UNITED STATES ARMr IN WORLD WAR II 

The Technical Services 

THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS: 

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

by 

Karl C. Dod 

CENTER OF M ILITARY IfISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARM!' 

WASHINGTON, D.C , 1987 





Foreword

Contributions of the Corps of Engineers to victory in war, and to our

country's peacetime history, are well known and appreciated. The skill

and versatility of this talented body of soldiers met a supreme test in operations against the Japanese, many of which were conducted in the most primitive and undeveloped regions of the world. Engineers built the Alaska

Highway, Canol, and the Ledo Road in Burma. They cleared the jungles

to build airfields for heavy bombers and supervised the work of Filipinos,

Chinese, and Melanesians as they built runways by hand. They built

ports, roads, and docks where none had existed. Indeed, one of the most

familiar recollections of the U.S. veteran of the war against Japan is the

ubiquitous engineer operating a bulldozer.

Dr. Dod's subject is vast and varied, and he has worked hard and capably

to fit it into the confines of a single volume. He has made an original

contribution to knowledge in the highly technical areas of Engineer problems, organization, equipment, supply, administration, and operations.

HAL C. PATTISON

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

Washington, D.C. 18 June 1965

vii
The Author

Karl C. Dod received a Ph.D. in history from the University of Illinois

and has taught history at Morningside College and at Montana State College.

During World War II he worked with the U.S. Civil Service Commission

and as historian with the Historical Division in the Office of the Chief of

Engineers, and subsequently served in the U.S. Army with the Field Artillery. After the war he joined the Office of the Chief Engineer, Army Forces,

Pacific, as a civilian historian. In 1950 he rejoined the Engineer Historical

Division and has been a staff member ever since. He is coauthor of Volume

I, Engineers in Theater Operations, and author of Volume II, Organizations, Troops, and Training, in the series "Engineers of the Southwest

Pacific, 1941-1945."

viii
Preface

This volume covers Engineer operations in support of the U.S. Army

in the war against Japan. The story begins with the defense build-up in

1939 and ends with the Japanese surrender aboard the battleship Missouri

on 2 September 1945. Geographically, Engineer operations extended from

the Panama Canal to India and from Alaska to Australia, in actual or potential areas of conflict. The author has attempted not only to depict various

types of Engineer operations but also to indicate how Engineer work helped

implement Allied strategy. Included are discussions of the Engineer position in the command structure and a general account of both Engineer

combat and service missions within a given theater.

Above all, the author has attempted to indicate the many problems that

had to be resolved—problems stemming from terrain and climate, from the

inadequacy of long-range planning, from insufficient preparations, and from

organizational shortcomings, as well as from the Japanese foe—before the

Engineer mission could be successfully accomplished.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to present and former colleagues

in the Historical Division who helped in the preparation of this book. Dr.

Jesse A. Remington, Director of the Historical Division, gave valuable advice

and encouragement. Miss Lenore Fine offered many helpful suggestions.

Miss Louise Marr did research and drafted sections on the defense triangle and on the 1945 Southern Philippines Campaign. Dr. Leslie Anders

prepared the initial drafts for the chapters on the China-Burma-India

theater. Dr. Kenneth J. Deacon wrote the first draft on the Alcan Highway, and Mr. David Latt did the initial research on the engineers in Panama

and Alaska. I am indebted to a large number of Engineer officers who were

participants in the war against Japan and who reviewed portions of the

manuscript and provided additional information and also pointed out

errors of fact; the names of nearly all of them are recorded in the volume.

In this connection special mention should be made of Col. Desloge Brown,

C.E., Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey (Ret.), Maj. Gen. Edmond H. Leavey (Ret.),

Col. Willard P. McCrone, C.E., Maj. Gen. George J. Nold (Ret.), Col. Earl

North (Ret), Maj. Gen. Bernard L. Robinson (Ret.), Col. Harry A. Skerry

(Ret.), Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr. (Ret.), Maj. Gen. Leif J. Sverdrup

ix
(AUS, Ret), Brig. Gen. Benjamin B. Talley (Ret.), Lt. Gen. Walter K.

Wilson, Jr., and Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr. (Ret.). For the facts presented,

I am alone responsible.

Mrs. Caroline Moore and Mrs. Lois Aldridge of the World War II Reference Branch, Office of Military Records, National Archives and Records

Service, were most helpful in locating engineer files. Many typists in the

Historical Division labored over the manuscript, but special credit is due

to Mrs. Margaret Lillian Tucker, who typed the final version of the manuscript. Mr. George H. Weitzel of the U.S. Army Engineer District Office

in Baltimore prepared the maps.

I am also indebted to members of the Office of the Chief of Military

History, especially to Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, and to Dr. John

Miller, jr., who, as Deputy Chief Historian, offered numerous valuable suggestions for improving the manuscript. Mr. David Jaffé was responsible

for the final editing, assisted by Mrs. Marion P. Grimes. Miss Mary Ann

Bacon, Chief of the Editorial Branch, gave valuable advice in the editing

of the manuscript. Miss Ruth A. Phillips selected the photographs.

Mr. Nicholas J. Anthony compiled the index.

Baltimore, Maryland

18 June 1965

KARL C. DOD

x
Contents

Chapter Page

I. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA,

HAWAII, AND ALASKA. ............................ . 3

Early War Plans and the Corps of Engineers. ............... 3

First Steps in Building Up the Pacific Outposts. ............ . 6

II. THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM. ............ . 27

Panama ............................................... . 29

Alaska ................................................. . 33

Hawaii ................................................ . 38

The Air Ferry Route..................................... 45

Supplies ............................................... . 48

War Appears Imminent................................... 50

Last Days of Peace........................................ 52

III. THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES ........................ . 55

Preparations for Defense.................................. 57

Withdrawal to Bataan and Corregidor. .................... . 72

Bataan ................................................ . 85

Corregidor and the End of the Campaign.................... 101

IV. BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC ................ . 107

Australia—The First Days. ............................... . 107

Toward a More Aggressive Strategy......................... 128

Preparing for the Offensive................................ 153

V. FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA ...... . 160

Strengthening the South Pacific. ........................... 160

Preparing To Fight in New Guinea........................ 173

Engineers in Combat..................................... 193

Problems of Logistics. ................................... . 209

VI. THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL ....................... . 225

Preparing for CARTWHEEL............................. 225

CARTWHEEL ......................................... . 245

The Engineers Continue To Furnish Logistic Support. ...... . 255

Arawe, Cape Gloucester, and Saidor. ....................... 272

xi
Chapter Page

VII. THE FAR NORTH......................................... . 276

Strengthening Alaska's Defenses ........................... 276

The Alcan Highway ...................................... 299

Canol ........................................... . .... . 318

The Danger Passes....................................... 328

VIII. HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 340

The Engineers Organize for War. ......................... . 340

Protection Against Air Raids. ............................. 344

Military Defenses ........................................ . 346

Change in Organization................................... 360

IX. AFTER MIDWAY ......................................... . 365

Work on Defensive Installations Slows Down................. 365

First Offensives in the Central Pacific. ...................... 380

X. THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 387

Priority on Airfields ..................................... 389

Ground Communications for a Campaign in Burma. ........ . 404

Renewed Priority on Airfields. ........................... . 418

XI. THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 .......................................... . 426

QUADRANT Directs an All-out Effort.................... . 426

The All-out Effort Continues. ............................ . 442

The CBI Is Cut Back..................................... 463

XII. THE DRIVE ACROSS THE CENTRAL PACIFIC. ........... . 476

The Marshalls .......................................... . 476

Logistical Support From Hawaii. ......................... . 486

The Marianas............................................ 492

1944 Draws to a Close..................................... 506

XIII. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND BASE CONSTRUCTION IN

THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC......................... . 520

The Advance to Biak..................................... 520

Logistical Support ....................................... . 542

Western New Guinea and the Moluccas. ................... . 561

XIV. RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES.......................... . 570

Leyte and Mindoro....................................... 570

Luzon: The Drive to Manila.............................. 587

The Capture of Manila and the Islands of Manila Bay........ 614

xii
Chapter Page

XV. THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR...................... . 625

Destruction of the Japanese in the Philippines and Borneo.... 625

Iwo Jima .............................................. . 640

Okinawa ............................................... . 640

Base and Airfield Construction for the Assault on Japan....... 649

Planning for the Invasion of Japan......................... 672

Conclusion ............................................. . 679

Appendix

A. U.S. ARMY AND ARMY ENGINEER PERSONNEL

STRENGTH IN OVERSEAS THEATERS, 1 JANUARY

1942-1 OCTOBER 1945................................. . 684

B. TYPES OF ENGINEER UNITS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS. 685

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ..................................... . 691

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................... . 695

LIST OF CODE NAMES........................................... . 700

INDEX ......................................................... . 70 5

Chart

Major Command Channels and Lines of Engineer Technical Supervision, Southwest Pacific Area, 1 May 1942..................... . 132

Maps

No.

1. The Pacific Outposts ......................................... . 4

2. Alaska, 1940. ................................................. . 13

3. Hawaiian Islands ............................................. . 17

4. Panama, 1941................................................. . 30

5. Philippine Islands............................................. . 56

6. Bataan, 1942 ................................................. . 86

7. Australia, 1942................................................ . 108

8. Pacific Ocean Areas, 1 August 1942.............................. . 129

9. Papua ........................................................ . 173

10. Milne Bay, August 1942....................................... . 176

xiii
No. Page

11. Buna ........................................................ . 194

12. Combat Zone, 1943............................................ . 226

13. Airfields Constructed or Improved by the Commonwealth of Australia

for the United States Army up to 31 December 1943............. . 240

14. Facilities Other Than Airfields Constructed or Improved by the Commonwealth of Australia for the United States Army up to 31 December 1943 ................................................... . 241

15. Alaska and Western Canada, 1942-43............................ . 277

16. Aleutian Islands .............................................. . 285

17. Oahu ........................................................ . 349

18. Honolulu Harbor, 1946........................................ . 368

19. Makin Atoll................................................. . 382

20. The China-Burma-India Theater, December 1942................. . 388

21. China ....................................................... . 441

22. The Ledo Road. ............................................. . 474

23. Kwajalein Island. ............................................. . 477

24. South Marianas and Saipan.................................... . 494

25. Guam, 1945 .................................................. . 504

26. The Western Pacific. .......................................... . 513

27. Hollandia ................................................... . 528

28. The Southern Philippines, 1944-45.............................. . 574

29. Central Luzon ................................................ . 589

30. Iwo Jima. .................................................... . 641

31. Okinawa ..................................................... . 642

32. Pipelines in CBI, 1 July 1945................................... . 667

33. Planned Attack on Japan...................................... . 676

Illustrations

Brig. Gen. Eugene Reybold........................................ . 46

Malinta Tunnel ................................................. . 67

Col. Wendell W. Fertig ........................................... . 79

Camp Columbia .................................................. . 116

Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey and Brig. Gen. Leif J. Sverdrup ............ . 131

An Australian Road Builder...................................... . 142

Nouméa, New Caledonia ......................................... . 166

The Port Moresby Causeway....................................... . 184

Buna Area Adjacent to Simemi Creek. .............................. . 197

43d Engineers at Dobodura Strip No. 1.............................. . 199

Improvised Bridge Over Entrance Creek. ............................ . 201

Chow Time at a Native Labor Camp................................ . 204

Airstrip at Dobodura, Showing Revetments........................... . 221

xiv
Page

Moving Supplies on the Rebuilt Railroad, Nouméa................... . 224

A Section of the Oro Bay-Dobodura Road. .......................... . 237

A Corduroy Road, New Georgia ................................... . 250

Base B Area, Oro Bay.............................................. . 259

Engineer Troops Making Their Own Hardware...................... . 262

Construction of the First Steel Building at Milne Bay.................. . 268

Engineers Dressed for -37° F....................................... . 292

Digging Out Tundra.............................................. . 294

Constructing a Pacific Hut on Kiska................................. . 298

Brig. Gen. William M. Hoge....................................... . 303

Skagway Harbor .................................................. . 304

Trucking Supplies Through Mud................................... . 306

Alcan Highway .................................................. . 316

Peace River Suspension Bridge .................................... . 336

Refinery at Whitehorse............................................ . 337

A Pipeline Carried on a Trestle..................................... . 338

King's Wharf, Butaritari, Makin Atoll .......... . 38 4

Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler. ................................... . 395

Native Bridge on the Refugee Trail................................. . 407

A Pipeline Carried on an A-Frame.................................. . 442

Stringing a Ferry Cable Across the Salween........................... . 460

Footbridge and Ferry on the Salween................................ . 461

A Japanese Pillbox, Kwajalein...................................... . 481

Guam Landing .................................................... . 505

Floating Ponton Pier, Saipan....................................... . 512

Engineers of the 1881st With Full Jungle Equipment ................ . 531

Hollandia Development, 1944...................................... . 545

Dispensary in Native-Type Building, Milne Bay. ..................... . 551

Liberty Docks, Oro Bay............................................ . 552

Section of the Map Distribution Area, Finschhafen.................... . 555

Dredging Coral for Runway Construction ........................... . 566

Laying Pierced Steel Plank, Tacloban. .............................. . 580

Repairs on the Carmen Bridge, Agno River.......................... . 605

Infantry Support Rafts on the Pasig River .......................... . 616

Laying a Pipeline to the Mortar Pit, Caballo Island................... . 622

Fort Drum ....................................................... . 623

Trucks Negotiate the Villa Verde Trail.............................. . 630

Filipinos Help Construct a Road, Luzon............................. . 631

Japanese Truck Supporting a Temporary Bridge...................... . 637

Airfield Construction, Iwo Jima..................................... . 659

Three Examples of Bridging in the CBI............................. . 665

All illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

xv

THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS:

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

CHAPTER I

Strengthening the Defense Triangle:

Panama, Hawaii, and Alaska

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor

on 7 December 1941 found the Corps of

Engineers, like the rest of the Military

Establishment, in the midst of feverish

defense preparations. The Corps had

been assigned the task of building up

defenses in Panama, Alaska, Hawaii, and

other Pacific outposts; in areas ranging

from the Arctic to the tropics, engineer

units were engaged in a wide variety of

urgent projects. Plagued by shortages

of men and materials and difficult working conditions, these defense preparations were still far from finished when

the nation was plunged into war. Along

with these desperate efforts to build a

bulwark on many fronts, the engineers

were engaged in the vital mission of creating an organization and developing

equipment that would enable them to

carry out their many duties on the battlefronts and behind the lines in case war

broke out. By the time of Pearl Harbor

much progress had been made in the relatively short time since the defense

build-up began. The story of the prePearl Harbor defense preparations is one

of an effort gradually getting under way

from small beginnings and destined

eventually to assume tremendous proportions.

Early War Plans and the Corps of

Engineers

The United States Army had been

concerned with the possibility of war

with Japan for many years before Pearl

Harbor. Soon after World War I,

American military leaders began to

frame a strategy to be followed if war

broke out. The first strategic plan, War

Plan ORANGE, adopted in 1924, envisaged mainly a naval struggle, with the

Army to seize the Japanese mandated

islands in the central Pacific, reinforce

the Philippines, and then prepare for an

attack on Japan itself.

During the 1930's, in view of Japan's

growing power and the low state of

American armaments, and with the independence of the Philippines scheduled

for 1946, the War Department General

Staff concluded that the United States

should not attempt to hold initially in

the western Pacific. Alaska, Hawaii,

and Panama, often referred to as the

"strategic triangle," should form the

main line of defense. (Map 1) The last

version of War Plan ORANGE, issued in

1938, embodied these views. It was assumed that after a period of strained

relations, Japan would attack without
4 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 1

notice. The Japanese would in all likelihood seize Guam and the Philippines.

Enemy forces could be expected to make

raids on Hawaii, Alaska, and the west

coast of the United States. The Panama

Canal might be wrecked by sabotage or

by naval and air raids. Initially, the

United States would mobilize one million men. Two armies would defend

the Pacific coast, Alaska, Hawaii, and the

Canal, while two more would be in reserve. Since it was assumed the Philippines would soon be lost, no plans were

made for reinforcing them. Eventually,

the Navy, with Army support, would

fight its way across the central Pacific

toward Japan. Once bases had been established in the western Pacific, the time

would be at hand to begin the attack on

the Japanese home islands.1

A seemingly modest Engineer force

was contemplated for a conflict of such

magnitude. The Army's strategic plan

for a war with Japan, prepared in 1936,

called for the mobilization of 46 engineer units on the outbreak of hostilities.

1

 (1) Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The

First Two Years, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1962), pp. 21-30.

(2) Louis Morton, "American and Allied Strategy in

the Far East," The Military Review, XXIX, No. 9,

(December, 1949), 22-39. (3) Mark Skinner Watson,

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1950), pp. 415, 453-54. (4) Joint Army

and Navy Basic War Plan—ORANGE (1938). AG

Reg Doc 223.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 5

Five engineer combat regiments would

support the infantry and 3 squadrons the

cavalry.2 In addition, 4 heavy ponton

battalions and 13 light ponton companies would serve with the combat forces.

Two general service regiments, 7 separate labor battalions, 4 dump truck companies, 2 depot companies, 2 water supply battalions, a topographic battalion,

5 railway battalions, and a railway shop

battalion would be needed in the rear

areas. An engineer section would serve

with General Headquarters. As the war

progressed more engineer units would

be formed.3

Had war broken out in 1938, the

Corps of Engineers, like the rest of the

Army, would not have been able to meet

the requirements of War Plan ORANGE.

Engineer officers numbered 739 and enlisted men 5,786 in an Army totaling

183,455. There were but ten engineer

units—7 combat regiments, 2 of them at

full strength, parts of 2 squadrons, and

a topographic battalion. These units

were for the most part undermanned

and poorly equipped. This small force

could be augmented. The 23 engineer

units of the National Guard—18 combat

regiments, 4 squadrons, and a general

service regiment, in various stages of organization and totaling 8,768 officers and

men in 1938—could be called into federal service. There were besides, 8,057

Engineer Reserve officers available for

duty.4

This engineer force was wholly inadequate to deal with the manifold responsibilities which the Corps of Engineers,

both a combat arm and a supply service,

would have to discharge in the course of

a bitter and probably prolonged struggle

in the Pacific. On far-flung battlefronts

of that enormous area engineer units

would be called upon to remove mines,

cut through barbed wire entanglements,

reduce fortifications, and build and repair roads to enable the infantry to advance. Units trained in bridging would

have to put troops across streams. During enemy offensives, engineers would

have to try to slow the advance by placing mines, destroying roads, wrecking

bridges, blowing up supplies, and at

times fighting as infantry. Behind the

fighting fronts the Corps could expect

to have its traditional wartime logistical

missions—to build fortifications, construct airfields, camps, hospitals, warehouses, roads, and ports; operate light,

power, and water systems; repair and

operate railroads;5 camouflage important installations; make maps for the

Army; and at the same time procure the

necessary supplies.6

While the Engineers would do extensive construction for the Army overseas

2

 A brief description of the different types of engineer units is given in Appendix B. 3

 Army Strategical Plan—ORANGE (1936 Revision),

an. 2, pp. 1-2. AG Reg Doc 235. 4

 OCE, Annual Rpt Covering Mil Activities of the

CE for FY Ending 30 Jun 38, pp. 3, 4, 10, 12, 13.

5

 (1) 41 Stat. 759. (2) Responsibility for the repair

and operation of railroads was transferred to the

Transportation Corps in November 1942. Chester

Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,

1951), p. 64. 6

 The organization of the Corps of Engineers and

its World War II mission are discussed in Blanche

D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosenthal,

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1958), pp. 3ff.
6 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

in time of war, their responsibility for

military construction in the United

States and its possessions in peacetime

was limited. They were responsible

only for building fortifications, which,

since the United States no longer had to

defend its land frontiers, meant almost

exclusively seacoast defenses. In the

1920's the term seacoast defenses signified coastal batteries, access roads, and

storage space for ammunition. With

the growing danger of air attack in the

early 1930's, the term came to include

searchlight positions and antiaircraft emplacements and, by the late 1930's, aircraft warning stations. All construction

for the Army in peacetime other than

fortifications was charged to The Quartermaster General.

With a relatively small engineer force

at his disposal, it is hardly surprising that

Maj. Gen. Julian L. Schley, the Chief

of Engineers, had a staff of but 21 officers

in Washington in 1938. One of his principal tasks was to organize and train

engineer units and develop new types of

engineer equipment. This mission was

the responsibility of Brig. Gen. John J.

Kingman, head of the Military Division

of the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

The troops, for the most part, received

only on-the-job training in the 1930's.

At Fort Belvoir, Virginia, some seventeen miles southwest of Washington, was

the Engineer School, which provided

specialized instruction to officers and specially chosen enlisted men. Also at Fort

Belvoir was the Engineer Board, which

developed and tested equipment.

General Schley's second major task was

construction. This, however, included

not merely the building of fortifications.

Congress had charged the Corps with

two important civil responsibilities—improvement of rivers and harbors and

flood control. To perform this civil

work and to build fortifications, the

Corps had developed a nationwide organization of 11 divisions with 48 districts, staffed in 1938 by 206 engineer

officers and some 56,000 civilians, all under the general direction of the Chief of

Engineers and directly responsible to

Brig. Gen. Max C. Tyler, head of the

Civil Works Division of General Schley's

office. At that time the Corps was at

work on about 1,000 rivers and harbors

projects and about 400 flood control projects in the United States, Puerto Rico,

Alaska, and the Hawaiian Islands, for

which Congress had appropriated $234,-

465,300 for the fiscal year 1938.7 The

general belief was that the divisions and

districts afforded Engineer officers valuable experience which would stand them

in good stead in time of war. What is

more, a construction organization was

already at hand to participate in any defense effort which might be launched.

First Steps in Building Up the Pacific

Outposts

Rearmament Begins

The Corps of Engineers began building up the defenses of the United States

against possible attack from the Pacific

about eighteen months before Pearl Har7

 (1) OCE, Annual Rpts Covering Mil Activities of

the CE for FY Ending 30 Jun 37, pp. 4, 28-29; FY

Ending 30 Jun 40, p. 39. (2) OCE, Chart and Tabs

Showing Costs of Engr Dept Work, FY's 1926-41,

p. 24. EHD Files. (3) Annual Rpt OCE, 1938, p. 1.

(4) Incl, Appns for Mil and Civil Functions, CE, to

Memo, C Budget and Programs Div OCE for EHD,

6 Jun 55.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 7

bor. The kind of construction to be

done and its location depended largely

on the policies of the administration in

Washington, the strategic planning of

the War Department, and the appropriations voted by Congress. It was to be

assumed that by far the larger share of

the money for a defense build-up would

go to The Quartermaster General. In

a period of strained relations likely to

precede the outbreak of war with Japan,

it could be expected that one of the first

tasks assigned the Corps would be the

strengthening of seacoast defenses bordering on the Pacific.

The mounting international tension

in the late 1930's in Europe and in the

Far East indicated that a major defense

build-up was probably close at hand.

Late in 1938, President Roosevelt advocated that the United States, hitherto

concerned only with defending its own

territories, protect all of the western

hemisphere. Addressing Congress in

January 1939, he stressed the need for

strong armed forces and asked for $525

million for armaments, half of it to be

spent by 30 June 1940. Three hundred

million dollars of the total would go for

airplanes to bolster the air defenses of

the continental United States, Alaska,

Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone. The

President wanted some $8 million to improve seacoast defenses in the Canal

Zone, Hawaii, and the continental

United States.8

The General Staff began to work out

a strategy of hemisphere defense along

the lines suggested by the President.

Despite the enlarged scope of responsibilities, the War Department concentrated almost entirely on strengthening

the United States and its outlying territories. The latter, especially, needed

attention, and Puerto Rico and the strategic triangle figured prominently in the

early planning. In the words of Brig.

Gen. George V. Strong, chief of the War

Plans Division of the General Staff, "Panama, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Alaska,"

were "vital links in our defensive

chain."9 Appearing before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House

of Representatives on 17 January 1939

during a hearing on a request for funds,

Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring

and General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff,

outlined their defense program. Like

the President, they stressed the need for

air power. Of the outlying territories,

they considered the Canal Zone by far

the most important. General Craig

wanted $23 million for work on airfields

there. He asked for $6.5 million to

strengthen coastal defenses in the United

States, the Canal Zone, and Hawaii and

$4 million to build the first air base in

Alaska. An unspecified but modest sum

would be needed to build technical facilities and temporary housing for the Air

Corps in Puerto Rico. No money was

requested for the Philippines.10

8

 (1) Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The

Framework of Hemisphere Defense, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1960), pp. 3-5. (2) William L. Langer and

S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-

1940 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 11.

(3) The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.

Roosevelt, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman (New

York: The Macmillan Co., 1938-50), 1939 volume,

pp. 70-74. 9

 Memo, Strong for C Budget and Legis Plng Br

GS, 6 May 39, with Incl. WPD 3807-31. 10

 (1) Statement of Woodring, pp. 1-3; (2) Statement of Craig, pp. 4-8. Both in H Com on Mil

Affairs, 76th Cong, 1st sess, Hearings, An Adequate
8 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Existing Defenses

The strength of the existing defenses

of Panama, Hawaii, and Alaska varied.

The Canal Zone, with possibly the

strongest defenses of the three outposts,

had two military airfields, France, near

the Atlantic entrance, and Albrook, near

the Pacific. There were 6 major Army

posts, 3 on the Atlantic side, and 3 on

the Pacific. Coast artillery and antiaircraft batteries, searchlight positions, and

supply depots were numerous. The sole

defense installation outside the Canal

Zone was Rio Hato airfield in Panama,

on the Pacific coast, 50 air miles southwest of the Pacific entrance to the Canal.

Rio Hato had originally been a private

landing strip, the property of the owner

of a nearby resort. The owner gradually improved the strip, and U.S. airmen

began using it more and more frequently

while on training flights. In 1935 the

United States leased it for a dollar a year

and, in 1938, for $200 a month. By 1939

Rio Hato had become so important for

defense that Air Corps commanders in

the Canal Zone urged the War Department to buy it or lease it on a long-term

basis. In the Hawaiian chain, almost all

military installations were on the island

of Oahu. Here were the two major

Army airfields, Wheeler, on the central

plateau, and Hickam, on the southern

shore northwest of Honolulu. The

island was protected by numerous seacoast batteries near Honolulu and Pearl

Harbor. Alaska had no military defenses, the only Army installation in the

Territory being Chilkoot Barracks, some

15 miles south of Skagway. Army and

Navy planners believed that Alaska

might be subjected to air attack, but

thought it unlikely that an enemy would

attempt a major campaign in Alaska's

frigid wastes. The Navy would be primarily responsible for keeping hostile

forces away.11

The defenses of Hawaii and the Panama Canal, though elaborate, were outmoded. Most of them had been designed and built in the days before the

airplane became an important weapon.

For many years it had been apparent that

the islands and the Canal were more vulnerable to air attack than to naval bombardment. Maj. Gen. David L. Stone,

Commanding General, Panama Canal

Department, expressed a widely held

view when he wrote on 15 November

1939 that "the first threat against the

Canal will come from either land based

or carrier based aviation."

 12

 Despite

its more remote location, Panama, like

Hawaii, feared attack mainly from Japan.

To the east was a protective screen of

islands extending from Florida to South

America. There was no such barrier in

the Pacific. The only islands on which

defenses could be built were the Galápagos, Cocos, and Clipperton.13

Appropriations

On 26 April 1939 Congress made its

regular appropriation for the War DeNational Defense as Outlined by the Message of the

President of the U.S., Jan-Feb 39.

11

 (1) Hist Sec CDC, Constr and Real Estate Activities in the CDC, 1 Jul 46, vol I, p. 1. (2) Preliminary

Study for Retrospective History, Dept Engr PCD,

6 Sep 39-31 Dec 45 (cited hereafter as Prelim Study),

II, 4. EHD Files. (3) Ltr, Acting SW to the President, 22 Nov 39. WPD 3512-50. 12

 Ltr, Stone to TAG, 15 Nov 39. 660.283 (Panama) File 3, 1936-41. 13 Ibid.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 9

partment for the fiscal year 1940. By

far the greater share of the money for

defense construction requested by the

War Department went to The Quartermaster General, who received $24,387,-

987 for construction in the United States

and its outlying territories. The Chief

of Engineers got $2,721,960 to improve

seacoast defenses, of which $1,146,000

was to be spent in Panama and $268,746

in Hawaii. During the following

months Congress made supplemental

appropriations. In May it gave the Engineers an additional $1,059,705 to improve seacoast defenses, $828,805 of it

for Panama and $230,900 for Hawaii.

In July the Quartermaster Corps got

$90,349,459 more for military construction in the United States and its outlying

possessions, including $3,600,000 to build

an airfield near Fairbanks, Alaska, the

first money to be allotted to the War

Department for defense in that Territory. In August Congress gave the

Quartermaster Corps an additional $400,-

000 for the Alaskan airfield and the Engineers $1,500,000 to improve the road

from the Canal Zone to Rio Hato airfield. By 1 September 1939 the Quartermaster General had received a total

of $132,466,746 for military construction, about half of it for strengthening

the defense triangle. The Engineers

had received $6,526,196, of which they

were to spend $3,924,451 to strengthen

the Canal Zone and Hawaii.14

The outbreak of the war in Europe

on 1 September had little effect on defense appropriations. Until well into

1940 Congress took no further action.

On 12 February it made its last appropriation for the fiscal year 1940, giving

The Quartermaster General $11,661,800

in construction funds, of which $112,800

was earmarked for Panama. Nothing

was given to the Engineers. This was

the period of the "phony war." The

conflict in Europe aroused little alarm;

many members of Congress, well attuned

to public opinion, were strongly disposed

to slash the War Department's request

for funds. On 23 February, the Subcommittee of the House Committee on

Appropriations began hearings on the

War Department's requests for funds for

the fiscal year 1941. The War Department had asked for $29,461,748 to improve and enlarge military posts—$18,-

535,560 of this sum to be spent on installations in the triangle. Over $12

million was to go for a second air base

in Alaska at Anchorage and for the storage of gasoline and bombs in the Territory. In the report made by the Appropriations Committee to the House

on 3 April, the War Department's requests for the triangle were drastically

curtailed. In the bill sent by the House

to the Senate, the $18,535,560 asked for

had been cut to $4,305,675. The funds

requested for Panama were only slightly

curtailed, but those for Hawaii were cut

approximately in half and those for

Alaska eliminated completely.15

14

 (1) Public Law 44, 76th Cong, 1st sess, 26 Apr 39.

(2) Public Law 61, 76th Cong, 1st sess, 2 May 39.

(3) Public Law 164, 76th Cong, 1st sess, 1 Jul 39. (4)

Public Law 361, 76th Cong, 1st sess, 9 Aug 39.

15

 (1) Public Law 415, 76th Cong, 3d sess, 12 Feb

40. (2) House Subcom of the Com on Appns, 76th

Cong, 3d sess, Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1941, p. 375. (3) Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 165. (4) S Subcom of Com on

Appns, 76th Cong, 3d sess, Hearings on House

Report 9209, p. 5.
10 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

War Plans

During the months of mounting world

tension, the War Department began to

revise its war plans. War Plan ORANGE

had presupposed a conflict involving only

the United States and Japan. After

Munich, the view gained ground that

the United States might find itself at war

not only with Japan but also with Germany and Italy. The Joint Army and

Navy Board began a study of various

strategies which might be followed if the

United States became involved in a

struggle with several countries. In April

1939, the Board's Joint Planning Committee reported that it was of the opinion that if Japan should join the European axis in hostilities, the United States

could not go on the offensive in the

Pacific, but would have to withdraw its

forces to the east of 180 degrees longitude. The War Department's immediate task in the Pacific, therefore, was to

strengthen Hawaii, the Canal Zone, and

Alaska. In May the Joint Board, approving the report, instructed the committee to prepare five strategic plans for

a number of possible war situations.

These plans were given the code name

RAINBOW. The committee completed

the first plan—RAINBOW I—in August

1939. According to this plan, the

United States would protect all of its

territory and that part of the Western

Hemisphere north of 10 degrees south

latitude. No reinforcements would be

sent to the Philippines. The outbreak

of war in Europe led to further studies.

The subsequent RAINBOW plans outlined, in general, more extensive commitments of the United States in the

defense of its territories and the Western

Hemisphere.16

Engineer Organizations

Both the Canal Zone and Hawaii had

going engineer organizations which could

take on new defense work. On General

Stone's staff was Col. Earl North, the

department engineer, with offices at the

post of Corozal, near the Canal's Pacific

entrance. Colonel North had a force of

about 200 civilians, made up of supervisors from the United States and laborers from the Canal Zone and Panama.

Under General Stone's command was the

11th Engineer Combat Regiment, headed

by Lt. Col. Gordon R. Young. The

main job of the combat engineers was

to train with the Canal Zone's defense

forces, but they also were available to

Colonel North on a part-time basis to

help with construction. Hawaii had

two engineer organizations. At Fort

Shatter, just northwest of Honolulu, was

the office of the department engineer,

Col. John N. Hodges, a member of the

staff of Maj. Gen. Charles D. Herron,

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. Colonel Hodges also commanded the Hawaiian Division's 3d Engineer Combat Regiment, stationed at

Schofield Barracks on the central plateau, the only Army engineer unit in

the Islands. The other organization was

the Honolulu Engineer District, which,

like district organizations of the Corps

16

 (1) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 7-10. (2) Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1951), pp. 55-57.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 11

elsewhere, was responsible for building

fortifications, improving rivers and harbors, and constructing works for flood

control. In late 1939 Maj. Peter E. Bermel was district engineer, serving under

the Pacific Division engineer in San

Francisco, who in turn was responsible

to the Chief of Engineers.

There was no engineer organization in

Alaska. Responsibility for such rivers

and harbors and flood control work as

was done rested on the Seattle Engineer

District headed by Col. Beverly C. Dunn,

who was under Col. John C. H. Lee,

North Pacific Division Engineer. The

defense of the Territory was the responsibility of Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commander of the Fourth Army, with headquarters in San Francisco.17

An expanding construction effort in

the outlying territories would pose difficulties. There were few resources in

manpower or materials in the triangle.

The Hawaiian chain, about 2,400 miles

southwest of San Francisco, with an area

of some 6,200 square miles, had a population of 425,000, almost all of it concentrated on the five major islands.

Oahu, with the capital city of Honolulu,

was the center of the Territory's economy, which was based mainly on the

production of pineapples and sugar cane.

There was little manufacturing. Almost all of the supplies and the great

number of workmen required for an

extensive construction program would

have to come from the United States.

The Canal Zone, a strip of land 10 miles

wide through which ran the vital waterway, was 3,350 miles from Los Angeles.

Panama, which the Canal Zone bisected, had no industry to speak of,

almost no construction equipment, and

few skilled workmen. The only manufactured items the engineers could count

upon getting locally were structural clay

products, principally brick and tile. Of

the three outlying territories, Alaska

would offer the greatest obstacles to

large-scale military construction. About

one-fifth the size of the continental

United States, the Territory had a scant

75,000 inhabitants. The almost complete absence of industry, public utilities, and highways, and the remote location of the areas of strategic importance, presented a dreary prospect.

Work Begins

During 1939 and the first months of

1940, the engineers began the task of

improving the defenses of Panama.

Colonel North's organization casemated

a few guns, built additional bombproof

storage for ammunition, and put in a

small number of access roads. In late

1939 the 11th Engineers began to improve Rio Hato airfield.18

 On the

whole, the expanded program provided

for by the Congressional appropriations

remained in the planning stages. Much

of the money which Congress did make

available for the fiscal year 1940 had to

be spent for equipment. "Our dry season," Colonel North wrote on 27 December, "is about here and we were all

17

 (1) Prelim Study, I, 3, 10, 49; III, 127; app. A,

pp. 1-2. (2) Ltr, North to C EHD, 19 Jul 57. EHD

Files. (3) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Covering

Opns During World War II, POA, pp. VI, X. EHD

Files. 18

 Hist Rcd of the 11th Engrs, 1943. 314.7, KCRC.
12 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

set for a big push. . . . Most of our new

equipment is here . . . but we must

have a lot more money which I understand ... is in the War Department

Act for 1941."

 19

In January Lt. Gen. Daniel Van

Voorhis replaced General Stone. Van

Voorhis' staff continued work on the

program of modernizing the defenses of

the Canal. In mid-February North reported that plans were completed to

make all antiaircraft batteries mobile,

except ten on the Atlantic side and nine

on the Pacific. But up to this time, the

War Department had authorized no additional construction at the batteries except the building of more gun blocks at

fifteen of the fixed sites. Soon after his

arrival, Van Voorhis and his staff began

to devote more time to preparing plans

for building defense installations in the

Panamanian Republic. If the Canal

were to be adequately protected, defenses would have to be built far beyond

the limits of the Canal Zone.20

In Hawaii, the department engineer

continued to work on plans to bombproof more coastal guns, install additional searchlights, and build aircraft

warning stations. In view of the great

amount of work local commanders

thought necessary, it appeared that funds

available in the near future would not

be adequate. Merely to bombproof the

more important installations, including

seacoast defenses, communication centers, command posts, and storage facilities for critical supplies, would, it was

estimated in June 1939, cost approximately $4.5 million. The Honolulu

District, with its force of hired labor,

was engaged in a modest program of

strengthening seacoast defenses and improving the ports at Honolulu, Pearl

Harbor, and Midway Island.21

In 1939 and early 1940 the Engineers

had little to do with Alaska. The Navy

and the Quartermaster Corps undertook

the first construction for defense in the

Territory. With funds appropriated by

Congress in April 1939, the Navy began

work on its new air bases at Kodiak and

Sitka in September and at Dutch Harbor in the following spring. Late in

1939 the Quartermaster Corps made

preparations to enable work to get under

way by spring on the air base at Fairbanks, to be called Ladd Field. (Map 2)

In August a board of officers proposed

that the War Department build several

operating and emergency airfields in

Alaska. The Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) was then embarking on a program of building and improving airfields

in the Territory. Of those CAA planned

to build, the Secretary of War was especially interested in the one on Annette

Island at the southern tip of the Alaska

panhandle and the one near the village

of Yakutat at the northern end. With

fields at these two places, planes would

be able to make the 1,500-mile trip from

the United States to Ladd in relative

safety. Early in 1940 the Engineers became engaged in defense work in the

19

 Ltr, North to C Constr Sec Mil Div OCE, 27

Dec 39. 451.2 pt. 4. 20

 1st Ind, North to CofEngrs, 13 Feb 40, on Ltr,

C Constr Sec Mil Div OCE to Engr PCD, 1 Feb 40.

660.283 (Panama) File 3, 1936-41.

21

 (1) Statement of Capt James C. Marshall, CE,

26 Apr 39. House Subcom of the Com on Appropriations, 76th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings on the War

Department Civil Functions Appns Bill for 1940, p.

61. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen William H. Wilson, CG HD,

to TAG, 22 Jun 39. AAF Central Files, 630-A

Hawaii 1939-41.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 13

MAP 2

Territory for the first time. They were

directed to make surveys for the staging

fields to be built by CAA or the Quartermaster Corps in the panhandle. In

February, under engineer supervision,

men of the Department of the Interior

began to survey the site at Annette. No

final decision had as yet been made with

regard to Yakutat.22

A Sudden Upsurge

The spring of 1940 saw the end of the

"phony war." In April Germany seized

Denmark and Norway and in May invaded the Low Countries and France.

On 25 June France surrendered. There

was a violent reaction in the United

States, and President Roosevelt and Con22

 (1) Navy Department, Bureau of Yards and

Docks, Building the Navy's Bases in World War II

(Washington, 1947) (cited hereafter as Building the

Navy's Bases) I, 163, 169, 174. (2) Ltr, Maj Edward

M. George, CQM Alaska Air Base, to Lt J. B.

Rankin, Acting CQM Alaska Air Base, 19 Jan 40.

600.1 (Ladd Field AC Progress) vol. II, 1940-41. (3)

Rpt of Bd of Offs on Survey of Airfields in Alaska

... 7 Jun to 8 Aug 39. 686 (Alaska) 1939. (4) Ltr,

SW to Chmn CAA, 4 Jan 40. WPD 4239. (5) Ltr,

Kingman to CofAC, 6 Mar 40. 686 (Annette Island,

Alaska) vol. I, 1940-41.
14 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

gress rushed plans and preparations for

building up armaments. On 13 June,

Congress, in its regular appropriation

for the fiscal year 1941, restored the items

for the triangle that it had cut out a few

months earlier. The Quartermaster received funds for modernizing and enlarging Fort Shafter and Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, improving Albrook

Field and the post of Corozal in Panama,

and constructing a second air base, Elmendorf, together with an Army post,

Fort Richardson, near Anchorage in

Alaska. The Engineers got $8,722,718

for seacoast defenses; $2,896,813 of this

sum was to be spent for installations in

Panama and $599,686 for those in Hawaii. Of the sum for Panama, $212,193

was to be used to improve fortifications,

$328,100 to complete work on the 16-

inch guns at Fort Kobbe and on minor

batteries, $236,520 to build storage for

ammunition, $1,120,000 to buy and install searchlights, and $1,000,000 to put

in access roads.23

During the summer Congress enacted

additional measures to strengthen defenses. On 19 July it passed the "Two

Ocean Navy Act," which authorized expansion of the fleet by 70 percent. In

August it authorized the President to

call the National Guard into federal

service. On 9 September it passed the

second supplemental defense appropriations act, which increased the authorized

program by $5.4 billion. A week later

it enacted legislation authorizing the

draft. The strength of the Army was

to be increased to 1400,000 men.

The Joint Board accelerated work on

the RAINBOW plans. The fall of France

had caused a decided shift in emphasis

from the Pacific to the Atlantic. During the late spring, Army and Navy planners had concentrated on RAINBOW 4,

which presupposed possible operations

in the Atlantic and South America and

a defensive stand in the Pacific. President Roosevelt approved this plan on

14 August. Thereafter, the planners

concentrated on RAINBOW 5, which presupposed operations in Europe and

Africa, while, as under RAINBOW 4, the

United States would remain on the defensive in the Pacific.24

Faced with the threat of a two-ocean

conflict, War Department planners regarded the strengthening of the Canal

Zone as more urgent than ever. North

and his engineers expanded their construction efforts. They got started on

the job of making the antiaircraft batteries mobile. A new type of project,

assigned in June, was the building of

the joint command post tunnel for the

department headquarters at Quarry

Heights on the Pacific side. For this

job, North used men from his regular

hired labor force trained in fortifications

work. Construction was speeded up at

Rio Hato. During the summer part of

the 11th Engineers, about 600 men from

the Air Corps, and some men loaned

by the quartermaster were at work there.

A dock was built to unload materials and

heavy equipment, which had to be

shipped by sea, since the road from the

Canal Zone, constructed as part of the

Pan American Highway, would not hold

23

 Public Law 611, 76th Cong, 3d sess, 13 Jun 40.

24

 (1) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 34-36, 92-93. (2) Public Law

781, 76th Cong, 3d sess, 9 Sep 40.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 15

up under military traffic.25 A hampering factor was the rainy season, which

prevailed from May till December.

"One of the major difficulties . . . was

the climate," North wrote later. "During the rainy season, the clayey earth became a soft sticky gumbo and . . . construction which involved earth excavation and moving was difficult and

slow."

 26

 Construction was not North's

only interest. Because military maps of

the Canal Zone, made back in 1915, were

almost obsolete, North wanted to remap certain areas by using aerial photography. In September, much-needed

equipment began to arrive to make possible a start on the aerocartographic program.

By the summer of 1940 General Van

Voorhis and his staff were greatly concerned with making defenses more mobile. But mobility of itself would be

of little value unless numerous defense

installations were built in the Republic

of Panama. Some of the 153 searchlights and most of the aircraft warning

stations which Van Voorhis wanted

would have to be located there. New

defense installations in the Republic

would necessitate building many additional roads. A big stumbling block

was securing land from Panama. By a

treaty negotiated in 1936 and ratified in

1939, any tracts of land which the United

States authorities wanted in the Republic were to be secured by negotiations

with the Panamanian Government, and

procedures for leasing had not yet been

worked out. The War Department and

the State Department were making little

progress in persuading the Panamanian

Government to lease land for 999 years,

as American commanders in the Canal

Zone wished. How long it would be

before Panama would consent to lease

land was a question impossible to answer

in the summer of 1940.27

In only slightly less emphatic fashion,

the engineers in Hawaii felt the impact

of the growing defense effort. Between

April 1939 and July 1940 Congress had

appropriated $1,197,332 for improving

seacoast defenses in the islands. General

Herron, convinced that the program for

peacetime defense construction as outlined in mid-1939 would have to be expanded, continued to insist on more

funds for fortifications, and in this he

was wholeheartedly supported by Col.

Albert K. B. Lyman, who became department engineer in July 1940. Herron

wanted more airfields and seacoast batteries, more antiaircraft guns and searchlights. He was particularly anxious to

bombproof vital installations on Oahu.

He insisted on more underground storage for ammunition, which he planned

to distribute on Oahu as a protection

against bombing and to relieve congestion at Aliamanu Crater, the main storage area, about one mile east of Pearl

Harbor. On 5 July he appointed a

board of officers to consider all aspects

of defense against aerial and naval bombardment. With construction on new

military installations about to begin, the

need for more roads and trails was pressing. They would have to be put in to

25

 (1) Public Law 611, 76th Cong, 3d sess, 13 Jun

40. (2) Hist Rcd of the 11th Engrs, 1943. 314.7. 26

 Ltr, North to C EHD, 19 Jul 57. EHD Files.

27

 (1) Memo, C Constr Sec Mil Div OCE for

CofEngrs, 29 Apr 40. 660.283 (Panama) File 3, 1936-

41. (2) Acquisition of Land, PCD, prepared by Hist

Sec AGO HQ PCD, Mar 45, pp. 13-20.
16 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

provide access to the new observation

posts, antiaircraft batteries, seacoast batteries, and searchlight positions. Additional roads would be needed for military

operations. The conflict in Europe had

demonstrated that, in the new mobile

type of warfare, troops, in order to move

forward or withdraw rapidly, required a

variety of roads and trails. Lyman

doubted that many additional roads

could be built if war were imminent or

under way; if built at all, they would

have to be put in in peacetime. To

bolster the defenses of the Islands, General Herron and Colonel Lyman wanted

more engineer troops. On 23 August,

Herron "strongly recommended" to the

War Department that a regiment of aviation engineers, less one battalion—a new

type of engineer unit trained to build

airfields—be sent. The reply from

Washington was that there were so few

engineer troops none could be spared.28

Especially critical in Hawaii was the

need for aircraft warning stations.

Early in 1940, a local board of officers

had made a study of the need for such

stations. The members spent ten weeks

surveying the five principal islands from

the air and on the ground. It was apparent that the configuration of the archipelago limited construction to a line

extending generally northwest and southeast from Oahu. It would be difficult

to detect planes approaching from the

north, northeast, south, or southwest until they were quite close. The members

of the board emphasized the need of providing protection to the westward as this

was the direction from which an attack

would most likely come. Their report,

made in April 1940, called for three fixed

and six mobile stations on the four largest islands and an information center at

Fort Shafter. The fixed stations were

to be built at the most crucial points.

The westernmost one would be at Kokee

on Kauai. (Map 3) On Oahu, the station would be put on steep and craggy

4,000-foot high Mount Kaala, west of

Schofield Barracks, while the station on

Maui would be atop 10,000-foot high

Haleakala. On 27 June the War Department authorized construction, and in

July Lyman conferred with Lt. Col.

Theodore Wyman, Jr., the newly appointed district engineer, to acquaint

him with the project. Building these

stations would not be easy, for the sites

were remote and inaccessible. The station on Mount Kaala would require a

cableway to the summit to bring up supplies. To get construction started in

the summer, Lyman planned to have the

3d Engineers begin surveying for an access road to the lower terminal of the

cableway to be built to the top of Mount

Kaala.29

The Engineers in the summer of 1940

somewhat unexpectedly became in part

responsible for defense construction in

Alaska. On 10 May the War Plans Division had informed General George C.

Marshall, Chief of Staff since 1 July 1939, 28

 (1) Rad, Herron to TAG, 8 Oct 40. WPD 1928-

27. (2) Memo, Acting ACofS WPD for Marshall, 21

Jan 41. WPD 1928-27. (3) 5th Ind, Herron to

TAG, 15 Nov 40, basic unknown. 600-B Hawaii,

1940-42, AAF, Central Files. (4) Interstaff Routing

Slip, Dept Engr to CofS HD, 4 Oct 40. Engr AGF

PAC. (5) Ltr, Herron to TAG, 3 Feb 41. 381

(Hawaii) 106.

29

 (1) Ltr, Herron to TAG, 17 Apr 40. Engr AGF

PAC, Sig 676.3. (2) 4th Ind, TAG to Herron, 27

Jun 40, on Herron Ltr. (3) Ltr, Lyman to CofEngrs,

13 Jul 40. Engr AGF PAC, Sig 676.3.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 17

MAP 3

that strengthening the Anchorage-Seward area and the Navy bases under construction at Kodiak and Dutch Harbor

was imperative.30 It recommended that

an infantry battalion and a battery of

field artillery be sent to the Territory.

On 17 June, the War Department set up

the Alaska Defense Force, with headquarters at Anchorage, under Col. Simon

B. Buckner, Jr. Buckner was responsible to DeWitt. The first echelon of

the garrison, numbering 751, reached

Anchorage on 27 June and included the

32d Engineer Combat Company (Separate) of 91 officers and men, the first

engineer unit to reach the Territory.

The 32d engineers went to Elmendorf

Field, where they began to build facilities for their camp and engage in combat training. In August the Joint Army

and Navy Board, after a month-long

study of Alaska's strategic position, advocated a still greater defense build-up

so that the Territory could be held even

without naval protection. The board

advised stronger defenses for the naval

30

 For a discussion of the War Department's reinforcement of Alaska before Pearl Harbor, see Stetson

Conn, Rose Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1964), ch. IX.
18 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

stations, and also recommended that the

contractors being employed to build the

naval bases be used to build posts for

Army garrisons. The Secretaries of War

and Navy approved these recommendations, which became the basis of Army

and Navy policies with regard to Alaskan

defenses.31

Since Alaska in time of war would be

especially liable to air attack, much

thought was given to the construction of

aircraft warning stations. Late in May

DeWitt was directed to make a study of

the network of stations which the War

Plans Division proposed for the Territory. Included was an information center at Anchorage and four detector stations, three of them to be near the naval

bases and one near Anchorage. If possible, the stations were to be mobile.

Should General DeWitt judge that more

stations were needed, he was to decide

where they were to be located. Colonel

Lee, as North Pacific Division Engineer,

would be responsible for making surveys,

preparing estimates, and constructing the

buildings for housing the equipment.

After studies had been made by a board

of officers, DeWitt proposed construction

of an information center at Anchorage,

one mobile station at Fairbanks, and 7

fixed stations along the coast from Sitka

to Norton Sound, just south of Bering

Strait. He believed the number of detector stations should eventually be increased to 13. In August General Marshall approved plans for the information

center and for 8 of the detector stations.

He was in favor of the locations for the

installations at Kodiak, Sitka, Fairbanks,

and Anchorage, but wanted the 5 other

sites resurveyed. He suggested that efforts be made to reduce costs, especially

for access roads.32

General DeWitt was anxious to improve communications in the almost uninhabited territory. Of vital importance was the government-owned Alaskan

Railroad running northward from the

port of Seward through Anchorage and

on to Fairbanks. From the standpoint

of defense, the weakest point in the line

was the 100-mile section from Seward to

Anchorage, where the railway passed

through deep gorges and over high

trestles, thus providing attractive targets

for saboteurs and hostile aircraft. The

railroad's management was considering

building a 14-mile cutoff at a point sixtysix miles north of Seward eastward to

Passage Canal, an inlet on Prince William Sound. DeWitt suggested to the

War Department that it exert every influence to have this project carried out, preferably by the Engineers. On 13 July the

War Department authorized Colonel Lee

to investigate and consider three choices:

improving the line from Seward to

Anchorage, constructing the cutoff, and

developing Anchorage itself as a port for

oceangoing vessels. Two engineers sent

out by Colonel Dunn to explore the possibilities recommended that the Alaskan

Railroad be authorized to build the cutoff. While this shortened route would

require some three and one-half miles

31

 (1) Memos, Strong for Marshall, 10 May, 17 Jun

40. WPD 4297. (2) Hist of the 32d Engr Co (Combat) (Sep) While in Alaska. (3) JB 312 Ser 650, 14

Aug 40. WPD 3512-68. (4) Watson, Chief of Staff,

p. 456.

32

 (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for TAG, 22 May 40.

(2) Ltr, ACofS WPD to TAG, 29 May 40. (3) Note

for Rcd on Memo, Acting ACofS for TAG, 9 Dec 40.

(4) Memo, ACofS for TAG, 7 Aug 40. All in WPD

3640-6.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 19

of tunneling, it would be easier to defend

against aerial attack than the existing

line south to Seward and would considerably shorten the haul to Anchorage and Fairbanks. Moreover, Passage

Canal had an advantage over Anchorage

in that it was ice free the year round.

On 31 July DeWitt repeated his earlier

recommendation that the job be given

to the Corps of Engineers.33

More important than any of these

projects was the building of airfields.

Since the Quartermaster Corps had

started work at Ladd and Elmendorf, it

was highly important to get work under

way on the two staging fields in the

Alaska panhandle. In mid-1940 the

Civil Aeronautics Authority was planning to build both fields, but DeWitt

thought CAA would take too long.

Convinced that Annette, especially,

should be started at once, he recommended on 9 July—despite the fact that

airfield construction was properly the

province of the Quartermaster—that the

Engineers build the field. Late that

month the War Department assigned the

job to Maj. George J. Nold, commander

of the 28th Engineer Aviation Regiment,

in order to give the unit training in

building airfields. The Seattle District

would supervise work on the field, the

site of which was on the reservation of the

Metlakatla Indians. On 6 August the

Department of the Interior granted temporary use of the land needed, with the

understanding that consideration would

be given to the Indians with regard to

employment and the purchase of supplies. The field was to be extensive,

with two asphalt runways 5,000 feet

long, concrete aprons and taxiways, a

hangar, a dock, a seaplane ramp, roads,

housing, and storage for supplies, gasoline, and oil. On 20 August Major

Nold, with two battalions of the 28th

Engineers, two companies of the Civilian

Conservation Corps (CCC) from Oregon

and California, and thirty-five civilian

technicians sailed from Seattle. They

arrived at Annette three days later and

immediately went to work on a camp and

a dock.34

Last Months of 1940

As the international situation continued to deteriorate, Congress voted

additional funds for armaments. On 8

October, it passed the Third Supplemental Defense Appropriation Act for

the fiscal year 1941, in the amount of $1.7

billion, making a total of over $12 billion

appropriated for defense since the previous June. It now appeared more likely

that the United States would be involved

in a war with Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Insofar as the Pacific was concerned, the

United States initially would continue to

maintain a defensive position and concentrate on strengthening Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. The RAINBOW 5

plan, which presupposed such a turn of

events, had by fall been worked out in

broad outlines.35

33

 (1) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 2 Jul 40. (2) Ltr, AG

Fourth Army to Lee, 15 Jul 40. (3) Rpt of Passage

Canal Cut-Off by 1st Lt A. C. Welling, CE, and Mr.

James G. Truitt, c. 29 Jul 40. (4) Ltr, DeWitt to

TAG, 31 Jul 40. All in 617 (Alaska).

34

 (1) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 9 Jul 40. (2) 1st Ind,

TAG to CofEngrs, 25 Jul 40, basic unknown. (3)

Ltr, Acting Secy of the Interior to SW, 6 Aug 40.

(4) Ltr, Dunn to Lee, 5 Oct 40. All in 868 (Annette

Island, Alaska), 1940-41, vol. I. (5) Maj Gen George

J. Nold, Personal Account. EHD Files. 35

 (1) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemi-
20 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

By this time, there was a declining

emphasis in Washington on civil works.

The President, while requesting greater

sums for military construction, was asking that rivers and harbors work be held

to a minimum. Largely for this reason,

the Chief of Engineers made a bid for a

substantial role in the building of defense projects.36

 The commanders in

the triangle were very much in favor of

transferring military construction from

the Quartermaster Corps to the Engineers. The centralized system whereby

local constructing quartermasters were

under the direct control of The Quartermaster General in Washington had

caused a great deal of dissatisfaction. In

the Canal Zone, for example, the department engineer, a member of General

Van Voorhis' staff, handled fortifications

work, but all other military construction

was the responsibility of the constructing

quartermaster, who reported directly to

The Quartermaster General's office. In

Hawaii, the Honolulu District Engineer

had broad authority and could, in line

with General Herron's suggestions, make

decisions on the spot, while the local constructing quartermaster had to refer most

design and contractual matters to his

superiors in Washington. General DeWitt was of the opinion that The

Quartermaster Corps, although it did

excellent work, was inclined to carry on

construction at a leisurely peacetime

pace, while the Engineers, prepared to

build in war, put great emphasis on

speed. All three department commanders had great confidence in the Corps of

Engineers' technical ability.37

A change in construction responsibilities was soon forthcoming, for on 9

September the President signed a bill

which authorized the Secretary of War

at his discretion to transfer to the Engineers any part of military construction

then assigned to the Quartermaster

Corps. This authority was to expire on

30 June 1942. For the time being, the

Secretary did not invoke this power.38

In view of the increasingly serious

international situation, defense work in

the outlying territories seemed exasperatingly slow to the local commanders.

There were many reasons for the delays.

It took time for the enactments of Congress to be translated into construction.

The War Department had to put detailed

plans for building into final form.

Workmen had to be hired and organized

into effective construction forces. In recruiting workers, the Engineers were

confronted with increasing competition

from the Quartermaster Corps and the

Navy. Materials had to be ordered and

shipped as prescribed by government

regulations. In Panama and Alaska,

climatic conditions were a hampering

factor. In many cases, work was held up

because of strong differences of opinion

over sites for installations. To many in

the War Department, the possibility of

an attack on the triangle seemed remote,

with the need for fast action not

apparent.

In the Canal Zone, the rains continued

to be a major hindrance. Insofar as

sphere Defense, pp. 74-75, 93. (2) Public Law 800,

76th Cong, 3d sess, 8 Oct 40. 36

 Testimony of Robert P. Patterson, USW, 22 Sep

41. S Com on Mil Affairs, Hearings ... on S. 1884,

77th Cong, 1st sess, p. 29.

37

 Interv, Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington

with General DeWitt, 10 Apr 57. EHD Files. 38

 54 Stat. 875.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 21

possible, the engineers worked on searchlight emplacements, antiaircraft batteries, storage for ammunition, and access roads. They made some progress on

Rio Hato. When the 9th Bombardment

Group arrived from the United States in

November, the 11th Engineers put up a

2,000-man camp for them. The Public

Roads Administration, with funds supplied by the Engineers, began to improve

the highway from the Canal Zone to the

airfield. In November Colonel North

set up a Soils Laboratory whose main job

was to test the soils of the Canal Zone's

generally swampy terrain and recommend methods of compaction and stabilization for roads and airfields.39

Van Voorhis was especially anxious to

get work started on the aircraft warning

stations, and in October the War Department approved his plans for nine.

Besides the two at the entrances to the

Canal, where experimental facilities were

already in place, Van Voorhis wanted

seven in the Panamanian Republic. He

prepared plans for two coast artillery and

forty-six searchlight positions, some of

the latter to be set up in Panama. In

addition, he wanted the quartermaster to

build a number of auxiliary airdromes

and landing fields in the Republic. On

11 October he gave a list of the desired

sites to the Panamanian Government.

Little progress was being made on the

leasing question. Dr. Arnulfo Arias,

who took office as President of Panama

on 2 October 1940, raised many objections to the views of the Government of

the United States about acquiring land

in Panama. Instead of a 999-year lease

—or even a 99-year lease as some suggested—he wished to limit U.S. tenure to

the duration of the emergency. The

War Department wanted jurisdiction

over acquired real estate; President Arias

insisted that Panama should retain full

sovereignty.40

Early in December, Arias proposed

that a joint U.S.-Panamanian commission be appointed to investigate the sites.

A commission of five—three Panamanians and two Americans, one of them

Colonel North—was established. After

the commission's first meeting, North informed Van Voorhis that it would take

at least four months to inspect the sites

and locate the owners. On 30 December Van Voorhis forwarded a list of the

most urgently needed tracts to the Panamanian Government, suggesting that,

pending final agreement, the United

States should be permitted to occupy the

lands. By the end of the year, no appreciable progress had been made toward

a settlement of the land acquisition

problem.41

In Alaska the engineers continued to

be mainly concerned with the airfields in

the panhandle. The aviation engineers

at Annette were gaining experience on

their first job. Work went ahead on the

camp and dock and, late in the fall, the

men began clearing the runway sites.

Such problems as Major Nold had were

mainly with people. A few weeks after

39

 (1) Prelim Study, II, 240-42, 258-60, 345-47; I,

112-17. (2) Hist of 11th Engrs, Panama, 1940-42.

314.7, KCRC. (3) Memo, C Constr Sec OCE for

Schley, 29 Aug 40, sub: Progress on Rio Hato Road

Panama. 611 Panama 1940-45.

40

 (1) Ltr, Van Voorhis to Marshall, 12 Nov 40.

WPD 2674-30. (2) Acquisition of Land, PCD, pp.

20-23. 41

 (1) Ltr, Van Voorhis to Marshall, 3 Jan 41.

WPD 2674-31. (2) Acquisition of Land, PCD, pp.

23-25.
22 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

work started, the Council of the Metlakatla Indians called upon Governor

Ernest Gruening of Alaska to inform

him that their tribesmen were not being

given jobs or an opportunity to sell

supplies and that Nold had exceeded his

authority by getting water for his camp

from a lake outside the area set aside for

the airfield.42 Agreeing that the Indians

were partly justified, Nold was prepared

to meet some of their demands. He

hired some fifty Indians as laborers, and

placed them in their own camp, situated

at some distance from the soldiers'

bivouac to lessen chances of friction.

"The scheme," Nold wrote, "worked

pretty well and satisfied the Indians."

 43

The lake was the only adequate source

of water and, in accordance with Nold's

recommendation, the amount of land

under lease was extended to include the

lake.

There were difficulties not only with

the Indians but also with the CCC.

Under that organization's regulations,

the work-day included the time spent in

travel between camp and job. Because

the soldiers resented seeing the civilians

arrive at work later and leave earlier,

Nold set out to have the CCC regulations

changed, but without success, at least not

then. There were bitter complaints

from both the CCC men and the civilian

technicians about the inadequate rations

for the cold, damp climate. In December more adequate supplies of food began to arrive. By the end of the year

the dock had been finished and the

camp was nearing completion. Clearing

for the runways was continuing.44

To get work started at Yakutat, Nold

sent part of his slender force to that site.

On 23 October Capt. Benjamin B. Talley

with Company B of the 28th Engineers

and a few civilians arrived from Annette.

No CCC labor was desired and none was

sent. As this was the off-season for fish

canning, a local company leased its

buildings, wharf, and narrow-gauge railroad, and some of the troops were housed

in the canneries. By the end of the

year, clearing for the runways was about

to begin. By using engineer troops, DeWitt had gotten a head start on the airfields in the Alaska panhandle.45

Other Alaskan projects remained in

the planning stages. In late October,

G-4 directed the Chief of Engineers to

make preparations to start work in the

spring on the cut-off for the Alaska Railroad. General Schley assigned the job

to Colonel Dunn, who planned to have

hired labor and contractors' organizations do the clearing, grading, and tunneling and employees of the Alaskan

Railroad lay the track. On 9 December

the War Plans Division ordered construction of aircraft warning stations at

Kodiak, Sitka, and Fairbanks and an information center at Anchorage. DeWitt

now recommended that one or more stations be built north of Cape Prince of

Wales, which would extend the line of

protection almost to the Arctic Circle,

42

 Ltr, Nold to Dunn, 18 Sep 40. 686 (Annette

Island, Alaska), 1940-41, vol. I. 43

 Ltr, Nold to C EHD, 7 Aug 57. EHD Files.

44

 (1) Ltr, Nold to Dunn, 6 Feb 41. 230.44 Alaska

pt. I. (2) Ltr, Nold to CG, Ninth Corps Area, 5 Nov

40. 430.2 (Alaska). 45

 (1) Memo, Kingman for ACofS G-4, 16 Sep 40.

(2) Ltr, Dunn to Lee, 14 Oct 40. (3) Semimonthly

Rpt, Yakutat Landing Field, 1-15 Dec 40. All in

868 (Yakutat Airfield), pt. I.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 23

and the War Plans Division took the

suggestion under study. Preparations

were being made to photomap many of

the little-known areas of the Territory

now vitally important for defense. DeWitt planned to send a photoreconnaissance flight and Company D of the 29th

Engineer Topographic Battalion to

Alaska in the spring.46 There was much

discussion over how many defenses

Alaska needed and where they should be

located. "Generally speaking," Talley

subsequently recalled, "through 1940 an

atmosphere of peacetime life prevailed,

only those who remembered 1914-1917

furnished the spark of urgency."

 47

In Hawaii, some work was started in

late 1940. Construction began on a few

roads and trails, since Congress had allotted $70,200 for such work in the

Islands in the third supplemental appropriation, made in September. But this

was only a small beginning in bettering

communications. In Lyman's opinion,

improving the rail net was just as important as building new roads. Urgently needed was a connecting link

between Wahiawa on the Central Plateau

and the island's north shore to keep

supplies moving to the coastal defenses.

Also of great benefit would be doubletracking part of the line from Honolulu

to Schofield Barracks and providing bypasses where the railroad crossed over on

high bridges. But the chances were slim

that money would be forthcoming for

such projects. In September the 3d Engineers began work on the access road for

the aircraft warning station on Mount

Kaala. There were indications that building this station and the others as well

might take considerable time. The site

atop Haleakala was in Hawaii National

Park. Park officials agreed to give the War

Department temporary use of the land,

but they were opposed to having structures erected which would "materially

alter the natural appearance of the reservation." They insisted on first seeing "the

preliminary building plans showing the

architecture and general appearance" of

the structures. The Honolulu District

was finding it difficult to recruit workmen because the Navy and the Quartermaster Corps had already absorbed a

large part of the labor force in the

Islands. By late 1940, various military

units, such as the Hawaiian Separate

Coast Artillery Brigade and the Hawaiian

Division, were forced to use their own

men to build and maintain the roads and

trails they needed.48

Wyman had planned to do the additional defense work with hired labor, but

by fall it was doubtful if enough workers

could be found. Using hired labor was a

method best suited for small jobs, as a

rule, and not practical for larger projects,

46

 (1) 1st Ind, TAG to CofEngrs, 30 Oct 40, on Ltr,

DeWitt to TAG, 31 Jul 40. (2) Ltr, Dunn to Lee,

7 Dec 40. Both in 617 (Alaska). (3) Note for Rcd

on Memo, Acting ACofS WPD for TAG, 9 Dec 40.

WPD 3640-6. (4) 10th Ind, TAG to DeWitt, 20 Dec

40, on Ltr, Kingman to DeWitt, 17 Sep 40. 061.01

(Alaska) pt. I. 47

 Incl to Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Nov 57. EHD

Files.

48

 (1) Interstaff Routing Slip, Lyman to CofS HD,

4 Oct 40. (2) Interstaff Routing Slip, Maj Vere A.

Beers, 3d Engr Regt, to CO, 3d Engr Regt, 4 Oct 40.

Both in Engr AGF PAC. (3) Ltr, Herron to

Wyman, 7 Nov 40. Engr AGF PAC, 676.3. (4) Ltr,

Short to Marshall, 15 Mar 41. Pearl Harbor Attack,

Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (cited hereafter as

Pearl Harbor Hearings, 79th Cong, 1st sess, pt. 30,

pp. 3005-3006). (5) Ltr, Herron to TAG, 8 Nov 40.

Engr AGF PAC, 611.
24 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

especially if speed was a primary consideration, because of the time and effort

required to recruit, organize, and administer a large number of workmen.

There were alternative ways of getting

the work done. Wyman could employ

construction firms under lump-sum contracts. This would mean advertising the

work, receiving bids from contractors,

and giving the contract to the lowest responsible bidder. Once an agreement

was signed, it would be up to the contractor to finish the job within the specified time. Another method—new to the

Engineers—was to give a job to a construction firm under a cost-plus-a-fixedfee contract. This type of contract had

been designed for emergency conditions,

and was to be used especially when there

was little or no time for preparing plans

and specifications. Congress had first authorized its use in August 1939 for construction in Panama and Alaska. In July

1940 Congress approved its use without

restrictions as to time or place. Under

the new arrangement, the War Department selected a firm it considered qualified and negotiated an agreement. Advertising, receiving bids, and awarding

the job to the lowest responsible bidder

—standard procedure under the lumpsum arrangement—were eliminated.

To qualify for the new type of contract a

firm had to have a good reputation and

the financial resources to do the work.

Every cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract had to

be approved by the Under Secretary of

War. If it amounted to more than $500,-

000, it had to be approved, in addition,

by the Advisory Commission to the

Council of National Defense. The contractor furnished his organization and

his know-how and supplied materials and

equipment. The government was expected to provide him, if necessary, with

additional equipment, which it would

rent from suppliers of such machinery.

Under the terms of the agreement the

government reimbursed the contractor

for nearly all expenditures and paid him

a fee, the amount of which was limited

by law. The haste with which such contracts had to be let meant that cost estimates were often not much more than

guesses of the most general kind. Costplus-a-fixed-fee contracts were frequently

used by big construction firms. The government had entered into such contracts

in World War I, but had not used them

in peacetime. In 1940 few Army officers

outside the Quartermaster Corps were

conversant with them, or with the difficulties which might ensue from their

use.49

In October 1940 Colonel Wyman discussed ways and means of accomplishing

construction with Col. Warren T. Hannum, the South Pacific Division Engineer, at that time on an inspection trip

to the Islands. Like engineer officers in

general, Hannum preferred having work

done by purchase and hire and was opposed to using cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. But in view of the fact that the

Navy was using this type of agreement

extensively in the Islands and since there

was little time to prepare plans and specifications, negotiating a cost-plus-a-fixedfee contract appeared to be the best

solution. In a letter to Hannum on 4

November, the Office of the Chief of

49

 For a detailed discussion of cost-plus-a-fixed-fee

contracts, see Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington,

Military Construction in the United States, a draft

manuscript in preparation for the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
THE DEFENSE TRIANGLE: PANAMA, HAWAII, AND ALASKA 25

Engineers approved using the new type

of contract. Looking about for reliable

contractors, Wyman could find none in

Hawaii not already heavily engaged in

defense work. Hannum suggested to Wyman that he come to the mainland to

look for suitable firms. Interviewing contractors in Los Angeles, Wyman was able

to line up three well-known firms, the

Rohl-Connolly Company, the W. E.

Callahan Construction Company, and

Gunther & Shirley Company. RohlConnolly had completed several large

projects for the Corps of Engineers and

other agencies of the federal government,

among them the Los Angeles—Long

Beach breakwater and Headgate Dam at

Parker, Arizona.

On 20 December 1940 Wyman, with

the approval of the Chief of Engineers,

the Under Secretary of War, and the Advisory Commission to the Council of

National Defense, signed a cost-plus-afixed-fee contract in Washington, D. C.,

with the three firms, who formed a joint

venture known as the Hawaiian Constructors. The contract called for building fortifications, aircraft warning stations, and storage for ammunition;

laying additional railway track; and

making additions to the radio station at

Fort Shafter. The work was to cost $1,-

097,673 and the fixed fee was $52,220.

The Hawaiian Constructors would receive all plans and specifications from

the district as they became ready and

would be responsible for detailed construction planning to meet the approval

of the engineer in charge of the field area

in which the project was located. They

would be responsible for transporting

materials and equipment from the engineer supply yards in Honolulu to the

job sites, for organizing and directing the

work crews, and for administering their

organization. One of their first tasks

would be to recruit workers in the

United States to build up a construction

organization in the islands.50

After Congress had empowered the

Secretary of War to transfer any part of

construction for the Army from the

Quartermaster Corps to the Corps of Engineers, discussions began in the War

Department about what changes, if any,

should be made in the construction

setup. On 19 November, a partial transfer was made. All construction for the

Air Corps was transferred to the Engineers, except in the Canal Zone, where

many contracts included work for both

Air Corps and ground forces and a division of responsibility would have been

impractical. In the United States, the

first fields were transferred in December,

while in the triangle, the first ones were

scheduled for transfer early in 1941.

Military commanders in Hawaii and

Alaska believed the transfer did not go

far enough. On 16 December, General

DeWitt wrote to Maj. Gen. Richard C.

Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff, that "the

two parts of the Anchorage construction

. . . are so closely tied together th

efficient and expeditious job cannot be

done, if both the Quartermaster Corps

and the Corps of Engineers are involved." DeWitt wanted the work given

to the Engineers, and the General Staff

50

 (1) Pearl Harbor Hearings, pts. 28-29, Testimony of Col Wyman, pp. 1748ff. (2) Ibid., Testimony of Brig Gen Warren T. Hannum, pp. 1060ff.

(3) Ltr, Asst Dept IG to CG HD, 4 Nov 41. Engr

AGF PAC, 331 IG Rpts (Gen)-3. (4) Ltr, Engr CPA

to CG CPA, 14 Mar 44. Engr AGF PAC, Contracts,

160, vol. I.
26 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

took his suggestions under study. Herron

wanted all military construction in the

Islands transferred to the Engineers,

radioing the War Department on 6 December 1940 that most of the work was

for the Air Corps. In Herron's opinion,

two agencies engaged in the same type of

work would mean duplication of organization and competition for workmen and

materials. He wanted the constructing quartermaster's entire organization,

plant, and equipment transferred. The

General Staff did not agree. On 31 December, General Herron was informed

that the transfer of all construction in

Hawaii was "not favorably considered."51

In any case, with work for the Air Corps

added to their responsibilities in part of

the triangle, the Engineers could look

forward to expanded activities in 1941.

51

 (1) Fine and Remington, Military Construction

in the United States. (2) Memo, CofS for SW, 1

Apr 41. G-4/31324. (3) Ltr, DeWitt to Moore, 16

Dec 40. (4) Rad, Herron to TAG, 6 Dec 40. (5)

DCofS G-4 to TAG, 31 Dec 40. Last three in AG

600.12 (11-19-40) Airfield Constr.
CHAPTER II

The Defense Effort Gains Momentum

The first months of 1941 found the

engineers in the outlying territories under increasing pressure as numerous signs

pointed to America's becoming involved

in open hostilities. Top-ranking American and British military and naval

planners, meeting in Washington from

late January through March to assign

areas of responsibility to the United

States and Great Britain in global strategy, agreed that the United States would

have primary responsibility in the Pacific

if it was drawn into the war. In a strategy

at first defensive, American forces would

attempt to hold a line running from

Alaska through Hawaii to Panama and

from there down the west coast of South

America. With the passage on 11 March

of the Lend-Lease Act, which authorized

sending arms and war supplies to Britain

and its allies, the United States became

virtually a belligerent. A month later,

Russia and Japan signed a 5-year neutrality pact. With little to fear from the

USSR in the near future, Japan was free

to turn southward toward the Philippines and the Indies. The situation in

the Pacific appeared even more critical

after Germany invaded the Soviet Union

on 22 June. With the USSR engaged in a

desperate struggle in Europe, Japan

could devote its attention almost exclusively to the Pacific.1

In Washington and the Pacific outposts anxiety grew in early 1941 over the

state of the defenses, and Hawaii now

became a major cause of concern. Late in

January Secretary of the Navy Frank

Knox wrote to Secretary of War Henry L.

Stimson of his dissatisfaction with the

existing protection for the fleet in the

Islands; he was especially apprehensive

over the possibility of an attack by carrier planes.2

 Stimson, agreeing fully as to

the urgency of preparing a co-ordinated

defense, reassured Knox that Hawaii was

"the best equipped of all our overseas

departments" and that the Islands continued to hold high priority in the overall defense program.3

 Less than two

weeks later General Herron, in a letter

to the War Department requesting more

construction equipment to speed up defense work, stated that it could "be anticipated that the attack on these islands

might take the form of a sudden raid

without any advance notice."4 On 7

February, Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short succeeded Herron. Taking up his new

post, he informed General Marshall regarding his plans for further strengthen1

 Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere

Defense, pp. 98-99, 101. William L. Langer and S.

Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 354. 2

 Ltr, Knox to Stimson, 24 Jan 41. WPD 3583-1. 3

 Ltr, Stimson to Knox, 7 Feb 41. WPD 3583-1. 4

 Ltr, Herron to TAG, 3 Feb 41. 381 (Hawaii)

106.
28 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ing the Islands. He hoped to build

more airfields, improve harbor and antiaircraft defenses, bombproof installations, camouflage important military

areas, and put in more roads and trails.

In Panama, a new command—the Caribbean Defense Command—was established in February under General Van

Voorhis, who henceforth directed the

activities of the Panama Canal and

Puerto Rican Departments and the Trinidad Base Command. He continued to

press for more defenses for the Canal.

He wanted a more extensive network of

aircraft warning stations and was

troubled over continuing shortages of

equipment.

Alaskan defenses, likewise, left a good

deal to be desired. General Dewitt, concerned over inadequate protection for

the installations at Dutch Harbor,

stressed the need for airfields on Umnak

Island in the Aleutians just to the west

of Unalaska Island and on the Alaska

Peninsula at Port Heiden. He persisted in championing these projects

against almost unanimous opposition in

the War Department. He continued to

take a strong interest in CAA's plans for

a network of airfields in the Territory.

Dissatisfied with the slowness of CAA's

preparations, DeWitt made repeated attempts to have construction of the fields

of military value placed under the

Seattle District Engineer.5

Early in 1941 the Engineers, as had

been agreed the previous November,

took over construction for the Air Corps

in Hawaii and Alaska. In Hawaii, the

constructing quartermaster had already

made substantial progress in improving

airfields, and at the time of the transfer

on 1 January he had a fund of $18 million for such work. Most of the construction—done by contractors and hired

labor—had been finished; the biggest

projects were the building of barracks

and quarters at Wheeler Field, at a cost

of approximately $6 million. Additional jobs were in prospect, such as storage for gasoline and bombs, involving an

expenditure of about $1.5 million. Additional improvements at existing fields

and the building of new ones would undoubtedly soon be necessary.

In line with General DeWitt's recommendations of the previous December,

G-4 on 4 January directed the Engineers

to take over all construction for the

Army in Alaska, and Ladd and Elmendorf were transferred less than two weeks

later. Ladd, being built by hired labor,

was 85 percent complete; Elmendorf, being worked on by the contractors Bechtel, McCone, and Parsons, was 80 percent

finished. For better supervision of the

engineers' growing number of projects,

Colonel Dunn set up an area office at

Anchorage under Talley, who was transferred from the 28th Engineers at

Yakutat.

The engineers in the triangle could

expect an increasingly heavy workload.

They could also count on growing shortages of workmen, equipment, and supplies and mounting transportation problems. In addition, each of the outlying

territories would continue to present

difficulties of its own.6

5

 (1) Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 462-64, 470-73.

(2) 1st Ind, DeWitt to TAG, 13 Jan 41, basic unknown. 452.1 Alaska.

6

 (1) Memo, Constr Sec OCE for Col Frank M.

Kennedy and Maj Frank M. Paul, AC, 3 Jan 41.

686 (Airfields) pt. 2, Serials 81-200. (2) 2d Ind,
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 29

Panama

With the beginning of the dry season

in January, a great push forward in construction in Panama was possible. But

it appeared that progress on important

projects would, as before, be held back

by the disagreement over the acquisition

of land. On 5 March, the Panamanian

Government stated it would be willing to

turn sites over to the U. S. Army, provided the leases were for the duration of

the war, compensation was adequate, and

Panama would retain jurisdiction over

civilians. Negotiations continued until

the end of the month when Panama

agreed to let the United States occupy

the sites, pending the working out of a

final settlement. During April, Van

Voorhis took over nine tracts for airfields

and two for aircraft warning stations.7

Since construction for the Air Corps

in the Panama Canal Department had

not been transferred to the Engineers,

the War Department directed General

Schley to turn over $600,000 from his

general fund for airfield work to the constructing quartermaster in Panama to

finance work on the new fields. Van

Voorhis, however, insisted that the

Engineers do the construction. He

pointed out that the quartermaster already had more than a full schedule of

work in the Canal Zone, and that engineer troops and the civilians had for

months been working on airfields in

Panama, so that assigning the jobs to the

quartermaster would seem to be an inefficient procedure. Brig. Gen. Brehon

B. Somervell, Chief, Construction Division, Office of The Quartermaster General, agreed to give the money back to

the Engineers and have them do the jobs.

Two companies of the 11th Engineers

were assigned to the fields. In March

the 805th Engineer Aviation Company

reached Panama to help with the work.

Just as the construction effort was getting

well under way, North returned to the

United States. His place as department

engineer was taken in May by the commander of the 11th Engineers, Colonel

Young, who continued with Colonel

North's program. Since there were too

few engineer units and the supply of local

labor was almost exhausted, Young

planned to recruit additional workmen

and purchase large quantities of equipment and supplies in the United States.

At the same time, he planned to make

the greatest possible use of local sources

of surfacing materials, such as rock and

sand.8

As Young took over, the engineers

were under increasing pressure. Maj.

Gen. Frank M. Andrews, chief of the recently organized Caribbean Air Force,

was anxious to expedite work on the airfields because the rainy season would

Somervell to CofEngrs, 12 Dec 40, basic unknown.

Engr AGF PAC, QM 600.1 C-C (Hawaii). (3) Ltr,

SPD Engr to CofEngrs, 7 Dec 40. Engr AGF PAC.

(4) Ltr, Acting Asst CofS G-4 to TQMG, 7 Jan 41.

G4/30436-13. (5) Lt Col James D. Bush, Jr.,

CofOpns Constr Div Engr Alaskan Dept, Narrative

Rpt of Alaska Constr 1941-44, pp. 12, 441. C 12027,

KCRC. 7

 (1) Acquisition of Land, PCD, pp. 25-31. (2)

Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the

United States, pp. 344-45. (3) Memo, Actg ACofS

WPD for Marshall, 10 Mar 41. (4) Rad, Van

Voorhis to TAG, 12 Apr 41. Last two in WPD

2674-34.

8

 (1) Memo, C Opns Br OQMG for Engineering

Br, 30 Apr 41. 686 (Panama) 1940-41. (2) Memo,

C Fortification Sec OCE for CofEngrs, 25 Apr 41.

Both in 686 (Panama) 1940-41. (3) Prelim Study, I,

11, 51, 160; II, 11-12; III, 84-85, app. A, p. A-2.
30 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 4

begin any day. He suggested that his

airmen help the engineers, since substantial numbers of civilian workmen from

the United States were not expected for

some time. In May, Andrews put the

airmen to work on the fields, despite the

fact that this prevented them from getting proper training as aviation mechanics. By June six emergency landing

strips were ready in Panama with runways sufficiently graded to allow planes

to land. Two auxiliary dromes—Aguadulce and Chame—were under construction. (Map 4) With the onset of the

rains late in May, Andrews demanded

better airfields. He wanted the emergency strips developed into auxiliary airdromes with hard-surfaced runways, for

the original plans had not specified hardsurfacing. The engineers experimented

with soil stabilization and compaction at

Chame to find out if such treatment

would make all-weather use possible. In

June construction began on two of the

aircraft warning stations, one at Jaqué

near the Colombian border and the other

at Almirante, at the extreme western end

of the Republic. Both sites were hard to

get to, being accessible only by plane or

ship. Land had been acquired for two
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 31

more stations but the three remaining

sites had not yet been taken over. Van

Voorhis was already thinking of expanding the system further. The local joint

board wanted five more stations in Panama, and proposed extending the service

into Costa Rica and Colombia.9

Work went ahead in Panama during

the summer and fall of 1941 despite the

downpours of the rainy season. Additional handicaps as frustrating as the

climate were, Colonel Young believed,

the "lack of money, of authority, and of

certain equipment for special jobs;

notably, seagoing vessels to service the

construction crews at several distant

(AWS) sites."

 10

The protracted negotiations over the

acquisition of land continued to hold up

engineer work after midyear. Since the

original stalemate had been broken in

March, a number of sites had been occupied. But the procedures still had to be

worked out to make possible the legal

transfer of tracts. In July two U. S.-

Panamanian boards were established,

one of which investigated sites that were

to be taken over immediately, while the

other arranged for their formal transfer,

after investigations were completed, to

the United States. This system worked

well, and by late August the additional

tracts which Van Voorhis had requested

late in April had been surveyed and Panama had authorized their occupation by

U.S. forces. By now the Panama Canal

Department was in possession of all sites

for airfields. Tracts needed for other

installations would be occupied as soon

as enough men and materials were on

hand to make occupation practicable.

Negotiations for a permanent settlement

of the leasing problem were being carried on through diplomatic channels.

There was nothing more the military

authorities or the engineers could do except finish the surveys and request the

transfers.11

The engineers continued to put their

major effort on the airfields, but despite

hard work, they could not keep up with

the demands of the Air Corps. Planning

to make more intensive use of the fields,

Andrews wanted more of the emergency

landing strips converted into auxiliary

airdromes. Those not converted he

wanted improved through better marking of the runways and the removal of

obstacles in the approach zones. As the

rainy season wore on, the experiments

with soil stabilization and compaction

proved that such expedients were no substitute for asphalt or concrete. Runways would have to be hard-surfaced, an

improvement agreed to by Panama.

Washington was requested to approve

plans to expand some of the emergency

landing strips, particularly the one at

Chorrera and the two at La Joya, into

airdromes and to provide hard surfacing

for the runways. Construction was expected to be so extensive that contractors, already working for the Navy and

the quartermaster in Panama, would

probably have to be employed. More

money was requested but the War Department did not want to ask Congress

for additional sums until more land had

9

 (1) Prelim Study, II, 9-12, 230ff. (2) Note for

Rcd on Memo, WPD for C AAF, 24 Sep 41. WPD

4186-17. 10

 Ltr, Young to EHD, 28 Jul 57. EHD Files.

11

 (1) Acquisition of Land, PCD, pp. 32-40. (2)

Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the

United States, 344-45. (3) Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, pp. 613-15.
32 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

been secured. General Andrews, meanwhile, transferred funds from other

projects, hoping that he would later be

reimbursed. Improvements of airfields

continued, but slowly.12 The airmen

occupied Aguadulce in September but

construction at Chame was still under

way. Work had barely started at

Chorrera and La Joya.

During the summer the engineers began work on two more aircraft warning

stations and obtained the right of entry

to the three remaining sites. With

priority in construction going to the

stations on the Pacific side, General Van

Voorhis pressed for the completion of all

seven stations. Colonel Young believed

there were only two ways of speeding up

construction. One was to postpone

work on what he called the "elaborate

barracks" at the stations until essential

apparatus had been installed. The

other was to transfer workers from other

jobs. But this would mean slower progress on such important installations as

searchlights and antiaircraft batteries.

There remained the difficulty of transporting men and supplies to the remote

sites, one of the prime causes of delay.

As recommended by the local joint

board, early in September Van Voorhis

asked Washington to approve construction of several more stations in Panama

and in Colombia and Costa Rica as

well.13

The Engineers now had to devote

some attention to camouflage, hitherto

neglected in the Canal Zone. In line

with a suggestion made in the spring of

1941 by Col. Homer Saint-Gaudens,

chief of the Camouflage Branch, OCE,

an expert in the subject, Capt. Frederick

L. Fritsche, was sent to Panama. Captain

Fritsche's main concern was how best to

camouflage the waterway and in due

course he prepared three plans. The

first, calling for covering the three sets

of locks with netting, was not considered

feasible because of mechanical difficulties. The second—building a dummy

set of locks in the Chagres River and the

old French canal—was not practicable

because the river did not present a

straight line or follow the contours of

the Canal. The third, hiding the waterway under a smoke screen to be supplied

by the Chemical Warfare Service, was

adopted.14

On 19 September, Andrews succeeded

Van Voorhis and proved as insistent as

his predecessor that defenses be strengthened. The number of Engineer jobs

continued to grow, and work had to be

carried on in the face of mounting shortages of workmen and equipment. On 1

July Colonel Young had 2,295 employees

and 1 ,500 more were expected before the

end of the year, but there were never

enough to keep pace with needs. Various ways were tried to increase production. On 16 July, Young received permission to have his employees work

eight hours a day, seven days a week. In

October, he asked that the restriction of

working hours to 56 a week be suspended.

Contractors working for the Quartermaster Corps and other services already

12

 (1) Acquisition of Land, PCD, pp. 37-39. (2)

Prelim Study, II, pp. 12-14. (3) Memo, C Constr

Sec Pan Engr Div PCD to Pan Div Engr, 28 Oct 43.

CDC 686 (Airfield Facilities, Pan). 13

 (1) Prelim Study, II, 232-34. (2) Note for Rcd

on Ltr, WPD to C AAF, 24 Sep 41. WPD 4186-17.

14

 (1) Prelim Study, I, 36; III, 50-54. (2) Ltr,

Young to C EHD, 28 Jul 57.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 33

had their employees work longer hours.

One group of new arrivals was dissatisfied with the 56-hours-a-week limit. During the rainy season working hours in

some weeks totaled only 30 or 40; in

others as many as 70 hours would have

been possible except for the limitation.

On 16 October, approval was received to

extend the work week. As part of an

effort to get more equipment, Young in

July asked for almost $6 million more

for the fiscal year 1942, much of it to go

for additional machinery. The rest

would be used for hiring more workers,

providing housing, and getting materials.

Construction could then be vigorously

pushed with the beginning of the dry

season in January. Late in July the

War Department approved this plan,

and in the following months additional

workmen were recruited in the United

States and machinery ordered. A new

difficulty arose in October when, in a

coup d'etat, President Arias was replaced

by Ricardo Adolfo de la Guardia. In

the change of administration, the Panamanian members of the land boards lost

their places. The land transfer question

was stalemated again.15

Alaska

With the end of the long subarctic

winter, the tempo of work in Alaska

quickened. The Alaska Defense Force

was in February 1941 redesignated the

Alaska Defense Command, and the following April authorized strength was

raised from 7,300 men to over 18,500.

In May DeWitt asked that a headquarters detachment and one company of an

engineer construction battalion be sent

to Fort Richardson to help the 32d engineers, who had more than enough to

do in working on facilities for their

camp, improving roads, and engaging in

combat training. Meanwhile, the General Staff directed Schley and DeWitt to

prepare plans for housing for the growing garrison. By early May Col. Richard Park, Lee's successor as North Pacific

Division Engineer, had finished designs

for the buildings for the enlarged Army

forts at the three naval stations, for a new

post, Fort Raymond, at Seward, and for

housing for a small garrison at the airport being planned by CAA for Nome.

The engineers were to do all construction, except at the naval stations, where

it would be performed by contractors

working for the Navy. Additional projects were being planned. In April

Colonel Dunn received $1 million to install tanks for aviation gasoline at the

airfields and naval stations. That same

month, Company D of the 29th Engineers and Flight F, 1st Photo Squadron,

arrived in Alaska to begin ground surveys and take photographs for mapping

purposes. Areas to be mapped included

the region around Anchorage, the Richardson Highway, and a number of major

routes regularly flown by military aircraft.16

15

 (1) Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 462-65. (2) 1st

Ind, 6 Aug 41, on Ltr, TAG to OCE, 29 Jul 41.

600.1 (Pan 1941-45) pt. 3. (3) Ltr, OCE to SW, 15

Oct 41, with 1st Ind, WD to CofEngrs, 16 Oct 41.

2250, pt. 12 Ser 1051-1175, Natl Archives. (4) Acquisition of Land, PCD, p. 40.

16

 (1) Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 457. (2) Hist of

the 32d Engr Co (Combat) (Sep) While in Alaska.

(3) Ltr, Park to Schley, 8 May 41. (4) Memo, G-4

for TAG, 18 Apr 41. Last two in 600.1 (Alaska)

May 40-Oct 41. (5) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 12 Feb 41.

061.01 (Alaska) pt. 1. (6) List of Units in, En Route
34 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

On 5 April the President approved the

Fifth Supplemental Appropriation Bill

for the fiscal year 1941 which made available funds for the cutoff for the Alaska

Railroad.17 Two weeks later, the Seattle

District advertised for bids. Construction was to be under a lump-sum contract rather than under the new and

unfamiliar fixed-fee type of agreement.

On 12 May Dunn opened the two bids

he had received and found that the lower

one was about 35 percent above the engineers' estimate of the reasonable cost

of building the cutoff. Both bidders,

Dunn wrote Park, were undoubtedly trying to protect themselves "against the

uncertainties of labor conditions, rising

costs in construction, remote location"

and other factors which ruled out "normal estimates" in this period of increasing defense construction.18

 Dunn rejected both bids. To get work started

with a minimum of delay, he decided to

let a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. The

following month, he signed an agreement with the West Construction Company of Boston, Massachusetts, for work

on the subgrade, drainage, and tunnels.

The job was to begin in July.19

Receiving a report from General

Buckner in May that CAA was making

little progress on its airfields in Alaska,

General DeWitt again advocated that the

work be turned over to the Engineers.

There were, he observed, only two major

airdromes in the Territory suitable for

military aircraft—Ladd and Elmendorf.

The fields CAA was preparing to build

were urgently needed. In addition, DeWitt recommended that the War Department construct seven dispersal fields.

The War Plans Division did not concur,

but did agree that the CAA program

should be expedited and asked General

Schley if the Engineers could take over.

Many in the War Department wanted the

Engineers to do the work because they

questioned whether the runways and

facilities put in by CAA would be adequate for Army planes. Countering this

view, CAA assured the War Department

that the facilities and runways would be

adequate and explained that the cause of

the delays was the fact that money had

not been received in time to start surveys

before the winter had set in. Now that

spring had come, construction could be

expedited. Contracts for two of the

fields had recently been let, work on the

others would be pushed, and by fall

graveled runways would be ready. Persuaded by these assurances, Colonel

Park recommended against having the

Engineers take over. The War Department decided not to press the matter, and

by the end of June CAA had let contracts

for four additional fields.20

In May, DeWitt decided to go to

Alaska to see for himself how construction was progressing. Accompanied by

General Buckner and Colonel Park, he

made a tour of the various projects.

The ones at Anchorage and Fairbanks,

begun early by the Quartermaster Corps,

were the most advanced. The garrison

to, or Scheduled for Alaska, 28 Mar 41. WPD

4464-9. 17

 Rad, Kingman to NPD Engr, 4 Apr 41. 617

(Alaska). 18

 Ltr, Dunn to Park, 15 May 41. 617 (Alaska). 19

 Rpt of Opns, Seattle Dist, Jun 41. 617 (Alaska).

20

 (1) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 1 May 41. 600.1

(Alaska) pt. I. (2) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 1 May 41.

600.1 (Alaska) May 40-Oct 41. (3) DF, WPD to

Spec Staff, Army Avn, 19 Jun 41. WPD 4503. (4)

Memo, WPD for G-4, 22 May 41. (5) Ltr, Park to

CofEngrs, 24 Jun 41. Last two in 600.1 (Alaska)

pt. I.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 35

of 5,000 men at Fort Richardson was

"properly sheltered." Such work on the

post and at Elmendorf as was not finished

was being rushed to completion by Major

Talley and the contractors. At Ladd,

living quarters for an infantry garrison

of 500 men were nearly finished and it

was planned to transfer many of the

workmen to Yakutat. Here, improvement of the runway was continuing and

a start would soon be made on hangars

and storage for gasoline. When DeWitt, Buckner, and Park arrived at Annette on 12 May, they found an emergency landing strip in use but, on the

whole, progress was not as marked as at

Yakutat. An obstacle was the muskeg,

a spongy growth found in low, marshy

places, and sometimes as much as eighteen feet thick. When the engineers

encountered it at a construction site,

they often had to scoop it out and fill the

hole with gravel. Nold had solved the

troublesome problem of the shorter

working hours for the CCC, for in April

the head of the organization in Washington had authorized the same working

hours for the CCC men as for the troops.

After reviewing progress of the work to

date and estimating the number of

troops and civilians likely to be available, DeWitt concluded that one of the

regular runways would be ready by December. At the three Navy bases, the

temporary buildings for the Army garrisons, which had been given priority by

the Navy over its own permanent construction, were nearing completion and

some troops were already housed. On

the whole, DeWitt was well pleased with

what he found.21

Alaska's defenses still had one glaring

weakness. There were no airfields on

the Alaska Peninsula or in the Aleutians. DeWitt and Buckner pressed for

construction in both areas to protect not

only the Alaskan mainland but also the

Navy base at Dutch Harbor, which was

remote from other defense installations.

Fighter planes could not safely fly the

600 miles from Kodiak, the nearest field,

because the distance was too great. In

view of the increased shipping and naval

protection required, Admiral Harold R.

Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, argued

that airfields should not be constructed

in the Aleutians without approval by the

Joint Board. General Marshall, on the

other hand, pressed for the building

of an Aleutian airfield. Construction

would have to wait until differences of

opinion between the services could be

resolved.22

The rapid advance of the German

armies into the USSR during the summer focused attention especially on

Alaska, since many in the War Department feared that a quick Soviet collapse

might soon bring German forces to the

Bering Strait. Early in July, Secretary

of War Stimson directed that the sending

of additional troops to the Territory be

expedited. On the 15th of that month

the War Department increased the authorized strength of the Alaskan garrison

from 18,500 to 24,000. Because the

Army posts at the three naval stations

were far from ready, Stimson promised

DeWitt that he would turn over funds to

the Navy to assure housing for the military garrisons there as soon as possible.

21

 (1) Excerpts of Ltr from DeWitt to Marshall,

4 Jun 41. 600.1 (Alaska) pt. I. (2) Ltr, Nold to

C EHD, 7 Aug 57. EHD Files.

22

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Marshall to Stark, 19 Aug 41.

WPD 4503-3. (3) Memo, WPD for Marshall, 16

Aug 41. WPD 4503-4.
36 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

General Schley received additional funds

to complete previously authorized construction. Meanwhile, DeWitt directed

Buckner to prepare, in co-operation with

the North Pacific Division and the 13th

Naval District, a comprehensive program

to strengthen further the defenses of the

Territory.23 "Actual pressure," Talley

wrote later, "commenced ... on the

4th of July 1941, when an alert came to

Brig. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr.,

. . . from that date the tempo changed

and Alaska was psychologically and mentally prepared for war. . . ."

 24

The small number of engineer troops

continued working on major defense installations. The 32d engineers, immediately after 4 July, began building tactical roads and bombproof shelters at

Fort Richardson. At Annette the 802d

Engineer Aviation Battalion was fully

occupied developing the airfield, especially after DeWitt directed that the runways be lengthened to 7,500 feet. The

men were confident that they would have

one of the runways ready by the end of

the year. At Yakutat the 807th Engineer Aviation Company was making further improvements. On 30 July, DeWitt ordered the unit to construct a third

runway and lengthen the two already

partially completed; by mid-August,

Yakutat had limited runway facilities.

During August and September, part of

the 1st Battalion of the 151st Combat

Engineers reached Alaska to take care of

maintenance at Ladd Field and various

other Army installations from Dutch

Harbor to Sitka.25 So far, the engineers,

their jobs restricted to a few coastal areas,

had encountered no major difficulties.

"There was cold, rain, 'muskeg,' ice, and

snow." Talley observed, "and engineer

troops . . . many the first tim

from New York—but no other problem

per se." 26

Contractors and hired labor were also

making progress. By midsummer, runways at Ladd and Elmendorf were operational. Ladd was a comparatively

small installation with permanent housing for 560 officers and men. Elmendorf

was the largest military base under construction in the Territory. In July the

West Construction Company began work

on the railroad cutoff. Much preliminary labor was required—unloading supplies and equipment, erecting camps,

putting through access roads, and grubbing the right of way. Blasting began

in August on the two and one-half mile

tunnel at the eastern end of the line. In

September the Seattle District advertised

for bids for the construction of a dock at

the terminus of the cutoff. In addition,

work had begun on those aircraft warning stations which had been approved

almost a year before, and survey crews

were investigating sites for other stations.27

23

 (1) Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 457. (2) Table,

Incl to AG Ltr 320.2 (5-6-41) MC-E-M, 15 Jul 41.

WPD 4297-1. (3) Memo, WPD for TAG, 9 Jul 41.

WPD 3512-120. 24

 Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Nov 57. EHD Files.

23

 (1) Orgns Hists, U. S. Army, Alaska. C12027,

KCRC. (2) Ltr, DeWitt to Park, 30 Jul 41. 686

(Annette Island, Alaska), 1940-41, vol. I. (3) In midJune 1941 the 28th Engineer Aviation Regiment was

disbanded. Men and material from the regiment

were used to activate the 802d Engineer Aviation

Battalion and the 807th Engineer Aviation Company. 26

 Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Nov 57. 27

 (1) Ltr, Schley to Hon. J. Buell Snyder, HR,

6 Aug 41. 600.1 (Alaska) pt. 1. (2) Seattle Engr

Dist, Monthly Rpt of Opns, Jul-Sep 41. (3) Ltr,

Seattle Engr Dist to OCE, 27 Sep 41. Last two in
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 37

Many projects which had been planned

did not get under way. During the summer, DeWitt wanted to start construction on the storage tanks for reserve gasoline. Work had been deferred pending

further investigation. Storage for five

million gallons was to be provided in

Alaska, over four million of it near Anchorage, but no final decision had been

made regarding the remainder. The

Air Corps wanted to put much of it near

various airfields, with maximum dispersion and concealment. Discussions continued over building landing fields on

the Alaska Peninsula and in the Aleutians. In July, DeWitt suggested putting in a field at Port Heiden and another

at Cold Bay, the latter near the tip of the

peninsula. He pointed out that the airmen would need more extensive facilities than those being planned by CAA,

so that longer runways and hard surfacing would be necessary. He asked that

the Engineers be made responsible for

building the fields on the Alaska Peninsula. In August the Joint Planning

Committee recommended that the Army

construct an airfield on Umnak. The

Joint Board postponed making its decision because it wanted the engineers

first to survey the island to determine if

the sites were as suitable as they seemed.

Late that month a group of engineers

from the Seattle District began a reconnaissance of Umnak and of Unalaska as

well. Construction would have to wait

until their reports were in.28

General Buckner, who had repeatedly

requested the War Department for authority to have an engineer on his staff,

was authorized in September to appoint

Nold. Nold took up his new duties at

the close of the month, and during the

next few weeks became fully aware of

how far the defense build-up still had to

go. Ladd, Elmendorf, and Yakutat were

operational and refinements were being

put in, while Annette was expected to be

operational shortly. The CAA fields

were coming along fairly well. The

Army posts at the naval stations were under construction. Work was progressing

slowly on the aircraft warning stations

which had been started in the summer,

but other projects were, as before, still

in the planning stages. On 6 October

Colonel Dunn in his preliminary report

summarizing the findings of the engineers who had made the surveys for airfield sites in the Aleutians, pointed out

that no suitable sites had been found on

Unalaska, but Umnak had several which

looked promising. Visiting Alaska in

the fall, Maj. John F. Ohmer, Jr., of the

Office of the Chief of Engineers, an expert in camouflage, found that almost

nothing had been done to conceal military installations. He recommended

planting trees, using camouflage nets,

and painting structures so that they

would blend in with their surroundings.

Soon thereafter DeWitt had buildings

painted in three colors in place of the

standard ivory previously directed by

the General Staff. In midfall, Alaskan

defenses still needed a great deal of

work. 617 29 (Alaska). (4) DF, WPD to TAG, 6 Sep 41.

WPD 3640-6. 28

 (1) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 15 Jul 41. 600.1

(Alaska) May 40-Oct 41. (2) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG,

25 Jul 41. 600.1 (Alaska) 1940-47. (3) Memo, WPD

for SGS, 31 Oct 41. WPD 4503-4. (4) WD Ltr

(AG 600.12) (9-23-41) MO-E to CofEngrs, 24 Sep 41.

600.1 (Alaska) May 40-Oct 41. 29

 (1) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 16 Jul 41. WPD
38 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Hawaii

Upon assuming his post as department

commander in February 1941, General

Short began to push especially the program of airfield expansion. During the

first months of 1941 Congress did not

appropriate large funds for airfields in

the Islands. In its Fourth Supplemental

Appropriation for the fiscal year 1941,

passed on 17 March, it allotted $108,410

for officers quarters at Hickam Field, but

in the Fifth Supplemental, passed on 5

April, no funds were included for airfields in Hawaii.30

 Short believed large

sums would be necessary. "The development of adequate airfields for the

rapidly expanding Hawaiian Air Force

is essential," he wrote to Marshall on 2

May. "An effort has been made to develop these fields through use of troop

labor and WPA, but this is entirely too

slow and uncertain." Short asked for

some $17 million for airfields to insure

"satisfactory operating conditions." He

wanted $10 million of the total for use

as a general fund "to finance necessary

projects as the need for them occurs,"

adding that "the situation has progressed

to such a point that we can no longer

afford the delay in time which has heretofore been required to secure appropriations by Congress after the projects have

been approved."

 31

 Old fields were to

be modernized and new ones made available. First priority was to be given

those with runways that could be extended to at least 5,000 feet for use by

heavy bombers; later, lengths were to

be increased to 6,000 feet. In addition

to the effort on the airfields, more work

would be necessary to house the increased

garrison, improve roads, build fortifications, and otherwise strengthen the

Islands.

Lyman continued to labor under the

handicap of insufficient personnel. His

staff consisted of but two officers, eight

enlisted men, and four civilians. With

construction for defense expanding,

WPA labor was almost impossible to get.

Lyman needed more troops. The 3d

Combat Regiment, still the only engineer unit in the Islands, was spread thin.

On 1 April, Lyman wrote General

Schley that the engineers made up only

about 3 percent of the garrison of 30,000

instead of the more normal 8 to 10 percent. In view of the growing importance of air power, the Hawaiian Department especially needed aviation engineer

units. More combat engineers were required for work on roads and trails,

fortifications, and cantonments. There

was a growing shortage of equipment.

Lyman's requests were partly met with

the arrival, on 26 April, of the 804th Engineer Aviation Company. But prospects of getting more combat engineers

or substantial amounts of machinery in

the near future were not bright because

the War Department had neither the

one nor the other to spare.32

Colonel Wyman likewise was faced

4297-1. (2) Data from files of Mil Pers Div OCE.

(3) Ltr, Dunn to Park, 6 Oct 41. 600.1 (Alaska) May

40-Oct 41. (4) Ltr, DeWitt to TAG, 30 Oct 41.

618.33 (Alaska). 30

 House Subcom of Com on Appns, 77th Cong,

1st sess, Hearings on Fourth Supplemental National

Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941, p. 158. 31

 Ltr, Short to Marshall, 2 May 41. Engr AGF

PAC.

32

 (1) Ltr, Herron to TAG, 6 Feb 41. 320.2 (3d

Engrs) 251/1. (2) Ltr, Lyman to CofEngrs, 1 Apr

41. Engr AGF PAC. (3) Hist of the 804th Engr

Avn Bn.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 39

with a growing construction program

and inadequate means for carrying it out.

The transfer of work for the Air Corps

added to his burdens. In January 1941

he began to reorganize the district office so as to be better able to supervise

construction. In February he designated Maj. Bernard L. Robinson, his

principal military assistant and executive, as operations officer. On Major

Robinson henceforth fell the main responsibility for furnishing workmen, materials, and equipment to the widely

separated areas where projects were

under way. He was soon under constant

pressure to insure the uninterrupted

progress of the engineer effort in the

Islands. To decentralize responsibilities

for construction, Wyman established

seven field areas in the first months of

1941.33

Using data furnished by Maj. Gen.

Frederick L. Martin, commander of the

Hawaiian Air Force, the Honolulu District office prepared plans for improving

old airfields and putting in new ones.

Eight were to be enlarged and modernized and two new ones added. Wyman

and Martin, while awaiting expected approval from Washington, were anxious

to get work started on the airfields.

Little money was available for such

work, and until more was forthcoming

from Washington, only stopgap measures

could be used. Wyman had inherited

rather meager funds from the quartermaster with which to build temporary barracks at three fields—Hickam,

Wheeler, and Bellows. He could enlarge the two military fields on the outlying islands—Morse on Hawaii and

Barking Sands on Kauai—with funds

supplied by WPA. He could improve

the four territorial airports—Burns,

Hilo, Molokai, and Maui—with money

from CAA. These resources would

have to do until Congress appropriated

more funds as requested by Short. But

even stopgap construction would require

more workmen, substantial quantities of

equipment, and large amounts of

supplies.34

For some time the War and Navy

Departments had been making plans for

storing reserves of 100 octane aviation

gasoline for use in wartime. In 1940,

the Joint Board had advised construction

of storage facilities at eight places, four

of them in the United States and four in

overseas territories. The board recommended putting in storage for 100,000

barrels in Hawaii, a recommendation

approved by the Secretaries of War and

the Navy. With the transfer of construction for the Air Corps to the Engineers, Wyman became responsible for

this job in the Islands. Since the reserves were to be used only if shipments

from the United States were cut off, two

considerations were uppermost. One

was that the sites selected would make

reasonably certain the expeditious delivery of gasoline in time of need. The

other was that protection against aerial

and naval bombardment would be

adequate.35

There were two good sites on Oahu,

33

 Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 940-41, 1113.

34

 (1) Ltr, Wyman to SPD Engr, 2 Jun 41. Engr

AGF PAC, 686. (2) Memo, Asst Dept Engr for

Lyman, 18 Mar 41. Engr AGF PAC. 35

 (1) WD Ltr, AG 463.7 (12-16-40) M-D to

CofEngrs, 3 Jan 41. (2) Ltr, Short to TAG, 3 Apr

41. Both in Engr AGF PAC.
40 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

one on a ridge at Aliamanu Crater and

the other in the side of a steep cliff in

Waikakalaua Gulch, two and one-half

miles east of Schofield Barracks. The

question arose as to how much bombproofing was necessary. Many felt that

only completely bombproof storage was

practical, while others, believing that

complete bombproofing would take too

much time and money, urged concealment and protection against light incendiary bombs and bomb fragments

only. The District Office reported in

June 1941, after an exhaustive study of

the problem, that concealment and partial protection were of little value.

Complete concealment was impossible

because any region on Oahu could be

readily identified from the air, and saturation bombing would quickly destroy a

lightly protected installation. It would

be fairly easy to provide enough "cut and

cover" protection to withstand hits from

one-ton bombs, the largest used up to

that time. Required would be a concrete cover about 6 feet thick, topped

with earth. But with larger bombs undoubtedly soon to be used, the question

arose as to how much additional protection would be necessary. Only tunnels

under 75 feet of solid rock would provide sure protection. Wyman believed

the safety provided by tunnels justified

the higher cost of construction and the

longer time required to finish the work.

How much storage should be provided

had not been decided. Although the

Joint Board had recommended 100,000

barrels, Congress, in the Fifth Supplemental, authorized construction for

250,000 barrels. Then the Navy requested storage along with the Army and

allotted $200,000 for the project, but did

not specify how much storage it wanted

or where it wanted it. As with other

defense work, there was the problem of

rising costs. Originally estimated at two

dollars per barrel, by January the cost

for constructing storage had gone up

four dollars and, by May 1941, to six.36

While concerned with many new

projects, Wyman still had to give a good

deal of thought to old ones. A matter

of importance was the improvement of

Honolulu harbor. The city's port facilities had been gradually expanding northwestward. New areas were being developed around Kapalama Basin, lying

between the mainland and offshore Sand

Island. On 17 October 1940, Congress

had authorized the dredging of Keehi

Lagoon north of the island to provide a

landing place for seaplanes, a project

which came under the category of improving rivers and harbors. Primarily

of commercial value, the improvement

would also benefit the armed forces.

The work, financed by CAA, was being

carried out by the Engineers. Linked

with the dredging of the seaplane basin

was the construction of John Rodgers

Airport, which was to be built just east

of Hickam on the northern shore of

Keehi Lagoon, partly on land dredged

from the sea bottom. Construction was

authorized in May 1941, and preparations were soon being made to begin

work. The engineers made little headway on the aircraft warning stations. In

May, after Short had decided that a

larger number of stations would be

36

 (1) Ltr, Short to TAG, 3 Apr 41. (2) Rpt,

Wyman to CofEngrs, Definite Proj Rpt for Installation of War Reserve Avn Gas Storage in Hawaiian

Islands, 23 Jun 41. (3) Ltr, OCE to SPD Engr, 19

May 41. All three in Engr AGF PAC.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 41

needed, twelve were authorized, half of

them to be mobile. Negotiations with

the National Park Service over permission to build on Haleakala were proceeding slowly.37

Responsible for more and more construction, Wyman awarded additional

cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. On 19

May he signed one in the amount of

$1,801,159.70 with the Territorial Airport Contractors, a joint venture including W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Gunther & Shirley Company, and

Paul Grafe. This group was to improve

the territorial airports with funds supplied by CAA. He signed an agreement

with the engineering firm of Sverdrup

and Parcel of St. Louis, Missouri, for the

preparation of designs for bombproof

shelters; this firm was also to do field

engineering and supervise some of the

work at the territorial airports. For

most of the additional construction,

Wyman made supplemental agreements

with the Hawaiian Constructors, enlarged in May with the addition of Ralph

Woolley and Company, a prominent contracting firm of Honolulu. In June

1941 he made such an agreement with

the Constructors for cut and cover bomb- proof storage for 200,000 barrels of reserve gasoline in Waikakalaua Gulch.

A tunnel had been considered, but the

contractors had estimated it would take

twenty months to complete the job,

whereas cut and cover construction could

be finished in eight at considerably less

cost. Nothing was being planned for

Aliamanu Crater, but Wyman asked that

funds be provided so that work could

begin there for storage for the Army and

Navy. On 19 May the original contract

with the Hawaiian Constructors was

modified. Complying with a recent directive from Under Secretary of War

Robert P. Patterson for streamlining

administrative and auditing procedures,

Wyman took over such functions as

timekeeping, preparing payrolls, and

procuring supplies. The contractor

would henceforth be responsible only

for construction. Wyman's added responsibilities made an ever larger district

organization necessary. By mid-1941

there were 10 officers and 401 civilians in

the Honolulu office and three officers

and 220 civilians in the field.38

In June, Lyman received the first of

the additional combat troops he had

been requesting. That month, the 34th

Engineer Combat Regiment was activated in the Islands, its cadre furnished

by units in the Hawaiian Department.

Bringing the 34th up to full strength

would take some time, since most of the

men for the organization were not expected to arrive from the United States

until several months later. Meanwhile,

efforts were being made to bring the 3d

Engineers up to full strength and steps

were taken to increase the number of

aviation engineers. Plans called for expanding the 804th from a company into

a battalion by 15 July.39 Slowly the defenses of the Islands were being built up.

37

 (1) Arthur D. Llewellyn, "Honolulu Harbor,"

The Military Engineer, XXXIX (February, 1947),

51-53. (2) Rpt [Brief History of the Air Warning

Service] n.d. Engr AGF PAC.

38

 (1) Ltr, Asst Dept IG Hawaiian Dept to Short,

4 Nov 41. Engr AGF PAC, 333, IG Rpts (Gen). (2)

Ltr, D. C. Wolfe of Sverdrup and Parcel to Hawaii

War Rcds Depository, 21 Jan 46. Hawaii War Rcds

Depository. (3) Ltr, Wyman to Schley, 24 Jun 41.

Engr AGF PAC. 39

 Ltr, Short to TAG, 5 Aug 41. 381 (Hawaii)

113/1.
42 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

By midsummer, the Engineers could

point to considerable progress in construction in the Islands. The Hawaiian

Constructors were at work on five military airfields—three on Oahu, one on

Hawaii, and one on Kauai—jobs expected to be finished by the end of the

year. Improvement of the territorial

airports with CAA funds, just getting

started and about 5 percent complete,

was to be finished by July 1942. The

Constructors were beginning work on

coastal defenses, including emplacements

for 155-mm. and 240-mm. guns, fire control structures, storage for ammunition,

and access roads. Meanwhile, they had

made a start on the aircraft warning

stations which, along with the coastal

defenses, were to be completed by 1

November. The Honolulu District continued dredging Kapalama basin and

expected to complete this job by the end

of the year.40

Still in the planning stage was the

underground storage for reserve aviation

gasoline. Much confusion developed

over this. The Hawaiian Constructors

had been ready to start work at Waikakalaua Gulch late in June on cut and

cover construction for 200,000 barrels.

Investigations at Aliamanu Crater indicated that only a tunnel would be practicable there. General Short and Rear

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, Commandant,

14th Naval District, wanted storage for

83,000 barrels at the crater. A pipeline

would connect the two installations with

the airfields. Since no funds had been

received for construction at the crater,

Wyman asked General Schley for authority to proceed.41

The Office of the Chief of Engineers

had misgivings about the whole project.

The bombproof storage being planned

for Hawaii "would require an impractical amount of cover." Concealment

and protection against light incendiary

bomb and bomb fragments was all that

could reasonably be provided. Aviation

gasoline should be placed underground,

but for concealment only. Brig. Gen.

Eugene Reybold, Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-4, advised General Schley that it was

"desired that the full amount of storage

be provided on the basis of the established construction policy rather than a

smaller amount of storage having a

greater degree of protection."42 In

September, Schley accordingly informed

Wyman that plans providing for the

added protection would have to be revised. OCE sent three specialists from

the oil industry to Honolulu, where in

October they consulted with Wyman and

helped revise construction plans. Meanwhile, no work was being done at either

site.43

While Wyman was struggling with

construction, Lyman was trying to get

more troops and put his units on a war

footing. Repeated requests went to the

War Department for more men. The

activation of the 34th Combat Regiment

and the expansion of the 804th into a

battalion with an authorized strength of

40

 Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 14 Aug 41. Engr

AGF PAC.

41

 (1) Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 24 Jun 41, with

and Ind, CofEngrs to TAG, 26 Jul 41. (2) Interstaff Routing Slip, Dept Engr to G-4 HD, 11 Jul 41.

Both in Engr AGF PAC. 42

 2d Ind, TAG to CofEngrs, 3 Sep 41, basic unknown. Engr AGF PAC. 43

 3d Ind, CofEngrs to SPD Engr, 9 Sep 41, basic

unknown. Engr AGF PAC.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 43

656 officers and men in July only partially met the need for more manpower.

More aviation engineers were urgently

needed. Heavy construction equipment

was in short supply, especially concrete

mixers, compressors, and power shovels.

Much of the machinery on hand would

be worn out before the defense program

was completed.44 "In previous planning

for an emergency," Short wrote to the

Adjutant General on 5 August, "much

reliance had been placed upon the availability of ... equipment in the hands

of local contractors and plantation owners"; now, because of the demands of

defense construction, equipment was

fast wearing out and, as Short explained, "Manufacturing and transportation bottlenecks are making it extremely

difficult for both contractors and plantation owners to obtain needed replacements."

 45

 The reply from Washington

was not encouraging. Reybold informed Short that "no action is being

taken at this time with reference to provision of special or additional Engineer

equipment for the Hawaiian Defense

Project. It is desired that a listing of

additional equipment required . . .

be submitted for further consideration. . . ."

 46

Most of the men for the 34th and

804th Engineers reached Hawaii in the

fall. Now at almost full strength, the

34th took over the Hawaiian Division's

job of improving roads and trails on

Oahu. Routes leading to searchlight

positions and 155-mm. gun emplacements had highest priority. Most of the

aviation engineers went to Wheeler and

Hickam Fields. From time to time, detachments were assigned to other fields

on Oahu and the outlying islands. On

1 October the square Hawaiian Division

was converted into two triangular divisions—the 24th and the 25th. The 3d

Engineer Regiment was split into the 3d

and 65th Battalions, which were assigned

to the new divisions. Both units continued on the same tasks, with the 65th

engineers working mainly on beach defenses and trails in the southern half of

Oahu, and the 3d engineers, in the

northern.47

Plans had long since been prepared

for mobilizing the entire engineer service

in case of an emergency. Under the

Mobilization Plan of the Hawaiian Department, which would go into effect if

an attack on the Islands was launched or

appeared imminent, Colonel Lyman

would have over-all responsibility for

using troops and civilians on engineer

tasks as required. He would assume

control over the Honolulu District office

and the organization of the zone constructing quartermaster. He would be

responsible for taking over vital civilian

utilities and industries to insure continued operation. The mobilization

plans called for recruiting some 12,000

civilians who would work under the

supervision of the department engineer.

Lyman's staff developed in detail the

type of engineer organization which

would be set up in case hostilities occurred. Vehicles, equipment, and supplies would be requisitioned from local 44

 Hist of the 804th Engr Avn Bn. 45

 Ltr, Short to TAG, 5 Aug 41. Engr AGF PAC,

381 (Hawaii) 113/1. 46

 1st Ind, 4 Sep 41, on Short's Ltr, cited in preceding note.

47

 (1) HD GO No. 71, 4 Nov 41. (2) HD GO No.

53, 16 Sep 41.
44 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

factories and from sugar and pineapple

plantations.48

The engineers were at work on plans

for better protection of the Islands

against air attack, even though Army

and Navy commanders at this time

seemed to think the chance of such an

attack was remote. Capt. James A.

Ostrand, Jr., commander of the 804th,

together with members of his staff, made

a study of the role the aviation engineers

would play in case of an aerial assault.

For planning purposes, Ostrand assumed

that both the USSR and Great Britain

would be defeated, and that Japan would

have preponderant power in the Pacific.

An air attack on the Hawaiian Islands

would be possible. There might be an

assault by paratroopers, with landings

by amphibious forces not to be ruled out.

The airfields, a major objective of the

enemy, would have to be defended by

infantry and engineers. The infantry

would try to repel any paratroops or

amphibious forces, while the engineers

would block the approaches to the airfields with demolitions and obstacles,

maintain and repair runways, and put

up camouflage. If necessary, they would

destroy fields which had to be abandoned. At each field an engineer force

of one officer, four noncommissioned

officers, and 200 civilians would be required. Considerable engineer work

would be necessary in advance to prepare airfields for defense. It would take

time to build plane pens, pillboxes, and

barbed wire entanglements, ready fields

for demolitions, and disguise them with

camouflage. Lyman on 10 October approved the over-all plan, which he believed might be especially valuable in the

defense of the fields on the outlying

islands. He recommended to the Chief

of Staff, Hawaiian Department, that the

plan of the 804th be adopted.49

More emphasis was being put on

camouflage. Much study and experimentation would be needed before military installations in the Islands could be

hidden effectively. Early in 1941, the

engineers began training commissioned

and noncommissioned officers at a number of installations and helped plan

camouflage treatments. Various groups

were making experiments. The Camouflage Section of the 3d Engineers was

successful in developing a paint that

would not show up as paint on photographs made with infrared filters. On

two of the oil tanks at Pearl Harbor the

men painted trees which did not appear

as camouflage on pictures made with specially equipped cameras. Several men

of the 804th prepared a plan for camouflaging Wheeler Field with netting.

Hickam could not be effectively concealed unless Pearl Harbor were included. The engineers discussed with a

number of naval officers plans for camouflaging this crucial area. The consensus was that about forty-five machines

of the type used in Hollywood for producing fog effects in motion pictures

would be enough to hide Pearl Harbor

and Hickam. Some progress was made

48

 (1) An. No. 12 to Mobilization Plan, HD Engr

(Revision 1940). (2) Interoffice Routing Slip, Lyman

to G-4 HD, 21 Nov 41. Both in Engr AGF PAC.

49

 (1) Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding

the United States. (2) Hist of the 804th Avn Bn.

(3) Memo, Lyman for CofS HD, 10 Oct 41. Engr

AGF PAC 600.12 (Gen). (4) Hq 804th Engr Avn Bn

(Sep), 8 Oct 41, Rpt, Avn Engrs and the Defense of

the Hawaiian Islands. Engr AGF PAC.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 45

in camouflaging a number of gun positions with netting or by planting trees

and shrubbery. Very useful in this connection was the hau tree, which could be

made to grow in almost any direction

and within a year produced branches

thirty feet long. Extremely difficult to

camouflage were command and observation posts on mountain and hill tops.

The most effective expedients for breaking up sharp outlines were the construction of false rock formations and the

planting of cacti. On the whole, because Washington, despite requests, provided few funds for camouflage, little

effective work was done. There was

almost no co-ordination with respect to

camouflage among the various units of

the Army and no over-all plan. Trees

planted to conceal an installation would

be removed a few weeks later to make

room for a new building. Runways,

taxiways, and hardstands being built at

Bellows and at other fields in the usual

manner could be easily identified from

the air.50

The Air Ferry Route

In the fall of 1941 a new route was

needed to ferry heavy bombers from the

United States to the Philippines. The

existing one by way of Midway, Wake,

and Guam, traversing the Japanese mandated islands, was dangerously exposed.

A more secure route would be by way of

the islands of the South Pacific and

Australia. On 4 October the War Department directed Short to begin work

on fields in the South Pacific and to have

them finished as soon as possible, as the

matter was urgent. "It must be thought

of in terms of weeks and not years," he

was told. "Every possible expedient

must be visualized and utilized. . . .

The General Staff charged General

Reybold, who succeeded Schley as Chief

of Engineers on 1 October, with construction of the route. Reybold directed

Wyman to carry out the work. An

initial sum of $5 million was allotted.

General Short, after conferences with

members of his staff and with Admiral

Bloch, in mid-October ordered construction at Christmas Island, Canton Island,

Fiji, and New Caledonia; in Australia at

Townsville or Rockhampton and Darwin; and at Fort Stotsenburg in the

Philippines. At each place, at least one

5,000-foot runway suitable for heavy

bombers was to be built. Short set 15

January 1942 as the date for completion

of the first runway at each field. Thereafter other facilities were to be finished

as soon as possible. Each site would

ultimately have three runways at least

7,000 feet long and 200 feet wide. Storage for gasoline and buildings for servicing crews would be provided later. The

project was given an A-1-a rating, the

highest at that time. Wyman considered this his most important job.52

Wyman and his staff knew little about

the islands of the South Pacific, except

two—Canton and Christmas, which were

owned jointly by the United States and

50

 (1) Rpt, Lt Col R. C. Williams, 3d Engrs, 13

Nov 40. (2) Rpt, Maj John F. Oliver, Jr., 11 Jul 41.

Engr AGF PAC.

51

 WD Ltr, AG 580.82 (9-30-41) MC-G to CG HD,

4 Oct 41. Engr AGF PAC, 686 (Ferry Route) 1. 52

 (1) Ltr, SPD Engr to CofEngrs, 17 Oct 41. (2)

Ltr, Chief Finance Sec OCE to the Priorities Com

ANMB, 20 Oct 41, with 1st Ind, 20 Oct 41. Both in

Engr AGF PAC, 686 (Ferry Route) I.
46 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

GENERAL REYBOLD

Great Britain. CAA had already prepared plans for building an airfield on

Canton, and its survey was available to

the Engineers. To get more up-to-date

information on Christmas, Wyman on

16 October prepared to send out a survey

detachment. The next day Short and

Wyman agreed that construction on

Christmas would be done mainly by the

men of the 804th, assisted by civilians;

on Canton, by the Hawaiian Constructors under a supplemental agreement to their contract, aided by a few

troops. To get firsthand knowledge

about the more distant sites, Wyman sent

two officers, Maj. Roger M. Ramey of

the Air Corps and Capt. Stanford MacCasland of the Corps of Engineers to

make a reconnaissance. They set out

by Navy seaplane on 18 October, and the

same day a party of officers and civilians

left by ship for Christmas to investigate

conditions on that island and make preliminary preparations for construction.

On 21 October an engineer from the

district office left by clipper to make a

reconnaissance of Canton. Wyman,

meanwhile, began securing supplies and

equipment. Requiring at least one

supply ship based on Honolulu, and

finding the Navy short of ships, Wyman

chartered an interisland steamer, the

Haleakala. The Hawaiian Constructors

began to purchase plant and supplies in

the United States and to recruit workers

in San Francisco and Los Angeles.53

Ramey and MacCasland sent back

optimistic reports. The word from

Canton was that "the only acceptable site

looks excellent from an airman's point

of view." The setup in Fiji was "about

perfect." The defenses of that British

Crown Colony were being strengthened

by New Zealand, which was developing

an airfield, Nandi, on Viti Levu, the

largest island of the group. On New

Caledonia, there might be some difficulties. Here, a field at Tontouta,

about 30 miles north of Noumea, the

capital, did not look very good, but other

fields on the island held promise.54

Ramey reported from Australia late in

October that he had found two good

runways at Townsville. The British,

French, and Australian authorities

agreed to do the construction in their

territories.55

On 6 November, Mr. Leif J. Sverdrup,

53

 (1) Ltr, Short to TAG, 22 Nov 41. (2) Rad,

Wyman to CofEngrs, 23 Oct 41. Both in Engr AGF

PAC, 686 (Ferry Route) I. 54

 Memo, CofS Hawaii Air Force for ACofS

G-4 HD, 28 Oct 41. Engr AGF PAC, 686 (Ferry

Route) I. 55

 Ltr, Short to TAG, 22 Nov 41. Engr AGF PAC,

686 (Ferry Route) I.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 47

president of Sverdrup and Parcel of St.

Louis, Missouri, arrived in Honolulu,

and that same day signed a cost-plus-afixed-fee contract for architect-engineer

services in connection with the ferry

route on the British- and French-owned

islands and Australia. The next day he

and Major Robinson left for the South

Pacific to establish the necessary liaison

with the local governments. At this

time the War Department informed

Short that General Douglas MacArthur,

commanding U.S. forces in the Philippines, would be responsible for work on

the fields west of New Caledonia.56

On 18 November 4 officers and 145

men of the 804th Aviation Battalion and

70 civilians of the Hawaiian Constructors

and Honolulu District reached Christmas to join the group already there. In

command was Maj. John E. Shield of the

district office. About 1,350 miles south

of Honolulu, Christmas, 35 miles long

and 20 miles wide, was the largest coral

island in the Pacific. The newcomers

found it to be flat and generally only ten

feet above sea level. At the western end

was a sizable lagoon opening into the sea.

The once numerous coconut plantations

had been abandoned after the collapse

of the copra market. In 1940 the population had been evacuated, but a British

resident commissioner and 26 Polynesians had returned in April 1941 and

had established two settlements at the

mouth of the lagoon. There were a

number of warehouses, a dock fifty feet

long at high tide, and two residences, all

inadequate for present needs. The

roads were poor. The engineers would

have to build not only runways but also

piers, roads, and camps.57

On 3 November a transport, with

about 130 troops and civilians headed by

Capt. C. D. Baker aboard and towing

four barges loaded with equipment and

supplies, began the 2,000-mile trip from

Honolulu to Canton. During the voyage two of the barges filled with water

and had to be abandoned though some

of the equipment was saved. On 14

November the ship reached its destination. Canton was a narrow strip of

coral, enclosing a lagoon eight miles

long and four miles wide. The land was

covered with scrub; the lagoon, choked

with reefs. An Englishman operated

the radio station. Pan American Airways had a few facilities on the island.

The first jobs were the construction of a

temporary dock, the blasting of coral

from the lagoon, the erection of shop

buildings, and the surveying of the site

for the runway.58

Meanwhile, work had begun on Fiji.

In New Zealand and its possessions, governmental agencies constructed public

works. Practically all the heavy equipment which would be needed for airfield

construction was government owned.

The most feasible solution was to lease

or borrow the machinery and hire native

workers. Sverdrup and Parcel's original

architect-engineer contract was expanded

to include supervision of construction.

The Dominion authorities were most

co-operative. Within thirty-six hours

56

 Ltr, Short to TAG, 22 Nov 41. Engr AGF PAC.

57

 (1) Ibid. (2) Rpt, Maj James A. Ostrand, Jr.,

5 Nov 41. (3) Rad, Wyman to CofEngrs, 25 Nov 41.

Both in Engr AGF PAC. 58

 (1) Ltr, Baker to Wyman, 17 Mar 42. (2) Ltr,

Baker to Wyman, 30 Nov 41. Both in Engr AGF

PAC.
48 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

after Ramey and MacCasland had made

the survey for the route and discussed

with Prime Minister Peter Fraser the

desirability of improving Nandi field,

work had begun. New Zealand even

gave the project priority over all defense

work being done in the Dominion itself.

The Governor of Fiji issued a proclamation prohibiting the export of lumber

and ordered sawmills to operate under

direct orders of the government in order

that sufficient lumber might be obtained

locally. On 20 November several pieces

of equipment arrived from the United

States. The next day Sverdrup wrote

Wyman that work had started at Nandi.

In late November Capt. Carl F. Ende

arrived from Honolulu to take up his

duties as area engineer.59

Accompanying Captain Ende was 1st

Lt. Richard P. Sauer, who went on to

New Caledonia as area engineer for that

island. Visiting Tontouta, Sauer found

that the pessimistic report of Ramey and

MacCasland was fully justified. One of

the field's main drawbacks was that hills

obstructed the approaches to the runways. When Sverdrup and Robinson

arrived later, they inspected a field the

French had started at Plaines des Gaiacs,

about 150 miles northeast of Noumea.

They believed the runways there could

be developed easily to minimum requirements. It was planned, consequently,

to lengthen the runways at Tontouta for

emergency use until the field at Plaines

des Gaiacs could be gotten ready. Sauer

discovered the Hawaiian Department

had made no arrangements with the

French High Commissioner for construction. Doing any work on the island

would be out of the question until an

agreement between the War Department

and the Free French government had

been signed. Since workmen sent over

by the Australian Government at the request of the Free French were already

improving Tontouta, Sauer asked the

Australians to develop Plaines des Gaiacs

until an agreement could be made by the

American authorities and the Free

French to permit sending in American

workmen and equipment. The Australians agreed to complete Tontouta as an

emergency field. They also made planes

available for a reconnaissance of additional sites in the Solomons and New

Hebrides, but they were unable to do

anything at Plaines des Gaiacs because

their resources were too slender.60 Development of this important field would

have to wait.

Supplies

Procurement of supplies and equipment for the burgeoning construction

program in the Pacific outposts was increasingly hampered by various obstacles.

Transportation bottlenecks began to

plague the construction forces. After

Congress appropriated funds for projects,

it took three or four months to get

materials from the United States to the

outlying territories. Before long, procurement became entangled with the

priorities system. In the summer of

1941, the Army and Navy Munitions

59

 (1) Ltr, Sverdrup to Wyman, 13 Nov 41. (2)

Ltr, Sverdrup to Wyman, 21 Nov 41. (3) Ltr, Short

to TAG, 22 Nov 41. All in Engr AGF PAC.

60

 (1) Sauer, Narrative Rpt, Airfield Constr. (2)

Rad, Sverdrup to Short, 27 Nov 41. Both in Engr

AGF PAC.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 49

Board (ANMB) rated projects in Panama

A-1-b; those in Hawaii, A-1-c; and

those in Alaska, A-1-c or lower. Local

commanders tried to get their priorities

raised. In July, Short recommended

that projects in Hawaii be given the

same priority as those in Panama. He

wanted especially to have an A-1-b rating for materials needed for the storage

tanks for reserve gasoline, a request

strongly supported by the Chief of Engineers. But ANMB refused to grant the

higher rating. In July, all defense projects in Alaska were rated A-1-c. With

this low rating, the Seattle District Engineer had great difficulty in getting materials, particularly steel and copper, all

the more so since the Navy's Alaska projects enjoyed the top A-1-a rating.

Because of the difficulty of winter delivery, it was essential that the bulk of

construction materials be on hand by

early fall. Under the current ratings, it

would take several months or even a

year to get delivery. On 9 August

Colonel Dunn requested the A-1-a rating, stating it should be given at least for

steel, spare parts, and similar items.61 A

few days later, DeWitt reminded the

War Department that he had been instructed to alert the garrisons in the

Territory and declared that the "defense

of Alaska will be endangered" unless

vital construction was helped in every

way "during the short working season

which is now rapidly dwindling."62

Although balking at first, the ANMB

Priorities Committee on 4 September assigned an A-1-a rating to construction

materials for military projects.63 General Short was not so successful. The

A-1-c rating remained in effect, except

for the ferry route. Construction in

Panama and Alaska was at this time apparently considered more essential than

construction in Hawaii.

It was impossible to stockpile materials. Only after Congress had voted

funds for a project could the Engineers

place orders for the supplies. All materials shipped from the United States were

to be used only on the project for which

they were designated, a normal procedure in peacetime. To make possible

building up reserves of materials and

transferring them from one project to

another as deemed necessary, efforts were

made to change this system. In the

meantime, the Chief of Engineers, in

order to ease the supply situation in

Hawaii, made an allotment of more than

$1,000,000 to Wyman for the purchase of

materials and equipment. In November, The Quartermaster General made

available $400,000 to the Seattle District

for a similar stockpile for work in Alaska.

As materials were withdrawn, the Seattle

District was to replace them with stocks

purchased with funds allocated to the

projects. Dunn planned to have the

stockpile in operation before the spring

of 1942. Still, these sums could not be

used for building up stockpiles in any

real sense because the money was to be

used for the advance purchase of materials for authorized projects. Nor were

61

 (1) Ltr, Short to TAG, 28 Jul 41. (2) Ltr, Fiscal

Br OCE to Col D. I. McKay, OCE, 29 Aug 44. Both

in Engr AGF PAC. (3) Ltr, Dunn to Schley, 22 Jul

41. (4) Ltr, Dunn to Schley, 9 Aug 41. 161 Alaska

(Preferred Rating). 62

 2d Ind, DeWitt to TAG, 12 Aug 41, on Ltr,

Dunn to Schley, 9 Aug 41.

63

 5th Ind, ANMB Priorities Comm OCE, 4 Sep 41,

on Ltr, Dunn to Schley, 9 Aug 41.
50 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

commanders in Panama more successful

in getting authority to build up

reserves.64

War Appears Imminent

Relations between the United States

and Japan had reached a precarious state

by October 1941. On the 18th of that

month General Hideki Tojo, an advocate

of an aggressive, expansionist policy, became premier of Japan. The American

position regarding a settlement in the

Pacific, hitherto unacceptable to Japan,

remained unchanged. The Imperial

Army and Navy were being put in a state

of readiness to strike early in December.

Last-ditch diplomatic negotiations for a

peaceful settlement continued in Washington. Japanese intentions were known

to the American negotiators because the

Japanese code had been broken, but it

was not known when and where Japan

would attack. Still greater efforts would

have to be made to improve the defenses

of the triangle.65

Panama needed a good deal more

work, even though much had been done.

Since the summer of 1939 the cost of

construction under the department engineer's supervision had increased from

$1.5 million to $17 million. The number of workmen had risen from 1,000 to

approximately 5,000. Despite the rains

and shortages of men and equipment,

work was being accelerated. By midNovember, the engineers had completed

more than 100 magazines for storing

ammunition and had almost finished the

bombproof command post. They had

placed the concrete foundations for small

defense installations such as antiaircraft

guns, had completed emplacements for

medium caliber coastal guns, and were

preparing plans for casemating large seacoast defenses. In the Panamanian Republic, engineer troops and civilians,

and in some cases the using units themselves, were doing all military construction, except some housing at Rio Hato

being built by the constructing quartermaster. The auxiliary airfields were being improved. By mid-November, Chorrera had two graveled landing strips.

The 805th (which had been expanded

into a battalion late in June) continued

with construction of the auxiliary drome

at Chame, and work was continuing at

the two strips at La Joya. A major effort

was necessary on the roads. The engineers were building about 225 miles of

new paved routes and were resurfacing

many existing ones. When completed,

hard-surfaced roads would lead to over

100 searchlight positions and other installations. Continued maintenance was

required, especially during the rainy season, "to preserve even a semblance of a

road in the mountainous areas." A continuing bottleneck was the land acquisition question, since the places left vacant

by the dismissal of the Panamanian members in the coup d'etat of October had

not been filled.66

Alaska, had only a minimum of de64

 (1) Ltr, Moore to Short, 29 Sep 41. Engr AGF

PAC. (2) Ltr, OCE to TQMG, 21 Nov 41. 400.291

(Stockpiles). (3) 1st Ind, TQMG to OCE, 26 Nov

41, to Ltr, Moore to Short, 29 Sep 41. (4) 1st Ind,

Dunn to Park, 7 Nov 41, on Ltr, Park to Dunn, 29

Oct 41. 400.291 (Stockpiles). 65

 Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., Command Decisions (Washington, 1960), pp. 103, 113.

66

 (1) Prelim Study, II, pp. 14-16, 254. (2) Ltr, Lt

Col S. N. Karrick, IGD, to TIG, 20 Dec 41. G-4/

27963-188.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 51

fenses. With winter approaching the

engineers would be able to do little more

in the immediate future. In October

and November, a group representing the

War Department's General Staff divisions

toured the Territory to see at firsthand

how work was progressing. All were

struck by the few defenses and by the lack

of camouflage and concealment. Lt.

Col. Nelson M. Walker, the G-3 officer,

declared that construction in Alaska "invites disaster" from air attack because

Army installations made such conspicuous targets and on the whole were inadequately defended, a view shared by

most members of the group. On 4

December Lt. Col. James K. Tully of the

War Plans Division made several recommendations for Alaska based on observations made during the tour. He urged

particularly that construction, approved

by the Joint Board a week earlier, be

started at Umnak, Cold Bay, and Port

Heiden, that Army camps be built at

several fields under construction by CAA

besides the ten with military priority,

and that a number of roads be built as

alternate lines of communication. To

bring Alaskan defenses up to the level

envisioned by the War Department planners would require much more engineer

work. Completion of the airfields alone

would take another summer season.

"Full construction," in the opinion of

Colonel Walker, "could only be accomplished within a year by a maximum, and

most improbable, effort."

 67

In Hawaii, the contractors continued

to improve the airfields. Crews were

lengthening the runways, erecting permanent and temporary buildings, and

constructing storage facilities for ammunition, gasoline, and water. Wheeler,

Hickam, and the new Bellows airfield

were getting longer and better runways.

On the outlying islands, 6,000-foot strips

were under construction or were being

planned. But work on most of the other

projects lagged. The aircraft warning

stations were behind schedule. As expected, in some cases acquiring real estate

took an inordinately long time. The

Engineers had to negotiate with the National Park Service for almost a year

before they were allowed on Haleakala.

By late November progress was a little

more encouraging. Housing for the station on Mount Kaala on Oahu was finished, and the station on Haleakala was

almost completed. Kokee was about

two-thirds done. Surveys for sites for

the remaining stations were continuing.

None of the stations were in operation

and would not be for weeks to come because the Signal Corps' apparatus still

had to be installed. By late November

the revised plans for the reserve gasoline

storage were complete and had been

given to the Hawaiian Constructors, who

were assembling equipment to start work

shortly. Nine tanks, each with a capacity of 40,000 barrels, were later to be

installed in Waikakalaua Gulch by the

Hammond Iron Works of Warren,

Pennsylvania. Three major projects for

ammunition storage had been started.

Two were being built underground—

one at Wheeler Field and the other at

Aliamanu Crater—while the third, consisting of igloos for storing minor ammu67

 (1) Memo, G-2 WD for ACofS G-2, 1 Dec 41.

WPD 3512-148. (2) Memo, Walker for G-3 WD, 5

Dec 41, with Incl. WPD 3512-146. (3) Memo, Tully

for WPD, 4 Dec 41. WPD 3512-148. (4) Conn,

Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United

States, p. 244.
52 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

nition, was under way at Hickam.

Work had begun on coastal defenses,

principally the bombproofing of command posts, and a start had been made

on railway gun positions.68

By December, Wyman had added ten

supplemental agreements to the originally modest contract of the Hawaiian

Constructors. The estimated cost of the

work had risen from $1,097,673 to

$19,545,557; the fixed fee, from $52,220

to $455,145. The Hawaiian Constructors, plagued with growing scarcities of

men and materials, struggled to build up

an organization capable of completing

the defense projects. To fashion into a

smoothly functioning force the relatively

small number of workers who could be

recruited required an extraordinary

effort. Adequate supervision was difficult because the jobs were so widely

scattered. The contractor's expanding

organization was beset with numerous

deficiencies, duly commented on by the

inspector general of the Hawaiian Department after his investigation in

September. Many property records

kept by area clerks were incomplete and

carelessly posted, while the handling of

money and the keeping of accounts at

many of the commissaries were unsatisfactory. The personnel and payroll

auditing subdivision lacked proper coordination. To make matters worse,

the using agencies often did not furnish

exact information as to what they

wanted, or, after construction had begun,

requested changes in design. Wyman,

trying as best he could to keep the construction effort on an even keel, held

conferences every Monday morning with

key men from the district office and the

Hawaiian Constructors. At these conferences Wyman and the contractor's

men tried to "iron out any problems that

arose," with the district engineer constantly trying to impress on the contractors the need for speed. But even

so, the difficulties he faced were great.69

Last Days of Peace

Prospects for an agreement between

the United States and Japan seemed so

slight that on 24 November the Navy

informed its Pacific commanders that

Japanese troop movements indicated a

sudden attack could be expected "in any

direction," and especially against the

Philippines or Guam. Three days later,

the Army told its commanders in San

Francisco, Panama, Hawaii, and the

Philippines of the imminence of war and

directed them to undertake appropriate

measures, keeping in mind that it would

be desirable to have Japan strike the first

blow. All but MacArthur were instructed "not to alarm the civilian

population."

 70

At this critical juncture, it appeared

that engineer work would soon reach its 68

 (1) Rpt, Wyman to CofEngrs, 5 Dec 41, sub:

Semimonthly Rpt of Opns, Constr Progress, AC

Stations 16-30 Nov 41. (2) Rpt, Wyman to CofEngrs, 4 Dec 41, sub: Monthly Rpt of Opns, AWS

Detector Stations, Nov 41. (3) 1st Ind, Honolulu

Dist Of to CofEngrs, 19 Sep 44, on Memo, Army

Pearl Harbor Bd to CofEngrs, 1 Aug 44. (4) Ltr,

Hq 1st Bn 15th CA to CO Harbor Defense of Pearl

Harbor, 15 Dec 41. All in Engr AGF PAC.

69

 (1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 98off. (2) Ltr, Asst IG HD

to CG HD, 4 Nov 41. (3) Rpt from Div Engr, Pac

Div, to the Army Pearl Harbor Bd on Contract No.

W-414-Eng-602 and Hans Wilhelm Rohl, Exhibit

"B." Both in Engr AGF PAC. 70

 Greenfield, ed., Command Decisions, p. 117.
THE DEFENSE EFFORT GAINS MOMENTUM 53

full stride everywhere except in Alaska.

In Panama, the impasse over real estate

was broken on 3 December when President de la Guardia appointed members

to a new land board. The program of

extending installations out from the

Canal could begin in earnest.71 In the

Hawaiian Islands, where work was just

getting well under way, coastal defenses

were being steadily strengthened and airfields improved, the aircraft warning stations were nearing completion, and a

start was about to be made on storage for

reserve gasoline. Construction on the

ferry route had begun. In Alaska—

aside from the three airfields that were

operational, and preliminary construction on some of the aircraft warning

stations and the railroad cutoff—projects

were still in the planning stage. Little

could be done before spring.72

Besides building up the triangle's defenses, the Corps was increasing its troop

strength, the figures for which were beginning to appear more encouraging.

In Panama, there were 1,500 engineers

in a total Army force of approximately

32,000—just under 5 percent. In

Hawaii, the three combat units and the

804th engineers totaled some 2,800 men

—about 7 percent of the 42,000 troops in

the department. In Alaska, engineers

totaled approximately 1,400 of some

21,000 troops in the Territory.73

At 5 minutes before eight o'clock on

Sunday morning, 7 December 1941,

Japanese planes appeared over Oahu

without warning. Some made straight

for the warships anchored in Pearl

Harbor; others headed for the major

Army and Navy airfields. In this attack,

lasting about 30 minutes, dive bombers

heavily damaged Hickam and Wheeler

Fields and machine-gunned Schofield

Barracks. At Schofield, a bomb exploded near the area occupied by the

34th Engineers, leaving a large crater.

In a second assault, beginning at 20

minutes before nine and lasting about an

hour, Bellows Field was also hit. No

engineers were killed during these attacks, but a considerable amount of

equipment was destroyed, especially at

Hickam and Wheeler. At Bellows, although most of the planes on the field

were demolished, no equipment was

damaged. In both assaults, the attackers

directed their most devastating blows

against the Navy. They wrecked the

bulk of the fleet at Pearl Harbor and

partly destroyed the Navy's Kaneohe Seaplane Base in eastern Oahu and its Ewa

71

 Since the Panama Canal, considered a likely

target in case of war with Japan, was, in fact, not

attacked or directly involved in combat operations,

the story of engineer work on the Canal and in the

surrounding regions after the outbreak of hostilities

has been omitted from the subsequent parts of this

book. Information on engineer work in the Canal

Zone and the surrounding regions after the outbreak

of war to guard against possible attack from the

Pacific may be obtained from a monograph on the

subject prepared by the author and on file in the

Historical Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers.

Information on the acquisition of real estate may be

found in Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding

the United States and Its Outposts, pp. 346-48. 72

 (1) Acquisition of Land, PCD, p. 40. (2) Honolulu Engr Dist to CofEngrs, 4 Dec 41, Monthly Rpt

of Opns, AWS Detector Stations, Nov 41. (3) Honolulu Eng Dist to CofEngrs, 5 Dec 41, Semimonthly

Rpt of Opns, Constr Progress AC Stations, 16-30

Nov 41. Last two in Engr AGF PAC.

73

 (1) Strength of the Army WD AGO Rpts. (2)

The smaller proportion in Panama reflected the

continued responsibility of the Quartermaster Corps

there for much military construction. Erna Risch,

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply,

and Services, Volume I, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), p. 8.
54 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Marine Air Station in the southwestern

part of the island. The period of peacetime preparations for defense was a thing

of the past. The United States was

plunged into war.74

74

 (1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 24ff. (2) Wesley Frank

Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., "The Army Air

Forces in World War II, vol. I, Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 197-98. For

accounts of the attack on Pearl Harbor see (3) Conn,

Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United

States, ch. VII, p. 1ff., and Samuel Eliot Morison,

"History of United States Naval Operations in World

War II," vol. III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific,

1931-1942 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,

1948), pp. 98ff.
CHAPTER III

The Fall of the Philippines

When Japanese fighters and bombers

struck at the Philippines, a few hours

after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the

engineers in those islands were building

airfields and strengthening fortifications.

Mobilization of engineer units of the

Philippine Army was under way, and

stocks of supplies and equipment were

being increased. After the Japanese

landed, the engineers strove to delay

their advance by blocking roads and

wrecking bridges. They strengthened

Philippine defenses by erecting field

fortifications, keeping open lines of communication, providing maps, and building in rear areas. Toward the end, the

engineers became infantrymen. Determined effort and devoted service could

not prevent the tragic outcome. Like

the other defenders of the Philippines,

the engineers were not prepared to withstand the Japanese forces.

Before World War II it had not been

U.S. policy to maintain a strong force in

the Philippines, and, apparently, the War

Department had no plan for sending reinforcements if war broke out. War Plan

ORANGE–3 (WPO-3), the Philippine Department's defense plan being prepared

in 1940, stipulated that if the American

and the Filipino forces could not beat off

an invasion at the beaches, they were to

withdrew to Bataan Peninsula. (Map

5) There and on Corregidor they were to

make a 6-month stand and thus deny the

enemy access to Manila Bay. Although

it was widely assumed that help would

reach the beleaguered defenders within

six months, WPO-3 made no mention of

reinforcements from the United States.1

Late in 1940 the War Department's

policy regarding the Philippines began

to change. Among the men responsible

for modifying the War Department's

policy was Maj. Gen. George Grunert,

who had become commander of the

Philippine Department in June of that

year. His insistent pleas for reinforcements at length led the War Department

to make a beginning toward bolstering

the islands' defenses. Also influential

was General Douglas MacArthur, since

1935 military adviser to the Philippine

Government. In February 1941 he informed Marshall of his rather extensive

plans for building up the military forces

of the commonwealth. There was

henceforth an increasing emphasis in

Washington on strengthening the defenses of the islands. By the summer of

1941 the General Staff believed the

Philippines might be reinforced to the

1

 (1) Phil Dept Plan ORANGE, 1940 Rev (Short

title: HPD WPO-3). AG 326. (2) Louis Morton,

The Fall of the Philippines, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953),

pp. 61-64.

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 57

point of not only being able to hold off

an invasion, but also, of deterring

Japanese expansion southward. Perhaps

a deciding factor in altering American

policy was the successful development of

the B-17 heavy bomber. Now for the

first time the Army had a weapon which,

if based in the Philippines, could deliver

effective blows against the Japanese.2

In line with the new policy of strengthening the Philippines, President Roosevelt on 26 July 1941 established in the

islands an over-all command, United

States Army Forces in the Far East

(USAFFE). Headed by General MacArthur, who had been recalled to active

duty in the United States Army, the

command included both the Philippine

Department and the Philippine Army.

MacArthur had in mind not merely holding Bataan Peninsula and Manila Bay.

With an increasing number of B-17's at

his disposal and with a Philippine Army

of some 125,000 men to be mobilized by

the end of the year and an even larger

force in prospect, he believed he could

successfully defend the entire archipelago, provided he had time to complete

his preparations. On 1 October he

asked permission to prepare a new war

plan to replace WPO–3, and early in

November Marshall told him to proceed.

The outbreak of war one month later

found MacArthur in the midst of revising his plans for defense.3

Preparations for Defense

Plans and Appropriations

The decision to reinforce the Philippines placed a heavy load on the engineers. Col. Henry H. Stickney, an

officer of long experience, who had become department engineer in May 1940,

had only a small staff to supervise construction, supply, and map making.

MacArthur had no engineer in USAFFE

until October 1941, when Lt. Col. Hugh

J. Casey arrived from the United States.

Colonel Stickney thus directed the engineer effort during most of the prewar

period. Construction was to be his first

concern.

Earliest efforts were aimed at strengthening the harbor installations in Manila

and Subic Bays. Guarding the entrance

to Manila Bay were four fortified islands,

Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile, and

Carabao. Guarding Subic Bay was

Grande Island. Corregidor claimed the

major share of attention. Construction

there, begun in 1904, had continued

until after World War I. The result

was a maze of defensive works—tunnels,

artillery batteries, communications centers, and shops. The island appeared to

be impregnable against any probable

naval attack, but little, if any, consideration had been given to defense against

aerial bombardment. Corregidor's fortifications were becoming obsolete and the

same was true of the defenses of the other

fortified islands. During the twenties

and thirties appropriations for the fortified islands were pitifully meager.4

 For

2

 (1) Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 417ff., 440. (2)

Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active

Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and

Brothers, 1947), p. 338. (3) Craven and Cate, eds.,

Plans and Early Operations, p. 125. 3

 (1) Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 1 Feb 41. AG

093.5. P.I. (7-2-40) (4). (2) Ltr, MacArthur to

Marshall, 28 Oct 41. AG 350.5 (10-28-41) (1). (3)

Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 64-71.

4

 The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 24 March 1934 provided for Philippine independence after a ten-year
58 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

the fiscal years 1939-41 inclusive, funds

allotted to the Army for harbor defense

projects amounted to but $39,000 annually; in May 1939, however, the Navy

transferred $500,000 to the Engineers

for the construction of tunnels on

Corregidor. With this money, Maj.

Lloyd E. Mielenz, the engineer in charge

of fortification work at the harbor defenses, built two-thirds of a mile of

concrete-lined tunnel. By stretching the

Navy funds he was also able to provide

Panama mounts (makeshift concrete

mountings that permitted the trail of a

field gun to be swung in a full circle),

access roads for the big guns, and other

minor improvements.5

War Plan ORANGE-3 linked Bataan

Peninsula with the fortified islands in the

defense of Manila Bay. Except for a

few roads and trails, most of Bataan was

virtually a wilderness. On 25 July 1940

Grunert, after outlining for the General

Staff what he considered to be the

"minimum requirements for an efficient

defense" of the peninsula, requested

$1,939,000 for roads, docks, and bombproof storage. Marshall replied that it

was against War Department policy to

put money into large projects of this

nature.6 Grunert nevertheless persisted,

and in fact broadened his request to

include $346,000 for the harbor defenses.

He made little progress until early 1941,

by which time the War Department's

attitude had begun to change. In

March of that year Congress appropriated

$946,000 and in June $3,688,000 for

work on Bataan and Corregidor. In

November 1940 Major Mielenz had

recommended that an interservice board

be appointed "without delay to formulate a workable plan for modernizing the

Harbor Defense protection against heavy

shelling and aerial bombing." The

commanding general of the Harbor Defenses appointed the board at once, and

by early May 1941 it had prepared plans

calling for underground protection, gas

proofing, and air conditioning. This

program was to cost $3,500,000 and take

three years to complete. In June,

Grunert submitted the plan to the War

Department, but he received no money

until early October.7

Airfields, according to General Grunert, were the most vital element in the

defense of the islands.8 In 1940 and early

1941 there were but two Army airfields

in the Philippines—Nichols, just south

transitional period, during which the United States

would have the right to "maintain military and

other reservations and armed forces" in the islands,

and the President of the United States would have

the power "to call into the service of such armed

forces all military forces organized by the Philippine

Government." Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 4. 5

 (1) Ltr, CG Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic

Bays to CG Phil Dept, 26 Oct 40. AG 600.12 (10-

26-40) sec. 1 (1). (2) Col. Paschal Strong, "The Lean

Years," The Military Engineer, XLI (May-June,

1949), 179-81. (3) Col L. E. Mielenz, MS, Engr

Preparation for Defense of the Fortified Islands of

Manila and Subic Bays (cited hereafter as Mielenz,

Engr Preparation). SWPA File M343. (4) TM 20–

205, 18 Jan 44.

6

 (1) Ltr, CG Phil Dept to TAG, 25 Jul 40. AG

600.12 (7-25-40) (1). (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 14

Aug 40. (3) Rad, TAG to CG Phil Dept, 19 Aug

40. All three in AG 600.12 (7-25-40) (1). (4) WD

Ltr AG 660.2 Phil Dept (9-9-37) (Misc)-E to CG

Phil Dept, 22 Oct 37. 381 (Phils) 1934-45. 7

 (1) 1st Ind, CG Phil Dept to TAG, 1 Nov 40 on

Ltr, CG Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays

to CG Phil Dept, 26 Oct 40. AG 600-12 (10-26-40)

sec. 1 (1). (2) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. (3)

Table, Funds Released to Phil Dept [Jul 41] with

Ltr, C Constr Sec OCE to CG Phil Dept, 6 Aug 41.

600.1 (Phil Dept Airfields) 1941-42. 8

 Rad, CG Phil Dept to TAG, 25 Jul 41. AG

600.12 (10-26-40) sec 2 (1).
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 59

of Manila, and Clark, about 50 miles

northwest of the capital. Nichols had

the distinction of being the only military

field in the islands with a paved runway.

But this runway, like the turf strips at

Clark, was too small to take B-17's

safely. Indeed, there was not a paved

runway in the entire Philippines that

could accommodate a fully loaded B-17.9

In October 1940 Grunert began to plan

a network of modern military airfields.

He envisioned 6 major fields—4 on Luzon and 2 on Mindanao—and a score of

smaller ones dispersed throughout the

islands. By July 1941 the War Department had obtained $2,773,000 for Grunert's projects.10

 MacArthur, after his

appointment as Commanding General,

USAFFE, insisted on an even larger sum.

By October a total of $4,187,130 had

been allotted for airfields in the Philippines, and MacArthur was calling for

$5 million more. The War Department

immediately allotted him three of the five

million, and it promised him the rest in

the near future.11 Part of the construction was to be carried out by the Civil

Aeronautics Authority and the Philippine Commonwealth, but the bulk was

assigned to the Engineer Department.

By 30 November 1941, $4,654,350 had

been turned over to Colonel Stickney for

construction of airfields. To help protect not only the airfields but the islands

themselves against attack, an air warning

service was needed. During the latter

part of 1941 Stickney received $265,000

to build ten warning stations and an

underground information center.12

Construction Gets Under Way

By early 1941, the growing program

threatened to overwhelm the engineer

department. Stickney appealed to OCE

for help. On 28 April he wrote to General Kingman that the department engineer's office had until recently been "a

sleepy inactive place with two . . .

American civilian employees, and was

able to transact its business in a few

hours each morning. It was similar to

all other offices in this headquarters.

There were no funds available for new

work and all duties were routine." Now

the situation had changed completely,

and Stickney lacked the wherewithal to

carry out a high-speed construction program. With but one regular officer to

assist him, he considered personnel to be

his "most crying need." The several reservists who had recently arrived from

the United States were not acquainted

with local conditions and required time

"to take hold." Few American civilians

were available and only limited use could

be made of Filipinos. Stickney nevertheless succeeded in finding enough Reserve officers and civilian engineers to

9

 (1) Walter D. Edmonds, They Fought With What

They Had (Boston, 1951), pp. 26-27. (2) Ltr, Stickney to Kingman, 28 Apr 41. 600.1 (Phil Dept Airfields) 1941. 10

 (1) Rad, CG Phil Dept to TAG, 30 Oct 40. (2)

Rad, TAG to CG Phil Dept, 7 Dec 40. Both in

600.1 (Phil Dept Airfields) 1941-42. (3) Rad, CG

Phil Dept to TAG, 12 Jan 41. AG 600.12 (10-26-40)

sec. 1 (1). (4) DF, G-4 to CofEngrs, 3 Apr 41. (5)

Ltr, C Constr Sec OCE to Dept Engr, Phil Dept, 6

Aug 41. Last two in 600.1 (Phil Dept Airfields)

1941-42. 11

 (1) Rad, CG USAFFE to TAG, 23 Oct 41. (2)

Rad, TAG to CG USAFFE, 4 Nov 41. Both in AG

600.12 (10-26-40) sec. 20 (1).

12

 (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 5 Feb 41. AG 600.12

(10-26-40) sec. 1 (1). (2) Dept Engr, Constr Progress

Rpt for Semimonthly Period Ending 30 Nov 41. AG

319.1 (20 Oct 41) Phil Rcds.
60 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

form a skeleton organization in his

office and in the field.13

The department engineer was anxious

to get construction under way before the

start of the rainy season, which, on western Luzon, where most of the work was

to be undertaken, lasted from June to

November. Unless started before the

onset of the rains, construction would be

almost impossible at some locations.

Meanwhile, there was heavy pressure

from General Grunert to get things done

which everyone now felt "should have

been done years ago."

 14

Formidable difficulties stood in Stickney's way. Among them were his remoteness from the United States and the

necessity of having to deal with a semiindependent government. Contractors

were scarce as were skilled labor, materials, and equipment. The engineer

effort and an $11.5 million dollar building program under the department

quartermaster's direction severely taxed

the resources of the islands.15 Some of

Stickney's most serious difficulties arose

from having to follow procedures designed for normal peacetime conditions.

He was determined to overcome these

obstacles, proposing "to do what is necessary . . . even though the regulations

may be temporarily violated."

 16

Construction was in some instances

held up by the long time required to

obtain title to land. Although large

projects such as those at Clark and

Nichols were to be built on land already

owned by the government, sites for many

of the smaller jobs had to be acquired.

Without the power to condemn, the department quartermaster was forced into

protracted negotiations with land owners. Not until 21 October 1941 did

MacArthur and President Manuel L.

Quezon agree upon a procedure for

breaking this bottleneck. Where few

property holders were involved, titles

were clear, and the land could be acquired at reasonable cost, USAFFE

would continue to obtain land by direct

negotiation; otherwise, the Philippine

Government would expropriate the land.

The agreement speeded up real estate

transactions.17

Stickney did not have to look far for

construction firms as there were only

three in the islands with the equipment

and experience necessary for doing work

on a large scale within a reasonable time

—the Benguet Consolidated Mining

Company, Marsman and Company (also

a mining firm); and the Atlantic, Gulf,

and Pacific Company of Manila. The

last was the only concern capable of

building docks and erecting steel hangars. The two mining companies were

specialists at tunneling but were not well

equipped to handle airfield construction,

though they volunteered to do this type

of work in order to aid the defense effort.

For less complicated projects Stickney

could rely on Filipino contractors, who

13

 (1) Ltr, Stickney to Kingman, 28 Apr 41. 600.1

(Phil Dept Airfields) 1941. (2) Rad, CG Phil Dept

to TAG, 29 Jan 41. 600.1 (Phil Dept Airfields)

1941-42. 14

 Ltr, Stickney to Kingman, 28 Apr 41. 15

 Figure for the QM program compiled from

Dept QM Constr Serv, Constr Progress Rpt for Semimonthly Period Ending 15 Nov 41. AG 319.1 (20

Oct 41) Phil Rcds. 16

 Ltr, Stickney to Kingman, 28 Apr 41.

17

 (1) Ltr, AG USAFFE to CG Phil Dept, 19 Aug

41. (2) Ltr, AG USAFFE to CG Phil Dept and CG

FEAF. 21 Oct 41. Both in AG 601 (21 Jun 41) Phil

Rcds. (3) Wendell W. Fertig, Guerrillero (MS), p.

12. SWPA Files.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 61

generally had small staffs and little equipment. He could also hire workmen and

organize a work force of his own. No

troops were available. The only U.S.

Army engineer unit in the islands in

early 1941 was the understrength 14th

Engineers (Philippine Scouts), a combat

regiment of the Philippine Division,

already engaged in improving tactical

roads and trails on Bataan. In this situation, Stickney had to make the best use

of the construction and engineering talent at his disposal.18

One obstacle to speed was the traditionally slow method of awarding lumpsum contracts by advertising for competitive bids. With so few large construction

firms in the islands and with their

capabilities quite well known to the

department engineer, competitive bidding would cause needless delay. Besides, the tunnels the engineers were to

construct on the fortified islands and

Bataan were of a highly secret nature,

the details of which it was not advisable

to make public through advertising.

Accordingly, on 2 May Stickney radioed

to Washington asking authority to negotiate contracts. Under Secretary of War

Patterson on 19 May directed the department engineer to use cost-plus-a-fixed-fee

agreements. After Stickney wired back

that he did not need to make fixed-fee

contracts but urgently required authority

to negotiate lump-sum and unit-price

contracts, Washington on 13 June gave

him that authority. Even though he

could now negotiate, there still remained

the time-consuming tasks of making estimates, preparing plans, and arriving at

terms of agreement.19

Construction got under way slowly.

During April and May, Stickney managed to start 4 projects, including

Bataan Field in the southeastern part of

the peninsula, a bombproof shelter for

general headquarters at Fort McKinley,

just south of Manila, and a runway at

Nichols Field. June marked the beginning of work on a depot at San Juan del

Monte, just east of Manila, and on already existing Kindley Field on Corregidor. Within the next three months the

engineers broke ground for 16 projects,

among them a dock on Bataan, 2 air

warning stations, and 3 new airfields—

Del Monte and Malabang on Mindanao

and O'Donnell on Luzon. By the end

of September construction was in progress at 26 jobs estimated to cost $1,500,-

000.20

Colonel Stickney had barely started to

build when the southwestern monsoons

began. For the next five months construction crews battled mud and torrential rains. Maj. Wendell W. Fertig,

assigned to Bataan early in the summer,

later recounted: "[The] rainy season was

in full swing and the forest was a morass.

. . . Thousands of cubic yards of rock

had been placed as surfacing on the

secondary roads, but under the pounding

of 10-wheel ammunition trucks, all vestiges of hard surfacing disappeared in a

18

 (1) Ltr, Stickney to Kingman, 28 Apr 41. (2)

Ltr, Stickney to CofEngrs, 14 Nov 41. 600.1 (Phil

Dept (Airfields) 1941. (3) Rpt of Interv, Capt Manning J. Dauer with Maj Gen Hugh J. Casey, Jun 44.

Casey File 9.

19

 (1) Rads, Dept Engr to CofEngrs, 2 and 28 May

41. 600.1 (Phil Dept Airfields) 1941-42. (2) 1st Ind,

OUSW to TAG, 19 May 41, on Ltr, OCE to USW,

10 May 41. (3) Rad, TAG to CG Phil Dept, 23 May

41. (4) Ltr, TAG to CofEngrs, 13 Jun 41. All in

600.1 (Phil Dept Airfields) 1941-42. 20

 Dept Engr, Constr Progress Rpt for Semimonthly Period Ending 30 Nov 41.
62 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

sea of mud. Two tractors were kept

busy hauling these monstrous trucks out

of mud holes." Transferred to Clark

Field in August, Fertig remarked that

construction had become a "nightmare."

 21

 Conditions were so bad at

Nichols Field that the Air Corps suspended operations there in July.22

 The

engineers continued work on the runways at Nichols but with "25 percent

efficiency." The weather had a hampering effect on construction throughout

western Luzon.23

At the outset the department engineer

had little construction machinery. An

inventory of 28 December 1940 listed the

following items of power-driven equipment: 6 bulldozers, 2 shovels, 2 rock

crushers, an earth auger, and a grader.

Little help could be expected from the

Philippine Government, for, in order to

keep down unemployment, the commonwealth used practically no equipment.

Few contractors in the islands had machinery, and delivery from the United

States would take months. Stickney

proposed to rent and buy locally as much

equipment as he could and to order from

the United States, although shipments

from America would arrive too late "to

be of much benefit this working season."

The Chief of Engineers refused to let

him rent but gave him permission to

negotiate purchases in the local market,

and promised to send equipment from

the States along with the first shipment of

troops.24 Stickney hastened to buy the

few items of new and used equipment

held by local dealers. He begged a few

pieces from the Philippine Department

of Public Works and borrowed from

American commanders. Brig. Gen. Edward P. King, Jr., commanding Fort

Stotsenburg, loaned two new 11⁄2-ton

trucks to the, O'Donnell project. "Without them," wrote an Engineer officer, "it

would have been impossible to begin

construction ... [in an area] which

could normally be reached only by horsedrawn units and then only during the

dry season." Notwithstanding co-operation of this sort, there was never enough

machinery. Only by constant shifting of

equipment from one location to another

could Stickney keep all of his jobs moving.25

Efficient maintenance and repair of

equipment were hard to come by. Most

natives were unacquainted with machines, and the skilled mechanic was

"nearly nonexistent." Too often the

Filipino was concerned primarily with

the appearance of his equipment.

Capt. Harry O. Fischer, area engineer at

Clark Field, got hold of some tractors

belonging to the commonwealth's Bureau of Public Works, "which looked

beautiful—freshly painted and shined."

"But, I found to my sorrow," he wrote,

"that Filipino maintenance went only

skin deep—what they couldn't see didn't

bother them. One D-8 [tractor] I got

had had 7,000 operating hours and had

21

 Fertig, Guerrillero, pp. 5-6, 10. 22

 Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had,

pp. 31–32. 23

 Dept Engr, Constr Progress Rpt for Semimonthly Period Ending 30 Nov 41. 24

 (1) Ltr, Stickney to CofEngrs, 28 Dec 40. 230.14

(Field Maint Force) Rqmts Br Sup Sec. (2) Ltr,

Stickney to CofEngrs, 8 Mar 41. (3) Rad, CofEngrs

to Stickney, 26 Mar 41. Last two in 686 (Clark

Field) 1938-41. 25

 (1) Ltr, Col Harry O. Fischer to C Staff Br OCE

GHQ FEC, 28 Apr 49. SWPA File M343. (2) Fertig, Guerrillero, p. 8. (3) Dept Engr, Constr Progress Rpt for Semimonthly Period Ending 15 Nov 41.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 63

had nothing done to it. It sounded like

a corn grinder." There was, besides,

virtually no local supply of spare parts.

Almost all replacements had to be requisitioned from the United States and delivered over a 7,000-mile-long supply

line. These were conditions the engineers could do little to correct.26

The islands produced many of the

materials needed for construction, including lumber, slag, cement, lime, and

aggregate. Local dealers stocked pumps

and other common items of installed

equipment. Access to these markets was

at first restricted by regulations which

forbade Stickney to purchase in amounts

of more than $500 or to alter standard

plans and specifications without consulting the Chief of Engineers. OCE lifted

the first restriction in March and the

second in May when Stickney made it

known that shortages of steel would

force him to build hangars of wood.

Since time could not be spared for sending the new drawings back to the States

for approval, General Schley gave Stickney authority to alter plans whenever

necessary. The department engineer

could now draw freely on the resources

of the Philippines, but many of the supplies he most desperately needed still

had to come from the United States.

