UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING

56 Forsyth Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

David J. Smith

Clerk of Court 

December 08, 2022 

For rules and forms visit

www.ca11.uscourts.gov

Clerk - Southern District of Florida

U.S. District Court 

400 N MIAMI AVE

MIAMI, FL 33128-1810 

Appeal Number: 22-13005-DD 

Case Style: Donald Trump v. USA 

District Court Docket No: 9:22-cv-81294-AMC

A copy of this letter, and the judgment form if noted above, but not a copy of the court's 

decision, is also being forwarded to counsel and pro se parties. A copy of the court's decision 

was previously forwarded to counsel and pro se parties on the date it was issued. 

The enclosed copy of the judgment is hereby issued as mandate of the court. The court's opinion 

was previously provided on the date of issuance. 

Sincerely,

DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court 

Reply to: Lois Tunstall 

Phone #: (404) 335-6191 

Enclosure(s) 

MDT-1 Letter Issuing Mandate

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AP Dec 8, 2022 MIAMI

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DONALD J. TRUMP, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cv-81294-AMC

____________________

JUDGMENT

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit 

____________________

No. 22-13005

____________________

ISSUED AS MANDATE: 12/08/2022

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2 22-13005

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the opinion issued on this date in this appeal is entered as the judgment of this 

Court.

Entered: December 1, 2022

For the Court: DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court

ISSUED AS MANDATE: 12/08/2022

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 [PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13005

____________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cv-81294-AMC

____________________

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal requires us to consider whether the district 

court had jurisdiction to block the United States from using 

lawfully seized records in a criminal investigation. The answer is 

no.

Former President Donald J. Trump brought a civil action 

seeking an injunction against the government after it executed a 

search warrant at his Mar-a-Lago residence. He argues that a courtmandated special master review process is necessary because the 

government’s Privilege Review Team protocols were inadequate, 

because various seized documents are protected by executive or 

attorney-client privilege, because he could have declassified 

documents or designated them as personal rather than presidential 

records, and—if all that fails—because the government’s appeal 

was procedurally deficient. The government disagrees with each 

contention.

These disputes ignore one fundamental question—whether 

the district court had the power to hear the case. After all: “Federal 

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that 

power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be 

expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 

of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citation omitted). 

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This case was such an expansion. Exercises of equitable 

jurisdiction—which the district court invoked here—should be 

“exceptional” and “anomalous.” Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 

29, 32 (5th Cir. 1974).1 Our precedents have limited this 

jurisdiction with a four-factor test. Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 

1243–44 (5th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff’s jurisdictional arguments fail all 

four factors. 

In considering these arguments, we are faced with a choice: 

apply our usual test; drastically expand the availability of equitable 

jurisdiction for every subject of a search warrant; or carve out an 

unprecedented exception in our law for former presidents. We 

choose the first option. So the case must be dismissed. 

I. 

As Plaintiff’s presidential term drew to a close in January 

2021, movers transferred documents from the White House to his 

personal residence, a South Florida resort and club known as Mara-Lago. Over the course of that year and into the next, and 

consistent with its responsibilities under the Presidential Records 

Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2209, the National Archives and Records 

Administration sought to obtain missing presidential records that 

its officials believed were in Plaintiff’s possession. 

1 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) 

(adopting as binding precedent all published cases of the former Fifth Circuit 

decided prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).

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The government first sought the voluntary return of the 

records. In January 2022, after months of discussions, Plaintiff

transferred fifteen boxes of documents to the National Archives. 

Inside were “newspapers, magazines, printed news articles, photos, 

miscellaneous print-outs, notes, presidential correspondence, 

personal and post-presidential records, and a lot of classified 

records.” Affidavit in Support of an Application Under Rule 41 for 

a Warrant to Search and Seize ¶ 24, In re Sealed Search Warrant, 

No. 22-mj-08332 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2022) (“Warrant Affidavit”) 

(quotation omitted). 

