Santa n a ’ s c o u n s e l w it

h dr e w o nA p r il 2 2 , 2 0 0 4 , b u t S an ta n a p r o c e e d e d

to tr ia l o nM ar ch 1 29, 2005, pro se. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00452 -CV

Jo se Sant ana , A ppe lla nt

v. Texas Workforce Com m ission and Wi lliam M cCr ea, Appellees

FR OM T HE C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W N O. 2 OF T R A V IS C OU N T Y, NO. 25975 0, HO NORAB LE ORLI NDA NARAN JO , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Pro se appe llant J ose Santana appea ls the denial of his plea to the jurisdiction, 1
asser ting that subsec tion 26.043(1) of the g overnme nt code de prived the trial court of subje ct-matter jurisdiction in his suit for defa mation ag ainst his employ er, appellee Texas Workforce Commi ssion, and his supervisor, appe llee Willi am McCre a. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 26.043( 1) (West 2004). We c on c lud e tha

t th e c ivi l ju ri sd ic tio n o f t he statut or

y c ounty c ourt s at la

w i n T ra vis County

is
concur rent with t hat of the Tr avis County district courts, see id
. §§ 25.0001, .2292(a) (West 2004), and we aff

irm the trial cour

t’s order denying the plea to the jurisdiction.2 BACK GR OUND The question of the trial court’s jurisdiction in sui ts for def amation is the sole issue befor e us. B eca

use the mer its of this appea l are not aff ecte d by the facts of t he under ly ing suit, our discussion of t he fa cts is brief. Cf. Tex as Dep’ t of Park s & W ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004) (concluding that predic ate facts im plicated merits of ca se and jurisdictional issue).

Santana sue d his e mploy er, the Texas Workforce Commi ssion, and his supervisor, Wil liam McCrea , for defamation. The c ase pr ocee ded to trial bef ore a jury . The trial c ourt g rante d a motion for direct ed v er d i ct in favor of the Commission based on sovere ign immunity and dis mis se d Sa

nta na ’s c la ims fo r la c k o f j ur isd ic tio n. Santa na ’s re ma ini ngc la im a g a ins t Mc Cr e a in h i s i n d i v i d

u a l c a p a c i t y an d

t h e qu e s t i o no f

M c C r e a ’ s o f

f i c i a l i m m u n i t y w e r e s u

b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y, wh ic h f ound un anim ou sly

th at Mc Cr e a

did no t de fa me Santa na and that Mc Cr e a

wa s e nti tle d to officia l immuni ty . The trial c ourt enter ed a f inal judgme nt that Santa

na take nothing based on the jury ’s ver dict. After

the cour t signe d the final judg ment, Santana f iled a pl ea to the jurisdiction arguing that subsection 26.043(1) of the g overnme nt code de prived the tria l court of subjec t-matter jurisdiction. The trial cour t denied the plea . This appea l followed.

DI SCU SSIO N I n his sole point of error , Santana a rg ues that t he trial court err ed in deny ing his plea to the jurisdiction because the g overnme nt code de prived the c ourt of jurisdiction in h i s s u i t for defa mation. S

ee T ex . Gov’t Code Ann. § 26.043( 1). A plea that challeng es the trial c ourt’s subject-matter

jurisdiction pr esents a question of law that we revie w de novo. W estbrook v. P enley ,3

No
. 0 4 -0 8 3 8 , 2 0 0 7 T ex . L E XIS 5 9 9 , at * 8 -9 (T ex . J u n e 2 9 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226). The jurisdiction of Te x as cour ts is conferred solely

by the Texas Constit ution and state statutes. Chenault v. Phillips , 914 S.W .2d 140, 141 (Tex. 1996) . Pursuant to the Texas Constit ution, the judicial power of the State is “vested in o n e S u p re m e C ourt, in one Court of Criminal Appea ls, in Courts of Appeals, i n District Courts, in Count y Courts, in Com missioners Courts, in Courts of J ustices of the Peace , and in such other courts as ma

y be provide d by

law.” Tex. Cons t. art. V, § 1. The Texas Consti tution also authorizes the leg islature to “e sta b l i s h such other courts as it may

deem ne cessa

ry and pre scribe the jurisdiction and org anization thereof, a nd [t o] conform the jurisdiction of t h e d istrict and other infe rior cour ts thereto.” Id. ; see id. § 15 (“The re sha ll be established in e ach county in this State a County Court . . . .”). Te x as cour ts that
are enumer ated in the c onstitut ion are ref err ed to as “ constitution al cour ts,” while cour

ts that are established pursua

nt to the l eg islature’s power to cre ate “other c ourts” ar e re fer red to a s “leg islative” or “statutory ” courts. 1 Roy W. McDona ld & Elaine A. Gr afton Car lson, Texas Civil Practice § 3 :3 (2 d e d. 20 04 ); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 21.009 (1), ( 2) (West 2004).