Though shipments of structural steel,

steel siding, heavy cable, switchboards,

and lighting equipment were anxiously

awaited, months were to pass before any

of these items would be received.27

Construction During the Latter

Half of 1941

The arrival of U.S. Engineer units

gave an impetus to the airfield construction program. First to come was the

809th Engineer Aviation Company,

which, upon disembarking at Manila on

10 July, was assigned to Nichols Field.

Well supplied with modern equipment,

the 176 men of the 809th worked around

the clock, operating their own machinery

and serving as foremen of the 800 unskilled native laborers employed on the

project. A second unit, the 803d Engineer Aviation Battalion (less Company

C), arrived from the United States on 23

October. Headquarters Company began

extending the turf runways at Clark to

transform this field into a huge base for

B–17's. Company A took over the project at O'Donnell, some twenty miles

north of Clark, while Company B went

to Del Carmen, near the base of Bataan

Peninsula, where on 10 November it

started construction of a complete airdrome estimated to cost $432,500. On

1 December the 809th became Company

C of the 803d. These engineer troops

helped greatly to make key airfields

operative at an early date.28

Construction gained added momentum

after the arrival of Colonel Casey on 8

26

 (1) Ltr, Stickney to CofEngrs, 28 Dec 40. 230.14

(Field Maint Force) Rqmts Br Sup Sec. (2) Fischer

Ltr, 28 Apr 49. (3) Rad, Stickney to OCE, 18 Jan

41, and reply 29 Jan 41. 400.312 (Phil Dept) pt. 2. 27

 (1) Rad exchanges Stickney with OCE, 12, 21

Mar 41, 2, 8 May 41. (2) Ltr, C Constr Sec OCE to

CG Phil Dept, 24 Mar 41. Both in 600-1 (Phil

Dept Airfields) 1941-42. 28

 (1) Ltr, CO 809th to CofEngrs, 10 Sep 41. 320.2

(809th Engrs) Mil Files, OCE. (2) Brief Hist (Station, Rcds and Events) Co A, 803d Engr Bn (Avn)

(Sep). SWPA Files. (3) Ltr, C Sup Sec OCE to

Stickney, 29 Apr 41. 400.312 (Phil Dept) pt. 2. (4)

Capt. S. A. Goldblith, "The 803d Engineers in the

Philippine Defense," The Military Engineer,

XXXVIII, (August, 1946), 323-25. (5) Dept Engr,

Constr Progress Rpt for Semimonthly Period Ending

30 Nov 41. AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41) Phil Rcds.
64 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

October. Having served in the Philippines from 1937 to 1940 as assistant to

General MacArthur, Casey was familiar

with conditions in the islands. At the

time of his appointment as Engineer,

USAFFE, he was chief of the Design Section of the Construction Division, Office

of The Quartermaster General. There

he had worked under General Somervell

and had had an opportunity to observe

how construction could be pushed at

high speed. Casey, losing no time in

trying to find out where Stickney's program stood, called for information on the

status of major projects. On 1 November Stickney submitted his first semimonthly progress report, and from it

Casey concluded that work would have

to be greatly expedited. He urged Stickney to intensify pressure on contractors

and suggested that certain jobs be

switched from purchase and hire to contract. He induced the commonwealth's

Bureau of Public Works to undertake

additional projects, and used all the

influence he could muster to speed

deliveries from the United States and to

streamline procedures.29

Casey was especially concerned over

the inadequate progress on the air warning stations. Reconnaissance parties led

by Barney Clark, an American civil

engineer who had spent many years in

the islands, had selected sites on Luzon

and on nearby Mindoro and Lubang.

Construction of two stations, one on

Bataan and the other on the Bicol Peninsula, was begun in September, but at

eight other locations nothing had as yet

been done. Since many stations were

in out-of-the-way places, the engineers

had to build hard-surfaced access roads

and strengthen many bridges before the

detection units, each weighing over

eight tons, could be hauled to the sites.

On 15 November plans and specifications

for eight of the stations were but 5 percent complete. Casey insisted that every

effort be made to get these "high priority

projects underway." Of even greater

concern to him was the underground

chamber at Fort McKinley where the

headquarters of the air warning service

was to be located. This complicated

tunneling job was not begun until. 15

October. Casey suggested that Stickney

bring pressure on the contractor, explaining that this tunnel was "a vital

item of the entire Air Warning Service."

 30

With the end of the southwestern

monsoons, construction of airfields on

western Luzon progressed rapidly. The

soil of the Central Plains, composed

largely of marine deposits, had admirable

bearing qualities. Even without surfacing, the runways at Clark, O'Donnell,

and Del Carmen could carry the heaviest

aircraft then in use. Because the soil

was porous, drainage was easily provided.

As one engineer expressed it, Clark Field

29

 (1) Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, "Engineers of the

Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945," vol. I, Engineers in

Theater Operations (cited hereafter as Of C Engr

GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I) (Washington,

1947), p. 4. (2) Fine and Remington, Mil Constr in

the U.S. (3) Ltr, AG USAFFE to CG Phil Dept,

20 Oct 41. (4) DS, Engr USAFFE to AG USAFFE,

27 Nov 41. (5) DS, Engr USAFFE to AG USAFFE,

4 Dec 41. All three in AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41) Phil

Rcds. (6) Ltr, CG USAFFE to TAG, 22 Oct 41.

400.312 (Phil Dept) pt. 2.

30

 (1) DF, Engr USAFFE to AG USAFFE, 27 Nov

41. AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41) Phil Rcds. (2) Fertig,

Guerrillero, pp. 20-21. (3) Dept Engr, Constr Progress Rpt for Semimonthly Period Ending 15 Nov 41.

AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41).
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 65

had "vertical drainage." Dust proved

to be the major problem. The increasingly large numbers of planes arriving at

Clark wore off the turf, with the result

that such clouds of dust arose from the

runways that the air was seldom clear

unless a strong wind was blowing. At

Del Carmen the dust was even thicker.

There, as at Clark, the engineers had

neither equipment nor material for hard

surfacing. Nor did they have any calcium chloride, the chemical commonly

used for dust control. Fertig, the area

engineer at Del Carmen, recalling his

tennis-playing days in Colorado, remembered that clay courts were often treated

with water and beet sugar syrup to make

them dust proof. He decided to experiment by applying to the runway a mixture of water and waste molasses from a

nearby sugar refinery. War came before

the experiment could be completed, but

it was successfully carried out later on

Bataan Field.31

Although plans for fields on the

southern islands developed slowly, considerable work had been done by 15

November. Malabang, a small commercial airport on the southwest coast of

Mindanao, was easily enlarged. Its runway, surfaced with fine volcanic cinders,

was lengthened by the removal of a few

coconut trees. Del Monte, located in

the midst of the pineapple plantations

of northern Mindanao, was originally

nothing more than the fairway of a golf

course. By removing a few rocks from a

strip of land which extended out into the

Tagoloan River and by mowing the

grass of a large neighboring meadow,

natives quickly prepared two additional

strips. Late in 1941 Del Monte was

transformed into a second base for

B-17's. Zamboanga, the third large

field, showed little progress. The War

Department had insisted on the construction of a bomber base near the tip

of Zamboanga Peninsula, where the only

feasible site was in the rice paddies of

that area. Local farmers would not give

up their land willingly and the government resorted to expropriation. After

the land was acquired on 3 November,

the engineers drained the paddies, a task

that consumed much valuable time. By

mid-November runways at Malabang

and Del Monte were in use, but construction at Zamboanga had not yet started.32

Meanwhile, work was under way on

Corregidor, where Mielenz encountered

difficulties similar to Stickney's. His

chief problem was to find contractors for

the big modernization program; begun

late, negotiations dragged on throughout

the fall. Mielenz did manage to begin a

number of smaller projects in the summer of 1941. At the height of the rainy

season, convicts from Bilibid Prison in

Manila laid four-and-one-half miles of

cable six feet underground for the con31

 (1) Dept Engr, Constr Progress Rpts for Semimonthly Periods Ending 15, 30 Nov 41. AG 319.1

(20 Oct 41) Phil Rcds. (2) Edmonds, They Fought

With What They Had, pp. 51 and 239. (3) Fertig,

Guerrillero, pp. 18-20.

32

 (1) Rad, CG Phil Dept to TAG, 17 Apr 41. AG

600.12 (10-26-40) sec. 1 (1). (2) Fertig, Guerrillero,

pp. 24-25. (3) Edmonds, They Fought With What

They Had, pp. 53-55. (4) Rad, TAG to CG Phil

Dept, 27 Mar 41. AG 600.12 (10-26-40). (5) 2d

Ind, Hq Phil Dept to CG USAFFE, 20 Oct 41, on

Ltr, Chmn of Bd of Dirs Staff of Zamboanga City

Farmers Assn to U.S. High Commissioner in the

Phil, 24 Sep 41. (6) Ltr, Office President of the Phil

to CofS USAFFE, 24 Nov 41. Last two in AG 600.1

(6 Sep 41) Phil Rcds. (7) Dept Engr, Constr Progress

Rpts for Semimonthly Periods Ending 15, 30 Nov 41.

AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41) Phil Rcds.
66 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

trolled mine system. In July a construction crew began blasting additional space

for the hospital in the great tunnel under

Malinta Hill and enlarging five laterals

to be used for storage. Other projects

included construction of a bombproof

command post, strengthening beach defenses, and sandbagging.33

General MacArthur found the progress

of construction encouraging, and there

was much to support his view. In

October Stickney launched projects estimated to cost one-third of a million

dollars at Nichols, Clark, and Fort

McKinley. The following month he

added nine jobs to the list of going

projects; included were warehouses and

docks on Bataan, an air warning station

on Lubang Island, additional facilities at

Clark, Bataan, Cabanatuan, and Nielson

Fields, and the two new airbases, Del

Carmen and Zamboanga. By late November Stickney had a program of $3,-

600,000 under way. Meanwhile, the

Corps of Engineers of the Philippine

Army was improving numerous military

fields on Luzon, among them Tuguegarao, Aparri, and Legaspi; the Civil

Aeronautics Authority was readying

commercial fields for military use; and

the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Philippine Government was building a

considerable number of emergency landing strips throughout the islands. All

told, about forty fields, ranging from

large installations such as Clark and

Nichols to mere strips for emergency

landings, were being developed for

military aircraft.34

Combat Engineers

Concurrently with the construction

program, the Engineers prepared for

combat. For many years successive department engineers had been at work on

defense plans under War Plan ORANGE.

Upon mobilization, the department engineer's organization was to be expanded

rapidly by the addition of reservists and

civilians. Labor companies of Filipinos

were to be formed, and full use was to be

made of the employees of the commonwealth's Bureau of Public Works.

Should the enemy invade Luzon, demolitions were to retard his advance, and

the engineers planned to put up roadblocks, mine highways, and destroy

bridges. Especially marked for destruction were roads on the sides of precipitous

mountains and long bridges over deep

gorges and unfordable streams. In the

department engineer's office was a "demolition book" containing sketches of

every bridge of any importance on Luzon, together with wiring diagrams and

computations of the charges required for

destruction. Some 400,000 pounds of

TNT or the equivalent would be needed.

If supplies of TNT were low, the engineers planned to draw on the stocks of

dynamite held by mining companies,

although dynamite was not as effective

33

 (1) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. (2) Rpt of Opns

of USAFFE and USFIP in the Phil Islands, 1941-42,

an. VIII, exhibit E. AG 98-USFI-0.3. 34

 (1) Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 28 Oct 41. AG

350.05 (10-28-41) (1). (2) Dept Engr, Constr Progress Rpt for Semimonthly Period Ending 30 Nov 41.

AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41) Phil Rcds. (3) Rpt of Interv,

Dauer with Casey, Jun 44. (4) Fertig, Guerrillero,

pp. 26ff. (5) Ltr, AG Phil Dept to TAG, 30 Aug 41.

(6) Rad, TAG to CG Phil Dept, 27 Aug 41. Last

two in AG 580.82 (8-2-41) (1). (7) Office of the Chief

Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces,

Pacific, "Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, 1940-

1945," vol. VI, Airfield and Base Development (cited

hereafter as Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of

SWPA, VI) (Washington, 1951).

68 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

for hasty demolitions. Mining engineers

would be called upon to help destroy

roads and bridges. Colonel Casey began

to formulate a plan in line with MacArthur's new strategy of defending the

whole archipelago, but war prevented its

completion.35

The one U.S. engineer combat unit

in the islands, the 14th Engineers (Philippine Scouts), a part of the Philippine

Division and commanded by Lt. Col.

Harry A. Skerry, consisted in mid-1940

of 322 officers and men. While most of

the officers were Americans, the enlisted

men were Filipinos. When not training

or on maneuvers, the 14th built military

roads and bridges and cut trails through

the jungles of Bataan. In January 1941,

when the Scouts were authorized an increase from 6,500 to 12,000, the 14th was

ordered to add 544 men to its roster. By

late November the regiment had been

expanded to include 938 officers and

men. Most of the recruits came from

the Baguio gold mining area and were

old hands at construction.36

The mobilization of the Philippine

Army, begun in September 1941, was

expected to provide the great majority

of the engineer units urgently needed by

MacArthur. Shortly after Casey arrived,

MacArthur ordered him to develop a

force "equipped and trained to meet the

heavy demands now required of the

Engineers in modern warfare." Each of

the 12 Philippine Army divisions was to

include an engineer combat battalion of

500 officers and men. Also to be organized were 3 engineer combat regiments, 6 separate battalions, 2 heavy

ponton battalions, 3 topographic companies, and enough additional units to

provide a complete engineer component

for a Philippine Army of 160,000 men to

be fully mobilized by October 1942. To

accomplish this program would be no

easy task. Casey had no engineer officer

to assist him until 20 November, when

Capt. Emilio Viardo of the Philippine

Army was assigned. Occasionally officers and men from other arms and services helped out. Casey would have to

try to build the force from a cadre with

but limited training. Most Filipino

officers did not have the necessary background to command technical units, and

few American officers could be expected.

The bulk of supplies and equipment

would have to come from the United

States.37

Engineer combat battalions of the

Philippine Army mobilized with disappointing slowness. As late as 1 December 1941 not a single battalion was

completely manned and equipped, with

actual strength closer to 400 men than to

the authorized 500. Equipment consisted chiefly of hand tools, and there

were not enough of these to go around.

The Philippine Army as a whole was no

better prepared than its engineers, a state

of affairs that did not augur well for the

future.38

To make matters worse, MacArthur's

35

 Phil Dept Engr Plan—ORANGE (1936 Revision). 36

 (1) Ltr, Skerry to C Staff Br, 5 May 49. SWPA

Files. (2) OCE, Annual Rpt for Mil Activities of the

CE for the FY 1941, pp. 6, 9. (3) Morton, Fall of the

Philippines, p. 21, n. 16. (4) Ltr, Skerry to C Staff

Br, 30 Jun 49, Comment 2. SWPA Files.

37

 (1) Ltr, Casey to CofEngrs, 17 Oct 41. SWPA

Files. (2) Fischer Ltr, 28 Apr 49. (3) Ltr, Casey to

G-1 USAFFE, 29 Jan 42. Casey File 1. 38

 (1) Skerry Ltr, 30 Jun 49, Comment 4. (2) Ltr,

Col William C. Chenoweth (formerly Engr SLF and

II Corps) to Chief Staff Br, 30 May 49. SWPA files.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 69

order to reduce the four regiments of the

Philippine Division to three, in accordance with the War Department policy of

converting square divisions to triangular,

decreased the number of U.S. engineers.

The conversion of the Philippine Division in early December reduced the 14th

Engineers to a battalion. Despite protests by Casey, Stickney, and Skerry, several hundred officers and men of the

regiment were transferred to other arms

and services. Fortunately, the 14th was

allowed to keep its equipment, which it

later put to good use.39

By early December U.S. Army engineer troops in the Philippines numbered

approximately 1,500, the combined

strength of the 14th and 803d Battalions.

These units made up less than 5 percent

of the total U.S. force. Estimates of the

engineer strength of the Philippine

Army are difficult to arrive at, because

that army was never fully mobilized.

When war broke out, the engineer

component of the Philippine Army

amounted to roughly 5 percent of the

total, far below the 20 percent generally

considered by engineer officers to be the

ideal proportion. In the large force

which MacArthur and Casey planned,

development of engineer units was to

receive high priority and the ratio of

engineer troops was to approach the

optimum.40

Supply

The task of providing engineer supplies and equipment for the growing

U.S.-Filipino forces fell to Maj. Roscoe

Bonham, Stickney's supply officer. In

January 1941 the Supply Division, in

addition to Major Bonham, consisted of

one enlisted man and two native clerks.

The Philippine Engineer Depot, which

Bonham also commanded, was run by

half a dozen enlisted men and roughly

25 native employees. A vigorous program of recruitment produced good

results. By December the Supply Division included 5 officers, 4 enlisted men,

and 31 American and Filipino civilians;

the depot was staffed by 3 officers, 18

enlisted men, and 90 civilians. Located

in the Manila port area, the depot had

been adequate in the past but was too

small to hold the enormous quantities

now required. Bonham succeeded in

increasing facilities during the summer

and fall by constructing a shop and several warehouses and sheds along the

Pasig River. But despite his extraordinary efforts, he never succeeded in

getting enough people or providing

sufficient space.41

Bonham found it even more difficult

to assemble stocks of engineer items than

to find employees and build warehouses.

He scoured the islands for steel, wire,

hand tools, camouflage materials, explo39 sives, and machinery. Importers, local (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 32, 34.

(2) Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and

Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat

Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1947), pp. 271-72, 277. (3)

Skerry Ltr, 30 Jun 49, Comment 2. (4) Chenoweth

Ltr, 30 May 49. 40

 (1) Phil Dept Machine Rcds Unit, Station

Strength and Misc, Offs and EM, Nov 41, cited in

Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 49. (2) Skerry

Ltr, 30 Jun 49, Comment 4. (3) Chenoweth Ltr, 30

May 49. (4) OCE, May 1920, Study, The Corps of

Engrs. EHD Files. (5) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA,

18 Sep 43, Study Gen Engr Problems. SWPA File

139. (6) Ltr, Casey to CofEngrs, 17 Oct 41. SWPA

Files. 41

 Col Roscoe Bonham, 1943, Rpt, Engr Sup,

Luzon Campaign, 1941-42. SWPA Files.
70 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

merchants, manufacturers, and mining

companies all contributed to Bonham's

stores. No likely source escaped his attention. Learning that the CadwalladerGibson Lumber Company was to be

liquidated, he quickly bought up its

stock of one and a quarter million feet

of lumber, paying 40 percent less than

the current market price. Devising an

"unorthodox plan" whereby he himself

guaranteed payment, Bonham was able

to import from India enough burlap to

make more than half a million sandbags.

Ingenuity notwithstanding, scientific instruments, mechanical equipment, and

other special engineer items could not be

procured in the Orient. These would

have to come from the United States.42

Colonel Stickney asked the Chief of

Engineers to send searchlights, bridging,

and water purification units in addition

to construction equipment for the troops.

He also appealed for spare parts. General Schley promised to fill the requisitions as quickly as possible. Meanwhile,

Bonham ordered equipment from

American manufacturers through the

Pacific Commercial Company of Manila.

The U.S. defense program and lendlease requirements took precedence over

the needs of the Philippines, however,

and consignments to the islands had a

low priority. By 19 September Bonham

had accumulated sufficient stocks of earth

augurs, assault boats, and gas shovels to

equip the U.S. troops at initial war

strength. Nevertheless, his inventories

showed great shortages of such basic

items as explosives, searchlights, ponton

bridges, water purification units, tractors,

trailers, and gas-motored timber saws.

Not until autumn did the War Department take decisive action to speed deliveries to the islands.43

Early in September MacArthur expressed dissatisfaction with the low

priority assigned to the Philippines.

Unless his orders for supplies and equipment were filled more promptly, he

would be unable to put the Army on a

war footing as rapidly as he considered

necessary. Marshall, fully aware of the

difficulties that faced MacArthur, agreed

to give the Philippines highest priority.

The engineers in the islands could now

hope to get the troops, supplies, and

equipment they so sorely needed. By

mid-November a general service regiment—the 47th—was being readied for

movement overseas, and equipment for

two aviation battalions was en route.

OCE was making an all-out effort to

speed reinforcements. Encouraged by

the Chief's attempts to aid them, Casey,

Stickney, and Mielenz sent back a huge

requisition. They asked for 21,000 tons

of construction materials and equipment

costing $5 million dollars, but this request did not reach the Chief of Engineers until after Pearl Harbor.44

43

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, 9 Nov 40, and Rads, 18 Jan,

20 Mar 41, Stickney to OCE. 400.312 (Phil Dept)

pt. 2. (3) 1st Ind, 27 Nov 40 on Ltr, 9 Nov 40. (4)

Rad, 29 Jan 41 and Ltr, 29 Apr 41, OCE to Stickney.

Last three in 400.312 (Phil Dept) pt. 2. (5) Rqns,

Bonham to Pacific Commercial Co., 15, 22 Aug 41.

600.1 Phil Dept (Airfields) 1941. (6) Table, Rqmts

and Status of Controlled Items of Engr Equip, 19

Sep41. 400.31 (Phil Dept). 44

 (1) Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 7 Sep 41, and

reply, 9 Sep 41. AG 320.2 (7-28-41). (2) Rqn Form,

Dept Engr to CofEngrs, 21 Oct 41. 600.1 Phil Dept

(Airfields) 1941. (3) Memo, C Misc Br G-3 for C

Opns Br, 10 Nov 41. AG 320.2 (7-28-41). (4) Rad,

Acting CofEngrs to CG USAFFE, 18 Nov 41. 400.31

(Phil Dept). (5) Notes of Conf in G-4, with Incl, 13

Nov 41. 381 (Phils). (6) Ltr, AG USAFFE to TAG,
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 71

Construction Progress

By the first week of December construction was progressing satisfactorily,

but the program was far short of accomplishment. Farthest advanced were

Clark and Nichols. Yet several runways

at these fields were still building. Bataan Field was 68 percent complete;

Del Monte had one usable runway, and

the construction of housing was just

beginning; and 70 percent of the work

on Malabang's runway had been done.

The remaining fields were far behind

these. Other types of projects were also

lagging. The Mariveles dock and the

Limay wharf were nearing completion,

but the important tunnels on Bataan

had not yet been started. Progress on

the air warning stations was slow; only

two were operating—one at Nielson, the

other at Iba. Contracts for the first

items in the new program to modernize

fortifications on Corregidor were still in

process of negotiation. The engineers

had succeeded in getting most of their

projects under way, but much of the

work of construction remained to be

done.45

To some the prospect was not encouraging. Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, commanding the Far East Air Force

(FEAF), pronounced the progress of airfield construction "disappointing." He

observed that work was proceeding more

or less on a peacetime basis. It was difficult to change the age-old customs of

the tropics. "The idea of an imminent

war seemed far removed from the minds

of most," wrote Brereton in his diary

under the date of 9 November.46 On

the eve of the Japanese attack, Col.

Francis M. Brady of FEAF described the

outlook as "quite discouraging." In a

personal letter to Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz,

he stated: "Construction of airdromes is

lagging due to lack of engineer personnel

and inability to secure competent civilian

assistance from among the Filipinos or

local contractors. The dearth of equipment is also a serious factor."

 47

 The

engineers were no better satisfied but

offered no apologies. Considering the

handicaps under which they labored,

they felt their showing was a creditable

one.

Except those high-ranking officers who

had been informed of the breakdown of

negotiations between the United States

and Japan, few were aware of the

seriousness of the situation and the

imminence of war. A peaceful atmosphere still pervaded the islands. How

remote war seemed is suggested by Col.

Wendell W. Fertig's description of an

excursion on the last day of peace:

Sunday, December 7th, dawned a perfect

day for a picnic at Lake Taal. The four

officers from our mess had already made

arrangements for an old-fashioned steak

fry. . . . loading the outboard motor we

set out for the lake. . . . [The] entire day

17 Nov 41. 400.312 (Phil Dept). (7) Exhibit B

with Ltr in (6) above. AG 320.2 (7-28-41). WD

Ltr AG 575.1 (11-17-41) MC-D to CofEngrs, 11 Dec

41. 400.312 (Phil Dept). 45

 (1) 1 Incl to Ltr, Dept Engr, Phil Dept, to CG

FEAF (thru CG USAFFE), 3 Dec 41. (2) Dept Engr,

Constr Progress Rpt for the Semimonthly Period

Ending 30 Nov 41. Both in AG 319.1 (20 Oct 41)

Phil Rcds. (3) Ltr, Asst to CofEngrs to USW, 5

Dec 41. 600.1 Phil Dept (Airfields) 1941.

46

 Quotations from Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton,

The Brereton Diaries (New York: William Morrow

and Company, 1946), p. 21. Copyright, 1946, by

Lewis H. Brereton. 47

 Quoted in Memo, OCAAF for CofEngrs, 6 Dec

41. 600.1 Phil Dept (Airfields) 1941-42.
72 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

was spent in lazy fishing and in enjoyment

of the huge steaks prepared over a driftwood fire. The brilliant sunset illumi- nated the lake and we started home across

the reddened waters.

The picnickers were awakened at 4:30

the next morning to the news that the

Japanese had attacked Hawaii. "We

stood by ... awaiting the inevitable

blow. . . . ," wrote Fertig. "We could

only hope that, in matching our puny

weapons against the aggressor, somehow

help would reach us before too late."

 48

Withdrawal to Bataan and

Corregidor

War came to the Philippines with

overwhelming suddenness. On the

morning of 8 December enemy planes

appeared over the islands to bomb strategic targets. About noon Japanese

bombers carried out devastating attacks

on Iba and Clark Fields. So effective

were these and succeeding raids on airfields that within a few days the striking

power of the Far East Air Force was

almost completely destroyed. On 10

December Japanese troops landed at

Vigan on the northwestern coast of Luzon and near Aparri on the northern

coast. Two days later a third force came

ashore at Legaspi near the southeastern

tip of the island. From these three

points enemy troops began moving inland—their major objective, the nearby

airfields. In the Visayan Islands and on

Mindanao no landings of decisive or even

critical importance were made until

fairly late in the campaign.49 The story

of the defense of the Philippines is thus

almost entirely one of fighting on Luzon.

It was here that the engineers had to

make their greatest effort.

The engineers urgently required a

large increase in troop strength, but because of Japan's naval superiority, no

more units could be expected from the

United States, at least not in the near

future. All that could be done to increase the number of men in the field

was to speed mobilization of the combat

battalions of the Philippine Army. Most

retired and Reserve officers had already

been ordered to active duty and the

remaining few were called up immediately.50

 Casey appealed to civilian engineers to serve with the Army. Many

volunteered, with some being commissioned at once and others serving as

civilians.51 American mining engineers,

who came to be known as "Casey's

dynamiters," were to be of inestimable

value.52 "These men," Casey wrote,

"although they in general knew little of

the military, were ideally qualified to

perform all phases of engineer operations. They were of a pioneer type

accustomed to doing crude engineering]

under great difficulties . . . and capable

of improvising and getting the work

done."

 53

 Since the number of mining

engineers was small, each man knew

48

 Fertig, Guerrillero, pp. 40-41. 49

 Morton, Fall of the Phillipines, pp. 98ff.

50

 Incl 5 to Ltr, Mielenz to C Staff Br, 17 Mar 47.

SWPA Files. 51

 From December 1941 to May 1942, approximately 85 men were commissioned as Engineer officers directly from civilian life or the enlisted

grades. Incl 2 to Mielenz Ltr, 17 Mar 47. 52

 Frazier Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against

Japan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), pp.

39ff. 53 Casey, Rpt on Conduct of Demolitions in the

Philippines (cited hereafter as Casey, Demolitions),

draft MS, 1942. SWPA File M344.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 73

most of the others either personally or by

reputation. This simplified recruiting.

Many of the mining engineers, moreover,

brought with them their crews of loyal

Filipino workmen.54

When war began, two Army ground

forces were mobilizing on Luzon.

North Luzon Force (NLF), commanded

by Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright,

was responsible for the defense of the

part of the island north of Manila. The

part south and east of the capital was to

be defended by South Luzon Force

(SLF), commanded by Brig. Gen. George

M. Parker, Jr. A third force, USAFFE

Reserve, under the immediate command

of General MacArthur, was to hold

Manila and the area immediately to the

north along the shore of Manila Bay.

In USAFFE Reserve were the 14th engineers. The 803d, under Stickney's

direction, was kept hard at work repairing bomb damage at Clark and Nichols

and rushing Del Carmen and O'Donnell

to completion. Each of the divisions in

the North and South Luzon Forces had

its engineer combat battalion. The

first engineer units to see combat were

the battalions with Wainwright's North

Luzon Force.55

Engineers With North

Luzon Force

On 4 December, Colonel Skerry had

turned the command on the 14th engineers over to Capt. Frederick G. Saint

and left to take up his new duties as

Engineer, North Luzon Force. When,

on the following day, he reported to

Wainwright's headquarters at Fort Stotsenburg, he found he was the only engineer on the scene. On 7 December three

enlisted men were loaned to him, and he

was told he could expect an officer within

a few weeks. Four divisional combat

battalions were mobilizing, the 11th,

21st, 31st, and 71st. The 91st, also mobilizing, was attached to NLF but was

not to be assigned until a week later.

There were no force engineer units for

work in rear areas; neither was there any

equipment. For work behind the front

lines Skerry was expected to make use of

the divisional combat battalions, insofar

as possible. In accordance with plans of

long standing, he could also employ the

district engineers of the commonwealth's

Bureau of Public Works.56

The engineers of NLF were to operate

in an area some 275 miles long and 100

miles wide. In the north it was mountainous. On the west was a narrow

coastal plain and in the east the mountains extended directly to the sea. The

only passageway south through the northern ranges was the narrow Cagayan

River valley. Southeast of Lingayen

Gulf was an extensive level area, the

Central Plains. About 40 miles wide

and stretching 100 miles from the Gulf

to Manila, the plains provided a natural

avenue of approach to the Philippine

capital. Northern Luzon had three

principal rivers, the Cagayan flowing 54

 Ltr, Fertig to C Staff Br, 17 Mar 47. SWPA

Files. 55

 (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 69ff.

(2) [Hist of] The Philippine Division in 1941-42.

OCMH Files. (3) Goldblith, "803d Engineers,"

The Military Engineer, XXXVIII (August, 1946),

323-25.

56

 Memo, Skerry to CofS NLF, 1 Aug 42, sub: Rpt

of Orgn and Opns of NLF Engrs Between 8 Dec 41

and 6 Jan 42 (cited hereafter as Skerry, Rpt of NLF

Engrs). SWPA Files.
74 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

northward through the mountains, the

Agno following a westerly course and

emptying into Lingayan Gulf, and the

Pampanga cutting southwestward across

the Central Plains to Manila Bay. Except in their upper reaches and in a few

other places, these rivers were unfordable. Northern Luzon boasted a fairly

good road net. Along the west coast

from Lingayen Gulf to Bataan was a

graveled highway capable of taking heavy

military traffic during the dry season.

An all-weather road, Highway 5, ran

from Aparri through the Cagayan Valley

and across the Central Plains to Manila.

Another all-weather road, Highway 3,

extended down the northwest coast to

Lingayen Gulf and thence across the

Central Plains to the capital. Northern

Luzon was also served by the main line

of the narrow-gauge Manila Railroad,

which ran from Manila to San Fernando,

La Union, on the coast north of Lingayen Gulf.57

On the day the Japanese landed at

Vigan and Aparri, Casey ordered the

destruction of roads, bridges, and ferries

in the Cagayan Valley and the mountainous regions of northern Luzon. Skerry

called upon the engineers of the Bureau

of Public Works to do this job. No

TNT was available, nor were there any

tetryl caps or electrical cap exploders,

but mining companies of the Baguio

region had ample stocks of dynamite,

and Skerry asked three of the largest to

send him 180 tons. Within a few days

shipments began to arrive. Lacking the

most powerful explosive and the best

types of detonators, Skerry prescribed

exceptionally large charges of dynamite

and ordered the use of time fuzes. One

expert described this method as "plainly

a matter of loading heavy charges of

dynamite, sandbagging or tamping them

as much as possible, and . . . pray[ing]

for a complete job of demolition." Steel

bridges with concrete floors proved especially difficult to destroy. In the confusion of the times, no use was made of

the demolition book, so carefully prepared over the years. It remained in

Stickney's office in Manila, to be destroyed shortly before the capital was

evacuated. By 19 December, the engineers had completed their demolitions

in north central Luzon and had sealed

off the region with roadblocks. The

enemy advance southward from Aparri

to the Central Plains would be difficult.58

A greater menace was the Japanese

thrust along the coastal road southward

from Vigan. On learning of the enemy

landing, Casey had issued orders for

large-scale demolitions between Vigan

and San Fernando. Since no engineer

units were available, he asked the Bureau

of Public Works to take this assignment.

By 16 December enemy troops had penetrated as far south as Tagudin, about

twenty-five miles above San Fernando.

That same day USAFFE received word

that its orders for demolitions were not

being carried out. Casey telephoned

57

 Rpt of Opns of NLF and I Phil Corps in Defense of North Luzon and Bataan From 8 Dec 41 to

9 Apr 42 (hereafter cited as Rpt of Opns of NLF

and I Phil Corps), p. 2. OCMH Files; copy in

SWPA File M278.

58

 (1) Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 10 Dec 41,

Casey File 8. (2) Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. (3)

McCandlish, "How Explosives Went to War in the

Philippines," The Explosives Engineer, XXIII, No.

5 (September-October, 1945), 211. (4) Incl, Comment by Stickney, "Engineer Organization," to

Mielenz Ltr, 17 Mar 47.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 75

Skerry at once, ordering him to blow the

bridges to the north of San Fernando.

The next morning Skerry made a hurried

reconnaissance of advance positions and

found that bridges south of Tagudin had

already been destroyed. He saw, however, that the situation called for more

engineers. On the afternoon of the

17th he visited the local district engineer

to urge greater speed in the preparation

of demolitions around San Fernando and

the following day persuaded the manager

of a nearby mine to lend him twelve

foremen. Meanwhile, on orders from

USAFFE, Skerry's engineers destroyed

the large concrete pier, the telephone

exchange, and the oil and gasoline tanks

at San Fernando. Although demolitions

did not appreciably retard the Japanese

advancing down the coast, they entered

the city to find little of military value

remaining.59

A major enemy landing at Lingayen

Gulf appeared imminent. On 18 December Wainwright ordered Skerry to

prepare for demolition the roads and

bridges from Lingayen Gulf to as far

south as the towns of Tarlac and Cabanatuan—an area about forty miles wide and

sixty miles deep. Holding up enemy

forces by demolitions on the Central

Plains would be much more difficult than

delaying them in the mountainous regions of the north. In the upper Central

Plains, there were only two rivers that

would be serious obstacles to an invader

equipped for modern war—the Agno

and the Tarlac. During the dry season

even these were fordable at certain

points. Because the land was flat, there

were few good sites for roadblocks.

Tanks could easily traverse the dry rice

paddies of the almost treeless Central

Plains.60

Given this terrain, Skerry prepared a

plan of defense in depth, making use of

the only important obstacles in the entire

region—the natural barriers of the

rivers. Under his direction, the engineers of the Philippine Army and employees of the Bureau of Public Works

set out to prepare all major highway

bridges from the Agno to Tarlac and

Cabanatuan for instant demolition.

Casey furnished groups of miners under

the command of Lt. Col. Narciso L.

Manzano (Philippine Scouts) to help

with this work. Colonel Manzano and

his miners were temporarily attached to

North Luzon Force. Casey's office also

sent a special detail—a second lieutenant

and three miners—to NLF to help

Skerry prepare the large railroad bridges

for destruction. Small spans and culverts in the area were to be taken care

of by the rearmost divisions if and when

Wainwright's force withdrew through

the Central Plains.61

A serious weakness in the defense was

the lack of antitank mines. On 18 December Casey asked the USAFFE ordnance officer to order 70,000 from the

United States. Meanwhile, Bonham,

using designs supplied by Casey, furnished makeshift mines. Consisting of

a wooden box about ten inches on a side,

with approximately five pounds of dyna- 59

 (1) Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 10 Dec 41.

Casey File 8. (2) Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. (3)

DF, Engr USAFFE to G-3 USAFFE, 16 Dec 41. (4)

DF Engr USAFFE to CofS USAFFE, 16 Dec 41. Last

two in Casey File 8.

60

 (1) Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. (2) Memo,

Casey for Rcd, 23 Dec 41. Casey File 4. 61

 (1) Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. (2) Ltr, Skerry

to C EHD, 13 Apr 56, Comment 5. SWPA Files.
76 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

mite, a flashlight battery, and a detonator, each mine was put together and

placed by the troops. Bonham could not

supply enough materials to mine extensive areas. The most the engineers

could hope for was that an enemy tank

would occasionally blunder into a mine

field. Skerry's success in delaying the

enemy would have to depend mainly on

the destruction of bridges.62

Fears of a landing at Lingayen Gulf

proved well founded. On 22 December

a large Japanese force came ashore between Bauang and Damortis. The

enemy troops were too numerous to be

beaten back by the few NLF units near

the gulf, and reinforcements were not

available. Hopes of defeating the

enemy at the beaches vanished. On the

night of 23 December, General MacArthur declared War Plan ORANGE-3 in

effect. Wainwright would withdraw

southward and attempt to hold back

Japanese forces coming down from the

gulf long enough to enable South Luzon

Force to fall back through Manila, cross

the Pampanga, and continue on to

Bataan. NLF was to carry out its withdrawal in five phases, designated D1, D2,

D3, D4, and D5. Making his first stand

midway between Lingayen Gulf and the

Agno, Wainwright would retire to four

successive positions, the last of which,

D5, stretched from the town of Bamban

on the west to Sibul Springs at the foot

of the mountains on the east. This was

the critical line. It had to be held until

South Luzon Force was safely across the

Pampanga.63

Because there were few planes left to

interfere with the enemy's progress and

because the untrained Philippine troops

could not withstand the powerful Japanese onslaughts, Wainwright had to rely

heavily on his engineers. It was they

who had to keep open roads and bridges

ahead of the retreating columns—not an

easy task in view of the Japanese supremacy in the air. It was the engineers,

too, who had to prepare all bridges for

demolition and assure their destruction

after friendly troops had passed over.

Four of Wainwright's five engineer

combat battalions participated in the

withdrawal—the 11th, 21st, 71st, and

91st. The 31st had gone with its division to help guard the western coast just

above Bataan and on 14 December had

been removed from NLF control. Wainwright decided to keep the 11th, 21st,

and 71st Battalions with their divisions

until they reached San Fernando, Pampanga. Then each battalion, less one

company, was to be detached to maintain

the roads leading into Bataan.

By Christmas Eve, Wainwright's forces

were retreating toward the D2 position,

located along the southern bank of the

Agno. The engineers had been at work

here for more than a week. Anticipating bottlenecks when the heavy traffic

from the north reached the bridges at

Bayambang and Carmen, Skerry had put

men from the Bureau of Public Works

to work building two bridges of palm

62

 (1) Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, "Engineers of the

Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945," vol. VII, Engineer

Supply (cited hereafter as Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC,

Engrs of SWPA, VII) (Washington, 1947), p. 21. (2)

Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. (3) Hq USAFFE, Instr

on Use of Improvised Antitank Mines, [n.d.]. Casey

File 4.

63

 (1) Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story (New York, 1946), pp. 32-42. (2)

Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 166-69.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 77

logs at Wawa and Urbiztondo. Charges

had been placed on all the bridges over

the Agno. When the Japanese bombed

the big highway bridge at Carmen on 23

December, some of the charges exploded,

dropping the southernmost span to the

river bed. Wainwright, alarmed because most of his tanks were still north

of the river, ordered immediate repair.

The 91st engineers, under constant

enemy air attack, built a temporary span

within 24 hours.64 After the last of the

American and Philippine troops had

crossed the river, the engineers demolished all the bridges along the 50-mile

front. Wainwright's forces had reached

the south bank of the Agno and temporary safety.65

During most of the ensuing withdrawal, the front-line engineer battalions

were kept intact. They moved in a

definite pattern: on completing an assignment in a given area, a unit leapfrogged over the one behind it and

continued working farther to the rear.

These battalions, with other covering

forces, prepared and executed demolitions and put in roadblocks near the

front. To the rear, all important demolitions, whether of bridges and roads or

of equipment and supplies, were carried

out by engineers under Skerry's command. Much of this work was done by

the 91st Engineers. On 21 December

the entire battalion was placed under

Skerry, and, except for one company

which later returned to its division, remained with him throughout the withdrawal. Still farther to the rear, other

engineers readied roads and bridges for

destruction. When War Plan ORANGE-3

went into effect, Wainwright ordered

Skerry to prepare demolitions and erect

obstacles in the territory south of Tarlac

and Cabanatuan. In the large new area,

stretching southeast toward Manila and

southward to Bataan, mining engineers

and district engineers of the Bureau of

Public Works again rendered valuable

service.66

As NLF withdrew farther south, the

engineers made ready to blow up every

bridge in the path of the Japanese.

Skerry personally directed the placing of

the charges at the critical highway

bridges across the Tarlac and the Bamban Rivers and over the Pampanga at

Cabanatuan, Arayat, and Candaba. The

special detail of miners, with the aid of

troops, prepared the spans on the Manila

Railroad, taking special care with the

great bridge at Bamban. At all the large

bridges on the highways and the railroad

the engineers managed to place their

charges well ahead of time.67

Groups of miners, getting the innumerable smaller spans ready for destruction, had to work rapidly, for they had

much to do and time was short. W. L.

McCandlish, a demolitions expert who

had arrived in the islands shortly before

the outbreak of war, worked with a small

group under Manzano which operated

north of San Fernando, Pampanga. Mc64

 Their commander, Capt. Antonio P. Chanco

(Philippine Army), writing to Wainwright later, recalled this effort "as one of our best under stress."

Ltr, Chanco to Wainwright, 10 Jun 46. SWPA Files. 65

 (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 169ff.

(2) Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 16 Dec 41.

Casey File 4. (3) Wainwright, General Wainwright's

Story, pp. 39-40. (4) 2d Ind, Skerry to Hq Fourth

Army, Awards and Decorations Bd, 6 Sep 46, on Ltr,

Chanco to Wainwright, 10 Jun 46.

66

 Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. 67

 Ibid.
78 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Candlish's description of the group's

activities furnishes an example of how

such parties operated. While fighting

was going on at Tarlac, about twentyfive miles to the north, McCandlish and

his men prepared the bridge at Angeles.

After placing the charges, the blasting

cap, and six feet of fuze, they arranged to

have three Scouts stationed at the south

end of the bridge to guard against premature detonation, and then moved

southward. Between Angeles and Mexico, they found only small timber structures. They drenched these with fuel

oil and directed the troops stationed as

guards to ignite them when the order

was issued by the proper divisional staff

officer. At Mexico, McCandlish and his

miners found a 30-foot concrete bridge

over a deep gorge. At both sides of the

north and south abutments they dug pits

six feet deep, and in each of the four

holes they placed 150 pounds of dynamite, attaching a cap and a fuze three

feet long. They then instructed the detachment at the bridge how to fire the

charges, cautioning the men that it

would take only two minutes for the

fuzes to burn through to the blasting

caps.68

Inexperienced Filipino engineers left

to blow up bridges found it difficult to

determine when to set the charges off.

They frequently could not ascertain

whether all friendly forces had crossed,

for the Philippine infantrymen very

often did not arrive at the right place at

the right time. Sometimes the engineers could not find the divisional staff

officer who was to notify them when to

light the fuzes. An engineer would then

have to take upon himself the responsibility of destroying the bridge. Sometimes officers, with but incomplete

knowledge of the tactical situation,

ordered demolitions too soon. Occasionally, Filipino engineers grew panicky

and set the charges off without waiting

for any orders at all. The foot soldier

who found himself stranded on the

wrong side of a wrecked span might

somehow manage to get across and rejoin his outfit, but to the tanker, a prematurely blown bridge could spell

disaster. Since tanks operated under

USAFFE control, the engineers made

special efforts to get information on their

movements but were not always successful. One tank commander, Col. Ernest

B. Miller, concluded that he would have

to place his own men at each bridge

over which his tanks must pass, "with

orders to shoot anyone who attempted to

blow it without our authority." On at

least one occasion Miller's tankers had

to rebuild a bridge before they could

move south. Colonel Skerry pointed

out that demolition at the proper time

was his greatest problem by far. As a

rule, the engineers tried to keep a bridge

intact until strong enemy action on the

far bank made destruction imperative,

but the fact remained that some bridges

were blown too soon.69

In these tense days the engineers were

called upon not only to destroy but also

68

 McCandlish, "How Explosives Went to War in

the Philippines," The Explosives Engineer, XXIII,

No. 5 (September-October, 1945), pp. 209-10.

69

 (1) Map 2, facing page 10, Office of the Chief

Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces,

Pacific, "Engineers of the Southwest Pacific," Volume

VIII, Critique (Washington, 1950), shows the location

of the principal demolitions on Luzon. (2) Skerry,

Rpt of NLF Engrs. (3) Col. Ernest B. Miller,

Bataan Uncensored (Brainerd, Minn., 1949), pp. 103-

104. (4) Ltr, Skerry to C Staff Br, 4 Jun 49, Comment 6. (5) Casey, Demolitions.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 79

COLONEL FERTIG. (Photograph taken in 1953.)

to build. On 18 December MacArthur

directed Stickney to prepare temporary

landing fields for the "large reinforcements of airplanes" expected from the

United States. These fields were first to

be developed for pursuit craft and later

to be enlarged for bombers. Every

likely site was to be turned to use.

Ordered to move to Bataan, the

companies of the 803d Aviation Battalion built a number of fields while

on their way to their new location.

On 21 December, Company A left

O'Donnell for Dinalupihan, near the

base of Bataan Peninsula, where it

put in three emergency strips in as

many days and then began work on

revetments. On Christmas Day, headquarters company left Clark to join

Company A. Four days later, both

moved south to Orani to build another strip there. Company B, meanwhile, having finished one runway at Del

Carmen, moved on to construct two

bomber strips at Hermosa and Pilar on

Bataan's eastern coast. Company C left

Nichols and went to the tip of Bataan to

push work on Bataan and Cabcaben

fields. Filipino civilians helped greatly

in the preparation of these fields. Under

the direction of Colonel Fertig, who in

October had been appointed chief of

Stickney's Construction Division, thousands worked to improve existing runways and rough out additional fighter

strips. The engineers provided the

fields, but there were few planes to use

them. Most of the newly constructed

strips were soon to be overrun by the

enemy.70

The situation confronting Wainwright grew progressively more serious.

Six days after their landing at Lingayen

Gulf, the Japanese reached the D4 line,

and on the night of 30 December Wainwright ordered a withdrawal to the D5

position. That the retreat from Lingayen Gulf had been a planned and

orderly withdrawal was owing in no

small measure to the demolitions of the

engineers.71 With Wainwright's men

now making a determined effort to hold,

much depended upon the speed with

which the troops of South Luzon Force

70

 (1) Ltr, MacArthur to Dept Engr, 18 Dec 41.

Casey File 8. (2) Mielenz Ltr, 14 Mar 47. (3) Goldblith, 803d Engineers," The Military Engineer,

XXXVIII (August, 1946), 323-25. (4) Brief Hist of

Co A, 803d Engrs. (5) Ltr, Fertig to C Staff Br, 5

Jun 47. SWPA Files. 71

 The importance of this work in helping prevent

the enemy from disrupting the withdrawal is attested

to not only by American but by Japanese officers as

well. Lt. Gen. Masami Maeda, chief of staff of the

14th Army, later stated that "the destruction of all

bridges by the American forces delayed our advance"

from the gulf to Manila. Statement of Gen Maeda,

2 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56234. Copies are in Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div,

GHQ, FEC, I and II, and in OCMH Files.
80 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

could clear the bridges over the Pampanga at Calumpit on their way to

Bataan.72

Engineers With South

Luzon Force

When war broke out, South Luzon

Force was mobilizing in the mountainous

country below Manila. An engineer

organization had barely begun to take

form. Arriving at headquarters at Fort

McKinley on 8 December, Capt. William C. Chenoweth, the engineer, SLF,

found he had a staff consisting of two

enlisted men from the 14th Engineers.

Force engineers were entirely lacking,

nor were any divisional engineers available for work behind the front lines; the

only battalions in SLF, the 41st and 51st,

could not be spared by their divisions.

Chenoweth quickly mobilized the employees of the Bureau of Public Works.

Within a few days after the first enemy

landings on Luzon, he had 2,000 men at

work stockpiling materials to be used in

repairing roads and rebuilding bombdamaged bridges.73

With the landing at Legaspi on 12

December, much of southern Luzon was

in danger of being overrun by the enemy.

About 250 miles southeast of Manila,

Legaspi was connected with the capital

by a good highway and the main line of

the Manila Railroad. The only obstacles in the way of the advancing Japanese were the numerous ravines, gorges,

and isthmuses of the long and narrow

Bicol Peninsula. Because of its length

and the small number of troops at his

disposal, MacArthur had decided not to

defend the peninsula. He relied chiefly

upon the engineers to impede the

enemy's advance toward the capital.74

Upon learning of the landing, General

Parker ordered an engineer detachment

to the peninsula, and a group from the

51st Engineer Battalion, under the command of 2d Lt. Robert C. Silhavy, left

at once to destroy highway and railroad

bridges. The Japanese rushed small

motorized units forward in an attempt to

head off demolition parties. On 17 December, while placing charges on the

railroad bridge near Ragay, 75 miles

northwest of Legaspi, Silhavy and his

men were fired on by a Japanese patrol.

The engineers returned the fire and proceeded with their work. After demolishing the bridge, they took up positions

on the near bank of the gorge and soon

thereafter the Japanese retired. This

was the first encounter with enemy

ground forces on southern Luzon.

Silhavy and his men continued demolition work on the peninsula until ordered

to move to Bataan.75

On 14 December Casey directed the

district engineers to destroy the bridges

and "critical road cuts and fills" on the

main highway running along the length

of the peninsula. Their work in wrecking many highway bridges and roads

greatly hampered the enemy's progress

72

 (1) Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp.

41-42. (2) Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. 73

 (1) Ltr with Inch, Chenoweth to C Staff Br, 27

Sep 47. SWPA File M339. (2) Chenoweth Ltr, 30

May 49.

74

 (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 109-10.

(2) Rpt of Opns of SLF, Bataan Defense Force, and

II Phil Corps in Defense of South Luzon and Bataan,

pp. 8-9. Copy in SWPA File M281. 75

 (1) Rpt of Opns of SLF, Bataan Defense Force,

and II Phil Corps, app. II, p. 7. (2) Casey, Demolitions.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 81

toward Manila. Casey, meanwhile, instructed the Manila Railroad to prepare

to dynamite its principal bridges. The

president of the railroad, Mr. Jose Paez,

on 16 December told Casey that he had

ordered all rolling stock and materials

moved toward the capital. His crews

had already pulled spikes out of thirty

kilometers of track. Stocks of gasoline

and oil which could not be hauled northward were being burned or dumped into

the sea. He agreed to destroy all bridges

and promised to give special attention to

the destruction of spans over deep gorges.

These pledges were in large part fulfilled. By the 17th the piers of the

bridges at Libmanan and Banga Caves

had been partly wrecked, the trusses

dropped about three feet, and the ties

and rails thrown into the river. The

destruction of the 150-foot center span

of the bridge across the gorge at Del

Gallego effectively ended all rail traffic

between Legaspi and Manila for months

to come.76

Lack of co-ordination between the

Manila Railroad and South Luzon Force

increased the difficulties of evacuating

supplies. Around 14 December, before

any trains could be moved out of the

peninsula, the bridges at Malicbuy and

Pagbilao, both west of the Bicol Peninsula, were blown on orders of a tactical

commander of South Luzon Force.

Casey ordered the bridges rebuilt at

once. Since they had not been seriously

damaged, reconstruction was completed

in thirty-six hours. On the 16th a wreck

southeast of Manila damaged three cars

and tore up a section of track. Casey

attributed the accident to "interference

by the local military authorities with

railroad operation." Seeking an end to

mishaps of this sort, he arranged a meeting between officials of the railroad and

officers of SLF. Better timing in the

destruction of vital bridges arid improved

scheduling of trains resulted.77

With but few mining engineers in his

part of the island, Chenoweth had to rely

heavily on men from the Bureau of

Public Works. McCandlish, who made

several inspection trips in southern

Luzon, reported that in many instances

demolitions were not expertly handled.

On the eastern Luzon coast, for example,

he happened upon a district engineer

and a group of Filipino workmen who

were preparing to destroy a section of

road near the mouth of the Tignuan

River. The road ran along the side of a

steep cliff about 500 feet above the river.

The men were digging holes two feet

deep in the road and loading each of

them with two cartridges of dynamite.

McCandlish considered these measures

entirely inadequate. A tunnel with

crosscuts blasted out of the cliff and

loaded with three or four tons of dynamite "would have taken out the road,

brought down the cliff, and stopped all

transportation for a considerable period."

With little experience in complicated

demolitions work, and lacking the time

for adequate planning and preparation,

district engineers nevertheless carried out

hundreds of small jobs successfully.78

76

 (1) Memos, 14, 17, 18, 19 Dec 41, Casey for

CofS USAFFE. (2) Memo, M[anzano] for Rcd, 16

Dec 41. Both in Casey File 4. (3) Fertig Ltr, 5 Jun

47. (4) Rpt of Opns of SLF, Bataan Def Force, and

II Phil Corps, p. 16, and app. II, p. 25.

77

 (1) Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 16 Dec 41.

Casey File 4. (2) Casey, Demolitions. 78

 McCandlish, "How Explosives Went to War in
82 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

A Japanese landing on 24 December

at Atimonan, at the base of the Bicol

Peninsula, threatened to cut off all troops

to the east. The day before, MacArthur

had decided to withdraw to Bataan.

The rapid movement of SLF northward

was doubly urgent. The only troops

east of Atimonan by the 24th were two

reinforced infantry companies and several detachments of the 51st Engineers.

These were recalled at once. On 28

December, MacArthur informed SLF of

Wainwright's precarious position and

urged greater speed in the movement to

Bataan. He directed SLF to cross the

vital Calumpit bridges not later than

0600 of New Year's Day.79

As SLF withdrew across southern

Luzon, the engineers destroyed highway

and railroad bridges. They dynamited

steel and stone structures and soaked

wooden spans with fuel oil and burned

them. Rolling stock, food, automobiles,

trucks, and gasoline were evacuated or

destroyed. Brig. Gen. Albert M. Jones,

in command of SLF during its withdrawal to Bataan, stated that demolitions

in southern Luzon were so effective that

if so ordered his troops could have held

back the enemy for a much longer time.80

Last Days of the Withdrawal

With both SLF and NLF troops converging on Calumpit, much depended

on the effectiveness of demolitions in the

vital area between the D5 line and

Manila. Many small groups were at

work here. One party of fifteen miners

with Colonel Manzano helped clear

fields of fire and erect barbed wire entanglements along the D5 line. Thousands of civilians, recruited by the mayor

of San Fernando and the district engineer, aided in this work. After helping

to strengthen Wainwright's positions,

Manzano and his men moved southward

to the region between the Pampanga

River and Manila to prepare bridges for

demolition. Engineers from Stickney's

office placed charges along roads and

railroads leading to the capital. Colonel

Casey organized several parties who were

to destroy important installations in and

near Manila.81

Of all the bridges being prepared for

destruction, those at Calumpit were to

furnish the most exacting test of the

engineers' skill in demolitions. The

Pampanga, 500 feet wide and 16 feet

deep at this point, was spanned by two

bridges, one carrying Highway 3, and the

other the main line of the Manila Railroad. Charges for blasting the great

steel and concrete spans had to be figured

and laid with exceeding care. Because

SLF and some units of NLF were still

east of the river, the greatest precaution

had to be taken not only against premature blowing but also to insure setting

off the charges at precisely the right

time.82 The story of the engineers' work

at Calumpit is one of the most dramatic

of the Philippine campaign.

On 27 December McCandlish, tothe Philippines," The Explosives Engineer, XXIII,

No. 5 (September-October, 1945), 208. 79

 (1) Rpt of Opns of SLF, and Bataan Defense

Force, and II Phil Corps, app. II, p. 8. (2) Morton,

Fall of the Philippines, p. 199. 80

 (1) Rpt of Opns of SLF, Bataan Defense Force,

and II Phil Corps, app. II, p. 25. (2) Casey, Demolitions.

81

 (1) Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs. (2) Skerry Ltr,

4 Jun 49, Comment 6. (3) Casey, Demolitions. 82

 Skerry, Rpt of NLF Engrs.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 83

gether with other experts from Casey's

office and a company of soldiers, began

preliminary tasks. They first turned

their attention to the highway bridge,

breaking holes through the concrete deck

directly over the piers. Blowing the

north abutment would be easy, since at

its base was a recess three feet deep in

which a half ton of dynamite could be

loaded and tamped with sandbags and

boulders. While one group of soldiers

packed charges in the holes on the highway bridge, another placed explosives

under the railroad bridge. Japanese

planes dropped several bombs, but apparently made no determined efforts to

destroy the bridges. Still, even near

misses were dangerous to the heavily

loaded structures. During one raid, a

bomb hit a sugar warehouse near the

south end of the highway bridge; another landed in the river only fifty yards

downstream. At first, air raid warnings

delayed the work, but as the men gained

confidence, they continued to pack dynamite and fill sandbags, heedless of the

wailing sirens.83

When Skerry inspected the bridges on

30 December, he found that heavier

charges would be required at the lower

panel points to insure complete destruction. The highway bridge needed additional dynamite on its concrete deck.

Intending to take no chances, he prescribed an extra ton for each of the two

structures and ordered an alternate system of firing for the deck charges on the

highway bridge. Inspecting the bridges

again on the morning of the 31st, he

noted that more dynamite had been

placed at the critical panel points and

covered with sandbags. Before leaving,

Skerry instructed his men to lay still

more explosives across the decks of the

structures after all traffic had passed over.

The bridges would then be ready.84

By the early morning hours of New

Year's Day SLF and NLF had cleared the

bridges. A flank guard which had been

stationed at Plaridel, some seven miles to

the southeast, crossed over between 0430

and 0500. All U.S. and Filipino forces

were now safely across the Pampanga—

all except Manzano and his men, who

were somewhere between Manila and

Calumpit. Skerry asked Wainwright to

delay the destruction of the bridges as

long as possible in order to give Manzano's party time to get across. Wainwright agreed to wait until 0600, even

though he felt the situation was becoming more and more serious. Dawn was

beginning to break, and rifle fire was

increasing on the south bank of the

Pampanga. Enemy patrols were getting

close to the river. "In weighing the

tactical importance of blowing the

bridges and making the . . . unfordable Pampanga a real obstacle," wrote

Skerry, "against waiting for a small

group, that . . . could withdraw to

Bataan by other routes, . . . [there

could be] but one answer. . . ." Wainwright directed Skerry to blow the

bridges. At 0600, the engineer went to

the men waiting at the two abutments

and instructed them to fire the highway

bridge at 0615, the railroad bridge immediately thereafter. Wainwright and

the members of his staff took cover, and 83

 McCandlish, "How Explosives Went to War in

the Philippines," The Explosives Engineer, XXIII,

No. 5 (September-October, 1945), p. 210. 84

 Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, Comment 9.
84 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

the engineers lit the fuzes. After a few

minutes the huge charges went off with a

tremendous roar and the spans fell into

the river. The broad Pampanga lay in

the path of the enemy.85

As the Japanese columns neared

Manila, the engineers touched off largescale demolitions in and around the city.

Preparations for denying the enemy

everything of military value had been

under way for more than a week. Industrial plants, radio stations, warehouses and shops of the Manila Railroad,

Nichols and Nielson Fields, and Fort

McKinley were to be wrecked. Supplies

which could not be moved to Bataan

were to be destroyed, all except food, the

loss of which would inflict greater hardship on the Filipinos than on the Japanese. Casey was especially anxious to

leave no oil, since the enemy's stocks

were extremely limited. He had therefore made elaborate plans for setting on

fire the large oil tank farm in the Pandacan district. Roads and bridges within

Manila were to be left intact. On 30

December the work of destruction began. On that day and the next, the city

was dotted with fires and rocked by

explosions, as the engineers put into

effect their scorched earth policy.86

Demolition engineers were among the

last to leave the city. One of the many

to remain behind was Earle Bedford,

before the war a civilian engineer in the

islands, and now in charge of demolition

work south and east of Manila in the

provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Laguna,

and Rizal. Casey had instructed Bedford to stay in Manila as long as possible

to destroy any military equipment he

could find, and to make his way to Bataan

by whatever means he could command.

Bedford and his men destroyed three

large bridges and many small ones south

of the city. They wrecked the piers at

Wawa. While mining bridges, they

noticed about twenty-seven native houseboats and barges moored in the tidal

waters of the rivers. Bedford succeeded

in burning four in the Imus River, but

the strenuous objections of the owners

stopped him from setting the rest on fire.

On New Year's Day he and his crew of

Filipinos destroyed quantities of abandoned supplies at Fort McKinley. With

another American civilian he went to

Pandacan to ignite any remaining supplies of gasoline and oil. The two men

found three tanks still intact but surrounded by moats of burning oil. Unable to get near enough to place

explosives against the valves, they used

rifle fire to perforate the center tank and

then ran to escape the ensuing explosion. On 2 January, the day the Japanese occupied the capital, Bedford

arranged to leave for Bataan by boat.

But while on his way to a rendezvous

with two of his Filipino foremen in

Intramuros, the old walled city of

Manila, he was picked up by the Japanese and interned at Santo Tomas

University for the duration of the occupation. Many who stayed behind shared

Bedford's fate, but others managed to

escape, some finding small boats to take

them across the Bay. Among those eluding the enemy were Manzano and his

men, who, after destroying six bridges

just north of the city, made their way to

85

 (1) Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story,

pp. 43-44. (2) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp.

201, 208-10. (3) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49. Comment 9. 86

 (1) Casey, Demolitions. (2) Fertig, Guerrillero,

pp. 50-51.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 85

Bataan by walking across country and

slipping through the Japanese lines at

night.87

Meanwhile, American and Philippine

forces were completing their withdrawal

to Bataan. After clearing the bottleneck at San Fernando, troops of NLF

and SLF withdrew southwestward. The

rearmost units passed through Layac

Junction, at the entrance to the peninsula, in the early morning of 6 January.

Here was the last bridge over which the

troops had to pass. Before destroying

the bridge, Captain Chanco asked the

officer commanding the covering force of

tanks whether his last tank was across.

He replied it was, Skerry later recalled,

"taking the usual position for a military

oath and swearing by all that was holy

all his tanks had crossed. The enemy

was not immediately at hand, so a delay

was ordered. Suddenly from out of the

darkness one of his own tanks came

rumbling along!"

 88

 When the last tank

had crossed, Chanco destroyed the

bridge. The withdrawal to Bataan was

complete.

Bataan

The Philippine campaign, so far a

war of movement, was henceforth to be

a war of position. The defenders of

Bataan were to undergo one of the most

protracted sieges of World War II.

How long they could hold out would

depend to a considerable extent on the

strength of their fortified positions.

One of the oldest arts of the military

engineer is the construction of fieldworks, and here was a situation requiring

all his skill and experience. Lines had

to be drawn that would give the weak

American and Filipino forces the greatest

advantage. Positions had to be made

as strong as possible and given the utmost

support. As they dug in, the beleaguered troops were conscious of their

desperate situation but were sustained by

the hope that help would come before an

overwhelming attack or attrition forced

them to surrender.

The terrain was on the side of the

defenders. About twenty-five miles long

and twenty miles wide, rugged, jungled

Bataan provided many areas where a

small force could hold off a superior

one. (Map 6) Down the center of the

peninsula ran a steep mountain range,

with two prominent peaks, Mount Natib

in the north and Mount Bataan in the

south. The deep jungles of western

Bataan, especially, favored the stationary

defender rather than the attacker. Here

trails afforded the principal means of

communication. During the day the

oppressive heat made travel through the

forests exhausting. Nights were cool,

but the dense vegetation reduced visibility almost to zero; even when the

moon was full, movement was almost

impossible except along well-worn trails.

Less primitive was the eastern half of

Bataan. Along the coast were several

towns, among them Limay, Orion, and

Pilar, soon to figure prominently in the

fighting. While the many rice paddies

would furnish the defenders with good

fields of fire, there were fewer strong

positions than in the western half of the

peninsula. Bataan had two roads suitable for vehicular traffic. One, a single87

 (1) Memo, Bedford for Casey, 31 Jan 45. Casey

File 5. (2) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, Comment 9. (3)

Fertig, Guerrillero, pp. 52-53. 88

 Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, Comment 9.
86 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 6

lane coastal highway, ran south along

the eastern shore to Mariveles at the tip,

crossed over to the western side, and

extended north as far as Moron. The

other stretched across the middle of the

peninsula from Bagac to Pilar.89

Early in January, Casey and Stickney

went to Bataan to help organize the defenses, setting up their offices at "Little

Baguio," high on the southern slopes of

the Mariveles Mountains. As Engineer,

USAFFE, Colonel Casey was to supervise

all engineer activities during the siege.

By early January he had eight officers to

assist him. Five remained with their

chief on Bataan; three were sent to MacArthur's headquarters on Corregidor.

As service command engineer, Colonel

Stickney was to be responsible for work

in the rear areas, including all construction. A week after war began, Washington had ordered the duties of the constructing quartermaster in the islands

transferred to the department engineer.

89

 (1) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, Comment 10. (2) Rpt

of Opns of NLF and I Phil Corps, pp. 16-17. (3)

Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 63.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 87

Stickney immediately took over construction as well as repairs and utilities work

in and around Manila, but elsewhere on

Luzon the confused tactical situation prevented the transfer. On 28 December

Stickney assumed direction of all construction on Bataan and Corregidor.

He had succeeded in augmenting his

staff considerably since the beginning of

the defense build-up and now had forty

officers. His organization was divided

into three sections: Construction, under

Fertig; Supply, under Bonham; and Defense Works on the Fortified Islands,

under Mielenz.90

When the Filipino troops moving

down from the north reached Bataan, all

the detached units of combat engineers

were once more with their divisions.

The 1st, 31st, and 91st Battalions moved

to the western half of the peninsula, becoming part of General Wainwright's

command, now redesignated I Corps.

The 11th, 21st, 41st, and 51st Battalions

became part of II Corps, formerly SLF,

which, under General Parker, was to

defend the eastern half of Bataan. The

2d and 71st Battalions went first to the

service command area; the 71st was later

transferred to I Corps, the 2d to II

Corps. Skerry as Engineer, I Corps, and

Chenoweth as Engineer, II Corps, set to

work immediately to help ready frontline positions.91

The Main Battle Position

The main battle position, along which

Wainwright and Parker would first attempt to hold, extended from Mauban

on the west to Mabatang on the east, a

distance of about 18 miles. At the

center of the line were two precipitous

mountains, Mount Natib and Mount

Silanganan, covered with jungle, which,

it was believed, the enemy would be able

to penetrate only with the greatest difficulty. Extensive field fortifications were

therefore to be prepared only on the

eastern and western portions of the line

and were to extend about 5 miles inland

from the coast on either side of the

peninsula. The position had one obvious weakness. The almost impassable

interior made communication between

the two corps extremely difficult. Casey

believed there was still another drawback. On 2 January he pointed out that

between Mauban and Moron, 3 miles to

the northwest, lay an excellent beach

which would invite a Japanese flank attack. He recommended that the line be

anchored at Moron, and that the Mauban

line be used as a switch position. The

line remained at Mauban, but MacArthur took steps to strengthen the

beach, posting a company of infantry and

a troop of cavalry at Moron and along

the shore to the south to guard against

an amphibious landing.92

During these first days of strenuous

effort to prepare the main battle position 90

 (1) Fertig, Guerrillero, p. 60. (2) Memo, Casey

for Rcd, 25 Jan 42. (3) Ltr, Mielenz to CG Harbor

Defense of Manila and Subic Bays, 19 Jan 41. Last

two in Casey File 8. (4) 2d Ind on Mielenz Ltr, O

HD QM, Fort Mills to CG Harbor Defense of

Manila and Subic Bays, 14 Jan 42. 91

 (1) Ltr, Casey to CofS USAFFE, 19 Jan 42.

Casey File 8. (2) Morton, Fall of the Philippines,

p. 247.

92

 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 248-50.

(2) Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 48.

(3) Rpt of Opns of SLF, Bataan Defense Force, and

II Phil Corps, p. 20. (4) Memo, Casey for CofS

USAFFE, 2 Jan 42. AG 381 (2 Jan 42) Phil Rcds.
88 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

before the Japanese could strike, the

engineer combat battalions were not only

developing roads and trails, laying mines,

and building gun emplacements but

were also clearing fields of fire, digging

foxholes, and stringing barbed wire.

Inspecting his portion of the line during

the first week of January, Skerry found

the work but half complete and noted a

number of deficiencies. The outpost

line of resistance had good fields of fire,

but too much of the scarce barbed wire

had been placed here. Along the main

line of resistance, foxholes were too close

to the wire. The regimental reserve

line, while well located, was badly in

need of the wire which had been used so

lavishly on the outpost line. Skerry

concluded that engineer troops were not

being used to best advantage. He asked

division commanders to take their engineers off such jobs as digging foxholes,

which should be done by infantry, and

put them to building roads and trails.

He also arranged to have the engineers

work with the infantry in stringing wire.

Chenoweth reported troubles, too, but

of another variety. The troops "were

green and could see no reason for digging

foxholes, clearing fields of fire, or laying

barbed wire." They expended "no

great amount of energy ... in digging

themselves in." The 41st engineers

were attempting to build roads across

rice paddies, but "as fast as ... [they]

would dry out a rice field someone else

would turn in the water." Yet, despite

many difficulties, the lines along the II

Corps front were fairly well fortified

when the Japanese attacked on 9 January. In the I Corps sector, fortifications

were less elaborate, but there, because of

the difficult terrain, an enemy attack was

less likely to succeed.93

Skerry was plagued by a shortage of

engineer troops, but Chenoweth was

more fortunate. During the last days

of December a number of mining engineers had made their way to the east

coast of Bataan. About 500 troops who

had become separated from their units

were also in the II Corps area. Most of

the soldiers were stragglers, or survivors

of a ship that had sunk after hitting a

mine in Manila Bay. On 29 December

these men were organized into the 301st

Engineer Combat Regiment (Philippine

Army), which on 13 February was split

into two battalions, the 201st and the

202d. The miners were commissioned

as officers. Assigned to Chenoweth,

these new engineer troops erected field

fortifications, prepared tank traps, and

laid mines. In time they became some

of the best road builders on Bataan.94

After the Japanese assaults began, the

engineers continued to strengthen the

lines. Visiting I Corps positions in midJanuary, Casey observed that Skerry's

men had felled trees and placed antitank

mines and timber piles in front of the

main line of resistance. He found infantrymen stringing an additional

twenty-five tons of wire on the defense

lines and along the shore of the South

China Sea. The troops were also constructing underwater obstacles south to

93

 (1) Skerry Ltrs, 4 Jun 49, Comment 11-1/2, and

20 Jul 49, Comment 7. (2) Chenoweth Ltr, 27

Sep 47. 94

 (1) 1st Lt P. V. Cardenas, Hist and Composition

[of the 301st Engr Combat Regt]. SWPA Files. (2)

Hq USAFFE GO No. 26, 13 Feb 42. (3) Ltr, Casey

to CofS USAFFE, 19 Jan 42. Casey File 8.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 89

Eman Point. Moving on to the II Corps

area, he noted that wire had been placed

not only on the main line of resistance

but also around sectors down to platoons.

Many makeshift mines were in place,

and the 11th Division had strung wire

along the beach. Chenoweth had built

about fifty dummy gun positions of

stove pipe and bamboo, and was using

small charges of dynamite to simulate the

firing of cannon. These dummies were

proving effective in drawing enemy fire.

While defenses were fairly good at both

ends of the line, the Japanese, displaying

an unexpected skill in jungle warfare,

had begun to penetrate the dense forests

on the slopes of Mount Natib and Mount

Silanganan.95

The Reserve Battle Position

By 22 January, Japanese pressure on I

Corps was heavy, and the enemy's penetration of the left flank of II Corps was

threatening to envelop Parker's divisions.

On that day MacArthur ordered Wainwright and Parker to fall back to the

reserve battle position, eight miles to the

rear. The withdrawal was to begin on

the 23d and be completed by the 26th.

Both corps would take over defense of

the service command area so that their

responsibilities would extend to the tip

of Bataan. The reserve line, stretching

a distance of about fourteen miles from

Bagac on the South China Sea to Orion

on Manila Bay, had been selected many

years before in accordance with the requirements of War Plan ORANGE-3.

The withdrawal would put both corps

on less mountainous ground and greatly

shorten the extent of the beaches and

headlands which the troops of I Corps

would have to defend against seaborne

attack. The reserve position was to be

the final one. When the Japanese broke

through it, the battle for Bataan would

be over.96

The withdrawal was not altogether

advantageous. Casey, now a brigadier

general, pointed out the many disadvantages that would plague the defenders. The original line, while longer

than the reserve line, was better organized and better wired, and it had good

fields of fire and artillery positions.

Withdrawal to the narrow waist of

Bataan would shorten the line but would

crowd the defenders into an area about

fifteen miles square. Pilar airfield, the

8-inch guns at Bagac, and part of the

road between Pilar and Bagac would be

lost. Bataan Field would come under

long-range artillery fire. Worst of all,

almost nothing had been done on the

preparation of the reserve battle position. But enemy pressure forced the

decision to withdraw, a decision that

was "timely and necessary even if more

than regrettable."

 97

When Skerry had inspected the reserve

battle position in the I Corps area in

early January, he found that, except for

one stretch of wire at Bagac and another

at the center of the peninsula, the defense

lines had not even been marked on the

95

 (1) Ltr, Casey to CofS USAFFE, 19 Jan 42.

Casey File 8. (2) Wainwright, General Wainwright's

Story, pp. 50-51.

96

 (I) Ibid., p. 52. (2) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, Comment 13. 97

 (1) Memo, Casey for DCofS USAFFE, 22 Jan 42.

Casey File 8. (2) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, Comment 13.
90 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ground. The eastern sector of the line

was, at that time, not much better prepared. The 14th engineers, sent to the

II Corps area in late December, were the

only troops to work steadily on the line.

Other units, both engineer and infantry,

came and went in rapid succession.

Outfits were ordered to the area only to

be pulled out after a short stay and sent

into combat. In mid-January two companies of the 301st and 600 additional

Filipino soldiers, most of them airmen,

were rushed down to the reserve position.

But time was fast running out. When

MacArthur withdrew from the first line,

much still remained to be done on the

second.98

On reaching the reserve position, every

available man, combat engineer and infantryman alike, was put to strengthening the new line. All the work of

digging foxholes, stringing wire, laying

mines, and hacking out underbrush had

to be repeated. Tools were now fewer

and materials more scarce. Much of the

wire expended on the first line could not

be reclaimed; many picks, axes, and bolos

had been broken or lost. When the men

of the 41st Combat Battalion fell back

from the original battle line, they left

everything behind, including 1,700

shovels and 140 rolls of barbed wire.

Bayonets, mess kits, and tin cans, which

had sometimes served as entrenching

tools on the first battle position, were

used even more extensively on the second. The engineers of both corps toiled

long and hard to build fortifications,

occasionally working well in front of the

outposts without any covering forces.

By the end of the month Casey found

positions in the II Corps "relatively well

organized." The I Corps sector, where

jungles restricted fields of fire, was, in his

opinion, the weaker one. He pointed

out, however, that a concentrated enemy

drive could penetrate either position.

He therefore stressed the need for a

strong mobile reserve which could be

rushed to any point along the front.

"If our strength is all tied down," he

warned, "it is bound to fail."

 99

There was no lateral communication

between the two corps except by the

roundabout coastal highway. The front

lines cut across the Pilar-Bagac road in

such a way that the central portion was

held by the Japanese. Troops in the

center of the peninsula were isolated.

An attempt to carry in supplies to them

on pack mules met with little success,

and some companies had nearly exhausted their food and ammunition

before roads could be cut through.

Engineer units in II Corps alone built

over 100 kilometers of roads. But the

most important and difficult task of all

was that of building a road to parallel

the Pilar-Bagac highway. The new

route cut through the jungles on the

northern slopes of the Mariveles Mountains and across river valleys with vertical

drops of as much as 2,000 feet. This

project was assigned to the 14th engineers. Having but five dozers of their

own, they borrowed an angledozer and a

tractor from Chenoweth and two graders

from the 803d. Beginning the job on 5

98

 (1) Rpt of Opns of NLF and I Phil Corps, p. 18.

(2) Skerry Ltr, 20 Jul 49, Comment 7. (3) Ltrs,

Casey to CofS USAFFE, 19 and 24 Jan 42. Casey

File 8. (4) Chenoweth Ltr, 30 May 49.

99

 (1) Ltr, Casey to CofS USAFFE, 31 Jan 42. (2)

Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Feb 42. Both in Casey

File 1.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 91

February, the 14th completed it two

weeks later, one day ahead of schedule.100

Often the combat engineers had to

fight as infantry. On 2 February, when

Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel, the commander of the 31st Infantry Division,

launched a counterattack to prevent an

enemy breakthrough in the II Corps

area, he took his engineer battalion from

reserve to make the assault. The men

crossed the defense lines and advanced

toward the enemy but soon encountered

strong opposition. Infantrymen were

sent in to support the engineers, and by

sundown the attackers were directly in

front of the Japanese position. The

next morning engineers and infantrymen again moved forward, this time

without meeting any resistance. Under

the cover of darkness, the enemy had

withdrawn. Frequently engineers became involved in combat when the positions they were fortifying came under

attack. One hundred and eighty men

of the 51st Battalion worked on the outpost line from 26 January to 8 February.

They had no machine guns and but three

automatic rifles. Ten percent of the

men were sick with malaria and dysentery, yet they helped beat off three attacks and suffered 25 percent casualties.

Recalling these grueling times, Skerry

wrote, "The problem we had was to stave

off pursuit by the enemy after the crushing of the main battle position and to

organize and occupy the reserve battle

position ... I doubt if ... any staff

engineer in the I Philippine Corps got

over two hours sleep a night. Some

nights none."

 101

Field manuals had little to say about

the defense of positions in the jungle

terrain. Most of their space was devoted

to the conduct of operations in country

like that of western Europe. Although

defensive warfare in the jungle was in

many ways similar to that in other types

of terrain, Skerry noted certain essential

differences. The dense vegetation of

Bataan limited visibility to from 10 to

100 yards. In order to provide themselves with fields of fire and with passageways through the jungle, the troops

had to cut out trees and underbrush, but

they had to be careful not to clear so

much that their positions could be

spotted from the air. Positions to be

mutually supporting had to be closer

together than in open, rolling terrain.

If units were not to be isolated, the

regimental reserve line had to be nearer

the main line of resistance. Patrols had

to be constantly on the lookout for infiltration parties. It was highly advisable to have the main line of resistance

continuous and to have it wired throughout in order to conceal the location of the

mutually supporting areas and to prevent

infiltration. At all times, maximum

camouflage was essential.102

With the stabilization of the line between Orion and Bagac, the struggle

became a test of American and Filipino

endurance. Japanese naval and air

100

 (1) Ltr, Engr USAFFE to CO 14th Engr Bn

et al, 5 Feb 42. Casey File 4. (2) Wainwright,

General Wainwright's Story, p. 63. (3) Ltr, Casey

to CO 14th Engrs, 22 Feb 42. Casey File 1. (4)

Chenoweth Ltr, 27 Sep 47.

101

 (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 335. (2)

Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Feb 42. Casey File 1.

(3) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, Comment 14.

102 (1) with Wainwright's approval, Skerry, prepared instructions incorporating these ideas and

distributed them to all units of I Corps. Skerry Ltr,

20 Jul 49, Comment 10. (2) Ltr, Skerry to EHD, 13

Feb 56, Comment 4. SWPA Files.
92 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

supremacy precluded sending in any

sizable reinforcements. Occasionally a

few small boats and planes from the

southern Philippines managed to slip

through the blockade. The Japanese

had the upper hand and could either

settle down to await the inevitable collapse or by fighting hasten the end. The

defenders, still hoping for help from the

outside, could only try to stretch their

meager supplies as far as possible and

supplement them by every available

means.

Supplies

When the siege began, the engineers

were among the best supplied troops on

Bataan. Their depot near Mariveles

and their advance dump in the center

of the peninsula were well stocked with

dynamite, caps and fuzes, roofing, and

food. "We have so much gasoline and

fuel," wrote Fertig, "that we need not

bother the Quartermaster for some

time." Much of the credit for the enviable position of the engineers was owing

to Bonham. As soon as War Plan

ORANGE-3 went into effect, he and his

transportation officer, Capt. Harold T.

Gewald, took prompt and vigorous

action to get supplies to Bataan.

USAFFE had issued instructions that

food was to be given first priority. Bonham and Gewald, disregarding priorities,

organized their own transportation system. They shipped stocks to the peninsula by rail and truck. In Manila they

pressed into service two tugs and a number of barges and lighters which were

used to carry supplies to Bataan and

Corregidor. In the last few days a number of barges were towed out into the

bay and anchored or tied to piling.

Later the engineer launch Night Hawk

combed the bay and found all of them

with most of their cargoes still on board.

By 1 January, 10,800 tons of supplies had

been moved out of Manila. Engineer

officers gave Bonham high praise,

Mielenz, for example, affirming that

Bonham had gotten "the jump on all the

other services."

 103

But even with the transfer of thousands of tons of supplies, the situation

was critical. Among the items in short

supply were barbed wire, burlap bags,

axes, bolos, picks, and shovels, as well as

construction items such as bitumen, cement, steel pipe, acetylene, and oxygen.

Most of the materials and tools needed

in field fortification were scarce, and

there was far too little construction

equipment. When the siege began, the

803d Battalion and the 14th Battalion

were fairly well equipped, but the engineer battalions of the Philippine Army

had only a few bulldozers and no graders, shovels, rollers, or electrical equipment.104

Shortages of supplies and equipment

were in part the result of changes in

tactical plans. In July 1941 the department engineer had asked for authority to

establish a base depot in southern

Bataan, but permission was not granted.

After MacArthur decided to try to hold

the enemy at the beaches, Stickney and

Bonham had to give up their project for

103

 (1) Incl 1 to Ltr, Fertig to C Staff Br, 13 Jun 49.

(2) Casey, Demolitions. (3) Bonham, Engr Sup. (4)

Ltr, Fertig to C Staff Br, 10 Jun 47. (5) Incl 6 with

Mielenz Ltr, 17 Mar 47. 104

 (1) Skerry Ltr, 20 Jul 49, Comment 13. (2)

Ltr, Fertig to C Staff Br, 17 Jun 49. (3) Ltr, Casey

to MacArthur, 1 Mar 42. Casey File 6. (4) Of C

Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I, 23.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 93

sending supplies to the peninsula and

get ready, instead, to disperse them

throughout the islands. In November

they opened a second depot in Manila

and another on the island of Cebu, and

shortly after the outbreak of war they

started up two more depots on Luzon,

one at Tarlac and one at Los Banos.

Not until WPO-3 went into effect were

they permitted to move large quantities

to Bataan. In the confusion of the hurried withdrawal, vital supplies were lost.

Stocks at some of the advanced depots

had to be destroyed or left behind. On

the way to Bataan, Filipino soldiers

abandoned much of their equipment and

supplies. Colonel Mielenz later commented that "many supplies could have

been saved and the troops finally retreating into Bataan would have been much

more adequately provided for" had War

Plan ORANGE not been temporarily discarded.105

Determined to increase their stores,

the engineers set out to salvage everything of use on Bataan. Groups dispatched by Bonham to scour the peninsula stripped the fences of barbed wire

and took nails, roofing, lumber, and

machinery from bombed-out buildings

and sunken barges. One of Bonham's

parties found 6,500 feet of pipe, six

transformers, and four motor boats at

Orion. Another raised 100 tons of

barbed wire from the waters off Cabcaben. Learning that 150 tons of wire

had gone to the bottom off Corregidor,

the engineers hastened to retrieve it.

Among the more important finds was a

sawmill, which Chenoweth located early

in January near the Pilar-Bagac road.

Stickney dismantled the mill and moved

it to Mariveles, where, reassembled and

operated by civilians under the supervision of Bonham's Supply Division, it

was producing lumber before the end of

the month. By March it was supplying

25,000 board feet daily. The 803d

moved rice mills from the vicinity of

Orion and Pilar to lower Bataan.

Though none of the men had ever seen

a rice mill, they succeeded in setting up

four. Three were turned over to the

quartermaster in late January, the fourth

in early February. After the mills went

into production, the engineers were

called upon to keep them in running

order.106

What they did not have and could not

find, the engineers undertook to make.

One of their specialties was a mat, 3 feet

wide and from 5 to 12 feet long, woven

of wire, bamboo, and vines. These mats

were used as temporary revetments.

Rolled into cylinders and filled with

earth, they could also be used in place

of sandbags. Another improvisation

was the hand grenade or "Casey Cookie"

made of a hollow joint of bamboo some

six inches long and three inches in diameter. Containing half a stick of dynamite and tightly packed with 21⁄2-inch

nails, broken glass, or sharp stones, the

bamboo container had its open end

sealed with concrete through which pro105

 (1) Incl 5 to Mielenz Ltr, 17 Mar 47. (2)

Bonham, Engr Sup. (3) Fertig Ltr, 17 Jun 49. (4)

Incl 4 with Mielenz Ltr, 17 Mar 47.

106

 (1) Memo, Casey for Engrs, I Corps and II

Corps and Dept Engr, 29 Jan 42. Casey File 1. (2)

Bonham, Engr Sup. (3) Inspec Rpt, Maj William

A. Gay, 11 Feb 42. Casey File 1. (4) Ltr, Chenoweth to C Staff Br, 30 Aug 47, with Incl. (5) Goldblith, "The 803d Engineers," The Military Engineer,

XXXVIII (August, 1946), 323.
94 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

truded a 3-inch fuze. Stickney produced

these weapons in sizable quantities. By

15 February he was turning out 500 a

day and by the end of the month, 10,000

had been made. At times the grenades

were highly successful, but many failed

to explode. Bonham meanwhile continued to manufacture mines, producing

not only the antitank mine but also a

smaller one to be used against personnel.

Running short of seasoned lumber, he

had to use green timber, which warped

in the heat and sometimes set the charges

off accidentally. On one occasion, the

engineers substituted submarine depth

charges, brought over from Corregidor,

for mines.107

Maps

Even to provide the army with maps,

the engineers had to resort to expedients.

When the war began, they had on hand

two series of topographic maps. The

first, based on surveys made between

1911 and 1914, covered most of Luzon at

a scale of an inch to the mile. The

second, based on surveys made in 1934

and 1935, covered important tactical

areas on that island, such as Cavite and

Bataan, at a scale of two inches to the

mile. Also available was a trail map of

Bataan, prepared by the 14th Engineers

in 1939. The Engineer maps were not

the only ones on hand. Over the years,

the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey had

developed two series, one covering the

entire archipelago, the other, the major

islands. After the switch to War Plan

ORANGE-3, plans to continue map production in Manila had to be quickly

revised. Stickney ordered as many maps

and as much reproduction equipment as

possible transferred to Corregidor by

midnight of 31 December. One of the

four barges loaded with maps, plates, and

equipment sank in Manila Bay, and

another disappeared; the remaining two

reached Corregidor in heavy seas, their

cargoes lost or badly damaged.108

Without presses and with few plates,

Stickney had to devise some way of making maps for the combat units. He put

Maj. Clarence F. Maynard, formerly of

the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey office

in Manila, in charge of map production.

Gathering together the pieces of equipment that had survived the voyage from

Manila, Maynard rigged up a small reproduction plant in one of the plotting

rooms of a gun battery on Corregidor.

Here he produced prints and tracings of

the Engineer and Geodetic Survey maps.

Stickney sent a couple of men to Bataan

to turn out copies of the trail map on a

gelatin duplicator. The sketch maps

were amended from time to time to show

the latest information on roads and trails.

Although a scarcity of paper limited production, most requests were met. On 1

March Casey reported that "map supply

stocks continue adequate for require107

 (1) Rpt of Interv, Lt C. C. Peters with Lt Col

M. S. Janairo, 23 Nov 45. SWPA File M21. (2)

Hq USAFFE, Tng Memo, [n.d.] sub: Improvised

Hand Grenade. Casey File 1. (3) Ltr, Casey to

MacArthur, 1 Mar 42. Casey File 6. (4) Inspec

Rpt, Maj Gay, 15 Feb 42. (5) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49,

Comment 19.

108

 (1) Ltr, Brig Gen Herbert B. Loper to C Staff

Br, 13 Sep 46. (2) Ltr, C. F. Maynard to C Staff Br,

1 Dec 47. Both in SWPA Files. (3) Office of the

Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces,

Pacific, "Engineers of the Southwest Pacific 1941-

1945," vol. III, Engineer Intelligence (cited hereafter

as Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, III),

(Washington, 1950), pp. 12-14.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 95

merits." For a small area such as Bataan,

these primitive methods were satisfactory. Had it been necessary for the

defenders to hold a larger area, the story

might have been a different one.109

Construction in Rear Areas

Fertig, as Stickney's construction

officer, carried heavy responsibilities,

confronted as he was with the job of

completing a number of tasks proposed

or started before the war. The little

work that remained to be done on the

Mariveles dock and the Limay wharf was

quickly accomplished, and the big tunnels near Mariveles were soon under construction. Four thousand linear feet of

underground storage space was provided

during the siege. Fertig kept the quarry

at Mariveles going at full blast while

Bonham operated a ferry service to transport rock to Corregidor. As the numbers of sick and wounded mounted,

construction and maintenance of hospitals, a function recently taken over from

the quartermaster, became increasingly

important. Roads and airfields, however, claimed the major share of Fertig's

effort.110

Engineers of the 803d and civilians

prepared airfields for the planes that

were still expected. They continued to

widen and lengthen the runways at the

three remaining fields—Bataan, Mariveles, and Cabcaben, the quarry near

Mariveles supplying rock for surfacing.

At first progress was fair, largely because

the 803d still had much of its heavy

equipment, but later, as enemy raids took

their toll of men and machinery, the pace

slowed. Dwindling supplies of gasoline

restricted the use of equipment so that

much of the rock had to be crushed by

hand. Plans to extend runways to 6,000

feet seemed more and more impractical.

Soon after the siege began there was but

one plane left for each field. And no

more were to come.111

Roads were more vital than airfields to

the defense. The coastal highway was

the chief supply artery for both corps.

The stretch between Pilar and Orion,

the only paved section, had been torn up

by heavy traffic during the withdrawal.

South of Orion, the road consisted largely

of base rock intended as a foundation for

paving, while along the west coast from

Mariveles to Bagac, the surface was soft

dirt. The 803d Aviation Battalion devoted much of its energies to this allimportant coastal highway. The men

spread gravel over practically the whole

length of the road in the service command area. They widened stretches on

the west coast and constructed alternate

bridges. After air attacks, they filled in

bomb craters so that the flow of supplies

to the front would not be interrupted.112

The 71st Engineer Battalion with its

attached labor companies maintained the

west coast road north of the service com109

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

III, pp. 15-17. (2) Memo, 26 Jan 42, and Ltr, 31

Jan 42, Casey to CofS USAFFE. Casey File 1. (3)

Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 1 Mar 42. Casey File 6.

(4) Skerry Ltr, 20 July 49, Comment 13. 110

 Ltr, Fertig to C Staff Br, 16 Jun 49.

111

 (1) Ltr, Maj Albert J. Kircher to Casey, 24 Jan

42. Casey File 7. (2) Ltr, Casey to CofS USAFFE,

31 Jan 42. Casey File 1. (3) Incl 1 to Ltr, Fertig to

C Staff Br, 31 Jun 49. (4) Fertig, Guerrillero, pp.

85-86. 112

 (1) Ltr, Kircher to Casey, 24 Jan 42. Casey File

7. (2) Goldblith, "The 803d Engineers," The Military Engineer, XXXVIII (August, 1946), 323.
96 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

mand area and placed crushed rock on

part of it.

In most of their undertakings, the

engineers were aided by Filipino civilians. Thousands had fled to Bataan

before the advancing Japanese. Many

Filipinos were reluctant to leave their

families and go to Army projects, which

were likely to be bombed; nevertheless,

the engineers persuaded hundreds to

work for them. At one time Stickney

had about 500 on various jobs, and several hundred more were employed in the

I Corps area. Short rations, cramped

quarters, and frequent bombings led to

a steady deterioration in morale, and

many natives were unwilling to stay on

the job. The engineers offered such

inducements as blankets, transportation,

and more food. When the ration was

increased from two ounces of rice and

one-eighth loaf of bread per man per day

to nine ounces of rice, two ounces of

bread, and some fish, morale improved

noticeably. Despite efforts to better the

workmen's lot, the high rate of turnover

in the labor force continued.113

Exposed to constant bombings and

frequent artillery fire, the engineers in

the rear areas on occasion also had to

fight. In mid-January, Company A of

the 803d began working on the west road

and putting in gun emplacements along

the coast. On 23 January, the Japanese

made a surprise landing at Quinauan

Point, and after scaling the rocky cliffs,

managed to work their way through the

jungle to within 100 yards of the coastal

road. On the 25th, Company A was

ordered to help repulse the enemy, and

of the 90 engineers who took part in the

fight, nine were killed and 38 wounded.

According to the company commander,

the high casualty rate resulted mainly

from the failure of the bamboo grenades

to explode and the impossibility of getting cross fire on the enemy. Driven

back down the cliffs, the Japanese took

refuge in caves and ravines. When assaults by infantrymen and shelling by a

small gunboat failed to dislodge them,

Wainwright sent Skerry with a platoon

of the 71st Battalion to blast them out.

The engineers lowered 50-pound boxes

of dynamite with time fuzes over the edge

of the cliff to the mouths of the caves.

After a sergeant was killed while letting

down one of the boxes, the engineers

tried another method. They threw

grenades consisting of four sticks of dynamite with a 30-second time fuze into the

ravines at the base of the cliff from where

the Japanese were firing. The enemy,

numbering about 50, retreated into a

large cave. The engineers again lowered dynamite, and "blew the place to

pieces."114 The few survivors were

mopped up later.

The End of Resistance

In mid-February, a calm descended

over the battlefields of Bataan. The 113

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, "Engineers of the

Southwest Pacific 1941-1945," vol. II, Organizations,

Troops and Training (cited hereafter as Engrs of

SWPA, II) (Washington, 1953), pp. 13-14. (2)

Memo, Casey to Dept Engr et al., 12 Feb 42. Casey

File 1. (3) Memo, Casey to CofS USAFFE, 2 Mar

42. Casey File 6. (4) Skerry Ltr, 20 Jul 49, Comment 14. (5) Insp Rpt, Maj Gay, 11 Feb 42.

114

 (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 311. (2)

Wainwright, General Wainwrights Story, p. 57. (3)

Inspec Rpt, Lt Thomas H. Delamore, 29 Jan 42.

Casey File 1. (4) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49, Comment 16.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 97

Japanese guns were silent, and there

were few planes overhead. American

and Filipino patrols sometimes moved

as far north as the original battle position

without encountering hostile troops.

Many officers, among them General

Bluemel, talked of re-establishing the

Mabatang-Mauban line. The enemy

was merely biding his time. Early in

February the Japanese commander had

decided to pull back his forces, tighten

the blockade, and prepare an offensive

aimed at overwhelming the weakened

defenders. The pause in battle gave

MacArthur's men time to throw up new

defenses against the assaults, which would

inevitably come.

The engineers now had an unhoped

for opportunity to strengthen positions

all along the line. In the II Corps area,

they dammed the Pilar River, creating a

barrier against enemy tanks, and mined

roads leading to the river crossings. To

provide additional fields of fire, they

dynamited or cut out extensive thickets

of bamboo. Along the front lines, they

constructed more than 1,150 yards of

double apron fence. Along the water's

edge near Limay, they burned houses to

get better fields of fire on the beach.

Meanwhile, they pushed work on roads

and trails. In the I Corps area, they

strung additional barbed wire, connected

foxholes by trenches, and flooded rice

paddies in front of defensive positions.

They built log and earth dams across the

Bagac, the Tuol, and the Tiis Rivers.

During February, they cleared 875,000

square yards of underbrush from the

densely wooded bluffs along the South

China Sea and the jungles near the front.

Early in March, Casey found some of the

front-line positions "outstandingly excellent," others "reasonably well prepared."

 115

As the strain of the siege began to tell

on the defenders, the psychological unpreparedness and lack of training of the

Filipino engineers, as of the Philippine

Army as a whole, became more and more

apparent. Many of the soldiers, recently inducted into the Army, had little

understanding of the issues of the conflict. The language barrier alone was

nearly insurmountable, for 75 percent of

the men understood almost no English.

Nor was there one native tongue; eight

major dialects existed. Efforts to form

this polyglot army into an effective

fighting force had not begun until

shortly before the outbreak of war.

Upon induction, most of the combat

engineers had been assigned to help the

Quartermaster Corps build camps. Not

until November 1941 was a training

program for engineer enlisted men

started. Some inductees were taught

how to use hand tools and pioneer equipment and to build field fortifications and

bridges. A month before the war, twelve

hundred engineer officers began training; the Japanese invasion abruptly

terminated the program. The preparation of the Filipino engineer was at best

rudimentary.116

Performance in battle reflected the

lack of training. Many defense lines

were poorly prepared and carelessly

maintained. Trenches were sometimes

115

 (1) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 1 Mar 42. Casey

File 6. (2) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Mar 42. AG

319.1 (5 Jan 41) Phil Rcds. 116

 (1) Skerry Ltr, 20 Jul 49, Comment 11. (2)

Rpt of Opns of SLF, Bataan Force, and II Phil

Corps, p. 11. (3) Ltr, Fertig to C Staff Br, 10 Jul 47.

(4) Rpt of Interv, Peters with Janairo, 23 Nov 45.
98 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

so close to the barbed wire that the

enemy could easily toss grenades into the

ranks of the defenders. Along the shores

of Manila Bay, wire strung too far out

in the water was beaten down by waves,

and no one took the trouble to replace it.

The Filipino soldier frequently dug his

foxhole behind a mound of earth or a

clump of bamboo, which gave him a

sense of security but prevented him from

firing directly at the approaching enemy.

Often he did not appreciate the importance of grazing fire; in many cases, he

placed his machine gun on a slope, and

his fire thus went over the heads of the

advancing Japanese.117 When Chenoweth asked one platoon commander

why his men had their foxholes at the

top of a hill instead of at the bottom

where they could have delivered grazing

fire, the officer replied that "he had

placed them up high where they could

retreat faster."

 118

In an effort to teach the Filipinos the

bare essentials of combat engineering,

Casey, Skerry, and Chenoweth launched

an intensive training program. Officers

of the 14th and the 803d were assigned to

the combat battalions to give instruction

in the proper use of tools and equipment, placing machine guns, and preparing beach defenses. These instructors

found themselves in a difficult position.

Without command authority, they were

frequently held responsible for the performance of their units. Toward the

end of February, as the tactical situation

worsened, MacArthur ordered the combat engineers to train to fight as infantry,

and during the second week of March,

training was begun in both camps.

Little could be done at this late date, for

"fight and learn" was now the chief, if

not the only, method of training. Philippine engineers showed some progress,

and American officers reported that on

the whole the Filipino engineer, despite

his inadequate preparation, performed

well when ably led. But basic weaknesses in training could not be overcome.119

A number of division commanders,

American and Filipino alike, apparently

did not understand how to employ their

engineer units properly. They frequently required them to do guard duty,

bury the dead, transport rations for other

units, or serve as infantry even though

infantry units were available. Chenoweth relates that "an entire infantry division was found sitting quietly in bivouac"

while its half-strength engineer battalion

"was stringing barbed wire and digging

foxholes for the entire division." Some

division commanders would not permit

their battalion engineers to make adverse reports to Chenoweth and Skerry.

Brig. Gen. Vincente Lim of the 41st

Division told 1st Lt. Henry Harris, an

instructor assigned to the engineer battalion, that anything wrong would be 117

 (1) Insp Rpts, Delamore, 8 and 11 Feb 42. (2) reported to him, the general, and not to

Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Feb 42. Both in Casey

File 1. (3) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Mar 42.

AG 319.1 (5 Jan 41) Phil Rcds. (4) Ltr, CofS USAFFE

to Corps and Beach Defense Subsector Comdrs, 9

Feb 42. (5) Insp Rpt, Maj Gay, 13 Feb 42. Last

two in Casey File 1. (6) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur,

15 Feb 42. Same file. 118

 Chenoweth Ltr, 27 Sep 47.

119

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

II, 16. (2) Incl to Chenoweth Ltr, 30 Aug 47. (3)

Ltr, Hq USAFFE to CG's I Corps and II Corps,

25 Feb 42. Casey File 1. (4) Ltr, Stickney to MacArthur, 15 Mar 42. Casey File 6. (5) Skerry Ltr,

20 Jul 49, Comment 10.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 99

the corps engineer. "General Lim,"

one of Casey's assistants stated, "is determined that no reports of deficiencies

in his division will get to higher headquarters but he does not take steps to

correct his deficiencies. He considers

his division his kingdom and does not

intend for anyone to interfere with him."

Casey and members of his staff as well as

Skerry and Chenoweth had to make repeated and time-consuming inspections

of the Philippine engineer combat battalions and front-line positions to check

on the progress of engineer work. As a

rule, division commanders were cooperative and tried to follow suggestions

for improving defenses and for using

their engineers properly, but all this required much time and effort on the part

of top-ranking engineer officers.120

During the first week of March, Casey,

inspecting the front-line positions, noted

many weaknesses. There was still no

mobile reserve; practically all the troops

were spread "in a continuously occupied

trench line clear across the front."

Casey again saw no need for occupying

every foot of ground, since natural

strongpoints, well organized and mutually supporting, could control many

yards. The men thus released could be

formed into a reserve. The handiwork

of the amateur Filipino soldier was still

in evidence—Casey's listing of mistakes

in the organization of positions filled

half a dozen pages. But, he reassured

MacArthur, not everything was wrong;

much good work had been done and the

troops were determined to hold. Skerry,

who accompanied the Engineer,

USAFFE, on part of his tour of the I

Corps area, was less optimistic. He

observed that the men were tired, hungry, and sick and that their supplies of

barbed wire and entrenching tools were

extremely low. As Casey and Skerry

moved from unit to unit, they explained

how positions might be improved but

refrained from making any adverse

criticism, "knowing full well that morale

and a determination to fight it out . . .

[were] of paramount importance."

 121

Casey had visited the front for the last

time. When MacArthur, acting on orders from President Roosevelt, left

Corregidor on 12 March for Australia,

he took with him seventeen members of

his staff, among them Casey. On 21

March U.S. Forces in the Philippines,

(USFIP), under General Wainwright,

replaced USAFFE as the command in

the islands. Colonel Stickney henceforth served as Wainwright's engineer

and as staff engineer to Maj. Gen. Edward P. King, who was in charge of

Luzon Force. Bonham became service

command engineer under Brig. Gen.

Allan C. McBride and at the same time

served as engineer supply officer for

USFIP in Colonel Stickney's office. The

engineer organization in the field, not

affected by the changes in the high command, remained as before, with Skerry

and Chenoweth continuing as engineers

of I Corps and II Corps, respectively.122

120

 (1) Ltr, CofS USAFFE to Corps and Div

Comdrs, 2 Mar 42. Casey File 6. (2) Insp Rpt,

Casey and Gay, 7 Feb 42. Casey File 1. (3) Ltr,

CofS USAFFE to Corps and Div Comdrs, 9 Feb 42.

Casey File 4. (4) Chenoweth Ltr, 27 Sep 47. (5)

Insp Rpt, Maj Gay, 17 Feb 42. Casey File 1. (6)

Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 16.

121

 (1) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Mar 42. AG

319.1 (5 Jan 41) Phil Rcds. (2) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49,

Comment 18. 122

 (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 359. (2)

Incl with Ltr, Mielenz to C Staff Br, 4 May 51.
100 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The situation of the engineers, like

that of the other defenders, was almost

hopeless. Supplies of many critical

items were nearly exhausted. Early in

March the remaining stocks of burlap

were given to the troops for use as

blankets. On 9 March I Corps received

its last issue of barbed wire. Spare parts

could be obtained only from equipment

turned in for salvage. The critical

shortage of gasoline deadlined so much

of the machinery that construction work

had to be drastically curtailed. Toward

the end of the month Chenoweth estimated the effectiveness of his engineers

as 10 percent of normal.123

The lull in the fighting came to an

end during the second week of March.

Skirmishes along the outpost line became more frequent. Enemy artillery

opened up and aerial bombings increased. On 3 April the Japanese

launched their offensive, directing their

heaviest blows against II Corps. The

next morning the 14th and the 803d Battalions were ordered to stop work and

assemble for combat. On 6 April the

51st Engineer Battalion was overrun as

the entire line was hurled back. Parker

then took the 201st and the 202d from

reserve and committed them as infantry.

Maj. Harry O. Fischer, commander of

the 201st, later recalled that the enemy

planes "had a field day. The jungle was

so thick we could not see them and they

proceeded to fly 300 or 400 feet off the

ground . . . and drop bombs on us.

The number of casualties was terrific.

. . . We were practically dead . . . from

fatigue, hunger, and dysentery. . . . We

were so tired that the idea that the Japs

finally had us didn't bother us a bit."

The 201st and the 202d disintegrated,

and on the morning of 8 April, in a last

effort to stem the Japanese advance, the

803d and the 14th were thrown into the

battle. The aviation battalion moved

toward its position, but finding no units

on either of its flanks, retreated southward. The 14th took its assigned position across one of the trails and hastily

erected a roadblock. Enemy tanks, moving south, were stopped by the obstacle,

unable to advance further without infantry support. The engineers had no

weapons for knocking out the tanks, and

later in the day the 14th was ordered to

withdraw. The end was now only a

question of time, perhaps a matter of

hours.124

With the fall of Bataan imminent, the

engineers, in accordance with plans previously formulated, prepared to destroy

all supplies and equipment that could

not be moved to Corregidor. By 7 April

preparations were complete. On the

evening of the 8th General King ordered

the work of destruction to begin. The

engineer depot at Mariveles was set on

fire. Tons of dynamite were detonated,

and vehicles were burned or pushed into

the sea, each of the combat battalions

wrecking its own equipment. During

the early morning hours of 9 April, a few

engineers of the service command, among

them Stickney, Bonham, and Fertig,

escaped to Corregidor on the Night

123

 (1) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 8 Mar 42. AG

319.1 (5 Jan 41) Phil Rcds. (2) Skerry Ltr, 4 Jun 49,

Comment 18. (3) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 1 Mar

42. Casey File 6. (4) Chenoweth Ltr, 27 Sep 47.

124

 (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 431ff.

(2) Rpt of Opns of SFL, Bataan Defense Force, and

II Phil Corps, pp. 52ff. (3) Fischer Ltr, 28 Apr 49.

(4) Goldblith, "The 803d Engineers," The Military

Engineer, XXXVIII (August, 1946), 325.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 101

Hawk and other craft. With the surrender of all forces on Bataan later that

day, the engineers still on the peninsula

became prisoners of war. The long siege

was over.125

Corregidor and the End

of the Campaign

To the men on Bataan, Fort Mills on

Corregidor seemed a place of security.

The elaborate fortifications, many big

guns, and subterranean chambers appeared to justify the name, Gibraltar of

the East. The power plant, water system, cold storage plant, and sizable stocks

of munitions and supplies gave a measure of self-sufficiency. But life on the

island, though not so perilous as on

Bataan, was still precarious. Four miles

long and one and one-half miles across

at its widest point, Corregidor offered an

excellent target. Its importance as the

key to Manila Bay insured repeated

bombings. Only by going underground

could its garrison be safe. Largest of

the tunnels was Malinta, which the

engineers had blasted out of the rocky

hill in the center of the island many

years before. Its main east-west passage,

825 feet long and 50 feet wide, and its

fifty-odd lateral tunnels, each about 150

feet long, housed the headquarters,

repair shops, and the hospital, and

provided space for large quantities of

supplies. But all the men on the island

could not remain in Malinta. The

guns, the power plant, the water reservoirs, and indeed most of the facilities

needed to maintain Corregidor as an

effective bastion, were above ground.

Keeping utilities in operation, maintaining the island's 62 miles of roads and

trails and its 13 miles of electric railway,

and providing additional tunnels and

shelters were the responsibility of the

engineers.126

Just before the war began, Colonel

Mielenz and his assistants were attempting to get the projects for modernizing

Corregidor under way. The contractor

and his crews were on the scene, but no

formal agreement had yet been signed.

Most of the requisitions for supplies and

equipment sent to the United States

months before were still unfilled. Except for the construction machinery

brought over by the contractor, items of

equipment on the island were few. On

hearing the news of Pearl Harbor, Mielenz suspended negotiations, hired the

contractor's men as temporary civil servants, and forced into high gear a program

previously estimated to take three years

to complete. Some of the workmen

were soon building bombproof shelters

at gun batteries, while others were placing baffle walls and sandbags in front of

the doors and windows of the power and

cold storage plants. Still others were at

work on Malinta Tunnel, where they

began laying a concrete floor in the hospital, installing a temporary ventilating

system, and putting sandbags at the east

and west entrances.127

For three weeks the Japanese ignored

the island. On 29 December, a few

125

 (1) Fertig, Guerrillero, pp. 92ff. (2) Bonham,

Engr Supply.

126

 (1) Strong, "The Lean Years," The Military

Engineer, XLI (May-June, 1949), 179-81. (2) Rpt

of Opns of USAFFE and USFIP in the Phil Islands,

1941-1942, Exhibit J, Malinta Tunnel Plan. AG

98-USFI-0.3. (3) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. 127

 Ibid.
102 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

days after MacArthur moved to Corregidor, enemy planes made the first of a

series of attacks which continued until 6

January. Almost all buildings were

destroyed or heavily damaged. Power

lines were knocked out, pipelines damaged, water tanks demolished. Large

sections of road were obliterated and the

electric railway was wrecked. In the

huge fires that swept the island, great

quantities of supplies were lost, including large amounts of construction materials. When the smoke had cleared, the

engineers began removing the wreckage

and strengthening the island to withstand

further attacks.128

Even while the raids were in progress,

Mielenz was making frantic efforts to repair the damage. As soon as the all

clear sounded, crews went out to patch

roads and mend power, sewage, and

water lines. Fixing the roads, most of

which were surfaced with gravel, was

comparatively easy, since bulldozers

could quickly fill in craters and smooth

out churned-up sections. The few

stretches of concrete were more difficult

to repair, but detours could be readily

provided. Road gangs worked all

through the night until raids at dawn

forced them to take shelter. The

plumbers, electricians, and mechanics

who had formed the small peacetime

maintenance staff were unable to cope

with the extensive damage to utilities.

The electric railway was ruined beyond

repair. Electric cable was scarce and

only the most vital power lines could be

maintained. The sewage system was so

badly damaged that field latrines had to

be used. The restoration of water lines

was difficult and time consuming; not

until 14 January were the troops again

permitted to use fresh water for washing

clothes or bathing.129

Saturation bombing demonstrated the

defects of some of the existing tunnels

and shelters and brought home the need

for increased passive protection. During the raids several of the shallower

tunnels collapsed and a number of bombproof shelters turned out to be death

traps. Many of the shelters built before

the war were covered with 4 feet of concrete, topped by 8 feet of earth. Bombs

penetrated the earth and exploded when

they hit the concrete. The soil served

as tamping and forced the blast downward. When the troops manning the

gun batteries and beach defenses began

digging tunnels and building bombproofs for their own protection, the

engineers furnished technical advice.

Mielenz directed that no new tunnels

were to be constructed unless the rock

cover was at least 50 feet thick. He also

adopted a type of bombproof with a

layer of concrete covered with rubble to

act as a burster course. Meanwhile, he

pushed projects to protect installations

above ground and to make Malinta Tunnel safer and more livable. The engineers put covers of reinforced concrete

over the large gasoline tank and the

telephone exchange. Neither installation was ever damaged. In Malinta,

they installed stand-by water and power

systems and completed a sewage system

128

 (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 479-80.

(2) Fertig, Guerrillero, pp. 61-62.

129

 (1) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. (2) Ltr, Mielenz

to CG Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays,

7 Jan 42. (3) Hq HD of Manila and Subic Bays,

Fort Mills, Official Bull, No. 10, 14 Jan 42. Last two

in Casey File 7.
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 103

for the hospital. They placed additional

sandbags inside the tunnel entrances to

deflect the burst of bombs landing behind the protective wall of bags previously stacked outside. Almost until the

end, the men on Corregidor continued

building shelters and providing cover.

Between 8 December and 10 April they

blasted about two miles of tunnel.130

Keeping the island supplied with

water was one of Mielenz' chief concerns.

Eighteen wells normally furnished some

675,000 gallons a day, while eight reservoirs held about six million gallons.

Wells and reservoirs were scattered in

such a manner that it was hardly likely

that they would all be hit in one raid.

Nevertheless, by 20 January four reservoirs had been knocked out. To replace

them, the engineers installed temporary

tanks and a stand-by pumping system

was also provided. Usually enemy

bombings damaged only the pipelines.

To prevent the loss of large quantities of

water from broken lines, the engineers

posted guards at the reservoirs with

orders to close the valves when the air

raid sirens sounded. On 9 March Mielenz reported that 6,642,251 gallons were

in storage. Except for occasional shortages, the supply of water was adequate

until the last few days before the surrender.131

In January Casey pressed for the improvement of Kindley Field and the

construction of five splinter-proof, camouflaged plane pens. Located on the

eastern end of the island, Kindley was

rocky and muddy, and could be used

only for emergency landings. Stickney

had started work on the runway in early

1941, but shortages of equipment and

personnel had hampered progress. Little had been done before the war, except

to extend the runway from 2,100 to

2,400 feet. Since Mielenz could spare

no men for work on Kindley, volunteers

from the air force in mid-January were

given the job of building revetments of

sandbags but accomplished little. Casey

was at length able to get Company A of

the 803d assigned to the project, and on

4 February the unit moved to Corregidor,

but it had been so badly mauled in the

fighting at Quinauan Point that it was no

longer an effective organization. Poorly

equipped and subjected to repeated

aerial and artillery bombardment, it

constructed the five revetments but could

do little to improve the runway.132

Calls for engineer assistance came from

every quarter. Each branch and service

had its special construction projects and

its urgent need for repairs. The troops

building fortifications and shelters required expert direction. Engineers and

skilled workmen had to be spread

thinner and thinner. Mielenz urged

that every man who could be spared be

assigned to engineer projects; even so,

many jobs went begging. Dynamite,

lumber, and crushed rock were sent 130

 (1) Fertig, Guerrillero, pp. 65-66. (2) Ltr,

Mielenz to CG Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic

Bays, 7 Jan 42. (3) Memo, D. J. Rutherford for

Rcd, n.d. Casey File 4. (4) Mielenz, Engr

Preparation. 131

 (1) Memo, Mielenz for Rcd, 20 Jan 42. Casey

File 7. (2) Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 26 Jan

42. Casey File 1. (3) Ltr, Mielenz to Casey, 9 Mar

42. Casey File 6.

132

 (1) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. (2) Memo,

Casey for CofS USAFFE, 26 Jan 42. Casey File 1.

(3) Hq USAFFE FO No. 12, 3 Feb 42. (4) Ltr,

Mielenz to Casey, 9 Feb 42. Casey File 4. (5)

Memo, D. J. R[utherford] for CG Harbor Defense of

Manila and Subic Bays, 2 Feb 42. Casey File 7.
104 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

from Bataan, but replenishing many of

the supplies was almost impossible. In

an effort to do first things first, Mielenz

tried to hold to a system of priorities, but

he was not completely successful. The

wishes of high-ranking officers sometimes

took precedence over priorities.133

Late in January the Japanese moved

artillery to Cavite Province on the southern shore of Manila Bay and on 6 February began a prolonged bombardment of

the fortified islands. The smaller forts

bore the brunt of the shelling. Fort

Frank, on Carabao Island, nearest the

coast of Luzon, suffered the greatest

number of hits. Here the engineers

partially casemated several guns and

strengthened beach defenses but attempted no tunneling. North of Carabao was El Fraile Island, on which the

engineers had built Fort Drum, a thickwalled concrete fort resembling a battleship. When the war began, the fort's

dilapidated power plant was being overhauled under the direction of a Mr.

Williams of Manila. With the occupation of the city by the Japanese, Williams

remained on the island and was mainly

responsible for the fact that Fort Drum

was never without power. Although the

Japanese placed heavy concentrations on

the fort, they failed to silence its 14-inch

guns. Closest to Corregidor was Caballo, on which Fort Hughes was located.

This island was too small to be easily hit

by enemy aircraft, but it offered a worthwhile target to the artillery emplaced

across the bay. Troops and civilians

worked on a tunnel, bombproofed the

water storage tanks, and placed wire

along the beaches. For forty-four days

the guns on the islands answered the

enemy bombardment. When the Japanese lifted their fire on 22 March, the

forts still commanded the bay. That

they had withstood the intense shelling

was due to the courage of their defenders,

to the fact that utilities were kept in

operation, and to the strength of the forts

themselves.134

Corregidor, rather than the smaller

islands, was the enemy's ultimate objective. Working against heavy odds, the

engineers tried to check the deterioration

of utilities and roads and to strengthen

the fortress against the day when it would

have to stand alone. Because a number

of tunnel entrances were directly in the

line of the projectiles coming from

Cavite, the engineers relocated some of

the entrances and provided baffle walls

for the rest. Power lines and water

pipes, broken repeatedly by shells and

bombs, kept maintenance crews busy.

The refrigeration plant required constant attention. When the cold storage

room was damaged by a bomb, the engineers immediately undertook to restore

it. Much of the ammonia and tubing

they needed was salvaged from wrecked

ships off the shores of Bataan and Corregidor. A new steel roof was almost

finished at the time of the surrender.

The defenders meanwhile kept up the

continual round of piling sandbags,

erecting baffle walls, propping up structures, and covering observation and

command posts.135

133

 (1) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. (2) Memo,

R[utherford] for CG Harbor Defense of Manila and

Subic Bays, 2 Feb 42. Casey File 7. (3) Ltr,

Mielenz to Casey, 2 Mar 42. Casey File 6.

134

 (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 485ff.

(2) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. 135

 (1) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. (2) Rpt of
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 105

After the fall of Bataan, Corregidor

received a still more merciless pounding.

The Japanese moved artillery to the

heights of the Mariveles Mountains and

raked the island with fire. Air attacks

mounted in fury. On 29 April, the

emperor's birthday, air and artillery

bombardments reached their height.

During the first week in May, the island

shook from incessant shelling and

bombing. The engineers found it impossible to repair the damage. Artillery

and aerial bombardments were so intense that work in the open was impossible day or night. Roads could no

longer be kept free of obstructions.

Many broken power and water lines

could not be repaired. Company A of

the 803d, still struggling with the runway of Kindley Field, was subjected to

almost continuous bombing. By the

end of April the company commander

and 18 men had been killed. In the

last days four engineer officers were

given the hazardous assignment of acting

as observers for the artillery. Two lost

their lives. 1st Lt. Hersel E. Philippe,

one of Mielenz' assistants, was killed

while serving as a spotter on the western

part of the island, and Captain Gewald

was burned to death on top of Malinta

Hill.136

Early in April the southern Philippines came under attack. Except for

the small force which had come ashore

on Mindanao on 20 December, no enemy troops had landed in the southern

islands during the first four months of

the war. The combat engineers of the

Visayan-Mindanao force, the 61st, 81st,

and 101st Battalions, had erected fortifications and prepared roads and bridges

for demolition. Men from Stickney's

office had readied many airfields with

the help of contractors and civilian

laborers. The Japanese assaults began

on 10 April with a landing on Cebu, and

within a week the enemy was in control

of the coastal areas. On 16 April the

Japanese invaded Panay; four days later

organized resistance ceased. On the

29th they made a major landing on Mindanao's western coast and on 3 May

another on the northern coast. The

defenders were quickly overwhelmed.

With the seizure of these three islands,

the Japanese controlled the southern

Philippines. Only the islands in Manila

Bay still resisted the enemy.137

The landing of Japanese troops on the

eastern end of Corregidor on the night of

5 May and their advance toward Malinta

Tunnel the next morning convinced

Wainwright that continuation of the

suicidal struggle could serve no useful

purpose. With the surrender on 6 May

of the remaining USFIP forces on Corregidor and the southern Philippine

Islands, all organized engineer operations came to an end. Except for a few

who escaped, the men on Corregidor

were sent to prisoner of war camps in the

Philippines, and many were later transferred to camps in Japan and Manchuria.

Most of the engineers of the VisayanMindanao force eluded the enemy by

retreating into the almost inaccessible

Opns of USAFFE and USFIP in the Phil Islands,

1941-42, an VIII, Exhibit E. AG 98-USFI-0.3. 136

 (1) Mielenz, Engr Preparation. (2) Brief Hist

of Co A, 803d Engrs.

137

 (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 498ff.

(2) Ltr, MacArthur to CG Visayas-Mindanao Force,

16 Dec 41. Casey File 8. (3) Incl 2 with Fertig

Ltr, 5 Jun 47.
106 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

mountainous regions of the southern

islands.138

Within a few months guerrilla warfare began. One of the leaders was

Colonel Fertig, who left Corregidor by

plane on 29 April for Mindanao, where

he helped organize the guerrilla forces.

By 1943 he had 45,000 men under his

command. Destruction of roads and

bridges by Fertig's guerrillas made Japanese overland transport almost impossible. Colonel Manzano made his way

to Manila and established an intelligence

network. Information gathered by his

agents was sent to Fertig on Mindanao

and from there to General MacArthur's

headquarters in Australia. The guerrillas were still harassing the enemy

when American troops returned to the

Philippines late in 1944.139

138

 (1) Rpt of Opns of USAFFE and USFIP in the

Phil Islands, 1941-42, pp. 76ff. (2) Some units in

the southern islands did not surrender until several

weeks later. See Morton, Fall of the Philippines,

pp. 574ff. (3) Summary of Activities of 61st Engr

Bn, in USAFFE Orgn and Hist 1941-42, prepared

by "IJKL" Subsection, ICS. OCMH Files. (4)

Claude E. Fertig, "American Engineers with the

Filipino Guerrillas," The Military Engineer, XLI,

No. 283 (September-October, 1949), 366, 368.

139

 (1) Ltr, W. W. Fertig to Casey, 1 July 43.

SWPA Files. (2) Fertig, "American Engineers with

The Filipino Guerrillas," The Military Engineer,

XLI, No. 283 (September-October, 1949), 366-68.

(3) Fertig Ltr, 17 Jun 49.
CHAPTER IV

Build-up in the Southwest Pacific

Concurrently with their campaign in

the Philippines, the Japanese swept

rapidly southward into the Netherlands

Indies, and were, before long, menacing

Australia and the islands of the South

Pacific. In all of that vast area Australia

remained as the one practicable base of

resistance. Because of its great size, the

country could not easily be overrun.

With its small but expanding munitions

industry, its armed strength, and its

factories and farms, the Commonwealth

could contribute substantially to the

Allied effort against Japan. But Australia's resources were too slender, its

population too sparse, and its defenses

too weak to resist a possible Japanese

invasion effectively or to launch offensives without aid from its allies. The

continent had to be transformed into an

Allied bastion and a base from which to

strike back. To reach such a goal, the

amount of engineer work required

would be enormous.

Australia—The First Days

Defense Plans

During the early weeks after Pearl

Harbor, Australia had assumed an ever

greater importance in Allied strategy.

Within ten days Secretary Stimson and

General Marshall had decided to establish a base on the southern continent

from which to supply the Philippines

and provide air support for General

MacArthur. By Christmas it was apparent that efforts to help the forces in

the Philippines, the bulk of them already

withdrawing to Bataan, would be of

little use. The Allies had to concentrate on holding farther south, and their

hope now was to save the Netherlands Indies. Although Roosevelt and

Churchill, meeting at the ARCADIA Conference in Washington in late December,

agreed to direct the main Allied effort

against Germany first, the seriousness of

the situation in the Far East prompted

them to divert additional strength to the

western Pacific. America's chief contribution was to be air power based on

Australia. Toward the close of the

year the War Department took steps to

send nine air groups to the southwest

Pacific.1

The outbreak of war with Japan was

to put a heavy strain on Australia's resources. As large as the United States,

the Commonwealth had a population of

1

 (1) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in

Peace and War, pp. 396-97. (2) Maurice Matloff

and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition

Warfare, 1941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 87-88,

95, 114-19, 128-29. (2) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, 1948), pp. 21, 22, 24, 28.
108 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 7

but seven million. Only the southeastern areas were highly developed; twothirds of the total population lived in the

two states of Victoria and New South

Wales. (Map 7) Natural resources

were limited, with agricultural and pastoral products forming the foundation of

the country's economy. By American

or European standards, Australia's industrial system was small. Its communications network was poor. Except in the

southeast, there were few paved roads.

Most rail lines were single track and

gauges in the various states ranged from

three feet six inches to five feet three

inches.

Most of the Commonwealth's trained

fighting forces were overseas at the time

of Pearl Harbor. Nearly all of the Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) and the

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)

were fighting in Europe and the Mediterranean or helping to protect the Middle

East and Malaya. The two heavy and

three light cruisers, which comprised the

bulk of the Royal Australian Navy

(RAN), had only recently returned to

home waters after serving in the Medi-
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 109

terranean and the Indian Ocean. The

air force assigned to defend Australia

consisted of forty-three British and

American bombers and an equally small

number of Australian-built training

planes. The troops on hand included

the Australian Military Forces (AMF)—

a militia poorly equipped and with little

training—and one AIF armored division

without its tanks. There was, besides,

the Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC), an

organized reserve of some 50,000 men,

most of them veterans of World War I.2

Because their means were limited, the

Australians understandably adopted a

defensive strategy. Soon after the Japanese began their rapid thrust southward, the Australian Chiefs of Staff had

come to the conclusion that any attempt

to hold the islands northeast of the continent or even the underdeveloped,

sparsely inhabited areas of the northern

part of the Commonwealth would be ill

advised. Should the Japanese invade,

the Australians would have no choice but

to abandon all territories except the

southeastern corner of the continent

containing the major cities of Brisbane,

Sydney, and Melbourne. Most of the

military forces in the Commonwealth

were therefore concentrated in this important industrial and agricultural area.

Only small forces were sent to such distant outposts as Darwin in the northwest

and the Cape York Peninsula in the

northeast.3 Not unless the Australians

received substantial reinforcements

would they be inclined to adopt a more

aggressive plan of action.

Reinforcements Arrive

A few reinforcements were soon to

come from the United States. When

Japan declared war, a convoy of eight

transports, carrying men and supplies to

the Philippines, was approaching the Fiji

Islands. Instructed by General Marshall

not to return to Hawaii but to go on to

Australia, the convoy headed for Brisbane, arriving there on 22 December.

The 4,600 men aboard, commanded by

Brig. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, included a

regiment and two battalions of field

artillery and the ground echelon of a

bomber group. There were no engineer units. Late in December Maj.

Gen. George H. Brett, Chief of the Air

Corps, at that time on a mission to

Chungking, flew down to take command

of the American troops. On 1 January

his command was designated United

States Army Forces in Australia

(USAFIA). Marshall gave Brett two

major tasks: get supplies to the Philippines and transform Australia into a

major air base. As hope of getting help

to MacArthur dimmed, Brett concentrated on his second objective.4 2

 (1) Samuel L. Milner, Victory in Papua, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,

1957), pp. 3-4. (2) C. Hartley Grattan, ed., Australia

(Berkeley, Calif., 1947), pp. 165, 204, 389ff. (3)

Richard M. Leighton and Robert M. Coakley, Global

Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955),

pp. 167-68. (4) Memo, OCE Tr Div Railway Br for

C Opns and Tng Br, 29 Aug 42. 617 (Australia)

1942. (5) Sydney Morning Herald, February 26,

1942, p. 7.

3

 Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 4-6. 4

 (1) Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA, pp. 2-7.

SWPA File A161. (2) Rad, Marshall to U.S. Mil

Attache in Australia, 17 Dec 41. Incl 6b to Rpt of

Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (3) Rad, Marshall to

Brett, 25 Dec 41. Incl 11 to Rpt of Orgn and

Activities. USAFIA.
110 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Australia, Brett declared, must be a

"second England." On 4 January he

laid before the Commonwealth's Chiefs

of Staff his plans for strengthening the

continent, placing special emphasis on

the northern regions. His program

called for constructing air bases at Darwin, Brisbane, and Townsville. He

considered Darwin, centrally located on

the north coast of Australia, an ideal site

from which to launch operations against

the Indies and the Philippines. This

city would be both an advance air base

and a port of embarkation for troops and

supplies moving northward. Shipments

of planes and airmen from the United

States would put in at Brisbane, 1,800

miles to the southeast, where Brett

wished to establish his main assembly

plant and repair shops for all types of

aircraft. Townsville, 750 miles north

of Brisbane, was to be a secondary port

and a subsidiary base for assembling and

maintaining planes. To stage fighters

to the Indies, Brett proposed to develop

still further the existing air ferry route

from Brisbane and Townsville to Darwin. He chose Melbourne as the major

port of entry for troops and supplies and

as the site for his headquarters. The

Australians, while pointing out that the

areas north of Brisbane would be difficult

to defend, agreed to go along with Brett's

plan.5

A quick trip by plane over eastern and

northern Australia revealed to Brett the

magnitude of the job ahead. Melbourne

and Brisbane would present little difficulty. They were large, modern cities,

with deep harbors, well-developed roads

and railroads, manufacturing plants, and

indeed all the facilities of metropolitan

centers. In the surrounding countryside

were most of the airfields, camps, and

depots of the Australian Army. Townsville and Darwin offered a sharp contrast.

A commercial center for the sheepherders, farmers, and miners of northern

Queensland, Townsville was a provincial

city of 25,000. It was linked with the

south by a single-track railroad and a

rough coastal highway, neither of them

designed to carry heavy traffic. Its harbor was too shallow for large ships. Except for nearby Garbutt Field, being

developed for the air ferry route to the

Philippines, and the field at Charters

Towers, 65 miles to the southwest,

Townsville had few of the facilities that

go to make up an air base. Darwin,

with 1,500 inhabitants, was about 2,000

miles from Melbourne and 1,800 from

Brisbane. It had no rail connection

with the rest of the continent. The

only line out of the city, "two streaks of

rust without much rolling stock," extended southeastward for a distance of

300 miles and ended in the desert at

Birdum. Not much better than cattle

tracks were the roads leading to the more

populous parts of the continent. Darwin's docks could take only two ships at

a time. Near the city were two small

airfields—Darwin RAAF Field and Darwin Civil; a third, Batchelor Field, was

located 40 miles to the south. Brereton,

while visiting Australia in November

1941, had arranged for the improvement

of Batchelor to enable it to take heavy

5

 (1) Notes of Conf Held on 4 Jan 42. Incl 13C

to Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (2) Rad,

Brett to Marshall, 2 Jan 42. Incl 12a to Rpt of

Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (3) Cable, Brett to

TAG, 3 Jan 42. (4) Rad, Brett to MID, 5 Jan 42.

Last two in WPD WDGS Msg File No. 5, 1-12

Jan 42.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 111

bombers, and the RAAF had begun

work two days later. Circumstances

now required not one, but a whole series

of bomber fields in the Darwin area. As

a result of his trip, Brett saw clearly that

carrying out his plans would require

large-scale construction, but he was convinced his program was necessary if the

enemy advance southward was to be

halted.6

Asked by the War Department for a

rough estimate of his needs, Brett called

for a large contingent of engineer troops

and generous quantities of construction

supplies. In cable after cable, he detailed his requirements—three engineer

airdrome units, two labor battalions, one

service unit, and one general service

regiment; rock crushers, jack hammers,

trucks, compressors, landing mat, trucks,

32,000 tons of rail, and 100,000 tons of

asphalt. Marshall, when he saw the tack

Brett was taking, became somewhat concerned and asked him to trim his sails.

The Chief of Staff could not go along

with plans for developing "a second

England." He explained to Brett that

he did not intend to send many service

troops to Australia and reminded him

that the shortage of shipping was critical

and that the War Department had to

save "every possible ton of ship space."

American forces in Australia would

therefore have to exploit local resources

to the limit. Brett persisted in asking

for large shipments, but Marshall refused

to yield.7

Eager to do their part, the Australians

promised Brett a "maximum measure

of co-operation." The Commonwealth

government quickly agreed to furnish

supplies, provide workmen, hire contractors, and turn over such buildings as

could be spared. The Treasury foresaw little difficulty in financing projects.

The Australians were careful to point

out the limitations of their resources.

They emphasized that construction machinery was scarce, that most of their

manpower was already committed to

defense, and that many materials, among

them asphalt and bitumen, now so

urgently needed for airfields, would have

to be imported. The "most vital and

difficult factors" in construction, they

warned, "would be materials, labor, and

time."

 8

Engineer Tasks

Even though the Australians would do

their utmost, the U.S. Army engineers

6

 (1) Rad, Brett to Marshall, 2 Jan 42. Incl 12a

to Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (2) Cable,

Brett to TAG, 3 Jan 42. WPD WDGS Msg File No.

5, 1-12 Jan 42. (3) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries,

pp. 25-26, 72-75. (4) [Hist of] Base Sec Two (Draft

MS), p. 1. SWPA File A173. (5) Ltr, Col Albert G.

Matthews to Staff Br Of C Engr GHQ FEC, 10 Nov

49, pp. 8, 19. SWPA Files. (6) Ltr, Matthews to

Staff Br OF C Engr GHQ FEC, 20 Apr 50, p. 6.

SWPA Files.

7

 Rad, Marshall to Brett, n.d. Incl 12 to Rpt of

Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (2) Leighton and

Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, pp. 168-69.

(3) Rad, Brett to Marshall, n.d. Incl 12a to Rpt of

Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (4) Cable, Brett to

MID, 4 Jan 42. G-4/33861 sec. II (Jan 42). (5)

Cable, Brett to AGO, 7 Jan 42. WPD WDGS Msg

File No. 5, 1-12 Jan 42. (6) Memo, G-4 WD for

Marshall, 8 Jan 42. (7) Ltr, Marshall to CG

USAFIA, 6 Feb 42. Last two in G-4/33861 sec. II

(Jan 42). 8

 (1) Notes of Conf between Australian CofS and

their deputies, the Secy Dept of Defense Coordination, the Secy Defense Com, Gens Brett, Brereton,

and Barnes, et al., 3 Jan 42. Incl 13b to Orgn and

Activities, USAFIA. (2) Min 2, Second Mtg of

Admin Plng Com, 13 Jan 42. Incl 13d to Orgn and

Activities, USAFIA.
112 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

would have to assume heavy responsibilities. They would have to provide plans

and specifications, advise in the selection

of sites, and guide the Australians in the

unfamiliar task of building for the

American Army. The officers who had

reached Australia by early January were

far too few to carry the load. Brett informed the War Department that more

engineer officers were urgently needed.

He asked that Brig. Gen. Raymond A.

Wheeler be sent posthaste to Australia,

but since Wheeler was then on an important mission to Iran, General Reybold chose Col. Dwight F. Johns for assignment to the southwest Pacific. The

Chief of Engineers also selected several

officers of lower rank for Brett's staff.

Meanwhile, Maj. George T. Derby, who

had come over on the convoy, served as

Brett's first engineer. Because Brett had

so few men to staff his headquarters,

Derby served also as finance officer and

briefly as G-4.9

On 5 January, Derby moved from

Brisbane to Melbourne and before long

had set up his office on the top floor of

an empty, ramshackle warehouse. During the course of the month, he added an

engineer and two infantry officers to his

staff and hired a small number of civilians. At the same time he fell heir to a

ready-made engineering organization.

The firm of Sverdrup and Parcel had

built up a staff of Australian civilians for

work on airfields for the South Pacific air

ferry route. Derby negotiated a contract with the firm whereby he secured

the services of about thirty skilled architects, engineers, and draftsmen. The

Australians saw to it that he was well

supplied with money. The story goes

that he went to one of the Melbourne

banks, introduced himself, and explained

his needs for funds. The bank promptly

made out a note for 1,000,000 pounds,

adding that he was welcome to more if

he needed it.10 Derby scarcely had

time to do more than assemble a staff

and secure funds before leaving early in

February for Java. He was replaced

temporarily by Maj. Elvin R. Heiberg.11

To decentralize operations, Brett had

established four base sections on 5 January. Base Section One, with headquarters at Darwin, included Northern

Territory. Two and Three were set up

in Queensland, with headquarters in

Townsville and Brisbane, respectively.

Base Section Four, with headquarters in

Melbourne, included Victoria in southeastern Australia. When the base sections were first organized, there were not

enough engineer officers to staff them all.

Capt. Willard Farrar was assigned to

Brisbane and Maj. Ward T. Abbott to

Townsville, while Derby himself, before

his departure, assumed the duties of base

section engineer in Melbourne. Darwin was left to the RAAF. Base section

engineers, like the chief engineer, were to

be staff officers only. Under the techni9

 (1) Cable, Brett to AGO, 7 Jan 42. (2) Cable,

Brett to MID G-2 [recd 3 Jan 42]. Both in WPD

WDGS Msg File No. 5, 1-12 Jan 42. (3) DF, G-4

WD to TAG, 7 Jan 42. G-4/33861, sec. II (Jan 42).

(4) A Narrative Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, Jan-30

Jun 42 (cited hereafter as Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA),

p. 1. SWPA File A147.

10

 Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 23. 11

 (1) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, pp. 1-2, 4. (2)

Cable, Mil Attaché in Australia to G-2 WD, 4 Jan

42. WPD WDGS Msg File No. 5, 1-12 Jan 42. (3)

Memo, C of Finance WD for G-4 WD, 6 Jan 42.

G-4/33861, sec. II (Jan 42). (4) Hq USAFIA GO

10, 7 Feb 42.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 113

cal supervision of Derby and his successors, they were to take orders only

from their base section commanders.12

The engineers found themselves almost totally dependent on the Australians. Although the War Department

gave Brett authority to use fixed-fee or

negotiated lump-sum contracts to lease

whatever properties he needed and to

overobligate funds if necessary for urgent

construction, the engineers could do

little without Australian advice and assistance. Not acquainted with local contracting or supply firms, they called on

the RAAF, which controlled most airfield work, and on government works

agencies for help in getting projects

started and pushing them to completion.

Lacking knowledge of real estate prices,

methods of acquisition, or terms of leasing, they turned to the Australian Army's

Hiring Service for land and buildings.

Because of the Americans' unfamiliarity

with the local scene, setting up a procedure whereby the engineers as well as

other branches of the Army could work

together with the Australians was of

fundamental importance. To bring

about co-ordination at the highest level,

Brett and the Australian chiefs of staff

established three joint committees, made

up of representatives of USAFIA and the

Commonwealth's armed services. The

Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Joint

Planning Committee, the latter composed of the deputy chiefs, were responsible for formulating "policies concerning

the distribution of troops and facilities

for the U.S. Army in Australia." In

other words, they would decide what to

build and where. The Administrative

Planning Committee had the task of

recommending ways in which the construction effort could best be organized,

materials and equipment equitably apportioned between Australians and

Americans, and the work of the supply

services co-ordinated. The decisions of

these three predominantly Australian

committees would greatly affect the progress of construction.13

Work for the Americans would have to

be superimposed on a broad defense program which the Commonwealth government was already carrying out. Soon

after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Australia had launched a large

construction effort, designed both to

strengthen the nation for war and to

develop the postwar economy. By the

time of Pearl Harbor, work had been

undertaken on some thirty-five new

munitions plants and on seventy-seven

additions to existing ones. The RAAF

was building fields for forty-two squadrons in the southern half of the continent. Tanks for motor gasoline were

being erected at various points located

inland at least one hundred miles from

12

 (1) Hq USAFIA GO 1, 5 Jan 42. (2) Hist Summary of Activities of Hq of Base Sec 3 From 23 Dec

41 to 31 Mar 44. (Draft MS). SWPA File A176.

(3) [Hist of] Base Two. (4) Hist of Base One (Draft

MS). SWPA File A174. (5) Of of the Engr Base

Sec Four, [Hist Rpt] From 21 Feb 42 to 30 Mar 44,

dtd 20 May 44. (Draft MS). SWPA File A182. (6)

Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 25-26.

13

 (1) WD Ltr, AG 381 (12-20-41) Misc-D-M to

CG American Forces in Australia, 20 Dec 41, sub:

G-4 Admin Order—Plan X. G-4/33861, sec. I. (2)

WD Ltr, AG 400 (1-31-42) MSC-D-M to CG

USAFIA, 2 Feb 42. G-4/33861, sec II (Jan 42). (3)

Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, p. 16. (4) Of C Engr

GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 10. (5) Rpt of

Orgn and Activities, USAFIA, pp. 14-15. (6) Notes

of Conf Between the Australian CsofS et al., and

Gens Brett, Brereton et al., 3 Jan 42. Incl 13b to

Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA.
114 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

the eastern and southern coasts, and

storage for aviation gasoline was being

provided at army and oil company

depots. Two major links in the transcontinental highway system were being

improved: one, the North-South Road

from the railhead at Alice Springs to

Darwin, the other, the East-West Road

from Mt. Isa in western Queensland to

Tennant Creek on the North-South

Road. A huge drydock for capital ships

was building at Sydney. Two large

permanent hospitals were going up, one

at Brisbane, the other at Adelaide.

These undertakings were already taxing

the Commonwealth's slender resources

to near capacity, and with the war coming close to Australia's shores, a great

deal of additional construction would be

needed. In the south, where much

could be turned over to the Americans,

co-operation with the engineers imposed

no great burden, but any help the

Australians could give for the new projects in the north would have to be at the

expense of their own program and in

violation of their own strategic concepts.14

Construction Begins

At Melbourne, consequently, the

engineers found their task fairly easy.

Even though the city was crowded, the

headquarters of the Australian Army,

Navy, and Air Force being located there,

the Commonwealth government found

space for the Americans. Headquarters

of Base Section Four moved into the

Seamen's Mission, which Derby converted into an office building. He had

the Sailor's Home altered to accommodate the military police and turned a

wool warehouse into an engineer depot.

The engineers leased the Royal Melbourne Hospital, 95 percent complete

when the war began, thus obtaining

space for over 700 beds. They built

barracks for enlisted men on the hospital

grounds and provided lodgings for nurses

and medical officers inside the hospital buildings. Many Americans found

quarters in private homes, apartments,

and hotels; others pitched tents on

cricket fields, race tracks, and other flat

ground.15

The establishment of a major base at

Brisbane was to require more extensive

work. In mid-January, Col. Alexander

L. P. Johnson, the base section commander, together with his engineer,

Captain Farrar, began pushing base development. Here, as at Melbourne, the

Australians made a number of properties

available, among them two large airfields, Amberly and Archerfield, a wharf

near the mouth of the Brisbane River,

and several warehouses. Queensland

Agricultural College at Gatton, fifty-five

miles west of the city, was also turned

over to the Americans. Contractors

were soon adapting these facilities to

American requirements. At Amberly

and Archerfield, they began building

additional barracks, operations buildings, and bombproof shelters. Near the

14

 (1) Paul Hasluck, "Australia in the War of

1939-1945," The Government and the People, 1939-

41 (Canberra, 1952), pp. 469-70, 560. (2) Of C Engr

GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942 (Draft MS).

SWPA Files A1-A6. (3) Allied Works Council,

Report on the Activities of the Allied Works Council for the Period February 26, 1942 to June 30, 1943

(cited hereafter as AWC, Report, February 1942-

June 1943) (Melbourne, 1943), pp. 49ff., 60ff.

15

 (1) Of of the Engr Base Sec Four [Hist Rpt]

From 21 Feb 42 to 30 Mar 44. (2) Of C Engr GHQ

SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942. (3) Memo, G-4

USASOS, 2 Nov 42. SWPA File 94.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 115

wharf they erected frame office buildings,

a warehouse, and a 40-ton crane. They

began converting Queensland Agricultural College into a hospital with 250

beds. Quite a few new projects had to

be undertaken. Colonel Johnson directed the building of eight frame warehouses to be dispersed throughout the

city and arranged for contractors to build

an ordnance depot in suburban Derra.

Camps were a major requirement.

Johnson selected a site near Wacol, fifteen miles southwest of Brisbane, and

soon work was under way on a 5,000-man

staging camp, later named Camp Columbia. He also set work in motion on a

1,000-man camp near Archerfield. Farrar designed both camps on a dispersal

basis, with buildings to be constructed in

wooded areas and concealed from air

observation. By far the largest of the

jobs was Eagle Farm air base, which was

to be Brett's main depot for assembling

planes. Designing and laying out the

two all-weather runways, assembly plant,

hardstandings, shops, and warehouses

and finding contractors, workmen, plant,

and materials presented Johnson and

Farrar with a real challenge, but, with

Australian help, they soon succeeded in

getting construction started.16

Farther north the engineers faced a

tough assignment. At Townsville, destined to be the great base in northeastern

Australia, most construction would have

to be from the ground up. Brett wanted

a plant for assembling fighters, shops for

repairing them, and a great deal besides.

Because of the grave danger of Japanese

raids, a strong air defense was needed,

but placing more fighter planes at

Townsville would necessitate construction of at least one new airdrome to

supplement the bomber fields at Garbutt

and Charters Towers. If oceangoing

vessels were to use the port, the harbor

would have to be deepened, new wharves

built, and roads to the docks improved.

On 5 January the base section commander, Brig. Gen. Henry B. Clagett,

and his engineer, Major Abbott, arrived.

After checking in at their hotel, they set

out for a conference at the local headquarters of the RAAF. Having discussed their needs with the Australian

airmen, they inspected several airfield

sites selected earlier by General Brereton

and found them suitable. A tour of the

town and the surrounding countryside

convinced them that there were "acres of

open country on which to build" but

little else. Labor was scarce, many residents having fled to the south. Since

local merchants stocked few of the items

needed for large-scale construction projects, supplies were low. Despite the discouraging outlook, Clagett and Abbott

went ahead. Within a few days, they

had obtained the RAAF's permission to

award fixed-fee contracts and sent out a

call for workmen to all the towns within

a radius of 200 miles. By the ninth, contractors had been hired, workmen recruited, and construction started on

barracks at Garbutt and on a fighter strip

at Charters Towers.17

Brett considered Darwin the key

16 point in the fight for the Indies and (1) Hist Summary of Activities of Hq of Base

Sec 3 From 23 Dec 41 Through 31 Mar 44. (2)

Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations,

p. 376. (3) Extracts, Maj Farrar, 23 Dec 42. SWPA

File 241. (4) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of

SWPA, VI, 36.

17

 (1) Notes of Conf Held on 4 Jan 42, Incl 13 to

Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (2) [Hist of]

Base Two.
116 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

CAMP COLUMBIA

Australia, and believed the establishment

of a major base there was "absolutely

necessary." He nevertheless recognized

that construction in the town and surrounding territory would be extremely

difficult. Living conditions in this forbidding tropical outpost were almost

unbearable. There were few workmen

to be had, and supplies would have to be

brought in by tortuous overland routes or

shipped by sea from southeastern Australia. To develop Darwin fully would

be a long-term proposition. For the

time being it would have to serve merely

as a staging area for air units moving

northward. Brett called initially only

for construction of a field for fighters,

shops for emergency repairs, and housing for 2,500 troops. Since no American engineer could be spared for Darwin,

he persuaded the RAAF to take charge of

construction and asked the Australian

Government to speed work on the road

and railroad leading into the town. Although little could be accomplished immediately, Darwin continued to figure

prominently in Brett's long-range

plans.18

The construction program, modest as

it was, got off to a faltering start. During their first weeks, the engineers had to

grope their way along. Since those who

had arrived with the convoy had expected to serve in the Philippines, they

18

 (1) Notes of Conf Held on 4 Jan 42. Incl 13c

to Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (2) Min of

Mtg, Admin Plng Com, 5 Jan 42. Incl 13d to Rpt

of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (3) Cable, Brett

to TAG, 3 Jan 42. WPD, EDGS, Msg file 5, 1-12

Jan 42. (4) Rad, Brett to MID, 5 Jan 42. Incl

13d to Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (5)

Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 12-14.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 117

had not even brought along sets of drawings or field manuals.19

 The engineers

knew little or nothing of the local terrain, rainfall, or wind directions. "The

rocks, trees, and soil," wrote one, "were

without parallel in our previous experience. The very stars and constellations

were strange."

 20

 Derby, in Melbourne,

at first had difficulty finding out what his

engineers one or two thousand miles

away were doing or what their needs

were. They, on the other hand, with

few regulations to guide them, did not

always know how far to go in hiring contractors, buying supplies, and dealing

with the Australian authorities. Small

wonder that construction appeared to be

slow in getting under way. When General Brereton visited Australia in late

January he complained that "conditions

at Darwin were unsatisfactory" and that

projects at Brisbane had not "progressed

beyond the planning stage."

 21

Difficulties in procuring scarce building materials and equipment also had a

hampering effect. Of the raw materials

needed for construction, only iron ore

and timber were plentiful, and the country's capacity for turning them into finished products was limited. The output

of hardware, steel plate, and lumber fell

far short of wartime demands, as did the

production of roofing and pipe. Cement was the only manufactured product

produced in ample quantities. Bitumen

was almost impossible to get. Manufacturers turned out fairly large numbers

of concrete mixers and light tractors and

trucks. They also produced certain

other items of equipment, but without

essential parts, which had to be imported; bearings for carryalls, for example, had to come from abroad, as did

motors for graders. Spare parts for all

types of machinery were at a premium.

Only a thin trickle of supplies came from

the United States. The Chief of Engineers had little to spare for overseas, and

the European Theater of Operations got

first priority on that. And, to make matters worse, the shipping shortage slowed

delivery of such items as could be earmarked for the southwest Pacific.22

Competition for such supplies as there

were further aggravated a bad situation.

The Australians placed orders without

reference to the needs of the Americans,

who also bought up meager stocks, heedless of the requirements of their allies.

The American services likewise bid

against each other. On 21 January the

Commanding General, USAFIA, in an

attempt to bring about more orderly

procurement, ruled that all supplies procured locally must be obtained through

Australian military channels. Also, base

section commanders could purchase on

their own authority only in amounts up

to $500; purchases costing more had to

be approved by USAFIA. While this

order prevented a good deal of indiscriminate buying, it did not put an end

19

 Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, pp. 4-5, 7. 20

 Col Albert G. Matthews, Data for a Hist Rpt of

Engr Activities in SWPA (cited hereafter as Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt), p. 4. Incl to Ltr, Matthews to Casey, 3 Jun 46. SWPA Files. 21

 (1) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49. (2) Brereton,

The Brereton Diaries, pp. 80-81.

22

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for

1942. (2) Incls, 22 Jun 42, to Memo, Barnes for

Somervell, 9 Jul 42. 400.312 (Australia) 1942-43.

(3) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, p. 3. (4) Memo,

OCE Supply Div Intl Sec for C Intl Sec, 1 Apr 42.

Office file, Intl Div, DA 400.33 (Australia) (up to 19

Jan 44).
118 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

to competition among the American

services. Nor did it stop the Australians

from pouring materials into projects

which some engineers were beginning to

think were unnecessary.23

Total War

By the beginning of 1942 the Japanese

had bottled up MacArthur's forces on

Bataan and Corregidor, and enemy

troops in Malaya were driving on Singapore. In mid-January, in order to have

more unified direction of the war against

Japan, the Allied governments had established the ABDA (American, British,

Dutch, Australian) Command, under

General Sir Archibald Wavell, commander in chief of the British Forces in

India. Wavell's main task was to hold

the Malay Peninsula and the Netherlands

Indies. General Brett was named his

deputy. The American forces in Australia now became in effect a supply

service of ABDA. Wavell's hastily organized command could not contain the

Japanese; the enemy continued to advance,'fanning out in several directions.

On 23 January the Australian base of

Rabaul, at the northeast tip of New

Britain, fell. On 15 February Singapore

capitulated. The enemy was already invading Borneo and Sumatra and preparing to strike at Java. On the 19th

Darwin was heavily bombed. The entire Indies appeared to be doomed, and

on 25 February, the ABDA Command

was dissolved. Wavell returned to India

and Brett to Australia, which now

seemed threatened not only from the

northwest but also from the northeast.24

Where the Japanese would strike next

was a question. Brett believed they

would launch an attack from the northwest and seize Darwin. The Australian

Chiefs of Staff held that the real danger

lay to the northeast; the Japanese would

want to sever lines of communication

between the United States and Australia

to prevent reinforcement of the southern

continent. Immediately threatened, the

Chiefs of Staff believed, were not only

New Caledonia and Fiji, but also Port

Moresby on the southern coast of New

Guinea. To meet the growing peril,

Australia would need air power and

considerable numbers of ground troops

as well. Prime Minister John Curtin

had already ordered the AIF divisions

home. Roosevelt and Marshall, reversing their earlier stand that only air and

service troops were to be shipped to

Australia, decided to send ground troops.

On 17 February Marshall ordered the

41st Infantry Division to Australia and in

early March Roosevelt promised Curtin

the 32d Infantry Division also, if the

Commonwealth would keep one of its

divisions in the Near East. Curtin

agreed. With the first troops of the AIF

scheduled to return in mid-March and

with the American 41st Division due to

arrive in April and the 32d in May, the

outlook for the defense of Australia appeared to be less desperate.25

The planned concentration of Allied

power in Australia made necessary a 23

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

II, 47-48. (2) Ltr, CG USAFIA to CO's of Base

Secs, 21 Jan 42. App. 20, Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA. (3) Ltr, Matthews to C Staff Br Of

C Engr GHQ FEC, 12 Oct 50, p. 9. SWPA Files.

24

 Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 1-2, 5, 8-10. 25

 (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for

Coalition Warfare, pp. 128ff., 149. (2) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 11-13, 14-15.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 119

vastly expanded construction program.

Upon his return from the Indies, Brett

called for a redoubling of efforts to

strengthen the northern bases. Runways at Darwin and Townsville were to

be lengthened and the fields provided

with camouflaged dispersals. The capacity of the assembly plants at Brisbane

and Townsville was to be increased and

work on them speeded up. In fact,

nearly all the going projects were to be

enlarged and given new impetus. Brett

knew that this was not enough, and that

many new jobs would have to be undertaken. He proposed to build 6 more

bomber fields—three near Darwin, 2

near Brisbane, and 1 to the west of

Townsville—and 4 more fighter fields—

2 south of Darwin and 2 near Townsville. At Darwin he projected a host of

smaller jobs, among them increasing the

water supply and replacing the bombedout wharf. He also planned to build a

score of aviation fuel depots to be scattered over the continent. The Australian Chiefs of Staff agreed with Brett on

the importance of all these projects and

at his request gave top priority to those in

the Darwin area. But since the steady

Japanese advance had forced Allied supply lines southward and increased the

danger to the southern part of the continent, Americans and Australians alike

recognized the need for additional construction there. Camps and depots

would have to be clustered around Melbourne and Adelaide, the safest ports of

entry. Airfields would have to be developed in southwestern Australia, particularly around Perth, to defend the

continent against attack from the Indian

Ocean. On 3 March Brett established

two new base sections: Base Section Five

in South Australia, with headquarters at

Adelaide, and Base Section Six in Western Australia, with headquarters at

Perth.26

Engineer Problems

The engineers were in no position to

plan for and direct adequately such a

constantly growing construction program. Their staff sections in USAFIA

were hardly bigger than they had been in

January. Now headed by Brig. Gen.

Dwight F. Johns, who had arrived from

the United States by way of Java on 28

February, the engineer office in Headquarters, USAFIA, consisted of 4 officers,

3 enlisted men, and 45 civilians. The

offices in the base sections in Victoria

and Queensland were still undermanned.

Engineers had yet to be found for Darwin, Adelaide, and Perth. The difficulties of building in a foreign land were

becoming more apparent. Like the

other defenders of Australia, the engineers speculated daily on the next Japanese move and had to plan for the construction program in an atmosphere of

growing tension. Worried about the

future and uncertain over how to proceed, they had the task, as one highranking officer put it, of "developing a

country the size of the United States."

 27

Because so much construction had to

be done in the north, reconnaissance

alone required a vast amount of time

26

 (1) Memo, Of C Engr USAFIA for Rcd, n.d., sub:

Priority List as on 10 Mar 42. SWPA File 243. (2)

Hq USAFIA, GO 20, 3 Mar 42. 27

 (1) Hq USAFIA, GO 19, 2 Mar 42. (2) Hist of

Engr Hq USAFIA, p. 2. (3) Ltr, Brig Gen Stephen

J. Chamberlin to Gen Somervell, 26 Feb 42. Logis

File, OCMH. Quoted in Leighton and Coakley,

Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, p. 168.
120 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

and effort. In order to find suitable sites

for airfields in this largely unexplored

region, the engineers took to the air.

General Johns chartered a private plane

to fly his engineers on inspections. He

was fortunate in finding a civilian pilot

who "knew well the behavior of soils

under traffic, the class and quality of

timber which grew on the various soils

and possessed the ability to recognize

these." The pilot usually flew at an

altitude of 5,000 feet. When he spotted

a promising site, he dropped down for a

closer look, sometimes circling not much

higher than the treetops. Ground

parties later surveyed about one-fifth of

the areas recommended by the aerial

observers and chose the best ones. This

method of selection worked so well that

it soon became common practice.28

A severe handicap was the lack of plans

and specifications. Having no American blueprints, Derby had directed the

men transferred from Sverdrup and

Parcel to develop suitable designs. Because these men had no acquaintance

with the American Army's standards of

construction, they had to gather information from every possible source. They

questioned officers who came into engineer headquarters, visited Australian

camps occupied by U.S. troops, and

studied Australian plans. At length

they succeeded in producing some tentative drawings, though still too few to fill

the needs of contractors, who consequently adopted designs of their own

choosing. The result was that many

facilities were overelaborate. Cables

were sent to the Chief of Engineers for

complete sets of the standard drawings

for theater of operations buildings,

which the Engineers had prepared in

1939 and 1940 to simplify overseas construction in time of war. Some time

elapsed before the drawings arrived.

One package containing plans for different types of airdrome structures was lost

in a plane crash. After the engineers

had received fairly complete sets of standard drawings, they discovered that quite

a few alterations were necessary. Australian hardwoods, among the strongest

in the world, had such unusual bearing

qualities that much less timber was

needed than the theater of operations

drawings called for. The plans also had

to be modified to conform to Australian

sizes of materials. In fact, such radical

changes were required that there was

some question as to whether the drawings

should be used at all. The engineers

debated whether it would not be preferable to switch to Australian designs or

perhaps develop entirely new plans.

The matter was not to be settled for some

weeks.29

The growing construction program

placed a tremendous strain on Australia's

manpower and production. Early in

February the Administrative Planning

Committee had recommended that the

Commonwealth government set up more

effective machinery to direct construction for the armed forces, Australian and

American. On the day Singapore fell,

15 February 1942, Prime Minister

Curtin determined to put Australia's

28

 (1) Ltr, Farrar to Johnson, 21 Jan 42. (2) Ltr,

Farrar to Johnson, 12 Jan 42. (3) Ltr, Farrar to

Abbott, 8 Jan 42. All three in AG 207.3 A45-345.

(4) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, p. 8.

29

 (1) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, pp. 4-5. (2) DF,

Somervell to CofEngrs, 4 Mar 42. 400.33 (Australia)

1942-43.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 121

manpower and resources on a "total war

basis." In line with this policy, the

Australian Government established the

Allied Works Council (AWC) on 26

February. The council was to direct

and control "the carrying out of works of

whatever nature required for war purposes by Allied Forces in Australia."

Curtin appointed Mr. Edward G. Theodore, former Commonwealth treasurer,

as director general, and Mr. C. A. Hoy,

head of the works agency of the Department of the Interior, as assistant director.

General Brett, asked to nominate a third

member, chose Major Heiberg, who was

succeeded within a few days by General

Johns. The council was given broad

powers, including the right to commandeer supplies and equipment, condemn property, and adopt any form

of contract that would expedite construction.30

Theodore and his colleagues strove to

bring order into the building program.

Meeting in Melbourne, they began at

once to assemble a staff and to establish

offices in each of the states and in Northern Territory. The state organizations

would hire contractors, recruit workers,

and obtain materials and equipment.

Finding it almost impossible to use

peacetime methods of contracting, the

council adopted the fixed-fee contract

for the bulk of the jobs, offering builders

an average profit of 3 percent of the estimated cost. In order to alleviate shortages of supplies and equipment, the

AWC surveyed existing stocks, impressed

privately owned machinery, searched for

ways to increase production, and sent

urgent requests to the American government for lend-lease aid. One of their

major tasks, the members of the council

believed, was the recruitment of workers. At first, they relied on private industry and on state construction agencies,

such as roads commissions, to round up

additional laborers. Appeals for volunteers met with little success. Men could

not be readily persuaded to leave defense

jobs in Melbourne and Sydney to go to

work in the inhospitable regions of the

north. When the manpower shortage

continued acute, the council considered

drafting workers but hesitated to take

this unpopular step unless there was no

alternative.31

The Allied Works Council was no

panacea. It could not alter the basic

fact that Australia's resources were

limited, nor could its members simply

ignore political considerations and insist

on unpopular measures. It had, moreover, to operate as part of a cumbersome

system. Before work on a project could

begin, the council had to obtain the approval of what many thought was an inordinately large number of governmental

bodies, military and civilian. Among

them were the Administrative Planning

Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who assigned priorities. The

30

 (1) AWC, Report, February 1942-June 1943, pp.

5-7. (2) Melbourne Argus, February 18, 1942, p. 1.

(3) Commonwealth of Australia, Statutory Rules,

1942, No. 88 (February 26, 1942), Regulations Under

the National Security Act, 1939-1940. (4) Rpt of

Orgn and Activities, USAFIA, app. 20, Hist Rcd,

Gen Purchasing Agent USAFIA, pp. 10-11. (5)

Who's Who, 1943.

31

 (1) AWC, Report, February 1942-June 1943, pp.

80, 85, 107. (2) AWC, Office Memo No. 196, [5 Nov

42], sub: AWC Projects. SWPA File 242. (3) Memo,

WD Of Defense Aid Dir Distr Br for CofEngrs, c.17

Mar 42, sub: Constr Engineering Equip for Australia

and New Zealand. 400.333 (Australia) 1942-44. (4)

Incls, n.d., to Memo in (3), above.
122 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ministers of the Australian armed services were notified of pending construction so that they might determine if

existing facilities could be used. The

Treasury reviewed projects for American

forces to arrange for financing through

reverse lend-lease. The war Cabinet reserved the right to pass upon all large

projects or those of a controversial nature. Only after all these agencies had

approved was the Allied Works Council

permitted to go ahead with construction.

All too often this procedure proved to be

exasperatingly slow.32

Yet, despite many obstacles, the Allied

Works Council could by mid-March report considerable progress. The number of going projects was mounting

steadily. Most of the new jobs were in

the south, where the council was to perform extensive construction for the Australian services and provide numerous

key facilities for the Americans. Expansion of camps near Melbourne and

Brisbane was continuing. A beginning

had been made on the largest job in the

entire airfield program—the Tocumwal

Repair and Assembly Depot in New

South Wales, located on the Murray

River, which formed the boundary with

Victoria. This gigantic project, covering sixteen square miles, was to include

4 runways for heavy bombers, seventy

miles of roads, and 608 buildings. But

while the bulk of its effort was in Victoria

and New South Wales, the council was

beginning to devote some attention to

the north. Work on roads leading from

South Australia and Queensland to

Darwin was being speeded up. An accomplishment the AWC took particular

pride in was the launching of work on

new runways at Charters Towers. The

council's field representative in Queensland received the request for this job on

a Saturday night early in March. He at

once suspended operations at most of the

other projects in the area and ordered

the equipment sent to Charters Towers.

He requisitioned three trains to haul the

machinery and called workmen from

their homes to get everything in readiness

at the airfield for construction to begin.

By Monday morning 200 men, with 100

trucks, 12 bulldozers, and a large number

of scoops, tractors, and graders, were

hard at work. The Australians, well

aware that they were just embarking on a

vast undertaking, were eager to get on

with the program as a whole.33

First Engineer Units

While the Australians were intensifying their efforts, the first engineer troops

arrived from the United States. On 2

February the 808th Aviation Battalion

had landed at Melbourne. The people

of the city, says the battalion chronicler,

"were very glad to see the U.S. forces

come in" and gave the 808th a "rousing

welcome." But the men so warmly received were in some ways unprepared

for the task ahead. Activated in September 1941, the 808th, like most of the

early aviation battalions, had received

only haphazard training. The unit arrived without its heavy equipment, except for three dump trucks and two

32

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC Engrs of SWPA, II,

40-41. (2) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, p. 8.

33

 (1) AWC, Report February 1942-June 1943, pp.

44-47, 49-53. (2) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual

Rpt for 1942. (3) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, [Rpt on]

Warehouses [1942]. (Draft MS). SWPA File A5.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 123

tractors. The bulk of its machinery was

to follow later. Brett lost no time in

giving the unit its assignment. Under

Capt. Andrew D. Chaffin, Jr., the 808th

was soon on its way to build airdromes

in the Darwin area.34

The long journey northward introduced the engineers to the Australian

transportation system. On 12 February

the men went by truck to Baccus Marsh

near Melbourne, where they boarded a

special train. The next day, on reaching Terowie, in the state of South

Australia, where the broad gauge ended,

they transferred to the narrow gauge line

which ran through the desert to Alice

Springs, a thousand miles to the north.

Having a top speed of twenty miles an

hour, the train did not reach Alice

Springs until 2130 of the 15th. Since

there was no railroad northward out of

the town, trucks carried the troops on to

Larrimah, 635 miles distant. The passengers found the road rough and the

"vibration . . . terrific." Arriving in

Larrimah on the 18th the men "broke

out laughing" when they saw the train

that was to take them on to Darwin. "It

consisted," one wrote, "of cattle cars for

personnel, small open cars (trucks) for

baggage, and a small wheezy locomotive

which looked as though each hour of

existence would be its last." The Australian crew's custom of stopping every

few hours to have a "spot of tea" was an

added irritation to the Americans, who

were impatient to get to their destination. On 19 February the battalion left

the train at Katherine, the site of one of

the new bomber fields, instead of going

on to Darwin, 200 miles to the north,

which that day had been hard hit by an

air attack. After experiencing the difficulties of movement between Melbourne

and the Darwin area, the men of the

808th, deep in what the Australians

called the "Never-Never" land, felt

"completely isolated as far as the remainder of the U.S. Army was concerned."

 35

The 808th got orders to turn the civil

airdrome at Katherine into a field for

medium bombers and to find sites for

new fields in the area. On his own

initiative, Chaffin undertook another

project in order to eliminate the need

for transshipping cargoes at Larrimah.

He decided to improve the road from

that point northward so that supplies

could be trucked all the way from Alice

Springs. The battalion quickly settled

down to work. Survey parties, sent out

daily, located several good sites for airfields. Men of Company B began removing trees and providing detours

around bad spots on the road to the

south. At first, the 808th made scant

progress on runways. On 6 March

Captain Chaffin reported "little . . .

has been done towards building airfields

in this vicinity because of the complete

absence of equipment." The battalion

had brought to Katherine only the three

dump trucks and two tractors it had unloaded at Melbourne in early February.

Chaffin had been able to obtain 11 cargo

trucks and 2 old bulldozers at Darwin.

But at least 7 of his 14 trucks were

needed to keep the battalion supplied

with food and water. The others were 34

 Lt Col Ralph C. Glover, The Hist of the 808th

Engr Avn Bn (MS), pp. 1, 15, 22, 27. SWPA File

A167. 35

 Ibid., pp. 28ff.
124 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

used to haul gravel for the Katherine

runway. The cargo trucks were of the

type which had to be emptied by hand;

unloading these trucks in the tropical

sun was so exhausting that the men could

work only six hours a day. Still, in

spite of these handicaps, occasional Japanese bombings, and the ever-present

dread of enemy invasion, the battalion

persevered. By mid-March the Katherine runway had been lengthened and

was being surfaced with gravel, and the

clearing of three sites for new strips had

begun.36

Prospects for construction in Australia

brightened with the arrival at Melbourne

on 26 February of two general service

regiments—the 43d, commanded by Lt.

Col. Heston R. Cole, and the 46th, commanded by Lt. Col. Albert G. Matthews.

Since these units were older than the

aviation battalion, they had received

more extensive training in the United

States. The 43d, activated in April

1941 and given seven weeks of basic

training, had in June taken part in army

maneuvers in Tennessee, where, according to an observer from the Office of the

Chief of Engineers, the men had performed "as nearly like veteran troops as

could possibly be expected from such a

short training period." The 46th, activated in July 1941, had undergone training in road building, airfield construction, bridging, fortification, and demolitions—the usual instruction given to

general service regiments—and in addition had had the benefit of experience

in the Louisiana maneuvers in the fall.

On 23 January 1942 the 46th and the 43d

had sailed for Australia; three weeks

later the bulk of their equipment was

shipped. The units were at full

strength when they landed, but did not

long remain so. "USAFIA shanghaied

both officers and men ruthlessly . . . ,"

Matthews wrote. Brett took the 46th's

motor repairmen for the base motor pool

at Melbourne. When their vehicles arrived early in March, the commanders

discovered that the spare tires had been

removed in the States. The first days in

Australia seemed to portend difficult

times ahead.37

The 43d Engineers began work almost

at once preparing Camp Seymour near

Melbourne for the 41st Division, expected in April. Seymour was an old

Australian tent camp. With the addition of huts for kitchens, mess halls,

showers, latrines, recreation buildings,

and hospitals, it was quickly made ready

to accommodate the American division.

In mid-March, when the 43d received its

vehicles, the headquarters and service

company and the 1st Battalion left to

join the 808th in Northern Territory.

Except for one company which remained

at Seymour, the 2d Battalion moved to

Adelaide to enlarge Australian camps

there for the 32d Division. Using materials supplied by the Commonwealth's

Department of Defence, the Engineers

strove to complete the facilities by the

time the 32d would arrive in May.38

36

 Ibid., pp. 36ff.

37

 (1) Hist of 46th Engr GS Regt, 1942. (2) Of C

Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942. (3) Incls,

3 Jul 41, to Of C Engr Info Bull No. 89, 18 Jul 41.

(4) Ltr, OCE Mil Div, Opns and Tng Sec, to C Opns

and Tng Sec, 9 Jul 41. 354.2 pt. 8. (5) Incls to

Memo, Port and Water Sec Transport Br G-4 WD

for Somervell, 24 Jan 42. WPD, 4630-41 (Equip

and Trps—Australia) (sec. II). (6) Matthews Ltr,

10 Nov 49, p. 7. 38

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 125

After two weeks of combat training

near Melbourne, the 46th Engineers left

by rail for northern Queensland, an area

which might at any time become a battle

zone. To protect themselves against

enemy air attack the men mounted machine guns on the flatcars of their trains.

During the trip they passed trainload

after trainload of refugees headed southward. On 13 March the first of the

troops reached Woodstock, a town twenty

miles southwest of Townsville. Here

and in the surrounding countryside the

regiment was to build airstrips so vital

to the defense of the Townsville area.

Colonel Matthews was under exceptional

orders. Since the officer who commanded Base Section Two was a major,

Matthews was to report directly to General Johns. Matthews was to be largely

responsible for the development of airfields in northeastern Australia in the

critical days of early 1942.39

On 18 March the entire regiment

began the work of clearing and grading

three runways for a giant airfield at

Woodstock. Matthews ordered aroundthe-clock operations, scheduling three 8-

hour shifts a day. Because general service troops were trained as jacks of all

engineering trades rather than as specialists in airfield construction, their

equipment included no rooters, rollers,

or scrapers. The troops worked mainly

with picks and shovels, keeping their

trucks and few dozers in reserve for pushing over trees and pulling out stumps.

Even final grading often had to be done

by hand. Still, the regimental historian

reports, "the men were eager and enthusiastic, and went about their work

with vigor . . . troops laboring under

the intense heat of the sun, and in clouds

of dust, slashed away at trees and

stumps. . . ." Four days after construction began, the first plane landed on one

of the runways. Matthews had meanwhile lined up sites for additional strips,

but soon the regiment was dispersed.

On 22 March Company A arrived at

Torrens Creek, a small town about 180

miles southwest of Townsville. Here

the men rapidly cleared the site and laid

steel mat, 2,500 by 100 feet, in five days—

possibly, they thought, a speed record for

putting down mat up to that time.40 On

29 March, Companies B, C, and F moved

to Reid River, 40 miles south of Townsville, where they began building a third

airfield. Although this job, undertaken

in a heavily wooded area, required much

clearing, the first landing strip was ready

by 15 April.41

Matthews described the construction

of these airstrips as "field improvisation

at its ... best." The officers of the

46th were largely on their own and "did

what seemed good to them and in most

cases their engineering common sense

was the primary and single qualification

for the work." Construction was held

to the simplest standards. Because

equipment was short, dispersal taxiways,

(2) [Hist of] Base Sec V, Adelaide, South Australia,

3 Mar 42-8 Mar 43, pp. 10ff. SWPA File A183. (3)

[Hist of] Base Sec V, Rpt of Estimate of Cost of

Work Performed to Last Day of Jun 42. Incls to

Hist cited in (2), above. 39

 (1) Hist of 46th Engr GS Regt, 1942. (2)

Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 40.