The Department of Justice was alerted about the classified 

materials in February 2022. Id. It then sought access to the fifteen 

boxes so that the “FBI and others in the Intelligence Community” 

could examine them to assess “important national security 

interests,” including “the potential damage resulting from the 

apparent manner in which these materials were stored.” The 

National Archives later advised Plaintiff that it planned to provide 

the FBI access to the records in roughly one week. When he 

requested a delay of up to eleven days, the National Archives 

agreed. 

When the new deadline arrived in April 2022, Plaintiff

requested yet another extension. He also informed the National 

Archives that if it declined to grant it, he would make a “protective 

assertion of executive privilege” over the documents. The 

National Archives rejected that assertion as unviable—saying the 

“question in this case is not a close one”—and informed Plaintiff’s 

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representatives that it would give the FBI access to the records. 

Plaintiff did not follow through with any effort to block the FBI’s 

review of the documents. So the FBI reviewed the records in midMay, more than three months after it first learned that classified 

documents had been stored at Mar-a-Lago. It found 184 

documents marked at varying levels of classification, including 

twenty-five marked top secret. Warrant Affidavit ¶ 47. 

In the meantime, the FBI had developed evidence that even 

more classified information likely remained at Plaintiff’s residence. 

The Department of Justice obtained a grand-jury subpoena for all 

documents or writings bearing classification markings that were in 

Plaintiff’s custody or control, and Plaintiff’s counsel was served 

with the subpoena in early May. 

Plaintiff did not assert claims of privilege or declassification 

in response to the subpoena. But he did seek more time to produce 

the requested documents, and the government eventually 

extended the compliance deadline to June 7, 2022. A few days 

before the deadline was set to expire, Plaintiff’s representatives 

produced an envelope wrapped in tape, which was consistent with 

an effort to comply with handling procedures for classified 

documents. Warrant Affidavit ¶¶ 58, 60. It contained thirty-eight 

classified documents, seventeen of which were marked top secret. 

Id. A declaration accompanying the documents certified that a 

“diligent search was conducted” of the boxes moved from the 

White House and that “[a]ny and all responsive documents” had 

now been produced. 

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Even so, the FBI developed more evidence that other 

classified documents remained at Mar-a-Lago. In August 2022—

over one-and-a-half years after the end of Plaintiff’s presidential 

administration, six months after the first transfer of boxes to the 

National Archives, and three months after the subpoena was 

served—the Department of Justice sought a search warrant. It 

presented an FBI agent’s sworn affidavit to a Florida magistrate 

judge, who agreed that probable cause existed to believe that 

evidence of criminal violations would likely be found at Mar-aLago. Warrant Affidavit at 1, 32; Notice of Filing of Redacted 

Documents at 2, In re Sealed Search Warrant, No. 22-mj-08332 

(S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2022) (“Search Warrant”). The magistrate judge 

issued a search warrant for the offices, storage rooms, and potential 

storage sites at Plaintiff’s residence, and authorized the seizure of:

All physical documents and records constituting 

evidence, contraband, fruits of crime, or other items 

illegally possessed in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 

2071, or 1519, including the following:

a. Any physical documents with classification 

markings, along with any containers/boxes 

(including any other contents) in which such 

documents are located, as well as any other 

containers/boxes that are collectively stored or found

together with the aforementioned documents and 

containers/boxes;

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b. Information, including communications in any 

form, regarding the retrieval, storage, or transmission 

of national defense information or classified material;

c. Any government and/or Presidential Records 

created between January 20, 2017, and January 20, 

2021; or

d. Any evidence of the knowing alteration, 

destruction, or concealment of any government 

and/or Presidential Records, or of any documents 

with classification markings.

Search Warrant at 4. The warrant affidavit described a set of 

protocols proposed by the government to create a “Privilege 

Review Team.” Warrant Affidavit ¶ 81. The team was made up 

of agents who were not otherwise participating in the 

investigation; they were tasked with reviewing certain seized 

documents to protect Plaintiff’s attorney-client privilege. See id. 

¶¶ 81–84. 

