UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO: 22-CR-20326-MOORE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. 

ANDRE LORQUET, 

Defendant. 

____________________________________________/ 

NOTICE TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE UNDER

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(B)

The United States of America (the “Government”), through the undersigned Assistant 

United States Attorney, hereby files this Notice to Introduce Evidence Under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 404(b). 

INTRODUCTION

The Defendant Andre Lorquet is charged with participating in a scheme in or around June 

2020 through in or around November 2021 to submit or cause others to submit fraudulent COVIDrelief loan applications for his company, Miami Ent LLC (“MEL”). MEL applied for and received 

Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans, an Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”), and a 

Shuttered Venue Operator Grant (“SVOG”). In a post-Miranda interview, the Defendant admitted 

that he applied for the EIDL loan but said that someone else applied for the PPP loans and SVOG 

grant. The only loan he “knew how to do” was the EIDL, the Defendant said, and he “didn’t know 

how to do anything” regarding COVID-relief. 

The Defendant’s denials during his post-Miranda interview place his knowledge, intent, 

and identity at issue in this trial. The Government therefore seeks to introduce evidence that shows 

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that the Defendant knew exactly what he was doing, that it was the Defendant doing it, and that 

the Defendant intended to commit COVID-relief fraud. This evidence includes fraudulent loan 

applications that the Defendant filed for third parties and communications between the Defendant 

and third parties in which he solicits them as clients and writes that he knows how to apply for 

PPP and SBA loans. This evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence, and outside Rule 404(b), 

because it is inextricably intertwined with the Defendant’s scheme and integral to an account of 

his crime. In the alternative, the evidence is admissible “other acts” evidence because it is 

probative of the Defendant’s intent, knowledge, and identity. 

BACKGROUND

In 2020 and 2021, the Defendant participated in a scheme to file COVID-relief applications 

that greatly overstated MEL’s payroll and revenue. In each application, the Defendant fabricated 

numbers and submitted fraudulent documents. Among other things, the Defendant submitted 

fraudulent IRS Form 940s, which are annual filings with the IRS that report an employer’s federal 

unemployment tax. To submit two of his applications, the Defendant created sham e-mail 

addresses. 

Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment allege interstate wires related to the Defendant’s PPP 

applications. During the COVID-19 epidemic, PPP provided forgivable loans to small businesses 

to help them keep up with their expenses and maintain their payroll. Under PPP, participating 

lenders funded the loans and the SBA guaranteed them. The indictment alleges that the Defendant 

applied for PPP loans with two participating lenders in June 2020 and March 2021. 

Count 2 of the indictment alleges an interstate wire related to the Defendant’s EIDL 

application. EIDL is an SBA program that lends money to businesses affected by COVID-19 and 

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other disasters. The indictment alleges that the Defendant applied for an EIDL loan with the SBA

in June 2020. 

Count 4 of the indictment alleges a wire related to the Defendant’s SVOG grant. Through 

SVOG the SBA awarded grants to entertainment venues and companies that could not fully 

function during the pandemic. The indictment alleges that the Defendant applied for an SVOG 

award with the SBA in August 2021. In the SVOG application, the Defendant used the identity of 

a certified tax preparer and submitted a fake confirmation with her identifying information. The 

indictment charges that submission as aggravated identity theft in Count 9. 

The Defendant’s scheme was successful and he received approximately $4.4 million in 

COVID-relief funds. The defendant laundered the proceeds of his COVID-relief fraud by 

withdrawing large amounts of cash, writing high-value checks, and purchasing expensive jewelry. 

The Defendant also laundered his proceeds by purchasing five cars: one Porsche, one 

Lamborghini, and three Teslas. The indictment charges four of these car purchases as money 

laundering in Counts 5 through 8. 

EVIDENCE TO BE INTRODUCED

The wire fraud scheme the Defendant participated in involved more COVID-relief 

applications than those charged in the indictment. The Defendant’s e-mail inbox shows that he 

and his accomplices filed dozens of applications for third parties, the Defendant’s cloud drive 

contains a document listing each of the applicants and their loans, and the Defendant’s bank 

statements show that he received kickbacks from the successful applications. During its case-inchief, the Government intends to introduce evidence related to two of the loan applications that 

the Defendant submitted for third parties, AJI Clark Bathtub Refinishing LLC (“Clark”) and 

Daniela Rendon PA (“Rendon”). This evidence includes e-mails in which the Defendant sends 

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and receives application information for Clark and Rendon, Exs. 1 & 2, financial statements for 