40

 Steel mat was also known as pierced steel plank,

pierced plank, or Marston mat, from the name of

the town in North Carolina near which this type of

mat was first tested. 41 (1) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 10. (2) Hist of

46th Engr GS Regt, 1942.
126 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

hardstands, and revetments were omitted.

As the long dry season was just beginning, drainage was dispensed with.

Since the engineers had no asphalt or tar,

they surfaced the runways with rotted

granite, semidecomposed shale, or sometimes merely with gravel and clay. The

fields were rough and crude, but planes

could land on them. Construction took

a heavy toll of equipment. Machinery

broke down quickly under hard usage.

Constant turning and twisting over

rough ground wore out the front tires of

the graders, and the tires of many of the

trucks were slashed by the stumps of

eucalyptus trees, cut off by Australian

surveyors just above the ground.

Having no maintenance repair truck,

Matthews converted a motorized earth

augur, "which wasn't any good anyway,"

into a mobile shop and equipped it with

tools obtained from the Air Forces and

the Australians. For repair work, he

relied on men "who . . . weren't experts but . . . learned fast." The shortage of tires was remedied when the 46th

took over a retreading plant whose workmen had been evacuated from the

Townsville area.42 Despite the regiment's many difficulties, building in the

bush country of northern Queensland

was, as Matthews pointed out, "excellent

training for the officers and men engaged

in doing much with nothing, [and] . . .

living under the most primitive conditions. . . ."

 43

Supplies

If Brett and Johns were cheered by the

coming of engineer units, they were no

less gratified by the decreasing competition for supplies. On 21 February the

Commanding General, USAFIA, had set

up the American Procurement Commission, in response to General Marshall's

suggestion that a central purchasing

board be established in Australia, "along

the lines which were so successful . . .

in France during the last war." The

new commission included representatives

of all the Army's procurement services,

with Heiberg serving as the Engineer

member. Henceforth the services had

to send requests for supplies to the commission, which determined priorities and

placed orders with the Australians. On

20 March the organization was renamed

the General Purchasing Board. It soon

succeeded in bettering relations with the

Australians and in effecting a more

equitable distribution of supplies among

the American services.44

Ships fleeing before the Japanese advance through Malaya and the Indies

meanwhile were bringing large quantities of "distress cargo" to Australia.

Ports were crowded with fugitive merchantmen; so great was the mass of material dumped at Sydney that the wharves

threatened to collapse. Many ships had

to anchor in the harbor to await their

turn to unload, and once they docked,

supplies were hurriedly removed and

thrown into warehouses. The Australian Department of Import Procurement

took possession of the cargoes and began

42

 Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, pp. 13-14, 32. 43

 Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, p. 30.

44

 (1) Ltr, Marshall to Brett [n.d.]. WPD 4630-41

(Equip and Trps—Australia), sec. II. (2) WD Ltr,

AG 334.8 (1-3-42) MSC-D-M to CG USAFIA, 3 Feb

42. 400.333 (Australia) 1942-43. (3) Memo, Barnes

for Heads of Gen and Spec Staff Sec USAFIA, 21

Feb 42. (4) Memo, Brett for Heads of Gen and

Spec Staff Sec USAFIA, 20 Mar 42. Last two in

Rpt of Orgn and Activities, USAFIA, app. 20.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 127

sorting them, after which the Commonwealth government gave the U.S. Army

first choice of all goods brought in by

American and Dutch vessels. Distress

cargo proved to be a windfall for the

engineers, providing them with more

tools, steel plate, pipe, cable, generators,

and construction machinery than any

other source.45

One of the ships which had escaped

from Java brought Mr. Albert Wright, a

petroleum executive of many years' experience in the Indies. The engineers

immediately pressed him into service,

commissioning him a major. Named

Johns' supply officer, Wright was ordered

to get equipment quickly. After conferences with officers of the 808th, the

43d, and the 46th, all of whom stressed

the urgent need for earth-moving machinery, Wright began requisitioning

farm tractors from the Australians. But

these machines were too light for the job,

and, since most of them were secondhand, large stocks of spare parts would

have to be found. When Wright's

efforts to get parts from dealers met with

slight success, distress cargo again proved

a godsend; a shipload of parts for caterpillar tractors enabled the engineers to

keep most of their equipment running.

Meanwhile, rock drills, wire rope, and

hand tools from Australian gold mines

supplemented the engineers' meager

stocks of equipment, and carbon dioxide

cylinders from breweries were rebuilt to

hold oxygen for use in welding. While

the engineers still had too few supplies

and too little equipment, their lot was

gradually improving.46

A New Command

On the morning of 17 March the

planes bringing MacArthur and his staff

from the Philippines to Darwin landed

at Batchelor Field. From there the

group traveled by plane, train and automobile to Melbourne, where MacArthur

set up his headquarters. He and his

staff at once began to take stock of the

situation. General Casey was particularly anxious to get out into the field and

see construction projects firsthand. On

28 March, accompanied by Johns and

Theodore, he flew to Amberley Field

near Brisbane, which he found "well

provided with paved runways." Proceeding to Eagle Farm, he noted that one

5,000-foot runway had been surfaced and

another was under construction. The

strips at nearby Archerfield were of turf,

soft in spots and slippery when wet.

Troops were moving into the recently

finished camps near the fields. Inspecting these camps, Casey was disturbed by

the "relatively high type construction,"

which included tongue and groove flooring, asbestos roofing, and waterborne

sewage systems. He suggested that

"temporary and less costly shelter . . .

be provided." The members of the

party continued on to Townsville, where

they were met by Colonel Matthews,

who took them to see the fields being

built by the 46th Engineers. Casey pronounced the fields "excellent" and was 45 (1) AWC, Report, February 1942-June 1943, p.

109. (2) [Hist of] Base Sec 7, (Draft MS), p. 12.

SWPA File A185. (3) Engr Br Proc Div USASOS,

12 Dec 44, Hist Rpt, Engr Proc in Australia. SWPA

File M35. (4) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, p. 18.

46

 Engr Br Proc Div USASOS, 12 Dec 44, Hist Rpt,

Engr Proc in Australia.
128 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

pleased to find the troops still out working at 2200. The activities of the Australians at Townsville evoked less enthusiasm. Much effort was going into the

dredging of the harbor and the improvement of the road to Brisbane; Casey

wondered if such jobs might not be suspended and the men and equipment put

to work on airfields. Nor was he overly

impressed with Charters Towers. He

noted much equipment on hand but remarked that there were not enough men

to run it. The job, he felt, should be

reorganized and given a "general push."

The tour convinced him that designs

must be simpler, equipment and manpower allocated more wisely, and efforts

centered first of all on airfield construction. Much good work had been done,

but the program required better over-all

direction.47

Toward a More Aggressive Strategy

Strategic Plans

While MacArthur had been making

good his escape from Corregidor, American and British plans for carrying on the

war against Japan were beginning to

crystallize. On 9 March President

Roosevelt proposed that the United

States assume responsibility for the conduct of the war in the Pacific; on the 18th

Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill

agreed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff meanwhile were dividing the Pacific into two

main theaters, the Pacific Ocean Area

(POA) and the Southwest Pacific Area

(SWPA). (Map 8) The latter was to include the large land masses, Australia,

New Guinea, the East Indies (except

Sumatra), and the Philippines, as well as

the Bismarck Archipelago and part of the

Solomon Islands. POA was to include

most of the remainder of the Pacific.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who already

commanded naval forces in this area,

was named commander in chief of Allied

forces. Roosevelt's choice for command

of all Allied air, sea, and ground

forces in the Southwest Pacific Area was

MacArthur. The Australians received

Roosevelt's nomination of the general

with great enthusiasm. Almost from the

time of his arrival in the Commonwealth,

MacArthur had had the prerogatives if

not the title of commander in chief. His

nomination as supreme commander approved by the governments concerned,

MacArthur on 18 April officially assumed

his position as the leader of the Allied

forces in the Southwest Pacific. He organized three new commands under his

own General Headquarters, Southwest

Pacific Area: Allied Land Forces under

Australian General Sir Thomas Blamey,

Allied Air Forces under General Brett,

and Allied Naval Forces under Vice

Adm. Herbert F. Leary. Continuing

under MacArthur's direction were

USFIP, commanded by General Wainwright, and USAFIA, now headed by

General Barnes. As set forth in

Marshall's orders, MacArthur's mission

was threefold: to hold Australia, prevent

the Japanese from cutting supply lines to

the United States, and prepare to take

the offensive.48

47

 (1) Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against

Japan, pp. 70-74. (2) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, n.d.,

sub: Rpt of Inspec Northeast Australia—New

Guinea Areas, 28 Mar-3 Apr. SWPA File 158.

48

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 16-23. (2)

Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 129

MAP 8

MacArthur, on arrival at Melbourne,

had learned of the plans of the Australian

Chiefs of Staff which called for a defense

of the southeastern part of the Commonwealth. He almost at once came to the

conclusion that a different strategy was

needed. Plans for continental defense

he rejected as impractical. To hold the

vast stretches of the sparsely inhabited

country would require a large army; even

twenty-five divisions might not be

enough. Considerable air and naval

power would also be necessary, and no

such force was available or in prospect.

In the near future, the Southwest Pacific

could count on having only two American and possibly three Australian divisions and small naval and air forces.

But, MacArthur reasoned, it might be

possible, with only limited forces, to

ward off invasion by striking enemy-held

islands and enemy naval forces and shipping during an attempted approach to

Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 165-72. (3) Morton, Strategy

and Command, p. 253.
130 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Australia. The Japanese seemed most

apt to try to seize the rich industrial

regions of Victoria and New South Wales

rather than the barren deserts of the west

and north. Consequently, the islands to

the northeast appeared most liable to attack. Port Moresby, on the southern

coast of New Guinea, would be a particularly valuable prize, since it controlled

the air and sea lanes southward along the

Australian coast. MacArthur decided

not to wait for the Japanese to come to

Australia, but to go north to meet them.

With the forces allotted to the Southwest

Pacific a good defensive position could

be maintained, and it might even be

possible to launch limited offensives.49

Role of the Engineers

In choosing to defend Australia in the

islands to the north, MacArthur gave the

engineers a decisive role. The battle

would be joined on mountainous,

jungled, rain-drenched islands, where

overland movement and supply would

be all but impossible. The airplane

would be a principal weapon and heavy

reliance would have to be placed on

water transport. What MacArthur envisioned was a war in which airfields,

ports, and bases would be the prerequisites of victory. Northern Australia had few facilities for waging modern war; New Guinea and the nearby

islands had almost none. The engineers

would have to build what was needed

from the ground up and under the

most difficult conditions. Construction

would be their chief mission, but not

their only one. Before Allied troops

could advance, the engineers would

have to provide maps of the uncharted,

enemy-held regions. Once an offensive

was launched, they would have to support the infantry in combat, help reduce

enemy strongpoints, and perform many

of their traditional functions in moving

the army forward. Though MacArthur

would employ the engineers in many

ways, the effectiveness of his strategy

would, in large measure, depend on the

speed with which they could build

bases and, above all, airfields from

which fighters and bombers could

strike at enemy targets.

That Casey would be chief engineer

of SWPA had been a foregone conclusion, and on 19 April MacArthur issued

the necessary orders. Having already

had several weeks to study conditions

in Australia, Casey was aware of the

immense task ahead. As chief engineer

of an Allied headquarters, he would coordinate the activities of all engineers,

Australian and American, under MacArthur's command, frame the policies

under which they would work, and

give them technical direction. To handle this assignment, he believed he would

need a staff of at least 25 officers and

men. But the number of officers in the

theater was so scant that at first he could

set up only a small section consisting of

5 officers and 5 enlisted men. Heiberg,

transferred from Johns's office, became

his executive officer; Maj. Emil F.

Klinke, transferred from the 43d General

Service Regiment, became chief of operations and training. Lacking experts in

construction, Casey asked Reybold to

send him Lt. Col. Bernard L. Robinson,

then in Wyman's office in Honolulu, and 49

 Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 23-25. Leif J. Sverdrup, at that time about to
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 131

GENERAL CASEY AND GENERAL SVERDRUP (Photograph taken in 1944.)

return to the United States in connection

with work on the air ferry route and

soon to be commissioned a colonel.

Sverdrup and Robinson reached Australia in late May. Sverdrup became

chief of the Construction Section and

Robinson, assistant chief. Although his

staff was part of an Allied headquarters,

Casey had but one subordinate who was

not American, an Australian major who

served as liaison officer. He nevertheless

intended to work closely with Maj. Gen.

Clive S. Steele, who was both Engineer

in Chief of the Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) and Engineer in Chief of

the Allied Land Forces under General

Blamey. Working with the Australians

and integrating their engineer effort into

the Allied program would require not a

little tact and diplomacy, since the Commonwealth's Department of Defence

lay outside MacArthur's jurisdiction.50

(Chart)

50

 (1) GHQ SWPA GO 2, 19 Apr 42. (2) Memo,

Casey for CofS GHQ SWPA 9 Apr 42. SWPA File

26. (3) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

II, 26-28. (4) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, 12 May 42.

(5) Memo, Casey for Rcd, 20 May 42. (6) Rad,

MacArthur to Reybold, 27 Apr 42. Last three in

SWPA File 26. (7) Data obtained from Mil Pers

BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 133

At conferences held during the last

weeks of April, Casey and Steele took

stock of their resources. They had to

assume that they would not have large

numbers of American engineers at their

disposal. One aviation battalion, 2 general service regiments, 2 separate battalions, and 2 dump truck companies

would be in Australia by the end of

April. Scheduled to arrive in May and

June were 2 divisional combat battalions,

2 topographic units, and a depot company, the only additional engineer units

approved by the War Department for

SWPA at that time. This small contingent would hardly be sufficient for the

tasks ahead, but fortunately, increasing

numbers of Australian engineers were

available. Units of the RAE were returning home with their divisions, and

Steele had launched a strenuous recruiting drive. The engineers of the Australian Military Forces, while poorly

trained and equipped, were receiving intensive instruction from veterans of the

RAE. Steele expected soon to be in a

position to furnish not only combat,

construction, and supply units, but also

all the camouflage and railway troops

MacArthur needed. He was further

prepared to supply the Americans with

bridging, landing barges, barbed wire,

and camouflage nets. Casey reasoned

that water supply units from the United

States could be dispensed with, since

providing water would be difficult only

in the parched deserts in the interior of

Australia, and in his opinion the Allies

did "not propose to have any operations

there." He did believe, however, that

more troops trained in general and combat engineering must be sent from the

United States. Urgently needed were

an additional aviation battalion, 2 separate battalions, and 2 dump truck companies, a depot company, and a combat

battalion, all fully equipped, and a heavy

ponton battalion without its equipage.

This was the absolute minimum but

probably all that could be expected in

view of the shortage of trained units in

the United States, the lack of shipping,

and the priority of operations planned

for Europe. With a few reinforcements

from the United States, Casey and Steele

believed they could support the kind of

strategy MacArthur had in mind. But

engineer strength would have to be

spread thin in the Southwest Pacific.51

While Casey drew long-range plans for

the coming offensive, he had to supervise

a construction program that was growing

rapidly larger and more difficult of

accomplishment. In announcing his

strategy, MacArthur had indicated the

need for prodigies of engineering in

northern Australia and New Guinea.

Port Moresby, northeastern Queensland,

and Darwin were now areas of primary

military importance. Greatest stress

would have to be placed on developing

Port Moresby, which MacArthur regarded as the key to the defense of Australia and the springboard for future

offensives. Building an air and supply

base in this exposed area would require

much more than an ordinary engineer

effort. Large numbers of men and

Div OCE. (8) Ltr, Robinson to Lyman, 1 Jun 42.

Engr AGF PAC, 686 (Ferry Route).

51

 (1) Memo, Casey for Rcd, 28 Apr 42. SWPA

File 27. (2) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt

for 1942. (3) Check sheet, Press Relations Off to

Casey, 24 Jun 42. SWPA File 240. (4) Memo,

Casey for Rcd, 15 Apr 42. SWPA File 210.
134 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

quantities of material and equipment

needed to improve facilities in the town

and to construct roads and airfields in

the surrounding countryside would have

to be sent in over supply lines that were

vulnerable to enemy attack. If Moresby

were to serve as the main air base for

operations to the north, a string of supporting airfields would have to be constructed along the coast of northern

Queensland. This, too, would be a

formidable job, for little was known

about terrain and soil conditions of the

bush and jungles of the Cape York Peninsula. Darwin figured less prominently

in MacArthur's plans, but because the

enemy might attack from the northwest

and because the Allies might decide to

invade the Indies, the hard work of

building in remote Northern Territory

would have to be continued and indeed

stepped up. While emphasis was now

on the north as never before, MacArthur

could not neglect his flanks; western

Australia would have to be provided

with more airfields to guard against a

Japanese thrust at that part of the continent. Moreover, logistical facilities in

southern Australia would have to be

expanded. MacArthur chose Sydney,

the largest city and port of Australia, as

the principal supply center for the American forces, rather than Melbourne, some

400 miles to the south. Thus, not only

would a vast new program have to be

undertaken, but the existing one would

have to be continued.52 Only after base

development was fairly well along would

MacArthur be able to take the offensive.

Organizing the Engineer Effort

Since the war in the Southwest Pacific

was clearly destined to be a "poor man's

war," the engineers would have to make

the most of what they had. As Casey

saw it, they would have to build "what is

wanted within the minimum time and

with the minimum expenditure of manpower and material resources." This

ideal had not yet been attained. There

was evidence of waste, duplication of

effort, poor management, and inefficient

administration. Too much was being

done on "a peacetime basis of permanency." Too many projects were longterm and would be of no help in furthering immediate military objectives and,

"in addition, might seriously endanger

other urgent military projects direly

needed now." Priorities were almost

meaningless. In one case, a dressing

room for women in a defense plant carried a higher priority than a hospital for

the RAAF. It seemed that nearly every

project of any importance was rated A-1.

Although the shortage of equipment

was acute, many contractors were not

operating on a multiple shift basis.

Agencies were duplicating each other's

work. In Queensland, the RAAF, the

U.S. Air Forces, the Commonwealth government, and the engineers were all

engaged in picking sites for airfields.

Machinery for working with the Australians was slowed by red tape. It took

the Allied Works Council an excessively

long time not only to get approval to

start a project but also to obtain permis52

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 25-27. (2) Of

C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942. (3)

[Hist of] Base Sec 7.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 135

sion to make minor changes in specifications. Casey concluded that this state of

affairs would force him to take a strong

stand.53

One of his prime objectives was to give

the program unified direction. He

therefore set out to view construction in

broad perspective, to consider projects

not on an individual basis but as parts

of an integrated program. As a first step

toward this goal, he directed his staff to

inventory jobs, under way and projected,

and to make a survey of available manpower, materials, and equipment. He

next attempted to formulate "a planned

program of ... construction with definite time limits based on ... a knowledge of requirements and resources."

Once the program had been defined, he

intended to keep close check on rates of

progress and percentages of completion.

He asked for uniform progress reports

from each project, explaining that "the

purpose is to see that the job is approximately up to date and if behind . . .

[what] action can be taken to bring it up

to schedule."54 Merely analyzing the

program and diagnosing its ills were not

enough. Casey would have to persuade

others to follow his suggestions. Under

the command-staff setup, he could not

issue orders, but since he was MacArthur's chief engineer, his recommendations would carry great weight.

He encountered resistance almost at

once. The American airmen, not content to be dependent on the base sections,

wished to handle their own construction.

They were quick to cite examples of

waste and inefficiency in the existing arrangement. To strengthen their position, they had already made a beginning

toward setting up their own engineer

establishment with the appointment on

16 March of Abbott as air engineer.

After reminding Casey of the many

difficulties the base sections had encountered in getting Air Forces projects finished on time, Brett on 18 April proposed

that a separate field organization be

created to handle the building of airfields. He asked that each air area

commander be assigned an engineer who

would be responsible to USAFIA for all

Air Forces jobs in the area, selecting the

sites and supervising the construction.

Casey was unalterably opposed to such

an arrangement. Not only would the

authority of the air engineers conflict

with that of the base section commanders, but this might well be the first step

toward the establishment of a dual engineer organization with control of the

aviation battalions exclusively by the Air

Forces. Because the number of engineers in SWPA was so small, Casey

believed that having two separate field

systems would merely slow down progress. He countered Brett's proposal

with one of his own. What was needed,

he suggested, was not another field

organization but better co-ordination

between the existing one and the Air

53

 (1) Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951 (New York, 1954), pp.

83-84. (2) W. A. Rogers, Secy AWC, Memo for Rcd,

sub: Conf Held at the Of of the Dep Dir Gen of

Allied Works on Sunday, 31 May 42. SWPA File

240. (3) Memo, Casey for Staff Sec Heads, 27 Jun

42. SWPA File 26. (4) Memo, Sverdrup for Casey,

27 Jun 42. SWPA File 243. (5) Rad, Brett to Air

Bd, 18 Apr 42. (6) Ltr, Casey to Brett, 24 Apr 42.

Last two in SWPA File 490. 54

 (1) Memo, Casey for Brett, 20 May 42. SWPA

File 490. (2) Min of Conf Held at Engr Hq Office

of Col Bres, . . . Jun 17, 1942. SWPA File 240.
136 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Forces. He persuaded Brett to let Johns

assign engineers from the base sections

to air commands in areas where extensive

airfield construction was under way.

These air engineers would act as liaison

officers between the air areas and the base

sections. They would also help select

sites and inspect projects and could order

minor changes in plans and specifications, but they would not be responsible

for construction. Thus, Casey was able

to forestall the setting up of a separate

engineer organization under the Air

Forces.55

Casey had no sooner come to an understanding with Brett than he found himself at odds with the RAAF. Although

this organization was engaged in an

extensive construction program, Casey

was unable to get a list of its projects.

Nor was the RAAF inclined to tell him

how many fields it planned to build or

what its over-all requirements would be.

He learned indirectly that it was concentrating heavily on the southeast and was

planning to work on some eighty fields

in the Sydney area alone. While these

matters were not, strictly speaking, his

affair, Casey believed that the concentration of so much effort in the southeast

was detrimental to Allied strategy. He

prepared a memorandum for Brett, indicating that there was not "complete

coordination," between the American

and Australian air forces. He expressed

the belief that it was "desirable that the

broad picture of Allied Air Force construction requirements be pulled together into an all embracing program."

He went on to say that if "we are to be

forced back into the southeastern Australian area, an extensive construction

program in that area is undoubtedly

wanted" but implied that if MacArthur's

strategy were sound, many of the southern projects could be dropped. While

this memo was still on his desk, Casey

received a letter from General Steele of

the RAE, telling him of the RAAF's plan

to organize four works units for building

airfields, each unit to consist of 1,000

men and to be equipped with heavy

machinery. "I feel a little diffident,"

Steele wrote, "but in view of [the] manpower shortage feel that I should . . .

[suggest] that their establishment seems

somewhat top-heavy." Casey had additional grounds for objecting—the works

units would probably be used exclusively

on RAAF projects. He quickly drafted

a second memo to Brett in which he

recommended that smaller units, modeled on U.S. engineer aviation companies, be formed and placed under

Steele. Taking both memos, he set off

for the headquarters of the AAF. Brett

glanced over the documents and passed

them on to his chief of staff, Australian

Air Vice-Marshal William D. Bostock.56

Two days later Bostock held a meeting

of air officers and engineers. Casey,

away on a field inspection trip, could not

attend. Among those present were Lt.

Col. Ward T. Abbott, Col. E. S. Bres of

Johns' office, and 1st Lt. Max D. Lovett

55

 (1) TWX, Brett to Air Bd, 18 Apr 42. (2)

Memo, Casey for Brett, 24 Apr 42. (3) Memo, Casey

for DCofS GHQ SWPA, 24 Apr 42. (4) Memo,

Casey for Johns, 24 Apr 42. (5) Memo, Casey for

DCofS GHQ SWPA, 26 Apr 42. (6) Ltr, MacArthur

to Brett and Barnes, 7 May 42. All in SWPA File

490. (7) Memo, Brett for CG's U.S. Air Commands

No. 1 and No. 2, 9 May 42. SWPA File 459.

56

 Memo, Casey for Brett, 20 May 42. (2) Ltr,

Steele to Casey, 19 May 42. (3) Memo, Casey for

Brett, 20 May 42. (4) Ltr, Casey to Steele, 21 May

42. All in SWPA File 490.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 137

of Casey's staff. A rather heated discussion developed. Bostock opened the

conference with the statement that he

thought a great many of Casey's misgivings about the RAAF's construction

program were the result of "incomplete

information" and suggested that the

chief engineer possibly had not "had an

opportunity of thoroughly dealing with

. . . [the] problem." Bostock was not

inclined to discuss the question of how

RAAF works units should be organized.

This, he said "was the concern of the

Australian Government and a matter for

the Ministry of Air to decide. . . . It

was not a question for Allied Air Forces

to worry about." Remarking that Casey

seemed "somewhat worried" over the

amount of construction going on in the

southeast, Bostock stated that manpower

and materials available there could not

always be sent elsewhere. On the island

of Tasmania, for example, there were

plenty of laborers ready to work at home

but unwilling to go to New Guinea.

When Colonel Abbott asked if the equipment in Tasmania could not be sent

north, Bostock retorted that that was a

matter for the Allied Works Council.

As Colonel Heiberg put it later, the "general attitude . . . seemed to be that

works are now progressing satisfactorily,

and no external control is desired or

necessary." The RAAF nevertheless

agreed to make one concession; it would

furnish a statement of its airfield program to Brett.57

Even as he attempted to co-ordinate

construction work and to centralize responsibility, Casey, together with other

engineers, favored the policy of giving

more authority to the field. In the early

days the men directly in charge of projects had had little leeway. Approval for

even the most trifling jobs had to come

from Melbourne. The granting of more

power to the base section commanders

had been advocated for some time. On

26 March Brett had ruled that jobs costing less than £1,000 (about $3,200) could

be undertaken by base section commanders on their own authority. On

13 April he raised the ceiling to £5,000

(about $16,000). Since the vast majority

of projects were to cost less than this

sum, Brett thus decentralized his authority over most of the program. Many

engineers believed that Theodore would

have to follow suit. Contractors were

having to get the AWC's approval for

practically everything they did. When

Colonel Matthews tried to stop certain

work he considered unnecessary at

Charters Towers and Cloncurry, the

contractor refused to quit, saying that he

took "his orders from Brisbane." Both

Casey and Steele proposed that the AWC

send to the projects representatives

clothed with authority comparable to

that of the base section commanders.

Then, if Matthews wanted a few buildings more or less at Charters Towers, he

could get approval directly from the

AWC's man at the site. Theodore at

first objected, maintaining that a telephone call to him would bring action

within twenty-four hours. To this

Steele replied that "he was interested in

a method of operation that can go on in

the event a bomb should cut the telephone lines." Finally Theodore agreed

57

 (1) Memo, Bostock for Casey, 21 May 42. (2)

Memo, Bostock for Casey, 21 May 42. Both in

SWPA File 490. (3) Min of Mtg Held at RAAF Hq,

22 May 42. SWPA File 481. (4) Memo, Heiberg

for G-4 SWPA, 30 May 42. SWPA File 490.
138 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

to send out men empowered to make

on-the-spot decisions. Soon "coordinating engineers" were on their way to

many of the large projects with orders to

remove bottlenecks and improve efficiency.58

Minimum Construction

Requirements

It was difficult to escape the conclusion

that much of the construction was overelaborate and some of it unnecessary.

On the road from Townsville to Charters

Towers Casey observed workmen putting

in a heavy type of culvert, better suited

for a permanent peacetime highway than

for a temporary military supply route.

He learned that the RAAF was planning

to build an officers' club costing $100,000

at Darwin. There were many projects

which would not be finished for years but

would benefit the Australian economy

after the war. Insisting that construction be held to "bare essentials," Casey

suggested that long-term projects be deferred. "The tactical situation might

materially alter . . .," he pointed out,

'and works which will not be completed

for say a year or more hence will be of no

value insofar as near term operations are

concerned." Many of the AWC officials

agreed with him. They too wished to

avoid "spit and polish" construction and

to eliminate jobs which would not contribute to the winning of the war. But

paring down to essentials was no easy

matter. Many commanders, American

and Australian, were interested in

building elaborate installations for themselves and in promoting their own pet

projects. Many jobs had been started

before Japan declared war, and supplies

and materials had already been allocated.

Yet the situation was not quite so hopeless as it appeared. Officials of the

AWC through their control of manpower, materials, and equipment could

do much to correct abuses, and Casey

kept up unremitting pressure to make

them do so.59

The chief engineer saw still another

opportunity to economize. Believing an

enemy landing imminent, the Australians were making frantic preparations in

the southeast to hold back the invader

and, failing that, to destroy everything

in his path. Around Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane, large numbers of

men were mining roads and bridges,

digging trenches, preparing tank traps,

and making ready to put a scorchedearth policy into effect. Undoubtedly

much of this work could be suspended.

Fixed positions would be of little value

since the enemy could easily bypass most

58

 (1) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, n.d. sub: Rpt of

Inspec Northeast Australia-New Guinea Areas, 28

Mar-3 Apr. SWPA File 158. (2) Memo, CofS

USAFIA to G-4 USAFIA, 25 Mar 42. SWPA File

275. (3) Ltr, Hq USAFIA to CG's All Base Secs, 26

Mar 42. SWPA File M51B. (4) Ltr, CG USAFIA to

Cs All Arms and Servs and CO's, All Base Secs

USAFIA, 13 Apr 42. SWPA File 275. (5) Col Bres,

Memo for Rcd, sub: Conf Held at Engr Hq, The Of

of Col Bres, . . . 17 Jun 42. SWPA File 240. (6)

Telg, Brett to Air Bds, 18 Apr 42. SWPA File 490.

(7) Memo, Opns and Tng [Br] of C Engr, GHQ

SWPA for Casey, 19 May 42. SWPA File 275. (8)

AWC Of Memo 196 [5 Nov 42], sub: AWC Projects.

SWPA File 242.

59

 (1) Memo, Klinke for Casey, 19 May 42. SWPA

File 275. (2) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 5-6.

(3) Memo, Sverdrup for Casey, 27 Jun 42. SWPA

File 243. (4) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 8 Jun 42.

SWPA File 158. (5) Telg, Brett to Air Bd, 18 Apr

42. (6) Memo, Casey for Brett, 20 May 42. (7)

Memo for Rcd, Casey, 24 Apr 42. Last three in

SWPA File 490.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 139

of them. Because 10,000 miles of coast

line had to be protected, Australia's defenses should be mobile. Casey held

that materials for fortifications and demolitions should be stockpiled at points

"where they can be procured quickly in

an emergency rather than all emplaced

. . . beforehand." In place of the

scorched-earth policy, he advocated a

"two stage" program for wrecking Australia's industrial plant; first, a partial

demolition, and second, a complete destruction. The Japanese, he argued,

would very likely be expelled from the

continent within a few months after

their first landing. The Australians had

therefore but to put important industrial

and power plants out of operation for a

comparatively short period, a task that

could be quickly accomplished by removing or destroying vital machine

parts. Total destruction should be carried out only as a final resort and then

only on orders from MacArthur. Although General Steele gave this suggested program wholehearted support,

the Australian Government insisted that

the work of fortifying the southeast and

preparing for total destruction be continued.60

Sometimes the engineers themselves

were guilty of overelaborate construction. This situation developed largely

because they still had so few suitable

plans and specifications to work with.

Until the Americans had designs for

buildings that were both cheap and easy

to construct, their projects would continue to consume excessive amounts of

effort and materials. On 5 April Johns

had settled the question of uniform plans

and specifications by ruling that the

theater of operations drawings would

henceforth be standard. As fast as

plans could be modified to meet conditions in Australia, they were to be sent

to the field. Base section engineers were

permitted to make minor changes which

would enable them to utilize locally

available materials and to expedite

construction.

As the name implied, theater of operations drawings were intended for use in

overseas theaters, where only the flimsiest

and most temporary structures were

required. The Australian Army, building in home territory, erected more

durable installations and would have

preferred that the Americans also construct along more permanent lines.

When MacArthur in April ordered

camps for two American divisions in

northeastern Queensland, Casey, following the theater of operations plans, directed a minimum of shelter and no

conveniences. The enemy, he reasoned,

was already accustomed to living under

the most primitive conditions. If the

Americans were to defeat the Japanese,

they must be no less rugged. General

Blamey saw the matter in a different

light. Contemplating the eventual use

of the camps by the Australian Army, he

proposed that the Allies work out designs together. If Blarney's suggestion

were followed, the engineers might as

well forget the theater of operations

plans. Pointing out that General Steele

considered American structures suitable

60

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 8 Jun 42. SWPA File

158. (2) Grattan, ed., Australia, p. 397. (3) Ltr,

CofS SWPA to Blamey, 31 Jul 42. (4) Ltr, Steele to

Casey, 29 Jul 42. (5) Commonwealth of Australia

Defence Com, Denial of Resources to the Enemy,

Directive for Guidance in the Formulation of Detailed Plans. Last three in SWPA File 175.
140 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

for Australian units, Casey ruled that

adherence to the theater of operations

drawings would continue to be required

at all American projects.61

Supply Policies

Although the campaign to cut down to

bare essentials was moderately successful,

the demand for materials and equipment

still far exceeded the supply. Both

Americans and Australians were banking

heavily on shipments from the United

States. The Commonwealth was calling

for tremendous quantities of lend-lease

equipment; on one occasion, Prime

Minister Curtin had requested nearly a

thousand items of heavy machinery, including 445 tractors, 111 carryalls, 142

rollers, 161 rooters, and 83 graders. The

U.S. Army's total requests were nearly as

large as those of the Australians. By

March, Reybold's office had on file numerous orders from USAFIA. A single

requisition listed 2,000,000 square feet of

landing mat, 3,250,000 gallons of asphalt,

200 motors, 70 D-8 tractors with dozers,

50 carryalls, and large quantities of other

types of equipment and supplies. The

Chief of Engineers promised to do his

best to meet requirements in the Southwest Pacific but offered little encouragement. Manufacturers of construction

equipment were booked heavily for many

months to come. A few of the items,

among them asphalt, bitumen, and landing mat, were immediately available, but

ships to carry them to Australia were

not. Reybold's advice was to ask for less

from the United States and to get more

in Australia.62

Surveys of Australia's industrial capacity showed that local production of

engineer items could be considerably expanded. The Broken Hill Proprietary

Company, the country's largest industrial

combine, was capable of producing

9,000,000 gallons of tar annually, and

this material could be used in place of

asphalt or bitumen. Steel fabricating

plants could be converted to the manufacture of landing mat. Several concerns had facilities for making stone

crushers, portable pumps, and sheepsfoot

rollers. The Commonwealth government had ordered the AWC to increase

the manufacture of earth-moving equipment. Working closely with members

of the council on this job, Casey and

Colonel Wright had a hand in promoting

the formation of the Earth Moving

Manufacturers Group. This body included not only the principal makers of

this type of machinery, among them the

Australian affiliates of International Harvester and of Le Tourneau, but also a

number of concerns which had not previously built such equipment. By pooling their resources and distributing

orders so that one plant would not be

overburdened with work while others

stood idle, the members of the group

stepped up production of graders, dozers,

61

 (1) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, p. 5. (2) Ltr,

MacArthur to Barnes, 11 Apr 42. (3) Memo, Casey

for DCofS GHQ SWPA, 18 Apr 42. (4) Ltr, Blamey

to MacArthur, 3 Jun 42. (5) Draft Ltr of MacArthur to Blamey, prepared by Casey, 7 Jun 42.

Last four in SWPA File 545.

62

 (1) Incls to Memo, Johns for Casey, 11 Apr 42.

(2) Cable, Prime Minister's Dept to Dir Gen, Australian War Sups Proc, Washington, D.C., 4 Mar 42.

Both in SWPA File 210. (3) Memo, WPD for TAG,

20 Feb 42. AG 381 (11-27-41). (4) Incls with Ltr,

Sup Div OCE WD to WPD, 27 Mar 42. 400.333

(Australia) 1942-44.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 141

shovels, rooters, cranes, and scrapers.

Although certain special parts still had

to come from the United States, a large

percentage of equipment requirements

could be filled in Australia. Meeting in

mid-April, Johns, Casey, and Theodore

agreed to defer delivery of most American-made goods and to cancel many

orders outright.63

Decisions affecting the engineer supply picture, if not always made by

Casey, were generally influenced by him.

From the first he saw to it that his opinions were well known to the Allied Supply Council, the policy-making body

which controlled procurement in the

Southwest Pacific. Established in March

1942, the council included Americans,

Australians, British, and Dutch, whose

job it was to find means of exploiting

Australian resources to the fullest and to

determine what must be imported.

Casey kept abreast of the council's activities, scrutinizing the minutes of each

meeting. By working through the

American representative, he obtained

sympathetic consideration of the engineers' needs. Because local manufacturers of earth-moving machinery looked

to America for engines and bearings, he

also assumed responsibility for apportioning the end products among the

Australian and U.S. Armies and the

Allied Works Council. After the signing of the American-Australian LendLease agreement in May, the chief engineer occupied a position of considerable

power. MacArthur's office reviewed

every request for lend-lease aid and controlled the distribution of incoming shipments. Casey ruled on all matters involving engineer construction supplies

and equipment.64

AWC Construction

All these efforts notwithstanding, success of the construction program rested

largely with the Allied Works Council.

Responsible for the great majority of

projects on the continent, the council

had made rapid strides during its first

few months of existence. By mid-May

it was directing a work force of nearly

45,000. Well over 100 airfields were

under construction, about 50 in New

South Wales alone. Bombers were operating from new runways at Charters

Towers, Garbutt, and Eagle Farm; fighters, from numerous smaller fields. The

U.S. Air Forces had begun moving into

the big depot at Tocumwal. Work had

been launched on the 7 fields of an inland ferry route extending from Melbourne to Cloncurry in the interior of

Queensland—a communications link

that would be vitally needed if the eastern coast came under attack. At Melbourne, Adelaide, and Brisbane, recently

completed warehouses were being

stocked and more stood ready to receive

additional stores. From Sydney, Maj.

William Lehr, engineer of the recently

organized Base Section Seven in New

South Wales, reported that the council

63

 (1) Memo, Casey for Johns, 24 Apr 42. SWPA

File 490. (2) Memo for Rcd, Wright, 10 Apr 42.

SWPA file 210. (3) Rpt, Engr Br Proc Div USASOS,

12 Dec 44, sub: Engr Proc in Australia. SWPA File

M35. (4) AWC, Report, February 1942-June 1943,

p. 107. (5) Memo, Johns for Casey, 11 Apr 42.

SWPA File 210. (6) Incls to Memo, Johns for Casey,

11 Apr 42.

64

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for

1942. (2) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for

1943. Sup (Draft). SWPA File A8. (3) Engr Proc in

Australia.
142 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

AN AUSTRALIAN ROAD BUILDER AND HIS TRAILER

had begun erecting facilities that would

enable the Americans to use the port as

their main base of supply. Theodore

had meanwhile accelerated work on defense highways, on tank farms for storing

114,526,000 imperial gallons of oil, and

on munitions plants. He now had to

cope with a program that was increasing

at the rate of 2,000 jobs a month. So

extensive had construction become that

the council reluctantly concluded that

workers must be drafted. On 14 April,

the government had empowered Theodore to establish the Civil Constructional

Corps, an organization of civilian volunteers and draftees. All male civilians

between the ages of 18 and 60 were liable

for service, except defense workers.

While the CCC was to be under Theodore's direction, recruitment and conscription were left to the states. Victoria, the first state to conscript workers,

started calling up men in May; New

South Wales began one month later.

The Allied Works Council had made a

substantial contribution and would soon

be in position to make an even larger

one. But the fact remained that most

of its efforts, directed as they were to the

Australian defense program, were confined to the southeastern part of the

continent.65

65

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Brief Statement of Works

Being Carried out Under Direction of the AWC.

SWPA File 240. (2) AWC, Report, February 1942-

June 1943, pp. 40-47, 87. (3) Of C Engr GHQ

AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 25-46. (4) [Hist of]

Base Sec 7. (5) Memo for Rcd, Constr Sec Of C
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 143

From the American point of view the

most crying need was for airfields in the

northeast. The critical area of southeastern New Guinea was still almost defenseless. While enemy planes, based at

Rabaul on New Britain and at Lae and

Salamaua on the northeastern New

Guinea coast, bombed Port Moresby at

will, Allied airmen were severely handicapped by the lack of bases in New

Guinea and on the Cape York Peninsula.

At Moresby were two fields, both small

and crudely built. Seven-Mile Drome,

east of the town, had one 5,000-foot runway, surfaced with bitumen but in poor

condition. Surrounding hills made

takeoffs hazardous. Kila Drome, a commercial field 3 miles southeast of

Moresby, was "a 3,000 foot roller coaster

with 300-foot hills at its ends and grades

to make your hair stand on end." The

fields on the Cape York Peninsula at

Cairns, Cooktown, and Coen, and on

Horn Island, off the tip of the peninsula,

were small and rough, and so near the

sea that they were fogged in much of the

time. Small numbers of fighters and

light bombers could be based at the

Moresby and Cape York fields, but

B-17's had to operate out of Townsville,

far down on the Queensland coast.

From there the heavy bombers flew the

600 miles to Moresby, arriving at dusk.

Taking on fuel and bombs during the

night, they left early in the morning to

strike at enemy targets to the north.66

The Air Forces could not bring their

full strength to bear under these conditions. If the Allies were to neutralize

Japanese positions on the northern coast

of New Guinea and on New Britain and

to gain control of the skies over Moresby,

more air power must be based farther

north.

Construction there would have to be

accomplished without the help of the

AWC. Theodore was reluctant to send

workers to the Cape York Peninsula,

much less to New Guinea. In May,

when the council began to consider

establishing the Civil Constructional

Corps in Queensland, the question arose

whether the men should be assigned to

forward areas. The Australians hesitated to take such a step. Some thought

that because of the possibility of attack

by enemy raiding parties, the workers

would have to be armed for their own

protection. General Steele pointed out

there was a chance they would be shot if

captured. He was of the opinion that

employing the Civil Constructional

Corps in forward areas would need "careful consideration." Australian commanders in New Guinea were adamant

against bringing in civilians, insisting

that all persons in that threatened area

must be under military control. So long

as the grave danger of invasion remained,

Theodore would not send civilians north

of Townsville. Nor would he send large

quantities of supplies. Concerned lest

Australian defense projects be slighted,

he hesitated to "denude" the works

agencies in Victoria and New South

Engr GHQ SWPA, 8 May 42. SWPA File 241. (6)

Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942. (7)

Commonwealth of Australia, Statutory Rules, 1942,

No. 170, Regulations Under the National Security

Act, 1939-1940. 66

 (1) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 30ff. (2)

Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations,

pp. 416-17. (3) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 12.

(4) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, n.d., sub: Rpt of Inspec

Northeast Australia-New Guinea Areas, 28 Mar3 Apr. SWPA File 158.
144 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Wales of their equipment and to deplete

their stock of materials. Americans

found that the farther north they went,

the more difficult it became to secure the

council's assistance.67

For airfields in the Cape York Peninsula, the engineers would have to depend

on the Queensland Main Roads Commission. After reconnaissance parties of

the 46th Engineers had located two good

sites—one near Mareeba, a small town

on the Atherton Tablelands west of

Cairns, the other, near Cooktown Mission, about a hundred miles to the north

—the commission took over the work of

construction. Farther north it began

lengthening the principal runway of the

small field at Coen and improving the

strip on Horn Island. These jobs had to

be carried out in the face of great difficulties. All of the sites were isolated.

There were no rail or road connections

with the remainder of the continent so

that supply was possible only by air or

sea. Men experienced chiefly in building roads now had to build airfields without adequate equipment or supplies.

Progress was understandably slow, but

the engineers were grateful for Australian help. "I was deeply impressed

with the splendid work performed by the

Main Roads Commission organization"

at Cooktown Mission and Mareeba,

Casey wrote later. "Both of these fields

are important ones for our present and

proposed operations." Matthews also

had high praise for the Australians'

effort. "Had it not been for Jumbo

Jack Mathison, the Main Roads Commissioner, located at Townsville," he

wrote, "the work we undertook in ...

[Base Section Two] by civilian forces

could not have been accomplished, as

AWC was not only unable but apparently unwilling to do much."

 68

Engineer Units in Northern Australia

and New Guinea

Matthews needed more engineers

desperately. Until early April the 46th

was the only engineer unit in Queensland. On the 10th of that month, two

battalions (separate), the 91st under Lt.

Col. Burton B. Bruce and the 96th under

Lt. Col. Leverett G. Yoder, reached

Townsville. With the landing of these

two units, some 2,200 troops were added

to the labor force.69 Unfortunately,

separate battalions were never intended

to handle large or complex construction

jobs. They were designed rather to

serve mainly as labor pools. Men were

to be attached as needed to other engineer units. With an authorized strength

of 28 officers and 1,059 enlisted men, a

battalion had but one motorized road

grader, one 1⁄2-cubic-yard power shovel,

8 medium tractors with angledozers, and

67

 (1) Memo for Rcd, W. A. Rogers, Secy AWC

Queensland Div, sub: Conf Held at the Of of the

Dep Dir Gen of Allied Works on Sunday, 31 May 42.

SWPA File 240. (2) E. F. Borrie, Dir of Engr, Dept

of Interior, Min of Conf of Representatives of State

Road Authorities . . . Held in Melbourne . . . 2 and

3 Jun 42. SWPA File 481.

68

 (1) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 30-34. (2)

Memo for Rcd, Rogers, sub: Conf held in the Office

of the Dep Dir Gen of Allied Works, 31 May 42.

SWPA File 490. (3) Ltr, Casey to J. C. Mathison,

14 Aug 42. SWPA File 492. (4) Matthews Ltr, 10

Nov 49, pp. 8, 11-12. 69

 The 91st and 96th Battalions were Negro units.

For the role of Negro troops in the Pacific in World

War II, see Ulysses G. Lee, Jr., The Employment of

Negro Troops, THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1966).
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 145

47 trucks, nearly one-third of which were

21⁄2 ton. Hand tools were the principal

equipment. After they reached Australia, neither the 91st nor the 96th was

to receive the greater part of the machinery assigned to it. What happened

is something of a mystery. "These units

never did get their organic equipment

except their half-tracks and their air

compressors," Matthews wrote. "We

know the equipment was landed. But I

never could trace it after that. . . ."

The 46th Engineers furnished a few

trucks to both the 91st and the 96th, but

the men would have to do their daily

work mainly by hand. Although greatly

disappointed because he had not received general service regiments,

Matthews found plenty of work for the

troops to do.70

Most of the men were put to building

airfields. After helping the 46th Engineers at Woodstock for a few days, the

91st Battalion moved to Giru, thirty

miles southeast of Townsville, to clear

ground for a new strip. Meanwhile,

Companies A and C of the 96th were

assigned the dual mission of providing

three 7,000-foot turf strips at Kelso Field

near Townsville and furnishing work

parties for other jobs. The troops were

severely handicapped by their lack of

equipment. The 96th tackled the job

at Giru with picks, shovels, wheelbarrows, and a carpenter's level. Requested to supply machinery, the local

office of the AWC rented some from

farmers in the surrounding countryside.

The first implement obtained was a

horse-drawn mowing machine. In time

the council turned over a few trucks and

graders. The three remaining companies of the 96th did not work in

Queensland, having been alerted, after a

few days ashore, for movement to Port

Moresby.71

Plans for developing Moresby into a

first-class operational base had been in

the making for almost a month. After

inspecting the town early in April, Casey

had written MacArthur, "[this] is one of

our most vital areas, and . . . highest

priority should be given to the development of the airfields in this locality."

Moresby had much to commend it.

Besides the two airfields, it had a deep

water harbor with a dock for unloading

freighters, two piers for barges, and a seaplane ramp. There was also a power

plant, a water supply system, and about

twenty-five miles of road, seven of which

were asphalted. The chief engineer

recommended that the port and the two

airfields be improved and that three new

fields be built. He asked that one general service company, one separate battalion (less two companies), and one

dump truck company be sent in as soon

as possible.72

70

 (1) Hist of 91st Engr Regt, Jan 42-Jun 43. (2)

Hist of 96th Engr GS Regt, 1942-43. (3) Memo,

Brig Gen Clarence L. Sturdevant, ACofEngrs, for

CG AGF, 2 May 42. 320.2 (Engrs, Corps of). (4)

Memo, Col F. K. Newcomer, Engr Third Army, for

ACofS G-3 Third Army, 21 Jan 42. 320.2 (Engrs,

Corps of) pt. 15. (5) Incl 1, Comparison of Pers

and Major Items of Equip of the Sep Bn and GS

Regt, to Memo, Newcomer for ACofS G-3, 21 Jan 42.

(6) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 17. (7) Ltr, Heiberg to Casey, 29 May 42. SWPA File 469. (8)

Interv, author with Lt Col David M. Matheson, formerly CO of Co D, 96th Engr Bn (Sep), 14 Mar 55.

71

 (1) Hist of 91st Engr Bn (Sep), 1942-43. (2)

Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 9. (3) Hist of 96th Engr

Bn (Sep), 1942-43. 72

 (1) Ltr, Casey to MacArthur, n.d., sub: Rpt of

Inspec Northeast Australia-New Guinea Areas, 28

Mar-3 Apr - SWPA File 158. (2) Matthews, Data for
146 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

On 22 April an advanced detachment

of the 96th left Townsville by air and

landed at Seven-Mile Drome, the first

American ground troops to reach New

Guinea. Late on the evening of the

28th a boat carrying headquarters and

Companies B and D steamed into

Moresby harbor. Morale was low.

The enemy had by some means apparently learned of the movement of the

96th. Someone had picked up a broadcast from Tokyo announcing that on the

next day, the Emperor's birthday, Japanese airmen would make a devastating

raid on Port Moresby and promised that

before long the streets would run red

with American blood. During the

night, the engineers worked at the docks

in a pouring rain to unload their cargo,

for the ship had to be out of the harbor

before dawn. When the men entered

Moresby proper the next day they found

a ghost town. The city's 2,000 white

inhabitants had been evacuated, and

nearly all of the natives had fled to the

safety of their own villages. Although

most buildings were still standing, the

effects of repeated bombings were very

much in evidence. The Australians had

destroyed utilities and there were signs

that they had begun to carry out a

scorched-earth policy. The Americans

took what encouragement they could

from the fact that a small number of

Royal Australian Engineers were already

at work on Seven-Mile Drome, patching

up the bomb-damaged runways.73

The 96th had a task it could not perform well—that of building airfields.

Company B went to Seven-Mile Drome,

where its first job was to help the Australians repair the runway. Then, with

their hand tools, the men scraped out

extensions at either end and provided

additional taxiways and hardstands.

Company D began work on two new

runways, Bomana and Laloki, about

twelve miles northeast of the town. On

arriving at the sites, the engineers found

that some rough grading had already

been done. The men had no specifications to work from, no instructions on

how to build, and, as usual, no equipment. Their officers had had little experience in airfield construction. The

commander of Company D later described the operation as "building fields

with our fingernails." The engineers

at Moresby eventually got a few graders

and dozers from the Australians and

rounded up several flat-bed trucks which

still had the name of a Chinese vegetable

dealer lettered on their sides. Air raids

were frequent, and the men spent much

time jumping in and out of slit trenches.

In addition to working on the runways,

the troops had to do all sorts of odd jobs.

They refueled planes, loaded bombs,

and worked as stevedores at Moresby

harbor. These engineers could not be

expected to accomplish much in the way

of airfield construction.74 Until the arrival of more units, better trained and

equipped, progress would continue to be

slow.

About thirty miles northwest of Port

Moresby was a wide, coastal plain, named

Hist Rpt, p. 35. (3) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 7 Apr 42.

SWPA File 158. 73

 (1) Hist of 96th Engr Bn (Sep), 1942-43. (2)

Interv, author with Matheson, 14 Mar 55. (3) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49.

74

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

VI, p. 78. (2) Interv, author with Matheson, 14 Mar

55. (3) Hist of 96th Engr Bn (Sep), 1942-43.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 147

Rorona after a native village located

there. Airfields at this location would

make possible better dispersal of aircraft

and would also enable fighters to cover

Port Moresby more adequately. But a

major drawback was Rorona's almost inaccessible location. Between the plain

and Port Moresby were numerous

swamps. Coral reefs and sandbars along

the coast made navigation extremely

hazardous. Despite these adverse conditions, the Air Forces wished to have an

airfield there. When on 4 May, Company E of the 43d Engineer General

Service Regiment, some 165 men, arrived

at Port Moresby, it was not assigned to

the fields near that town but to Rorona.

With no equipment except their hand

tools, one Australian grader, and three

dump trucks, the men began work,

helped by 150 natives.75

Progress in New Guinea was hampered not only by shortages of troops

and equipment but also by an inadequate organizational setup. The Royal

Australian Engineers were under the

Australian commander at Moresby; the

American engineers, under the commander of Base Section Two, Maj.

Francis I. Irwin. Except for an occasional inspection, neither Irwin nor

Matthews, who succeeded him as base

section commander on 28 May, could

give much attention to the troops in

New Guinea. The men at Moresby

seemed to be working without any definite purpose, having only vague information as to what to build or why. This

partly explained their noticeable lack of

incentive. Work of the Americans and

Australians was not co-ordinated. More

or less by chance, a division of labor

evolved. Under Colonel Yoder, the

Americans concentrated their efforts on

airfields, including access roads and

bridges. The Australians worked principally on camps, roads, and base facilities. Under this haphazard arrangement, neither group was very effective.

High-ranking engineer officers generally

agreed that something should be done

but could not agree on what. Colonel

Robinson suggested that units working

on airfields be placed under the U.S. Air

Forces and that an engineer be assigned

to the staff of the Australian commander

at Moresby to co-ordinate all construction in that area. No more willing to

place engineer officers under Australian

commanders than to assign engineer

units to the Air Forces, Casey did not act

on these recommendations. Although

various proposals were made to develop

a more effective Australian-American organization, no solution was reached.76

While the 96th was struggling to get

fields started at Moresby, the 808th, the

only aviation engineer unit in the theater, reinforced by one battalion of the

43d General Service Regiment, continued to work in Northern Territory,

building fields along the rail line from

Darwin to Birdum. Even though the

area of greatest danger appeared to be in

the northeast, the possibility of an enemy

assault from the northwest remained.

Brett, still thinking in terms of an advance against the East Indies, continued

to emphasize the importance of fields

75

 (1) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 37-38.

(2) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 44.

76

 (1) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 40. (2) [Hist of]

Base Sec Two. (3) Memo, Robinson for Sverdrup,

22 Jun 42. SWPA File 158.
148 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

near Darwin. At a conference with

Casey on 24 April, he talked of using

Darwin as the main port for launching

an expeditionary force. He stressed that

the strengthening of the region around

the city was urgent. He believed the

entire area should be brought under military control, adding that the Air Forces

would soon be very active there, "ultimately embracing as much as 8 to 10

bomber squadrons, each of which would

require about 400 tons per day for its

operation. . . ." Casey discouraged

plans for using Darwin as an expeditionary port, explaining that "overland

supply communications . . . [were] too

weak to sustain the development of this

area" and that forces could be dispatched

from large ports for operations in the

Indies, in which case there would be no

reason for stopping off at Darwin.

Nevertheless, the chief engineer went

along with Brett's proposal to continue

work on the airfields in Northern Territory.77

Working in a region of diminishing

tactical importance, and far removed

from Casey's and Johns' offices, the 808th

and the 43d Engineers were left largely

to their own devices. Located in Northern Territory since early March, the

808th had already acquired considerable

experience in working more or less independently. Upon receiving orders to

build an airfield, the engineers selected

sites, prepared plans and specifications,

and began construction. By the time

higher headquarters approved the plans,

work was well along. The men sometimes found it expedient to disregard

prescribed procedures and to resort to

innovations. Their method for clearing

wooded areas serves as a case in point.

As a rule, the trees of this semiarid

region, with shallow root systems and

with trunks averaging 12 inches in diameter, could be pushed over fairly easily.

Taking a cable about 400 feet long, the

men fastened the ends to two D-6 tractors. They then drove the machines

forward, parallel to each other, uprooting trees. Light cables about one inch

in diameter, while they had to be spliced

frequently, proved best because the

troops had difficulty in raising heavier

ones high enough to topple the larger

trees. On several occasions, ten men

were able to clear an area 5,000 feet long

and 100 feet wide in ten hours. The

unit took great pride in such exploits.

According to the battalion's chronicler,

"the drive and spirit of the 808th seemed

to have caught the fancy of the Australians, and from Darwin to Alice

Springs and southward the name of the

battalion became the watchword for

work and efficiency."

 78

By May the 808th was the best

equipped engineer unit in the theater, a

situation for which the men themselves

were partly responsible. Moving heavy

machinery across the 600-mile stretch of

no-man's-land from Alice Springs to

Birdum and then northward on the

dilapidated railroad was a hazardous and

laborious undertaking. The odyssey of

77

 (1) Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, pp.

160ff. (2) Memo for Rcd, Casey, sub: Conf with Lt

Gen G. H. Brett on 24 Apr 42. SWPA File 490.

78

 (1) Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, pp.

68-69, 78. (2) 3d Ind, Hq 808th Engr Avn Bn

to C Engr GHQ SWPA, 3 May 43, on Memo, C Engr

GHQ SWPA for CO 808th Engr Avn Bn, 13 Apr 43,

in Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, pp. 154-

55ff.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 149

one D-8 tractor illustrates the type of

difficulties the 808th encountered. The

big "cat" began its journey north from

Alice Springs aboard a 20-ton trailer,

which bumped along over the washboard

road. The trip ruined the trailer, the

only one of its size in the area. North

of Birdum the flatcar carrying the tractor

buckled under the weight of its cargo.

A lieutenant and an enlisted man had to

go down and drive the D-8 up to Katherine under its own power. Once the

engineers got their equipment, they were

hard put to keep it running. Spare

parts had to come from Melbourne and

shipments were infrequent. Two enlisted men, Pvt. Karl F. Bretschneider

and Pvt. Jerald F. Patnode, were especially good at keeping the machines in

repair. They combed the area for any

materials they might be able to use and

even searched bombed-out ships in Darwin harbor. By adapting the parts they

could find and by improvising others,

they succeeded in keeping most of the

battalion's equipment going.79

The engineers in Northern Territory

were meeting the challenge of an arduous assignment. In an area which offered none of the usual American

recreations, the men were "enjoying life

as far as it was possible . . . under the

circumstances." Working in an area

2,000 miles from the main American

quartermaster depots, the engineers,

after the first few weeks in this remote

part of Australia, were able to get abundant quantities of food. They arranged

to get rations from the Australian quartermasters, who were able to provide

generous amounts of supplies. The

country around the Pine Creek airfield

had once been a gold mining center, and

some of the troops spent their few free

hours prospecting and panning for the

precious metal. But the greatest boost

to the men's morale was the knowledge

that their mission was important. Well

aware of their nearness to the fighting

zone and realizing only too well that a

landing at Darwin could easily take

place, the men knew that their best

defense was the rapid building of airfields.80

Eastern New Guinea

The long-expected Japanese thrust

soon materialized. During April, the

enemy assembled near Rabaul a task

force of 2 carriers, 7 heavy cruisers, and

13 destroyers, together with transports.

Such a concentration of naval forces,

coupled with an increase in enemy air

strength in eastern New Guinea and on

New Britain, was sufficient indication

that the Japanese were about to strike,

probably at both the Solomons and Port

Moresby. Forces in northeast Australia

and on New Guinea were alerted. The

engineers near Townsville stopped work

to prepare for defense. The 91st and

Company F of the 46th took up positions

in a gap in the coastal range near Giru.

Companies E, D, and Headquarters and

Service Company of the 46th remained

at Woodstock field, ready to move to the

beaches should the enemy attempt a landing. Companies A and C of the 96th

79

 (1) Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, pp.

72, 73, 75. (2) Ltr, Heiberg to Casey, 29 May 42. SWPA File 469.

80

 (1) Ltr, Heiberg to Casey, 29 May 42. (2)

Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, pp. 77-78.
150 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

were held in reserve near Townsville.

At Port Moresby, the newly arrived

Headquarters Company and Companies

B and D of the 96th got orders to carry

full field equipment. They were to help

defend a line fifteen miles inland from

the beach. Should the Japanese break

through, the engineers were to retreat

into the jungle and make their way back

to Australia as best they could. But the

Japanese did not land. The Allied victory in the Battle of the Coral Sea saved

Port Moresby and stopped the Japanese

thrust southward across the Pacific supply

lines.81

MacArthur believed the Japanese

would try again. The enemy would

need at least a month to prepare for a

second assault on Moresby. In the interim the Allies would have to make

every effort to build up their forward

defenses. Uppermost in the minds of

theater planners was the need for locating more air power in southeastern New

Guinea to give added protection to Port

Moresby and at the same time enable

Allied airmen to strike more effective

blows at enemy bases and shipping.

MacArthur also intended to base more

fighters and bombers on the fields of the

Cape York Peninsula. If the Allies

were not to be caught short, existing

fields would have to be improved and

new ones made operational before the

Japanese returned.82

Of major importance was the construction of a base near the southeastern

tip of New Guinea. As demonstrated by

the Battle of the Coral Sea, an airfield

was needed here so that Allied planes

could intercept enemy ships rounding

the tip of the island. Brett argued,

moreover, that airdromes in that area

would be essential to any offensive

against Rabaul. On 20 May MacArthur

chose as the site for a fighter field the

general vicinity of Abau-Mullins Harbor

on the southern coast of New Guinea,

midway between Moresby and the southeastern end of the island. A landing

strip was to be built as quickly as possible and a bomber field constructed

later. As soon as a reconnaissance party

had picked a specific site, one company

of engineers was to be sent in, along with

infantry and antiaircraft units. Planes

were to be operating from the field three

weeks after construction started. Since

activity in this area might provoke a

Japanese attack, MacArthur enjoined

greatest secrecy.83

On 22 May, General MacArthur's

headquarters directed Yoder, the senior

Engineer officer in New Guinea, to make

a reconnaissance by air of possible airfield sites on the southern coast of the

island. Five days later, Yoder with a

party of Australians and Americans explored the region around Abau. The

location did not appear promising. Information gathered by the group indicated that it would take about four

months to build an airdrome at that

81

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 37-39. (2)

Hist of 46th Engrs GS Regt for 1942-43. (3) Hist of

91st Engr Bn (Sep), 1942-43. (4) Hist of 96th Engr

Bn (Sep), 1942-43. (5) Interv, author with Matheson, 14 Mar 55. 82

 (1) Memo, MacArthur for Blamey et al., 25 May

42. G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA. (2) Milner, Victory in

Papua, pp. 39-41. (3) Memo, MacArthur for Blamey

et al., 20 May 42. G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA 385 (Fall

River).

83

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 39-41. (2)

Memo, Brett for MacArthur, 1 May 42. (3) Memo,

MacArthur for Blamey et al., 20 May 42. Last two

in G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA 686 (New Guinea) No. 1.

(4) Memo, Casey for Johns, 22 May 42. SWPA File

491.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 151

point. Twelve days later Yoder, with

eleven Americans and Australians,

made a second trip, this time to Milne

Bay, at the extreme southeastern tip of

New Guinea. In and near the coconut

plantations at the western end of the bay,

they found several good sites for airfields.

The next day they turned in a favorable

report to Casey. Among the advantages

of Milne Bay were the availability of

fresh water, coral, and gravel, and the

presence of native laborers and Australian overseers. The area already had

a landing strip, a road net, and a power

plant. One of the principal drawbacks

was that the area was "open on all sides

to enemy attack." The new information corroborated the sketchy data

Casey's office already had about Milne

Bay. On 11 June MacArthur canceled

the project at Abau and on the next day

directed that the airdrome be built at

Milne Bay instead.84

On 18 June Company E of the 46th

Engineers left Townsville for Milne Bay,

arriving on the 25th, together with some

500 Australian ground troops. The

next day MacArthur's headquarters set

20 July as the date the bomber field must

be ready. Prospects were dim for meeting this deadline. The equipment

brought in by the engineers consisted of

2 medium bulldozers, both in need of

repair, 2 graders, 4 small dump trucks,

and one cargo truck. Twenty additional items were at Moresby awaiting

shipment, but no vessel had been found

to carry them eastward. At Milne Bay,

unloading of machinery and supplies was

rendered difficult by inadequate wharfage. Only one vessel at a time could

discharge cargo. To help remedy the

situation, the Australian commander

ordered one platoon of Company E to

build an unloading ramp and an access

road. The rest of the engineers shortly

began work on Strip No. 1, about two

miles west of the bay. Not the least of

the company's troubles was the climate.

The heat was intense. This was a notorious malarial region, and before long

6 percent of the men of the task force had

become ill with the disease. Since the

rainfall was extremely heavy, averaging

150 inches a year, the engineers had to

provide the field with an extensive drainage system. Despite their many handicaps, the men of Company E, helped by

natives, labored day and night in a race

against time.85

Meanwhile, the engineers were under

pressure to step up construction on the

Cape York Peninsula and in the area

around Port Moresby. MacArthur directed that going projects be accelerated

and that several new fields be built

quickly. Responsibility for carrying out

these orders now fell on Col. Willis E.

Teale, chief engineer of USAFIA after

25 May when Johns became the G-4.

Teale was hard put to find enough manpower. No assistance from the AWC

84

 (1) Yoder, Rpt of Reconnaissance—BOSTON

[Abau] Area, 30 May 42. (2) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 9 Jun 42. Both in SWPA File 491. (3) Rpt,

Yoder, 9 Jun 42. (4) Memo, MacArthur for Blamey

et al., 11 Jun 42. (5) Memo, MacArthur for Blamey

et al., 12 Jun 42. Last two in G-3 Files, GHQ

SWPA 385 (Fall River).

85

 (1) Hist of 46th GS Regt, 1942, pp. 57-58. (2)

Rad, Land Forces, Melbourne, to Mil Comd,

Moresby, 26 Jun 42. G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA 385

(Fall River). (3) Rads, Hq New Guinea Forces to

Land Forces, Melbourne, 26, 27, 29 Jun 42. Last

two in G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA 385 (Fall River). (4)

Memo, Robinson for Casey, 14 Jul 42. SWPA Files

492. (5) Memo for Rcd, Casey, sub: Rpt on Inspec

of New Guinea and North Queensland Between 29

Jul-7 Aug. SWPA File 491.
152 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

was in sight. The Queensland State

Roads Commission already had as much

work as it could handle. Any impetus

the projects received would have to be

provided by engineer units, and Teale

pulled as many troops out of Townsville

as he could. On 19 June Companies A

and C of the 96th moved to Moresby,

where they began a new runway at Kila

and took over the operation of a quarry.

Company A of the 46th went to Horn

Island to help the Australians complete

two runways for B-17's. Companies B

and C of the 46th sailed to Portland

Roads, 150 miles south of Horn Island,

to begin work on an airdrome for light

bombers. During June MacArthur

ordered construction of a bomber field

near the tip of the Cape York Peninsula

and of a fighter strip at Merauke, on the

southern coast of New Guinea 450 miles

west of Moresby. Teale, by this time

scraping the bottom of the barrel, could

not at once find engineer units for these

last two jobs.86

Progress by Midyear

As the first half of 1942 drew to a close,

construction was progressing over a vast

area. By mid-June the Allied Works

Council had under way a program comprising more than 10,000 projects estimated to cost a total of £60,520,000.

Throughout the southeast new runways, warehouses, tank farms, wharves,

camps, and hospitals were coming

into use. In northern Australia and

on New Guinea, American engineers

were providing runways for defense

and offense. In Northern Territory

8 fields had been completed by 1

July and 7 more were well along. Of

the 4 fields at Port Moresby, one, SevenMile, was suitable for all-weather operations; the other three could take bombers

in emergencies. The field at Milne Bay

had been started. Australians and

Americans were developing a chain of

fields on the Cape York Peninsula. Few

of the runways in these forward areas

were sealed, most had not even been

treated to hold down dust, and, in the

haste to carve out the many strips needed

by the Air Forces, drainage had frequently been held in abeyance. Their

substantial progress notwithstanding,

neither the Allied Works Council nor

the engineers were able to keep pace

with MacArthur's demands.87

The inability of the engineers to do

more can be charged chiefly to shortages

of men, materials, and equipment. So

far only 10 engineer units had arrived

from the United States—1 aviation battalion, 2 general service regiments, 2

separate battalions, 2 dump truck companies, 2 combat battalions, and 1 depot

company—about 6,000 men in all. The

RAE and the RAAF had as yet been

able to send but few men to the north.

The supply situation was not encourag86

 (1) Casey's Notes on Conf, 18 Jun 42. SWPA

File 491. (2) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, p. 1. (3)

Hist of 96th Engr Bn (Sep), 1942-43. (4) Hist of

46th GS Regt, p. 31.

87

 (1) Memo for Rcd, AWC, n.d., sub: Brief Statement of Works Being Carried Out Under the Direction of the AWC on Behalf of Commonwealth

Depts and USAFIA. SWPA File 240. (2) Memo

for Rcd, Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 1 Jul 42. SWPA

File 491. (3) Progress Rpt, Of C Engr GHQ SWPA

Constr Sec, 9 July 42. SWPA File M244. (4) Progress Rpt, G-4 USASOS, n.d., sub: Constr Proj Underway Under Supervision of Hq USASOS SWPA, as of

13 Aug 42. SWPA File 469. (5) Memo, Robinson

for Casey, 29 Jun 42. SWPA File 491.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 153

ing. The Australians were continuing

to husband their meager stocks, and

shipments from the United States were

pitifully small. At the end of June,

Colonel Teale listed 37 tractors, 62 graders, 36 carryalls, one distributor, and one

shovel with dragline, as the principal

items received from the United States

during the last six months. The one

Engineer supply unit, the 391st Depot

Company, had reached the theater in

May, and its 6 officers and 188 men were

attempting to organize and run 3 depots

at Melbourne, Brisbane, and Townsville.88

 Summing up, late in June,

Colonel Robinson wrote that "equipment and personnel are inadequate to

accomplish the Engineer mission in the

Southwest Pacific Area, and it is therefore recommended that immediate steps

be taken to augment Engineer construction forces and equipment." He declared such action to be "vital to the

success of any contemplated offensive."

 89

Preparing for the Offensive

The Battle of Midway proved to be a

turning point in the war against Japan.

In this decisive naval engagement of 3

and 4 June, the main striking force of the

Japanese Combined Fleet was destroyed.

For the first time, the Allies were in a

position to seize the initiative. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff began to revise their

plans accordingly. On 2 July, they directed Nimitz and MacArthur to mount

a joint offensive, northwestward through

the Solomon Islands and eastward from

New Guinea, with the ultimate object of

capturing Rabaul, the chief Japanese

stronghold in the Southwest Pacific.

The first phase of the operation was to

begin on 1 August, when the marines

were to land in the southern Solomons.

MacArthur had already been planning a

thrust through New Guinea and the

Solomons toward Rabaul, a plan of campaign known by the code name TULSA.

On receiving the joint chiefs' directive,

he further developed this plan and prepared for the attack.90

To conquer Rabaul, the Allies would

first have to gain air supremacy over the

approaches to New Britain. Brett estimated the task would require at least

twenty-four squadrons based in New

Guinea. On 10 July he informed MacArthur that 12 additional airdromes

were urgently needed—4 at Moresby, 4

at Milne Bay, and 4 at Buna on the

northeastern coast of the island. All

were to be provided with dispersals and

sealed runways capable of taking heavy

bombers. Brett pressed for "speedy consideration," "prompt action," and "rapid

completion." Information from Casey

indicated that it would take all the engineers in the theater to do the job. This

would mean "the withdrawal of all such

personnel now in northern Queensland

and perhaps in the Darwin area." Yet,

as Brett himself pointed out, much vital

work remained to be done in the Cape

York Peninsula.91

Casey had been concerned with the

problem for some time. As early as 2

July he had suggested that the 808th be

88

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for

1942. (2) Hist of Engr Hq USAFIA, pp. 18ff. 89

 Memo, Robinson for Sverdrup, 25 Jun 42.

SWPA File 469.

90

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 45-48. (2)

Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 16ff. 91

 Memo, Brett for MacArthur, 10 Jul 42. SWPA

File 491.
154 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

transferred from Northern Territory for

urgent construction "now in prospect"

on New Guinea and New Britain.92 On

7 July, after receiving advance notice of

Brett's plans, he asked Colonel Sverdrup

to estimate how long the work would

take. The answer was not reassuring.

With so few troops available, Sverdrup

did not believe the engineers could build

what the Air Forces asked for in anything

like the time they stipulated. He spoke

in terms of a year or more for the New

Guinea fields. Two things seemed apparent. First, Brett must lower his requirements. Second, the engineers must

get more units—ten aviation battalions

or the equivalent. Casey agreed with

the first of Sverdrup's suggestions, but,

since he was under no illusions as to his

chances of obtaining so many additional

troops, rejected the second in favor of a

scheme for accomplishing a maximum

amount of construction with the forces

at hand.93

What he had in mind was to eliminate

all frills from Air Forces projects and to

move every available engineer to New

Guinea as quickly as possible. He would

cut the length of runways from 6,000 to

4,000 feet and treat the surfaces just

enough to control dust. He would

substitute landing mats for pavements,

reduce the number of dispersals, and

hold housing to minimum standards.

Then, if the engineers remaining at

Townsville were moved to New Guinea,

it might be possible to complete three

dromes at Moresby and one at Milne Bay

by 20 July, and more by the end of the

month. With the transfer of the 808th

from Darwin to New Guinea, scheduled

for sometime between 15 and 25 July,

other units might be pulled out of

Moresby and Milne Bay and sent north

to begin work at Buna. At projects in

Australia, RAAF works units and civilians could fill the breach left by the

departing Americans. The engineers

would concentrate on completing facilities first at Port Moresby, next at Milne

Bay, and lastly at Buna. By 1 September, the Air Forces would have the

requisite number of runways, crude to be

sure, but usable. On 10 July Casey laid

his plan before Brett, who accepted it in

principle. Brett refused, however, to

sanction the shortening of runways.

Moreover, he reminded Casey that efforts

to complete the Cape York fields could

not be relaxed. The chief engineer had

reservations of his own about the plan,

for the difficulties of moving units into

advanced areas and keeping them supplied were immense.94

A great deal would depend on the

speed with which the engineers could

finish their work in the Cape York Peninsula. Though Queensland began drafting men for a Civil Constructional Corps

on 6 July, the Air Forces could not wait

until the civilians were organized into an

effective working force and sent north92

 Extract from Ltr, Casey to CofS SWPA, 2 Jul

42. SWPA File 481. 93

 (1) Memo, Lt Col David Larr, GSC, GHQ SWPA,

for Casey, 7 Jul 42. 686 (Airdromes) 6/42-12/43.

G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (2) Memo, Sverdrup for

Casey, 8 Jul 42. SWPA File 492. (3) Incls to Memo

for Rcd, Casey, 11 Jul 42. SWPA File 491.

94

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 11 Jul 42. SWPA

File 491. (2) Incls to Memo for Rcd, Casey, 11 Jul

42. (3) Ltr, MacArthur to Brett, 6 Jul 42. G-3

files, GHQ SWPA 385 (Fall River). (4) Min of Conf

Held in the Of of the Comdr AAF, 1000, Fri, 10 Jul

42. G-3 files, GHQ SWPA 686 (Airdromes) 6/42-

12/43.
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 155

ward. The troops who left Townsville

during July went therefore not to New

Guinea but to various points on the

peninsula. On 12 July, Headquarters

and Service Company and Company D

of the 46th arrived at Portland Roads to

help elements of the regiment already at

work there. One week later the 91st

Battalion moved to the tip of the peninsula to build an airfield in an area shown

on the maps as Red Island Point but

more frequently called Jacky Jacky after

a small river nearby. Later, one platoon

of the 91st went on to Horn Island.

While these units were better equipped

than before, the conditions they found

were not conducive to the rapid completion of airfields. The region was an

engineer's nightmare. Around Portland

Roads the terrain was jungled and

dotted with huge ant hills, some of them

twenty feet high. Jacky Jacky was a forbidding place, barren and desolate.

Rocky beaches there prolonged the

lightering of men and supplies for twelve

days. Horn Island was "an ancient

lump of granite," devoid of gravel or

coral. The isolation of these areas complicated supply. Signal communications

were poor, so that requests for materials

and equipment were difficult to send out

and were seldom acknowledged. The

best way of getting action was to send a

man by plane to Melbourne or Brisbane.

The shipping shortage was often given

as the reason why engineering supplies

and equipment were not getting to Cape

York Peninsula, but frequently large

quantities of bombs, aviation gasoline,

and telephone poles, not yet needed,

were dumped on shore. These articles

usually had to be hauled away by the

engineers, because quartermaster and

Air Forces troops, who should have done

the job, were not on hand. There were

other interruptions. Because rainfall

was infrequent, the engineers had to

spend considerable time searching for

water. At Horn Island, the Australian

commander, fearing enemy attack, insisted that the troops blast a tunnel under

the runway. At each of the fields in

northeast Australia the men worked

steadily, but the pace was slow.95

In New Guinea, the troops were experiencing trouble too. The 96th, still

the only engineers at Moresby, were

having an especially rough time. About

all they had received in the way of additional equipment was a shipment of

secondhand items from the AWC. This

machinery was in such bad repair that

"some of it wouldn't even run when it

came off the ship and had to be towed

off the dock."

 96

 Since no bitumen, calcium chloride, or molasses had been

received, the engineers had to try to

keep down the dust by sprinkling water

on the runways. Although multiple

shifts were at work in the quarry, there

were too few trucks to keep the jobs

supplied with gravel, the chief surfacing

material. The projects at Moresby

lagged behind schedule. At Milne Bay,

Company E of the 46th was likewise beset

by difficulties. Company E, the sole

engineer outfit at this location until midJuly, when one company of RAE landed,

95

 (1) AWC, Report, February 1942-June 1943, p.

87. (2) Hist of 46th GS regt, 1942. (3) Hist of the

91st Engr GS Regt, Jan-Jun 42. (4) Matthews, Data

for Hist Rpt, pp. 33-34. (5) Memo for Rcd, Casey,

sub: Rpt on Inspec of New Guinea and North

Queensland Between 29 Jul-7 Aug. SWPA File 491.

(6) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 8 Aug 42. SWPA File

94.

96

 Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, p. 92.
156 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

had to rely heavily on the help of natives. Not until 6 July did the bulk of its

equipment reach Milne Bay, and even

then several badly needed items were

lacking. Having no rock crusher to

break up the coral in the area and no

dragline to remove gravel and sand in

the river bed, the company hastily laid

the landing mat on a silt base. Rains

were especially heavy even for this wet

region, and the mud oozed up through

the perforations of the mat, making a

slick film on the surface. There was

then nothing to do but send for drag- lines, take up the mat, and put down a

gravel base.97

Meanwhile, pressure was mounting on

the engineers to build fields in the vicin- ity of Buna. Once established on the

upper coast of Papua, MacArthur would

be in a position to get the offensive roll- ing. Allied intelligence indicated that

there was not much time to spare, for the

Japanese were showing increasing inter- est in the Buna area. On the basis of

reports he had received, MacArthur

predicted that the enemy would attempt

to land and then push southward over

the Kokoda Trail. This primitive track

ran from the vicinity of Buna to Kokoda, a village in the foothills of the Owen

Stanleys, and thence over the mountains

to Moresby. MacArthur planned to get

to the northeastern New Guinea coast

first. On 9 July he ordered a reconnaissance to determine if the small emer- gency landing strip at Buna would take

military aircraft, and if not, whether

there were suitable sites nearby. The

next day, a party of six officers, headed by

Colonel Robinson, left Moresby by

plane. They found the existing field to

be of little military value. But on the

grass plains at Dobodura, fifteen miles to

the southwest, they discovered many

excellent sites. Drainage was good, and gravel and timber were plentiful. Workmen could be drawn from the

native population of the region. With

little effort, a number of runways could

be provided. On 15 July MacArthur

issued orders to seize and occupy Buna

and build an airdrome. He directed

the organization of a special task force,

Buna Force, to consist of engineers and

protective troops. D-day was set for 10

August.98

As plans for the occupation of Buna

took form, MacArthur began to ready

his command for the offensive. He ordered the 41st and 32d Divisions north

from Melbourne and Adelaide to new

camps in Queensland, where they were

to undergo training in jungle warfare.

In order to be nearer the combat zone,

he transferred his headquarters from

Melbourne to Brisbane, completing the

move on 20 July. These shifts of Amer- ican forces northward were accompanied

by organizational changes. On 20 July, MacArthur redesignated USAFIA as U.S.

Army Services of Supply (USASOS).

97

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, Rpt on Inspec of New

Guinea and North Queensland Betw 29 Jul-7 Aug.

SWPA File 491. (2) Rad, Matthews to MacArthur,

7 Jul 42. G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA 385 (Fall River).

98

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 50-53. (2)

Ltr, MacArthur to Blamey, 9 Jun 42. G-3 Files,

GHQ SWPA 385 (New Guinea). (3) Rad, Land

Forces, Melbourne, to Mil Comd, Moresby, 20 Jun

42. Last two in G-3 files, GHQ SWPA 385 (New

Guinea). (4) Memo, Robinson for Casey, 13 Jul 42.

SWPA File 58. (5) Rad, Matthews to MacArthur, 13

Jul 42. SWPA File 491. (6) Ltr, MacArthur to

Blamey et al., 15 Jul 42. (7) Memo, Heiberg for

Casey, 15 Jul 42. Last two in G-3 files, GHQ SWPA

385 (Buna Bay Plan).
BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 157

The organization was henceforth to discontinue such administrative and tactical

functions as it had acquired during its

first months of operations and concentrate its efforts more and more on providing logistical support. Brig. Gen.

Richard J. Marshall replaced Barnes as

head. The Allied Air Forces was also

to come under new leadership. Sometime before, MacArthur had chosen Maj.

Gen. George C. Kenney to replace Brett

as commander of the Allied Air Forces

and the U.S. Fifth Air Force. Kenney,

who arrived from the United States on

28 July, assumed his new duties on 4

August."

The Japanese acted more quickly than

had been expected. Although their disastrous setback at Midway had ruled out

further large-scale assaults, they were still

strong enough to undertake limited

offensives. Having failed, as a result of

the Battle of the Coral Sea, in their attempt to take Moresby from the sea, they

decided to launch an overland campaign.

As MacArthur had anticipated, their

strategy called for a landing on the northeastern coast of Papua, after which their

troops were to advance through the

mountains and take Moresby from the

rear. On 21 July enemy transports put

a force ashore near Buna. Encountering

little opposition, the Japanese started

out over the Kokoda Trail toward

Moresby. Within a week they had

reached Kokoda Village, eighty miles

from Buna and almost half way to their

goal.100

Four days after the enemy landing at

Buna, the 808th engineers reached

Moresby. Their arrival was timely, for

construction of airfields here was now

more imperative than ever before. Additional planes had to be based at

Moresby if the Allied Air Forces were

effectively to bomb Buna, harass the

column advancing along the Kokoda

Trail, and drop supplies to Australian

infantry units marching north to meet

the enemy.101

The 808th's first job was to build a new

airdrome, Waigani Field, about twelve

miles north of the town. A part of the

site had already been cleared, but a

dense growth of timber had still to be

taken out. The men found the work

much more difficult than had been the

case in Northern Territory. The trees

were huge, many of them more than

seventy-five feet high and with trunks

measuring over two feet in diameter.

Their roots were large and deep and

their branches entangled in a thick

growth of vines. The job of clearing

was not one that could be accomplished

merely with cables hooked to tractors.

These trees had to be chopped down or

dynamited. The increasingly serious

tactical situation added to the strain

brought on by long, fatiguing hours of

work. Air raids were frequent, even

during day time, and at night, "the continual fight against hordes of mosquitoes,

the . . . sounds of the jungle . . . , the

99 rotten limbs dropping off the great trees, (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 48-50. (2)

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds.,

"The Army Air Forces in World War II," Vol. IV,

The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to

July 1944 (Chicago: The University of Chicago

Press, 1950), pp. 25-26.

100

 Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 56, 64-65. 101

 (1) Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, pp.

88 ff. (2) Ltr, Casey to Teale, 23 Jul 42. SWPA

File 481.
158 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

small animals scurrying through grass

and leaves, and the flying foxes swishing

through the air made the men nervous

and irritable from loss of sleep and personal discomfort." The presence of a

well-equipped and experienced aviation

battalion at Moresby speeded construction, but there was still far more to do

than these additional engineers could

cope with.102

The enemy landing at Buna likewise

rendered construction at Milne Bay all

the more urgent. Yet for some time no

reinforcements could be sent. While

the Australian field company worked to

provide seventy miles of road, Company

E of the 46th struggled to hasten the

building of runways. Colonel Teale

was by now able to dispatch larger quantities of supplies to Milne Bay, but the

difficulty of unloading ships continued

to have a hampering effect. To get

materials and equipment ashore, the

engineers, using floating gasoline drums,

rigged a makeshift wharf on which ships

could discharge cargo into four trucks

at a time. The new wharf helped the

situation, but was not adequate for the

quantities of cargo coming in. By late

July the engineers had succeeded in

getting the first strip far enough along to

accommodate a squadron of pursuit

planes and had begun clearing a second

strip, three miles to the west of the first.

MacArthur was meanwhile demanding

greater speed. And speed was essential,

for reports indicated that the Japanese

might soon attempt to land at Milne

Bay.103 But if construction were to go

any faster, more engineers would be

needed.

Help for the New Guinea jobs was in

sight. At Darwin the RAAF units had

begun to take hold, and Teale was preparing to transfer the 1st Battalion of the

43d Engineers to Moresby. Since efforts

by Australian civilians on the Cape York

fields were beginning to produce results,

the engineers there could soon move

northward, turning unfinished construction over to the Main Roads Commission,

which would complete its current projects in the peninsula around the middle

of August. The increased support provided by the Australians enabled most of

the engineers to pull out of Queensland.

By early August the last of the units had

left Townsville. On 6 August Company

F of the 46th reached Merauke, on the

southern coast of Netherlands New

Guinea, to build a field to protect Moresby's western flank. Two days later

Companies D and F of the 43d disembarked at Milne Bay. The withdrawal

of the engineers still remaining on the

continent would have to be accomplished

as soon as possible.104

A clash between the Allies and the

Japanese in New Guinea could not be

long postponed. With enemy forces

beyond Kokoda making their way

through the precipitous Owen Stanley

Range, the threat to the Allied position

102

 Glover, Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, pp.

102-03. 103

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, Rpt on Inspec of New

Guinea and North Queensland Between 29 Jul-7 Aug.

(2) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 8 Aug 42. Both in

SWPA File 491. (3) Memo, Casey for Rcd, 25 Jul

42. (4) Ltr, Casey to Teale, 23 Jul 42. Last two in

SWPA File 481. 104

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 11 Aug 42. SWPA

File 491. (2) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 23 Jul 42. (3)

Rad, Matthews to Hq USASOS, 2 Aug 42. Last two

in SWPA File 481. (4) Hist of 46th GS Regt, 1942.

(5) Ltr, CO 2d Bn 43d Engr GS Regt to CG USASOS,

2 Nov 42. SWPA File Al.
BUILD UP IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 159

in Papua was growing steadily. While

the Japanese advance was much slower

than it had been across the coastal plain,

it was continuous. Meanwhile, on 7

August, American forces in the South

Pacific were moving forward, and fighting had begun on Guadalcanal in the

Solomons. The engineers were soon to

be involved in combat on a broad front.

The strides they had already made in

building up defenses in the Southwest

Pacific had substantially increased the

Allied chances of victory in the coming

test of strength.
CHAPTER V

First Offensives: The Solomons And Papua

The war in the Pacific had reached a

critical juncture by the summer of 1942.

A still formidable enemy threatened the

line of communication between Australia

and the United States. The Japanese

had suffered two reverses at sea, but they

remained undefeated on land and in the

air. Their invasion of Papua and their

advance through the Solomons, if unchecked, might yet develop into a major

setback for the defenders in the South

and Southwest Pacific. By launching a

limited offensive, the Allies hoped to

halt the Japanese and begin pushing

them back on a broad front stretching

across New Guinea and extending eastward for hundreds of miles. While

containing the enemy, the Allies would

gather strength for future large-scale

assaults against the Japanese stronghold

at Rabaul. The task of carrying out a

stopgap offensive while continuing to

prepare for an all-out drive would fall

with special weight on the engineers,

who would have to support the combat

forces in the field and at the same time

build the bases from which future sustained offensives could be launched.

Strengthening the South Pacific

The South Pacific was hardly less important in the Allied strategy than Australia itself. Through this immense

ocean area ran the lines of communication from the United States to the

southern continent—lines which would

have to be kept open. The South Pacific

could do little in its own defense. The

widely scattered and more or less isolated

islands of the region had, for the most

part, sparse populations, primitive industries, and few natural resources. Only

New Zealand had a modern industrial

system, but with a population of some

1,600,000 and limited resources, that

dominion was unable to make substantial

contributions to the defense of the area.

Having sent one division to the Near

East in 1941, New Zealand had few

troops left for home defense, and of

these one brigade had already been dispatched to Fiji. Australia had agreed

to reinforce New Caledonia, but was able

to send only one company of troops to

the island. In the first weeks after the

outbreak of war with Japan, the strengthening of the South Pacific was not immediately urgent. That area did not appear

so directly threatened as Australia was.

Insofar as the United States was concerned, primary responsibility for defense of the region rested with the Navy.

Only with the fall of the East Indies and

the emergence of Australia as a great

Allied base did the South Pacific become

of vital interest to the Army.1

1

 (1) Oliver A. Gillespie, The Pacific, "Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 161

The South Pacific Ferry Route

The engineers, at work on the ferry

route when war began, were the first

American troops in the South Pacific.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, engineer

officers were reporting good progress on

the airfields. On Christmas and Canton,

troops and civilian workmen were clearing and grading runways. On Fiji,

natives were lengthening the airstrips,

and New Zealand was sending in more

men, materials, and equipment. On

New Caledonia, the Free French were

making headway on the fields at Tontouta and Plaines des Gaiacs. Just

before the attack on Pearl Harbor, General Short had assured Washington that

the route would be open by 15 January.

Events of the following weeks rendered

completion more urgent than ever.

Heavy bombers were desperately needed

to stem the Japanese tide in the Philippines. The Central Pacific route

through Midway and Wake was lost in

the first days of the war. The only

alternate besides that through the South

Pacific was the long, roundabout way

across the Atlantic, Africa, and the

Indian Ocean—two-thirds of the distance

around the globe.2

In Hawaii Colonel Wyman ordered

work on the ferry route pushed with all

possible speed. In carrying out his

instructions, the engineers in the South

Pacific islands were confronted with

mounting difficulties. The islands were

almost completely isolated. Peacetime

sailing schedules were disrupted, and

there were few vessels to carry cargo to

the South Pacific. Even the project's

A-1-a priority was of little help. Wyman complained that, while he assumed

the rating to be in effect, it had proven

virtually useless for getting materials

and equipment to places where they

were needed. Shipping was not to be

had for the stocks piled up in the San

Francisco port. On Christmas and Canton even supplies of food and water ran

low. Poor communications complicated

matters.3 "[The] greatest obstacle . . .

toward the proper direction of the jobs

down here," one of the civilian employees on the ferry route wrote Wyman

from New Caledonia, "is the lack of

communication whereby detailed information can be transmitted between jobs.

Cables and radios are fine, but you cannot say enough, and we always have a

certain amount of garbling which sometimes is not recognized as such."

 4 General Short's efforts to get a Navy or

Pan American plane to fly couriers back

and forth among the Pacific islands were

unavailing, as were those of his successor,

Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, who assumed

command of the Hawaiian Department

on 17 December. The situation was

alleviated to some extent when Wyman

1939-45" (Wellington, New Zealand, 1952), p. 26.

(2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 115, 154-55. (3) Craven

and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 428-

30.

2

 (1) Incl to Ltr, Dist Engr Honolulu to CofEngrs,

14 Dec 41. 686 (Trans Pac) Serials 1-470, 1942. (2)

Rpt by Sverdrup, 9 Dec 41. 319.1 (New Caledonia,

Rpts), Engr AGF PAC. (3) Craven and Cate, eds,

Plans and Early Operations, pp. 192-93, 228-29, 331-

32. (4) Rad, Emmons to TAG, 27 Dec 41. WPD,

Msg File 4.

3

 (1) Rad, SPD to CofEngrs, 7 Jan 42. 686 (Trans

Pac), 1942. (2) Rad, SPD to CofEngrs, 13 Jan 42.

686 (Trans Pac), Serials 1-470, 1942. 4

 Ltr, Wolfe to Wyman, 18 Jan 42. 686 Airflds,

Australia, Engr AGF PAC.
162 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

obtained a yacht and put it into service

early in January.

The enemy's swift advance toward the

South Pacific greatly increased the tension under which work had to be carried

on. The islands were practically defenseless. Initially the small detachments of engineers on Canton and

Christmas had been equipped only with

carbines, rifles, and a few machine guns.

Late in November, Short had sent to

Christmas two 75-mm. guns with 800

rounds of ammunition and a sergeant to

train men from the 804th Aviation

Battalion as artillerymen. Neither the

New Zealanders on Fiji nor the Australians on New Caledonia had any

illusions about their ability to hold the

islands against determined assaults. On

Fiji, the New Zealand troops were expending great efforts fortifying the

capital city of Suva, meanwhile leaving

the airfields on the opposite side of the

island extremely vulnerable to attack.

So weak were the forces on New Caledonia that preparation even of minimal

defenses was out of the question.5

There was near panic on Christmas.

When news of the attack on Pearl Harbor reached the island, fantastic rumors

began to spread. Three days after the

outbreak of war, reports were circulating

that a Japanese submarine was based on

the shores of the lagoon. The general

consternation heightened when an engineer officer was quoted as having told

workmen that they would all end lip

before a Japanese firing squad. Many

of the civilians began clamoring for passage to Honolulu. On 19 December

Major Shield, the engineer officer in

charge, put Christmas Island under martial law, declaring that no one would be

permitted to leave. He ordered the men

to work seven days a week, with no time

off. In an effort to keep work moving,

he endeavored personally to run the

Hawaiian Constructors' organization,

which had been hastily pulled together

and was not functioning well. Displaying what appeared to be little respect for

the company's foremen, he countermanded their orders so frequently that

the men did not know whose instructions

to follow. In the words of one of the

supervisors, "orders were given indiscriminately to anyone and everyone."

The Hawaiian Constructors became less

a contracting organization than a gang of

hired laborers. When the War Department imposed radio silence on the island

and deliveries of mail were delayed, discontent increased. The men promptly

blamed Shield for their inability to get

in touch with their families. The military as well as the civilians were becoming more and more difficult to deal with.

A lieutenant from Wyman's office, inspecting the island in mid-December,

noted a "complete lack of cooperation"

between Shield and the officers and men

of the 804th. Work proceeded, but at

a very slow pace.6

A calmer atmosphere prevailed on

Canton and Fiji, although these islands

were more directly in the enemy's path.

Convinced that Canton could not be suc5

 (1) Ltr, Short to TAG, 22 Nov 41. 686 (Ferry

Route), Engr AGF PAC. (2) Gillespie, The Pacific,

pp. 29-30, and 38-40. (3) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp.

115-16.

6

 (1) Affidavits of Paul D. Degley et al., 9 Feb 42,

with Ltr, Investigating Of to Opns Of Dist Engr

Honolulu, 10 Feb 42. (2) Rad, Shield to Wyman,

22 Dec 41. (3) Ltr, Lt. E. B. Roland, Opns Div

Honolulu Dist Of to Wyman, 17 Dec 41. All in 319.1

Christmas Island (Rpts), Engr AGF PAC.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 163

cessfully defended, General Short ordered the civilians evacuated. On 14

December the ship to take them off the

island arrived, bringing with it ten

artillerymen, two 75's, and a dozen machine guns. After the civilians departed,

the engineer troops, under Captain

Baker's direction, continued work on the

airfield, and not without success, since

they had plenty of equipment for what

they were trying to do. On Fiji, natives,

helped by increasing numbers of skilled

workmen from New Zealand, continued

improving and enlarging Nandi Field.

Urged by Short to strengthen the garrison and to step up construction of the

airfield, New Zealand replied on 20

December that additional reinforcements

were being rushed to the Crown Colony.

Within a short time thereafter, the Dominion had 3 infantry battalions on Fiji

and had increased the number of skilled

workmen to 1,200.7

New Caledonia, the most westerly

island of the route in the South Pacific,

was almost completely cut off from Wyman's office. On 7 December the engineers were represented on the island by

Lieutenant Sauer. He was shortly

joined by Captain MacCasland, who

henceforth served as area engineer. As

the, only American officers in the French

colony, their responsibilities were heavy.

When Pan American Airways evacuated

its employees soon after hostilities began,

MacCasland and Sauer took over the

company's property and kept the important seaplane base in operation. When

an outbreak of bubonic plague on New

Caledonia prevented the firm of Sverdrup and Parcel from sending in civilian

engineers and draftsmen from the States,

the officers in New Caledonia undertook

to do the work of the architect-engineers.

When Rear Adm. Thierry d'Argenlieu,

the new Free French High Commissioner

for the Pacific, announced that he would

negotiate only with representatives of

the U.S. Army with regard to the airfield

program, the engineers had to take a turn

at diplomacy. The French were most

co-operative. They diverted the bulk

of their scant stock of dilapidated equipment to airfield work and hired every

man who could be recruited in New

Caledonia and nearby islands, even going

as far afield as Australia to get skilled

labor. The New Caledonia Bureau of

Public Works assumed the complicated

task of administering a motley force of

some 400 men at work on the airfields—

Frenchmen, Australians, Javanese, Tonkinese, Indochinese, and Kanakas. Efforts centered on Tontouta. Though

the engineers knew this field was poorly

located and part of it would probably be

under water during the rainy season, construction there was considerably further

along than at Plaines des Gaiacs. The

outbreak of war rendered imperative the

completion of an emergency runway that

could serve until Plaines des Gaiacs was

ready. Urged on by MacCasland and

Sauer, the French set themselves the task

of finishing Tontouta before the deadline of 15 January.8

On 28 December Wyman announced

7

 (1) AAF Hist Of, AAF Hist Studies, 45, Development of the South Pacific Air Route, 1946, p. 64.

Maxwell AFB. (2) Honolulu Dist Of, Rpt for Week

Ending Dec 27, 1941. (3) Ltr, Area Engr 8th Field

Area to Dist Engr Honolulu, 17 Mar 42. Last two

in 319.1 Canton Island, Engr AGF PAC. (4) Rad,

Emmons to TAG, 27 Dec 41. WPD, Msg File 4.

(5) Gillespie, The Pacific, pp. 40-42.

8

 (1) Ltr, with Incls, Sauer to Honolulu Dist Engr,

15 Feb 43. (2) Rpt by Sverdrup, 9 Dec 41. Both in

319.1 New Caledonia, Rpts, Engr AGF PAC.
164 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

that the South Pacific ferry route was

open. Canton, Tontouta, and Nandi

were far enough along to take heavy

bombers. Runways were 5,000 feet in

length at the first two fields, 4,200 at the

third. On 12 January the first flight of

B-17's completed its trip over the route,

landing at Canton, Nandi, Tontouta,

and Townsville. The pilots pronounced

the runways excellent. The strip at

Christmas, which lagged behind the rest,

was reported ready on 20 January, and

the next day a flight of B-17's landed

there. From this time on, increasing

numbers of planes flew over the route.

The work of providing adequate gasoline

storage and other facilities still remained

to be done. There remained, too, the

problem of defense.9

Arrival of Task Forces

By late December top-ranking Allied

strategists were considering means of

reinforcing the South Pacific. The

danger here had become apparent a few

weeks after Pearl Harbor, when the

Japanese occupied the Gilbert Islands.

At the ARCADIA Conference, the Americans voiced fears that Australia might

be isolated, while the British expressed

apprehension over the growing threat

to New Zealand as well. The Americans promised to strengthen Canton

and Christmas and to aid New Caledonia and Fiji if it appeared that

Australia and New Zealand could not

adequately protect those islands. Steps

were soon under way to send 2,000 men

to Christmas, 1,500 to Canton, and a

pursuit group (700 men) to Fiji. New

Caledonia also stood in need of reinforcements, but Australia could spare nothing

more for the island. Reports had

reached Washington that Admiral D'Argenlieu was threatening to stop work on

Plaines des Gaiacs unless more troops

and weapons were forthcoming. The

War Department assembled a task force

of some 16,000 men under Brig. Gen.

Alexander M. Patch for shipment to New

Caledonia late in January.10

Reinforcements reached Christmas

and Canton in February. On the loth,

a task force under Col. Paul W. Rutledge

landed at Christmas, and three days later

another under Col. Herbert D. Gibson

arrived at Canton. Soon after going

ashore, Colonel Rutledge inspected the

air base and was shocked by what he

found. There was bickering among the

engineer officers and "much friction"

between Shield and the workmen. So

complete was the demoralization of the

civilians that, in Rutledge's opinion, they

could not be expected to accomplish

anything worthwhile. One runway was

completed and another half-finished, but

there was "no evidence of any other satisfactory work." Indications of inept

planning and weak administration were

numerous. Building materials were

strewn around and equipment was

rusting. Sanitary conditions were intolerable; garbage and filth littered the

9

 (1) Rad, Emmons to TAG, 28 Dec 41. WPD,

Msg File 4. (2) Rad, Wyman to CofEngrs, 28 Dec

41. Same file. (3) Rad, Div Engr SPD to CofEngrs,

17 Jan 42. 686 (Trans Pac) Serial 1-470. (4) Rads,

22, 24 Jan 42, Div Engr SPD to CofEngrs. 686

(Trans Pac) 1942.

10

 (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for

Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 114ff. (2) Memo,

WPD to Marshall, 4 Jan 42. (3) Memo, WPD to

GHQ G-3, G-4, and CofAAF, 10 Jan 42. Both in

WPD 4571-38, Additional Basic Rqmts, BOBCAT.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 165

camp area and formed breeding grounds

for swarms of flies. Rutledge asked

Emmons to relieve Shield immediately.

The situation on Canton, while not so

bad as on Christmas, left room for considerable improvement. Colonel Gibson found that much construction remained to be done, that morale was low,

and that living conditions were deplorable.

Steps were shortly taken to set matters

right on the islands. The disgruntled

civilians on Christmas were returned to

Honolulu. Shield and Baker were replaced. Both officers had had difficult

assignments, starting out as they had with

pioneer expeditions to build on remote

and undefended islands.11 Colonel Wyman supported both officers, stating

that he found little fault with their

performance. They had, he maintained,

"accomplished their missions . . . with

remarkable speed" and in accordance

with directions.12 Nevertheless, conditions improved noticeably after the

construction forces on the islands were

placed under the task force commanders.13

Meanwhile, on New Caledonia, Sauer,

who succeeded MacCasland as area engineer in January, was making strenuous

efforts to get Plaines des Gaiacs finished.

Upon completion of the emergency strip

at Tontouta, he transferred every available man and piece of equipment to the

new project. He received an unlocked

for addition to his slender labor force

when the 125 civilians taken off Canton

unexpectedly appeared at Noumea on 10

January and 100 remained. These men

built a camp at Plaines des Gaiacs, while

the French, who insisted on retaining

direct supervision of their workers, concentrated on the runways. Initial specifications had called for strips of asphaltic

concrete, but since there was now small

chance of importing this material into

New Caledonia, a substitute had to be

found. About four miles from the field

was a bed of gravel composed of about

50 percent iron ore. The gravel proved

to be satisfactory for surfacing. The

French made rapid progress; one reason,

undoubtedly, being their method of

working. It consisted in placing the

surfacing material on the ground with

little if any grading and no compaction

of the soil. As a result, the runways,

from which roots and snags protruded,

had many bumps and dips. But the

iron ore made an exceptionally hard surface, and planes were able to land. On

15 February one strip was complete and

two days later the first heavy bomber put

down at Plaines des Gaiacs. Work on a

second runway began immediately.14

The first ships carrying General Patch's

task force steamed into Noumea harbor

on 12 March. Only days before, the

Japanese had established a foothold in

the northern Solomons, and New Caledonia now appeared to be directly in the

enemy's path. Patch's tersely worded

orders read, "Hold New Caledonia

11

 (1) Ltr, Rutledge to CG HD, 21 Feb 42. 319.1

Christmas Island (Rpts). (2) Ltr, Baker to Honolulu

Dist Engr, 17 Mar 42. 319.1 Canton Island, Engr

AGF PAC. 12

 Memo, Wyman for CofS HD, 27 Feb 42. 319.1

Christmas Island (Rpts). 13

 Ltr, Maj Gen Robert C. Richardson, Jr., to

Marshall, 22 Jun 42. OPD 333 (Gen Richardson's Trip).

14

 (1) Ltr, with Incls, Sauer to Honolulu Dist Engr,

15 Feb 43. (2) Resident Engr for Sverdrup and Parcel in New Caledonia, Inspec Rpt, 2 Feb 42. Both

in 319.1 New Caledonia, Rpts.
166 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

NOUMEA, NEW CALEDONIA

against attack." Making plans for carrying out this directive was the first order

of business for the task force commander,

his engineer, Col. Joseph D. Arthur, Jr.,

and other members of his staff. It was

obvious that 16,000 men could not garrison the whole island. A mobile defense would have to be ruled out until

communications were improved. Almost all of New Caledonia was mountainous. There was but one main highway,

a narrow, twisting road running parallel

to the western shore line. The only

railroad, a line extending a short distance

northward from the capital, had been

abandoned in 1940. Noumea was the

one port worth mentioning. In the

light of these conditions, Patch concluded

that he must first of all protect Noumea.

That being the case, the Allied forces

could not be stretched to Plaines des

Gaiacs, 158 miles away. Patch therefore

selected Tontouta as the principal airfield for defense. The work of maintaining Tontouta and completing Plaines

des Gaiacs could for a time be left to

Sauer. Patch's engineers must at once

begin improving the island's system of

communications.15

15

 (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for

Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, p. 150. (2) Memo, WPD

for TAG, 22 Jan 42. WPD 3718 France (Gen). (3)

MID WD, A Survey of the French Islands of the

Pacific, Feb 1942. USAFISPA, Survey of the French
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 167

Three engineer units had come with

the task force, the 57th Combat Battalion, commanded by Maj. George H.

Lenox, and two aviation battalions, the

810th, commanded by Maj. R. P. Burt,

Jr., and the 811th, under Maj. Charles

H. McNutt. Except for a detachment

of the 57th which remained near

Noumea to rehabilitate the railway, all

engineers were put to work on roads.

Most were assigned to the coastal highway, which was crumbling under heavy

traffic. By early April the engineers

were fully occupied in patching and

widening this main artery. Though the

bulk of their equipment had yet to arrive, the men built several new sections

of road. One such project was a detour,

eighteen miles long, around a mountain

pass, at a place where a direct hit would

have isolated the northern half of the

island. But even with these improvements, the road was inadequate. Moving heavy construction machinery up to

the airfields was no easy feat, as the

engineers learned when most of their

equipment finally reached New Caledonia in April. To eliminate the need

for trucking all supplies from Noumea,

Colonel Arthur started construction of

piers near Tontouta and Plaines des

Gaiacs.16

Dispatching engineer troops to the

airfields could not be long deferred.

Under heavy use, the emergency strip at

Tontouta was beginning to break up. A

second runway completed by the Australians on 17 March was too short for

heavy bombers to use safely. Plaines

des Gaiacs was operational but needed

much more work. In April, General

Patch began giving special attention to

the fields. He ordered one company of

the 811th Battalion to Tontouta to repair the runway and build dispersals,

which pilots who had been in the Philippine and Java campaigns insisted

were necessary. Construction of a pursuit field at Bourake, a short distance

north of Tontouta, was undertaken by

another company of the 811th. Since

the site had good natural drainage, sandy

soil, and only scrub vegetation, the task

was comparatively easy. In eight days

the men were able to clear a 3,000-foot

runway. The job at Plaines des Gaiacs

was gaining momentum. The Australian crew, their work at Tontouta done,

moved with a considerable stock of

equipment to this project late in March.

On 24 April the entire 810th went to

Plaines des Gaiacs and began operations

on a three-shift basis. On 10 May,

Major Burt assumed direction of all

work. When Sauer relinquished control

of the project to the commander of the

810th, a second runway was usable, dispersals were almost complete, thirteen

miles of access roads were in, and housing

and utilities were well along. The job

of the 810th was to lengthen the runways, install gasoline storage, provide

lighting, and maintain a base from which

heavy bombers could attack enemy forces

moving south. Islands of the Pac. (4) Sauer, Narrative Rpt—Air- 17

field Constr—12th Field Area, New Caledonia. 319.1

New Caledonia, Rpts. 16

 (1) Hist of the 57th Engr Combat Bn. (2) Hist

of the 811th Engr Avn Bn. (3) Hist of the 810th

Engr Avn Bn. (4) Sauer, Narrative Rpt, Airfield

Constr.

17

 (1) Ltr, Sauer to Arthur, 23 Jun 42. 319.1

New Caledonia, Rpts. (2) Hist of the 811th Engrs.

(3) Hist of the 810th Engrs.
168 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The danger to the South Pacific line

of communications was becoming acute.

On 3 May the Japanese occupied Tulagi,

an island of the southern Solomons, some

800 miles north of New Caledonia, just

as their task force at Rabaul was preparing to leave for Port Moresby. Shortly

after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the

enemy prepared to strike again as a

mighty task force assembled in home

waters. The islands of the South Pacific seemed a probable objective.

Among the most likely targets were the

ferry bases. Although the islands had

been reinforced, their defenses were still

pitifully weak, and reports from the

bases were uniformly pessimistic. After

inspecting the three easternmost islands

in April, Maj. Robert J. Fleming, Jr., of

Emmon's G-4 section, confirmed the

findings of earlier official visitors. Although he observed that the engineers

were making good progress toward

completing facilities, he considered the

efforts to strengthen the islands against

attack largely ineffectual. Needed were

ammunition, guns, barbed wire, and,

above all, troops. Even camouflage was

lacking. The installations on Christmas

could be clearly seen from the air, and

the acres of brilliant red drums used for

storing gasoline on Canton were visible

for many miles. Weakly fortified and

lightly held, the islands of the ferry route,

except possibly New Caledonia, could

have been taken with very little effort.18

The Alternate Ferry Route

As early as January, Wyman had anticipated the need for a second ferry

route—one less in danger of being overrun. On the 25th, he had recommended

to General Emmons that a series of airfields be developed in the Marquesas,

Society, and Tonga Islands. Late in

February, after receiving permission

from Washington, Emmons ordered a

survey of the proposed route. Wyman

picked Sverdrup, at that time still

working as a civilian on the ferry route,

as the man for the job, and recalled him

from Suva to Honolulu for instructions.

The district engineer wished to make

sure that lessons learned on the first

route would be taken into account and

that the peculiarities of the weather in

the region would be considered.19 Experiences on Christmas and Canton had

demonstrated that American workmen

were "not temperamentally suited for

construction work on these islands,

largely due to the foreign environment,

danger of enemy action, and the confinement in a small area without . . .

amusement and recreation."

 20

 Wyman

insisted that Sverdrup select islands

"with a native population engaged in

agriculture or mining."21 Because the

unloading of supplies at Christmas and

Canton had been complicated by reefs

and shoals, he also instructed Sverdrup

to find good natural harbors or lagoons.

18

 (1) Memo for Rcd, SGS, HD, 1 Mar 42. 686, I,

1942-43, Engr AGF PAC. (2) Memo, G-3 HD for

CofS HD, 1 Apr 42. OPD 381 (Fiji Islands) 1944.

(3) Ltr, Fleming to CG HD, 6 May 42. 686 (Ferry

Route) File I.

19

 (1) Memo, Wyman for Emmons, 25 Jan 42. (2)

Rad, Emmons to TAG, 27 Feb 42. (3) Ltr, Emmons

to Nimitz, 24 Feb 42. All in 686, I, 1942-43. 20

 1st Ind, 27 Feb 42 on Ltr, OCG HD to Wyman,

27 Feb 42. 686, I, 1942-43, Engr AGF PAC. 21

 Ibid.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 169

The violent storms that swept the area

just south of the equator would present

an added problem. Since the many low

atolls of the region were frequently

awash in rough weather, Sverdrup was

cautioned to pay particular attention to

elevation. Early in March, after signing

a contract with the Honolulu District,

Sverdrup boarded a Navy plane for

Tahiti to begin his reconnaissance.22

During the latter part of March, he

visited some thirteen islands and found

a number of good sites. One was on

Penrhyn, a possession of New Zealand,

770 miles south of Christmas. Most of

this atoll was awash during high seas, as

only one of the many islets was more

than two feet above sea level. But this

one, 4 miles long arid a quarter mile

wide, offered ample room for a runway,

and planes could be dispersed under the

numerous coconut trees. All the land

was native owned. It was passed down

from generation to generation within the

family and for a native to dispose of any

was illegal. The local representative of

New Zealand assured Sverdrup that he

did not believe there would be any

trouble in arranging for its use. He

also estimated that at least 75 of the 500

natives could probably be recruited for

work on the runway. Some 800 miles

south of Penrhyn, Sverdrup found another promising site on Aitutaki, an

island in the Middle Cook Group, also

a possession of New Zealand. Of volcanic origin, Aitutaki was rugged, but

there was one fairly flat area where two

runways could be readily graded and

compacted. With a population of 2,000,

the island could provide all the common

labor needed. The Government of

New Zealand would undoubtedly be

able to send in a few skilled equipment

operators. About 1,000 miles to the

southwest, Sverdrup found a third desirable site on Tongatabu in the Tonga

group, a protectorate of Great Britain

that he had visited before in the fall of

1941. Tongatabu had one great advantage—it already had an airfield. Sverdrup believed little effort would be required to develop three 6,000-foot runways. On 1 April he sent word to the

Honolulu District that Penrhyn, Aitutaki, and Tongatabu met Wyman's

specifications. Shortly thereafter Emmons informed Washington that an

alternate ferry route was feasible. On

11 May authority was given to go ahead

with construction.23

Further Strengthening of the

South Pacific

While the Army had been reluctant

to commit itself heavily in the South

Pacific during the first months of 1942,

the Navy had strongly urged a build-up

of forces there. Admiral Ernest J.

King, who in March became Chief of

Naval Operations, wanted to garrison

additional islands, especially Efate in the

New Hebrides, an archipelago to the

22

 Rad, Wyman to Div Engr San Francisco, 2 Mar

42. 686, I, 1942-43.

23

 (1) Ltr, Sverdrup to Dept Engr HD, 1 Apr 42.

686, I, 1942-43. (2) Sverdrup, Rpt on North Cook

Island, 1 Apr 42. Incl to Ltr, Sverdrup to Dept

Engr HD, 1 Apr 42. (3) Paraphrase of Rad No. 3643,

Emmons to TAG, 25 Apr 42. 686, I, 1942-43. (4)

Memo, OPD for WD Msg Ltr, 4 Jul 42. OPD 384

PTO sec. 1.
170 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

north of New Caledonia, and Tongatabu. General Marshall was at first

hesitant to adopt King's views but finally

agreed to go along with them. The Joint

Chiefs in May issued two basic plans: one

for the occupation and defense of Tongatabu and another for Efate. Tongatabu

was to be primarily a Naval base, while

Efate was first to be an "outpost for

supporting both New Caledonia and

Fiji and later was to serve as a minor

advance air and naval base for future

offensive operations." On 17 March

General Patch, following instructions

from Marshall, sent a battalion of infantry and a platoon of the 57th engineers to Efate. A small beginning had

been made toward strengthening the

New Hebrides.24

With the formal delimitation of the

Pacific theaters on 30 March, responsibility for the South Pacific was more

sharply defined. The Pacific Ocean

Area was divided into three subordinate

areas—the North, Central, and South

Pacific. The first included all the

region above 42 degrees north. The

second was bounded by the 42d parallel

and the equator. The third took in the

area south of the equator, west of longitude no degrees west, and east of the

Southwest Pacific Area. Except for the

forces responsible for the land defense

of New Zealand, which were controlled

by the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff,

Admiral Nimitz was commander in chief

of all Allied forces in POA. His missions were similar to MacArthur's. The

two commanders were to hold the lines

of communications between the United

States and Australia, contain the enemy

in the western Pacific, and prepare for

major amphibious offensives. Each was

to support his neighbor's undertakings.

Nimitz was to command the Central and

North Pacific Areas directly but was to

appoint a subordinate to command the

South Pacific. In April he selected Vice

Adm. Robert L. Ghormley for the post.25

Strenuous efforts were made to

strengthen the New Hebrides. On 8

April the small force of infantry and

engineers on Efate was joined by a

marine defense battalion. Sauer, now

a captain, going to the island later that

month to line up sites for airfields,

found that the engineers, the marines,

and some 200 natives had already cleared

2,000 feet for a fighter strip and had

begun the arduous task of providing

roads. Most of the island was a jungle

wilderness. The only roads to speak of

were the 15-odd miles of track near the

town of Vila. In order to penetrate into

the interior, even on the existing trails,

it was necessary to have native cutting

parties out in front.26 "[The] . . .

roads," wrote one engineer who explored

the island by jeep in May, "[were] . . .

absolutely the worst in the world—it

took us 21⁄2 hours to go about 10 miles.

. . ."

 27

 On 4 May, the day after the

24

 (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for

Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 151, 155-56, 210-12.

(2) Memo, OPD for TAG, 8 Mar 42. OPD 381

Efate, New Hebrides. (3) Joint Basic Plan for the

Occupation and Defense of Tongatabu. OPD 381

Tongatabu sec. 1. (4) Joint Basic Plan for the

Occupation and Defense of Efate, New Hebrides.

OPD 381 Efate, New Hebrides. (5) 57th Engr Combat Bn, War Diary. (6) Building the Navy's Bases,

II, 204.

25

 Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 2-3. 26

 (1) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 204-05. (2)

Ltr, Sauer to Arthur, 1 May 42. Engr Files, U.S.

Army Forces in New Caledonia, KCRC.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 171

enemy moved into Tulagi, the Efate

Task Force arrived from the States,

bringing with it Company B of the 116th

Engineer Combat Battalion and two

companies of Seabees. The newcomers

at once buckled down to extend the airstrip to 6,000 feet. With the Japanese

about 700 miles to the northwest, pressure for completion of a runway for

bombers was intense. By prodigious

efforts, the engineers, seabees, marines,

and natives completed the field on 28

May. That same day, a small party of

infantry and engineers moved 200 miles

northwest to Espíritu Santo, the largest

island of the group, where extensive defense works would soon be needed.28

Efforts to bolster other islands of the

South Pacific were intensified. In May

the 37th Infantry Division, then being

readied for shipment to New Zealand,

was ordered to Fiji instead. The unit,

which included the 117th Engineer Combat Battalion, reached its destination in

June. Later that month steps were

taken to enlarge an old French runway

at Koumac, near the northern tip of

New Caledonia, to enable it to take

heavy bombers. The 810th engineers,

assisted by Australian workmen, had the

field operational by the end of the

month. Construction of the alternate

ferry route got under way when natives

began clearing runway sites on Aitutaki

and Tongatabu in June and on Penrhyn

in July. The construction program on

Fiji received a boost on 8 July with the

landing of 687 officers and men of the

821st Aviation Battalion. Work commenced the same day on an airfield at

Espíritu Santo. The men on this project were involved in a race against Japanese construction forces who had only

recently begun building an airfield on

the northern shore of Guadalcanal in the

Solomons, within easy bombing distance

of the advanced Allied bases.29

By June problems of administration

and supply had assumed formidable proportions. A well-knit Army organization had yet to be evolved. Each base

handled its own affairs. The War Department, the San Francisco Port of

Embarkation, the Hawaiian Department,

and USAFIA all had a part in supplying

the area. Local procurement was not

regulated in any way. When Ghormley

took command of the South Pacific Area

on 19 June, one of his first acts was to

set up the Joint Purchasing Board at

Wellington, New Zealand. Composed

of three officers, representing the Army,

the Navy, and the Marine Corps, the

board was to control the procurement of

all supplies except those obtained from

the United States. The War Department was also taking steps to rectify the

situation. On 25 June Emmons was

relieved of responsibility for directing

and supplying Army forces in the South

Pacific, except those working on the

alternate ferry route. The War Department would henceforth administer the

Army forces in the South Pacific, while

27

 Ltr, Robinson to Lyman, 1 Jun 42. 686 (Ferry

Route), File I. 28

 Ltr, Chamberlin to C Opns Sec WDGS, 2 Jun

42. OPD 381 Efate, New Hebrides.

29

 (1) Joint Army and Navy Plan for the Relief of

New Zealand in the Fiji Islands, [13] May 42. OPD

381 Fiji Islands 1944. (2) Hist of the 117th Engr

Combat Bn. (3) Hist of the 810th Engr Avn Bn.

(4) Hist Review, CE U.S. Army, Covering Opns

During World War II, POA, pp. 1199-1200, 1203,

1207. (5) Hist of the 821st Engr Avn Bn. (6) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 228.
172 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

the San Francisco Port of Embarkation

and the Joint Purchasing Board would

see to their supply.30

Preparations for the Offensive

Admiral Ghormley had no sooner set

up his headquarters at Noumea than he

was plunged into preparations for the

coming offensive. With the Japanese

making frantic efforts to complete the

airstrip on Guadalcanal, it appeared that

another, perhaps final, blow would soon

be directed at the South Pacific. In

their directive for the offensive issued on

2 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took

cognizance of the acute danger. They

combined the plans of Nimitz and

Ghormley for a campaign in the southern

Solomons with those of MacArthur for

an offensive against Rabaul. The joint

operation was to be carried out in three

phases: first, the taking of Tulagi and

adjacent islands; second, the seizure of

the northern Solomons, northeastern

New Guinea, and western New Britain;

and third, the capture of Rabaul.

Ghormley was to command the first

phase; MacArthur, the second and third.

The target date for the invasion of

Tulagi was 1 August.31

The imminence of the campaign in

the Solomons led the War Department

to establish an over-all command, United

States Army Forces in the South Pacific

(USAFISPA)—with Maj. Gen. Millard

F. Harmon in command. As Ghormley's subordinate, he was to have direct

responsibility for administering and supplying the 52,000 Army troops now in

the area and, although he was to have no

part in directing tactical operations, he

was to make plans for employing Army

units in combat. On 21 July Harmon

left the United States, accompanied by

members of his staff, including his engineer, Col. Frank L. Beadle. Eight days

later, the party arrived in Noumea. Six

engineer units had preceded Beadle to

the South Pacific—three aviation battalions, two combat battalions, and one

combat company, about 3,500 men in all.

There was little Beadle could do in the

way of building an effective engineer

organization or planning for the coming

campaign, now only a few days away.32

On 7 August the marines landed on

the northern coast of Guadalcanal near

the airfield. The landing apparently

caught the enemy by surprise. The next

day the field was in American hands.

In the course of violent sea, land, and air

battles in the ensuing weeks, the Americans not only held but expanded their

positions. But the advance was slow.

Guadalcanal was well suited for defensive warfare, and the Japanese poured in

reinforcements. The marines, in their

efforts to compress the enemy into the

northwestern tip of the island, were to

have months of fighting ahead of them.

While Marine engineers and Navy construction battalions had initial missions

on the island, Army engineers contributed by helping with the develop30

 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and

Strategy, 1940-43, pp. 186-92. 31

 Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 17, 20-21. Although

Guadalcanal was not mentioned as an objective of

the first phase of the plan, it became the main objective after the Allies learned that the Japanese

were building an airfield on the northern coast of

the island at Lunga Point.

32

 Ibid., pp. 22-24. (2) Ltr with Incls, Harmon to

OPD WDGS, 6 Jun 44. 98-USF2-0.5 (3721)M, 6 Jun

44.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 173

MAP 9

ment of bases and airfields on islands to

the rear. Since the Marine Corps and

Navy carried full responsibility for fighting the Japanese on Guadalcanal during

the first two months of combat on that

island, the story of the engineers in the

first offensives in the South and Southwest Pacific is largely one of their operations in New Guinea.

Preparing To Fight in

New Guinea

When the marines landed on Guadalcanal, the enemy forces in New Guinea

advancing along the Kokoda Trail had

reached Isurava, sixty miles from Port

Moresby. (Map 9) Intercepts of radio

messages indicated the Japanese were

planning to land troops on the island of

Samarai, at the mouth of Milne Bay.

From this vantage point, the enemy

could control the waters near the southeast tip of New Guinea and would be in

a better position to strike along the

island's southern coast. Early in August,

MacArthur moved to meet the growing

danger. In order to have a unified command in the combat area, he placed all
174 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Allied troops in Australian New Guinea

under New Guinea Force, henceforth

commanded by Australian Maj. Gen.

Sydney F. Rowell. Rowell was given a

large assignment. He was to stop the

enemy advance toward Port Moresby, recapture Kokoda and Buna, and eventually drive the Japanese from Salamaua

and Lae. The 7th Australian Division

was being readied in Australia for movement forward; advance elements were

already on their way. MacArthur

placed one limitation on Rowell's authority: While he had complete command over combat forces, he was to

exercise no control over American service troops engaged in base construction

unless an attack was under way or

imminent.33

The sending of so much Allied

strength to the forward areas increased

enormously the task of the engineers.

Though base development had come a

long way, much remained to be done.

Of the seven fields planned for Moresby,

two all-weather airfields and two dryweather strips were operational. They

could not accommodate the great numbers of planes that would have to operate

continuously against the advancing

enemy. The sole deep-water dock of the

city's harbor was so inadequate that only

one vessel could discharge cargo at a

time. Key installations, some of them

many miles inland, were connected to

the port by dirt roads. Milne Bay, with

its single operational airstrip and its

primitive piers and jetties, could not

serve as an adequate base for strikes to

the north.34

With an ever-growing construction

program in prospect, a better organization of the Engineer effort in New

Guinea was imperative. Visiting Port

Moresby early in August, Colonel

Sverdrup, now head of construction in

Casey's office, concluded that "all construction work under US supervision

should be reorganized from top to bottom." Believing that engineer output

could be stepped up 30 percent if the

work were properly organized and directed, he recommended that a "senior

officer well qualified in construction and

planning" be sent to the New Guinea

port at once.35 Sverdrup was not alone

in this opinion. GHQ SWPA was already preparing plans to set up a more

adequate supply and construction organization in New Guinea. On 11 August

General Richard Marshall, the commanding general of USASOS, established

U.S. Advanced Base at Port Moresby.36

Naming Matthews base commander,

Marshall made him responsible for construction and supply for American forces

in the Port Moresby and Milne Bay

areas. The next day Matthews arrived

by plane at his new headquarters, and

was hardly settled before an avalanche of

demands descended on him. General

Kenney was calling for two additional

fields at Moresby to bring the total number there to nine; at Milne Bay he

wanted not two but three strips, and by

late August, he was asking for the construction of 227 revetments at Moresby

alone. Meanwhile, USASOS could not

33

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 73-74. (2)

GHQ SWPA OI No. 15, 6 Aug 42. 34

 (1) Ltr, Of C Engr USASOS to Casey, 9 Aug 42.

SWPA File 459. (2) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp.

75-77. 35

 Memo, Sverdrup for Rcd, 8 Aug 42. SWPA File

94.

36

 USASOS SWPA GO No. 7, 11 Aug 42.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 175

ignore the fact that, in view of the

shortage of ships in the theater, the ports

at Moresby and Milne Bay would have to

be enlarged to permit faster unloading

and quicker turn around. These demands were only the beginning of many

additional requirements the engineers

would have to meet. Taking stock of

his resources—the few engineer troops

and the meager stocks of supplies and

equipment—and viewing the task ahead,

Matthews could only conclude that the

job would not be completed before 1

November and that it could be finished

by then only with "weather permitting

and God helping."

 37

Battle of Milne Bay

While preparations for the offensive

were going ahead in Papua, the enemy

struck again. Having learned in midAugust of the airfields at the head of

Milne Bay, the Japanese decided to land

there rather than on Samarai. On the

morning of 25 August reports reached

the forces at the bay that nine enemy

ships were approaching. Three engineer companies—D and F of the 43d and

E of the 46th—were in the threatened

area, battling mud and almost incessant

rains to complete the airstrips. (Map 10)

All of Company F and part of D were

working on Strip No. 3, recently begun

at the northwest tip of the bay. They

had just finished clearing a site 6,000

feet long and 300 feet wide. Three

miles to the west, detachments of Company D were working on Strip No. 1,

which, despite its poor foundation, was

being regularly used by planes. Company E of the 46th was preparing Strip

No. 2, some four miles southwest of No. 1

and five miles from the bay. There were

9,458 Allied troops in the area—the

Americans, including the engineers and

an airborne antiaircraft battery, numbered 1,365; Australian strength totaled

8,093. On 22 August, Australian Maj.

Gen. Cyril A. Clowes had assumed command of all forces at Milne Bay. The

engineers and antiaircraft gunners of

Clowes' command were to be the first

American ground troops to meet the

Japanese in combat in New Guinea.38

On learning of the enemy's approach,

General Clowes began at once to deploy

his forces. The Australian infantrymen

were readied, and the RAAF pilots at

Strip No. 1 were briefed for a strike at

the enemy convoy. The engineers were

likewise ordered to prepare for combat.

On the 22d Company D was taken off the

airfields and directed to fortify its

bivouac area. Later that day, Company

F stopped work on Strip No. 3, and the

men were issued rifles and 128 rounds of

ammunition each. Farther west, at Strip

No. 2, Company E of the 46th was in no

immediate danger. General Clowes assigned that unit to the rear sector, about

37

 (1) Memo, Casey for Kenney, 26 Aug 42. 686

New Guinea No. 1, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (2)

Memo, Casey for Rcd, 11 Aug 42. (3) Rad, Kenney

to Matthews, 23 Aug 42. Last two in SWPA File

491. (4) Rad, Matthews to GHQ SWPA, 7 Sep 42.

686 New Guinea, No. 1, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA.

38

 The account of the battle of Milne Bay is based

on the following sources: (1) Clowes, Rpt by Cmdr

Milne Force on Opns Between 25 Aug 42 and 7 Sep

42. SWPA File B188. (2) Rpt, ALF in SWPA, 18

Oct 42. Both in SWPA File B188. (3) Ltr, CO 2d

Bn 43d Engr GS Regt to CG USASOS, 2 Nov 42.

(4) Ltr, Adj 2d Bn 43d Engr GS Regt to Casey, 18

Sep 42. Last two in SWPA File Al. (5) 46th Engr

GS Regt, Hist for 1942. (6) Milner, Victory in

Papua, pp. 76-88.
176 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 10

four miles square, where it was to construct fortifications and patrol jungle

trails. One platoon was to defend the

airstrip, about 75 percent cleared, and

smash any paratroop landing the enemy

might attempt to make. Protected

against air attack by overcast skies, 1,171

Japanese landed that night on the northern shore near Waga Waga, about 6

miles east of Strip No. 3, and began

advancing westward along the swampy,

mile wide, coastal shelf. Since the

jungle track skirting the northern shore

crossed the center of the runway site, the

enemy was expected shortly. The airfield clearing was an ideal location for a

defensive stand. It was improbable that

the enemy could successfully carry out

an encircling movement. Just to the

north were the rugged foothills of the

Stirling Range. Between the foothills

and the northwestern edge of the clearing flowed Wehuria Creek, which continued on behind the airstrip in a southerly direction. The southeastern end of

the clearing was only 500 feet from an

inlet of Milne Bay. At 0200 on 26

August most of the men of Company F

were sent to join the Australians and the

antiaircraft troops already in position
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 177

along the southwestern edge of the clearing. Most of the engineers were assigned to the center of the line. Company D, meanwhile, continued digging

trenches and foxholes around its bivouac

area to the rear and prepared its 37-mm.

gun and half-track for action.

The first night was a quiet one for the

defenders along the airstrip. No attack

materialized. The next day Japanese

warships shelled Strip No. 3 and planes

raided Strip No. 1. There was no serious damage to either field, but many

engineers had narrow escapes. Slowed

by soggy terrain and the Australians,

enemy ground troops doggedly continued their advance westward. On the

26th some 1,200 more Japanese were

landed, and on the night of the 27th the

enemy approached the clearing. By

early morning they stood at the northern

edge, directly opposite the positions occupied by Company F. After exchanging fire with the defenders for about

half an hour, the Japanese withdrew.

During the daylight hours of the 28th

there was no further activity, except for

occasional enemy rifle fire on the clearing. Since Allied air superiority had

forced the Japanese to restrict themselves

to night attacks, the defenders, aware

that additional troops had landed, looked

for a more determined assault that night.

They were not mistaken. Under cover

of darkness, the enemy made what appeared to be several haphazard attempts,

to cross the strip. All ended in failure.

Two or three riflemen got through the

defenders' line and penetrated into Company F's bivouac area but did not inflict

any damage.

Ashore for three days, the Japanese

had still made no determined effort to

seize the airstrip. On the 29th more

reinforcements landed, raising the number of enemy troops to some 3,100 men.

Convinced an attack was not far off, the

defenders again strengthened their line

on the 29th and 30th. Three officers

and 132 men of Company F, flanked on

both sides by Australian infantry, were

already fully committed to the defense

of the clearing. The remaining 27 men

of the company had moved miles to the

rear with the company's heavy construction equipment and supplies. Members

of Company D who could be spared from

their work on Strip No. 1 and on the

roads leading from the wharf to the airfields were sent to help man the defenses

along the clearing. The company's halftrack and 37-mm. gun were moved up

to the line alongside those of Company F.

At 0330 on 31 August the attack

came. The Japanese laid down heavy

rifle and machine gun fire as 300 men

prepared to storm across the clearing.

Strong counterfire disrupted the enemy's

plans, a hail of bullets stopping the advance before it got started. The Japanese failed even to set foot on the clearing. Nor did they break through along

the beach or at Wehuria Creek. At

dawn they withdrew, pursued by the

Australians. The attack had failed

completely. Later that day the engineers counted 160 bodies, most of them

in the wooded area opposite the position

held by Company F. As the surviving

Japanese made their way back to Waga

Waga, the engineers bulldozed shallow

graves for the enemy dead. Although

the enemy had been repulsed, General

Clowes did not believe the danger of

surprise attack had passed. During the

first week in September, Companies D
178 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

and F exchanged defensive positions

daily. Air attacks continued, and on the

8th, Japanese planes bombed Company

F's bivouac area, killing 4 men and

wounding 7. But ground fighting was

over. By the second week of September Japanese warships had evacuated

most of the enemy troops. The battle

of Milne Bay, which was soon to assume

legendary aspects for the engineers of

the Southwest Pacific, had ended in a

complete victory for the Allies.

Allied Preparations Continue

The beaten invaders withdrew from

Milne Bay, but the enemy force on the

Kokoda Trail continued to advance

through the Owen Stanley Range. Outnumbered and poorly supplied, General

Rowell's Australians fell back from one

ridge to another. In early September

Australian reinforcements were rushed to

the front to contain the Japanese advance. MacArthur and Rowell believed

the Japanese, overextended as they were,

could now be contained. In order to

put additional pressure on the enemy,

MacArthur planned to execute a flanking movement by sending an American

regimental combat team (RCT) from the

32d Division on foot over the mountains

to attack the enemy from the rear. Of

the trails that led north through the

Owen Stanleys, two seemed most practicable. One, starting from Kapa Kapa,

a few miles southeast of Port Moresby,

wound through the mountains to Jaure

on the eastern slopes. But it presented

difficult obstacles since it crossed innumerable hogbacks and at the divide

reached an elevation of 9,000 feet. The

second track, leading northward from

Abau to Jaure, crossed what was believed

to be gentler terrain; its highest elevation

was about 5,000 feet. On 15 September,

a reconnaissance party organized by

MacArthur's G-4, Brig. Gen. Lester J.

Whitlock, began to explore the Kapa

Kapa Trail. The day before, a company

of the 91st Engineers had begun improving the dirt track from Moresby to Kapa

Kapa. On the 16th, Casey and Sverdrup, who were in Moresby at the time,

took charge of investigating the Abau

Trail. The march through the mountains would have to wait until the reconnaissance reports were in.39

Casey and Sverdrup reached Abau on

the morning of 18 September. They

wanted the answers to two questions:

could the harbor be made to serve as a

base of supply for a regimental combat

team and would it be possible to send

jeeps and mule trains up over the trail?

 40

Casey took on the job of exploring the

harbor. For "hours that stretched into

days" the chief engineer lay off shore in

a native canoe sounding the depths of the

waters.41 Meanwhile, Sverdrup had

started out for Jaure with a party of one

American, 2 Australians, 10 native policemen, and 26 carriers. The first

day's march was easy and the party covered 13 miles. But the following

morning when they reached the foothills

39

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 88-91. (2)

Memo, Hq Adv Ech Fifth AF for Whitlock, 17 Sep

42. 384 New Guinea 2, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA.

(3) Spec Abau Reconnaissance Party, MAPLE, Order

No. 1, 16 Sep 42. SWPA File 631. (4) CO 91st

Engr GS Regt, Constr Progress Rpt for Period Ending 30 Sep 42. SWPA File 627. 40

 (1) Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 5 Oct 42. (2)

Spec Abau Reconnaissance Party MAPLE, Order No.

1, 16 Sep 42. Both in SWPA File 631. 41

 Ltr, Sverdrup to C Staff Br, 13 Jun 50. SWPA

Files.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 179

of the Owen Stanleys, the going got

rougher. "Some of the hills we climbed

are over 45 degrees—would like to see a

mule climb that," Sverdrup wrote in a

letter he sent back to Casey by native

bearer. At noon of the fourth day, he

noted in his log, "elevation 3,380 and

still going up." After scaling heights of

almost 5,000 feet and toiling up preciptious grades of 80 percent, Sverdrup and

the members of his party began to suspect

that they were "on a wild goose chase,"

and would never be able to "build a

motor transport road in here and probably not a mule track either." By the

time the group reached Jaure on 25

September, after eight days on the trail,

Sverdrup doubted whether it would be

possible even to march troops over the

route. On the 27th the party began its

trek back to Abau, arriving there on 3

October. By this time, Casey, having

concluded that the harbor was too shallow even for lightering, much less for

use by cargo vessels, had returned to

Moresby.42

The day Casey and Sverdrup went to

Abau the Japanese had reached the

native village of Ioribaiwa on the southwestern slopes of the mountains overlooking Moresby and the coastal plain.

The Allied position was less precarious

than it seemed. The enemy column

had overreached itself, and Kenney's airmen had been knocking out the enemy's

supply line along the Kokoda Trail most

effectively. Nor was the war going well

for the Japanese elsewhere. The setback at Milne Bay and serious reverses

on Guadalcanal induced Imperial General Headquarters to change its strategy

temporarily. It planned to withdraw

the troops on the Kokoda Trail and concentrate them for the time being on the

coastal flats at Buna. Operations in

New Guinea were to be held to a minimum until Guadalcanal was secured.

In Allied eyes, however, the Japanese

were still a powerful adversary. On 23

September, General Blamey assumed

direct command of New Guinea Force

and two days later launched the Allied

counterdrive. Soon the Japanese were

in full retreat along the Kokoda Trail.43

As the enemy withdrew, MacArthur

adopted a more aggressive plan of action.

He envisioned a three-pronged advance

on Buna. The Australians were to pursue the Japanese along the Kokoda

Trail. One American force was to cross

the Owen Stanleys on either the Kapa

Kapa or the Abau Trail. A second was

to move in small boats from Milne Bay

up the northeastern coast. When all

these forces were sufficiently close to

Buna, MacArthur would order a concerted attack. The success of such

tactics hinged largely on getting the

troops across the mountains. Casey's

report on the Abau Trail, which he gave

to Sutherland on 5 October, indicated a

tremendous effort would have to be

made to convert the track into a practicable route. The Kapa Kapa Trail

appeared to be the more feasible way.

By late September, a regimental combat

team had been readied for the march.

On 6 October, one company of infantry

with a platoon of twenty-three engineers

set out across the mountains as the ad- 42

 (1) Ltrs, Sverdrup to Casey, 19, 20, 22 Sep 42.

SWPA File 631. (2) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 11 Oct

42. SWPA File 629. (3) Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 3 Oct 42. SWPA File 630. 43

 Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 95-100.
180 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

vance detachment. On their backs the

engineers carried axes, saws, machetes,

and shovels to clear the trail for the

troops who would follow. The expedition would be supplied by airdrop.

None doubted the march would be difficult, but there seemed to be no other

way of getting the men to Buna.44

While on the Abau Trail, Sverdrup

had chanced upon a plateau in the northern foothills of the Owen Stanleys which

appeared to offer a good site for an airstrip. On returning to Abau he discussed the possibility of building landing

fields beyond the mountains and flying

the troops across. The practicality of

such a scheme was confirmed by Cecil

Abel, a missionary who owned a plantation near Abau and knew well the territory north of the divide. The possibility

of flying troops and supplies across

Papua had been considered before. As

far back as July, air and engineer officers

had suggested that a field at Wanigela

Mission, sixty-five miles southeast of

Buna, on the eastern Papuan coast be

developed to make possible ferrying

troops and supplies from Moresby. At

various times during August and September, Kenney had urged that troops be

flown to Wanigela and then be moved up

the coast to Buna. MacArthur had held

back, waiting to see if the Australians

could stop the Japanese on the Kokoda

Trail. When the enemy began retreating toward Buna, he accepted the plan.

On 6 October, Australians were flown

from Milne Bay to Wanigela. Under

their direction, natives began cutting the

grass and readying the landing strip.

But Wanigela was many miles from Buna

and surrounded by almost impenetrable

swamp and jungle. Sverdrup, as a result of his reconnaissances north of the

Owen Stanleys, believed that fields could

be constructed rapidly in terrain from

which Buna would be easier to get to.

Early in October, Mr. Abel, who was

flown to Port Moresby to talk to Allied

commanders, assured them that a landing

field could be readily developed near

Fasari in the upper valley of the Musa

River. From there the troops could

make their way on foot along trails over

relatively flat, though heavily jungled,

terrain. The idea was enthusiastically

received all around and MacArthur approved the project. Sverdrup was to

round up natives, hand tools, and supplies and march north from Abau to

carry out this mission. On 11 October,

Abel was flown to Wanigela, where he

recruited over a score of natives and set

out with them for Fasari. Sverdrup,

after laying in a store of tobacco, calico,

boy scout knives, garden seeds, and other

trade goods, left Abau on 14 October

with 185 natives and 5 white men, among

them Flight Lt. Michael J. Leahy, who

had spent most of his life in New Guinea

and knew personally many of the tribal

chieftains.45

44

 (1) Ibid. pp. 100-103, 111. (2) Memo, Casey for

Sutherland, 5 Oct 42. SWPA File 631. (3) 114th

Engr Combat Bn, Engr Opns in Papuan Campaign.

SWPA File A82.

45

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 11 Oct 42. SWPA

File 629. (2) Ltr, Harding to Sutherland, 12-14

Oct 42. GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 16-21 Oct 42. (3)

Check Sheet, G-3 GHQ SWPA to CofS GHQ SWPA,

17 Jul 42. 686 Airdromes, Jun 42 to 1 Dec 43. G-3

Files, GHQ SWPA. (4) Kenney, General Kenney

Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War (New

York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), pp. 41-42, 50,

70, 75-76, 102. (5) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp.

102-03, 106, 115-16. (6) Incl with 1st Ind, Hq

USASOS to MacArthur, 14 Oct 42, on Ltr, Casey to
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 181

Reaching Fasari on the afternoon of

18 October, Sverdrup found that Mr.

Abel "had made a fine start on the strip."

The site had been burned over and all

that remained to be done was to remove

some stumps and widen and smooth the

clearing. The next morning Sverdrup's

natives joined Abel's in finishing up the

work. Later that day a DC-3 put down

at the field, henceforth known as Abel's

Landing. On the 20th Sverdrup and

Leahy headed north over jungle trails,

leaving an Australian officer and the

Papuans to put in refinements at Fasari.

Near the native villages of Embessa and

Kinjaki Barige, they located two fairly

level sites, overgrown with kunai grass

some eight to twelve feet high. Lured

by the prospect of getting trade goods,

entire villages turned out to help with

the cutting. Soon the work force numbered in the thousands. By pitting villages "against one another as teams,"

Sverdrup got the natives to put forth a

tremendous effort. At Embessa, "the

Musa boys won hands down and got an

extra one-half stick of tobacco each as a

reward and damn near killed themselves

earning it," he wrote. As the natives

were rapidly exhausting the expedition's

stores, Sverdrup appealed frantically to

Moresby for additional supplies. The

first airdrop, made on 24 October at

Kinjaki, disrupted the work there for

some time. "At 9:45," Sverdrup noted

in his log, "a B–25 came . . . roaring

down . . . with bomb doors open, and

then it rained rice and corned beef. . . .

When we started to pick up [the] stuff,

we found forty percent of [the] corned

beef tins smashed and opened. No holding [the] boys after that. Had to go to

camp and eat themselves out of shape."

The plane having dropped a note instructing him to go to Pongani, Sverdrup

on 25 October hiked to that coastal village. Fifty men of Company C of the

114th Combat Battalion were already

there, having been part of a group flown

from Moresby to Wanigela in midOctober and moved up the coast by boat.

Since the troops seemed to be making

little progress, Sverdrup went back to

Kinjaki to bring up several hundred

natives, and returned to Pongani with

them on 28 October. Working twelve

hours a day in oppressive heat, the natives and engineers completed the Pongani airstrip in two and one half days.

By the end of October planes could land

there, at Kinjaki, and at Abel's Landing.

Sverdrup was proud of his "Papuan

Aviation Battalion," defying anyone to

beat its performance at Pongani. "One

thing has been definitely proven," he

wrote. "If strips are to be built by

hand in this country, native labor competently led is the only answer."

 46

Meanwhile, the engineers at Port

Moresby and Milne Bay were struggling

against almost insurmountable odds.

Colonel Matthews was hard put to find

the wherewithal to push construction at

these advance bases. His staff was too

small. His engineer, Yoder, was borrowed from the 96th Engineers. He

had almost no personnel to help him

organize and direct the work, and the

troops at his disposal were too few to

carry the load. He had the 808th, the

AG GHQ SWPA, 11 Oct 42. 384 New Guinea 2,

G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA.

46

 Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, sub: Diary from 13

Oct to 31 Oct 42. SWPA File 631.
182 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

96th, one battalion of the 91st, and Company E of the 43d at Moresby and two

companies of the 43d and one of the

46th at Milne Bay—a total of some

3,200 men.47 But more annoying than

the shortage of troops and personnel was

the absence of even a general statement

of what he was to build. "No one at

GHQ, at Hq, Fifth Air Force, or at Hq,

USASOS, ever revealed, to me at least,"

Matthews later wrote, "the probable

plan and garrison to be supported."

 48

The Australian commanders, asserting

the authority granted them of exercising

operational control when an enemy attack threatened, took the engineers off

important construction projects. When

the Japanese were approaching Moresby,

General Rowell had ordered the 808th

to stop work on airfields and sent them

into combat reserve along the Goldie

River northeast of Moresby. There

they remained until the arrival of the

114th in mid-September. After the

Japanese withdrew from Milne Bay,

General Clowes refused to let the engineers resume work on Strips No. 2 and

No. 3, despite the fact that Matthews had

ordered this work expedited. Casey, inspecting Milne on 15 September, discovered that Clowes had overruled

Matthews' instructions and had diverted

the engineers to repairing strip No. 1,

building a dock, and standing guard.

It took a direct order from MacArthur to

Blamey to get the men back on airfield

construction. Marshall, the commanding general of USASOS, meanwhile tried

unsuccessfully to get the 116th Combat

Battalion to stop training in Queensland

and go to Moresby, where under

USASOS direction it would help improve port facilities. At the same time,

the Allied Air Forces opposed taking

engineers off airfields to improve ports

and to build such things as the road to

Kapa Kapa.49

MacArthur, visiting Moresby in late

September, quickly concluded that centralized co-ordination of all service activities in New Guinea was urgently needed.

On 5 October he established the Combined Operational Service Command

(COSC) for New Guinea under the

direction of New Guinea Force. This

was to be a joint Australian-American

logistical organization; its function was

to co-ordinate all service activities in the

forward areas. General Johns, now

Chief of Staff, USASOS, was designated

commander both of Advance Base and

of COSC. Each of the sections in Headquarters, COSC, had two chiefs, one an

American and the other an Australian.

Matthews was henceforth Engineer, Advance Base, and together with an Australian lieutenant colonel, head of

COSC's Engineer Construction Section.

Operating under priorities laid down

by Blamey, Johns was to be responsible

for all engineer work in the advance

bases. He was to prepare a co-ordinated

plan for building airdromes, roads, ports,

and other installations. Under him

were all Australian and American engi47

 Incl, 19 Sep 42, with Ltr, Heiberg to Casey, 23

Sep 42. SWPA File 26. 48

 Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 45. Fifth Air Force

was established on 3 September 1942 as the subordinate U.S. command of Allied Air Forces.

49

 (1) Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 41. (2)

Rad [Matthews] to Hq USASOS, 18 Sep 42. (3) Ltr,

MacArthur to Blamey, 16 Sep 42. Both in SWPA

File 491. (4) Memo, Marshall for MacArthur, 30

Sep 42. SWPA File 27. (5) Ltr, CG Adv Ech Fifth

AF to CG Fifth AF, 30 Sep 42. SWPA File 494.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 183

neer units in the service areas. He was

to allot them to the various projects in

such a way as to carry out most expeditiously Blarney's wishes. This was an

attempt, insofar as construction was concerned, Johns wrote later, "to provide

the maximum utilization of the meager

means available. ... " But bringing

about an integration of effort would

take considerable time.50

As Johns took over his new duties,

more and more of the engineer effort

was going into port development. On

11 September MacArthur had sent Casey

to New Guinea to find out what could be

done to increase the capacity of the ports

at Moresby and Milne Bay. Casey had

seen that it would not be easy to enlarge

the Moresby port. Shoal water ran out

to about 1,500 feet from shore. With

from 11 to 18 feet of water at low tide,

the harbor was too shallow for large ships

and too deep for construction of a causeway. A piling approach dock seemed to

be the only answer, but there was no

piling at Moresby and little prospect of

getting any from Australia. A deepwater dock had existed at Bootless Inlet,

a few miles to the east, but the Australians had destroyed this and mined

the harbor without plotting the mines.

Matthews had learned that oceangoing

vessels could come to within 50 to 100

feet of Tatana Island, about 4 miles

northwest of Moresby. The island was

separated from the mainland by half a

mile of water from 6 to 12 feet deep at

high tide. One of Matthews' officers

had waded from the mainland to Tatana

at low tide and was never in water above

his chest. Matthews suggested that a

causeway be constructed across this shallow water and that a floating pier be

built on the island first and permanent

docks later as labor and materials became available. Casey readily accepted

this plan. Visiting Milne Bay, he found

that docking facilities could be easily expanded. Two crib piers already in

could be extended with the addition of

pile piers into deeper water 250 feet

from shore to provide berths for large

vessels. Casey sent word back to

USASOS that launches, pontons, lumber

decking, and piling would have to be

sent to Moresby and Milne Bay immediately.51

Once construction started, the engineers made rapid progress. On 6

October Matthews reported the new pier

at Milne could take a ship up to 430

feet long and with a 22-foot draft. Two

days later he began construction of the

causeway to Tatana Island. Part of the

2d Battalion of the 96th Engineers

opened borrow pits on the island and on

the mainland from which to take rock

and dirt. The men loaded their trucks,

drove them out on the lengthening

causeway, and dumped the loads into the

shallows. The gap was gradually closed

and the roadway packed by the traffic of

the trucks. The floating pier was built

concurrently on the north side of the

50 (1) Ltr, MacArthur to Blamey et al., 5 Oct 42.

385 New Guinea. G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (2) Of

C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II 50-52.

(3) Ltr, Matthews to Staff Br, 16 Jun 50. (4) Ltr,

Johns to Casey, 13 May 46. SWPA Files.

51

 (1) Rad, Sutherland to Rowell, 11 Sep 42. 826

Ports, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (2) Matthews Ltr,

16 Jun 50. (3) Rpt, Matthews, 15 Nov 42. SWPA

File 675. (4) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 36-

37. (5) Rad, Matthews to GHQ SWPA, 18 Sep 42.

826 Ports, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (6) Rad, Casey

to USASOS, 18 Sep 42. SWPA File 491.
184 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

THE PORT MORESBY CAUSEWAY, LOOKING TOWARD TATANA ISLAND (General

Johns in the foreground, third from left).

island. On 30 October the causeway

was opened to traffic, and on 3 November, the floating pier took its first ship.52

Work was proceeding on airfields but

far too slowly to satisfy Kenney and his

generals. As the tempo of the air war

quickened, their discontent with the

engineers' progress grew. At Port

Moresby increasing numbers of planes

were being based on the dusty fields,

which had neither camouflage nor adequate revetments. The airmen, among

them Brig. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead,

Kenney's deputy and commander of the

advance echelon of the Fifth Air Force

at Port Moresby, were obsessed with the

fear that the Moresby dromes might not

be ready for all-weather operations when

the rainy season began in late November.

Their appeals for the assignment of more

engineers to Air Force projects were

coupled with predictions that fields

would be washed out and planes

grounded if the "wet" commenced before runways, taxiways, dispersals, and

access roads were hard surfaced. But

52

 (1) Rad, Matthews to USASOS, 6 Oct 42. 826

Ports, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (2) Rpt, Matthews,

15 Nov 42. SWPA File 675. (3) Of C Engr GHQ

AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 98.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 185

concern over the progress of the fields

did not deter the air force from heaping

new demands on the engineers. Among

the items they requested were steel huts,

electric lighting, and screened mess halls

with concrete floors.53 "As long as we

were the only ones doing any fighting in

the American forces," Kenney later explained, "I was going to see that if any

gravy was passed around, we got first

crack at it."

 54

 One of the Fifth Air

Force's frequent protests against the

slowness of airfield work was made at the

same time that Colonel Matthews was

being asked to construct "water-borne

sanitary facilities [and] install wash bowls

and other china fixtures" at air force

installations near Port Moresby. The

engineers of Advance Base refused to

sanction such departures from theater of

operations plans. Unable to get what

he wanted through the usual channels,

Kenney began procuring materials for

air force projects himself and shipping

them from Australia to Moresby.

Matthews, learning what was afoot, invoked the authority of General Johns

as base commander to control construction supplies and confiscated the cargoes.

In order to bypass such control, Kenney

began flying materials directly to his

units in New Guinea. Relations between air and engineer officers were

rapidly deteriorating. The air force

kept up an almost constant complaint

that the engineers were devoting too

much effort to projects which, in the

eyes of the airmen, were of relatively

small importance. The engineers made

no secret of the fact that they believed

the airmen were too demanding. When,

on 8 October, General Whitehead issued

a stinging indictment of Colonel

Matthews, stating, in effect, that Advance

Base was going back on its commitments

to the Fifth Air Force, Casey felt obliged

to intervene.55

Writing to Kenney on 14 October,

Casey pointed out that the construction

program at Moresby consisted of a good

deal besides jobs for the Army Air Forces.

"The Air Corps," he reminded Kenney,

"is vitally concerned in the program as a

whole, as airdromes without access roads

will not be usable during the wet season

nor will air operations be effective unless

unloading facilities and transport facilities in the harbor area are materially

improved." The engineers were putting first things first. Not having

enough manpower to undertake all the

projects requested of them at once, Casey

explained, they had to split the program

into two parts—jobs which were "absolutely essential" and jobs which were

"useful but which can be postponed."

In the first category were all-weather

dromes, improved ports, minimum

shelter and utilities, and hard surfacing

for key roads; in the second were blastproof revetments, additional roads,

more ample water supplies, and more

comfortable quarters. Since the essential projects must be usable before the

others were tackled, the Fifth Air Force

53 would have to wait for much of the con- (1) Ltr, CG Adv Ech Fifth AF to Kenney, 30 Sep

42. SWPA File 494. (2) Ltr, CG Adv Ech Fifth AF

to CO Adv Base New Guinea, 17 Sep 42. SWPA File

495.

54

 Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 73-75,

119-20.

55

 (1) Matthews Ltr, 16 Jun 50, p. 9. (2) Rad, CG

Adv Ech Fifth AF to Kenney, 8 Oct 42. SWPA File

460.
186 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

struction it wanted. But they could rest

assured, Casey said, that the Moresby

fields would be ready for the rains.

Apparently mollified, Kenney sent to his

airmen at Moresby a radio prepared for

him by Casey's office. The chief engineer, the message read, was "fully cognizant of the situation" and would have the

dromes "in shape to operate from" when

the rains began.56

During October the engineers made

great strides toward completing the New

Guinea dromes. The "roller coaster"

runway at Three-Mile was torn up, regraded, and hard surfaced. The field at

Rorona was lengthened to take heavy

bombers. New strips were begun at

Bomana and Ward's Drome. Dispersals

were provided for twenty-six planes,

revetments for twelve. At Milne Bay,

Strip No. 3 was graveled and covered

with mat. Still, much essential work

remained. The gravel runways at

Laloki and Seven-Mile Drome had yet

to be sealed or surfaced with mat. Most

access roads had to be paved, and nearly

half of the three hundred dispersals and

plane pens provided so far were suitable

only for use in dry weather, and many

more were needed. Drainage systems

left much to be desired, and taxiways,

hardstands, and warm-up areas were far

from adequate. Believing that the engineers at Moresby were doing all that was

humanly possible to hasten construction,

Casey was trying hard to move the units

that remained in Australia to New

Guinea, but without success. Because

of the acute shortage of ships, USASOS

could spare no vessels for the engineers.

The units already in New Guinea continued to carry the load alone.57

The strain of constant operations was

beginning to tell. Men and machines

were wearing out. Sverdrup, stopping

at Moresby on his way back to Brisbane from Pongani, found the situation alarming. The engineer troops

were tired and large numbers were reporting for sick call. Many were suffering from malaria, dengue, dysentery, and

disease of the skin. Accidents were frequent. "I am much worried," he wrote

to Casey, "about how these same Engineer troops will be able to perform when

we advance, as we hope to do. ... "

The condition of the units' equipment

was just as discouraging. A large part

of it was sidelined for repairs. Mechanics were scarce. Spare parts were

almost nonexistent. Such cargoes of

equipment and parts as were reaching

Australia seldom found their way to New

Guinea. USASOS could not arrange for

shipping space, and cargo space on planes

was at a premium.58

As the rainy season approached, the

airmen grew increasingly impatient. An

unseasonable downpour on the night of

21 October seemed to confirm their forebodings. Seven-Mile, Three-Mile, and

Rorona were unserviceable for a time.

The road to Waigani was barely passable,

and the bridge to Laloki was washed out.

Greatly perturbed, Kenney again brought

pressure to bear on the engineers. In a

57

 (1) Rad, Johns to Casey, 24 Oct 42. 686 New

Guinea No. 2. G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (2) Rad,

Johns to Casey, 28 Oct 42. SWPA File 496. (3)

Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 28 Oct 42. SWPA File

56

 (1) Memo, with Incls and notations thereon,

Casey for Kenney, 14 Oct 42. SWPA File 460.

495.

58

 (1) Hist of the 96th GS Regt. (2) Memo,

Sverdrup for Casey, 8 Nov 42. SWPA File 27.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 187

letter to MacArthur on 26 October he

predicted that with the onset of the rains

at least two squadrons would have to be

returned to Australia. He conceded

that the strips themselves were nearly

finished but stressed the fact that dispersals, hardstands, and access roads were

not. Stating that he could not operate

effectively without the missing facilities,

he insisted that they be supplied at once.

"Otherwise," he warned, "reliance on

aviation operations is not well founded."

Both Sutherland and Casey hastened to

reassure him. Casey again pointed out

that there was a big job to be done at

Moresby and few engineers to do it, but

he promised that "all work necessary to

provide maximum use of the New

Guinea airdromes during the wet

weather season [would] be pushed to the

maximum within the limitations of plant

and men."

 59

At this juncture Kenney again began

to press for operational control of the

808th Aviation Battalion. Early in

November he raised the question as to

what authority there was for having the

unit under USASOS. Protesting to

Sutherland that aviation engineers were

being taken off the airfields to work on

the Tatana causeway and to operate

cranes on the docks, he asked that the

battalion be placed under him. Casey,

as before, strongly opposed placing the

aviation engineers under Air Forces'

control. Given the tremendous scope

of the construction program and the

small size of the engineer force, he believed the existing arrangement to be

the most efficient. The pooling of construction units and resources had, he

felt, worked to the advantage of all concerned. Actually, only twenty-five men

had been diverted from the 808th to

other jobs, whereas the bulk of the service engineers had been employed in

building airdromes. "If it is regarded

that the aviation Engineers are an Air

Corps unit and the only engineers [intended] primarily for airdrome construction," he told Sutherland, "the counter

view may be taken that all other engineer

units had been diverted from other

assignments to work for the Air

Corps. . . ." Engineer dump truck

companies and details from general service regiments had worked for long

periods hauling gasoline and bombs for

the air force and loading planes. This

work, Casey said, had been undertaken

in the knowledge "that the job had to be

done by whatever means were available."

As the chief engineer saw it, nothing

would be gained by setting up two independent construction organizations to

compete for materials and equipment,

duplicate each other's planning, and get

in each other's way. Casey's views prevailed. The 808th remained under the

control of USASOS.60

The stir created by the Fifth Air

Force had served to emphasize the need

for sending more engineers to New

Guinea, and Casey was now able to

persuade Marshall to make shipping

available. By 8 November the 576th

Dump Truck Company and elements of 59

 (1) Rad, CG Adv Ech Fifth AF to CG V Bomber

Comd, 22 Oct 42. (2) Ltr, Kenney to MacArthur, 26

Oct 42. Both in 686 New Guinea 2, G-3 Files, GHQ

SWPA. (3) 1st Ind, 29 Oct 42 on (2). (4) Memo,

Casey for Kenney, 1 Nov 42. SWAP File 460.

60

 (1) Memo, G-3 GHQ SWPA for Casey, 3 Nov

42. (2) Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 3 Nov 42.

Both in SWPA File 27.
188 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

the 43d and 46th General Service Regiments were loading to ship out within a

week, and USASOS was promising to

transport more units to New Guinea at

an early date. Meanwhile, at Moresby

additional engineers were being pulled

off non-air-force projects and sent to

work on the dromes. Australians took

over operation of the quarry and construction of docks and dumps as the

Americans moved in with their equipment to finish up access roads, hardstands,

and dispersals. By mid-November, the

first reinforcements from Australia were

unloading their gear on the Moresby

docks. On 18 November the chief engineer sent word to Kenny that "every

effort [was] being made to get and hold

all airfields here to wet weather operational condition."61

Maps

The days before the attack on Buna

were scarcely less hectic for the topographic engineers than for the engineers

engaged in construction. The coming

offensive was generating a brisk demand

for maps. Top commanders and their

staffs had to be furnished with strategic

maps of the combat zones. Ranging in

scale from 1:500,000 to 1:1,200,000 and

depicting large areas with such salient

features as mountains, large bodies of

water, important lines of communications, and major centers of population,

maps of this type were indispensable to

men who were planning campaigns.

Commanders in the field were calling for

tactical maps with scales varying from

1:62,500 to 1:300,000. The scale

1:63,360 was especially popular because

it was one inch to the mile. Necessary

in moving large bodies of men across

unfamiliar terrain, these maps supplied

much the same information as strategic

maps but in far greater detail. For

artillery batteries and small infantry

units, the engineers had to provide battle

or terrain maps with a scale of 1:20,000.

Since these large-scale projections were

used in firing on unseen targets, their

delineation of distance, direction, and

elevation had to be very precise. All

these varieties of maps had to be supplied quickly, some of them by the

thousands; and because Ghormley had

no military mapping units, MacArthur's

topographers not only had to cover New

Guinea but the Solomons as well.62

Among the least explored areas of the

world, the islands north and northeast of

Australia had been mapped haphazardly

or not at all. In months of searching,

the engineers of USAFIA had failed to

turn up much information of value on

the now vital parts of Melanesia. The

Army Map Service at Washington, an

agency of the Corps of Engineers responsible for providing maps to the

Armed Services, could supply but few

of the far Pacific. Nor could the Australians do much better. Their topographical surveys had been confined

primarily to the continent itself—in fact,

almost entirely to the southeastern coastal

region. Good maps of Papua and the

61

 (1) Memo, Casey for Teale, 2 Nov 42. SWPA

File 460. (2) Memo, Teale for Casey, 8 Nov 42.

SWPA File 496. (3) Memo, Casey for Kenney, 18

Nov 42. SWPA File 460.

62

 (1) Memo, ACofEngrs for CofAAF, 23 Sep 41,

with Incls. 061. (2) For a detailed discussion of

military maps and mapping techniques, see Coll,

Keith, and Rosenthal, Troops and Equipment, chs.

III, XIX.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 189

mandated territories were simply not to

be had. The only military maps of the

Buna area—Australian sketches drawn

to a scale of four miles to the inch—were

so seriously in error that they showed

some rivers flowing up over mountains.

Just as disheartening was the situation

with regard to the South Pacific. Although sketches had been made of some

of the Solomons, no comprehensive

effort to map the islands had ever been

made. Data on the topography of

Guadalcanal, now the scene of desperate

fighting, was both incomplete and unreliable. In mapping the combat zone,

a vast land and water area much larger

than the United States, the engineers

had to start virtually from scratch.63

To map the forward areas by the timehonored method of surveying the ground

was impossible. Much of the contested

territory was occupied by the enemy,

and even where the ground was accessible, there was no time for painstaking

measurements with transits, tapes, and

levels. Chief reliance had to be placed

on aerial photography. New techniques, just coming into use, enabled

cartographers to make maps from photographs of the terrain furnished them by

airmen. Mapping, once the exclusive

province of the engineers, was now a

joint responsibility of the Corps of Engineers and the Air Forces. A recent

development was trimetrogon photography, which involved mounting three

cameras in a plane with one pointing

straight down and the others pointing

sideways. Three cameras arranged in

this manner could, of course, photograph

a much wider area than could one

camera aimed directly down. But aerial

photographs had their limitations. Unless the elevation of some point in the

picture were known, there was no way

of determining the elevation of any of

the terrain features. Because the photographs were taken from an altitude of

20,000 feet or more, many objects appearing on the prints, each about nine

inches square, were hard to make out.

Photo interpreters had to try to identify

an object mainly from its outline and its

shade of gray. It was not easy to deduce

what might lie beneath the heavy jungle

growth directly below the camera or behind the mountain off to one side.

Shots taken from oblique angles presented an added difficulty—that of determining the elevation of the terrain features and their distance from one

another.64

The men of the Australian Survey

Corps, the only topographers in MacArthur's command at the outset, were

surveyors of the ground with little or no

experience in photomapping. Although

the 8th Photo Squadron, an Air Forces

unit trained in trimetrogon photography,

began arriving in Australia in April,

few, if any, engineers were yet available

to transform photographs into maps.

Johns, soon after becoming Chief

Engineer, USAFIA, had requested two

mapping units from the United States—

an army topographic battalion and a

corps topographic company, but some

time was to elapse before these units

63

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for

1942. (2) 648th Engr Topo Bn, Of Maps and Men,

Battalion History, 1941-45. (3) Of C Engr GHQ

AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, III, 19-20. (4) WD MID

Survey of the Solomon Islands, 15 Mar 43.RED VAULT,

USAFISPA. 64

 648th Engr Topo Bn, Of Maps and Men.
190 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

would reach the Southwest Pacific.

Casey, who assumed over-all direction

of the mapping effort on becoming chief

engineer of SWPA, was meanwhile planning to co-ordinate the work of Australian and American topographers.

Shortly after the signing in Washington

on 12 May of the Loper-Hotine Agreement, a convention between the British

and the Americans that gave the latter

primary responsibility for mapping in

the Pacific, Casey reserved for the

American topographic units a dominant

role in SWPA's mapping program. The

Americans, under USAFIA, were to

concentrate mainly on mapping the forward areas; the Survey Corps, operating

under General Blamey, on mapping

Australia. While the Allies would cooperate fully in all they did, the Australians would, as a rule, be the surveyors,

the Americans the photomappers of the

Southwest Pacific.65

The units that Johns had sent for

arrived at Brisbane late in June. One,

the 648th Engineer Topographic Battalion (less Company A), commanded by

Maj. Emil F. Kumpe, was set up to map

limited areas and reproduce existing

maps while moving with an army in the

field. The other, the 69th Engineer

Topographic Company, under Capt.

Orris A. Carnegie, was prepared to serve

near the front, where it would print maps

for immediate distribution and carry out

such short-term, emergency assignments

as running quick surveys, making hasty

sketches, and helping the artillery coordinate its fire. Soon after debarking,

the 69th was scattered, as detachments

were sent north to begin field surveys in

Queensland. The 648th moved to Melbourne, where it was to establish and

operate a fixed base printing plant, a

mission normally reserved for the larger

and better equipped GHQ topographic

battalions. The unit had, moreover, to

accomplish under pressure of war what

would ordinarily have been a long-term,

peacetime program and to pioneer in

making maps from trimetrogon photographs. Lacking sketchmasters and

angulators—the devices used in producing planimetric maps from such photographs—the battalion gave its water

purification units to the 8th Photo

Squadron in exchange for a set of these

instruments. Seventeen men of the

battalion who had had training in working with trimetrogon undertook to

teach the new mapping technique to

others. The engineers located a large

Harris offset press in Melbourne which,

with the three smaller presses they had

brought with them, enabled them to

print all required sizes of maps in quantity. The battalion had barely moved

into its new headquarters, a 5-story warehouse in downtown Melbourne belonging to Australia's largest department

store, when it was put to work. Even

before the building was cleared of merchandise, the photomappers were tackling their first job, which was to produce

maps of Guadalcanal "with the utmost

speed." No sooner had nine halftone

photomosaics and nine planimetric drawings of the island been reproduced and

shipped out than the battalion turned to

compiling maps of eastern New Guinea.

But it was immediately apparent that

provision of anything like adequate

65

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942.

(2) Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, Troops and Equipment, pp. 445-46.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 191

coverage of that area must await receipt

of quantities of aerial photos.66

Photographs came in slowly. The 8th

Photo Squadron had difficulty in getting

even a fraction of the shots the engineers

needed. Until August 1942, it had only

three single-seater planes which could be

used for taking photographs. That

month it got a number of additional aircraft, but it still had far too few. These

planes, "rickety crates . . . little better

than flying coffins," had to operate under

extremely difficult conditions. In the

first place, the Air Forces insisted on

using them primarily for reconnaissance

and permitted only occasional photographic flights. In the coastal and

mountainous areas of New Guinea there

were often only fifteen minutes of good,

clear weather a day. Time and again

missions had to be abandoned because

of enemy interference. Even when conditions were best, good aerial photographs were still not easy to come by.

The pilots had to make painstaking efforts to interlock the cameras at the

exact angle and set them correctly in the

plane. Once aloft, the pilots found it

difficult to maintain a constant altitude,

to fly straight lines without tipping and

tilting, and to make sure they got pictures of all the area assigned to them.

By late September, the 8th Photo Squadron had accomplished but 5 percent of

its photography missions, largely because

of the diversion of its planes to reconnaissance.67

Getting pictures was only half the

battle. Trimetrogon theory was still in

its infancy, and the engineers had to

learn by trial and error how best to

interpret the photographs. To supplement information deduced from the

pictures, they gathered as much data as

they could from other sources. Australian libraries were ransacked for books

on islands to the north. People who

fled before the advancing Japanese were

interviewed. Many supplies had to be

obtained in the Commonwealth. While

high-grade inks were satisfactory and

some types of paper were scarcely inferior to American brands, a number of

products of local manufacture produced

unpredictable results. Most of the

highly complex technical equipment, so

important for map making, had to be

gotten from the United States. The

men worked long and hard during the

chill Australian spring to produce maps

of the critical areas of New Guinea as

quickly as possible. "This Buna business was . . . miserable because at night

the temperature was down to about

freezing . . . ," the chronicler of the

648th reported. The men worked on

the maps in overcoats and hats and continued work until their fingers got numb.

By mid-November, the engineers were

distributing strategic and tactical maps

of the combat area. To be sure, these

maps had inaccuracies, but as one of the

topographic engineers pointed out, "any

map, based on any photographs, is better

than no map at all."

 68

66

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

III, 25-27. (2) 648th Engr Topo Bn, Of Maps and

Men. (3) 69 Engr Topo Co, Sixty Ninth Overseas.

ENCO-69-0.1, (21115) M. 67

 (1) 648th Engr Topo Bn, Of Maps and Men.

(2) Memos, for Rcd, Casey, 11, 12 Dec 42. SWPA

File 130. (3) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of

SWPA, III, 30-32. 68

 648th Engr Topo Bn, Of Maps and Men.
192 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Approaching Buna

By early November, Allied troops were

converging on Buna by air, land, and sea.

