the United Arab Emirates 

already bought.60 In early 2015, a high-level representative from Lockheed Martin went public to announce 

that Saudi Arabia was going to order the THAAD 

system, but until today, this was not confirmed by an 

official statement from Riyadh.61

Regarding Qatar, the leadership in Doha also 

decided to acquire 10 Patriot batteries, which were 

part of a broader arms sale deal with the United States 

worth $11 billion.62 Finally, in June 2016, Raytheon 

announced that it would modernize Kuwait’s Patriot 

systems under a $523 million contract issued by the 

U.S. Army.63

While these sales evidence the strong interest from 

Gulf kingdoms to strengthen their defenses against 

Iranian ballistic means, they were national initiatives 

taken without consulting neighboring allies. For several years now, the U.S. Government strongly supported the idea of building a genuine GCC missile 

defense system that would ensure comprehensive coverage of the territories of the organization. Not only 

did it make sense at the military level, but also missile 

defense was identified as a means to foster the project of collective defense in the Peninsula. In December 

2013, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel visited Gulf 
29

capitals to announce a reinforcement of U.S. missile 

defense systems sold to GCC countries, adding that 

the Barack Obama administration aimed to do so “by 

working in a coordinated way with the GCC.”64

Noticeably, this U.S.-Gulf cooperation developed 

while the negotiations regarding the Iranian nuclear 

program were underway; therefore, missile defense 

clearly played a role of reassurance for the Gulf allies. 

The file progressively became a pillar of U.S.-GCC strategic dialogue. At the U.S.-Gulf Summit in May 2015, 

heads of state publicly committed to build a regional 

defense architecture. In early 2016, there were signs that 

Gulf States were soon to make a joint missile defense 

structure official. During an air force conference, on 

January 20, Reuters reported the words of Hamad Al 

Khalifah, commander of the Royal Bahraini Air Force, 

“we have started and hopefully it (the result) will be 

announced soon.”65

Although the specifics of a GCC joint missile 

defense architecture obviously are not open to the 

public, the challenges country members face are similar to those that have been at the core of NATO internal 

discussions―and sometimes disputes. A joint system 

implies joint ownership that challenges several aspects 

of the decision-making: the investments in capabilities, the sharing of intelligence data, and the chain of 

command.

First, a collective missile defense structure would 

need to specify the levels of burden sharing among its 

members regarding the allocated capabilities. The biggest specificity of the field of missile defense, compared 

to other arms domains, relates to the level of sophistication of these systems involving several platforms 

and combining numerous technologies. As a result, 

missile defense enterprises remain an expensive game. 
30

Although most of the GCC members have bought 

some capabilities, only Saudi Arabia and the United 

Arab Emirates are deploying the most comprehensive 

systems. As in Europe, the imbalance between burden 

sharing is not inevitably going to block the whole project, but it has to be addressed. As NATO also faced an 

imbalance―which to a certain extent was much bigger 

between the United States and Europe than the one in 

the Gulf―the U.S. administration offered (to its European allies) to allocate its capabilities such as radars, 

interceptors, and Aegis destroyers, while the rest of the 

Atlantic Alliance would focus on the command and 

control system. The GCC solution likely is to be different, but the challenge is a similar one as it relates to 

the ability of allies to build a common system despite 

disparities regarding their own capabilities.

The second and third issues directly touch upon 

matters of national sovereignty. Intelligence sharing 

and political decision-making remain sensitive processes that in the case of a GCC missile defense would 

require a robust organization with clearly established 

and automated routines that would exclude long consultations for practical reasons. Inside NATO, there is 

a fear from some European members that, because the 

United States owns most of the capabilities and technologies, it would be the primary, if not the unique, 

decision maker. In the Gulf, if one imagines a scenario 

where Iran was to launch a missile on Saudi Arabia and 

radars in the United Arab Emirates and/or Qatar were 

to detect the launching, sharing the data with Saudi 

counterparts would have to be done in a few minutes, 

if not seconds. Likewise, if the GCC as a whole was 

to decide to retaliate by intercepting the missile, it 

could not do so by convening a meeting of heads of 

states but by specifying the chain reaction prior to the 
31

crisis. It is not an easy task, as evidenced by the difficulties NATO has faced in that same domain for 

several years.

