[Cite as State v. Howell, 2019-Ohio-1806.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MONROE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SHELLY L. HOWELL, 

Defendant-Appellant.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 17 MO 0018 

 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio 

Case No. 2017-047 

BEFORE: 

Cheryl L. Waite, Gene Donofrio, David A. D’Apolito, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Affirmed. 

Atty. James L. Peters, Monroe County Prosecutor, 101 North Main Street, Room 15, 

P.O. Box 430, Woodsfield, Ohio 43793-0430, for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Atty. Desirae Dipiero, 8256 E. Market Street, Suite 111, Warren, Ohio 44484, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

 

Dated: May 7, 2019 

 

WAITE, P.J. 
 – 2 – 

Case No. 17 MO 0018

{¶1} Appellant Shelly L. Howell appeals a September 28, 2017 Monroe County 

Common Pleas Court judgment entry convicting her of one count of trafficking in heroin. 

Appellant argues that the trial court failed to adequately advise her of her term of 

postrelease control and the penalties she might face should she violate postrelease 

control. Based on this, she argues that she did not enter her plea knowingly, voluntarily, 

and intelligently. For the reasons provided, Appellant’s argument is without merit and the 

judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Factual and Procedural History 

{¶2} On August 3, 2016, Appellant and a codefendant were arrested after the 

Monroe County Sheriff’s Department conducted a controlled buy of narcotics. On 

February 24, 2017, Appellant was indicted on one count of trafficking in heroin, a felony 

of the fourth degree in violation of R.C. 2925.03. Appellant pleaded guilty to the sole 

count as charged. The state agreed to recommend probation conditioned on successful 

completion of the residential drug and alcohol treatment program at the Eastern Ohio 

Correctional Center (“EOCC”). 

{¶3} On September 28, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to three years 

of community control and required completion of the EOCC treatment program. Relevant 

to this appeal, the trial court imposed a three-year discretionary term of postrelease 

control. This timely appeal followed. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADVISE APPELLANT 

OF THE TERM OF HER OPTIONAL POSTRELEASE CONTROL AND THE 

PENALTIES FOR A VIOLATION THEROF [SIC]. AS A RESULT, 
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Case No. 17 MO 0018

APPELLANT WAS NOT ADVISED OF THE MAXIMUM PENALTY AND 

HER PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND 

INTELLIGENTLY MADE. 

{¶4} Appellant argues that the trial court failed to adequately advise her of the 

applicable postrelease control term. Because the court failed to specify the number of 

years she would be subject to postrelease control and of the consequences for a violation, 

she contends that she did not enter her plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 

{¶5} In response, the state argues that the court did not sentence Appellant to a 

prison term, and so was not required to advise her of postrelease control. Regardless, 

the trial court advised Appellant at the plea hearing of her postrelease control term and 

the consequences she might face if she violated postrelease control. 

{¶6} Before a trial court may accept a defendant’s guilty plea, the court must 

inform the defendant of five constitutional rights. State v. Rowbotham, 173 Ohio App.3d 

642, 2007-Ohio-6227, 879 N.E.2d 856, ¶ 7 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio 

St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981), paragraph one of the syllabus. The constitutional 

rights are outlined within Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c): 

Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands 

that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront 

witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining 

witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the 

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. 
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Case No. 17 MO 0018

{¶7} The trial court must also notify the defendant of her nonconstitutional rights. 

The court’s dialogue regarding nonconstitutional rights is reviewed for substantial 

compliance. Rothbotham, supra, at ¶ 18. The nonconstitutional rights are described 

within Crim.R. 11(C)(2): 

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty 

involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or 

for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. 

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, 

upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence. 

Advisement as to postrelease control falls within a defendant’s nonconstitutional rights. 

State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 19-26. 

{¶8} “Under the substantial-compliance standard, we review the totality of 

circumstances surrounding [the defendant's] plea and determine whether he subjectively 

understood [the effect of his plea].” Sarkozy, supra, at ¶ 20. If the trial court completely 

neglects to advise a defendant of a nonconstitutional right, the plea is vacated without a 

prejudice analysis. State v. Cruz-Ramos, 2019-Ohio-779, -- N.E.3d -- (7th Dist.), citing 

Sarkozy at ¶ 22, 25. However, if the trial court partially complies with the rule, the plea 

will only be vacated if prejudice is shown. Id. citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 

2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 32. In order to establish prejudice, the defendant 

must show that the plea would not have been otherwise entered. State v. Cologie, 7th 
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Case No. 17 MO 0018

Dist. Belmont No. 17 BE 0009, 2017-Ohio-9217, ¶ 11, citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio 

St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 15; State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 

564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). 

{¶9} At the plea hearing, the trial court stated: 

If you serve any prison time for this felony four charge to which you’re going 

to be pleading guilty, after your prison time is served, you may be put on 

Post Release Control at the time of your release. 

Post Release Control is when the Parole Board decides after a prison 

sentence that they want to supervise an individual, and they have terms and 

conditions, rules and regulations that they have to follow, and failure to 

abide by your Post Release Control could basically end up in additional 

prison sentence for you. 

(7/10/17 Hrg. Tr., pp. 8-9.) 

{¶10} The trial court clearly raised the issue of postrelease control. While it 

appears the trial court’s discussion of this matter falls short, we need not reach the issue 

of whether the trial court’s advisement regarding postrelease control rose to the level of 

substantial compliance with the Crim.R. 11 requirements because Appellant has not 

alleged any claim of prejudice and a review of this record does not reveal any possible 

prejudice. One factor regarding prejudice is the length of sentence. This record shows 

Appellant would face a significantly harsher penalty if her plea is vacated. Based on the 

terms of her plea agreement, she was sentenced to three years of probation conditioned 

on successful drug and alcohol treatment. The possible penalty without the benefit of a 
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Case No. 17 MO 0018

plea agreement is six to eighteen months of incarceration, a $5,000 fine, a possible 

driver’s license suspension, and a three-year optional postrelease control term. Perhaps 

in recognition of this, at no time in her appeal does Appellant even raise the issue of 

prejudice. Without proving that she suffered prejudice, Appellant’s plea will not be 

vacated. Accordingly, Appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

Conclusion 

{¶11} Appellant argues that the trial court failed to adequately advise her of the 

possible term of postrelease control for a violation. Appellant has not argued that she 

suffered any prejudice for this alleged failure. Appellant’s arguments are without merit 

and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

D’Apolito, J., concurs. 
[Cite as State v. Howell, 2019-Ohio-1806.]

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error 

is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs waived. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 

 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.