As far back as mid-October, a combat

team of the 32d Division together with

Company C of the 114th engineers had

been flown to Wanigela. From there a

party of infantry and engineers had attempted to march overland to Buna.

About fifteen miles west of Wanigela,

their way was blocked by the swift waters

of the Musa. The engineers built a

raft to ferry the infantry across, only to

find that the trails on the far bank, some

under seven feet of water, were impassable. The troops were then ordered

to follow the river to its mouth. From

there they were taken to Pongani in

small boats, completing the movement

on the 31st. While the Americans were

moving up the coast, the Australians

were securing nearby Goodenough

Island. On the night of 22-23 October

an Australian battalion landed and

within twenty-four hours had driven off

the Japanese. Americans and Australians were also approaching Buna overland from the southwest and southeast.

On 8 and 9 November a battalion of

infantry was flown to Abel's Landing,

while another went on to Pongani. The

day after the infantry put down at Abel's

Landing, Company A of the 114th, less

one platoon, arrived. Using native

rafts and an assault boat, the engineers

helped the troops cross the Musa three

miles west of Fasari. The men then

continued overland along jungle trails

toward Buna. Meanwhile, the battalion, which, with its platoon of engineers,

was slogging its way across the Owen

Stanleys, had reached Jaure by 28 October. That same day advance elements

continued their march through the northeastern foothills of the mountains. On

2 November the Australians recaptured

Kokoda. The Allies would soon be in

a position to attack.69

Among the Americans there was widespread optimism. The troops were

cocky and their commanders seemed

assured of an early victory. The men

of the 32d Division had a high regard for

their own ability as fighters, an opinion

shared by their commander, Maj. Gen.

Edwin F. Harding, whose "confidence in

the fighting qualities of the American

Soldier" prompted him to write on 31

October, "I am not at all pessimistic

about the outcome of this scrap." The

completion by the engineers of the landing strips north of the Owen Stanleys

had greatly raised hopes for an easy

campaign. On 20 October, the day

after Abel's Landing was completed,

Harding sent word to MacArthur that

"what promised to be a long, dull,

plodding campaign against inhospitable

nature is beginning to look more like

Marengo than Hannibal crossing the

Alps." Nor was Harding greatly perturbed by the terrain around Buna. He

reported "considerable open country in

the area over which we will operate,"

rated one native track leading into Buna

as "a broad highway for this part of the

world," and pronounced a number of

trails as suitable for motor traffic. He

foresaw the need for rather extensive

bridging but was prepared to deal with

this contingency. Two weeks before

69

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 106ff. (2)

114th Engr Combat Bn, Rpt of Engr Opns in Papuan

Campaign. SWPA File A82.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 193

the scheduled assault, he stated his intention of having plenty of engineers on

hand.70

Engineers in Combat

The enemy forces in Papua had withdrawn into three small pockets on the

northeastern coast, one at Buna, another

three miles to the northwest at Sanananda, and a third some five miles still

farther west at Gona.71 The largest was

the one at Buna. There the enemy held

an area three-quarters of a mile wide,

which extended from Buna Village eastward three miles to Cape Endaiadere,

where the coast line turned abruptly

southward. (Map 11) Just to the east of

the village was Musita Island and, beyond

it, Entrance Creek. On the other side

of the creek was the Government Station,

usually called Buna Mission, consisting

of three European houses and several

dozen native huts at the edge of a coconut plantation. Beyond the plantation

lay the major Allied objective, the airfield. Between the southeastern tip of

this field and the shore to the south of

Cape Endaiadere, the Japanese had

cleared a dummy runway, which the

Allied troops called the New Strip.

Simemi Creek, flowing in a northerly

direction, passed between the two airstrips. The Japanese occupied practically all the dry ground in the area.

South of the enemy perimeter were

jungle and boundless, impenetrable

swamps, broken here and there by

patches of kunai grass. Three native

tracks led through this nearly impassable

terrain to the enemy positions. One,

extending northward from Dobodura,

ran along the east bank of Entrance

Creek to a point about a mile from its

mouth, and then branched, with one

fork leading westward across the creek

to the village and the other continuing

on to the mission. Another track from

Dobodura ran northeastward to the native settlement of Simemi and from there

continued on along the east bank of

Simemi Creek. Crossing the stream between the two airstrips over a low

wooden bridge, it curved northwestward

to Buna Mission. A third followed the

coast to Cape Endaiadere. Since treacherous coral reefs offshore made an attack

from the sea well-nigh impossible, the

assault would have to be channeled along

these three trails.

The attack was set for 16 November.

The 7th Australian Division, under Maj.

Gen. George A. Vasey, was to take Gona

and Sanananda; the 32d Division,

under General Harding, was to capture

Buna. The Australian and American

forces would be separated by the Girua

River, which emptied into the sea just

west of Buna Village. Harding's men

70

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 137-39. (2)

Ltrs, Harding to Sutherland, 20, 31 Oct 42. GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 27-31 Oct 42. 71

 Unless otherwise indicated, the account of the

engineers in the Papua Campaign is based on the

following sources: (1) Rpt of the CG Buna Forces,

on the Buna Campaign, 1 Dec 42-25 Jan 43. (2)

AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION, Papuan Campaign, The Buna-Sanananda Operation, 16 November 1942-23 January 1943 (Washington, 1944).

(3) Milner, Victory in Papua. (4) 114th Engr

Combat Bn, Rpt of Engr Opns in Papuan Campaign. (5) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for

1942. (6) Ltrs, Maj. David B. Parker, U.S. Engr

Liaison Off with the First Aust Army, to USASOS

et al., 2 Dec 42, 12 Jan 43. SWPA File 56. (7) Rpt,

Work Accomplished by 43d Engr Regt in New

Guinea. SWPA File 145. (8) Rpt, Sverdrup to

Casey, 5 Jan 43. SWPA File 159. (9) Robert L.

Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New

York: The Viking Press, 1950).
MAP 11

were to converge on Buna along the

three trails. The troops near the coast

would be supplied by small boats moving up the coast from Milne Bay; those

in the interior, mainly by airdrop.

These makeshift arrangements would

have to be relied upon until the engineers could clear fields for transports at

Dobodura and open a port for oceangoing freighters at the deepwater harbor

of Oro Bay, about fifteen miles south of

Cape Endaiadere. The Allied commanders also planned to have the engineers put in a road from Oro Bay to

Dobodura. As soon as possible the

engineers were to transform the landing

strips at Dobodura into a major Allied

base for fighters and bombers—the first

one north of the Owen Stanleys.

Trails, ports, and airfields figured

large in Harding's plans, but only two

companies of the 114th Combat Battalion were assigned to the campaign.

The makeup of this engineer force was,

moreover, decided without the advice of

Col. John J. Carew, the battalion's commanding officer and Harding's engineer.

Carew knew little of Harding's plans

until 28 October, when he received

orders to proceed to Moresby with one
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 195

member of his staff. On arriving in

eastern Papua he found his units, Companies A and C, in poor shape. The

men had almost no equipment or supplies. A small number of hand tools, a

few coils of rope, and an assault boat or

two made up almost their entire stock

of engineer items. Carew learned that

Harding was planning to bring heavy

machinery, tools, and materials by boat

from Milne Bay. The engineer units

were no better trained than they were

equipped. Prepared like the rest of the

32d Division primarily to defend Australia, they had little knowledge of

jungle warfare and almost none of night

fighting, in which the Japanese excelled.

Weary from their hard march to the

Buna area, the men had to go into combat carrying on their backs such tools as

they had in addition to their usual packs

and arms.

First Contacts With the Enemy

At dawn on 16 November one battalion of infantry crossed the Samboga

River and began its advance toward Cape

Endaiadere, five miles to the north. Another moved inland from the coastal

village of Embogo to Dobodura, its

destination the eastern edge of the new

strip. A third advanced along the trail

toward Dobodura on its way to Ango and

Buna. A platoon of thirty-five engineers, reinforced by a pioneer platoon of

one officer and twenty-two infantrymen

and a group of native carriers, accompanied each battalion. Hope ran high

for a quick and easy victory. During

the morning the three groups pushed

ahead without seeing any signs of the

enemy. The greatest annoyance was

the heat, which was so oppressive that

some of the men threw away their tools

to lighten their load. As the pioneers

hacked away at the underbrush, the engineers put the troops over the streams

that crossed the trails every half mile or

so. At some of the crossings they built

footbridges; at others they constructed

rafts to ferry the men over; at still others

natives paddled the troops across in dugout canoes, sometimes pulling their

craft by hand along a rope the engineers

had stretched from shore to shore.

First contact with the enemy came

that afternoon. At 1210, Japanese machine gunners near Cape Endaiadere

opened fire on the column advancing

along the coast but inflicted no damage.

At 1300 forward elements on the inland

trail routed an enemy patrol near Dobodura. The first big attack came at 1900,

when enemy dive bombers strafed the

column moving along the coast. Little

thought had been given to the possibility

of air attack. Now, in a mad scramble

for shelter, the men dug slit trenches

with whatever tools they could find.

Shovels, bayonets, mess kits, and bare

hands were brought into play. The

main target of the Japanese was not the

column of troops, but the luggers offshore bringing up supplies and ammunition. All the small craft were hit. Several sank immediately; the rest caught

fire and exploded. Colonel Carew

helped to rescue many of the survivors.

On the beach when a lifeboat carrying

the crew from one of the luggers reached

shore, he called for volunteers to help

him row the boat back toward the burning ships. Bombed and strafed, the

rescuers neared one of the craft as its

exploding ammunition was throwing
196 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

flaming debris in all directions. Carew

and his men pulled a number of survivors from the water and took them

safely to shore. The luggers and cargoes

could not be saved. Their loss was a

severe blow to Harding's forces and the

forward movement had to be postponed.72

The advance along the coast was resumed on the 19th. As the troops

neared the Japanese positions south of

Cape Endaiadere, the enemy opened up

with murderous fire, pinning the men to

the ground. The troops marching along

the trail from Simemi to the airfields

fared no better. They were stopped in

their tracks by machine gun and rifle fire

from positions near the bridge over

Simemi Creek. To the west, the situation was equally serious. The area

where the track from Dobodura branched

to Buna Mission and Buna Village—the

Triangle as it was called—bristled with

defenses. When some of the men tried

to flank the enemy positions, they sank

into seemingly bottomless swamps.

It was now clear that the Allies had

greatly underestimated the strength of

the enemy's position and his will to resist. Only about 2,200 troops were entrenched at Buna, but the excellence of

their defenses was astonishing. The

Japanese engineers had done a masterful

job. Maj. David B. Parker, sent to

Buna as engineer liaison officer with the

First Australian Army, described the

enemy's defenses as "well planned," his

field fortifications as "comparatively impervious," and his camouflage as "perfect." The area was lavishly provided

with bunkers, dugouts, and gun positions, many of them prepared long before the assault began. Bunkers were

sturdily built of dirt, logs, and sandbags,

topped with thick roofs, and connected

by trenches. Gun positions were well

sited and mutually supporting. The

Japanese had made expert use of leaves

and grass for camouflage. Many bunkers and pillboxes were completely concealed by the lush jungle growth which

had sprung quickly from their covering

of earth. Some were so hard to spot

that the attacking troops unwittingly

passed them by, only to be shot at from

behind.

The attackers were handicapped by a

dearth of information on the area they

were trying to take. Troops in the

jungle swamps and grass flats before

Buna could neither see the enemy nor

learn much about his positions.73 The

Australian maps to the scale of one inch

to four miles, on hand when the campaign began, were so inaccurate as to be

almost worthless. The small number of

hastily prepared photomaps that shortly

began to reach the front were of some

help, especially to the artillery, but

lacked much essential data. No enemy

positions and few jungle trails appeared

on them, and many place names were

missing. Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, commanding general of I Corps,

who had under him all American combat

forces in the Southwest Pacific, was

highly critical of the mapping effort,

condemning not only the shortage of

maps but also the poor quality of those

72

 GHQ SWPA GO No. 64, 28 Dec 42, and GO No

1, 1 Jan 43.

73

 Memo for Rcd, Lt. Col. Emil F. Klinke, C Opns

and Tng Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 29 Nov 42. SWPA

File 159.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 197

AERIAL VIEW OF THE BUNA AREA ADJACENT TO SIMEMI CREEK

furnished. "[In] a dense jungle where a

bunker or entrenchment cannot be seen

from thirty yards away," he later wrote,

"aerial photography must be swallowed

with a full shaker of salt."74 Since

aerial observation was so ineffective,

reconnaissance on the ground seemed

the only answer. But it proved to be

hazardous and difficult. The Japanese

held all the high ground, and riflemen

who seemed to be everywhere were so

well concealed that it was nearly impossible to spot them. Infantry commanders had great difficulty getting their

men to volunteer for patrol duty, and

Colonel Carew had no engineers to

spare. Most of what little information

was obtained came from natives who

lived near Buna.

On the Buna perimeter, the engineers

were fully occupied with roads and

bridges. Besides having to maintain

twenty-eight miles of existing trails, they

had many miles of new construction to

do. With the start of the rains in late

November, jobs multiplied and became

more arduous. Roads were transformed

into seas of mud, and flash floods swept

bridges away. If routes were to be kept

open, bridges had to be repaired quickly

and long stretches of corduroy put in. 74

 Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, p. 20.
198 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

There was almost no machinery, and

the shortage of hand tools remained

acute. Machetes, now the most useful

of tools, were especially scarce. The

small stock of rope originally brought in

had long since been exhausted. Between 15 and 24 November no building

supplies were delivered to the front.

The handful of engineers were limited

to pioneer construction. Not properly

trained in such work, they sometimes

bungled. In laying corduroy, they repeatedly put down logs without first

providing bottom stringers, with the result that the corduroy soon sank out of

sight in the mud.

The plight of the engineers would

have been much worse had it not been

for the Papuans. Familiar with the local

flora, the natives pointed out the kinds

of timber best suited for construction.

They demonstrated how to sink poles

into sandy stream beds by hand and how

to use lashings of bark to hold bridge

timbers in place. The size of the native

work force available to the engineers

fluctuated widely. Although the Australians had recruited well over a thousand Papuan helpers, none were at first

attached permanently to any unit.

Blarney's headquarters parceled the natives out to the various commands on a

day-to-day basis. Of the 400 allotted to

Colonel Carew at the start of the campaign, none continued, uninterrupted,

on construction. From time to time,

large groups were taken off engineer

projects to act as stretcher bearers.

After especially severe rains, when the

roads were impassable to vehicles, all

were used to carry supplies. The engineers might have several hundred natives

one day and none the next. Papuans

were not the only ones to be diverted

from construction. When the 1st Platoon of Company A of the 11i4th reached

the front on 21 November, after marching over the Owen Stanleys, it was assigned to carrying rations and ammunition for the infantry, a chore it had for

over a month. Since the natives would

not go near the front, there was nothing

left to do but use the troops to carry

supplies.

Because the loss of the luggers had

crippled supply up the coast, completion

of an airstrip at Dobodura was all the

more urgent. By 20 November the 2d

Platoon of Company C of the 114th had

reached Dobodura, where, together with

22 infantrymen and a group of natives,

they began work on the first runway.

Clearing away kunai grass and scrub

trees with brushhooks, machetes, and

bayonets, they completed the first temporary strip in a day. On the 21st, Company A, less one platoon, arrived to help

enlarge the field. Next morning the

engineers were ordered north to support

the infantry trying to get to Buna Mission and Buna Village. Since no

quartermaster units had yet arrived, 25

men stayed behind to stake out a cemetery and unload the supplies already

being flown in from Moresby. On 25

November, 210 men of the 43d General

Service Regiment were flown to Dobodura to build more runways. They

brought with them part of their equipment—five mowing machines, two tractors, one sheepsfoot roller, and one

grader, all of which they had cut up

with torches at Moresby in order to get

them aboard the planes. As soon as the

machines were welded together again,

the engineers, with a force of natives,
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 199

43D ENGINEERS Mow KUNAI GRASS ON THE OLD DOBODURA STRIP No. 1

began clearing the kunai grass for additional strips.

The Fall of Buna

By the end of November little progress had been made against the enemy.

On the front near Buna Village and

Buna Mission, the troops, now known as

Urbana Force, were stymied. Warren

Force, fighting near the airfields, was

likewise unable to advance. Alarmed

by the way the campaign was going,

MacArthur prepared to take action. On

1 December he gave General Eichelberger direct command of the bogged

down forces. When the new commander reached the front, a number of

top officers were relieved, and units

which had become jumbled together

were unscrambled and assigned to other

parts of the line. As Eichelberger took

over, things were already taking a turn

for the better. Tanks were being

brought from Milne Bay, and fresh

Australian and American troops were

scheduled to arrive soon. The airlift

from Moresby to Dobodura was becoming more effective. Efforts of the engineers on the trails were showing results.

Supplies could be carried to the front

more rapidly, and jeeps could travel the

road from Dobodura to Simemi. More

accurate maps, though still too few, were

being provided. The survey platoon of

the 69th Topographic Company was on
200 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

its way to Moresby, where it was to help

members of the Australian Survey Corps

bring maps of Buna up to date.75 A

map depot was being set up at Moresby

to speed distribution to the troops. In

nearly every respect, the outlook was

more favorable than when the campaign

began two weeks before.

Five days after Eichelberger assumed

command, the offensive was renewed.

During the next few days, the troops of

Warren Force, at the eastern end of the

New Strip, made slight gains. But the

progress of those advancing towards the

bridge over Simemi Creek was negligible. The span remained in enemy

hands. On Urbana front, events took a

more favorable turn. The troops

worked their way up the west bank of

Entrance Creek and then followed the

trail to Buna Village. They broke

through to the sea just east of the village.

The objective now was to clear the entire

area west of the Triangle, and then seize

the heavily fortified Triangle itself.

One noncommissioned officer and twenty

men of Company A of the 114th engineers were assigned to Urbana Force as

a "roving detachment" to destroy captured bunkers, dispose of duds, and build

bridges. Everywhere the enemy's resistance was fanatical. Nevertheless, his

defenses began to crack. On 14 December, the Americans entered Buna Village,

already abandoned by the Japanese.

Gona had fallen to the Australians five

days before.

Eichelberger scheduled an all-out attack for 18 December. On Warren

front, the American troops, recently reinforced by Australians, were to advance

up the coast to Cape Endaiadere, turn

westward, and push on to Simemi Creek

near its mouth, thus getting behind the

enemy's line at the airstrips. One

American battalion, supported by the

tanks which had recently arrived, was to

move over the bridge between the strips

and drive on to Buna Mission. At the

same time, Urbana Force was to reduce

the Triangle and capture Musita Island.

The outcome of these operations would

depend in considerable degree on the

engineers' success in bridging Simemi

and Entrance Creeks.

On Warren front, the drive along the

coast was a complete success. The Japanese positions on Cape Endaiadere were

overrun. But when the troops turned

westward and began to push into the

area behind the new strip, they were

again held back by intense fire from

enemy bunkers. Meanwhile, the advance through the swamps towards the

bridge over Simemi Creek was painfully

slow. When, on the 20th, the troops

at last converged on the span, they were

fired on by about fifty riflemen and

several machine gunners near the old

strip. The vitally important bridge, a

low, wooden structure, 125 feet long and

10 feet wide, was found to be in fair

shape, but the flooring was poor and a

12-foot section had been blown out of

the far end. Unable to cross the bridge,

the troops tried to ford the creek at

several places, but found the water over

6 feet deep. A smoke screen was put

down under cover of which infantrymen

tried to span the gap with a catwalk,

which turned out to be too short.

Meanwhile, the Australians discovered a

ford some distance to the north and

began crossing over. Since tanks were 75

 69th Engr Topo Co, Sixty Ninth Overseas.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 201

IMPROVISED BRIDGE OVER ENTRANCE GREEK

slated to support the combat troops,

repair of the bridge was imperative. At

dawn of the 23d, while the infantry

strove to clear out the Japanese who were

placing fire on the structure, engineers

of Company C moved in to repair the

bridge. Soon after the work began, the

enemy opened up with machine guns

and mortars. When the men took cover,

the Japanese stopped firing. Staying out

of sight for a time, the troops returned to

their job and continued working until

the enemy fire again became intolerable,

when they once more took cover. This

round of operations was repeated four

times before the bridge was ready. That

afternoon, the remaining infantry and

four tanks crossed over. By the 27th,

the enemy positions around the airstrip

were crumbling.

After a faltering start, Urbana Force

also scored some decisive gains. Additional troops which had begun arriving

in the Buna area were sent into the line

to reinforce the weary veterans. A twopronged attack on Musita Island and the

Triangle was launched on 18 December.

Attempts to capture Musita were repulsed, and the troops withdrew that

evening. To the south, the infantry
202 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

made repeated thrusts at the Triangle,

all of which failed. Eichelberger then

changed his plans. Orders were issued

for the infantry to cross Entrance Creek

to the north of the Triangle, bypass that

heavily fortified area, and push on to

Buna Mission. To get the troops over

the creek, engineers of the roving detachment lashed coconut logs together

and laid them across two captured boats

which they had anchored in the middle

of the stream. On 22 December one

company of infantry crossed this bridge

safely. Several hundred yards downstream, the other company, with no

bridge, was forced to swim to the opposite bank and a number of men were

drowned. That same day the attack on

Musita was renewed. The engineers

had by this time completed a makeshift

footbridge to the island. The infantry

swarmed over and, meeting little opposition, pressed on to the bridge near the

mouth of Entrance Creek, which they

would have to cross to get to the mission.

There the men ran into such heavy fire

that they could get no farther. By this

time the troops who had crossed upstream were driving eastward through

the plantation south of the mission.

After overrunning the Japanese defenses,

they reached the sea on the 29th.

Meanwhile, construction of logistic

facilities was not being neglected. An

Australian field company had made a

start on docking facilities at Oro Bay,

some twenty miles southeast of Buna.

Part of the unit began work on an

urgently needed road from Oro Bay to

Dobodura. The Australian engineers

had selected a rather difficult route,

much of it through hilly country, in

preference to an alternate "low level"

way which paralleled the coast and then

passed through extensive swamplands

along the Embogo River. Progress on

the air base, port, and road was understandably slow. Though they generally

employed several hundred Papuans, the

Australians had less equipment than the

43d. On 18 December Company B of

the 43d, with a large stock of equipment,

left Milne Bay under orders to unload at

Oro Bay, make arrangements for forwarding the machinery to Dobodura,

and then march inland to work on the

airfields. These engineers were not able

to carry out their instructions. When

Sverdrup visited the front at the end of

December, he found part of Company B

at work near the bay, building a stretch

of road through a swamp where the

water sometimes reached a depth of four

feet. Noting that the road was so poorly

located it might never be completed, he

set out to find the rest of the unit. He

discovered the men unloading ships and

doing odd jobs at Oro Bay. Part of the

equipment, he was told, was in the hands

of the Australians. Inquiries revealed

that one of Blarney's officers, mistakenly

thinking the unit had been assigned to

New Guinea Force, had taken charge of

it. Only after Sverdrup had made it

clear that the 43d was under USASOS

was Company B permitted to go on to

Dobodura. The mix-up, Sverdrup

wrote, "had resulted in loss of valuable

time which will adversely affect construction of the airstrips. . . ."

 76

By the time the struggle for Buna

moved into its final phases, engineer

strength was greatly depleted. The

heat, the weeks of unceasing labor, the

76

 Rpt, Sverdrup to Casey, 5 Jan 43.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 203

lack of equipment and supplies had taken

their toll. Torrential downpours were

a regular occurrence. "It was common

practice to leave the M1 helmet outside

the tents ... at night in order the next

morning to estimate the amount of rain

which had fallen," Major Parker reported. ". . . if the helmet was completely full of water, the rainfall was

considered . . . normally severe.77 Many

of the men were exhausted. Disease had

cut the ranks severely. When the two

companies of the 114th arrived at the

front, they totaled 304 men. Six weeks

later they were down to 140. At Dobodura, where the engineers had a comparatively easy time of it, 12 percent

were suffering from fever or malaria at

the end of the year.

Reliance on the Papuans became increasingly heavy. By late December 400

had been permanently assigned to the

114th, and attempts were being made to

get 100 to assist the 43d. As a rule, the

natives camped in groups of 100, with

each group supervised by an Australian

officer. Through discussions with the

Australians as well as through experience, the engineers learned how best to

handle the Papuans. Men from the

same village were kept together, since the

natives were suspicious of anyone not

from their own tribe. Since each tribe

had its own specialty—for example, the

coastal natives excelled in bridging

streams and the hill people in hacking

out trails—it was advantageous to keep

the Papuans on the jobs they could do

best. Here, again, competition between

villages was an incentive to speed.

Quick to learn and proud of the part

they were playing in the war, the

Papuans made a substantial contribution

to the Allied cause. "The success of

engineer operations in this campaign,"

wrote Colonel Carew, "was due, in no

small way, to the loyal, whole hearted,

and tireless efforts of the natives. . . ."

 78

On 28 December, Eichelberger alerted

the troops on Musita for the final assault

on Buna Mission. Entrance Creek still

barred the way. Spanning the stream

near its mouth was a ramshackle, nativebuilt bridge, about 125 feet long, with a

large hole in the flooring. Enemy bunkers on a spit of land jutting into the

mouth of the creek from the mission side

could rake the bridge with machine gun

fire. A plan of attack was worked out.

A group of infantry was to cross the

creek in assault boats and charge the

bunkers. While the enemy was busy

beating off this attack, several men would

carry planks to the gap in the bridge and

drop them in place. Then the infantry

would race across. When a call was

made for volunteers to fix the bridge, 4

engineers of the roving detachment and

2 infantrymen offered to take on the

perilous job. Shortly after 1700 on the

29th, the boats shoved off, but on nearing the opposite bank, they came under

such heavy fire they had to turn back.

Meanwhile, the volunteers ran out on

the bridge and hastily threw three timbers over the gap in the flooring. One

of the engineers was shot dead. The 5

other men returned unhurt. Two infantrymen succeeded in crossing over,

but before the rest could follow, the

77

 Parker's Ltr, 12 Jan 43.

78

 114th Engr Combat Bn, Rpt of Engr Opns in

Papuan Campaign.
204 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

CHOW TIME AT A NATIVE LABOR CAMP, NEW CALEDONIA

planks toppled into the water. The

way to the mission remained closed.

Visiting Musita Island the next day

and hearing of the attempt to repair the

bridge, Sverdrup persuaded Cpl. Charles

H. Gray, one of the engineer volunteers

of the night before, to take him to see the

structure. Gray and the two surviving

engineers of his party had offered to

make another try at repairing the bridge.

Since the Japanese were now on the alert,

Sverdrup believed that a second attempt,

if made while the bunkers were still

intact, would be suicidal. While going over the ground with Gray, he noted

that a spit of land extending eastward

from Buna Village came close to the one

jutting into the creek from the opposite

bank. On returning to the infantry

command post, he suggested that assault

troops ford the narrows and make a flank

attack on the pillboxes. The infantry

commanders had apparently been thinking along the same lines. A reconnaissance made the night before had disclosed that the water between the two

spits of land was only ankle deep at low

tide, which occurred at four in the

morning. That night two companies

set out to wade the narrows. In a confused action the men got across but were

unable to knock out the bunkers. Re-
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 205

pair of the bridge had to wait once

again.

On New Year's Day Urbana Force

launched its final assault. The troops

who had cut across the coconut plantation to the sea attacked the mission from

the southeast. The men who had

crossed the shallows again advanced

along the spit, and by late afternoon of

2 January had wiped out the bunkers

commanding the bridge. The engineers

thereupon repaired the span and within

an hour the infantry were streaming

across. By the evening of the 2d, organized resistance had ended. The enemy

survivors were mopped up during the

next few days.

Sanananda

Between the capture of Gona on 9

December and the fall of Buna Mission,

the Australians had made little headway

west of the Girua. General Vasey's

forces, consisting initially of Australian

troops and one battalion of American

infantry, had been unable to do much

more than maintain roadblocks inside

the Japanese outpost area and keep the

enemy bottled up. In late December

MacArthur sped reinforcements. A

regimental combat team of the 41st

Division was ordered north from Queensland. In the van went the 1st Platoon

of Company B, 116th Engineer Combat

Battalion.79 On 31 December the platoon flew into Dobodura and from there

marched to Ango and on across the Girua

to the Sanananda front. The engineers

relieved the Australians at one of the

roadblocks. The first element of the

41st Division to go into combat, the

platoon suffered its first casualties when

two men were wounded while laying

corduroy beyond the American lines.

Meantime, the Buna campaign over, an

American battalion set out with a number of tanks to reinforce the Australians.

Ahead of them went Company B of the

114th, clearing the trail and putting

down corduroy so that the armor could

pass. In early January the remainder

of the regimental combat team of the

41st Division reached the front. The

2d Platoon of Company B of the 116th

was committed to combat; the 3d was

held in reserve. Though they encountered the same swampy, jungled terrain that the 114th had found at Buna,

the 116th engineers were somewhat better equipped, for each man carried along

with his field equipment a machete, a

shovel or pick, and a coil of rope or wire.

The men were kept busy digging

trenches, building bridges, corduroying

roads, guarding positions, and carrying

supplies—often under fire. Gradually

the enemy strongholds were reduced, and

by 22 January all organized resistance at

Sanananda had been wiped out.

Guadalcanal

When the Papua Campaign ended,

fighting was still in progress on Guadalcanal. The first phase of the battle,

during which the marines struggled to

consolidate their foothold and the Japanese tried vainly to dislodge them, had

lasted for more than three months.

While the Americans strove to hold their

beachhead and to gain air and naval

superiority, the enemy tried repeatedly

79

 116th Engr Combat Bn, Opns Rpt, Jan 1-Sep

30, 43.
206 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

to reinforce the defending garrison.

Sometimes the Japanese convoys moving

down from the north were intercepted

by Allied ships and planes; more frequently they got through. As the enemy

strength increased, Ghormley dispatched

more units to the island. In late September, the first regiment of an additional Marine division was sent in, and

early in October the first Army ground

troops arrived—the 164th Infantry of

the Americal Division. In the middle

of the month an estimated 16,000 Japanese were put ashore. Shortly thereafter, Admiral William F. Halsey

replaced Ghormley as commander of the

South Pacific Area. Late in October the

Japanese made repeated efforts to retake

the airfield, launching five strong, but

unsuccessful, attacks from the 23d to the

25th alone. From 11 to 15 November,

when a big enemy task force sought to

land reinforcements, the contest for

Guadalcanal reached its climax. In

furious air and sea battles the Japanese

power in the area was broken. The

campaign now entered a second phase

during which the enemy's position deteriorated steadily as his men were

pushed into the northwestern corner of

the island. Fresh American troops,

among them the 25th Infantry Division

and the remainder of the Americal, were

brought in to relieve the tired marines.

General Patch, who assumed command

of the Guadalcanal forces on 9 December, got the final offensive under way.

By January the enemy was being crushed

in a giant pincers, one jaw of which extended westward along the northern

coast, the other southwestward through

the interior. The issue was no longer

in doubt. Destruction of the Japanese

on Guadalcanal was merely a matter of

time.80

During the early months of the

struggle, the engineers did their chief

work on Espíritu Santo. Since the unfinished Japanese airstrip on Guadalcanal had been damaged in the preinvasion bombardment, Espíritu Santo

was for a time the most advanced place

from which land-based planes could

operate. Even after the runway on

Guadalcanal—Henderson Field, the

Americans named it—became usable late

in August, Espíritu continued to serve

as a major base for bombers and reconnaissance planes and as a staging point

for transports. Barely finished on 7

August, the Espíritu runway had almost

no facilities. Supplies were stored

under coconut trees, pilots slept on the

ground or in their planes, and bombers

were fueled by bucket brigades. With

the arrival of additional construction

units, conditions began to improve.

First to reach the island was the 7th

Naval Construction Battalion, joined on

23 September by Company B of the

810th Aviation Battalion. While the

Seabees concentrated on completing a

bomber field at Pallikulo, near the southeastern tip of the island, the aviation

engineers began construction of a second

one at nearby Pekoa. Clearing the

tangled growth of teak and banyan trees

which covered the Pekoa site was in itself a major undertaking, made still

more difficult by frequent enemy bombings. Yet, by early December, a coral

runway 5,500 feet long, 2 miles of taxi80 (1) Incl to Ltr, Halsey to COMINCH, 3 Sep 44.

6-13.0309/44 (7211) SP Camp—Narrative Acct, 3 Sep

44. (2) Incl to Ltr, Harmon to Handy, 6 Jun 44.

98-USF2-0.5 (3721)M, 6 Jun 44.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 207

ways, and 75 hardstands had been put in.

On 23 November, the 822d Engineer

Aviation Battalion had landed. Part of

this unit went to Pallikulo to build hardstands, taxiways, a pier, and a control

tower, and part went to Pekoa to help

the engineers there. Most of the battalion, however, was put to building

roads, camps, and a hospital. Although

the facilities on Espíritu were limited

and crude, they played an important role

in backing up the forces in the

Solomons.81

The first Army engineers to reach

Guadalcanal were members of the 57th

Combat Battalion of the Americal Division who arrived on 12 November in the

midst of the decisive battles. After unloading during an air attack and witnessing a naval engagement off the coast,

the men took the lay of the land.

Clearly, engineers were needed here.

Some ninety miles long and twenty-five

miles wide, Guadalcanal had a generally

rugged terrain. A chain of mountains

ran its entire length from east to west,

with the highest peak, Mount Popomanisu, reaching an elevation of nearly

8,000 feet. Along the central part of

the northern coast were flat, sandy

beaches, in back of which was a plain

extending west to the Matanikau River.

Beyond the river, the plain narrowed

and was broken by ridges and ravines.

The American beachhead was on the

northern coast east of the Matanikau,

whereas the main enemy strength was

lodged near Mount Austen in the foothills southwest of the American position

and in the area beyond the river.

Guadalcanal had almost no roads. At

the time of the invasion, the island's

network had consisted only of a trail

along the northern shore and a few

native footpaths into the hinterland.

Marine engineers had done much good

work, improving the coastal track and

starting a road toward Mount Austen,

but an immense job remained to be

done. Although the 57th Combat Battalion was to be employed in clearing

mines, supplying water, and doing many

different types of construction, its principal concern was to be roads and bridges.

The men did not have long to wait before beginning. On 18 November they

were sent to support the infantry in an

attempt to push the Japanese westward

along the coast. In a hard-fought action,

the troops succeeded in establishing a

bridgehead on the west bank of the

Matanikau. By the 21st the engineers

had completed a span over the flooded

stream and heavy vehicles were rolling

across. Two days later the Americans

were firmly established west of the

river.82

Late November and early December

witnessed preparations for the final

offensive. Now the combat battalion

was occupied with what the men referred

to as "normal duties." One group

helped the marines clear out enemy

machine gun nests, using dynamite and 81

 Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, p.

37ff. (2) Hq XIII AF Serv Comd Hist Monograph

17, The Opns of Avn Engrs in SOPAC, Jan 42-Aug

44, pp. 82-87. COMD-AF-SV-13-HI, Jan 42, Maxwell AFB. (3) 810th Engr Avn Bn, Hist From

Activation to 31 Dec 43. (4) 822d Engr Avn Bn,

Hist Data, 15 Apr 42-1 Jul 43. (5) Building the

Navy's Bases, II, 228-30.

82

 (1) 57th Engr Combat Bn, Jnl-War Diary, 7

Dec 41-21 Mar 45. 300-Engr-0.7 (2540)(M). (2)

Hist of the 57th Engr Combat Bn, 19 Jan 42-1 Jul

43. Engr-0.1. (5217) Master. (3) Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 43-44, 202-09, 225.
208 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

bottles filled with gasoline and explosives. Another helped construct a

fighter strip near the front lines, while

marines stood guard against enemy raiding parties. A third worked to complete

a hospital and provide shelters for division headquarters. Some of the engineers prepared artillery and radar

positions along the northern shore.

Others took over the operation of water

points. By far the largest contingent

worked in the valley of the Matanikau,

building bridges and cutting trails. Prevented by the shortage of cargo space

from bringing in more than a fraction

of their equipment, the men had to do

most of their work by hand. As in

Papua, the climate and terrain were anything but favorable. The days were intensely hot, the nights were cold, and

downpours were frequent. Streams

were swollen and roads were mudholes.

The ridges west of the river presented

an added difficulty. Whenever they

could, the engineers ran the roads

through the lowland rain forests, laying

corduroy of coconut logs to keep the

traffic out of the muck. Where the

jungles were impenetrable, the road

builders had to take to the ridges. Because construction here required innumerable fills, great quantities of coral

and gravel had to be hand-loaded and

trucked in. The men worked long

hours, their clothes often wringing wet,

and they shivered through the chilly

nights. Before long, symptoms of fever

and malaria began to appear.83

In mid-December the pace began to

quicken. On the 16th General Patch

ordered the capture of Mount Austen.

Two days earlier, a part of the 57th

engineers had started extending the trail

the marines had built toward the enemy

strongpoint. For a time the road crews

kept pace with the advancing infantry.

But when the foothills were reached,

construction slowed almost to a halt.

Here the engineers encountered slopes

with grades of up to sixty degrees. The

rains became more intense. The battalion's heavy equipment, the trucks and

dozers left behind on New Caledonia,

were missed more sorely than before.

As the engineers tried to extend the trail

up the slippery mountainsides, the infantry outran its line of supply. Such

food and ammunition as the forward

elements received was dropped from the

air or carried in by native bearers. The

hard work of the engineers was sometimes coupled with danger. On the

19th, a group of enemy infantrymen infiltrated the American lines to harry the

men busy on the road. On the 21st one

officer and five enlisted men of the 57th

answered a call for volunteers to remove

a mine field that stood in the way of the

advance. These engineers, locating the

mines without detection devices, removed 225 before they were ordered to

stop. They met their death when the

truck in which they were hauling the

mines to a depot mysteriously blew up.

Occasionally the men of the 57th applied

engineering techniques to the problems

of other services. When the medics had

difficulty evacuating casualties from the 83

 (1) 57th Engr Combat Bn, Jnl-War Diary. (2)

Hq 57th Engr Combat Bn, Opns Rpt, 12 Nov 42-9

Feb 43. 300-Engr-0.3 (25307) Master. (3) 57th

Engr Combat Bn, Unit Rpt 22. G-3 Jnl File, 300-

3-3 (23311). (4) Rpt, Liaison Off for Air Ground

Opns Hq HD to CG HD, 27 Jan 43. 381 (SOPAC)

1943.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 209

heights around Mount Austen, the engineers devised litters with skids that could

be eased downhill and stretched cables

on which litters could be moved across

ravines by means of pulleys. The main

work of building roads meanwhile went

forward, receiving a boost on 30 December when a sizable group of natives was

assigned to help. By early January the

Japanese on Mount Austen had been

compressed into a small area and the

infantry had turned west toward the

Matanikau.84

On 10 January Patch launched the

final offensive. The Americal and 2d

Marine Divisions struck west along the

coast and the 25th Infantry Division

pushed through the hills beyond Mount

Austen, with the object of surrounding

and annihilating the enemy forces.

Two engineer combat battalions took

part in the advance, the 57th and the

65th, the latter having recently arrived

from Hawaii with the 25th Division.

The second engineer unit was more

poorly equipped than the first, for it

lacked not only bridging materials

gasoline-operated saws, and many minor

items, but dump trucks as well. It had

but two bulldozers, described by the

battalion commander as being "of inferior make, partially worn out, and too

light for the job." Again, the engineers

functioned mainly as road builders.

But now, in addition to extending the

interior and coastal trails, they had to

keep open lateral communications between the two spearheads of the advance. Natives helped hack trails

through the jungles and put down

corduroy. The difficulty of supplying

troops in the interior was eased to some

extent when the engineers dredged the

Matanikau, enabling boats to ply up and

down the river. As the fighting moved

westward into increasingly rugged terrain, ravines too deep for filling were

spanned with trestles. Heavy rains, almost unbearable heat, and frequent

bombings and strafings added to the

strain. By mid-January the malaria rate

in some of the engineer platoons had

reached 40 percent. Gradually the

Americans made their way westward.

On 1 February an amphibious force

landed near Cape Esperance, on the

northwestern end of the island, cutting

off the Japanese retreat. During the

following week, some of the enemy were

evacuated, the remainder were hemmed

in. On the afternoon of 9 February the

engineers got the welcome news that

organized resistance had ended.85

Problems of Logistics

Japan's expansion southward had been

stopped. Australia and the islands in

the South Pacific at last seemed secure.

The victories at Buna and Guadalcanal,

however significant in themselves, were

also indicative of the growing Allied

strength in the Far Pacific. While

combat troops were fighting in Papua

and the Solomons, service forces, some

84

 (1) Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 237-52, passim. (2)

57th Engr Combat Bn, Jnl-War Diary. (3) Craven

and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 82. (4) Hq

USAFISPA GO No. 310, 19 Oct 43.

85

 (1) Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 254ff. (2) Maj

George F. Dickson, Rpt, Opns of the 65th Engr Bn

in Opns of 25th Inf Div on Guadalcanal 17 Dec

42-5 Feb 43, pp. 145-148. 3.2.11 Guadalcanal Opns.

(3) 57th Engr Combat Bn, Jnl-War Diary. (4) Incl

to Ltr, Harmon to OPD, 6 Jun 44. 98-USF 2-0.5

(3721) M, 6 Jun 44.
210 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

distance to the rear, were laying the

foundations for further victories. Australia, New Zealand, and New Caledonia,

once hardly more than rallying points,

could now be counted as bases capable

of supporting major offensives. Stretching from Port Moresby to Fiji was a

chain of advance bases that guarded the

vital areas to the south and rendered

more vulnerable the enemy's forward

positions. Communications with the

United States were surer than before.

Slowly the Allies were gaining the upper

hand.

To accomplish so much had not been

easy. The very presence of the U.S.

Army in the South and Southwest Pacific

was the reaction to Japanese offensives

rather than the result of prewar planning. Before the outbreak of war, little

thought, if any, had been given to the

unique problems that now confronted

the commanders of the South and Southwest Pacific. Such questions as how to

go about building in New Guinea and

New Caledonia and what the size and

composition of an engineer force should

be and how it could be supplied had

scarcely been raised, much less answered.

Not only the absence of long-range planning but also the immense distances, the

shortage of shipping, the production lag

in the United States, and the priority of

the war against Germany, all conspired

to slow the progress of the war in the

Pacific. In the two theaters which then

bore the brunt of the conflict against

Japan, the engineers found themselves

under the necessity of relying on makeshifts, exploiting local resources to the

utmost, and exercising ingenuity. This

was no less true in the rear areas than

in the combat zones.

Troop Shortages

One of the principal drawbacks was

the shortage of engineers. In both the

South and Southwest Pacific the number

was far too small. By the end of 1942,

there were but 7,684 under MacArthur

and 8,770 under Halsey to support about

100,000 Army troops in each theater.

Not only were the engineer components

too slim, but they were also not properly

constituted. There were too few construction units, and most of them were

not adequately equipped. Only the

aviation battalions had anything like

enough machinery. The general service

regiments and separate battalions, originally organized as hand labor outfits

and expected to use machinery only to a

limited extent, were not prepared for the

tasks they faced in the Pacific. The

combat battalions, which frequently had

to be thrown on construction jobs, were

neither trained nor equipped for such

missions. Efforts to get more of the

right kind of construction units from the

United States were thwarted by the

policy of defeating Germany first and by

the shortage of shipping. An alternative was to increase the effectiveness of

the units already in the theaters. In the

Southwest Pacific the separate battalions

were converted into general service regiments, and the tables of equipment of all

the regiments were then revised to bring

them more in line with those of the

aviation battalions. In both theaters,

additional equipment was authorized for

units engaged in construction. Still, the

engineer forces in SWPA and SOPAC

(South Pacific Area) could not meet the

requirements. Fortunately, additional

military and civilian forces were on hand
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 211

to perform much vital construction.

The engineers of the Southwest Pacific

received their greatest support from the

Royal Australian Engineers, who by late

1942 totaled some 25,000, from the

Royal Australian Air Force engineers,

now grown in number to about 2,700,

and from the Allied Works Council,

which had 52,000 men on its rolls at

the end of the year. Seabees and

Marine engineers, together with New

Zealand troops and civilians, undertook

a large share of construction in the

South Pacific. In remote and backward

areas, it was the natives who often made

up a large part of the labor force.86

Supply Problems

Just as critical as the shortage of troops

was the scarcity of supplies. Insofar as

the Engineers were concerned, the War

Department's plans for supplying the far

Pacific were unrealistic. Five categories

of material were furnished the Army.

The Engineers were concerned primarily

with two of them, Class II and Class IV.

Issued to units in accordance with tables

of equipment, Class II items were expected to suffice for routine work. Class

IV stocks were those needed over and

above Class II, usually for extensive construction projects. Soon after the

United States entered the war, the

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, authorized a

90-day level of supply for both Class II

and Class IV items in the far Pacific. In

July 1942 a 90-day reserve was added.

Engineer stocks in the two theaters never

approached such levels. Shipments

from the United States fell short of

requirements, and local resources were

not rich enough to make up the deficiency. In rugged jungle terrain where

everything had to be built from the

ground up, supplies were expended in

unprecedented amounts. The engineers

in the Southwest Pacific received more

matériel in terms of tons from all sources

than any other service—about 40 percent of the total. But since most of

their supplies were heavy construction

materials, which were expended as

quickly as they were obtained, the engineers were not able to build up any

reserves. To make matters worse, the

engineers in the theaters did not get

detailed information on strategic plans

far enough in advance to make intelligent estimates of what or how much they

would need. By the end of the year

construction forces were still operating

"virtually on a hand to mouth basis."

 87

After construction equipment and

materials in the United States had been

earmarked for the Pacific, months

elapsed before they reached their destinations. One reason for the lag was the

small proportion of shipping space allotted to engineer items. Although

their supplies were exceedingly bulky,

and although the Engineers were more

86

 (1) WD AGO, Monthly Strength of the Army.

(2) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and

Strategy, pp. 412-14. (3) USASOS SWPA GO No. 4,

29 Jul 42. (4) Ltr, Casey to Brig Gen S. C. Godfrey,

AF Engr, 1 Jan 43. 381 (Australia). (5) Of C Engr

GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 32-34. (6) Incl

to Ltr, Farrar to Teale, 27 Jan 43. SWPA File 94.

87

 (1) WD Ltr AG 400 (1-31-42) MISC-D-M to

CG USAFIA, 2 Feb 42. 33861 sec. II (Jan 42). (2)

Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,

PP. 335-36, 734. (3) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VIII, 49, 56. (4) Memo, Casey for

Lt Col R. C. Kramer, AUS, 14 Mar 43. SWPA File

M51.
212 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

heavily dependent on shipments from

the United States than most of the other

services—the Quartermaster Corps, for

example, could procure plenty of food

in Australia and New Zealand, whereas

the Engineers could get almost no heavy

machinery there—only 14 percent of the

cargo space on transpacific transports was

reserved for the Engineers. From April

through December 1942, 353,023 measurement tons of cargo were shipped from

the United States to the Quartermaster

Corps in the Southwest Pacific, only

53,500 tons to the Engineers. Partly

because of inadequate transportation and

partly because of such factors as equipment shortages and administrative delays, engineer troops were sent from the

United States without their machinery.

With monotonous regularity, units arrived with little or no equipment. On

7 November the 131st Combat Battalion

landed in New Caledonia with three

dump trucks; by the end of the year the

rest of their equipment still had not

arrived. The 828th Aviation Battalion

reached Efate in mid-November; its

equipment did not show up until

February. Much time was wasted because units had almost no equipment to

work with. As Matthews pointed out,

"an engineer unit without its plant and

tools is like an artillery unit without its

guns."

 88

 Once ships put in at Brisbane,

Sydney, or Auckland, there remained the

work of sorting and distributing their

cargoes. Consignments were often jumbled; ships' manifests, incorrect; and

labels, missing. Distances within the

theaters were enormous. Ships traveling from Brisbane to Port Moresby had

to cover a distance of 1,500 miles; those

going from Noumea to Guadalcanal,

1,000. Shortages of local shipping intensified the problem. The lack of port

facilities made matters still worse, especially at Noumea harbor, where congestion was particularly severe.89

 It is

hardly surprising that many engineers in

New Guinea and the Solomons firmly

believed that supplies intended for the

forward areas were being held back by

commanders at rear bases to be used on

their own special projects.

Such little equipment as the units did

receive, they had trouble keeping in

working order. Part of what they got

was in poor repair, while much of it was

too light for heavy construction jobs.

All of it was put to hard and continuous

use by the troops, many of whom had

inadequate training as operators and

slight knowledge of preventive maintenance. Breakdowns were frequent and

once out of commission, a machine might

stand idle a long time. First to be

reckoned with was the exasperating shortage of spare parts, a shortage aggravated

by the great variety of makes and models

to be serviced. Four different makes of

medium-type tractors alone were sent to

the engineers in the Pacific. Each had

its own line of parts to be stocked and

distributed. Next was the matter of

finding skilled mechanics. Repeated re88

 (1) James R. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in SWPA 1941-1947, Monograph, Transportation Unit Hist Div Spec Staff, U.S. Army, Oct 49,

app. 21. OCMH Files. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Raymond L.

Harrison to Col C. Rodney Smith, OC of Engrs, 18

Jan 43. EHD Files. (3) Ltr, CO 828th Engrs to AF

Engr, 5 Jul 43, in 828th Engr Avn Bn, 314.700, Hist

Data. Engr-828-HI, 15 Apr 1942-31 Oct 1945. (4)

Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, p. 9.

89

 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and

Strategy, p. 390.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 213

quests from the theaters for equipment

repair units brought the word from

Washington that none were available.

Finally, on 10 November, the 472d.

Engineer Maintenance Company landed

at Noumea, the sole unit of its kind to

be sent to the far Pacific in 1942. Within a few days the men were swamped

with work. Because their shop equipment was being sent on a later transport,

they had to tackle the tremendous backlog of repairs with a few tools borrowed

here and there.90 A month after reaching New Caledonia, the unit's commander wrote, "Life is very busy over

here, but very interesting, what with

three-cylinder Southern Cross engines,

Leeds-Fowler power units, five-cylinder

Paxman-Ricardo diesel engines, 75-yearold French locomotives, Nippon brand

cement mixers, [and] miscellaneous

Japanese electrical apparatus . . . there

is never a dull moment."

 91

 The situation in the Southwest Pacific was not

encouraging. Visiting the two theaters

in January 1943, Lt. Col. Raymond L.

Harrison, head of the Spare Parts

Branch, Supply Division, Office of the

Chief of Engineers, was alarmed to find

that 40 percent of the equipment in

SWPA was deadlined. Recalling the

prodigal expenditure of equipment and

spare parts on construction jobs in the

States, he wrote his chief, "I cannot help

but believe . . . that sufficient preference is not being given to overseas requirements. ... I am appalled by the

lack of equipment and spare parts in

overseas theaters with active fighting

fronts."

 92

Both Australia and New Zealand were

making determined efforts to ease the

shortage of construction supplies. Having diverted as much as they felt they

could spare from existing stocks and

current production to American projects,

the Australians branched out into new

manufacturing fields. Using pilot models developed in Colonel Teale's office

from designs drawn by General Casey's

staff, the seven firms of the Earth Moving

Manufacturers Group tooled up to make

heavy construction machinery. Between

April and September 1942 the engineers contracted for the manufacture

of £2,000,000 worth of heavy equipment

in the Commonwealth. Not much

equipment could be expected from New

Zealand. The only supplier in SOPAC,

New Zealand had a much smaller productive capacity than Australia and was

itself badly in need of machinery. Almost no tractors had been imported since

1938, and in 1940 the best of New Zealand's plant had been sent to the Middle

East, Malaya, and Fiji. By September

1942 members of the New Zealand Supply Mission in Washington were complaining that their country was "almost

without plant," and Prime Minister

Fraser was warning that important defense construction could not be completed unless tractors and carryalls were

forthcoming from the United States.

But New Zealand was able to contribute

some supplies. Like Australia, it furnished materials on reverse lend-lease

90

 (1) Ltr, Hq USASOS to TAG, 22 Jul 42. 400.312

(Australia) 1942-43. (2) 472d Engr Maint Co, Orgn

Hist, 1 Oct 42-31 Dec 42. 91

 Ltr, CO 472d Engr Maint Co to Smith, 14 Dec

42. Of Files, R&D Div, Mech Engineering Br Maint

Misc No. 1, EHD Files.

92

 Ltr, Harrison to Smith, 28 Jan 43. 400.312 SP

Area.
214 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

through the Joint Purchasing Board.

The New Zealand Joint Supply Council

turned over to the Americans names of

local firms supplying the Dominion's

armed services, with the understanding

that these concerns would make goods

available at the same preferential prices

charged the New Zealand forces. The

Dominion became the principal, and for

some items the only source of engineer

construction materials in the South

Pacific. It furnished large quantities of

cement, asphalt, plywood, piping, and

fibrolite roofing. Yet however hard the

Australians and New Zealanders might

try, they could succeed in easing only

slightly the shortage of construction

supplies.93

Supply Organization in the

South Pacific

In some respects, the engineers in

SOPAC were worse off than those in

SWPA. The South Pacific had only a

rudimentary logistical organization at

the time the Guadalcanal Campaign

began. Each of the island garrisons was

more or less independent and each was

left largely to its own resources. Coordination between supply agencies of

the Army and the Navy left much to be

desired. Once the struggle for Guadalcanal had begun, the need for better

control became increasingly apparent.

By November action could no longer be

postponed. Scores of ships jammed

Noumea harbor awaiting their turn at

the docks. Troop movements were

slowed. Units building on Efate and

Espíritu Santo and troops fighting on

Guadalcanal meanwhile waited for

sorely needed supplies. On 10 November the War Department activated

Services of Supply (SOS), USAFISPA,

under the command of Brig. Gen.

Robert G. Breene. Headquarters, originally at Auckland, was moved to

Noumea at the end of the month.

Breene established three subordinate

service commands, one on New Caledonia, another on New Zealand, and a

third on Fiji. The setup at the other

bases was left unchanged for the time

being, but plans were made to organize

additional commands if the situation

warranted. The job of Engineer, SOS,

went to Colonel Beadle. Since he continued to serve also on Harmon's staff,

he henceforth acted in a dual capacity.

In December he transferred all personnel

from his section in USAFISPA to the

one in SOS, retaining purely nominal

duties as Engineer, USAFISPA. Since

his office in SOS was now the sole agency

for supervising and planning engineer

work in the South Pacific, Beadle had

important responsibilities. It was he

who must find the wherewithal to carry

out the Army's construction program

in SOPAC, get more engineer troops and

equipment from the United States, and

exploit local resources to the fullest.

It was he too who must handle the difficult assignment of fitting the Army engineers into an Allied theater under the

command of a naval officer.94

93

 (1) Engr Br Proc Div USASOS, 12 Dec 44, Hist

Rpt, Engr Proc in Australia. (2) Ltr, New Zealand

Sup Mission, Washington, D.C., to Defense Aid Unit

Rqmts Br Sup Div OCE, 14 Sep 42. 400.333 New

Zealand. (3) Incl, U.S. Joint Purchasing Bd,

SOPAC, Proc Procedure, with Ltr, Halsey to Joint

Purchasing Bd et al., 6 Dec 42. 381 (SWPA) 41.

(4) Hist of USAFISPA During World War II, 30

Mar 42-1 Aug 44. Draft MS, OCMH files.

94

 (1) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and

Strategy, pp. 398-402. (2) SOS SOPAC, Hist Rpt
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 215

Australian-American Co-operation

In the Southwest Pacific one of the

foremost problems continued to be that

of bringing about more effective Allied

co-operation. The Australian Government kept a tight rein on military construction within the Commonwealth and

its territories. The views of the Curtin

cabinet and those of the U.S. engineers

did not always coincide. One point of

difference was organized labor. The

government, drawing much of its support from the trade unions, was sensitive

to their demands. The engineers, who

had to rely on Australian workmen for

many urgent jobs, deplored what they

considered the government's pampering

of the workers. Of even greater concern to the engineers was the government's attitude toward the construction

program as a whole. Many projects

that the Australians seemed to consider

highly important the engineers continued to regard as unnecessary. By the

end of 1942, there were numerous complaints that more jobs had been authorized than could be completed within a

reasonable time. In Queensland alone,

one member of Teale's staff asserted,

there was enough work to keep the

"existing labor forces busy until the

end of September 1943." A number of

engineers believed that the entire construction program in Australia should

be radically revised. Few of them realized that the Commonwealth had undertaken its defense construction program

with an eye to the postwar period. A

policy document prepared by the Economic Cabinet in February 1940, had

bracketed plans for increasing the nation's military strength with programs

for water conservation, rural electrification, afforestation, and the enhancement

of the "beauties and amenities of country

towns." Various public officials continued to emphasize that the postwar

economy must be kept in mind while

industry and commerce were being

mobilized for war.95

The leisurely pace at which the governmental machinery moved was a constant source of irritation to the engineers,

who found it hard to understand why so

many agencies had to pass upon every

project. Shortcuts were proposed repeatedly. Col. Bernard L. Robinson,

for instance, suggested that the War

Ministry, instead of investigating to find

out if projects were justified, ought to

limit its activities to providing funds to

get construction started promptly. In

an attempt to expedite work for the

American forces, Colonel Teale began

submitting requests for construction

directly to the Allied Works Council as

soon as he received word that the Chiefs

of Staff Committee had assigned a priority. The engineers saw nothing irregular in Teale's stratagem. As Robinson

pointed out, Mr. Theodore was empowered to undertake "works of whatever

nature required for war purposes by

[the] Allied Forces in Australia." But

the Commonwealth Government saw

things in a different light. On 4 September Prime Minister Curtin protested

to MacArthur. The supreme comfrom Activation to 30 Jun 43. 98-SS2-0.1 (23774) M.

(3) Hq SOS SOPAC SO No. 1, 10 Nov 42.

95

 (1) Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, pp. 21-22. (2) Pat

Robinson, The Fight for New Guinea: General

Douglas MacArthur's First Offensive (New York,

1943), p. 25. (3) Ltr, Farrar to Teale, 27 Jan 43.

SWPA File 94. (4) Hasluck, The Government and

the People, pp. 469-70.
216 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

mander was reminded that putting

requests through regular channels was

"not only essential to sound budgetary

planning in view of the incidence of the

Reciprocal Lend-Lease Agreement, but

also . . . to ensure that all important

works proposals affecting the war effort

in Australia come before the War Cabinet for consideration." MacArthur's

reply was an endorsement of Teale's

shortcut. He stated that in his opinion

the approval of a project by the Chiefs

of Staff Committee followed by assignment of a priority was sufficient justification for starting construction. He

furthermore assured the Prime Minister

that a fund of several million dollars

was available in case Australian funds

were not sufficient for American construction needs. But MacArthur could

not persuade the government to alter its

methods. The War Cabinet continued

to insist that, in view of Australia's severe

limitations in manpower and resources,

all requests for construction must be

closely scrutinized. Procedures remained as they were.96

The Australians did make one major

change the engineers considered long

overdue. They let their demolitions

program go by the board. MacArthur,

who was inclined from the first toward

an offensive strategy, had never deemed

the program appropriate. But the

Commonwealth government was fully

and it seemed, irrevocably, committed to

a scorched earth policy. A directive

issued in July 1942 had stated: "Denial

plans should aim at total destruction

. . . and should not be compromised

by any desire to recover resources intact

when the enemy withdraws. He will

most certainly himself destroy anything

of value in his retreat."

 97

 As General

Blamey pointed out to the Americans,

even the limiting of destruction to important industries would "involve a

major change in a policy that had already

been given wide circulation." MacArthur had decided not to press the

issue, and the various Australian states

had gone ahead with their preparations

for total destruction. By late 1942 New

South Wales had drawn up a scorched

earth code and had mined numerous

roads and bridges. Western Australia

had completed total denial plans for her

principal cities. Even Tasmania had a

detailed and comprehensive plan for

total destruction. But as the fear of invasion abated, less attention was devoted

to denial schemes. By the end of the

year preparations for destruction had all

but ceased. Although the government

was still officially bound to it, the

scorched earth policy was a dead letter.98

Changes in Design

Since there was little the engineers

could do to augment their resources

further, they were forced to seek ever

more efficient methods of doing things.

96

 (1) Memo, Robinson for Casey, 7 Oct 42. (2)

Ltr, Secy of the War Cabinet to MacArthur, 4 Sep

42. (3) Ltr, MacArthur to Curtin, 25 Sep 42. (4)

Memo [Capt] M. D. L[ovett] for Casey, 28 Nov 42.

All in SWPA File 270.

97

 Incl to Memo, F. G. Shedden for the Secy, Dept

of the Army, 27 Jul 42. SWPA File 175. 98

 (1) Memo, Casey for Steele, 2 Sep 42. (2) Incl

to Ltr, ALF to Aust Liaison, Of C Engr GHQ

SWPA, 8 Dec. 42. (3) Memo, C Engr First Aust

Army for G (0), 29 Dec 42. All in SWPA File 175.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 217

As Casey pointed out many times, they

had to do more with less. The main

idea was to give the combat forces what

they required in the shortest possible

time and with a minimum of effort.

This meant lowering construction standards, devising shortcuts, and resorting to

improvisation. During 1942 the greatest strides toward increased efficiency

were made in the Southwest Pacific.

Here an effective theaterwide engineer

organization had functioned at a much

earlier date than in the South Pacific.

After the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway had ended Japanese naval predominance and placed the South Pacific

seemingly beyond the enemy's reach, the

danger to the Southwest Pacific still remained, making speed of construction

particularly urgent there.

During their first year in the Southwest Pacific, the engineers had to make

frequent changes in structural plans.

By late 1942 there were few vestiges left

of the original theater of operations

drawings. To make possible better use

of local materials, theater of operations

designs had been revised and many of

them had been replaced by blueprints for

less substantial structures. With the

demand for quarters, hospitals, and

storage space rising rapidly, the engineers could not afford to miss any

opportunities to save on manpower and

materials. There was a marked trend

toward flimsier housing. In the early

days of the war, most Americans had

occupied fairly commodious quarters in

Australian barracks, hotels, apartments,

and private homes, and the first camps

constructed for United States troops had

featured screens, electricity, and waterborne sewerage. But as time went on,

more and more men were living in tents,

sleeping on the ground, dining in unfloored mess halls, working in unscreened

offices, and doing without electric lights

and modern plumbing. For a while

floors could be put in mess halls, and

bunks and floors in tents, if time and

funds permitted, but later, standards became still more rigorous. A construction policy issued by GHQ SWPA in

October eliminated tent floors entirely

and cut out nearly all other refinements.

Although no such drastic innovations

could be made in hospital designs,

floored tents and prefabricated huts had

made their appearance at many medical

installations by the close of the year.

Similar developments occurred in the

design of warehouses. One popular new

type was a modified version of the theater

of operation warehouse with the interior

columns eliminated—a change made possible by the amazing strength of Australian hardwoods. Another was the

standard storehouse of the Australian

Army, also designed to take advantage of

the unique characteristics of native timbers. A third was a prefabricated, portable warehouse of corrugated iron

developed by the Australians. A fourth,

and among the most widely used, was

the igloo warehouse, modeled on a

hangar designed by Mr. Brizay, a French

engineer who had come to work for the

base section engineer in Brisbane after

fleeing from Malaya. Brizay's hangar

consisted of arches constructed of scrap

lumber, held together by purlins and

covered with camouflage netting. By

taking such a hangar, adding a concrete

floor and a corrugated iron or fibrolite
218 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

roof, and closing the ends, a large and

roomy warehouse could be quickly

provided.99

Construction for the Army Air Forces,

which represented about 80 percent of

the engineer program, offered a rewarding field for savings. When the war

began, blueprints for military airports

were more or less standard. Fields were

to have three intersecting landing strips

running in the direction of the prevailing winds. Strips for fighters were to

have an average length of 3,000 feet,

those for medium bombers, 4,000, and

those for heavy bombers, 5,000. All

runways were to be 150 feet wide with a

1,000-foot clearing on each side. The

engineers soon discovered that the

shorter runways did not work out in

SWPA. Overloaded planes needed extra length to take off, and disabled ones,

to land. In the fluid tactical situation,

a field might be used by fighters one day

and by bombers the next. Six-thousandfoot runways, capable of taking the

heaviest craft, became the rule. The

added effort expended on longer airstrips

was more than offset in other ways.

Since it was found that pilots could

align their planes just as easily on narrower strips, runways were reduced in

width to 100 feet. Because the speed of

planes landing or taking off was at least

100 miles an hour, the direction of the

wind made little difference. Intersecting runways were replaced by parallel

strips, and thus satisfactory sites could

usually be located more quickly and less

earth moving was required. "We

tended," Matthews explained, "to go not

to wide runways but to double barreled

and triple barreled runways, approximately parallel but separated by 100 feet

or so between the edges of the pavement.

This actually simplified both drainage

and grading and gave us uninterrupted

construction and paving work on each

of the new strips while the older strip

was in full use."

 100

Although the Air Forces generally

preferred concrete pavements, few landing strips of that material were built in

SWPA. Runway surfaces, the engineers

found, had to be neither so thick nor so

rigid as had previously been thought

necessary. The first designers of airfield

pavements, most of them highway engineers, had usually assumed that a runway must be strong enough to carry a

wheel load one and one-half times the

weight of the plane. With the fast new

planes of World War II, most of the

weight in landing and taking off was

borne by the wings, not the wheels.

With this discovery, the concrete runway passed from the scene in SWPA, for

it was both expensive and time consuming to build. In Queensland and New

Guinea, graveled strips were the rule.

But wherever possible, the gravel was

topped with bitumen to give a better

wearing surface and eliminate dust. A

thin bitumen surfacing of the type used

on country roads in the United States

served the purpose well. Four coats

were applied for heavy planes and two

for light on a gravel base from three to 99

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for

1942. (2) Ltr, CG USASOS to CG Fifth AF et al.,

3 Oct 42. SWPA File 275. (3) Memo for Rcd,

Casey, 25 Nov 42. SWPA File 94. (4) Memo for

Rcd, Casey, 25 Nov 42. SWPA File 159.

100

 (1) WD OCE, Info Bull No. 53, 1 Aug 40. (2)

Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 26ff. (3) Ltr,

Casey to Godfrey, 1 Jan 43. SWPA File 497. (4)

Matthews Ltr, 10 Nov 49, p. 35.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 219

five inches thick. A half-inch layer of

pea-size gravel was then spread on the

bitumen and rolled. This thin paving

saved a great number of man-hours, and

although it was sometimes picked up by

the wheels of the planes, especially in the

turnaround areas, repair was easy.

While gravel and bitumen runways became standard, the engineers experimented with other types of paving. Soil

cement, a recent development in the

United States, was tried for the first time

in Australia. The formula called for

about six parts of dirt and gravel to one

part of cement, with water added. The

mixture formed a weak concrete but

saved a good deal of labor, since it made

use of the materials found at the site of

construction and thus eliminated the

hauling of gravel and rock. It was tried

on an experimental basis at Roto and

North Burke, two fields of the Melbourne-Cloncurry ferry route. Visiting

Roto in mid-November, Colonel Robinson reported that the first runway there

had been completed in six weeks, and the

second, in two. He expected the strips

to give good service for one or two years.

However, since soil cement did not stand

up as well at bitumen and gravel and

cost half again as much, it was not widely

used. The engineers made rather extensive use of the recently developed

Marston mat, or pierced steel plank, as

an alternate type of surfacing to bitumen

and gravel. Capable of being put down

quickly, the mat proved very satisfactory

when placed on a firm foundation.101

Putting in runways was only a small

part of the job of building an airfield.

In addition to well-paved and welldrained strips, a complete airdrome included miles of taxiways, innumerable

hardstands and dispersals, and such

necessities and refinements as operations

buildings, hangars, fuel storage and dispensing systems, camouflage, and revetments. The engineers in SWPA could

not hope to build such elaborate fields.

Any feature that could be dispensed with

had to be omitted if essentials were to

be provided. Little was done with

camouflage. Making an airfield invisible from the air was anything but easy,

and the engineers considered the effort

unjustified in any case, since the enemy

would have little trouble locating an

active airdrome even if it were camouflaged. During the early months of the

war some attention was paid to camouflage in Australia. Several types of

hangars were designed which could be

quickly erected and would serve to hide

planes, the best known being Mr.

Brizay's igloo. In the advanced areas,

concealment became largely a matter of

dispersal. Revetments were gradually

eliminated. Originally, the engineers

had been called upon to build an enormous number of them, each one consisting of a hardstand with an earthen wall

fifteen feet high on three sides. It took

three D-8 tractors about three days to

produce one such revetment. When it

became apparent that the best protection

was a strong air force ready to meet the

enemy in the skies, the engineers stopped 101

 (1) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, p. 27. (2)

"Bituminous Surfacing of Flight Strips in Combat

Zones," The Military Engineer, XXXV (November,

1943). 552-54. (3) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs

of SWPA, VI, 442ff. (4) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA

Annual Rpt for 1942. (5) AWC Report, February

1942-June 1943, pp. 40ff. (6) Memo, Robinson for

Sverdrup, 18 Nov 42. SWPA File 94.
220 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

putting earthen walls around hardstands. Still other items were dropped.

Hangars were seldom built. Gasoline

storage tanks with fueling systems at

airfields in the combat zones were a rare

luxury. Usually gasoline was stored in

drums.102

Work that could not be eliminated

was sometimes postponed. During the

dry season, graveled strips in northern

Queensland and New Guinea went weeks

and sometimes months before a coating

of bitumen was applied. Planes landing and taking off raised huge clouds of

dust which sometimes took as long as

thirty minutes to settle. Calcium chloride was of no value here, for it was

effective only when it could draw

moisture from the air. In hot, dry

climates it merely became additional

dust. Gradually, the engineers brought

the situation under control. At some

fields they sprinkled the runways with

oil and tar, while at others they experimented with solutions consisting of one

part molasses and nine parts water,

which proved quite effective. The delay in sealing the runways produced

little more than a temporary annoyance.

In deferring drainage work the engineers

ran a greater risk. When the tropical

downpours began, they were hard

pressed to keep many of the fields, especially the highly critical ones at Moresby,

from being flooded out. Hundreds of

culverts and drains had to be put in

almost overnight. Many of them had to

be built of wood or improvised out of

gasoline drums with the ends knocked

out, since stocks of pipe and cement had

been quickly used up. Adequate drainage could not be supplied in a hurry,

and several runways gave signs of buckling as water seeped into the subgrades.

The strips at Seven-Mile were weakened

by underground springs, which put the

field out of operation for a time. Early

in December, Casey flew to Moresby to

see the fields at firsthand and discuss

with the airmen some of the problems

about which they had been continually

complaining. Talking to Kenney, he

maintained that the engineers had, on

the whole, clone a splendid job. Few

fields had been out of operation and then

only for a short time. But in conversations with the engineers, Casey expressed

his dissatisfaction over the way drainage

had been handled. He was not convinced "that all had been done that

could be done." Suggesting that closer

attention and more intelligent thought

be given to this aspect of construction,

he reminded the engineers that even

though a strip might consist of "six-inch

armor plate, if it rests on soup it will

sink and not support anything." So

long as the rains continued, conditions

were far from ideal. Even so, the disaster that some had predicted, the

grounding of large numbers of planes,

did not occur.103

Construction Progress

Despite manifold difficulties, construction forces in the South and Southwest

102

 (1) Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, pp. 28-29.

(2) Ltr, Casey to Godfrey, 1 Jan 43. SWPA File

497. (3) Memo, Robinson for Casey, 9 Oct 42.

SWPA File 496.

103

 (1) Ltr, Casey to Godfrey, 1 Jan 43. (2) Of C

Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for 1942. (3) Incl,

Advice from 808th Engrs, to Ltr, CO, 808th Engrs

to Casey, 25 Sep 43. SWPA File 144. (4) Memos

for Rcd, Casey, 10 and 11 Dec 42. SWPA File 130.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 221

AIRSTRIP AT DOBODURA, SHOWING REVETMENTS. Note the dust behind the plane.

Pacific had succeeded by the close of

1942 in forging a chain of bases to secure

the Allied position. All the engineer

construction units in SWPA had been

sent to New Guinea. At Moresby,

where most of them were located, work

was fairly well along. Finishing touches

were being put on the airdromes, and

base development was continuing with

the improvement of the port and the

building of depots, hospitals, camps,

roads, and bridges. Though Milne Bay

and Oro Bay were considerably behind

Moresby, largely because of the swampy

terrain and the shortage of engineers,

they nevertheless showed some progress.

At Milne, the troops had finished a

ponton wharf, a Liberty dock, a pier for

small ships, and several stretches of road,

in addition to completing two airfields

and surfacing them with steel mat. The

third had been abandoned because of its

swampy site. The engineers at Oro

Bay, where work had only recently begun, had built a dock for barges and a

few miles of road. In the South Pacific,

also, construction had advanced. When

the fighting ended on Guadalcanal,

Espíritu Santo boasted four airfields, a

seaplane base, three hospitals, ten small
222 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

camps, and thirty-two miles of roads.

Efate had two bomber fields, a fighter

strip, a seaplane base, a 600-bed hospital,

and a rather extensive roadnet. Facilities on Viti Levu had been expanded to

include a narrow-gauge railroad between Nandi and Narewa, several gasoline pipelines, and additional roads,

depots, piers, and docks. Farther south,

planes were staging over the alternate

ferry route, which was operational by

late 1942.104

Although New Zealand was a major

Allied base in the South Pacific, the

engineers did no construction there during 1942. Facilities for the U.S. forces,

including some $3.3 million worth of

camps, warehouses, and hospitals for the

Army, were provided by the New Zealanders themselves through reverse lendlease. The engineers confined their

activities in the Dominion to exploring

for oil. In April 1942, with the Netherlands Indies falling rapidly to the

Japanese, and Allied tankers being sunk

in large numbers, the War Department

began seeking new sources of oil within

the Pacific theaters. On the 29th General Somervell directed the Chief of

Engineers to contract with the Superior

Oil Company of California for the testing of certain promising geologic structures in New Zealand. A fund of $5

million was set aside for the purpose.

By a fixed-fee contract signed on 2 May,

the United States underwrote the costs of

the exploration, and the company

agreed, if oil were found, to reimburse

the government with deliveries of petroleum. On 31 May Lt. Col. Cornelius

Beard, who was to supervise the project

for the Engineers, and a party of the

contractor's men, reached Wellington,

and from there left immediately for the

site of a supposed oil field on the western

coast of South Island. Drilling began

late in June, after a force of local workmen had been assembled and rigs had

arrived from the United States. In

August a large shipment of machinery

arrived for drilling on North Island.

With the help of New Zealand troops,

this equipment was moved ten miles

beyond Palmerston North. During the

first week in November work was abandoned on North Island with "absolutely

negative" results, and a short time later

drilling was suspended at the South

Island site. Explorations were continued at other points on South Island,

but, by the end of the year, no oil had

been found.105

Insofar as the Army was concerned,

the great base in the South Pacific was

New Caledonia. This island was a beehive of activity. By early 1943 there

were twelve Army airports on the island,

seven of which were satellite fields and

five, major dromes. Plaines des Gaiacs,

the largest, had been vastly improved by 104

 (1) 46th Engr GS Regt, Hist for 1942-43. (2)

91st Engr GS Regt, Hist for 1942-43. (3) Incls to

Ltr, CO 43d Engr GS Regt, to Of C Engr GHQ

SWPA, 27 July 43. SWPA File 145. (4) Hq XIII

AF Serv Comd, Hist Monograph 17, Opns of Avn

Engrs in SOPAC, pp. 60-65, 82-87. (5) Building

the Navy's Bases, II, pp. 228-30, 204-06, and 218-20.

(6) Ltr, Maj. W. E. Wilhelm to Honolulu Dist Engr,

27 Dec 42. (7) Ltr, Capt H. N. Hockensmith to

Honolulu Dist Engr, 3 Feb 43. (8) Ltr, Maj H. D.

Wilbert to Honolulu Dist Engr, 12 Jan 43, with Incl.

Last three in Engr AGF PAC.

105

 (1) Incl to Ltr, Hq USAF and Serv Comd APO

715, 21 Jan 43. 600.914 (New Zealand) 1943. (2)

Beard, Concluding Rpt, 2 Oct 43. 678 SOPAC 1944.

(3) WD OCE, Negotiations for Servs of Contractor

on CPFF Basis. CE—New Zealand—Contract Negotiations, Rcd of. (4) Rad, Capt F. S. McNamara to

CofEngrs, 6 Nov 42. (5) Ltr, Col. Joseph S. Gorlinski to Somervell, 19 Feb 43. Last two in 678 (New

Zealand) 1945.
FIRST OFFENSIVES: THE SOLOMONS AND PAPUA 223

the 810th Aviation Battalion, and Tontouta, as a result of the almost continuous

efforts of the 811th, was on the way to

becoming perhaps the leading air base

in the theater. Considerable attention

had been devoted to ports and roads. In

November the engineers embarked on a

program of extensive development at

Noumea harbor. Reaching New Caledonia on the 7th of that month, the 131st

Combat Battalion was given as one of

its jobs the building of a new dock, 60

by 500 feet, complete with warehouses

and a railroad siding. This unit also

repaired the approach to the port's

original dock. When the 955th Topographic Company arrived at Noumea

late in 1942, it went to work not on maps

but on the harbor. While much of the

construction and repair of highways was

handled by the New Caledonia Department of Public Works, every engineer

unit on the island, with the exception

of the mapping company, had a part in

widening, surfacing, and maintaining

roads. The 810th alone kept up eighty

miles of roads in the northern part of

the island. Transforming New Caledonia into a major base necessitated all

kinds of projects. Besides working on

roads, ports, and airfields, the engineers

had completed such varied assignments

as building a new headquarters for

USAFISPA, rehabilitating the tracks and

rolling stock of the Nouméa-Paita railway, renovating a sawmill which had

been out of operation for fifteen years,

working in stone quarries, and putting a

fence around Tontouta to keep out

cattle and deer.106

Within the two theaters, the most

extensive construction was still by far on

the Australian continent. The program

of the Allied Works Council included

nearly every type of military installation

—airfields, camps, depots, hospitals, arsenals, staging areas, and harbor defenses.

Included also were munitions plants,

aircraft factories, docks, defense highways, oil pipelines, radio stations, and

telephone lines. By 31 December 1942,

the AWC had built or improved over 200

airfields—to cite only one figure. In

Queensland, a number of camps were

going up, including four to house units

expected soon from the United States.

The center of construction activity remained in the southeast, where the bulk

of the Commonwealth's defense projects

were located. During the last months

of 1942, the Australians began three

large jobs in this area for the Americans.

Two were hospitals, one of which, the

largest in the Southwest Pacific, was being built at Herne Bay in Sydney, while

the other, only slightly smaller, was

going up at Holland Park in Brisbane.

The third project was a huge supply

depot at Meeandah near Brisbane, which

was to have 47 warehouses dispersed

over 260 acres. Notwithstanding the

size of some of the installations being

built for the Americans, work for the

United States forces on the whole had

dropped off considerably and accounted

for only a small proportion of the

AWC's construction by the end of the

year. Funds being expended by the

council totaled slightly more than

forty-five million pounds on 31 Decem106

 (1) Hq XIII AF Serv Comd, Hist Mono 17,

Opns of Avn Engrs in SOPAC, pp. 7, 66-80. (2)

Hist of 810th Engrs, Oct-31 Dec 43. (3) Hist of

811th Engrs, 1 Dec 41-31 Dec 43. (4) Hist of 131st

Engr Regt (Combat). (5) Building the Navy's Bases,

II, pp. 221-25.
224 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MOVING SUPPLIES ON THE REBUILT RAILROAD, NOUMÉA

ber, but only 6 percent of that amount

was being spent for the Americans. Yet

many of the Australian projects, by

strengthening the major Allied base of

operations in the Southwest Pacific,

would benefit the U.S. forces.107

From their bases in the South and

Southwest Pacific, the Allies hoped to

launch large-scale offensives during 1943.

As the old year ended, plans were already

being drawn for the reduction of the

Japanese stronghold at Rabaul. Once

details of strategy and command had

been settled and sufficient forces had

been assembled in the theaters, operations would commence.

107

 (1) AWC Report, February 1942-June 1943, pp.

17-74, passim. (2) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual

Rpt for 1942. (3) Incl to Ltr, Farrar to Teale, 27

Jan 43. SWPA File 94.
CHAPTER VI

The Drive Toward Rabaul

Preparing for CARTWHEEL

With victory in Papua and on Guadalcanal virtually assured, the Joint Chiefs

were ready to consider further offensive

moves. On 14 January 1943, Roosevelt

and Churchill met with the Combined

Chiefs at Casablanca to discuss strategic

objectives for the year. By 23 January

over-all goals were fairly well agreed

upon. Insofar as the South and Southwest Pacific were concerned, the main

objectives in 1943 would be the carrying

out of Tasks Two and Three of the directive of 2 July 1942. MacArthur's

plan of campaign against the Japanese

entrenched in New Guinea and the

Solomons was named ELKTON. Basically

it provided for a two-pronged drive toward Rabaul by Southwest Pacific forces

along the coasts of eastern New Guinea

and western New Britain and by South

Pacific forces through the Solomons.

(Map 12) But the assault could not be

undertaken at once. There were not

enough troops or supplies in the two

theaters in early 1943, nor had MacArthur and Halsey worked out a

co-ordinated plan. On 11 February,

Rear Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson,

Halsey's deputy, reached Brisbane for

conferences with MacArthur and his

staff. In mid-February, the Joint Chiefs

scheduled a conference of delegates from

the South and Southwest Pacific to be

held in March in Washington. There

the conferees would review the numbers

of men and the amounts of supplies

available and determine in general how

they were to be allocated.1 Meanwhile,

the engineers in the two theaters were

fully occupied in preparing plans for the

support of the combat forces in the

coming campaign, to be known as

CARTWHEEL. Since the capture of Rabaul would require the progressive advance of air and naval forces, not only

combat support but also the construction

of airfields and naval bases in areas

captured from the enemy would continue to be a most important task.

Additional Engineers Arrive

The number of engineers in the South

and Southwest Pacific was increased in

the first months of 1943. On 17 February, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, the

commander of Sixth Army, together

with members of his advance echelon,

arrived by air at Brisbane; five days later,

his engineer, Col. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr.,

with an engineer officer and an enlisted

man came in at Amberley Field.

1

 John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction

of Rabaul, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 7-12.
226 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 12

Colonel Sturgis set up his headquarters

at nearby Camp Columbia. The remainder of the engineer section, on its

way to Australia by ship, was expected

in mid-April. By visits to engineer

offices and installations in and near Brisbane, including Casey's office and the

engineer section of Headquarters, Base

Section 3, and by trips through eastern

Australia and Papua, Colonel Sturgis

soon became acquainted with current

operations and learned of some of the

major engineer problems in the theater.2

In February and March, several units

2

 (1) Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon (Washington, 1953), pp. 5-6. (2) Engr Sec

Sixth Army, Engr Hist (Draft MS), Chs. I, III.

Sturgis File 31.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 227

arrived in the Southwest Pacific—the

first since the preceding June. Among

them were two aviation battalions, a

heavy shop company, and a maintenance

company. Also earmarked for SWPA

and scheduled to leave the United States

in March, were an aviation battalion, a

depot company, a base equipment company, two airborne aviation battalions,

and a dump truck company. Scheduled

to arrive in the South Pacific in the first

half of 1943 were three general service

regiments, two depot companies, and a

heavy shop company.3

The Engineer Special Brigades

Engineer units of a novel type were to

be employed in the coming campaign in

New Guinea. These were the engineer

special brigades (ESB's). Originally

called engineer amphibian brigades,

they had been organized and developed

in the United States beginning in June

1942 in accordance with new concepts for

putting a landing force ashore. The

required techniques devised by top military and naval planners called for moving fully equipped infantry units in small

craft from one shore to another where

the distance involved was less than a

hundred miles. Because it would obviate using large naval vessels close to

shore, where they would be exposed to

attacks from land-based aircraft, such a

technique would be invaluable not only

for operations against continental Europe

but also for driving the Japanese out of

the many islands of the western Pacific.

When this new concept of amphibious

warfare was developed, the invasion of

Europe took precedence over operations

in the Pacific. The innovation was devised primarily to move troops across

the English Channel for an invasion of

the Continent. Sole reliance on small

craft was a departure from traditional

naval concepts. Landing craft had always been carried to the target area

aboard transports. When an assault

force arrived off an enemy-held shore,

the craft were lowered over the side of

the ships into the water, the troops

boarded them by climbing down the

ships' nets and, protected by fire from

cruisers and battleships, headed for the

enemy-held beach.

Moving troops and supplies from

island to island in small craft and organizing newly won beachheads would

appear to be a joint Army-Navy responsibility. In the first months of 1942,

the Navy, still relying on enlistments,

was short of men for its ships and shore

installations, and so could not embark

on a program of organizing and training new types of amphibious units.

Responsibility for developing and training the amphibious brigades was given

to the Army and assigned to the Services

of Supply. Mainly because moving

troops across short stretches of sea

resembled river-crossing operations, the

Services of Supply gave the Corps of Engineers the responsibility of organizing

and training the units. Twelve brigades

were to be organized, each an integrated

but flexible unit capable of transporting

one division.

In September, MacArthur had requested one brigade. Col. Arthur G.

Trudeau, a pioneer in developing the

3

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 3 Mar 43. SWPA File

27. (2) SOS SOPAC, Hist Rpt from Activation to

30 Jun 43, app., List of Serv Trp Units, SOPAC,

15 Jul 43.
228 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

brigades, visited MacArthur's headquarters in November to discuss the advisability of sending three to the Southwest

Pacific. MacArthur strongly favored

getting these new units. It was readily

apparent to him that they would be ideal

for operations against the Japanese in the

islands north of Australia. It would now

be possible to move men and supplies

along the coasts of New Guinea and to

nearby islands, through narrow channels,

across uncharted, shallow, reef-choked

waters, without the use of naval vessels.

And the perplexing question of whether

amphibious operations in the Southwest

Pacific should be largely under Army or

Navy control would be solved.4 In

Casey's words, the brigades would "afford [the Army] an independence of

operation and unity of control not otherwise attainable if dependence had to be

placed on the Navy for such movement."

 5

The initial brigade to go to the Southwest Pacific was the 2d, commanded by

Brig. Gen. William F. Heavey. During

February and March 1943 the elements

of the organization arrived in Australia

at various ports from Sydney to Townsville. The entire brigade consisted of

just under 7,400 officers and men.

Major components were a headquarters

and headquarters company and three

boat and shore regiments.6 Each regiment, with approximately 1,950 officers

and men, had two battalions: a boat

battalion to man the craft that would

transport the infantry and other troops

from island to island, and a shore battalion to help troops embark on the near

shore and establish and organize the

beachhead on the far shore. Each

brigade had five auxiliary units—a boat

maintenance company, a quartermaster

battalion, an ordnance platoon, a signal

company, and a medical battalion. The

brigade got its 180 boats from the Navy.

The amphibian engineers arrived in the

Southwest Pacific equipped mainly with

LCVP's (landing craft, vehicle, personnel). These wooden boats were 36 feet

long and had 11-foot beams. Powered

with 225 horsepower diesel engines, they

had a speed of 9 knots. They could

carry 36 fully-equipped infantrymen or

4 tons of cargo. Protection was provided by quarter-inch armor plate on the

bow and sides. The amphibian engineers hoped to add soon to their small

stock of the newer and larger LCM(3)'s

(landing craft, mechanized), which were

50 feet long, 14 feet wide, were made

entirely of steel, and had a speed of 10

knots. They could carry 60 men or 18

tons of supplies. Before long, the elements of the brigade were concentrated

at Cairns and Rockhampton, and joint

training began at nearby beaches with

American and Australian infantry units.

Some of the amphibian engineers attended specialist schools in reconnaissance, signal communications, and boat

maintenance. Others trained in the

Australian "bush" in infantry tactics and

in fighting in jungle country.7 The

4

 For discussions of the organization and training

of the engineer special brigades and their arrival in

the Southwest Pacific, see: (1) Coll, Keith, and

Rosenthal, Troops and Equipment, Ch XVI; (2)

Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters,

Army Forces, Pacific, "The Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945," IV, Amphibian Engineer

Operations (Washington, 1959), pp. 22ff. 5

 Memo, Casey for MacArthur, 17 Nov 42. SWPA

File 18. 6

 Known as amphibian regiments until April 1943. 7

 (1) Interim Rpt of the 2d ESB for the period Jan
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 229

arrival of the amphibian engineers was

not greeted with enthusiasm on all sides.

General Heavey found "considerable

antagonism" on the part of many Navy

officers, a number of whom expressed

serious doubts that the brigades could

operate successfully.8

Late in January the 411th Engineer

Base Shop Battalion, 1,145 officers and

men, arrived with the first elements of

the brigade. The 411th had originally

been organized to repair and maintain

the amphibian engineers' landing craft.

When the decision was subsequently

made to send the craft overseas knocked

down, the mission of the 411th was

changed to boat assembly. The unit

was reorganized so that all three companies could put landing craft together.

The first job in Australia was the building, with the help of a regiment of

amphibian engineers, of an assembly

plant at Cairns. Here LCVP's, and

later LCM's, were to be launched and

used in the drive up the New Guinea

coast toward Rabaul. The 411th had

not been organized or trained to build

an assembly plant; it turned to this job

when it arrived at its destination only to

find "the plant not even started and the

site encumbered with an old saw mill

whose owners were holding out for a

high settlement." It was many weeks

before the battalion retrieved its equipment from the various Australian ports.

Thereafter followed the struggle to build

the assembly plant with its three production lines.9

Problems of Organization

If CARTWHEEL were to have proper

Engineer support, the continuing disagreement in the Southwest Pacific between the Engineers and the Army Air

Forces over the control of airfield construction would have to be resolved.

The Air Forces persisted in its attempts

to get control of the aviation units, and

Casey continued to oppose strongly the

demands of Kenney and Whitehead.

He maintained, as he had done previously, that if the aviation units were

placed under the control of the Air

Forces and were used solely on airfield

construction, there would in effect be

two construction agencies in the theater.

They would have to compete for the

limited amounts of materials, equipment, and spare parts. Over-all planning for construction would become

needlessly complicated, and control of

the construction program would become

much more difficult. It was Casey's

view that, in the communications zone,

there should be not two construction

organizations, but one, and it should

be under the operational control of

USASOS, to be used on any type of work

that MacArthur believed was most

urgent.10 The question was settled late

in February. MacArthur directed that

the construction of airfields continue as

through 30 Sep 43, pp. 1ff. SWPA File E15. (2)

Brig. Gen. William F. Heavey, "Down Ramp," The

Military Engineer, XXXVIII (August, 1946), 334. 8

 Ltr, Heavey to Brig Gen Daniel Noce, formerly

commander of the Amphib Tng Comd, 3 Jan 44.

SWPA File 62.

9

 (1) Hist of 411th Engr Base Shop Bn, 20 Jul 42-

31 Oct 43. (2) Heavey, "Down Ramp," The Military Engineer, XXXVIII (August, 1946), p. 334. 10

 (1) Ltr, Kenney to MacArthur, 4 Feb 43. (2)

Memo, Casey for G-3 GHQ SWPA, 12 Feb 43. Both

in SWPA File 27.
230 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

before. USASOS would be responsible

for all construction for American forces

in the communications zone. Task

force commanders would be responsible

for construction in the combat zone

until that responsibility was transferred

to USASOS. When airfields were completed, they would be released to the Air

Forces for maintenance.11

To provide for better administration

of the growing number of American

units, MacArthur reconstituted, under

his direct command, United States Army

Forces in the Far East on 26 February.

The headquarters was to provide administrative control for all American

units in the Southwest Pacific, including

those in USASOS, the Fifth Air Force,

and the newly arrived Sixth Army.

MacArthur appointed Casey Chief Engineer, USAFFE. Casey transferred some

of the men for his new office from his

staff in GHQ SWPA; a few came from

USASOS. Most were officers and men

who had recently arrived from the

United States. As Chief Engineer,

USAFFE, Casey had duties similar to

those he concurrently had as chief engineer of SWPA. But in his new position,

he was concerned mainly with providing

technical supervision over American

units only; as Chief Engineer, GHQ, he

was responsible for co-ordinating the

entire Allied engineer effort in the

theater. Since the functions of the two

offices were so much alike, it soon proved

difficult to prevent overlapping of functions and duplication of work.12

Engineers in Forward Areas

The engineers continued their explorations and studies of the forward

regions where the coming campaign was

to be fought. Reconnaissance from the

air and on the ground provided considerable information about the most desirable sites for airfields and bases. As

early as December 1942, Colonel Sverdrup and others had traveled through the

Markham Valley in east central New

Guinea—a crucial area in any further

advance against the Japanese. They

found many suitable sites for airfields.

Near the native village of Nadzab, the

favorable terrain and the long dry season

would make construction of runways for

heavy bombers and fighters fairly easy.

Aerial photographs indicated that at the

coastal village of Lae the Japanese had

two airfields that could be enlarged and

developed, and that the road from Lae

to Nadzab could undoubtedly be readily

improved to make possible trucking in

gasoline and other supplies. Sites would

also have to be found for airfields farther

west.13 The Air Forces was concerned

about growing Japanese strength in

northwestern New Guinea and in the

islands of the Netherlands Indies. The

enemy apparently was building up his

potential for offensive action in the

Darwin-Merauke-Cape York area.

Kenney therefore wanted to strengthen

the airfields at Horn Island, at Jacky

11

 1st Ind, AG GHQ SWPA, 24 Feb 43, on Kenny

Ltr, 4 Feb 43. 12

 (1) Hq USAFFE Staff Memo No. 1, 26 Feb 43.

SWPA File M84. (2) Of C Engr USAFFE, No. 1, 26

Feb 43. Both in SWPA File M84. (3) Memo, Of C

Engr GHQ SWPA for All Secs, Engr Of, 3 Mar 43.

SWPA File 57. (4) Brig Gen Lewis T. Ross,

formerly Chief Engr, USASOS, Personal Recollections of the CE (MS). SWPA Files. 13

 (1) Sverdrup, Rcn Rpt, Bena Bena—Markham

Valley, 25 Dec 42. (2) Leahy, Rcn Rpt, Bena Bena

to Mt. Hagen, 30 Jan 43. Both in SWPA File 460.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 231

Jacky, and in the Millingimbi area near

Darwin. These projects were to proceed "simultaneously and with the greatest possible speed."14

 In the South

Pacific aerial reconnaissances were being

made of the Solomons, especially of those

places where Japanese installations were

located.15 In February reconnaissance

parties sent out by Casey's office investigated two little-known islands—Woodlark and Kiriwina—midway between

Papua and the Solomons and found

excellent sites for airfields.

Engineer work was already under way

in the most forward areas. A continuing

task was improving communications in

northeastern New Guinea, where airfields, roads, and trails were primitive, to

say the least. A promising link between

southern New Guinea and the Markham

Valley was the 68-mile-long trail stretching from the native village of Bulldog

north over the Owen Stanleys to Wau.

Improvement of this track would make

possible transporting substantial quantities of supplies overland from the Gulf

of Papua to Lae and Salamaua. On 18

February a company of Royal Australian Engineers began work at Bulldog,

and three days later another company

started in at Wau. American units

could not be spared from high priority

airfield construction, but a number of

bulldozers were sent to the Australians

for this difficult construction job. The

terrain was rugged, little material could

be found for surfacing, and downpours

were frequent; the Australians had to do

much of the work with picks, shovels,

and crowbars. Progress was slow. In

out-of-the-way areas to the north, work

was speeded on runways.16 Early in

March, Sverdrup directed Lieutenant

Leahy to prepare one strip at Mt. Hagen

and two at Ogelbang, four miles to the

northwest.17 For these jobs Leahy

rounded up 5,000 Papuans who worked

with great energy in the way they knew

best: They hauled earth in their native

baskets, Colonel Robinson wrote later

in describing this project, "and compaction was accomplished by thousands of

bare native feet tramping in time with

their weird chant or 'sing-sing.' " 18

Troop Requirements

for ELKTON

By 22 February, Casey's office had

completed a preliminary study of engineer troop requirements for ELKTON.

More exact needs, to be worked out

later, would in large measure depend on

the time allotted for the various phases

of the operation, the number of native

laborers who could be recruited, and the

demands for additional construction

which might be made. Principal engineer tasks would include supporting the

combat troops, building airfields, ports,

and roads in the combat zone, and preparing and distributing maps. It was

estimated that 15 new runways would

have to be built, 16 improved, and pos14

 Ltr, CofS AAF SWPA, to AirO Comdg RAAF

Comd, AAF, 22 Mar 43. SWPA File 498. 15

 (1) Maj Merrill E. DeLonge, AAF Representative Engr Bd Fort Belvoir, Rpt on Observations in

SOPAC 15 Jan 44. EHD Files. (2) Of C Engr

GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 146-48.

16

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI,

159-62, 164. 17

 Ltr, Sverdrup to Leahy, 9 Mar 43. 686 New

Guinea No. 2, G-3 Files GHQ SWPA. 18

 Ltr, Robinson to C Staff Br, 31 Jul 50. SWPA

Files.
232 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

sibly 45 maintained. Port facilities in

the South Pacific would be built principally by naval construction battalions;

in the Southwest Pacific, by engineer

units. In both theaters the combat

engineers, though handicapped by inadequate equipment, would have to do

virtually all road construction and maintenance. Mapping units would be hard

pressed. The South Pacific area, which

already had one aviation topographic

company, needed, in addition, a corps

topographic company. All told, a large

number of additional units would be

required for the campaign—ten general

service regiments, two aviation battalions, two port construction and repair

groups, two equipment companies, one

topographic battalion, one topographic

company, two depot companies, and two

maintenance companies. Some of these

units were already en route to the

theaters.19

The South Pacific

In the South Pacific the engineers had

begun to prepare in January for the

coming campaign. Organization in that

theater was complicated. Halsey had

many more subordinate commanders reporting directly to him than MacArthur

had. There were two major ground

forces—the Army and the Marine Corps

—as well as various Air Forces elements.

The bulk of the U.S. Pacific Fleet was

serving in the South Pacific. A multiplicity of service commands supported

the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. The

South Pacific had no chief engineer to

supervise and co-ordinate engineer work.

There was, instead, a Base Plans Section,

consisting of Colonel Beadle and two

Navy captains from Halsey's staff. The

three members reviewed requests for

projects received from island commanders or from the Base Plans Board in

Halsey's headquarters. They then approved or disapproved construction,

fixed priorities, and designated the constructing agency. Projects were built

under the direction of the island commanders. Insofar as the Engineers were

concerned, the most important service

force was SOS USAFISPA, under Maj.

Gen. Robert G. Breene. On Halsey's

orders, it and other supply agencies began assembling supplies and developing

bases early in 1943. Colonel Beadle, as

SOS engineer, and his staff were thus

fully occupied during the months before

the campaign was scheduled to start.20

Engineer units worked with Seabees

and Marine engineers to strengthen

various islands of the South Pacific.

The marines were building up Guadalcanal as a forward base. Engineer construction units were scheduled to be sent

in by the middle of the year. In the

New Hebrides the 822d and 828th aviation engineers were improving Bauer

and Quoin Hill fields.21 On Fiji the

821st was continuing to improve Nandi

airdrome. The battalion was also working on such projects as hospitals and

infantry and artillery positions in the

19

 Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 22 Feb 43. SWPA

File 111.

20

 (1) Miller, CARTWHEEL: Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 67ff. (2) Hq and Hq Co USAFISPA, Hist

1 Jul 42-30 Jun 43. 98-USF2-Hq-0.1 (23779). (3)

Memo, Lt Col Emil F. Kumpe for Casey, 27 Sep 43.

061.20 Intel Rpts, SWPA Engr Files, KCRC. (4)

Rpt on Conditions in SOPAC [c.1 Sep 43]. DR-3,

G-11 South Pac Theater, pt. III. 21

 Hists of the 822d and 828th Engr Avn Bns.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 233

Nandi area. An extensive road improvement program was under way.

The commanding general of the island

selected a plateau 2,000 feet above sea

level as the site for a rest camp. After

conducting an extensive survey, the unit

began work on an 18-mile road from

Nandi to the camp, a difficult job, as

much of the route had to be blasted from

almost sheer rock.22

On New Caledonia the major task was

improving the airfields. The 811th

engineers were at various places—Company A was at Tontouta; B, at Oua Tom;

and C, at Plaines des Gaiacs. With the

installation of aviation gasoline storage

tanks on Penrhyn and Aitutaki, work on

the alternate ferry route was almost

complete. Such slight construction and

maintenance as was still required was

done by engineer units of the task forces

on the islands.23 Construction was now

under way in New Zealand, where work

was carried on in and near Auckland.

In early 1943 New Zealand's Public

Works Department, using local contractors, was building a 1,000-bed hospital, a replacement and supply depot, a

camp, and installations for the Quartermaster Corps. The exploration for oil

continued. In January 1943 the managing director of the Shell Oil Company

in New Zealand asked Colonel Beard for

help in testing a geological formation

on South Island. In March the War

Department approved, and plans were

made to begin drilling in several weeks.24

The combat forces focused their main

attention on the Solomons. The steady

infiltration of the Japanese down the

island chain posed a continuing threat

to Guadalcanal. Halsey decided to

seize the Russell Islands, about thirty

miles to the northwest. Occupation was

scheduled for late February, with the

43d Infantry Division assigned to the

operation. The division's 118th Engineer Combat Battalion sailed with the

assault forces for the Russells on 15 February and landed on the 21st. No

enemy troops were found. Combat engineer missions comprised, for the most

part, road improvement, installation of

water points, and clearing of gun positions. Naval construction battalions

built the airfields. The 118th engineers

found their tasks easy. They were able

to establish water points in short order,

and, since most of the terrain was flat

and coral surfaced, road construction

proceeded rapidly.25

As preparations for the offensive increased, engineer supply was given

greater attention than before. In March

1943 a general engineer supply depot

was organized at Noumea. Subsequently, the Seabees, with some help

from Army engineer units, built a large

depot, where a heavy shop company was

installed. Supplies from the United

States were stored there and then distributed to engineer units in the South

22

 Hist of the 821st Engr Avn Bn. 23

 Hist of the 811th Engr Avn Bn. 24

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Hq USAFINZ and Serv

Comd, Of of the Engr, 8 Dec 42. (2) Hq USAFINZ

and Serv Comd, Of of the Engr, Progress Rpt, 2 Apr

43. Both in Engr Files, US Army Forces in New

Caledonia, KCRC. (3) Beard, Concluding Rpt-Oil

Exploration Opns in New Zealand Under WD Fixed

Fee Contract W-412-eng-49. 25

 (1) Memo for Rcd, n.d., Brief Appreciation of

Russell Islands Situation. RED VAULT, USAFISPA,

Misc Hist Info, Russell Islands, 5 Jan 44. (2) Rpt,

G-3 Sec 43d Inf Div, 25 Feb 43. RED VAULT,

USAFISPA. (3) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 257-

58.
234 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Pacific. An additional mission of the

depot was to receive, store, and distribute

spare parts. Since there was no spare

parts company, men had to be taken

from the Engineer Section, SOS, and

from a maintenance company to man

the depot's spare parts section. The

result was that a skeleton force had to

carry out the important job of distributing parts to engineer units, with about

20 men trying to do the work of 200.26

Further Over-all Planning for the

Campaign

With plans for the campaign well

along, representatives from the Southwest and South Pacific arrived in Washington early in March for a series of

conferences with the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and War Department planners.

General Sutherland, MacArthur's chief

of staff, made it plain that large forces

would be needed. At least 22-2/3 divisions and over 4,000 additional aircraft

would be required. The Pacific delegates found that there was no chance of

getting that number of men and planes;

the shortage of shipping alone precluded

sending them. The decision was made

to limit operations in the two theaters in

1943 to Task Two—that is, the seizure of

the northern Solomons, northeastern

New Guinea, and western New Britain

—but with the additional objective of

seizing the small islands of Woodlark

and Kiriwina to the east of New Guinea.

Bombers based on these islands could

easily reach Rabaul, about 300 miles

away. General MacArthur would command operations outlined by ELKTON.

The matter of timing was left to the

theater commanders. On 28 March, the

Joint Chiefs issued their directive

for the forthcoming campaign. MacArthur and Halsey were to establish airfields on Woodlark and Kiriwina, seize

various areas along the northeast New

Guinea coast, including Lae, Salamaua,

Finschhafen, and Madang, occupy western New Britain, and occupy the

Solomon Islands as far as southern

Bougainville. Late in March, Halsey

and MacArthur met at Brisbane to work

out the many details. They agreed to

carry out a series of approximately thirteen assaults in a period of eight months.

They planned to begin the campaign

with simultaneous invasions of Woodlark, Kiriwina, and New Georgia.

Thereafter, Southwest Pacific forces

would seize areas along the eastern New

Guinea coast while South Pacific forces

would move through the Solomons as

far as southern Bougainville. Finally,

MacArthur's forces would seize parts of

western New Britain. CARTWHEEL was

to begin about 1 June.27

General Casey repeatedly stressed that

even with the lowered requirements, the

engineer force contemplated for CARTWHEEL was too small. The Air Forces

alone required a tremendous amount of

construction. On 8 April the total air

strength in the Southwest Pacific was 516

planes. There were expected to be 1,330

by the end of the year, plus a 25-percent

reserve. If the airfields for this enlarged force were to be provided, a substantial increase in engineer strength was

26 SOS, SOPAC Hist Rpt From Activation to 30

Jun 43. 98-SS2-0.1 (23774)M, 10 Nov 42-30 Jun 43.

27

 Miller, CARTWHEEL: Reduction of Rabaul,

pp. 12ff.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 235

necessary. The engineers would have

to do much work for the ground and

service forces. It was essential to have

a balanced engineer force, but such a

force was not in the theater in early 1943.

Urgently needed were construction units,

general service regiments, and dump

truck companies. Requirements for

such units were so heavy that it was not

possible under the troop basis to provide

light or heavy ponton units, camouflage,

water supply, or additional topographic

units. There was a critical need for a

forestry company to provide timber in

the forward areas and thus reduce shipping requirements. In a campaign such

as that contemplated in ELKTON, to be

waged in the jungles of New Guinea and

the Solomons, engineer work, especially

construction, would be particularly

heavy during the first three months.

From now on the engineers would not

be able to count on civilian workmen to

meet most or a large part of their construction needs. All that would be

available, besides troops, would be the

natives of New Guinea and the

Solomons.28

Further Engineer Preparation

in SWPA

By April engineer work for the coming

offensive was moving ahead satisfactorily.

The 2d Special Brigade was training for

its missions. On the 7th the first LCVP

slid down the ways of the boat assembly

plant at Cairns, and before long the men

were completing six a day. The first

LCM's were expected from the United

States in May.29 On 17 April the remainder of the Engineer Section, Sixth

Army, reached Australia and Colonel

Sturgis now had a more adequate staff to

help him plan for combat. As rapidly

as possible the units arriving from the

United States were being sent to New

Guinea and were employed around the

clock. In mid-April, the 46th, 91st, and

96th engineers were working on airfields,

roads, docks, and hospitals at Port

Moresby. The 808th Aviation Battalion, which had recently left for Sydney

for rest and recuperation, was replaced

by the 857th Aviation Battalion, which

reached Port Moresby early in April.

The 43d engineers were continuing work

on airdromes and roads at Milne Bay and

Dobodura. Their effectiveness, Casey

noted, had been lowered by "a high sickness rate resulting from continued hard

physical activity under severe tropical

conditions with much of their operations in malarial infested regions."

Two companies of the 96th were to be

transferred to Dobodura and two to

Milne Bay to help the 43d. The 842d

Aviation Battalion, just arrived in the

Southwest Pacific, was to go to Port

Moresby to become acclimatized and to

replace other units being moved to more

forward areas. A heavy shop company

and a maintenance company, which had

recently landed in Australia and which

had been urgently needed to repair

equipment, were to be moved to New

Guinea as soon as shipping became

available. The American units in New

Guinea were being supplemented by

28

 (1) Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 31 Mar 43.

(2) Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 8 Apr 43. Both in

SWPA File 111.

29

 Heavey, "Down Ramp," The Military Engineer,

XXXVIII (August, 1946), p. 335.
236 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

increasing numbers of Australians. By

April, four mobile works squadrons of

the RAAF, about 2,000 men, were working at Port Moresby, Milne Bay, and

Goodenough. In order to release some

of the engineers employed in the Port

Moresby area, Casey asked for 700 men

of the Civil Constructional Corps to take

over part of the work there. Heavy

demands on the engineers elsewhere in

New Guinea made such arrangements

imperative. Of the organization, thirtynine men who had volunteered for service arrived at Port Moresby in April to

work for the American forces, but the

Civil Constructional Corps could not

send the relatively large numbers of

men which the engineers needed.30

Engineer units continued to be hampered by shortages of supplies and equipment. "Considerable difficulty has been

encountered," Casey wrote to Reybold

on 2 March, "in replenishing worn out

construction equipment and in building

up a suitable stock to take care of operational needs. . . ." Colonel Harrison,

the engineer officer expert in spare parts

supply, on a tour of the theater in late

1942 and early 1943, suggested to Casey

that it might be possible to obtain overhauled and rebuilt machinery from the

Construction Division of the Office of

the Chief of Engineers, now that building in the United States had begun to

taper off. Casey wrote General Reybold, asking if there were any chance of

getting a number of items urgently

needed and almost impossible to procure

in the theater: 25 shovels with pile driver

and dragline, 18 truck-mounted cranes,

54 D-7 and D-8 tractors with bulldozers

or angledozers, 12 Tournapulls, and 200

dump trucks.31 It turned out that prospects of getting used equipment were

slight. On 1 May, Somervell informed

MacArthur that it would not be "feasible

to ship used equipment to overseas theaters" and that there was no rebuilt

equipment on hand for shipment.32

On 21 April USASOS expanded its

system of bases in New Guinea. It

designated Milne Bay, Oro Bay, and

Port Moresby Advance Sub-Bases A, B,

and D. Six days later, USASOS set up

Advance Sub-Base C on Goodenough

Island. These four bases were under

the supervision of U.S. Advanced Base

at Port Moresby. In New Guinea, as in

Australia, decentralization of authority

was emphasized in order to expedite

work as much as possible. The Commanding General, U.S. Advanced Base,

placed responsibility for engineer construction on the base commanders, who

in turn assigned to their engineers the

planning and execution of the work. It

was impossible, however, to find enough

engineers to staff adequately the offices

at the forward bases.33

Early in May, Casey and Sverdrup,

accompanied by engineer and naval officers, made an inspection of the forward

bases. Visiting Dobodura first, they

were impressed by the amount of work

which had been done there. Excellent

progress had been made on the airstrips.

One of the runways was surfaced with

5,000 feet of steel mat. Maj. Gen.

30

 Memo for Rcd, Casey, 15 Apr 43. SWPA File 1.

31

 Ltr, Casey to Reybold, 2 Mar 43. SWPA File

139.

32

 2d Ind, ACofS for Opns ASF to CINCSWPA,

1 May 43, on n. 30. 33

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

66ff.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 237

A SECTION OF THE ORO BAY-DOBODURA ROAD

Horace H. Fuller, commander of the

41st Division, joined the group for an

inspection trip of the 25-mile-long road

connecting Dobodura with Oro Bay.

This was the road on which the Australians had begun work the previous

December. The 116th and two companies of the 43d Engineers had taken

over from the Australians in February.

Just out of Dobodura, the road was "in

excellent condition on the long flat reach

up to the Embogo River." Beyond was

a stretch of about eleven miles, "the highlevel road," which was being put through

hilly country. A great deal of effort was

still necessary here; excessive grades

would have to be reduced, and in one

area where a cut was made through an

artesian well formation, better drainage

was required. Engineers of the 116th

and 43d, helped by native workmen,

had, Casey reported, "performed a tremendous amount of work in the construction of the high-level road under

most difficult conditions of terrain and

weather." A more thorough reconnaissance of the alternate low-level route

had indicated that construction there

would not be as difficult as originally

supposed. A road had already been put

in part way to serve as a cutoff which

bypassed much of the hilly section, but
238 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

it could not be depended upon during

heavy rains. Casey directed that after

the high-level road was finished, the lowlevel route be worked on to provide an

alternate highway. Both roads were to

be completed eventually to take the

heavy traffic which would soon be moving

inland from Oro Bay to Dobodura. The

party found that facilities at Oro Bay

were well advanced. Hastily constructed warehouses, well dispersed, provided excellent storage for the large

amounts of supplies arriving daily. On

Goodenough, also, Casey found that the

RAAF works units had made noteworthy

progress on the airfields.34

Milne Bay, from which the advance up

the New Guinea coast and against the

nearby islands would have to be mounted

and largely supplied, presented a different picture. Construction was far behind schedule. Some work was going

on at three areas on the northern shore

—Ahioma, K. B. Mission, and Gili Gili—

and at one area on the southern shore

—Waga Waga. Farthest along was Gili

Gili, where work had been started as far

back as July 1942. Here were two airfields, two docks, several warehouses, and

a fair network of roads. At the other

areas, work was just beginning. Waga

Waga was the only other place where

piers had been built. Casey believed

that K. B. Mission, Ahioma, and Waga

Waga were excellent for base development. They had extensive, well-drained

areas, ample supplies of water, and

beaches with deep water close to shore,

well suited for piers. There might be

problems at Waga Waga, where, in some

places, swamps extended half a mile inland. A major handicap was the almost

complete lack of engineer troops. Only

Company F of the 96th Engineers was at

Milne Bay, together with some Australian troops and natives. The units

which had built the airfields the year

before were gone; Company E of the

46th Engineers had been transferred to

Port Moresby and Companies D and F

of the 43d Engineers to Dobodura and

Oro Bay. Most of the Papuans at Milne

Bay were working for the Australians;

2,500 of them were building facilities for

the Australian Army, but only 250 had

been assigned to the Americans. Malaria reduced the effectiveness of troops

and natives further. Shortages of equipment and materials were serious. Casey,

in a radio to Sutherland on 9 May, recommended that the principal advance base

be located at Ahioma and that the K. B.

Mission area be developed for staging

troops. He emphasized the need for

sending in more engineer units.

USASOS was hard pressed to find additional troops; it had practically none to

spare.35

At the time of Casey's visit, the prospects were dim that the base would be

ready to support combat operations by

early June. Colonel Sturgis was greatly

concerned over the slow rate of progress.

Members of his staff, having made a

reconnaissance of Milne Bay in midMay, reported that much additional work

was necessary. On 26 May, General

Krueger, with the approval of MacArthur, ordered an advance echelon of

Headquarters, Sixth Army, including 34

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 May 43. SWPA

File 98. (2) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 10 May 43.

SWPA File 94. 35

 Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 May 43.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 239

Colonel Sturgis with a staff of thirteen

officers and men, to go to Milne Bay to

help with the development of the base.

The advance echelon reached Gili Gili

the next day. Borrowing a launch from

the base commander, Sturgis, with part

of his staff, cruised along the northern

shore, stopping off at K. B. Mission and

Ahioma for a closer look at sites for

docks, warehouses, camps, and staging

areas. A number of units, recently arrived from the United States, were

rushed to Milne Bay; included were the

339th General Service Regiment, the

198th Dump Truck Company, and the

445th Heavy Shop Company. The 46th

General Service Regiment, a USASOS

unit, was put under Sixth Army control;

on 1 June, the second battalion and

Company B arrived at Milne Bay from

Port Moresby. The next day, Sturgis

directed that a staging area for 10,000

men be ready east of Ahioma by the 15th

of the month. Required were clearing

the jungle, putting in access roads,

wharves, and water supply points, and

erecting buildings for an advanced command post. By 5 June, 2,824 engineers

and 700 natives were cutting out patches

of jungle, building piers, and erecting

native-type structures. It was slow

work. Shortages of supplies, especially

of piling, were extreme. Sturgis had

the natives cut mangrove; the logs, some

of them seventy-five feet long, made excellent piling and could also be used for

decking. Engineer blacksmiths cut and

shaped spikes from lengths of concrete

reinforcing rods. The rains were almost

continuous, and vehicles became hopelessly mired on the primitive roads,

which, for the most part, paralleled the

beaches and streams and meandered

through swamps. "It was common," the

historian of the 46th Engineers wrote,

"to see three D-8 tractors stuck in the

same mud hole." Meantime, Sturgis

readied two advance detachments, one

under Col. Orville E. Walsh, the other

under Lt. Col. William J. Ely, to go to

Woodlark and Kirwina about a week

before the assault and select good landing areas, locate sites for airfields, and

find possible routes for roads.36

Despite growing efforts being made in

New Guinea, Australia remained the

major base in the Southwest Pacific, and

an extensive construction program was

still under way there. On 30 June 1943,

48,000 civilians were at work on military projects—an all-time peak. An

impressive amount of building had been

accomplished. Over 300 airfields had

been provided, from unpretentious grass

strips without facilities to large airdromes with four or five paved runways.

(Map 13) The Allied Works Council

reported having built or reconditioned

4,621 miles of road. The Queensland

Island Defense Road was finished, and

about two-thirds of the North-South

Road from Alice Springs to Larrimah

had been surfaced with bitumen. Hard

surfacing of the road from Larrimah to

Darwin was in progress, and sealing of

the road from Mt. Isa to Tennant Creek

was nearing completion. Work had

been finished on storage for gasoline—

174 tanks with a capacity of 110,092,000

gallons had been provided. The AWC

had built hospitals in all the states and

Northern Territory. The largest one,

36

 (1) Engr Sec Sixth Army, Engr Hist, ch. I. (2)

Comments by General Sturgis on draft of this chapter. (3) 46th Engr GS Regt, Hist Rpt, 16 May-4

Aug 43.
240 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 13

the Temperate Zone Hospital at Herne

Bay in Sydney—being built for the

American forces—was to be finished by

September, and the slightly smaller Holland Park Hospital in Brisbane, likewise

being built for the U.S. Army, was also

to be finished that same month. Millions of cubic feet of warehouse space had

been provided, and construction was still

going on. Again, the largest project

under construction was a group of fortyseven warehouses being built for the

American forces at Meeandah, near

Brisbane. (Map 14) The program of

camp construction was vast, particularly

in Queensland. The harbors of Townsville, Darwin, Fremantle, and other cities

were being dredged and their port facilities improved. The Brisbane graving

dock was more than half finished. Excavation for the dock at Sydney was

complete. The largest maritime project was the transshipment port being

built at Cairns for American forces at an

estimated cost of £3,500,000, work on

which was just getting under way by the

end of June. Cairns harbor was to be

dredged, wharves totaling more than a

mile were to be built, almost 100 warehouses were to be erected, and 15 miles

of road and 10 miles of railroad were to

be put in. When finished the trans-
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 241

MAP 14

shipment port would be able to receive

and distribute up to 25 percent of all

supplies and equipment sent from the

United States to Australia. During the

fiscal year ending 30 June 1943, the

Allied Works Council spent £55,961,398

for military construction. About onethird of this amount went for facilities

for the American forces.37

The AWC still found it impossible to

get enough workmen and equipment for

its projects. As before, the jobs in

northern Australia were the hardest to

complete. In early June 167 major

projects, costing from £6,000 to

£3,050,000, were under way in Queensland and Northern Territory. The

four largest, each costing more than

£1,000,000, were the transshipment port

at Cairns, the camp at Atherton Tablelands, the road from Mt. Isa to Tennant

Creek, and the road from Alice Springs

to Larrimah. On 12 June, Theodore

wrote to Air Marshal George Jones,

Chief of the Air Staff, RAAF, that the

council was "experiencing the greatest

difficulty in providing sufficient plant,

materials and manpower to enable . . .

37

 (1) AWC, Report, February 1942-June 1943, pp.

21, 22, 24-26, 40, 50, 53, 56, 57, 60-61, 68, 71, 80.

(2) Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 17 June 43. SWPA

File 94.
242 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

works [in Queensland and Northern

Territory] to be completed within the

period asked for by the Services, and it

is safe to say that there are few, if any,

works in these areas which are proceeding at the desired rate." As exasperating as the lack of manpower and the

shortages of supplies was the transportation bottleneck. On 12 June there were

3,775 tons of supplies piled up at Brisbane, Townsville, and Sydney awaiting

shipment to projects in the northern part

of the continent.38

Procedure for construction, already

involved, became still more elaborate—

partly the result of the establishment of

the additional commands. After Headquarters, USAFFE, was set up, it was

empowered to approve all requests for

construction before USASOS could forward them to the various AustralianAmerican committees, a procedure instituted principally to curb requests from

the Army Air Forces. Moreover, headquarters of both Sixth Army and Fifth

Air Force first reviewed all requests

from their lower echelons before submitting them to USAFFE for approval.

In April 1943, USAFFE directed that all

requests for construction in the service

areas, whatever their cost, be submitted

for approval, if construction required

building a new installation or expanding

an existing one in order to increase the

scope of operations.39 Considerable

confusion resulted. Many base section

commanders would not authorize any

construction without first getting a decision from higher headquarters. Dissatisfaction with "red tape" grew. Some

kind of action was required to simplify

procedures.40

Little could be done to expedite procedures on the Australian side. The

Commonwealth authorities insisted on

reviewing all requests for construction

from the U.S. Army for which Australia,

from its limited resources, had to provide

workmen and materials. The Australian authorities studied each request

to determine if it was in line with MacArthur's operational and strategic plans

and made surveys to ascertain whether

Australian facilities were already available. They reviewed all requests for

construction of permanent type installations to determine if the standards of

construction were in harmony with those

of the Australian services. The Australians agreed that confusion and red

tape existed; the remedy, they said, was

not to change the system but to operate

it more efficiently. They complained

that full details, plans, and estimates for

American projects were not furnished

soon enough. Casey stressed the need

for prompt submission of the necessary

data. But in other respects, the system

would have to go on as before.41

The South Pacific by Midyear

In the South Pacific Area, construction

in the rear areas, except in Fiji, was

largely complete by mid-1943. There

38

 Ltr, Theodore to Jones, 12 Jun 43. SWPA File

241.

39

 Ltr, MacArthur to Krueger et al., 26 Apr 43.

SWPA File 270.

40

 (1) Ltr, Brig Gen Carl W. Connell, Hq Fifth

AF Serv Comd, to Casey, 15 Jul 43. (2) Ltr, Heiberg

to Connell, 21 Jul 43. Both in SWPA File 270. 41

 (1) War Cabinet Secret Agendum No. 249/1943,

sub: Works for the USASOS, Rec'd Of C Engr,

GHQ, 24 Jun 43. SWPA File 241. (2) Memo, AWC

to Dep Dir-General of Allied Works, Queensland,

27 Jul 43. SWPA File 270.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 243

was little left to do on the islands of the

ferry route. In New Zealand, the camp,

depot, and hospital near Auckland had

been finished in April. The drilling for

oil, resumed in May, had been discontinued after about two weeks when it

appeared fairly certain that no oil would

be found.42

The engineer aviation battalions had

initially been assigned to the Services of

Supply in the South Pacific. In January

1943 the Thirteenth Air Force was activated, and shortly thereafter the XIII

Air Force Service Command. The latter

was responsible for the administration

and operations of engineer aviation units.

The first unit was transferred on 19

April. The remote location of many

units and poor communications resulted

in a great deal of local autonomy. On

many of the outlying islands, the aviation

engineers were supervised by the base

engineer, and they remained under his

supervision. On the islands more centrally located—New Caledonia, New

Hebrides, and Guadalcanal—the Air

Forces took direct responsibility for the

administration and operation of engineer aviation units. On such islands as

New Caledonia and Fiji, the aviation

battalions were largely responsible for

the building of airfields. In the combat

zone of the Solomons the Navy directed

airfield planning and construction, and

work on the fields was done for the most

part by the naval construction battalions

and Marine engineer units. Army engineer aviation battalions did such minor

work as extending and maintaining runways, constructing housing and storage,

and building roads.43

By 30 June there were 145,443 United

States Army troops in SOPAC, of whom

13,434 were engineers. In SWPA, U.S.

Army troops at this time numbered

176,254, of whom 23,909 were engineers.

The Southwest Pacific, with a more extensive engineer organization, had four

major engineer offices, one each for GHQ,

USAFFE, USASOS, and the Sixth Army.

The Australian military engineer organization worked closely with the U.S. Army

Engineers. In the South Pacific during

the first months of 1943, there was but

one over-all Army engineer office—that

of Colonel Beadle in headquarters of the

Services of Supply at Noumea. On 10

June, Beadle reconstituted the theater

Engineer Section, which had been discontinued the previous December. The

new section had 2 officers and 2 enlisted

men. As Engineer, USAFISPA, Beadle

was henceforth responsible for formulating policies with regard to Army engineer activities in the theater, advising

General Harmon on engineer matters,

and co-ordinating Army engineer work

in the theater. Col. Lacey V. Murrow

took over from Beadle as engineer for

the Services of Supply; his staff numbered 21 officers and 53 enlisted men.

Even with their expanded setup, the

engineers of SOPAC had nothing like

the engineer organization of SWPA.44

42

 (1) SOS SOPAC Hist Rpt From Activation to

30 Jun 43. (2) Beard, Concluding Rpt—Oil Exploration Opns in New Zealand.

43

 (1) Hq XIII Air Force Serv Comd, Hist Monograph, Opns of Avn Engrs in SOPAC, Jan 42-Aug

44. (2) Memo, Kumpe for Casey, 27 Sep 43. 061.20

Intel Rpt, SWPA Files, KCRC. (3) DeLonge, Rpt

on Observations in SOPAC. 44

 Hq and Hq Co USAFISPA, Hist, 1 Jul 42-30

Jun 43.
244 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Operations Instructions

for CARTWHEEL

General MacArthur issued operations

instructions for CARTWHEEL on 13 June.

There were to be three major drives.

The most extensive assaults were assigned to General Blamey. American

and Australian troops under his command were to seize a large part of northeastern New Guinea. Advancing by air,

land, and sea, they were to capture

Salamaua, Lae, the Markham Valley, and

Finschhafen. They were then to prepare to seize, by airborne, overland, and

shore-to-shore operations, the northern

coast of New Guinea, including Madang

and its surrounding area. Meanwhile,

elements of Sixth Army under General

Krueger were to seize Kiriwina Island

and, using South Pacific forces, were to

capture nearby Woodlark. Airfields

were to be constructed on both islands.

South Pacific Force under Halsey was to

take Japanese-held areas in the central

Solomons and hold off enemy air and

naval forces operating from bases in the

northern part of the island chain. As

soon as possible USASOS was to develop

advance bases in the parts of New Guinea

to be taken from the Japanese.45

The engineers would have to make a

maximum effort to insure the success of

CARTWHEEL. They would have to support the combat forces by constructing

airfields, roads, ports, warehouses, camps,

and hospitals in the forward areas and by

furnishing technical assistance in connection with the building of field fortifications. If necessary, they would have to

fight as infantry. Most construction

would have to be done in eastern New

Guinea. In the jungles of that part of

the island the engineers would have to

improve the existing airfield at Bena

Bena and build a new one at Tsili Tsili.

In the Markham Valley, their chief task

would be enlargement of the airstrip at

Nadzab, followed by the construction of

a second strip nearby. They would have

to enlarge the airfields and port facilities

at Lae and improve the road from Lae

to Nadzab and extend it to the Leron

River. They would have to construct

oil storage tanks at Lae and pipelines

from there to the airfields in the Markham Valley. On hand to do all this

work would probably be, by D plus 30,

2 airborne aviation battalions for Tsili

Tsili, 3 aviation battalions for the upper

Markham Valley, and 6 aviation battalions, one depot platoon, one heavy

shop company, one maintenance platoon,

two equipment companies, and one

engineer shore battalion for Lae and the

lower Markham Valley. Engineer units

under Sixth Army would meanwhile do

construction on Kiriwina and Goodenough as requested by the Air Forces,

and on Woodlark in accordance with

specifications furnished by the Commander, South Pacific Force. For these

operations the Southwest Pacific theater

was to furnish 2 aviation battalions, a

general service regiment, and RAAF

units; the South Pacific, a naval construction battalion. Of first priority on each

island was the construction of a landing

strip with dispersals. In the Solomons,

Navy and Marine units would undertake

major combat and construction missions,

supported by Army engineer units. In

the Southwest Pacific, USASOS engineers

45

 GHQ SWPA OI No. 34, 13 Jun 43. SWPA

File A283.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 245

would begin base construction as soon

as the Japanese had been cleared from a

newly won area. The commanding

general of USASOS was directed to push

completion of facilities on the Cape

York Peninsula, and at Port Moresby,

Dobodura, and Milne Bay. He was to

put special emphasis on building up

Milne Bay, as this was to be the major

supply base in southeastern New Guinea.

General Blamey was to begin the development of the base at Lae at the earliest

possible time and was to get reinforcements from USASOS for that purpose.

As soon as the tactical situation permitted, USASOS would be made responsible for developing the base.46

CARTWHEEL

Combat Engineers on New Georgia

CARTWHEEL was to begin with an assault on New Georgia in the central

Solomons. A task force including the

Army's 43d Division and two Marine

raider battalions had been organized for

the operation. Landings were to be

nade at various points on New Georgia

and nearby islands. The principal objective was Munda Airfield, the capture

of which was to be followed by the

destruction of the major concentrations

of the Japanese forces. Since the islands

of the New Georgia group were mountainous and blanketed with tropical

forests and tangled undergrowth, the

destruction of the enemy was expected to

be a laborious process.

On 20 June the marines landed at the

southern tip of New Georgia island, and

soon thereafter Seabees began to build a

fighter strip and a base for motor torpedo

boats (PT's). Ten days later elements

of the 43d Division landed on small

Rendova island. On 2 July they crossed

the narrow channel and came ashore on

New Georgia, some five miles southeast

of Munda Airfield. The engineers of

the 118th Combat Battalion went in

with the infantry. They first cleared

beach areas and developed water points

and then prepared to support the infantry in the drive toward Munda Airfield. Though the objective was not

far away, it was hard to get to because of

the almost impenetrable jungle, the

swamps, and the skillful resistance of the

enemy. The engineers had more than

enough to do to clear trails, cut roads

through the jungle, and build timber

bridges. On 14 July a second landing

was made on New Georgia at a more

favorable point to the west, named

Laiana. The combat engineers again

supported the infantrymen in the advance. Early in July Company C of the

118th had landed on southern New

Georgia. They helped the marines with

base construction and destroyed enemy

pillboxes with flame throwers. In midJuly this company moved to Laiana to

support the advance on Munda. Meantime, a force of marines had landed on

the northern coast and was moving south.

Everywhere the forward movement was

slow; Munda would not be easy to take.47

46

 ELKTON Plan, Engr Annex, 1 July 43. SWPA

File 117.

47

 (1) Hq 118th Combat Bn, Opns Jnl, 29 Jun 43-

21 Aug 43. 343-43.3 (20433). (2) Capt. Joseph A.

Lieberman, "Road Construction on New Georgia,"

The Military Engineer, XXXVI (March, 1944), 75-

78. (3) Incl, The Army in the South Pacific, to Ltr,

Harmon to Handy, 6 Jun 44 (cited hereafter as
246 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Construction on Woodlark

and Kiriwina

There was a different story on the

small islands of Woodlark and Kiriwina.

Six days before the assault was scheduled,

the engineer advance parties under

Colonels Walsh and Ely went to the two

islands, where their work in clearing and

blasting obstacles from the beaches and

coral reefs and removing obstructions

from the trails—all of it unobserved by

the Japanese—was to be of great help to

the landing forces. The main assaults,

made on 30 June, were unopposed, and,

enemy resistance did not materialize

during the operation. On Kiriwina two

engineer units—the 59th Combat Company (separate), and Headquarters and

Service Company and the 2d Battalion,

46th General Service Regiment—came

in on D-day, ready to begin work on

docks, roads, and two airdromes. Since

there were no wharves, the combat engineers, with the help of native workers,

first prepared landing areas on the

beaches. Because of the heavy rains and

the lack of roads, the 46th Engineers,

charged with airfield construction, had

first of all to build roads to the two sites

for the airfields. Within a few days,

after a road had been completed from

the landing beach to one of the airfield

sites, the 46th began work on the first

field. On Woodlark, as on Kiriwina,

the main concern was construction.

The 404th Engineer Combat Company

went in with the task force. During the

first few days the men had as their main

jobs operating water points and opening

trails through the forests and widening

them into roads. On 2 July the company began work on the airfield. Since

the Navy was primarily interested in

Woodlark, the naval construction battalion which arrived on D-day did most

of the work on the single-runway airfield.

On 16 July, when the first plane put

down, the landing strip was operational

for about 4,000 feet.48

Amphibian Engineers in Eastern

New Guinea

Simultaneously with the attack on

New Georgia and on Woodlark and

Kiriwina, a landing was scheduled for

the eastern New Guinea coast. This,

the amphibian engineers' first combat

mission, would be of crucial importance;

Navy commanders in the theater, skeptical of the capabilities of the special

brigades, were exerting strong pressure

to have them turned into "stevedore"

outfits with shore duty only.49 The

amphibian engineers were scheduled to

land on the night of 29-30 June at

Nassau Bay, some 175 miles up the coast

from Oro Bay and 10 miles southeast of

Japanese-held Salamaua. At Morobe,

50 miles south of Nassau Bay, the 532d

Boat and Shore Regiment of the 2d

Special Brigade loaded infantrymen,

artillerymen, and a few members of the

116th Combat Battalion—some 740 men

all told—together with supplies and

Harmon, The Army in SOPAC). 98-USF2-0.5

(3721)M, 6 Jun 44. (4) See Brooks E. Kleber and

Dale Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1966).

48

 (1) Engr Sec Sixth Army, Engr Hist, ch. IV.

(2) 46th Engr GS Regt, Hist Rpt, 16 May-4 Aug 43. 49

 Ltr, Heavey to Noce, 3 Jan 44. SWPA File 62.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 247

equipment on 29 LCVP's, an LCM, and

2 captured Japanese landing barges.

The small force started out in stormy

weather. Rain fell continuously during

the trip along the coast, and the winds

churned the sea into 12-foot waves. A

few minutes before midnight a landing

was attempted. All the men reached

shore, but 22 of the boats and many

pieces of equipment were lost when the

craft were swamped on the beach.

There was no enemy resistance. The

infantry soon established a beachhead;

the shore engineers helped to organize

the defense perimeter. The next night

the Japanese attacked the beachhead on

both flanks. The shore engineers, along

with the infantry, fought on the southern

sector. In hand-to-hand combat, in the

course of which an amphibian officer and

6 enlisted men were killed, the enemy

was driven off, leaving from 30 to 40

dead. The Japanese made no further

attacks. The following day reinforcements and badly needed supplies began

to arrive. In the latter part of July the

amphibian engineers established a similar beachhead at Tambu Bay, five miles

north of Nassau. Soon they were moving supplies to the new location. The

men were so close to enemy positions

near Salamaua that they were frequently

under fire.50 "Every night our boats

carried up more troops, artillery, ammunition, tractors, jeeps, and the hundred other items an army must have,"

General Heavey wrote. "Every return

trip brought something back; casualties,

sick, mail, relieved troops." In the

course of these operations the shore engineers did considerable construction, including roads, bomb shelters, and a

bridge over a stream near Nassau Bay

to carry 10-ton loads. Meanwhile, combat engineers supported elements of the

41st Division and Australian troops moving up from the southwest toward Salamaua. Progress was slow. The men

had to push through jungle and swamp

and struggle across steep mountain

ranges. Without amphibious movement up the coast, the capture of

Salamaua would be well-nigh impossible.51

Airborne Engineers in the

Marhham Valley

Soon after operations began in the

Solomons and on the New Guinea coast,

they were also under way in the Markham Valley. In May and June two airborne aviation battalions, the 871st and

872d, arrived in Australia; each had

about 30 officers and 500 men. Equipment was lightweight and specially designed to be carried in C-47 transports

or 15-man gliders. The heaviest piece,

the tractor without its bulldozer blade,

weighed about one and one-half tons.

Twenty C-47's could carry one company,

fully equipped, 1,100 miles. The airborne engineers' primary job was to land

with paratroops and rehabilitate captured airdromes or to land with an

amphibious force and build new landing

strips quickly. Airborne engineers 50

 (1) Interim Rpt of the 2d ESB for Period Jan

Through 30 Sep 43. (2) Brig. Gen. William F.

Heavey, Down Ramp! The Story of the Army

Amphibian Engineers (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 60-63.

51

 Brig. Gen. William F. Heavey, "Amphibian

Engineers in Action," The Military Engineer,

XXXVI (May, 1944), 147.
248 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

could also be used to build airfields in

remote, out-of-the-way places into which

machinery could not be moved overland.

The battalions were ideal for construction in Markham Valley. Airfields built

there would enable the Allies to maintain continuous fighter cover over Lae

at an early date and make possible raids

on Wewak, a sizable enemy base on the

northern New Guinea coast.52

The initial unit selected for work in

the Markham valley was the 871st.

Early in July the men trained a few days

in loading equipment on C-47's and

taking it off again. A major objective

was to cut down the time for unloading

one plane to three minutes. Since

the airborne engineers would have to

rely mainly on their own resources to

protect themselves against enemy planes

and ground troops while working in

forward areas, each company of the battalion received additional machine guns.

Soon the men learned where they were

going. At Marilinan and Tsili Tsili,

natives, working under Australian and

American officers, had for several days

been clearing some old turf runways,

once used by missionaries and gold

miners. On 7 July a plane carrying five

men of Company C, a tractor, and a mowing machine took off for Marilinan along

with other planes carrying an antiaircraft

battery. Two days later, the remainder

of the company—about 125 men—together with equipment and supplies, was

loaded on thirty planes and flown over

the Owen Stanleys to Tsili Tsili. The

thirty planes were unloaded and, except

one, were on their way back to Port

Moresby by 1100, just two hours after

they had first taken off. The engineers

immediately began to improve one of

the strips at Tsili Tsili, continuing this

work until nightfall. The next day

they began work with their airborne

equipment on a 2-shift basis. By the

end of the second day, the runway was in

fair shape to take transports. The men

then began work on a nearby fighter

strip that Colonel Abbott, engineer of

the Fifth Air Force, said he wanted as

"smooth as a billiard table," an assignment the engineers considered "a pretty

big order for airborne equipment."

The men were soon working around the

clock. Since the kunai was six feet high,

the mowing machines brought from Port

Moresby were a godsend. About 400

natives helped on the field, clearing,

grubbing, and ditching. Defense was

provided by two companies of Australian

infantrymen "astride all the trails leading into the area." According to intelligence reports, there were about 9,000

Japanese troops at Lae and Salamaua,

some forty miles away. The engineers

found conditions ideal for construction

with airborne equipment. The natural

drainage and bearing value of the soil

were excellent. The skies were clear

with no sign of rain. Company C

worked alone until 21 July, when the

rest of the battalion landed, after having

been held back by bad weather over the

Owen Stanleys. By this time the transport runway had been extended to 5,000

feet and the fighter strip to 4,600. On

26 July two fighters landed.53 "Had

52

 Memo, Engr Sec Directorate of Base Serv Hq

AAF WD for Theater Group OPD WD et al, 2 Nov

42. SWPA File 23.

53

 Memo, Maj J. R. Walton, ExecO 871st Engr

Avn Bn, for Woodbury, 5 Sep 43. EHD Files.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 249

you been here this morning you too

would have been proud of your aviation

engineers," Lt. Col. Harry G. Woodbury,

Jr., the battalion commander, wrote to

Brig. Gen. Stuart C. Godfrey, engineer

of the Army Air Forces.54

Progress in the Central Solomons

Meanwhile, in the Central Solomons

the campaign moved ahead. By late

July the troops on New Georgia were

slowly closing in on Munda. Engineer

support was continuous. The 118th

Combat Battalion built a small boat pier

at Laiana, cut roads through the jungle,

and established water points. Responsible for the defense of the beachhead,

the men established a peripheral defense

with barbed wire and automatic

weapons. At various times, both companies of the battalion went into the

front lines with the infantry, using flame

throwers with excellent results. Engineer machine gunners shot down an

enemy plane. On 22 July the first elements of the 117th Combat Battalion of

the 37th Division arrived. Part of the

men served as infantry. All regular

engineer work had to be carried on

under fire and the threat of ambush.

Bulldozer operators, to protect themselves from snipers, improvised cabs with

armor plates taken from captured or

beached Japanese barges. On 5 August,

Munda Airfield was captured. Eight

days later the first planes landed. Engineer work continued as the enemy troops

were destroyed piecemeal or driven into

the interior of the island. In midAugust elements of the 65th Combat

Battalion landed to help the 117th and

118th engineers in the jungles around

Munda. By the 25th of the month organized resistance on New Georgia had

ended.55

Henceforth, the main engineer job on

the island was the building or improving

of roads in support of the infantry trying

to eliminate isolated pockets of resistance. Even when completed, most of

the roads were merely narrow clearings

through the tangled vegetation and were

just wide enough to take 21⁄2-ton trucks.

Many of the routes were located by

native guides and with excellent results.

Because the advance of the infantry was

now so rapid, the engineers found it impossible to provide drainage, not to mention surfacing. The numerous bridges

and culverts required were made of local

timber and discarded gasoline drums.

During the rainy season, the roads became impassable; the engineers attempted to provide surfacing with coral,

but the coral was too badly weathered to

be suitable. Considerable corduroying

was necessary. Although the rainy season lasted, as a rule, from November to

May, rains occurred in the dry season

too.56

Additional airfields were needed in the

54

 Ltr, Woodbury to Godfrey, 26 Jul 43. Engr871-SU, Tsili Tsili Airdrome New Guinea, Maxwell AFB.

55

 (1) Rpt, CO 65th Engr Bn to CG 25th Inf Div,

2 Sep 43. (2) 65th Engr Combat Bn, Opns of the

65th Engr Combat Bn. (3642) 325-33.4, 16 Aug12 Oct 43. 56

 (1) Lieberman, "Road Construction on New

Georgia," The Military Engineer, XXXVI (March,

1944). 75-78. (2) Harmon, The Army in SOPAC.

(3) Opns of the 25th Inf Div in the Central

Solomons. (3462) 325-33.4, 16 Aug-12 Oct 43. (4)

Lt. Col. William B Eubank, "Combat Engineers in

the Solomon Islands," The Military Engineer,

XXXVI (August, 1944), 260-63.
250 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

A CORDUROY ROAD, NEW GEORGIA, capable of supporting 155-mm. howitzers.

Solomons. The question arose whether

Vila Airfield on Kolombangara Island,

the other Japanese-held field in the New

Georgia group, was worth taking.

Aerial photographs indicated it was not

suitable for further development; Kolombangara was therefore bypassed, and

Vella Lavella, about fifty miles northwest of New Georgia Island, was chosen

for a landing. After ground reconnaissance had disclosed that the island

was not held in force, Admiral Halsey

decided to seize part of it in order to

construct an airstrip. Vella Lavella had

a mile-wide coastal plain, beyond which

the ground rose abruptly to a central

ridge about 3,000 feet high. Almost

the entire island was heavily wooded.

On 8 August, 6,000 men of the 25th

Division landed on the southeast coast.

Company C of the 65th Combat Battalion arrived seven days later. Principal engineer tasks included clearing

landing areas and locating supply dumps.

Subsequently the men worked on roads.

Because of the heavy rains, the engineers

had to corduroy about 10 percent of the

roads they built or improved; coconut

trees provided ample material for this

job. Miscellaneous tasks included installation of radar, operating the engineer supply depot, and putting in floors

for a field hospital.57

Work was under way on several

smaller islands near New Georgia. On

Arundel, Company B of the 65th began

work in September on roads and piers.

Coral outcroppings and potholes made

road construction difficult, and considerable blasting and fill were required.

Engineer equipment was too light for

the rough work. If building roads was

arduous, supplying water was easy. As

on the other large islands, there were

many springs, streams, and wells to take

care of all needs. On the smaller islands,

where no fresh water could be located,

salt water distillation units were set up.

In the New Georgia operations, the 65th

did not take part in combat as did the

117th and 118th. Nevertheless, the men

worked so near the infantry that they

were frequently exposed to fire. They

usually had to organize their own security

parties for each bulldozer and, in addition, had to send patrols to the front,

flanks, and rear. All told, the 65th suffered 17 casualties from machine gun and

rifle fire on New Georgia.58

57

 Opns of the 65th Engr Combat Bn. 58

 Ibid.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 251

The benefits resulting from the operations in the central Solomons were well

worth the effort made. "The results of

the New Georgia Campaign almost exceeded expectations," General Harmon

wrote, ". . . the Munda airdrome site

proved more advantageous than we had

anticipated. [With] four splendid airdromes ... all of Bougainville [was]

within easy bombardment range with

fighter cover."

 59

Satisfactory Progress Elsewhere

Meantime, operations were progressing on Kiriwina and Woodlark. On

Kiriwina a 6,000-foot coral strip was

ready for emergency landings by midAugust. By the end of the month one

runway was complete and work was going ahead satisfactorily on a second. At

North Drome, about four miles distant,

work was also progressing on the runway.

The 59th engineers were providing roads

and storage facilities. In New Guinea,

the Allies were slowly converging on the

enemy at Salamaua. The amphibious

move along the shores of northeast New

Guinea continued. In the Markham

Valley things were going well for the

airborne engineers. The work went so

fast during late July and early August

that numerous planes were soon stationed at this new field in the Markham

Valley. Not until 15 August did the

Japanese attempt to bomb the area, and

then their raids were largely ineffectual.

Salamaua, beleaguered since early July,

was still holding out at the beginning of

September, but the end appeared near.60

The Assault on Lae

Late in August elements of the Australian 9th Division and the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment began

assembling at Morobe for an assault on

Lae, about twenty-five miles north of

Salamaua. On the evening of 3 September the task force left Morobe. The

U.S. Navy used its own landing craft to

transport the Australian troops; the

amphibian engineers, using 44 LCVP's,

10 LCM's and a few miscellaneous craft,

carried their own boat and shore personnel, equipment, and supplies forward.

On the morning of the 4th the task force

arrived offshore, twenty miles east of

Lae. Three engineer amphibian officers

and 12 enlisted amphibian scouts went

ashore with the first wave, their job to

set up beach markers and direct landing

craft toward shore. The remainder of

the shore engineers, landing with subsequent waves, unloaded ESB and Navy

craft, helped by about 2,000 Australian

troops. The few Japanese in the area

put up only slight resistance; enemy air

attacks were a greater danger. Japanese

planes knocked out 2 LCI's (landing

craft, infantry) on the beach but had

difficulty in hitting the small amphibian

craft. About 12 officers and men were

casualties. Despite enemy interference,

the shore engineers were able to unload

supplies quickly, move them away from

the beach over hastily constructed roads,

and disperse them in supply dumps.

By D plus 3 the shore battalion had the

beach so well organized that operations

could henceforth be carried on in a

routine manner.61 "Our part of this 59

 Harmon, The Army in SOPAC. 60

 (1) Engr Sec Sixth Army, Engr History, ch IV.

(2) Memo, Walton for Woodbury, 5 Sep 43. 61

 (1) Heavey, "Amphibious Engineers in Action,"
252 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

operation turned out so successfully,"

Heavey wrote to Col. Henry Hutchings,

Jr., head of the 4th Brigade in the

United States, "and our Shore Engineers

proved so efficient that I think some of

our disbelievers will have to have more

faith in us in the future."62 Soon the

advance westward along the shore toward

Lae was under way. The men found it

slow going through the jungle and

swamp. Conditions ashore were worse

than aerial photographs had indicated,

rains having turned most of the area into

a quagmire. Almost all supplies had to

be forwarded along the coast by the

amphibian engineers.

For the Japanese entrenched at Lae

there was a growing threat from the west,

also. The airborne engineers had maintained their rapid progress in constructing runways at Tsili Tsili, and plans

were soon under way to prepare

additional strips closer to the enemy

positions. On 5 September the 503d

Parachute Infantry landed at an abandoned turf strip near Nadzab, about 50

miles northeast of Tsili Tsili and 25

miles west of Lae. The same day some

200 Australian pioneers with light engineer equipment reached Nadzab, having paddled from Tsili Tsili in rubber

boats down the Watut and Markham

Rivers. While the paratroopers guarded

the trails in the vicinity, the pioneers'

quickly prepared the landing strip for

the 7th Australian Division, the first

units of which flew in as scheduled the

next morning. The following day,

Company A of the 871st landed with

most of its equipment. After setting up

a temporary camp, the men laid out a

new and better landing strip, and then

began dozing away the heavy kunai grass

and leveling the ground. Enemy patrols

and ground troops were only 8 miles

away. A continual rumble of bombings

and artillery fire could be heard from

the direction of Lae and Salamaua. Expecting an enemy attack at any time, the

men rushed to get the runway in shape

as soon as possible. During the next

two days, a brigade of the Australian 7th

Division began to advance down the

Markham Valley toward Lae. The engineers meantime continued to enlarge

and improve the runways at Nadzab.63

Conditions were more difficult at Nadzab

than at Tsili Tsili. Rains were heavy,

and the light equipment was not satisfactory for the vast amount of earth

moving required. But the airborne

engineers' work helped speed the advance. The Japanese on the eastern

New Guinea coast were in a hopeless

position. On 11 September Salamaua

was captured; four days later, Lae fell.64

Finschhafen

MacArthur had originally planned to

attack Finschhafen four weeks after the

fall of Lae. Since an earlier assault now

appeared practicable and would undoubtedly take the Japanese by surprise, the date for the attack was moved

up to 22 September. It was to be carried out by Australian forces, who were

The Military Engineer, XXXVI (May, 1944), 147.

(2) Interim Rpt of the 2d ESB for the Period Jan

Through 30 Sep 43. 62

 Ltr, Heavey to Hutchings, 7 Sep 43. SWPA

File E10.

63

 (1) Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 292.

(2) Rpt, 871st Engrs, The Nadzab Mission. EHD

Files. 64

 Ltr, Woodbury to Casey, 15 Sep 43. ENGR871-SU, Tsili Tsili Airdrome—New Guinea, Maxwell AFB.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 253

to be moved to the area on American

transports. About 500 men of the 2d

Engineer Special Brigade with ten LCM's

and fifteen LCVP's were to help forward

men and supplies from Lae along the

New Guinea coast to the landing beaches.

Finschhafen was situated on a coastal

plain about half a mile wide, in back of

which were steep, heavily wooded mountains. The assault was made as planned

two miles north of the town. The

Japanese were at least partially prepared.

The amphibian scouts, coming ashore

with the first wave, were met by enemy

troops. After helping the infantry beat

off the attack, the scouts put up beach

markers. Landing with the second and

third waves, the shore engineers came

under intermittent fire from wellconcealed enemy pillboxes on the beach.

The infantry soon wiped out these emplacements. When the LCT's (landing

craft, tank) and LST's (landing ships,

tank) came in, the shore engineers were

ready to unload them.65

The Australians easily overcame the

scattered enemy resistance near the

beach, and on the second day, the airstrip

was captured. The town of Finschhafen,

however, proved to be strongly defended

and would not be taken without prolonged fighting. Japanese planes made

repeated attacks on the landing beaches,

especially during the first four days.

The craft of the amphibian engineers,

moving about or anchored in the open

seas, were prime targets. As the fighting

continued, the amphibians brought in

supplies and equipment and evacuated

casualties. They began operating a supply service between Lae and the Finschhafen beaches. On 2 October, Finschhafen fell. The Japanese retreated into

the mountainous region to the west of

the town. Despite the retreat of the

enemy ground forces, the Allied troops

along the shore continued to be in constant danger of attack by air and sea.

On the morning of 17 October, an

hour or so before daybreak, three barges

approached one of the landing beaches.

About 600 yards from shore, the occupants turned off the motors and silently

rowed their craft toward the beach. An

amphibious engineer happened to see the

approaching craft and, alerting the

American and Australian defenders,

opened fire with his 37-mm. gun. One

of the barges withdrew; the other two,

crippled, managed to land. Ten yards

away was a .50-caliber machine gun

position manned by 19-year-old Pvt.

Junior N. Van Noy and his loader, Cpl.

Stephen Popa, both of the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment of the 2d

Engineer Special Brigade. Van Noy, a

skilled gunner, held his fire until the

Japanese had lowered the ramps and

started to jump ashore. An enemy

grenade, landing in the gun position,

badly mangled one of Van Noy's legs

and wounded Popa. Van Noy opened

up a murderous fire on the Japanese,

who tried to annihilate him with flame

throwers, rifle fire, and grenades. Few

of the other guns on the beach could be

trained on the landing party, and, because of the darkness, the gunners were

largely forced to fire blindly. In the

course of the fighting, Popa was evacuated. Van Noy, heedless of calls to get

65

 (1) Heavey, "Amphibian Engineers in Action,"

The Military Engineer, XXXVI (May, 1944), pp.

148-49. (2) Interim Rpt of the 2nd ESB for Period

Jan Through 30 Sep 43. (3) Final Rpt on Opns of

2d ESB, 20 Jun-30 Sep. 43. SWPA File E17. (4)

2d ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt of Opns, 1-31 Oct 43.

SWPA File E18.
254 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

back to a defense line being formed a

hundred yards to the rear, remained in

his pit and continued to fire point-blank

at the enemy, now bent on wiping out

his position. An Australian rifle platoon

moved to the beach to mop up the Japanese. Van Noy was found dead from

numerous wounds, his last round of

ammunition fired. Estimates were that

he killed at least half of the 39 enemy

troops who had come ashore. "Van

Noy's gallant action," an Australian observer wrote, "gained time for all troops

to get into position to repel the landing

and undoubtedly saved lives," an opinion

shared by the Australians and Americans

alike at Finschhafen. Van Noy was

awarded, posthumously, the Medal of

Honor, the highest award for bravery

given by the United States Army.66

Airfields in the Interior

of New Guinea

During September the engineers continued work on the airfield at Nadzab,

concentrating on the construction of a

second runway. During October they

worked chiefly on graveling and asphalting a third strip. They employed several hundred natives, who cleared camp

sites, unloaded aircraft, and worked on

the runways, sorting rock and spreading

gravel by hand. Although designed as

fair-weather strips and gravel-surfaced

only, the first two runways constructed

at Nadzab remained serviceable in all

kinds of weather and required little

maintenance in the following months.

Meanwhile, the airborne engineers had

begun a third major airfield at Gusap in

the far northwest part of the Markham

Valley, near the source of the Ramu

River. After the area had been reconnoitered in September, the decision was

made to develop an all-weather airfield

including complete servicing and repair

facilities and runways to handle 200

transports daily. Early in October an

advance party of the 872d laid out the

landing strips and taxiways. Later

that month, the entire unit arrived and

began work. By mid-November, a

6,000-foot gravel-surfaced runway was

almost finished. Arriving at Gusap in

November, the 871st Battalion supplemented the efforts of the 872d. In

December, a 5,000-foot section of the

initial strip was given an asphalt surface,

the fair-weather strips, previously cleared

by the 872d, were maintained and repaired, and a number of buildings were

erected. At Gusap the men were fortu

nate in that they could build comfortable

quarters for themselves. For their mess

halls all companies erected portable

huts with concrete floors. They had

screened buildings with walls of lumber

and roofs of canvas for their dispensaries

and recreation rooms. These were almost unheard of luxuries in the out-ofthe-way reaches of New Guinea.67

Bougainville

The final operation in the Solomons in

which the engineers participated was the 66

 (1) History of the Second Engineer Special

Brigade (Harrisburg, Pa., 1946), pp. 52-53. (2)

Heavey, Down Ramp!, pp. 67-68. (3) Ltr, Lt Col

H. Boyd Norman, AIF 2/28 Aust Inf Bn, to CO

532d EBSR, 31 Oct 43. SWPA File E18.

67

 (1) Rpt, 871st Engrs, The Gusap Mission. EHD

Files. (2) Rpt, 871st Engrs, The Nadzab Mission.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 255

one on Bougainville. The largest island

in the chain, Bougainville, for the most

part mountainous and jungle covered,

had swampy coastal plains. The assault

was to be under the direction of I Marine

Amphibious Corps. The 3d Marine Division was scheduled to go in first, followed by the Army's 37th Division. On

1 November, the marines landed at Empress Augusta Bay on the western part of

the island. Naval construction battalions began work on a base and an airfield.

A week later a combat team of the 37th

Division, including elements of the 117th

Combat Battalion, came in. During

their first two days ashore, the engineers

cut supply trails through the jungle east

of the Koromokina River so that the

infantry could be supplied. Late in

November they put a 3-span all-traffic

bridge across the river in five days. The

117th engineers gained considerable experience in building roads through

virgin jungles. Using bulldozers and

explosives, the men first cleared a strip

a hundred feet wide. Next, shovels and

"cats" scooped out drainage ditches ten

feet wide and up to ten feet deep on

either side of the planned 30-foot road.

Under the top soil, about one foot thick,

was volcanic sand, which proved to be

adequate for surfacing. The sand was

excavated, piled up on the road, and

then leveled by bulldozers and graders.

Dump trucks were not necessary. By

15 December the engineers had completed most road construction. On

that date responsibility for operations on

the island passed from the Marine I Amphibious Corps to the Army's XIV

Corps. A service command was organized for Bougainville, and engineer work

thereafter was directed by it. Additional

engineer units were scheduled to arrive

to begin work on a sizable base.68

By this time the decision had already

been made to bypass and neutralize

rather than capture Rabaul. In June

various planning staffs in Washington

had reasoned that the advance toward

the Philippines and the Japanese home

islands would thereby be speeded up

considerably, and on 21 July General

Marshall suggested to MacArthur that

Rabaul be isolated. MacArthur at that

time did not believe that this would be

a wise course, but the Washington strategists became more and more convinced

that Rabaul should not be captured.

At the Quebec Conference Roosevelt

and Churchill approved the recommendations of the Combined Chiefs that

Rabaul be merely neutralized. This

decision was forwarded to MacArthur on

17 September. CARTWHEEL would be

continued, but, in its final phases, the

major objective would be not to take

Rabaul but to neutralize it and at the

same time provide bases to support operations farther west.69

The Engineers Continue To Furnish

Logistic Support

The South Pacific

In SOPAC the engineers made even

greater efforts on airfields and bases

during the last half of 1943. When the

810th Aviation Battalion had arrived on

68

 (1) Hist of the 117th Engr Combat Bn, 1 Oct31 Dec 43. (2) Lt Col William B. Eubank, "Combat

Engineers in the Solomon Islands," The Military

Engineer, XXXVI (August, 1944), 263. 69

 Miller, CARTWHEEL, The Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 222-25.
256 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Guadalcanal in June, Henderson Field,

badly in need of repair, was the only one

from which heavy bombers could take

off; marine engineers were striving to

put it in better shape. The 810th went

to work on a second bomber field, known

as Carney. At the time of the American

landing in August 1942, Guadalcanal

had no real motor roads. Even as late

as mid-1943, improvement of the rough

tracks and the construction of new roads

were imperative. The work of the

810th was extensive. "Mess halls were

constructed of native materials, . . .

steel quonset huts and . . . warehouses

were erected at assembly line speed," the

unit historian reported, "mile after mile

of road was built." In September part

of the unit with its heavy equipment

moved to Fighter No. 2 to improve that

field. That same month the 117th

Combat Battalion returned to Guadalcanal from New Georgia, its principal

job to build camps.70

On New Georgia, the 828th Aviation

Battalion, the 65th Combat Battalion,

part of the 131st Combat Regiment, and,

until they left for Guadalcanal, the 117th

engineers concentrated almost all their

efforts on or near Munda airfield. Their

major job was building roads, for the

almost complete lack of communications

on New Georgia made it necessary to do

much more than the normal amount of

new construction. Coral was plentiful

and was used almost entirely for surfacing. With the onset of the rains in November, some roads became quagmires,

with mud so deep that even road building

equipment could not get through. Improving drainage became a matter of utmost importance. In the New Hebrides,

the 822d and 828th aviation engineers

worked on roads, camps, and supply

depots. On Fiji, the 821st continued

on its various construction jobs. By

mid-December, they had finished work

on the airfields, completed the 250-bed

station hospital, improved a number of

roads, strengthened bridges, and finished

the 18-mile highway to the rest camp in

the Nausori Highlands.71

Extensive work was still under way on

New Caledonia. At the end of the year,

an aviation battalion, an aviation company, and all of one general service

regiment and part of another were busy

on that island. Three airfields—Tontouta, Plaines des Gaiacs, and Oua Tom

continued to receive the most attention.

The number of troops stationed at Tontouta was now so large that the engineers

had to provide the quartermaster with a

complete installation for servicing the

area. Most troops and supplies for the

South Pacific continued to be funneled

through the island. "The continued

construction and enlargement of facilities

on New Caledonia," General Breene

reported, "would indicate that this area

will contain a large proportion of the

rear installations and base activities for a

long time to come."

 72

The Southwest Pacific

In SWPA the engineers concentrated

their major efforts on the bases and air70

 (1) Hist of the 810th Engr Avn Bn. (2) Hist of

the 117th Engr Combat Bn.

71

 (1) Hist of the 65th Engr Combat Bn. (2) Hist

of the 131st Combat Regt. (3) Hist of the 821st,

822d, and 828th Engr Avn Bns. (4) Lieberman,

"Road Construction on New Georgia," The Military

Engineer XXXVI (March, 1944), 78. 72

 Rpt on Conditions in SOPAC, pt. I.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 257

fields along the northeast New Guinea

coast. Work at Milne Bay continued to

be difficult, and as the engineers enlarged

the base at Oro Bay, they found construction there more involved than had

been expected. The greatest obstacle

in both areas was the soggy terrain.

USASOS did not have enough engineers

to develop the two bases as rapidly as had

been planned. There was, moreover, a

basic weakness in organization; USASOS,

a service command designed for work in

rear areas, had up to now also been

operating in what was, for all practical

purposes, the combat zone; the forward

bases, without adequate defense, were in

serious danger of being overrun. Construction had gotten so far behind

schedule that MacArthur directed Sixth

Army to take over the work at Milne and

Oro Bays from USASOS on 1 July.

The two bases, with engineer units of

both Sixth Army and USASOS laboring

on them, developed at a more rapid pace.

Base C on Goodenough Island, placed

under Sixth Army control in July, was

inactivated that same month. On 15

August, with construction at Milne Bay

and Oro Bay fairly well along, the two

bases reverted to USASOS control.

With a growing number of Sixth Army

as well as Australian combat units in

New Guinea, the danger of an enemy

attack on USASOS installations in the

forward areas lessened considerably.

Milne Bay and Oro Bay set the pattern

for the future; henceforth, Sixth Army

began base construction in the forward

areas and, later on, when the tactical

situation permitted, USASOS took over.73

The demands on the engineers at the

two bases continued to be enormous. In

October, the program at Milne Bay still

called for five Liberty ship docks for the

exclusive use of USASOS. Gasoline

storage for 2,500,000 gallons had to be

put in. Over a million square feet of

covered storage had to be built at numerous sites, and an ordnance depot for

30,000 tons of ammunition was required

near the southern shore. A hospital

program of portable prefabricated huts

for 2,500 beds was planned, and possibly

2,500 additional beds would be needed.

In general, the base was to provide support for 140,000 men, and indications

were that this figure might even have to

be increased. By the end of the year

work was progressing at a fairly rapid

rate. Seven wharves had been constructed for Liberty ships along the

shore from Gili Gili to Ahioma. Storage space had been increased to 750,000

square feet. Depots were located along

the coast in such a manner that almost

each one had its own pier. One hundred miles of gravel road had been provided, together with six major bridges.

Two airdromes, Gurney and Turnbull,

were in operation. At Oro Bay and

Dobodura, work was near completion,

largely because extensive facilities were

not required. Oro Bay was to be a

staging area for 50,000 troops. By the

end of the year, Base B had eight runways of bitumen or steel mat, almost

half a million square feet of covered

storage, 125 miles of road, 35 bridges, 10

wharves, including 4 which could take

Libertys, together with hospitals and

administrative buildings.74 Inspecting 73

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

I, 122ff. (2) Memo, Sturgis for Sverdrup, 17 Aug

43. Sturgis File 35. 74

 (1) Ltr, CG USASOS to MacArthur, 13 Oct 43.
258 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Base B in November, Col. Thomas A.

Lane, Casey's operations officer, reported

that much work had been done, especially on the airfields. Like so many

other observers, he was struck by the

great effort which had been put into the

road from Oro Bay to Dobodura. He

considered the "high road" a "good example" of much engineer effort wasted

by "inadequate planning." At Oro Bay,

he came upon several long roads on

narrow ridges which, apparently, had

been built for "the sole purpose of

placing headquarters in sunlight and

breeze."

 75

At recently captured Lae and Finschhafen, the engineers were starting many

new projects. Needs at Lae, where the

first construction troops arrived on 18

September, were not so extensive as at

Oro Bay or Milne. As elsewhere in

New Guinea, shortages of men, equipment, supplies, and shipping were acute;

for many weeks, progress was slow.

Finschhafen was to be an advance air

base and have facilities for eight naval

vessels. Early in October, Maj. William

J. Ellison, Jr., the commander of the

808th, together with seven of his officers

and men, arrived at that newly acquired

area to make a start on construction.

They put in considerable time and effort

surveying sites for an airfield, since a

quick reconnaissance on the ground

clearly showed that the location picked

on the basis of aerial photographs was

unsatisfactory. On 23 October, the entire 808th arrived at Langemak Bay, just

south of Finschhafen, for work

 76

 on the

airfield. A battalion of Seabees, less

one company, helped with this project.

Heavy rainfall slowed earth moving and

grading. On 5 November MacArthur

directed that a major base be constructed

at Finschhafen to support air, ground,

and naval forces.77

On 15 November Lae and Finschhafen

passed to USASOS control, the former as

Base E, the latter as Base F. Both were

placed under Headquarters, Advance

Section, at Lae. Intermediate Section

was set up at Port Moresby to exercise

general supervision over all bases in New

Guinea. Engineer work at Lae and

Finschhafen continued under USASOS.

Late in the year there was a noticeable

increase in the scope of the work at Lae.

A major effort was required on the highpriority road to Nadzab, especially since

heavy rains made it impassable at times.

The 836th and 857th Engineer Aviation

Battalions did much of the work, completing the road by mid-December. At

Lae, rapid completion of docking facilities was held up by shortages of timber

and dock hardware. Still, by the end

of 1943 work was fairly well along. The

engineers had completed an airfield with

a steel mat runway and had provided

semipermanent housing for 900 troops,

15,000 square feet of warehouse space,

aviation gasoline storage for 600,000

gallons, together with a 20-mile pipeline

to Nadzab, a dock, and a jetty. At

Finschhafen, the runway, surfaced with

pierced plank laid on a coral base, was

finished on 10 December. The extenSWPA File 691. (2) Ltr, ExecO Of C Engr GHQ

SWPA to Casey, 9 Nov 43. SWPA File 160. (3)

Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I, 126-31. 75

 Memo, Lane for Casey, 9 Nov 43. SWPA File

160.

76

 (1) Ltr, Ellison to Casey, 3 Jan 44. SWPA File

102. (2) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 292. 77

 Ltr, MacArthur to Comdr New Guinea Force

et al., 5 Nov 43. SWPA File 116.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 259

BASE B AREA, ORO BAY

sive construction being planned for

Finschhafen was not to reach its full

stride until 1944.78

At Moresby work had tapered off and

by the end of the year was almost complete. Six airfields were in operation.

Eighty miles of road had been built,

about one-tenth of them surfaced with

bitumen. The engineers had built or

improved six docks, four of them large

enough to take Liberty ships. There

were hospital beds, most of them in prefabricated portable units or native-type

huts, for over 2,000 troops.79 "The construction achieved in this area, especially

airdrome construction, is most impressive," Colonel Lane wrote to Casey in

November.80 By the end of the year

most of the engineer troops had left Port

Moresby for more forward areas. The

78

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

II, 67. (2) Ltr, ExecO Of C Engr GHQ SWPA to

Casey, 9 Nov 43.

79

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I,

122ff. 80

 Memo, Lane for Casey, 9 Nov 43.
260 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

road from Bulldog to Wau had been

opened to traffic in August. By September jeeps with trailers loaded with

about ten tons of supplies could make

the rather rough trip in ten hours.

With the capture of Lae and Salamaua,

the need for a route linking Port

Moresby with the Markham Valley became unnecessary, and work on the road

was discontinued.81

Construction in Australia in the latter

half of 1943 was still extensive. From 1

July to 31 December 1943 the Allied

Works Council expended £25,845,556.

There was less building in the southern

part of the continent, but outlays for construction in Queensland and Northern

Territory increased slightly. Work for

American forces, though declining, was

still considerable. In mid-October, the

number of projects being built for the

U.S. Army totaled eighty-eight.82 The

jobs of highest priority were the improvement of five airfields—Garbutt,

Iron Range, Charters Towers, Amberley,

and Eagle Farms—the enlargement of

two camps—The Caves and Maryborough—and the construction of a coldstorage warehouse at Townsville. The

size of the transshipment port at Cairns

had been cut drastically because of the

rapidly expanding port facilities in New

Guinea.83

The complexity of the construction

procedures remained. Particularly

troublesome was the apparent necessity

for American commanders to send every

request to Headquarters, USAFFE, for

approval. Brig. Gen. Carl W. Connell,

head of the V Air Force Service Command, writing to Casey on 15 July, requested that something be done so that

a base commander could go ahead with

his work "without the necessity of writing a scenario concerning his each and

every effort, and then waiting a fortnight

while it is reviewed by someone who has

very little knowledge of his problems.

. . ."

 84

 This matter was shortly clarified. On 21 July MacArthur directed

that "construction involving minor repairs, alterations, and improvements at

a cost estimated to be less than 5,000

pounds will not be submitted . . . for

approval" to Headquarters, USAFFE,

"unless such alterations and improvements are not in accord with construction

policy and directives."

 85

Supplies

In both theaters, stocks of supplies

and equipment were extremely low.

In 1943, as in 1942, the authorized level

of supply for Class II and Class IV items

was a 90-day operating level, plus a 90-

day reserve. Most stocks in the two

theaters never remotely approached the

quantities called for. In the Southwest

Pacific, in late 1943, only about 7 percent

of the Class II items were on hand in

amounts sufficient to meet estimated

needs for 180 days. Class IV stocks were

equally scarce. The engineers in both

theaters needed far more than the ordi- 81

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI,

159. 82

 AWC, Report for the Period July 1, 1943-February 15, 1945, pp. 9-11. 83

 Memo for Rcd, Hq USAFFE, sub: Relative

Order of Importance of U.S. Army Constr Projs in

Australia, 11 Oct 43. SWPA File 241.

84

 Ltr, Connell to Casey, 15 Jul 43. SWPA File

270.

85

 Ltr, MacArthur to CG USASOS et al., 21 Jul 43.

SWPA File 270.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 261

nary amounts of supplies and equipment. Getting materials from the

United States was an extraordinarily

slow process. In the Southwest Pacific,

about 300 days elapsed between the time

a requisition was sent to the United

States and the time the troops received

the supplies. About one-third of this

time was taken up with the transshipment of stocks from Australia to New

Guinea and their distribution to the

using units. One requisition for the

Papua Campaign reached the San Francisco Port of Embarkation in October

1942. The War Department did not

finish editing it until February 1943, and

seven months later, materials ordered on

this requisition were still arriving at

Australian ports. In 1943 MacArthur's

headquarters began sending requisitions

for engineer Class II items to San Francisco 300 days in advance. Once a

month a new over-all requisition was

sent to indicate changes in needs. Thus,

there was constantly on file with the War

Department a requisition for 300 days of

engineer supplies and equipment for the

Southwest Pacific. There were frequently difficulties in getting these

requisitions approved and many were cut

extensively in the United States.86 General Reybold, visiting the Southwest

Pacific in November 1943, reported that

"reserve stockages have not been built

up in this theater, and as a result the forward displacement of port and airdrome

facilities has been retarded both by lack

of construction equipment and by lack

of sufficient engineer troops. A more

liberal policy in editing Class IV requisitions should be adopted."

 87

Both theaters reported many critical

shortages. In the South Pacific, lumber,

pipe, and electrical wire and fittings were

almost invariably in short supply. In

the Southwest Pacific, there was a heavy

demand for corrugated iron. It was the

best material for covered storage because

it was easy to erect, easy to ship, and held

up well in the tropics; on the whole, it

was far superior to sisalcraft, fibrolite, tar

paper, or native thatch. The engineers

ordered 6,500 tons from the United

States in May and another 6,500 tons in

August, but by mid-November they had

received nothing. Lumber was continually in short supply. It was needed

mainly for camps, hospitals, warehouses,

wharfs, and bridges. Only about onesixth of the 154,000,000 board feet

requisitioned in 1943 from the United

States had been sent by mid-November.