Building a Multilateral Culture through Military 

Education

Another major challenge that GCC armed forces 

face in the build-up of a robust collective defense 

system relates to the multilateral culture such organization requires. Earlier we described the operational 

requirements to build a united command or coordination units in the field of missile defense and maritime 

security, but these new bodies will only become cohesive if the troops of the Gulf kingdoms become accustomed to the culture of multilateral work. In other 

words, technical interoperability also relies on cultural 

interoperability. This alliance culture is what generates bonds and a feeling of camaraderie among officers 

from different countries. It shapes the exchanges and 

allows for disagreements in order to reach a consensus 

on core issues.

It is not an easy and short process. The warfighting experience is an important driver of that culture. 

Regional interventions such as the one in Yemen are a 

first step toward this objective. Because of its scale and 

duration, an operation like the one of 2015-2016 forces 

officers to familiarize themselves with the distinct military cultures of allies and to increase their awareness 

on the subtleties of allied operations.

However, the warfighting experience is not the 

only instrument to shape a multilateral culture among 

armed forces: military education and training programs are equally important. The NATO experience 

provides an interesting lesson in that domain. The 
32

builders of the Atlantic Alliance understood from the 

outset that building such a multilateral culture would 

be necessary to ensure the cohesion of its military 

structure. Creating commands and a headquarters to 

gather the military leaders was necessary but not sufficient. This is why as early as 1951, General Dwight 

Eisenhower identified military education as an instrument of building a NATO ethos. In a statement to the 

North Atlantic Council on April 25, 1951, Eisenhower 

declared, “it is highly desirable to establish in the 

near future a NATO Defense College for the training of individuals who will be needed to serve in key 

capacities in NATO Organizations.”66 This new education entity would not replace national war colleges 

that were already training their officers, but it would 

bring about the multinational culture that domestic 

institutions could not instill. By attending courses at 

the NATO Defense College―as well as at the NATO 

School created in 1975―officers from allied countries 

would meet, share views, disagree on some issues, but 

eventually learn to work together. In other words, education was not to be seen as a goal but as a means to 

foster the NATO culture.

Interestingly, military education has been the 

object of a renewed interest from Gulf leaders. Countries like the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, or 

Kuwait recently have created defense colleges whose 

objective is to prepare a new generation of officers to 

understand the impact of international affairs on their 

national security interests. Moreover, the decision in 

the 2015 GCC summit to build a GCC Defense College 

to be hosted by the United Arab Emirates reinforces 

the idea that common education programs could pave 

the way for a more cohesive military structure. One 

could rightfully argue that this project is nothing new 

as GCC chiefs of state had already envisioned a joint 
33

Gulf Military College as early as February 1984.67 Still, 

its ongoing development should be encouraged. From 

a practical point of view, initiatives like a GCC Defense 

College are much less complex to implement, they 

are by nature less politically sensitive than a missile 

defense coordination center or a united military command, but over time, they equally play a major role in 

the strengthening of the collective defense project.

Implications for U.S. Regional Policy

In recent history, one of the most difficult U.S. challenges has been to find the right balance between reinforcing local initiatives in the Gulf, while reassuring 

its partners regarding its long-term commitment to the 

stability of the region. This meant pushing for a more 

effective regional security architecture without implying the United States was to decrease its engagement 

in the region. This policy mix of support to multilateral projects and reassurance measures―made at the 

bilateral level―sometimes has seemed contradictory, 

but the stability of the Peninsula is likely to depend on 

this equation.

The United States aims to enhance its regional 

policy not only via bilateral relations, but also at the 

multilateral level, in particular following the creation 

of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in 2012. 

This forum gathers all the political representatives of 

the GCC and the U.S. Government to exchange on 

major strategic issues such as counterterrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the Syrian 

civil war. The goal of this new initiative is clearly to 

foster the GCC’s own collective dynamic. It also signals the American intention to “multilateralize” its 

policy toward the region to avoid the past competitive 
34

bilateralism.68 As of today, the most important areas 

of cooperation under the framework of this U.S.-GCC 

Strategic Cooperation Forum have been missile defense 

and arms procurement but it may be worth considering expanding this current focus to military education. 