The FBI executed the search warrant on August 8. Agents 

seized approximately 13,000 documents and a number of other 

items, totaling more than 22,000 pages of material. Despite the 

certification from Plaintiff that “[a]ny and all” documents bearing 

classification markings had been produced, fifteen of the thirtythree seized boxes, containers, or groups of papers contained 

documents with classification markings, including three such 

documents found in desks in Plaintiff’s office. All told, the search 

uncovered over one hundred documents marked confidential, 

secret, or top secret. 

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Plaintiff requested a copy of the warrant affidavit, an 

opportunity to inspect the seized property, a detailed list of what 

was taken from the residence and where it was found, and consent 

to the appointment of a special master “to protect the integrity of 

privileged documents.” The government denied those requests 

shortly after the search. 

A few weeks later, Plaintiff filed a new action in the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, which he 

styled as a “Motion For Judicial Oversight And Additional Relief.” 

The motion asked the court to (1) appoint a special master; 

(2) enjoin review of the seized materials until a special master was 

appointed; (3) require the United States to supply a more detailed 

list of the items seized; and (4) order the United States to return any 

item seized that was not within the scope of the search warrant. 

The motion was a civil filing and did not explain how the district 

court had jurisdiction to act on all of its requests. It did, however, 

claim to be a precursor to an eventual motion under Federal Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 41(g). That rule permits a “person 

aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the 

deprivation of property” to “move for the property’s return.” Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 41(g).

The district court could not identify a sufficient 

jurisdictional basis for the filing, so it requested a jurisdictional 

brief. Days later, Plaintiff responded that the district court had 

“equitable and ancillary jurisdiction,” as well as “anomalous 

jurisdiction,” to enjoin the government and appoint a special 

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master. He also suggested that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 

may create an independent cause of action to appoint a special 

master, but cited no authority for that theory. As for the requested 

injunction against the United States, Plaintiff noted that the “law’s 

ambiguity” meant that “principles of fairness” supported exercising 

jurisdiction over the entire motion. 

The next day—August 27—the district court issued an order 

declaring “its preliminary intent to appoint a special master” and 

requiring the government to provide Plaintiff with a more detailed 

list of seized items. The court stated that it had jurisdiction 

pursuant to the court’s “inherent authority” and Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 53(b)(1), which reads: “Before appointing a master, 

the court must give the parties notice and an opportunity to be 

heard. Any party may suggest candidates for appointment.” 

After a response from the government that included a 

description of its privilege filter process, the district court issued a 

September 5 order directing the appointment of a special master 

under soon-to-be developed procedures, and barring the 

government from using any of the seized documents “pending 

resolution of the special master’s review process.” The order was 

issued “[p]ursuant to the Court’s equitable jurisdiction and 

inherent supervisory authority.” 

Three days later, the government filed a notice of appeal. It 

also filed a motion for a partial stay of the injunction so that it could 

continue using the seized documents bearing classification 

markings in its criminal investigation. The district court rejected 

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the partial stay on September 15. It also issued an order naming 

the special master and setting out his specific duties. 

The government sought a partial stay from this Court the 

next day. We granted the stay, concluding that the district court 

likely had no equitable jurisdiction to issue an order relating to the 

classified documents. Trump v. United States, No. 22-13005, 2022 

WL 4366684, at *1, *7 (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 2022). Plaintiff applied 

for relief in the Supreme Court, but that request was denied. 

Trump v. United States, No. 22A283, 2022 WL 7255980, at *1 (U.S. 

Oct. 13, 2022).

On October 5, this Court approved the government’s 

request for expedited briefing in its appeal of the September 5 order 

blocking review of the seized documents and directing the 

appointment of a special master. Now, with the benefit of oral 

argument, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

consider Plaintiff’s initial motion or to issue any orders in response 

to it. 

II. 

Because federal courts lack general jurisdiction, it “is to be 

presumed that a cause lies outside” of our “limited jurisdiction.” 

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. The “burden of establishing the 

contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. We 

review an exercise of equitable jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. 

See Richey, 515 F.2d at 1243. And review of a preliminary 

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injunction includes the power to dismiss the entire action based on 

jurisdiction or the merits. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 691 (2008).