Exploitation of New Guinea's lumber

resources was urgent, but it was held

back by a lack of sawmills.88 "All

engineering troops . . . should come

equipped with sawmills; lumber is the

big cry here," Col. Carl A. Brandt of the

V Air Force Service Command informed

General Godfrey. "We in the Air

Service Command have had to salvage

old saw mills and fly them to forward areas, set them up, and operate

them to get any lumber at all."

 89

 The

43d Engineers and the 116th improvised

sawmills from scrapped equipment, but

even though the units now had the

86

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 Nov 43. (2) Ltr,

Casey to Reybold, 7 Oct 43. Both in SWPA File

139.

87

 Ltr, Reybold to Somervell, 25 Nov 43. SWPA

File 88. 88

 Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 Nov 43. 89

 Ltr, Brandt to Godfrey, 24 Aug 43. AAF, RG

501 Central Files, 322 Comds, Aug-Sep 43.
262 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ENGINEER TROOPS AT ORO BAY MAKE THEIR OWN HARDWARE

equipment, they lacked skilled operators.

Casey's efforts to have a forestry company

sent from the United States in 1943 were

unsuccessful; nevertheless he requested

six such companies for 1944. Shortages

of dock hardware, especially of nuts,

bolts, and steel rods, held back the construction of badly needed wharfs and

unloading facilities in the forward areas.

The only items not in short supply in

both theaters were fortifications materials. Insofar as possible the engineers

continued to rely on local resources.

Australia furnished considerable quantities of cement, lumber, nails, corrugated iron, dock hardware, and wire

screening, but of these items, only cement

was available in adequate amounts. In

the South Pacific only New Zealand continued to be a supplier of any consequence.90

Distribution of Supplies

With the arrival of growing, though

still insufficient, amounts of supplies in

the theaters, distribution to the units in

the combat zones became a vexing

90

 (1) Ltr, Reybold to Somervell, 25 Nov 43. (2)

Hist of USAFISPA During World War II From 30

Mar 42 to 1 Aug 44 (Draft MS). OCMH Files.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 263

matter. This problem was particularly acute in the Southwest Pacific.

USASOS established engineer supply

depots at the various forward bases but

set up no systematic procedure for requisitioning, with the result that most units

in New Guinea continued to order from

depots in Australia. No engineer office

was responsible for co-ordinating supply

requisitions, nor was there an engineer

office which had an over-all view of the

supply situation. Since stock control

was almost completely absent, locating

supplies was difficult. A second problem arose. Insufficient amounts of supplies had to be allocated to engineer

units of USASOS for base development

and to engineer units of task forces for

initial base construction.91 General

MacArthur delegated to USASOS, as the

major logistics agency of the theater,

responsibility for allocating supplies.

Colonel Sturgis suggested that stocks,

upon arrival in the Southwest Pacific, be

allocated to General Headquarters, to

USASOS engineers, and to task force

engineers. He believed that resupply

for Sixth Army engineer units should be

from Army and not USASOS depots.

Casey did not look with favor on this

suggestion. In his opinion, USASOS,

responsible as it was for logistic support

in the theater, should determine, on the

basis of operational directives, how

supplies in the theater should be allocated.92

 Late in 1943 the engineers

attempted to co-ordinate distribution of

supplies more adequately. In December USASOS set up an advance echelon

at Port Moresby and made it responsible

for co-ordinating engineer supply in the

forward areas. The Advance Echelon

was to receive all supply requisitions

from the forward areas and decide which

engineer depot was to fill them.93

Shortage of Supply Units

Difficulties in both theaters were compounded by an inadequate number of

engineer depot companies. The South

Pacific had to manage with two platoons

of one company during the first half of

1943. In the latter part of the year a

provisional depot company was organized

in Fiji, and one entire company and two

platoons of another arrived in the

theater from the United States. Elements of these units were dispersed to the

various islands. In the Southwest Pacific, there was but one depot company

throughout most of 1943. In the second

half of the year, three more arrived.

These were too few to handle adequately

the growing quantities of supplies.94

General Reybold, upon returning from

the Southwest Pacific in November 1943,

reported to Somervell, ". . . until recently this theater has operated with one

engineer depot company, and ... [in

Australia with] such civilian assistance as

could be procured. There have recently arrived three more companies

which should ease the situation."

 95

 To

keep supply from sinking into chaos,

91

 Memo, Casey for Sutherland, 3 Sep 43. SWPA

File 211. 92

 Memo, Sturgis for Sverdrup, 29 Sep 43. SWPA

File 124.

93

 Memo, Casey for Engr Adv Ech USASOS, 23

Dec 43, with 1st Ind, Engr Adv Ech USASOS to

Engr GHQ Adv Ech, 30 Dec 43. SWPA File 219. 94

 (1) SOS SOPAC, Hist Rpt From Activation to

30 Jun 43, app., List of Trp Units, SOPAC, 15 Jul

43. (2) Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 Nov 43. 95

 Ltr, Reybold to Somervell, 25 Nov 43.
264 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

men had to be detailed from general

service regiments to engineer depots

from time to time.

Equipment Shortages

Equipment was chronically short.

Because there were so few troops, they

usually had to be furnished with more

machinery than the tables of equipment

called for. Some units, such as general

service regiments and combat battalions,

needed not only more, but also heavier,

machinery. As soon as a machine arrived in either theater, it was immediately sent to a unit which was greatly in

need of it. In both theaters units

worked in widely separated and isolated

areas; because of the shortage of shipping, it was difficult to send equipment

back to a central pool for redistribution.

As a result, while there might be a considerable stock of some types of machinery in a theater, equipment could not

always be delivered where and when it

was most needed. In the Southwest

Pacific there were serious shortages of

tractors, graders, cranes, concrete mixers,

ditching machines, and welding equipment. In the South Pacific tractors,

cranes, shovels, and dump trucks were

most in demand. A bad situation was

made worse by the continual arrival of

so many engineer units without their

machinery. Often the plant did not

show up until months after a unit had

reached its destination. An equally

great cause of confusion was the arrival

of a unit's equipment on many ships at

widely scattered ports. In the Southwest Pacific the machinery of the 839th

Aviation Battalion arrived on 11 ships,

that of the 1052d Port Construction and

Repair Group on 15, and that of the

864th Aviation Battalion on 18. In an

effort to bring about more efficient use

of the inadequate amount of equipment

available, the War Department required

the overseas theaters to submit a Material Status Report at the end of each

month, beginning on 31 October 1943.

This report was to state how many pieces

of machinery were on hand in the

theater, the number of items in depots,

and the number "lost" during the

month. Computations would be made

in the War Department as to the numbers of each item of equipment to which

a theater was entitled. Late in 1943,

Casey reported that "the rate of shipment of construction plant either as

Class II or IV has been barely sufficient

to replace losses and obsolescent plant

and to issue the additional plant required

by units. . . ."

 96

Spare Parts and Maintenance

Since spare parts were almost nonexistent, much equipment was deadlined.

In some respects, matters were worse in

the SOPAC than in the SWPA because

the former theater had so few commercial concerns to supply parts.97

 The engineer of the service command on New

Caledonia reported in late 1943 that a

large percentage of engineer equipment

was "down due to lack of parts."98

Spare parts, especially those needed for

shovels, tractors, motor graders, and

carryall scrapers, were scarce in both

96

 Memo for Rcd, Casey, 13 Nov 43. 97

 Rpt on Conditions in SOPAC, pt. I. 98

 TWX, Maj Gen Thomas M. Robins to Engr

SupO Columbus QM Depot Columbus Ohio, 26

Dec 42. CE South Pac 1.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 265

theaters for a number of reasons. Far

larger quantities of equipment were

required than had been anticipated. A

great deal of the machinery, too light for

the work which had to be done, was,

nevertheless, subjected continuously to

hard usage. Extraordinarily large numbers of parts were needed because engineer equipment was not standardized.

One unit arrived in Australia with seven

kinds of tractors manufactured by five

firms. Because stocks of spare parts in

the United States were low and shipment

to the theaters infrequent, parts often

were not received until eight months

after requisitions for them were sent in.

After the parts arrived in either theater,

it sometimes took as long as five months

to get them to the using units. Automatic shipments were just as unreliable.

The 842d Aviation Battalion left San

Francisco on 26 February; second echelon parts for its D-7 tractors, which

should have been sent automatically

with the unit, were not shipped until five

months later.

A bad spare parts situation was aggravated by an almost complete lack of

personnel trained in storing and distributing. During 1942 and 1943 there

were no spare parts companies in either

theater, even though requests for such

units had been sent to Washington repeatedly. On 1 August the War Department stated that no such companies

would be available in 1943. Late that

year spare parts began to arrive in more

adequate amounts. Now the problem

of storing and issuing them became

acute. Great confusion existed at Milne

Bay. "The most striking Engineer

problem at this base," wrote Lane, "is

the organization of [the] Engineer spare

parts services. Some 1,300 cases of

urgently needed parts have arrived but

cannot be handled for lack of personnel

and suitable storage space."

 99

 Efforts

were being made to better the situation.

By late December a warehouse, 80 by

400 feet, with a concrete floor, had

been completed. Bins were being constructed, and the classification of spare

parts was being "vigorously pushed."

 100

Just as scarce were spare parts for the

amphibian engineers' landing craft.

They were needed in much greater

amounts than had been expected.

Tropical waters quickly corroded generators and starters; coral reefs tore up

propellers and shafts. Since the Navy

was responsible for supplying spare parts,

the amphibian engineers sent their

requisitions to Service Forces, Seventh

Fleet, at Brisbane. The Navy procured

the items it needed from its stocks in the

United States and supplied the amphibian engineers with their share. Although a supply system was set up in the

theater, the engineers received only a

trickle of spare parts. During the last

six months of 1943, the Navy could meet

only 5 percent of the amphibian engineers' demands, although it turned over

to them half the stocks in its distribution

center at Milne Bay.101 "Our really

important and only serious trouble has

been [the] shortage of spare parts,"

Heavey wrote on 3 January 1944 to Brig.

Gen. Daniel Noce, formerly head of

the Engineer Amphibian Command.

99

 Memo, Lane for Casey, 9 Nov 43. 100

 Memo, Col C. R. Bathurst, SupO Of C Engr

GHQ SWPA for Casey, 23 Dec 43. SWPA File 160. 101

 Ltr, Capt Donald Joseph, Liaison Off 2d ESB

USAFFE Engr Sec, to Casey, 13 Nov 43. SWPA

File 228.
266 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

". . . no one foresaw that electrical

parts, generators and starters would go so

fast in these tropics. . . . Not a spare

generator or starter now in this whole

theater. . . . Navy is as short as we

are. . . ."

 102

The shortage of parts alone would

have made it hard to keep machinery in

good running order. Now most equipment was being used constantly in isolated areas, hundreds, and sometimes

thousands, of miles from repair centers.

Maintaining equipment properly under

such conditions was extremely difficult.

A maintenance company and a heavy

shop company arrived in the Southwest

Pacific in April; a heavy shop company

and a maintenance company, in the

South Pacific in June. Elements of

these units were sent far and wide in

order to get the most urgent repair jobs

out of the way. As a rule, construction

units had to repair and maintain their

own equipment as best they could. Already working on two or three shifts a

day, the units were hard pressed to provide operators for heavy equipment and

at the same time furnish men for repairing and maintaining it. General Reybold reported to Somervell in November

that "the lack of maintenance and shop

installations and personnel has been

apparent."

 103

 This was an understatement.

Construction Standards

Building in the forward areas continued to be mainly on a makeshift basis.

Though troops were few and supplies

scarce, speed, especially in the construc

tion of airfields, was as urgent as ever.

In the Southwest Pacific a landing field

now consisted of a single runway. If a

second strip was put in, it was constructed parallel to the first. Runways

were, as a rule, initially grass landing

places or captured Japanese airstrips;

but in either case they were improved

and later surfaced with mat, coral, or

bitumen. In the South Pacific, where

airfields were built under the Navy's

guidance, they were more elaborate.

Early in 1943, runways were still crossed

in the "traditional" manner and were

150 feet wide and of varying lengths.

But by the end of the year it was the rule

to put in a single runway and provide

two parallel taxiways. In the South

Pacific coral was extensively used for

surfacing; the airmen preferred it to

mat, also widely used. Coconut plantations were generally the most ideal sites

for landing strips. Construction at each

runway followed standard procedures.

Fill was placed in a 4-inch layer and was

compacted with sheepsfoot rollers. The

final surfacing consisted of a 6-inch layer

of coral. The result was a "smooth,

hard, impervious, reasonably dust-free

surface." If landing mat was used, it

was placed on the compacted coral.104

In both theaters troops in the forward

areas lived in tents. Wherever possible,

screened and floored mess halls and

kitchens were built of local materials.

Makeshift facilities were provided

for bathing. In April 1943, General

Breene, head of the Services of Supply

in the South Pacific, directed that north

102

 Ltr, Heavey to Noce, 3 Jan 44. 103

 Ltr, Reybold to Somervell, 25 Nov 43.

104

 (1) DeLonge, Rpt on Observations in SOPAC.

(2) Memo, Kumpe for Casey, 27 Sep 43.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 267

of the New Hebrides only tents or

native-type structures requiring no imported materials would be permitted for

troop housing. South of the New

Hebrides, frame structures were permissible, but such construction would

receive the lowest priority. In late

1943 prefabricated buildings began to be

used. In the Southwest Pacific, Colonel

Teale's engineers developed a number of

standard types, the three major ones

being 20, 47, and 88 feet wide and of

variable lengths. The one 20 feet wide,

and usually 54 feet long, was the most

practical as it could be used as living

quarters, an administrative building, or

as a warehouse. In the South Pacific,

New Zealand supplied prefabricated

hutments 20 feet wide, with lengths in

multiples of 4 feet. Very noticeable in

the SOPAC was the superior type of

housing provided for Navy personnel.

They usually lived in comparatively

comfortable Quonset or Dallas huts.

Colonel Murrow believed that housing

for the Army was not good enough, that

if troops were to occupy an area for more

than six months, they should live in

frame buildings of some kind. In the

forward areas, makeshift structures were

used as warehouses and hospitals. Native huts and canvas-covered native-type

frames often had to do as hospital wards

but were not satisfactory. Teale's engineers adapted the 20-foot-wide prefabricated buildings to hospital needs.

Lengths could be extended by 9-foot

increments. Eaves were wide and overhanging. Units contained from 50 to

100 beds. One of Australia's leading

building contractors was appointed coordinator of the manufacturing program,

and many firms built the prefabricated

sections. By late 1943 shipments to New

Guinea began.105

Men and Machines

Engineer units were being put to a

severe test. Since operations in SWPA

extended over a much wider land area

than those in the SOPAC, conditions

under which the engineers had to work

imposed greater hardships. In the preparation of the tables of organization and

equipment of general service regiments

and other kinds of construction units in

prewar days, it had been assumed that

the men would do their work mainly

with hand tools and that machines would

be used only occasionally. This basic

assumption had to be drastically revised.

Getting a large amount of machinery

and keeping it going around the clock

were most important matters.106 The

commander of the 808 th Aviation Battalion estimated that the 800 men of his

unit, using their machinery around the

clock, could do as much work as 50,000

men equipped only with hand tools.107

Small wonder that machinery was operated for twenty or more hours a day and

was stopped only for maintenance and

repair. Small wonder, also, that under

such usage problems arose. It was hard,

in fact, usually impossible, to find enough

capable equipment operators and maintenance personnel. Most units, especially general service regiments, did not

105

 (1) AWC, Report for the Period July 1, 1943-

February 15, 1945, pp. 49-54. (2) Hist of USAFISPA

During World War II From 30 Mar 42 to 1 Aug 44,

pp. 585-611. (3) Rpt on Conditions in SOPAC, pt.

III.

106

 Matthews, Data for Hist Rpt, p. 13. 107

 Ltr with Incls, Ellison to Casey, 25 Sep 43.

SWPA File 144.
268 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

CONSTRUCTION OF THE FIRST STEEL BUILDING AT MILNE BAY

have enough high ratings for the large

numbers of specially trained men required. "Their disadvantage as to

grades and ratings in comparison with

Aviation and C. B. battalions is resulting

in much dissatisfaction,"

 108 Reybold reported to Somervell after his visit to the

Southwest Pacific. The fact that jobs

were scattered over such wide areas

meant that many detachments had to be

sent out from the larger units. This

practice led to complications in setting

up an efficient organization, providing

equipment, performing maintenance,

and furnishing supplies. The large

general service regiment seemed especially unwieldy in vast theaters with

fluid tactical situations. Greater flexibility in organization was needed.

Attempts were being made to find

solutions to these problems.

Faced with severe shortages of troops

and equipment, the engineers, in 1943

as in 1942, had to rely heavily on native

workmen, especially in New Guinea.

Little interested in the war, the natives

of that island were nevertheless eager to

work for certain types of goods. Those

living near the coast, who had had fairly

extensive contact with white men,

wanted tobacco, matches, knives, razor

blades, calico, and salt. Those living in 108

 Ltr, Reybold to Somervell, 25 Nov 43.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 269

the more inaccessible interior regions

demanded beads and, more often, the

highly prized gold-lip, mother-of-pearl,

and cowrie shells, all found in abundant

quantities on the shores of New Guinea.

Great numbers of shells were needed.

In March 1943 USASOS purchased 2,000

gold-lip shells with which to pay workers at various projects. The AustralianNew Guinea Administrative Unit had

general charge of native affairs. It organized the Papuans into working parties, with leaders or "boss boys" who

spoke some English, and assigned the

parties to American or Australian units.

As in the Papua Campaign, the natives

were much in demand as road and bridge

builders, and they often served as carriers of supplies or as stretcher bearers.

They sometimes supplied information

on the availability of local materials, the

nature of the terrain, and the location of

enemy forces. Some served as guides to

parties traversing the jungle, whereas

others helped ESB pilots guide their

craft through the unfamiliar coastal

waters. By mid-June approximately

24,000 Papuans were employed on American and Australian engineer projects in

New Guinea. In the opinion of Maj.

Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, MacArthur's G-3, the Papuans "almost spelled

the difference between victory and defeat." In the South Pacific, natives were

employed to a lesser extent. They were

occasionally used on airfield construction

in the Solomons and were quite frequently used for building native-type

huts, especially on Fiji and in the Solomons.109

Maps and Intelligence

Expanding combat operations in the

two theaters greatly increased the requirements for maps and intelligence

information. Both theaters enlarged

their mapping and intelligence-gathering

organizations, and both received additional units from the United States. In

the Southwest Pacific, two changes in

top-level organization were made, which

brought map production more directly

under Casey's control. After the Engineer Section, USAFFE, was set up in

March, the Engineer Intelligence Section, USASOS, was transferred to it.

When, in September, the special staff

sections of USAFFE were abolished, the

question arose as to whether the men

engaged in mapping and intelligence

should go back to USASOS or be transferred to General MacArthur's staff.

Casey believed mapping and intelligence

should be concentrated in the commander in chief's headquarters to permit

better co-ordination with other theater

commands and with Australian mapping

and intelligence agencies. At the same

time there would be close at hand a

ready source of maps and charts for

planning purposes. In line with Casey's

recommendations, all responsibilities for

mapping and gathering engineer intelligence became henceforth the responsibility of his office. The 648th at

Melbourne continued to put out most of

the maps for the theater, while the 69th

Topographic Company, assigned to Sixth

Army, was at work in New Guinea. A

109

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Leahy, sub: Hints on Carrier Transport in New Guinea. SWPA File 100.

(2) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

106ff. (3) Rad, GHQ SWPA, to Adv GHQ, 18 Mar

43. 384 NG #2 5-40, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. (4)

DeLonge, Rpt on Observations in SOPAC.
270 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

third mapping unit, the 960th Aviation

Topographic Company, reached the

Southwest Pacific during the year.110

In the South Pacific, Army mapping

and intelligence functions were the responsibility of Admiral Halsey's G-2

section. G-2 had placed all mapping

and intelligence functions, Army, Navy,

and Marine, in the Combined Intelligence Center, which, along with other

headquarters installations, was located

in a converted warehouse in Noumea.

The center had six sections, each concerned with a particular aspect of map

making or gathering intelligence; Army,

Navy, and Marine personnel worked in

all sections. The one Army mapping

unit in the South Pacific, the 955th

Aviation Topographic Company, had

arrived in May 1942 without its equipment. For eight months thereafter it

was on construction jobs. With the

arrival of its equipment late that year, it

began to make photomaps of the Solomons and was in late 1942 engaged in

this work on Espiritu Santo.111

The map makers had to rely more and

more on aerial photography. The South

Pacific was better off than the Southwest

Pacific in this respect, for the land areas

that had to be mapped were comparatively small and there were sufficient

numbers of aircraft to furnish fairly

adequate photographic coverage. "The

photo reconnaissance group has apparently given excellent cooperation in supplying those photographs necessary for

planning purposes," Maj. Merrill E.

DeLonge wrote in his report to General

Reybold. The map makers were mainly

occupied with producing hasty terrain

maps and photomaps of areas in the Solomons likely to be the scene of combat.112

In the Southwest Pacific, even as late as

July 1943, a half-strength photographic

reconnaissance squadron, equipped with

P-38-type F-4 planes, was all that was

available for photographic missions.

Much of the photography obtained in

1942 had been poor because the airmen

were not fully aware of the engineers'

needs. To give them a better idea of

what was expected, an officer from the

648th began to serve with the photographic squadron in a liaison capacity

late that year. He gave the airmen a

better understanding of the importance

of getting good photographs. Pilots visited the base map plant at Melbourne to

see how their photographs were used and

to learn how hard it was to make good

maps from indifferent photography.113

To meet the growing complexities of

supplying maps to units, especially in

such large theaters as the Southwest Pacific, the War Department activated map

distribution units, each with one officer

and twelve enlisted men. The first of

the units to be shipped to SWPA arrived

in late 1943 and was sent to Finschhafen,

where it opened a map depot. The

Australians opened a similar depot at

Port Moresby.114

Of growing importance was the gathering of engineer intelligence. Extensive

construction needs in the forward areas

110

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

97ff. 111

 Memo, Col Kumpe for Lt Col E. A. Dunbar,

Intel Sec OCE GHQ SWPA, 3 Oct 43. SWPA Files.

112

 DeLonge, Rpt on Observations in SOPAC. 113

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for

1943, Intelligence. SWPA File I 27. (2) 648th Engr

Topo Bn GHQ, Interim Rpt, 1 Jan-30 Sep 43.

SWPA File I 4. 114 Ibid.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 271

made accurate analyses of the terrain

highly important. Here too, aerial

photography continued to be a most

important source of information, especially in the Southwest Pacific, where

great stress was being put on terrain

intelligence. On occasion, members of

Casey's intelligence section made personal reconnaissances of the forward

areas. The information gathered from

different sources was compiled and issued

in numerous publications, such as terrain analyses, engineer annexes to terrain

studies, preliminary terrain estimates,

and spot area studies. Toward the end

of 1943 Casey's intelligence section also

began to gather more extensive information on the organization of the Japanese

engineers and on their equipment and

activities.115

Training

The training of troops was the function of engineer training centers in the

United States. Sometimes additional

instruction was necessary overseas. Occasionally, entire units had to be given

special training so that they could cope

with conditions peculiar to the theater

or meet new tactics developed by the

enemy. Specialists were sometimes sent

to schools to take refresher courses. If

there was a great demand for men with

certain skills, such as for operating

equipment, removing mines, and making soil analyses, special instruction had

to be given to train the additional men

needed. Because of the pressure of

work in the South and Southwest Pacific,

little time could be set aside for teaching

entire units. The only exceptions were

the combat engineer units, which were

given rather intensive training before

being sent to the front lines. In SWPA,

training centers were set up in early

1943 near the major Australian coastal

cities from Melbourne to Cairns to train

American and Australian units in all

phases of amphibious operations. The

114th and 116th Combat Battalions and

the 8th Engineer Squadron of the 1st

Cavalry Division spent three weeks at

the center north of Brisbane, undergoing

training in landing operations. Exercises were realistic, even to the point of

including bombardments. But for the

men of the service units, unit training

almost invariably meant on-the-job

training.116

A number of men from service units

were sent to specialist schools. The

Australian armed services had several

that enrolled engineers in need of additional training. The RAE school in

bomb disposal at Bonegilla in Victoria,

one of the first which the engineers attended, provided excellent training.

After finishing their course of instruction, the men returned to their units to

become heads of bomb disposal squads

and train others in the subject. The

RAE and the RAAF had several schools

to teach camouflage. A small number

of engineers attended the courses. On

the whole, the instruction provided was

too technical to serve U.S. Army needs,

and the fast-growing Allied air superiority made training in camouflage seem

115

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

100-101.

116

 (1) For a more detailed discussion of Engineer

troop training in the Southwest Pacific, see Of C

Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 52ff., 108ff.
272 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

questionable in any case. Of more

practical value was training men in

equipment operation and maintenance.

The Australians had several schools to

provide such instruction. The Allied

Works Council opened one in Sydney in

April to train equipment operators and

maintenance men for six weeks. Forty

U.S. engineers attended. The AWC

opened a second school in Sydney which

offered a similar course beginning in

July; ninety engineers attended. The

Australian branch of the Le Tourneau

Company opened a school in equipment

operation and maintenance at Port

Moresby in June. The RAAF had a

school in diesel mechanics in Melbourne

to which a number of men from the 91st

and 96th General Service Regiments

were sent. Thus, the Australians were

able to take care of some of the engineers'

instructional needs in the Southwest

Pacific.117

Two U.S. Army Engineer schools

opened in 1943. One was the Engineer

Branch of the officer candidate school

which began instruction in Brisbane in

February. Students were selected from

a list of men recommended by commanding officers of engineer units. Qualifications for admittance were the same as

for engineer branches in the United

States. During 1943 about 125 enlisted

men attended the 3-month courses. The

second school established was the Soil

Mechanics School at Port Moresby,

which trained officers and men to make

adequate soil analyses for construction projects, particularly airfields. U.S.

Army engineer units were given quotas,

with a small number of vacancies allotted

to the RAE and the RAAF.118

Inadequacies in the training of engineers were becoming apparent by late

1943, particularly in the Southwest

Pacific. Especially noticeable was the

inadequate training of most men in planning construction projects and operating

and maintaining equipment. To correct some of these deficiencies, increasing numbers of men were sent to

Australian specialist schools. But the

schools were a long way from the units,

and their courses of instruction were

sometimes not well adapted to engineer

needs. Unit on-the-job training had to

be stressed as much as possible.

Arawe, Cape Gloucester, and Saidor

The capture of Finschhafen had

cleared the way for the last phase of

CARTWHEEL—the seizure of western New

Britain, control of which would give the

Allies great advantages. The air forces

would be able to make more effective

strikes against Rabaul, ships could be

sent through the Vitiaz Straits into the

Bismarck Sea, and amphibious operations in that area would be possible.

MacArthur planned to make two major

landings—one at Arawe, the other at

Cape Gloucester. Base construction

would follow. If western New Britain

were lightly held, a landing was also to

117

 (1) Ltr, G-3 USASOS to CO 43d Engr GS Regt

et al, 3 Sep 42. SWPA File 10. (2) Memo for Rcd,

Capt Dean W. Barnes, Opns and Tng, Of C Engr

GHQ SWPA, 17 Sep 43. SWPA File 11. (3) Memo,

Maj W. D. Murphy, Opns and Tng Br OCE

USAFFE, for Casey, 4 Jun 43. SWPA File 10.

118

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Annual Rpt for

1943. SWPA File A9. (2) Memos, Heiberg for Dir

of Works and Bldgs RAAF and E-in-C LHQ ALF,

13 Aug 43. SWPA File 10.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 273

be made at Saidor, on the New Guinea

coast.119

MacArthur scheduled the landing at

Arawe for 15 December, and the 59th

Engineer Combat Company and boat

and shore units of the 2d Special Brigade

were assigned. This was to be the first

assault since the Nassau Bay landing in

which the amphibious engineers would

support a task force made up solely of

American troops. Naval transports took

the amphibious engineers with seventeen

LCVP's and two LCM's to the rendezvous area about four miles from Arawe.

Since the tops of the reefs were just

barely submerged, only the Navy's

Alligators and Buffaloes were sent in on

the first four waves.120 The first engineer craft to go in—part of the fifth wave

—had a hard time. One LCVP, stuck

on a reef, was riddled by bullets from

Japanese planes. Previous amphibious

operations had a serious weakness in that

protective naval fire stopped when the

assault craft were about a thousand yards

from shore. The next few minutes were

crucial. Enemy fire from the beach,

even if minor, might seriously disrupt

the landing. At Arawe, the amphibian

engineers used two of the newly developed Dukws equipped with rocket

launchers which fired on the beaches

after the naval barrage had lifted.121

Each Dukw had 120 rocket tubes capable of shooting 4.5-inch rockets for a

distance of 1,100 yards. At Arawe the

Dukws continued their fire until the

first wave was only 150 yards from shore.

While they did not have pinpoint

accuracy, they threw up an effective barrage. Riding low in the water, they

made small targets. The barrage at

Arawe proved to be largely a practice

one, for there was but slight opposition

to the landing.122

The 59th engineers had few combat

missions. They found no mines or

obstacles, and rarely saw any enemy

troops. Most of the men at first worked

as stevedores. Some began to improve

the landing beach. One man with a

bulldozer stripped off the 15-foot-high

undergrowth. Teams of thirteen men

laid landing mat, stapled it down, and

covered it with sand to keep it from

curling. Despite some interruptions

caused by bombing and strafing by

enemy planes, unloading and dispersing

of supplies were carried out in an orderly

manner. Supplies unloaded, the 59th

turned to construction. The men built

a small dock, a refueling pier, a station

hospital, five miles of all-weather roads,

and three baseball diamonds. They had

ample equipment for their work, having

recently received the additional machinery required by their unit's table of

organization and equipment. Enemy

air raids were frequent. During their

first ten days ashore, the men bivouacked

in a narrow area between the shore and

a swamp. One night, planes bombing

119

 Krueger, Rpt of the DEXTERITY Opn, 15 Dec

43-10 Feb 44. SWPA File A167A. 120

 Alligator was the popular term for the landing

vehicle, tracked, Mark I (LVT (1)); the Water Buffalo,

or landing vehicle, tracked, Mark II (LVT(2)), was

an improved type of Alligator. 121

 The Dukw was a 21⁄2-ton 6x6 amphibian truck.

122

 (1) Heavey, "Amphibious Engineers in Action,"

The Military Engineer, XXXVI (May, 1944), 150.

(2) 2d ESB, Monthly Rpt of Opns, 1-31 Dec 43.

SWPA File E20. (3) 59th Engr Combat Co (Sep),

Engr Opn Rpt. SWPA File 74. (4) Heavey,

"Rockets by Army Engineers at Arawe," The Military Engineer, XXXIX (August, 1947), 345.
274 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

the area killed two men and wounded

four. Washing Machine Charley, as the

enemy planes were called, caused much

loss of sleep. The Japanese made no

attacks by land. Amphibian engineers,

their craft equipped with automatic

weapons, ranged through the swampy inlets and coastal waterways near Arawe,

seeking out enemy craft that might attempt to approach the landing area.

They came upon several and sank

them.123

On 26 December the 1st Marine Division landed at two points on Cape

Gloucester. The amphibian engineers,

their small craft tossed about by high

seas stirred up by strong northwest

winds, helped bring in the marines, employed rocket Dukws to protect the

boats in the first waves and subsequently

engaged in resupply missions and carried

on patrols nightly off nearby beaches

where the Japanese were reported lurking. One rocket Dukw knocked out

four pillboxes that were holding up the

advance along the coast. On shore,

Marine engineers were responsible for

combat support; Army engineers, for

base construction. Work was under the

direction of the Marine task force commander. Already in the area were two

Japanese-built airstrips, both poorly constructed. Engineer officers who inspected them believed that the better of

the two could be developed. In January, three aviation battalions—the

1913th, the 841st, and the 864th (less

one company)—arrived and proceeded to

put in two parallel runways. The men

removed the humus and cut down the

underlying gravel to the required level,

using the excess to fill the low spots.

Construction was hampered by the almost continuous torrential rains.124

On 17 December General Krueger received MacArthur's directive to take

Saidor. Five days later he organized a

task force made up of elements of the

32d Division which would attack on or

after 1 January 1944. The attack was

made on the 2d. Boat units of the 2d

ESB brought the troops ashore in calm

seas with little trouble. The engineers

placed landing mat on the loose stones

and sand of the beach, thus enabling

trucks to move across easily. As the

infantry expanded the beachhead, the

amphibian engineers carried out numerous resupply missions, necessary because

heavy rains had made the few roads and

trails almost impassable. There were

no Japanese in the area. Company A

of the 114th Combat Battalion, responsible for combat missions, built

roads and bridges. Much corduroy and

many small bridges were required. The

Australians, upon abandoning Saidor

early in 1942, had dug trenches across the

landing strip and had erected 12-foot

poles. Trenches and poles were still

there and the field was overgrown with

kunai grass. The task force engineer directed that the runway be rehabilitated.

Shore engineers and field artillery troops,

using bulldozers, shoved the dirt back into

the ditches while fifteen men of a depot

platoon took down the poles. Trucks,

ranging back and forth, knocked down

the grass and compacted the surface.

Combat engineers and field artillery

123

 59th Engr Combat Co (Sep), Engr Opn Rpt.

124

 (1) Heavey, "Amphibious Engineers in Action,"

The Military Engineer, XXXVI (May, 1944), 151.

(2) Hq 1913th Engr Avn Bn, History of the Bn

During Dec 43 and Jan 44.
THE DRIVE TOWARD RABAUL 275

troops policed the area. On the afternoon of the third day the strip was ready

for use. The next day the 808th Aviation Battalion arrived and was assigned

the job of extending the runway to 6,000

feet. It carried out this work, assisted

by the 863d and 860th Aviation Battalions. Soon a minor base was under

construction at Saidor.125

CARTWHEEL had come to an end.

Rabaul was so effectively neutralized that

it could be bypassed. Engineer activities in the South and Southwest Pacific

had greatly expanded in 1943. The

number of U.S. Army engineer troops

had increased from 8,770 to 15,261 in

the South Pacific and from 7,594 to

42,285 in the Southwest Pacific. The

engineers had had their first experience

with amphibious operations. They had

continued to play an important part in

supporting the infantry in combat, and

they had had increasing responsibilities

for construction in the forward areas.

The most striking aspect of engineer

operations in the two theaters was the

divergence from usual patterns in that

service engineers did not work behind

the combat forces, but beside them.

Almost as soon as the first combat forces

landed in a forward area, construction

units came in to begin the building of

bases and airfields. As a result, adequate

support of the combat troops was possible sooner, the air forces were able to

strike at the more remote enemy strongpoints at an early date, and the rapid

advance of the Allied forces could be

sustained. It was becoming increasingly clear that the rapidity of the advance in the two theaters in large

measure depended on the speed with

which the engineers could build bases

and airfields.

125

 (1) 114th Engr Combat Bn, Opns of Co A,

114th Engr Combat Bn From 2 Jan 44 to 29 Feb 44.

(2) Task Force Engr Rpt, MICHAELMAS Task Force,

12 May 44. Sturgis File 38.
CHAPTER VII

The Far North

The outbreak of war with Japan

brought the northwestern part of the

North American continent very much

into the foreground. The disaster at

Pearl Harbor meant that the United

States had lost naval control of the northern Pacific. It was not known whether

the Japanese would attack Alaska, or, if

they did so, what size force they would

use. The defenses of Alaska would have

to be strengthened insofar as it could be

done without detriment to the build-up

in more vital theaters of war. Engineer

operations in the Territory were expanded. At the same time the engineers

were called upon to construct projects

in northwestern Canada to strengthen

Alaska. Soon after the outbreak of war

they were directed to build a road—the

Canada-Alaska, or Alcan Highway—to

link Alaska with the United States, and

they were directed to develop the oil

resources on the Mackenzie River—a

project known as Canol. (Map 15) The

Japanese attack on Dutch Harbor in

June 1942 and the seizure of Attu and

Kiska increased fears that Alaska was in

danger and made engineer construction

appear even more urgent. The threat

was not entirely removed until the Japanese were driven from the Aleutians in

mid-1943. In retrospect, the alarm over

the danger seems much exaggerated, but

to many at the time it seemed very real.

Much of the contruction at first glance

appears to have had little to do with the

war against Japan. Yet the fact remains

that most of it in all probability would

never have been undertaken had the

United States not been at war with that

country. Because of the war with Japan,

the Engineers had to do extensive work

in a region with which just a few years

previously they had been little concerned.

Strengthening Alaska's Defenses

Plans for Alaska

After Pearl Harbor General DeWitt,

who, as commander of the Fourth Army

and of the Western Defense Command

established in 1941, was responsible for

the defense of Alaska, estimated that the

Territory might be subjected to surprise

attack and, possibly, invasion. He

wanted more ground troops and an immediate increase in the number of

planes. Washington authorities in considering his demands did not believe

Alaska to be in imminent danger. But

the possibility that the Japanese might

launch an attack could not be ignored.

On 11 December the Western Defense

Command, including Alaska, was made

a theater of operations. The alert of

late November was intensified. No new

construction was contemplated, but the

War Department directed speedy completion of approved or planned projects

278 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

that were considered urgent. In December a number of jobs, some of them

under review since July, were quickly

approved. Improvements were to be

made at Ladd, Elmendorf, Annette, and

Yakutat. All airfields, including those

built by the Civil Aeronautics Authority,

were to have storage for aviation gasoline and for bombs and ammunition.

Army posts were to be enlarged. The

camp for the Army garrison at the CAA

field at Nome was almost finished; similar facilities were to be built at nine

other CAA fields. Eleven of the aircraft warning stations were to be completed. At long last, work was to be

started on an airfield and Army post on

Umnak; on 9 December Reybold got the

signal to go ahead with this construction,

which DeWitt had been urging since

July. The two fields which CAA was

planning to construct on the Alaska

Peninsula at Cold Bay and at Port

Heiden were to be built by the Army.

At all installations dispersion and concealment, hitherto largely ignored, were

to be stressed. Refinements, such as

family quarters for married officers and

fencing around military installations,

were to be eliminated. The estimated

cost of construction as of 31 December

was approximately $90 million. Various projects of benefit to the Army would

be undertaken by civilian agencies. The

Department of the Interior was getting

ready to improve the Richardson Highway, and the Public Roads Administration was preparing to build or improve

other roads. The Department of Commerce planned to hard-surface the CAA

runways.1

The expanded and accelerated construction program meant a great increase

in the workload of the engineers. Lt.

Col. George J. Nold as engineer of the

Alaska Defense Command and Major

Talley as area engineer would have far

greater responsibilities than before.

The Seattle District under Colonel Dunn

would likewise have much more to do.

At the close of 1941 there were in Alaska

Company D of the 29th Topographic

Battalion at Seward, the 32d Combat

Company at Fort Richardson, the 802d

Aviation Battalion at Annette, the 807th

Aviation Company at Yakutat, and the

1st battalion of the 151st Combat Regiment, elements of which were at various

Army posts from Dutch Harbor to Fairbanks. Contractors for the Navy were

building the posts for the Army garrisons

at Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor.

Projects not being built by troops or

Navy contractors were the responsibility

of the Seattle District. Most of this

work was being done by hired labor.

Colonel Dunn had made no large contracts, except the one with the West

Construction Company for work on the

railroad cutoff. More troops and civilians were urgently needed.2

Shortages

It was difficult to get either troops or

civilians for Alaskan projects after Pearl

Harbor. Enlistments and the draft cut

1

 DF, Somervell to C AAF, 15 Dec 41. G-4/30436.

(2) Ltr, TAG to CofEngrs, 31 Dec 41, with 1st Ind,

Asst C Opns Br OCE to NPD, 5 Jan 42. (3) Ltr,

TAG to DeWitt, 31 Dec 41. Last two in 600.1

(Alaska) 2 Jan-Mar 42. 2

 (1) Hists of the 32d Engr Combat Co, 807th Engr

Avn Bn, and 151st Engr Combat Regt, in Orgns

Hists, U.S. Army, Alaska.
THE FAR NORTH 279

deeply into the supply of civilian manpower; deferments were as a rule not

granted to men who wanted to work in

the Territory. Governor Gruening believed more use should be made of local

residents. In his opinion, salmon fishermen and packers, unemployed because

of war conditions, would make good

construction workers. Secretary of the

Interior Harold L. Ickes suggested that

the 4,000 prospectors in the Territory,

many of whom owned construction

equipment, could be of help. The

Seattle District, while glad to take any

qualified residents, could not draw appreciable numbers of workmen from

sparsely inhabited Alaska. Because of

the great distances and poor transportation, it would, as a rule, have been more

of a problem to assemble a working force

within the Territory for a project than

to send one in from the United States.

Local civilians could not always be relied upon to stay on the job. Some of

the fishermen who had been hired were

planning to quit when the fishing season

began in the spring. With the outbreak of war, many workers from the

United States wanted to return home.

Even if they could be persuaded to renew their contracts, most insisted on

interim vacations. Neither local nor

imported civilian labor could fill the

need. The shipment of more engineer

troops was imperative, but few could be

spared for Alaska. The first unit to

arrive after Pearl Harbor was the 2d

Battalion of the 151st Combat Regiment,

which reached Cold Bay in January.

The next was the 42d General Service

Regiment, the first battalion disembarking at Juneau on 28 February, and the

second reaching Cordova in the middle

of March. After Pearl Harbor, almost

all jobs west of Fort Richardson except

those at Kodiak and Dutch Harbor were

assigned to troops. To ease the manpower shortage, some work was done by

troops of other arms and services under

engineer supervision.3

A persistent problem was the shortage

of matériel. Almost all supplies and

equipment had to be procured in the

United States. Before January 1942,

Colonel Park's approval was necessary

for all purchases; after that date, the

Seattle District was permitted to buy in

the open market, but this new freedom

was of little value. Despite Alaska's

high priority of A-1-a, sufficient quantities of supplies could not be obtained to

meet requirements. The greatest need

by far was for heavy earth-moving equipment, but prospects of getting any were

slight. "After Pearl Harbor," Nold

wrote later, "we were practically limited

to the equipment we had in hand or

could obtain locally. . . ." All such

machinery was kept going around the

clock and used under very unfavorable

conditions. Tractors churned through

mud, snow, muskeg, salt water, and

sandy beaches. Many of the operators

were inexperienced or untrained in

handling equipment under such conditions. Repairs were constantly necessary, and there were no maintenance

units in the Territory. Spare parts were

scarce. Not enough came in with the

3

 (1) Incl, Tab A, ADC to Memo, ExecO Sup Div

OCE to G-4, 18 Dec 41. 400.34. (2) Ltr, Stimson to

Anthony J. Dimond, Delegate from Alaska in HR,

16 Apr 42. 600.1 (Alaska) (Misc) pt. 2. (3) Ltr,

Ickes to Stimson, 19 Jan 42, with 3d Ind, Dunn to

NPD, 28 Feb 42. Same file. (4) Hists of 151st

Combat Regt and 42d GS Regt, in Orgn Hists, U.S.

Army, Alaska.
280 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

machinery, and follow-up shipments

were inadequate. Units had to maintain their equipment as best they could.

Efforts were made to cut down on needs;

projects not essential to the war effort

were discontinued. Local resources

were exploited insofar as possible—particularly lumber. Yet it was difficult to

curb extravagance. Talley recalled that

a number of post commanders insisted on

requisitioning "tapered steel flagpoles in

a land of tall timber" where "it was only

necessary to select and cut a spruce of

any height you might desire." The

steel poles were not delivered.4

The shortage of ships, severe enough

in the months before Pearl Harbor, was

now much more pronounced. Dunn's

office estimated that demand for cargo

space would be four to six times as much

as that of the last months before the

war. As needs grew, the number of

ships fell off. Oceangoing vessels that

might have been available were put on

more distant overseas routes. Fishing

boats which had been leased would have

to be returned to their owners when the

season opened. Deliveries to Alaska

were slowed by the threat of Japanese

submarines in Alaskan waters; vessels

were forced to travel in convoys or to

go by way of the Inland Passage. Dunn

did what he could to keep supplies moving northward. He rented such barges

and tugs as he could find. But, on the

whole, the number of ships on the Alaska

run could not be increased. More effective use would have to be made of what

was available. Early in 1942 the Seattle

subport was made an independent port

of embarkation to serve Alaska primarily. Increasing quantities of supplies were sent by way of Prince Rupert

in Canada, the first and most important

of the subports established in western

Canada and southeastern Alaska, and

activated on 6 April 1942. Shipping

stocks to that port via Canadian railways

meant a saving of 600 miles in water

transportation. Supplies for Alaskan

projects began to accumulate on the

docks and in the warehouses at Seattle.

Some way would have to be found to

get them to Alaska.5

Engineer Construction

Despite handicaps, work moved ahead

on strengthening the defenses of the

Alaska Peninsula and the Aleutians.

Dutch Harbor and nearby Fort Mears,

and installations on the Alaskan mainland as well, had nothing between them

and Japan but the ocean and a string of

unfortified, largely uninhabited islands.

As soon as construction was authorized

at Umnak and Cold Bay, Dunn prepared

to ship equipment and supplies. The

greatest secrecy was maintained. Materials shipped from Seattle to the airfields

were marked to indicate they were to be

used by private firms for building fish

4

 (1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Construction.

(2) Ltr, Nold to C EHD, 7 Aug 57. (3) Ltr, Talley to

C EHD, 6 Jan 59.

5

 (1) Ltr, Dunn to NPD Engr, 13 Jan 42. 600.1

(Alaska), 4 Mar 42. (2) Ltr, G-4 to CG SFPOE, 29

Dec 41. G-4/32763. (3) 2d Ind, TAG to CG Field

Forces, 20 Feb 42, on Ltr, DeWitt to CG GHQ Field

Forces, 28 Jan 42. 600.1 (Alaska), 3 Jan-Mar 42.

(4) Wardlow, Transportation Corps: Responsibilities,

Organization, and Operations, p. 97. (5) Joseph

Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation

Corps: Operations Overseas, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957),

p. 42.
THE FAR NORTH 281

canneries. On 18 January, sixty-four

officers and men of the 807th Aviation

Company arrived at Umnak from

Yakutat. Since the island had no harbor facilities, supplies were landed at

Chernofski Bay on Unalaska to the east

and barged twelve miles across the strait.

This job was not easy. The repeated

loading and unloading of equipment

caused a great deal of breakage, and

some of the barges sank in the stormy

waters. It was not the best time of year

for airfield construction. Bulldozer

operators, trying to level off a runway on

Umnak's treeless wastes, were sometimes

lost for hours in blinding snow storms.

Work also began on the Alaska Peninsula. When, in early February, the

second battalion of the 151st Combat

Regiment reached Cold Bay from the

United States, it took over construction

of the runway from the CAA. Here,

also, the subarctic winter greatly slowed

work. More rapid progress was made

on Umnak with the arrival of more

troops. By mid-March the entire 807th,

now an aviation battalion, was working

on the airfield, and by the end of the

month, helped by men from the infantry

and field artillery, the battalion had

finished a landing strip of steel mat.

The first plane came in on the 31st. By

this time a strip was in at Cold Bay, but

its surface was soft and full of ruts. No

construction had been started at Port

Heiden, reported by Colonel Park, visiting Alaska late in March, as "still frozen

in."

 6

Drastic measures were needed to get

supplies to Alaska. Toward the end of

March, Dunn estimated that by the fall

of 1942 some 150,000 tons of materials

would be piled up on the Seattle docks

awaiting shipment. Completion of important construction during the summer

would be impossible. Dunn proposed

an ambitious plan. He suggested sending barges loaded with supplies and

equipment up the Inland Passage to

Juneau. Seagoing vessels would be

taken off the Seattle-Alaska run and assigned to Juneau to ply back and forth

across the Gulf of Alaska. The haul of

oceangoing vessels carrying cargo to

western Alaskan ports would be greatly

shortened. On 28 March, Dunn proposed building a barge terminal at Cape

Spencer near Juneau, complete with

covered and open storage. It would be

an expensive undertaking, but unless it

were done he did not see how urgent

materials would reach Alaska in time.

DeWitt was enthusiastic. On 15 May,

Somervell gave his approval and the

Seattle District began to prepare plans

for construction. Meanwhile, additional barges were put into service and

began carrying materials to Juneau.7

Problems of Organization

Some of the engineers' difficulties in

the Territory resulted from an apparent

conflict in War Department directives.

Before the outbreak of war, the right to

6

 (1) Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 304-05. (2) Hist of the 807th Engr Avn

Bn. (3) Lt. Col. David G. Hammond, "Aleutian

Water Transportation Problems," The Military

Engineer, XXXVI (November, 1944), 373-75. (4)

Ltr, Park to Robins, 20 Apr 42. 333.1 Alaska

1920-45. 7

 (1) Ltr, Dunn to DeWitt, 28 Mar 42, with 3d

Ind, SOS to CofEngrs, 15 May 42. 541.2 (Alaska).

(2) Bykofsky and Larson, Transportation Corps:

Operations Overseas, pp. 43-44.
282 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

authorize construction had been reserved to the Secretary of War. Soon

after Pearl Harbor the War Department

had directed DeWitt to undertake emergency work on his own responsibility.

Directives for construction now came

from Washington and from DeWitt. In

February the War Department suspended DeWitt's authority to initiate

emergency work, and DeWitt assumed

that henceforth he could not start any

projects without approval from Washington. On 11 March the War Department made General DeWitt solely responsible for construction and real estate

in the Alaskan theater of operations.

Henceforth, the responsibility of Colonel

Dunn and, after 15 April, of his successor, Col. Peter P. Goerz, to the Chief

of Engineers for work in Alaska was

limited to flood control and the improvement of rivers and harbors. The Seattle

District, however, continued to do work

of a technical and administrative nature

for all Alaskan projects. It still prepared designs, made up fiscal, accounting, and cost statements, and took care

of civilian personnel matters. The district also continued to purchase supplies

and equipment. In the words of

Colonel Park, "Though our authority is

theoretically nil, our responsibility remains about as before."

 8

Further changes in organization were

made. On 1 May, DeWitt made the

Army commander, Maj. Gen. Simon B.

Buckner, Jr., entirely responsible for the

execution of military construction in

Alaska. Buckner's headquarters absorbed Talley's office in Anchorage, and

Talley's title was changed to Officer in

Charge, Alaska Construction. Although

Talley was now directly under Buckner,

his office was not consolidated with

Nold's. No over-all organization had

been set up in Alaska to repair and maintain buildings which had been completed and turned over to post

commanders. In May three colonels,

sent from the Corps of Engineers' Mountain Division office in Salt Lake City to

investigate the matter, found a pressing

need for repair and maintenance. Two

were assigned to Buckner's headquarters

as liaison officers. They began to recruit qualified civilians in the United

States and searched for enlisted men to

do repairs and utilities work at Alaskan

stations. Some delays had heretofore

resulted because project engineers lacked

authority to initiate construction. Frequently they had to hold up work of even

minor scope for months while awaiting

approval from Talley's office, Buckner's

office, the Seattle District, or General

DeWitt. Now authority was partly decentralized. After 1 May area engineers

could build projects costing less than

$20,000 without reference to higher authority, and they could start those costing up to $50,000 without getting prior

approval from higher authority.

While a great deal was done to improve

organization, little could be done to increase the number of troops or civilians.

Only two engineer units arrived during

the spring. In March the 639th Engineer Camouflage Company reached Fort

Richardson and began construction of a

8

 (1) Memo, AC Proj Sec Opn Br Constr Div OCE

to Opns and Tng Sec, 13 Mar 42. 600.1 (Alaska),

3 Jan-Mar 42. (2) Ltr, TAG to DeWitt, 11 Mar 42.

USW Files, Misc and Sub, Constr Beginning Dec.

(3) Nold, Hist of Development and Accomplishments

of Of of Engr Alaskan Dept, pp. 15-17. C 12027,

KCRC. (4) Ltr, Park to Robins, 20 Apr 42. 333.1

Alaska 1920-45.
THE FAR NORTH 283

depot for the newly established Eleventh

Air Force. In May the 813th Engineer

Aviation Battalion arrived to begin work

on satellite fields for Elmendorf. By 1

June, approximately 4,500 engineer

troops and 3,000 civilian workmen were

in the territory.9

Construction Progress

The engineers could show considerable progress by June. Annette and

Yakutat were virtually complete. Cold

Bay had a good gravel runway which,

while not finished, was usable. No work

had as yet been done at Port Heiden because of bad weather. Since their arrival in February, the 42d Engineers had

been building camps for the Army garrisons at the CAA fields at Juneau and

Cordova. Facilities for gasoline storage

were being erected at major airfields.

At all projects the engineers were putting

in access roads. By the end of May

drilling of the tunnels for the railroad

cutoff was about half finished, and work

on the roadbed was about one-fourth

done. With the beginning of spring the

strategically important Seward Peninsula

began to receive more attention. In

March and April Air and Engineer officers made a reconnaissance of that area

for a site for an airfield away from the

coast where weather conditions would be

better than at Nome. A site was found

sixty-five miles to the north of the city.

In May several groups from Talley's office

made a 3-week air and ground survey of

the almost unknown region west of Fairbanks in an effort to find a route for a

highway or railroad from Fairbanks to

the coast and a site for an ocean terminal.

The preliminary investigation indicated

a route along the Yukon Valley would be

feasible. Two locations were found on

the Bering Sea deep enough for port

construction.10

Progress on the eleven aircraft warning

stations approved for construction was

disappointingly slow. Differences of

opinion still existed over where some of

the stations should be located. In

March the Eleventh Air Force wanted,

at its major bases, additional information

and filter centers to receive signals from

and transmit signals to nearby detector

stations. Work was further retarded

when a new type of radar detector was

developed that permitted 360-degree

coverage. Buckner believed 20 of these

would be required, but the War Department would allow only 10; after plans for

installing 10 of the devices had been

prepared, only 5 turned out to be available. Work on the aircraft warning

stations, most of them in isolated places,

was difficult. At some, cableways had

first to be built so that supplies could be

brought up. At most stations, the

Alaskan winter slowed construction; at

four, work was impossible before spring.

By the beginning of May only the mobile

9

 (1) Nold, Hist of Of of Engr Alaskan Dept, pp.

20-25. (2) Incl to Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Nov 57.

(3) Memo, WDC for Buckner, 21 Apr 42. ADC 600.1,

Constr in Genl, vol. III. (4) 2d Wrapper Ind, U.S.

EngrO Anchorage, Alaska, to CG ADC, 16 Jan 43, on

Memo, SOS to CG ADC, 12 Dec 42. 600.1 (Alaska)

(Labor) pt. 1.

10

 (1) Hist of 42d GS Regt, in Orgn Hists, U.S.

Army, Alaska. (2) Ltr, Park to Robins, 20 Apr 42.

333.1 Alaska 1920-45. (3) Bush, Narrative Rpt of

Alaska Constr, pp. 217, 269-71, 412-413, 424. (4)

Anchorage AreaO, Rcn Rpt for RR or Hwy West of

Fairbanks, 15 Jun 42. NWSC 617 (NWD).
284 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

station at Anchorage and the fixed one

at Kodiak were in operation.11

Concentrating on the Aleutians

The attack on the Territory, which

many had regarded as almost inevitable,

was soon to come. Early in May Navy

intelligence learned that the Japanese

were planning to strike at Midway and

the Aleutians. On 3 June two enemy

carriers launched their planes for an attack on Dutch Harbor. (Map 16) Despite the bad weather 17 aircraft got

through to their target, demolishing barracks and killing about 25 men. On the

afternoon of the next day about 30

planes came in and again caused some

loss of life and considerable damage to

installations. Eight men of Company C

of the 151st Engineer Combat Regiment

were killed. After the attack some of

the enemy airmen chose a rendezvous

point near Umnak almost directly over

the airfield, of whose existence they were

unaware. Here U.S. fighters shot down

4 enemy planes. Meanwhile, two Japanese occupation forces approached the

Aleutians. On 7 June one landed on

Attu, the most remote island of the chain,

and the next day the other came ashore

on Kiska. As soon as enough planes

could be concentrated on the strip on

Umnak, bombing of the Japanese foothold on Kiska began.12

Although the Japanese thrust at

Alaska, as is now known, served mainly

as a feint, preliminary to the major strike

against Midway, General DeWitt saw in

it the possible beginning of a full-scale

invasion and suggested to the War Department on 14 June that an expedition

be launched against the Japanese in the

western Aleutians. DeWitt's recommendations evoked no enthusiastic response. As far as the Joint Chiefs were

concerned, there were more urgent combat theaters than the North Pacific. DeWitt then proposed that an airfield be

built on Tanaga Island, about 200 miles

east of Kiska, so that the Japaneseoccupied islands could be effectively

bombed. No time was lost in making a

reconnaissance. Talley, together with

an Air officer and a Navy officer, landed

on Tanaga on 27 June. They found the

island to be similar to Umnak and estimated that a runway could be built in

three weeks. But the Navy preferred

Adak, 60 miles farther east, because of

its good harbor. Whichever site was

chosen, the engineers would have a formidable construction job. The islands

of the Aleutian chain extended southwestward for 1,100 miles. Peaks of a

partially submerged mountain range,

they were treeless and much of the time

shrouded in fog. They were uninhabited; the natives, about 1,300 Aleuts,

of Eskimo stock, had been evacuated by

the U.S. Navy after the attack on Dutch

Harbor. Those on Attu and Kiska had

been removed by the Japanese. During the summer the Joint Chiefs ordered

airfields put in on Atka and Adak, and

on small St. Paul Island in the Bering

Sea, 300 miles north of Umnak. Airfields on these various islands would

11

 (1) Memo, Hq Eleventh AF for Buckner, 24 Mar

42. WDC-ADC, 381/32, pt. I. (2) Bush, Narrative

Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp. 217ff. (3) Memo, TAG

for OinC, Alaska Com System, 29 May 42. WDCADC 660.2 AWS/48. 12

 (1) Craven and Cate, Plans and Early Operations, pp. 466-67. (2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic

Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, pp. 225ff.

(3) 151st Engr Combat Regt, Regtl Hist.
THE FAR NORTH 285

MAP 16

provide a fairly effective barrier against

Japanese air fleets operating from carriers or from Attu and Kiska.13

Work began first on Adak. Having

completed its job on Umnak, the 807th

Aviation Battalion, less a company which

had begun work at Port Heiden, was

scheduled to start the new undertaking.

At Unalaska, the men assembled a motley

collection of some 250 craft, including

tugboats, barges, fishing scows, and a

four-masted schooner, to take them to

their new destination. They were to

go with the task force which would

occupy the island. On 26 August, the

engineer "fleet," escorted by five destroyers, headed into the Bering Sea in

the teeth of a rising gale. The crews

worked hard to keep their supplies from

being washed overboard. A route well

up into the Bering Sea was taken to avoid

enemy aircraft and submarines. During the night some vessels became sepa13

 (1) Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 368-69. (2) Bush, Narrative

Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp. 178, 184, 189, 193. (3)

DeWitt, Memo for Rcd, 22 Jun 42. WDC-ADC

384/7, vol. III, Notes by DeWitt, 22 Jun 42. (4)

Memo, DeWitt for Marshall, 16 Jul 42. ADC 381

Defense Plans, bk. 4.
286 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

rated from the convoy, and the destroyers

had a busy time locating and bringing

back the wanderers. One barge was

lost. After five days, Adak was sighted.

Destroyers and boats headed into Kuluk

Bay on the island's eastern shore, just as

a heavy fog closed in. Several of the

barges were beached and some of the

tractors and light cranes unloaded. The

tractors dozed sand ramps to two scows

sunk in tandem to provide access to an

oceangoing barge being used as a floating

dock. Troops, bivouacked in tents,

found living conditions extremely uncomfortable.14

The mountainous island seemed to

have no good location for an airfield.

The sand dunes along the shores of

Kuluk Bay appeared promising but

would require much more earth moving

than could be done with the small

amount of machinery on hand. Beyond

the dunes was a low, flat area of firmly

packed sand, about two miles long.

Along the western edge flowed Sweeper

Creek, which emptied into Kuluk Bay

through a narrow gap in the dunes just

to the south of the flat. Tidal waters

which entered through the mouth of

the creek covered the area twice a day.

If the tide could be shut out and, at the

same time, the waters of the creek controlled, a strip could be provided quickly.

On 1 September the engineers, after

bulldozing dikes along the banks of the

creek, dozed a sand dam across its mouth

to shut out the tide. To keep the pentup waters from overflowing the dikes,

they gouged a new channel into the bay

through the dunes, two and one-half

miles from the creek's original mouth.

On 10 September the sand strip could

take a B-18 bomber. In order that

planes might operate more effectively,

3,000 feet of landing mat were laid down.

On the 13th forty-three planes took off

to bomb Kiska. A second runway was

ready five days later. To allow water

accumulating in the lower reaches of the

creek to escape, bulldozers had to break

open the dike across the mouth of the

creek daily. To eliminate this repeated

opening and closing, culverts with gates

were installed. Sometimes the accumulated water flooded the runways, especially when rainfall was heavy during

high tide, and the gates had to remain

closed. The airmen, ignoring shallow

flooding, would take off in a cloud of

spray. In November water pumps arrived and were put in operation later that

month. In dry weather, the sand was

kept moist and stable by means of controlled pumping.15

In September construction began on

Atka and St. Paul. On the 17th Company A of the 802d Aviation Battalion

came ashore on Atka near an abandoned

fishing village of some fifteen buildings.

The men took over a number of the

empty structures. As the dock was too

small, the engineers provided a temporary pier by turning a barge upside down

at the water's edge. They were soon at

work leveling nearby sand dunes for an

airstrip with mat surfacing. Work was

soon well in hand on Atka; two days

after Christmas a 3,000-foot runway was

ready. One company of the 42d Gen14

 (1) Hist of the 807th Engr Avn Bn. (2) Bush,

Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, p. 178. (3) Incl to

Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Jan 59.

15

 (1) Hist of the 807th Engr Avn Bn. (2) Bush,

Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, p. 230.
THE FAR NORTH 287

eral Service Regiment reached St. Paul

late in September, its job to build a

fighter strip surfaced with steel mat.

The men found a deserted village of

fifty-five buildings. Some of the 1,400

officers and men of the garrison were

sheltered in the houses, with about onethird living in winterized tents. On 14

November the runway, surfaced with

volcanic ash, was completed. From this

time on, little work could be done, for

blizzards, occurring almost daily, filled

the roads with drifts so high that equipment could not get through. Rough

seas and masses of floating ice destroyed

or damaged almost every boat and barge

moored to the island.16

Alaska: July-December 1942

During the last half of 1942 the engineers did a substantial amount of work

on the defenses of the Alaskan mainland. They undertook additional construction at Ladd and Elmendorf, most

of it to house more troops. During the

summer elements of the 176th General

Service Regiment arrived to build camps

for garrisons at the remaining CAA

fields in the interior of Alaska. At the

naval air stations, Seabees took over

from the contractors and finished the

facilities for the Army garrisons. The

runways were in at Cold Bay and Port

Heiden by the end of the year. At long

last, work had got under way on the

seacoast batteries. Before Pearl Harbor,

Alaska's only seacoast defenses were a

few 155-mm. gun batteries on Panama

mounts at Dutch Harbor, Kodiak, Sitka,

and Seward. Work on additional defenses authorized in late 1941 had been

held up by delays in site selection and

revisions in the numbers and sizes of the

batteries. It was finally decided to have

the Navy build the defenses at the naval

bases and to have the Engineers improve

the harbor defenses at Seward. The

Corps made a contract with the West

Construction Company for this job and

work began in September. Work on

the railroad cutoff was shaping up well.

The 714th Railroad Battalion, men from

the 42d and 177th General Service Regiments, and employees of the Alaska

Railroad were laying the tracks and the

job was expected to be finished by the

end of the year. A dock terminal was

under construction at Whittier on Prince

William Sound. Late in July the War

Department authorized going ahead

with the barge terminal which Dunn

had advocated in March. Plans called

for establishing a terminal for nine

oceangoing vessels on the eastern shore of

Excursion Inlet on Icy Straits to the west

of Juneau. In August the Engineers

awarded the contract to the Guy F.

Atkinson Company of San Francisco.

Toward the end of the month the contractor's employees began work on piers

and warehouses. In October the 2d

Battalion of the 331 st General Service

Regiment, about 1,300 officers and men,

arrived to help the civilian forces.

Meantime, the port of Juneau was being

enlarged so that it could be used until

the barge terminal was operational.

Still far behind schedule were the air

warning stations. After the Japanese

defeat at Midway, previously chosen

sites in the Alaskan interior and on the

16

 (1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp.

184-85, 189-90. (2) Memo, Opns and Tng Br Tng

Div OCE for C Opns and Tng Br, 14 Jun 43. 600.1

(ADC).
288 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

west coast in the Bristol Bay and Norton

Sound areas were abandoned for sites on

the Alaska Peninsula and in the Aleutians. Construction plans had to be

revised and work started anew.17

Interest in improving communications

within Alaska heightened in the summer

and fall. At the time of Pearl Harbor,

Canada was building a string of airfields

in the western part of the Dominion

from Edmonton to Whitehorse. These

fields, soon being used to fly planes from

the United States to Alaska, formed part

of the Northwest Staging Route. Six

fields in Alaska—Northway, Tanacross,

Big Delta, Ladd, Galena, and Nome—

formed the other part. After the attack

on Dutch Harbor, the Engineers got the

task of improving the runways at the

fields in Alaska. Since the fall of 1941

negotiations had been under way with

the Soviet Union to fly planes from

Alaska to Siberia. In September 1942

the Russians accepted the first planes via

the northern route. Work on the

Alaskan fields of the route, now called

the Alaskan Siberian Ferry Route

(ALSIB), was pushed even more, so that

larger numbers of planes could be ferried

to Siberia in the spring. Much thought

was now given to developing ground

communications westward from Fairbanks. During the fall of 1942 the

Seattle District made additional surveys

for a road or railroad and a pipeline from

Fairbanks to the Seward Peninsula.

Since building a road or railroad would

take too long, a study was made of the

possibility of developing river routes.

Two were planned—one from Fairbanks

to Tanana on the Yukon and another

from Fairbanks to McGrath on the Kuskokwim. Supplies could be stored at

these two points and, after the spring

thaws, loaded on barges and sent down

the rivers to the Bering Sea, whence they

could be forwarded to various points on

the Seward Peninsula. In order to have

transportation out of Fairbanks as soon

as possible, General Somervell in January 1943 instructed the Engineers to

build the winter roads to Tanana and

McGrath and develop and operate the

barge lines on the Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers when the ice broke up.18

Amchitka

In early November 1942 Admiral

Nimitz, conjecturing that the Japanese

might be planning to occupy Amchitka

Island, between Kiska and Adak, advised sending an American force there

to develop an advanced air base. The

Joint Chiefs tentatively approved this

move on 18 December, providing a good

site for an airfield could be found on the

island. Colonel Talley, with a party of

engineers, went to Amchitka by Navy

plane on 17 December, and after a 2-day

survey reported finding a site on which a

fighter strip could be built in less than

three weeks. Accordingly, on 11 Janu17

 (1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp.

170-72, 220-21, 344-45. (2) Hist of the 176th GS

Regt, 10 Feb 42-12 Mar 45. (3) Hist of the 331st

Engr Regt. (4) Memo, Talley for Buckner, 3 Aug

42. ADC 600.1, Constr in Genl, vol. IV.

18

 (1) Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1959), pp. 200-204. (2) Memo, C TC

for Somervell, 8 Nov 42. ASF HQ CG Alaska, 1943-

46. (3) Ltr, SOS to CG NWSC, 16 Nov. 400 (AD).

(4) Ltr, Somervell to CG NWSC, 8 Jan 43. NWSC

600.93 (Fairbanks). (5) Matloff and Snell, Strategic

Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 339ff.
THE FAR NORTH 289

ary 1943 the first U.S. troops, including

the 813th Aviation Battalion, came

ashore at Constantine Harbor. The

engineers, finding the flat coastal area

excellent for airfield construction, began

to put the strip in on a tidal flat, using

the methods employed on Adak. The

heavily overcast skies required the use

of artificial lighting even in the daytime.

Operations were not too onerous because

the men had an adequate amount of

heavy construction equipment. Almost

daily visits by Japanese patrol planes

with intermittent bombings made it

highly urgent to complete the runway

quickly. The first American plane

landed in mid-February. Henceforth,

there was only light enemy activity.

Earlier that month, the 1st Battalion of

the 151st Combat Regiment had arrived

to construct base facilities on the island,

and in March the 2d Battalion of the

177th General Service Regiment arrived

to build storage tanks for aviation gasoline. The aviation engineers meanwhile began work on the main bomber

runway on a high, flat area above Constantine Harbor.19

Supplies, Equipment, and

Spare Parts

By early 1943 the most critically

needed supplies were reaching Alaska in

fairly adequate amounts. During 1941

the Seattle District had sent 182,531

measurement tons of construction materials and equipment. In 1942, the

amount rose to 585,443 tons. Still

larger and speedier shipments to the

Territory were possible in 1943 because

of improved transportation. By the beginning of that year the expanded rail

facilities at the Canadian port of Prince

Rupert were being put into use. Additional docks had been built at Juneau,

Seward, and Anchorage. The cutoff to

the Alaska Railroad and the port of

Whittier were finished by June. The

barge terminal was in use. Shortages

had so stimulated production of local

materials that some surpluses accumulated. More lumber was being produced than was required, and Alaskan

strip mines were furnishing more than

enough coal. But the procurement of

some items not produced locally became

difficult during late 1942 and early 1943

as needs became greater and Alaska lost

its relatively high priority to more active

combat theaters. The short shipping

season added to the troubles. Supplies

for many projects west and north of

Juneau had to be delivered after 1 July

and before mid-October, when the ice

pack began to form. To complete a

project during a given year, it was necessary to have most of the materials on

hand by the previous fall. But this was

extremely hard to do because of the

shortage of vessels and the lack of adequate planning in the scheduling of

shipments. "It was impossible," Nold

later wrote, "for agencies and authorities

within the United States to visualize the

necessity for . . . early shipment of

supplies to permit construction ... in

the short working season."

 20 19

 (1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp.

193-96. (2) Hist Sec Alaskan Dept Official Hist of the

Alaskan Dept, pp. 26ff. OCMH. (3) Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and

Its Outposts, ch. X.

20

 (1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp.

390ff. (2) Interstaff Memo, C Sup Div Seattle Dist
290 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Especially severe was the shortage of

spare parts. Maintenance of equipment

under adverse operating conditions was

a formidable task and for the most part

had to be carried out by the using units

in any way they could. Soon after Pearl

Harbor, Nold wanted to send the better

equipment to Seattle for repair, but was

informed that, if sent, it would probably

be shipped to theaters with higher priorities, and no replacements for Alaska

would be forthcoming. In August 1942

the 468th Maintenance Company arrived

at Dutch Harbor. It took over the

repair shop there, began building additional facilities, and started repairing

machinery on an around-the-clock schedule. Its first job was the rehabilitation

of the equipment of the 802d aviation

engineers. In January the 2d platoon

of the 468th Engineer Maintenance

Company went to Adak and found that,

as elsewhere in Alaska, maintenance

facilities were inadequate and spare parts

scarce.21

Maps

Work on the three major mapping

projects started before Pearl Harbor—

the making of maps of the SewardAnchorage region, mapping the area traversed by the Richardson Highway, and

making maps of the major air routes—

continued. In the spring and summer

of 1942 Company D of the 29th Topographic Battalion established ground

control for the Seward-Anchorage region.

By December photomapping of this part

of Alaska was about three-fourths complete and reproduction of initial editions

about one-third done. The engineers

were not able to show much progress in

mapping the area traversed by the Richardson Highway—an area comprising

about 7,000 square miles—or with the

making of maps of the major air routes,

mainly because poor weather kept the

airmen from furnishing adequate quantities of good photographs. By late 1942

the Aleutians were much more important than the Alaskan mainland. The

principal effort now had to be concentrated on preparing maps for the troops

who would eventually assault enemy

positions on Attu and Kiska. The 29th

Topographic Battalion at Portland,

Oregon, did all the mapping for the

planned operations in the Aleutians. It

produced a 1:25,000 series from aerial

photographs with a coverage of 1:10,000

for critical areas. Again because of bad

weather, the Air Forces found it hard to

supply good photographs in sufficient

numbers. The engineers had to make a

large part of their maps from obliques,

which were not especially suitable material for the multiplex. Meanwhile, the

Army Map Service supplied copies of

such maps as it had of the Aleutians.22

Camouflage

Within a few months after Pearl

Harbor, a comprehensive camouflage

program was authorized for Alaska, funds

being allotted in excess of $6 million.

Great quantities of camouflage materials for Lt Col Conrad P. Hardy, Seattle Dist, 11 Nov 43.

323.41 (Seattle Dist Of) (3) Ltrs, Nold to C EHD, 7

Aug 57, 22 Aug 58. 21

 (1) 468th Engr Maint Co, Unit Hist of Alaskan

Opns . . . 19 Jul 42 Until 15 Oct 44. (2) Ltr, Nold

to C EHD, 7 Aug 57.

22

 (1) Ltr, Col Herbert B. Loper, Intel Br Tr Div

OCE to G-2, 22 Dec 42. 061.01 (Alaska) Dec 42 thru

——— . (2) Ltr, Loper to Engr CPA, 4 Feb 44.

Engr AGF PAC.
THE FAR NORTH 291

were shipped to each of the projects

under way, but little effective work was

done. Except for the dispersal of structures, concealment was as a rule neglected in the haste to complete construction. When the 639th Camouflage

Company arrived at Fort Richardson in

March 1942, it was put to work not on

what it was trained to do but on the

building of a depot for the Air Forces.

As the likelihood of a Japanese attack

increased, more attention was given to

camouflage. Nevertheless, by June 1942

so much of the construction had inadvertently made the installations conspicuous that little could now be done to hide

them. To make Army posts less noticeable, nets and garlands were hung and

trees and shrubs replanted, and at some

posts camouflage discipline was observed.

In the interior of Alaska, camouflage

was limited to dispersing buildings and

toning them down with paint. Concealment, highly important in the Aleutians,

was at the same time most difficult to

accomplish. The absence of trees made

effective camouflage seemingly impossible. Ingenious treatments were sometimes devised. Buildings and other installations were dug into hillsides, and

the more brightly colored buildings were

toned down, often with the use of mud.

Driftwood, weeds, grass, tin cans, and

chicken wire were used to blend structures into their surroundings. In the

winter deep snow often hid installations

more effectively than any camouflage

could have done. On the whole,

camouflage, even in the Aleutians, had

very low priority; at a number of bases

it was all but ignored.23

Building in Subarctic Regions

After two years in Alaska and the

Aleutians the engineers had acquired

considerable experience in building in

subarctic regions. They had gained

most of it after Pearl Harbor. Before

the war engineer work, not very extensive, had been restricted almost entirely to a few points along the coast

where conditions, on the whole, were

similar to those in the northern United

States. In the interior the engineers

had worked only at Ladd, where much of

the construction had already been done

by the Quartermaster Corps. After

hostilities began, the engineers had to

build at many points in both the Alaskan

interior and the Aleutians. They constructed airfields, wharves, gasoline

storage, seacoast fortifications, roads, utilities, barracks, warehouses, shops, mess

halls, and hospitals. Information about

the various areas was scanty. Since

speed was of paramount importance,

there was no time to make on-the-spot

investigations. "In designing facilities

for the Aleutian bases," wrote one of the

men working in the Seattle District office,

"interesting and perplexing difficulties

were encountered, which called for every

trick in the engineer's bag." The engineers likewise had to use many "tricks"

in actual construction, both in the Aleutians and on the Alaskan mainland, in

order to deal with the unusual conditions

they encountered.24

One of the great hindrances was the

long Alaskan winter. During this time

of the year, daylight hours were few.

23

 (1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp.

354ff. (2) Rpt, 639th Camouflage Co (Sep) to Engr

Alaskan Dept, 1 Jan 44. KCRC.

24

 Joseph D. Bodman, "Peculiarities of Aleutian

Military Design," Civil Engineering, XV (September,

1945), 402-04.
292 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ENGINEERS DRESSED FOR -37 ° F.

For about four months, the sun shone

less than eight hours a day; at Fairbanks,

in December, there were three hours of

sunshine out of twenty-four. In the interior, probably the greatest obstacle was

the extreme cold, with temperatures

from 50 to 70 degrees F. below zero not

uncommon. Drums of pure antifreeze

were sometimes frozen solid. The engineers used steam to soften the ground

for excavating and to keep newly prepared concrete from freezing. At many

Alaskan projects, they placed water and

sewerage pipes on the ground in heated

wooden conduits called utiladors. "The

'Old Timers' said work could not continue through the winter," Talley wrote

later. The engineers proved them

wrong. As Talley said, "We poured

concrete . . . at -15°F., erected steel at

-20°F. . . . We stopped wooden construction sooner since the wood froze."

The 176th engineers, who worked on

camps for garrisons at the CAA fields in

central Alaska, had more experience

than most units in living and working

in the frigid Alaskan interior. At

Northway ". . . frostbitten ears, noses,

and feet were common during the first

part of the winter," the 176th reported,

"but we gradually learned from the

Indians and through experience how to

prevent this." The men found that

keeping their feet warm was their hardest job. Shoes were soon discarded,

since "any use of leather or rubber footwear was asking for trouble." Wearing

three pairs of socks and Indian-made hide

moccasins helped. On one occasion,

when the thermometer stood at -60°F.,

a group of men was sent out to cut wood,

with instructions to come in when the

cold became unbearable. The men

stayed out for two hours. Such assignments were rare. "Only the Indians

venture out in these periods and their

health shows the results," the unit historian wrote. ".. . approximately 90

percent . . . frost their lungs and develop T.B." At the various stations in

the interior, work was usually so arranged that when the temperature fell to

-35°F., the men were put on inside

jobs.25

Building in areas of "permafrost" or

permanently frozen ground was a new

experience for most engineers. In a

25

 (1) Lt. Col. John R. Hardin, "Engineers Rush

Alaskan Defenses," The Military Engineer, XXXIV

(January, 1942), 1-3. (2) Incl to Ltr, Talley to C

EHD, 6 Nov 57. (3) Lt. (j.g.) Frank W. Galbraith,

"The Distribution of Utilities in Arctic Advanced

Bases," The Military Engineer, XLII (March-April,

1950), 121-22. (4) Hist of the 176th Engr GS Regt,

10 Feb 42-12 Mar 45.
THE FAR NORTH 293

large part of the Arctic and subarctic

regions, permafrost, possibly a remnant

of the Ice Age, was encountered from 2

to 5 feet beneath the surface of the earth

and it extended downward sometimes to

a depth of 1,500 feet. It was invariably

found in regions where the average annual temperature was below 32°F.

Permafrost was widespread in Alaska,

but there was little of it in the Aleutians.

If the thin layer of topsoil which thawed

in the summer and froze in the winter

was removed, the permanently frozen

ground underneath was left without its

insulating cover. If subjected to heat,

it became soft and lost its bearing power.

Unpredictable results followed; the

ground might shrink, crack, slide, or

creep. When permafrost froze again, it

produced an upward thrust. A number

of buildings constructed by the engineers

were heavily damaged when warm currents of air from the heated structures

softened the underlying permafrost and

caused parts of the structures to sink.

Flowing water presented a constant

hazard because it might cause the permafrost to melt. One of the runways at

Ladd Field was believed to have failed

because the waters of a nearby river inexplicably seeped into the frozen ground

underneath the runway. Little was

known about permafrost. No scientific

studies of it had been made before World

War II, except by the Russians as a consequence of structural failures on the

Trans-Siberian railroad. Attempts to

get information from the Soviet Government were fruitless. The engineers had

to learn from experience how best to deal

with permafrost. Before constructing

buildings and runways, they had to make

a thorough study of the conditions at the

building site. The most effective treatment generally consisted of excavating

the top layer of the permanently frozen

ground and replacing it with insulating materials. Sometimes the damage

caused by settling could be remedied

rather quickly. At Fairbanks a well was

drilled in one corner of a powerhouse

through more than 200 feet of permafrost to water-bearing gravel. The passage of the water through the pipe

softened the permafrost and caused the

corner of the building to settle. The

pumping was stopped, the soil refroze,

and the settling ceased. "Thereafter,"

Talley wrote, "we located wells from 100

to 200 feet away from buildings."

 26

Muskeg and tundra were troublesome

obstacles until the engineers learned how

to deal with them effectively. Muskeg

was the heavy growth of moss found in

bogs, sometimes to a depth of twenty

feet, and often extending many square

miles in area. In many instances, the

semidecayed matter at the bottom had

turned into peat; often buried in the

muskeg were logs and branches. The

surface was spongy. A man walking on

it had the feeling of treading on a mattress. Once its surface was broken,

muskeg could sustain little weight, and

anyone venturing across would sink in

to his knees or even deeper. Shallow

patches were not a serious hindrance and

neither were deeper ones, provided

sufficient precautions were taken. If

heavy machinery was to be moved across

26

 (1) Col. Lynn C. Barnes, "Permafrost: A Challenge to Engineers," The Military Engineer,

XXXVIII (January, 1946), 9-11. (2) Col. Walter K.

Wilson, Jr., "The Problem of Permafrost," The

Military Engineer, XL (April, 1948), 162-64. (3)

Incl to Ltr, Talley to C EHD, 6 Nov 57.
294 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

DIGGING OUT TUNDRA

muskeg, the engineers usually dumped

gravel or laid mats over the route beforehand. Sometimes they built trestles

over the more treacherous sections. If

a runway was to be constructed or a

building put up, the muskeg had to be

scooped out and replaced with rock or

sand. Rare on the Alaskan mainland,

tundra was common in the Aleutians.

Tundra was the term used by the local

inhabitants for the heavy, wet, partly decayed masses of grass from two to ten

feet deep. When left undisturbed,

tundra could support considerable

weight. Like muskeg, once its surface

was ruptured, it lost its bearing capacity.

It usually had to be removed so that runways and buildings could be constructed

on the solid base of sand, gravel, or rock

underneath. When it could not be

easily taken out and extensive construction was not called for, tundra was covered with sand or gravel and would cause

no further trouble.27

During much of the year, and especially from October to March, violent

winds, called the williwaws, swirled over

the Aleutians or sped across Alaskan

27

 (1) Hardin, "Engineers Rush Alaskan Defenses,"

The Military Engineer, XXXIV (January, 1942), 1-3.

(2) Harold W. Richardson, "Construction in the

Tundra," Engineering News-Record, CXXXII (29

Jun 44), 106-10. (3) Incl to Ltr, Talley to C EHD,

6 Nov 57.
THE FAR NORTH 295

wastelands, sometimes reaching speeds

of more than a hundred miles an hour.

Frequently they were accompanied by

heavy snow. Transferred to Adak in

March 1943, the 18th Engineer Combat

Regiment, although used to subarctic

weather, found living on the island extremely uncomfortable. "This was the

day of the Big Wind," the regimental

historian wrote under the date of 7 April.

"At breakfast a man emerging from a

. . . tent with hotcakes in his messkit

saw them take off and gain altitude. . . ."

By noon, men were getting lost in a

raging snowstorm. By midafternoon it

was hard to see a tent at twenty-five yards.

Walking against the wind was almost

impossible. "The sleet driving against

your eyeballs was extremely painful,"

the writer continued. "You involuntarily turned your back and then with

nothing visible but snow you started in

a wrong direction." Soon almost every

tent had a whirlpool of snow forced in

through even the smallest openings. A

major job was to keep men and tents on

the ground. Similar accounts came

from other islands. At one project in

the Aleutians nine men trying to reach

the mess hall during a snow storm were

lost for five hours. At some camps, men

followed ropes stretched from one building or tent to another, though the

distance was only a thousand feet.

Buildings of conventional design were

quickly leveled. Some caught fire from

downdrafts in chimneys.28

Many projects remained virtually isolated despite efforts to improve communications. Even some near the coast

were hard to reach because the shallow

waters prevented oceangoing vessels from

approaching closely. Much lightering

and transfer of supplies was necessary.

Construction materials for the airfield at

Naknek had to be transferred from

oceangoing vessels to barges at high tide

and then towed 15 miles up the Naknek

River to the construction site. After the

supplies were ashore, they had to be

moved across the muddy flats. Lumber

needed at Bethel had to be floated 85

miles down the Kuskokwim River;

gravel had to be barged down the same

river for 100 miles. Supplies needed at

Galena were brought by two small

steamers and by barges which plied the

distance of 435 miles down the Tanana

and Yukon Rivers from Nenana, the

transfer point on the Alaska Railroad.

Supplies and equipment for the base at

Northway were barged from Big Delta

via the Tanana and Nabesna Rivers.

These out-of-the-way places were readily

accessible by plane, but aircraft could

carry only limited amounts of supplies.

And during Alaska's frequent winter

storms, the airplane was often of less use

than the Eskimo's dog sled. It sometimes took thirty days for mail from an

engineer project to reach Talley's office

in Anchorage. To provide an even partially adequate road network would have

been impossible. Road construction

was limited principally to the areas

around important installations at Fair- 28

 (1) Bodman, "Peculiarities of Aleutian Military

Design," Civil Engineering, XV (September, 1945),

402-04. (2) 18th Engr Combat Regt, Regt'l Diary,

20 Jan-7 Jun 43. KCRC. (3) Hist Sec Alaskan

Dept, Official Hist, pp. 177ff. (4) Memo for Rcd,

Col A. L. Parmelee, CAC, sub: Winter Conditions

and Problems Common to Fort Mears, Unalaska,

Alaska. 062.2 (Alaska).
296 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

banks, Anchorage, Yakutat, Kodiak, and

Unalaska.29

Designs

Charged with preparing designs for

buildings to be erected in Alaska, the

Seattle District was faced with unusual

and sometimes perplexing problems.

Designs often had to be based on scanty

information supplemented by an extensive use of the imagination. The district prepared a set of "typical drawings"

for airfields, buildings, docks, gasoline

storage, electric utilities, and other

installations which could be used as a

basis for the procurement of supplies

and as a guide in construction. About

five hundred copies of this set were made.

In Alaska these drawings usually had to

be modified to make them suitable for

local conditions. As long as the modifications did not affect key points, the

designs were useful. The Seattle District also furnished plans for hundreds

of specific installations which were built

at various projects.30

Practically all work the engineers did

in Alaska was in some way related to the

development of a network of airfields.

As a rule, runways were built according

to prewar designs. If two or more were

put in at one field, they were almost

always crossed in the direction of the

prevailing winds. Whether built in the

coastal, interior, or Aleutian areas,

runways, taxiways, parking areas, and

revetments were similarly constructed.

Although the Seattle District designed

airfields for the Alaskan interior, the

engineers built only one there. This

was the field southeast of Fairbanks

known as Mile 26, where contractors put

in two parallel 6,000-foot runways. CAA

was responsible for building or improving all other runways in the interior for

military use. The engineers gained

most of their experience in airfield construction on the Alaska Peninsula and

in the Aleutians. Here pumice stone,

volcanic cinder or ash, gravel, and sand

were all used for surfacing. Extensive

use was made of steel mat. Concrete

and asphalt were rarely used. The only

runways of either type put in by the

engineers were those at Annette, Yakutat, and Elmendorf.31

In the erection of buildings the emphasis was on speed. Prewar types of

troop housing, such as permanent

structures of brick and stone and

mobilization-type buildings requiring

skilled labor to put up, were discontinued with a few exceptions, as for

example, the reinforced concrete barracks which had been started at Ladd

before the outbreak of war. Troops

arriving in Alaska or the Aleutians were

usually housed in tents for the first few

weeks or even months. Several types of

housing to provide more adequate

shelter, especially in winter, were developed. Among these were winterized

tents, consisting of floors and sides of

wood, topped with a light skeleton

framework over which the 16' X 16'

Army pyramidal tents could be placed.

29

 (1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp.

103-04, 108, 396. (2) Hist of the 176th Engr GS

Regt, 10 Feb 42-12 Mar 45. 30

 Bodman, "Peculiarities of Aleutian Military Design," Civil Engineering, XV (September, 1945), 402-

04.

31

 Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp. 227ff.,

313ff.
THE FAR NORTH 297

Various types of prefabricated structures

were developed. Among the most popular were the boxlike Stout houses,

built of panels 8 feet high and 8 feet

wide. Very satisfactory was the Pacific

hut, the prefabricated sections of which

were manufactured near Seattle, almost

entirely of noncritical materials. The

arched sides and roof, inexpensively

built of plywood, were lightweight and

highly windproof and waterproof, and

could be easily assembled. Equally

satisfactory was the theater of operations

type, which had prefabricated panels of

rough lumber and tar paper. The

panels could be manufactured and assembled even by inexperienced workmen or troops to form almost any kind

of building. Widely used were the

Yakutat and Quonset huts. All structures had to be especially designed to

make them suitable for Alaskan conditions. The thickness of structural

members had to be increased, additional

bracing put in, diagonal sheathings

applied, and the distance between studs

narrowed to reduce the possibility of

damage from the wind. Sidings almost

invariably had to be put on all important

buildings because the wind tore the tar

paper off. Air exhaust systems were

added to larger heating units to eliminate downdrafts in chimneys. Special

chimney caps were put on stoves. Vapor

barriers were built into buildings to

prevent damage to insulation and interiors which might result from the high

humidity. Buildings used as offices or

quarters had to be provided with vestibules or storm entrances.32

In building harbor facilities, the

engineers had to contend with extremely

rough seas, particularly in the Aleutians.

Before tackling the job of building docks,

they had to put supplies ashore as best

they could. The 807th aviation engineers, when they landed at Umnak, were

among the first who had to deal with this

problem. The heavy surf pounded the

beach even in calm weather. Before

barges bringing supplies and machinery

across the strait from Unalaska could be

unloaded, a way had to be found to keep

them on the beach. At first they were

held by winch cables of tractors placed

well back from shore, but this kept

badly needed equipment from construction jobs. Mooring lines from the

barges were then attached to piles driven

into the ground back from the shore line.

Unloading the barges was even more

difficult than keeping them near the

shore, and at times almost impossible.

At first, the troops unloaded their supplies by hand and put them on tracked

trailers. They then installed a trolley

hoist which permitted unloading even

when the waves rose to tremendous

heights, but this method was not entirely

satisfactory because only one barge could

be unloaded at a time. Three months

after the first barge landed the first dock,

a T-shaped affair, was near enough to

completion to permit its use. The dock

was built about ten feet above high tide

level so that it would not be flooded by

the pounding waves. Barges were tied

32

 (1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp.

278ff. (2) WD Ltr, AG 600.12 (5-1-42) MO-E to

DeWitt, 2 May 42, with 1st Ind, Hq WDC and

Fourth Army, to TAG, 18 May 42. 411.4 Alaska

1940-43. (3) Ltr, Gorlinski, Opns and Tng Br Tr

Div OCE, to Dist Engr Seattle, 9 Jun 42. (4) Ltr,

Asst OSG to OCE, 24 May 43. Last three in 411.4

Alaska 1940-43.
298 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

CONSTRUCTING A PACIFIC HUT ON KISKA

up alongside and cranes hoisted the supplies directly into trucks. The dock

withstood the battering of the sea, but

its excessive height made unloading extremely slow. Two docks built later at

a lower level were destroyed, when heavy

seas floated the decking off the posts. It

was found that it was easier to unload

barges in the turbulent surf if they were

docked perpendicular rather than parallel to the beach.33

By the beginning of 1943 the defenses

of Alaska, particularly the airfields, had

been built up sufficiently to make it

highly improbable that the Japanese,

especially after their defeat at Midway,

would be able to expand their foothold

in the Aleutians or launch a successful

attack on the Alaskan mainland. While

the engineers were strengthening Alaska

and helping to prepare the Territory as

a possible springboard for an offensive,

they were at the same time at work on

two important projects in northwestern

Canada, the purpose of which was, at

least in part, to strengthen Alaska. One

project was the construction of the

Alaska-Canada, or Alcan Highway; the

other was the development of Canol.

33

 (1) Hist Sec Alaskan Dept, Official Hist. (2)

Hammond, "Aleutian Water Transportation Problems," The Military Engineer, XXXVI (November,

1944). 373-75.
THE FAR NORTH 299

The Alcan Highway

Plans for a Highway

For many years groups of Americans

and Canadians had urged their governments to construct a highway through

British Columbia and Yukon Territory

to Alaska. They advocated such a project primarily for the purposes of developing the resources and promoting the

settlement of those regions. In the

1930's the United States and Canada

established commissions to investigate

possible routes. The Alaskan International Highway Commission, headed by

Warren G. Magnusson, Congressman

from the State of Washington, favored a

route as near the Pacific coast as the

terrain would permit. The British Columbia-Yukon-Alaska Highway Commission of Canada preferred locating the

highway farther east, in the Rocky

Mountain Trench. Both commissions

advocated starting the highway at Prince

George in east central British Columbia

and terminating it at Big Delta, Alaska,

a town about ninety miles southeast of

Fairbanks and on the Richardson Highway. In February 1941, Anthony J.

Dimond, delegate from Alaska in the

House of Representatives, introduced a

bill for a road through Canada to Alaska

along whatever route President Roosevelt would consider best in the interest

of national defense. The War Department, questioned on the military value

of such a road, and believing it could

continue to rely almost exclusively on

ships for transporting troops, equipment,

and supplies to Alaska, concluded that

while such a highway might be desirable

as a "long-range defense measure," it

could be justified "only under low

priority."

 34

The disaster at Pearl Harbor caused

military planners to take a stronger

interest in an overland link with Alaska.

The War Plans Division now recommended building a road to provide an

emergency overland supply line to isolated Alaskan outposts. Such a road

could also be used to supply the airfields which were under construction as

the Canadian part of the Northwest

Staging Route. These fields were located at Edmonton, Fort St. John, Fort

Nelson, Watson Lake, and Whitehorse.

The Air Forces were already using the

partially completed runways, but flights

were restricted because of the shortage

of supplies and servicing facilities. In

a Cabinet meeting held on 16 January

1942, President Roosevelt asked Secretaries Stimson, Knox, and Ickes to study

the need for a highway to Alaska, and, if

construction appeared practicable, to

decide on the best route. Heeding the

advice of the General Staff, the Air

Staff, and the Engineer members of the

War Plans Division, the three Cabinet

members recommended building the

road along the line of the staging fields

from Fort St. John to Big Delta. Construction would begin at Dawson Creek,

the end of the rail line fifty miles south34

 Unless otherwise indicated, documents cited in

this section, except unit histories, are located in

Alcan Files, EHD. (1) British Columbia-YukonAlaska Highway Commission, Canada, Report on

Proposed Highway Through British Columbia and

the Yukon Territory to Alaska, August 1941 (Ottawa,

1942), pp. 7-10. (2) 77th Cong, 1st sess, H Rpt 3095,

photostatic copy in Exhibit E of The Alaskan Highway, A Report Compiled for the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, May, 1945 (cited hereafter

as Alaska Hwy). (3) Ltr, Stimson to Chmn, Comm

on Roads HR, 6 Oct 41. Exhibit E, Alaska Hwy.
300 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

east of Fort St. John. The Chief of

Engineers would be responsible for the

work. On 2 February the War Plans

Division informed Brig. Gen. Clarence

L. Sturdevant, Assistant Chief of Engineers in charge of the Troops Division,

of its decision to build the road and directed him to submit within the next

few days a plan for surveys and construction.35

General Sturdevant at once consulted

with members of his staff and with

Thomas H. MacDonald, Commissioner

of the Public Roads Administration

(PRA). Two days later, he submitted a

plan that called for building the 1,500-

mile highway in two phases. First, the

Engineers would push through a pioneer

road. Public Roads would then transform it into a permanent road. The

main obstacle to building any kind of

highway would stem from the fact that

there were so few points of access from

which the construction forces could start

working. To avoid losing any of the

short subarctic working season, Sturdevant advised using engineer troops rather

than taking time to assemble and organize a civilian construction force. If the

troops could be moved over the frozen

expanses of the north before the spring

thaws made the terrain impassable and

could begin work at several points at

once, it might be possible to finish a

pioneer road by fall. Along with construction units, topographic units would

have to be moved in to reconnoiter the

terrain over which the road would pass,

and ponton units would have to transport men and equipment across rivers

and lakes. Through the access afforded

by the pioneer road, civilian contractors,

working under the Public Roads Administration, would soon be able to

work on many stretches and put in a

permanent highway. On 14 February,

three days after Presidential approval of

the program, the War Department directed the Chief of Engineers to proceed

with the project. Because most of the

route passed through British Columbia

and the Yukon Territory, the consent of

the Canadian Government had to be

obtained. On 26 February the Permanent Joint Board of Defense, CanadaUnited States, reported favorably on the

project, and less than two weeks later

William L. Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, announced his

government's approval of the board's

recommendation.36

Organizing for Construction

While discussions between the Canadian and the United States Governments

were under way, General Sturdevant

organized a task force for building the

highway. In mid-February Col. William M. Hoge was named commander

and ordered to report directly to Reybold. Two combat regiments, the 18th,

commanded by Lt. Col. Earl G. Paules,

and the 35th, under Col. Robert D. In35

 (1) Paraphrase of Telg sent to American Legation, Ottawa, by Secy of State Cordell Hull, 12 Feb

42. Alaska Hwy, pp. 70-71. (2) Notes of Cabinet

Mtg of 16 Jan 42. Alaska Hwy, p. 59. (3) Excerpt

from notes of Gen Sturdevant. Alaska Hwy, p. 61.

36

 (1) Memo, Sturdevant for WPD, 4 Feb 42.

Alaska Hwy, p. 62. (2) Ltr, TAG to CofEngrs, 14

Feb 42. Alaska Hwy, p. 68. (3) Brig. Gen. C. L.

Sturdevant, "The Alaska Military Highway," The

Engineering Journal, XXVI (March 1943), 117. (4)

Memo, Stimson for Roosevelt, 7 Mar 42. Alaska

Hwy, p. 81. (5) Memo for Rcd, Permanent Joint

Bd on Defense, 6 Mar 42. Alaska Hwy, p. 82.
THE FAR NORTH 301

galls, were the first units assigned. They

were to start work on the highway and,

at the same time, furnish cadres for new

regiments which would move up later

for work on the road. On 9 March Maj.

Alvin C. Welling, executive officer of

the task force, arrived at the town of

Dawson Creek, at the end of the rail line

from Edmonton, and proceeded northward by way of the provincial road to

Fort St. John, situated on the far bank

of the Peace River. Here he set up a

command post from which Colonel

Hoge would supervise the construction

of 650 miles of the highway northwestward from Dawson Creek to the town

of Watson Lake. A second command

post for the remainder of the route was

to be set up later.37

No time was lost in moving the first

troops up. Elements of the 35th Engineers under Colonel Ingalls, forming the

vanguard, were on the train with Major

Welling. Company A of the 648th

Topographic Battalion reached Dawson

Creek on the 13th, and the 74th Light

Ponton Company came in the next day.

The last elements of the 35th arrived on

the 16th. Men, vehicles, and supplies

were moved northward to Fort St. John.

At this point, the Peace River was 1,800

feet wide. There was no bridge, and

ice on the river ruled out ferrying men

and equipment to the other bank.

Speed was imperative because a warm

spell made the crossing of the troops

with their heavy machinery hazardous.

The 35th Engineers laid planks and

sawdust over the ice and drove across to

Fort St. John without mishap. The

men then pushed ahead over 265 miles

of frozen muskeg in an effort to reach

Fort Nelson before the thaws set in. A

drop in temperature from 50 degrees

above to 35 degrees below hardened the

winter road sufficiently to permit the

equipment to move forward easily. But

the men suffered greatly from the cold,

the bitter wind, and the roughness of

the trail. Truck drivers, hauling load

after load of troops and supplies, went

for days with little rest. The most

grueling task was driving the tractors,

graders, and power shovels. Frostbitten

and shivering operators approached the

limits of physical endurance in "walking" their ponderous machines for 40

to 80 miles at a stretch without relief.

Upon reaching Fort Nelson, the men

were so exhausted from cold and exposure that they could scarcely move. On

5 April the last of the equipment

crawled into Fort Nelson, shortly before

the spring thaw made the trail impassable. The 35th Regiment and its auxiliary units were ready to begin work

westward out of Fort Nelson.38

Meanwhile, in a formal exchange of

notes on 17 and 18 March, Canada and

the United States agreed to co-operate

in the construction, maintenance, and

use of the highway. The United States

agreed to make surveys and to send in

engineer troops to construct a pioneer

road; to have contractors, Canadian or

American, complete the highway under

the supervision of the Public Roads Administration; to maintain the road for

37

 (1) Memo, Sturdevant for WPD, 4 Feb 42. (2)

Ltr, Sturdevant to Paules, 19 Feb 42. (3) Ltr, Sturdevant to Hoge, 3 Mar 42. Alaska Hwy, pp. 62-64.

38

 (1) Sturdevant, "The Alaska Military Highway,"

The Engineering Journal, XXVI (March, 1943).

(2) Ltr, Welling to CofEngrs, 1 Apr 42. (3) Hist of

the 74th Engr Light Ponton Co.
302 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

six months after the war, unless Canada

should prefer to assume maintenance of

the Canadian portion sooner; and to

turn the Canadian part of the highway

over to Canada at the end of the war

with the understanding that citizens of

the United States would not suffer discrimination in its use. The Canadian

Government, in turn, agreed to provide

the right of way, to permit the use of

local timber, gravel, and rock, to waive

all import duties, sales taxes, and license

fees in connection with work on the

road, and to exempt American citizens

employed on the project from paying

Canadian income taxes.39

Early in April, Hoge, now a brigadier

general, set up his second command post

at Whitehorse, a point from which he

would direct construction of the 850

miles of road from Watson Lake to Big

Delta. On the 9th of the month, the

73d Light Ponton Company disembarked at Skagway and during the next

two weeks set up camp at Whitehorse.

Soon thereafter Company D of the 29th

Topographic Battalion reached the town.

Meanwhile, the 18th Combat Regiment

under Colonel Paules, the 340th General

Service Regiment under Lt. Col. F.

Russel Lyons, and the 93d General

Service Regiment under Col. Frank M.

S. Johnson had sailed from Seattle. The

18th Engineers, the first to arrive, set up

their headquarters at Whitehorse on the

15th and, with the little equipment they

had, began work on the wagon trail

leading westward to Kluane Lake.

The next week the other two units disembarked at Skagway. They had none

of their heavy equipment, though it was

expected shortly. Weeks passed with no

sign of it. In mid-May, General Hoge

flew to the United States to find out the

reasons for the delay. In Seattle, he

came across tractors, graders, and trucks

lined up on the docks and in nearby

yards because too few vessels had either

sufficient space to carry the machinery

or booms capable of putting it aboard.

To relieve the overburdened facilities

at Seattle, Hoge arranged to have the

E. W. Elliott Company send some heavy

equipment by barge out of Prince Rupert. After mid-May prospects that the

equipment would soon arrive at Skagway were brighter, and, late that month,

it began to appear. A major feat was to

get it from the docks to its destination.

The White Pass and Yukon Railroad, an

antiquated, narrow-gauge line, 111 miles

long, was the only link between Skagway

and Carcross and Whitehorse, the transportation hubs of the Canadian Northwest, both of them on the route of the

highway. During the latter part of May

the railroad, which had but twelve locomotives, was taxed far beyond its capacity

to transport the machinery needed on

the highway. But despite the difficulties, the equipment began to arrive for

work on the road.40

The 18th Engineers, having received

39

 (1) Paraphrase of Telg sent by Secy of State Hull

to American Legation, Ottawa, 12 Feb 42. Alaska

Hwy, pp. 70-71. (2) Ltr, Pierrepont Moffat, American Minister to Canada, to Mackenzie King, 17 Mar

42. Alaska Hwy, pp. 86ff. (3) Ltr, Mackenzie King

to Moffat, 18 Mar 42. Alaska Hwy, pp. 90ff.

40

 (1) Memo, Col Clarence L. Adcock, Exec Asst,

Tr Div OCE for Somervell, 18 Apr 42. (2) Sturdevant, "The Alaska Military Highway," The Engineering Journal, XXVI (March, 1943). (3) Hist of

the 93d Engr GS Regt. (4) Hist of the 340th Engr

GS Regt. (5) Ltr, Adj 18th Engrs to CofEngrs, 26

May 42.
THE FAR NORTH 303

GENERAL HOGE (CENTER) WITH STAFF OFFICERS

most of their machinery by late May,

continued working on the trail leading

to Kluane Lake. The 93d Engineers

had about 60 percent of their machinery

by the end of the month; with this and

two tractors borrowed from the 18th,

they began clearing a trail eastward out

of Carcross toward the Teslin River,

some fifty miles away. The 340th Engineers remained at Skagway till June,

when they received enough trucks and

equipment to make work on the highway

practicable. One platoon remained at

Skagway and another went to Whitehorse

to do stevedoring. The remainder of

the regiment went by train to Carcross,

then marched to the Teslin River, part

of the way over the trail being blazed by

the 93d Engineers, and sailed up the

river to Lake Teslin. The men arrived

at their destination east of the lake on 18

June and started hacking out a trail.

Work had also begun on the part of the

route in Alaska. On 7 May, the 97th

General Service Regiment, commanded

by Col. Stephen C. Whipple, disembarked at Valdez, the southern terminus

of the Richardson Highway. The men

had brought only a few items of heavy

equipment. Before embarking at Seattle

they had turned in their wornout trucks

and requisitioned new ones. They
304 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

SKAGWAY HARBOR

spent their first weeks in Alaska in maintaining the Richardson and Nabesna

Highways. Early in June their equipment arrived, including the same trucks

they had turned in, still in need of a

complete overhauling. The men began

working on a pioneer road from the

village of Slana, on an arm of the Richardson Highway, northeastward toward

the Tanana River.41

As over-all commander, General Hoge

found he was needed at both Whitehorse and Fort St. John for resolving

many important matters regarding construction. There were neither telephone lines nor passable trails between

the two towns, which were 600 miles

apart by air, and atmospheric disturbances made communication by radio

uncertain. To remedy the situation,

Reybold late in April split the project

into two independent commands, placing Col. James A. O'Connor in charge

of the Fort St. John, or Southern Sector,

and leaving General Hoge in charge of

the Whitehorse, or Northern Sector.

Watson Lake was the dividing point.

Colonel O'Connor assumed command at

41

 (1) Ibid. (2) Hist of the 93d Engr GS Regt. (3)

Hist of the 340th Engr GS Regt. (4) Ltr, Maj. C. F.

Waite, OpnsO Whitehorse Sec, to CofEngrs, 24 Jun

42.
THE FAR NORTH 305

Fort St. John on 6 May. Both he and

General Hoge reported directly to the

Chief of Engineers.42

Construction Progress

In the Southern Sector little progress

could be made during the first weeks.

Rain and mud held up the 35th Engineers, working westward out of Fort

Nelson. In May, two more units arrived, the 341st General Service Regiment, commanded by Col. Albert L.

Lane, reaching Dawson Creek on 1 May,

and the 95th General Service Regiment,

under Col. David L. Neumann, arriving

on the 31st. Both units were assigned

to the section between Fort St. John and

Fort Nelson. The 341st bulldozed the

pioneer trail through forests of alder and

poplar; the 95th, directly behind, improved and maintained the completed

trail. Both units had come without

their road-building machinery. Of all

the units on the highway, only Colonel

Ingall's 35th Engineers had arrived adequately equipped. But shortages were

no major obstacle in the Southern Sector,

for excellent rail connections permitted

a fairly steady flow of machinery and

supplies from Chicago and other centers

of the industrial Midwest. More difficult to contend with was the unpredictable weather. At times, the temperature

soared to 80 degrees and frozen earth

turned into sticky mud. This dried up

and became dust, which, under heavy

rain, turned into mud again. Soon the

men ran into many patches of muskeg.

Insofar as possible, the route was detoured around them. Short strips

proved to be unavoidable. Shallow

patches were usually scooped out and

filled with gravel; deeper ones were

corduroyed.43

Meanwhile, Sturdevant and MacDonald prepared a plan whereby the Engineers and the Public Roads Administration would co-operate on building the

road. MacDonald envisioned a smoothly

surfaced highway for two-way traffic, with

gentle grades and curves, built according

to specifications for roads in national

forests. It would normally be 36 feet

wide but, where construction was difficult, would be temporarily limited to 20

or 22 feet. Local materials would be

used for surfacing and for small culverts

and temporary bridges. If desired,

permanent structures could be put in

later. Public Roads would help make

reconnaissances for routing the permanent highway, but the military commanders would have the final decision

on location because their mission required opening a road for military

traffic as soon as possible. If time permitted, engineer troops could improve

any section beyond pioneer road standards if this could be done without

interfering with the contractors' operations.44

Construction had begun before a

thorough investigation of the route

could be made. Considerable information existed on the sections located in

Alaska and the Yukon Territory and on

the section between Fort St. John and

Fort Nelson, but for the remainder, al42

 (1) Ltr, Sturdevant to Hoge, 24 Apr 42. Alaska

Hwy, p. 179. (2) Ltr, Hoge to Sturdevant, 3 May 42.

43

 Ltrs, O'Connor to CofEngrs, 19 May, 22 Jun 42. 44

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Sturdevant, 29 Apr 42. (2)

Ltr, MacDonald to Sturdevant, 4 Mar 42. Alaska

Hwy, p. 183.
306 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

TRUCKING SUPPLIES THROUGH THE MUD BY TRACTOR TRAIN

most all terrain data had to be gotten

from small-scale, incomplete, and contradictory maps. On these, "lakes were

out of position and critical elevations

almost wholly useless. . . . The indicated courses of many considerable

rivers were largely schematic." Prom- ising trails used by guides and hunters

often passed over swampy terrain and

were serviceable only when the ground

was frozen or were confined to tortuous

river valleys where game was most

plentiful. The men from the 648th and

29th and surveyors from Public Roads

had more than enough to do during the

first few weeks. Military and civilian

surveyors dovetailed their efforts in

order to incorporate as much of the

pioneer road as possible into the final

route for the highway. Of great help

were the local "bush flyers," who knew

considerably more about the terrain

than most other inhabitants. Going

aloft with them, Army and PRA engineers got a general impression of the lay

of the land. A bright spot in the picture

was that the engineers had a great deal

of latitude in locating the road. Restrictions as to the right of way were not

a problem.45

45

 T. H. MacDonald, L. I. Hewes, and J. S. Bright,
THE FAR NORTH 307

By early June, all engineer troops

scheduled for work on the highway had

arrived. Colonel O'Connor at Fort St.

John had a combat regiment, 2 general

service regiments, a light ponton company, and a topographic company, totaling 4,354 officers and men. General

Hoge at Whitehorse had a combat regiment, 3 general service regiments, a

light ponton company, and a topographic

company, totaling 5,806. Auxiliary signal, finance, quartermaster, and medical

troops numbered approximately 340 in

the Southern Sector and 165 in the

Northern. Two gaps remained in the

building of the highway. One, at the

extreme northern end, extended from

Big Delta to Tanacross, a distance of a

hundred miles. The other ran southeastward for fifty miles from Whitehorse

to Jake's Corner, midway between Carcross and the Teslin River. It was

planned to assign these stretches eventually to PRA contractors.46

In all sections, the pioneer road was

pushed through in more or less the same

manner. As stretches were located and

surveyed, clearing crews, driving 23-ton

D-8 tractors with bulldozers, smashed a

corridor through brush and woods.

The shallow-rooted trees of the north

were easily toppled. While the lead

dozer opened a pathway, others widened

the clearing and shoved aside fallen

trees and debris. General Hoge had

originally specified a clearing thirty-two

feet wide, but it soon became evident

that in wooded areas a corridor two or

three times as great was necessary to admit enough sunlight to dry out the

ground. Clearing crews readily accomplished this additional work without

excessive effort because most of their

time was spent in turning and lining up

for new cuts. By June the many hours

of sunlight of the northern summer day

made it possible to work two and sometimes three shifts every twenty-four

hours. Working around the clock,

crews could clear from three to four

miles a day. Behind the clearing echelon, engineer units built log bridges and

culverts over gulleys and small streams.

Using hand tools and the versatile air

compressor with attachments, a platoon

could build a bridge, or a squad a culvert, in less than a day. Farther to the

rear, other units smoothed the trail with

scrapers and graders, corduroying where

necessary. Still farther back, others

widened narrow spaces, reduced the

worst grades, and filled soft spots with

gravel. The tactics of rapid construction depended on the use of special

equipment, particularly the heavy bulldozer. Every other piece of machinery

was auxiliary to this item. Strenuous

efforts had been made to supply the

units with plentiful amounts of equipment. Under normal circumstances, a

combat or general service regiment was

furnished 8 medium tractors, but on the

highway each regiment was allotted 20

heavy and 24 medium tractors with bulldozers and winches. Equipment lists

further included 6 12-yard carryalls, 3

motor patrols, and 2 power shovels; from

50 to 90 dump trucks and many other

vehicles; one portable sawmill, two pile

drivers, water purification sets, electrical

generators, and radio receivers and

transmitters. Men sent to northern

"Alaska Highway—Organizing $30,000,000 Job,"

Western Construction News (February 1943), 55ff. 46

 (1) Memo, Sturdevant for Somervell, 7 Jul 42. (2) Alaska Hwy, p. 241.
308 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Canada and Alaska were also furnished

arctic clothing, sleeping bags, and tents,

as well as mosquito bars and head nets

for protection against the great swarms

of mosquitoes and flies which infested

the northern regions in the summer.47

Back in the United States, critics were

waging a vigorous campaign against the

construction of the highway. Their

most violent attacks were directed against

the route which had been selected.

After the bombing of Dutch Harbor, the

project attracted unusual interest. In

response to various charges, among them

that the road was an "engineering monstrosity because of the muskeg swamp

along the major portion of the route,"

the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee held hearings in June to consider

a formal probe of the matter. Witnesses

appearing before the subcommittee contended that in the Southern Sector a road

might be built for a few miles out of

Fort St. John, but it would be swallowed up in the hundreds of miles of

muskeg near Fort Nelson. The engineers had obviated most of these

criticisms before they were made. They

had relocated the pioneer road westward

on the foothills of the Rockies and thus

avoided the poor drainage along the

original route. They blazed the trail

on the ridges west of the Blueberry River

and then east of the Minaker and

Prophet Rivers into Fort Nelson. By

painstaking care in routing, they bypassed a great deal of muskeg, save for

scattered stretches from 200 to 400 yards

in length. In the last sixty miles into

Fort Nelson, where much muskeg was

expected, less than four miles of it were

encountered. On 17 June the Senate

subcommittee recommended that no

further investigation be made of construction on the Alcan Highway.48

Reconnaissance

To make rapid construction possible,

reconnaissance had to be continuous.

Since it was difficult to remember all the

features of the ground from a swiftly

moving plane, the engineers turned to

aerial photography. Photographic aircraft became available to the Southern

Sector in May; to the Northern, in June.

Examining aerial photographs, sector

and regimental commanders were able

to avoid locations that involved extreme

elevations, long stretches of swamp, or

excessively rugged terrain. Location

parties made low-altitude flights for onthe-spot inspections of critical areas.

Ground survey parties went forward on

foot, or by dog sled, horse, or tractordrawn trailers. To investigate likely

river crossings, the parties sometimes

used improvised ponton rafts, powered

by outboard motors, or flew in with aircraft equipped with pontons. After

they decided upon the location of the

route, the surveyors blazed a center line

to guide the leading bulldozers. In

47

 Sturdevant, "The Alaska Military Highway,"

The Engineering Journal, XXVI (March, 1943), pp.

120-21.

48

 (1) Ltrs, O'Connor to CofEngrs, 22 Jun, 23 Aug

42. (2) Ltr, OpnsO Fort St. John Sec to CofEngrs,

24 Jul 42. (3) Ltr, Gruening to Stimson, 3 Mar 42.

(4) Ltr, Chmn of British Columbia-Yukon-Alaska

Hwy Cmte to Sturdevant, 21 Mar 42. (5) Alaska

Highway Hearings Before a Subcmte of Senate Cmte

on Foreign Relations, 77th Cong, 2d sess, 1, 12, 16

Jun 42. (6) Rpt of Subcmte of Senate Cmte on

Foreign Relations, 17 Jun 42. Alaska Hwy Hearings, Exhibit I-f.
THE FAR NORTH 309

many instances, operators swung around

obstacles that would cause excessive

cutting and blazing. Where the line of

least resistance was followed, the road,

it was said, "had more curves than Hollywood."

 49

West of Fort Nelson, the engineers ran

into innumerable obstacles. The initial

route of the highway lay to the northwest along the Fort Nelson River, along

the Liard and Crow Rivers, along the

southern shores of the Toobally Lakes,

and then across open country to Watson

Lake. Aerial reconnaissance and closer

observation from ponton rafts indicated

that this fairly level route had much soft

ground and little material for surfacing.

In May a pack train sent out by Colonel

Ingalls to reconnoiter the country more

thoroughly found a better route farther

south. It led directly west out of Fort

Nelson along the Muskwa River to

Muncho Lake and then veered northward to the Liard River. It followed

the north bank of that river for 150

miles into Watson Lake. From Watson

Lake to Whitehorse, a distance of 300

miles, lay another most forbidding section. It included the Continental

Divide separating the Mackenzie and

Yukon drainage systems. Maps indicated mountain ranges from 6,000 to

7,000 feet high, which would necessitate

prohibitive grades. Heavy snowfall

would block a road for many months of

the year. Critics freely predicted the

engineers would not be able to put a

road through this region unless they

made a sweeping southward detour,

which would add 500 miles to the highway. Aerial reconnaissance revealed

that the ranges were not continuous as

the maps indicated but were interspersed

by low-lying areas and broad valleys. A

bush flyer, Les Cook, observed at one

point on the Continental Divide a fairly

extensive growth of trees which in this

latitude could not thrive much above

4,000 feet. Engineer ground parties,

exploring the area, located a route which

crossed the divide at a maximum altitude

of 3,100 feet. This section could be

built far more readily than had been

anticipated. West of Whitehorse, the

route stretched for 318 miles to the

Alaskan boundary. Part of it was along

the old wagon trail to Kluane Lake. Between the lake and the international

boundary, the engineers would undoubtedly encounter some of the roughest terrain between Fort St. John and Big

Delta. The most careful reconnaissance indicated it would be impossible

to avoid entirely the treacherous permafrost which would make a mockery of

normal construction.50

Progress During the Summer

By the end of June progress on the

pioneer road was encouraging. In the

Southern Sector, the 341st Engineers had

completed 36 miles out of Fort St. John,

49

 (1) Col. Albert L. Lane, "The Alcan Highway,

Road Location and Construction Methods," The

Military Engineer, XXXIV (October, 1942), 492-99.

(2) Memo, Sturdevant for Somervell, 1 Jun 42. (3)

Ltr, O'Connor to Sturdevant, 19 May 42.

50

 (1) Sturdevant, "The Alaska Military Highway,"

The Engineering Journal, XXVI (March, 1943). (2)

MacDonald et al., Constr Activities of the PRA and

Their Contractors in Cooperation with the WD

CofEngrs, on the Canadian Alaska Military Hwy

(cited hereafter as MacDonald Paper), Paper presented at 19th Annual Mtg of American Society of

Civil Engrs, 20 Jan 43. (3) Ltr, O'Connor to CofEngrs, 19 May 42.
310 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

which the 95th was improving and maintaining. The 35th had reached a point

48 miles west of Fort Nelson. This unit

had perhaps the most trying section of

all. "The sloppy soil conditions which

prevailed . . . near Charlie Lake [north

of Fort St. John]," O'Connor wrote

Sturdevant late in May, "were almost of

minor magnitude in contrast with the

sloppier conditions which prevailed . . .

in the vicinity of Fort Nelson. At this

latter point the soil was in general nothing better than pure mud."

 51

 In the

Northern Sector, the 93d Engineers had

finished 33 miles from Carcross to Lake

Teslin and the 340th had completed 10

miles east of the lake. The 18th had

pushed 112 miles along the wagon road

west of Whitehorse. Working in difficult terrain in Alaska, the 97th General

Service Regiment had completed only 6

miles, but it expected to make more

rapid progress once it got into the

Tanana River valley. Most of the route

had been determined, at least tentatively,

in both sectors. Detachments of the

ponton companies were fully occupied

ferrying men and equipment across the

many streams. With the beginning of

summer, progress could be more rapid.

Temperatures ranged up to 84°F. The

frost was gone from the ground, save in

heavily wooded sections. PRA's operations were gaining momentum, and its

contractors were already at work on the

permanent road out of Fort St. John.

Some of the contractors' men and equipment had been flown from Fairbanks to

Tanacross and Gulkana. PRA expected

to begin construction in the Northern

Sector in July.52

Between the 7th and the 18th of July

General Sturdevant inspected the entire

route by airplane and traveled 500 miles

by car over the part under construction

or already completed. He observed that

the troops, instead of putting in a rough

access trail, were building a fairly welldrained and graded highway. This was

necessary because the road was the only

line of supply the troops had with their

bases. It appeared that the pioneer

road, besides providing access for PRA

contractors, could also be made to serve

the airports during the coming winter.

To operate vehicles over the entire route

the year round would require not only

pushing 1,000 miles of pioneer road to

completion, but also constructing rest

camps, telephone lines, and fuel supply

depots. Sturdevant decided to modify

existing arrangements with PRA so that

the contractors and engineers could

merge their forces to expedite work on

the pioneer road. So far, PRA had done

no work on the permanent highway except for short distances out of Fort St.

John and Whitehorse. The contractors

were still spending most of their efforts

in setting up camps and collecting equipment. Early in August, Sturdevant and

MacDonald agreed that for the remainder of the working season the contractors would help put the pioneer road

in shape for winter traffic. Sturdevant

asked PRA to give precedence in construction to the sections between Big

Delta and Tanacross and between Whitehorse and Jake's Corner.53

On 8 August MacDonald directed his

51

 Ltr, O'Connor to CofEngrs, 19 May 42. 52

 (1) Ltr, O'Connor to CofEngrs, 22 Jun 42. (2)

Ltr, Maj. C. F. Waite, OpnsO Whitehorse Sec, to

CofEngrs, 24 Jun 42. 53

 (1) Memo, Sturdevant for Somervell, 1 Aug 42.

(2) Ltr, Sturdevant to Somervell, 8 Aug 42. Canol

Files.
THE FAR NORTH 311

field offices to comply with the new

policy. During the next weeks, he set

up additional offices at Edmonton,

Whitehorse, and Gulkana. Public

Roads meantime enlisted the services of

four management contractors, who, by

August, had under them forty-seven

American and Canadian construction

firms, working under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee

contracts. The E. W. Elliott Company

of Seattle, which had helped the engineers get equipment to Skagway, was

now called upon to transport men, supplies, and machinery for PRA. In

August, some of the contractors began to

clear the sections which PRA was to construct. Other contractors' crews, upon

arriving at the highway, moved in behind

the troops to widen, improve, and gravel

the roadbed. Relieved of heavy maintenance on stretches of road to the rear, the

engineers could henceforth apply most

of their efforts to the construction of new

road.54

During the summer, favored by warm,

clear weather, and with most of their

equipment now on hand, the troops

made rapid progress. By 20 August the

35th Engineers had blazed 209 miles of

one-way trail to the Liard River and were

pushing forward along the river's northern bank. At the end of the month, the

341st and 95th Engineers, having turned

their section of the road south of Fort

Nelson over to PRA, moved in behind

the 35th Engineers and began to convert

the pioneer road into a two-lane highway. The 340th Engineers, working

eastward from Teslin Lake, first put in a

trail for two-way traffic and after midJuly for one-way traffic. By the first

week in September, the 340th had

pushed through to Watson Lake.

Thereupon, one of the battalions widened the last fifty miles of the trail

while the other continued eastward.55

West of Whitehorse, work was proceeding at an equally fast pace. By midAugust, the 18th Engineers had swung

past the western shore of Kluane Lake

and had reached the Duke River, 200

miles from Whitehorse. Fording the

river, the regiment came up against the

forbidding terrain that the survey parties

had described. It was at first "heavily

wooded and creased with many small

ridges." Beyond lay a desolate area of

burnt trees that "stood together like

thousands of scarecrows."

 56

 This burnt

timber stood on permafrost which defied

heretofore tried and tested methods of

road building. Once the surface of the

ground was disturbed, the sun brought

on as much mud as heavy rains could

produce. Uprooted trees left gaping

holes that deepened as the subsurface

thawed. Unaware at first that the

permafrost extended for another hundred miles, Colonel Paules on 17 August

prodded his troops to push through this

final stretch by early October, before the

Yukon winter set in. The regiment

was unable to attain such a pace, but did

find ways of coping with the frozen subsoil. Instead of clearing by bulldozer,

the men chopped trees level with the

ground. To keep sunlight off the exposed area, they cut a corridor of

54

 (1) MacDonald Paper. (2) Ltr, Hoge to CofEngrs, 24 Aug 42. (3) Ltr, O'Connor to CofEngrs,

23 Aug 42. (4) Ltr, Sturdevant to Somervell, 1 Sep

42.

55

 (1) Ltr, OpnsO Fort St. John Sec to CofEngrs,

24 Jul 1942. (2) Ltr, Hoge, to CofEngrs, 24 Jul 42.

(3) Ltr, O'Connor to CofEngrs, 23 Aug 42. (4) Ltr,

Ingalls to CofEngrs, 30 Sep 42. 56

 The Eighteenth Engineers (Combat) in Yukon

Territory, Apr 42-Jan 43, p. 57. 94 KCRC.
312 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

medium width which they immediately

corduroyed with small trees and

branches. One company spread gravel

over the corduroy, while another, using

almost all the dump trucks of the regiment, hauled rock day and night. The

graveled strip crept forward at the rate

of half a mile a day. Meanwhile, in

Alaska, the 97th Engineers had by 25

August finished the stretch of pioneer

road from Slana to the Tanana River.

The regiment then worked southeast

along the river toward the international

boundary in the direction of the 18th

Engineers.57

Bridges

Every one of the more than 100 major

streams which crossed the route between

Dawson Creek and Big Delta was a

hindrance to rapid construction. The

two light ponton companies had from

the first supported the road-building

regiments at the water crossings. Wherever possible, equipment was forded

across. If streams could not be forded,

ponton bridges were used. If there was

insufficient equipment for bridging, the

pontoniers made rafts by lashing pontons

together and decking them with timber.

To power these rafts, they generally used

outboard motors. As soon as possible,

the rear elements of the regiments moved

up to build timber bridges. When these

were finished, the ponton units moved

on to the next crossing. At the wider

waterways, the pontoniers operated ferry

lines until bridges could be erected.

One of the major barriers was the Peace

River at Fort St. John. After the ice

broke up, the provincial government

operated a 20-ton ferry from shore to

shore, but this craft was too small to

handle the great quantities of equipment

that had to be carried over the river.

From June on, a detachment of the 74th

Light Ponton Company hauled men and

supplies across on the Alcan, which consisted of a tug and a 65-foot barge, capable of carrying up to sixty tons. In the

Northern Sector, detachments of the 73d

Light Ponton Company manned tugs

and barges which plied back and forth on

the Teslin River and on Teslin and

Tagish Lakes.58

Unfamiliar with the quirks and vagaries of the northern rivers, the engineers believed it best to build only

temporary structures at first. They expected spring floods to damage or even

carry away many of these spans. The

troops used local timber, originally cut

and trimmed by hand and later prepared

with portable sawmills. Forward bridging crews built simple stringer spans by

hand over small streams, leaving the

construction of the longer pile and

trestle structures to troops with cranes,

pile drivers, and other heavy equipment.

In Yukon Territory, a number of streams

had cut narrow channels through wide

valleys, which were strewn with heavy

deposits of boulders and gravel. These

streams would rise to unpredictable

levels. Here the temporary bridges, as a

rule, were built only across the channels.

To keep the approaches open necessitated considerable maintenance. A

57

 (1) Ltr, Hoge to CofEngrs, 24 Jul 42. (2) Ltr,

Johnson to CofEngrs, 30 Sep 42.

58

 (1) Waldo G. Bowman et al., Bulldozers Come

First (New York, 1944), pp. 136fF. (2) Ltr, O'Connor

to CofEngrs, 22 Jun 42. (3) Ltr, Hoge to CofEngrs,

24 Jul 42.
THE FAR NORTH 313

number of structures of more than 500

feet were built. In July, the 18th Engineers built a pile and trestle bridge

across Slim's River, a tributary of Kluane

Lake. Toward the center of the channel

the gravel was frozen so solidly that the

piles splintered under the impact of the

3,000-pound hammer. Blasting proved

ineffective. Steel caps were radioed for

and flown in, enabling the engineers to

drive the piles into the bottom. Other

engineers, working from the opposite

bank, improvised a hydraulic pile-driving

machine which consisted of a hose

fastened to an iron pipe. Men in boats

held the pipe against the bottom near the

pile and pumped water under high pressure through the hose and pipe, thus

loosening the frozen gravel. When finished, the bridge was 1,040 feet long, had

86 bents, and despite the frozen river

bottom and the swift current, took only

a month to erect. In August elements

of the 35th Engineers constructed a 730-

foot combination crib, pile, and trestle

bridge across the Muskwa River, just

west of Fort Nelson, finishing it shortly

before the arrival of construction troops

working north from Fort St. John. All

these structures were temporary. Once

the behavior of the streams was better

known, PRA contractors would install

the permanent structures.59

Preparations for Winter Traffic

During the summer the engineers also

had to construct the facilities required

for operating the highway and the staging route during the coming winter.

To improve the communications system,

Somervell authorized a telephone line

from Edmonton to Fairbanks, parallel to

the highway. Although a private corporation would install the line, the engineers were to build repeater stations at

100-mile intervals. To supplement the

fields of the Northwest Staging Route,

the Army Air Forces requested that the

Corps of Engineers construct eight flight

strips and weather observation stations

along the highway. Realizing that considerable quantities of supplies and

equipment would have to be moved over

the pioneer road as soon as it was opened,

General Sturdevant made arrangements

during August and September for winter

traffic. He planned to build barracks

for maintenance and snow-clearing

crews, way stations for changing drivers,

and repair shops for servicing vehicles.60

Northwest Service Command

The additional construction, together

with the rapidly expanding activities in

connection with Canol, made it desirable

to have one man in command of all U.S.

projects in northwestern Canada. On 2

September the Northwest Service Command was activated to direct work on the

highway and related undertakings.

O'Connor, now a brigadier general, was

placed in command. General Hoge left

for the United States and another assignment. Col. W. J. Wheeler took direct

charge of work on the highway. The 59

 (1) Bowman et al., Bulldozers Come First, pp.

136ff. (2) The Eighteenth Engineers (Combat) in

Yukon Territory, Apr 42-Jan 43, p. 54. (3) Ltr,

Hoge to CofEngrs, 24 Jul 42. (4) Ltr, O'Connor to

CofEngrs, 23 Aug 42.

60

 (1) Memo, DCofAS for Somervell, 29 Jul 42.

(2) Memo for Rcd, Col George Horowitz, Opns Br

Constr Div OCE, 20 Oct 42. Canol Files.
314 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Northern Sector was henceforth under

Colonel Paules; the Southern, under

Ingalls. The Chief of Engineers retained technical supervision over the

work.61

Closing the Gaps

By mid-September, the road in the

Southern Sector was almost complete.

The 35th and the 340th Engineers had

nearly closed the gap between them.

On the 24th, "amid the roar and thunder

of the big 'cats' and the swishing crash of

the giant trees as they bent to the . . .

will of the big dozer blades, there was a

strong feeling of suspense and anticipation," wrote the unit historian of the

340th Engineers. While the men waited

on the west bank of Contact Creek,

about fifty miles east of Watson Lake, the

35th Engineers, on the opposite side of

the stream, blasted rock from the side

of a steep hill which was the last obstacle

to the completion of "two long and

treacherous stretches of the road through

the northwest wilderness of Canada."

One of the bulldozers made a run down

the yet unfinished cut on the hill and

pushed forward through brush and trees.

It moved into the creek and met the leading bulldozer of the 340th in the center

of the stream. Colonel Lyons, commander of the 340th, and Maj. James A.

McCarthy, commander of the 35th,

standing on the tracks of their bulldozers, shook hands amid the shouts of

the men and the blare of the band of the

340th. Everybody was milling about on

land and in the water to get snapshots.

Several days later, a truck which had

started out from Dawson Creek crossed

the stream and continued on its way to

Whitehorse. It made the trip of 1,000

miles in seventy-one hours.62

In the Northern Sector additional

work was needed to complete the road.

By October a considerable gap still remained at the Alaskan-Canadian border.

Realizing that the construction season

would not last long enough for the 18th

and 97th Engineers to complete their

sections and bring them to pioneer road

standards, Colonel Paules sent two

platoons of the 18th across the White

River on 10 October to build a trail that

would be suitable for winter travel.

This region had many hillocks, covered

with tall grass which slowed travel on

foot or horseback. To avoid damaging

the ground on which the permanent road

would be built, a trail was blazed parallel

to the line already surveyed by PRA

engineers. The 18th Engineers cut

many of the clumps of grass by hand.

When the ground was sufficiently frozen,

they took bulldozers and "walked down"

the heaviest growths.63

By November prospects were bright

that the remaining gaps in the pioneer

road would soon be closed. On 25

October the lead bulldozers of the 18th

and 97th Engineers had met at Beaver

Creek, a few miles east of the AlaskanCanadian border. The two units had

joined their sections by means of a winter

road which would be passable until

broken up by the spring thaws. During

61

 (1) WD GO No. 44, 4 Sep 42. (2) Ltr, Sturdevant to TQMG, 4 Aug 42.

62 (1) Ltr, Ingalls to CofEngrs, 30 Sep 42. (2) Ltr,

Johnson to CofEngrs, 30 Sep 42. 63

 (1) Ltr, Ingalls to CofEngrs, 31 Oct 42. (2) Ltr,

Welling to CofEngrs, 30 Nov 42. (3) Ltr, Paules to

CofEngrs, 31 Oct 42.
THE FAR NORTH 315

the next weeks the engineers and the

contractors' forces graveled this road east

of the international boundary as far as

the White River. Still to be finished

was a trestle bridge across the river. It

was to be a makeshift affair, the frame

bents being placed directly on the ice

except in the stream's channel. Meanwhile, PRA contractors finished their

sections from Big Delta to Tanacross and

from Whitehorse to Jake's Corner; on

20 November, the 18th and 97th Engineers completed the bridge over the

White. The Alcan Highway was open

from Dawson Creek to Big Delta. A

pioneer road, 1,450 miles long, had been

pushed through in eight months. That

same day Canadian and American officials assembled at Soldier's Summit, overlooking Kluane Lake, to hold a short

ceremony in celebration of the completion of the pioneer road. The next day

the first trucks from Dawson Creek rolled

into Fairbanks.64

Winter on the Alcan

Although the pioneer road was finished, the engineers still had many jobs

to complete, some of which they had

started in September. In the Southern

Sector a major task was building a number of connecting roads from the highway. One was put in to the radio

station at Toobally Lakes. Another

was being run from Fort Nelson to Fort

Simpson on the Mackenzie River, to be

used as a supply route for the Canol

project. Bridges required a major

effort, and the engineers built a number

of long structures during the fall. The

35th Engineers spent nine days in

September erecting a pile-bent structure,

1,270 feet long, across the Liard River

209 miles west of Fort Nelson. Two

months later the 340th built a pile-bent

bridge 750 feet long across the same

stream, 15 miles east of Watson Lake.

PRA also put in temporary structures.

Late in September the Oakes Construction Company began work on a 2,200-

foot timber structure across the Peace

River at Fort St. John and finished it in

three weeks. In November a sudden

thaw hurled huge floes of ice against the

bridge, tearing out a 200-foot section.

The gap was closed, and traffic resumed

within a few days. That same month,

the 340th Engineers joined contractors

in building a 2,300-foot pile-trestle

bridge across Nisutlin Bay. Many of the

piles were driven through ice. While

temporary bridges were under construction, PRA studied sites for the permanent structures, and contractors prepared

to begin work on several late in the

year.65

As the cold weather set in, many of the

troops were shifted to work on camps

and shelters. During the summer the

men had slept on the ground in tents,

but by October, better quarters were

needed, for the temperature had dropped

below freezing in both sectors. Hundreds of steel huts and prefabricated

buildings were shipped from the United

States and distributed along the route.

Most of the camps and shelters, however,

were built by the troops from standardized plans and specifications prepared by

the Construction Division of the Office

64

 Ltrs, Paules to CofEngrs, 31 Oct and 30 Nov 42.

65

 (1) Ltrs, Ingalls to CofEngrs, 30 Sep and 31 Oct

42. (2) Ltr, Paules to CofEngrs, 31 Oct 42.
316 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

A VIEW ALONG THE ALCAN HIGHWAY

of the Chief of Engineers. Except for

hardware, windows, wallboard, and tar

paper, all materials were obtained locally. Stoves were improvised from

gasoline drums. Shortages of materials

delayed putting in some of the final

touches; spells of intense cold held back

logging, milling, and outdoor carpentry

work even more.66

On 1 December 1942 the Northwest

Division was organized under the Northwest Service Command. Its first chief

was Colonel Wyman, who, after his transfer from Hawaii, had taken charge of the

Canol project. As division engineer,

Wyman was to direct all engineer projects in northwestern Canada. Work on

the Alcan Highway went on. The relatively few engineer troops and contractors' forces struggled to keep the pioneer

road open during the winter in order to

move the seemingly endless quantities of

supplies and equipment that were

needed for future operations. Ice, snow,

and cold were the main impediments.

In the Northern Sector water from

underground warm springs flowed into

culverts and ditches and, upon freezing,

formed solid mounds of ice across the

road. Near Kluane Lake a glacier

66

 (1) Ltr, Paules to CofEngrs, 30 Nov 42. (2) Ltr,

Welling to CofEngrs, 30 Nov 42. (3) Ltr, MacDonald to CofEngrs, 15 Dec 42.
THE FAR NORTH 317

blocked a half-mile stretch of road.

After attempts to dynamite an opening

failed, the obstacle had to be completely

detoured. At subzero temperatures

diesel fuel solidified and gasoline lines

froze. It was frequently impossible to

start an engine without first warming it

with a torch, and drivers kept their

engines running whenever they stopped

to eat or sleep. At one time, 1,600

trucks were deadlined. With the aid of

repair shops, way stations, and camps

along the road, some traffic kept going

even under the worst conditions. Work

began during the winter on the Haines

cutoff, running 150 miles from the coastal

village of Haines, about 15 miles from

Skagway, to Champagne on the Alcan

Highway west of Whitehorse, in order

to provide another point of access to the

highway. In January the first engineer

units to leave, the 18th and 93d Engineers, moved out. In February, the

35th, 95th, and 97th Engineers and the

73d Light Ponton Company departed.

The 340th and 341st Regiments and the

74th Light Ponton Battalion were scheduled to remain on the road for several

months longer.67

As spring approached, Public Roads

prepared to build the permanent highway without the aid of engineer troops.

Since the road, at least until the end of

the war, would serve primarily as a military supply line, General Reybold on 25

March discussed with officials of the

Federal Works Agency the possibility of

lowering, at least temporarily, PRA's

standards for the permanent highway.

It was agreed that Colonel Ludson D.

Worsham, slated to replace Wyman as

Northwest Division engineer on 1 April,

should for the time being determine the

location and standards of design for the

highway. On 2 April Colonel Worsham

arrived at Edmonton and within a week

had formulated drastic revisions in construction policies. By eliminating unnecessary refinements, he planned to

complete rapidly a highway that would

meet all military requirements. He

directed PRA to follow the pioneer road

unless deviations would involve less

work. The width of the highway was to

be reduced from thirty-six to twenty-six

feet, shoulder to shoulder, with a 20- to

22-foot-wide lane for traffic, surfaced with

local materials. The maximum grade

would be 10 percent. Aside from thirtyfour steel bridges already on order,

Worsham directed that no other bridges

be replaced except those which were unsafe or would not survive the breakup of

the ice during the next few months.68

During the spring, maintenance of the

road and bridges was the most important

of the tasks assigned the engineers.

After the thaws began, the winter trail

west of the White River disappeared

entirely. Many temporary trestles and

portions of pioneer road were destroyed

by rains and floods and repeatedly had to

be repaired. Expecting such troubles,

contractors had stockpiled replacement

timbers at bridge sites and were able to

make repairs with minimum loss of time.

Despite unfavorable conditions, the 67

 (1) OCE GO No. 42, 14 Nov 42. (2) Ltr, Capt

Byron C. Hyde, QMC, to Lt Col Soderston, NWSC,

19 Dec 42. NWSC 333 Insp and Investigations.

(3) Memo, Wyman for Robins, 1 Feb 43. Canol

Files. (4) Alaska Hwy, p. 241.

68

 (1) Ltr, Reybold to Maj Gen Philip B. Fleming,

FWA, 25 Mar 43. (2) Ltr, Worsham to PRA Dist

Engr Edmonton, 7 Apr 43. NWSC 1943-44 Dec

File 611 (Alcan Hwy) 1944.
318 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Alcan Highway was serviceable as a military road during the winter and spring.69

Canol

The second extensive Engineer project

in northwest Canada was Canol. It was

undertaken to supply fuel to vehicles on

the Alcan Highway and to planes using

the Northwest Staging Route and at the

same time make available to Alaska supplies of gasoline which would not be at

the mercy of enemy sea attacks or naval

blockade. There was but one known

source of oil in the northern part of the

continent—the oil field on the Mackenzie River at Norman Wells, just below

the Arctic Circle. The Imperial Oil

Company, a Canadian subsidiary of the

Standard Oil Company of New Jersey,

had drilled the first producing well there

in 1920. By 1940 three wells, operating

during the summer months, yielded 800

barrels of crude oil a day. All of this

went to nearby mines. The War Department had given some attention to

Norman Wells during the period of the

defense build-up. The desirability of

developing the field had been pointed

out on several occasions by the wellknown Arctic explorer, Dr. Vilhjalmur

Stefansson, serving as a special consultant

to the War and Navy Departments on

cold weather and other Arctic problems.

In a conference with representatives of

the War Plans Division on 8 August

1940, he had called attention to the oil

field as a source of supply for Alaska.

Again in January 1941, Dr. Stefansson,

in reply to an inquiry from General

Marshall regarding construction of a

road to Alaska, pointed out the desirability of developing Norman Wells for

national defense. No action was taken,

as the War Department saw no need at

that time to build the road or develop an

oil field in such a remote and almost inaccessible region. Even after the outbreak of war, the War Plans Division

paid little attention to Norman Wells.

The Canadian Government considered

using the field to supply oil to planes flying the Northwest Staging Route, but

gave up the project because there were

no refineries in the area to produce 100-

octane gasoline.70

Canol Approved

The need for oil appeared more crucial early in 1942 as the exposed position

of Alaska became increasingly apparent.

The matter became particularly critical

after the decision was made to build the

Alcan Highway. General Somervell,

then G-4, was responsible for supplying

not only Alaska but also military installations along the Highway. He directed

his special assistant on transportation,

Col. James H. Graham, to study the

problem. Many in the War Department now suggested making use of Norman Wells. Among them was Brig.

Gen. Walter B. Pyron, formerly vice

president of the Gulf Oil Company and

69

 (1) PRA Monthly Rpt of Constr Activities of

PRA Alaska Highway Proj, Apr 43. NWSC 1943-44

Dec File 600-914 (Alcan) No. 1-99. (2) PRA

Monthly Rpt for May 1943.

70

 Unless otherwise indicated, documents cited in

this section, except unit histories, are located in

Canol Files, EHD. (1) Rpt on Canol Proj, prepared by a Cmte Representing Control Div ASF

OCE and CG NWSC, 1 Jun 45, pp. 37-38. (2) Ltr,

P. W. Lambright, Imperial Oil Ltd., to Robert W.

Coghill, Bureau of the Budget, Exec Off of the

President, 17 Apr 43.
THE FAR NORTH 319

at the time serving as a special assistant

to Mr. Patterson. Some members of the

War Plans Division now believed, as

Stefansson had already suggested, that a

winter road might be built from Norman

Wells to Mayo Landing, on the Stewart

River, a tributary of the Yukon, to make

possible emergency shipments of oil by

barge from there to Alaska. Somervell

discussed the possibility of developing

the oil resources at Norman Wells with

Graham, with various members of the

War Plans Division, and with General

Marshall. President Roosevelt in a

Cabinet meeting held on 2 April explained the need for developing oil

resources near Alaska, emphasizing that

military necessity fully justified exploring the possibilities of developing such

resources. On 15 April Stefansson

again expressed the view to Somervell

that local resources should be exploited.

During the rest of April, discussion of

the merits of Norman Wells continued.

Brig. Gen. A. H. Carter, chief of Somervell's Fiscal Division, held a conference

on 29 April at which representatives of

the War Department and officials of

Standard and Imperial were present and

the various problems were considered.

The conferees agreed that the project

was feasible but that it would be a most

difficult undertaking. No Engineer officers had so far participated in the planning and none were present at the

conference.71

After the meeting, Graham wrote a

memorandum for Somervell in which he

recommended that the Chief of Engineers be charged with undertaking the

development of Norman Wells. The

Engineers, he said, should arrange with

Imperial Oil to drill at least nine new

wells to boost production to 3,000 barrels

of crude a day by September 1942. To

make possible such an expansion, the

Engineers should have in operation a

system of transportation on the Mackenzie and its tributaries from the railhead

at Waterways in Alberta to Norman

Wells by 15 June. They should build

a 500-mile-long pipeline from Norman

Wells to Whitehorse in the Yukon Territory by 15 September and erect a refining

plant at Whitehorse capable of taking

3,000 barrels of crude a day. This plant

should be in operation by 1 October.

Somervell approved this memorandum

at once. The next morning, General

Reybold received "a preliminary directive" containing the Graham recommendations with instructions to carry

them out. Canol, as the project was

soon to be called, was thus authorized

with a minimum of delay. That afternoon, representatives of the two oil

companies arrived at the Office of the

Chief of Engineers to confer with Maj.

Gen. Thomas M. Robins, head of the

Construction Division. Robins thought

that if oil was to be gotten to Whitehorse

it would be simpler and much cheaper

to send it by barge from Seattle to Skagway and then by rail. But as he later

told a Senate Committee, ". . . we had a

job to do and . . . we were going to do

it."

 72

71

 (1) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 38-40, 43-46. (2)

Memo, Pyron for Brig Gen Lucius D. Clay, 25 Apr

42. (3) Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings Before a Spec Cmte Investigating the

National Defense Program, U.S. Senate, 78 Cong, 1st

sess, pt. 22, "The Canol Project," pp. 9480-81, 9843.

72

 (1) Memo, Graham for Somervell, 29 Apr 42.

(2) Memo, Somervell for Reybold, 30 Apr 42. (3)
320 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Work Begins

On 5 May Colonel Wyman was placed

in charge of Canol, and was directly

responsible to General Reybold. Construction was to be by contractors under

cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. No time

was lost in making the contracts. In

May, OCE made one with Imperial Oil,

whereby the company agreed to drill at

least nine new wells, operate them, and

construct additional storage tanks at the

oil field. The production goal was to

be 3,000 barrels a day. The War Department agreed to reimburse Imperial

for this expansion program. The fixed

fee was one dollar. Title to all wells

drilled would remain with Imperial.

For architect-engineer services, the Engineers made contracts with the firm of

Sverdrup and Parcel and with J. Gordon

Turnbull, a consulting engineer of

Cleveland, Ohio, who had had extensive

experience in designing industrial plants.

These firms were to make plans for a

crude oil pipeline, together with pumping stations, from Norman Wells to

Whitehorse, capable of delivering 3,000

barrels a day, and for a refinery at Whitehorse, capable of producing 100-octane

gasoline. It was planned to purchase an

existing refinery in the United States,

dismantle it, and ship it to Whitehorse.

Wyman opened negotiations with the

W. E. Callahan Construction Company

of Dallas, Texas, and the H. C. Price

Company of Bartlesville, Oklahoma, the

latter recommended by Standard Oil as

an experienced pipeline constructor.

On the recommendation of the Price

Company, the W. A. Bechtel Company of

San Francisco was also brought into the

negotiations. Various combinations of

these and of a number of other firms

were considered, but final negotiations

centered on a combination of Bechtel,

Price, and Callahan. In May, a costplus-a-fixed-fee contract was signed, according to which the coadventurers were

to construct the crude oil pipeline and

refinery "in the shortest reasonable

time." All work was to be completed by

31 December 1942. Secretary Stimson

recommended that Standard Oil of California act as consultant and operate the

pipeline and refinery after they were

finished, and on 28 May, Standard accepted. Meanwhile, since the work

would have to be done largely on Canadian soil, permission of the Canadian

Government was necessary. On 16 May,

Canada gave informal approval.73

When the Canol project was first discussed, officials of Imperial Oil had

warned of the difficulties. It would be

impossible to boost production to 3,000

barrels a day unless adequate amounts

of supplies and equipment were brought

in at an early date. This would require

a long journey northward from Edmonton—300 miles by rickety railroad to

Waterways and then from the adjacent

town of Fort McMurray, 1,170 miles by

steamer down the Athabaska, Slave, and

Mackenzie Rivers. A continuous voyage from Fort McMurray was impossible

Rpt on Canol Proj, p. 46. (4) Investigation of the

National Defense Program, pp. 9481, 9845.

73

 (1) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 53-58. (2) Ltr,

Sturdevant to Wyman, 5 May 42. (3) WD OCE,

Contracts and Claims Br, Letter Contract No. W412-eng-52 with Imperial Oil Ltd., 1 May 42. (4)

Ltr, Reybold to SOS, 22 May 42. (5) Ltr, WD to

Standard Oil Co of Calif., 25 May 42. NWSC 311.5

(NWD). (6) Telg, Moffat, American Minister to

Canada, to Hull, 18 May 42.
THE FAR NORTH 321

because of a series of rapids on the Slave

River between Fort Fitzgerald and Fort

Smith. Supplies and machinery would

have to be unloaded at Fort Fitzgerald,

transported 16 miles over dirt roads, and

then reloaded on other steamers at Fort

Smith. The river boats, dating from the

pre-World War I period and the 1920's,

and serving mainly prospectors and trappers during the four and one-half months

of the late spring and summer, were

incapable of moving thousands of men

and tons of supplies and equipment during a single season. To expedite the

flow of men and materials, the War Department planned to activate a special

task force made up of engineer units

proficient in stevedoring and in operating barges and pontons and send it to

northern Canada. As soon as the transportation system had been sufficiently

improved, civilians would replace the

troops.74

On 28 May Colonel Wyman, together

with a small party of civilians from the

division office in San Francisco, arrived

at Edmonton, where he set up his headquarters. At the same time, the contractors opened their offices in that city.

Five days later, Wyman organized an advance headquarters at Fort McMurray.

Soon after his arrival, he got an idea of

the magnitude of his task. Camps

would be needed for troops and civilians;

storage areas and depots, for supplies

and equipment. Boats would have to be

imported from the United States and

large numbers of barges and rafts built

or improvised to move the supplies and

equipment. Docks would have to be

constructed at Waterways, Fort Fitzgerald, and at other points on the rivers

so that the great tonnages about to arrive

could be forwarded expeditiously. Construction of landing strips would be

necessary so that some men and supplies

could be moved by air. Eventually

winter roads would have to be pushed

through so that supplies could be

shipped northward after the rivers froze

over early in October.

On 26 May, the War Department

activated Task Force 2600 and placed it

under Wyman's command. It included

the 388th Engineer Battalion (separate)

and the 89th and 90th Engineer Heavy

Ponton Battalions, together with signal,

quartermaster, finance, and medical units

—2,500 men in all. Their job was to

improve transportation from Waterways

to Norman Wells. The troops and

seventy civilians from the Kansas City

District Office reached Waterways during the first two weeks in June. It was

cold and rainy and the frost was not

completely out of the ground. The men

lived in pup tents in Camp Prairie, as

their bivouac was called. The first jobs

of the 388th engineers and the civilians

were to build more adequate living quarters, unload the great quantities of equipment already arriving from Edmonton,

and cut and stack firewood for the two

somewhat dilapidated steamers tied up

at Waterways. The ponton engineers

lashed their boats together to make rafts

and floating docks. To get materials

and supplies to Norman Wells would

require using the two steamers and as

many pontons, rafts, barges, and other

74

 (1) Ltr, R. V. LeSueur, Imperial Oil Ltd, to Gen

Carter, 2 May 42. (2) River and Lake Navigation

Through Northern Alberta and the Northwest Territories to the Arctic Ocean, Incl with Memo, WD,

SOS OCE Tr Div Intel Br for Opns and Tng Br,

9 Jul 42. (3) Ltr, Sturdevant to Wyman, 5 May 42.
322 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

kinds of craft as could be procured or

improvised.75

The pontoniers lost no time in loading supplies and equipment on their

improvised rafts. On 6 June a crew

from the 89th, with Indian guides,

started down the Athabaska with the first

raft, which was so heavily loaded that its

deck was only six inches above water.

The trip down the river was successful,

but while crossing Lake Athabaska, the

craft ran into a windstorm, was swamped

by the 3-foot-high waves, and sank. The

engineers had no better luck with a

second raft, which went down near the

first, but a third one managed to get

across the lake. It proceeded up the

Slave River to Fort Fitzgerald, where

supplies and machinery were unloaded

and transported over the portage roads.

By 15 June, as the ice was breaking up

on Great Slave Lake and the Mackenzie,

the engineers had a base at Fort Smith,

sufficiently far along to make operations

to Norman Wells practicable. Great

quantities of equipment were pouring

into Waterways. Thirty to seventy-five

carloads were arriving daily and were

being unloaded by troops working

around the clock. "The time limit imposed by the directive for the Canol

project," Sturdevant wrote to Somervell

on 25 June, "has necessitated an extravagant amount of equipment for the

actual work to be accomplished."

 76

Changes in Plans

Doubts as to the advisability of undertaking Canol continued to be expressed

on all sides. Both Imperial and Standard had been dubious about the project

from the start. On 2 May, R. V. LeSueur, vice president of Imperial, had

written to General Carter that the production of 3,000 barrels of crude a day

was optimistic in the extreme. On 4

June, J. L. Hanna of Standard wrote to

Secretary Stimson, expressing his views

regarding the impractical nature of the

undertaking—it would probably take at

least nine months to get Canol into

operation. Various agencies of the government were also opposed. On 29 May

Secretary Ickes wrote to President Roosevelt, stating that by mere chance he had

heard of Canol and that he considered

the project impractical. If there was

some danger in the first months of 1942

that communications with Alaska might

be cut, the danger seemed much greater

after the Japanese attack on Dutch

Harbor on 3 June and the landings several days later on Attu and Kiska. All

doubts were swept aside. Roosevelt remained strongly in favor of Canol. Replying to Ickes on 10 June, he stated that

he recognized the project was not commercially feasible, which seemed to be

the implied objection of many. "The

recent attack on Dutch Harbor," the

President wrote, "discloses the possibility of great military need for this

additional source of supply. . . . We

are daily taking greater chances and, in

75

 (1) Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 30 Jun 42. (2)

Memo, Lt Col Joseph S. Gorlinski, Tr Div OCE, for

Sturdevant, 22 May 42. (3) Ltr, S-3, 388th Engr GS

Regt, to CG NWSC, 6 May 43. (4) History of

Eighty-Ninth Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion

(Gainesville, Texas), p. 11. ENBN 89-0. (5) Hist of

the 90th Engr Heavy Ponton Bn. (6) Memo, Sturdevant for John Hickerson, Dept of State, 15 May 42. 76

 (1) History of Eighty-Ninth Engineer Heavy

Ponton Battalion, pp. 11-12. (2) Ltr, Wyman to

CofEngrs, 30 Jun 42. (3) Ltr, Sturdevant to Somervell, 25 Jun 42.
THE FAR NORTH 323

view of the military needs of Alaska, the

project has my full approval." Still, by

mid-June, it had become fully apparent

that Canol could not be finished by the

end of the year. A more expeditious

and yet fairly dependable method of

getting oil to the northwestern part of

the continent would have to be found.77

Many had advocated shipping gasoline

by barge from Seattle or Prince Rupert

to Skagway and transporting it from

there by rail to Whitehorse. The Engineers had suggested this alternative when

Canol was first discussed. On 25 June

Sturdevant wrote Somervell that the

most optimistic date for starting production of 100 octane gasoline at Whitehorse

was 1 January 1943. By the following

July 65,000 barrels could be produced.

One tanker could carry twice that much.

That same day Somervell authorized the

organization of an oil barge line to operate from Prince Rupert to Skagway, the

laying of a pipeline from Skagway to

Whitehorse, and the erection of storage

tanks at Whitehorse. Construction of

the pipeline would mean diverting some

workmen and about 110 miles of pipe

from the original Canol project. Completion of the refinery and of the crude

oil line from Norman Wells to Whitehorse, called for under the original

directive for Canol, would have to be

postponed from October 1942 to December 1943. On 27 June the Canadian

Government gave informal consent to

the new project, soon referred to as

Canol 2. It would not provide a local

source of gasoline, but it could be put

into operation much sooner than Canol

1. Late in June, Reybold informed

Wyman that the completion of the

original Canol project in 1942 was not

desired; the remainder of the year should

be spent in drilling at Norman Wells to

determine if enough crude could be

produced to warrant putting in the refinery and the pipeline.78

Progress During the Summer

Great quantities of supplies continued

to pour into Waterways, and were forwarded by steamer and raft. By the end

of June, 5,450 tons had been shipped out.

Having gotten their preliminary jobs

out of the way, the civilians from the

Kansas City District office began to

build Missouri River-type barges and to

assemble trailers to transport barges and

rafts over the portage roads. By early

July they had completed twelve of the

barges. With the arrival of men and

equipment at the oil field, the drilling

of additional wells began the first week

of July. The first well was in production on the 18th, and four others were

being drilled. The outlook was optimistic that the goal of 3,000 barrels a

day could be reached. OCE meanwhile

procured 550 miles of 4-inch pipe for the

crude-oil line from Norman Wells to

Whitehorse. That month the first

aerial reconnaissance of the route was

made. To get enough well-drilling

77 equipment and pipe to Norman Wells (1)Memo for Rcd, Dept of State, 16 May 42.

(2) Ltr, Eugene Holman, Standard Oil Co of N.J., to

Stefansson, 18 May 42. (3) Ltr, Hanna to Stimson,

4 Jun 42. (4) Rpt on Canol Proj, p. 61. (5) Ltr,

Ickes to Roosevelt, 29 May 42. (6) Ltr, Roosevelt to

Ickes, 10 Jun 42.

78

 (1) Ltr, Sturdevant to Somervell, 25 Jun 42. (2)

Ltr, Moffat to the Canadian Secy of State for External Affairs, 14 Aug 42.
324 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

was a most arduous task. Since the

rivers would be frozen over within a few

months, Wyman had to begin at an

early date to develop other means of

supply. He arranged with the Air

Transport Command and a Canadian

airline to operate a modest aerial transport system from Waterways to Norman

Wells, to be fully operational by autumn. To facilitate air transport, he

planned in late summer to construct

fourteen landing strips from Waterways

to Norman Wells. Meantime, Canol 2

was not neglected. Laying of the pipeline from Skagway to Whitehorse began

on 17 August.79

Transportation remained the main

bottleneck. By far the greatest problems were encountered in connection

with getting materials and equipment to

Norman Wells. In many places the

channels of the meandering rivers were

shallow and obstructed by shifting sandbars. No charts were available, and

Indian guides often had to be used to

pilot the engineer craft. The lakes

were especially hazardous. In stormy

weather Lake Athabaska was dangerous

even for the river steamers which regularly made the run from Waterways to

Fort Fitzgerald. Sometimes the ships

had to wait for days near the entrance of

the lake until calm weather set in.

Great Slave Lake was just as treacherous.

"The lake is difficult to navigate," Wyman wrote to Sturdevant on 3 August,

"and during high winds the turbulence

approximates ocean conditions, except

that the waves are very choppy in character. . . . The approach to the Mackenzie River is very dangerous due to

submerged rocks." After the debacles

resulting from the first attempts with

rafts, the pontons were decked with canvas and boards; later, all rafts were provided with wave breakers. Nevertheless,

during the summer of 1942 a number of

rafts were swamped by waves or badly

damaged by rocks or snags. Several

more piled up on sandbars. Only heavy

barges of from 200- to 300-tons capacity

proved suitable for crossing Great Slave

Lake and making the trip down the

Mackenzie to Norman Wells.80

Canol Is Expanded

On 17 and 18 August, Somervell and

Reybold made an inspection of the Alcan

Highway and the Canol project. Wyman informed them that Imperial Oil

now freely predicted that 3,000 barrels

a day would be attained. On the 18th,

Somervell, in a conference with Wyman

and representatives of the contractors at

Edmonton, directed that work on Canol

be expanded. The pipeline for Canol

2 was to be finished at the earliest practicable date. Canol 1 was to be continued as planned. During the coming

winter Task Force 2600, which had been

scheduled to return to the United States,

was to remain and help the contractors

transport equipment and materials to

Norman Wells. A suitable refinery was

to be found in the United States, dismantled, and shipped to Whitehorse. A

plan for distributing gasoline from

79

 (1) Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 30 Jun 42. (2)

Memos, Pyron for Somervell, 7, 23 Jul 42. (3)

Telg, Wyman to CofEngrs, 25 Aug 42.

80

 (1) Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 31 Jul 42. (2) Ltr,

Wyman to Sturdevant, 3 Aug 42, quoted in Rpt on

Canol Proj, p. 70. (3) Ltr, CO Hq Base Zone Canol

Proj to Wyman, 10 Oct 42.
THE FAR NORTH 325

Whitehorse to Fairbanks, Nome, and

Anchorage was to be devised. Formally

directed by Sturdevant on 28 August to

carry out these decisions, Wyman consulted his architect-engineers and several

days later recommended laying a pipeline along the Alcan Highway from

Whitehorse to Fairbanks and thence

westward to Tanana. From here barges

could carry petroleum products down

the Yukon to the Bering Sea. To carry

gasoline east of Whitehorse, he proposed

putting in a pipeline to Watson Lake,

which could transport 800 barrels of

gasoline a day to various points along

the Alcan Highway.81

On 4 September the Transportation

Corps sent a report to Somervell concerning the possible use of Alaska as a springboard for an attack on Japan. If such

a strategy were adopted, large supplies

of oil would be needed, and the continuing scarcity of shipping indicated the

necessity for developing resources in or

near Alaska. If Norman Wells could

produce 20,000 barrels of crude a day,

Alaska could be made well-nigh selfsufficient with regard to gasoline. Somervell forwarded this report to General

O'Connor, who passed it on to Wyman.

On 15 September, Wyman recommended

to O'Connor that a wildcat drilling

program be undertaken north and south

of Norman Wells. Imperial could do

some of the drilling, but an additional

firm would have to be brought in. On

25 September Wyman signed a contract

with the Noble Drilling Corporation of

Tulsa, Oklahoma, which called for

drilling 100 wildcat wells; Noble was

to begin work with the arrival of

its equipment at the oil field in midNovember. Although the Transportation Corps report also emphasized the

need for more pipelines, Wyman's major

emphasis during the fall was on increasing production at Norman Wells, in

order to make sure that there was sufficient oil to warrant going ahead with

the rest of Canol. Ground reconnaissances of the route for the crude oil

pipeline were started. The first party

to begin a survey of the route, led by an

American surveyor, Kent Fuller, left

Whitehorse in September and headed

northeast for Sheldon Lake, the midway

point. In November a party headed by

a Canadian set out from Norman Wells

in a southwesterly direction.82

In September construction began on

the first of the fourteen landing strips

between Waterways and Norman Wells.

Air transport alone, however, could not

bring in the tonnages needed; most

freight would have to be moved overland. Wyman began work on a system

of winter roads, which could be cleared

and smoothed quickly by bulldozers.

Without roadbed or surfacing, they

could support traffic as long as ground

remained frozen but would break up in

the spring thaws. Because the routes

crossed swamps, construction could not

be undertaken until freezing weather set

in. Employees of Bechtel, Price, and

Callahan and such troops as were available were to bulldoze the main road

from the railhead at Peace River north81

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Somervell, 18 Aug 42. NWSC

337 Canol. (2) Ltr, Sturdevant to Canol Proj, 28

Aug 42. (3) Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 31 Aug 42.

82

 (1) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 76-77. (2) Ltr,

Wyman to CofEngrs, 26 Sep 42. (3) Ltr, Robins to

Hickerson, 11 Dec 42. (4) Ltr, Sturdevant to Hickerson, 13 Aug 42.
326 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ward to Norman Wells—a distance of

1,000 miles. One company of the separate 388th Battalion and one company

of the 90th Heavy Ponton Battalion began working out of Peace River on 23

October. The 35th Engineers, after

finishing their part of the Alcan Highway in October, started work on a winter

road leading northward from Fort Nelson to Fort Simpson, a distance of 248

miles. When completed, this road

would connect the Alcan Highway with

the road being bulldozed from Peace

River. Drilling at Norman Wells was

by now so successful that 3,000 barrels a

day was assured, and 20,000 barrels a day

seemed possible. On 19 October a directive was issued to the architect

engineer to dismantle a refinery at

Corpus Christi, Texas, and ship it to

Skagway. Work on the pipeline from

Whitehorse to Watson Lake—Canol 3—

began in October.83

In view of the unfavorable war situation in the fall of 1942, Somervell believed that the full development of

Canol as planned was justified. Allied

fortunes seemed to have reached a low

point. In the Pacific, the battle for

Guadalcanal was raging indecisively. By

November it appeared that the Germans

might capture the Caucasian oil fields.

Should the USSR seem to be on the

verge of collapse, Japan might move into

Siberia, and Alaska would then be of

even greater strategic importance. Early

in November Somervell reviewed the

entire Canol project; on the 16th he

issued his "final directive." Drilling

was to be continued at Norman Wells

until 20,000 barrels a day were produced, and a pipeline capable of carrying

3,000 barrels a day, together with a road,

was to be built from Norman Wells

to Whitehorse. The pipelines from

Skagway to Whitehorse—Canol 2—from

Whitehorse to Watson Lake—Canol 3—

and from Whitehorse to Fairbanks—

Canol 4—were to be completed, and the

refinery was to be erected at Whitehorse.

The landing strips were to be put in between Waterways and Norman Wells.

All construction was to be finished by 1

December 1943.84

Progress During Winter and Spring

During the winter work was pushed

on all the projects except Canol 4, which

was to be started in the spring. Canol

2 was perhaps the easiest job. One

hundred and ten miles of pipeline were

laid alongside the railroad tracks. The

final weld was made in December, and

by the end of January the line was carrying gasoline. Work continued on Canol

3, but slowly. Additional wells were

being drilled at the oil field, despite the

freezing weather. The refinery at Corpus Christi was dismantled, packed, and

shipped on 275 freight cars to Edmonton.

Most of the parts were sent on by way of

Prince Rupert and Skagway. Those

too bulky for the 11-foot tunnels of the

White Pass and Yukon Railroad were

trucked over the Alcan Highway from

83

 (1) Ltr, Sturdevant to Hickerson, 26 Sep 42.

(2) Force Comdr, Task Force 2600, Opns Order No.

8, 25 Sep 42. (3) Ltr, Wyman to CofEngrs, 30 Sep

42. (4) Memo, Wyman for CofEngrs, 9 Oct 42.

(5) Ltr, S-3 388th Engr GS Regt to CG NWSC, 6

May 43. (6) Memo, Maj J. M. Wild, OCE Constr

Div, to ExecO Constr Div, 3 Nov 42.

84

 (1) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 78-80. (2) Ltr,

Somervell to CofEngrs, 16 Nov 42.
THE FAR NORTH 327

Dawson Creek. The winter roads

showed rapid progress. By the beginning of January, the 388th and 90th

engineers had bulldozed 374 miles from

Peace River to Alexandra Falls, and by

the end of February, the contractors' men

had completed the road to Norman

Wells. Additional roads were bulldozed

across the Arctic expanses. Company B

of the 388th completed one 200 miles

long from Fort Smith westward to the

Hay River. The reconnaissance parties

meanwhile continued their exploration

of the route for the crude oil pipeline.

In December the party that had set out

from Norman Wells finished its survey

of the eastern half of the route; the one

which had set out from Whitehorse

reached Sheldon Lake on 28 February.

The route finally selected was 577 miles

long, running southwestward, usually

along the valleys of streams, from Norman Wells across the Mackenzie Mountains to Johnson's Crossing on the Alcan

Highway, 80 miles east of Whitehorse.

The maximum elevation was 5,000 feet.

In January 1943, elements of the 35th

Engineers at Johnson's Crossing began

the difficult job of building the road to

Sheldon Lake, which would parallel the

pipeline, and had to be put in first so

that trucks could haul pipe to the welding crews. Employees of Bechtel, Price,

and Callahan began work on the other

half of the road from Norman Wells.

Work also moved ahead on the airfields.

Troops and civilians had finished eleven

by the end of January.85

Despite all efforts to improve transportation to Norman Wells, sufficient

materials could not be shipped in to

expand crude production as scheduled.

Planes could do no more than bring in

supplies of food, clothing, fuel, and

other necessities to the men stationed at

the northern posts during the winter

months. To keep trucks going on the

rough roads during the bitter cold

proved to be an almost impossible task.

"The winter roads," the engineers reported, "were nightmares both to the

men who built them and to those who

operated vehicles over them." Nevertheless, about 8,000 tons of supplies were

trucked from Peace River as far as the

Mackenzie and stored to be sent down

the river when the ice broke up in the

spring. Wyman planned to turn traffic

on the rivers over to civilians during the

coming year. On 2 February he signed

a contract with Marine Operators, an

association made up of the firms of C. W.

Cunningham and Peter Kiewit of

Omaha, Nebraska, and Paul Grafe,

president of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company. The Marine Operators were to run barges and rafts on the

rivers and operate docks and portage

equipment between Waterways and Norman Wells.86

In the spring of 1943 work on Canol,

carried on under Colonel Worsham's

direction after Wyman's departure on 25

March, was accelerated. That same

month Canol 4—the pipeline from

Whitehorse to Fairbanks—was started.

85

 (1) Memo, Maj J. M. Wild, OCE, for WDGS, 5

Feb 43. (2) Northwest Div, Feb 44, Rpt, Winter

Road Ops Grimshaw, Alberta, to Norman Wells,

Northwest Territory, 1942-43. (3) Ltr, S-3 388th

Engr GS Regt to CG NWSC, 6 May 43. (4) Ltr,

Maj L. E. Laurion, Whitehorse Dist Engr, to

Wyman, 15 Feb 43. 86

 (1) History of Force 2600 (Gainesville, Texas),

p. 65. ENBN-89-0. (2) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp.

59, 90.
328 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Although the route paralleled the Alcan

Highway, construction was not easy.

There were 101 water crossings. Permanent highway bridges would carry the

pipeline over the major rivers, but over

the smaller ones the pipe had to be laid

on stream bottoms or carried across on

A-frames or cable suspension bridges.

Often glaciers of ice covered the low

temporary bridges, which in the spring

were torn out by floods. When the

thaws set in, the highway beyond the

White River became an impassable

quagmire. More rapid progress was

made on the pipeline from Whitehorse

to Watson Lake, and on 21 May, the line

was completed. Sections of the refinery

began to arrive at Whitehorse in the

spring, and the job of reassembling it

began on 19 April. But with the beginning of the spring thaws, work on the

crude oil pipeline and the parallel access

road came almost to a standstill and was

not resumed until May. When the

Arctic summer began, Canol was still far

from finished. By this time, the tactical

situation in the Aleutians had changed

the thinking regarding the Pacific northwest. The Japanese were being driven

out of the islands, and it appeared that

the threat to Alaska would be eliminated.87

The Danger Passes

Attu and Shemya

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun to

make definite plans in late 1942 to expel

the Japanese from the Aleutians. Kiska

was to be recaptured first. An ArmyNavy planning staff was set up at San

Diego, and during the winter the 7th

Infantry Division began training at Fort

Ord. The role of Alaska in the war

came under close scrutiny at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.

Roosevelt and Churchill decided that

efforts made in the North Pacific should

be aimed not so much at driving the

Japanese from the Aleutians as preventing them from expanding and consolidating their holdings. Rear Adm.

Thomas C. Kinkaid, commander of the

North Pacific area, was informed that the

ships required for the planned attack on

Kiska would not be forthcoming. Since

Attu was believed to be less heavily defended, Kinkaid suggested that Kiska be

bypassed and that available forces be

used to capture Attu and occupy the

nearby Semichi Islands. Such a stratagem would isolate Kiska and provide a

fine site for an airfield on Shemya

Island, 50 miles east of Attu and one of

the Semichi group. On 22 March the

Army and Navy ordered preparations

begun for the capture of Attu. Elements of the 7th Division were to make

the landing; the division's 13th Engineer

Combat Battalion would support the

infantry, while the 50th Engineer Combat Regiment would act as shore party.