The GCC could benefit from U.S. know-how in this 

domain, through a closer cooperation with U.S. professional military education institutions.

Furthermore, we believe that an additional way to 

solve the equation of U.S.-Gulf relations is to use the 

role of NATO in a more efficient way in the region. 

Although NATO is a frequently used analogy for the 

GCC, the existence of a partnership between the Atlantic Alliance and Gulf countries is sometimes forgotten. 

In 2004, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was 

launched during the Alliance Summit hosted in the 

Turkish city. In the final Summit Declaration, the heads 

of state asserted that, in complementing the existing 

Mediterranean Dialog, the ICI was:

offered by NATO to interested countries in the region, 

starting with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation 

Council, to foster mutually beneficial bilateral 

relationships and thus enhance security and stability,

by focusing:

 on practical cooperation where NATO can add value.69

The ICI was to become the partnership tool for NATO to 

engage with the GCC as a whole but Saudi Arabia and 

Oman, which account for approximately 70 percent of 

the Gulf countries’ defense expenditures, declined to 

be part of the ICI. Both agreed to participate in some 

activities but refrained from institutionalizing their 

relations with NATO.
35

Another shortcoming relates to the traditional 

inclination toward bilateralism in the Peninsula: the 

ICI partners approached NATO’s initiative the same 

way they approached their multiple national security 

arrangements and guarantees with Western powers. 

In both cases, the GCC countries sought close bilateral 

relations to pursue their own distinctive diplomatic 

goals. Furthermore, ICI partners sometimes are of 

two minds about their relations with NATO. Several 

officials from GCC countries met in the region and 

expressed their “ignorance about NATO’s real objectives with the ICI,” describing it as “a partnership 

without a cause.” Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman of the 

Gulf Research Centre, was already underlining this 

tendency in 2006:

the initiative being put forward within the framework 

of NATO has been perceived in negative terms as being 

no more than a mechanism by which the West can 

continue to control the region. With the reputation of the 

United States in the Gulf deteriorating rapidly, NATO 

was perceived as a wolf in sheep’s clothing or as a new 

package for Western policies of the past.70

Recognizing these pitfalls is a necessary process 

if one wants to improve NATO-Gulf relations. Given 

the current momentum for collective defense in the 

Peninsula, the NATO partnership more than ever is 

an asset to leverage. The Alliance’s experience in the 

field of multinational military education and training 

could help the GCC build its own. The NATO School 

in Oberammergau, Germany, and the NATO Defense 

College in Rome, Italy, play primary roles to that purpose, but there are many other initiatives opened to 

partners such as the Defense Education Enhancement 

Program and ad-hoc training teams deployed by the 
36

Allied Command for Transformation.71 Focusing on 

military education and training is a realistic objective, 

given the vast disparities among the armed forces of 

partner countries in terms of expenditures, force structure, and military readiness. The value of NATO as a 

defense education and training provider is evidenced 

by the enduring interest of Middle East partners for 

the various activities (exercises and courses) offered by 

NATO structures.

NATO could also play a significant role in support of 

the GCC defense initiatives to share lessons learned in 

the establishment of a united command. The ICI could 

also be turned into a platform to cover common operational challenges such as maritime security and missile 

defense, which are very likely to shape the strategic 

agenda of both regional actors. In that perspective, the 

United States should consult with its transatlantic allies 

to reconsider the format of their partnership toward 

the Gulf. Such a new relation would decrease the U.S. 

burden and enhance the multilateral framework, while 

both reassuring local allies of Western solidarity and 

providing them support for their projects in the field 

of collective defense. Announced in early 2017, the 

building of the first NATO-ICI Regional Centre in the 

Emirate of Kuwait could pave the way for this new 

step in the development of the Gulf-NATO partnership. 

This new entity could grow as a unique forum in the

region to discuss all security issues mentioned earlier 

at the multilateral level.72

CONCLUSION

The issue of collective defense in the Gulf has 

evolved significantly over the recent years. As 

explained, there are numerous indicators that the 
37

long-awaited regional security architecture for the 

Peninsula might emerge in the not so distant future. 

Of course, in light of the lessons of past initiatives and 

contemporary disputes, one should remain cautious 

when looking at these developments. Because of the 

evolving security challenges facing the Gulf partners, 

there is an urgent need to build a reliable framework to 

address these issues.