Th e Tr a vis County

Cou rt a t L aw No. 2 is a

statut or y c ounty c ourt , see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.229 1 (2 ) (West 2004), whose jurisdiction is presc ribed by sections 25.0003 and 25.2292 of the g overnme nt code. See id
. § 25.0003 (West Supp. 2006), § 25.2292. Section 25.0003 contains t he gene ral gra

nt of j urisdiction to all statutory county courts, and se ction 25.2292 contains the spec ific g rant of jur isdiction to st atutory county courts in Travis County
. The ge nera l g rant of jurisdiction in section 25.0003 provides , in part, that statutory county courts have concur

rent jurisdiction (1) with constitutional county courts, and ( 2) with district courts i n civil case s in which4

the am o u n t in controver sy is betwee n $500 and $100,000. Id . § 25 .0 00 3( a ), (c )( 1) . T he sp e c if ic g ra nt of jur isd ic tio n in se c tio n 25 .2 29 2 e xpand s th e jur isd ic tio n o f t he c ounty c ourt s at la

w i n T ra vis County
. Id . § 25
. 2 292(a) . I t states that “[i] n addition to the jurisdiction conferr ed g ener ally by
se c tio n 2 5. 00 03 and ot her law ,” a Tr a vis Cou

nty c ourt a t la w h a s c on c ur

re nt j ur isd ic tio n in

c ivi l
case s with the district court. Id . I t als o in c re a se s th e ma ximuma mou nt i n c on tr ov e rs y

fo r t ho se
case s to $250,000. Id
. Thus, under section 25.2292—the s pecif ic provisi on of t he gover

nment code applicable to Travis County —statuto r y c o u nty c o u r ts at law have conc urre nt jurisdiction with di strict courts in civil case s in which the amount in controve rsy is betwee n $500 and $250,000. See id. The parties do not dispute that Santana ’s suit satisfied the amount in controver sy require ment, nor do they dispute that district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction in sui ts for def amation. See Te x. Con st.
art . V , § 8 ( g ra

nti ngdis tr ic t co urt s “ e xclu siv e , a pp e llate , a

nd or ig ina l juri sd ic tio n o f a ll a c tio ns , proce eding s, and re medies,” unle ss exclusi ve, appe llate, or origin al j urisdiction is confer red by constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or

administrative body

). Santana’ s argument attempts to mini miz e the sig nificanc e of se ction 2 5
. 2 2 9 2 by linking two diffe rent provisions of the g overnme nt code that a re not c ounty -spec ific: subsections 25.0003(a) and 26.043(1) . Subsection 25.0003(a) states that statutory county courts have c oncurr ent jurisdiction with constit utional county courts. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.003(a) . Secti on 26.043(1) state s that constitutional county courts do not have jurisdiction in su i t s “to re cover damag es for

slander or

defa mation of cha

rac ter.” Id. § 2 6. 04 3 ( pr oh ib it in g co ns tit uti on a l c ounty courts fr om exercising jurisdiction in eig ht ty pes of c ivil sui ts). Combini ng these statutes, Santana argues that bec ause the trial court has concur rent jurisdiction with constit utional county courts and5

beca u s e constitutional county courts ar e not empowe red to he ar de famation suit s, the trial cour t lacke d jurisdiction in his suit for defa mation. We disag ree with Santana’s a rg ument. A county court lac ks jurisdiction in t he eig ht ty p e s o f c iv il s u it s th a t ar e li s te d in s e c ti o n 2 6
. 0 4 3 o f th e g o v e r n me n t code. Id
. “C ounty c ourt ” is defined in the g overnme nt code a s “the” court c reated in eac h co u n t y p u rs uant to the Texas Constit ution’s article V , section 15. Id . § 21 .0 09(1) ; see Te x. Con st. art . V , § 15 . B y c on tr a st, statutory county courts—such a s Travis County co u r ts a t l a w —are define d in the g overnme nt code a s courts cr eate d by

the leg islature pursua

nt to its power

under the Texas Consti tution’s art i cl e V,
se c tio n 1. Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 2 1. 00 9( 2) ; see Tex. Const. art. V, § 1. N othing in sec tion 26.043 of the g overnme nt code r efe rs to the county courts at law that possess civil jurisdiction concurre nt wi th t he dis tr ic t c ourt s. Santa na ob se rv e s c or

re c tly that th e le g isl a tur e ha s e na c te d s pe c if ic provisions clarify

ing the jurisdiction of s o m e co unty courts at law

in defamation suits. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.1032(c) (2) (West 2004) (pertaining to Har ris County), § 25.2222(b)(6) (West Supp. 2006) (perta ining to Tarr ant County). Howeve r, the plain lang uag e of sec tion 26.043 does not a

pply to statutory county courts at law; section 26.043 restric ts only the matters that may b e h e ar d in th e c o n s ti tuti o n a l “ c o u n ty c o u rt.” Se e id . §§ 21.009(1) ( defining“county court” ), (2 ) ( de fi nin g “ statut or

y c ounty c ourt ” ), 26 .0 43 (r e str ic tin g su bje c t- matter ju risd ic tio n o f “ c ounty
cou rt” ); see also Continental Coff ee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez , 9 3 7 S. W. 2 d 4 4 4 , 4 4 7 ( T e x. 1 996) (discussing jurisdictional conflict betwe en county court at law and district cour t in context of labor code section 451.003 and concluding that to extent statutory courts shared concurre nt jurisdiction6