III. 

Only the narrowest of circumstances permit a district court 

to invoke equitable jurisdiction. Such decisions “must be exercised 

with caution and restraint,” as equitable jurisdiction is appropriate 

only in “exceptional cases where equity demands intervention.” In 

re $67,470, 901 F.2d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1990); see also 

Hunsucker, 497 F.2d at 32. This is not one of them. 

“It is a familiar rule that courts of equity do not ordinarily 

restrain criminal prosecutions.” Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 

U.S. 157, 163 (1943). To avoid unnecessary interference with the 

executive branch’s criminal enforcement authority—while also 

offering relief in rare instances where a gross constitutional 

violation would otherwise leave the subject of a search without 

recourse—this Circuit has developed an exacting test for exercising 

equitable jurisdiction over suits flowing from the seizure of 

property. Richey v. Smith instructs courts to consider four factors:

(1) whether the government displayed a “callous disregard” for the 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) “whether the plaintiff has an 

individual interest in and need for the material whose return he 

seeks”; (3) “whether the plaintiff would be irreparably injured by 

denial of the return of the property”; and (4) “whether the plaintiff 

has an adequate remedy at law for the redress of his grievance.” 

515 F.2d at 1243–44 (quotation omitted). 

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Plaintiff’s jurisdictional brief in the district court dispatched 

with all four of these inquiries in a single paragraph. But Richey’s 

inquiry is not as simple as that filing made it out to be.

When we examine Plaintiff’s arguments about the Richey 

factors, we notice a recurring theme. He makes arguments that—

if consistently applied—would allow any subject of a search 

warrant to invoke a federal court’s equitable jurisdiction. That

understanding of Richey would make equitable jurisdiction not 

extraordinary, “but instead quite ordinary.” United States v. Search 

of Law Office, Residence, and Storage Unit Alan Brown, 341 F.3d 

404, 415 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Our precedents 

consistently reject this approach. We have emphasized again and 

again that equitable jurisdiction exists only in response to the most 

callous disregard of constitutional rights, and even then only if 

other factors make it clear that judicial oversight is absolutely 

necessary. 

A. 

We begin with whether Plaintiff has shown a “callous 

disregard” for his constitutional rights. Whether that sort of 

violation has occurred is the “foremost consideration” for a court

when deciding whether it may exercise its equitable jurisdiction in 

this context. United States v. Chapman, 559 F.2d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 

1977). When considering this factor, our precedent emphasizes the

“indispensability of an ‘accurate allegation’ of ‘callous disregard.’” 

Id. (quoting Richey, 515 F.2d at 1243) (alteration adopted); see also 

Hunsucker, 497 F.2d at 34 n.10 (collecting cases). Absent that,

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courts will not intervene in an ongoing investigation—and rightly 

so. Because the vast majority of subjects of a search warrant have 

not experienced a “callous disregard” of their constitutional rights, 

this factor ensures that equitable jurisdiction remains 

extraordinary. Otherwise, “a flood of disruptive civil litigation” 

would surely follow. Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66, 71 (D.C. Cir. 

1987). This restraint guards against needless judicial intrusion into 

the course of criminal investigations—a sphere of power 

committed to the executive branch. 

The callous disregard standard has not been met here, and 

no one argues otherwise. The district court’s entire reasoning 

about this factor was that it “agrees with the Government that, at 

least based on the record to date, there has not been a compelling 

showing of callous disregard for Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” 

None of Plaintiff’s filings here or in the district court contest this 

finding.

Instead, he says callous disregard of his constitutional rights

is not indispensable to Richey’s test. That is an incorrect reading 

of our precedent, as well as inconsistent with the longstanding 

principles outlined above. Chapman, 559 F.2d at 406. And the fact 

that Richey considers three other factors in its test does not suggest 

otherwise. To the contrary, these factors underscore how rare this

exercise of jurisdiction should be—even a callous disregard of 

constitutional rights is not enough, on its own, to allow for the type 

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of relief that Plaintiff seeks.2 As we did in Chapman, we will 

consider the remaining factors for the sake of completeness.