For the U.S. Government, the stability of the Gulf 

remains a major national security interest, and the key 

in the ongoing process will be to find a right posture 

vis-à-vis the GCC evolution. U.S. forces are unlikely to 

leave the area in the near future, but their role could 

evolve progressively from a fighting force to a supporting force for Gulf partners. Over the long term, 

this implies that the United States also would accept 

decreasing its own ability to shape regional dynamics. Although this generates a fair amount of criticisms in Washington, this is already the case regarding 

U.S. support to the coalition in Yemen and the sometimes-conflicted views between the United States and 

Saudi Arabia on the objectives of the campaign.

This new environment for defense diplomacy in 

the Gulf means a more complex environment to grasp. 

While the United States should monitor closely the 

evolution of GCC military initiatives, it should consult 

with NATO and include the Alliance in its Strategic 

Cooperation Forum in the region. Through this process, exchanges with the United Kingdom and France, 

two close European allies with significant presence in 

the Gulf, will also enable the U.S. Government to support the collective defense efforts in the region without sidelining any of the stakeholders. Eventually, 

this transition would lead to a new division of labor 

between Western and local forces, and therefore, it 
38

is extremely important for all the parties involved to 

ensure the stability of the region all along this process.

ENDNOTES

1. Florence Gaub, The Gulf Moment: Arab Relations Since 2011, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2015, p. ix.

2. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Contemporary socio-political issues of 

the Arab Gulf moment, London School of Economics, Centre for the 

Study of Global Governance, September 2010, p. 1.

3. Colin Simpson, “‘Arab Gulf moment’ is trend here to stay, 

says academic,” The National, November 22, 2011; see David Held, 

Kristian Ulrichsen, eds., The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, 

Economics and the Global Order, London, UK: Routledge, 2013.

4. “Time to raise an Arab NATO,” The National, March 10, 

2015. The Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon would be filled with 

mostly Syrian troops, and its mandate eventually would be used 

by the Assad regime to consolidate its influence in the Lebanese 

civil war.

5. On the topic of an Arab NATO, see Florence Gaub, An Arab 

NATO in the Making? Middle Eastern Military Cooperation since 

2011, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 2016.

6. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Al-nizam al-’iqlimi al-khaliji (The 

Gulf Regional System), Beirut, Lebanon: Al-Mu’assasa al-Jami’iya 

lil-Dirasat wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi, 1998.

7. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: the 

Structure of International Security, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 

University Press, 2003, p. 44.

8. F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian 

Gulf, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

9. Giorgio Cafiero, “Oman and Iran: friends with many 

benefits,” Al Monitor, April 29, 2016.

10. F. Gregory Gause III, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle 

East Cold War, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, No. 11, 
39

July 2014, p. 1; see also Ellie Geranmayeh, “Is the Iran-Saudi Cold 

War Heating Up,” The New York Times, July 27, 2016.

11. On this ideological shift, see Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of 

Political Islam, New York: Belknap Press, 2003.

12. Official Document, “The Decision to Establish the Gulf 

Cooperation Council,” February 14, 1981, Rouhollah K. Ramazani 

and Joseph A. Kechichian, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and 

Analysis, Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1988, 

p. 13.

13. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states, 

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more 

of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an 

attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if 

such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 

right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by 

Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the 

Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually 

and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 

necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 

maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such 

armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof 

shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 

measures shall be terminated when the Security Council 

has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain 

international peace and security.

For a recent analysis of the strategic implications of NATO’s article 5, see Bruno Tertrais, “Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: Its 

Origins, Meaning and Future,” Research Paper, No. 130, Rome, 

Italy: NATO Defense College, April 2016.

14. Ola Salem, “1981: The dawn of the GCC,” The National, 

November 22, 2011.

15. This strategy was revised several times, particularly in 

2012 with the Gulf Security Agreement.

16. Interestingly, it took 21 years before this “comprehensive security strategy” was updated and approved at the Muscat 

Summit in 2008.
40

17. Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, eds., Middle East 

Contemporary Survey, London, UK: Westview Press, 1987, p. 360.