Lt. Col. James E. Green, commander of

the 13th, was named Force Engineer.88

87

 (1) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 97-100. (2) Ltr,

Worsham to Col Thomas F. Farrell, OCE, 21 Apr 43.

(3) Ltr, Lambright, Imperial Oil Ltd, to Coghill,

Exec Off of the President, 17 Apr 43.

88

 (1) Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding

the United States and Its Outposts, ch. XI. (2) Hist

Sec Alaskan Dept, Official Hist, pp. 28ff. (3) Matloff

and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare,

pp. 370ff. (4) Ltr, Col Virgil L. Womeldorff, formerly CO 50th Engrs, to C EHD, 3 Feb 59. EHD

Files.
THE FAR NORTH 329

When the task force left Cold Bay on

4 May, D-day was set for the 8th. Because of fog at the landing beaches, the

assault was postponed till the 11th. On

that day the troops came in at two places

on eastern Attu: at Massacre Bay on the

southern shore and near Holtz Bay on

the northern. (See Map 16.) They

were to move inland, meet at Holtz Bay

pass, and then drive eastward against the

enemy troops concentrated in the valleys

and peninsulas. At Massacre Bay four

companies of the 50th Engineers and

three companies of the 13th went in

with the infantry. At Holtz Bay, one

company of the 50th landed with an

infantry detachment. Both forces encountered no resistance at the time of the

landings.89

During the next few days the troops

advanced inland against stubborn enemy

opposition. The engineers with the

larger force at Massacre Bay had a hard

time because of the difficult terrain.

Inland from the beach, swamp and

tundra extended for about a mile up

Massacre Valley to a hogback ridge.

Moving equipment across the tundra

was impossible. The engineers decided

to use the rocky bed of a creek as a road,

and lines of heavily laden tracked vehicles were soon moving up this novel

highway. The forward movement

stopped abruptly at the ridge. Struggling for two days to get a bulldozer to

the top of the tundra-covered slope, the

men finally succeeded. They then

turned the machine around and cut a

trough down through the tundra in five

minutes. A tractor with a winch was

moved up and anchored on top of the

ridge. Supplies were hauled up in toboggan sleds attached to a cable. Meantime, the infantry advanced up the

valley, along both sides of the hogback

toward Sarana Pass.

To improve supply, the engineers

started to build a road along the top of

the hogback. Here the bulldozers easily

stripped the tundra, from one to two feet

deep, exposing the rock or hardpan base.

The road was pushed through all the way

to Sarana Pass, which was reached on 24

May. By this time, the infantry had

driven the Japanese out of the pass and

forced them to retreat up Chichagof

Valley.90

On 25 May three companies of the

50th Engineers and elements of the 13th

set up their camps on a high point to the

east of Sarana Pass, on the south side of

Sarana Valley, a site that soon became

known as Engineer Hill. Infantry, artillery, and service troops were encamped

on both flanks. In order to get supplies

into Chichagof Valley, the engineers

began to build a switch-back road down

the steep slope of the hill, a job that

would take several days. A cableway

would speed supplies forward even more

expeditiously. To operate such a contrivance a tractor would have to be

gotten down to the valley floor, attached

to the cableway, and run back and forth.

Additional tractors would be needed

below to move supplies forward. The

problem was to get a machine into the

89

 (1) Harold W. Richardson, "Engineers in the

Battle of Attu," Engineering News-Record, CXXXI

(December 30, 1943), 46-50. (2) 50th Engr Combat

Bn, Unit Hist, Sep 42-Sep 45.

90

 (1) Richardson, "Engineers in the Battle of

Attu," Engineering News-Record, CXXXI (December

30, 1943), 46-50. (2) Ltr, ExecO 13th Engr Combat

Bn to Hq Task Group 16.11, APO 726, 15 Jun 43.

307 Engr (13) 0.3 (12414)M.
330 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

valley. The 1,000-foot slope of Engineer Hill, the most feasible route, was

steep, rocky, and partly covered with

tundra. Equipment could not descend

under its own power. The engineers

tumbled six tractors down, hoping that

one or two would be in running condition after hitting the bottom. All six

were. A cableway was rigged up and

attached to one of the tractors. Run

back and forth across the valley floor, the

tractor lowered and raised the sleds

attached to the cable. By the morning

of the 29th, a road had been completed

down the slope, replacing the cableway.91

By this time the enemy's position in

Chichagof Valley was hopeless. Despite

the heavy odds, the Japanese commander

decided to counterattack. At 0300 on

29 May nearly a thousand screaming

Japanese who had broken through American infantry lines stormed up Chichagof

Valley and within two hours were at Engineer Hill. An attack at this point was

wholly unexpected. Some men in the

engineer camp were killed while asleep.

Confusion and panic gripped many of

the others as, partly dressed, they

stumbled out of their tents. Company

officers and noncommissioned officers

hastily organized small groups to form

makeshift defense lines. The men

fought back as best they could. Some

crouched behind tractors and piles of

wooden cases, lobbing grenades into the

darkness. Others, taking positions behind piles of earth and rock which they

had excavated in the course of road

construction, fired their carbines and

rifles at the onrushing enemy. Some of

the machine guns that the 13th engineers

brought into play proved highly effective. The fighting continued during

the morning but by noon the routed

enemy troops were fleeing to the gorges

on the far side of Sarana Valley. When

wounded or cornered, many of the Japanese killed themselves with their own

grenades. By nightfall the enemy had

been practically wiped out. Over 250

Japanese bodies were found around Engineer Hill, many of them armed only

with bayonets tied to sticks. The engineers had borne the brunt of the attack

—29 had been killed and 47 wounded.92

The fierceness of the fighting on Attu

is attested to by the fact that about 2,350

Japanese were killed but only 29 prisoners taken. Some 550 American lives

were lost. The wounded numbered approximately 1,150. Disease and nonbattle injuries claimed another 2,100

men. Certain inadequacies in training

and tactics made the fighting on Attu

costlier than necessary for the engineers.

Lt. Col. Virgil M. Womeldorff, commander of the 50th Engineers, reported

that "realistic training in combat tactics,

night patrolling, outpost duty and uses

of terrain features would have saved

many of the casualties encountered and

91

 Richardson, "Engineers in the Battle of Attu,"

Engineering News-Record, CXXXI (December 30,

1943), 46-50.

92 (1) The Capture of Attu As Told By The Men

Who Fought There (Washington, 1944), pp. 21-23,

118-19. (2) Hist Sec Alaskan Dept, Official Hist,

pp. 71-73. (3) Ltr, Womeldorff to CG Task Group

16.11, 14 Jun 43, in Opns Rpt, 50 Engr Combat Bn,

11 May-2 Jun 43. (4) Hq 50th Engr Combat Regt,

Unit Jnl, 11 May-2 Jun 43. Last two in ENBN-50-

0.3 (16522)M. (5) Ltr, ExecO 13th Engr Combat Bn

to Hq Task Group 16.11, APO 726, 15 Jun 43. 307

Engr (13) 0.3 (12414)M. (6) Maj Gen Eugene M.

Landrum, Rpt of Opns on Attu, 25 Jun 43, p. 15.

91-TF4-0.3.
THE FAR NORTH 331

reduced firing at imaginary enemy

movements." Training for combat had

been neglected because so much time

was spent in training for amphibious

operations. Colonel Womeldorff also

noted that information as to the disposition and movement of friendly troops

and units was not available to the men

at the outposts.93

Late in May, work on the base and

airfield began. Colonel Womeldorff,

put in charge of construction after the

end of the fighting, had, besides the 50th

and 13th engineers, Company A of the

807th Aviation Battalion and a detachment of the 349th General Service

Regiment, both of which had reached

Attu while the battle was raging. The

aviation engineers began work on a field

at Massacre Bay. They drained a lake

and replaced the soft tundra with sand

and gravel. Three tractors were sometimes needed to pull a scraper usually

hauled by one machine. On 8 June,

eleven days after work began on the

runway, the first plane landed. By this

time, substantial progress had been made

in providing the Massacre Bay area with

a network of roads, a dock, and other

facilities. Meantime, work had begun

on Shemya. Colonel Talley with a

group of eighteen officers and men had

made a preliminary reconnaissance on 28

May. Two days later a task force, including the 18th Combat Regiment,

came in. Heavy seas slowed the disembarking of the troops and the unloading

of equipment. But Shemya's narrow

beaches were soon cluttered with troops

and with amphibious tractors towing

barges through the water and on to the

beaches. By 3 June the engineers had

begun work on a fighter strip, which they

later lengthened for bombers.94

Kiska

Even before the recapture of Attu,

DeWitt had asked Nimitz to join him in

requesting the Joint Chiefs to approve

an attack on Kiska. On 24 May the

Joint Chiefs directed that planning start

at once, and on 22 June they approved

the assault. The target date was set for

15 August. Plans called for building an

airfield and a base for 15,000 troops.

Kiska appeared to be well fortified, and

it was thought to have a garrison of at

least 10,000 men. The main enemy

forces were believed to be on the southeastern shore at Kiska Harbor and at

Gertrude Cove, several miles to the

south. The plan was to land on the

opposite side of the island and attack

these areas from the rear. A task force

numbering 34,000, including 5,500 Canadians, would make the attack. The

2d Battalion of the 50th Engineers was

to go in with the attacking troops for

shore party work. Maj. Gen. Charles

H. Corlett, the task force commander,

reorganized his force in June for the

assault. The basic unit was the battalion landing group. Each was divided

into a forward combat team and a beach

combat team. The forward team, one

of whose components was a platoon of

combat engineers, had the mission of

93

 (1) Hist Sec Alaskan Dept, Official Hist, p. 73.

(2) Ltr, Womeldorff to CG Task Group 16.11, 14

Jun 43.

94

 (1) 50th Engr Combat Bn, Unit Hist, Sep 42-

Sep 45. (2) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr,

pp. 201-07. (3) Hist of the 807th Engr Avn Bn.
332 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

defeating the enemy's forces. Each

beach combat team, with one company

of combat engineers, was to unload ships,

establish dumps, and move supplies inland. Both teams were organized and

equipped to fight.95

On the evening of 12 August the task

force left Adak, arriving off Kiska two

nights later. Soon after midnight, in

the light of a bright moon, the troops

clambered into their landing craft,

"grimly expectant" as they saw the "fogobscured mass of Kiska for miles

ahead. . . ."

 96

 The first landings were

made without incident, and the men

advanced over the rocky beaches "with

nothing but mysterious silence as welcome."

 97

 Each combat team moved forward to attack the enemy as it had been

directed to do. Defenses were considerably stronger than on Attu. Barbed

wire and mines were encountered on

most of the beaches. Further inland the

men ran into pillboxes, radar installations, and searchlights. But none of

the defenses were manned. "Each objective taken without contact of enemy

caused the men to be even more tense,"

wrote the historian of the 50th Engineers, "for the fear of moving into a

trap was common."

 98

 Fog, rain, and

strong winds heightened the feeling of

apprehension. No enemy troops were

ever found. "The impossible had been

accomplished," the historian of the 50th

Engineers continued, "Japan had completely evacuated the island in spite of

our constant naval blockade." At Gertrude Cove, where the Japanese had

located some of their important installations, "five ravens as large as turkeys,

scratching about in a pile of rotting food,

proved to be the only living things

there."

 99

Soon after the island was retaken, most

of the 7th Division left for Hawaii. The

battalion of the 50th Engineers, which

had engaged in shore party work, remained behind. The men had plenty

of work to do, even though the size of

the base that had been planned for Kiska

was reduced drastically and no air force

units were to be stationed there. Some

of the Japanese installations could be

used. On a high ridge near the northern part of the island the enemy had

partly finished a runway, the two ends of

which sloped downward. Considerable

cutting was required at the center and

fill was needed at both ends. The engineers had only light equipment and had

to haul dirt in push carts, but eventually

they managed to even up the strip to the

proper grade. They also improved the

Japanese-built road between Gertrude

Cove and Kiska Harbor. In many

places it had to be entirely reconstructed.

They blasted rock from the hillsides, and

carried much of it by hand to the roadway because trucks were not to be had.

"This was by no means a pleasant project, or one on which desired progress

could be made," the 50th Engineers reported. Late in September, the 50th

moved to Hawaii. The 223d and 521st

95 Combat Companies, recently arrived on (1) 50th Engr Combat Bn, Unit Hist, Sep 42-

Sep 45. (2) Hist Sec Alaska Dept, Official Hist, pp.

125-26. 96

 Hist Sec Alaska Dept, Official Hist, p. 134. 97

 Ibid, p. 135. 98

 50th Engr Combat Bn Unit Hist, Sep 42-Sep 45.

99

 (1) Ibid. (2) WD, Bureau of Public Relations

Press Br, Jap Mode of Living on Kiska Described by

A.G.F. [Observer], for release 8 Oct 43. EHD Files.
THE FAR NORTH 333

the island, remained to construct base

facilities.100

Engineer Reorganization

The expulsion of the Japanese ended

the immediate danger to the Aleutians

and Alaska. It was not likely that Japan

would again try to seize any of the islands.

But the North Pacific area was still important because it was near the Soviet

Union. Whether the USSR might become an ally in an offensive against

Japan was not known. In any case the

military forces were kept strong and were

reorganized to meet changing conditions.

The engineer organization was revamped. The anomalous situation of

having two engineer organizations in the

Alaskan Defense Command had worked

well in practice. But, as General Nold

wrote later, the War Department had not

liked it and had objected to it "at intervals of about three months because it

did not follow the diagrammatic pattern

of relationships that applied to other

theaters."

 101

 The first changes in the

engineer setup had been made in the

previous June. Colonel Talley's organization with its 250 officers, enlisted men,

and civilians, together with the Utilities

Engineer Section, was consolidated with

Nold's office. Talley, as scheduled, then

returned to the United States, and Nold

henceforth had technical supervision

over all engineer work in the Territory.

The three units of his office were the

Military Division, the Utilities Division,

and the Construction Division. There

was little change in the way the engineers

carried on their work, apparently the

only difference being that correspondence formerly exchanged between Nold

and Talley over Buckner's signature was

now forwarded in memorandum form

among the three divisions. The duties

of the Seattle District office remained as

before. No new projects were in prospect for the mainland, but additional

work was to be undertaken in the

Aleutians. When, in November, the

Alaska Defense Command became a

separate theater of operations and was

renamed the Alaskan Department, General Nold became the first department

engineer.102

Work on airfields and bases in the

Aleutians continued. On Kiska, the

engineers labored on the docks, the runway, gasoline storage, and quarters for

the troops. On Shemya, their main

concern was coping with the extremely

rough seas. During 1943 most supplies

and equipment had to be brought ashore

by barge and landing craft; a few could

be flown in. In 1944, the engineers

built a dock out to deep water, 1,400 feet

from shore, and to protect it erected a

2,000-foot breakwater. A violent storm

wrecked breakwater and dock. Landing

mats, laid on the slopes of the breakwater to give added protection, were

tossed about on the boiling seas. Fiftyfoot sections of the dock were torn off

their piles, some of which broke as the

sections were wrenched loose. Tons of

rock were thrown on the beach. The 100

 (1) 50th Engr Combat Bn, Unit Hist, Sep 42-

Sep 45. (2) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr,

pp. 210-11. (3) Nold, Hist of Of of Engr Alaskan

Dept, Incl 3, p. 11. 101

 Ltr, Nold to C EHD, 7 Aug 57.

102

 Nold, Hist of Of of Engr Alaskan Dept, pp.

31ff. (2) Ltr, TAG to Buckner, 27 Oct 43. 400.312

(AD).
334 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

engineers subsequently built a cellular

sheet metal dock, 60 feet wide, for a

distance of 300 feet out into the water.

They filled the outer end cell with concrete, the others with rock. The deck

was 22 feet above mean low water—

above the crest of all but the highest

waves. This height made for cumbersome unloading, but the dock remained

in place and the deck did not have to be

cleared of equipment and supplies, except during the most violent storms.

On Adak, the engineers did a considerable amount of construction. After the

Japanese were cleared from the Aleutians, the Alaska Defense Command

made preparations to build a supply

base on Adak capable of equipping and

maintaining an expeditionary force of

50,000 men. Work began in October

1943 and continued well into 1944.103

Alcan Highway

As soon as the danger to Alaska had

passed, work on the Alcan Highway was

no longer so critical. The last engineer

troops left the road in July 1943. The

Public Roads Administration continued

construction. The contractors concentrated their efforts in the period between

the end of June and the beginning of

October. At the peak of operations, 81

contractors had on their payrolls 14,000

men, who were working on the highway

from Dawson Creek to Big Delta. Using more construction equipment than

ever before marshaled on a single job,

the workers leveled and straightened the

roadway and greatly improved its drainage. The summer rains played havoc

with the bridges. The worst floods

came between 9 and 12 July, shortly

after the construction season was in full

swing. In the Southern Sector twentyfour temporary bridges were washed out,

including every structure within 160

miles west of Fort Nelson. Construction

workers began at once to repair the

damage and by 20 July had reopened the

road to through traffic. The floods left

no choice but to relocate certain stretches

of the highway and to replace many

temporary structures. Consequently,

Brig. Gen. Ludson D. Worsham authorized the restoration of the earlier bridging program. It was too late, however,

to procure all the prefabricated steel in

time for construction that season. By

the end of October, contractors had completed 99 major bridges with spans high

above ice and flood waters and had 34

others under construction. Probably

the most impressive was the 2,130-footlong suspension bridge over the Peace

River, which replaced the earlier timber

trestles that had been washed out so many

times. Before the war, it had taken the

contractor eight months to construct an

almost identical bridge in the Midwest.

On 2 August, four months and one week

after the first tower was started, this new

high-level bridge was opened to traffic,

and thus a major bottleneck at the southern end of the route was eliminated.104 103

 (1) Bush, Narrative Rpt of Alaska Constr, pp.

210-15. (2) Bodman, "Peculiarities of Aleutian

Military Design," Civil Engineering, XV (September,

1945), 403. (3) Excerpt from Ltr, Hq ADC to CG

WDC, 8 Sep 43. (4) Memo for Rcd, Hallnook, Tr

Div OCE, 9 Oct 43. Last two in 600.1 (Alaska),

Alaskan Defense 6.

104

 (1) Alaska Hwy, p. 241. (2) Hq NWSC and

Northwest Div Engr, Alcan Hwy, Completion Rpt,

6 Apr 45. (3) PRA, Monthly Rpt of Constr Activi-
THE FAR NORTH 335

Canol

Canol, during the summer of 1943,

became wholly a civilian project. The

troops of Task Force 2600, having finished their job of developing transportation facilities to Norman Wells, began to

leave in July. The 35th Engineers, who

worked on the access road for the crude

oil pipeline, were pulled out in July and

August. By midsummer, gasoline was

moving through the Canol 3 pipeline.

Two hundred twenty-five miles of the

600 miles of pipe required for the Canol

4 line had been laid, and it was hoped

gasoline would be flowing through it

by the end of November. Work on the

refinery at Whitehorse was continuing

and was to be finished by the end of the

year. Great difficulties were encountered in building the road and pipeline

between Norman Wells and Whitehorse.

At the western end, the 35th Engineers

had completed about 160 miles of road

and the contractors' employees had laid

and welded about 106 miles of pipe. In

the eastern half, about 50 miles of allweather road had been completed and

10 miles of pipe welded. An immense

amount of work still had to be done—

367 miles of all-weather road had to be

built and 461 miles of pipeline laid and

welded.

Drilling by Imperial at Norman Wells

seemed to bear out the most optimistic

forecasts. By the end of August 23 wells

were in production and the total potential yield was estimated at 4,159 barrels

a day. It was now believed possible that

wildcat drilling would raise the daily

yield to 20,000 barrels a day. The

Noble Company had not been able to

begin wildcat drilling before the summer

of 1943 because its rigs could not be

transported to Norman Wells until after

the rivers were open for navigation.

Drilling proved to be difficult for Noble.

The rigs could not be moved to the sites

unless roads were first put in. Little

progress could be made during the short

summer season. Canol was still a sizable project; in October, the number of

civilian employees reached a peak of

10,629.105

During the summer and fall of 1943

the question as to whether or not work

on Canol should be continued was hotly

debated. Now that the Japanese had

been expelled from the Aleutians, there

seemed little point in going on with the

project. Various civilian government

agencies were still sharply critical of

Canol. The special committee of the

Senate investigating the national defense

program—usually called the Truman

Committee—looked into Canol in the

fall. A subcommittee held hearings at

Whitehorse; the full committee, in

Washington. Because the pipelines

were already in operation from Skagway

to Whitehorse and from Whitehorse to

Watson Lake and part of the way to

Fairbanks, the committee focused its attention on the as yet unfinished crude oil

pipeline and the uncompleted refinery.

It was soon apparent that the members

of the committee were opposed to Canol.

The War Department took the stand

that work would have to go on. On 26

ties of PRA-Alcan Hwy Proj, Jul 43. (4) Bowman

et al., Bulldozers Come First, pp. 142-43.

105

 (1) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 94-97, 138. (2)

Bechtel, Price, and Callahan, Constr Schedule for the

Canol Proj, 1 Aug 43. NWSC 1943-44 Dec File 611

Canol.
336 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

THE PEACE RIVER SUSPENSION BRIDGE

October, the Joint Chiefs declared that

the completion and operation of the

project were necessary for the war effort,

and two months later, Secretary Stimson

informed the Truman Committee of the

War Department's intention to continue

work. On 8 January 1944, the committee issued a highly critical report,

charging among other things that Canol

had been authorized after insufficient

study and was continued contrary to the

advice of government and industry.

One of the criticisms was that a production goal of 20,000 barrels a day was the

aim at Norman Wells when the crude oil

pipeline would be able to carry only

3,000 barrels. The committee's attacks

were directed entirely at the conception

and scope of the project and not against

the way it was executed. The committee agreed that the War Department

should decide whether or not Canol

should be completed.106

Work moved ahead. By November

106

 (1) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 123-25 and app. A.

(2) Investigation of the National Defense Program,

pp. 9287ff., 9337ff. (3) Ltr, USW Patterson to Senator

Harry S. Truman, 24 Nov 43. (4) Ltr, Stimson to

Truman, 23 Dec 43. Investigation of the National

Defense Program, p. 9915.
THE FAR NORTH 337

REFINERY AT WHITEHORSE

1943, Imperial had twenty-nine wells in

production. Noble found little oil.

On 23 November the latter company

was told to discontinue all drilling outside the proven field, and later its contract was terminated. The exploratory

operations showed that the oil deposits

were larger than originally assumed; reserves, once estimated at 2 million

barrels, were now believed to range

from 60 to 100 million. By the end of

the year, the road from Norman Wells to

Whitehorse was finished, together with

some of the bridges over the many

streams, including the 600-foot-wide

Pelly River. Completion of the road

enabled the contractors to speed up work

on the pipeline, 470 miles of which had

now been completed. Since tests indicated the oil would flow even at -75°F.,

the pipe could be laid directly on the

ground. A telephone line was installed

which connected Norman Wells with the

pumping stations and Whitehorse and

tied in with the line along the Alcan

Highway. In mid-February 1944 the

last two pipes were welded. Ten pumping stations were in place. On 16 April

the first oil from Norman Wells reached

Whitehorse. Two weeks later the re-
338 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

A PIPELINE CARRIED ON A WHITEHORSE AND YUKON RAILROAD TRESTLE

finery was completed and turned over to

Standard Oil for operation. Thirtynine wells were in production. The

pipeline from Whitehorse to Fairbanks

had been completed in the fall of 1943,

and the first oil had reached Fairbanks

the following February.107

It had taken two years to build Canol.

Some 4,000 engineers and 10,000 civilians, at an estimated cost of $133,000,000,

had developed the oil field at Norman

Wells, laid 1,600 miles of pipeline, installed a refinery for processing crude oil,

and greatly improved the transportation

facilities in a subarctic region half the

size of the United States. Canol provided a feasible means of supplying gasoline and oil to the Alcan Highway and

the Northwest Staging Route. From

April 1944 to April 1945, 1,102,000

barrels of crude oil were sent through

the pipeline from Norman Wells to

Whitehorse. The pipelines out of

Whitehorse proved to be more economical to operate than other means of

107

 (1) Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 119-22. (2) Ltr,

Worsham to CofE, 2 Feb 44. (3) Ltr, Stimson to

Truman, 23 Dec 43. (4) Bechtel, Price, and Callahan, Schedule of Progress, 31 Dec 43. (5) Ltr, C. C.

Wilcox of J. Gordon Turnbull and Sverdrup and

Parcel to Worsham, 31 Dec 43. NWSC 1943-44

Dec File, 823 Canol. (6) Memo, Somervell for the

Spec Asst to SW, 4 Mar 44.
THE FAR NORTH 339

petroleum distribution in the areas in

which they served. To ship a barrel of

gasoline from Skagway to Whitehorse by

rail cost $8.40; by Canol 2 pipeline, 23

cents. Nevertheless, Canol could supply the North Pacific theater with only

a fraction of its gasoline requirements,

and on 1 April 1945, operation of the

crude oil pipeline and refinery was

suspended.108

The Canol project, pushed through at

the insistence of General Somervell,

served little practical purpose. To

many, Canol had seemed a visionary and

expensive undertaking. But it was also

true that the possibility of an attack on

Alaska could not be ignored in early

1942. Many of those who supported

Canol were of the opinion that if oil

shipments from the United States had

been cut off and a local source of oil

that existed in the northwestern part of

America had not been developed, the

War Department might well have come

under more severe criticism than it did

for having built Canol.

The Engineers had made an extensive

effort in Alaska and northwestern Canada. Their work was not altogether

futile. Alcan remained as a permanent

link between the United States and

Alaska. Canol was abandoned, but a

great deal had been learned about construction in the far north. And much

of the engineer work in Alaska was of

permanent value because of Alaska's important strategic position in the postwar world. 108

 Rpt on Canol Proj, pp. 136, 146, 150.
CHAPTER VIII

Hawaii After Pearl Harbor

The war had begun with an attack on

the Hawaiian Islands. Thereafter, other

areas of the Pacific had borne the brunt

of the Japanese onslaughts. The Philippines, Australia, and even the Aleutians

had been in the limelight. The possibility of a Japanese assault constantly

remained, however, and a great deal of

work was necessary to fortify the Hawaiian chain. The Engineers not only

strengthened the Islands but also built

them up as a tremendous base through

which passed the troops headed for the

South and Southwest Pacific. At a relatively late date—November 1943—the

Central Pacific began to engage in offensive operations. By this time, the Allies

had advanced far along the road to

Rabaul, and the enemy had been expelled from the Aleutians. Henceforth,

he was to be on the defensive in the

Central Pacific also.

The Engineers Organize for War

When the Japanese planes made their

first attack on Oahu on the morning of 7

December 1941 at five minutes before

eight, a number of employees of the

Honolulu District were already at work

in the offices in the Young Hotel Building, at Hickam Field, and in the supply yard at nearby Ft. Kamehameha, on

the southern shore of Oahu. In a broadcast sent out over Honolulu's two radio

stations soon after nine o'clock, Colonel

Wyman, the District Engineer, directed

all employees to report at once to their

jobs or to a new headquarters being

organized in the Tuna Packers cannery

at Kewalo Basin on the Honolulu water

front. The additional headquarters,

being set up in accordance with plans

prepared before the war, was expected to

expedite work required for the defense

of the Islands; it would function as a

forward base and operate independently

of the office in the Young Hotel Building, which would continue to carry on

the "routine" duties of the district. By

half past nine that morning, the new

headquarters was in operation.1

The first hours after the attack were

hectic. There was widespread fear of

additional bombings; many expected an

enemy landing. One of the engineers'

first tasks was to make certain that the

principal runways on Oahu were operational and would remain so. The raids

were hardly over when the 804th Aviation Battalion set out for Wheeler and

Hickam to clear and repair the landing

areas. The latter field was highly im1

 (1) Historical Review, Corps of Engineers, United

States Army, Covering Operations During World

War II, Pacific Ocean Area, pp. 24ff. EHD Files.

(2) Rad, SP Div to Reybold, 3 Jan 42. 523.07

(Hawaiian Dept) 1942.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 341

portant as it was the only one in the

Islands with runways capable of taking

B-17's safely. During the evening, workmen from the district began repairing

Hickam's broken water mains and damaged utilities. Bellows also received attention. One of the 12 B-17's that

happened to arrive in Hawaii during

the attack on Pearl Harbor made an

emergency landing at this field; the

Hawaiian Constructors that same day

began lengthening the second runway so

that it could take more of the B-17's expected from the mainland within the

next few days.2

Wyman believed it imperative to move

the district's advance headquarters from

its exposed position at Kewalo Basin to a

safer place. A trustee of Punahou,

Honolulu's exclusive and venerable private school, suggested that he move the

district office into the school buildings.

Located back in the hills, Punahou offered a more sheltered location, had

adequate office and storage space, and

possessed superior messing and dormitory facilities, a most important consideration, since civilian employees who

worked at night were not permitted to

travel to and from work while blackouts

were in effect. The school's authorities

appeared to have no inkling of what was

about to happen when, at two o'clock in

the morning of 8 December, the first

cars from the district arrived at Punahou's gates. When the night watchman

rushed out to learn what was going on,

he was informed the engineers were taking over. During the next few hours, a

stream of cars, buses, and trucks arrived

on the campus. Keys not being readily

available, some of the doors of the building were forced open. A number of

the faculty, hurriedly called in, helped

clear out furniture and equipment and

made inventories of the items being removed; Monday morning found the new

headquarters ready for work.3

Martial law went into effect in the

Islands on the afternoon of the 7th.

General Short became military governor.

As stipulated in the defense plans,

Colonel Lyman, the Hawaiian Department engineer, became the head of the

military engineer organizations in

Hawaii.4 He henceforth directed all

engineering activities in connection with

defense, except those under the control

of the U.S. Navy. He was authorized to

spend money without limit on engineer

work. Wyman's job was to help Lyman

give the commanders in the Islands the

defenses they needed. Specifically, he

was to maintain permanent fortifications

in a state of readiness, help civilian authorities keep the roads and other means

of communications open, construct

shelters in and around Honolulu, relieve

the 804th engineers as soon as possible

of the responsibility of keeping permanent airdromes repaired, and lastly, as

directed by Lyman, furnish workmen

and equipment to the military forces in

the Islands. These various tasks got

under way immediately. On the 8th

2

 (1) Memo, Wyman for Rcd, 7 Dec 41, sub: Telephone messages. Engr, AGF PAC, KCRC. (2) Pearl

Harbor Hearings, Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C.

Short, Parts 30-31, p. 2473.

3

 (1) Wyman, Comments on Draft Manuscript of

this chapter. EHD Files. (2) O. F. Shepard, former President of Punahou, An Account of the Early

Days of World War II at Punahou School. (MS).

Hawaii War Records Depository. (3) Ltr w/Incl,

Maj Gen B. L. Robinson to C, EHD, 23 Dec 60.

EHD Files. 4

 See above, p. 43.
342 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Wyman took over all building materials,

supplies, and equipment, called all construction companies into service, and

started constructing bunkers and extending runways at the airfields. Lyman

distributed material to the troops and

got work on field fortifications under

way. No sooner had the engineer organization been consolidated than it was

also enlarged. The transfer of the constructing quartermaster's staff and field

organization to the Engineers had been

scheduled for the 16th. Short directed

that it take place on the 8th. The constructing quartermaster's 200 employees

were transferred to the district. Wyman

acquired from the Quartermaster Corps

63 construction contracts for work estimated to cost $12,793,942, about onefourth of which was finished. He continued to be responsible for the efforts

of the Hawaiian Constructors. They

moved their main offices to Punahou,

so that they could co-operate better with

the district. Wyman was still responsible to the Chief of Engineers for the

improvement of rivers and harbors and

flood control, but such civil work not in

some way pertaining to defense was now

negligible.5

Lyman, besides looking to the district

for help, had made plans to use as many

civilian organizations as possible. He

was prepared to turn to contractors and

suppliers of building materials, public

roads departments, the Oahu Railway

and Land Company, and the pineapple

and sugarcane plantations. The plantations were of vital importance. They

had extensive repair shops, sizable

quantities of heavy construction equipment, and many trained mechanics.

Their electric generating facilities could

be tied into commercial power circuits.

Each plantation was so organized and

equipped that its workers could be used

as corps engineer troops. Besides helping the engineers, the plantations were

expected to contribute to civilian defense. The director of Civilian Defense

divided rural Oahu into districts; men

from the plantations were organized in

each to carry out such jobs as repairing

airfields, maintaining roads, railroads,

and utilities, fighting fires, and rounding

up saboteurs.6

Besides the district and civilian organizations, Lyman could rely on troop

units. The 34th Combat Regiment,

under the direction of the department

commander, was already busy on roads

and trails; so were the two divisional

combat battalions, the 3d and the 65th.

The 804th engineers, assigned to the

Hawaiian Air Force, were responsible

for keeping all airfields used by military

aircraft in a state of repair, until relieved by the district. The few troops

on hand were hardly adequate to do the

work that now had to be done, and

Lyman appealed to the War Department

for more units. He asked for two aviation battalions, a camouflage company,

a topographic company (corps), a depot 5

 (1) Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding

the United States and Its Outposts, ch. VIII. (2)

Pearl Harbor Attack, Statement by General Short,

pts. 30-31, p. 2473. (3) Hq Engr Serv FO No 1, 8

Dec 41. (4) Ltr, Lyman to Honolulu Water Works,

8 Dec 41. Last two in Engr, AGF PAC. (5) Hist

Review, CE, U.S. Army, Covering Opns During

World War II, POA, p. 11.

6

 (1) Ltr, Lyman to Honolulu Water Works, 8 Dec

41. (2) 1st Ind, Lyman to G-1 HD, 4 Mar 42, basic

unknown. (1). (3) Ltr, Military Governor to

Territorial Dir of Civil Defense, n.d. All in Engr

AGF PAC.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 343

company, and a mobile shop company.7

He pointed out that his staff was too

small for the multitudinous jobs ahead.

"I have been making strenuous efforts to

obtain suitable officers for the engineer

service," he wrote to Reybold on 3 January, ". . . and I find myself blocked by

inaction in Washington and cumbersome regulations."

 8 He went on to say

that he had few military men, Regular

or Reserve, who had had much experience. Members of his staff were working from sixteen to twenty hours a day

trying to "handle the great volume of

Engineer work that has to be done as

fast as possible because it was not done

before the war began. . . ." "Between

overworked officers and inexperienced

officers," Lyman concluded, "the Engineer service is in a serious condition."

With the over-all shortage of engineers,

General Reybold could do little to fill

Lyman's request in the near future.9

An especially heavy burden fell on the

district office. As military governor,

Short charged Wyman with the "supervision and direction of all normal civilian

engineer activities, including operation

of utilities."

 10

 Under martial law, all

employees of essential industries had to

stay in their jobs. Construction machinery and materials, vital supplies, and

wages were frozen. Wyman signed contracts with a joint committee made up of

representatives of the Sugar Plantations

and the Pineapple Growers Associations.

The plantation owners agreed to make

available their equipment, materials, and

workers as needed. The Hawaiian Constructors were geared for war. General

Short directed that all construction for

the Army being done by civilian firms in

the Islands be placed under the Hawaiian Constructors; the other firms

would henceforth be considered their

subcontractors. Many jobs were suspended while Short and his staff reviewed

the over-all program. For the time being, work was to continue on only the

most urgent projects. Many of the contractors' forces were switched to what

were now deemed emergency jobs.

Blackouts and restrictions on traffic

forced the engineers to provide quarters

and subsistence to men who were working in remote or barely accessible places

from which they could not return home

after the day's work.11

Besides his mounting engineer responsibilities, Wyman was given a number of special jobs. He shared with the

navy yard supply officer the responsibility

for apportioning gasoline and other

petroleum products to the armed forces

and for rationing them to the public.

Huge quantities of war materials and

civilian goods were piling up on the piers

of west coast ports for shipment to the

islands. Much of the accumulating

merchandise was destined for Honolulu

stores for the Christmas shopping season.

Wyman got the job of determining shipping priorities. He appointed a local

shipping man to review all orders placed

by the local stores and recommend shipment in accordance with the military

7

 Ltr, Lyman to Reybold, 17 Dec 41. 400.312

(HD) 1941-43. 8

 Ltr, Lyman to Reybold, 3 Jan 42. 210.3 (HD)

1919.42. 9

 Rad, SPD to Reybold, 17 Jan 42. 210.3 (HD)

1919.42. 10

 Ltr, Hannum to Reybold, 15 Dec 41. 600.1

(HD) 1941-42.

11

 Rad, SPD to Reybold, 3 Jan 42. 523.07 (HD)

1942.
344 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

importance of the material. This complex task required a most diplomatic

handling of the Honolulu firms.12 Since

the Islands did not produce enough food

to support the population, General

Emmons, who replaced Short as Department Commander on 17 December,

directed that certain pineapple and

sugarcane fields be turned into vegetable

gardens, which should be producing "in

four months." He put Wyman in

charge of this program. The South

Pacific Division office in San Francisco

began to buy seeds, fertilizer, and farm

machinery for the gardens. "It is evident," Colonel Hannum, South Pacific

Division engineer, wrote to General

Reybold on 15 December, "that the

Commanding General leans heavily upon

the District Engineer and the forces

under his charge."

 13

Protection Against Air Raids

One of the urgent tasks after Pearl

Harbor was to quiet the fears of the

civilian population, which lived in dread

of another air raid. A great clamor

arose in Honolulu for shelters to provide at least some degree of protection.

The engineers were asked to advise what

kind of shelter would, on the whole, be

best for the population at large. This

was a question hard to answer. Since

the fear of another raid was widespread,

shelters which offered at least some protection against light bombs and machine

gun fire would have to be provided

quickly. "I would hesitate," Lyman

said, "to recommend that people stay

inside their houses no matter how well

reinforced . . . the single or double

frame walls of the residences in Honolulu

offer little or no protection from shrapnel or machine gun bullets. In addition, there is the serious danger of falling

debris or the ever present danger of

fire. . . ." Lyman recommended the

digging of trenches. Most practical

would be an excavation about 6 feet

deep and from 3 to 6 feet wide. To give

added protection against machine gun

bullets and bomb fragments, the trench

could be covered with timbers 2 inches

thick, topped with about 6 inches of

earth. A bench put in along one side

would make a stay in one of the shelters

more endurable. Simpler to construct

would be a slit trench 4 to 5 feet deep

and 20 inches wide. It would be rather

uncomfortable during a prolonged raid,

but since an attack would probably be

by carrier-borne planes, the cruising

time of which was relatively short, attacks would most likely not last long and

elaborate shelters would not be necessary. On 9 December Lyman ordered

trenches be dug on military posts, in

parks, and near schools.14

Joseph P. Poindexter, Governor of

Hawaii, requested Wyman to undertake

a "program of construction for protection of the civilian population of Honolulu."

 15

 Major stress was to be placed

on slit trenches. Emmons subsequently

12

 Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Covering Opns

During World War II, POA, pp. 828-29. 13

 Ltr, Hannum to Reybold, 15 Dec 41. 600.1

(HD) 1941-42.

14

 Ltr, Lyman to H. A. R. Austin, Consulting Engr

and Chmn of the Civilian Engrg Comte, 12 Dec 41.

Engr AGF PAC, 383. 15

 Ltr, Emmons to Dir of Civilian Defense, Territory of Hawaii . . ., n.d., sub: Civilian Defense:

Protective Measures and Evacuation. Engr AGF

PAC, 383/1.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 345

directed that they be at least two feet

wide and up to five feet deep. Insofar

as possible, they were to be dug under

trees, were to have zigzag patterns, and

were to be "well away from buildings."

As time permitted, they were to be improved by widening, trimming, and removing rocks and debris, and by

"planting the revetments with grass for

camouflage purposes." Two and onehalf feet lengthwise would be allowed

for each adult; one and one-half feet, for

each child.

The Director of Civilian Defense, assigned to the Office of the Military

Governor, shared with Wyman the responsibility for providing shelters. On

24 December the director added Lt. Col.

G. K. Larrison, CE, to his staff. With

the help of two civilian engineers, and

under Lyman's general direction,

Colonel Larrison was to help provide

protection for the people of Honolulu.

He "borrowed" two engineers from the

office of the chief engineer of the City

and County of Honolulu, and soon he

and his organization were working closely

with the district office, using materials

and workmen supplied by Wyman.

Civilians, helped by some fifty volunteers

from Hawaiian prisons, dug trenches in

parks and on the grounds of public buildings "to provide immediate protection

for the general public."

 16

Many thought more adequate protection was needed. Some urged the building of shelters to withstand heavy bombs,

or at least of shelters which were splinterproof. The latter were structures which

could withstand fragments from 500-

pound bombs exploding fifty feet away.

Required would be a concrete wall at

least fifteen inches thick. There were

few buildings in Honolulu with walls

so sturdily built that they could withstand splinters even from 100-pound

bombs. Building enough splinterproof

shelters for the inhabitants of the city

would be a considerable, even impossible, task. It was ruled that splinterproof protection was to be provided for

employees of vital industries and key

installations and for parts of the installations themselves. One of Larrison's

duties was to lay out, approve, and construct splinterproofs in Honolulu with

labor, equipment, and material furnished

by Wyman. Larrison's men built splinterproof shelters of concrete or wood.

Generally 6 feet square and 6 feet high,

they were provided with benches. If

possible, each shelter was placed to take

advantage of the protection of trees, was

at least 25 feet from other shelters, and

was topped with about 2 feet of earth

free from rock. Entrances to first-aid

stations and hospitals were protected

against shell fragments by wooden baffle

walls 2.5 feet thick, filled with earth or

sand.17

In case of dire necessity, the civilian

population of the city was to be evacuated. Governor Poindexter directed

construction of evacuation centers near

Honolulu, a job which Wyman gave to

the Hawaiian Constructors. Soon three

centers were under construction in the

Kalihi and Palolo Valleys. Structures,

16

 Memo, Larrison to Lt Col Frederick W. Herman, Asst Dept Engr, 14 Jan 42. Engr AGF PAC.

17

 (1) Ltr, Lyman to Austin, 12 Dec 41. (2) Ltr,

Emmons to Wyman, 11 Mar 42. Engr AGF PAC,

600.96. (3) Ltr, Emmons to Dir of Civilian Defense
346 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

of a temporary nature, were for the most

part long, shed-type buildings, with individual quarters for families, together

with small sheds which could be used as

one- or two-family units. The camps

would have public wash houses and latrines. Protective measures against air

raids were generally limited to Oahu.

On the other islands, the population and

the few important installations were so

well dispersed that little or nothing could

be done to give added protection.18

Camouflage

Frantic efforts were made to camouflage important installations. Before

the war, some interesting experiments

had been made in concealment, but little

effective work had been done to disguise

telltale targets. Now the aim was to

hide, insofar as possible, most, if not all,

of the conspicuous structures, both military and civilian, on Oahu. The engineers used paint extensively on large

buildings, canneries, oil tanks, piers, and

even such a prominent landmark as

famed Aloha Tower on the Honolulu

water front, covering them with bizarre

splotches of green and brown. Netting

and garlands were used to conceal

smaller targets such as ammunition

dumps and gun emplacements. Many

of Honolulu's lei sellers wove and dyed

the garlands and prepared the netting.

Two 8-inch guns at the outskirts of a

village were concealed under a dummy

house. Fake planes of wood and burlap

were placed in open fields to draw enemy

fire. To hide, at least partially, some

installations, the engineers began extensive plantings of trees and shrubbery.

They bought 250,000 seedlings from the

Territorial Board of Agriculture and

Forestry and replanted many of them on

the Punahou football field, which they

had turned into a nursery. Most of the

camouflage was of little value. Netting

hid small buildings and dumps and concealed the entrances to tunnels, but large

installations could not be disguised. No

way could be found to conceal runways.

In flying over Oahu, one could readily

recognize camouflaged buildings and airfields.19

Military Defenses

Meanwhile, work was being rushed on

strictly military defenses. To bring

about some kind of order in construction,

Emmons set up a list of priorities. At

the head of the list was the protection of

existing aircraft warning stations and the

building of additional ones. Next came

the construction of more airfields, complete with revetments, and the strengthening of coastal defenses. This was

followed by the protection of vital public

utilities, the building of shelters at the

airfields, the dispersion of supplies for

the Hawaiian Air Force, and the building of underground air depots. Of second priority were slit trenches for

military personnel and expansion of existing hospitals. Of third priority were

the construction of field fortifications, the

improvement of roads and trails, and

the erection of minimum housing for

the troops arriving from the mainland.20

18

 Ltr, Emmons to Dir of Civilian Defense . . . .

19

 (1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 629ff. (2) Gwenfread

Allen, Hawaii's War Years (Honolulu: University of

Hawaii Press, 1950), pp. 91-92. 20

 Ltrs, Emmons to subordinate commands, 25

Dec 41; 6 Mar 42. Engr AGF PAC, AG 600.12.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 347

Aircraft Warning Service

At the time of Pearl Harbor, the

permanent aircraft warning system was

not operating. Among other things,

there was a shortage of such important

parts as vacuum tubes and oscillators.

To give the troops experience in detection with radar, the Signal Corps had set

up mobile stations on a temporary basis.

By making the best use of the small

number of parts on hand, the signalmen

were able to have part of the warning

service in operation soon after Pearl

Harbor. The engineers began to splinterproof all structures at the permanent

stations. Early in January General

Emmons ordered the structures bombproofed. This meant that each site

would have to have a number of subterranean rooms with a cover of at least

forty feet of earth or rock for vital equipment and living quarters. At some of

the stations, the 100-foot-high steel tower

with its revolving antenna would have to

be moved so that it would be directly

over the chambers, and at all the stations

a vertical shaft would have to be drilled

through the rock or earth between the

tower and the rooms. The district office hurriedly redesigned the stations

while continuing work on them. When

the equipment at the high altitude stations was tested, the sites proved to be

unsatisfactory. Planes zooming in low

over the water escaped detection. After

the engineers had accomplished the difficult feat of building the cableway to the

top of Mount Kaala, the site there was

abandoned because it was too high.

When the radar equipment was installed

atop 10,000-foot-high Haleakala it was

found to be unsatisfactory for close-in

detection—there was a dead space about

thirty miles out. Another place would

have to be found. Kokee, at an elevation of 2,000 feet, was satisfactory.

Although work on the stations was progressing, it would be some time before

any of them would be operating. The

Signal Corps hoped to have the system

in working order by midyear.21

AirfieIds

Work on airfields was rushed. Within a few days after Pearl Harbor, the

engineers had cleared and repaired the

runways at Wheeler and Hickam. At

Bellows the second runway, lengthened

from 2,200 to 4,900 feet in five days, was

able to take the B-17's coming in from

the mainland. The war had reversed

the roles of the Army and Navy in the

defense of the Islands. Until 7 December, the Army had garrisoned Oahu

primarily to protect the fleet at Pearl

Harbor against attack by land. After 7

December, the Islands had to rely for

their protection mainly on land-based

planes. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who

took over from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel soon after the outbreak of war,

declared this would necessarily continue

to be the case because the fleet would

have to fight the enemy at widely separated points and could not always remain

near Hawaii. The Engineers would

have to build more airfields, and not only

on Oahu; now of vital importance was

21

 (1) George R. Thompson, Dixie R. Harris,

Pauline M. Oakes, and Dulaney Terrett, The Signal

Corps: The Test, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957). (2) Hist

Review, CE, U.S. Army, Covering Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 275ff. (3) Pearl Harbor Attack, Testimony of Col C. A. Powell, pts. 28-29, pp.

1983ff. (4) Memo, Powell for CofS Hawaiian Air

Force, 2 Jan 42. Engr AGF PAC.
348 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

the improvement of airfields on the outlying islands. Maj. Gen. Clarence L.

Tinker, commander of the Hawaiian Air

Force, was pressing for a speed-up of

work everywhere. Wyman placed all

work on airfields for which he was responsible under the Hawaiian Constructors; on 13 December, the contract

with the Territorial Airport Contractors

was terminated. Hickam and Wheeler

continued to receive special attention.

Traffic was heavy on Hickam's runways,

which had been in service for four years

and were not designed to take the new

heavy bombers and transports. Additional work was needed not only on runways but also on parking areas. Because

of the many aircraft using the field, the

runways could not be closed down for

complete reconstruction; it was decided

to repair the weak spots only, and to

apply a one-inch coat of asphaltic concrete to keep water from penetrating

through the pavement and softening the

subbase. The field was kept in full

operation. Bellows likewise had high

priority. The airmen were pressing for

completion of this field because they

wanted to move some of their units from

overcrowded Wheeler. The engineers

pushed work on a number of additional

fields on Oahu, two of exceptional importance being Kahuku on the northern

tip of the island and Mokuleia on the

north central coast. (Map 17) Three

more were planned for the central

plateau. Work was speeded up on

Morse and Hilo on Hawaii and on

Barking Sands on Kauai. Additional

fields were to be built, even including

one on small Lanai island.22

General Emmons ordered obstructions

placed on all level areas over 400 feet

long on which enemy planes could land

or take off. "Level areas" meant primarily grazing lands and fields of pineapple and sugarcane. The Hawaiian

Pineapple Company, the California Packing Company, and other firms with extensive holdings were enlisted for this

work and supplied most of the workmen

and materials. The companies were to

make every effort to block the level areas

as soon as possible, using any practicable

means at their disposal. They would be

reimbursed by the government. Lyman

chose Capt. George E. White, Jr., of the

804th Aviation Battalion, as his representative to approve and co-ordinate

plans and inspect the work. On many

of the fields, the workers erected posts at

least eight inches in diameter, stacked

boxes in piles at least five feet high, or

parked junked machinery. On some,

they dug ditches with embankments

three feet high. By mid-March all pineapple fields and 60 percent of the other

likely landing areas on Oahu had been

blocked, and many level areas on the

outlying islands had been similarly

treated. On the latter islands, major

emphasis was put on rendering all airfields useless to the enemy, except those

necessary for defense. The engineers

placed mine chambers on the runways at

Hilo airport and Upolo Field on the

22

 (1) Ltr, Wyman to Paul J. Lynch, Area Engr 5th

Field Area, 29 Dec 41. Engr AGF PAC, ND 686

Bellows, X 201 Misc. (2) Honolulu Engr Dist, Semimonthly Labor Rpt on AC Stations for Dec 16-31,

1941. Engr AGF PAC, ND 319.1 Semimonthly AC

Sta. (3) Ltr, Richardson, CG Northern Calif Sector

and VII Army Corps, to Marshall, 1 Jun 42. AAF

Central File, Misc-C-Hawaii, Apr-Oct 42. (4) Ltr,

CO Hawaiian AF Base Comd to Lyman, 8 Feb 42.

Engr AGF PAC, 686 (G).
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 349

MAP 17

island of Hawaii, but did not load them.

On Kauai they mined Burns Field and

Barking Sands.23

Coastal Defenses

Should the Hawaiian air defenses be

incapable of holding off an approaching

fleet, the Islands' next line of defense

would be the guns of the Coast Artillery.

Under Wyman's direction, the Hawaiian

Constructors worked around the clock

on all the fixed batteries along Oahu's

southern coast. Among their main jobs

were the casemating of the 16-inch guns

of Batteries Hatch and Williston and the

12-inch guns of Closson. At each gun

site, casemates, magazines, and storerooms were combined into a single structure of reinforced concrete with walls

twelve feet thick, which supported roofs

of concrete slabs, eight feet thick. On

23

 (1) Ltr, Lyman to Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd.,

20 Dec 41. Engr AGF PAC, 384.3 (2) Interstaff

Routing Slip, G-4 to Wyman, 20 Feb 42. Engr AGF

PAC, 686. (3) 2d Ind, 1st Lt Edward A. Flanders,

804th Engr Avn Bn, to Dept Engr, 19 Mar 42, basic

unknown. Engr AGF PAC, 231.4.
350 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

the east and west coasts of Oahu, workmen began to casemate the 8- and 6-inch

guns, and at numerous gun sites they

built projectile stands and powder storage chambers, replaced disintegrating

sandbags, built splinterproof plotting

rooms, camouflaged positions, built access roads, and provided adequate utilities. Where the terrain permitted, they

drove tunnels to house magazines and

operational facilities.24

Soon after Pearl Harbor the engineers

got an unlooked-for job. They were

directed to install various types of guns

which the Navy had removed from its

warships and turned over to the Army

for emplacement on land. On 15 February the Navy gave the Army 11 5-inch

gun batteries, which the Coast Artillery

wanted installed at four points on Oahu.

Next, the Navy offered the Army 12 old

7-inch guns; 2 of these were to be installed on Oahu and 2 on Kauai. The

additional armament was expected to

provide many advantages. Since practically all fixed seacoast guns had been

emplaced at or near the beaches, it was

highly desirable to have additional largecaliber guns placed well back from the

shore, preferably at an elevation high

enough to assure the batteries not being

overrun by small landing parties. Considerable ingenuity was required to plan

layouts and prepare barbettes for these

guns to ensure efficient operation on

land; plans for standard batteries proved

to be of little help.25 Lyman considered

these jobs of gun installation so important that he directed they be carried on

"day and night, seven days a week, until

they [were] completed."

 26

The biggest job was yet to come. In

mid-December Emmons' G-3 informed

Maj. Gen. Harry T. Burgin, chief of the

Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command,

that there was a good chance that some

of the big guns of the battleships and

aircraft carriers sunk or damaged at Pearl

Harbor could be salvaged and emplaced

on land. In numerous conferences,

Army and Navy authorities discussed the

practicality of the scheme. Under consideration were the 8-inch guns of the

aircraft carrier Saratoga and the 14-inch

guns of the battleships Arizona and

Pennsylvania. On 16 January General

Burgin wrote Emmons that the "Navy

authorities" believed that "two 3-gun

turrets, 14-inch, with all their appurtenances could be obtained and in all

probability a third . . . might be obtained for use by the Army."

 27

 Burgin's

staff began to investigate various sites on

Oahu where the guns might be emplaced.

Nimitz doubted that the 14-inch guns of

the Arizona and the Pennsylvania could

be easily installed on land; he thought

the turrets with their guns too heavy.

But he believed the Army could make

good use of the 8-inch guns of the Saratoga. Burgin wanted both and requested Emmons to have the engineers

make a survey to determine if they could

be moved "to locations some 300 feet up

on the ridges to the north and east of

Pearl Harbor and installed in usable

condition with magazines and ammunition servicing from below as . . .on

24

 Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 305ff. 25

 Memo, Asst Dept Engr for Wyman, 14 Dec 41.

Engr AGF PAC.

26

 Memo, Lyman for Area Engr 2d Field Area

et al., 23 Mar 42. Engr AGF PAC. 27

 Ltr, Burgin to Emmons, 16 Jan 42. Engr AGF

PAC, 472.3.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 351

battleships."

 28

 On the basis of the survey, made by Lyman on orders from

Emmons, the engineers concluded that

the transfer would be practical. The

Coast Artillery decided to take both

types. On 8 February Emmons directed

Wyman to begin work on four emplacements for the 8-inch guns, two of them at

Diamond Head and two in the pineapple

fields north of Schofield Barracks. He

considered this job extremely important;

Colonel Robinson was to give it the

"highest priority equal to flying fields,"

and the engineers were to work around

the clock on it.29 The 14-inch guns of

the Arizona and the Pennsylvania, to be

emplaced at Barber's Point and Ulupau

Head, were a different matter. It was

soon apparent that their tremendous size

and weight, their intricate construction,

and the vast number of parts would

create the most complex problems.

Months of planning and preparation

would be necessary before the job of

moving the big guns to their sites could

even begin.

Despite growing defenses, amphibious

landings by an enemy force were a

distinct possibility. In Lyman's opinion,

a most serious problem for an attacking

force was the one of providing sufficient

protective cover for the first troops to hit

the beaches. Naval guns of the attacking force would have to lift their fire just

as the landing craft were nearing shore;

the enemy would then have to use his

planes, which, to give protection, would

have to fly so low that they would be

vulnerable to the defenders' machine gun

fire. To meet such tactics, defensive

positions on Oahu, especially those on

the beaches and in the foothills close to

the shore line, were being strengthened,

principally by the construction of "heavy

overhead cover" which would "give adequate protection against enemy machine

guns and bomb and shell fragments."

 30

Little was being done or could be done

to increase antiaircraft fire. Few of the

coastal guns on Oahu were so emplaced

that they could fire on planes. The

Navy removed a few antiaircraft guns

from its ships for installation on Oahu.

Wyman took over this work in February.

Beach defenses had a large number of

machine guns emplaced in a single line

near the shore. Most were so close to

the water that it was impossible to maintain effective wire entanglements at a

reasonable distance in front of them, and,

as a consequence, penetration of the

beach line would be fairly easy. Lyman

stressed the need for organizing defenses

in depth. It was imperative that these

defenses have strongpoints so organized

that heavy fire could be placed in any

direction. In addition, the defending

forces should be kept as mobile as

possible. In the positions already organized on hilltops, machine gun emplacements in many instances were so sited

that they could deliver only plunging

fire in support of the beach defenses.

Many were poorly camouflaged. Lyman

emphasized that emplacements should

be concealed from aircraft, that beach

positions close to the water should be

moved inland and set up to deliver fire 28

 Ltr, Burgin to Emmons, 18 Jan 42. Engr AGF

PAC, 472. 29

 (1) Ltr, Emmons to Wyman, 8 Feb 42. (2)

Memo, Capt Joseph Matson, Jr., Asst Dept Engr, for

Robinson, 28 Mar 42. Both in Engr AGF PAC, 662.

30

 Ltr, Lyman to Emmons, 8 Jan 42. Engr AGF

PAC, 381.
352 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

in more than one direction, that the

silhouettes of positions should blend

with their surroundings, and that antipersonnel mines should be used extensively in the natural avenues of approach.

Work was being undertaken along all

these lines. At the same time boat

obstacles were placed off the shores of

Oahu. They consisted for the most part

of railroad and streetcar rails, many of

them pulled up from the streets of Honolulu, and driven into the coral sea bottom to form tetrahedrons submerged at

high tide.31

Mines and Demolitions

If worst came to worst, and the Hawaiian air and coastal defenses could not

halt an attacking force, mobile ground

troops would have to prevent the landings and, if unable to do so, would be

responsible for stopping or retarding the

enemy's advance across the Islands.

Preparing roads, bridges, airfields, and

buildings for demolition to slow down a

successful enemy invasion would require

considerable effort. Because of the

Islands' peculiar topography, the use of

demolitions was a complicated matter.

Normally, local commanders decided

when the charges should be set off, but in

Hawaii this would not be good practice

because the main routes of communication were limited, and the destruction of

a vital bridge during retreat, for example,

might make an effective counterattack

later on impossible. It was suggested

that in each critical area two types of

roadblock be prepared; a temporary one

strong enough to hold off an initial assault, and a permanent one requiring

demolition to be executed by the engineers as part of the over-all tactical plan

of the combat forces. Co-ordination of

major demolitions would have to be

worked out between the local commanders of the beach defenses and the combat

forces. The engineers placed various

kinds of obstacles and prepared demolitions. The 3d and 65th engineers

readied roads, highway bridges, and railway bridges, principally by drilling holes

for explosives but, except in a few cases,

they did not put the charges in place.32

Should the Japanese make a successful

landing, they would probably attempt

to advance first across the low-lying areas

and plains of the islands. There were

few natural obstacles to slow such an

advance, particularly on Oahu. The

central plateau had practically no trees,

and, in general, streams and marshes

were few. On all the islands, the defenders would have to rely heavily on

mines. On 23 December Emmons

asked the War Department for 160,000

antitank mines. While awaiting shipment, the engineers placed the few on

hand and prepared to improvise.

Howitzer shells were satisfactory substitutes but would be used only as a last

resort. The engineers improvised hand

grenades by filling bottles with gasoline

and petroleum which would ignite upon

striking a tank. Hawaii had a scorched

earth plan; it would go into effect in

whole or in part only upon orders of the

31

 (1) 1st Ind, Interstaff Routing Slip, Lyman to

CofS HD, 13 Aug 42. Engr AGF PAC. (2) Ltr, Col

Desloge Brown to C EHD, 21 Dec 60. EHD Files.

32

 (1) Ltr, Lyman to Emmons, 8 Jan 42. Engr

AGF PAC, 381. (2) Hq 65th Engr Bn, 30 Dec 41,

Rpt, Demolitions, 25th Inf Div Sector, Data and

Present Status. Engr AGF PAC.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 353

department engineer or sector commanders, as the case might be. All

demolitions and destruction were to be

total, since any supplies and equipment

falling into the hands of the enemy

would have to be regarded as lost in any

case.33

Problems of Administration

With the avalanche of work descending on the engineer troops and the

Honolulu District, it was highly important to have the most efficient type of

organization. Spheres of responsibility

were quite well defined: all work not

performed by troops under Lyman was

to be done by the Hawaiian Constructors

and their subcontractors under Wyman.

On 3 January, the Constructors' organization was enlarged with the addition of

the Hawaiian Contracting Company.

Wyman was responsible for more than

1,000 jobs, which ranged from the building of large airfields and elaborate

underground chambers for storing gasoline and ammunition to the paving of

access roads and the minor repair of

buildings. He issued job orders almost

daily. Supplemental agreements were

made with the Constructors, by which

the contract was expanded to cover most

of the work ordered after the start of the

war. Within two months the amount of

the contract rose from $15 million to

approximately $75 million. Extraordinary efforts were needed to manage such

a mushrooming construction program

successfully.

Numerous problems arose concerning

the work of the Hawaiian Constructors.

In the days of frenzied activity after

Pearl Harbor, projects had been assigned

willy-nilly, and before long no one knew

how much work the contract covered.

Wyman, Robinson, and the contractor's

representatives had many conferences in

which they tried to find some way of

arriving at a fair estimate of the sum

total of the work and its cost. Figures

prepared by the Engineering Division of

the Honolulu District office were based

on what a lump sum contractor would

probably bid on the work in peacetime,

with no allowance made for the wholly

unforeseen conditions arising from the

war. Moreover, these estimates did not

take into account the fact that work done

under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract was

often more costly than if done on a

lump-sum basis. To the estimates of

the Engineering Division, Wyman and

Robinson added 10 percent for the cost

of mobilizing and demobilizing the working forces, another 10 percent for the

expense to the contractor of maintaining

offices on the west coast and in Honolulu,

and an additional 20 percent for contingencies, including overhead costs,

which were exceptionally large because

of the many changes in the program.

Priorities were, moreover, being continuously revised, which made it necessary to move men and materials from one

project to another. Often men and

equipment had to be kept on a job with

nothing to do because supplies did not

arrive as scheduled. Meanwhile, largely

because of conditions beyond their control, the Hawaiian Constructors were be33

 (1) Ltr, Emmons to Somervell, 6 Jul 42. (2)

Interstaff Routing Slip, Lyman to G-4 HD, 2 Jan

42. Both in Engr AGF PAC. (3) Memo, Asst Dept

Engr for Engr Offs, 11 Jan 42. Engr AGF PAC,

660.3. (4) Ltr Emmons to Lyman et al., 13 Jan 42.

Engr AGF PAC.
354 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ing subjected to mounting criticism for

incompetence and inefficiency, not a little

of it coming from the contractors who

had been placed under their direction.34

Wyman had other troubles, among

them his inability to resist the demands

of many military commanders. Stating

they had verbal authorization for their

projects, the commanders insisted that

Wyman get started on the work at once.

Pressure was especially strong from the

Hawaiian Air Force, redesignated the

Seventh Air Force on 5 February. Insofar as the district engineer knew or

could determine, many of the requests

from the air force, and from others as

well, had not been officially approved by

higher authority. More confusion arose

because it was not clear what the chain

of command really was. The engineer

organization had supposedly been consolidated under Lyman; nevertheless,

Emmons gave orders directly to Wyman,

and the district engineer at times attended the department commander's

staff conferences. Inquiries from Wyman to the Office of the Chief of Engineers brought rather vague replies. On

12 January, General Reybold radioed

"Wyman is in complete charge of all

construction working directly under the

commanding general" of the Hawaiian

Department. Reybold stressed the need

for caution in accepting construction requests. He told Wyman to do "only

that construction specifically authorized

by the commanding general preferably

in writing, but in any event in definite

terms and confirmed in writing by proper

authority." But commanders in Hawaii

continued to press Wyman to get started

on their projects. His well-meaning

efforts to be helpful to everybody only

made his position more difficult.35

Supplies and Equipment

Since there was a chance that the

shipping lanes from the mainland would

be cut, the engineers had to give special

attention to supply. Stocks for the

troops, stored for the most part at Schofield and Fort Kamehameha, were dangerously low. After Pearl Harbor,

Lyman began building up his reserves,

particularly of fortifications materials.

It was not hard to find and distribute

sufficient quantities of supplies for the

few engineer units assigned to the Hawaiian Department. Dealers had quite

a few items. Lyman stored his new

acquisitions at various points on Oahu,

including the district's yards in Honolulu. Ample numbers of civilians could

be hired as clerks for sorting and distributing. Since Oahu had good roads

and excellent rail lines, transportation

was adequate. Already evident was the

lack of spare parts and of units to distribute them. Fortunately, some spare

parts could be procured in Honolulu,

and requisitions for additional items

were sent to the mainland. The 34th

Engineers organized a stopgap parts supply unit at Schofield. The lack of

maintenance units was noticeable; civil34

 (1) Ltr, Kramer to Richardson, 14 Mar 44, sub:

Contract W-414-Engr 602, Hawaiian Constructors.

(2) Memo for Rcd, Robinson, 5 May 44. Both in

Engr AGF PAC, 160 Contracts, vol. 1. (3) Ltr,

Brown to C EHD, 21 Dec 60. EHD Files.

35

 (1) Rad, Hannum to Reybold, 9 Jan 42. 600.1

Hawaii 1927-45. (2) Memo, Robins to SGS 16 Jan

42. (3) Rad, Reybold to SPD Engr, 12 Jan 42. (4)

Rad, Reybold to SPD Engr, 16 Jan 42. All in 600.1

Hawaii 1927-45.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 355

ian repair shops were called upon for

help insofar as possible.36

For Wyman and the Hawaiian Constructors, with their huge construction

program, supply was much more complex. Measures had to be taken immediately lest construction bog down. An

engineer officer, Maj. Louis J. Clatterbos,

arriving in Honolulu on 5 December,

bound for Africa by way of the Pacific,

was temporarily detained by the tide of

war. Reporting to Army headquarters

on Pearl Harbor day, he was assigned to

the Honolulu District office. He arrived at Punahou at 0900 the next morning, and Wyman made him his supply

officer. Hitherto a responsibility of the

Operations Division, supply had not

been one of the district's most important

functions; the division office in San

Francisco had taken care of most procurement. Wyman directed Clatterbos

to set up a separate supply division,

pointing out the rapid expansion that

would be necessary to meet wartime

needs. Soon requisitions to San Francisco for large amounts of supplies, especially lumber, cement, corrugated iron,

and camouflage materials, were being

prepared. Wyman was responsible for

procuring these supplies and determining the priorities in which they were to

be shipped. How much material would

actually arrive depended as much on

how many ships were available as on

anything else. Clatterbos had just

gotten started on his many tasks when

he left for Africa on 20 December.37

One of the district engineer's biggest

jobs was to find construction machinery

and allocate it to the various projects.

The plantations supplied some machinery and local contractors managed to

scrape together a few odds and ends.

These were makeshift arrangements.

It would soon be necessary to turn equipment back to the plantations so that they

could begin planting foodstuffs, and

equipment would have to be returned to

the contractors to enable them to "proceed with the large and complicated

fortifications items." Because of the

shortage of transports, great amounts of

machinery earmarked for Hawaii were

piling up on the docks at San Francisco.

All ships arriving at Honolulu were

thoroughly searched for the equipment

they might have aboard. The engineers

requisitioned any new automobiles, station wagons, and trucks they could find.

Under authority from Emmons, Wyman

directed that practically all construction

equipment which the engineers could

get hold of be turned over to the Hawaiian Constructors.38

By the end of the year a start had been

made in coping with major supply

problems. On 29 December, Wyman

sent his first order to San Francisco. It

called for 3,740,000 dollars' worth of

materials. In January, Capt. Carl H.

Trik, transferred from the Quartermaster Corps about a month before, became

chief of the Supply Division. Despite

the improvement in the outlook for

36

 (1) Ltr, Asst Dept Engr to CG HD, 3 Jan 42.

Engr AGF PAC, Engr 475.4 (Defense Reserves). (2)

Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During World

War II, POA, pp. 82off. 37

 (1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 820ff. (2) Ltr, Gorlinski,

Tr Div OCE, to Hannum, 17 Jun 42, with 2d Ind,

Asst Dept Engr HD to SPD Engr, 1 Sep 42. Copies

in Hist Review, cited (1), above, pp. 835-38. 38

 (1) Ltr, Lyman to Reybold, 17 Dec 41. 400.312

HD, 1941-43. (2) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army,

Opns During World War II, POA, p. 827.
356 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

supply, Captain Trik had numerous

difficulties. Hawaiian projects now had

an A-1-a rating, but their high priority

did not seem to expedite the sending of

cargo. Distribution was slowed because

of the poor condition of supplies when

they arrived. Manifests were often

garbled or were not received before the

arrival of a vessel, and identification tags

on boxes and crates were frequently indecipherable. Early in February Wyman set up a separate field area on Oahu

to operate the base yards, shops, gas stations, and factories which served more

than one field area. The district engineer, meantime, had been freed of a few

of his more burdensome and rather

extraneous supply chores, for shortly

after the beginning of the year the Office

of the Military Governor took over the

rationing of gasoline and construction

materials and the allocation of shipping

for civilian goods from the mainland.39

A muddle developed over equipment.

The Honolulu District had turned over

practically all the machinery it could get

to the Hawaiian Constructors. Because

equipment was so scarce, Wyman wanted

to buy a large part of the stocks of the

Hawaiian Constructors, but they were

willing to sell only if the district engineer took over everything they owned.

Since there was small chance of getting

enough machinery from the mainland,

Wyman and Robinson thought it best to

buy everything the Constructors had.

Poor pieces could be repaired or used to

repair other items. The engineers and

the Constructors were far apart as to

price. Meanwhile, spare parts shortages

were causing increasing trouble.40

Real Estate

After Pearl Harbor the acquisition of

real estate, a function transferred from

the Quartermaster Corps, was added to

Wyman's growing list of responsibilities.

The pressure of events forced the engineers to streamline procedures, particularly those for acquiring tracts for a

temporary period. Under the new

system, a military unit wishing a piece

of land sent its request to the commanding general of the major echelon concerned. If he approved, he informed

Wyman, who thereupon directed his real

estate officer to acquire property. It

took about six weeks to get legal possession. From 11 December 1941 to 16

February 1942, the Real Estate Division

of the Honolulu District processed some

200 cases, involving all types of transactions. The Army tried to take as few

residential areas or cultivated tracts as

possible. For the most part, it occupied

forest preserves, pastures, and wasteland.

It leased many hotels, offices, shops,

warehouses, and schools. In the tense

days after Pearl Harbor, numerous tracts

and buildings had to be occupied without proper authorization.41

Financial Problems

The feverish efforts to build up defenses after Pearl Harbor produced 39

 (1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 82off. (2) Ltr, Asst Dept

IG HD to Short, 7 Nov 41, with 1st Ind, Wyman to

Emmons, 19 Feb 42. Engr AGF PAC, 333 IG Rpts

(Gen).

40

 Memo for Rcd, Robinson, 5 May 44. Engr

AGF PAC, 160 Contracts, vol. 1. 41

 Ltr, 2d Lt George R. Lumsden, Asst IG HD 16

Feb 42. Engr AGF PAC, 331 IG Rpts (Gen).
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 357

growing disorder in the district's

finances. To speed up construction,

procurement of supplies in the Islands

was partially decentralized. Each of

the district's fifteen field areas was authorized to purchase at least some of its

supplies, and the Hawaiian Constructors

were permitted to buy part of what they

needed in the open market. As the

number of purchases mounted, invoices

and vouchers sent to the district office

piled up. Not enough bookkeepers

and auditors could be found for the

swelling volume of paper, and effective

control over the purchase of supplies

became impossible. Apparently the

magic words "Charge it to the District

Engineer" were sufficient to get construction supplies from local dealers, who

believed that defense required rapid

delivery to any purchaser who appeared

to be bona fide. The district's Procurement Section often did not know what

materials had been contracted for and

delivered, and it was frequently not informed when orders for materials had

been changed or canceled. Vouchers

began coming in from department engineer units, and not always for construction materials; some were for food,

lodging, or clothing, and even such

extraordinary items as "medicinal

liquors." Some supplies ordered from

dealers by telephone never reached their

destination, yet they were undoubtedly

delivered somewhere, if the more or less

undecipherable signatures on the receipted invoices meant anything. One

invoice came back with the notation

"Received by Captain Blackjack of the

Horse Marines." Much of the confusion was the result of good intentions,

of a laudable desire to cut through red

tape, to dispense with the now intolerably slow peacetime procedures, and to

get on with vital construction with the

greatest possible speed.42

A tremendous number of bills from

local merchants accumulated. Businessmen pressed the district's Finance

Section for the payment of accounts long

overdue. By March 1942 the Honolulu

District owed local merchants about $3

million, most of which had been outstanding since December. A number of

businessmen threatened to protest to

Washington, and others stated they

would make no more deliveries unless

the amounts owed them were paid and

they were given assurance that payments

for new purchases would be made within

a reasonable time.43

Mounting Difficulties

The district office was so swamped

with work that administrative procedures almost collapsed. The sudden

expansion of the organization and the

lack of clear-cut lines of authority were

largely to blame. In November 1941,

the district office had directed or supervised the work of about 3,500 civilians

and spent approximately $1,700,000 a

month. By March 1942 the number of

personnel had risen to 17,000, and expenditures to $8,000,000 a month.44

Many of the thousands of newcomers

were not well qualified for their jobs,

42

 (1) Draft Memo, 1st Lt H.E. Wilbert, Transportation Off Honolulu Engr Dist, for SupO, 6 Feb

42. Engr AGF PAC, IG Rpts (Gen) File 1. (2) Lt

Col Willard P. McCrone, The Honolulu District and

Pearl Harbor. Draft MS copy in EHD Files. 43 Alien, Hawaii's War Years, p. 282. 44

 Figures for civilian personnel include the contractors' employees.
358 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

and time-consuming efforts were necessary to train them. Lt. Col. Howard B.

Nurse, before the transfer one of the

Quartermaster Corps' top construction

men and now Wyman's executive officer,

observed that the development of "a

smooth-running, well-organized business

of that magnitude requires years in civil

life." Wyman's place in the chain of

command in the Islands remained vague,

despite his efforts to have it clarified.

Many local commanders in Hawaii continued to put pressure on him to expedite

or finish their projects. He was under

the additional handicap of being responsible for such jobs as rationing gasoline

and planting vegetable gardens—somewhat unusual functions for an engineer

district. Colonel Nurse believed that

if Wyman had not had to assume so many

extra responsibilities, he would have

been "more free to pursue the usual

functions of a district engineer."

 45

Resentment against the Honolulu District mounted. It seemed the engineers

were blamed for everything that had

gone wrong, except the disaster at Pearl

Harbor itself. Perhaps nothing caused

a greater furor than the taking over of

Punahou School. Rumors circulated

that when the engineers moved in, they

smashed the doors, broke the windows,

dumped valuable pianos on the lawn

during a rain, and unconcernedly threw

out a statue of Venus de Milo, since "it

was already broken; its arms were off."

 46

Weeks later, some workmen, while putting up a barbed-wire fence around the

school grounds, needlessly hacked down

part of a superb hedge of night-blooming

cereus which was "the pride and joy of

Punahou, and of all Honolulu." This

led to a furious outburst, particularly

from the school's alumni, many of them

prominent in the city's business and civic

affairs. "For two or three days," wrote

O. F. Shepard, the school's president, "it

seemed as if the Pacific War were a small

event in comparison to the partial

destruction of the cereus hedge."47

There were reports that after the engineers had commandeered the Pleasanton

Hotel, across the street from Punahou,

they tossed chairs and tables out of the

windows to make room for the more

comfortable furniture they had taken

from the swank Royal Hawaiian Hotel.

A prominent resident of Honolulu reported that on one Sunday afternoon he

counted thirty-five cars with district

licenses, most of them "filled with

women and children out joy riding."

 48

Driving hard to get things done, Wyman had alienated many. The inability

of the district to deal with many of its

numerous problems in a satisfactory

manner irritated most of those who had

to deal with it. Wyman's sometimes

abrupt manner further incensed the

easygoing islanders. "The District Engineer," Lyman wrote to Reybold on 14

February, "has antagonized a great many

of the local people as well as some of the

new employees and officers who have recently been assigned to this office." He

went on to say, ". . . whenever any condition arises . . . even ... if beyond

45

 Memo, Nurse for Wyman, 5 Mar 42. Engr

AGF PAC, 333 IG Rpts (Gen) vol. 1. 46

 Alien, Hawaii's War Years, p. 236.

47

 Shepard, former president of Punahou, MS, An

Account of the Early Days of World War II at

Punahou School. Hawaii War Records Depository. 48

 Memo, Nurse for Wyman, 5 Mar 42. Engr

AGF PAC, 333 IG Rpts (Gen) vol. 1.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 359

the control of the District Engineer, the

people wrathfully rise up ... against

him."49 Many engineer officers concurred in these views.50

 When an editorial favorable to the district engineer

appeared in one of the Honolulu dailies,

a reader called up the editor to find out

when the district engineer had taken the

newspaper over.51 This, Colonel Nurse

relates, "was considered the joke of the

day, and was kicked around with a great

deal of glee."

 52

 Even relations between

Lyman and Wyman became so strained

that an almost intolerable situation resulted.53

The rumors were, of course, almost

entirely unfounded. The take over of

Punahou was orderly with only a minimum of disturbance, and care was taken

to safeguard property. Some damage

was inevitable but "much . . . [could]

be forgiven," the school's president wrote,

".. . because of the emergency and of

the confusion into which everybody was

thrown." Furniture was not tossed out

of the Pleasanton, and the few items

taken from the Royal Hawaiian were

obtained in the proper manner. Nevertheless, the fact remains that many residents of Honolulu believed the stories

and some still do. In an effort to get at

the truth of the charges regarding district employees and their families out joy

riding, Colonel Nurse posted eight commissioned officers one Sunday with

orders to stop every military vehicle and

ascertain the reason for its being on the

road. Only one was spotted; its driver

was on his way to Bellows Field to make

some repairs on a bulldozer. When

Colonel Nurse reported his findings to

the "prominent resident," the latter

replied that he "was glad to hear it ...

turned on his heel, and walked off without further comment."

 54

 In the growing controversy, the valuable work being

done by the district was deliberately

ignored.

Perhaps much of the clamor could

have been avoided had an effective public relations program been instituted

early. Before the war the Honolulu

District had been a relatively small and

little-known government department;

the civilian population could not understand why, after Pearl Harbor, this particular organization had suddenly become so important with so many things

to do so fast and on such a large scale.

Many people, from lack of information,

misconstrued the intentions of the engineers. President Shepard, who had a

sympathetic attitude toward the district,

relates that he was present when Wyman

"in no uncertain terms" told Mr. Ralph

Wooley, one of the Hawaiian Constructors, an alumnus of Punahou and a

horticulture expert, to replant the destroyed part of the cereus hedge and

make sure that no further harm was done

to it. But the public was never in49

 Ltr, Lyman to Reybold, 14 Feb 42, in ch. V,

Rpt of Pearl Harbor Army Board, pp. 53-54. 100

A48-82, pt. II, Army Pearl Harbor Rpt. 50

 (1) Rpt of IG HD to CofS HD, 14 Feb 42.

Quoted in part in Ch. V, Rpt of Pearl Harbor Army

Board, p. 58. (2) Pearl Harbor Attack, Testimony

of Gen Hannum, pts. 28-29, p. 1066. 51

 Memo, Nurse for Wyman, 5 Mar 42. Rpt of

Pearl Harbor Army Board, pp. 53-54. 52

 Ltr, Nurse to C Mil Hist, 2 Jun 60. EHD

Files. 53

 Memo, Wyman for Robinson et al., 4 Mar 42.

Engr AGF PAC 333 IG Rpts (Gen) vol. 1.

54

 (1) Alien, Hawaii's War Years, p. 236. (2)

Shepard, An Account of the Early Days of World

War II at Punahou School. (3) Ltr, Nurse to C

Mil Hist, 2 Jun 60. EHD Files.
360 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

formed of this, and "the Colonel got all

the blame for the mutilation of the

hedge." On the advice of members of

his staff, Wyman eventually started a

public relations program. He hired a

writer to prepare a series of articles

setting forth the importance of the work

of the engineer district. Two appeared

in one of the Honolulu dailies, the second one along with the favorable

editorial. The public reaction was so

adverse that the project was dropped.55

Change in Organization

For some time the War Department

had been making plans to consolidate

the engineer organization in the Islands

more fully. Despite the reorganization

made on 8 December, the explanatory

letters from the Chief's Office, and

statements by General Emmons, the organization was not functioning well.

On 28 February the Secretary of War

wrote to Emmons delimiting the responsibilities of the commanding general in

Hawaii with regard to engineer work.

Emmons, as commanding general, was

completely responsible for "military

construction ... in the Department,

including administration of existing

construction contracts."56 Within the

limits set by Congressional legislation

and War Department regulations he

could transfer contracts of the department and the district to any command

he wished. It was made clear that the

district engineer was responsible to the

Chief of Engineers only for work in connection with the improvement of rivers

and harbors and flood control. All

employees and all funds, equipment,

and supplies of the district which were

not included in the last categories were

to be transferred to the department.

Henceforth, whoever was department

engineer would also be district engineer.

Emmons, empowered to set the day for

the consolidation, designated it as 15

March.57 Wyman was returned to the

United States and subsequently was

assigned to the Canol project.

Colonel Lyman became head of the

Honolulu District and at the same time

continued to serve as department engineer. For the first time district and department were under one head. Lyman

did not try to reorganize or unite the

two offices; any attempt to do so would

very likely have increased the confusion.

The great gain was that Lyman had

under him the military engineer organization in the islands and that his place

in the chain of command was abundantly clear. He would be able to advise Emmons on the best course of action

from the engineer standpoint, and as a

member of his staff would not be subject

to direct pressure from other commanders in Hawaii. Partly of native Hawaiian descent, Colonel Lyman was a

member of an old and widely known

island family; a graduate of Punahou

and of West Point, where he had been a

classmate of General Emmons, he understood well the local temperament and

made every effort to improve public

55

 (1) Shepard, An Account of the Early Days of

World War II at Punahou School. (2) Ltr, Nurse

to C Mil Hist, 2 Jun 60. EHD Files. 56

 Ltr, SW to Emmons, 28 Feb 42. Reproduced in

Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During World

War II, POA, pp. 30-32.

57

 Ltr, Lyman to Reybold, 27 Feb 42. Copy in

Rpt of Pearl Harbor Army Bd, app No. 1, p. 56.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 361

relations. Soon a marked change for

the better was noticeable. There was

no lessening in the urgency of the

situation. The Japanese continued to

enjoy naval preponderance in the Pacific and were still strong enough to

attempt an assault on Hawaii.

Strengthening of Defenses Continues

Under Lyman

Under Colonel Lyman, work continued on all engineer projects in the

Islands. After mid-March great emphasis was put on construction for the air

forces. In a conference held on the

30th of March, Emmons, Tinker, and

Lyman discussed the construction effort

still required. It was agreed that as

regards Oahu, work on Bellows was

especially urgent and that efforts would

have to be speeded up on runways and

housing at Mokuleia and Kahuku. At

Kipapa, a new field on the central plateau, where some construction had already been done, activities for the time

being would be limited to clearing cane,

building runways to minimum standards, and providing housing for 225

officers and men. Greater efforts were

needed on the airfields on the outlying

islands. There the engineers were to

remove the demolitions at Hilo and pave

two of the runways. They were to pave

the runways at Barking Sands as soon as

they could get a hot-mix asphalt plant

and transport it to the field. They

were to continue construction at Homestead on the island of Molokai, the

runways of which were to be surfaced

with Marston mat or paved with asphaltic concrete. Work on a number of

fields, including the one on small Lanai

island, was canceled because the terrain

and flying conditions were found to be

unsuitable.58

A special type of project for the air

forces was now requiring a considerable

construction effort—this was the underground bombproof shop for repairing

airplanes. The Honolulu District Office and Hawaiian Air Depot had started

preliminary studies for such a shop early

in 1941. In September General Short

had asked the War Department to authorize construction near Wheeler Field;

the War Department disapproved the

project. Later the department reversed

itself and authorized construction. General Short selected a site in a pineapple

field southwest of Wheeler. Two days

after Pearl Harbor, Wyman directed the

Hawaiian Constructors to begin work.

Since the project had the highest priority,

it was soon under way. Late in February the Seventh Air Force proposed a

different layout; Emmons approved, and

in mid-April a new directive was issued.

Plans now called for a bombproof cut

and cover shop of three floors, airconditioned throughout, with an elevator of 10-ton capacity. Diesels and

generators taken from obsolete submarines would serve as a power plant of

about 100,000-kilowatt capacity. A concrete slab roof, 10 feet thick, under a 5-

foot layer of earth was considered sufficient to withstand 1⁄2-ton bombs and at

the same time would be deep enough to

permit the growing of pineapples for

camouflage. The entrance, in a sheer

58

 (1) Memo, Emmons to Lyman, 1 Apr 42. (2)

Interstaff Routing Slip, 2d Ind, AirO Hawaiian AF

to Lyman, 25 May 42, on Ltr, Hawaiian Pineapple

Co to Lyman, 24 Mar 42. Both in Engr AGF PAC.
362 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

cliff on the west side of Waiele Gulch

and practically invisible from the air,

was to be large enough to admit B-17's.

Planes going to the repair shop would

land on a runway to be built at the bottom of Waiele Gulch or would approach

on ramps leading from Wheeler Field.59

By May construction was proceeding

satisfactorily.

By 1 June, the Hawaiian Islands were

far more secure than they had been six

months before. Airfields, coastal guns,

fortified positions, antiaircraft batteries,

offshore obstacles, underground shelters,

and an alerted defense force would make

an assault anything but easy. Lyman believed there were still certain weaknesses

in the defensive system. For one thing,

although the engineers had finished

their share of construction on 12 of the

aircraft warning stations—7 on Oahu

and the rest on the outlying islands—

none of the stations was as yet operating

on a permanent basis, a deficiency made

up to a considerable extent by the Signal

Corps' use of mobile stations. He was

also perturbed by the continued shortage

of mines. The Hawaiian Department

had requested 160,000 on 23 December,

but by June only a few thousand had

been received. In Lyman's view, large

quantities were needed because of the

few natural obstacles in the Hawaiian

chain, and because so many airfields,

close to excellent landing beaches, could

be easily overrun. Yet, despite these

minor deficiencies, the state of defenses

could, on the whole, be considered

encouraging.60

Some problems that had appeared earlier persisted under Colonel Lyman—notably shortages of equipment. Shortages

existed while large amounts of machinery

continued to pile up in San Francisco

and Los Angeles for lack of shipping.

Members of the Truman Committee,

investigating the equipment situation

late in March, came across large numbers

of items at the Albany Race Track

near Oakland that were scheduled for

shipment to the Hawaiian Constructors.61

On 28 March Col. Raymond F. Fowler,

assistant chief of engineers for supply, in

a memorandum to the Director of Procurement and Distribution, SOS, stated,

". . . every effort is being made to expedite shipment of available articles to San

Francisco within the next 30 days." He

explained that supplies and equipment

were accumulating in California because of the scarcity of transports. "All

requisitions received from Hawaii,"

Fowler stated, "have at present either

been shipped from available stocks or

placed on expedite procurement requisition."

 62

 On 1 April Colonel Hannum

reported that 57,140 tons of equipment

were on hand in Los Angeles and San

Francisco for shipment overseas. But

the shortage of ships was so great that

59

 (1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Covering Opns

During World War II, POA, pp. 501ff. (2) Memo,

Asst Dept Engr for Robinson, 9 Apr 42. Engr AGF

PAC, 600.12 (Waiele). (3) Ltr, Brown to C EHD,

21 Dec 60.

60

 (1) 1st Ind, Interstaff Routing Slip, Dept Engr

to Dept Ord Off, 11 May 42. (2) 2d Ind to Interstaff Routing Slip noted in (1), above, Dept Ord Off

to Dept Engr, 30 May 42. (3) 3d Ind to Interstaff

Routing Slip noted in (1), above, Dept Engr to Dept

Ord Off, 2 Jun 42. All in Engr AGF PAC. 61

 Ltr, Mr. Hugh A. Fulton, Chief Counsel Truman Committee, to Julius H. Amberg, Spec Asst to SW, 12 Jun 42, copy in Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army,

Opns During World War II, POA, p. 834. 62 Memo, Fowler for Dir of Proc and Dist, SOS,

28 Mar 42. 400.312 HD, 1941-43.
HAWAII AFTER PEARL HARBOR 363

the materials would probably remain on

the wharves for months.63

Efforts to Resolve Administrative

Problems

Also persistent were the difficulties of

administering the contract with the

Hawaiian Constructors. By 15 May

forty-three supplemental agreements had

been added to the original contract.

The number of projects had risen to

about 1,400. It was impossible to

amend the contract and make supplemental agreements fast enough to keep

pace with the changes and additions to

the construction program. Nevertheless, Colonel Robinson and the Constructors reached agreement as to the

over-all cost and the fixed fee as of midMay—the total estimated cost of the

work was $84,436,887; the fixed fee,

$1,014,690.64

Criticism of the Hawaiian Constructors, growing in volume during the first

months of 1942, became still louder.

Colonel Lyman chose two officers and a

civilian from the Honolulu District to

review the question of whether the

contract should be terminated. Having

made their study, two of the men believed it should be; the third thought the

interests of the government would be

better served "by continuing the contract with clearly defined lines of responsibility and with the Government performing the function of administering

and inspecting the work." All three

believed the work should not continue

under the contract unless a more efficient administration and more effective

co-operation between the contractors and

the government were achieved. A committee made up of representatives of the

Hawaiian Constructors agreed. Lyman

informed the Constructors on 9 May

that a "substantial revision" would probably, soon be made in the handling of

construction in the Islands. The contract would not be terminated, but work

thereunder would be greatly curtailed.

In view of the changes, bound to ensue,

the program of work included in the

contract and the supplemental agreements would have to be reviewed again.65

Meanwhile the district initiated action

to eliminate the confusion in finances by

hiring additional help to prepare vouchers for payment. It set up a special

"detective" section, whose job it was to

find out who had signed the vouchers

with illegible and unknown signatures;

in turn area offices set up their own special "detective" sections to help with

this work. Lyman accepted responsibility for vouchers which indicated the

goods had been delivered to military

units. Trying to find out who had received the materials was often a slow and

laborious process; as a rule, the search

began with the questioning of the clerk

or driver who had delivered the goods.

But progress was made. By May the

Finance Section was forwarding some

300 certified vouchers a day to Lt. Col.

Herbert Baldwin, finance officer of the

Hawaiian Department. Some further

delays resulted because Baldwin thought

63

 Ltr, SPD to CofEngrs, 1 Apr 42. 400.312 HD,

1941-43. 64

 Ltr, Kramer to Richardson, 14 Mar 44. Engr

AGF PAC, 160 Contracts, vol. 1, p. 6.

65

 Rpt of Bd Appointed To Consider Termination

of Fixed Fee Contract No. W-414-Eng-602, 6 May

42. Engr AGF PAC, 333 IG Rpts (Gen) vol. 1.
364 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

the evidence presented with some vouchers that materials had been delivered to

people entitled to them was not good

enough. Numerous Honolulu merchants were still of the opinion that

payments were much too slow.66

Early in June the war in the Pacific

took a crucial turn. In the first months

after Pearl Harbor, Hawaii had not been

on the list of Japanese objectives.

Japan's main concern had been to seize

southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the

Netherlands Indies, and, if possible, to

cut the lines of communications from

the United States to Australia. Having

attained most of these goals in the first

months of 1942, the Japanese prepared

to strengthen their position still further

by establishing a defense line to the east

and northeast of their home islands—

they would seize Midway and part of

the Aleutians. By occupying Midway,

Japan could extend her air coverage

eastward from that island by 1,300 miles.

Japanese planes could then sweep over

the Hawaiian chain. In June, the

Japanese successfully occupied Attu and

Kiska, but their thrust at Midway met

with disaster. In a battle between a

Japanese task force and U.S. air and

naval units northwest of Midway on 3

and 4 June, the enemy lost 4 aircraft

carriers, 1 heavy cruiser, and some 250

planes, together with 100 of his best

pilots.67 The possibility of a serious

attack on the Hawaiian Islands after that

was considered most unlikely.

66

 (1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 141-42. (2) McCrone,

Honolulu District and Pearl Harbor.

67

 (1) United States Strategic Bombing Survey

(Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, The Campaigns

of the Pacific War (Washington, 1946), pp. 58-60,

78-81. (2) Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, p. 222.
CHAPTER IX

After Midway

The Battle of Midway was followed

by an uneasy period as work on defenses

continued and base build-up was accelerated to make possible the launching of

offensives. Construction needs, despite

the Japanese defeat, were still great.

On 14 June Emmons wrote to Somervell

that $50 million more was required for

work in the Islands. Much remained to

be done on airfields; Hickam, especially,

needed a great deal of attention, since

the runways were in danger of crumbling

under the continuous, heavy traffic.

The Seventh Air Force was pressing for

the completion of additional construction—shops, warehouses, and storage for

reserve gasoline. More aircraft warning

stations were needed and considerable

effort was still required on seacoast defenses, field fortifications, and bombproof

storage for ammunition. The growing

numbers of troops called for many more

camps, warehouses, and hospitals. And

there remained innumerable minor jobs,

such as fencing critical areas, camouflaging, splinterproofing, and constructing

and maintaining utilities. All this work

required additional supplies. Some 200,-

000 tons were still needed—about 35,000

a month. The most pressing demands

were for lumber, cement, and asphalt.1

Work on Defensive Installations

Slows Down

As the weeks went by and the Army

garrison increased to 100,000, the fear

of invasion almost vanished and made

work on purely defensive installations

less urgent. Some defenses could even

be eliminated. The Navy was no longer

greatly interested in the seaplane basin

in Keehi Lagoon. The request for large

numbers of antitank mines was dropped.

By July the Hawaiian Department had

received 14,000, but there was no indication from Washington that any more

would be sent. The need for antipersonnel mines had likewise lessened.

Boat obstacles placed offshore lost most

of their effectiveness, since the action of

the waves had loosened them from their

moorings, and they were removed in

August.

The growing sense of security had an

adverse effect on those projects still

deemed important, and much of the

work progressed slowly. This was particularly true of the coastal batteries.

Headway on the 8-inch gun turrets, for

example, was far less rapid than had

been expected, and at some of the larger

batteries, also, work was considerably

behind schedule. One of the main

difficulties at the coastal batteries was

the short workday. The men had to be

taken by car or bus to the job sites, some

coming from as far as Honolulu. They

1

 Ltr, Emmons to Somervell, 14 Jun 42. 600.1

Hawaii 1927-45.
366 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

started work anywhere from 0800 to

0930, depending on the distance they

had to travel; some quit at 1500. Absenteeism was common. Shortages of

equipment, especially of power shovels,

further slowed construction.2

Construction Tailored to Hawaii's

Needs

Stress was now being placed on building up Hawaii as a base to support offensives and as a staging area to move

troops westward. From December 1941

to October 1942 alone, the number of

Army troops in the Islands rose from

42,000 to 132,000, and the archipelago

was also crowded with Navy personnel

and civilian war workers. Once again,

the engineers had to make as much use

as possible of existing facilities, and once

again, they had to revise standard theater

of operations drawings to meet local

conditions. In an important overseas

base such as Hawaii, where structures

might be needed for an indefinite period

after the war, the flimsiest possible construction consistent with safety was not

necessarily the most desirable. Where

standard theater of operations drawings

were modified, it was done to improve

and strengthen the buildings and at the

same time make as much use as possible

of local materials. In some cases the

engineers even used critical materials if

that was necessary to produce a more

adequate building. Standard drawings

prescribed earth floors for barracks and

latrines; in Hawaii, the engineers installed floors of wood or concrete. The

drawings prescribed waterborne sewage

for hospitals only; in the Islands it was

a feature of other buildings as well.

Officers' quarters had interior plumbing

and lounge space not called for in the

original designs.3

Among the greatest changes were

those made in troop housing. The first

men to arrive in the Islands had been

quartered in buildings on permanent

posts; soon all space was filled. Quarters

of the type built before Pearl Harbor

were expensive to construct and required

great amounts of now scarce materials.

Construction of the 2-story, 63-man,

mobilization-type barracks was also discontinued for still another reason. It

could not be evacuated as rapidly as a

one-story structure. During the attack

on Pearl Harbor, men had been trapped

on the upper floors in several of these

structures.4

In any case, shortages, especially of

lumber, made imperative the building

of a more economical type of barracks.

In January 1942 the district office prepared designs for "demountable buildings"—one-story prefabricated structures

that could serve as barracks, and, if

necessary, as warehouses or administration buildings. Sixteen and one-half

feet wide, these buildings, which could

be extended in multiples of ten feet,

were erected rapidly. Roofs and inside

2

 (1) Ltr, Brig Gen Robert C. Garrett, Hq to C of

Arty HD, 24 June 42. Engr AGF PAC, 662. (2)

Memo, Of of C of Hawaiian Arty for General

Burgin, 19 May 42. (3) 2d Ind, Interstaff Routing

Slip, Lyman to CA HD, 5 Jul 42. Last two in Engr

AGF PAC. (4) Ltr, Asst Dept Engr to CofEngrs.

Engr AGF PAC, 660.3.

3

 (1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 369ff. (2) 5th Ind, Interstaff Routing Slip, Kramer to G-4 HD, 2 Nov 43.

Engr AGF PAC. 4

 Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During World

War II, POA, p. 378.
AFTER MIDWAY 367

walls were made of "canec," a local wallboard, manufactured from the waste

products of sugar refineries. On all of

the Islands, large numbers of the troops

were quartered in pyramidal tents with

wooden floors.5

More warehouses were needed. Late

in March, Emmons wrote to Reybold,

". . . the expansion of the facilities to

accommodate increasing storage needs in

this Department requires that fifty . . .

T/O type warehouses be constructed."6

These fifty were in addition to the twelve

requested in a letter of 5 March. In a

number of ways, the theater of operations

type of warehouse, like most theater-type

structures, was not suitable for Hawaii.

The district office designed a new model,

from 50 to 110 feet wide, which could

be erected in variable lengths and made

the maximum use of local materials.

The trussed roof made possible a 30-foot

span, without the row of center posts

that was such an objectionable feature

of the theater of operations buildings.

Eaves were wider because the roofs of the

standard structures were too narrow to

keep out the driving rains of the Islands.

In most cases the prescribed floors of

earth were covered with asphalt or concrete. The new design also made possible more economical construction. It

required 19 percent less lumber and

cost only two-thirds as much to erect.

Originally warehouses were spaced 100

feet apart. As time passed and the

chances of bombing became negligible,

the distance was reduced to 50 feet.7

Honolulu Harbor

Before the Japanese attack the engineers were dredging Keehi Lagoon and

Kapalama Basin and had started placing

the fill for John Rodgers Airport. (Map

18) After 8 December they had the

added responsibility of constructing piers

and warehouses along the northeastern

shore of the basin, a job previously

charged to the Quartermaster Corps.

The scope of most of this work greatly

increased now that Honolulu harbor

was jammed with ships. John Rodgers

had high priority. This field, being

built in an area of marshes and old fishing ponds, required an immense amount

of fill, almost all of it taken from the

seaplane runway areas in Keehi Lagoon.

The engineers packed the coral at John

Rodgers to an average height of 8 feet

above low water level. At Kapalama,

the dredge S. G. Hindes continued work

on clearing a channel 1,500 by 1,800 feet

to a depth of 36 feet to enable oceangoing vessels to come safely to the docking area. Along the shore, construction

was under way on a host of piers, warehouses, and storage yards. The concentration of so many facilities in this small

section of northwestern Honolulu was

leading to serious overcrowding. In

August Lyman suggested that the Army

put some of its docks, warehouses, and

storage yards on nearby Sand Island, thus

providing badly needed facilities without

increasing the congestion on the already

overcrowded Honolulu waterfront.8

5

 Ibid., p. 370. 6

 Ltr, Emmons to Reybold, 26 Mar 42. Engr

AGF PAC, 633. 7

 Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During World

War II, POA, pp. 510ff.

8

 (1) Llewellyn, "Honolulu Harbor," The Military

Engineer, XXXIX (February, 1947), 52. (2) Ltr,

Secy of the Navy to CAA, 28 Aug 42. Engr AGF

PAC.
368 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 18

Ammunition Storage

Ammunition was arriving in enormous quantities. Pre-Pearl Harbor estimates of the amount of storage space

required had to be discarded. General

Emmons, fully in accord with General

Burgin's plan for dispersing ammunition, wanted storage at various places on

Oahu. Smaller facilities were to be

above the ground; large ones, underneath. After making reconnaissances,

the engineers chose Wahiawa Gulch,

about five miles northeast of Schofield

Barracks, as the best site for the first

large underground storage chamber, and

began construction in March. Further

investigation indicated that Kipapa and

Waikakalaua Gulches in central Oahu

afforded even better sites. Tunnels

driven into the almost vertical walls of

the two gorges would have entrances

invisible from the air. To keep out

bomb fragments, passageways to the

storage chambers would be dog-legged

or provided with baffles. The only

drawbacks to these sites were lava formations and cinder pockets which would
AFTER MIDWAY 369

necessitate timbering or concreting considerable portions of the chambers. By

midsummer, the construction of storage

areas above and below ground was well

along.9

Road and Highway Repair

Deterioration of the highways was

causing widespread alarm. "The main

roads of Oahu," Emmons wrote to Somervell on 14 June, "are nearly destroyed

now from heavy military traffic. These,

in addition to some new roads, must be

built." Meanwhile, the engineers were

fully occupied in their struggle to keep

the roads and trails on military reservations open. At the time of Pearl Harbor, the combat engineers, together with

the units which used the roads and trails,

were responsible for this work. The

34th Combat Regiment was busy mainly

on the southern half of Oahu; the 47th

General Service Regiment, having arrived in the Islands early in 1942, gradually took over from the 3d and 65th

Combat Battalions on northern Oahu.

Keeping roads on military posts in good

repair was the responsibility of the district. Various civilian authorities maintained arterial highways, country roads,

and the streets of Honolulu. The

civilian authorities were fighting a losing

battle. In March 1942, representatives

of civilian and military agencies held a

conference in Honolulu to work out a

plan whereby equipment and manpower

could be pooled for work on Oahu's

principal highways. It was agreed that

the civilian agencies would prepare a

program of road maintenance for the

island, and submit to the department

engineer and the Navy an estimate of the

total number of workmen and the

amount of materials and equipment

needed. Lyman and representatives of

the Navy were to determine the relative

importance of the various projects and

fix priorities of construction. The engineers and the Navy would provide the

means to carry out the work. Plans

were made, but little, if any, improvement of the public roads resulted, principally because more important jobs had

higher priority.10

A New Engineer

Lyman died suddenly of a heart attack

on 12 August, two days after his promotion to brigadier general. The next

day Emmons asked the War Department

for a suitable replacement. Col. Holland L. Robb served temporarily as

engineer while a search was made for a

permanent successor to General Lyman.

Reybold radioed Emmons that he believed Col. Hans Kramer, engineer of

the Panama Canal Department, was

"eminently qualified because of past

construction experience, including the

construction of additional locks for the

Panama Canal." Emmons requested

Kramer's transfer to Hawaii, and the

Governor of the Panama Canal agreed

to his release. Promoted to brigadier

general on 18 September, Kramer ar9

(1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 217ff. (2) Memo for Rcd,

Col W. A. Capron, HD Ord Off, 13 Jul 42. Engr

AGF PAC, D00633/179.

10

 (1) Ltr, Emmons to Somervell, 14 Jun 42, 600.1

HD 1927-45. (2) HD GO No. 87, 20 Dec 41. (3)

Memo, Lt Col Earl B. Lockridge, Asst Dept Engr, to

Lt Col Frederick W. Herman, Asst Dept Engr, 26

Mar 42. Engr AGF PAC, 611.
370 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

rived in the Islands on the 26th and

took over as department and district

engineer.11

Base Build-up Continues

Kramer soon learned that the Engineers in Hawaii were still responsible for

an extensive construction effort. The

work yet to be done on airfields, even if

of a minor nature, was of considerable

scope; in the fall of 1942, the engineers

were working on eight fields on Oahu

alone. Not the least of the many projects on Oahu was the huge 3-story subterranean airplane repair shop. A still

sizable job was the construction of the

tunnels for reserve gasoline. In Waikakalaua Gulch, nine tanks, each to hold

40,000 barrels, were nearing completion.

Enormously increased requirements for

gasoline had necessitated construction of

more tanks; storage for an additional

240,000 barrels had been approved.

Soon after arriving in the Islands,

Kramer proposed that tunnels be drilled

in Kipapa Gulch, and late in 1942 work

on the new tunnels began.

A striking feature of construction in

Hawaii was that so many installations

were being put underground. Among

the big subterranean projects, besides

the airplane repair shop and the gasoline

storage tanks, which were either under

construction or about to be started, were

the joint Army-Navy operating center

at Aliamanu Crater and the tunnels for

ammunition in Kipapa and Waikakalaua

Gulches. Many smaller installations,

also, including even the telephone exchanges, were being put underground.

These underground structures, built on

a tropical island that at times had extremely heavy rains, were most unusual;

they were "bone dry." In most tunnels

in the tropics, even without leakage

through rock faults, condensation was a

serious problem. On Oahu, because of

the remarkably low humidity (60 to 65

percent) and the small range in temperature (25 degrees) the installation of

drainage or even the drying of the air

was seldom necessary.12

Problems of Administration

Surveying the construction effort in

Hawaii, Kramer found a number of

areas where improvement was possible.

He believed many engineers gave in

too easily to commanders who wanted

to expand their projects; the result

was unnecessary construction. Numerous projects had "too many frills."

Some installations were being graced

with such features as concrete sidewalks

and curbed streets. The demand for

luxuries was widespread; requests were

even coming in for chromium-plated

coat hangers. "Engineers," Kramer

stated at a conference with his key men,

"particularly military engineers—must

be realists. . . . Refined design is not

needed for . . . most war installations.

... " In numerous instances, Kramer

11

 Ltr, Brig Gen David McCoach, Jr., Asst

CofEngrs, to G-1 SOS WD, 17 Aug 42. 210.3 HD

1940-42.

12

 (1) Ltr, Ostrand to Emmons, 9 Nov 42. Engr

AGF PAC. (2) 5th Ind, Interstaff Routing Slip,

Engr to G-4 HD, 1 Sep 42. Engr AGF PAC,

D00381.4/459. (3) 5th Ind, Interstaff Routing Slip,

Kramer to G-4 HD, 1 Oct 42. Engr AGF PAC. (4)

Col G. R. McMeekan, British Army Staff, Rpt on a

Visit as Engr Observer to Central Pacific, Aug-Sep

44. EHD Files.
AFTER MIDWAY 371

felt, the engineers were adding to the

cost by inadequate planning. For

example, with the rainy season approaching, or already under way in some

areas, buildings were going up without

access roads or with roads so poor that

the first rains washed them out entirely.

Plans for one underground shop provided for gravity drainage, but water

was being pumped out during construction, when permanent drainage could

have been installed and utilized from the

first. "Don't trust to dry weather from

now on," Kramer warned.13

The new district engineer soon had to

turn his attention to the contract with

the Hawaiian Constructors. Quite a

few changes had been made during the

preceding months. In May, Lyman had

informed the Constructors that the

amount of work would be curtailed.

Soon thereafter, the first jobs were

transferred to the government, to be

completed by hired labor, engineer

troops, or, in a few cases, by local firms

working under lump-sum contracts. By

midsummer numerous jobs had been

transferred. The canceling of some

projects, the transfer of others, and lastminute additions to still others required

a revision of the figure of $84,436,887

which the engineers and the Hawaiian

Constructors had agreed in May was a

fair estimate of the total cost of the

work up to that time. In weeks, even

months, of conferring, the two sides

could come to no agreement. A number of preliminary matters had been

settled, however. Late in August the

engineers and the contractors reached

agreement as to the extent of the cutback

in the contractor's efforts up to that time,

and early in September they arrived at

an accord on how much work was covered by the forty-three supplemental

agreements. Still to be decided was the

question of how much work the Constructors had under way or had finished

which was not included in the original

contract and the supplemental agreements.14

After Kramer arrived, the burden of

the discussions centered on how the contract should be terminated. This led

to an acrimonious wrangle. Some of

the engineers believed it should be terminated because of the fault of the contractors; Kramer's position was that

since both government and contractor

had made mistakes, termination should

be at the convenience of the government.

Ending the contract on that basis would

probably mean retaining, at least for a

time, the good will of the contractor and

his employees. Another matter of contention coming more to the fore was the

amount of the fixed fee. The Hawaiian

Constructors felt that the many supplemental agreements and the countless

changes in the work had made the fee

hitherto agreed upon entirely inadequate. Meanwhile, confusion increased

as job after job was transferred to the

government. Many of the contractors'

employees did not look forward to working for the government any more than

the government employees relished the

13

 Notes on Confs presided over by Gen Kramer,

30 Sep 42, 18 Jan, 15 Feb 43. Engr AGF PAC, 337

Confs.

14

 (1) Ltr, Kramer to Richardson, 14 Mar 44.

Engr AGF PAC, 160 Contracts, vol. 1. (2) Ltr, Lt

Col Edward H. O'Rourke, Asst IG HD, to Emmons,

24 Jul 42. Engr AGF PAC, 333 IG Rpts, loth Field

Area, File 1.
372 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

prospect of working with the contractors'

men. "Some feeling exists," Kramer

remarked, "that, by and large, every

Hawaiian Constructors' man is a

scoundrel." To make the transition as

smooth as possible, Kramer held numerous conferences attended by key engineer

employees and representatives of the

Hawaiian Constructors.15

On 31 January 1943 the contract was

terminated at the convenience of the

government. Up to that time the engineers had paid a fixed fee of $541,031.

They had bought $625,051.75 worth of

used equipment from the Hawaiian

Constructors and had paid them $124,-

105.05 for the rental and recapture of

new equipment. The debate over the

full amount of the contract and the fixed

fee continued. Two of the most vexing

problems were to determine what

changes had been made in various jobs

and how much work had been done

which had not been stipulated in the

original contract and in the supplemental agreements. Representatives of

the Hawaiian Constructors and the engineers held many meetings to iron out

differences; they were to have months of

work ahead of them.16

On the whole, the Honolulu District

seemed to be plagued by more than the

usual difficulties and inefficiencies. To

improve the work, General Kramer set

up the "Bottleneck Busting Division" in

January.17 Headed by Colonel Nurse,

the new unit had a difficult assignment.

Its major job, Kramer announced, was

"locating and removing ... all forms of

obstruction—too much or too little

labor, slackers who cheat and chisel . . .

favoritism and cliques, grievances and

jealousies, boondoggling, lack or mis-use

of equipment."

 18

 The division was to

deal at first primarily with problems on

Oahu; those on the outlying islands

would be gone into later. Insofar as

possible, the members of the division

were to make use of the technical assistance of men working on the jobs being

investigated; a small force would do

administrative and supervisory work in

the district office. Colonel Nurse's men

found the greatest inefficiencies in connection with the assignment of the workmen to the various projects. Many, improperly classified, were not doing the

jobs they were best qualified for. Some

projects had too many workers; others,

not enough. Low morale and loafing

on the job were all too common. A

number of projects were administered

haphazardly at best; at some, the workmen did not even have regular paydays.

By mid-February, about 400 "bottlenecks" had been broken—an average of

14 a day. Difficulties nevertheless continued, and complaints about inefficiency

kept coming in. A new problem arose.

Because the amount of construction required was diminishing, there was a

surplus of some types of labor. "We

have been fighting absenteeism," Kramer

told key officers and civilians of the

district as late as 10 April. "I assure 15

 Rpt of Kramer Conf, 18 Jan 43. Engr AGF

PAC. 16

 Ltr, Kramer to Richardson, 14 Mar 44. Engr

AGF PAC, 160 Contracts, vol. 1. 17

 Honolulu Engr Dist, Dist Order No. 1, 1 Jan 43.

Reproduced in Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns

During World War II, POA, pp. 1324-26.

18

 Rpt of Kramer Conf, 15 Feb 43. Engr AGF

PAC.
AFTER MIDWAY 373

you that loafing, idleness, and laxness on

the job are going to disappear."

 19

Despite two years of continuous construction, there was still a great demand

for new projects. Kramer's office made

an analysis of all requests received by the

engineers during the period from 15

February to 15 April 1943; during these

two months, 576 came in, of which 101

were disapproved. Of those approved,

most were for more troop housing, more

water, power, or sewerage facilities, especially for the Seventh Air Force, the

improvement of piers, the construction

of more warehouses, and the strengthening of fortifications. Of the projects

approved, only 14 could be regarded as

of major importance.20 There were

great numbers of requests for minor construction. "The current uninterrupted

flow of directives authorizing minor

. . . work at stations where the major

program has already been completed

... is unduly delaying the desired reduction of overhead and construction

personnel," The Adjutant General

stated in a memorandum of 2 April,

addressed to the Army as a whole.21

Another memorandum sent out on 15

April directed: "Spartan simplicity must

be observed. Nothing will be done

merely because it contributes to beauty,

convenience, comfort, or prestige."

 22

These instructions seemed especially

applicable to Hawaii. The Islands were

in a theater of operations and were considered a better than average training

area for combat troops. In camps where

the troops were to be toughened, such

comforts as electric lights, hot water, and

flush toilets were not essential. To

make matters worse, some commanders

in the Islands seemed to feel that tactical

troops should be exempt from labor

duties. The engineers held that this

belief was incorrect. Troops occupying

an area should perform such simple jobs

as clearing weeds and underbrush,

digging ditches for drainage, and doing

minor road repair. But, as in other

theaters, restricting construction to essentials was difficult. Lt. Col. W. H.

Johnson of the Supply Division, OCE,

in a memorandum of 26 May 1943 stated,

"Hawaii recently submitted a very comprehensive and bulky estimate in six

parts embracing over 400 pages and calling for a large amount of air compressors,

air diffusers, water valves, thermostats

and coils, all of which are to be used

principally in installing air conditioning

equipment." Johnson went on to say

that all these supplies were being requested despite the fact that the status

reports from the Hawaiian Department

indicated that depots were well stocked

with these items.23

Construction Progress

Much progress was made in 1943.

Work on airfields on Oahu moved ahead

steadily, and the underground airplane

repair shop was beginning to take shape.

By fall, the military outlook had improved so much that the blocking of

airfields on the outlying island was dis19

 Rpt of Kramer Conf, 10 Apr 43. Engr AGF

PAC. 20

 1st Ind, Interstaff Routing Slip, Kramer to

CG/SF, D/C, n.d. Engr AGF PAC. 21

 AG Memo No. W100-7-43, 2 Apr 43. 22

 AG Memo No. W100-10-43, 15 Apr 43.

23

 Memo for Rcd, Johnson, 26 May 43. 400.291

(HD) 43.
374 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

continued and at the same time obstacles

on grazing lands and pineapple and cane

fields on all the islands were removed.

Improvement of Honolulu harbor was

continuing. By early 1943, five new

warehouses at Kapalama Basin were almost finished, and work was well along

on two new piers. Army and Navy officials and businessmen in Honolulu had

for years stressed the need for a second

harbor entrance; now something was being done about it. In February the

engineers began to clear "underwater

obstacles for a second entrance across

Keehi Lagoon to Kapalama Basin; at the

same time they prepared plans for piers

and warehouses to be built on Sand

Island. Although the Navy was no

longer greatly interested in the seaplane

runways in Keehi Lagoon, dredging continued mainly as a quarrying operation

to provide coral for John Rodgers Airport. The engineers provided more

camps, staging areas, and rest and recreation centers; in midyear, they started

work on a number of general, field, and

evacuation hospitals, and began surveys

for a huge new structure to replace

Tripler General Hospital, located northwest of Honolulu. At the same time,

some of the schools taken over for hospitals were being returned to the civilian

authorities. Still two of the most unusual projects were the drilling of tunnels

in Kipapa Gulch for the storage of reserve gasoline and the emplacement of

the big naval guns. The tunnels consisted of four parallel, cylindrical excavations, 938 feet long and 22 feet in diameter, with a cover of 200 feet of solid

rock. They were being lined with steel

plate. Insofar as the engineers in Hawaii could determine, these were the

first steel-lined tunnels for storing gasoline ever constructed. Final locations

for the big guns were selected by April.

The Navy, making good progress in

salvaging the turrets, had them ashore

by midyear; installing the batteries

proved to be even more complicated than

earlier engineer estimates had indicated.

Detailed plans for the design and assembly of of naval turrets on land were

nonexistent. Kramer set up a warehouse near Pearl City to store the hundreds of small parts which were salvaged

or newly fabricated, and Emmons appointed a board of four officers, including an engineer, to expedite the work

of emplacement. One project on which

no progress was made was the repair of

disintegrating roads and highways.

Army commanders were inclined to feel

it was the responsibility of local civilian

officials to maintain and repair roads and

streets, particularly since local tax revenues had increased enormously during

the war, with much of the additional

money coming from the armed services.

The civilian authorities did not agree,

and a workable program of road improvement was not initiated. On the

whole, by late 1943, much of the major

construction in the islands had been

completed. The new work the engineers received was mainly for additional

facilities at some of the airfields.24

24

 (1) Ltr, Maj Edward A. Flanders, CO 804 Engr

Avn Bn, to Richardson, 5 Oct 43, with 1st Ind, G-3

HD to Engr HD, 11 Oct 43. Engr AGF PAC, 661.

(2) Kramer to Emmons, 1 Feb 43, Rpt, Comprehensive Study of Honolulu Harbor and Vicinity, Including Kapalama Basin, Keehi Lagoon, and Sand

Island. Engr AGF PAC. (3) Hist Review, CE, U.S.

Army, Opns During World War II, POA, pp. 173ff.

(4) Draft of Ltr, Kramer to Reybold n.d. Engr

AGF PAC. (5) Ltr, Lt Col O. M. McDale, Asst AG
AFTER MIDWAY 375

Supply

The supply system was working satisfactorily after mid-1942. During the remainder of that year, stocks were, as a

rule, arriving from the mainland in

ample amounts and in excellent condition. Only occasionally were they

poorly packed or improperly labeled.

If an item was in short supply, local

merchants could often furnish it; this

was generally true with regard to fortifications materials. Shortages remained

in lumber and in parts needed for the

tanks for reserve gasoline storage. Machinery was fairly plentiful.25

 "The

largest part of the equipment ordered

and required is now on hand," Emmons

had written to Somervell on 14 June

1942. "Some additional items have

been ordered. The tonnage involved is

not appreciable."

 26

Spare parts were scarce in 1942.

None of the stocks requisitioned from

the mainland arrived that year; most of

those on hand came from local sources.

Parts supply units were lacking. Arriving three months after the attack on

Pearl Harbor, the 1st platoon of the

452d Depot Company had taken over

spare parts supply from the 34th Engineers, but the platoon was not much

better trained than its predecessor in

the work of stocking and distributing

parts. There were no maintenance

units, but this was not so serious a matter

because local mechanics were available

for servicing machinery.27

In 1943 stocks of materials, equipment, and spare parts constantly increased as requisitions sent to the

mainland were being filled and shiploads

of items reached Honolulu. With construction tapering off late that year,

supplies were no longer so urgently

needed and the amounts on hand were

adequate in most respects. Stocks of

equipment were sufficient. Even spare

parts became fairly plentiful. The first

shipments ordered from the mainland

had begun to arrive in January 1943, and

by April fairly large quantities were

coming in. As before, local firms manufactured some parts and reconditioned

others. As in other theaters, principal

shortcomings in supply were the lack of

a continuous inventory and the absence

of over-all stock control. Steps were

taken to improve matters. Early in

1943 the 452d Depot platoon was expanded into a company, and one of its

platoons was assigned to the spare parts

section of the engineer depot. Progress

was slow. A representative of the Engineer Spare Parts Depot in Columbus,

Ohio, inspecting spare parts supply in

Hawaii in January 1944, commented on

the need for better organization and

stock control.28 So far, there had been

no great pressure on engineer supply in

Hawaii. The coming offensive would

undoubtedly change this unusual state

of affairs. "Hawaii has been on the re- HD ceiving end for some time," Somervell , to Comdt, 14th Naval Dist, 18 Apr 43. Engr

AGF PAC, PLA-Engr 662. (6) Ltr, Richardson to

Hon Ingram M. Stainback, Governor of Hawaii, n.d. Engr AGF PAC, 611. 25

 Col Brendan A. Burns, Dep Dept Engr, G-4

Periodic Rpt, 5 Nov 42. Engr AGF PAC, Engr 400. 26

 Ltr, Emmons to Somervell, 14 Jun 42. 600.1

Hawaii 1927-45.

27

 Hist of the 452d Engr Depot Co. 28

 (1) 1st Ind, Interoffice Memorandum Slip, Engr

Depot to Dept Engr, 8 Jul 43. (2) Ltr, Maj Howard H. Dougherty to C Parts Sup Sec Engr Field

Maint Off, Columbus, Ohio. Both in AGF PAC.
376 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

wrote to General Marshall from Hawaii

in September. "It must now reorient

its thinking and its organization to be

on the sending end of the performance."

 29

Meanwhile, the engineers were trying

to straighten out their accounts and pay

what they owed for supplies they had

received from local merchants. As old

bills were paid off, new ones kept coming

in. At the end of 1943 payment of

$1,000,000 was held up because the district contracting officer and the finance

officer could not agree on the validity of

numerous vouchers. Because payments

were so slow, the engineers were still not

popular with many of the local businessmen.30

Maps

Since the Central Pacific was not involved in combat during 1942 and the

first months of 1943, the engineers had

to devote only a minimum effort to preparing maps. The department engineer was responsible for supplying maps

to the troops; needs were in large part

met by the Hawaiian Department Reproduction Plant, operating under the

department engineer's command.

Draftsmen periodically revised the topographic maps of the United States Coast

and Geodetic Survey and printed the

revised versions needed for military purposes. Before the war, Lyman had

maintained his small stock of maps, together with hydrographic charts, in

concrete vaults at Fort Shafter. The

64th Topographic Company, arriving

late in 1942, was the only mapping unit

in the Islands. With little to do, part

of the men were sent out to make surveys

of tracts of land the War Department

had acquired or was interested in.31

This easygoing state of affairs changed

in mid-1943. The 64th engineers,

henceforth working under "war" conditions, had to prepare maps of Japaneseheld islands from photographs supplied

by Army or Navy fliers. The men had

had little or no experience in preparing

such things as "beachstrip mosaics" or in

using indifferent photography, obtained

by aircraft in spite of bad weather and

enemy opposition, but they secured the

needed equipment and began work. In

1943 Navy fliers, taking off from carriers

west of Hawaii, provided a constantly

growing number of photographs for the

64th to work with. The unit co-operated closely with other Army and Navy

elements in Hawaii interested in map

production and the gathering of intelligence, such as the Seventh Air Force,

the Intelligence Center, POA, and the

reproduction plant of the engineer department. Soon the men were able to

produce on short notice the maps expected of them. The 64th engineers, in

addition, made maps and did drafting

for the Navy. By late 1943, their work

load had increased so much that more

men were needed, especially those skilled

in drafting, photomapping, and reproduction. Also needed was more equipment for interpreting data supplied by

aerial reconnaissance. Best suited for

29

 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 12 Sep 43. OPD

384 PTO sec. 111, Cases 57-89. 30

 Alien, Hawaii's War Years, pp. 282-83.

31

 (1) Memo, Brown for Robb, 17 Jun 42. Engr

AGF PAC, 600.92. (2) Memo, Maj John H. Donoghue, Asst Dept Engr, to Kramer, 21 Oct 42. Engr

AGF PAC, 061.
AFTER MIDWAY 377

the Central Pacific was a GHQ topographic battalion, less one company.

The plan was to expand the 64th into

such a unit in 1944.32

Training

In the rush to complete construction

after Pearl Harbor, the engineers had to

neglect training. As a rule, the men

learned by doing—by going out and

building runways, warehouses, roads,

fortifications, and obstacles. From time

to time, the combat engineers participated in maneuvers designed to test

various aspects of the defense plans.

The coming offensives forced the engineers to emphasize training as never

before. It was especially important to

prepare the men for combat. Soon

after arriving in Hawaii, Kramer stressed

the need for something better than the

sketchy instruction being given. He believed, for example, that more training

in removing mines was necessary and

that qualified instructors—men who had

had actual experience in removing

enemy mines in a combat zone—should

teach the troops. Despite the increased

emphasis on training, inadequacies persisted. In March 1943 the Inspector

General reported that there was still insufficient stress on preparing troops for

combat. The difficulty was that commanders were expected to get the work

done and train the troops at the same

time. In the fall of 1943, engineer

training was stepped up. The troops

received more training in small arms

fire. Some men were given instruction

in laying Marston mat, and specialists

were trained in using flame throwers.

A school was started to provide instruction in operating water stills. A major

drawback in the Hawaiian Islands was

the absence of sizable rivers. Little

could be done to give the combat engineers adequate training in putting up

ponton bridges and in using expedients

for crossing streams. In any event,

Kramer wanted all units that were

alerted for movement to the combat

zones to get at least some "catch-as-catchcan training."

 33

Plans for the Offensive

Early in 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff

began to make plans for an offensive in

the Central Pacific to start later that year.

At the TRIDENT Conference in Washington in May, they obtained British

agreement to a drive from Hawaii to

Japan that would begin with the capture

of the Gilbert Islands, to be followed by

the seizure of the Marshalls. These assaults were to have a higher priority than

any possibly conflicting operations in the

South or Southwest Pacific. On 1 June

Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., replaced Emmons as commander of the

Hawaiian Department. On 14 August

General Richardson became the head of

the newly activated United States Army

Forces in the Central Pacific Area

(USAFICPA). He chose Kramer as his

engineer. On 1 September Kramer

merged the department and district organizations into the Engineer Office,

32

 Ltr, Kramer to Loper, 26 Sep 43. Engr AGF

PAC, 061.

33 (1) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Opns During

World War II, POA, pp. 819Dff. (2) Kramer Conf,

6 Mar, and various confs in Jun, Aug, and Sep, 1943.
378 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Central Pacific Area, but the two components continued to have their separate

functions. Kramer appointed two deputies—Lt. Col. Desloge Brown, to supervise the activities of the department, and

Col. Benjamin R. Wimer, those of the

district.34

For the coming offensives, Admiral

Nimitz set up a joint Army-Navy staff to

replace the Joint Logistical Board,

POA, which had heretofore resolved

supply problems pertaining to both services. The new Joint Staff, POA, directly under Nimitz, had four divisions.

Two of them, J-1 and J-3, were headed

by Navy officers, and two, J-2 and J-4,

by Army engineers. J-2 was under Col.

Joseph J. Twitty. He established close

contact with Kramer's office with regard

to engineer intelligence and mapping.

J-4 was headed by Brig. Gen. Edmond

H. Leavey, who for many years had

worked under Somervell as one of his

most capable assistants. In 1943, while

Leavey was serving in the Mediterranean

Theater, Somervell recommended him

for the important assignment on Nimitz'

staff. There had been some feeling

among high ranking Navy officers, among

them Admiral King, over having Army

men on Nimitz' staff. Somervell, visiting Hawaii during his tour of the Pacific

areas in the fall of 1943, reported to

Marshall that Leavey's arrival in Hawaii

had been "more or less of a bombshell."

But owing to his "outstanding capabilities" he had been "well received."

Harmony had apparently been established, since Leavey was living in Navy

quarters with the other three members

of the Joint Staff. Somervell expected

that Leavey would "secure the proper

arrangements in the logistics field"

through his "tact and downright

capacity."

 35

One of the shortcomings of the Joint

Logistical Board had been that it did not

provide sufficient over-all direction and

co-ordination in Army and Navy planning for construction and supply at new

bases. The board merely co-ordinated

plans already prepared independently by

the services. Thus, in advance of each

operation, Army and Navy would arrive

at a formal agreement as to which facilities and what supplies each would provide for its own use and which each

would provide for joint use. Difficulties

arose in co-ordinating Army and Navy

plans already prepared, especially to prevent unnecessary duplication of such

facilities as hospitals, post exchanges, and

communications systems. At times,

Army and Navy disagreed considerably

on how joint supply should be handled.

Since the operations so far undertaken

had involved the occupation of small

islands with no enemy resistance, the

difficulties had not been insurmountable.

As planning began for more extensive

operations, the problems of co-ordination loomed larger.36

The Joint Staff, patterned after the

concept of the Army General Staff, modi34

 (1) U.S. Army Forces, Mid Pac and Predecessor

Comds, MS, vol. 3, pp. 360ff., pp. 427ff. OCMH

Files. (2) Kramer Conf, 18 Sep 43.

35

 (1) Ltr, Kramer to Loper, 26 Sep 43. Engr

AGF PAC, 061. (2) McMeekan, Rpt on Visit as

Engr Observer to Central Pac, Aug-Sep 44. (3)

Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 12 Sep 43. OPD

384 PTO sec. III Cases 57-89. (4) Min, Staff Conf

ASF, 6 Nov 43. Staff Conf, ASF, 337. 36

 Min Staff Conf, ASF, 6 Nov 43. Staff Conf,

ASF, 337. (2) Ltr, Leavey to C EHD, 21 Jun 61.

EHD Files.
AFTER MIDWAY 379

fied to meet conditions in the theater,

provided greater over-all direction and

co-ordination. In accordance with directives from Admiral Nimitz, it was to

prepare a master plan for each operation

in advance. J-3 developed the over-all

operational plan; J-4 worked out a detailed logistics plan. Both plans were

co-ordinated and then discussed with the

senior staffs of the various service commands in Hawaii and, if necessary,

altered to meet available means. Meanwhile, the Joint Staff prepared the final

command directives, which it discussed

informally with the staff members of the

task force scheduled to conduct the

operation. These directives set forth

responsibilities for construction and

supply, allocated shipping space, and

established shipping priorities. Upon

receiving their formal directives, task

force commanders completed the details

of their plans and set out to obtain such

additional men and supplies as they

needed. Major Army and Navy administrative commands screened requests

from task force commanders and computed over-all space and tonnage requirements, which they forwarded to the Joint

Staff for final review. Insofar as the

Engineers were concerned, the new system not only eliminated some unnecessary duplication in construction and

supply, but also centralized responsibility for construction. Each new base

would have one engineer, either Army

or Navy, directly responsible to the base

commander for all construction.37

One of the most important responsibilities of the Joint Staff was the shipping

of supplies in the proper priorities.

Leavey's section had the main responsibility for fixing priorities. Having a

representative of the Army in this important job would, Somervell believed,

result in better conditions than in the

South Pacific, where the Army was at a

disadvantage because it was completely

dependent on the Navy for getting its

supplies sent forward. One of the aims

of the staff was to work toward "direct

loading" from San Francisco, that is,

sending supplies straight to the islands

where they were to be used, which would

mean bypassing Hawaii.38

The new procedures had to be developed gradually. Since campaign plans

were formulated some time in advance,

those already prepared had to be brought

under the new system in somewhat piecemeal fashion and co-ordinated as quickly

as possible. When the Joint Staff took

over on 6 September 1943, planning for

the assault on the Gilberts was already so

far along that little could be done to

revise arrangements already made.

Little could have been done in any case,

since the Joint Staff had to spend many

weeks in assembling personnel to take

care of its multitudinous duties. The

staff had to be set up on an experimental

basis, since there was no headquarters

organization which might have been

used as a model. Leavey estimated that

85 officers and 120 enlisted men were

needed for J-4 alone; as the war progressed, this estimate proved to be too

low. Men began arriving in fairly adequate numbers in the fall of 1943 and

37

 (1) Ltr, Leavey to C EHD, 21 Jun 61. EHD

Files. (2) Memo, M. W. Marston for Richardson,

11 Sep 43. OPD 384 PTO sec. III Cases 57-89.

38

 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 12 Sep 43, OPD

384 PTO sec. III Cases 57-89.
380 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

set to work to make the new procedures

more effective for operations scheduled

to take place after the capture of the

Gilberts.39

By the fall of 1943 the Central Pacific

was ready to launch its first offensives.

Hawaii had been converted into a powerful base. The fleet, having overcome

the setback it received in the Pearl

Harbor debacle, was prepared to strike.

The Army was also ready. By 1 October

the number of troops in Hawaii numbered 165,423, with the engineers totaling 10,626. Ample and well-trained

manpower was on hand to seize some of

the Japanese-held islands in the Central

Pacific.

First Offensives in the

Central Pacific

Baker Island

The offensive got under way in late

1943. The Gilbert Islands, the first objective, were about 2,500 miles southwest

of Hawaii; in Allied hands they would

provide sites for bases to support operations farther west and would strengthen

the lines of communications from Hawaii

to the Southwest Pacific. Before the

Gilberts could be attacked, certain preliminary operations were necessary. In

August, Nimitz ordered the occupation

of three small islands east and southeast

of the Gilberts and the building of airfields on them. They were Nukufetau

and Nanomea in the Ellice chain, and

Baker, a lone islet some 500 miles east

of the Gilberts. Marines and naval construction battalions were sent to Nukufetau and Nanomea. An Army task

force was to go to Baker, garrison the

island, and build an airfield. The 804th

Aviation Battalion, commanded by Maj.

Edward A. Flanders, had the job of

construction.

On the morning of 1 September, the

task force reached its destination. The

island, one mile long and almost a mile

wide, was rimmed by a narrow beach

behind which the coral rose to a height of

about twenty feet. The sand on the

beaches was so deep that no equipment

except bulldozers could move forward.

Men of the 804th dozed roads across the

landing beaches, laid down Sommerfeld

mat, and cut roadways through the

island's rim to the central plateau. A

reconnaissance party, making a survey

the morning of the landing, found the

center of the island was a dry basin.

The runway site which had been selected was not the best, and a new center

line was run so that a longer strip could

be built. Grading began shortly after

noon. Seven days later it was complete

and 3,000 feet of Marston mat was in

place. The runway was adequate for

fighters, and soon an Army fighter

squadron moved in. Bombers taking

off from this field could reach the

western Marshalls, a feat hitherto impossible from any Allied base.40

39

 (1) Ltr, Leavey to C EHD, 21 Jun 61. EHD

Files. (2) Memo, Brig Gen John E. Hull, Actg

ACofS for G-1 and G-3, 22 Dec 43. OPD 384 PTO

sec. III Cases 57-89.

40

 (1) Philip A. Growl and Edmund G. Love,

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,

1955). PP. 52-53. (2) Ltr, Lt Col George E. White, Jr, to CG CPA, sub: Outline Rpt on Ldg and Cons

Opns at Baker Island. EHD Files. (3) Participation of USAFICPA in GALVANIC Opn, p. 145. 98-

USF3-03(23507). (4) Final Close-out Rpt on Baker.

98-BC4-0.1 (19840) Master.
AFTER MIDWAY 381

Makin

Three of the Gilbert islands were to

be captured—Tarawa and Apamama by

the Marines, and Makin by the Army.

Makin was one of the northernmost

atolls in the island chain. The 165th

Regimental Combat Team of the 27th

Infantry Division was selected for the

assault; Company C and part of Headquarters Company of the division's 102d

Engineer Combat Battalion were to go

in with the infantry. The planners in

Hawaii concluded that large numbers of

service engineers would be needed during the assault phase; they therefore gave

the 152d Combat Battalion the job of

unloading supplies and equipment.

To defend the bases to be built on the

islands seized from the Japanese, General

Richardson organized a new type of unit,

the defense battalion, patterned after a

similar kind of organization in the

Marine Corps. Engineer service units

and Seabees would be responsible for

building bases and, together with the

defense battalions, would constitute the

"garrison forces" of the islands. Some

of the islands would have garrison forces

composed solely of Marine and Navy

units; others, entirely of Army units;

still others of all three. An Army or

Navy officer would serve as island commander. If both Army and Navy units

were used, care would have to be taken

to prevent duplication of functions and

organization; as already indicated, each

island commander would have one staff

engineer.

Elements of the 34th Combat and 47th

General Service Regiments, both of

which had seen long service in the Hawaiian Islands, were scheduled to serve

in the first garrison forces being organized. Any island worth taking in the

Central Pacific would probably already

have an enemy-built airfield which could

be rehabilitated. If none existed, one

would have to be built. In that case,

aviation engineers would be assigned to

the garrison force until the field was

finished, whereupon they would return

to Hawaii. All other construction

would be the responsibility of the 34th

or 47th Engineers. If an airfield already

existed, the 34th or 47th Engineers would

rehabilitate it, build fortifications, erect

housing, and operate and maintain utilities. Two companies of the 47th and

the entire 804th Aviation Battalion were

assigned to the Makin operation; the

service engineers totaled 1,169 in a garrison force of some 4,000 men.41

The engineers did detailed planning

for assault and construction. Planners

in major theater headquarters and on the

newly organized staff of Col. Clesen H.

Tenney, garrison force commander,

made estimates of the amount of construction needed. Kramer's staff reviewed the requests, and prepared a plan

for base development which listed in

detail all the construction the engineers

would do. Estimates were then made

of the amount of supplies required, and

detailed lists of materials needed during

the first ninety days were prepared.

Supplies earmarked for the operation

were to be shipped in three priorities.

The 64th Topographic Company fur41

 (1) Participation of USAFICPA in GALVANIC

Opn, pp. 16-18, 45ff. (2) Memo, Marston for Richardson, 11 Sep 43. OPD 384 PTO sec. III, Cases

57-89.
382 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 19

nished about 100,000 copies of maps

prepared from aerial photographs.42

The task force reached Makin atoll on

20 November. The troops were scheduled to land on narrow, heavily wooded,

9-mile-long Butaritari Island, on the

southeastern side of Makin's triangularshaped lagoon. (Map 19) The men

came ashore at two points: on the western end of the island and on the lagoon

side. Each of the three platoons of

Company C, load, went in with its battalion landing team, an engineer squad

equipped with bangalore torpedoes going ashore with the first wave to remove

obstacles which might impede the landing. Enemy opposition was light, and

both beaches were clear of obstructions.

As soon as the beachheads were established, the 152d engineers began unloading supplies, each company supporting

one battalion landing team. The men

did not have an easy time of it. The

beaches at the western end of the island

were rocky; and on the lagoon side the

landing craft grounded in shallow water

600 feet from shore, forcing the troops

to reload supplies on Alligators and

Buffaloes. Two of the objectives of the

infantry landing on the lagoon side were

King's Wharf on the east and On

Chong's Wharf, on the west. The first

fell without a fight; the second, taken

after a brief struggle, was heavily damaged. The engineers soon had the former in operating condition, and by the

second day, all shore parties of the 152d

were busy at this pier unloading LST's,

soon helped by the 804th engineers, part

of whom landed that day.43

Aerial photographs indicated that almost all defenses were between two tank

barriers which extended across the island,

one of them about a half mile west of the

lagoon landing area and the other about

a mile to the east of it. At both the

Japanese had dug moats and placed coconut logs in the ground to stop tanks. A

most important task of the landing forces

was to capture the defenses between the

barriers. The troops advancing inland

from the west end of the island continued

42

 Participation of USAFICPA in GALVANIC Opn,

pp. 50ff. 43

 (1) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and

Marshalls, pp. 75ff. (2) Col Brendan A. Burns,

Makin Task Force Engr, 20 Dec 43, Rpt and Recommendations, Makin Task Force Engr. Engr AGF

PAC.
AFTER MIDWAY 383

to meet light resistance. Those coming

ashore at the lagoon pushed across the

island and then veered to the east and

west. Here too opposition was unexpectedly light. Only a few defense

works—antitank gun positions, machine

gun emplacements, pillboxes, and air

raid shelters—were encountered. The

infantry bypassed the strongest of these,

leaving a few riflemen to cover them.

The 102d engineers then moved up and

demolished them with explosives.44

Some of the troops moving westward

from the lagoon area were stopped by a

concrete shelter, about thirty feet long.

It had blastproof entrances at either end.

When the men tried to reduce the obstacle by tossing in hand grenades, the

occupants threw them out again. A tank

moved up, firing 75-mm. shells, but without effect. A new maneuver was tried.

The tank, followed by 2 infantrymen

with automatic rifles and 4 engineers, 2

with rifles and 2 carrying a flame thrower

and pole charges, moved up slowly to one

of the entrances and stopped within a

few feet of it. While the riflemen covered the opening, the 2 engineers with

flame thrower and pole charges crept

toward the shelter. The flame thrower,

still wet from the landing, failed to

function. One of the men, taking about

a minute, placed a pole charge with a

15-second fuze attached just inside the

entrance. The group scrambled for

cover. The explosion killed the occupants.45

The infantry advancing eastward from

the lagoon landing area ran into the

island's most strongly fortified area; it

consisted of a system of pillboxes and

shelters, a number of them connected by

passageways, some underground and

some above ground. Shelters and tunnels had a covering of logs and earth up

to six feet thick. One tunnel, some 100

feet long, had machine gun emplacements at both ends; various wellconcealed openings were just large

enough for a man to squeeze through.

Nearby taro pits served as moats, and

kept tanks from approaching. Artillery,

bazookas, and hand grenades were

largely ineffective, and the flame throwers

on hand were too wet to be of value.

The infantry commander directed the

engineers to reduce the obstacle. They

dropped TNT charges into the machine

gun positions at both ends; when the

Japanese emerged from the openings

with bayonets drawn, they were shot

down. Having been delayed about four

hours, the advance eastward was resumed.

On the third day the east tank barrier

was taken without opposition; the west

tank barrier had been taken the day

before. Makin was in American hands.

The island was captured easily—in contrast to the bloody battle the marines

were waging on Tarawa.46

On the fourth day, the 804th Aviation

Battalion began work on the airfield.

Plans called for a fighter runway, surfaced with Marston mat, to be extended

eventually for bombers; if possible, a 44

 (1) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and

Marshalls, pp. 70-72. (2) Lt Col S. L. A. Marshall,

Hist Br G-2 27th Div, Notes on Makin Opn (20-25

Nov 43), p. 182. OCMH Files. 45

 (1) Marshall, Notes on the Makin Opn (20-25

Nov 43), pp. 180-81. (2) Crowl and Love, Seizure of

the Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 91-93.

46

 (1) Makin Opn, 2-3.7A AFA, MA (Notes).

OCMH. (2) Marshall, Notes on the Makin Opn

(20-25 Nov 43), pp. 101-03. (3) Crowl and Love,

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 99-100.
384 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

KING'S WHARF, BUTARITARI ISLAND, MAKIN ATOLL

second runway was to be built. Making

a reconnaissance of the site, the engineers found that a large swamp covered

part of the area, making rapid construction impossible. Nevertheless, the

men began work, since there was little

chance of having the plans altered without undue delay. When a D-8 dozer

almost immediately bogged down in the

marshy ground along the center line,

work was stopped. A reconnaissance

group which had just finished a detailed

survey reported that the swamp extended

for about half a mile. The engineers

ran another center line and began clearing anew. The only complication was

a series of taro pits. The men assembled

a large amount of equipment, borrowing

light and heavy dozers from the infantry,

tractors from the artillery, and equipment from service units of the garrison

force. Soon the work was proceeding

systematically. A D-8 with one push

would topple a coconut tree; a second

push freed the root mass from the

ground; a tractor then towed the tree

away. The men removed about a foot

of top soil. Underneath was wellcompacted sand with a considerable

amount of silt. Clean coral from the

lagoon was used for surfacing. By 10

December the runway, surfaced with

Marston mat, together with a parallel

coral taxiway, was operational. The
AFTER MIDWAY 385

first fighter planes arrived four days

later. The aviation engineers were well

on the way toward completion of their

first combat mission in the Central

Pacific.47

Coral

Makin was one of the many coral atolls

the engineers would encounter on the

road to Tokyo. From now on, the littleknown islets of the Central Pacific were

to acquire a tremendous significance.

They were the steppingstones, the "stationary aircraft carriers" on the way to

Japan. For the constructing engineers

they were almost ideal "aircraft carriers"

because they furnished a valuable, and

up to this time little-known, construction

material—coral. The great quantities

of this material, so readily accessible,

would make possible the rapid construction of runways and roads. Coral had

long been used in some tropical countries

for construction, but little was known in

the United States regarding its use before

the outbreak of World War II. The

Engineers had had little information regarding either coral islands or construction with coral. They had learned from

experience on Canton and Christmas

and on the islands of the South Pacific,

and they collected additional data. The

studies made yielded much information

not only about construction with coral

but also about the formation and structure of coral atolls, information of vital

importance in preparing and making

amphibious assaults.48

Coral, made up of the skeletons of

minute spherical animals, was chemically

similar to limestone. About one-eighth

of an inch in diameter, the animals could

live only in tropical or subtropical

waters. Most species grew only in salt

water. They flourished best if the salt

content was between 2.7 and 3.8 percent

and the depth of the water less than 150

feet, with temperatures ranging from

66° to 100°F. Coral fed on plankton

washed toward them by the waves and

currents of the ocean. On an island's

windward side, where food was plentiful

and the water well aerated, coral grew

rapidly. Reefs proliferated and were

found from a few yards to several miles

offshore. Approaching an island on this

side was, as a rule, dangerous, as the reefs

were almost invariably numerous and

rocky. On the leeward side, the reefs

were generally flat, had few rocky

patches, and were often submerged at

high tide. Coral islands, encircling a

lagoon, formed an atoll which usually

opened to the sea on the leeward side.

In the central Pacific, coral islands were

low and flat, being only four or five feet

above sea level. In the volcanic islands

of the western Pacific, upward thrusts of

land accounted for the presence of hills

or cliffs of solid coral.49

Whether dead or alive, whether taken

from the top of a cliff or the bottom of

the sea, coral was suitable for roads and

runways. The surface of an island usually consisted of coarse coral sand packed

hard when dry. In the interior, the soil

was often a sandy loam. Coral could be

47

 Of of Engr, Hq Seventh Air Force, Rpt, Avn

Engr Mission at Makin. 48

 John R. Perry, "Coral: Our Pacific Lifesaver,"

The Military Engineer, XXXVII (May, 1945), 168-

75.

49

 (1) Ibid. (2) Hobart E. Stocking, "Coral Reefs

of the South Pacific," The Military Engineer,

XXXVI (August, 1944), 249-53.
386 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

easily quarried; the engineers had to

use explosives only occasionally. The

coarser the coral—up to particles about

two and one-half inches in diameter—

the easier the job of surfacing. Using

sheepsfoot rollers, the engineers broke

the pieces sufficiently to fill the interstices

with the right amount of fines. A

smooth, hard runway was the result.

Coral had to be kept wet continuously to

keep it from becoming dusty. If dry, it

rutted easily and blew away. It could

be wetted with either fresh or salt water.

Some coral runways were sprinkled

daily. Roads and runways which were

subjected to heavy use were surfaced

with asphaltic concrete. In some cases,

the engineers first applied a binder while

in others, they sprinkled the coral and

immediately paved over it. Sometimes

they rolled a surface until it was hard

and tight and then applied a coating of

oil, which bound the surface temporarily

and made it waterproof. But such a

runway had to be repaired almost daily.

It required special attention near the

ends where aircraft did considerable

turning.50

Progress on Makin

Work on Makin moved ahead rapidly.

By mid-January 1944, the 804th engineers, helped for a time by the 152d,

which had been attached to the Garrison

Force, had extended the runway to 7,000

feet, paving the extra 3,000 feet with

coral. Two taxiways paralleled the runway. There were hardstands, revetments, and some forty prefabricated

buildings. An aviation gasoline storage

system was in operation, the tanks of

which were filled by means of a submarine pipeline extending out to an

anchorage for tankers. The Japanese

had reacted violently to the seizure of

the Gilberts. After the first American

landings they bombed the islands frequently. The heaviest raid took place

on 15 January; bombs dropped on the

152d Battalion area on that day killed 6

men and wounded 30.51 But despite

Japanese air attacks, the American hold

on the Gilberts was secure. By midJanuary, preparations were already well

along for further thrusts against Japanese

islands in the Central Pacific.

50

 Perry, "Coral: Our Pacific Lifesaver," The Military Engineer XXXVII (May, 1945), pp. 168-75.

51

 Of of Engr, Hq Seventh Air Force, Rpt, Avn

Engr Mission at Makin.
CHAPTER X

The China-Burma-India Theater

1941-August 1943

On the defensive in the Pacific after

Midway, the Japanese were under pressure in still another quarter. This was

the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater.

Operations there, reaching their full

stride by the beginning of 1944, had by

then been under way for more than two

years. Soon after the outbreak of war,

Japanese forces had marched on Burma

to cut off China's last land communications to the west. (Map 20) The United

States had reacted by dispatching commanders, troops, planes, equipment, and

supplies to help keep China in the war

and prepare for ground and air offensives

against enemy forces in eastern China

and the Japanese home islands. Japanese successes in isolating China by land

and sea made it extremely difficult to

send in men and supplies. The obstacles encountered in developing an

effective fighting force of Americans,

British, Indians and other Commonwealth troops, and Chinese proved all

but insurmountable. The immense

distances in the theater, the conflict of

national interests in that part of the

globe, and the isolation of China and

India from each other and from Burma

made the task of organizing the theater's

resources effectively an impossible one

and led to repeated diplomatic and

military crises. The plan to develop

China together with Burma and India

into a major theater of war never fully

materialized. As time passed the strategic importance of CBI declined as it

became increasingly evident that the war

against Japan would, in the main, be

fought and won in the Pacific.

The attempts to develop a major theater of operations in Asia would require

prodigies of engineering. Before China

could receive material assistance from

the outside, a line of communications

would have to be created. The only

feasible route of entry was from India.

But India and China were separated by

the lofty Himalayan range, and with the

Japanese holding most of Burma by the

end of May 1942, supply by air remained

the only alternative. Thus, for the first

engineers in the theater, construction of

airfields, not only to defend India but

also to support an airlift to China, was

of paramount importance. Late in

1942, when the Allies had completed

plans for a campaign to recapture northern Burma, the engineers were given the

primary mission of building ground

communications to support a campaign

in Burma and to make possible the sending of large quantities of supplies overland to China. American engineers

THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 389

were to help the Chinese improve the

world-famous Burma Road linking

China with northeastern Burma, and

were to take sole charge of constructing

the Ledo Road from northeastern India

across northern Burma to a junction

with the Burma Road.

By the time of the QUADRANT Conference at Quebec in August 1943, the

development of the B-29 bomber had

opened up the possibility of long-range

air assaults against the Japanese homeland from bases in China. The engineers in CBI were consequently the first

to build airfields overseas for the big

bombers. As a further consequence of

the decisions made at Quebec, the engineers were called upon to link eastern

India and southwestern China with the

most extensive military pipeline system

ever constructed—to supply the airlift

to China, facilitate combat in Burma,

and supply American air units in China.

Many of the engineer feats in CBI

actually contributed little to defeating

Japan. But the fact remains that engineer projects in the CBI because of their

sheer magnitude were among the most

impressive of the war. In no other theater were engineer officers to fill so many

key positions in the chain of command.

Priority on Airfields

Prewar Efforts To Help China

The United States began to support

China in her fight against Japan well

before Pearl Harbor. In April 1941,

President Roosevelt approved sending

lend-lease aid; by late spring the War

Department was administering a program of assistance totaling nearly

$125,000,000. Part of this money was

being used to buy materiel and rolling

stock for a railroad the Chinese and

British were building from Kunming,

in southwestern China, to Lashio, in

northeastern Burma, where it would

connect with the Burmese railroad system. In June the United States set

aside a hundred new fighter planes for

China to form the nucleus of a modern

air force. The War and Navy Departments released over a hundred pilots to

fly these planes as members of the American Volunteer Group (AVG) being organized in China by retired Air Corps

Capt. Claire L. Chennault.1 In July the

War Department established the American Military Mission to China to advise

the Chinese in Washington and Chungking with regard to the procurement,

shipment, care, and use of American

equipment. That same month General

Schley sent an officer expert in railway

construction to the Far East to act as

adviser to the Yunnan-Burma Railroad

Authority, which was building the Chinese section of the railroad between

Kunming and Lashio. To provide the

first of the approximately 30,000 tons of

rails needed, the Corps of Engineers procured and started dismantling a 125-mile

stretch of abandoned narrow-gauge railway of the Denver, Rio Grande, and

Western in New Mexico and Colorado.2

1

 (1) Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland,

Stilwell's Mission to China, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953),

pp. 13-32. (2) Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and

Early Operations, pp. 484-89. 2

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission

to China, pp. 26-32, 47. (2) Rpt, Maj John E. Ausland to Brig Gen John Magruder, C Mil Mission to

China, 12 Sep 41. (3) Memo, C Railway Sec OCE,

for Maj Haydon L. Boatner, 28 Sep 41. Last two in
390 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

In September the Shell Oil Company,

which had just perfected a light, "invasion-weight" petroleum pipeline, interested the military mission in having such

a line installed between Kunming and

Bhamo in northern Burma. In agreement with the mission, the oil company

sent one of its specialists to Burma to

prepare a plan for constructing the pipeline. General Kingman, Assistant Chief

of Engineers, had an investigation made

of the proposed route. He reported in

October that such a line appeared to have

"sufficient merit ... to justify further

investigation."

 3

Help for China After

Pearl Harbor

After Pearl Harbor all these efforts to

strengthen China were in jeopardy.

The course of the war soon threatened

to bring all of southeast Asia under

Japanese control. The capitulation of

Thailand in mid-December enabled the

enemy to make gargantuan strides toward attainment of his two main objectives, one of which was to seize the

British naval bastion of Singapore, and

the other to capture southern Burma and

cut the railway running northward from

Rangoon to Lashio. The latter was

not only an important railhead, but also

the southern terminus of the Burma

Road, a narrow, graveled highway winding 700 miles northeastward to Kunming—China's last line of surface

communication with the outside world.

The Japanese moved swiftly into Malaya

and Burma, and Singapore fell on 15

February 1942. After entering southern

Burma in mid-January, the Japanese

drove hard for Rangoon. If they captured that key port, China would be

isolated.

At the ARCADIA Conference in Washington Roosevelt and Churchill agreed

that China should constitute a separate

theater and as such be under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, head of the

National Military Council governing

Free China. Because he was also the

head of a state, Chiang would not be

under the Combined Chiefs. Churchill

and Roosevelt proposed that he establish a planning staff to include American,

British, and Chinese officers. Chiang

agreed and asked that a high-ranking

American general be sent to Chungking

to act as chief of the Allied staff. Stimson and Marshall conferred the post on

Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, who had

served for many years in China as military attache. On 2 February the War

Department appointed him Commanding General of the United States Army

Forces in the Chinese Theater of Operations, Burma, and India. Stilwell was

to go to the Far East with about thirty

American officers composing the U.S.

Task Force in China.4

As his engineer, Stilwell chose Col.

William H. Holcombe. In late December 1941, the War Plans Division had

designated Holcombe, at that time

assistant commandant of the Engineer

School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to serve

AMMISCA 617, Yunnan-Burma RR, WW II Rcds

Div. 3

 Memo, Magruder for CofEngrs, 18 Sep 41 with

Ind, 3 Oct 41. AMMISCA 679, Pipelines for China,

World War II Rcds Div.

4

 For a detailed account of the events leading up

to Stilwell's appointment see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 61-76.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 391

as engineer adviser to Stilwell in the

planning for the invasion of North

Africa. When Stilwell received his assignment to serve with Chiang instead,

he transferred Colonel Holcombe from

the North African project. On 11

February, Stilwell and his staff left New

York by plane for India.5

On the 25th Stilwell and his group

reached New Delhi. To the ensuing

round of conferences with the British

commander-in-chief in India, General

Wavell, and his officers in General Headquarters (India), Stilwell brought an

impressive catalog of American plans.

He emphasized that his major missions

were to modernize and rearm the Chinese Army and to step up American

participation in the air war over China.

To carry out his plans, he intended to

increase lend-lease tonnages moving up

the railway from Rangoon to Lashio.

Should Rangoon fall, he hoped to fly

supplies from the Royal Air Force

(RAF) fighter field at Dinjan, in Assam,

to Myitkyina, in northern Burma, barge

them from there down the Irrawaddy

River to Bhamo, and then truck them to

the Burma Road and China. This

roundabout way could possibly be shortened. Work was already in progress on

a road to extend eastward from the coal

mining community of Ledo, in eastern

Assam, across northern Burma to link

up with the Burma Road. The Chinese

and British had agreed to co-operate in

its construction when Chiang visited

India the first week of February. Stilwell instructed Holcombe to help the

British and Chinese who were preparing

plans for this road in the office of Maj.

Gen. Richard L. Bond, Wavell's

engineer-in-chief.6

On 3 March Stilwell flew to Chungking to set up his task force headquarters

there. Three days later Chiang announced that Stilwell would head the

Chinese Expeditionary Force, which

during the past week had been moving

into Burma to bolster the British forces,

consisting for the most part of Burmese

and Indian troops. All available hands

were needed now in southern Burma,

where the situation was growing more

serious by the hour. On 6 March the

Japanese occupied Rangoon. The British retreated northward toward Mandalay. Completing his staff assignments

and command arrangements, Stilwell

hastened to Lashio to assume control of

the six Chinese divisions there. He had

certain definite strategic aims. His

most cherished plan was to drive the

Japanese out of Rangoon and reopen the

supply line to Kunming. Failing this,

he hoped to dig in around Mandalay to

protect the future line of communications from India across northern Burma

to China.

Meanwhile, the War Department had

begun sending some air reinforcements.

On 22 February Col. Clayton Bissell,

selected as Stilwell's air adviser by Lt.

Gen. Henry H. Arnold, commanding the

Army Air Forces, left Washington for

India to handle arrangements for receipt

in the theater of several consignments of

aircraft for the Tenth Air Force and for

Chennault's volunteers, about to be in5

 Ltr, Brig Gen W. H. Holcombe to C EHD, 22

Nov 54. EHD Files.

6

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission

to China, pp. 76-77, 93-94. (2) Craven and Cate,

eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 497-98. (3)

Ltr, Holcombe to C EHD, 22 Nov 54.
392 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ducted into the U.S. Army. In an independent action approved by Marshall,

General Brett, Deputy Chief of Staff,

ABDA Command, ordered General

Brereton to evacuate doomed Java and

re-establish the remnants of his FEAF

task force at Karachi.7 Here, early in

March, Brereton activated his base and

training center. General Marshall made

Brereton commander of the Tenth Air

Force and directed him to provide combat air support to Chiang in China and

to the British in Burma and at the same

time make plans for supplying China

by air. He was to be directly subordinate to Stilwell, although as regards the

campaign in Burma the War Department

expected him to "cooperate with the

British as [they] requested."

 8

Engineer Work Begins

Soon after arriving at Lashio, Stilwell

directed Holcombe to join him. While

waiting in his hotel room at New Delhi

for a plane to take him to Burma, Holcombe got word that Stilwell had made

him temporarily engineer of the Tenth

Air Force. In his new assignment he

would have to advise Brereton as to the

most feasible way of providing the facilities the airmen needed. He and Brereton had to deal with several fundamental

problems. Organization of a port of

debarkation and of a training base at

Karachi would require major improvements in facilities there. The 2,000-

mile supply line to China would necessitate building or improving numerous

fields capable of handling transports—

particularly in Assam and in Yunnan

Province in southwestern China. To

accommodate American aircraft which

would help to defend India, either

bomber fields would have to be built in

the central and eastern parts of the

country or British fields taken over and

improved. Providing adequate facilities

for the Air Forces in the Indian subcontinent would necessitate a major construction effort. Holcombe worked in

Brereton's office, helping to draw up

plans for a headquarters for the Air

Forces at Willingdon Airdrome near

New Delhi, expansion of Karachi Airdrome, construction of five bomber

fields near Calcutta, construction of an

air depot at Agra, and the building of

four airfields in Assam for the airlift to

China. Holcombe gave his preliminary

layouts to the airmen for their approval.

As soon as satisfactory drawings were

ready, they were forwarded to the architects in British General Headquarters

(India), who put them in final form.9

Since there were no U.S. engineer

troops and none could be expected soon,

the Americans had to turn to the British

for construction. The reverse lend-lease

procedure, as worked out between British and American headquarters in India,

provided that major U.S. Army commands would send their requests for construction to General Headquarters

(India). General Bond would then call

upon the Royal Engineers to "put the

work in hand" or would ask the government of India to assign the projects to

7

 See above, p. 118. 8

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission

to China, pp. 78-80. (2) Craven and Cate, eds.,

Plans and Early Operations, pp. 396-97, 502-04.

9

(1) Ltr, Holcombe to C EHD, 22 Nov 54. (2)

Brereton Diaries, pp. 97, 99, no. (3) Craven and

Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 511-12.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 393

the Central Public Works Department

or some other civilian government

agency. Whether civilian or military

organizations controlled a particular

project, the work was usually done by

Indian contractors employing their own

labor gangs.10

Brereton and Holcombe could not fail

to be impressed by the immensity of the

Asian scene and its challenge to the engineers. In China, Burma, and India

lived nearly half the human race—

900,000,000 people—largely undernourished, unlettered, and indifferent to the

issues which had brought the war to

their homelands. The towering Himalayas isolated the Indian subcontinent

from China, and spurs of that range,

called the Hump by the airmen, shut off

Burma from China. Throughout the

year, malaria, typhus, intestinal infestations, and other serious endemic diseases

sapped the vitality of native and newcomer alike. The monsoon rains, lasting from May to October, drenched

Burma and much of India annually; the

world's heaviest rainfall, more than 400

inches a year, fell in the Khasi hills of

Assam.11 In various ways the summer

downpours would create engineering

problems. Constant repair of the waterlogged roads would be necessary.

Workmen would be scarce because they

would be needed in great numbers for

work on the rice and tea plantations.

In general, land communications were

far from ideal. In the 1,800 miles between Karachi and Assam, rail gauges

changed four times. Nowhere in India

were there long stretches of highway

capable of sustaining high-speed truck

traffic the year around. The scanty

Burmese road and rail net was not connected with the transportation system of

India. The long and virtually uncharted mountainous frontier between

the two countries was an almost impenetrable jungle haven for primitive tribes.

In China, the Japanese were in firm control of all the modern highways and

most of the railroads of the country.

Such control as Chiang's government

exercised was confined to the underdeveloped part of the country.12

In attempting to have bomber bases

and transport fields constructed, Brereton encountered almost insurmountable

obstacles. It seemed to him and to

other Americans that GHQ (India), despite the threat of invasion, did not shake

off its peacetime routine. The government of India, fearful of provoking

Indian nationalist outbursts by stepping

up demands on the country's agrarian

economy, appeared to show little energy

in meeting requests for construction and

materiel for the American forces. In a

diary entry for 20 March, Brereton

fumed, ".. . practically nothing had

been done in the northeastern area on

airfield construction. No one has shown

any initiative in assembling labor.

. . ."13 A month later he complained

to Stilwell of the ". . . lack of central

10

 (1) GHQ (India), Provision Sec Routine Order

No. B-37, 19 Jul 42. (2) Ltr, CG SOS CBI to QMG

(India), 2 Sep 42. Both in Reverse Lend-Lease Sup

File, Constr Serv Files, KCRC. 11

 In most of the United States rainfall averages

between 15 and 45 inches a year.

12

 (1) Anon., "The China-Burma-India Theater of

Operations," The Military Engineer, XXXVI (June,

1944), 188-89. (2) Irving B. Crosby, "Physiography

and War in Burma," The Military Engineer,

XXXVII (February, 1945), 43-48. 13

 Brereton Diaries, p. 112.
394 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

control and proper co-ordination in

construction projects in Assam and

Burma. There are on order various

projects in these areas . . . and all apparently have first priority. As a result

. . . progress is slow."

 14

As March drew to a close, new disasters

overtook the campaign in Burma. With

the Allied front in the south crumbling,

the defenders resumed their withdrawal

up the Irrawaddy Plain. Unwilling to

continue without Holcombe's services,

Stilwell late in March ordered him to

finish his work for Brereton at once and

report to the command post near Mandalay. Arriving there on 1 April, Holcombe undertook various assignments.

For a few days he was Stilwell's liaison

officer with the Chinese division in the

Mandalay area. Then, after arranging

with the British to allow the Chinese to

use the railway to the north during the

impending withdrawal, he rejoined Stilwell in mid-April. During the next

two weeks, before the collapse of Allied

resistance and the fall of Mandalay, he

served on a number of liaison and reconnaissance missions.15

Establishment of a

Services of Supply

The expanding scope of American

projects in India pointed up the urgent

need for an American logistics organization. In late February the War Department had directed the head of the

U.S. Military Mission to Iran, General

Wheeler, an engineer officer of wide experience, to report to Stilwell and assume

the additional task of creating a "Services

of Supply, United States Army Forces

in India, Burma and China . . . ." The

War Department instructed Wheeler to

"initiate required action to push through

to Gen[eral] Stilwell all equipment.

... " and to "Investigate . . . and report upon such matters as special supply

requirements; supplies locally procurable; special supply difficulties and availability of skilled labor." Wheeler,

whom Stilwell had regarded highly ever

since their days at West Point, was to

have considerable latitude in determining his mode of operation. He was the

first of many engineer officers to achieve

a prominent command position under

Stilwell.16

During March and April, Wheeler,

with a small staff borrowed from his

Iranian mission, strove to establish order

in the supply and construction situation

in India. He worked out with British

officials a program for expanding storage

and dock facilities at Karachi and carried

on discussions with members of Stilwell's

staff in India and Burma regarding the

organization and responsibilities of the

proposed services of supply. On 17

April, Stilwell agreed to a directive

according to which Wheeler was to operate lines of communication from ports in

India to the airfields in Assam and furnish technical advice to the Chinese

Army in the operation of its communica14 tions zone. Brereton, disgusted with the Memo, Magruder for Stilwell, 24 Apr 42. AG

600.1 CBI. KCRC. 15

 (1) General Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell

Papers (Theodore H. White, ed.) (New York, 1948),

pp. 76-106. (2) Ltr, Holcombe to C EHD, 22

Nov 54.

16

 (1) Memo, G-4 for TAG, 27 Feb 42. G-4/34208.

(2) Interv, Leslie Anders with General Wheeler, 5

Mar 53. EHD Files.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 395

GENERAL WHEELER

slow progress of construction under

reverse lend-lease and having no engineer

troops in his command, suggested to

Stilwell that all American construction

be put under Wheeler to insure maximum effectiveness. On 24 April Stilwell charged Wheeler with all U.S. Army

construction in India, Assam, and

Burma. To provide him with at least

the nucleus of an engineer force sufficiently flexible to perform either airfield

or highway construction, Stilwell asked

the War Department to send a general

service regiment, an aviation battalion,

and a dump truck company.17

In late April Wheeler began to organize his Engineer Section. His chief of

staff, Col. Fabius H. Kohloss, an engineer

who had come to India in February as a

member of a War Department observer

group, recommended setting up a section

of seven officers. Whether that many

would be available in the near future was

doubtful. On 27 April Wheeler chose

as his chief engineer, Maj. John P. Johnson, a member of the mission to Iran.

On 27 May, he moved his headquarters

from Karachi to New Delhi. Johnson

remained in Karachi on another assignment. There was a rapid succession of

chief engineers at New Delhi from the

end of May until August. All had to

get along as best they could with small

staffs of two officers or less.18

In May Wheeler set up his field organization. Kohloss prepared a plan of

organization calling for two base sections

and two advance sections in India and

one advance section in China. Wheeler

put engineers over four of his five field

organizations. Col. Paul F. Yount, formerly of the Iranian mission, took command at Karachi of Base Section 1,

which covered roughly the western half

of India. Maj. H. Case Wilcox, also

transferred from the Iranian mission,

went to Agra to set up Advance Section

1 in central India. Maj. Henry A.

Byroade, recently arrived from the

United States with a small party of Air

Forces engineers, took charge of Advance

Section 2, which included a large part of

Assam. In early June another veteran

17

 (1) Hq USAFCBI, Hist of the CBI Theater, 21

May 42-25 Oct 44 (cited hereafter as CBI Hist) (MS),

sec. III, app. IX. World War II Rcds Div. (2) Ltr,

Hq American Army Forces CBI to CG SOS Karachi

et al., 17 Apr 42. (3) Rad, Stilwell to Brereton, 24

Apr 42. Last two in AG 322 CBI. (4) Interv,

Anders with Wheeler, 5 Mar 53. 18

 (1) Hq SOS India-Burma Theater, Hist of the

Engr Sec USAFCBI, 23 Apr-30 Jun 42 (cited hereafter as Hist of Engr Sec SOS CBI). 319.1 CBI. (2)

Memos, Kohloss for Wheeler, 21 May and 20 Jun 42.

Kohloss Pers Files.
396 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

of the Iranian mission, Maj. Charles F.

B. Price, flew to Kunming to establish

Advance Section 3, which was to include

the southern half of China. Only Base

Section 2, with headquarters at Calcutta

and including most of southeastern

India, was not commanded by an engineer. Its chief was Col. Edwin M.

Sutherland of the Infantry. In each

section, the commander, directly subordinate to Wheeler, would control all

engineer supply and construction activities. Although shortages of personnel

made it impossible for the field commands to organize adequate engineer

staffs, this lack was offset somewhat by

the fact that engineers headed SOS and

four of its major subdivisions.19

Construction Progress

Work was urgently needed at Karachi.

This city had become the major port of

entry for the American forces, since

British shipping had already overtaxed

harbor facilities at Bombay, and Calcutta

was too exposed to enemy attack. When

Major Johnson left his job as Engineer,

SOS, on 27 May he became engineer of

Base Section 1. He had the task of expediting a variety of projects designed

to make Karachi an efficient base and

port of entry. With contractors and

native laborers working under him and

the Royal Engineers, construction went

forward on a 5,600-foot concrete runway at the former civil airdrome and on

two outlying fighter strips. Various improvements were under way at the New

Malir and Landhi airports, twelve miles

east of the city. Other projects undertaken during the late spring of 1942 were

extensions to the wharves and warehousing in the port, remodeling of hotels to

provide additional billets in the city, and

construction of a cantonment for 20,000

men at Malir.20

There was a great need for engineer

work in northeastern Assam. Arriving

at his post in May, Byroade set out to

organize the SOS effort to support the

airlift across Burma to China. He

found the British engaged in improving

four airfields, known as the Hump fields.

The area assigned to him, so crucial for

the supply line to China and the defense

of India, was a scene of confusion. The

Japanese forces were approaching India.

Retreating and disorganized Chinese

troops were straggling over the frontier

mountains; the natives were panicstricken. The Royal Engineers and the

Central Public Works Department,

supposedly co-operating to prepare the

needed airfields, were engaged in a bitter

struggle for the control of construction.

Fortunately, soon after Byroade's arrival,

General Headquarters (India) interceded and placed the Royal Engineers

firmly in charge of work at the airfields. "The change," Byroade informed Wheeler, "has been entirely for

the better, as the military has many more

means at its disposal." Byroade was not

alarmed by the absence of personnel

with which to man his engineer section.

He believed his participation in the

airfield program should be "solely

a matter of liaison ... in clearly es19

 (1) Memo, Kohloss for Wheeler, 21 May 42. (2)

Hist of Engr Sec SOS CBI.

20

 (1)Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation

Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 559-61. (2) Engr

Sec Base Sec 1 Prog Rpts, 2 May-2O July 42. AG

600.9 CBI.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 397

tablishing the needs of United States

Forces . . . ."21

At Calcutta and in central India work

made little headway. The exposure of

Calcutta to enemy sea and air assaults

obliged Wheeler to mark time there.

Matters were critical in central India.

Brereton was especially anxious to

complete the large depot field at Agra

and the bomber bases across northern

India at Cawnpore, Fyzabad, Allahabad,

and Gaya. Contractors were far behind

schedule. The onset of the monsoon

rains made it difficult to keep laborers

on the job. Supervisors seemed lax

about informing contractors as to specifications and priorities. Critical materials did not arrive either on time or in

desired quantities. American airmen,

forced to live in tents while awaiting

completion of their barracks, became

increasingly irritated over the slowness

of the British effort.

The campaign in Burma had in the

meantime come to its disastrous end.