with district courts, nothing in plain mea ning of that statute limit ed or ex cluded that c oncurr ent jurisdiction). Santana’ s argument is also unpersua sive beca use i t ignor es subsec tion 25.0001(a) of the g overnme nt code. See Te x. Go v’ t C od e Ann
. § 25.0 00 1( a ). Spe a kin g dir e c tly to c on fl ic ts
conce rning the jurisdiction of statutory county courts, sec tion 25.0001 states that i f a ge nera l provision “conf

licts with a specific provision for a particula r court or county , the spec ific provision controls.” Id. ; see also id. § 311.026 (West 2005) (stating si milar rule in Code Construction Act). Santa na ’s iss ue pr e se nts su c h a c on fl ic t. S ub se c tio n 2 6. 04 3( 1) is a g e ne ra l pr ov isi on

that r e str ic ts the jurisdiction of the constitutional c ounty court in e very county i n T ex as. Id. § 26.043. Under Santa na ’s int e rp re tatio n, su

bs e c tio n 2 6. 04 3( 1) c on fl ic ts w ithsu bs e c tio n 2 5. 22 92(a ), the sp e c if ic provision that expands the jurisdiction of a statutory county court at law in Travis County
. See id
. § 2 5.2292. Thus, the spec ific provision that applies only to Travis County

controls. See id
. § 25.0001(a)
. Santana r elies on Lov ill e v . Lo v ill e , 944 S.W .2d 818 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 1997, writ denied) , in support of his argument that sect i o n 2 6
. 0 43 confine d the trial cour t’s jurisdiction t o t h at of the c onstitut ional county courts. His re liance on Lov ill e is mispl ace d. I n Lov ill e , the B eaumont Court of Appe als h el d t h at a county court at law of Jeffer son County lacke d jurisdiction over the L ovilles’ suit seeki n g t he re cover y of land be cause section 26.043 of the g ov e rnme nt c od e lim ite d th e jur isd ic tio n o f t he statut or

y c ounty c ourt

a t la w o f Je ff e rs on County to that of the constitutional county court. Id
. at 819 (citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 26.043( 8) (stating that “county

court doe s not have jur isdiction in . . . (8) a suit for the r ecove ry of land” )). B ut7

unlike Travis County , J eff erson County

did not have a spe cific pr ovision in t he g overnme nt code g ra nti ngits statut or

y c ounty courts at law concur rent jurisdiction with its district courts. Com pa re Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 25.1252 (West 2004) (per taining to J eff

erson County

), with i d. .2292(a) (per taining to Tr avis County

). The Dallas Court of Appe als construe d a spec ific provision of the g overnme nt code p e rta in in g to th e D a ll a s c o u n ty c o u rts a t l aw in Schuld v. De mbrinski , 12 S.W .3d 485, 489 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pe t.) (construingTex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.0592(a) (West 2004)). The provision at issue in Sc hu ld applies to Dallas County co u rts at law spe cifica lly , and with the
e xce pti on of the a mou nt- in- c on tr ov e rs y

re qu ir e me nt, mir

ro rs the e xpand e d g ra

nt of jur isd ic tio n to courts at l aw in Travis County
. See id . § § 2 5. 05 92 (a ), .2 29 2( a ). I t st a te s th a t “ [i]n a dd iti on to the jur isd ic tio n p ro vid e d b y Se c tio n 2 5. 00 03 and

oth e r l aw, a

c ounty c ourt a t la w i n D a lla s Co un ty has conc urre nt jurisdiction with t he district cour t in civil cas es . . . .” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.0592(a)
. After deciding that the statutory probate court did not have e x clusive jurisdiction over the subject matter

of Schuld’s suit, the Dallas c ourt of ap p eals c oncluded, “ [B]ecause the district court h as j urisdiction over pa rtition suit s, and bec ause the Dallas County courts at law

have
c on c ur re nt j ur isd ic tio n w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt s in c ivil mat ter s re g ard le ss o f t he a mou nt i n controve rsy , we conclude the county court at law has jurisdiction over this par tition s uit.” Sc hu ld , 12 S.W .3d at 489.

Si mi la r ly , b y v ir tu e o f th e c o n tr o ll in g , s p e c if

ic g r an t o f

ju r is d ic ti o nin

s u b s e c tion 25 .2 29 2( a ), the statut or

y c ounty c ourt s at l aw i n T ra

vis Cou nty have c on c ur

re nt j ur isd ic tio n in civil case s with the distri ct courts. Tra vis County

district courts have jurisdiction in sui ts for8

defa mation, and the Tra

vis County

courts at law

share that jurisdiction in civil s uits that have an
a mou nt i n c on tr ov e rs y

be tw e e n $ 50 0 a

nd $2 50 ,0 00 . A c c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that th e Tr a vis County c ourt a t la w h a d sub je c t- matte r jur isd ic tio n in Sant ana ’s su it fo r de fa matio n. We o ve rr

ule Santana’ s sole issue.
CO NC LU SION

Havingoverr

uled Santana’ s sole issue, we a ffirm the tria l court’s orde r deny ing the plea to the jurisdiction.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 16, 2007