18. The Peninsula Shield was, in fact, an old project, 

mentioned for the first time in 1982.

19. “Timeline of the GCC Summits,” Gulf News, December 5, 

2010.

20. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 1987, p. 270.

21. On this frequent misinterpretation of the GCC, see Scott 

Cooper, “State-Centric Balance-of-Threat Theory: Explaining the 

Misunderstood Gulf Cooperation Council,” Security Studies, Vol. 

13, No. 2, 2003, pp. 306-349.

22. Tajuddin Abdul Haq, “Abdullah slams GCC indecision,” 

Arab News, December 31, 2001.

23. See, for instance, the opinion piece by David Roberts, 

“Gulf disunion,” Foreign Policy, May 2, 2012.

24. See Florence Gaub, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

and Libya: Reviewing Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013.

25. Kathleen McInnis, “Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research

Service, August 24, 2016.

26. A small contingent of the Peninsula Shield was sent to 

Kuwait during the First Gulf War in 1990 and again in 2003.

27. For the details of the coalition deployments, see International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 

2016, London, UK: Routledge, 2015, p. 315.

28. While Mohammed Bin Salman was named Minister of 

Defense of Saudi Arabia on January 23, 2015, “Operation Decisive 

Storm” was initiated on April 21, 2015.

29. Interviews with policy and military officials, Kuwait City, 

Kuwait, June 2012.
41

30. Declan Walsh, “Egypt gives Saudi Arabia 2 islands in a 

show of gratitude,” The New York Times, April 10, 2016.

31. Interview with the author, Abu Dhabi, United Arab 

Emirates, September 2016.

32. See Andrew Dorman, European Adaptation to Expeditionary Warfare: Implications for the U.S. Army, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002.

33. The entire strait is 180 kilometers long and at its narrowest 

points 45 kilometers wide.

34. Quote from Sabahat Khan, Strategies in Contemporary Maritime Security: Challenges Confronting the Arabian Gulf, Dubai, UAE: 

Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis, 2009, p. 42.

35. Tim Ripley, “Gulf of Distrust: Naval Stand-offs and the 

Persian Gulf,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 2008, p. 8.

36. Ibid., pp. 8-15.

37. Some estimates suggest that the IRGC naval branch has as 

much manpower as the regular navy. It has two main specialties: 

small patrol boat and anti-ship missile operations.

38. Ripley, p. 11.

39. Anthony Cordesman, Martin Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces 

and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 

Press, 2007, p. 201.

40. The threat has been made several times by different representatives of the regime. It came at the forefront of international 

news in late 2011 when Iranian Vice President Mohammad-Reza 

Rahimi used that threat to deter the European Union to enforce 

new economic sanctions (banning Iranian oil exports to Europe) in 

the context of the negotiations related to Iran’s nuclear program.

41. Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian 

Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 

1, Summer 2008, pp. 82-117.
42

42. Anthony Cordesman and Aaron Lin, The Iranian Sea-AirMissile Threat to Gulf Shipping, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 

2015, pp. 16-17.

43. Steven Hildreth, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for 

Congress, February 2009, p. 1.

44. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments,” Memorandum, July 1990. Source: CIA Electronic 

Reading Room, released under the Freedom of Information Act.

45. Bernard Rostker, Information Paper Iraq’s Scud Ballistic 

Missiles, July 25, 2000, available from cc.bingj.com/cache.aspx?q=

bernard+rostker+scud&d=4944995094366793&mkt=en-US&setlang=

en-US&w=eDpQsAZRMoPIuU6qaL8lJ5lTqyArHc6v, accessed on 

September 6, 2017.

46. Kevin Woods, David Palkki, and Mark Stout, eds., A 

Survey of Saddam’s Audio Files, 1978-2001: Toward an Understanding of Authoritarian Regimes, Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense 

Analyses, 2010, p. 259.

47. Steven A. Hildreth, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch 

Programs, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 

Report for Congress, 2012, p. 15.

48. U.N. Security Council Committee established pursuant to 

resolution 1737 (2006, Final Report of the Panel of Experts submitted in accordance with resolution 1984 (2011), S/2012/395, 

June 12, 2012.) The Panel of Experts report was issued under UN 

Security Council Resolution 1929, which mandated the Panel of 

Experts. UN Security Council Resolution 1984 renewed the 1929 

Panel of Experts mandate.