B. 

The second Richey factor is “whether the plaintiff has an 

individual interest in and need for the material whose return he 

seeks.” 515 F.2d at 1243. Plaintiff’s jurisdictional brief

mischaracterized this standard, referring to “the parties’ need for 

the seized material” (emphasis added). He is wrong to suggest that 

jurisdiction somehow depends on the balance of interests between 

the parties—the relevant inquiry is if he needs the documents.

Plaintiff has made no such showing. His jurisdictional brief

in the district court asserted that the government had improperly 

seized his passports and that its continued custody of “similar 

materials” was “both unnecessary and likely to cause significant 

harm.” But the passports had already been returned before he filed 

his first motion, and his jurisdictional brief did not explain what 

“similar materials” were at issue or why he needed them. 

The district court was undeterred by this lack of 

information. It said that “based on the volume and nature of the 

seized material, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has an interest in 

and need for at least a portion of it,” though it cited only the 

2 Plaintiff’s lawyers claimed at oral argument that the special master process is 

necessary to determine whether a constitutional violation happened. This justification finds no support in our precedent and would result in a dramatic and 

unwarranted expansion of equitable jurisdiction.

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government’s filings and not Plaintiff’s. But that is not enough. 

Courts that have authorized equitable jurisdiction have 

emphasized the importance of identifying “specific” documents

and explaining the harm from their “seizure and retention.” See, 

e.g., Harbor Healthcare Sys., L.P. v. United States, 5 F.4th 593, 600 

(5th Cir. 2021) (Harbor did “far more than assert vague allegations” 

by pointing to “thousands” of privileged documents that the 

government retained for four years). Neither the district court nor 

Plaintiff has offered such specifics.

Indeed, Plaintiff does not press the district court’s theory on 

appeal. Instead, he argues that the Presidential Records Act gives 

him a possessory interest in the seized documents. This argument

is unresponsive. Even if Plaintiff’s statutory interpretation were

correct (a proposition that we neither consider nor endorse),

personal interest in or ownership of a seized document is not 

synonymous with the need for its return.3 In most search warrants, 

the government seizes property that unambiguously belongs to the 

subject of a search. That cannot be enough to support equitable 

jurisdiction. 

3 During discussion of this factor at oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel noted 

that the seized items included “golf shirts” and “pictures of Celine Dion.” The 

government concedes that Plaintiff “may have a property interest in his personal effects.” While Plaintiff may have an interest in these items and others 

like them, we do not see the need for their immediate return after seizure under a presumptively lawful search warrant.

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Having failed to show his own need, Plaintiff attempts—as 

he did in the district court—to reverse the standard, arguing that 

the government does not need the non-classified documents for its 

investigation. This is not self-evident, but it would be irrelevant in 

any event. Plaintiff’s task was to show why he needed the 

documents, not why the government did not. He has failed to 

meet his burden under this factor. 

C. 

Richey next asks “whether the plaintiff would be irreparably 

injured by denial of the return of the property.” 515 F.2d at 1243. 

In his jurisdictional brief, Plaintiff suggested only that the 

government’s “continued custody” of documents “similar” to his 

passport was “likely to cause significant harm.” And again, the 

district court stepped in with its own reasoning. It identified

potential irreparable harm that could arise based on (1) improper 

disclosure of “sensitive information” to the public; (2) the United 

States’s retention and potential use of privileged materials; and 

(3) the stigma associated with the threat of future prosecution.

Plaintiff has adopted two of the district court’s arguments, 

dedicating a single page of his brief to discussing the first and third 

theories of harm. On the first argument, Plaintiff echoes the 

district court and asserts that he faces an “unquantifiable potential 

harm by way of improper disclosure of sensitive information to the 

public.” It is not clear whether Plaintiff and the district court mean 

classified information or information that is sensitive to Plaintiff

personally. If the former, permitting the United States to review 

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classified documents does not suggest that they will be released. 