Clark and Rendon from the Defendant’s cloud drive, Exs. 3 & 5, the PPP applications for Clark 

and Rendon, Exs. 4 & 7, and the subscriber information and e-mails from 

danielarendonpa@gmail.com, which the Defendant created to submit the application for Rendon, 

Exs. 6 and 8. The Government also intends to introduce the chart of PPP applications he and his 

accomplices submitted for third parties, Ex. 16. In addition, the Government intends to introduce 

the Defendant’s communications on Facebook and Instagram about filing COVID-relief 

applications, how much he charges for the service and where to send payment, and what documents 

the Defendant requested from third parties to process their loans. Exs. 9–15. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court may introduce evidence of “any other crime, wrong, or act,” that is, extrinsic 

evidence, for any purpose other than “to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 

particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 

To be admissible under Rule 404(b), “(1) [the evidence] must be relevant to an issue other than 

defendant’s character; (2) there must be sufficient proof to enable a jury to find by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the defendant committed the act(s) in question; and (3) the probative value of 

the evidence cannot be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice, and the evidence must satisfy 

Rule 403.” United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007). Permissible issues 

include “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, 

or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 

Rule 404(b) does not exclude evidence that is intrinsic to the charged offense. Intrinsic 

evidence is “evidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining 

the context, motive and set-up of the crime.” United States v. White, 848 F. App’x 830, 840 (11th 

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Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998)). Intrinsic 

evidence is admissible if it is “(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction 

or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, 

or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” United States v. 

Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1269 (11th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Intrinsic evidence does not require 

pretrial notice but must satisfy Rule 403, that is, its “probative value” must not be “substantially 

outweighed by any unfair prejudice caused by that evidence.” United States v. Olaniyi, 796 F. 

App’x 601, 606 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 403). 

ARGUMENT

The evidence related to the third-party applications are intrinsic to the Defendant’s charged 

offense because they are part of the same series of transactions as the alleged wire fraud. These 

applications were filed during the dates charged in the indictment and effectuated the same 

COVID-relief fraud, and therefore the evidence is “linked in time and circumstances” to the fraud 

and “forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime.” United States v. McClean, 

138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998). In the alternative, the evidence related to the third parties—

both the applications and the communications—are extrinsic evidence under Rule 404(b) that 

prove the Defendant’s intent, knowledge, and identity. The evidence shows that the Defendant 

himself submitted the applications alleged in the indictment, and the Defendant himself knowingly 

and intentionally participated in the scheme. Intrinsic or extrinsic, the third-party evidence is 

admissible.

I. INTRINSIC EVIDENCE: THE THIRD-PARTY APPLICATIONS AROSE FROM 

THE SAME SERIES OF TRANSACTIONS AS THE CHARGED WIRE FRAUD.

The fraudulent loan applications that the Defendant filed for third parties, of which Clark 

and Rendon are but two, are inextricably intertwined with the Defendant’s offense because they 

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were submitted through the same method as the Defendant’s own fraudulent applications. The 

Eleventh Circuit “repeatedly has held that evidence of uncharged conduct that is part of the same 

scheme or series of transactions and uses the same modus operandi as the charged offenses is 

admissible as intrinsic evidence outside the scope of Rule 404(b).” United States v. Ford, 784 

F.3d 1386, 1394 (11th Cir. 2015). 

To submit his own PPP applications, the Defendant included a fraudulent IRS Form 940 

that falsely represented MEL paid $1,035,091 to its employees in tax year 2019 and represented 

that MEL owed $84 in federal unemployment taxes. The Defendant did not “flatten” this Form

940 that was in PDF format, and the document markups show that the date and signature were 

added on an iPad months after it was purportedly signed. The Form 940 that the Defendant 

submitted was an identical copy of another Form 940 that he had submitted on behalf of another 

applicant, This Is The Sound LLC, which was also a client listed on the Defendant’s “PPP Clients” 

spreadsheet. The Defendant communicated with the owner of This Is The Sound LLC by e-mail, 

and the Defendant’s cloud drive contained application documents for This Is The Sound LLC.

The Defendant repeated this pattern with the applications for Rendon and Clark, both of 

which were created from an IP address from which the Defendant repeatedly accessed his social 

media accounts. Like his own application, the Defendant created a fraudulently Form 940 for 

Clark and Rendon with fraudulent figures that he copied from another Form 940. In each Form 

940, the Defendant reported that each company paid $955,152 to their employees in tax year 2019 

and incorrectly calculated the total unemployment tax as $84, a unique number which cannot be 

arrived at if the representations in the loan applications are true. Like his own application, the 

Defendant also added the date and signature for Clark and Rendon on a mobile device, each time 

forgetting to remove the document markups. And like two of his applications, the Defendant 

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created a sham e-mail address for Rendon to send and receive communications with the PPP 

processor. Although the applications for Clark and Rendon are not charged, they share the same 

method and modus operandi as the scheme the Defendant is charged with, and are admissible as 

intrinsic evidence in the Eleventh Circuit.