By the time Stilwell emerged onto the

plains of eastern India late in May, the

Japanese had overrun all of Burma except the northern tip and had occupied

part of China's Yunnan Province west

of the Salween gorge. Contact between

Stilwell's elements in India and his

bases in China was impossible except by

air. All supplies, fuel, guns, ammunition, and men needed in China would

henceforth have to be flown in. The

critical lack of air facilities in India and

China would necessitate a major construction effort. Early in June, Stilwell

decided to consolidate engineer responsibilities under Wheeler. Colonel Hoicombe, seriously ill with dysentery, to

which was added malaria contracted

during the harrowing, 3-week trek out

of Burma, went on convalescent leave to

Kashmir. Stilwell left Holcombe's post

vacant with the understanding that on

his return to duty he would be assigned

to the Services of Supply.22

The Broadening of Stilwell's

Mission

Since the plan for keeping China in

the war would require efforts much

greater than those contemplated earlier,

Stilwell was faced with the necessity of

broadening the scope of his mission. By

the latter part of June he had begun

referring to his command as a "theater"

instead of a task force. On 6 July he

formally set up a theater-type organization. He established a forward headquarters in Chungking and a rear

headquarters in New Delhi. Wheeler

and Brereton were his two major subordinate commanders. Although General

Marshall approved the reorganization,

no formal orders were ever published by

the War Department concerning it. By

mid-July Stilwell's command was generally known as the China-Burma-India

Theater. For that part lying in India

and Burma, Stilwell was under Wavell.

For the part in China, he was under

Chiang, who, as ruler of China, was accountable to no one. Stilwell had other

responsibilities. When he took over the

personnel and the responsibilities of the

21

 Ltrs, Byroade to Wheeler, 18 May, 1 Jun 42.

AG 600.9 CBI.

22

 (1) Craven and Cate, eds, Plans and Early

Operations, pp. 508-12. (2) Interv with Wheeler,

5 Mar 53. (3) Ltr, Holcombe to C EHD, 22 Nov 54.
398 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

American Military Mission to China, he

came under the direct command of General Marshall. He also served as President Roosevelt's military representative

in Chungking. Stilwell's diverse and exacting responsibilities imposed on him

numerous and sometimes conflicting obligations; the resulting confusion made

more difficult the work of the engineers

and hampered the development of an

effective engineer organization.23

First Engineer Troops Arrive

Fortunately for Stilwell's construction

program, engineer troops were on the

way. At the end of July, two units, the

45th General Service Regiment under

Col. John C. Arrowsmith and the 823d

Aviation Battalion under Maj. Ferdinand J. Tate, disembarked at Karachi.

Soon thereafter the 195th Engineer

Dump Truck Company, commanded by

Capt. Clyde L. Koontz, arrived. The

landing of these units coincided with the

heightening of domestic tensions in

India, where nationalist firebrands were

urging the natives to violence against

British rule. With a minimum of fanfare, the SOS port authorities issued

ammunition to the nearly 2,000 engineers, loaded them on trucks, and sped

them to Malir Cantonment through the

streets of Karachi, lined with "Americans, Quit India" signs. If the natives

were not happy to see the newcomers,

Wheeler and Brereton were. In a temporary departure from Stilwell's policy

of concentrating engineer resources in

Wheeler's hands, the 823d was assigned

to the Tenth Air Force; its first job was

the construction of a bomb shelter at the

Karachi air base. Within a few days

Wheeler's staff had worked out plans for

deploying the rest of the men. The

dump truck company was placed on

transportation detail at the port. Arrowsmith's regiment was split. The 1st

Battalion was held in reserve at Karachi

to be sent wherever it would be needed

in central and eastern India. The 2d

Battalion was kept in Base Section 1 to

improve roads, erect buildings, and

provide camouflaging. Since the engineer units arrived without their equipment, SOS was obliged to give them

machinery from lend-lease stocks earmarked for China. Most of these items

were of nonstandard types and in most

categories ill suited to the tasks ahead.24

On 1 August Colonel Arrowsmith became Wheeler's chief engineer. Borrowing officers from his own regiment,

Arrowsmith filled out the undermanned

SOS Engineer Section for the first time.

He organized the office into four main

branches, with seven officers usually

present for duty. The Administrative

and Supply Branches had the duties

customarily assigned to such units. The

Planning and Operations Branch carried

out supervision and analysis of all construction in the field. The Utilities

Branch had purely local jurisdiction

over construction and utilities in the

New Delhi area. The vastness of the

theater and the almost complete depend23

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission

to China, pp. 86-90, 191-207. (2) Interv, Anders

with Col Frank Milani, AG CBI, 1942-44, 16 May

52. EHD Files.

24

 (1) Histories of the 45th Engr GS Rgt, 195th

Engr Dump Truck Co, and 823d Engr Avn Bn. (2)

Interv, Anders with Tate, 3 Nov 53. EHD Files.

(3) Ltr with Incls, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12 Feb 54.

EHD Files.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 399

ence on the local authorities made the

task of Arrowsmith and his staff difficult.25

Soon after his appointment, Arrowsmith set out to inspect many of the

projects for which the engineers were

responsible. At New Delhi itself, the

British were improving housing and

hangar facilities for the Tenth Air

Force's section of Willingdon Airdrome.

The work was a month behind schedule

and the Tenth Air Force representatives

were growing increasingly concerned.

Arrowsmith took to the air to visit other

projects. Across northern India, the

Royal Engineers were continuing their

expansion of RAF fields into bomber

bases; in southern India they were developing the field at Bangalore and in

central India the fields at Guskhara,

Nawadih, and Pandaveswar, near Calcutta. Brereton had chosen Ondal,

north of Calcutta, as his air service center

and Agra, near New Delhi, as his main

air depot. Progress at most projects was

not satisfactory. At Agra, work was far

behind schedule. The British stated

that the incessant summer rains, the frequent Moslem and Hindu holidays, and

the slow procurement of cement—which

the British insisted on using for runways since they believed only concrete

would stand up under the monsoon

rains—had retarded construction. Arrowsmith returned to New Delhi in midAugust, convinced that engineer troops

would have to be concentrated in the

most vital areas—Karachi, Agra, and

Assam.26

Capt. Robert A. Hirshfield, who replaced Major Johnson as base section

engineer at Karachi late in July, was

soon able to report fairly constant progress. Civilian contractors had under

way a large number of projects, including

workshops and parking areas at the port,

38 mess halls and 175 ammunition sheds

at Malir, and parking aprons and an

operations building at the civil airdrome. Early in August, the 2d Battalion of the 45th Engineers was assigned

to Hirshfield. He thereupon expanded

his construction effort to include a 20-

mile road westward from Karachi to the

radar station on Cape Muari, wire entanglements and camouflaging at the

various airfields in the area, and refrigeration and electric power plants.27

There were, to be sure, dark spots in the

picture, such as shortages of cement and

inadequate transportation. The local

representatives of the Tenth Air Force

registered their dissatisfaction with the

quality of the concrete work and the

flimsiness of the roofing put in by the

native contractors. Nevertheless, of the

critical areas in India, Karachi was, by

the late summer of 1942, the least source

of concern to the Americans.28

To expedite work at Agra, Arrowsmith on 23 August asked Wheeler to

send the 1st Battalion and half of Head25

 (1) Hist of the 45th Engrs. (2) Interv with

Arrowsmith, 12 Mar 53. EHD Files. (3) Memo,

Arrowsmith for Wheeler, SOS, 17 Dec 42. Opns Br

File, Constr Serv Files. 26

 (1) Memo, Arrowsmith for Wheeler and Kohloss,

18 Sep 42. Agra Air Depot Folder, Constr Serv

Files. (2) CBI Hist, sec. III, app. IX. (3) Ltr, CO

Tenth AF Serv Comd, to Wheeler, 24 Jul 42. Agra

Air Depot Folder, Constr Serv Files. (4) Interv,

Anders with Arrowsmith, 12 Mar 53. 27

 (1) Engr Sec Base Sec 1 Prog Rpts, 27 Jul-12

Sep 42. AG 600.9 CBI. (2) Hist of the 45th Engrs. 28

 (1) Ltr, CG Karachi Air Defense Area to CO

Base Sec 1, 17 Aug 42. (2) Memo, Hirshfield for

Arrowsmith, 5 Sep 42. Both in Specs File, Constr

Serv Files.
400 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

quarters and Service Company of the

45th to supplement the efforts of the

contractors. The men arrived on 5 September to take over construction of warehouses, repair shops, and steel hangars.

Work was by this time about six weeks

behind schedule. The assumption by

the 45th Engineers of all trucking details for American forces at Agra somewhat relieved the British transportation

problem. But the Royal Engineers continued to have trouble obtaining the

necessary labor and materials to keep

work going on the runways and other

operational facilities remaining under

their jurisdiction. Because of the Indian nationalists' sabotage campaign, one

engineer company had to be kept constantly on guard duty at a time when

every man was badly needed for construction.29

Most critical of all was the situation

in Assam. By late July Byroade's Engineer Section had acquired two officers

and two enlisted men, but the section's

many responsibilities made it impossible

to spare more than one officer to prepare

layouts and inspect work at the four

fields. Byroade found himself increasingly concerned with the details of airfield construction, as the Royal Engineers turned to him time and again for

decisions on the phasing of various portions of the airfield program. Contractors and laborers continued to make

disappointingly slow progress during

the long rainy season. Byroade could do

little except to resort to friendly persuasion.30

 The British did not fail to

point out that their efforts suffered from

the inadequacy of materials and transportation. On 18 August Brig. Gen.

Clayton Bissell, who had just succeeded

Brereton as commander of the Tenth

Air Force, took the 823d off bomb shelter

construction at Karachi and ordered

them to Assam. By the end of September most of the men had arrived at their

new location.31

Byroade welcomed Tate and the 823d,

for there was no end of work. About

half of Company A was put on camouflaging the airfield at Chabua. The

other half and Company B took over the

loading and unloading of air freight at

Chabua and the other three Hump fields

at nearby Mohanbari, Dinjan, and Sookerating, from which planes took off for

China. While such use of the aviation

engineers was not to the liking of

Byroade and Tate, there were compensating factors; the 823d could be counted

upon for efficient loading and unloading

with a minimum of pilferage and breakage, and the assumption of freight

handling by the Americans released large

numbers of natives for return to airfield

construction. Meanwhile, Company C,

encamped at nearby Dibrugarh, began

assembling urgently needed trucks. The

surveyors, draftsmen, and truck drivers

of Headquarters Company were also

welcome reinforcements to Byroade's

hard-pressed Engineer Section. One recurring discordant note was the insistence

of the Royal Engineers upon concrete

runways. Byroade held out for asphalt,

which was procurable not only from

29

 (1) Hist of the 45th Engrs. (2) Ltr, CO Adv

Sec 1 to AdminO Central Com Agra 14 Nov 42. (3)

Ltr, Hq SOS CBI to Air Hq India, 28 Nov 42. Last

two in Agra Air Depot Folder, Constr Serv Files. 30

 Ltrs, Byroade to Wheeler, 1 Jun (AG600.9 CBI),

and 26 Jul 42 (Adv Sec 2, Admin File, Constr Serv

Files). 31

 (1) Ltr, Maj James W. Sloat, CO Adv Sec 2, to

Arrowsmith, 20 Oct 42. Adv Sec 2, Admin File,

Constr Serv Files. (2) Hist of the 823d Engrs.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 401

lend-lease materials destined for China

and stored in Assam but also from an oil

refinery in the province. As far back as

May, Byroade had attempted to reverse

local British decisions to use concrete.

By summer, he had succeeded in getting

specifications for asphalt.32

With the end of the monsoon in October, the Japanese launched a series of

air raids on the airfields in Assam. On

the 25th of the month, about a hundred

enemy planes bombed and strafed, concentrating their attacks on Dinjan and

Chabua. The enemy airmen returned

the next day for a second attack. Two

days later they made a reconnaissance-inforce. The effects of the raids went far

beyond the destruction of runways,

housing, and parked aircraft. The ensuing panic materially reduced the number of native workmen at the fields.

Meanwhile, the Americans were alarmed

by the apparent apathy of the British.

Colonel Kohloss, after witnessing the

raids and their aftermath while on an

inspection tour of the area, was especially

critical of British laxity in airfield construction and repair; he noted that at one

field Byroade's engineers were repairing

the runway hours before the British

"garrison engineer" appeared with his

coolies.33

Problems of Reverse Lend-Lease

By autumn the Americans had many

complaints with regard to construction

under reverse lend-lease. Elaborately

departmentalized British civil and military offices seemed exasperatingly slow in

untangling red tape and approving requests for construction. Delays in getting projects started were frequent.

Few local officials would turn a hand

before receiving the written "sanction"

or directive authorizing construction.

More than once American works suffered

from the preoccupation of the British

with their own projects. A noticeably

weak link in the chain was the native

contractor, as a rule poorly educated,

little concerned with specifications or

deadlines, and scarcely familiar with

machinery. Further retarding the British effort was the shortage of supervisors,

without whom the Indian laborer was

almost certain to adopt a lackadaisical

attitude toward his work. The last

phases of an airfield project frequently

ushered in an administrative crisis when

it became evident that the British could

not meet the target date. Arrowsmith

would express his concern in appropriate

British quarters, while his engineers in

the field encountered the dissatisfaction

of Air Forces commanders over the

"failure" to finish air bases on schedule.

It had been agreed at the outset that the

British would build accommodations

for the Americans on the same scale as

for equivalent British units. Nevertheless, the airmen all too often sought

greater refinements than those standards

allowed. Their insistence on showers

and sewerage at airfields caused several

disagreements with SOS, which was

carrying out construction according to

theater policy. In general, Arrowsmith

could point out that, while British

standards must govern, American airmen

were receiving more elaborate accom32(1)Hist of the 823d Engrs. (2) Rads, 14227,

Byroade to Wheeler, 11 Feb 42; T2190, Wheeler to

Byroade, 11 Apr 42. Specs File, Constr Serv Files.

(3) Ltr, Byroade to Wheeler, 1 Jun 42. 33

 (1) Hist of the 823d Engrs. (2) Memo, Sloat

for Wheeler, 30 Oct 42. (3) Memo, Kohloss for

Wheeler, 31 Oct 42. Both in Adv Sec 2, Admin File,

Constr Serv Files.
402 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

modations than those they would have

gotten under War Department specifications for theater of operations construction.34

Equipment and Supplies

Engineer troops assigned to construction were hampered by the scarcity of

supplies and the lack of equipment.

The units that had arrived in July had

not received their machinery by fall.

SOS had to provide them with makeshift allowances to enable them to get

their work under way. For months,

most of their equipment and a good part

of their supplies came from the stockpiles of lend-lease materiel scheduled for

China. This source furnished trucks,

trailers, rock crushers, air compressors,

road rollers, generators, power shovels,

pneumatic drills, and concrete mixers.

However, each diversion of lend-lease

machinery was a major operation,

requiring Chiang's personal approval.

Besides, the engineers had to put forth

much effort just to find the equipment

stored haphazardly at various points

across India.35 The British were able

to lend the Americans considerable

numbers of trucks and trailers. Lesser

amounts of supplies and equipment were

gotten through local procurement, diverted shipments, and distress cargo.

But it simply was not possible to build

up large stores. By the fall of 1942 the

engineer supply officer of Base Section

1 had succeeded in assembling in the

general depot at Karachi a small and unbalanced assortment consisting mostly of

pioneer-type equipment and drafting

supplies—the only stockpile of engineer

materials and equipment belonging to

the American forces in India.36

The Engineers in China

There was little activity in Advance

Section of SOS in China. The Engineer

Section, set up by Major Price on 4 July,

consisted during the next few months of

Lt. Francis C. Card. Card gave most of

his attention to finding ways of improving the airfield at Kunming and planning new fields near the city. He persuaded the local officials of the Committee on Aeronautical Affairs, a department

of Chiang's government, to extend the

runways at the Kunming field to about

6,800 feet, begin expansion of hangar

and storage facilities, and construct a

headquarters for Chennault's airmen,

now known collectively as the China Air

Task Force. By September the Americans had worked out plans for two new

transport fields, one to be built at

Chengkung, just outside Kunming, and

34

 (1) Hq SOS CBI, Hist of SOS CBI, 11 Jun 42-

24 Oct 44, p. 137. OCMH Files. (2) CBI Hist, sec.

III, app. IX. (3) Brig. Gen. Stuart C. Godfrey, "The

Airfields of the Far East," The Military Engineer,

XXXVII (January, 1945), 17-23. (4) Ltr, Chakulia

Area Engr to Works Liaison Gp RAF Calcutta, 29

Dec 42. Admin File, Constr Serv Files. (5) Ltr,

Bissell to CG Rear Ech Hq USAFCBI, 5 Jun 43.

AG 322 CBI. (6) Memo, Chakulia Area Engr for

CG SOS CBI, 16 Mar 43. Last two in Admin File,

Constr Service Files. (7) 1st Ind, CO Base Sec 1 to

Wheeler, 2 Mar 43, on Ltr, CG Karachi American

Air Base Comd to CO Base Sec 1, Mar 43. Base

Sec 1 Admin File, Constr Serv Files. 35

 (1) Intervs, Anders with Arrowsmith, 12 Mar 53,

and Tate, 3 Nov 53. (2) Hist of the 45th Engrs.

(3) ASF Activities in the Sup of CBI, 1942-1943

(MS), pp. 257-58. OCMH Files. 36

 (1) Rad, 136, Wheeler to Stilwell, 14 Oct 42.

AG 600.9 CBI. (2) Memo, Hirshfield for Arrowsmith, 12 Sep 42. Specs File, Constr Serv Files.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 403

another at Yangkai, forty miles to the

north. Chinese civilian and military

agencies were to be in charge of construction, and the Chinese Government

was to pay for the work. Such nonoperational features as housing and recreational facilities would be paid for by

reverse lend-lease. The hiring of contractors and the direction of work at the

fields was to be the responsibility of the

Committee on Aeronautical Affairs or of

the Military Engineering Commission, a

subordinate office of the Ministry of

Communications, also a department of

Chiang's government. The YunnanBurma Railroad Authority, idle since the

fall of Burma, was now given the job of

helping to build the airfields. The

first two organizations were to employ

civilian contractors; the Railroad Authority was to use both contractors and

peasants, the latter to be conscripted by

Governor Lung Yun of Yunnan. By

October 1942 work was under way on

the airfields at Chengkung and Kunming.37

Training

Having won Chiang's consent for the

organization of a Chinese corps in India

to be used eventually for the recapture

of Burma, Stilwell planned to provide

the corps first of all with adequate training. He got from the British a camp

which they had built at Ramgarh, about

200 miles west of Calcutta, to house

Italian prisoners taken in the North

African campaign. Here he assembled

the Chinese survivors of the retreat from

Burma and filled out their ranks with

raw replacements flown in from China.

Taking over Ramgarh in August 1942,

the Americans found that much work

had to be done to put it in shape. SOS,

organizing the station complement, established an Engineer Section under

Capt. George J. Mason to build access

roads, firing ranges, utilities, and

housing.38 One officer and 42 enlisted

men of the 195th Dump Truck Company were at Ramgarh from August on,

providing transportation and helping

with the engineer phases of the training

program worked out between Stilwell

and the Chinese officers there.39 For the

training program, Stilwell set up an

Engineer Section under Lt. Col. Edwin

B. Green, who would give basic and unit

training. The program included a

course for Chinese engineer officers on

bridges, road construction and maintenance, mine warfare, battlefield recovery

of materiel, rigging, knots, lashings, explosives, river crossing, engineer reconnaissance, camouflaging, field fortifications, mapping, water supply, and assault

tactics. Green's staff, consisting usually

of over a dozen engineer officers, also

helped organize a Chinese task force by

setting up and training pioneer-type

engineer units modeled after German

pioneer organizations described in Chinese field manuals paraphrasing German training literature. Chinese officers

37

 (1) Hq SOS in China Theater, Hist Background

of Engr Sec, Period Ending 31 May 43. Admin Div

File, China Theater, SOS Engr Files. (2) Oliver

LaFarge, The Eagle in the Egg (Boston, 1949), p. 112.

(3) Stilwell Papers, pp. 152-53. (4) Capt Paul J.

Sampson, Hq 1339th AAF Base Unit, Hist of

Chengkung Air Base, Jul 42-Jun 45. Air Univ Lib

Maxwell AFB Ala.

38

 (1) Hist of Engr Sec SOS CBI, 1 Oct-31 Dec 42.

319.1 CBI. (2) Ltr, CO Camp Ramgarh to CG

SOS CBI, 18 Sep 42. Specs File, Constr Serv Files. 39

 Hist of the 195th Engrs.
404 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

trained the Chinese troops, applying

precepts conveyed, often through interpreters, by Green and his assistants.40

The close of October found the engineers at work in an area stretching from

Karachi some 2,200 miles eastward into

Yunnan. Numbering only 14 in late

spring, their strength had risen to 1,986

by 1 October 1942. But even this force

was hardly adequate to meet the demands

of an airfield construction program

embracing seven transport fields in

eastern India and southwestern China

and about twenty bomber fields scattered

across northern India. Although the

greater part of the work was being done

by the Indians, British, and Chinese,

U.S. engineer troops were applying their

efforts in the most crucial links of the

chain—Karachi, Agra, and Assam. Far

too weak in personnel and equipment

for the tasks at hand, the engineers had

at least achieved an organization which

was making the best possible use of

available resources.

Ground Communications for a

Campaign in Burma

Campaign Plans

While the engineers were striving to

build airfields for Stilwell's expanding

air establishment, high-level planners in

the War Department gave them an additional mission—that of constructing

ground communications to support a

future offensive in Burma. Since the

close of the campaign in Burma, Allied

strategic planning for developing overland communications across the foothills

of the Himalayas had hung fire mainly

because domestic turbulence in India

was casting grave doubts on that country's usefulness as a base for military

operations. On 25 August 1942 General Marshall gave an impetus to

planning for an offensive by warning the

Combined Chiefs that only by reopening

land communications across northern

Burma could China be kept in the war

and the Pacific front spared the disastrous consequences of a total collapse of

Chinese resistance. During September,

the War Department worked out a plan

for a combined Chinese-British advance

into Burma. By the beginning of October, the plan had developed to the

point where it could be referred to the

theater for detailed arrangements among

American, British, and Chinese commanders. On 14 October, after receiving a radio from President Roosevelt

stressing the need for operations to open

the Burma Road, Chiang directed Stilwell to take the lead in planning for a

concerted Allied drive to achieve that

objective. In mid-October, Stilwell flew

to New Delhi to confer with Wavell

and arrange a series of conferences to

work out a strategic plan, with 1 March

1943 as the date for the opening of the

attack. Wavell informed Stilwell almost

at once that, mainly because of logistical

difficulties, the British could do no more

than occupy the western fringes of

Burma during the first part of 1943.

The conferees consequently prepared a

plan for clearing only northern Burma.

As finally developed, the plan of campaign called for the brunt of the fighting

to fall on the Chinese. Stilwell's

Ramgarh-trained Chinese, organized as

40

 (1) CBI Hist, sec. II, app. V. (2) Ltrs, Green to

C EHD, 3 Feb, 20 Feb 55. EHD Files.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 405

X-Force, would advance eastward from

Assam, while a Chinese force to be

known as Y-Force would advance westward from Yunnan. The meeting of

the two would mean the expulsion of the

Japanese from a large part of northern

Burma.41

The Ledo and Burma Roads

The clearing of northern Burma

would make possible the construction of

a road to link India with China. With

Wavell's assignment of the campaign in

northern Burma to Stilwell, Lt. Col.

Frank D. Merrill, Stilwell's G-3, suggested on 28 October that Wheeler's

engineers start to build a base at Ledo

and gradually replace the British on

their languishing road project. A road

across Burma could be built during the

course of the campaign and the completed portion used as a supply line. To

build a road across Burma to link India

and China would be an extensive undertaking. The most likely route ran east

from Ledo to the Patkai Range on the

Burmese border and then veered south

to the towns of Myitkyina and Bhamo.

From the latter it ran east to the Burma

Road. The entire distance was about

500 miles. The rugged country from

Ledo to Myitkyina, a distance of some

275 miles, was largely uncharted jungle.

Beyond Myitkyina, a one-lane, dryweather track extended to Bhamo.

From there a one-lane blacktop road

went to the Burma Road. The first 275

miles would require by far the greatest

construction effort. The first stage of

road construction by the Americans,

Merrill believed, should be a short

stretch running eastward from Ledo to

the Patkais and then southward to

Shingbwiyang in Burma, a total distance

of about 120 miles. Shingbwiyang

would be the jumping-off place for the

coming offensive.42 On 29 October,

Stilwell told Wheeler to carry out Merrill's proposals, emphasizing that he

wanted the road open to Shingbwiyang

by 1 March 1943. "The importance of

this mission is obvious," he declared,

"and far-reaching results depend upon

its successful accomplishment."

 43

Thereupon, Stilwell flew back to

Chungking to persuade Chiang to assemble an expeditionary force along the

Salween and to authorize early reconstruction of the demolished sections of

the Burma Road in western Yunnan.

The latter project was equal in importance to the building of a road out of

Ledo, not only from the standpoint of

its short-range usefulness as a tactical

supply route, but also because of its

eventual importance in the strategic line

of communications linking India with

China. On the surface, matters appeared to be progressing smoothly as

Stilwell explained to the Generalissimo

the Anglo-American plans for 1943.

Chiang agreed to organize along the

Salween a group of armies, 15 divisions

strong—the Y-Force. But he reserved

the right to cancel Chinese participation

41

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 222-28.

42

 (1) CBI Hist, pp. 61-62. (2) Min, Mtg of

British-American Staff Cmte, 22 Oct 42. (3) Min,

Conf between Wavell and Stilwell, New Delhi, 27

Oct 42. Last two in Opns Br File, Constr Serv Files.

(4) Memo, Merrill for Rcd, 28 Oct 42, sub: Estimate

of Situation. LAC Files. 43

 Memo, Wheeler for CofS Branch Hq, New

Delhi, 29 Oct 42. Opns Br File, Constr Serv Files.
406 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

in the offensive should the British Navy

fail to demonstrate a "dominance" of the

Bay of Bengal sufficient to prevent seaborne reinforcements from reaching the

Japanese in Burma. Anxious to get

repair of the Burma Road started, Stilwell called Wheeler to Chungking in

mid-November to open discussions with

the Chinese high command looking toward formation of a services of supply

for the Y-Force in addition to the development of a line of communications.44

Preparation for Work

on the Ledo Road

Wheeler took immediate steps to get

work started on a road from Ledo. On

29 October, he placed Arrowsmith in

command of the Ledo base and road

projects and instructed him to draft a

plan of construction for Stilwell's approval. Arrowsmith made determined

efforts to put "the show on the road."

He spent five days in New Delhi in conference with members of Wheeler's staff

in order to get information regarding

the project and the problems involved.

Little was known about routes which

might be followed. The plan was to use

the "refugee route," which the British

had used in withdrawing from Burma.

It was roughly the same as the one suggested by Merrill. The road when finished would be all-weather and one-lane

with turnouts. In estimating troop requirements and the amounts of materials

and equipment needed, Arrowsmith

found the situation bleak. There were

still but three engineer units in the

theater. Only part of the equipment of

the 823d and 45th engineers had arrived,

and only that of the 823d was heavy

enough for efficient road construction.

During the first week of November

Arrowsmith asked Wheeler to request

from the United States, among other

units, a general service regiment, a

maintenance company, and a depot

company. He sent a lengthy requisition

to the supply depot at Karachi for items

that would be needed. He suggested to

Wheeler that the War Department be

asked for several thousand tons of equipment, including 40 D-7 bulldozers, 30

H-20 steel bridges, and a 6-month supply

of spare parts—all to reach Ledo by 1

March 1943. On 5 November Arrowsmith flew to Assam as a member of a

British-American reconnaissance party

to collect data with regard to constructing the road and a base at Ledo. He

soon formulated his general plans for

building the road. On 7 November, his

operations officer flew to Chungking to

hand Stilwell a copy of the road

construction plan. The theater commander approved it at once and radioed

Wheeler's requests for troops and equipment to the War Department.45

Implementing the plan would be

more difficult than drawing it up. The

45th and 823d engineers were alerted for

movement to Ledo early in November;

the work they were doing on airfields

was to be taken over by the British. It

44

 (1) CBI Hist, pp. 61-62. (2) Stilwell Papers, p.

166.

45

 (1) Ltr with Incls, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12

Feb 54. (2) Material from Diary of Lt Col James

W. Sloat Covering the Early Days of the Ledo Road

Project (cited hereafter as Sloat Diary). EHD Files.

(3) Memo, OPD for CG SOS, 14 Dec 42. 400.312

(CBI). (4) Rad, Wheeler to Arrowsmith, 8 Nov 42.

LAC Files.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 407

NATIVE BRIDGE ON THE REFUGEE TRAIL

would, however, be about a month before the American units would arrive at

Ledo. To get the project started, the

British in the middle of November put

several hundred natives on the job of

extending the existing road out of Ledo.

Later that month, part of an Indian

excavation company arrived to help.

Arrowsmith directed Lt. Col. James W.

Sloat, executive officer of the 45th Engineers, and Maj. Robert A. Hirshfield,

Base Section 1 engineer, both members

of the reconnaissance party, to initiate

work on the road and base. On 19

November he returned to New Delhi

with the report of the reconnaissance

party and prepared to "arrange the details" of getting the work started. The

British exhibited little enthusiasm for

Stilwell's plans for an offensive or for the

construction of a road out of Ledo

through the jungles of northern Burma.

Wavell's staff believed that the British

military establishment in India could

not spare the engineering and transportation resources even to tide the Americans over until March, when reinforcements from the United States would

arrive. The British stated they had

been taxed to the limit during 1942 to

build or modernize 222 airfields, develop

training centers and other installations
408 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

for the expanding Indian Army, and, at

the same time, furnish materiel to the

hard-pressed Eighth Army in Egypt.

Weather, terrain, and disease would be

formidable obstacles to any road construction project in Assam and Burma.46

To the British staff's insistence that mud

and malaria would drive the Americans

out of Burma, Arrowsmith bluntly retorted on 24 November that he intended

to carry out the road project "even if he

had only one man."

 47

 The Ledo Road

was started with a minimum of planning

and few resources. As Arrowsmith observed later, "It was a case of kicking a

cat out the door and telling him to

scat."

 48

Preparation for Work in China

Meanwhile, the Chinese showed little

inclination to get on with preparations

for an offensive beyond the Salween or

for improving the Burma Road. Unknown to Stilwell, they had become

enamored of Brig. Gen. Claire L. Chennault's new plan for a vigorous air

offensive aimed at destroying Japanese

air power in eastern China and compelling the enemy to evacuate Chinese

soil. This line of thought appealed to

the Chinese because it involved little or

no effort on their part and put off indefinitely the politically explosive task of

modernizing the army. During the last

week of November, Stilwell learned that

the War Department was cutting in half

his request for troops and equipment

because of the shipping shortage. The

engineer contingent would be substantially intact, but other categories would

be drastically reduced or eliminated.49

Stilwell likened himself and Chiang to

two men "on a raft, with one sandwich

between . . . [them] and the rescue

ship . . . heading away from the

scene."

 50

Despite the rather discouraging outlook, General Wheeler concentrated on

organizing a communications zone for

the Y-Force. After extensive conferences with the Chinese War Ministry, he

decided on 26 November to place his

chief of staff, Colonel Kohloss, in command of the new Eastern Section.

Kohloss' headquarters would be in Kunming. He was to work with the Y-Force

headquarters wherever it operated. His

primary mission was that of advising

Y-Force in the organization and operation of its SOS. Arriving in Kunming

with his staff at the end of November,

Kohloss directed his engineer, Maj.

Louis Y. Dawson, Jr., to work with the

Yunnan-Burma Highway Engineering

Administration, the Chinese agency responsible for rehabilitating and reconstructing the Burma Road in the rear of

the Chinese divisions which would be

moving southward against the Japanese

in Burma.51

Work Begins on the Ledo Road

General Marshall, in steering the Ledo

Road project through to its final ap46

 (1) Memo, Wheeler for Stilwell, 9 Aug 43, sub:

Notes on Construction of the Ledo Road. Engr Sec

File, LAC Files. (2) Sloat Diary. 47

 Merrill, Notes on Joint Staff Mtg, 24th Nov.

Opns Br File, Constr Serv Files. 48

 Interv, Anders with Arrowsmith, 12 Mar 53.

49

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission

to China, pp. 250-52. (2) Leighton and Coakley,

Global Logistics and Strategy, p. 540. 50

 The Stilwell Papers, pp. 170-71. 51

 (1) Interv, Anders with Kohloss, 1 Dec 52.

EHD Files. (2) CBI Hist, sec. II, app. XII.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 409

proval by President Roosevelt on 8

December 1942, indicated the reasons

why War Department planners placed

such great stress on ejecting the Japanese

from northern Burma and on opening

land communications with China. The

great American objective in China,

Marshall declared, was "the build-up of

air operations . . . with a view to carrying out destructive attacks against Japanese shipping and sources of supply."

 52

A dependable overland line of communications with China was essential.

But before this could be provided, the

Chinese, with some help from the

British, would have to advance from

Assam and Yunnan across northern

Burma and get control of the route for

the road. So important did the Combined Chiefs consider the proposed

operations in northern Burma that they

gave them a priority surpassed only by

that of the North African campaign, then

in its critical phase. A most difficult

matter would be supplying men and

equipment in time for work on the line

of communications. Marshall gave Stilwell "some hope" on 10 December that

the needed 6,000 American service

troops and 63,000 tons of road construction and maintenance equipment could

be delivered at Ledo by early March.53

Arrowsmith pushed preparations for

building the road. At the beginning of

December he assumed command in the

Ledo area. The British units, supported by a growing number of laborers,

were barely making headway. An advance detachment of the 45th Regiment

had arrived at Ledo late in November;

the remainder of the unit and the 823d

Battalion were scheduled to arrive early

in December. Arrowsmith, intending

to take over activities around Ledo

gradually, planned to leave most of the

work on the road, for a time, in the

hands of the Royal engineer already in

command—an able colonel determined

to do things his own way until the formal

transfer of authority. Dissatisfied with

the slow advance of the grading and the

colonel's emphasis on graveling, Arrowsmith soon moved up the date of the

takeover to the first week of December.

Relegating the British commander to a

liaison role, he gave command of the

road force to Colonel Sloat, who was

henceforth "Road Engineer."

 54

 Discarding "boulevard specifications," Sloat

proceeded to carry out Arrowsmith's instructions to "put the leading piece of

equipment ahead as fast as we could and

. . . [build] the best road we could to

keep up with it."

 55

 With the arrival of

the 823d and most of the 45th in the first

half of December, work speeded up

considerably.

On 15 December General Wheeler

activated Base Section 3, with headquarters at Ledo. Arrowsmith was now

in formal command of work on the Ledo

Road, as it was henceforth called. At

the same time he continued to be Engineer, SOS. For the time being, he, and

Wheeler as well, were so preoccupied

with reconnaissance and planning for the

road that they had to leave their New

52

 Ltr, Marshall to Field Marshal Sir John Dill, 21

Dec 42. WDCSA 381 China. World War II Rcds

Div.

53

 (1) Ltrs, Marshall to Dill, 10, 13, 21 Dec 42.

WDCSA (China). (2) Ltr, Somervell to Maj Gen

Orlando Ward, C of Mil Hist, 1 May 50. OCMH.

(3) Ltr, Dill to Marshall, 10 Dec 42. WDCSA

(China).

54

 (1) Ltr, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12 Feb 54. (2)

Memo, Wheeler for Stilwell, 9 Aug 43. Engr Sec

File, LAC Files. 55

 Ltr, Sloat to C EHD, 22 Dec 52. EHD Files.
410 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Delhi offices almost entirely in the hands

of assistants. Since the frontier area was

largely uncharted, several officers and

men of the 823d were sent to Arrowsmith's headquarters to produce muchneeded maps. Maj. James A. Walker,

Arrowsmith's supply officer in SOS, set

up a supply depot in a group of brick

godowns at Likhapani, four miles northeast of Ledo. Major Hirshfield took

over as base engineer and started converting Ledo into a major supply point and

staging area. Working closely with

British civil affairs officers, he took over

houses and tea sheds for use as quarters,

offices, and depots. The Chinese divisions and American service units expected soon would be bivouacked on the

tea estates. Hirshfield hired native

labor to build more administrative buildings and warehouses and enlarge the railhead facilities at Likhapani.56

Of the various routes that might be

followed, the refugee trail appeared

best, since it reportedly had been used for

many years as a caravan route and would

therefore probably follow the easiest

way into Burma. An alternative was the

route of a proposed railway which had

been surveyed about twenty years earlier.

This was eliminated as a possibility because of the large tunnels and long river

crossings which would be required.

Arrowsmith decided to follow the refugee

trail wherever possible. The British in

building their highway out of Ledo had

followed the railroad route; soon after

taking over, Arrowsmith directed that

the road builders switch to the higher

ground of the refugee trail.57

By late December, the road team had

taken shape. Out in front, a group of

Tate's 823d engineers were in charge of

reconnaissance. Several Royal Engineer surveyors helped to select the exact

course the route was to follow. Most

of the 823d followed close on the heels

of the surveyors, clearing a roadhead

through the jungle. The unit's six bulldozers, the only available machines with

the power and traction to clear a trail,

had arrived in India without blades,

which were being sent from the United

States on another ship. Four months

after the 823d arrived in India the blades

had still not come. To get work started,

Tate had borrowed a blade from a

British engineer unit on the road. It

was attached to the lead tractor. When

the machine was returned to the rear for

servicing or repairs, another was moved

up and the blade attached to it. In back

of the 823d, the 45th did final grading

and graveling. A British excavating

company and a mechanical equipment

section worked briefly on the road before

withdrawing to British projects. Progress was gratifying to the Americans.

The 823d advanced a fresh graded trace

five miles during the last week of

December.58

By mid-January 1943, the lead dozer

was thirty miles from Ledo and nearing

the mountains. A more rapid advance

was possible after Arrowsmith got two

more blades from a training school in

Lahore. Chinese troops moved in to

56

 (1) Hist of Engr Sec SOS CBI, 1 Oct-31 Dec 42.

(2) Hist of the 823d Engrs. (3) Memo, Engr SupO

for Staff Depot, Likhapani, 28 Jan 43. Engr Sec

File, LAC Files.

57

 (1) Sloat Diary. (2) Ltr, Sloat to C EHD, 22

Dec 52. 58

 Interv, Anders with Tate, 3 Nov 53.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 411

protect the road force; a battalion of infantry and a battery of field artillery

took up positions beyond the Patkais

near Shingbwiyang, and other Chinese

troops were ordered to remain at least a

day's march ahead of the engineers.

The road was rather winding. This was

inevitable because of the way it was being built. The method was to bulldoze

a narrow path through the jungle, move

up all additional equipment to clear out

trees and underbrush on both sides, and

then fit the road into the best part of the

clearing. Because the light D-4 bulldozers of the 45th could not always cope

with the rugged terrain, detours had to

be made around the many large stumps

which the machines could not pull out.

The men put temporary timber bridges

across the major streams and installed

culverts at the minor water courses. In

the flat sections, the road could easily

take two lanes of traffic, but on the sides

of hills it was quite narrow.59 On 21

January Wheeler reported to Stilwell

that graveling had reached Mile 26.60

The theater commander was jubilant,

but agreed with Wheeler's suggestion

that satisfaction be kept "in the American family" to avoid embarrassment

should the units on the road be unable

to maintain their pace.61

Progress continued during February,

but at a much slower pace. By the end

of the month, the roadhead had reached

Pangsau Pass on the Burmese border, 38

miles from Ledo, still some 80 miles from

Shingbwiyang. The slowdown was

caused mainly by the rugged terrain of

the Patkais. Earthmoving was especially troublesome. The engineers had

to apply greater and greater efforts to

widening the road and sloping the high

banks. In mid-March, a brief rainy

spell—the "early monsoon"—temporarily halted work. An 8-mile stretch of

the road in the mountains soon became

so sodden that trucks could not get

through. Tate had to use natives to

carry supplies to the 823d. After the

weather cleared, operations were back to

normal. By the end of the month, the

leading elements were 48 miles from

Ledo and still 70 miles from their goal.62

The monsoon season was approaching.

Arrowsmith hoped to receive his first reinforcements before it struck. Early in

March Shipment 4201 landed at Bombay; it included the 330th Engineer

General Service Regiment, the 479th

Engineer Maintenance Company, and a

platoon of the 456th Engineer Depot

Company. Only the depot platoon was

on the road by the end of the month.

It took over operation of the engineer

depot at Likhapani. General Wheeler

persuaded Chiang to send in the loth

Chinese Independent Engineer Regiment, a crack outfit which reported directly to the Generalissimo. The Chinese engineers, who arrived in midMarch, cleared the jungle and did pioneering ahead of the 823d. During

March and April the 823d's blades and

the D-7 tractors and other heavy equipment on order since November arrived

at Calcutta and began moving up the

rickety railroad to Assam. Whether the

59

 (1) Hist of the 823d Engrs. (2) Interv, Anders with Tate, 3 Nov 53. 60

 Rad, Wheeler to Stilwell, 21 Jan 43. Engr Sec File, LAC Files. 61

 (1) Rad, Stilwell to Wheeler, 25 Jan 43. AG

Files, CBI. (2) Ltr, Sloat to C EHD, 22 Dec 52. 62

 Hist of the 823d Engrs.
412 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

blades and equipment would arrive soon

enough before the rains to be of much

good was doubtful.63

Early in April Stilwell visited Ledo.

As he looked over the various projects

with Arrowsmith, doubts rose in his

mind. In a letter to Wheeler, he expressed the view that the buildings constructed for the base were not sturdy

enough and suggested that a greater

effort be made to provide better housing.

He believed Arrowsmith was concentrating too much on pushing the road, when

he should be expanding the system of

access roads in the base and preparing

supply trails for jeeps through the

jungles to Chinese outposts along the

eastern slopes of the Patkais. In order

to have this additional work done, Stilwell was willing to accept the "sacrifice

of a little progress on the road." But,

after considering the critical shortage of

troops and equipment, he conceded that

"there has been so much done here, and

everybody is so willing and interested

that I have no business to criticise anything. So I won't."

 64

The monsoon, unusually early, was in

full swing by the first week of April.

Viewing the extreme difficulties with

mud slides and drainage in the Patkais,

and realizing that his meager force was

stretched too thin, Arrowsmith on 8

April instructed Colonel Tate to give

top priority to sloping, widening, and

ditching. Late that month, advance elements of the 330th Engineers came up to

reinforce the 823d at the roadhead. The

1st Battalion of the 45th Engineers then

turned to road maintenance while the 2d

Battalion moved back to Ledo to repair

the vital access roads before they disintegrated completely. By May, the engineers were struggling to restore or save

more than 120 miles of roads in and out

of the base. The rains did not cause as

much damage to the bridges as had been

feared. Some of the temporary structures turned out to be too low for the

swollen streams and a number were

washed away, but by the time the rains

began, the permanent bridges were

nearly ready. American and British

engineers put steel spans over the larger

rivers, while the Chinese loth Engineer

Regiment built hand-hewn timber

bridges over the smaller streams.65

The monsoon struck just as the condition of the equipment on the road was

nearing an all-time low. There were

almost no spare parts. A few pieces of

machinery did arrive from Calcutta in

April and May, but by far the greater

part of Shipment 4201 would not be

available until summer. In the meantime, the winter-long operations had

taken their toll. By the end of April a

third of the 823d's tractors and trucks

were awaiting repairs. A month later

two-thirds of its tractors and half its

trucks were out of service. The 45th

Engineers fared no better.66 The rains

were not so severe that all work had to be

63

 (1) Ltr, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12 Feb 54. (2)

Memo Hq Base Sec 3 for Secs and Units, Base Sec 3,

18 Mar 43. Engr Sec File, LAC Files. (3) Hist of

the 456th Engr Depot Co. (4) CBI Hist, p. 83. 64

 Ltr, Stilwell to Wheeler, 6 Apr 43. Stilwell

Pers Files, Ltrs, World War II Rcds Div.

65

 (1) Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, pt V. OCE

Lib. (2) Hist of the 45th and 823d Engrs. (3) Rad,

Arrowsmith to Wheeler, 27 Feb 43. AG Files CBI.

(4) Ltr, Sloat to C EHD, 22 Dec 52. (5) Interv,

Anders with Tate, 3 Nov 53. 66

 (1) Ltr, Harrison to Smith, Sup Div OCE, 8 Mar

43. 400.312 CBI. (2) Hist of the 823d and 45th

Engrs.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 413

stopped, but with their equipment in

such a poor state the engineers would

not be able to extend the roadhead much

beyond Mile 50 during the remainder of

the monsoon.67

Engineer Work in China

In China, likewise, work on the allimportant roads was the main concern

during the first months of 1943. Chinese and American officers were generally agreed that the main Chinese drive

beyond the Salween would follow the

route of the Burma Road toward Lashio.

A secondary thrust would be made along

the partially completed right-of-way of

the Yunnan-Burma railway. The latter

route left the Burma Road near Mitu

some 225 miles west of Kunming and

wound south through the mountains east

of the Burma Road. Kohloss believed

the Chinese should establish depots along

the Burma Road—their main supply

route—and put the road itself in shape.

They should also build a highway from

Mitu into Burma along the right-of-way

of the railroad. At the same time,

Kohloss strove to persuade General Chen

Cheng, the Y-Force commander, to organize a services of supply. In the

winter of 1942-43, Kohloss and Dawson

set themselves the task of achieving these

primary goals, despite such obstacles as

official apathy in Chungking and Kunming, the runaway inflation of the Chinese currency, and the technological

backwardness of the Chinese.68

Dawson's main job was to help the

Yunnan-Burma Highway Engineering

Administration improve the Burma

Road. As his first order of business, he

set out in December 1942 on a trip down

the road as far as the Salween to gather

the data necessary for making intelligent

plans and estimates. He discovered that

the celebrated Burma Road, started by

the Yunnanese administration in the

1920's and completed by the central

government in 1940, was not a highway

in the American sense of the word.

Construction had proceeded without

benefit of specifications, with the result

that each "hsien" or local district had

built its section as economically as possible. The road was two-lane in some

sectors, but poorly surfaced, and partially

demolished as a result of the defensive

measures carried out the previous spring.

With a surface consisting for the most

part of crushed rock and clay, with some

sections asphalted but in poor condition,

the road was dusty when dry and slippery

when wet. Dangerous hairpin curves

were frequent, grades were steep, and

shoulders were eroded.69

 There were

fourteen passes with an elevation of more

than 7,000 feet. The bridges, as a rule

one-lane and usually lower than the level

of the road, consisted of fairly sound

masonry abutments, but some had superstructures of rotting wood. The more

he saw, the more Dawson was convinced

that only a major construction effort

could put the Burma Road in shape

67

 Ltr, CO Base Sec 3 to Wheeler, 29 May 43. AG

611 CBI. 68

 (1) Ltr, Kohloss to Lt Gen Chen Chin-chieh,

7 Feb 43. Kohloss Pers Files. (2) Rpt, Dir YunnanBurma Hwy Engrg Administration, 9 Jan 43. Engr

Br File, Constr Serv Files. (3) YOKE Rpt 5, Kohloss

to Stilwell, 18 Apr 43. Kohloss Pers Files. 69

 Original plans for the Burma Road called for a

maximum grade of 8 percent; actually many grades

were close to 15 percent; a few, as high as 30

percent.
414 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

either as a supply route for the coming

campaign or as the Chinese portion of a

truck highway from Ledo to Kunming.70

Fortified with Dawson's description of

the road and his recommendations for

improving it, Kohloss succeeded in getting Lt. Gen. Chen Chin-chieh, commander of the SOS of Y-Force, to make

an inspection tour of the road from

Kunming to Paoshan, some 40 miles east

of the Salween. The first week in

February, Chen, accompanied by Kohloss, Dawson, and Dr. Lee Wen-ping, a

senior engineer of the Highway Administration, set out on the 430-mile trip.

Thus, the Americans had at last been

able to get key Chinese officials "on the

road"—two months after the Eastern

Section was established. Kohloss discussed with Chen and Lee Major Dawson's role in the proposed improvement

of the Burma Road. The Chinese

agreed to accept Dawson's participation

in their planning work. At the same

time, the Highway Administration, complying with American urging, ordered a

thorough road survey, the first in the

road's history.71 Having discovered that

the Highway Administration had about

a dozen pieces of mechanical equipment,

including three American tractors, two

German air compressors, and a British

power shovel—all in poor condition—

Dawson got the Chinese to promise that

they would assemble this machinery and

have it repaired.72

In the latter part of February Dawson

and the officials of the Highway Administration completed their estimates of

how much it would cost to transform the

Burma Road into an all-weather, twolane highway. Dawson brought to the

meetings with the Chinese engineers his

estimate of 79,823,400 Chinese dollars

for improving the 370-mile stretch between Kunming and the Mekong River

and 37,601,000 dollars for restoring the

226 miles of demolished roadway beyond

the Mekong to the Burmese border, a

total of 117,424,400 dollars, equivalent

to $5,871,220 in American money at the

official rate of exchange which fixed the

Chinese dollar at 5 cents. The uncertainties caused by the runaway inflation

in China were difficult to contend with.

It was impossible to determine what the

purchasing power of the money might be

even in the near future. The Chinese,

therefore, almost tripled Dawson's estimates. Believing that their figures

would not be accepted in Chungking, he

persuaded the Highway Administration

to reduce them by about 25 percent.

The figure eventually agreed upon was

295,566,000 Chinese dollars. Late in

February, this estimate was sent to the

Ministry of Communications at Chungking with a request for an early allotment

of funds.73 There was nothing to do

but wait.

A long period of inaction ensued. A

few laborers remained on the road performing desultory maintenance. When

the April rains started, they withdrew to

their homes. It was Dawson's unpleasant duty to report periodically to Koh70

 (1) Dawson, Rpt on Burma Road, Kunming to

Hsia Kwan, Dec 42, Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files.

(2) Ltr, Dawson to C Mil Hist, 2 Aug 60. EHD

Files. 71

 (1)Ltr, Kohloss to Chen, 7 Feb 43. (2) CBI

Hist, sec. II, app. XII. 72

 Dawson, Rpt 2, Yunnan-Burma Hwy, 26 Jan 43.

Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files.

73

 (1) CBI Hist, sec. II, app. XII. (2) Engr Memo

76, Dawson for Kohloss, 20 Oct 43. 400.312 CBI.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 415

loss on the progressive deterioration of

the Burma Road. In May, the Highway

Administration, in the throes of merging

with the Yunnan-Burma Railroad organization, acquired a new director, C. C.

Kung, who promptly installed his own

group of railway-construction specialists.

They had almost no knowledge of modern road machinery and little desire to

see it used. Dawson encountered only

indifference when he importuned the

Chinese to have their rusty equipment

repaired. The road survey, for which

funds had been borrowed against future

appropriations, was being carried out

with neither centralized direction nor a

common benchmark; the data gathered

would represent an almost complete

waste of time and money. In spite of

Dawson's insistence that final plans be

formulated for the best utilization of the

coming appropriation for improving the

road, the engineers of the Highway Administration declined to bestir themselves on the grounds that Chungking

would never make the appropriation.

It would appear that the only solid engineering achievement of the first half of

1943 was a 160-mile reconnaissance of

the route for the road out of Mitu to a

point 50 miles west of the Mekong,

carried out during April and May by an

infantry officer, one of Kohloss' deputies.74

 The Americans, trying to persuade the Chinese to prepare Y-Force for

action, were frustrated at every level of

command. While Kohloss was able with

his own small organization to construct

and stock depots at Yunnanyi and Kunming, he could not get the Chinese to do

anything toward organizing a supply

service.

Underlying the official apathy was the

Chinese disagreement with the basic

American strategy for the theater, a

strategy that emphasized the need for a

successful campaign in Burma to make

possible the establishment of ground

communications between India and

China. The Chinese, far more interested in aerial supply and air power,

displayed an altogether different attitude

toward airfield construction. Back in

November and December 1942, Yunnanese authorities had impressed thousands

of laborers to enable the Yunnan-Burma

Railroad organization to complete the

airfield at Chengkung. Chiang himself

ordered a bonus paid to the conscripted

laborers. By late January 1943 Advance

Section 3 had three transport fields in

operation at Chengkung, Kunming, and

Yangkai. By spring Capt. Harry F.

Kirkpatrick, Advance Section engineer,

and his staff began making improvements

at two fields near Kunming formerly

used by Chennault's volunteers—Chanyi

and Yunnanyi. Each field originally

had a runway and small hostel. Kirkpatrick extended the runway at Yunnanyi

and put in more taxiways and hardstands

at both fields. By 31 May major construction at Yunnanyi was complete.

Progress was less spectacular at Chanyi,

but this field had been in better shape

from the start.75

74

 (1) Rpt, Dawson to Kohloss, 27 May 43. (2)

Engr Memo 8, Dawson for Kohloss, 4 Jun 43. (3)

Engr Memo 35, Dawson for Kohloss, 21 Jun 43. All

in Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files.

75

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission

to China, pp. 350-53. (2) Memo, Kohloss for Brig

Gen Thomas G. Hearn, CofS CBI, 29 Aug 43.

Kohloss Pers Files. (3) Hq SOS in China Theater,

Hist Background of Engr Sec, Period Ending 31 May

43. Admin Div File, China Theater SOS Engr Files.
416 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The Office of the Theater

Engineer

Ever since Colonel Holcombe had

gone on convalescent leave in June 1942,

Stilwell had been without an engineer

on his staff. When Holcombe returned

to duty it was as Wheeler's deputy. The

position of engineer was filled once more

on 3 January 1943 with the arrival in

New Delhi of Col. Francis K. Newcomer.

Newcomer soon came to the conclusion

that his office was little needed in India,

where Arrowsmith, as SOS engineer,

with the major engineer responsibilities

and resources at his disposal, was "well

established and well equipped" to handle

all tasks. Because of the distance involved, Arrowsmith could exercise little

control over the American construction

program in China. Consequently, Newcomer in March transferred his office to

Chungking. His functions included coordination with the Chinese military in

matters relating to airfield construction

for the Americans in China, policy

making in such matters as mapping and

supplying Chinese troops in training at

Ramgarh and in Yunnan, and a "considerable amount of housekeeping for

the forward echelon of theater headquarters." Newcomer was able shortly

after his arrival in Chungking to add an

assistant theater engineer and three enlisted men to his office. Stilwell rarely

consulted Newcomer, and there was little

the latter could do to further the engineer

effort in China.76

Airfields in India

Since the principal American effort in

late 1942 and early 1943 was directed

toward opening ground communications

across Burma, the airfields in India received comparatively little attention.

Work on them was beset with difficulties,

and the slow rate of progress, especially

on those in central India, severely

strained relations among the engineers,

Tenth Air Force, and the British.

Keeping an anxious eye on the bomber

fields near Calcutta, General Bissell

during December and January repeatedly taxed the engineers with failure to

inspect regularly the work being done by

native contractors.77 Maj. James F.

Hyland, area engineer at Chakulia,

stated that he and his one assistant were

giving "a prorata share" of their time to

each of the five fields in their area. In

Hyland's view progress was not what it

should have been, because of the inefficiency of many of the native contractors

and the inability of the Public Works

Department's few engineers to give

effective supervision.78

Work on the four Hump fields in

Assam, left almost entirely to the British

since the start of the Ledo projects,

showed definite signs of floundering.

The plan to complete work on the fields

before the rains could not be carried out.

From the American point of view, the

failure of "slow acting and unsympathetic" echelons in British command

(4) Stilwell Papers, pp. 152-53. (5) Sampson, Hist

of Chenkung Air Base.

76 (1) Ltr, Holcombe to C EHD, 22 Nov 54. (2)

Ltr, Newcomer to C EHD, 5 Dec 54. EHD Files.

(3) Hq Rear Echelon USAFCBI, Theater Engr Staff

Journal, 1943. Admin File, Constr Serv Files. 77

 Interoffice Memo, Engr for CS SOS CBI, 25 Jan

43. Admin File, Constr Serv Files. 78

 Ltr, Hyland to Works Liaison Gp, RAF, Calcutta, 29 Dec 42. Admin File, Constr Serv Files.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 417

channels to grant adequate priorities was

largely responsible for slowing construction. Local British headquarters persisted in diverting resources away from

the airfields. On 3 March Byroade

stated that it was "very doubtful if more

than about 75% of the . . . work will

be completed in time.79 Holcombe expressed American dissatisfaction in a

letter of 28 April to the new engineer-inchief, Maj. Gen. Horace L. Roome, in

which he urged the British to make

"every effort ... to expedite completion of these airfields."80

 Expressions

of dissatisfaction came from other quarters. Col. Frederick S. Strong, who

arrived from the United States in April

to take over as Engineer, SOS, so that

Arrowsmith could give full attention to

the Ledo Road, soon became aware of

the lack of progress on the airfields.

"Those jobs," he wrote to Somervell on

15 May, "were a British responsibility

and they fell down. At the same time

we lacked sufficient engineer personnel

to keep in close touch with the

work. . . ."

 81

Things seemed no better at Karachi.

There were many differences of opinion

between the engineers on the one hand

and the airmen and the British on the

other. In January 1943 the local Public

Works officials charged the SOS engineers with slowing construction at the

local civil airdrome by stopping work at

sunset and by refusing to allow the mixing of concrete by hand when mechanical

mixers were out of order. Maj. John

P. Nolting, Hirshfield's successor as base

engineer, explained that he stopped

work at nightfall because of insufficient

lighting, and he would not allow mixing

concrete by hand because indifferent

native labor might unwittingly cause a

runway failure at a key airfield. He

was fortified in his stand by the clause

in the contract that, he declared, specifically called for a "2-minute mix." At

the Karachi air base the airmen attempted to "constitute themselves additional inspectors of construction." They

constantly needled the engineers about

construction standards, made surprise

inspections, tried to get possession of

blueprints, and on one occasion invaded

the base section engineer's drafting room

to alter a set of drawings.82

Chennault and the Air War

As 1943 wore on, there were few signs

that an offensive in Burma was near.

Stilwell thought that General Headquarters (India) showed an "extremely

pessimistic and obstructionist" attitude.

Chiang, hoping to avoid committing his

inadequately prepared troops to a

ground campaign in Burma, had written

to President Roosevelt in January suggesting that Chennault be allowed to

conduct an all-out air war against the

Japanese as a substitute: Neither Stil79

 Memo, Byroade to All Units in Adv Sec 2 Area,

3 Mar 43. Adv Sec 2, Admin File, Constr Serv Files. 80

 Memo, Holcombe for Roome, 28 Apr 43. Specs

File, Constr Serv Files. 81

 Ltr, Strong to Somervell, 15 May 43. Somervell

Files, CBI 1942-43. Natl Archives.

82

 (1) Ltr, Hq SOS to CO Base Sec 1, 11 Jan 43,

with Inds, 16 Jan, 18 Jan 43. Specs File, Constr

Serv Files. (2) Ltr, ExecO Karachi Air Base to Hq

SOS CBI, 19 Feb 43, with Inds, 21 Feb and 1, 6, 8

and 17 Mar 43. (3) Ltr, ExecO Karachi Air Base to

CG Karachi American Air Base Comd, 3 Mar 43,

with Inds, 4, 5, 6, 8 Mar 43. Last two in AG 600.1

CBI. (4) Ltr, Engr Base Sec 1 to CO Base Sec 1,

1 Mar 43. Base Sec 1 Admin Files Constr Serv Files.
418 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

well nor Marshall would give up his

plans for an offensive at the earliest possible time. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Marshall had

earnestly argued for an early rescheduling of the invasion of Burma. At

the close of the conference the Combined

Chiefs approved intensified planning

for a campaign to begin in November

1943. Meanwhile, Chiang kept up his

pressure to place the main burden of the

war in China on Chennault's airmen.

Roosevelt gave strong support to

Chiang's views, despite the opposition

of Marshall and General Arnold. He

directed establishment of an air force

under Chennault "to see that . . . [he]

gets his chance to do what he believes he

can do." On 3 March, Roosevelt nominated Chennault for the rank of major

general. Eight days later Stilwell activated the Fourteenth Air Force and

placed it under Chennault's command.83

Wheeler thereupon set up Advance Section 4 with headquarters at Kweilin, 525

miles east of Kunming. Major Price

headed the new organization, with the

mission of building half a dozen bomber

fields for Chennault in the region around

Kweilin.84

In mid-April, Stilwell and Chennault

went to Washington to advise Roosevelt

and Marshall at the TRIDENT Conference, scheduled to begin 12 May. Two

weeks before the conference began,

Chennault greatly impressed the President when he told him that he could

"sink and severely damage more than a

million tons of shipping" if his Fourteenth Air Force could get 10,000 tons of

supplies a month by air from India.

Stilwell's prosaic plans for the reform of

the Chinese Army and the reconquest of

Burma failed to fire the President's

imagination. Roosevelt went to the

TRIDENT Conference apparently committed to the program Chennault had

outlined. On 9 May he sent direct orders to General Wheeler to rush the construction of airfields in Assam "to the

limit."

 85

 Given the President's predisposition toward Chennault's views, it

should have occasioned little surprise to

Stilwell that the TRIDENT Conference

ordered air facilities in Assam developed

to permit an increase in deliveries to

10,000 tons a month by September.

TRIDENT approved reducing the campaign in Burma to a vigorous and aggressive air-ground action to take place after

the 1943 rains and to be limited to the

northern part of the country. Stilwell

disgustedly concluded, ". . . everything

was thrown to the air offensive."

 86

Renewed Priority on Airfields

The decisions made at the TRIDENT

Conference meant that the airfields

would again require a major effort.

Having finished with them, the engineers would be called upon to support

an offensive in northern Burma, to be

staged the following November, provided men and materials were available

to give such an undertaking a good

83

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to

China, pp. 277-84. 84

 Hist of the Engr Sec SOS CBI, 1 Jul-so Sep 43.

85

 (1) Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault (USA Ret.),

Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee

Chennault (New York, 1949), pp. 225-26. (2) Robert

E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York,

1948), pp. 730-31. 86

 Stilwell Papers, p. 205.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 419

chance of success. At the same time,

they would have to continue work on

the line of communications from Ledo

to Kunming, with a view to completing

it as soon as possible after the conclusion

of the campaign. As envisaged by the

conferees at TRIDENT, the line would be

a comprehensive one, including not only

the Ledo and Burma Roads, but also

telephone and telegraph systems, auxiliary airstrips, depots, and hospitals.

Visiting the theater in February 1943,

Somervell, in his talks with various commanders, had stressed the need for a

pipeline. The TRIDENT Conference,

thanks to Somervell's representations,

directed construction of such a line to

extend eventually from Assam to Kunming. All this would have to be built

by the few engineer troops in the theater,

with such help as could be gotten from

the British and the Chinese.87

Airfields in China

No time was lost in getting on with

the work in eastern China. By the first

week of June, Major Price and his small

staff were supervising or planning additional construction at seven existing

fields near the city of Kweilin in Kwangsi

province, about 300 miles northwest of

Canton. The work consisted mainly of

providing communications facilities, repair shops, taxiways, revetments, and

housing for upwards of 1,500 airmen.

A half-dozen fighter strips north and

east of the bomber fields were to be

improved. Byroade, who relieved Price

early in August, reported to Wheeler

late that month that work was "progressing at about half speed" on some

fields and was "completely stopped" at

others.

Because the Chinese Government was

in such a disorganized state, it was sometimes difficult to know with whom to

deal in the selection of contractors.

The engineers wanted some of the men

they had at Kunming and elsewhere to

work on the fields. Two of the fields,

one at Kanchow and the other at Sincheng, were in Kiangsi province, located

in a part of China threatened with economic paralysis because of the chronic

warfare. The lieutenant governor of

Kiangsi, looking for ways to put his part

of the province on its feet economically,

was well aware of the profits to be made

in working on American military projects. He organized two contracting

firms, the Kanchow Construction Company and the Sincheng Construction

Company; an ordinance was enacted

which required all contractors to register so that they might be officially

certified for work on the fields. It

turned out that the lieutenant governor's two firms were the only ones

deemed qualified for certification. To

get an even firmer grip, the local authorities took over the distribution of rice to

the workers in the localities where the

fields were to be built. The governor

expected to receive his share of the

profits or "squeeze" from the certified

contracting firms. Regarded as proper

in China, "squeeze" was considered a

form of racketeering by the Americans.

In August Byroade's resident engineer

arrived at Kanchow with his own contractors. The local authorities put the

87

 (1) ASF's Activities in the Sup of CBI, 1942-43,

pp. 54-58. (2) Ltr, Somervell to C Mil Hist, 1 May

50. OCMH. (4) Ltr, Strong to C EHD, 21 Nov 52.

EHD Files.
420 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

contractors in prison, and the resident

engineer had to cancel his agreements

with them. He found he had no recourse except to deal with the duly

certified local contractors and pay the

higher price necessitated by the squeeze.

Work began in September at Kanchow

but was suspended until the following

spring at Sincheng.88

Airfields in Assam

After TRIDENT, one of the main

objectives of the War Department was

the construction of some twelve transport and fighter fields in Assam. Marshall's personal instructions to Wheeler

on 22 May were that the four fields upon

which so much effort had already been

expended were to be ready by i July to

make possible flying 7,000 tons monthly

from then on.89 Such a goal could be

reached only by the most strenuous

efforts; still, there was some optimism

that it could be achieved. Colonel

Strong, after inspecting the water-logged

fields of Assam in May, expressed hope

that the airfield projects would soon be

"on their feet." The War Office in

London had just sent a harsh radiogram

to GHQ (India) directing an immediate

acceleration, of the work in Assam.

Consequently, Colonel Strong found on

his tour that Wavell's staff was "marshalling additional resources and placing

a top-flight Engineer in charge." He

noted further, ". . . we are reorganizing

our own engineer service there, and, by

robbing other places, are getting a good

officer at each field. . . ."

 90

 British

officials at New Delhi suggested to

Wheeler that they would like to withdraw from the airfield projects in Assam

if the Americans would bring in enough

men and equipment. But Wheeler refrained from exercising more than a

nominal command over these projects,

thus giving the British no pretext for

leaving. He strove to meet the goals set

by TRIDENT by borrowing men from the

330th Engineers, and bulldozers, carryalls, graders, and trucks from units on

the Ledo Road. While the rate of

progress moved steadily upward as compared with that of earlier months, the

work never caught up with the schedules.

By 1 July three of the runways had been

completed to specifications; four needed

additional steel plank, and three others

had only gravel.91 Hampered by inadequate airfields and poor weather, the

transports flying the Hump could deliver

no more than 4,500 tons in July.92

Preparations for the Offensive

in Burma

Stilwell, returning from the TRIDENT

Conference in mid-June, set out to 88

 (1) Hist of Engr Sec SOS CBI, 1 Jul-30 Sep 43.

611 CBI. (2) Rad, Stilwell to Marshall, CM-IN9875, 14 Jul 43. 611 CBI. (3) Ltr, CO Adv Sec 4 to

CG Fourteenth AF, 30 Jun 43. Air Engr File, China

Theater of Opns, KCRC. (4) Memo, Byroade for

Wheeler, 31 Aug 43. AG 686 CBI. (5) Ltr, Engr

Adv Sec 4 to CG USAFCBI, 17 Sep 43. Opns Br

File, Constr Serv Files. 89

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission

to China, pp. 341-45. (2) Min, Mtg at Engr Off Adv

Sec 2, 20 May 43. Specs File, Constr Serv Files.

90

 Ltr, Strong to Somervell, 15 May 43. Somervell

Files, CBI 1942-43. 91

 (1) Byroade, Notes for Rcd on Airdome Constr

and Cargo Availability for India-China Freight Line,

23 Jun 43. Somervell Files, CBI 1942-43. (2) Rad,

Wheeler to CG ATC, CM-IN 540, 1 Jul 43. 611 CBI. 92

 Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, p.

443.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 421

reorganize and unify the American effort

in support of the Y-Force. On 18 June

he organized the Y-Force Operations

Staff (Y-FOS) at Kunming. This was a

group of American officers who were to

advise the Chinese in planning for

operations in Burma, train native troops,

expedite the flow of supplies and equipment, and help improve lines of

communication. While Stilwell was

nominally the commander of the Y-Force

Operations Staff, his responsibilities

were actually exercised by the chief of

staff, Col. Frank Dorn. Colonel Dorn

made Kohloss his G-4 and Dawson his

engineer. Kohloss and Dawson continued their attempts to get the Chinese

to improve their logistical setup. The

two succeeded in getting them to complete the building of the general depots

at Kunming and Yunnanyi early in

August, but they had few illusions about

the future. The Chinese continued to

display almost no interest in an offensive

beyond the Salween—Chiang even proposing that the advance be held off until

January 1944 at the earliest—and there

were no signs during the summer that

he was organizing the Y-Force for a

campaign in Burma.93

The Road Projects

Despite the overriding priority now

given to Chennault's air war, and the

discouraging prospects with regard to

the campaign in Burma, the engineers

continued to push their road projects.

Since it appeared the Chinese would

continue to procrastinate, Stilwell himself felt obliged to intervene in Chungking. On 6 July he succeeded in getting

Dr. Tseng Yang-fu, Chiang's Communications Minister, to agree to begin work

at once on the Burma and Mitu Roads

with a view to opening them to trucks,

at least part way, by October. No action had been taken in Chungking on

the request for funds made in February.

Tseng promised to ask Chiang for 350

million dollars for work on the two

roads. In mid-July, Chiang acted. His

decision was a great disappointment to

the Americans. He authorized only 100

million dollars, to be used solely for the

improvement of the Burma Road. How

much could be accomplished with this

sum was questionable; the Chinese dollar of July was worth only a third of that

of February, and its value was continuing to decline rapidly.94

 Chiang's allotment took the Highway Administration

unawares. C. C. Kung, the director,

called the members of his staff and his

six district engineers to Kunming for

conferences on how to get the work on

the Burma Road under way by early

August. Dawson tried to persuade

Kung to approve a plan for widening

the road. Widening would be more desirable than surfacing during the coming

dry season, for it would interfere less

with military traffic. Kung agreed.

But he allotted the funds in what

seemed a most haphazard manner. As

Dawson put it, it was "by guess and not

based on any definite plan or estimate—

93

 (1) CBI Hist, sec. II, app. III. (2) YOKE Rpt No.

50, 16 Aug 43. Kohloss Pers Files.

94

 (1) YOKE Rpt No. 36-B, 6 Jul 43. Kohloss Pers

Files. (2) YOKE Rpt No. 45, 1 Aug 43. Both in

Kohloss Pers Files. (3) Memo 76, Dawson for Kohloss, 20 Oct 43. Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files.

(4) CBI Hist, sec. II app. III.
422 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

rather on a share-the-wealth scheme.' "95

By the beginning of August planning

for work on the road was complete.

Kung agreed to accept Dawson and Dr.

Lee Wen-ping, a graduate of the School

of Engineering of the University of

Michigan, as his deputy directors.

Kohloss arranged to have a U.S. engineer

officer on duty at each of the Highway

Administration's district offices along the

road. After getting enough mechanics

in July from General Wheeler to repair

the Highway Administration's equipment, Kohloss arranged with Kung early

in August to set up a "Mobile Construction Force" to operate under the administration's direction. Commanded by

an American engineer, Capt. Harvey W.

Gehr, and including 4 American officers,

6 American equipment operators, 4

Chinese civilian road engineers, and a

crew of coolies, the Mobile Construction

Force was to improve those sections of

the Burma Road where machinery

would be most effective. By far the

greater part of the work on the road

would be done by hand labor. On 2

August Governor Lung of Yunnan

agreed to conscript 36,000 peasants who

were to start work late that month.96

All these efforts produced few results.

Governor Lung was nearly a month late

in getting conscripted peasants on the

road. Dawson could not conceal his

misgivings over the Highway Administration's leisurely approach toward its

work. By September only one district

engineer had prepared an engineering

analysis of the improvements which were

to be made under the current allotment.

In Dawson's view, the Highway Administration had "too much overhead doing

nothing at headquarters and too little in

the field." The district engineers had

"too few capable foremen and engineers

to properly supervise the . . . 'conscripted labor.' The result will be that

the work will not be well planned and

the road will suffer." Meanwhile,

Kohloss, concerned over the potential

consequences of inflation, urged Stilwell

to secure additional funds. Chiang's

War Ministry did increase the allotment

for the Mitu Road by 44 million Chinese

dollars, but, no matter how great the allotments made in Chungking, work on

the roads progressed hardly at all.

The Highway Administration's direction

of such work as was carried out seemed to

the Americans quite haphazard. In

some sectors the Chinese went to extremes

in widening the road; in others they accomplished almost nothing. When the

administration, having exhausted its

funds, stopped work early in October, the

Burma Road was essentially what it had

always been—a one-lane road with steep

grades, horseshoe curves, and narrow

bridges. And it was now more in need

of repair than before.97

The renewed emphasis on airfield

95

 (1) Rpt, Dawson to Kohloss, 27 May 43. (2)

YOKE Rpt No. 45, 1 Aug 43. (3) Engr Rpt 6, Dawson to Dorn, 27 Dec 43. All in Engr Br File, Constr

Serv Files. 96

 (1) YOKE Rpts No. 46, 2 Aug 43, and No. 50, 16

Aug 43. Kohloss Pers Files. (2) CBI Hist, sec. II,

app. XII.

97

 (1) YOKE Rpt No. 55, 5 Sep 43. Kohloss Pers

Files. (2) Engr Memo 58, Dawson for Kohloss, 5

Sep 43. Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files. (3) Memo,

Kohloss for Hearn, CofS CBI, 29 Aug 43. Kohloss

Pers Files. (4) Engr Memo 57, Dawson for Kohloss,

31 Aug 43. (5) Engr Memo 76, Dawson for Kohloss,

20 Oct 43. Last two in Engr Br File, Constr Serv

Files.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 423

construction placed the Ledo Road

project in a precarious position. Its

loss of priority in troops and equipment

in May 1943 could scarcely have occurred at a worse time. With the roadhead at the crest of the Patkais, the monsoon storms created endless problems.

Torrential rains swept out bridges and

culverts and undermined the roadway.

Rain-soaked embankments collapsed

without warning and blocked the road

with massive slides. Disabled equipment piled up as the small force of mechanics struggled against forbidding

odds to make the necessary repairs. The

men working on the road saw their ranks

dwindling away as malaria rates rose

steadily. It is small wonder that work

went into low gear and the once-high

morale declined.98 Nevertheless, the

engineers continued improving the road

insofar as possible, although little could

be done to extend the roadhead through

the jungle.

Early in July Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D.

Styer, Somervell's chief of staff, made an

inspection of the road. In a detailed

report to Somervell of his impressions,

he urged, among other things, immediate

shipment of five general service regiments. Referring to earlier British

statements that work would be impossible during the summer, he reported

that the British still seemed "to think

. . . we are crazy for trying." There

was much to justify their views. Among

the American troops, the malaria rate

had reached 955 per 1,000 per year;

among the Chinese, 2,200. "In spite of

all the obstacles encountered on the

construction of the Ledo Road, it is

progressing," Styer concluded, "and

General Wheeler and his force deserve

a great deal of credit for what they have

accomplished under the conditions imposed upon them."

 99

 Shortly afterward, an Air Corps officer inspecting the

road at Stilwell's personal request found

that "the officers and men are doing a

good job under the circumstances."

 100

But others had different opinions. Col.

Frank D. Merrill, theater G-3, had inspected the road only a few days before

Styer's visit. He had come away highly

critical. While many of the resources of

Base Section 3 had admittedly been

drained away to the airfields, Merrill believed that commanders in SOS were

making too much of the effect of such

diversions on the rate of progress on the

road. Merrill particularly blamed the

situation at Ledo on Arrowsmith, recently promoted to brigadier general.

He asserted that Arrowsmith's leadership

was not sufficiently energetic for such

trying circumstances.101

In mid-July, Stilwell hastened to Ledo

for a firsthand look. Finding him "vinegary," Wheeler and Arrowsmith tried

to mollify him and give him a clearer

understanding of the difficult situation.

Wheeler again emphasized that Base

Section 3, "milked daily" of troops for

98

 (1) Ltr, Sloat to C EHD, 22 Dec 52. (2) Hist of

the 45th Engrs. (3) Base Sec 3, Prog Rpts, 29 May,

5 Jun, 9 Jul, 23 Jul 43. AG 611 CBI.

99

 Styer, Notes on Ledo Road Being Constructed

in N.E. Assam Into Northern Burma by U.S. Forces,

2, 3 Jul 43. Somervell Files, Ledo Road, 1943. 100

 Ltr, Col Thomas D. Campbell to Maj Gen

George E. Stratemeyer, CofS AAF, 14 Jul 43. 312.-

lE, AAF Central Files, WW II Rcds Div. 101

 (1) Excerpts from Ltr, Merrill to Stilwell, 29

Jun 43. OCMH Files.(2) Rad, Merrill to Stilwell,

25 Jun 43. Stilwell Pers File, Rads.
424 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

other projects, could use "thousands" of

engineers. Stilwell, staying on at Ledo

for three days, made no specific complaints.102 After he left, Wheeler continued to point out to him the difficulties

on the road. In a memorandum of 9

August, he stated that Base Section 3

had shipped to the airfields in Assam,

5,612 carloads of gravel, "enough . . .

for over 30 miles of single-track road.

. . ." The 330th Engineers, who should

have been sent directly to the road, had

been put to work as stevedores in Calcutta until July, and, upon arriving at

Ledo, the greater part of the regiment

had to be held at the base to work on

access roads and in gravel quarries.103

Wheeler further emphasized that progress on the road had suffered considerably from the failure of the British to

provide sufficient laborers.104 He might

have added that Arrowsmith had been

obliged during the summer to rotate the

823d and 45th engineers to rest camps

in Calcutta to forestall exhaustion

from their continual around-the-clock

efforts.105

Anxious to get the road to Shingbwiyang before fall, and stung by the knowing smiles of the British, Stilwell was

not disposed to give much weight to extenuating circumstances. On 21 August

he again visited the road for a 1-day inspection. He held a series of meetings

culminating in a night session with General Arrowsmith. Stilwell's questions

and remarks at the meetings and conferences appeared "more or less routine"

and seemed to indicate no displeasure

with the way the project had been managed. Nevertheless, that night, Stilwell

sent a radiogram to Wheeler ordering

Arrowsmith's relief. Criticizing Arrowsmith in terms reminiscent of Colonel

Merrill's report of 29 June, he stated he

could not "take chances on that project."

Branding the rate of progress on the road

as a threat to the "whole operation" in

northern Burma, Stilwell asked Wheeler

to look into the possibility of getting a

"top-flight man" from the States.106

Wheeler reluctantly recalled Arrowsmith the next day and placed a Quartermaster colonel, Ellis F. Altman, temporarily in charge of work on the road.

On 23 August Arrowsmith's command of

the project, on which 90 percent of the

engineers in the theater were engaged,

came to an end. As he departed for

temporary duty with Wheeler's headquarters, before leaving for the United

States, Arrowsmith was deeply disappointed. "We knew what we were up

against. . . ." he wrote later. "We

proved that we could not only overcome

the physical difficulties . . . but we also

held up against the mosquito. . . . We

were nearing the end of the long uphill

pull."

 107

 Arrowsmith was relieved just

as better times were almost in sight.

The dry season was approaching and

engineer reinforcements were on the

102Rads, Wheeler to Stilwell, G78, 10 Jul, E183,

13 Jul 43. AG Files, CBI. 103

 Memo, Wheeler for Stilwell, 9 Aug 43. Engr

Sec File, LAC Files. 104

 Memo, Wheeler for Stilwell, 10 Aug 43. 105

 Ltr with Incls, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12 Feb

54.

106

 (1) Ltr, with Incls, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12

Feb 54. (2) Stilwell Papers, p. 218. (3) Rad, Stilwell to Wheeler, 21 Aug 43. Item 681, Stilwell Pers

File, Rads. 107

 (1) Memo, Wheeler for Arrowsmith, 20 Oct

52. Copy in EHD Files. (2) Ltr with Incls, Arrowsmith to C EHD, 12 Feb 54.
THE CBI THEATER: 1941-AUGUST 1943 425

way. With the end of the rains the

natives would be more inclined to work

on the road, and the British would have

less trouble in mobilizing them. The

Anglo-American high commands, meeting at Quebec, had just a few days before

resolved to support a redoubled Allied

effort to open northern Burma and build

a supply road to China.

Chennault's Air Offensive

Meanwhile, Chennault's offensive, despite the support given it, was floundering. During May, June, and July his

flyers destroyed only 3,300 tons of Japanese shipping and appeared to be

making no headway in driving the enemy

out of the Yangtze Valley, as Chennault

had promised the President he would do.

The logistical structure supporting his

effort was unable to meet the demands

made on it. Deliveries from India had

fallen short in July and no great improvement was in sight. In September,

when the airlift was to have attained the

goal of 10,000 tons a month, it carried

but 5,000. Many obstacles had arisen

to hamstring the supply efforts, one of

the most serious being the inadequate

number of airfields in Assam. Of the

seven fields the British were to have

completed by 1 September, only three

were ready. Logistical difficulties in

China were equally serious. The five

large and well-kept fields in Yunnan

were no problem, but the inefficiency of

the line of communications eastward

from Kunming to Chennault's forward

bases left much to be desired. Even if

the airline from Assam to western China

had met its tonnage targets, it seems

unlikely that Chennault's position would

have been noticeably improved.108

The approaching end of the monsoon

season found engineer work in a discouraging state. Progress on the Ledo

Road had come to a virtual standstill.

Almost nothing was being done to improve the Burma Road. The airfields

in Assam were not being put in shape as

rapidly as had been hoped, and the prospects of finishing the fields in eastern

China were disheartening. Unless highlevel changes in policy were soon made,

the engineer effort in the theater might

bog down completely.

108

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission

to China, pp. 336-47. (2) Craven and Cate, eds.,

Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 443-49. (3) Memo,

Marshall for Roosevelt, 4 Oct 43. WDCSA 452.1

(China). (4) Rad, Somervell to Marshall, 20 Oct 43.

Somervell Files, Wires, Round-the-World Trip, Sep

2-Nov 1, 1943.
CHAPTER XI

The China-Burma-India Theater

August 1943—January 1945

QUADRANT Directs an All-out

Effort

Plans for CBI

A change for the better for the engineers in CBI seemed to be at hand.

Meeting in the QUADRANT Conference

at Quebec from 14 to 24 August 1943 to

discuss world strategy, the AngloAmerican high commands gave much

thought to operations in the ChinaBurma-India theater. The Combined

Chiefs, assuming that the Chinese trained

and rearmed by Stilwell would eventually link up with U.S. forces in southeastern China, agreed to commit enough

British and U.S. strength to the theater

to keep China in the war as an effective

ally and as a base for operations against

Japan. To facilitate strengthening

China, they directed the capture of the

northern part of Burma in order to

increase the safety of flights over the

Hump and to make possible the restoration of overland communications by

mid-February 1944.1 Much thought

was given to developing the line of

communications from India to China.

Somervell went into this matter with

the Quartermaster General of the British

Army, Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster.

The two worked out a comprehensive

program for improving logistical support

for the Chinese war effort. Their plans

called for an increase in deliveries over

the Hump to 20,000 tons a month by

mid-1944. There would have to be a

redoubled effort to open the Ledo and

Burma Roads to make possible trucking

30,000 tons of supplies a month to China

by January 1945.2

Plans for constructing a pipeline from

India to China figured prominently in

the talks. To ship sufficient quantities

of fuel to China by truck and plane to

support a sustained drive against the

Japanese would be impossible. "The

old Burma Road ate its head off in gasoline," Merrill had declared at TRIDENT.

"A pipeline is the only way to cure

this."

 3 Construction of a pipeline system

in a combat zone might have met with

insurmountable obstacles had it not been

for improvements, such as the Shell Oil

Company's invasion-weight pipe. This 1

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission

to China, pp. 357-60. (2) Memo, Stilwell for Chiang,

11 Nov 43. Stilwell Pers Files, Ltrs. (3) Plng Div

ASF, The Ledo Road, app. A, pp. 12-14. OCE

Library.

2

 (1) ASF Activities in the Sup of CBI, pp. 83-88.

(2) CBI Hist, sec. II, app. VIII. 3

 Memo, Merrill for Lt Col Donald F. Horton,

Plans Div ASF, 14 May 43. Stilwell Pers Files, Ltrs.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 427

pipe was thin-walled, portable, and

weighed about half as much as standard

pipe. There were two sizes—one, four

inches in diameter; the other six. Each

piece of pipe was twenty feet long. A

piece of 4-inch pipe weighed about 90

pounds; of 6-inch, about 150. The sections were not welded together as were

those of standard weight, but were

joined by "victaulic couplings." These

were collars with rubber gaskets, made

tight by the pressure of the oil or gasoline flowing through the pipes. A mile

of invasion-weight pipeline together

with pumping stations weighed thirteen

tons. Pipe and stations could be easily

transported and installed in any kind of

terrain accessible to trucks. Improved

types of submarine lines, ship-to-shore

loading equipment, and bolted steel

tanks holding 250, 500, or 1,000 barrels

had also been developed. In July 1943

the Office of the Chief of Engineers reported that construction of a 4-inch,

invasion-weight pipeline from the town

of Dibrugarh on the Brahmaputra

River in Assam through the mountains

of northern Burma to Fort Hertz and on

to Kunming was practicable.4 The

QUADRANT Conference approved construction of a line via Fort Hertz which

would skirt enemy-held territory and

would be used mainly to supply gasoline

to Chennault's air force. The Combined Chiefs further approved the laying

of a second 4-inch invasion-weight line;

this one would follow the Ledo and

Burma Roads to supply gasoline to

trucks hauling supplies from India to

China. In addition, the Combined

Chiefs directed that two 6-inch pipelines

be put in, one to extend from Calcutta

to Kunming via the Ledo and Burma

Roads to provide gasoline for American

and Chinese ground operations, and

the other to run from Calcutta to

Dibrugarh to feed the 4-inch lines.

When finished, these 4- and 6-inch lines

would form the most extensive pipeline

system in the world.5

The QUADRANT Conference also took

up the matter of guerrilla warfare.

British Brigadier Orde C. Wingate, who

had carried on such warfare in Burma,

had come to Quebec to support

Churchill's arguments for broadening

the scope of commando operations behind enemy lines. Wingate was convinced that in his recent campaigning he

had developed a method of harassment

that would cripple Japanese defenses.

He proposed to augment his specially

trained brigades of Chindits—named

after the mythical lionlike animals which

guarded Burmese temples and made up

of natives of India, whites from the

British Isles, and Negroes from West

Africa—so that they could strike really

effective blows. He wanted to improve

the means of sending his forces behind

enemy lines by air. Given enhanced

mobility and dependable air supply,

Wingate was certain the Chindits could

harry the Japanese sufficiently to force

them out of northern Burma. The

Allied commanders approved his proposals. General Marshall directed the

assembling of an American task force of

4

(1) Memo, C Opns and Tng Br OCE for Dir of

Opns ASF, 29 Jul 43. 678 (CBI.) (2) See also above,

p. 390.

5

 John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of

the Army Service Forces, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), p. 71.
428 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

some 3,000 volunteers who would serve

with the Chindits. General Arnold

promised to supply pilots from the AAF

to fly the planes Wingate said he needed.

He directed Air Force Col. Philip G.

Cochran to go to India in the autumn to

organize these men into the 5318th Air

Unit, which would be a "custom-made"

aggregation of bombers, fighters, transports, gliders, and helicopters. It would

be up to the engineers to provide the

landing fields for the air commandos

behind the enemy lines. Wingate would

carry on guerrilla warfare in Burma

while the Chinese under Stilwell

launched their full-scale offensive.6

General Arnold announced a project

at the conference which was destined to

have a tremendous impact on the engineer mission in CBI. The Army Air

Forces had almost perfected the B-29 or

"superfortress" bomber, which was to be

capable of delivering 10 tons of bombs

on a target 1,500 miles away. Arnold

informed the Combined Chiefs that the

first B-29's would be ready during the

coming winter. If bases could be provided in the Changsha area of China,

midway between Kunming and Shanghai, the Air Forces would be ready to

launch a massive assault on Japan by

October 1944. This plan of overwhelming Japan with fleets of superbombers appealed to the imagination of

the President. The number of fields to

be built was left rather indefinite and

methods of providing logistic support

were not clearly formulated. Planning

staffs in Washington and in the theater

would have to work out the details in

the next few months. Roosevelt believed that if the plan could be carried

out as Arnold proposed, there would be

a material improvement in Chinese

morale and an early end of the war with

Japan.7

Theater Reorganization

The decisions at Quebec were undertaken simultaneously with two basic

changes in the Allied command structure in the theater designed to promote

more effective use of resources. Hoping

to eliminate some of the confused relationships of the existing "loose coalition of Allied headquarters," Roosevelt

and Churchill agreed to set up the

Southeast Asia Command. Vice Adm.

Lord Louis Mountbatten was named commander. With his main forces based in

India, he would control Anglo-American

operations in Burma. Stilwell's position in the new setup was not clear. He

would be under Mountbatten insofar as

operations in Burma were concerned,

and it was generally assumed he would

be Mountbatten's deputy, but there was

no official confirmation of this assumption. Arnold's chief of staff, Maj. Gen.

George E. Stratemeyer, was to go to CBI

as Stilwell's air adviser. He was appointed commanding general of U.S.

Army Air Forces, India-Burma Sector,

and as such was the ranking American

air officer in the theater. Under him

6

 (1) Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan,

pp. 494-95, 503-07. (2) Romanus and Sunderland,

Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 366.

7

 (1) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate,

eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol V,

The Pacific—Matterhorn to Nagasaki: June 1944 to

August 1945 (Chicago: The University of Chicago

Press, 1953), pp. 16-22. (2) Henry H. Arnold,

Global Mission (New York, 1949), pp. 476-80.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 429

was Tenth Air Force, commanded, after

General Bissell's return to the United

States in mid-August, by Brig. Gen.

Howard C. Davidson. Stratemeyer, arriving in the theater in August, set up

his headquarters near Calcutta. He

soon learned that he would have little

control over Chennault. Roosevelt had

assured Chiang that Stratemeyer would

not interfere with the operations of the

Fourteenth Air Force, and Stilwell exempted Chennault from Stratemeyer's

operational control. To most observers,

command relationships in CBI remained

as involved as before, and the complexities of the engineer organization as great

as ever.8

The growing emphasis on air power

led to the organization of engineer offices

in the Air Forces in CBI for the first

time. On 15 August Col. Herman W.

Schull, Jr., organized an Engineer Section in Chennault's Fourteenth Air

Force headquarters at Kunming. Schull

and his one assistant were henceforth

responsible for maintaining liaison with

the Services of Supply regarding the

building or maintenance of five airfields

in Yunnan and ten in eastern China, together with a dozen reserve fields in

widely scattered localities. A similar

development took place in India. On

20 August Stilwell activated the CBI Air

Service Command with headquarters

near Calcutta, to succeed the X Air Force

Service Command. The new organization was charged with supporting the

Tenth Air Force in India and the Fourteenth in China. Col. Lyle E. Seeman,

who arrived from the United States in the

summer of 1943, became the first engineer of the new organization. At the

same time he became theater air engineer under Stratemeyer. Like Schull in

China, Seeman, with his small staff,

maintained liaison with SOS on airfield

construction in India.9

Planning for New Operations

Because of the shortage of planning

staffs in the theater, Army Service Forces

in Washington had to assume the main

burden of planning for the line of communications projects the Combined

Chiefs had approved. This responsibility Somervell and his staff accepted

with enthusiasm. Styer wrote that the

"development of the line of communications from India to China bids fair to be

the greatest engineering undertaking of

the war. . . ."

 10

 Early in September,

Somervell established the India Committee. It included specialists from the

technical services. The committee's job,

Somervell said, was to keep ASF "in a

position at all times to back up and even

anticipate the demands which are made

on us in the way of men and materials."

 11

8

(1)Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 89. (2)

Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp.

45-54. (3) CBI Hist, sec. III, app. IX. (4) Ltr,

Arnold to Stilwell, 28 Aug 43. Stilwell Pers Files,

Ltrs. (4) Ltr, Maj Edward E. Voynow to Hq AAF,

4 Jan 44. AAF Central Files 312.1—H Opns, Ltrs,

Nov 43-Feb 44.

9

 (1) Hq Fourteenth AF Engr Sec, Office Diary, 15

Aug 43-3 Apr 44, p. 1. Air Force Files, CT. (2)

CBI Hist, sec. III, app. IX. (3) Ralph G. Hoxie,

Frederick J. Ericson, and Robert T. Finney, Hist of

the Fourteenth AF (MS), pp. 109-13, 312-22. Air

Univ Lib Maxwell AFB. (4) Hist of CBI Air Serv

Comd, pp. 28-32. Last two in Air Univ Lib Maxwell AFB. (5) Ltr, Seeman to EHD, 29 May 53.

EHD Files. 10

 Quoted in ASF Activities in the Sup of CBI, p.

41.

11

 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
430 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The principal representatives of the

Corps of Engineers on the committee

were Col. Louis G. Horowitz, for theater

liaison, Col. Thomas F. Farrell, for construction, and Col. Harry A. Montgomery, for supply.

With such co-operation as the CBI

staffs could give, headquarters in Washington worked at top speed during the

autumn to get men and supplies to the

theater. Somervell was determined to

obtain for the Ledo Road its full allotment of eighteen engineer construction

battalions. As of September 1943 only

six were in the theater. Subject to the

availability of shipping and the troop

priority lists established by Stilwell,

Somervell intended if possible to have

the entire eighteen on the road by the

following January.12 The Corps of

Engineers expanded the Petroleum

Section of the Engineer Unit Training

Center at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana;

nine petroleum distribution companies

were to be trained and readied for shipment to India by early 194413

 General

Godfrey, the Army Air Forces engineer,

was deeply interested in a number of

projects scheduled for CBI. At his urging, General Arnold directed that the

headquarters of an aviation regiment and

four aviation battalions be sent to the

theater for work on the B-29 fields.

Godfrey, having played a key role in

securing the adoption of airborne engineer units by the Army in the summer of

1942, was especially interested in Wingate's plans for the air commandos. He

was largely instrumental in getting airborne engineers assigned to the commandos for the coming campaign in

Burma.14

In procuring supplies and equipment

for road and pipeline construction,

Somervell's hand was greatly strengthened by the fact that Army Service Forces

had already assembled many of the materials needed; they had been intended for

the now-abandoned line of communications from Rangoon to Kunming. All

of the pipe required for the 4-inch line

via Fort Hertz was en route to the theater

by late August. Nearly a fourth of the

900 miles of 6-inch pipe and accessories

which ASF had originally ordered for the

line from Bhamo to Kunming was on its

way. Of the 55,715 tons of road

construction equipment requested by

Wheeler during 1942 and 1943, all was

either en route or being procured by

Army Service Forces by 1 September.

Since additional pumping stations and

pipe would be needed, the Corps of Engineers undertook procurement during

September and October.

It soon became evident that the B-29

program would have to be curtailed. It

ran aground on the shoals of logistics.

Having the fields at Changsha would

mean developing a line of communications from Calcutta to Kunming of a

magnitude and at a speed not contemplated by the Combined Chiefs. The

supply effort required would be herculean. As modified by Stilwell and

Stratemeyer in October and November,

the MATTERHORN project called for the

construction of five air bases west of

Calcutta and four staging fields near the

12

 Ibid., pp. 88-101. 13

 Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, Troops and Equipment, p. 432.

14

 Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Matterhorn

to Nagasaki, p. 62.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 431

city of Cheng-tu in Szechwan Province,

northwest of Chungking. This reduced

program would move up the advent of

the bomber offensive to the spring of

1944, but mass bombings would have to

be given up in favor of careful selection

of strategic targets, such as Japanese steel

mills and aircraft factories.15

The preparations being made in the

United States soon had their repercussions in the theater. The engineers had

to make still greater efforts to meet the

goals set by the QUADRANT Conference.

Work on old projects had to be speeded

up and new ones begun. Whether

much more could be done until more

troops arrived was doubtful. Highly

desirable would be a better organization

of the theater. In any case, by the fall

of 1943 there was a noticeable quickening of engineer work in the theater from

eastern China to western India.

Airfields in China and India

In eastern China, Byroade continued

to supervise construction of the fields

near Kweilin and began to improve several more about 200 miles to the east and

southeast. In this part of China, the

engineers, as before, met with unexpected developments. Outside Kiangsi

Province, where the local authorities

were not so fully in control, "uncertified

contractors" were permitted to start

work on some of the fields. Soon organized gangs were carrying out systematic acts of violence and intimidation

against contractors and workers alike

with little or no interference on the part

of the authorities. A number of additional contractors were subsequently

"certified," after they indicated they

were willing to share profits with local

officials. Despite such hindrances, progress was made in construction. During

the autumn Byroade presented Chennault with 5 improved fields near Kweilin and 7 more 200 miles farther east and

southeast. By this time SOS engineers

in China were responsible for maintaining 27 fields for Chennault.16

The fields in Assam, upon which so

much work had been done to make possible flying larger tonnages to Chennault,

also showed progress. This improvement was accompanied by high-level

struggles in the final, critical phases of

the construction effort. The British,

pointing to the top priority assigned by

the Combined Chiefs to ground operations scheduled for 1943, explained that

it would be necessary to withdraw their

military engineers from Assam for duty

on the line of communications supporting the British forces facing southern

Burma. Stilwell and Wheeler were able

early in October to convince them that a

wholesale withdrawal would be uneconomical. The British agreed to leave

their engineers on the most important of

the remaining uncompleted fields. Late

that year the Air Transport Command

had available ten fields along the upper

Brahmaputra.17

With more fields in India and China to

15

 (1) ASF Activities in the Sup of CBI, pp. 88-101.

(2) Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, pt. V, p. 29; app.

B-1, pp. 37-45.

16

 Hoxie et al., Hist of Fourteenth AF, pp. 109-13,

312-22. 17

 (1) Hq USAF in CBI, G-4 Periodic Rpt, 30 Sep

43. EHD Files. (2) Rad, Stilwell to Marshall, 4 Oct

43. 611 CBI. (3) ASF Activities in the Sup of CBI,

p. 93.
432 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

give him support, Chennault in October

was able to make a more effective showing. Deliveries of supplies over the

Hump increased, and two additional

fighter squadrons arrived. After the

failure of his trial offensive in August

and September, Chennault now found

the going much easier. He began to

take the initiative in China's eastern

skies. In the last quarter of 1943 his

flyers carried out highly successful strikes

against Japanese shipping on the Yangtze

and off the China coast.18

The Ledo Road

Meanwhile, the engineers in Base

Section 3 labored to provide the overland communications indispensable for

expanded operations in China and

Burma. Inasmuch as Arrowsmith's successor was a Quartermaster officer, supervision of work on the road now rested

largely with Col. Robert E. York, road

engineer since 21 May. The return of

the 45th Engineers from their rest camp

near Calcutta early in September and the

tapering off of the monsoon gave Colonel

York a chance to push road construction

once more. With the 330th Engineers

breaking the trail and doing the advance grading and the 45th Engineers

doing the final grading and graveling,

the Ledo Road inched southward

through the jungle and defiles of northwestern Burma, despite the 23 inches of

rain that fell during the remainder of

the month.19 By 15 October the lead

bulldozer had advanced nearly seven

miles and was beyond Mile 60.20 By

this time there were on the road 2 general service regiments, 3 aviation battalions, and one engineer maintenance

company, about 5,250 engineers in all.21

On 17 October a new chapter began in

the history of the road. Col. Lewis A.

Pick, Missouri River Division engineer,

arrived to take command of Base Section

3.22 He lost no time in inaugurating a

new order of things. On the evening of

his arrival, he bluntly told his assembled

staff, "I've heard the same story all the

way from the States. It's always the

same—the Ledo Road can't be built.

Too much mud, too much rain, too

much malaria. From now on we're forgetting this defeatist spirit. The Ledo

Road is going to be built—mud, rain,

and malaria be damned!"

 23

 Pick set up

his command tent near the roadhead.

He reinstituted the around-the-clock

schedule that General Arrowsmith had

been forced to abandon five months before with the onset of the rains. Pick

was determined to brook no obstacle to

the speedy advance of the road. He

sought to provide adequate lighting for

work at night by stripping the base of all

generators, wiring, sockets, and bulbs

that could possibly be spared. He told

the troops that if necessary they were to

put flares in buckets of oil. Work would

have to go on without interruption.24

Pick believed that one of his first jobs

18

 Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan,

pp. 529-36. 19

 (1) Hist of the 45th and 330th Engrs. (2) Ltr,

CO 330th Engrs to CO Base Sec 3, 11 Oct 43. Engr

Sec File, LAC Files.

20

 Rad, Hirshfield to Stilwell, 16 Oct 43. AG Files

CBI.

21

 Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. C, p. 42. 22

 Hq Base Sec 3 GO 20, 17 Oct 43. AG File, LAC

Files. 23

 Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. F, p. 22. 24

 Ibid., p. 23.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 433

was to relieve the forward elements on

the road. The day before his arrival,

orders had gone out withdrawing Company D of the 330th Engineers from the

roadhead. This unit, which had spearheaded the advance since early July, had

been reduced to a handful of men by

malaria and dysentery. Its removal for

rest and recuperation was clearly necessary. On 1 November Pick lauded

Company D for displaying a fortitude

"comparable to that cited for combatant

troops." Shortly afterward, he began

pulling back the rest of the 2d Battalion

for road maintenance and improvement

south of Pangsau Pass. By 14 November he had moved up the 1st Battalion of

the 330th to take the lead. The roadhead stood at Mile 63. The advance was

about to begin in earnest.25

Early in November Stilwell visited

road headquarters. He impressed on

Pick the urgent importance to the tactical

plan of having a jeep trail open to

Shingbwiyang by the first of the year.

"I can't build you a jeep road," Pick replied, mindful of the difficulty of maintaining a narrow track in the swampy

jungle, "but I'll build you a military

highway to handle truck traffic." With

Pick's assurance that such a road could

be built to Shingbwiyang by 1 January

1944, Stilwell took him up on it.26 In

mid-November, the 330th and the Chinese 10th engineers at Mile 63 began the

54-mile "race to Shingbwiyang," by

breaking a path through the jungle. To

the rear, the 45th Engineers were joined

by a number of newly arrived units.

The 849th and 1883d Aviation Battalions

helped with final grading and graveling

from Pangsau Pass southward. The

209th Combat Battalion operated a sawmill, did road maintenance at the pass,

and a little farther south built a 157-footlong girder bridge over the Nawngyang

River. The 823d engineers maintained

the older sections of the road, while the

479th Maintenance Company repaired

equipment. With the help of Company

C of the 45th Engineers, which had made

an overland trek to open an advanced

roadhead at Mile 70 early in October,

the 330th had pushed its lead bulldozer

twenty-two miles beyond that point by

the close of November.27

Under Lt. Col. William J. Green, who

became road engineer on 3 December,

progress was rapid. Favored by generally clear weather, the 330th Engineers

gradually improved their performance

until they attained early in December an

average of a mile a day. The units to

the rear maintained the pace set by the

those in the lead. Specifications called

for a minimum width of twenty-seven

feet, shoulder to shoulder, with a 20-foot

roadway, maximum grades of 10 percent,

and a minimum curve radius of fifty feet.

Accounting for the rapid progress in

construction were various factors, including around-the-clock operations, the

trickling forward of new equipment, and

Pick's insistence on constant supervision

of construction and maintenance by all

commanders and on giving junior officers

25

 (1) Ltr, Surgeon 330th Engrs to CO 330th Engrs,

1 Oct 43, with Inds, 4, 14, 15 Oct 43. (2) Ltr, ExecO

330th Engrs to Road Engr, 1 Nov 43. Both in Engr

Sec File, LAC Files. 26

 Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. F, p. 23.

27

 (1) Road Hq Tab, Distr of Functions of Engr

Units on Ledo Road, 22 Nov 43. Engr Sec File,

LAC Files. (2) Rads, Col Pick to Brig Gen William

E. R. Covell, 27 Nov, 4 Dec 43. AG Files CBI. (3)

Hist of the 45th, 330th, and 1883d Engrs.
434 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

a detailed insight into the planning behind each phase of the work. The ingenuity of maintenance crews made up

somewhat for the scarcity of spare parts

but was not equal to the task of preventing entirely the continual deterioration

of the heavy equipment, too long in constant use. At any rate, by making the

best use of the equipment they had and

by throwing fresh grading parties from

the recently arrived 1905th Engineer

Aviation Battalion to create new roadheads, Green pushed his trace to within

eleven miles of Shingbwiyang by 23 December. The engineers now pressed

forward through the remaining stretch.

Green split the 330th to put in advance

roadheads and organized two more grading parties. Shortly before noon on 27

December, the 330th engineers connected

their traces 3 miles north of the town.

Pick flashed the word to New Delhi that

the 117-mile road from Ledo to Shingbwiyang was open. He then rode into

town at the head of a convoy of jeeps

and trucks. He had beaten his target

date of 1 January by five days. Finished grading and graveling remained to

be done, but the road from Ledo to

Shingbwiyang, which Stilwell wanted,

was open.28

Soon after his arrival in the theater,

Pick had taken steps to begin work on

that part of the pipeline system for which

he was responsible. Wheeler had informed him that Stilwell was no longer

interested in a line over the mountains

by way of Fort Hertz. Early in October

the Chief of Engineers had recommended against using the light, invasionweight pipe in the high elevations of the

China-Burma divide. Consequently, on

the 16th Stilwell had gone back to the

original plan of putting the pipeline

along the road. Because materials could

be moved forward more easily there,

construction would be simplified. Pick

had a considerable stock of 4-inch pipe

in his warehouses, but no troops to build

the line were scheduled to arrive before

January.29 Determined not to waste

two months of good construction

weather, he decided to use men from the

330th Engineers and from the recently

arrived 209th Combat Battalion and

382d Construction Battalion. On 27

October he put the men to work laying

pipe from the refinery at Digboi, toward

Ledo, fourteen miles to the south.

Early in November Col. Kenneth MacIsaac, who had recently arrived from the

United States with a staff of four petroleum engineers, took charge of the

project. Almost totally inexperienced

in this type of construction, the troops

under MacIsaac caught on quickly.

The line was soon complete to Ledo and

was being extended down the road.

The men were laying an average of 1.2

miles of pipe a day. The rate slowed

down when they reached the mountains,

where they rarely laid more than half a

mile a day. By the last week of December, the pipeline crews had almost caught

up with the graveling details at Mile 60. 28

 (1) Hist of the 330th Engrs. (2) Memo, ExecO

330th Engrs, for Bn CO's, 5 Dec 43. Engr Sec File,

LAC Files. (3) Rad, Pick to Wheeler, 9 Dec 43.

AG Files, CBI. (4) Memo, CO 1st Bn 330th Engrs,

For All Concerned, 17 Dec 43. Engr Sec File, LAC

Files. (5) Rad, Pick to Covell, 27 Dec 43. AG Files

CBI.

29

 (1) Rad, Somervell to Stilwell, 13 Oct 43. 678

(CBI). (2) Memo, OCE for CG ASF, 20 Oct 43.

320.2 (CBI).
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 435

Thereafter, MacIsaac slowed the pace of

the advance to that of the gravel-head in

order not to hamper the forward elements on the road.30

Stilwell's campaign in northern Burma

had gotten off to a premature start on 16

October. The tactical plan called for

the Chinese to advance from Shingbwiyang to the Tarung River, which flowed

in a southerly direction about twenty

miles to the east. From the Tarung,

Stilwell's forces were to drive southward

on 1 December toward the town of

Myitkyina, some 140 miles away. Myitkyina was the main operational base for

the Japanese forces holding northern

Burma. Astride the route planned for

the Ledo Road, it was a key rail terminus.

Near the outskirts of the town was a

vitally important airfield. Operations

against the Japanese did not develop as

planned. On 30 October the Chinese

ran into unexpectedly strong enemy

formations on the west bank of the

Tarung. What was to have been a quiet

"forward displacement" became a seesaw struggle.31

 The possibility of a

counterattack against Shingbwiyang and

the roadhead had loomed large in the

minds of the engineers near the front.

Writing to Pick on 14 December, Lt.

Col. William E. Hicks, executive officer

of the 330th Engineers, complained that

his forward battalion, approaching Shingbwiyang, had only piecemeal information on the location and status of the

front. Liaison of the engineers with the

ground forces was practically nonexistent, Hicks declared, and the air-raid

warning system was totally inadequate

insofar as his forward elements were concerned. On 30 December Hicks reiterated his fears, but by the time his letter

reached Ledo the Chinese had scored a

signal victory at Yupbang Ga. This

triumph clinched their hold on the line

of the Tarung.32

The Burma Road

Prospects in late 1943 for opening a

line of communications in Assam and

Burma appeared brighter, but such was

not the case in western China. Colonel

Dawson could report but slight progress

on road work there. By the end of

October, funds allotted for the repair of

the Burma Road east of the Mekong

were exhausted. West of the river the

Chinese did some work on bridges, but

since they were still haunted by the

spectre of a Japanese crossing of the

Salween, it was impossible to get them to

resurface the demolished portions of the

road within thirty-five miles of the river.

In December Stilwell proposed a further allotment of 480,000,000 Chinese

dollars for widening, surfacing, and reducing grades, but the likelihood of

getting the money appeared slight.

Little work was accomplished. The

Burma Road, Dawson disclosed late that

month, was "still essentially a one-track

road. . . ." Nor could he report any

real progress on the Mitu Road. Having appropriated 168,000,000 dollars in

September for construction of the first

30

 (1) Hist of the 209th, 330th, and 382d Engrs.

(2) Constr Serv SOS CBI, Informal Progress Rpt for

Jan 44—4" Pipeline (Digboi-Kunming). Opns Br

File, Constr Serv Files. 31

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command

Problems, pp. 122ff.

32

 Ltrs, Hicks to Pick, 14 and 30 Dec 43. AG File,

LAC Files.
436 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

300 kilometers, the Chinese Government

organized a makeshift Mitu Road Authority. Despite Dawson's repeated protests, the Chinese ignored the graded

and generally satisfactory roadbed of the

Yunnan-Burma Railroad; they planned

instead to turn a nearby supply trail into

a one-lane, dry-weather road. This trail

occasionally followed stream beds, which

meant that monsoon rains would wash a

road out altogether. In February the

director of the road authority quit. His

successor refused to take over because

the agency's funds were exhausted. By

this time American hopes for the Mitu

Road had been dashed to pieces by Chinese indifference and mismanagement.33

Supplies

Engineer supply for the theater was an

immense problem by the latter months

of 1943. In October General Somervell,

on a worldwide inspection trip, visited

Base Section 3. His observations and

his talks with General Wheeler and

Colonel Strong convinced him that

Army Service Forces would have to intensify its efforts even more if Stilwell's

vital supply line across Burma was to be

completed before the monsoon began in

1944. The engineers' most common

complaint about their equipment was

that the D-4 tractors and 1/2-yard shovels

were too small for the work the general

service regiments had to do. On 21

October Somervell radioed Styer, directing him to procure and ship to the

theater by January 1944 a large number

of heavy construction items. Included

were 100 D-7 tractors, 40 shovels, 70

scrapers, 75 graders, and no rock crushers. Somervell assured Wheeler that on

his return to Washington he would

institute changes in tables of equipment

for general service regiments to provide

machinery of greater earth-moving capacity. Noting that local sources of

engineer material were almost exhausted,

particularly in the categories of electrical

and water distribution systems and

builder's hardware, Somervell directed

his subordinates to begin shipment by

January 1944 of a 6-month supply of

such materials.34

In reviewing the troop situation with

Somervell, Wheeler emphasized the fact

that units from the United States were

not reaching Base Section 3 on time.

The causes were varied—insufficient

shipping, the relatively low position of

the engineers on the theater priority list,

and the frequent unreadiness of units in

the United States for overseas movement

when they were scheduled to go. The

troop basis for pipeline companies, which

Somervell proposed to expand from ten

to seventeen, was a case in point. Three

companies were needed at once, but for

the reasons given above none would be in

the theater before January 1944.35

Commenting on the over-all engineer

troop situation in a radiogram to Styer

on 22 October, Somervell stated that it

was impossible "to over-emphasize the

importance of getting these units here at

33

 (1) Engr Rpt 6, Dawson to Dorn, 27 Dec 43.

Engr Br File, Const Serv Files. (2) Ltr, Dawson to

CofS Y-FOS, 16 Feb 44. 611 (CBI). (3) Memo 95,

Dawson for Dorn, 29 Feb 44. Engr Br File, Constr

Serv Files.

34(1) ASF Activities in the Sup of CBI, p. 205.

(2) Rad, Somervell to Styer, 21 Oct 43. Somervell

Files, Wires, Round-the-World Trip. (3) Ltr,

Somervell to Reybold, 27 Nov 43. 400 CBI. 35

 ASF Activities in the Sup of CBI, p. 117.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 437

the earliest . . . date." "Adequate

shipping should be secured," he directed.

In addition Styer should insure "that

these units are ready to meet new priorities . . . and all delays due to defects

in equipment, training, or other causes

should be avoided at staging areas."

Also needed in order to "strengthen the

general situation" were maintenance,

heavy shop, depot, and parts supply companies.36

 Stilwell's staff agreed to improve the engineers' position on the

theater priority lists. The rest was up

to Army Service Forces.37

Problems of Organization

The latter part of 1943 saw far-reaching changes in the assignments of key

officers in the theater. Wheeler was

transferred from the Services of Supply,

CBI, to the Southeast Asia Command to

become Mountbatten's chief administrative and supply officer. Mountbatten's

engineer-in-chief was British Maj. Gen.

Desmond Harrison; his deputy engineerin-chief was Col. Walter K. Wilson, Jr.,

recently arrived from the United States

along with Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had been selected as Mountbatten's deputy chief of staff. As

Wheeler's successor in SOS, Stilwell accepted Somervell's choice of Brig. Gen.

William E. R. Covell, an Engineer officer, at that time head of the Fuels and

Lubricants Division in the Office of The

Quartermaster General. Colonel Farrell of ASF's India Committee went to

CBI as Engineer, SOS, to replace Colonel

Strong, who was to return to the United

States. General Godfrey was scheduled

to become Stratemeyer's engineer, with

Colonel Seeman as his deputy. More

officers were now available. Between

mid-November and mid-December about

fifty arrived from the United States to

staff the engineer structure in the

theater.

At this time Chennault and Stratemeyer were making vigorous attempts to

take airfield construction away from the

Services of Supply. Seeking control of

airfield construction in China, Chennault

criticized, as contrary to established

policy, the arrangement of having fields

built under the direction of SOS. "If

the present system were working well, it

might be best to let it ride," he declared

on 9 October 1943, but, he stated, SOS

engineers were in many instances unprepared to do the work which the Air

Forces wanted. Moreover, he felt the

presence of SOS in the chain of command

merely served to extend the interval between the request for and the start of

construction.38 Stratemeyer, hoping to

get control over construction of the B-29

fields, had placed his aviation engineers

on preliminary planning early in November. Wheeler pointed out that the

proposals of the airmen, if carried out,

would result in the formation of two

competing engineer services. The Services of Supply was already critically short

of engineers, and things would only be

worse if the few that were available had

to be shared.39 Upon taking up his

duties as commander of SOS, General

36

 Rad, Somervell to Styer, 22 Oct 43. Somervell

Files, Wires, Round-the-World Trip. 37

 Ltr, Hq SOS CBI to CG Rear Ech USAF CBI,

13 Nov 43. AG 322 CBI.

38

 Ltr, Chennault to Stratemeyer, 9 Oct 43. AG

322 CBI. 39

 Memo, Wheeler for DCofS Rear Ech CBI, 8

Nov 43. AG 322 CBI.
438 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Covell supported Wheeler's views. He

explained to Stilwell on 17 November

that aviation engineering was "not unlike other construction." Building up a

separate engineer organization for the

Air Forces would only delay getting

MATTERHORN off the ground. In his

opinion, it would be "more expeditious

to expand a going organization."40

After weighing the arguments, Stilwell

on 19 November transferred responsibility for building airfields in China and

Burma to the Air Forces. He approved

enlarging the Fourteenth Air Force Engineer Section and sending an Air Forces

engineer headquarters company to China

for service with Chennault. But he

kept SOS in charge of airfield construction in India.41

One of General Covell's first jobs was

to deal with a request from Stilwell for a

report on SOS and for proposals as to

how that command might be reorganized

in line with recent War Department

plans for reorganizing communications

zones in theaters of operations. These

plans called for centralizing control of

major technical activities in headquarters, SOS, rather than delegating control

to the commanders of base and advance

sections. In a report made on 2 December recommending strict adherence to

the War Department's plans, Covell suggested that command over construction

projects "of a nature that involves highly

technical control and operation" be

placed directly under his headquarters.

Insofar as engineer work was concerned,

commanders of base and advance sections

would henceforth be responsible only

for administrative and housekeeping

functions.42 Although Stilwell modified

parts of Covell's proposals, he approved

fullest possible application of the principle of centralized command over engineer construction.43

On 22 December Covell established

the Construction Service as one of his

subordinate commands and made Colonel

Farrell its head. At the same time,

Farrell remained as Engineer, SOS.44

On 15 January Farrell took charge of all

engineer work for which SOS was responsible except that in Pick's Base

Section 3 and in the advance sections in

China. To staff his new headquarters,

he merely made use of his SOS Engineer

Section. Retaining its organizational

structure substantially as it was, he took

advantage of the recent influx of engineer officers from the United States to

expand the various sections.45

By the end of January, Farrell, responsible for engineer work in a vast

area, had set up a field organization

modeled on what the Corps of Engineers

had in the United States; that is, one

made up of divisions and districts.

There were two divisions and six districts. Division 1, under Col. Philip F.

Kromer, included most of central and

eastern India, except Assam. In this

division, District 10, headed by Lt. Col.

Kenneth E. Madsen, was in charge of the

40

 Memo, Covell for Stilwell, 17 Nov 43. StilwellCovell Corresp File, Constr Serv Files. 41

 Ltr, Stilwell to Stratemeyer and Covell, 19 Nov

43. Theater Engr Policy File, Constr Serv Files.

42

 Ltr, Covell to Stilwell, 2 Dec 43. Opns Br File,

Constr Serv Files. 43

 1st Ind 10 Dec 43 on Ltr, Covell to Stilwell, 2

Dec 43. 44

 Hq SOS CBI GO No. 82, 22 Dec 43. AG 325.455

CBI.

45

 (1) Hq SOS CBI Memo No. 219, 22 Dec 43. AG

321 CBI. (2) Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 1 Feb 44.

Admin File, Constr Serv Files.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 439

work on the B-29 fields west of Calcutta,

just getting under way. District 12,

placed under Col. William C. Kinsolving, a petroleum engineer, formerly

general manager of the Sun Pipeline

Company and recently arrived from the

United States, had the task of laying the

two 6-inch pipelines from Calcutta to

Assam. District 11 had charge of all

remaining projects, located principally

around Calcutta. Outside the divisional

area and reporting directly to Colonel

Farrell was District 9, which was responsible for construction in the New Delhi

area. Pick was in charge of Division 2,

which included most of Assam and part

of Burma. He had two districts. District 20 was to do all construction and

maintenance at the Hump airfields in

Assam. District 22 was in charge of

building the pipelines along the Ledo

Road. Pick remained in command of

Base Section 3, which included the Ledo

Road. He retained firm control of all

construction for which he had been responsible; work on the Ledo Road was

not under Farrell's jurisdiction.46

In view of the transfer of airfield construction in China from the Services of

Supply to the Air Forces, Covell and

Stratemeyer in December prepared a

plan for reassigning engineer personnel

on duty there. All engineer officers assigned to airfield work in Advance Sections 3 and 4 were transferred to the CBI

Air Service Command. At the close of

the month, the latter organized the

5308th Air Service Area Command, with

headquarters at Kunming. The new

organization was to direct all airfield

construction in China. Colonel Byroade was transferred from Advance

Section 4 and assigned temporarily to

the area command as project engineer.

In early 1944 the area command organized three districts. The first had charge

of work on the eight fields near Kunming, the second was to build the B-29

fields, and the third was to build more

fields for Chennault in eastern China.47

The B-29 Fields

Late in 1943 work on the B-29 fields

began. The amount of construction required was considerable, for the size and

weight of the B-29 were unprecedented.

The craft's wing span was 141 feet as

compared to the 104 feet of the B-17, or

Flying Fortress, the next largest bomber;

its loaded gross weight of approximately

70 tons was twice that of the Flying

Fortress. Its wheel load was 34 tons as

against the 19 tons of the B-17. According to estimates made in the United

States, the B-29 required a runway 8,500

feet long and 200 feet wide, an area

almost twice that of the 6,000 by 150 foot

runway used by the B-17.

In India, the engineers set out to provide the runways for the B-29's by enlarging and improving five existing fields

in the flatlands west of Calcutta. Little

could be done unless help was forthcoming from the government of India.

Much of the impetus for getting work

started came from the engineers on

Mountbatten's staff. The SOS engineers appealed to General Harrison and

46

 Hq Constr Serv SOS CBI GO No. 1, Dec 43.

AG 325.455 CBI.

47

 (1) Ltr, Covell to Hq Fwd Ech CBI, 24 Dec 43.

Covell Ltr File, Constr Serv Files. (2) CBI Hist, sec.

Ill, app. IX.
440 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Colonel Wilson for help. They in turn

appealed to Mountbatten, whose influence on the government of India was

considerable, and help was promised.

In mid-December, Stratemeyer's engineers turned over to Covell the preliminary construction plans already

prepared. Company A of the 653d

Topographic Battalion began to survey

the fields in order to determine how the

extensions could best be made. So that

the runways could be made operational

at an early date despite the shortages of

men and materials, the SOS engineers

persuaded the airmen to accept, for the

time being, runways 7,500 feet long and

150 feet wide. Since the aviation engineers who were to build the fields would

not reach India until February, the engineer-in-chief of the British Eastern

Command agreed to furnish local contractors to begin work at the sites. In

December, District 10 borrowed 170

equipment operators from various engineer units, together with 300 trucks. By

the end of the month the district had

provided each field with a project engineer to serve as a liaison officer with the

Royal Engineers supervisor. In January Pick released the 382d Construction

Battalion temporarily to rush work on

the field at Kharagpur.48 These various

makeshift arrangements would have to

do until the aviation engineers arrived.

By late 1943 work on the B-29 fields in

China was also under way. Byroade and

his staff had begun planning during the

last week of November. To find sites

for the fields, Byroade personally reconnoitered the plains around Cheng-tu,

150 miles northwest of Chungking. He

believed the area to be the best in Free

China. The terrain was similar to that

of the American midwest, and in the

Cheng-tu Valley a number of fields already existed, the runways of which

could be easily lengthened for the big

bombers. After studying his report of

8 December,49 Chinese and American

commanders worked out an agreement

to get construction started. The Superfortresses would be based at four sites—

Kwanghan, Pengshan, Kiunglai, and

Hsinching. (Map 21) There were to be

seven fighter fields. The Chinese Military Engineering Commission would

control construction; American engineers would do mainly staff work. The

responsibility of Lt. Col. Waldo I.

Kenerson, head of District 2, would be

limited to drafting specifications, preparing layouts, making inspections, and

assisting with the organizing, administering, and paying the hundreds of thousands of peasants who would be

conscripted for work on the airfields.50

Since the runways would have to be built

largely by hand and probably could not

be brought up to required standards, the

48 full length of 8,500 feet was authorized (1) Hq Constr Serv SOS CBI, Final Rpt, 8-29

Bases, India, Nov 44, pp. 1-11. 686.61 (CBI). (2)

Memo, CG Air Serv Comd CBI to Farrell, 26 Nov 43.

(3) Rad, Arnold to Stratemeyer, 4 Dec 43. Last two

in Constr File, Constr Serv Files. (4) Hist of the

653d Engr Topo Bn. (5) Memo, Off C Engr SOS

CBI to Air Engr AAF IBS CBI 11 Dec 43. Constr

File, Constr Serv Files. (6) Ltr, Covell to CG Hq

Rear Ech, 25 Jan 44. Specs File, Constr Serv Files.

(7) Hist of the 382d Engrs.

49

 Ltr, Byroade to Chennault, 8 Dec 43. Air Engr

File, CTO. 50

 (1) Memo, Hq AAF China Theater for Bd of

Offs, 8 Sep 45, sub: Chengtu Constr Program. AAF

319.1 CTO. (2) Craven and Cate, eds, The Pacific—

Matterhorn to Nagasaki, pp. 65-70.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 441

MAP 21

to lessen the chance of serious mishaps in

takeoffs and landings.

Particularly irritating to the engineers

was the radical departure from existing

financial arrangements whereby the Chinese had paid for building operational

facilities, and the Americans had supplied quarters, recreational facilities, and

other nonoperational features. President Roosevelt had promised Chiang

reimbursement for all labor and materials expended on MATTERHORN in

China. How far Roosevelt had committed himself became evident in midDecember when the Chinese came up

with a preliminary cost estimate of two

to three billion Chinese dollars. "Appalling," wrote Stilwell on 18 December,

suspecting that "squeeze" accounted for

a large share of this astronomical figure,

which at the official rate of exchange

amounted to $100-150 million in American money.51

By early 1944 the engineers were making progress in providing the logistic

51

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command

Problems, p. 77.
442 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

PIPELINE CARRIED ACROSS A STREAM

on an A-frame.

basis for the impending Allied offensives.

Of a total U.S. Army strength in Stilwell's command of 100,000, 11,000 were

engineers. Five thousand more were on

the high seas, due to arrive within the

next few months. The engineers were

building or maintaining some forty-five

airfields in India and twenty-five in

China. Nearly 90 percent of the troops

were working on the Ledo Road and the

pipelines in Base Section 3. There were

now about 80,000 tons of supplies and

equipment in the hands of engineer

troops in the theater, almost all of the

tonnage being in Base Section 3. The

condition of most of the equipment was

poor. Nearly half of the machinery in

Pick's command was deadlined because

of the lack of spare parts. Local sources

of supply, almost depleted because of

India's low level of industrialization and

the difficulty of maintaining imports

from the West, furnished no remedy to

alleviate this situation. The engineers

were becoming increasingly dependent

on the United States for men and materials, and Army Service Forces was

working against time to make good

Somervell's commitments to the theater.

The All-out Effort Continues

There was no slackening in the pace in

the first months of 1944. With the

Japanese brought to battle in northern

Burma, work on the Ledo Road was of

great importance. The engineers in

western China continued urging upon

the Chinese the necessity for early reconstruction of the Burma Road to support the Y-Force's coming advance. At

the same time engineer commanders

were taking advantage of their growing

resources in men and materiel to push

the pipelines northward from Calcutta

to Assam, and from there southeastward

into Burma. To help prepare the great

surprise which the B-29's had in store

for the Japanese, the engineers had ahead

of them the enormous job of completing

the bases in India and China for the

Superfortresses. In addition, the demands of the struggle in northern Burma

were to involve the engineers in combat

for the first time.

Combat Support

After the Chinese won their victory

over the Japanese at Yupbang Ga in the

last week of December, Stilwell made

plans to push the enemy farther southward. One of the prominent terrain

features in northern Burma was the

Tanai River, which flowed northwest-
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 443

ward for about 50 miles through the

Hukawng Valley to within ten miles of

Shingbwiyang, where it made an abrupt

turn to the south. The Tarung River,

its source in the northern hills, flowed

southward into the Tanai in the

Hukawng Valley at a point about 18

miles southeast of Shingbwiyang. An

oxcart trail led from Shingbwiyang eastward across the Tarung and then south

across the Tanai to the village of

Mogaung, 30 miles southwest of Myitkyina. This trail was the main supply

route for the Japanese. Stilwell wanted

to move a Chinese force across it some

30 miles southeast of Shingbwiyang in

order to envelop the Japanese believed

to be along the north bank of the Tanai

east of the Tarung. While the main

body of the division would assault the

enemy frontally along the Tarung, a Chinese regimental combat team would slip

across the Tanai south of Shingbwiyang

and proceed along the river's left bank.

At the same time, a Chinese infantry

regiment, assembled 25 miles southwest

of Shingbwiyang, would move eastward

into the upper Hukawng far behind the

Japanese. If this plan of campaign

could be carried out successfully, the

Japanese would be trapped and destroyed

in the Hukawng Valley. After that, the

march on Myitkyina would be virtually

unopposed.52

While the Chinese were preparing for

the offensive, Stilwell detached two companies of the 330th Engineers to clear

trails through the ten miles of jungle

between Shingbwiyang and the Tarung

so that the infantrymen could move forward more easily. This area was so near

the enemy troops that patrols from both

the 330th and the Chinese units had to

be kept on both flanks. On 6 January a

route to the Tarung was open to jeeps.

The engineers then graded and widened

a 12-mile-long, dry-weather road leading

eastward from Shingbwiyang, to be used

as a supply line for the Chinese.53

The attack was soon under way. On

13 January the Chinese crossed the

Tarung and came to grips with the main

body of the enemy. The regimental

combat team which crossed the Tanai

southeast of Shingbwiyang, hoping to

envelop the enemy left flank, encountered unexpectedly strong resistance on

the south bank. Although it managed

to push the enemy eastward beyond the

confluence of the Tanai and Tarung, it

had to pause to root out pockets of resistance and consequently could not put

any serious pressure on the main enemy

force north of the Tanai. The envelopment of the Japanese flank failed.

Elsewhere, the Chinese made reasonable

progress. During the first" week of

February, they reached the village of

Taihpa Ga located at the point where the

oxcart trail crossed the Tanai, four miles

east of the Tarung.54 The stubborn

Japanese resistance halted progress on

the Ledo Road. Pick had to keep almost all of his men north of Shingbwiyang, where they were engaged in grading and widening the stretch of road

already put in.

Stilwell had decided that as soon as

Taihpa Ga had been captured, he would

52

 Romahus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command

Problems, 129-38.

53

 Hist of the 330th Engrs. 54

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command

Problems, pp. 134-38.
444 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

send Col. Rothwell H. Brown's Chinese

tank group down the oxcart trail toward

Mogaung. He directed Pick to send in

engineers to improve and hold open this

"combat trail," as it was henceforth usually called. This would mean a serious

diversion of Pick's engineers from the

Ledo Road. The combat trail, lying

dangerously below the flood levels of the

Hukawng Valley, had already been rejected as a possible route for the road.

A great deal of work would be needed to

make it passable for military vehicles.

Pick, bowing to tactical necessity, put a

strong engineer force on the job of improving the trail and bridging the rivers.

Men of the 1st Battalion, 330th Engineers, worked long and hard to make the

trail passable for military vehicles.

They were joined by the 76th Light

Ponton Company and Company A of the

1883d Aviation Battalion. Early in February a detail from the 330th built a dryweather transport strip at Taihpa Ga,

despite the frequent shelling from Japanese artillery south of the Tanai. In

the first half of the month the 76th

pontoniers put a 470-foot pneumatic

ponton bridge across the Tarung. The

over-all situation was encouraging.55

During March Pick, now a brigadier

general, had to lend a number of his

engineers to the infantry to provide

support for the forward movement. At

the beginning of the month, at Taihpa

Ga, the 71st and the 77th Light Ponton

Companies built a 470-foot ponton

bridge across the Tanai over which

Brown's Chinese tankers and infantrymen passed and then moved down the

combat trail.56 Ten bulldozer operators

from the 330th General Service Regiment volunteered to support Brown's

forces with their machines. On 3 March

they went into action with the tankers

at a point thirteen miles southeast of

Taihpa Ga. The engineers' mission

was to hew a trail through the jungle to

the southeast and help get the tanks

across numerous streams so that they

could make a surprise assault on the

Japanese at the hamlet of Walawbum,

twenty-two miles southeast of Taihpa

Ga. Three of the engineers were

wounded the first night. Three were

subsequently awarded the Silver Star,

and the entire group was commended, as

Stilwell put it, "for resolute conduct

under very difficult terrain conditions

and while frequently in contact with

enemy opposition."

 57

As infantry and tanks closed in on

Walawbum from the northwest, a new

threat to the Japanese appeared from

the east. The American infantrymen

originally scheduled at QUADRANT to

serve under Wingate were, upon arrival

in the theater, diverted to Stilwell to be

used as a hit-and-run force. Merrill,

now a brigadier general, was in command. Correspondents dubbed the

force "Merrill's Marauders." On their

first mission, the Marauders suddenly

appeared at Walawbum on 3 March and

threatened the Japanese there with entrapment. The enemy commander on

the same day ordered a general retreat to

the south. By 9 March the Japanese

were gone.58

Early in March Wingate was ready to

55

 (1) Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. G, pp.

16,37. (2) Rpt, Hirshfield to Pick, 24 Jan 44. LAC

Files. (3) Hist of the 76th, 330th, and 1883d Engrs.

56

 Hist of the 71st and 77th Engrs. 57

 Hist of the 330th Engrs. 58

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command

Problems, pp. 130-31, 148-57.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 445

begin his airborne offensive. He had

assembled Colonel Cochran's Air Commando unit, 4 brigades of Chindits, and

the 900th Engineer Airborne Aviation

Company at 2 airfields, 300 miles northeast of Calcutta. The engineers were to

prepare strips in the Burmese jungle for

the Chindits to land on. Engineers in

other theaters had already carried out

airborne missions; this one would be the

first mission in which they would travel

to their destinations in gliders. Airmen,

reconnoitering at low altitudes over the

Burmese forests, had come upon two

fairly level clearings near the western

bank of the Irrawaddy, eighty miles

south of Myitkyina. Engineers flown in

with the first infantry detachments were

to prepare the clearings for the large

number of planes to come in later.

Aerial photographs made shortly before

the scheduled takeoff showed that trees

had been dragged onto one of the clearings to block a landing. All the gliders

would therefore have to be flown to the

other clearing despite the congestion

likely to ensue.

On the evening of 5 March men,

planes, and gliders were ready to take off

for their destination, 250 miles deep

in enemy-held territory. Accompanying

the infantry were Capt. Patrick J. Casey,

commander of the 900th engineers, with

13 of his men. They had four bulldozers, two scrapers, a grader, a jeep, and

hand tools. The men loaded the bulldozers, with blades attached, on the

gliders. The air fleet took off, the

planes towing the gliders in tandem.

Crossing the 7,000-foot-high mountains

of the Indo-Burmese border, the fleet

soon approached the clearing. The

heavily loaded gliders came down at high

speed. Some of the first ones ran into

unforeseen difficulties. The field was

crisscrossed with ruts, which, overgrown

with grass, had been invisible to the

reconnoitering parties. The ruts tore

off the landing gear of some of the craft

and caused a number of crashes. With

so many craft coming down at once,

several pile-ups resulted. Some of the

gliders rammed into the trees surrounding the clearing. The glider in which

Captain Casey and an engineer enlisted

man were riding came in too high. Attempting to circle the clearing for a

landing, the pilot lost control of the

craft; it plunged into a tree, and the

occupants were killed. All told, about

5 percent of the landing force was lost.

A bulldozer and a scraper were wrecked.

The first infantrymen to land dispersed to guard against possible enemy

infiltration. The engineers began to

prepare the landing strip. Their main

job was to level the clearing as rapidly

as possible with their machinery. Some

of the infantry, using hand tools, filled in

ruts and cut grass. The soil, with a

high clay content, would be satisfactory

for dry-weather operations. The next

night, about seventy C-47's safely

brought in troops and supplies on a

runway already provided with lights,

radios, and radar. That same night another detachment of the 900th was flown

to a glade fifty miles farther south. This

landing was made without mishap.

Using their bulldozers, the engineers

smoothed the surface of the clearing

sufficiently to enable transports to

land without serious damage. Chindits,

flown to these two fields, set out to

dynamite the Burma Railway.59

59

 (1) Lowell Thomas, Back to Mandalay (New

York, 1951), pp. 198-225. (2) Hist of the 900th
446 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Harassed from the front and rear, the

Japanese in the Hukawng Valley withdrew southward, hoping to make a stand

on a ridge at the southern end of the

valley. On 19 March the Chinese upset

these plans by seizing the ridge. They

then pushed on, while the Marauders

repeatedly hit at the enemy's rear and

flanks. In late March, with his forces

only seventy-five miles from Myitkyina,

Stilwell planned a bold stroke to seize

the city and its important airstrip before

the monsoon closed in. The Chinese

were to continue the advance in such

strength as to lead the Japanese commanders to believe that Mogaung, not

Myitkyina, was their goal. While the

Japanese moved troops from Myitkyina

to defend Mogaung, two Chinese regiments and the Marauders would slip over

the Kumon Range and descend on

Myitkyina from the northwest.60

Meantime, the Japanese began an

offensive of their own against the British

Fourteenth Army near Imphal on the

Indian-Burmese border. The British

had been expecting an attack for months

and had their plans ready for meeting it.

At the first enemy attacks, they intended

to retire from the mountainous frontier

and draw the Japanese into the Manipur

Plain. When the Japanese reached

Imphal, British ground troops with the

help of airborne reinforcements would

turn on them. But the enemy struck

with much greater speed and strength

than expected, and the British position

soon appeared to be precarious.61

The extent of the Japanese offensive

suggested to Mountbatten the need for

stronger measures against the enemy's

lines of communications. Additional

airborne troops would have to be flown

into Burma. To place his last two

Chindit brigades across enemy lines of

communications and to supply his more

or less isolated units already in Burma,

Wingate called upon the airborne engineers to prepare a landing strip in a

clearing about eighty miles southwest of

Mogaung. At dusk of 21 March a third

detachment of the airborne engineers

was flown to Burma. Construction of

this landing field was a race against time.

Wingate's staff believed the Japanese,

who would undoubtedly learn of the

landing, would attack within twenty four

hours. The engineers would have to

prepare the strip so that the Chindits

could land before the enemy arrived.

The race was won by two hours; this

was the length of time it took the first

Chindits to make contact with the approaching Japanese. Personally directing this new assault, Wingate was killed

in a plane crash on 24 March. He left

to his successor, Maj. Gen. W. D. A. Lentaigne, the problem of coping with the

desperate situation of those Chindits

holding the railroad block at Mawlu

against frantic Japanese attempts to

break their grip.62

On the plains of Manipur, things continued to go badly for the British. By

30 March the Japanese vanguard had

reached the highway leading north from

Imphal to Dimapur, about 170 miles

Engrs. (3) Rpt, Godfrey to Stratemeyer, 28 Mar southwest of Ledo. The British Four- 44. AAF, Central Files, Folder for Gen Davidson. 60

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command

Problems, pp. 118, 185-88, 200-205. 61

 Ibid., pp. 172-75.

62

 (1) Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 507-08. (2) Hist of the 900th Engrs.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 447

teenth Army, 70,000 strong, found itself

cut off from contact with friendly forces.

In an emergency meeting on 3 April at

Jorhat with Mountbatten and his principal subordinates, Stilwell was relieved

to discover that the British were confident of ultimate success because of the

logistical overextension of the Japanese

forces. In fact, for the first time, Stilwell's British colleagues seemed really

enthusiastic about his offensive against

Myitkyina.63

Because of the desperate plight of the

Chindits at Mawlu, Lentaigne sent the

commandos and the engineers on a

rescue mission. On 4 April the commandos landed five gliderloads of engineers with equipment in a clearing near

the roadblock. The men prepared a

landing strip at the foot of the high hill

upon which the Chindit stronghold was

located. Additional troops and supplies

flown in enabled the Chindits to keep

the Burma Railway blocked until the

monsoon rains began one month later.64

Progress on the Ledo Road

During the first months of 1944 work

on the Ledo Road lagged. Because of

the unfavorable tactical situation east of

the Tarung, nothing was done on the

roadhead east of Shingbwiyang until 26

January. Between then and early February, the engineers cleared twelve miles

beyond the city. Work stopped. The

proximity of the Japanese and the diversion of troops to the combat trail made

it advisable to halt. For the time being,

the 45th and 330th General Service

Regiments and four aviation battalions

graded and graveled the road north of

Shingbwiyang. The beginning of March

saw the resumption of sustained work on

the roadhead. The 1st Battalion of the

45th Engineers took the lead. Hardly

had it finished its clearing and grading to

the Tarung during the last week of

March, when Stilwell directed it to move

south of the Tanai to help maintain the

combat trail. Moving up to the forefront on the Ledo Road, the 1883d Aviation Battalion began pushing through

the forests and marshes beyond the

Tarung. The unit did both grading

and graveling. In April, to speed the

work, General Pick sent the 1905th

Aviation Battalion and Company A of

the 330th Engineers ahead of the 1883d

to put in a finished and separate fourmile stretch of road. At the same time,

details of engineers built a number of

landing strips along the road so that

supplies could be flown in and defense

of the road facilitated.65

It had been recognized from the first

that one of the biggest jobs on the Ledo

Road would be bridging the turbulent

rivers of northern Burma. Materials

had been requisitioned early and had

begun to reach the theater in the first

months of 1943. The engineers in the

theater had decided that the H-20 bridge

would be best. This bridge consisted

of decking, supported by two trusses

made up of rectangular, latticed steel

sections, each 12 1/2 feet long, 6 feet high,

and 2 feet wide, weighing nearly a ton

63

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 192. (2) Stilwell Papers, p. 287. 64

 (1) CBI Hist, sec. II, app. IX. (2) Hist of the

900th Engrs.

65

 (1) Constr Serv, Progress Rpts, 12 Feb, 5 Apr,

5 May 44. 611 CBI. (2) Hist of the 45th, 330th,

and 1883d Engrs.
448 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

apiece, and bolted together. The maximum span, made up of ten sections on a

side, was 125 feet; it could carry loads

up to 15 tons. With shorter spans and

more than two parallel trusses, the

capacity of the bridge could be increased

to 54 tons. Early in March, General

Pick placed the main responsibility for

bridging on the 209th Combat Battalion.

One company of the battalion, helped

by the 76th Light Ponton Company,

built an H-20 bridge, 960 feet long, over

the Tarung in 27 days, completing it

early in April. The other companies of

the 209th bridged the lesser streams beyond the Tarung. In mid-March, Company A of the 209th started to build an

H-20 over the Tawang. This bridge,

together with its wooden trestles over the

swampy approaches, was 1,200 feet long.

The major accomplishment of Company

F of the 330th Engineers during the dry

season was the erection of a third H-20,

607 feet long, over the Tanai. This job

was completed early in May.66

As a result of the QUADRANT Conference, bridging for the Ledo Road had

become a major subject for planning in

the Office of the Chief of Engineers and

in Army Service Forces in the fall of

1943. During the following winter

OCE sponsored various study projects

in order to find the most suitable types

of bridges for the major river crossings.

Since the structures for the road would

be built far behind the front lines, various types of military bridges and even

commercial bridges could be considered.

At this time a new type of structure, the

Bailey bridge, was replacing the H-20.

Named after its British inventor, Sir

Donald Coleman Bailey, it was based on

an entirely different principle from that

of the H-20. Its basic unit was a flat

panel 10 feet long and 5 feet high, weighing about 600 pounds. The panels were

connected by pins to form trusses, which

were joined beneath by transoms to

support the decking. Multiple trusses

and multiple stories of panels made it

possible to erect spans of 30 to 220 feet

that could carry loads from 10 to 100

tons. The panels could also be used to

build piers. One great advantage of

the Bailey was its adaptability to various

loads. Another type of bridge which

might be used was the I-beam bridge,

produced commercially, the decking of

which rested on steel beams from 30 to

60 feet long.67 Confronted by a shortage of engineering data within and

without the theater, the Chief's Office

sent a team of bridging specialists to

CBI in January 1944 for firsthand consultations with engineers in the theater.

As a result of investigations and discussions held at Ledo and New Delhi during

February and March, the theater engineers chose the H-20 bridge as still the

best for the Ledo Road. This decision

created something of a stir in Washington, since the H-20's during the past year

had been replaced by Baileys in the

Engineers' catalog of standard equipment. Attempts by the Office of the

Chief of Engineers to get Pick and Farrell to accept substitutes were to no avail.

Bailey bridge panels would require more

cargo space for a given bridge capacity

than would the H-20, and I-beams were

66

 (1) Ltr, CG SOS CBI to OPD, 17 Apr 44. OPD

400 CTO, Case 150. (2) Hist of the 76th, 209th,

and 330th Engrs.

67

 For a fuller discussion of the characteristics and

relative merits of the various types of bridges in use

at this time, see Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, Troops

and Equipment, pp. 483-97.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 449

too long for shipment on the diminutive

cars of India's railways. Faced with

these irrefutable logistical arguments,

OCE accepted the theater's decision and

reinstituted procurement of H-20 bridging in late April 1944.68

The longer the finished portion of the

Ledo Road became, the greater was the

effort needed to keep it open to traffic.

Pick systematically turned over to various engineer battalions the responsibility

of maintaining each new section of the

road as soon as the forward troops finished compacting the final layer of

gravel or crushed rock. On 29 April, he

set up a road maintenance division under

Lt. Col. Donald L. Jarrett, to direct the

work of engineer troops who were to

keep completed sections in repair.69 By

mid-May, Jarrett had three aviation battalions working full time on maintaining

the road between Ledo and Shingbwiyang. They built and repaired bridges,

resurfaced poor sections, eliminated

some of the worst curves, reduced

grades, and installed better drainage.

Since Jarrett's organization was directly

under Pick, Colonel Green as road engineer was able to concentrate his attention

almost entirely on road construction.70

Progress on the Pipelines

During the first months of 1944

Colonel MacIsaac began to make more

rapid progress on the pipelines. Late in

January specially trained troops arrived

from the United States and took over

construction of the 4-inch line along the

road. The 699th and 706th Petroleum

Distribution Companies, joined by the

775th in February, strove to complete

the line from Ledo to Shingbwiyang as

soon as possible without getting in the

way of the graveling crews. Having arrived without their equipment, the

troops had to borrow hand tools, welding

machines, bulldozers, and trucks from

units at Ledo and on the road. They

soon discovered what troops on the road

had long known—that constant hauling

and rough roads gave trucks a merciless

beating and burdened drivers and mechanics with ceaseless maintenance

chores. As if to climax their trials, the

699th engineers had hardly gotten

pumping operations under way early in

March when a 1,000-barrel tank of gasoline at Logai, fifty miles down the road

from Ledo, burst into flames and had to

be junked. Nevertheless, by midMarch the line was through to Shingbwiyang. Thereafter, MacIsaac moved the

706th and 775th forward as rapidly as

the tactical situation permitted.71

Colonel Kinsolving, head of District

12, had hoped to begin construction in

January on the first standard-weight 6-

inch line, which would extend from Calcutta to the Assam Oil Company's storage tanks at Tinsukia, 30 miles west of

Ledo. The diversion of troops to build

a 6-inch line to the MATTERHORN fields,

and the delay in the arrival of salvaged

standard-weight pipe from British depots

in the Middle East forced Kinsolving to

mark time until mid-February. Then,

68

 (1) Leslie Anders, "Bridges on the Ledo Road,"

The Military Engineer, XLV (July-August, 1953),

293-95. (2) Memo, Madsen for Farrell, 19 Apr 44.

Opns Br File, Constr Serv Files. (3) Memo, OCE for

CG ASF, 25 Apr 44. 823 CBI. 69

 Hq Base Sec 3 GO No. 6, 29 Apr 44. Engr Sec

File, LAC Files. 70

 Hist of the 823d, 849th, and 858th Engrs.

71

 (1) Hist of the 699th and 706th Engrs. (2) Hq

Constr Serv Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 5 Mar, 5 Apr

44. 678 CBI.
450 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

with three petroleum distribution companies, the 709th, 776th and 777th, he

began to build the line from the tanker

terminal at Budge-Budge, south of Calcutta, up along the Bengal-Assam RailWay toward Tinsukia—a distance of 750

miles. At Tinsukia the line would

connect with the 4-inch invasion-weight

line running along the Ledo Road. It

must have seemed to Kinsolving that

many factors were in conspiracy against

his plans to complete the project by 1

August. When the pipe began to come

in, it was frequently in damaged condition and without couplings and screws.

Farrell and Kinsolving decided in late

February to build the line with invasionweight pipe, newly arrived from the

United States and intended only for the

northern reaches of the line. This decision produced complications, for in the

densely populated lower Brahmaputra

Valley it was necessary to bury this thin

pipe, which was highly subject to corrosion and leakage. Stilwell's drive in

Burma and the Japanese invasion of

Manipur Province placed such a strain

on the Bengal-Assam Railway that the

tonnage allotted to District 12 had to be

cut by nearly 75 percent in March.

There were bright spots, however. The

railway officials and crews proved highly

co-operative in hauling and unloading

pipe along the right-of-way, and the

British garrison engineers at various

posts along the route did effective work

in securing land and rounding up local

workmen.72

Progress on the B-29 Fields

Meanwhile, the engineers were rushing work on the MATTERHORN fields. In

West Bengal, Colonel Madsen, head of

District 10, had the 879th Airborne

Aviation Battalion, the 382d Construction Battalion, and the 853d, 1875th,

and 1877th Aviation Battalions. These

units began work on the five B-29 fields

in March with borrowed equipment,

pending the arrival of their machinery.

In mid-April, with the arrival of the

1888th Aviation Battalion, Madsen had

5,000 engineers on the job. By the end

of the month Kinsolving announced

substantial completion of a 6-inch pipeline from the tanker terminal at BudgeBudge to the fuel distribution systems

at the airfields. With the arrival of the

aviation battalions' machinery in April

more rapid progress was possible on the

runways. A major task was to make the

best use of the local workmen, who were

not too efficient at best. It was soon

obvious that native customs would have

to be observed, if the construction was

to go on smoothly. At Chakulia, the

1877th engineers, unaware that the

Bengalese regarded the quarrying of

rock as man's work and the screening of

it as woman's, bulldozed stockpiles for

both sexes to screen. Everyone walked

off the job. Religious considerations

obliged the engineers in District 10 to

stock seven types of rations. Work

moved ahead, but slowly.73

72

 (1) Min, Mtg at Off Engr-in-C GHQ (India), 28

Jan 44. Opns Br File, Constr Serv Files. (2) Hq

Constr Serv Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 12 Feb, 5 Mar,

5 Apr, and 9 May 44. 678 CBI. (3) Hist of the

709th and 776th Engrs.

73

 (1) Hq Constr Serv SOS CBI, Final Rpt B-29

Bases, India. (2) Hq Constr Serv Progress Rpts,

MATTERHORN Proj, 12 Feb, 5 Mar, 9 Apr 44. 678

(CBI). (3) Hist of the 382d Engrs. (4) Hist of the

853d, 879th, 1875th, 1877th, and 1888th Avn Engrs.

(5) Col. Kenneth E. Madsen, "Army Engineers and
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 451

In China, progress on the B-29 fields

was encouraging. Each field was to consist of a runway, taxiways, hardstands, a

fuel distribution system, revetments, and

housing for service crews. Since it was

impracticable to transport either cement

and concrete mixers or asphalt from

India, runways would have to be built

of rock, gravel, and sand. Limited in

theory to staff and liaison functions,

Colonel Kenerson, as District 2 engineer

at Cheng-tu, had to assume numerous

responsibilities which the Military Engineering Commission was charged with

but could not perform adequately.

Kenerson had to supervise much of the

administrative work required in hiring

and utilizing the 365,000 peasants conscripted by the Governor of Szechwan.

Despite centuries of experience in

building hard-surfaced roads by hand,

the Chinese were largely unprepared to

construct the 8,500-foot runways capable

of sustaining the 70-ton bomber. Kenerson found he had to teach them the

elements of soil mechanics; then he had

to supervise them constantly to see that

they applied what he had taught them.

As a rule, the peasants toiled dutifully,

but there were some serious riots caused

by disgruntled workers whose only desire

was to go home.74

In late February there was a noticeable

slowdown, partly as a result of the failure

of the Chinese to find enough trucks for

hauling material and partly because of

the breakdown in the government's

system for distributing funds. Brig.

Gen. Thomas F. Farrell, supporting

Kenerson's efforts insofar as possible,

sent several small rock-crushers by air

and supplied a detachment of engineers

to install gasoline distribution systems at

the bomber fields. By the time construction had started in January, Chinese estimates of the cost of the fields

had risen to a fantastic five billion

dollars. "Squeeze" in the Cheng-tu area

would inflate even that figure. By late

spring cost estimates were to reach seven

billion dollars. At the official rate of

exchange, the United States would have

to pay $350,000,000 for the fields at

Cheng-tu.75

Airfields for Chennault

Work was continuing on the fields in

eastern China for the Fourteenth Air

Force. Since the fall of 1943 Chennault

had been trying to enlarge his engineer

staff of four men to make possible more

effective supervision of the work.

Shortly after the 5308th Air Service

Area Command activated its Engineer

Division under Byroade at Kunming on

1 February 1944, Chennault conceived

the idea of merging Byroade's office with

the Engineer Section of the Fourteenth

Air Force. On 16 March Byroade assumed the dual role of Engineer, Fourteenth Air Force, and Engineer, 5308th

Air Service Area Command. He merged

his two offices within the month. On 18

March, Stilwell gave Chennault control

of all construction for air force elements

in China, a control Chennault delegated

the Superfortress," The Military Engineer, XXXVI

(October, 1944), 332-34. (6) Ltr, Lt Col Alvin B.

Auerbach, formerly CO 1877th Engr Avn Bn, to C

EHD, 22 Dec 52. EHD Files. 74

 (1) Engr Dist 2 Air Serv Comd China Sec Engr

Memo No. 1, 1 Feb 44. Air Engr File, CTO. (2)

Ltr, Col Austin W. Betts, Air Engr Fourteenth AF,

to C EHD, 11 May 53. EHD Files. 75 Fourteenth AF Hist, pp. 537-46.
452 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

to Byroade.76 The air force engineers

had their work cut out for them.

District 3 in eastern China inherited

all the harassments and irritations Advance Section 4 of SOS had experienced

with Chinese officials and contractors.

The lieutenant-governor in South

Kiangsi, who had tied up construction at

Kanchow and Sincheng during the winter because of a dispute over the certification of contractors, finally had the

situation sufficiently under control to

permit construction to start early in

March. "He has merged all the contractors in the area into a company of

his own," one engineer wrote to Byroade,

"and has jacked prices for earthwork,

paving, etc., up 200% at Sincheng and

100% at Kanchow."77 Merchants supplying materials for American projects,

informed that local officials expected generous kickbacks on each sale, adjusted

prices accordingly. In many instances

work was held up, specifications were

flouted, and schedules disrupted by the

paramount importance of "face." The

engineers learned that the Chinese could

easily lose face if they took orders from

foreigners, admitted their ignorance, or

dealt with officials of lesser rank. In

China, ways and means had to be found to

remove even the most minor incompetent

officials without affronting their dignity.

But progress was made on the airfields.

By 1 April 1944 Engineer District 3 was

maintaining eight major fields in eastern

China, and construction was well under

way on eight more.78

Even at this late date work on the

Hump airfields was continuing in Assam

to enable them to handle bigger loads

for Chennault. As head of District 20,

Lt. Col. Karl M. Pattee had a staff of

twenty officers and the 848th Aviation

Battalion at his disposal. Most construction and maintenance continued to be a

responsibility of the Royal Engineers.

But Pattee was able through his control

of his aviation battalion to exercise a

more than nominal control over the

course of airfield work in Assam. As

before, airfield construction conformed

to British specifications at all of the eight

airfields regularly used by the Air Transport Command in Assam. By the spring

of 1944 the airlift was beginning to realize its potentialities.79

While the Fourteenth Air Force was

unable during the first quarter of 1944

to carry out all of Chennault's claims,

the successes that it did achieve were

such that the Japanese high command

was compelled to act in the spring.

Shipping on the Yangtze River had become so unsafe that the enemy determined to reopen the Peiping-Hankow

railway as an alternate supply line. Because of Chennault's crippling attacks on

the sea-lanes linking Japan to her southern conquests, the high command

ordered its mainland armies to overrun

Chennault's eastern airfields and open

railroad communications from the

Yangtze Valley to Canton and French

76

 CBI Hist, sec. III, app. IX. 77

 Ltr, Capt R. D. Hunter to Byroade, 24 Feb 44.

Air Engr Files, CTO. 78

 (1) Ltr, Resident Engr Sincheng, to CO Dist 3,

1 Mar 44. (2) Memo, with Incls, Engr Fourteenth

AF for CG XX Bomber Comd, 5 May 44. Both in

Air Engr Files, CTO. 79

 (1) Hq USAF CBI, G-4 Periodic Rpts for the

Quarters Ending 31 Mar and 30 Sep 44. WW II

Rcds Div. (2) Rad, Covell to Somervell et al., 26

Jul 44. 678 CBI. (3) Hist of CBI Air Serv Comd,

PP. 34-42.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 453

Indochina. The first phase of this operation, starting in April, was to be the

conquest of a large pocket north of

Hankow. In May the Japanese began

to move south from their base at Hankow to drive the Fourteenth Air Force

off its advanced bases around Kweilin.80

The Theater Engineer

Colonel Newcomer, Stilwell's engineer, was little concerned with all this

activity in China. Although his responsibilities were theaterwide, Newcomer

never looked upon his office as playing "a

critical role." His staff at peak strength

included one officer, Lt. Col. Robert

F. Seedlock, and three enlisted men.

Stilwell rarely consulted Newcomer.

His principal job remained that of

co-ordinating with the Chinese on airfield construction for Chennault and

MATTERHORN and supplying Chinese

troops to be sent to Burma. His office

continued to take responsibility for

supervising housekeeping duties for the

American forces in Chungking. To do

such administrative work as was needed

for the engineer units in India, Newcomer had set up a small rear echelon

office in New Delhi.

Early in May, General O'Connor, formerly head of the Northwest Service

Command, arrived in India to replace

Newcomer, who was transferred to Panama. Newcomer later stated that he

was never so happy as when he received

his orders for his new assignment. General O'Connor set up his theater engineer office in New Delhi and maintained

a forward echelon in Chungking under

Colonel Seedlock. The office of theater

engineer assumed no more importance

under O'Connor than it had under

Newcomer.81

Over-all Progress in Burma During

the Early Monsoon

Work on the Ledo Road continued

well into May. The 45th Engineers,

taking over the lead on the road on the

15th of that month at Mile 168, began

clearing and grading. But it was soon

evident that the 1944 monsoon would be

the equal of its predecessor. "The rain

never stopped," recorded the regimental

historian.82 Progress through the mud

slowed to a crawl. Toward the end of

the month, General Pick came to definite conclusions about the immediate

future. Mindful of the loss of engineer

troops to the fighting front and the

increasing maintenance efforts required

by the rains, Pick decided that for the

time being his engineers could do little

more insofar as road construction was

concerned. Having advanced about 70

miles during the past four months, the

road was open to trucks as far as the

Tanai, 145 miles from Ledo. The roadhead had reached a point 30 miles

beyond the river. "I do not wish to

give you the impression," Pick wrote to

General Covell on 25 May, "that we are

folding up." He went on to say:

But I thought you would like to know

80

 (1) Fourteenth AF Hist, ch. XI. (2) Romanus

and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, pp.

316-20.

81

 (1) Interv, Anders with Wheeler, 5 Mar 53. (2)

Ltr, Newcomer to C EHD, 5 Dec 54. (3) Ltr, Seedlock to O'Connor, 16 May 44. O'Connor Ltr File,

Constr Serv Files. 82

 Hist of the 45th Engrs.
454 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

what the conditions are. . . . Our equip- ment to a very great extent is just about

shot. Our troop strength has been re- duced to such an extent that we can not

be expected to go any further [than] Wara- zup during this season. . . . But unless

I can get troops and equipment, I don't

think we can advance any farther and

maintain the soft, spongy, newly completed

road. . . . ,83

It was hardly likely that the Ledo Road

would be extended much further during

the monsoon.

The campaign in northern Burma was

so far behind schedule that it was questionable whether the road could have

been pushed through to Myitkyina before the monsoon rains in any case. To

make matters worse, the Chinese had

persistently hung back from launching

the Y-Force across the Salween. These

unfavorable developments, together with

the British reverses on the Manipur

Plain, had gradually forced Stilwell to

give up hope of extending the road into

Myitkyina during May. But since late

March he had been making plans for

taking Myitkyina by an air attack before

the monsoon set in. Capture of the

town would be desirable for many reasons. It would have beneficial effects

for the airlift to China. Seizure of the

airfield would drastically curtail the

enemy's power to interfere with the airlift and would at the same time permit

the Air Transport Command to use a

lower and more southerly route across

the mountains to Kunming. Besides,

the extension of the two 4-inch pipelines

to Myitkyina, which could probably be

achieved before the Ledo Road was completed that far, would enable transports

to refuel there and thus conserve valuable cargo space for supplies for China.84

On 17 May the Marauders and the

Chinese swooped down on the surprised

Japanese garrison at Myitkyina. The

attackers easily overran the bombcratered airstrip, but the defenses of

Myitkyina itself were stronger than

expected. Instead of winning a quick

victory, the attackers were pushed back

from the outskirts of the town. The

great need now was for more men and

supplies, which could come only by air.

The airfield would have to be repaired

in a hurry. On the evening of the first

day of the battle, a group of men from

the 879th Airborne Aviation Battalion

arrived in gliders and began filling

craters in the 4,800-foot runway. Two

days later a detachment of the 504th

Light Ponton Company, flown in from

Ledo, prepared to ferry troops across

the Irrawaddy and reconnoiter southwest of Myitkyina. When the tide of

battle turned in favor of the enemy, Stilwell decided to put engineer troops in

the line with the Marauders holding on

at the northern edge of the town. On

24 May the 209th Combat Battalion,

commanded by Lt. Col. Leslie E. Sandvail, was pulled off the Ledo Road and

hastily flown to the front; four days later,

the 236th Combat Battalion, under Lt.

Col. Harold E. Greenlee, was sent in

from Ledo. The struggle for Myitkyina

promised to be a long one. Meanwhile,

the monsoon made it necessary to put an

end to guerrilla warfare. When the

83

 Ltr, Pick to Covell, 29 May 44. Admin File,

Constr Serv Files.

84

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 205. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen Daniel I.

Sultan to Covell, 15 Jan 44. Opns Br File, Constr

Serv Files.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 455

rains set in, Mountbatten began withdrawing the Chindits. Early in May

engineer detachments were flown to two

villages some thirty miles south of

Myitkyina to prepare the fields from

which the air commandos were to fly the

Chindits back to eastern India.85

During June and July the fighting at

Myitkyina showed no signs of abating.

The engineers continued with their

missions in support of the siege. By

early June all the 879th Airborne Aviation Battalion was at work on the airfield. The detachment of the 504th

Ponton Company, having established a

boat landing on the Irrawaddy three

miles below Myitkyina, was busy ferrying

Chinese troops across the river and carrying Gurkha riflemen far downstream for

reconnaissance missions. In the lines

being drawn ever tighter around the

town were the two combat battalions.

After combining the engineers into a

provisional regiment early in June, Brig.

Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, Stilwell's

field chief of staff, brigaded them with

the Marauders on the northern approaches to Myitkyina. Their baptism

of fire proved costly and painful because

of their unfamiliarity with the ways of

the enemy and the peculiar demands of

the battlefield. Like the incoming replacements for the Marauders, they were

at first lax in security measures and too

prone to panic when surprised. Within

a short time, however, experience and

behind-the-lines training enabled the

engineers to fight like veterans. Casualties were heavy—the 209th engineers

reported 71 enlisted men killed and

179 wounded; the 236th engineers, 4

officers and 52 enlisted men killed

and 142 wounded. All of the 209th

and elements of the 236th Battalion

received high praise for their action

at Myitkyina.86

One hopeful development in the

Burma campaign was that the Chinese

forces in Yunnan were at last on the

move. On 11 May the Y-Force attacked

along the Salween, sending spearheads

of three divisions across the river above

and below the demolished bridge of the

Burma Road. The Chinese engineers

of the Y-Force now had an opportunity

to show how much they had profited

from instruction in river crossings given

at the Kunming Training Center by

American engineers serving with the

Y-Force. From nightfall of 11 May

until the next morning Chinese engineers ferried the infantry across the

turbulent Salween in pneumatic assault

boats and makeshift rafts, with the loss

of but one Chinese infantryman. Once

across the Salween, the Chinese infantry

engaged the Japanese in a battle that

raged back and forth for many weeks

in the rugged mountains along the west

bank. Eventually, the numerical preponderance of the Chinese began to tell.

During late May they made a twopronged attack. One force advanced

yard by yard down the Burma Road toward Lung-ling, thirty-five miles west of

the Salween, and another moved toward

85

 (1) Leslie Anders, "The Engineers at Myitkyina,"

The Military Engineer, XLIV (November-December,

1952), 446-50. (2) Hist of the 209th, 236th, 504th,

and 879th Engrs.

86

 (1) Anders, "The Engineers at Myitkyina" The

Military Engineer, XLIV (November-December,

1952). (2) Memo, Capt Leo A. Vecellio, Airfield

Engr Myitkyina, to Col. Manuel J. Asensio, 6 Jun

44. Air Univ Lib Maxwell AFB. (3) Hist of the

209th, 236th, 504th, and 879th Engrs.
456 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Teng-chung, thirty-five miles to the

north. On 8 June the Chinese laid

siege to Lung-ling and on 2 July attacked

Teng-chung. Repeated attempts to take

the cities were repulsed.87

By late spring the work of the engineers on MATTERHORN had begun to pay

dividends. The rock and gravel fields

in western China were ready on 15 May.

During the following weeks, the engineers accelerated work on the paved

fields in India. Kharagpur, a field

"barely operational" in mid-March, was

the one nearest completion by June.

The 7,500-foot long runway and fifty

hardstands were complete. Hangars,

salvaged from the Mediterranean theater,

operational buildings, and housing were

almost finished.88 On the 5th of the

month the 382d Construction Battalion

standing beside Kharagpur's concrete

runway, saw the first B-29's leave for

Bangkok to bomb railway shops there.

On 14 June the Superfortresses took off

for the first time for Cheng-tu, from

where they flew to the Japanese home

island of Kyushu to bomb the steel mills

of Yawata.89

The monsoon had brought an end to

the forward progress of the Ledo Road.

But efforts were under way to bring up

men and machinery so that work could

start with redoubled vigor in the fall.

Assuring Pick that he would make certain "no one spares the horses in supplying your needs," General Covell got

from the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation a promise that it would load thirtyseven tons of spare parts on ships sailing

in June and July. He had parts flown

in from Calcutta for Pick's 73 tractors

and other machines deadlined at the

beginning of June.90 Farrell's representatives at Calcutta made special efforts

to expedite the shipment of new machinery, an undertaking favored by the

rising efficiency of the Bengal-Assam

Railway. During the first three weeks of

June, the Engineer Supply Officer of

Base General Depot No. 2 at Calcutta

sent 39 tractors, 27 graders, nine shovels,

nine scrapers, and many other pieces of

much-needed equipment to Ledo.91

Pick wrote Farrell on 24 June that he

was as "pleased as a two-year-old at his

first Christmas tree. I believe with the

equipment which you are getting up to

us we are going to be better off than I

ever dreamed we could be. Most of us

here have worn out our patience, and I

might say our lifetime good looks, trying to make this old equipment go."

 92

Equipment was more plentiful, but

attempts to get more troops attained

little success. On 1 June 1944 there

were still only 7,200 on the road. The

most critical need was for more shop and

parts supply companies. Since early

1943 the struggle to obtain more such

units had been going on. The basic

difficulty had always been CBI's low

priority. In the United States there

was, moreover, a serious shortage of

trained mechanics and parts supply

specialists. The War Department found

87

 CBI Hist, sec. II, app. HI. 88

 Hq Constr Serv Progress Rpts, MATTERHORN 12

Feb, 5 Mar, 5 Apr, 9 May, 7 Jun 44. 678 CBI. 89

 (1) Hist of the 382d Engrs. (2) CBI, sec. III,

app. IX.

90

 Ltr, Covell to Pick, 18 Jun 44. Constr Serv

Files. 91

 Ltr, Farrell to Pick, 21 Jun 44. Engr Sec File,

LAC Files. 92

 Ltr, Pick to Farrell, 24 Jun 44. Engr Sec File,

LAC Files.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 457

it impossible to organize and train new

units to keep up with demands of even

those theaters overseas with the highest

priorities. The most Washington could

promise Covell was that it might allot

one parts supply and one heavy shop

company to the theater late in the summer of 1944.93

 Such reinforcements as

Pick was able to get for his projects during the summer months consisted of but

three pipeline companies, one construction battalion, and a depot company

organized at Ledo in May 1944 from two

platoons of the former 456th Depot

Company and casual personnel.94

Despite the downpours of the monsoon, the troops laid additional miles of

pipeline. On 8 June the 706th and

775th engineers connected their lines

along the Ledo Road. With this connection, 180 miles of 4-inch pipe were in

place from Digboi. Since Myitkyina

was under siege, Stilwell deemed it

inadvisable to extend the line further.

As construction on the line came to a

halt, work began on the second 4-inch

line along the road. MacIsaac had received three additional petroleum distribution companies, the 778th, 779th,

and 780th. He put the 778th to work

hauling pipe from the engineer depot at

Likhapani down the Ledo Road for the

future construction drive. He assigned

the 779th the job of putting in an underground line from Digboi to the tank

farm under construction at the railway

terminal in Tinsukia, twenty-two miles

to the west. To the 780th he gave the

job of laying the second 4-inch line from

Digboi into Burma. The pace was retarded by such problems as reluctant

laborers, flooded areas, washed-out

bridges, and delayed pipe shipments

from Calcutta. Meantime, in District

12, Colonel Kinsolving's men were pushing ahead with determination. On 1

July they coupled the last pipe in the

first 6-inch line from Calcutta to

Tinsukia. The longest invasion-weight

pipeline in history was ready to carry

250,000 barrels of gasoline a month

from Calcutta to Assam.95

Maps

Both the campaign in Burma and the

work on the Ledo Road had been handicapped by the lack of adequate maps.

The Americans had to depend mainly

on maps of British or Chinese origin,

many of which were out of date and

inaccurate. Wavell's General Staff Geological Survey, responsible for mapping

India and Burma, did not have the resources to carry out adequately its

responsibilities of revising maps and

distributing them. The Chinese were

too disorganized to carry on a mapping

effort. In the autumn of 1942 General

Reybold had sent three officers and three

enlisted men to New Delhi as a liaison

group. Headed by Maj. Frank N. Gunderson, they were to get from the British

such maps as the Americans needed.

Early in 1943 Gunderson's group was

directed to include liaison with the Chinese in Chungking in order to obtain

data that might enable the Army Map

93

 Ltr, OPD to CG SOS CBI, 2 May 44. Admin

File, Constr Serv Files. 94

 Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 22 May 44. Admin

File, Constr Serv Files.

95

 (1) Constr Serv Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 7 Jun,

4 Jul, and 4 Aug 44. Opns Br File, Constr Serv

Files. (2) Hist of the 699th, 706th, 778th, 779th, and

780th Engrs.
458 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Service in Washington to help supply

Stilwell's command with satisfactory

maps. Because of Chinese suspicions

that the data might fall into the hands of

"third powers," particularly Britain,

Gunderson's men could at first get little

information in Chungking. The situation in India improved somewhat during

the summer of 1943, with the arrival

of the 653d Topographic Battalion to

handle general publication and mapreproduction work for the American

forces and of the 958th Aviation Topographic Company to provide aeronautical charts for the Tenth Air Force. In

1944 Gunderson reported greater success. In the summer of that year, the

Chinese agreed to let the Air Forces

carry out a program of aerial photography to make possible the production

of up-to-date maps of China and adjacent countries. The Chinese handed

over to Gunderson material on geodetic

and astronomic stations, river surveys,

and towns—it being understood that

"third powers" would not get the data.

The 653d engineers undertook to

co-ordinate the information with that

obtainable from aerial photographs

supplied by the Fourteenth Air Force

and the XX Bomber Command. Late

in the summer the Combined Chiefs

gave the U.S. Army responsibility for

supplying maps to Anglo-American

forces in Asia. General O'Connor set

up a map depot at Chabua to supply

American forces with maps produced by

the 653d and 958th engineers or sent by

Army Map Service. Gunderson's office

in New Delhi was to take care of British

requisitions on American stocks, dealing

directly with the depot at Chabua or

with Army Map Service. Unfortunately, the aerial photography program

in China was of little help to the engineers in their efforts to increase the flow

of up-to-date maps to the field. Much

of the photography failed to meet specifications. Too much cloud coverage

and, during good weather, priorities of

combat sorties cut down on the number

of photographic missions. A further

handicap was the strict rationing of gasoline. Consequently, little could be done

to supply more adequate maps of China

and Burma.96

Over-all Progress During the Late

Monsoon

The Chinese drive into Burma gave

Allied commanders considerable cause

for optimism. The performance of the

Chinese engineers also contributed to

the brighter outlook. On 18 June local

Chinese commanders permitted the reconstruction of the partially demolished

25-kilometer stretch of the Burma road

just east of the Salween. This job was

turned over to Colonel Dawson and his

engineers as their first major project in

support of the drive west of the Salween.

After four days of around-the-clock operations under occasional enemy shell fire,

Dawson's men opened the stretch to

one-way traffic on 24 June. Their next

96

 (1) Bd of Off to Brig Gen John W. Middleton,

12 Oct 45, Rpt, Mapping and Aerial Photography.

Hq CTO Files, KCRC. (2) Ltr, Mil Intel Div OCE

to Dir Survey Div SEAC, 20 Sep 44. 812.3 China.