Any official who makes an improper disclosure of classified 

material risks her own criminal liability. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 798. 

What’s more, any leak of classified material would be properly 

characterized as a harm to the United States and its citizens—not 

as a personal injury to Plaintiff. 

As for records that may otherwise be “sensitive,” it cannot 

be that prosecutors reading unprivileged documents seized 

pursuant to a lawful warrant constitutes an irreparable injury for 

purposes of asserting equitable jurisdiction. Here too, Plaintiff’s 

argument would apply to nearly every subject of a search warrant. 

The district court’s unsupported conclusion that government 

possession of seized evidence creates an “unquantifiable” risk of 

public disclosure is not enough to show that Plaintiff faces 

irreparable harm. 

Similar reasoning guides our approach to the other potential 

injury identified by Plaintiff: the threat and stigma of future 

criminal prosecution. No doubt the threat of prosecution can 

weigh heavily on the mind of anyone under investigation. See 

Richey, 515 F.2d at 1243 n.10; see also Deaver, 822 F.2d at 70. But

without diminishing the seriousness of the burden, that ordinary 

experience cannot support extraordinary jurisdiction. Alan Brown, 

341 F.3d at 415; see also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 

325 (1940). The third Richey factor also weighs against exercising 

equitable jurisdiction.

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D. 

Finally, Richey asks “whether the plaintiff has an adequate 

remedy at law for the redress of his grievance.” 515 F.2d at 1243–

44. In deciding this factor for Plaintiff, the district court’s answer 

was that he “would have no legal means of seeking the return of 

his property for the time being and no knowledge of when other 

relief might become available.” This is not a sufficient justification. 

To start, Plaintiff invokes Rule 41(g) in his brief on appeal, but only 

to say that it has been applied in other cases. The only argument 

that he has plausibly made relating to that rule is for the return of 

documents “not within the scope of the Search Warrant.” There 

is no record evidence that the government exceeded the scope of 

the warrant—which, it bears repeating, was authorized by a 

magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause. And yet again, 

Plaintiff’s argument would apply universally; presumably any 

subject of a search warrant would like all of his property back

before the government has a chance to use it.

Plaintiff’s alternative framing of his grievance is that he 

needs a special master and an injunction to protect documents that 

he designated as personal under the Presidential Records Act. But 

as we have said, the status of a document as personal or presidential

does not alter the authority of the government to seize it under a 

warrant supported by probable cause; search warrants authorize 

the seizure of personal records as a matter of course. The 

Department of Justice has the documents because they were seized 

with a search warrant, not because of their status under the 

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22-13005 Opinion of the Court 19

Presidential Records Act. So Plaintiff’s suggestion that “whether 

the Government is entitled to retain some or all the seized 

documents has not been determined by any court” is incorrect. 

The magistrate judge decided that issue when approving the 

warrant. To the extent that the categorization of these documents 

has legal relevance in future proceedings, the issue can be raised at 

that time. 

All these arguments are a sideshow. The real question that 

guides our analysis is this—adequate remedy for what? The 

answer is the same as it was in Chapman: “No weight can be 

assigned to this factor because [Plaintiff] did not assert that any 

rights had been violated, i.e., that there has been a callous disregard 

for his constitutional rights or that a substantial interest in property 

is jeopardized.” 559 F.2d at 407. If there has been no constitutional 

violation—much less a serious one—then there is no harm to be 

remediated in the first place. This factor also weighs against 

exercising equitable jurisdiction.

IV. 

None of the Richey factors favor exercising equitable 

jurisdiction over this case. Plaintiff, however, asks us to refashion 

our analysis in a way that, if consistently applied, would make 

equitable jurisdiction available for every subject of every search 

warrant. He asks us to ignore our precedents finding that a callous 

disregard for constitutional rights is indispensable. He asks us to 

conclude that a property interest in a seized item is a sufficient 

“need” for its immediate return. He asks us to treat any stigma 

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-13005

arising from the government’s access to sensitive personal 

information or the threat of potential prosecution as irreparable 

injuries. And he asks us to find that he has no other remedy apart 

from equitable jurisdiction, even though he faces no remediable 

harm. Anyone could make these arguments. And accepting them 

would upend Richey, requiring federal courts to oversee routine 

criminal investigations beyond their constitutionally ascribed role 

of approving a search warrant based on a showing of probable 

cause. Our precedents do not allow this, and neither does our 

constitutional structure. 