In Ford, which involved a defendant who filed fraudulent tax returns in other people’s 

names, the Eleventh Circuit held that uncharged tax returns were intrinsic to the charged offense 

where that evidence “concerned fraudulent tax returns that were filed by [the defendant], during 

the same time period, and using the same methods.” 781 F.3d at 1394. One of those methods, like 

the Defendant’s in this case, was the use of tax returns containing “false Schedule C information” 

and “common” false representations such as dependents or addresses. Id. Like Ford, the 

fraudulent applications that the Defendant submitted for third parties are not “other acts” under 

Rule 404(b). Rather, they are part of the same scheme he is charged with and use the same 

methods. Moreover, like the charged scheme, they are acts the Defendant committed to benefit 

himself: after Rendon and Clark’s loans were approved, the Defendant received a $39,768 

kickback from Rendon—20% of her loan amount—and a $29,849.85 kickback from Clark—15% 

of his loan amount. 

The Eleventh Circuit has reaffirmed the reasoning of Ford in other cases like the 

Defendant’s. In United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2018), the defendant filed 

fraudulent tax returns for indigent inmates, claiming refunds for same tax period, using common 

addresses, and attaching forms that claimed similar expenses. The Government introduced 

uncharged tax returns that followed the same pattern as the charged offenses, and the Court of 

Appeals affirmed their admission as intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1217. The Court of Appeals found 

that the uncharged tax returns “were substantially similar to the charged returns,” rejecting the 

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defendant’s argument that the uncharged returns shared only “traits inherent in all inmate tax fraud 

schemes.” Id. The same reasoning should apply here. The two uncharged applications that the 

Government seeks to admit were filed by the Defendant, contain the same incorrectly calculated 

taxable wages as his own, and were signed by the same method with the same neglect of the 

document markups. The time and circumstances are the same and, like Ford and Shabazz, all that 

differs is the name on the application.

II. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE: THE THIRD-PARTY APPLICATIONS AND 

COMMUNICATIONS PROVE THE DEFENDANT’S IDENTITY AND 

FRAUDULENT INTENT. 

The third-party applications, as well as the Defendant’s communications with third parties, 

are also admissible as extrinsic evidence because they are relevant to the Defendant’s knowledge, 

intent, and identity. The Defendant has said that he did not know anything about COVID-relief 

loans or how to apply for them. The evidence the Government seeks to introduce shows that 

cannot be true and that, in fact, the Defendant attempted to capitalize on his own success by using 

the same methods for third parties. It is unlikely, the jury can infer, that the Defendant would 

solicit clients for something that the Defendant claims he knew nothing about. 

“Text me I getting people approved for disaster small business loans PPP,” the Defendant 

wrote to two people on Facebook, on June 19, 2020. The Defendant then requested the business 

information from the applicants, but did not ask for tax documents. He did not need to because, 

as is charged in the indictment, he could forge those himself. “I’m doing PPP loan for people and 

my Client’s,” the Defendant later wrote on March 2, 2021. Another person asked the Defendant 

if he could prepare Schedule Cs for PPP, and the Defendant said “Yes.”

“Heyy are you doing PPP,” someone wrote the Defendant on Instagram. “Yes,” the 

Defendant wrote back. “Do one for me,” she asked. “K,” the Defendant replied. The Defendant 

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sent a screenshot of an approved PPP application and a link to the SBA website. “This is hitting I 

got the plug,” the Defendant wrote.

The Government has a demanding burden: it must show the Defendant’s knowledge and 

intent. The evidence it seeks to introduce is relevant to these issues, which the Defendant has 

inserted into this case by pleading not guilty and, in a post-Miranda statement, denying his 

knowledge and intent. See, e.g., United States v. Zapata, 139 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1998) 

(“A defendant who enters a not guilty plea makes intent a material issue which imposes a 

substantial burden on the government to prove intent, which it may prove by qualifying Rule 

404(b) evidence absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent as an issue.”). 

In addition to intent and knowledge, the third-party applications also prove the Defendant’s 

identity because they bear his “signature,” “handiwork,” and “use[] a modus operandi that is 

uniquely his.” United States v. Vigne, 571 F. App’x 932, 934 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting United 

States v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1108 (11th Cir. 2010)). In Vigne, the defendant was accused 

of using a fake New York driver’s license to redeem a money order at the U.S. Post Office. Id.