49. Hildreth, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, 

p. 19.

50. IISS, The Military Balance 2012, London, UK: Routledge, 

2012, p. 297.

51. “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015,” Washington, DC: 
43

National Intelligence Council, September 1999. ICBMs are traditionally missiles capable of ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers 

(about 3,400 miles).

52. For a detailed assessment of Iran’s anti-access strategy 

and its implications for U.S. forces, see Mark Gunzinger and 

Chris Dougherty, Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s 

Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats, Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2012.

53. As of today, The Peninsula Shield gathers military 

resources from all six GCC members, and its training takes place 

at King Khalid Military City in Saudi Arabia.

54. Zafer Muhammad Alajmi, “Gulf Military Cooperation: 

Tangible Gains or Limited Results?” Doha, Qatar: Al Jazeera 

Centre for Studies, March 31, 2015.

55. “Stop meddling, Iran told,” Khaleej Times, December 26, 

2012.

56. Brahim Saidy, “The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Unified 

Military Command,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Book, 

October 8, 2014.

57. Saeed Al Batati, Kareem Fahim, and Eric Schmitt, “Yemeni 

Troops, Backed by United Arab Emirates, Take City From Al 

Qaeda,” The New York Times, April 24, 2016.

58. Interview with a European high-level military official, 

Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, September 2016.

59. Saudi Patriot interceptors were used between 2015 and 

2016 as Houthi insurgents launched SRBMs (Scud and Tochka 

missiles) from Yemen toward Saudi Arabia. According to a survey 

conducted by the CSIS, most of these missiles were intercepted. See 

the CSIS special website dedicated to the missile war in Yemen, 

available from missilethreat.csis.org/the-missile-war-in-yemen/.

60. Christopher Cavas, “Saudi Arabia Mulling BMD-Capable 

Destroyer,” Defense News, June 13, 2011.
44

61. Jeremy Binnie, “Saudi, Qatari THAAD contracts in the 

pipeline,” IHS Jane’s 360, February 24, 2015.

62. “Qatar Inks Deal to Buy U.S. Patriot Interceptors,” Nuclear 

Threat Initiative, July 15, 2014.

63. Richard Tomkins, “Raytheon upgrading Kuwait’s Patriot 

air defense system,” UPI, June 24, 2016.

64. Julian Barnes, “U.S. offers missile defense to Gulf,” The 

Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2013.

65. Reuters, “Gulf Arab states working on joint missile 

defence-Bahrain,” January 20, 2016.

66. Chronicle Book 60th Anniversary, Rome, Italy: NATO 

Defense College, 2011, p. 9.

67. R.K. Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and 

Analysis, Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1988, 

p. 216.

68. Becca Wasser and John Drennan, “The US-GCC Strategic 

Cooperation Forum: A multilateral approach to counter-terrorism,” London, UK: IISS, December 9, 2012, available from https://

www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/2012-6d11/december2012-a370/us-gcc-cooperation-b460, accessed on May 30, 2016.

69. Istanbul Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of 

State and Government participating in the meeting of the North 

Atlantic Council, Press Release 096, June 28, 2004, para. 37.

70. Abdulaziz Sager, “What Do the Gulf Cooperation Council States Want from NATO?” in: Ronald Asmus, ed., NATO and 

Global Partners: Views From the Outside, Riga Papers, Washington, 

DC: German Marshall Fund, 2006, p. 17.

71. Jean d’Andurain and Alan Stolberg, “Defense Education 

Enhancement Program: The NATO Functional Clearing-House 

on Defense Education,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal, Vol. 11, 

No. 4, 2012, pp. 53-58.

72. Jean-Loup Samaan, “The strategic significance of the 

new NATO-ICI regional center in Kuwait,” NATO Defense College Foundation, March 2017, available from natofoundation.org/
45

food/the-strategic-significance-of-the-new-nato-ici-regional-centre-inkuwait-jean-loup-samaan/, accessed on August 19, 2017.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General John S. Kem

Commandant

∗∗∗∗∗

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

AND

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Jean-Loup Samaan

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Denise J. Kersting

∗∗∗∗∗

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT

armywarcollege.edu

This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website