Only one possible justification for equitable jurisdiction 

remains: that Plaintiff is a former President of the United States. It 

is indeed extraordinary for a warrant to be executed at the home of 

a former president—but not in a way that affects our legal analysis 

or otherwise gives the judiciary license to interfere in an ongoing 

investigation. The Richey test has been in place for nearly fifty 

years; its limits apply no matter who the government is 

investigating. To create a special exception here would defy our

Nation’s foundational principle that our law applies “to all, without 

regard to numbers, wealth, or rank.” State of Georgia v. Brailsford, 

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794). 

* * *

The law is clear. We cannot write a rule that allows any 

subject of a search warrant to block government investigations 

after the execution of the warrant. Nor can we write a rule that 

allows only former presidents to do so. Either approach would be 

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22-13005 Opinion of the Court 21

a radical reordering of our caselaw limiting the federal courts’ 

involvement in criminal investigations. And both would violate 

bedrock separation-of-powers limitations. Accordingly, we agree 

with the government that the district court improperly exercised 

equitable jurisdiction, and that dismissal of the entire proceeding is 

required.

 The district court improperly exercised equitable 

jurisdiction in this case. For that reason, we VACATE the 

September 5 order on appeal and REMAND with instructions for 

the district court to DISMISS the underlying civil action. 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING

56 Forsyth Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

David J. Smith

Clerk of Court 

December 01, 2022

For rules and forms visit

www.ca11.uscourts.gov

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES

Appeal Number: 22-13005-DD 

Case Style: Donald Trump v. USA 

District Court Docket No: 9:22-cv-81294-AMC

Electronic Filing

All counsel must file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system, 

unless exempted for good cause. Although not required, non-incarcerated pro se parties are 

permitted to use the ECF system by registering for an account at www.pacer.gov. Information 

and training materials related to electronic filing are available on the Court's website. Enclosed 

is a copy of the court's decision filed today in this appeal. Judgment has this day been entered 

pursuant to FRAP 36. The court's mandate will issue at a later date in accordance with FRAP 

41(b). 

The time for filing a petition for rehearing is governed by 11th Cir. R. 40-3, and the time for 

filing a petition for rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir. R. 35-2. Except as otherwise 

provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings, a petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc is 

timely only if received in the clerk's office within the time specified in the rules. Costs are 

governed by FRAP 39 and 11th Cir.R. 39-1. The timing, format, and content of a motion for 

attorney's fees and an objection thereto is governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3. 

Please note that a petition for rehearing en banc must include in the Certificate of Interested 

Persons a complete list of all persons and entities listed on all certificates previously filed by 

any party in the appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1. In addition, a copy of the opinion sought to be 

reheard must be included in any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See

11th Cir. R. 35-5(k) and 40-1 . 

Counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) must submit a voucher claiming 

compensation for time spent on the appeal no later than 60 days after either issuance of mandate 

or filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of a petition for writ of certiorari (whichever is later) via 

the eVoucher system. Please contact the CJA Team at (404) 335-6167 or 

cja_evoucher@ca11.uscourts.gov for questions regarding CJA vouchers or the eVoucher 

system. 

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Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 39, costs taxed against appellee.

Please use the most recent version of the Bill of Costs form available on the court's website at 

www.ca11.uscourts.gov.

For questions concerning the issuance of the decision of this court, please call the number 

referenced in the signature block below. For all other questions, please call Bradly Wallace 

Holland, DD at 404-335-6181. 

Sincerely,

DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court 

Reply to: Jeff R. Patch

Phone #: 404-335-6151

OPIN-1A Issuance of Opinion With Costs

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