When he was arrested, the defendant was carrying a stolen Bank of America debit card. Id. At 

trial, the Government introduced the defendant’s ten-year-old prior conviction for using a stolen 

Bank of America debit card and a fake New York driver’s license to buy a laptop. Id. The Court 

of Appeals affirmed the admission of the conviction because the “shared characteristics [were] 

sufficiently similar to be considered [the defendant’s] signature or modus operandi.” Id. “While 

the two crimes were not exactly the same,” the Court of Appeals reasoned, “the manner in which 

they were carried out present the same unique characteristics—the use of a stolen Bank of America 

debit card in conjunction with a fake New York driver’s license to fraudulently obtain something 

of value.” Vigne, 571 F. App’x at, 934.

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In this case, the Defendant’s own applications and the applications for Clark and Rendon 

share far more characteristics than those in Vigne. In each application, the submitted Form 940 

copied another Form 940, each Form 940 was filled in the same way, and each Form 940 was 

neglected to be flattened and therefore revealed the way it was made. Furthermore, the Defendant 

communicated with each of the third-party applicants through his e-mail, documents submitted 

with each application were found in the Defendant’s drive, each of the applications were filed from 

an IP address the Defendant repeatedly accessed, and each application was filed in the same month. 

This is not a “commonplace variety of criminal act,” id., but is a signature, literally, of the 

Defendant’s crimes. To show that the Defendant filed the fraudulent applications charged in the 

indictment, the Government should be permitted to show other instances in which the Defendant 

used the same modus operandi. The Defendant may deny it was him, but the evidence shows 

differently.

The three Ellisor factors for admitting Rule 404(b) evidence have been met. First, the 

evidence is relevant to identity, knowledge, and intent. Occurring during the charged offenses, the 

evidence is also highly probative. See United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1204 (11th Cir. 

2010) (“[E]vidence of similar conduct that occurs during the same time period has heightened 

probative value.”) (internal citations omitted). Second, the evidence cannot be controverted. The 

third-party applications that the Government seeks to introduce have been stored on computerservers and produced as certified business records. The application documents come from the 

Defendant’s own cloud drive, and the messages come from the Defendant’s own social media. 

Third, any prejudice is not “undue.” The third-party applications the Government seeks to 

introduce are a limited selection of vast wire fraud that the Defendant’s own records show he 

participated in. And, the Defendant cannot be not unduly prejudiced by his own words, reprinted 

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directly from his social media. See United States v. Harbison, 523 F. App’x 569, 575 (11th Cir. 

2013) (admitting an undisclosed statement over objection where, “[a]s for prejudice to the 

Defendant, the statement that purportedly came as a surprise to defense counsel was [the 

Defendant’s] own statement” and, “[m]ore importantly, defense counsel had the opportunity to 

cross-examine [the witness] and ask in the jury’s presence whether the ‘y’ll can’t make nuthin’ 

stick’ statement could have been by someone who felt he was being wrongly accused”); United 

States v. Williams, No. 11-60285, 2013 WL 1748753, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2013) (“While it is 

true that the recording is prejudicial against [the defendant], that fact results in large part from [the 

defendant’s] own statements and actions.”). If there is a missing context to these messages, the 

Defendant can explain it. A meaning other than the obvious, he can explain that too. But excluding 

evidence because it is unduly prejudice under Rule 403 is “an extraordinary remedy which the 

district court should invoke sparingly.” United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1247 (11th Cir. 

2011). The third-party applications, as well as the Defendant’s communications with third parties

are highly relevant and hardly prejudicial. It should be seen by the jury, who can follow a limiting 

instruction to reduce any prejudicial effect. See United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 

1225 (11th Cir. 1993); see Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, Special Instr. No. 4.1, Similar 

Acts Evidence (Rule 404(b), Fed. R. Evid.) (2020). They can then decide what to think. 

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the United States of America (the “Government”), through the undersigned 

Assistant United States Attorney, hereby files this Notice to Introduce Under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 404(b). 

 

 

Respectfully submitted,

JUAN ANTONIO GONZALEZ 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

 BY: Jonathan Bailyn 

 Jonathan R. Bailyn, AUSA 

Court ID No. A5502602 

99 Northeast Fourth Street, 6th Floor 

Miami, Florida 33132-2111 

Phone: (305) 961-9071 

jonathan.bailyn@usdoj.gov 

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