(3) Rad, Reybold to Wheeler, CM-OUT 7866, 25

Aug 42. 210.3 CBI. (4) Ltr, Lt Col Francis R.

Sullivan to C EHD, 7 Dec 54. EHD Files. (5) Rad,

Reybold to Gunderson, 3 Mar 43. 812.3 China.

(6) Ltr, Gunderson to Newcomer, 28 Aug 43. Opns

Br File, CTEF. (7) Memo, C Mil Intel Div OCE

for G-2 WDGS, 1 Sep 44. 061.01 China. (8) Hist

of the 958th Engr Avn Topo Co.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 459

job was to rebuild the bridge across the

Salween, since rafts and pneumatic boats

had great difficulty in coping with the

swift and treacherous river. The previous span had been a suspension bridge

with stone towers and a steel trussed

deck. The Chinese had left the south

tower with its two anchorages intact but

had completely destroyed the north

tower. Dawson's engineers set out to

design an improvised steel suspension

bridge similar to the suspension bridges

the Chinese had been building out of

vines for centuries. Unable to find any

materials salvaged from the original

structure and informed by SOS that no

supplies could be sent from India, Dawson's men searched Yunnan for likely

substitutes. They found some 11⁄4-inch

wire rope, a few iron plates and rope

clips, and fairly ample supplies of wood.

With these materials, Dawson's Chinese

engineers first set out to build a suspension footbridge. They erected a wooden

tower on the north bank to replace the

destroyed stone tower. They then

stretched two cables across the river, anchored them to the towers, and along the

cables hung V-shaped stirrups, about five

feet apart. They then placed 2-inch

boards along the bottom of the stirrups.

The footbridge was soon improved with

the installation of four cables from anchorage to anchorage and 3-inch planks

along the bottom of the stirrups. The

bridge could safely take loaded jeeps.

The entire job required little more than

a month.97

As the Chinese continued to drive the

Japanese back west of the Salween,

American engineers supported practically every phase of the advance.

Through the efforts of the Y-Force engineers, explosives and hand tools went

forward to the Chinese at the front, and

each Chinese field army had a few American engineers as advisers to help locate

mines and find the best sites for airstrips. An outstanding example of U.S.

engineer co-operation with the Y-Force

came with the formation of the Burma

Road Engineer Detachment in June

under Dawson, now a lieutenant colonel.

The detachment, consisting initially of

27 officers and 46 men picked by Dawson from the engineers of the Y-Force

operations staff, was, in effect, a construction group headquarters, modified

to meet the peculiar needs of the locality. Attached for operations were

various types of units, including engineer, ordnance, signal, medical, and

antiaircraft artillery.98

Beyond the Salween, the engineers had

a great deal of work to do. Rising to a

height of 3,000 feet above the west bank

of the river was Sung Shan Mountain.

Japanese artillery emplaced on it commanded thirty-six miles of the Burma

Road's winding approach west of the

river. In their drive on Lung-ling the

Chinese had bypassed this strongpoint.

During late June and early July, Chinese

cannoneers exchanged shots regularly

with the enemy. During late July and

97

 (1) Memo, Engr Adv Sec 1 SOS to CO Adv Sec

1, 21 Aug 44. GED Files, CTOSOSEF. (2) Ltr with

Incls, Dawson to C of Mil Hist, 2 Aug 60. EHD

Files.

98

 Ltr, Hq USAF CBI to General Marshall, 26 Jul

44. Engr Br File, CSF. (2) Hq and Hq Det Burma

Road Engrs GO No. 1, 1 Jul 44. Burma Road Engr

Files, China Theater Engr Files. (3) Engr Memo

No. 116, Dawson for CO Adv Sec 1 SOS, 20 Jul 44.

CTO 611 Burma Road Engrs.
460 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

A WORKMAN STRINGS A FERRY CABLE ACROSS THE SALWEEN while men in the

foreground build the ferry.

early August the Chinese made repeated

assaults up the mountain but could not

dislodge the 1,200 Japanese."

Favorable developments along the

Salween in July, especially the siege of

the city of Teng-chung, had repercussions in headquarters at Ledo. The fall

of Teng-chung, 100 miles east of Myitkyina, would clear an old caravan trail

which linked Myitkyina with the Burma

Road at Lung-ling. A number of engineers in the theater believed the Ledo

Road should be built along this trail.

In the summer of 1944 a heated controversy developed over the relative merits

of this route as against the one Pick

wanted, which ran 80 miles farther south

through the town of Bhamo. The

origins of the dispute went back to

March 1944, when Stilwell thought he

would have to limit his advance in

northern Burma to a line including the

Teng-chung trail but not the Bhamo

area. In late March, CBI commanders

had begun to press Chiang to make a

99

 (1) Ltr with Incls, ExecO Theater Engr Sec

USAF CBI to OCE, 11 Oct 44. 370.2 CBI.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 461

THE FOOTBRIDGE AND FERRY ACROSS THE SALWEEN, during Chinese advance.

positive contribution to lifting the

blockade of China by constructing a military highway from Lung-ling through

Teng-chung toward Myitkyina as soon as

the Y-Force drove the Japanese from

that part of Burma. In April Colonel

Dawson made an analysis of the project

and reported that building the road

would be feasible from an engineering

standpoint. In July General O'Connor

approved construction of a road along

the trail on the grounds that the region

would be cleared of the enemy sooner and

a road there would be 200 miles shorter

than one by way of Bhamo.100 The Chinese agreed in June to adopt the American proposals and to survey the route

preparatory to calling out laborers and

initiating construction.101 Stilwell felt

construction along the new route was

urgent. "Essential that route and work

be started from the China side without delay," he radioed to O'Connor.

100

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 435. (2) Ltr, Dawson to C EHD,

10 Jun 53. 101

 Rad, Hearn to Sultan, 27 Jul 44. Engr Br File,

Constr Serv Files.
462 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

"Coordinate through Pick on this

work."

 102

Pick was strongly opposed to the whole

concept of building the road along the

trail, which wound through the mountains and over the steep ridges of the

Himalayan spurs in northern Burma.

He regarded it as a visionary undertaking, incapable of fulfillment with available resources. Upon receiving an unfavorable analysis of the project from his

own engineering branch in June, Pick

had ordered out a reconnaissance party

in the last week of that month to gather

additional data on the problems involved. Pick radioed Farrell on 18 July

that it might be desirable to have a combat road through the Teng-chung area

and even to consider routing a pipeline

that way, but he wanted nothing to do

with building a truck road along the

trail until more was known about the

terrain.103 The question was left undecided during the summer.

While the Chinese were advancing

westward from the Salween, the tide was

turning in favor of the British in eastern

India. By 22 June the British had

broken through to relieve Imphal. The

Japanese forces were now withering at

the end of a communications line consisting of little more than a network of

jungle trails sodden from more than a

month of monsoon rains. Malaria and

starvation were hastening the decimation

of the invading army. The enemy commanders resolved early in July to pull

back the survivors of the ill-fated offensive. The Japanese withdrew to their

Chindwin River lines, leaving a third of

their 155,000 troops dead on the Manipur Plain or along the mountain footpaths. The threat to the Ledo Road and

to the Allied forces in northern Burma

thus ended for good.104

And things continued to go badly for

the Japanese in western Yunnan. The

Chinese blasted the Japanese from one

stronghold after another west of the

Salween. Only Sung Shan Mountain

remained. The Y-Force commanders,

resorting to classic siege tactics, decided

to mine the seemingly impregnable

stronghold. With their American counterparts advising, the Chinese engineers

on 11 August began to dig two tunnels

under the main centers of resistance;

nine days later they set off three tons of

TNT, whereupon some of the Chinese

engineers rushed into the breach with

flame throwers as a spearhead for the

infantry. Nothing remained but to

hunt down the survivors; by the first

week of September, the last ones were

mopped up. Farther west, Y-Force engineers gave active support to the Chinese

troops besieging Teng-chung. The first

serious attempt to reduce this bastion

took place early in August. Chinese

engineers under American supervision

mined the southeastern section of the

city wall. The breach, together with

the damage subsequently inflicted by

Chennault's bombers, was not sufficient

to insure Teng-chung's immediate fall.

But Chinese troops secured a foothold

102

 Rad, Stilwell to O'Connor, 16 Jul 44, quoted in

Rad, Hq Admin Sec 1 to Hq SOS CBI, 20 Jul 44.

Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files. 103

 (1) Ltr, Capt James H. Kaminer, EngrgO Adv

Sec 3, to Pick, 22 Jun 44. Engr Br File, Constr Serv

Files. (2) Rad, Pick to Farrell, 18 Jul 44, quoted in

Rad, Hq Admin Sec 1 to Hq SOS CBI, 20 Jul 44.

Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files.

104

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command

Problems, pp. 194-96.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 463

at the site of the mining, and the capture

of the city was only a matter of time.105

On 3 August the Japanese lost Myitkyina, and their forces retreated southward. The fall of the city doomed the

enemy hold on northern Burma. A

turning point had been reached in the

long American struggle to help China.

The rest of Stilwell's Chinese troops

now came out of the Mogaung Valley to

assemble at Myitkyina in preparation for

the next phase of the offensive—down

the road toward Bhamo. General Pick

began moving in engineer and other

service troops to convert Myitkyina into

the key Allied base for the final drive to

open northern Burma; at the same time

he took back from Stilwell his decimated

engineer combat battalions, which had

suffered nearly 500 casualties, and flew

them to Ledo for recuperation.106

With the collapse of enemy resistance,

Col. Manuel J. Asensio, Tenth Air

Force engineer, prepared to carry out

Stratemeyer's plan for a ring of airfields

around Myitkyina, capable of making

this area a vital hub for transport and air

combat operations.107 The existing airfield at Myitkyina, with a plane landing

or taking off every two minutes, was

already the busiest in the theater.108 By

1 August the engineers had extended the

second four-inch line from Digboi to

Ledo. To provide the all-important

petroleum installations for the air and

ground efforts to come, Colonel MacIsaac launched District 22 on a strenuous

effort to extend the first of the 4-inch

pipelines into Myitkyina by 1 October.109

With the coming of dry weather in the

fall, engineer work could once more be

undertaken in earnest.

The CBI Is Cut Back

The Decision to Reduce the

Engineer Effort

Since the fall of 1943 Anglo-American

planning circles had been increasingly

reluctant to give their support to extensive military undertakings on the Asian

mainland. Many factors in late 1943

and in the first months of 1944 had

encouraged a shift of interest toward

operations in the Pacific. Among them

were China's interminable delay in reforming its military forces, British aversion to campaigning in the Burmese

jungles, the victory over the Japanese in

the Gilberts in November, the Russian

promise at Tehran in December to attack Japan after the surrender of Germany, and a growing desire in the spring

of 1944 to avoid frittering away military

resources that might be needed in the

coming invasion of the Philippines or

Formosa.110

Such was the feeling when General

Stilwell asked the War Department on

21 April 1944 for additional service 105

 Ltr, with Inch, ExecO Theater Engr Sec USAF

CBI to OCE, 11 Oct 44. 370.2 CBI. 106

 (1) Anders, "The Engineers at Myitkyina," The

Military Engineer, XLV (November-December, 1952),

pp. 449-50. (2) Hist of the 209th and 236th Engrs. 107

 Engr Sec Tenth AF, Burma Diary, 25 Jun 44.

Air Univ Lib, Maxwell AFB. 108

 Ltr, Godfrey to O'Connor, 31 Jul 44. O'Connor Ltr File, Constr Serv Files.

109

 Hq Constr Serv, Status Rpt, Pipelines, 7 Sep 44.

(2) Hq Engr Div 2, Constr Serv, Status Rpt, Pipelines, 30 Sep 44. Both in Opns Br File, Constr Serv

Files. 110

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, pp. 79-82. (2) Craven and Cate,

eds.,Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 495-97. (3) Churchhill, Closing the Ring, pp. 560-61.
464 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

troops, including fourteen engineer construction battalions. He regarded these

reinforcements as vital if he was to carry

out the War Department's known desires

for moving supplies by truck into China

and expanding deliveries by air to 20,000

tons a month by early 1945. Many in

the War Department strongly opposed

meeting Stilwell's requests.111 Arguments as to whether the Ledo Road

should be finished raged back and forth.

General Somervell fended off proposals

from the Air Forces and the British mission in Washington that the road should

be extended no farther than Myitkyina.

In July 1944 the Operations Division

proposed that the road be completed to

Myitkyina; beyond that point work

should be limited to repairing and maintaining the existing one-way road which

ran from that city through Bhamo to

Mong Yu, where it joined the Burma

Road. Trucking into China should be

restricted to carrying military equipment

that could not be sent by air. The Air

Forces and the British heartily indorsed

this view. They maintained, furthermore, that the Ledo Road could not be

completed in time to support the final

phases of the war against Japan; worse

than that, it would constitute a logistical

drain on these operations.112

General Somervell was determined to

preserve intact the planned overland line

of communications to China. On 24

July he warned the Operations Division

that if the optimistic assumptions regarding the early defeat of Japan proved unwarranted, everyone would be thankful

that there was a Ledo Road to enable

the Allies to support the Chinese locked

in battle with Japan's mainland armies.

He discounted arguments that continued

construction of the road would cut deeply

into resources needed elsewhere. Seventy percent of the material approved

for the road had already been shipped.

A major proportion of the troops deemed

necessary for construction and operation

would still be needed to patrol and

maintain the airfields at Myitkyina, the

pipelines, and the existing road from

Myitkyina through Bhamo to China.113

Somervell's arguments were of no avail.

The Operations Division stood its ground

and prevailed upon Marshall to reduce

the scope of the Ledo project. On 23

August 1944 the War Department directed Stilwell to limit construction beyond Myitkyina to a one-lane, allweather road to make possible sending

supplies by truck to China and helping

the construction forces pushing the pipelines through to Kunming. Work in

the theater continued at a fairly high rate

after August, but it became increasingly

obvious that a cutback was on the way.114

Work Resumes on the

Ledo Road

During August and September there

was no letup in the controversy over

whether the Ledo Road should be routed

east from Myitkyina through the mountains on the China-Burma border to the

111

 Memo, ACofS OPD for CG ASF, 9 May 44.

OPD 400, Case 122. 112

 Memo, Logistic Group ASF for OPD, 16 Jul 44.

(2) Memo, ACofAS (Plans) for ACofS OPD, 27 Jul

44. Both in OPD 400, Case 122.

113

 (1) Memo, Somervell for Handy (OPD), 24 Jul

44. (2) Memo, Actg CofS ASF for OPD, 29 Jul 44.

Both in OPD 400, Case 122. 114

 Rad, Marshall to Sultan, 23 Aug 44. Theater

Engr Policy File, Constr Serv Files.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 465

Chinese city of Teng-chung or continued

south through Bhamo. Despite the

enthusiasm of the engineers in China

and of General O'Connor for the undertaking, Pick insisted that the Ledo Road

should go 116 miles south by way of

Bhamo and then east to connect with the

Burma Road at Mong Yu.115 Aware of

the developing controversy, Stilwell late

in August approved construction of both

routes. The Chinese would build a

road over the 135 miles from Tengchung to Myitkyina; at the same time,

Pick's engineers would build the road via

Bhamo.116 Pick's reconnaissance party,

sent out in the summer, returned early

in September and confirmed his original

adverse opinion of the Teng-chung project by singling out the paucity of timber

and gravel in some sections and the need

for excessive excavation in others.117

As the end of the monsoon season approached, Pick redoubled preparations

for resuming work on the road. During

the summer months he had moved up

heavy equipment and stockpiled it in the

Hukawng Valley. In August Colonel

Hirshfield began building a supply depot

at Myitkyina not only for the road but

also for combat, using men from engineer units in the area together with

several thousand Burmese laborers recruited by the British. By the end of

the monsoon, Pick had approximately

14,000 engineers ready for work on the

road. He felt he at last had enough

troops to meet any demands which might

be made on him.

In the first week of October, work

began once more. Elements of the

330th Engineers and of the 1304th Construction Battalion, together with the

Chinese 12th Engineer Regiment, started

to build a dry-weather road along the

trail leading southward from Mile 178

to Myitkyina, to make possible sending

trucks into the town as soon as possible.

At the same time the Chinese loth Engineer Regiment began to clear the rightof-way of the Ledo Road itself beginning

at Mile 178. Behind the Chinese were

grading parties of the 330th to do finished grading, surfacing, and maintenance. The 1304th was responsible for

bridge building. On 10 October it began work on a 560-foot Bailey bridge

over the Mogaung River, using materials

supplied by British depots in India. In

mid-October, with the opening of the

offensive by Chinese troops from Myitkyina into eastern Burma, the 209th and

236th Combat Battalions began to repair

the road running east of the Irrawaddy

from Myitkyina to Bhamo.118

The Burma Road

The Burma Road engineers, commanded by Colonel Seedlock after

Colonel Dawson left for the United

States in September, got ready to help

the Highway Administration build the

road from Teng-chung to Myitkyina.

On 2 October Seedlock set up Burma

Road Engineer Division 2, with head- 115

 (1) Ltr, Covell to Sultan, 28 Aug 44. (2) Ltr,

CO Adv Sec 1 SOS to Farrell, 28 Aug 44. Both in

Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files. 116

 Ltr, Farrell to Pick, 1 Sep 44. Engr Br File,

Constr Serv Files. 117

 Rpt, Maj James H. Kaminer to Pick, 9 Sep 44.

Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files.

118

 (1) Progress Charts, Ledo Rd., 1 Oct, 1 Nov 44

in Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. C. (2) Hist

of the 209th, 330th, and 236th Engrs.
466 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

quarters at Teng-chung, and Division 3,

with headquarters at Sadon, just inside

the Burma frontier, some forty miles

east of Myitkyina.119 Seedlock used

most of his 257 engineers as supervisors

and equipment operators. He kept a

small force to maintain the Burma Road

east of the Salween and another to make

emergency repairs on the road immediately behind the Chinese XI Group

Army. The dark spot in the picture, as

autumn came on, was the unexpected

stalling of Governor Lung in conscripting the 120,000 laborers who were to

work under Seedlock. All that Seedlock

could do during September and October

was to push surveying, accumulate some

equipment, and organize such forces for

construction as he had.120

The Pipelines

When Myitkyina fell on 3 August,

Stilwell's headquarters again turned its

attention to the second 4-inch pipeline,

which by then had almost reached Pangsau Pass. Stilwell's deputy, Maj. Gen.

Daniel I. Sultan, stressed the urgency of

extending this line to Myitkyina in time

to support the coming autumn offensive

in eastern Burma. Sultan set MacIsaac's completion date as 1 October, and

MacIsaac made use of every available

resource to meet his deadline. The

Tenth Air Force flew 1,500 tons of pipe

to Myitkyina, and drivers of the 778th

Petroleum Distribution Company hauled

thousands of tons more from Likhapani

down the Ledo Road into Burma. Two

of Kinsolving's petroleum distribution

companies, the 709th and 776th, joined

the six already working on the line.121

"We have pipeline people," Pick wrote

to Covell, "road troops, ponton outfits,

Pioneer Indian Labor, Nepalese Porter

Corps people, a battalion of Chinese, and

a herd of elephants working on it."

 122

Because the pipeline left the route of the

road in some localities, it was often

necessary to construct cableways to ferry

pipe across rivers. Sometimes the men

had to carry pipe by hand through the

hip-deep water of the flooded lowlands.

Despite such obstacles, together with the

snakes, leeches, and malaria, the engineers strove to "get it through."

 123

 On

27 September Pick radioed Farrell that

the line was completed to Myitkyina.

Mountbatten wired his congratulations

to Covell and to Pick "and all his men

who were responsible for putting the

pipeline through from Tinsukia to Myitkyina in record time under monsoon

conditions." Covell, forwarding Mountbatten's message to Pick, observed, "Our

team is going strong." Col. Birney K.

Morse, former chief engineer of the

Susquehanna Pipeline Company, who

had succeeded MacIsaac on 22 September, took over the job of pushing the line

on to China. There was no advance of

the other 4-inch line beyond Tingkawk

Sakan. It was already operating to capacity just to support construction and

trucking along the Ledo Road.124

Plans made at QUADRANT had called

119

 Ltr, Seedlock to Div 2 Engr, 2 Oct 44. GED

File, CTSOSEF. 120

 (1) Ltr, ExecO Burma Road Engrs to Neyland,

CO Adv Hq 1, 18 Oct 44. GED File, CTSOSEF.

(2) Hist of Burma Road Engrs. CTO 611 BRE.

121

 Hq Constr Serv Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 7

Sep, 30 Sep, 6 Oct 44. 122

 Ltr, Pick to Covell, 27 Sep 44. Covell Ltr File,

Constr Serv Files. 123

 Hist of the 706th, 707th, 776th, 778th, and

780th Engrs. 124

 Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. E.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 467

for two 6-inch pipelines from Calcutta to

Assam.125 The first, built entirely with

invasion-weight pipe, had been in operation since the last week of August.

Kinsolving planned to start work in

October on the second, to be standardweight throughout. A heavier line

could be operated at greater capacity to

meet the great demand for aviation and

truck gasoline in upper Assam. Since

the line would pass through heavily

populated areas, it would, like the first,

have to be put underground. The improving tactical situation in Burma in

the late summer of 1944 enabled Kinsolving to shift the southern terminus of

the second line from Calcutta to the

Burmah Oil Company's port facilities at

Chittagong, 180 miles to the east across

the Ganges estuary. The Chief's Office

in July 1944 expressed misgivings about

this move, pointing out that construction

and operation in the rugged lands north

of Chittagong would require a much

larger number of troops. Besides,

Chittagong's shallow harbor would necessitate building a costly offshore mooring

together with a submarine unloading

line. But Farrell and Kinsolving knew

that the eastern route would require 180

miles less pipe, would obviate crossing

the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, and

would lessen the dangers implicit in concentrating so many storage facilities at

Calcutta. By mid-October, Kinsolving

had the 777th and the 138th Petroleum

Distribution Companies at work along

the railway from Chittagong to Tinsukia.

Three thousand Indian laborers were

clearing the route and digging the

ditches.126

Airfields

By the fall of 1944 few airmen set a

very high value on the advantages of the

MATTERHORN airfields to the American

war effort. Between June and October

the B-29's made four raids on steel and

aircraft plants on the Japanese island of

Kyushu, three attacks on a major steel

plant in Manchuria south of Mukden,

one on an aircraft factory on Formosa,

and another on an oil refinery on Sumatra. It was logistically impossible to

increase the rate of attack beyond an

average of two sorties monthly for each

B-29. The craft could not be supplied

with sufficient gasoline to make their

sorties profitable. Gasoline and munitions for each strike against Japan had to

be flown to Cheng-tu by transports or by

B-29's working overtime.127 On 3 October 1944 Secretary of War Stimson

observed that the drain of transports to

CBI ". . . bids fair to cost us an extra

winter in the main theater of war."

 128

It was expected that the B-29 fields being

built in the Marianas, much closer to

Tokyo, would soon be ready. After a

few more raids on Formosa and Kyushu

in support of the American drive in the 125

 The early planning papers place the northern

terminus of the 6-inch lines at Dibrugarh, a barge

landing on the upper Brahmaputra connected by a

short stretch of meter-gauge railway with the Digboi

refinery and the Ledo Base. By the spring of 1944

Construction Service planning had changed the

terminus to a tank storage "farm" under erection by

engineer troops at Tinsukia, a key railway junction

just west of Digboi.

126

 (1) Memo, ACofS OPD for CG ASF, 10 Jul 44,

with Inds, 14 Jul and 19 Jul 44. 678 CBI. (2)

Theater Engr Staff Journal 26 Jun, 4 Aug 44.

Admin File, Constr Serv Files. (3) Hq Constr Serv,

Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 6 Oct, 6 Nov 44. 127

 Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Matterhorn

to Nagasaki, pp. 94-118. 128

 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 538.
468 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Philippines and after several strategic

bombing missions in southeastern Asia,

the B-29's in CBI prepared to transfer to

the Pacific. By late 1944 the main engineer job on the fields in India and China

was maintenance only.129

The airfields now of most concern in

CBI were those around Myitkyina.

While the siege was still in progress,

Colonel Asensio's men had begun work

on the runways there. According to

plans which had been worked out with

Godfrey's representative in June, Asensio

was to complete by 1 October 1944 a

6,000-foot all-weather field at the original Myitkyina airstrip, now called

Myitkyina South. A similar field was

to be built just above the town—

Myitkyina North. Ten miles south of

Mogaung, Asensio was to build a fairweather strip by 15 November to support the British offensive rolling southward toward Mandalay. At the same

time, six miles southwest of Myitkyina,

he was to have a fair-weather runway

capable of taking B-29's. Finally, to

support the Chinese advance into eastern

Burma, there was to be a fair-weather

strip, just across the Irrawaddy, to be

known as Myitkyina East, and to be

finished by 1 January 1945. During

July the Tenth Air Force flew in the

1888th aviation engineers so that they

would be ready to begin work on Myitkyina North as soon as tactically feasible.

When, after capture of Myitkyina, it

became clear that the Ledo Road would

not reach the town before November,

Asensio began bringing in by air the

rest of his units and their equipment.

The 930th and 1877th engineers arrived

during September and October. By the

latter month, Asensio's projects were

well under way.130

The Tactical Situation

After their victories on the Manipur

Plain and at Myitkyina, the Allies made

fairly steady progress along their fronts.

The Japanese were being constantly

forced farther south in Burma. In September General Sultan, having taken

the field as Stilwell's deputy, sent the

British 36th Division on a long, southward drive along the Burma Railway

from Mogaung to Mandalay. At the

same time the newly organized and

American-trained Chinese Sixth Army

moved out of the Mogaung area and

pushed southward over hills and through

jungles toward a crossing of the Irrawaddy west of Bhamo. In mid-October

the Chinese 1st Army advanced from

Myitkyina along the road to Bhamo.

The military picture in Burma grew

constantly brighter for the Allies.

But it was darkening in eastern China.

Disaster had begun in the spring of 1944,

as the Japanese bestirred themselves to

seize the airfields that the Fourteenth Air

Force was using in its strikes against

enemy shipping. A major Japanese

drive had begun on 26 May with a

thrust in the direction of Changsha. On

18 June the Chinese abandoned the city.

Before the end of the month the Japa129

 Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Matterhorn

to Nagasaki, pp. 126-30.

130

 (1) Engr Sec Tenth AF, Burma Diary, Oct 44.

(2) Ltr, Godfrey to Byroade, 23 Aug 44. AAF 312.2

CTO. (3) Ltr, Godfrey to Stratemeyer, 8 Oct 44.

O'Connor Ltr File, Constr Serv Files. (4) Hist of

the 930th, 1877th, and 1888th Engrs.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 469

nese had reached Heng-yang, where they

at last encountered a Chinese force determined to hold. After a staunch but

hopeless defense that lasted nearly two

months, the Chinese surrendered the city

on 8 August. At the beginning of September the invaders started their advance

from Heng-yang. While one column

moved westward out of the valley toward the bomber field at Shao-yang, the

main body advanced toward Ling-ling.

Meanwhile, a Japanese expedition, moving west from Canton, threatened the

bomber fields in the region to the south

of Kweilin. As Stilwell had feared, the

Chinese armies in the eastern provinces

were incapable of stemming the enemy's

drives. It became the painful duty of

Chennault's engineers to undertake the

task of destroying the airfields which

would soon be overrun by the enemy.

On 4 September the resident engineer at

Ling-ling applied the torch and dynamite

to the field there, four days before the

Japanese arrived. On 14 September the

field at Shao-yang was destroyed.131

As the Japanese were advancing rapidly along the 100-mile road from Lingling to Kweilin, the Americans had to

decide quickly what to do about the

major airfields clustered around the

latter city. Stilwell himself went to

Kweilin on 14 September to canvass

possibilities for holding the area. He

found that the Japanese were only

seventy miles away. Equally ominous

was the fact that the local commander

had strict orders from Chungking to

employ the classic but futile stratagem

of retiring within the city's walls. This

news convinced Stilwell that Kweilin

was destined to become "another rat

trap."

 132

 He gave the order that afternoon to destroy the three heavy bomber

fields near the city. The engineers complied during the night. They buried

and detonated bombs in the taxiways and

runways, while air force personnel

burned the buildings. Eleven days

later the process was repeated 120 miles

to the south at Tanchuk, just before a

Japanese column from Canton arrived.133

The loss of airfields in eastern China

created a need for new ones in the central

and southern part of the country. Leaving some of his planes in the eastern

pocket around Kanchow and Sui-chuan,

Chennault planned in October to redeploy the bulk of his force to fields along

a north-south axis running through

Chungking.134 Thus Byroade, who returned to Washington in September,

bequeathed to Col. Austin W. Betts, the

new Fourteenth Air Force engineer, the

task of beginning construction and improvement of several fields north and

east of Chungking and east of Kunming.

During October Betts arranged with the

Chinese to build a medium bomber base

180 miles northwest of Kweilin and

another 400 miles west of that city, together with several fighter fields in these

areas.135

131

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, pp. 371-73, 399-401, 405, 433. (2)

Fourteenth AF Hist, pp. 433, 456-60. (3) Rad, CO

Kweilin Air Base to Hq China Air Serv Area Comd,

6 Sep 44. Air Engr Files, CTO.

132

 CBI Hist, pp. 198-99. 133

 Ltr, Resident Engr, Li Chia Chen, to Dist 3

Engr China Air Serv Area Comd, 1 Oct 44. Air

Engr Files, CTO. 134

 Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 81-82. 135

 Ltr, Betts to Godfrey, 13 Nov 44. AAF 312.2

CTO.
470 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Reorganization of CBI

The deterioration of the military situation in eastern China intensified the

long-standing animosity between Chiang

and Stilwell. The bitterness became

obvious after President Roosevelt, seeking to stave off a total collapse of the

Chinese front, had proposed in July that

Stilwell assume unified command of all

Nationalist and Communist military

forces in China. On 25 September

Chiang formally demanded Stilwell's recall, and on 18 October the President

complied.136 Within a week, CBI was

split into two theaters. China Theater

was headed by General Wedemeyer, who

was to "advise and assist the Generalissimo in the conduct of military operations against the Japanese" and to "carry

out air operations from China." IndiaBurma Theater was commanded by

General Sultan, whose main mission was

to "support the China Theater" by assuring the "establishment, maintenance,

operation, and security" of overland

communications with China. To the

extent specified by the Combined Chiefs,

Sultan was to support Mountbatten's

operations in southeast Asia.137

Wedemeyer organized his theater with

a forward echelon at Chungking and a

rear echelon at Kunming. There were

three major engineer offices—one for the

theater at Chungking, one for the air

forces at Kunming, and a third for the

Services of Supply, also at Kunming.

Almost no changes were made in the

engineer setup in the India-Burma

Theater.138

Road, Pipeline, and Airfield Projects

in Late 1944

General Pick, with a relatively large

force of engineers and a substantial

amount of machinery under his command, made rapid progress on the Ledo

Road during the fall of 1944. On 10

November the 330th General Service

Regiment and the 1304th Construction

Battalion, with the aid of the Chinese

12th Engineer Regiment completed work

on the dry-weather trail from Mogaung

to Myitkyina. Early in December the

leading bulldozer reached the west bank

of the Irrawaddy, some twenty miles

downstream from Myitkyina.

The outstanding feature of the work

on the road in late 1944 and early 1945

was the building of several major bridges.

From 10 October to 14 January, the

1304th engineers alone built 104 spans,

totaling 5,105 feet. Among their more

noteworthy accomplishments were the

building of a 164-foot Bailey over the

Mogaung, and the construction of three

H-20's, totaling 788 feet in length.139

On 6 December the 75th Light Ponton

Company completed a 1,200-foot ponton

bridge across the Irrawaddy at Myitkyina

to facilitate supply of the Chinese troops

marching southward to join the Y-Force.

136

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command

Problems, ch. XII, passim. 137

 Rad, JCS to Wedemeyer and Sultan, WARX

51593, 25 Oct 44. Theater Engr Policy File, Constr

Serv Files.

138

 (1) Hq SOS CBI, Hist of SOS China-BurmaIndia, 11 Jun 42-24 Oct 44, app. 1, p. 37; sec. II.

OCMH Files. (2) Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 10 Dec

44. Somervell Routine Corresp File, Constr Serv

Files. 139

 (1) Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. C. (2)

Hist of the 209th, 236th, 330th, 1304th, 1880th,

1883d, and 1905th Engrs. (3) Hq SOS CBI, Hist of

SOS CBI, I, 454.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 471

This bridge was apparently the third

longest ponton structure built by U.S.

Army Engineers up to this time.140

After the engineers had completed the

first 4-inch pipeline to Myitkyina on 27

September, emphasis turned to running

the line through to Kunming. Parties

worked toward each other from these

two points. On 26 October Colonel

Morse established an advanced headquarters at Yunnanyi and assigned to it

the 779th, 780th, and 1381st Petroleum

Distribution Companies; a fourth unit,

the 1382d, arrived in December. Pipe

was flown in from Assam. Lt. Col.

Frank H. Newnam, Jr., SOS engineer in

the China Theater, making an inspection

on 27 November, was favorably impressed with the work of the "wellequipped, well-manned, and efficient"

units. Meanwhile, two petroleum distribution companies, the 709th and the

775th, were laying pipe out of Myitkyina.

The two groups were expected to meet

in 1945. Three other companies were

operating the lines from Tinsukia to

Myitkyina. On 19 November the second 4-inch line was complete to Myitkyina, eleven days ahead of schedule.141

Work continued in eastern Bengal and

Assam on the second 6-inch line. Taking advantage of the proximity of the

pipeline's right-of-way to the railroad

from Chittagong northward, Colonel

Kinsolving made up work trains for his

men. Each train, with cars for troops,

equipment, and supplies, moved forward

as needed from siding to siding. From

the outset his work was hampered because much of the salvaged British pipe

made available under reverse lend-lease

had been seriously damaged in transit

from the Middle East. As was the case

with the first 6-inch line, Kinsolving had

to change specifications while construction was in progress. Despairing of

getting enough new standardweight pipe

from the United States in time to complete the project on 1 April 1945, he

decided in late December to convert the

northernmost 150 miles to invasionweight, which would mean a reduction

in the line's capacity from 13,000 to

10,000 barrels a day. For the northern

reaches of the line he used some of the

pipe intended for the 6-inch line across

Burma. At times, Kinsolving had difficulty in getting cargo space on British

vessels operating between Calcutta and

Chittagong, and the scarcity of workmen

was a problem at first. One obstacle

appeared well out of the way by Christmas; the Indian Navy had by then agreed

to install the offshore mooring at Chittagong's harbor, and the Burmah Oil Company had agreed to connect this mooring

to its tank farm with two underwater

unloading lines.142

140

 It was exceeded in length by the bridge laid

by Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's engineers across the

James River in June 1864 and by the demonstration bridge put across the Rhine by Third Army

engineers in 1919. See James A. Huston, "Grant's

Crossing of the James," The Military Engineer, XLV

(January-February, 1953), 18-22, and the R.O.T.C.

Manual, Engineers (Harrisburg, Pa., 1941), vol. III,

pp. 347-48. 141

 (1) Hq Constr Serv Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 6

Nov and 9 Dec 44, 28 Jan 45. (2) Plng Div ASF, The

Ledo Road, app. E. (3) Ltrs, Covell to Somervell,

18 Oct, 20 Nov 44. Admin File, Constr Serv Files.

(4) Hist of the 706th, 709th, 776th, 779th, 780th,

1381st, and 1382d Engrs. (5) Memo, Newnam for

Maj Gen Gilbert X. Cheves, 25 Nov 44. GED File, CTSOSEF.

142

 (1) Hq Constr Serv Progress Rpts, Pipelines, 6

Nov, 6 Dec 44, 9 Jan 45, 6 Feb 45. (2) Ltr, Welling

to Farrell, 27 Dec 44. Specs File, Constr Serv Files.

(3) Ltr, Kinsolving to Mgr Burmah Oil Co, 26 May

45. Opns Br File, Constr Serv Files.
472 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Colonel Asensio pushed work on the

airfields around Myitkyina. Additional

engineer troops and equipment came in

by air from India during November.

Between July and November the Tenth

Air Force had flown in 149 21⁄2-ton

trucks, 66 tractors, 32 scrapers, 30 motorized graders, 27 rollers, 9 power shovels,

4 cranes, and great quantities of lesser

equipment. Impressed by the ingenuity

of Asensio's subordinates in preparing so

much heavy machinery for air transportation, General Stratemeyer declared on 5

October that it was impossible to "give

too much publicity" to this significant

operation. The opening of the Ledo

Road's cutoff near Mogaung made it possible to bring into Myitkyina the aviation engineers' 12-yard Tournapulls, D-8

tractors, and 4-ton trucks during November. Asensio's work was now in high

gear. He strove not only to meet the

operational target dates for all fields

but also to bring them to all-weather

standards before the next monsoon.143

With regard to the Teng-chung Road,

the Chinese displayed their usual mixture of enthusiasm and procrastination.

The Central Government held back the

first allotment of funds until midNovember; Mr. Kung, director of the

Highway Administration, then made a

concerted effort to organize his laborers

and to get hand tools. Work began in

earnest in the latter part of the month,

but prospects for rapid construction

were not encouraging. Governor Lung

delayed a full month before conscripting

labor in large numbers. Parties working eastward from Myitkyina were showing encouraging progress. They were

comparatively well supplied with machinery. Pick's depots had sent them 4

D-7 bulldozers, 4 motor graders, 4 air

compressors, and 4 trucks; during the

latter part of November, the Air Transport Command flew in additional machinery. Still, by early December it was

obvious that the target-date for completion of a one-lane, surfaced road would

have to be moved back from 15

January.144

Work was going ahead on the Ledo

Road, although Japanese forces were still

astride the route in eastern Burma.

Until mid-December work east of the

Irrawaddy was designed primarily to

maintain a supply line for the troops

besieging Bhamo. Thereafter, the

1875th Aviation Battalion moved across

the river to begin in earnest the construction of a military highway. While

Company C built a 14-mile, all-weather

link eastward from the Irrawaddy crossing to the dry-weather track to Bhamo,

the major part of the battalion undertook regrading, widening, and surfacing

of the track south of its projected junction with the Ledo Road. The 209th

Combat Battalion worked on fixed

bridges; the 71st Light Ponton Company

erected and maintained ponton bridges

143

 (1) Asensio to Godfrey, n.d., Rpt of Movement

by Air of Heavy Engr Equip. Air Univ Lib, Maxwell AFB. (2) Engr Sec Tenth AF, Burma Diary,

passim. (3) Hist of the 1891st Engrs.

144

 (1) Memo, Seedlock for CO Adv Sec 1 SOS

CBI, 16 Sep 44. Engr Br Files, Constr Serv Files.

(2) Rad, Maj Gen Thomas G. Hearn, CofS CBI, to

Covell, 5 Oct 44. Engr Br File, Constr Serv Files.

(3) Memo for Rcd, C Engr SOS China Theater, 25

Nov 44. GED, CTSOSEF. (4) Rad, Cheves to Hq

USF 1 BT 19 Dec 44. Engr Br File, Constr Serv

Files.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 473

over the many streams. By January the

236th Combat Battalion, working closely

behind the advancing Chinese infantry,

was improving the 72-mile blacktop road

from Bhamo to its junction with the

Burma Road at Mong Yu. The work

consisted mostly of widening the road,

putting in culverts, and repairing the

bridges.145

Two Roads to China

Meanwhile, Seedlock's Burma Road

engineers, now 500 strong and assisted by

nearly 12,000 Chinese laborers, made unexpectedly rapid progress in pushing a

road along their route from both ends.

Initially the job had seemed an "impossible" one. The road reached elevations of 8,500 feet, skirted towering

cliffs, and in places had to be cut through

deep jungle; parts of the area were so

inaccessible that food and supplies had

to be brought in by mule pack or

dropped from planes. Nevertheless, a

100-mile-stretch of virgin trail was

pushed through in 60 days. In the belief that the road to Teng-chung would

soon be open, China Theater on 6 January approved the departure from Myitkyina of a "convoy" consisting of two

trucks and an 11-ton wrecker; in command was 1st Lt. Hugh A. Pock. On 20

January Seedlock's engineers met in the

mountainous frontier region. (Map 22)

A one-lane, unsurfaced track was open

from Myitkyina to China. Pock's convoy continued on to Kunming and

reached the city on the evening of 22

January. The Southeast Asia Command and China Theater flashed to the

world the news that the blockade of

China was broken.146

General Pick had his own plans for a

"first convoy." Early in January he had

assembled at Ledo a caravan of "jeeps,

weapon carriers, ambulances, [and] heavy

cargo trucks"—113 vehicles in all—

loaded with enough artillery and ammunition to equip two Chinese batteries

and one weapons company. The drivers had been selected from all the engineer units which had worked on the

road. Among the civilian passengers

were 65 radio, magazine, and newspaper

correspondents. At Ledo, the convoy

passed in review before General Sultan.

On 12 January, Pick led the procession

out of the city. Three days later it

reached Myitkyina, where it was forced

to halt because the Japanese were still

in control of the area around Namhkam,

seventy miles east of Bhamo. While

waiting, Pick received the news that the

Myitkyina-Teng-chung Road was open.

He gave it a frosty reception. On the

23d the convoy resumed its forward

movement. When it reached Namhkam

three days later, it had to halt again

because of the fighting near Mong Yu.

The next day, the Chinese drove the

Japanese from the city. Company B of

the 236th Combat Battalion rushed to

Mong Yu to connect the Ledo and Burma

Roads; at the same time, the 71st Light

Ponton Company hastily put a 450-foot

ponton bridge across the Shweli at

145

 Hist of the 71st, 209th, and 236th Engrs.

146

 (1) 1st Ind, Seedlock to Offs and Men of the

Burma Road Engrs, 28 Jan 45, on Ltr, Cheves, CG

SOS China Theater, 23 Jan 45. CTO 611 BRE. (2)

Ltr, Seedlock to Covell, 14 Mar 45. Covell Ltr File,

Constr Serv Files. (3) Romanus and Sunderland,

Time Runs Out in CBI, p. 140.
474 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 22

Wanting on the Chinese border. On

the 28th Pick's convoy left Namhkam

and soon covered the 40 miles to

Wanting, where T. V. Soong, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, welcomed the Americans in a brief

ceremony. On 4 February the caravan

reached Kunming. A series of celebrations culminated in a banquet given by

Governor Lung in Pick's honor. Pick

sent a congratulatory message to his command, in which he described the Ledo

Road as a "major contribution to the war

effort" and expressed to his troops his

"sincere appreciation" and "pride" in

their achievement.147

Overland communications with China

had been restored, but much still remained to be done. For the engineers,

months of hard work lay ahead to bring

the Ledo Road to all-weather standards,

improve the Burma Road, and extend

147

 (1) Hq Constr Serv, Status Rpt, Ledo Road, 6

Feb 45. Admin File, Constr Serv Files. (2) Ltr,

Pick to Covell, 16 Feb 45. Covell Corresp File,

Constr Serv Files. (3) Hist of the 330 Engr GS Regt.

(4) Hq Adv Sec 3 SOS India-Burma Theater, Daily

Bull No. 29, 29 Jan 45. Engr Sec File, LAC Files.
THE CBI THEATER: AUGUST 1943-JANUARY 1945 475

the 4-inch pipeline to Kunming. Now

that the major engineer missions in Asia

were certain of fulfillment, a policy of

retrenchment, particularly in the IndiaBurma Theater, was well under way.

Some units were transferred to China.

The organization in India-Burma was

reduced, and a number of officers returned to the United States. General

O'Connor and General Farrell left in

December; in January, Col. Alvin C.

Welling was given the triple responsibilities of Theater Engineer, SOS Engineer,

and Commanding Officer, Construction

Service. Work continued much as before, and all construction projects related to the supply of China remained in

full force. Additional troops and equipment arrived at Calcutta to insure the

earliest possible completion of the line

of communications across India and

Burma. Nevertheless, the favorable

progress of the war against Japan in other

theaters meant a decline in the importance of CBI.148

148

 Time Runs Out in CBI, chs. I, IV. For a brief

resume of engineer activities in China, Burma, and

India in 1945 to the end of the war, see below,

pp. 662-66.
CHAPTER XII

The Drive Across the Central Pacific

Having seized the Gilberts, American

forces were in a position to continue the

major drive across the Pacific. Four

thousand miles still separated them from

Tokyo. There was but one way to

reach the goal—seize enemy-held islands

and build airfields and bases on them to

provide support for the next assault

farther west. But building airfields and

bases would be a major construction job,

especially when the work had to be done

on isolated islands, 1,000 miles from the

nearest supply base. A strategy that

looked almost hopeless at the time of

Pearl Harbor now held great promise of

success. Many seemingly insurmountable problems in amphibious warfare of

the type required in the Central Pacific

had been solved. Naval transports and

landing craft, particularly LST's, LCM's,

and Dukws, made possible the rapid

loading and unloading of troops, supplies, and heavy construction equipment

on distant islands where no docks or

wharves existed. To expedite landings

in shallow water, floating steel ponton

cubes that could be bolted together to

form piers of various lengths and widths,

were developed. Equipment for distilling sea water, lacking before the war,

and without which the maintenance of

bases on waterless coral islands would

have been impossible, was now available.

Engineer construction had been simplified. Crossed runways and huge parking

aprons were a thing of the past. Plentiful supplies of coral and landing mat

made possible the expeditious construction of landing strips. Safety factors

were kept to the minimum. The use of

prefabricated buildings was widespread.

Engineering had been adapted to amphibious warfare.1

The Marshalls

Plans and Preparations

The first objective in 1944 was the

Marshall Islands. Two thousand five

hundred miles southwest of Honolulu

and 500 miles northwest of the Gilberts,

the Marshalls consisted of more than

thirty atolls. (Map 23) According to

information available at the time,

Kwajalein Island, in the atoll of the same

name, was well suited for airfield

construction. A crescent-shaped coral

island, it was 3 miles long and a mile

wide. To the north, in the same atoll,

were two islets, Roi and adjacent Namur,

large enough for a base and an airfield.

The Japanese had been active in the

atoll. They had built an airstrip, a pier,

1

 Col. George E. White, Jr., "From Pearl Harbor

to Tokyo," The Military Engineer, XXXVIII (January, 1946), 1-8.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 477

MAP 23

and warehouses on Kwajalein and had

constructed an airfield on Roi and a pier

and warehouses on Namur. On 20 July

1943 the Joint Chiefs directed Nimitz to

begin planning for an assault on the

Marshalls to be made the following

January. On 1 September they set the

date for the initial attack as 1 January;

this was postponed in October to 31

January. Kwajalein was to be taken

first. Thereafter, Majuro, in the southeastern part of the Marshalls, and Eniwetok, in the northwestern part of the

archipelago, were to be captured. The

attack on Kwajalein atoll would be a

joint Navy-Army affair. The Army

component, made up of elements of the

7th Infantry Division, under Maj. Gen.

Charles H. Corlett, was to seize Kwajalein Island. The 4th Marine Division

would take Roi and Namur.2

Extensive engineer planning was

necessary for operations in the Marshalls.

Most of it was required for Kwajalein

2

 (1) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and

Marshalls, pp. 166ff. (2) Lt Gen Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Rpt, Participation in the Marshall Islands

Opns by USAFICPA, Jan-Feb 44 (cited hereafter as

USAFICPA, Marshall Islands Opn), p. 27. 98-USF3-

0.3 (23498). (3) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 322.
478 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Island. Three combat units were assigned to the assault phase and their

functions clearly defined. The 13th

Engineer Combat Battalion, under Lt.

Col. Harold K. Howell, as the divisional

engineer unit, would go in with the 7th

Division. Each of the battalion's three

lettered companies was attached to a

regimental combat team; in turn, each

platoon was attached to a battalion landing team. Engineers and infantry of the

battalion landing teams were trained to

work together in special assault groups.

Each engineer platoon was broken down

into three provisional squads, each of

which, including specially attached personnel from platoon headquarters, had

about fifteen men. A squad supported

a reinforced rifle company. Equipped

with explosives, flame throwers, and

hand tools, the engineers were to give

close support to the infantry in the reduction of enemy strongpoints; since this

would probably be their only function,

they were to bring in no machinery except bulldozers during the first days.

The 50th Engineer Combat Battalion,

under Lt. Col. Leonard L. Kingsbury, if

not needed in combat, was to turn at

once to shore party work. In reserve

was Company B, less one platoon, of the

102d Combat Battalion of the 27th Division, which was to be ready for either

combat or shore party work.3

To garrison the island, the same type

of organization was set up as had been

employed on Makin. Two Army defense battalions were organized—the 3d

and the 4th. Company D of the 34th

Combat Regiment was assigned to the

former; the 1st Battalion of the 47th

General Service Regiment, the 854th

Aviation Battalion, and a provisional

engineer headquarters, to the latter. If

necessary, elements of the garrison force

engineers were to go in with the assault

troops and help the 50th engineers with

shore party work.4

The troops spent considerable time

in training. Combat engineers received

training in assault landings and coordination with the infantry. The men

assigned to the garrison force got instruction in removing mines, operating equipment, installing refrigeration, using

water distillation units, and fighting fires.

Much attention was given to planning

for the air base on Kwajalein. The

engineers of Headquarters, Seventh Air

Force, and in General Kramer's office

prepared most of the layouts. Those of

the air engineers called for facilities for

four medium bomber squadrons and

their servicing units. Final plans were

based on standard drawings modified to

fit the conditions expected. The commanding officer of the 4th Defense Battalion spent much time and effort in

helping to put plans for base construction in final shape. Engineer supply

required a great deal of effort. Kramer's

staff prepared detailed lists of materials

which were then reviewed by unit engineers and the base commander's staff.

Three shipping priorities were set up.

The first included 221 prefabricated

portable buildings, mostly kitchens and

3

 (1) USAFICPA, Marshall Islands Opn, pp. 85ff.

(2) Maj C. N. Shaffer, Rpt on the Kwajalein Opn

(cited hereafter as Shaffer Rpt). EHD Files. (3)

Ltr, Kramer to Reybold, 13 Apr 44. 98-USF3-20.0

(2590)M. (4) Memo for Rcd, Col Wayne C. Zimmerman, 17th Inf, n.d., sub: The Infantry-Engineer

Team. (2687) 9-1.2405/44. 4 USAFICPA, Marshall Islands Opn, pp. 87-8
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 479

mess halls, to be shipped with the assault

forces. The second and third included,

for the most part, materials for building

warehouses, shops, and hangars.5

The Assault on Kwajalein

During the last week of January a task

force of more than sixty vessels was on

its way to the Marshalls. An engineer

observer, Maj. C. N. Shaffer, aboard one

of the transports loaded principally with

engineers, infantrymen, and tankers, reported that "the trip . . . was uneventful,

the morale of the men was noticeably

high, and their spirit on the evening

prior to D-Day . . . was at a peak."

Dawn of the 31st found the armada six to

ten miles west of its objective. The

four islets to the northwest of Kwajalein

were attacked first, and, by midday, the

two outermost ones were secured. Few

Japanese were found on them. At the

same time the two islands nearest

Kwajalein were under assault. The first

waves of infantry and elements of the

13th engineers, expert with rocket

grenades, explosives, flame throwers, and

wire cutters, had come ashore soon after

0900. Major Shaffer, landing on one of

the islands shortly before noon, found

the assault had met with no resistance.

The fifty or so enemy soldiers had been

evacuated the night before. The first

waves of landing craft had crossed the

coral reefs without mishap, but several

of the later waves had a hard time. By

early afternoon a number of boats were

stuck and were forced to unload supplies

and equipment some sixty yards short of

the beach. It was especially difficult to

get jeeps, trucks, and trailers to shore.

Bulldozer operators helped pull the

vehicles to the beach and then went to

work to clear positions for the artillery.

By 1600 the job was finished, and soon

thereafter the 105's had completed their

registration fires.6

Soon after 0800 the next day, the landing craft lined up in waves for the

assault on Kwajalein. Infantry and

engineers clambered down the ships' nets

to their boats and, protected by a powerful naval bombardment, sped toward the

beaches in orderly formations. There

was little enemy fire aside from a few

antiaircraft shells. At 0930 the first

troops came ashore. The preliminary

bombardment had been effective. Fortifications near the water's edge had been

pounded into rubble; a seawall under

construction had been smashed. The

plan of attack called for two regimental

combat teams to land abreast and move

up the length of the island. Protected

by a heavy naval and air bombardment,

the landing teams advanced inland for

150 yards before meeting resistance.

Then, amidst piles of rubble, they came

upon a few small pillboxes, which the

infantry-engineer teams, in their first

test on such installations, easily eliminated.7

Soon after the first elements had

landed, the first shore party engineers

came in with Col. Brendan A. Burns, the

5

 (1) USAFICPA, Marshall Islands Opn, pp. 85,

93. (2) Ltr, Kramer to Reybold, 13 Apr 44.

6

 (1) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and

Marshalls, p. 223. (2) Shaffer Rpt. 7

 (1) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and

Marshalls, pp. 235ff. (2) Samuel Eliot Morison,

"History of United States Naval Operations," vol.

VII, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls (Boston,

1957), pp. 257ff. (3) S. L. A. Marshall, Island Victory (Washington, 1945), pp. 48ff. (4) Shaffer Rpt.
480 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

shore party commander. Organizing

two beaches for receiving supplies on the

island's western shore, the men collected

supplies brought in by LVT's and Dukws

and put them in a dump about 50 yards

inland. Meanwhile, the combat engineers had fewer problems than expected,

and some of them joined the shore party

engineers. With their bulldozers they

smoothed the rough ground from the

beach to the western section of the highway skirting the island and repaired part

of the highway. When darkness fell,

the front lines crossed the island at a

point more than one-fourth of the distance from the landing beaches to the

northeastern tip. The next morning

the advance continued past great mounds

of rubble. Again, enemy resistance was

slight. The infantry-engineer assault

teams knocked out some pillboxes; the

wrecked airfield was captured. By

nightfall of the second day half of the

island was in American hands.8

On the morning of the third day the

troops, expecting to capture all of Kwajalein by nightfall, prepared to advance

against the enemy holed up in the milelong tip of the island. Japanese prisoners and natives warned that enemy

defenses were strong. As the men advanced, they found them far stronger

than had been anticipated. Amidst

rubble and mounds of twisted wreckage

were numerous defensive installations,

many of them largely intact. Most

common were air-raid shelters that had

been converted into pillboxes; a considerable number were built of concrete,

heavily reinforced with steel; some were

constructed of coconut logs and sand.

Nearly all of the latter were near the

shore. Some of the shelters were occupied by as many as 75 men. Next in

order of frequency were the pillboxes.

Usually of concrete and hexagonal in

shape, they had walls from one to oneand-one-half feet thick, but only a few

had enough vents to permit all-around

firing. In addition, there were circular

cisterns, about seven feet high, apparently so constructed that, if necessary,

they could be used as pillboxes, but their

concrete walls were thin. The enemy

troops in all these defenses were ready

to resist to the death.9

The engineer-infantry teams were now

put fully to the test. While the infantrymen shot at the apertures of the

enemy strongpoints, the engineers ran

forward with flame throwers, explosives,

and bangalore torpedoes, then crawled to

within inches of the structures, which

they would prepare for destruction.

The best procedure was to put a charge

through an opening and let concussion

do the rest. If a charge could be exploded in a pillbox, probably all the

occupants would be killed. Flame

throwers were effective if the men could

get close enough to put one burst inside.

Bangalore torpedoes, used rather infrequently, were poked through machine

gun slits or pushed down ventilator pipes

of the larger structures. The infantryengineer teams had the support of tanks

in the destruction of the more massive

defense works. The tanks preceded the

troops by about 150 feet, firing their

8

 Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and

Marshalls, pp. 2538:.

9

 (1) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and

Marshalls, pp. 262ff. (2) Marshall, Island Victory,

pp. 77ff. (3) Shaffer Rpt.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 481

A JAPANESE PILLBOX, KWAJALEIN

75-mm. guns point-blank at the installation under attack, thus enabling the engineers and infantry to close in on it.

Though barbed-wire entanglements

were rare, the infantry-engineer teams

had been trained to deal with them also.

If the advancing troops were held up by

small arms fire aimed at the barbed wire

from a pillbox, the infantry "buttoned

up" the pillbox while the engineers ran

or crawled to the wire, placed bangalore

torpedoes, and withdrew. The ensuing

explosion, with its noise and smoke, was

the signal for the infantry to rush

through the opening in the obstacle.

Once safely past, the infantry again

placed fire on the pillbox while the engineers moved forward with satchel

charges and flame throwers. In some

cases, the occupants of an installation,

only stunned, would come to hours later

and reman their guns. Infiltrators

would reoccupy some of the pillboxes

that had been left intact. After the

second day on Kwajalein, clean-up details were organized to reduce all fortifications to rubble.10

The engineer shore parties were carry10

 (1) Shaffer Rpt. (2) Ltr, Kramer to Reybold,

13 Apr 44. (3) Engr an. to G-3, USAFICPA, Rpt on

Kwajalein Opn. 307-20 (3492). (4) Memo for Rcd,

Zimmerman, The Infantry-Engineer Team.
482 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ing on equally important if less dramatic

work. As his staff, Colonel Burns had a

provisional group headquarters of sixtytwo officers and men. Under his command were the 50th Battalion, one

battalion of the 47th General Service

Regiment, and one company of the 34th

Combat Regiment. Each company supported one battalion landing team. At

the two original beaches on the western

and southern shores of the island, reefs

interfered considerably with unloading.

Engineers making a reconnaissance of

the lagoon side of the island discovered

an excellent place for bringing in supplies, and by noon of the second day all

shore party activities had been diverted

to it. Rather slow at first, unloading

speeded up on the third day, when

cranes, trucks, and bulldozers were

brought in. The shore parties were

soon handling supplies faster than landing craft could transport them. About

300 yards inland, the engineers set up

supply dumps and cut roads to them

from the unloading sites. They constructed eight causeways in the lagoon to

unload the heavier supplies and equipment. Enemy interference was slight.

After the third day work went on without interruption even at night on the

brightly lighted beaches.11

By the morning of 4 February more

than three-fourths of Kwajalein was in

American hands. The enemy, bottled

up in a litter-strewn area 1,000 yards

long and 400 yards wide, was in a hopeless position. But this part of the island

abounded with defenses—shelters, pillboxes, machine gun emplacements, earth

and log bunkers, and barricades against

tanks—all of them still formidable even

though they had been heavily pounded

by naval guns, artillery, and aerial bombardment. Enemy resistance was tenacious; the fighting, savage. To the

troops the action seemed "indescribably

chaotic; it was like trying to fight your

way across the landscape of a nightmare."

 12

 Nevertheless, the advance

continued. At four in the afternoon

General Corlett radioed Rear Adm.

Richmond K. Turner, commander of the

Joint Expeditionary Force: "All organized resistance . . . has ceased."

 13

Majuro

The assault on Majuro, in the southeastern Marshalls, made on 31 January,

began with the disembarkment on the

atoll of a battalion landing team of the

106th RCT, 27th Division. Two engineer units went in with the assault

forces—the 2d platoon of Company B

of the 102d Combat Battalion to support

the infantry, and Company B of the

104th Combat Battalion to do shore

party work. The BLT commander

with a special staff, including the commander of Company B of the 104th

engineers, went ashore on the major

island of the atoll for a reconnaissance.

The party found large quantities of

construction supplies and explosives,

including many 5-inch and 8-inch naval

shells. There were no booby traps

or mines. Japanese installations were

11

 (1) Shaffer Rpt. (2) Ltr, Capt John S. Hassell,

Prov Hq Engr Combat Group, to Kramer, 21 Feb 44.

Engr AGF PAC.

12

 Marshall, Island Victory, p. 93. 13

 Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and

Marshalls, p. 289.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 483

fairly extensive, but only one enemy

soldier was found. The engineers destroyed the unexploded naval shells,

began clearing away the wreckage, and

prepared to rehabilitate the facilities of

the island.14

Eniwetok

Some 325 miles northwest of Kwajalein, Eniwetok atoll consisted of about

thirty islets arranged in an almost perfect ring, twenty miles in diameter.

Plans called for an assault by Army and

Marine units on three of the islets,

Eniwetok and Parry in the south and

Engebi in the north, and the subsequent

construction of a naval base. After the

unexpectedly rapid capture of Kwajalein,

Admiral Nimitz decided to move up the

assault on Eniwetok, originally scheduled for about 1 May. Begun on 3

February, preparations for the steppedup attack were completed twelve days

later and the assault force set out for its

destination; exact planning in this short

time had not been possible.15

The marines came ashore on Engebi

on 17 February. Two days later the

106th Regimental Combat Team, less a

battalion landing team, arrived off

Eniwetok. Company B, less one platoon, of the load Combat Battalion,

provided combat support, and the 104th

Combat Battalion, less one company,

served as shore party. The 102d engineers, most of them organized in squads

of sixteen men, had been teamed with

infantry platoons as on Kwajalein and

equipped with flame throwers and demolitions. Progress was slow against

such enemy pillboxes and fortifications

as remained after the bombardment.

Eniwetok was one of the highest islands

in the Marshalls. Because underground

defenses were deep and "well-recessed,"

few of them had been detected on aerial

photographs. Infantry-engineer teams

again destroyed pillboxes, emplacements, and dugouts with demolitions

and flame throwers. Operations on

Parry Island, to the northeast of Eniwetok, were similar. Parry was cleared in

one day.16

Shore party work was carried on as on

Kwajalein. The 104th Battalion went

in early on Eniwetok. Company C, the

first unit to hit the beach, came ashore

six minutes after the initial wave of infantry landed; it was quickly evident

that the engineers had arrived too soon.

Since the Japanese were putting up

unexpected resistance in back of the

beaches, congestion of troops and supplies at the landing points was marked.

Only after more than two hours had

passed was any cargo brought in for the

shore party to handle. The engineers

cut ramps through the high banks in

back of the beaches so that tanks and

trucks could move inland more easily.

They set up water points, collected discarded equipment, and buried enemy

dead. On Parry Island, Company C of

the 104th performed similar duties.17 14

 (1) 104th Engr Combat Bn, Jnl, 5 Jan-14 Nov

44. ENBN 104-0.7. (2) Memo for Rcd, Capt Raymond W. Beggs, CO Co B 104th Engr Combat Bn,

sub: Opn: SUNDANCE, 31 Jan-28 Feb 44. Engr AGF

PAC. (3) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 318ff. 15

 Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and

Marshalls, pp. 333ff.

16

 Hist of the load Engr Combat Bn. (2) 104th

Engr Combat Bn, Jnl, 5 Jan-14 Nov 44. 17

 Ltr, Lt Col John R. Sharp, CO 104th Engr Com-
484 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Base Construction—Kwajalein,

Eniwetok, Majuro

With the end of organized resistance

on Kwajalein, the commander of the

garrison force took over and directed

that work on the airfield and base facilities begin. The most important job—

the building of the airfield—was the

mission of the 854th Aviation Battalion.

The unit had arrived off the island on

30 January. Two days later Lt. Col.

Herbert E. Brown, Jr., the commanding

officer, with members of his staff and

four survey crews, came ashore to make

initial surveys for the runway. The

best site they could find was the one the

Japanese had selected for their field.

The runway was a heap of rubble, littered with live shells and grenades.

"We experienced some close calls from

sniper fire and random shots from the

direction of the battle, but suffered no

casualties," wrote Colonel Brown, "and

surveying proceeded with little interruption." When the first equipment operators came ashore with their bulldozers

on 2 February they headed straight for

the airfield, cleared away debris, and

filled in bomb craters. Most of the

battalion did not come ashore till 6

February. The next day around-theclock operations began. The strip was

to be coral surfaced not only because the

Air Forces preferred this to steel plank,

but also because coral was plentiful.

The main problem was to locate satisfactory deposits. The aviation engineers found coarse coral and sand in the

center of the island, which they scooped

out with a dragline. A more difficult

job was locating satisfactory material for

surfacing. After days of reconnoitering, the men found a satisfactory layer

about one foot thick, some five feet

underground. Carryalls placed it on

the runways. To determine the bearing qualities of the material, a strip

seventy-five feet long was constructed

with two layers of well-compacted coral

rock, topped with a lighter surface layer.

The engineers tested the strip with a

20-ton crane loaded with steel mat, the

closest approximation to a B-24 that

could be obtained with the material and

equipment on hand. Even after the

crane had passed 150 times over the

compacted strip, the latter showed no

visible deflection. The adjoining subgrade showed a deflection of threefourths of an inch for the same number

of trips. On 12 February a Navy plane

landed on the runway and took off

without difficulty. By 17 February, a

5,000-foot strip had been cleared, graded,

and surfaced sufficiently to be suitable

for all types of aircraft then in the Central Pacific. On the 21st, heavy bomber

squadrons began carrying out regular

tactical missions from Kwajalein. During their first month on the island, the

aviation engineers built seventy-six

acres of runways, taxiways, aprons, and

hardstands.18

Although Eniwetok atoll was to be

primarily a naval base, Army engineer

units helped build it. The engineers did

most of their work on Engebi. The 3d

bat Bn, to Kramer, 6 May 44. Engr AGF PAC,

319-1.

18

 (1) Hist of the 854th Engr Avn Bn, 1 Oct 43-31

Mar 44. (2) Ltr, Brown to Col George Mayo, Air

Engr Hq AAF, 16 May 44, in Rpt of Opns of 854th

Engr Avn Bn, Kwajalein. Engr 854-HI, 1944-45.

Air Univ Lib Maxwell AFB.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 485

Defense Battalion, the garrison force for

the island, included the 1st Battalion of

the 47th Engineers, numbering about

1,800 men. They were to start work on

the airfield and continue with the job

until relieved by a naval construction

battalion. The Japanese airstrip, with

a reinforced concrete runway four inches

thick, was repaired, and by 25 February

a 3,000-foot fighter strip was usable.

Progress was not as rapid as it might

have been for a number of reasons.

The engineers had to remove a large

number of unexploded bombs because

ordnance personnel was lacking. There

was also a serious shortage of supplies,

partly because of a difference of opinion

over who should supply the island—

one of the consequences of the speed-up

in operations.

After a naval construction battalion

reached Eniwetok, some of the 102d and

104th engineers remained to help construct the naval base. They were at

first used in an inefficient manner.

Their main jobs were to straighten out

supply dumps for the infantry and bury

enemy dead. The engineers pointed

out to the naval commander that little

work was being done on the naval base

and that they could help in base construction with their heavy equipment.

The atoll commander agreed, and the

combat engineers set out to help the

Seabees. Early in March they began an

extensive construction program on an

around-the-clock basis with 12-hour

shifts, erecting Quonset huts, clearing

areas for runways, taxiways, and roads,

blasting coral for surfacing, and building revetments. The naval commander

gave the engineers tentage and lumber

to enable them to build a semipermanent

camp for themselves, including screened

mess halls, kitchens, latrines, and a floor

for each tent.19

On Majuro, meanwhile, the engineers

continued to be busy. They helped

the infantry unload supplies, cleared and

repaired a road running from the north

to the south of the island, and, within a

few days, had established supply dumps,

waterpoints, and camps. They then

aided the Seabees in building a minor

base. They remodeled and repaired a

Japanese pier, resurfaced roads with

coral and sand, built causeways between

a number of islands, and helped in the

construction of the airfield. The Army

engineers left Majuro at the end of

February for Oahu; the base was henceforth operated by the Navy.20

Kwajalein Island remained the scene

of greatest activity. On the lagoon

side near the northeast end of the island,

the engineers rebuilt Nob Pier, 1,600

feet long, where five LST's and numerous smaller craft could unload at one

time. They also rebuilt a small pier,

250 feet long, near the center of the

island on the lagoon side. By June

1944 they had provided storage for

800,000 barrels of gasoline, extensive

camps, numerous administrative buildings, and hospitals. A network of

coral-surfaced roads crisscrossed the

island.

Construction was not carried on without some difficulties. Engineer plan19

 (1) Memo, Kramer for Richardson, 16 Mar 44.

Engr AGF PAC. (2) Memo, Kramer to DC/S-R, 20

Apr 44. Engr AGF PAC. (3) Building the Navy's

Bases, II, 324ff. 20

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Beggs, CO Co B 104th Engr

Combat Bn, sub: Opn: SUNDANCE, 31 Jan-28 Feb

1944. Engr AGF PAC. (2) Building the Navy's

Bases, II, 318ff.
486 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ning had been incomplete, and changes

made in plans by higher headquarters

after construction began complicated

the construction effort. It had not been

anticipated that so many tons of rubble

would have to be cleared away before

work could begin. Engineer supplies

were riot received rapidly enough, and

unloading was not always in accordance

with priorities that had been established.

The Air Forces insisted on having tons

of its supplies moved across the beaches

before badly needed engineer construction equipment was brought in, even

though the air supplies could not be

used until the airfield was operational.21

Logistical Support From Hawaii

Organization

In Hawaii, during the first months of

1944, the dual engineer organization of

department and district under General

Kramer continued to provide support

for the combat zones of the Central

Pacific Area. Colonel Wimer continued

to be in charge of the district office;

Colonel Brown, of the department office.

Colonel Brown's staff was principally

engaged in planning; the district office

supervised construction in Hawaii and

furnished supplies. The building program, while tapering off, was still considerable. Some of the work was now

being done under lump-sum contracts;

by 1 July there were fourteen such contracts in effect. Engineer troop units,

responsible to General Kramer, were

being used more and more to replace

civilian labor.22

Construction

In the first months of 1944 quite

extensive work was still required on

airfields because of the anticipated

expansion of the Air Forces in the

Central Pacific. In February the airmen proposed far-reaching improvements to fields on Oahu and the outlying

islands. Some required more housing;

most needed additional parking aprons.

Much construction was required aside

from that for the Air Forces. Still

extensive was the need for warehousing

and refrigerated storage space. During

April the engineers provided 491,360

square feet of the former and 46,800

cubic feet of the latter. By the end of

that month the demands for cold storage

space were met for the time being, but

the engineers were scheduled to provide

an additional 954,968 square feet of

warehousing during the next three

months. Because of the steadily increasing quantities of cargo arriving at

Honolulu, more piers were needed at

Kapalama Basin, and construction of

the piers at the basin continued. More

hospitals were urgently needed. Three

of the largest schools in Honolulu were

still being used as hospitals, two of them

as units of Tripler General, the largest

Army hospital in the islands, which was

filled to overflowing. Tripler itself,

because of its age and design, was no

longer satisfactory. The engineers had

begun preliminary surveys for a new

structure in 1943, and Kramer was now

convinced that the time had come to

begin long-range planning for a new

Tripler Hospital and for other hospitals

as well. The War Department did not

approve the construction of new hospitals, but directed that planning could

21

 USAFICPA, Marshall Islands Opn, pp. 97-98. 22

 Rpt of Kramer Conf, 4 Mar 44. Engr AGF

PAC.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 487

begin. A continuing problem was the

deterioration of the roads in the islands,

particularly at Oahu. Conferences were

held, but, as before, little or nothing

was done to improve the roads.23

The Hawaiian Constructors

Negotiations between the Honolulu

District and the Hawaiian Constructors

to arrive at a final settlement of the

contract dragged on. By late 1943 the

Engineers had been able to show additional progress. In mid-October, agreement had been reached as to the completion status of the work on 31 January

1943 and the estimated cost of the

projects not covered by the contract.

In January 1944 substantial agreement

was reached on the estimated cost of the

changes made in the basic contract and

the first forty-three supplemental agreements. Still a bone of bitter contention

was the fee. The contractors continued

to feel they were entitled to special

compensation because the government

had terminated the contract just when

they were making strenuous efforts to

fulfill their obligations. The engineers,

particularly Kramer and Wimer (the

contracting officer), thought their demands unreasonable. In mid-February,

negotiations reached an impasse.24 The

contractors believed they were not

being treated fairly and voiced their

complaints to General Richardson,

stating they had "not been able to obtain

from the Contracting Officer a satisfactory explanation of his actions, which

appear to be direct and clear violations

of the original contract, the change

orders and supplemental agreements

approved by the War Department in

Washington, D.C. ..." The contractors

went on to say that, in their opinion,

".. . the action of the Contracting

Officer is so arbitrary and obviously

erroneous that we must construe it as an

act of bad faith motivated by bias and

prejudice and intended to injure the

contractor."

 25

 General Richardson expressed the view that ". . . it would

appear that there does not obtain between the respective parties that degree

of mutual confidence which is deemed

essential to an early settlement of the

contract." He directed Kramer to

confer with the contractors' representatives and, having done so, explain why

settlement of the contract was "so unduly prolonged." The contractors were

permitted to tell their side of the story

at the meetings held early in March.

Late that month the Office of the Chief

of Engineers, at General Richardson's

request, sent two experts in cost-plus-afixed-fee contracts—Harry W. Loving,

head of the Price Adjustment Branch,

and Col. Clio E. Straight, chief of the

Contract and Claims Branch—to Hawaii

to review the Hawaiian Constructors'

contract.

On their arrival in Honolulu, one of

Loving and Straight's first jobs was to

examine the records in the Hawaiian

offices of the inspector general, the judge

advocate, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Governor.

General Kramer had voiced the sus23

 (1) Memo, AirO Seventh Air Force, to D/C CPA,

18 Feb 44. Engr AGF PAC. (2) Interstaff Routing

Slip, Richardson to CofS HD, 19 May 44. Engr

AGF PAC. 24

 Ltr, Kramer to Richardson, 14 Mar 44. Engr

AGF PAC 160, Contracts, vol. 1.

25

 As quoted in Ltr, Richardson to Kramer, 22

Feb 44. Engr AGF PAC, 160, Contracts, vol. 1.
488 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

picion that the contractors might have

been guilty of fraud, having arrived at

this view because cost estimates for many

jobs, for no apparent reason, had been

increased by 10 and sometimes even 20

percent. Loving and Straight immediately and thoroughly studied the possibility of fraud but found no evidence of

it. On 5 April Kramer, Wimer, Loving,

and Straight held a meeting. "We have

come to the conclusion," Loving and

Straight reported, "that the situation

here is not extraordinary, not entirely

unusual in that a lot of fixed fee contracts were confused [and] disagreements

resulted . . . the contractor in many

such cases comes to the conclusion that

the contracting officer has acted in bad

faith, . . . contractors many times, not

having previously worked under fixed

fee contracts, don't always understand

their rights and there is sincere disagreements on all sides."26

 Loving and

Straight spent several weeks more in

their investigations. Early in April,

they went to Canton and Christmas with

Capt. C. D. Baker to inspect the work

which had been done on those islands.

Early in May, they flew to Port Moresby,

New Guinea, where they talked with

Sverdrup and Robinson and learned of

the difficult conditions the contractors

had had to contend with in Hawaii.

Meanwhile, progress was made toward

a settlement. In May, the Engineers

and the Hawaiian Constructors reached

a final agreement. The total cost of the

work was set at $112,031,375. The

fixed fee was $1,215,597, plus a supplementary fee of $1,060,000 resulting

from termination. Purchases of equipment by the government were considered binding. The contract was

exempted from renegotiation.

By this time interest in the contract

of the Engineers with the Hawaiian Constructors had become nationwide. It

was touched on by a number of governmental committees delving into the

background of the Pearl Harbor attack.

It was thoroughly reviewed by the Army

Pearl Harbor Board, the principal members of which were Lt. Gen. George

Grunert, then commanding general of

the First Army and Eastern Defense

Command; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell,

an infantry commander; and Maj. Gen.

Walter H. Frank, of the Army Air

Forces. From 20 July to 20 October,

members of the Army board heard testimony from civilians and officers in Washington, San Francisco, and Hawaii.

Colonel Wyman, then commanding officer of Cherbourg Base Section in France,

testified at Fort Shafter on 14 September

and Col. Bernard L. Robinson, who had

flown in from Hollandia, was heard the

next day. Many others who had worked

in the Honolulu District were questioned.27

The Army board, in its report made

public after the war, did not deal gently

with Wyman as Honolulu District engi26

 (1) Min of Mtg Held in ... U.S. Engr Off

Honolulu ... at 1930, 5 Apr 44, p. 4. (2) Memo

for Rcd, Robinson, 5 May 44. (3) Contract No. W414-engr-602, Supplemental Agreement No. 53, 17

May 44. All in Engr AGF PAC, 160, Contracts,

vol. 1.

27

 (1) Min of Mtg Held in ... U.S. Engr Off

Honolulu ... at 1930, 5 Apr 44, p. 4. (2) Memo

for Rcd, Robinson, 5 May 44. (3) Contract No.

W-414-engr-602, Supplemental Agreement No. 53.

17 May 44. All in Engr AGF PAC, 160, Contracts,

vol. 1. (4) Pearl Harbor Hearings, Testimony of

Col Theodore Wyman, Jr., pts. 28-29, pp. 1735, 1742.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 489

neer, nor with the Hawaiian Constructors. It charged Wyman with poor

administration, with causing inexcusable

delays in construction, and with showing

favoritism toward the grossly inefficient

Hawaiian Constructors. Much was

made of the fact that Hans Wilhelm

Rohl, president of the Rohl-Connolly

Company when the original contract was

signed, was a German alien and did not

become an American citizen until a few

weeks before Pearl Harbor.28 Additional investigations and a judicious

review of the evidence raised doubts that

the charges of the board could be substantiated. Secretary Stimson stated that

nothing indicated "that any conduct on

the part of Colonel Wyman or of Rohl

or of any of the other contractors in Hawaii contributed in any way to the Pearl

Harbor disaster." It was not illegal to

give a defense contract to a firm, one or

more of whose officers was an alien; the

law merely prohibited showing secret

plans and specifications to an alien. No

evidence was adduced that Rohl ever saw

such plans or specifications before he became a citizen. There was no convincing proof that Wyman had shown undue

favoritism to the Hawaiian Constructors

or had awarded them contracts against the

best interests of the United States. There

was no evidence of fraud. The confusion, waste, and slowness in defense construction that existed before and after

Pearl Harbor could not be blamed on one

arm or service, much less on one man.

Stimson conceded that Wyman was guilty

of indiscretion, adding that there was

"creditable evidence" that the social and

personal relationship of Rohl and Wyman was quite close, and that "Colonel

Wyman acted unwisely in permitting this

close association to continue during the

progress of the work." This, together

with Wyman's undiplomatic handling of

some people, unnecessarily added to his

difficulties, which would undoubtedly

have been only a fraction of what they

were had they occurred in an inconspicuous place or at a less critical time.29

Many in the Army considered Wyman a

capable officer. In 1942 he was recommended for the Distinguished Service

Medal for his services in Hawaii and

subsequently he received the Legion of

Merit for his services in Europe.

Maps

Mapping units had an increasing work

load in 1944. "We have been putting

out a tremendous number of maps here

lately . . . ," Kramer wrote in late 1943

to Col. Herbert B. Loper, head of the

Military Intelligence Division of the

Chief's Office. "Both the 64th Engineers and the old Department reproduction plant are sorely taxed." Still, with

only small islands to be mapped, the

Central Pacific did not require a great

number of mapping units. Late in

1943, Kramer had asked for a GHQ

topographic battalion, a type of unit

which had substantial amounts of equipment and could produce and reproduce

large quantities of maps. The Corps

had only four such units and could spare

none for the Central Pacific. Loper

28

 Rpt of Army Pearl Harbor Bd, ch. V.

29

 WD, Bureau of Public Relations, Press Br,

Statement of the Secretary of War Relative to

Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Corps of Engineers,

for release Saturday a.m., 6 Oct 45. Copy in EHD

Files.
490 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

suggested that Kramer take one of the

Army topographic battalions instead.

These units, with less equipment, some

of it mobile, produced fewer maps, but

they had recently been reorganized to

meet more adequately the demands of

modern war. Their photomapping

platoons had been expanded into companies and the survey companies cut to

platoons. The Office of the Chief of

Engineers decided the 651st Topographic

Battalion, Army, would best meet the

needs of the Central Pacific. Kramer

wanted the 651st to merge with the 64th

Topographic Company and take the latter's number because of the 64th's fine

record. The 651st arrived in Honolulu

in April and was thereupon absorbed

into the 64th, which was then reorganized as a battalion. The new and enlarged unit of 451 men, under the

operational control of Brig. Gen. Joseph

J. Twitty, chief of J-2 of the Joint Staff,

went to work on maps of the Marianas

and the Carolines.30

In February 1944 Colonel Loper suggested that the 29th Topographic Battalion, GHQ, stationed at Portland,

Oregon, help make maps for the Central

Pacific. He believed this unit could be

of substantial aid in the preparation of

some of the badly needed large-scale

maps of the Marianas and Carolines.

The Navy would supply the photographs. Kramer thought Loper's suggestion an excellent one. It proved,

moreover, timely. The troops on Kwajalein had just found a fairly complete

set of maps of all Japanese-held islands

in the Central Pacific, mostly at a scale

of 1 to 50,000, containing a wealth of

hydrographic and topographic detail.

These maps could be compared with

aerial photographs of the Marianas, particularly of the islands of Saipan and

Tinian, just coming in. The 29th was

given the job of making maps for the

Central Pacific. Using aerial negatives

received from Hawaii, the men compiled

preliminary topographic maps of the

islands of the Central Pacific, then sent

the drafts to the 64th Topographic Battalion, which put them in final form,

making use of the latest intelligence data.

The engineers could do little to determine what specifications would be used

for aerial photography, since Navy

squadrons took practically all the pictures. But the engineers and naval

fliers did try to work out a plan whereby

photographs would be available for maps

sufficiently far in advance of scheduled

assaults to ". . . insure the availability

of adequate detailed maps for planning,

as well as for operations."

 31

Training

By 1944 training schedules for engineer units in Hawaii were rather extensive. Since the troops in the Islands

might be sent to any part of the western

Pacific, all divisional engineer units received a week's training in jungle warfare. Included were scouting and patrolling, working with dogs, close30

 (1) Ltr, Kramer to Loper, 5 Nov 43. Engr AGF

PAC, 016. (2) Ltr, Loper to Kramer, 8 Oct 43.

Engr AGF PAC, 370.09 (Mapping). (3) Hist of the

64th Engr Topo Bn.

31

 (1) Ltr, Loper to Kramer, 4 Feb 44. Engr AGF

PAC, 370.09 (Mapping). (2) Ltr, Kramer to Loper,

13 Feb 44. Engr AGF PAC, 061. (3) Ltr, Kramer

to Loper, 8 Mar 44. Engr AGF PAC, 061.01.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 491

quarter fighting, stream crossing, and

placing and deactivating mines and

booby traps. Two officers, who as

naturalists in civilian life had studied the

islands of the Pacific, gave the men pointers on how to live in the jungle. Their

basic idea was that the jungle, far from

being something to be feared, should be

regarded as the "friend and protector of

man," since it could be made to provide

shelter and food. Exercises were held in

areas of the Hawaiian Islands where

heavy tropical growth existed and could

provide a realistic background. At the

Waianae Amphibious Training Center

on Oahu, most engineer units were given

a week's refresher course in amphibious

landings. Included were exercises in

embarkation, debarkation, and swimming with equipment. Training was

completed with a battalion exercise at

night on the beach with live ammunition. There were, in addition, many

specialist schools to provide instruction

in such subjects as mine clearance, water

distillation, refrigeration, and the operation of mechanical equipment. The

mine clearance school, surprisingly

enough, by the fall of 1944 had more

than forty hard-to-get Japanese mines

and various types of fuzes—enough to

lay a small mine field for the trainees to

practice on. The school's commanding

officer explained that having long and

unsuccessfully tried to get Japanese

mines through official channels, he had

finally gotten some by trading his liquor

ration for souvenirs brought back by

the troops from the combat areas.32

Reorganization

When General Richardson visited

Washington in February, he was successful in obtaining War Department approval for a major reorganization of his

headquarters. What he had wanted was

an "integrated communications zone

command." He planned to have General Kramer as his theater engineer;

Kramer would plan for and exercise technical supervision mainly over engineer

operations in the combat zone. At the

same time a chief engineer would be

needed to provide technical supervision

over engineer work in the communications zone. In response to Richardson's

request of 29 March for Loper, Reybold

released him for assignment to the

Islands. In May Kramer consolidated

the two offices of district and department

engineer, which henceforth were designated the Office of the Engineer, CPA.

Late in May, Kramer returned to the

United States because of poor health.

In June Colonel Loper arrived and became Kramer's replacement. On the

29th of that month the logistics organization Richardson had wanted was

established with the activation of the

Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC).

But for the time being, no change was

made in the engineer organization in the

Hawaiian Islands, and no engineer was

appointed to exercise technical supervision over engineer work in the Central

Pacific Base Command.33

32

 (1) Engr USAFICPA, Tng Directive, n.d. Engr

AGF PAC. (2) McMeekan, British Army Staff, Rpt

on Visit as Engr Observer to Central Pac, Aug-Sep

44. (3) Hist Review, CE, U.S. Army, Covering Opns

During World War II, POA, pp. 819A-C. 33

 Ltr, Richardson to Reybold, 29 Mar 44. Engr

AGF PAC, 160, Contracts, vol. 1.
492 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The Marianas

Plans and Preparations

In mid-January 1944 Admiral Nimitz

released the general plan of campaign

approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for

the latter part of the year. The main

Japanese bastion to be seized was Truk,

one of the Caroline Islands, and the

target date for the assault was 15 June.

After Truk had been taken, three

islands in the Marianas—Saipan, Guam,

and Tinian—were to be captured.

These islands, 3,800 miles west of Hawaii, were a most important objective.

They would provide a site for an advance naval base for the Fifth Fleet, thus

enabling it to attack and destroy Japanese warships and transports and eventually gain control of the rest of the

Central Pacific. Air bases in the Marianas would help isolate and neutralize

the remaining enemy-held islands in the

central Carolines. Most important of

all, the Marianas, only 1,500 miles from

Tokyo, would be ideal sites for airfields

for the B-29's, now coming off the production line in quantities. Capture of

the Marianas was scheduled as the concluding phase of the 1944 campaign.

Initial planning centered almost entirely

around Truk, a base that had to be

captured in order to safeguard the American flank in an assault on the Marianas.

In a series of powerful carrier thrusts in

February, the Navy exposed the vulnerability of that enemy bastion. Truk

could be bypassed. The Joint Chiefs,

in a directive sent to Nimitz and MacArthur on 12 March, directed that the

attack on the Marianas begin on 15

June. On 20 March Nimitz issued a

staff study for FORAGER—the code name

for the conquest of the Marianas—and

detailed planning soon got under way in

full force for the capture of Saipan and

Tinian, the main Japanese islands in the

group, and for the recapture of Guam.

D-day for Saipan was to be 15 June; for

Guam, 18 June. The V Amphibious

Corps, consisting of the 2d and 4th

Marine Divisions, with the Army's 27th

Infantry Division in reserve, was to take

Saipan and Tinian. The III Amphibious Corps, made up of the 3d Marine

Division and the 1st Marine Provisional

Brigade, with the 77th Infantry Division

in reserve, was to take Guam. Marine

Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith was to have

tactical command of all troops ashore on

the three islands until the tactical phase

was completed, and he would be directly

responsible to Vice Adm. Richmond K.

Turner, who commanded the joint

Army-Navy-Marine task force. The

Army would have primary responsibility

for base development on Saipan. The

Army and Navy would be jointly responsible for base construction on Guam.

The Navy was to be responsible for base

construction on Tinian.34

The Engineers had begun long-range

planning for operations against Truk in

January. When the decision was made

to bypass that atoll, they concentrated

their studies on the Marianas, directing

most of their attention to Saipan. That

island, like others of the Marianas, ex34

 (1) Participation in the Marianas Opn by

USAFICPA, Jun-Sep 44 (cited hereafter as

USAFICPA, Marianas Opn), p. 63. (2) Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 33ff. (3) Samuel Eliot

Morison, "History of United States Naval Operations," vol. VIII, New Guinea and the Marianas (Boston, 1953), pp. 8-10. (4) Holland M. Smith, Coral

and Brass (New York, 1949), pp. 152ff.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 493

cept Guam—a U.S. possession since 1898

—had been held by the Japanese since

World War I. Information about

Saipan was meager. No aerial photographs were to be had. The engineers

studied German maps made before

World War I, when the Marianas (except

Guam) were a German possession; they

analyzed information found in the records of the Japanese Diet; and they

interviewed people who had lived on

Guam, since it was known that the terrain features of Guam and Saipan were

similar. Unlike the flat coral islands

to the east, the Marianas were of volcanic origin. Saipan, about twelve

miles long and five wide, was mountainous, with a line of low peaks running

in a north-south direction. (Map 24)

The highest, Mount Tapotchau, near

the center of the island, rose to an altitude of 1,554 feet. The eastern side of

the island had steep wooded hills bordering the ocean. On the western side,

the high points sloped gradually to level

areas cultivated principally with sugarcane. On the western coast were two

major towns, Garapan, the capital, to

the north, and Charan Kanoa, to the

south. The western side of the island

was most promising for an amphibious

assault. In late February the first

photographs of Saipan, taken from carrier planes, came in. They were rather

poor because many of the features were

obscured by clouds and the flight lines

were irregular.35

The most important construction mission in the Marianas was the building of

airfields for the B-29's. On Saipan and

Guam, the engineers were to construct

six runways for the long-range bombers.

On Tinian, Navy engineers were to build

six more with materials furnished by the

Army. Runways were to be 8,500 feet

long and surfaced with asphalt. Planning was involved and time consuming.

After the planners in Hawaii had determined airfield requirements, they began

estimating other construction needs,

such as camps, hospitals, and warehouses.

Kramer's staff prepared construction annexes for the base development plan for

Saipan, with layout plans showing the

tentative location of all major installations to be built. Because of the few

aerial photographs of the islands, the

engineers had to make their layouts somewhat flexible. After Kramer's engineers

had completed their work on the Base

Development Plan, they turned it over

to Colonel Burns, who had served as

head of the shore party on Kwajalein,

and was to be garrison force engineer on

Saipan. His staff prepared detailed designs and layout maps and computed

supply requirements. Civilians from

the Honolulu District office, aided by a

special staff of officers, worked on the

extensive engineer supply needs. The

effectiveness of the Joint Staff had increased constantly; the Marianas operation was the first in which its new procedures were to be fully applied. For

one thing, ships carrying supplies from

the United States were to bypass the

Hawaiian Islands and go directly to the

Marianas. The engineers planned to

send 150,000 ship tons to the islands by

1 October 1944 and 350,000 tons more

by the following April. If supplies

35

 (1) USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, pp. 63ff. (2)

Building Saipan, the Engineer Mission, 20 Jun 44-2

Sep 45 (cited hereafter as Rowland, Building Saipan), prepared for the 2233d Engr Constr Serv Sec

by Maj James C. Rowland, 98-USF4-0.3.0 (30757).
494 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 24

were sent directly from the United States,

requisitions would have to be submitted

to the ports of embarkation at least three,

months before the date the items were

to be delivered. Very important was

proper echeloning of the shipments.

The engineer liaison officer at the San

Francisco Port of Embarkation had the

authority to load engineer cargo for each

base as he thought necessary in order to

fill engineer tonnage allowances. Meeting supply needs in the Marianas would

not be easy because construction deadlines would require great quantities of

materials at an early date. One weakness in planning persisted: task force

commanders, after receiving their final

directives, had too little time to finish

their own planning and found that when

they needed additional supplies, the

items were almost impossible to get.36

Engineer troop requirements for

Saipan were similar to those for Kwajalein. Although Saipan was considerably

larger and enemy forces stationed there

were estimated to total many thousands,

Army troop requirements were not so

36

 (1) USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, pp. 75ff. (2)

Ltr, Leavey to C EHD, 21 Jun 61. EHD Files.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 495

great as originally expected because the

marines were to participate in the assault. As part of the 27th Division, the

102d combat engineers, under Lt. Col.

Harold F. Gormsen, their experiences

on Makin and Eniwetok behind them,

were scheduled to take part in the attack.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the 1165th Combat Group, recently split off from the 34th Engineers

when that unit was converted to a battalion, and commanded by Col. Horace

L. Porter, was to supervise the shore

party work of three combat battalions—

the 34th, 1341st, and 152d; all shore

party personnel were attached to the 27th

Division. After the assault phase of the

operation, the shore party was to be

transferred to the Saipan Garrison Force.

It was believed that the terrain which

would be encountered and the nature of

the operation did not require bridging,

topographic, depot, or maintenance units

during the combat phase. Army engineer units of the garrison force would be

directly under the Headquarters of the

1176th Construction Group, which had

been formed from the 47th General

Service Regiment when that unit was

converted into a battalion. Colonel

Burns, commander of the 1176th, was to

be responsible to Maj. Gen. Sanderford

Jarman, commander of the garrison

force. Engineer units assigned to

Burns's command were principally aviation and construction battalions and

elements of supply and maintenance

companies.37

While headquarters staffs were engaged in planning, troop units were

undergoing intensive training. The

102d engineers were alerted for FORAGER

in the latter part of February. They

were given considerable training in attacking fortified positions; some of the

men attended specialist schools. The

three battalions selected for shore party

operations were familiarized with unloading and storing supplies and in using demolitions; classroom instruction

was followed by rehearsals at the beaches.

Units assigned to the garrison force were

trained in their specialties by working

on construction jobs. The men worked

with well-drilling rigs, hot-mix asphalt

plants, and quarrying equipment; some

got additional training in civilian shops

and factories in Honolulu. To insure

around-the-clock operations in the Marianas, extra operators were selected and

trained on earth-moving and other construction equipment. Plans for base

development could be prepared with

greater accuracy in April, when B-24's

operating from the newly constructed airfields in the Marshalls obtained complete photographic coverage of Saipan.

By early May the base development plan

was complete.38

The Assault on Saipan

Late in May a task force with the 2d

and 4th Marine Divisions and the 27th

Division sailed from Hawaii for the

Marshalls. Somewhat earlier a similar

force carrying the III Amphibious

Corps, including the Marine 3d Division

and the 1st Provisional Brigade, had left

Guadalcanal for the same destination. 37

 (1) Hist of the 1165th Engr Combat Group. (2)

Hist of the 1176th Engr Constr Group. (3)

USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, p. 67. 38

 USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, pp. 68ff.
496 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The two fleets met near Kwajalein, the

staging base for the operation. FORAGER

was by far the largest assault yet undertaken in the Central Pacific. For

Saipan alone, plans called for transporting 78,000 men and 100,000 tons of

supplies from Hawaii. The Fifth Fleet,

commanded by Admiral Raymond A.

Spruance, was the largest American naval

force so far assembled in the Pacific.

The combat engineers spent their time

en route to the fighting zone in listening

to orientation lectures, doing physical

exercises, practicing loading and unloading supplies and equipment, and just

relaxing. Meanwhile, planes and warships were pounding the island. "Saipan was smoking when we arrived. ... "

wrote General Holland Smith.39

On 15 June the 2d and 4th Marine

Divisions landed near Charan Kanoa.

Enemy troops and defenses near the

beaches were few. But the Japanese,

skilfully using the guns they had emplaced on hills and in ravines farther

back, put enough fire on the landing

forces to hold them to a half-mile deep

beachhead during the day. Early on

the morning of the 17th, two regimental

combat teams—the 105th and the 165th

—of the 27th Division landed to the

south of the Marine positions. Company A of the 102d engineers came

ashore with the 105th; Company C, with

the 165th. Again combat engineers and

infantry had been organized into fighting teams. Each RCT came ashore with

its company of engineers, part of which

had been formed into assault groups,

each consisting of one noncommissioned

officer and five men. Three of the men

carried satchel charges, one had a Browning automatic rifle, and one carried a

flame thrower. The groups remained

at or near company headquarters to be

assigned to rifle platoons as needed.

Engineer company and platoon headquarters had the job of bringing in reserve supplies of tools, equipment, explosives, Bangalore torpedoes, mine

detectors, and liquid for flame throwers.

From the engineer standpoint, the

beach defenses of southwestern Saipan

were poor. They consisted for the most

part of hastily constructed trenches and

foxholes and a few log obstacles to stop

tanks. In the advance toward the airfield, named Aslito, the combat engineers

had to destroy only a few pillboxes, caves,

and dugouts. Their biggest job was to

find their supplies and equipment,

dumped indiscriminately on the beaches

and "hopelessly scattered."40

One of the first tasks of the shore party

engineers was to make a reconnaissance

of the beaches. On the third day of the

landing, at 0830, three officers and two

enlisted men from headquarters of the

1165th Group set out on a survey of one

of the beaches and its offshore coral reef

to determine if it would be possible to

unload palletized supplies from LCM's

and LST's, move them across the reef,

and then have Alligators haul them from

there to the beach. Ninety percent of

the cargo and supplies of the 27th Division had been palletized. The reconnaissance party had a rough time.

Caught in an enemy air raid and unable

to return to their ship, the group had to

39

 Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 158.

40

 (1) Hist of the 102d Engr Combat Bn. (2)

Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 99ff. (3) McMeekan, Rpt on Visit as Engr Observer to Central

Pac, Aug-Sep 44.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 497

spend the night in an LCVP. "With

our tow boat, we floated about until a

Jap plane came into view and began

strafing various boats around us," the

men reported in their diary. "We

hopped into the tow boat and dodged

about until the plane had gone, then

returning to our own LCVP. There

was much confusion and firing. Whenever one boat would open up at some

target, fancied or otherwise, every other

would join in and bullets were thick in

the air." Unloading began as planned

but could be carried out only with difficulty. Dukws and Buffaloes, clambering over the reef, brought in the first

supplies; landing craft with stores for all

three divisions used a single narrow

channel in the reef.41

Shore party operations in the 27th

Division area were entirely under engineer control. The engineers were responsible for organizing the beachhead,

selecting sites for dumps, hauling supplies to the dumps, and providing

security. Men from other arms, naval

beach parties, members of the Signal and

Medical Corps, and other troops in the

shore party area were subject to engineer

shore party command. The plan was

that supplies of all the arms and services

would be landed at the appropriate

beaches, near their dumps. But unloading was haphazard from the first. For

the engineers it was almost disastrous.

Units searched for days for their equipment; some items were never found.

The chances were that construction on

the airfield would not get started on

time.42

The Japanese had begun too late to

build up the island's permanent defenses.

At the time of the American landing,

their program was only about 25 percent

complete. "We found coastal defense

guns up to 200 mm. crated, or uncrated

and not installed, and large quantities of

equipment and materiel waiting to be

used," General Smith wrote.43 The

Japanese had, however, set up strong

makeshift defenses by cleverly exploiting the natural features of the island.

Artillery and mortars had been placed

in advantageous positions in the mountains and trained on the roads and defiles

leading inland. Army and Marine units

pushed forward against stubborn and

sometimes skilfull resistance. Yet the

defensive positions with which the engineers had to deal were few. The troops

came across a number of pillboxes with

sides of palm logs and roofs of sheet

metal topped with sand. There were

some blockhouses, generally with walls

of weak concrete, 21⁄2 to 4 feet thick,

usually with 4 ports and mounts for

20-mm. guns. Most of the emplacements were either just finished or under

construction. The combat engineers,

sometimes with the help of shore party

engineers, knocked out cave emplacements and pillboxes with demolitions

and flame throwers. The few mines

that were found revealed a "complete

lack of thought" with regard to their

41

 (1) Diary of the 1165th Engrs in Saipan Opn.

Engr AGF PAC. (2) McMeekan, Rpt on Visit as

Engr Observer to Central Pac, Aug-Sep 44. (3) Hist

of the 152d Engr Combat Bn. (4) Hist of the 1341st

Engr Combat Bn. (5) Hist of the 34th Engr C Bn.

42

 1165th Engr Combat Group, FORAGER Opns,

Questions and Answers on Shore Party Opns as

requested by Hq V Amphib Corps. EHD Files. 43

 Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 159.
498 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

placement, concealment, and tactical

use.44

By 18 June Aslito airfield, together

with the southern part of the island except a pocket at Nafutan Point, was in

American hands. The next day the 4th

Marine Division reached Magicienne

Bay on the eastern side of the island.

The 2d Marine Division was north of

Garapan. The two divisions re-formed

their lines and advanced northward.

Despite the makeshift Japanese defenses,

it was apparent that the capture of

Saipan would take longer than anticipated. Naval and military commanders

held a conference on shipboard and decided to prepare for a three weeks'

campaign.

After Aslito airfield was captured, it

was renamed Isley in memory of a naval

aviator

 45

 killed during one of the preliminary strikes on the island. On 19

June a naval construction battalion

reached the field and began filling in

craters and smoothing one of the runways. The next day a strip 4,500 feet

long was usable. At this time the 804th

Aviation Battalion, under Maj. John W.

Paxton, arrived, having been delayed two

days because of the unfavorable tactical

situation and the haphazard unloading.

The three LST's carrying the battalion

had beached on a coral reef, partly submerged at high tide, about 600 feet from

shore. Heavy dozers were unloaded

first. A roadway was smoothed over the

reef and through shallow water to the

bluff at the water's edge; a blasting crew

charged the bluff's 50-foot-high face with

dynamite. After blasting, dozers and

carryalls completed a road up to the

plateau of the island; construction equipment and personnel poured ashore

"through chest-deep water." The aviation engineers took over from the Seabees and continued improving the airfield for fighters. The men graded the

shoulders and approach zones to make

the strip safe for fighters and provided

parking facilities for four squadrons of

planes. They then began work on

storage for aviation gasoline.46 The

804th engineers were the first of the units

assigned to the 1176th Construction

Group to reach Saipan. The advance

echelon of group headquarters arrived

on the 25th, and, under Colonel Burns,

who had landed a week before, set up

camp just west of Isley.47

As the Americans advanced northward,

they came upon a series of cliffs and deep

ravines, pitted with caves, from which

the Japanese fought back stubbornly.

The enemy, astride Mount Tapotchau,

had a full view of the battlefield, which

gave him a considerable advantage.

Company B of the 102d Combat Battalion was active around Mount Tapotchau. The men had a rough time.

They had to reduce innumerable machine gun positions and neutralize a large 44

 (1) Hq 1165th Engr Combat Group, Hist Rcd.

(2) Diary of the 1165th Engrs in Saipan Opn. (3)

Hist of the 1341st Engr Combat Bn. (4) Hist of

the 34th Engr Combat Bn. (5) 1 165th Engr Combat

Group, FORAGER Opns, Questions and Answers on

Shore Party Opns. 45

 Comdr. Robert H. Isely. For reasons unknown,

the spelling of the aviator's name and that of the

field differ.

46

 (1) Hq 804th Engr Avn Bn, Rpt on Air Base

Constr, Saipan, Mariana Islands, 3 Feb 45. Engr

AGF PAC. (2) Ltr, Paxton to Air Engr Hq AAF,

22 Nov 44. Engr 804-SU-RE Mar 44. Air Univ

Lib Maxwell AFB. 47

 (1) Hist of the 1176th Engr Constr Gp. (2)

USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, p. 454.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 499

number of enemy caves. They used

their bulldozers to close the mouths of

caves which were so located that the

machines could be used effectively.

Sometimes the operators pushed dirt and

other material down a slope over a cave

entrance or inched their machines along

a shelf of the hillside to the cave's mouth.

When the Japanese fired at approaching

dozers, they aimed, as a rule, at the

driver, protected by his armored cab and

raised blade, instead of at the vulnerable

parts of the engine. The engineers

could reach some caves located in sheer

cliffs only by following goat tracks on

which enemy weapons were trained.

They usually demolished these hideouts

by lowering satchel charges from above,

putting them in place in accordance with

directions from observers stationed at a

distance. After the explosion, the infantry went in with rifles, grenades, and

flame throwers. Sometimes large charges

were set off above the cave, causing the

roof to collapse. The Japanese had laid

their mine fields clumsily, without plan,

and did not cover them with fire. A

field of about seventy-five mines was discovered alongside a road near Mount

Tapotchau. These mines, apparently

laid in haste, were easily rendered harmless. A few booby traps were found near

a radio station; poorly concealed, they

were quickly deactivated.48

Base Construction on Saipan

As the enemy was being forced back,

the work of transforming the island into

a major base began. In General Jarman's words, "I knew the primary job

was to push the very long-range [bomber]

program as rapidly as possible. There

were three things we had to do. First,

we had to build the strips for the Superfortresses; second, we had to have docks

to unload the equipment to build the

airstrips; third, we had to have the roads

from the docks to the fields to bring the

equipment. Everything else was secondary."

 49

Work began first on the B-29 runway,

to be 8,500 feet long and surfaced with

asphalt. It was to be built at Isley. On

20 June, when the original Japanese runway was rehabilitated sufficiently to take

fighters, work began on the B-29 runway. Survey parties of the 804th made

experimental profiles to determine runway directions, sometimes under rifle

fire. Intelligence reports had indicated

the topsoil was about two feet deep, but

it turned out to be only a few inches.

Underneath was hard coral rock, which

required much blasting. The aviation

engineers used about five tons of dynamite a day. During the first week and a

half, work was slowed by Japanese bombers overhead, usually at night, The

engineers were forced to impose blackouts and all work stopped.50

Base development plans called for

putting in a fighter field north of Charan

Kanoa, where the Japanese had been at

work on an airfield. Late in June the

48

 (1) Hist of the 102d Engr Combat Bn. (2)

McMeekan, Rpt on Visit as Engr Observer to Central Pac, Aug-Sep 44.

49

 As quoted by Clinton Green, "Our B-29 Base:

An Epic Job," New York Times Magazine, December 10, 1944, p. 8. Brackets are in the original

quotation. 50

 Of of the Air Engr AAF POA, Avn Engrs Build

B-29 Bases in the Marianas. AAF Central Files,

Misc Papers.
500 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

805th aviation engineers, just in from

Panama, surveyed the site. They regarded the area as unsuitable because of

the strong cross winds and operational

hazards. The local air force commander

decided to build a field on the eastern

side of the island at Kagman Point. On

3 July, when the enemy was cleared from

the area, construction began. The engineers used their earth-moving equipment on a 24-hour basis, and on 8 July,

they put the first coral from a nearby pit

on the runway. Rapid progress had

meanwhile been made on storage of aviation gasoline on Saipan. On 1 July the

804th Aviation Battalion began the rehabilitation of the Japanese storage facilities. Materials were beginning to

arrive for the additional tanks to be

constructed.51

The Japanese were being slowly forced

back to the northern tip of the island.

On 30 June a platoon of Company A,

102d Combat Battalion, was attached to

BLT 3 of the 105th Regimental Combat

Team and continued the attack, using

flame throwers and dynamiting caves and

dugouts. Fighting was savage. U.S.

troops suffered 25-percent casualties.

The Japanese commander on Saipan

ordered a last desperate counterattack

for the night of 6-7 July. At 0300, the

enemy attacked just north of Tanapag

harbor. Armed with rifles, grenades,

and knives, several thousand Japanese

advanced shoulder to shoulder. They

overran and wiped out two American

infantry battalions and a number of field

artillery units. "They came along the

road adjacent to the beach about 1000

yards above the Tanapag seaplane base,"

the 102d Combat Battalion historian reported, "and kept pushing in and in.

All the weapons of the BLT's were used

to stop them, and as a last resort flamethrowers were used." The attack lasted

for two and a half hours. The first

platoon of Company A, hit hard, lost

several men killed and wounded in

action. Some of the engineers, after

firing their last rounds, escaped by

swimming out to destroyers in the harbor. Many of the surviving Japanese

committed suicide, as did the commander

of the enemy garrison on the island. On

9 July organized resistance came to an

end. There had been twenty-four days

of fighting. A large number of Japanese had retreated to the caves and jungle

of northern Saipan, where mop-up operations continued for months.52

With the island secure, work on airfields and base facilities progressed at a

more rapid pace. Additional units of

the 1176th Construction Group arrived.

Progress continued on the B-29 runway,

but more slowly than had been expected.

In some places the engineers had to cut

coral down to a depth of fifteen feet; in

others they had to fill as much as twentytwo feet. Good coral rock for the base

course came from a quarry about two

miles away. To speed up work, the men

built a road from quarry to runway, to

be used only by trucks hauling coral;

stoplights at intersections gave the trucks

the right of way at all times. To build

this road, the engineers discontinued

work on the runway for four days, but in

about two days the increase in the

amount of coral hauled made up for the

51

 (1) Hist of the 805 Engr Avn Bn. (2) Rowland,

Building Saipan. 52

 Hist of the 102d Engr Combat Bn.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 501

time spent on constructing the road.

In building the runway, the engineers

placed a coral base from twelve to eighteen inches deep. Asphalt for surfacing

was produced at two plants located near

the field. The rehabilitated Japanese

runway crossed the B-29 strip near the

middle. In order not to interfere with

the flights of the fighter planes, the men

worked on the two ends of the B-29 runway and left the fighter strip untouched

in between. Heavy rains in July slowed

construction somewhat. Drainage required little attention. The runways

were constructed to drain to the shoulders, and from there the water percolated

down through the coral. Early in July

the 804th engineers began rehabilitation

of the Japanese aviation gasoline fueling

system. They had one of the tank farms

in operation by the 12th; work on a

second was under way.53

Working conditions on Saipan

were not ideal. "Tropical downpours

drenched the men, the heat was intense,

water was scarce," wrote war correspondent Clinton Green. "The flies

pressed unmercifully against sweaty

bodies and had to be pried from one's

eyes, ears, and nostrils. Yet the work

went on—twelve to eighteen hours a

day." There were heavy, almost continuous rains from the middle to the end

of July, but by this time enemy air raids

were becoming less frequent.54

The Army and Navy were jointly responsible for rehabilitating ports and

harbors. The Army was charged with

building piers and clearing areas for storing cargo; the Navy, for removing

sunken ships and debris offshore and

doing dredging. Saipan had one welldeveloped port—Tanapag, on the west

coast, north of Garapan. A 200-footwide channel, 22 feet deep, led to three

piers. The 47th engineers, organized as

a construction battalion in April 1944,

were slated to carry out the Army's responsibilities at Tanapag. The unit

arrived on 25 June and bivouacked in a

cane field near Isley. Early in July, it

moved to a hillside near Tanapag, prepared to work on docks and storage

areas. Harbor facilities were a shambles.

The three piers were wrecked. The

47th would have to repair them as

quickly as possible. The northernmost

one, an L-shaped structure built of large

concrete blocks, with 200 feet of water

along its northern face, appeared best

suited for immediate repair. The other

two were in water too shallow for American transports. The engineers could

make all three suitable by lengthening

them with floating piers. They began

work by clearing debris from the Lshaped pier; the plan was to lengthen it

to 570 feet and provide berthing facilities on both sides. The center pier

could be similarly extended for about

460 feet. The third pier was to be improved with the construction of an 800-

foot-long marginal pier, from which four

floating finger piers were to be extended.

When the engineers went to work, they

found Japanese riflemen still present in

the area. On the loth of July guards

posted by the 47th engineers on a dredge

in Tanapag harbor found seven Japanese

soldiers in the boiler room, and that

same day two enemy soldiers were caught

prowling in the 47th's camp area. The

presence of enemy soldiers, while some53

 Rowland, Building Saipan. 54

 Clinton Green, "Our B-29 Base: An Epic Job,"

New York Times Magazine (December 10, 1944), p. 38.
502 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

what nerve-racking, did not slow construction.55

Saipan was to be not only an important air base but also an important supply, staging, and rehabilitation center.

The number of installations was increased so many times that the original

base development plan had to be drastically revised. Extensive covered storage was required. Because of the danger

of an enemy landing, the engineers at

first built only small frame warehouses;

some of this construction was done by

troops from other arms and services, supplied with materials and supervised by

the engineers. The larger warehouses,

built later, were standardized structures

304 feet long, 100 feet wide, and 16 feet

high, designed to withstand winds with

velocities up to 60 miles an hour. At

the same time the engineers began work

on hundreds of hardstands and igloos for

ammunition. The main housing area

for the troops was placed on the narrow

coastal plain south of Isley. Pup tents

or pyramidal tents with floors provided

the first living quarters for the troops;

these gradually gave way to prefabricated

barracks and Quonset huts. The first

hospitals, also, were in tents. Operating

rooms were put in Quonset huts. Station and general hospitals of Quonset

huts and prefabricated buildings were

built around these operating rooms.

Added later were water, sewer, and electric systems, air conditioning, asphalt

roads, and concrete sidewalks. By the

beginning of September, 6,000 beds were

in Quonset huts or prefabricated buildings; 3,000 were still in tents.56

The roads on Saipan were in deplorable condition. The Japanese had built

about fifty miles of roads, many of them

not much better than oxcart trails. The

one highway that could support American military traffic was the 20-foot-wide

thoroughfare from Garapan to Charan

Kanoa. During the fighting the roads

almost disappeared. "Under the milling of thousands of feet and hundreds of

heavy-tracked vehicles, the dirt roads had

disintegrated into a fine, penetrating

dust," General Holland Smith observed,

and added, possibly with some exaggeration, "a passing jeep could put up a

smoke screen more effective than our

chemical services could produce and blot

out the sun. . . ." "When it rained,"

General Smith continued, "jeeps became

amphibians caught in quagmires that

had been roads a few hours before."

 57

The engineers found it more profitable

to build a new system of roads than to

try to rehabilitate the old one. They

built a perimeter road along the shores of

the island and put in three main cross

connections. They made most of the

main roads thirty-two feet wide and

paved them with coral. An unusual

job was rehabilitating the railroad. A

narrow-gauge line, which the Japanese

used mainly for hauling sugarcane and

military supplies, circled the island.

The shore party engineers, soon after

landing, went to work on it. They put

one diesel and three steam locomotives

back in use and repaired 100 flatcars.

The 1398th Engineer Construction Battalion operated the railroad and by the

end of July was hauling 350-ton miles a

day on it.58 Since the railroad was not,

55

 Hist of the 47th Engr Constr Bn. 56

 (1) USAFICPA, Marianas Opn, p. 460. (2)

Rowland, Building Saipan.

57

 Smith, Coral and Brass, pp. 182-83. 58

 (1) Hist of the 1398th Engr Constr Bn. (2)
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 503

on the whole, a practical form of transportation, the tracks were taken up and

a road built along the right of way.

Two of the locomotives made excellent

sterilizers for garbage cans.

The all-out effort on the airfields continued. By 6 August the engineers had

extended the heavy bomber strip at Isley

to 6,000 feet and had lengthened the

B-29 runway to nearly 7,000. The hard

coral, which required so much blasting,

was still the principal hindrance to rapid

construction. Heavy rains in August

added to the problems. It had been

hoped initially that a second B-29 field

could be built on the west coast to the

north of the field the Japanese had been

building. The site looked good on

aerial photographs, but it proved to be

unsuitable because of extensive marshes;

part of the area was below sea level.

Reconnaissance indicated the second

B-29 field could be built northwest of

Isley. Construction was authorized, and

the 1878th Engineer Aviation Battalion

got the job of building the field. Storage tanks for aviation gasoline were

being completed rapidly. The first job,

the erection of four 5,000-gallon tanks,

was finished on 12 July. The second—

the erection of twelve 1,000-barrel tanks,

begun on 10 July—was finished on 7

August. It would still be some time

before the B-29 base would be completed.59

The Assaults on Guam

and Tinian

While the Japanese were being

mopped up on Saipan and airfield and

base construction was well under way,

preparations went ahead for the capture

of Guam and Tinian. Plans had originally called for an assault on Guam on

18 June; when it was learned late on the

first day of the landing on Saipan that a

Japanese task force was headed for the

Marianas, the assault was postponed indefinitely. After the defeat of the Japanese force in the Battle of the Philippine

Sea, 19-24 June, preparations for Guam

were further delayed by the stubborn

resistance on Saipan. With the end of

fighting on that island, preparations for

the attack on Guam, and Tinian as well,

were resumed.60 Plans now called for an

attack on Guam on 21 July and on Tinian three days later. Marine units were

to be mainly responsible for combat on

both. The 3d Marine Division, the 1st

Provisional Marine Brigade, and the

Army's 77th Infantry Division, including the 302d Engineer Combat Battalion,

were to take Guam. The 2d and 4th

Marine Divisions would capture Tinian.

Engineer combat and shore party units

were to go into Guam, but only engineer

shore party units would take part in the

assault on Tinian.

The 77th Division arrived off the west

coast of Guam on 21 July; the marines

had already secured beachheads to the

north and south of Orote Peninsula.

(Map 25) Early in the afternoon the

305th RCT, with part of the 302d Combat Battalion, began to debark; the

remaining elements of the division completed their landing by dusk. A lettered

company had been attached to each of

the division's regimental combat teams.

The landing was unopposed, since the

preliminary bombardment had driven

Comments by Col Brown on draft of this chapter,

EHD Files. 59

 Hist of the 1878th Engr Avn Bn. 60

 Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 314-15.
504 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 25

the Japanese away from the beaches.

Some of the enemy returned during the

night and attacked the American perimeter at a point held by a platoon of engineers. In hand-to-hand fighting, 18

Japanese and 3 engineers were killed.

A combat group headquarters with three

combat battalions, the 132d, 233d, and

342d, arrived for shore party operations.

Unloading of supplies and equipment

was routine. The main hindrances were

shortages of unloading gear and the

troublesome fringing reef. Fortunately

the Japanese made no determined attack

at night when the beaches were flooded

with light. The shore party engineers

were subjected to only occasional enemy

fire and had little contact with the enemy,

though engineer and Japanese patrols

sometimes clashed over water points.61

The plan of campaign called for uniting the two beachheads by capturing

Orote Peninsula and then splitting the

enemy forces with a drive eastward across

the island to Pago Bay. As the troops

moved inland, enemy resistance stiffened

noticeably, but the Japanese could not

stop the advance. After five days Orote

Peninsula was captured. The 3d

Marine Division and the 77th Division

then drove eastward to Pago Bay, getting

possession of the one road across the

island by 31 July. The 1st Provisional

Brigade mopped up enemy positions on

southern Guam.

The main job of the engineers on the

southern part of the island was to keep

the supply roads open. The terrain was

rugged; beyond the beaches the ground

rose in a series of hills and ridges; the

soil, a reddish clay, was sticky when wet.

Guards posted at critical points protected

the work parties. The rapid advance of

the infantry across the island made almost impossible the maintenance of the

narrow existing roads with their thin

surfaces of crushed coral. In building

new roads, a route was first selected on

foot or by jeep, a D-6 dozer leveled a

two-lane width, and the excess dirt was

then shoved aside. If time permitted

and the tactical situation was sufficiently

61

 (1) Lt. Col. Leigh C. Fairbank, Jr., "Division

Engineers, Part 1, Guam," The Military Engineer,

XXXIX (January, 1947), 1-3. (2) Memo for Rcd,

302d Engr Combat Bn, 8 Sep 44. 377-Engr-3

(28973)M. (3) Ltr, Hq 132d Engr Combat Bn to

TAG, 17 Sep 44. Engr AGF PAC.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 505

GUAM LANDING

stable, coral and rubble were hauled in

for surfacing.62 "It is readily seen," the

302d engineers reported, "that the above

system violated good road building practice. The road was in general below

the surrounding ground, and side drainage was not provided for. As the road

rutted, bulldozers shoved off the mud

until a firm base was found farther

down."

 63

 This system, apparently the

best one possible in the deep clay of

southern Guam, assured rapid supply of

the division. The low parts of the road

had to be filled in with logs or rocks.

The Japanese, as they withdrew to the

northern plateau, put up a strong and

skillful resistance. The 3d Marine Division was on the right, the 77th Division

on the left. The enemy concentrated

his forces at the two peaks of Mount

Santa Rosa and Mount Barrigada.

Northern Guam was a limestone plateau

about 400 feet above sea level. Except

for Mount Santa Rosa and Mount

Barrigada, it was gently rolling and

offered excellent sites for airfields. On

this part of the island, the combat engineers were engaged mainly in maintaining old roads and trails and building

new ones. Here their task was somewhat easier than in the south because

only about a foot of clay covered the

62

 Fairbank, "Division Engineers, Part 1, Guam,"

The Military Engineer, XXXIX (January, 1947), 2-3. 63

 Memo for Rcd, 302d Engr Combat Bn, 8 Sep 44.

377-Engr-3 (28973)M.
506 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

limestone. The jungle was heavy, but

there were no streams. An engineer

bulldozer operator, protected by his armored cab and closely supported by

riflemen, usually moved ahead of each

infantry column, opening a passageway

through the dense growth. A second

dozer, behind the first, widened the trail

to 20 or 30 feet. Little work was needed

on surfacing because the limestone base

held up under all kinds of weather.

Maintenance required only filling in

shell craters and potholes, shaping up

the crown, and, if necessary, constructing

drainage ditches.64

Assault of fortified positions was a

negligible task for the 302d engineers on

Guam. The only instance of demolition

work was the destruction of an elaborate

Japanese underground headquarters,

which required three-quarters of a ton of

TNT. On 10 August all organized

enemy resistance was at an end. Mopping up continued, however, and for

many months it was necessary to search

for enemy troops entrenched in caves and

in isolated mountain areas.65

On 24 July at 0730 the 2d and 4th

Marine Divisions made the assault on

Tinian. The 1341st Engineer Combat

Battalion, assigned to shore party work,

landed in Alligators and Buffaloes in the

third and subsequent waves. While the

beach was still under heavy enemy fire

the men carried on their tasks, partly

protected by coral ledges. Their main

job was to gouge out exits from the beach

for tanks. The men removed mines and

filled in craters on the right flank of the

beach. Working about an hour with

bulldozers, they had cleared the beach

sufficiently to permit tanks to land at any

point. Soon the entire unit was engaged

in typical shore party activities. The

engineers selected dump areas in accordance with prearranged plans; by 1500

they had completed access roads to them,

and soon supplies were coming in on

amphibious trucks and LVT's. On 6

August, the 1341st reverted to the control of the 27th Division, and the next

day returned to Saipan. Seabees were

responsible for base construction on

Tinian.66

Meanwhile, on Guam, Seabees and

Marine engineers had begun building three airfields. Marine engineers,

helped by Seabees, extended the 4,500-

foot runway at Orote field another 1,000

feet. From early August on, the field

was in constant use. A 5,000-foot strip

which the Japanese had almost completed near Agana was lengthened to

7,000 feet, and on 23 August, the first

plane landed on this strip. To the

north of Agana Field, the Japanese had

completed clearing for a third runway.

This location was chosen for Depot

Field, which was to be used for the repair of B-29's. The engineers were not

to begin work on the big B-29 fields

until fall.67

1944 Draws to a Close

The last months of 1944 saw great

progress made in the Central Pacific.

The theater was reorganized in prepa64

 Fairbank, "Division Engineers, Part 1, Guam,"

The Military Engineer, XXXIX (January, 1947), 3-4. 65

 Ibid, p. 4.

66 Hist of the 1341st Engr Combat Bn. 67

 Lt. Col. Herbert E. Brown, Jr., "Aviation Engineers on Guam," The Military Engineer, XXXVII

(October, 1945), 398-99.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 507

ration for the final drive against Japan,

and the engineer setup was likewise

geared for the last stages of the war.

Work in the Marianas moved ahead.

Islands in the western Carolines were

seized. In Hawaii, the engineers continued their efforts in support of operations in the forward areas. It all meant

unrelenting pressure against the enemy.

Reorganization

On 1 August U.S. Army Forces in the

Pacific Ocean Area (USAFPOA) was set

up as a theaterwide Army command under General Richardson, who was

directly responsible to Admiral Nimitz.

General Richardson appointed Colonel

Loper as his engineer. Central Pacific

Base Command became a logistical organization of USAFPOA. In the South

Pacific Area, USAFISPA was reconstituted as a second logistical command

with the designation South Pacific Base

Command (SPBC). Few changes were

necessary to transform USAFISPA into a

logistics organization; the South Pacific

Area was now of diminishing importance, and most of its troops were being

transferred to the Southwest Pacific.

Since the Central Pacific Base Command

was a new organization, a considerable

effort was necessary to set it up. On 10

August an Engineer Section was organized and designated the Construction

Service. Headed by Colonel Wimer, it

was authorized 106 officers and 62 enlisted men. Wimer was responsible for

construction in the base command area,

procuring and distributing supplies, providing maps, furnishing intelligence

data, and acquiring real estate.

The new logistical command was expected to have about 10,000 engineer

troops, together with 12,000 civilians,

assigned to engineer projects. To provide Wimer with a staff, the district

organization, which had been part of the

Office of the Engineer, Central Pacific

Area, since August 1943, was transferred

to the new command. At the same time

the department engineer organization,

likewise part of the Office of the Engineer, CPA, since August 1943, was

transferred to USAFPOA, where it

constituted the major part of Colonel

Loper's office.68

Construction—Hawaii

The construction still required in the

Hawaiian Islands was of a minor nature.

On 28 June General Richardson stated

that the most important jobs of the

engineers were to ready troops for combat and construction in the forward

areas, make minor improvements at John

Rodgers, Hickam, and Mokuleia airfields, complete the depot for the Seventh

Air Force, finish the underground airplane repair shop, and construct camps

for prisoners of war. Other work was

secondary. The Construction Service

let a few lump-sum contracts, which it

awarded on the basis of competitive

bidding. New construction, almost entirely of a minor nature, included mainly

barracks, warehouses, and shops. The

biggest construction project, still to be

undertaken, was the building of the new

Tripler General Hospital. The engi68

 (1) U.S. Army Forces, Mid Pac and Predecessor

Comd, vol. 3, pp. 436ff. (2) Hist Review Covering

Activities of Constr Serv, CPBC, 1 Jul 44 Through

15 Sep 45 (cited hereafter as CPBC, Hist Review),

p. 1. Engr AGF PAC.
508 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

neers began planning for this installation

in August 1944.69

Despite so many efforts made to reduce

it, minor and miscellaneous construction

was still so extensive that warnings again

had to be issued. In October General

Richardson informed the Commanding

General, CPBC, that Colonel Wimer

had numerous projects on his books,

which, when they were finished, would

be of little, if any, value to the war effort.

As before, he warned, "It is the intention

of this headquarters that the construction

effort shall be directed to the completion

of those facilities which have an immediate, as well as a permanent, value to military operations in POA. . . ."

 70

 Specifically, this meant adequate facilities

for the supply services, training and

recreational facilities for the troops, and

the repair and improvement of utilities

at the permanent installations.

Supply

Now that combat forces based on

Hawaii were engaged in operations as

far west as Saipan, supply became more

complicated. At the end of June, the

Supply Division of the Office of the Engineer, CPA, included two major subdivisions: the War Plans Branch, responsible

for long-range planning and determining

general supply needs, and the Engineer

Depot, charged with requisitioning and

distributing stocks. When the Construction Service was set up, the depot

was transferred to it; the War Plans

Branch went to the engineer office in

Headquarters, USAFPOA.

Long-range planning, while simpler

than in some other theaters, was no

longer the easy thing it had been earlier.

This was in large measure the result of

the limited quantities of supplies in the

United States, and the consequent need

to ration them to meet the heavy demands from overseas theaters. The

greatest difficulties by far were encountered in allocating Class IV stocks. Ever

since overseas construction had first begun in 1939, a number of systems had

been successively set up to deal with this

troublesome problem. In peacetime,

requisitions had been prepared for the

Class IV supplies needed for a particular

project and the items then purchased in

the open market. Early in the war,

supply requisitions were prepared for all

projects to be constructed by a particular

task force being sent overseas and the

items purchased. In 1943 the War Department instituted the operational

project system under which each theater

was required to plan its construction one

year ahead, estimate the amount of supplies it needed, and forward to Washington a tabulation of its requirements,

together with construction plans of the

various projects. This system was unsatisfactory because theater planners

found it impossible to determine with

sufficient accuracy what projects would

be built during the coming year. In

1944 the War Department instituted the

quarterly estimates. Under this procedure, theater engineers estimated their

supply needs five quarters in advance

but were not required, in order to justify their supply needs, to give as much

detailed information regarding their

69

 (1) Memo, Engr to G-4 USAFICPA, 28 Jun 44.

Engr AGF PAC. (2) CPBC, Hist Review, p. 47. 70

 Ltr, Richardson to CG CPBC, 10 Oct 44. Engr

AGF PAC, 600.12.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 509

proposed projects. Both the operational

project and the quarterly estimate systems required too much meticulous

long-range planning by theater engineer

staffs and neither could be carried out as

intended. What the planners usually

did under the quarterly estimate system

was to calculate approximately how

much construction would be required to

support the operations planned for the

coming year and how much could be

accomplished with the number of men

and the amount of equipment likely to

be available. Striking a balance between these two estimates, they tried to

arrive at a reasonable figure as to the

amount of supplies needed.71

By mid-1944 the Central Pacific had

set up a well-functioning system of

requisitioning and distributing supplies

and equipment. Engineer units sent

their requests directly to the engineer

depot in Honolulu, which requisitioned

supplies from the United States, or, if

possible, secured them by purchase in

the Islands. The depot stored its supplies in seventeen base yards in and

around the city. Insofar as possible, all

items of one kind were stored in one

yard—one had electrical materials, another, plumbing supplies, and a third,

lumber. The engineers reviewed supply levels for the theater each month and

reset them every three months.

Supply units were noticeably short by

mid-1944. A need existed especially for

depot companies to handle the steadily

increasing numbers of items arriving

from the mainland. During the summer of 1944, because of the shortage

of such units the Class II depot on Oahu

was being operated by the 1399th Construction Battalion, an understrength

organization, made up largely of Japanese Americans, many of whom were

experienced in construction, but few of

whom knew anything about supply or

spare parts. Maintenance units were

noticeably lacking. In July Wimer informed Loper that 2 heavy shop companies and 2 maintenance companies

were attempting to meet the needs of

some 50 combat, construction, aviation,

and general service battalions and a

civilian construction force of 15,000.

On the basis of one maintenance company for 200 pieces of heavy engineer

equipment, the theater should have had

17 maintenance companies.72 Small

wonder that 500 pieces of engineer

equipment were deadlined.

By 1944 the Central Pacific was beset

by most of the troubles in spare parts

supply which had plagued other theaters,

particularly the Southwest Pacific, almost from the start of the war. There

were too few units to store and distribute

spare parts, together with too few men

trained or experienced in spare parts

supply; shipments were not received

from the mainland until months after 71

 (1) Engr CPA, Periodic Rpt, Quarter Ending 30

Jun 44. (2) Engr CPBC, Periodic Rpt, Quarter

Ending 30 Sep 44. Both in Engr AGF PAC. (3)

Memo for Rcd, Harry F. Kirkpatrick, 20 Dec 45,

sub: Development of Sup Plng for Engr Class IV

Sups. EHD Files. (4) Memo, Lt Col Joseph Matson, Jr., Asst to Honolulu Dist Engr, to Kramer, n.d.,

sub: Notes on Sup Matters Pertaining to Requisitioning Against HD Projs Engr AGF PAC, 400.

72

 (1) Memo, MIL Amph Tng to MIL ExecO CPA,

n.d., sub: Use of 1394th Engr Constr Tr Assigned to

Engr Depot. Engr AGF PAC, 370. (2) 1st Ind,

Wimer to Loper, 15 Jul 44, on Ltr, OCofEngrs to

Loper, 21 Jun 44. Engr AGF PAC.
510 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

requisitions were sent in from Hawaii;

diverse makes of equipment required

unnecessarily large quantities of parts;

inefficient and careless equipment operators further increased the need for

scarce parts; and stock control was inadequate. In 1944 construction of a

spare parts depot at Schofield Barracks

and the transfer to it of the spare parts

stored in the base yards on Oahu made

for better stock control and improved

distribution, but the shortage of trained

personnel remained. The spare parts

depot was manned by the parts supply

platoon of the 452d Depot Company,

helped occasionally by details from

construction battalions. In October

1944 two parts supply platoons (separate)

were assigned; the two units had only

one officer and one enlisted man with any

experience in spare parts supply.73

Maps

When Colonel Loper arrived in the

theater in June, he found that his mapping duties required more than merely

making and supplying maps for the

Army. The Navy and Marine Corps

had no adequate map-making units; consequently, the engineers had to "take on

the lion's share of production for those

arms as well." This continued to be

the case. When the Construction Service was set up and responsibilities for

map production for forces in the theater

were transferred to it, Colonel Wimer's

mapping section was charged with conducting surveys, making and reproducing

maps, and distributing copies to units in

the field. Fortunately for the map makers, General Twitty, J-2 of the Joint

Staff, continued to handle policy matters

and priorities for the theater. He had

the theater photographic officer under

his "immediate control" and maintained

close liaison with Colonel Loper. This

partly explains why photographic units

of the Navy and Air Forces were gaining

a better understanding of the needs of

the map-making units and accepted the

fact that "Photographic coverage is never

obtained by procrastination." A major

problem had at first been the great distance from the Hawaiian Islands of the

areas to be photographed. In the early

days, the engineers were heavily dependent on naval planes based on carriers.

With the Marianas under American

control, land-based aircraft could reach

most of the islands of the western Pacific,

and more systematic photographic coverage was possible. Because of clouds

over the islands, oblique pictures were

sometimes the best the airmen could

provide. During the summer the 64th

Topographic Battalion was busy making

maps of the western Carolines and the

Palau Islands, working on a two-shift,

24-hours-a-day basis. With the B-29's

about to take off from the Marianas,

most of Japan would soon be within

range of the cameramen.74

73

 Ltr, EngrO AFMIDPAC to CofEngrs, 17 Oct 45,

sub: Engr Spare Parts Sup in the Mid Pac Theater.

SWPA File M13.

74

 (1) Hq CPBC, Rough Draft of Circular, Aug 44,

sub: Engr Mapping Functions. Engr AGF PAC.

(2) Hist of the 64th Engr Topo Bn. (3) Memo,

Engr CPBC, for G-4, G-2, and G-1 CPBC, 19 Aug

44. Engr AGF PAC. (4) Memo for Rcd, Lt Col

H. E. Thomas, Of of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 25 Oct 44.

Engr AGF PAC, 061.20 Intel Rpts. (5) Ltr, Col

John Donoghue to Col Herbert Milwit, 20 Jan 45.

Engr AGF PAC.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 511

Construction in the Forward

Areas—Saipan

Meanwhile, work on Saipan was proceeding apace. By late September one of

the runways at Isley, 7,000-feet long,

could take medium bombers. After

construction got under way on the second

B-29 field to the northwest (Isley No. 2),

fill requirements were found to be so

great that higher headquarters directed

that the B-29 runways be built on

Tinian instead, and that Isley No. 2 be

developed only as a medium bomber and

transport strip. Construction of the

smaller field was fairly easy because the

coral was comparatively soft; only onethird of the cuts required blasting.

Most of the coral needed for the base

course was quarried from the field itself;

the engineers hauled additional material

from a pit three miles away. In September they began work on a second

parallel B-29 runway south of Isley No.

1. Construction problems were similar

to those at Runway No. 1. Much blasting, rock removal, and filling of ravines

was required. Here the deepest cut was

14 feet; the highest fill, 23.75

Work went ahead on the piers. Using

floating ponton cubes, the engineers

constructed unloading facilities rapidly.

They built all six piers on Saipan in a

similar manner. With angle irons, they

combined the cubes, each five by seven

feet, into floating strings, twelve cubes

long. The first strings, already assembled, were brought in on the sides

of LST's or cargo vessels. Later on,

strings were brought in on barges from

Oahu or were assembled in Tanapag

harbor itself. With fasteners and tie

rods, these floating strings were fastened

together into pier sections, twelve cubes

wide. As sections were completed, they

were floated into place and tied to

dolphins. The sections were hinged

together at the top, the flexibility so provided making it less likely that the piers

would be broken up by storms. In

September the commander of the naval

base gave General Jarman plans for

expanding facilities considerably. In

October Seabees arrived to begin construction. The engineers continued

work on Tanapag harbor.76 Jarman

congratulated the 47th engineers on

their expeditious work on the floating

extension to Pier B. "I noted with

pleasure that two full size cargo ships

tied up to the pier on 1 October 1944,

which was the date set for completion,"

Jarman wrote to Maj. Richard P. Sauer,

commanding officer of the unit. "A well

done to your 47th Engineer Battalion

which completed an excellent job . . .

in scheduled time."

 77

The Army engineer organization set

up to carry on construction on Saipan

was well designed for its task. Colonel

Burns was General Jarman's staff engineer, and, at the same time as garrison

force engineer and commander of the

1176th Construction Group, he was in

charge of construction on the island.

His original group staff was augmented

on Saipan with officers from Hawaii together with two additional ones from

each unit in the group. In October

1944 his staff was redesignated Head75

 Hist of the 1878th Engr Avn Bn.

76

 Rowland, Building Saipan. 77

 Ltr, Jarman to Sauer, 4 Oct 44. Incl to Hist

of the 47th Engr Constr Bn.
512 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

FLOATING PONTON PIER, SAIPAN

quarters, 1st Provisional Engineer Brigade. By November the brigade had 5

aviation, 3 construction, and 3 combat

battalions, a heavy shop company, a

maintenance company, a parts supply

platoon, and a camouflage company

which operated dump trucks. These

units were organized into groups, the

commanders of which were directly responsible to Colonel Burns. Three

naval construction battalions assigned to

the brigade worked on projects of special

interest to the Navy. The effectiveness

of this organization was due, at least in

part, to the fact that Colonel Burns,

while a staff engineer, at the same time

had full command of the engineer units

on Saipan. He, in effect, headed a construction command.78

The Assault on the Western

Carolines

One island barrier remained on the

road to the Philippines—the western

Carolines. Farthest west in this group

were the Palaus, about 550 miles east of

Mindanao. (Map 26) The Japanese had

78

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Thomas, 10 Nov 44. Engr

AGF PAC, 061.20, Intel Rpts. (2) Brown Comments

on draft of this chapter.

514 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

important naval and air bases in the

Palaus. American forces would have to

seize them or at least neutralize them

before beginning an invasion of the

Philippines. In addition to capturing

the Palaus, Admiral Nimitz planned to

seize Ulithi atoll and Yap, as well as a

number of other islands in the western

Carolines. Atolls and islands not seized

would be isolated and neutralized

through bombing attacks. The Army's

81st Infantry Division, together with

Navy and Marine units, was assigned to

operations in the western Carolines.

Little was known about these far-off

places. It was assumed their terrain was

similar to that of the other coral atolls

or volcanic islands of the western Pacific.

Plans were made to capture Babelthuap

and Peleliu, the two major islands in the

Palaus; both had airfields which could

probably be rehabilitated quickly. Subsequent studies showed that both were

almost completely surrounded by a dangerous barrier reef; to make matters

worse, mountainous Babelthuap was

believed to have a sizable Japanese garrison. Angaur, six miles south of

Peleliu and outside the barrier reef, and

with an area of three square miles, could

probably be taken fairly easily. In the

plan of campaign which was finally

developed, Angaur was substituted for

Babelthuap. Two regimental combat

teams of the 81st Division were scheduled

to seize Angaur; the marines, supported

by elements of the 81st Division, were

to take Peleliu.79

On 17 September the 321st and 522d

Regimental Combat Teams of the 81st

Division landed on Angaur. Divisional

and shore party engineers went in with

the landing forces. The 306th Engineer

Combat Battalion had combat missions;

the 1138th Combat Group, including the

52d and 154th Combat Battalions, was

responsible for shore party work. The

assault troops landed at two places on the

eastern side of the island. Company A

of the 306th came ashore with the second

and third waves of the 321st RCT to

the south; Company B, with the 522d

RCT, to the north. The southern beach

had firm sand which held up well under

vehicles. The northern one, narrow

and steep, was flanked by limestone

cliffs; here the engineers first had to cut

a road from the water's edge to high

ground. Moving inland, the troops

found the bombardments had turned the

island's jungle into an almost impenetrable tangle of broken trees and debris.

The combat engineers' main job was to

clear roads through the wreckage.

The next day Company C and Headquarters Company of the 306th landed.

They cleared a center line so that the

surveyors could plot the airstrip, constructed a perimeter road on the western

side of the island, and manned beach

defenses. Meanwhile, the shore party

engineers were unloading supplies and

establishing supply dumps. During the

first night the Japanese put beaches and

storage areas under small arms and

mortar fire, causing some casualties

among the shore party.

79 With the retreat of the defenders, (1) App. 2 to An. B, Intel to Accompany FO No.

7, 81st Inf Div, 5 Aug 44. 381-32.1 (8958). (2)

Robert R. Smith, The Approach to the Philippines,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1953), pp. 452ff. (3) Hq Western Pac

Base Comd Status Rpt on Angaur Island, an. A.

98-BC5-0.3.0 (19843)M.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 515

after a few days, into the rugged northwestern part of the island, the primary

mission of the combat engineers was

that of working with the infantry in destroying fortifications. The Japanese

had hollowed out numerous caves and

had built many pillboxes; the latter, constructed of reinforced concrete, coconut

logs, coral, or earth, were of various sizes

and shapes. Caves and pillboxes were,

as a rule, mutually supporting and expertly camouflaged. The 306th was

heavily engaged in assaulting these positions. The men advanced under covering fire, using flame throwers and

demolitions. Once again, the D-8 bulldozer with armored cab was a most valuable piece of equipment. This machine

could be used on many projects subject

to sniper fire. The engineers also used

it to ram dugouts and pillboxes or to

cover them with earth.80

About 300 miles east of the Palaus was

Ulithi, one of the atolls in the western

Carolines scheduled for capture. The

island was to be provided with a fleet

anchorage, a seaplane base, and an airfield. Capture of the atoll and initial

construction were assigned to the 323d

Regimental Combat Team, the engineer

component of which included the 155th

Combat Battalion and a detachment of

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1138th Combat Group. On 21

September the advance echelon of the

323d RCT reached the island; two days

later, the rear echelon arrived. No

enemy troops were found. The men of

the 155th, landing on a number of islets,

helped with unloading and did shore

party work. Part of them prepared to

begin work on the airfield. Apparently

the most suitable site was on Falalop

Island in the eastern part of the atoll.81

Construction in the Western

Carolines

By late September the engineers were

building airfields on Angaur and Ulithi.

Plans for Angaur called for a long-range

bomber runway of 6,000 feet, to be

lengthened eventually to 8,000 feet.

The site selected ran in a northeastsouthwest direction on the eastern side

of the island. Construction was delayed

because advance elements of the two

aviation battalions, the 1884th and the

1887th, could not disembark until three

days after the assault began because the

harbor facilities had been destroyed.

The men, moreover, arrived without

their equipment. Borrowing two bulldozers from the combat engineers, they

hacked out a center line for the airfield

through the tangled jungle, which had

trees up to 90 feet high. Enemy interference during the first ten days made

night work impossible. By 15 October

a 4,500-foot runway, coral surfaced, was

ready, and the next day the first plane

landed. The men completed the remaining 1,500 feet during the next five

days. The original intention was to

surface the strip with steel mat, but this 80

 (1) 81st Div, Opn Rpt, Ulithi Atoll and Other

Western Caroline Islands. 381-33.4 (21579) 21 Sep

44-4 Jan 45. (2) 154th Engr Combat Bn, Opns on

Angaur and Peleliu Islands. (3) 52d Engr Combat

Bn, Opns Rpt, Angaur Island. (4) Ltr, Capt Bonn

H. Wagner, C.E., Observer, Angaur Opn, to Richardson, 23 Oct 44. Engr AGF PAC.

81

 81st Div, Opn Rpt, Ulithi Atoll and Other

Western Caroline Islands.
516 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

turned out to be unnecessary because the

coral provided a satisfactory surface.82

On Ulithi, construction of the airfield

was complicated by a number of factors.

The map of Falalop, based on aerial

photography, indicated there was ample

room for a 3,500-foot runway, but the

island turned out to be smaller than expected. Reconnaissance on the ground

indicated the map was in error by as

much as 6 percent. The runway would

have extended over the eastern and

western beaches. Much of the island

was swampy, with a spongy vegetation

about five feet high; the terrain, together

with the heavy rainfall, made proper

drainage highly important. The 155th

Combat Battalion started to put a narrow

road through the swamps of the airfield

site. Using power saws, the men cut

down the trees on either side of the road

and dynamited the stumps; bulldozers

pushed trees, stumps, and brush to one

side or the other. With coral obtained

from nearby pits, the men widened and

lengthened the road, gradually transforming it into a runway. Probably

their major problem was to extend the

strip over the eastern beach, awash at

high tide. To hold back the strong

waves, the men built a protective wall of

coconut logs in a series of cribs, which

they filled with coral.83

Much additional work was done on

Angaur and Ulithi. Since the preliminary bombardment had destroyed the

piers on Angaur, extensive reconstruction was necessary. At first, unloading

facilities were provided on both the

eastern and the western shore. Subsequently, a landing pier for LCT's was

built on the eastern side. On the western side, the engineers constructed a

floating dock 350 feet long, held in place

by steel piles. The men of the 1887th

deepened and widened the harbor channel, completing this job in seven days,

even though they had had no experience

in underwater demolitions and were not

properly equipped for such work. On 9

October the 52d and 306th Combat Battalions took over harbor development.

They continued dredging and constructed a causeway over 500 feet long.

Additional work included building storage for 32,000 barrels of gasoline and a

camp for the troops, maintaining a network of coral-surfaced roads, and rehabilitating a narrow-gauge railway. On

14 October the 57th Naval Construction

Battalion landed on Ulithi and took over

most of the work on the airstrip and

other facilities from the 155th Combat

Battalion. The latter continued work

on the cribbing and taxiways until 26

October, when it left for Peleliu. The

next day the first plane landed. In general, the 155th engineers had been

handicapped by a shortage of personnel

and of heavy equipment.84

A number of additional atolls and

islets in the western Carolines were

seized, including Ngulu, Pulo Anna,

Kayangel, and Faie. Elements of the

155th, 52d, and 306th Combat Battalions

82

 (1) Army Garrison Force Hist, APO 264, Angaur

Island. World War II Rcds Div. (2) 1887th Engr

Avn Bn, Hist of Opns on Angaur Island. (3) Hist

of the 1884th Engr Avn Bn. (4) Ltr, Wagner to

Richardson, 23 Oct 44. 83

 Hist of the 155th Engr Combat Bn.

84

 (1) Army Garrison Force, Hist, APO 264, Angaur

Island. (2) Hist of the 1887th Engr Avn Bn. (3)

52d Engr Combat Bn, Opns Rpt, Angaur Island.

(4) 306th Engr Combat Bn, Rpt on Angaur and

Peleliu Opn, 10 Oct 44. 381-43.2 (21135).
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 517

took part in these landings, which were

under way from mid-October on. These

operations had various purposes: to find

sites for naval anchorages, to establish

loran stations, or simply to reconnoiter

the islands and destroy any enemy troops

thereon. Not many troops were found.

Only on Pulo Anna were any installations erected. Here, following the

initial landing made on 20 October, one

company of the 52d constructed a loran

station, together with defensive installations.85

Construction on Guam

The Army's base development plan

called for two B-29 fields on Guam's

northern plateau. On 7 October the

854th Aviation Battalion disembarked,

its officers and men recent veterans of

Kwajalein. Before turning to the B-29

fields, the aviation engineers helped the

Seabees, who were having difficulty in

meeting their completion dates on Depot

Field; providing repair facilities for the

big bombers was urgent, since many

would undoubtedly be damaged during

the attacks on Japan. From 9 October

on, most of the battalion was engaged in

building facilities at this field. Although the site was in a cultivated and

fairly thickly populated part of Guam,

Japanese riflemen were still a menace to

the construction crews.86

Work soon began on the first B-29

field. On 15 October the 854th's entire

engineering section, including three wellarmed survey parties, went to the northern part of the island to start the arduous

task of surveying the sites. When the

men reached the area selected for North

Field, they found a small clearing with

a barbed-wire enclosure in which a radio

signal detachment was already established. They welcomed this addition

to their reinforcements. A drafting

room was built within the enclosure and

the initial development of the new airfield was under way. Each of the three

survey parties was equipped with a D-8

bulldozer to clear a pathway; each had

two submachine guns and a half-track for

protection.87 Building the airfield was

not going to be easy. "Mother nature

made this construction job a hard and

gruelling grind in the sticky heat . . .

together with the ever-present dengueinfested mosquitoes," wrote Colonel

Brown. ". . . the northern part of

Guam was still a ... mystery to the

engineering world. Aerial photographs

that were on hand failed to show contours or even the few native trails

obscured by thick tropical growth."88

Meanwhile, one company with about a

third of the battalion's heavy equipment

had started on 12 October to build six

miles of access road to the new airfield

from the existing one-way island thoroughfare. Road construction went on

twenty-four hours a day.89

85

 81st Div, Opn Rpt, Ulithi Atoll and other

Western Caroline Islands. 86

 (1) Hist of the 854th Engr Avn Bn. (2) Brown,

"Aviation Engineers on Guam," The Military Engineer, XXXVII (October, 1945), 398. (3) Building

the Navy's Bases, II, 351-52.

87

 Hist of the 854th Engr Avn Bn. 88

 Ltr, Brown to Time Magazine, 30 Aug 45, sent

to CG AAF WD, for forwarding, in Rpt of Opns,

854th Engr Avn Bn, Kwajalein and Guam. Air

Univ Lib Maxwell AFB. 89

 Brown, "Aviation Engineers on Guam," The

Military Engineer, XXXVII (October, 1945), 398ff.
518 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

B-29's Take Off From Saipan

On 12 October the first B-29 landed

on the still unfinished runway at Isley,

and in a little over a week additional

Superfortresses came in from the United

States. The time had come to blast

Tokyo. On 24 November the first

bombers took off for the Japanese capital

and made a successful raid. Retaliation

was to be expected. On the 27th Zeros

bombed Isley during daylight hours.

The 804th engineers claimed they shot

down one enemy plane as it was strafing

their bivouac area. During the night of

the 29th, the Zeros returned. This

foray caused considerable damage.

Brig. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.,

commander of the XXI Bomber Command, in a letter to General Arnold, gave

an eye-witness account of the attack. He

and his party were coming up a hill near

Isley at about 0115 as the B-29's were

being loaded for their takeoff at 0515.

The Japanese scored a lucky hit on one

of the bombers. "There was the most

violent explosion I have ever seen. . . ."

General Hansell wrote. "There were

bombs all over the place, and the ground

was covered with small antipersonnel

fragmentation bombs dropped by the

Japanese planes." The engineers, General Hansell went on to say, moved in

with bulldozers and scoops to keep the

fires from spreading. They piled the

still burning wreckage into two heaps,

which they partially covered with earth,

and then drove their bulldozers over the

flaming mounds. "The flames came up

through the tractors and all around the

drivers but it didn't stop them . . . ,"

General Hansell continued. "All of

this when most of us were expecting any

moment that another set of bombs would

let go from the . . . adjacent hardstands

due to the intense heat." By 0230 the

fires were under control, and the engineers "were cleaning up the mess."90

The B-29's were soon pounding Japan

with growing strength, and reconnaissance planes from Saipan were taking

photographs of south central Honshu for

maps to be used for the invasion of the

Japanese home islands. Saipan was being developed into the most powerful

base in the Pacific. The whole appearance of the island was being changed.

"Saipan," wrote Clinton Green, who

had landed with the first Army troops

along the beaches south of Charan

Kanoa, ". . . is something out of an engineering dream book."

 91

From January to October 1944 forces

of the Central Pacific had advanced to a

point 4,800 miles west of Honolulu.

The Palaus, only about 550 miles from

the Philippines, had been captured. On

all the captured islands, base and airfield

construction was progressing rapidly.

In the Marianas, B-29 fields were being

built from which the Japanese home

islands would shortly be subjected to

crippling air raids. In the Central

Pacific, as in the Southwest Pacific, engineer base construction was vital to the

westward advance and required the

major share of the Engineer effort. To

support the movement across the Central

Pacific, a growing Army force was available. Army troop strength in the Cen90

 (1) Craven and Cate, eds., Matterhorn to

Nagaski, pp. 546-48, 558. (2) Ltr, Arnold to Reybold, 21 Dec 44. Engr AGF PAC, 330.1. 91

 Clinton Green, "Our B-29 Base: An Epic Job,"

New York Times Magazine (December 10, 1944), p. 8.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 519

tral Pacific rose from 389,706 on 1 January to 412,618 on 1 October. During

the same period, the number of engineer

troops in the Pacific Ocean Areas, even

with the dwindling strength in the

South Pacific, rose from 31,547 to 46,714

men.92

92

 AGO, Statistical and Accounting Br, Strength

Rpts of the U.S. Army.
CHAPTER XIII

Amphibious Warfare and Base

Construction in the Southwest Pacific

The Advance to Biak

Expanding Operations

During the first eight months of 1944

the engineers of the Southwest Pacific

were engaged in the kind of amphibious

warfare which had been well developed

in the latter part of 1943. Briefly, the

pattern for seizing areas from the enemy

was: air bombardment, naval bombardment, landing of assault forces, defeat of

enemy troops in the area, and construction of airfields and base facilities. General MacArthur's strategy was so planned

that enemy strongpoints and sizable concentrations of troops along the New

Guinea coast and on nearby islands were

bypassed. The campaign was highly

successful; by the end of September

Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific had

advanced 1 ,500 miles.

A similar pattern had been followed

in the South Pacific, but by 1944 combat

had almost ceased in that theater. Under MacArthur's general direction, South

Pacific forces in 1944 were engaged

mainly on Bougainville, an island actually in the Southwest Pacific Area. The

number of engineers in the South Pacific,

totaling 15,261 at the beginning of

the year, was steadily declining.

Colonel Beadle continued as Engineer,

USAFISPA, and Colonel Murrow, as

Engineer, SOS, but with progressively

fewer duties. Preparations were under

way during the first months of 1944 to

move large numbers of men and supplies

to the Southwest Pacific.1

In the Southwest Pacific theater, engineer activities were expanding constantly. On 1 January, engineer troop

strength totaled 42,285 and was increasing. Major engineer headquarters during the first months of the year remained

at Brisbane. General Casey's office was

steadily being enlarged. Late in 1943

Colonel Teale, Chief Engineer, USASOS,

returned to the United States; Col.

Lewis T. Ross took his place; under

Colonel Ross, the office continued to

carry out its basic logistic missions with

regard to engineer construction, supply,

and training. The USASOS field organization in Australia was gradually

being liquidated as installations were

being moved to New Guinea. The

Sixth Army Engineer Section under

Colonel Sturgis was located on Goodenough Island. These various engineer

offices were busily engaged in making

1

 AGO, Statistical and Accounting Br, Strength

Rpts of the U.S. Army.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 521

preparations to support the drive along

the New Guinea coast. Additional

units were arriving from the United

States; among them was the 3d Engineer

Special Brigade, under Brig. Gen. David

A. D. Ogden, which reached Milne Bay

soon after the first of the year. The

elements of the brigade began a period of

orientation, and some participated in

reconnaissance missions or in minor

landings on the coasts of New Guinea

and New Britain in preparation for a

major assault.2

It was the engineers of Sixth Army

who were to play a most crucial part in

the move up the New Guinea coast.

They would be responsible both for

combat support and for starting work

on new airfields and bases. Task force

commanders would have immediate responsibility for these two major missions

at various points along the route of

advance. One of the most important

duties Colonel Sturgis and his staff

had to assume was the selection of a

capable task force engineer for each

operation. As regards engineer organization within a task force, there was

little in the way of experience to go on

except what had been learned in the

operations of the previous year. There

were no standard tables of organization

and equipment or standing operating

procedures (SOP). Each task force engineer would have to try to organize his

staff in the way best suited to carry out

his particular mission. Nor were there

any rules to indicate how many units

should be assigned to a particular operation. One of the most pressing problems of a task force commander and his

engineer was how best to carry on combat

support and undertake base construction

at the same time. This was true even

though procedures for construction in

the combat zone had been fairly well

standardized. Responsibility for construction within a specified area was

usually assigned to the task force commander. GHQ SWPA, through channels, furnished him with a layout map,

construction requirements, and specifications. The task force engineer's

staff prepared detailed layout plans,

established priorities, and prepared plans

for using engineer construction units

assigned to the task force in the most

effective manner. The task force commander was responsible for the initial

phases of base development. GHQ

SWPA determined the final extent of

construction. Though directives and

procedures might be clear enough,

whether or not they could be carried

out in the midst of combat was a question not so easily answered. Casey

worked closely with Sturgis in these

operations. He passed on information

through technical channels and consulted with Sturgis ". . . even to the

extent," Casey wrote later, "that we both

sometimes trod on Command prerogatives."

 3

The Admiralty Islands

The Admiralty Islands were the scene

of the first major assault of 1944. About

2

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

115-20. (2) Brig Gen Lewis T. Ross, Personal

Recollections of the CE (MS). (3) 3d ESB, Our

Business Is Beachheads. Both in SWPA Files.

3

 (1) Engr Sec Sixth Army, Engr Hist, ch. XI (Draft

MS). Sturgis File 32. (2) Ltr, Casey to Sturgis, 14

Aug 50. SWPA Files.
522 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

200 miles northeast of New Guinea and

350 miles northwest of Rabaul, they

were of great strategic importance. On

13 February MacArthur directed Krueger and Halsey to seize them and the

enemy base at Kavieng on the northern

tip of New Ireland about 1 April.

Krueger would be responsible for seizing

the Admiralties; Halsey, for capturing

Kavieng. Using Navy construction battalions and Army engineer units furnished by Halsey, Krueger was to begin

work on a major naval base in the Admiralties and improve two Japanesebuilt airfields there. General Krueger

selected the 1st Cavalry Division, reinforced, designated the Brewer Task

Force, for the assault. A square division

of two brigades, the 1st Cavalry had been

dismounted and reorganized to fight as

infantry. Its engineer component was

the 8th Engineer Squadron under Lt.

Col. Marvin C. Ellison. Each of the

two brigade combat teams had an engineer troop, supplied with additional

equipment, including 7 bulldozers, 6

carryalls, 2 road graders, a crane, and a

sawmill. Troop A supported the 1st

Brigade Combat Team; Troop C, the

2d. In reserve were Troop B and Headquarters and Service Troop. Since the

Navy was especially interested in developing airfields and a base in the Admiralties, Krueger assigned airfield

construction initially to naval construction battalions. An Army engineer,

Col. William W. Wanamaker, was

named task force engineer.4

The Admiralties included one large

island—Manus—about sixty miles long

from east to west and twenty miles wide.

(See Map 27.) To the east, separated

from Manus by a 1,000-foot wide strait

about three miles long, was small Los

Negros Island, whose irregular coast line

enclosed two bays, Seeadler Harbour on

the northwest, and Hyane Harbour on

the east. The northern part of Los

Negros, known as Mokerang peninsula,

had numerous coconut plantations and

swamps. In a flat stretch south of Hyane

Harbour, the Japanese had built Momote airfield. The southern part of the

island was hilly and densely wooded.

Jungled Manus, never thoroughly explored, appeared from aerial photographs to have little more than native

villages and a few trails. On the

northern shore, the Japanese had built

a landing strip near the village of

Lorengau. The plan was to have two

combat teams land on D-day—one on

Los Negros on the west side of the

Mokerang peninsula and the other on

Manus near Lorengau.5

By mid-February, as signs became

fairly numerous that Japanese air

strength in the area around the Bismarck

Sea was weak, General Kenney pressed

for moving up the attack. In the last

week in February MacArthur, acting on

Kenney's suggestion, decided to change

his plans. In place of a full-scale amphibious assault on the islands on 1

4

 (1) Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of

Rabaul, pp. 316-17. (2) 8th Engr Squadron, Hist of

Activities in the Admiralty Campaign (Brewer Task

Force). 901-ENG-0.3 (2997)M 29 Feb-18 May 44. (3)

Col William N. Leaf, Task Force Engr Rpt, Opns at

TEACUP, 13 May 44. Sturgis File 39. (4) USAFFE

Bd, SWPA Rpt 18, Opns of Divl Engrs, Admiralties

Campaign (cited hereafter as USAFFE Bd Rpt 18).

World War II Rcds Div, 4-2/118/114. 5

 (1) Historical Division, War Department, The

Admiralties; Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division,

(Washington, 1946), pp. 4-7. (2) USAFFE Bd Rpt

18.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 523

April, he directed that a reconnaissance

in force be made at Hyane Harbour not

later than 29 February. If the reconnaissance group found Momote inadequately defended, an all-out amphibious

assault was to be launched immediately.

MacArthur's change in strategy required

Sixth Army, including the engineers assigned to the task force, to make some

changes in plans, since the initial landing was now to be made at Hyane

Harbour east of Momote. The 8th

Engineer Squadron had two days to make

necessary revisions. Because of the sudden change in plans, detailed diagrams

for loading engineer equipment on

LST's could not be prepared. But on

the whole, planning was readjusted

without difficulty.6

The reconnaissance in force met slight

resistance. During their first hours

ashore, elements of the 1st Cavalry

Brigade pushed across to the western

edge of Momote airfield. The small

detachment of the 8th engineers, which

had gone in with the second wave, destroyed an enemy bunker, carried on

reconnaissance, and disposed of duds.

General MacArthur, deciding to launch

a full-scale invasion, directed Brewer

Task Force to send reinforcements. A

reinforced platoon of the 8th engineers

and a regimental task group of the 2d

Special Brigade disembarked at Hyane

Harbour on 2 March. The beachhead

extended inland as far as the eastern

edge of the airfield, a distance of some

300 yards. The amphibian engineers,

bringing in supplies and equipment,

found the landing area, consisting of

hard coral topped with a thin layer of

humus, ideal for unloading; even trucks

were able to move inland easily. Since

the beachhead was so small, the unloading of supplies was frequently interrupted by enemy infiltrators and by

mortar and artillery shells; to screen

some of their operations, the amphibian

engineers used smoke pots. Meanwhile,

the 8th engineers supported the cavalrymen in their efforts to drive the enemy

away from the other side of the airfield,

using bulldozers to clear fields of fire

and knock down trees in front of artillery

and antiaircraft guns. The engineers

found no mines or obstacles. Though

the Japanese at times fought stubbornly,

they were forced to retreat into the

jungles of southern Los Negros.7

On 2 March part of the 40th Naval

Construction Battalion and detachments

of three other battalions reached Hyane

Harbour. The Seabees were to improve

Momote sufficiently to make it operational for fighters. Since Americans

and Japanese were still locked in battle

near the airfield, the Seabees spent

most of their first two days ashore in

building pillboxes, preparing dugouts,

and manning part of the perimeter.

When, on 4 March, they began to repair

Momote they found the task more

onerous than had been expected. The

runway was rough and much of it overgrown with grass; the Japanese had not

6

 (1) Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of

Rabaul, p. 321. (2) General Kenney Reports, p. 359.

(3) USAFFE Bd Rpt No. 18.

7

 (1) 8th Squadron, Hist of Activities in the

Admiralty Campaign. (2) Rpt, 2d ESB, 6 Mar 44.

SWPA File 72. (3) 2d ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt of

Opns, Mar 1-31, 44. SWPA File E-20-3. The

monthly reports of the engineer special brigades

contain after action, as well as routine and miscellaneous, reports of the various elements of the

brigades.
524 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

removed the humus before putting

down the coral surfacing. The Seabees

scraped the foot-deep top soil from the

solid coral underneath and, with excellent coral from a nearby pit, resurfaced

the entire runway. In a few days planes

were operating from it. By 6 March

beachhead and airfield had been secured.

The enemy was being forced farther back

into the jungle.8

With the beachhead under control,

the 12th Cavalry, with two platoons of

engineers, set out for Red Beach on the

west side of Mokerang peninsula, the site

originally chosen for the first landing.

The troops advanced along a road leading from Momote airfield. Enemy

resistance failed to materialize. The

only obstacle was a pit, the width of the

road, from 3 to 4 feet deep and 15 feet

long; canvas stretched over a framework

of poles had been placed over the top

and covered with sand to resemble the

road's surface. This crude trap was

easily detected, and an engineer with his

angledozer quickly filled in the hole.

That same day, the troops reached their

objective. At the same time other elements of the 8th Engineer Squadron

landed at Red Beach, the amphibian

engineers bringing in some of the men.

The 8th Engineers' job was to construct

and improve the coral-surfaced roads.

By mid-March organized enemy opposition on Los Negros had come to an end.9

The next objective was the Japanese

positions on Manus, especially those

near Lorengau airfield. The attackers

first set out to destroy enemy forces

which might be located on a number of

small islands in Seeadler Harbour, especially Hauwei and the Butjo Luos. The

amphibian engineers took part in these

assaults. No Japanese were found on

the Butjos, but on Hauwei enemy

troops, cleverly concealed, drove off the

cavalrymen brought in by the amphibian

engineers. A second landing was necessary to take this island. On 15 March

the 2d Cavalry Brigade Combat Team

landed about two miles west of Lorengau

airstrip. Boat and shore elements of

the 2d Engineer Special Brigade and

Troop C of the 8th Engineer Squadron

took part in this assault. The amphibian engineers used about 40 landing

craft. This was a shore-to-shore operation—men and supplies were moved

from Los Negros across Seeadler Harbour to Manus. Despite some machine

gun fire from the shore, the landing was

made successfully. The shore engineers

came in with the third wave and began

unloading the LST's as soon as the

latter arrived. As the shore engineers'

equipment had been placed well forward

on the decks, unloading proceeded

rapidly; in half an hour, the empty LST's

pulled away from the beaches.10

Many of the Japanese were holed up

in bunkers and pillboxes. The 8th

engineers used their bulldozers to ram

some of these structures; most were

quickly demolished, the men inside

crushed in the rubble. In three days,

cavalrymen and engineers, using tanks,

bulldozers, artillery, and dynamite, destroyed 340 enemy bunkers and pill8

 (1) USAFFE Bd Rpt No. 18. (2) Building the

Navy's Bases, II, 295. 9

 (1) USAFFE Bd Rpt 18. (2) 8th Engr Squadron,

Hist of Activities in the Admiralty Campaign.

10

 Brig. Gen. William F. Heavey, "Amphibian

Engineers in Action," The Military Engineer,

XXXVII (July, 1945). 253-54.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 525

boxes. Advancing toward the airfield,

the men easily overcame the weak resistance. The Japanese had installed more

obstacles on Manus than on Los Negros;

they had sown the beaches near the

landing area with antiboat mines and

had erected barbed wire entanglements.

But these hindrances were not in the

path of the advancing troops. On the

whole, the principal engineer jobs were

clearing jungle, building roads, and laying corduroy.11

To relieve congestion on the airfields

in New Guinea and to provide runways

for bombers to support operations

farther west, MacArthur directed in midMarch that the scope of airfield and base

development in the Admiralties be considerably enlarged. Instead of one

fighter field, two heavy bomber fields

were to be built. To meet the new

requirements, Colonel Wanamaker proposed extending Momote runway so that

it could take heavy bombers. Since the

condition of the Lorengau runway made

rehabilitation impracticable, he proposed

constructing the second bomber field in a

coconut plantation on Mokerang peninsula. Colonel Sturgis and Colonel

Sverdrup, who went to the Admiralties

on an inspection trip, approved these

suggestions. Additional Army Engineer

and Navy units were sent in. A detachment of Headquarters, 931st Aviation

Regiment, was flown in in mid-March; at

the end of the month, the 836th Aviation

Battalion and the 617th Base Equipment

Company disembarked, and the 104th

Naval Construction Battalion arrived on

1 April. The 931st Engineers designed

Mokerang airdrome and supervised its

construction. The 40th Naval Construction Battalion began work on this

field and had removed about 300 feet of

coconut trees when the 836th engineers

took over. The latter cleared a space

for a 7,500-foot strip. They blasted and

rooted the solid coral, graded and compacted it to a depth of six inches, then

surfaced it with cutback bitumen.12

Colonel Wanamaker did not have an

easy job in the Admiralties. Most of

his troubles were the result of poor

organization and interservice rivalries.

From the first, he did not have an adequate staff. The assumption had been

that the naval construction battalions

would do most of the construction, but

the battalions were not definitely placed

under Wanamaker and consequently

would not take orders from him. He

could give orders to the Seabees only

through the headquarters of the 17th

Naval Construction Regiment. Sometimes his orders were passed on; sometimes there was debate as to whether

they should be carried out or not.

Generally, the naval units did not take

kindly to suggestions. All four were put

on airfield construction in an attempt to

meet the optimistic deadlines that had

been set; this was resented by the naval

commanders who had their own construction to do on naval facilities and were

11

 (1) 8th Engr Squadron, Hist of Activities in the

Admiralty Campaign. (2) Lt. Col. Marvin C. Ellison, "Engineers in Attack on Lorengau Airdrome,"

The Military Engineer, XXXVI (September, 1944),

290-92.

12

 (1) Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 7 Mar 44.

SWPA Files. (2) Col. John H. Dudley and Maj.

William G. Staggs, "Engineer Troops on Airdrome

Construction," The Military Engineer, XXXVII

(October, 1945), 385-86. (3) 836th Engr Avn Bn,

Hist Narration for 1944. (4) Building the Navy's

Bases, II, 295-96.
526 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

unable to do it. There was confusion

even over the administration of Army

units.13 "Upon arrival this station the

usual existed," the chronicler of the

836th reported. "We knew not to

whom we were assigned."

 14 Early in

April the construction battalions were

placed directly under the operational

control of the task force engineer. Conditions improved greatly. Confusion

and delays in getting orders to construction units were noticeably reduced. A

considerable source of friction was the

slowness of the Seabees in getting started

on construction. Sverdrup reported,

"The 104th . . . spent the first 9 days

after arrival in unloading their gear and

equipment and setting up their camp.

In contrast . . . the 836th went to work

immediately upon arrival, and 36 hours

after the ship arrived at Seeadler Harbour, the entire unit was working on a

24-hour basis."

 15

Bougainville

Meanwhile, in the Solomons, the engineers continued to be heavily engaged

on Bougainville, both in combat and in

base construction. On 15 December

1943 responsibility for combat on the

island had passed from the Marines to

the Army's XIV Corps. That same day

the Army had organized a service command for base construction and logistic

support. Elements of the 131st Engineer Combat Regiment landed from 15

to 21 December. On the 25th the advance echelon of the 57th Combat Battalion arrived; the last elements came in

on 9 January 1944. Part of the 131st

and all of the 57th joined the 117th

Combat Battalion in supporting the infantry. The men cut roads and trails

through the heavy jungle, built timber

bridges, and strengthened perimeter defenses. Part of the 131st Engineers

went to work in the service command

area. This site was a tangle of jungle

interspersed with swamps; the growth

was so dense that the first clearing had to

be done by hand and drainage ditches

dug to lower the water table. Engineers

with bulldozers then moved in and took

out more growth. Others followed with

clamshells, which dug wider and deeper

drainage ditches. After the ground had

been cleared and drained, construction

of the major projects began. The engineers started work on supply dumps for

all sections of the command. The

largest jobs by far were the storage areas

for quartermaster, ordnance, chemical

warfare, and air forces units.

By early March, the signs were unmistakable that the Japanese were preparing an all-out counterattack. The

57th engineers increased the number of

guards, strung barbed wire, and mounted

machine guns in the bivouac area. On

the 8th, enemy artillery opened fire; the

counteroffensive was on. The 117th

and part of the 131st engineers were

heavily engaged in combat duties. On

11 March two companies of the 57th

were committed as infantry to be used in

case the enemy attacked in their sector.

On the 12th regular engineer work was

suspended by the remainder of the battalion and the men put to work carrying

ammunition, rations, and water, and

evacuating the wounded. The enemy

13

 Leaf, Task Force Engr Rpt, Opns at TEACUP,

13 May 44. 14

 836th Engr Avn Bn, Hist Narration for 1944. 15

 Memo for Rcd Sverdrup, 21 Apr 44. SWPA

File 164. It should be noted that it was SOP for

the Seabees to build their camps first.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 527

attacks, continuing for two weeks, had

spent themselves by the end of the

month. The engineers' main task

henceforth was base construction.16

Hollandia—Planning

With the Admiralties captured a

month ahead of schedule, the campaign

in the Southwest Pacific could be speeded

up. On 12 March the Joint Chiefs directed General MacArthur to cancel the

attack on Kavieng and accelerate base

and airfield construction in the Admiralties. In line with suggestions previously

made by MacArthur, they further directed him to bypass Hansa Bay and

Wewak and seize Hollandia, 200 miles

west of Wewak. Bombers taking off

from fields at Hollandia would be able

to reach western New Guinea and the

Palau Islands, and thus could strike at

bases deep in enemy-held territory.

MacArthur, anticipating the Joint

Chiefs' directive, had, a few days before

its arrival, ordered his staff to discontinue

preparations for the attacks on Hansa

Bay and Wewak and plan instead for an

assault on Hollandia. The attack was

set for 22 April. Simultaneously, there

was to be a landing near Aitape, some

100 miles to the east, to forestall any

overland attack by enemy forces bottled

up at Wewak and other points along the

New Guinea coast.17

Hollandia, the name of a small settlement on the northern shore of New

Guinea, also denoted an area just west

of the Netherlands New Guinea boundary, extending about 50 miles along the

coast and stretching inland for some 40

miles. (Map 27) Here were two large

bays—Humboldt in the east and Tanahmerah, 25 miles to the northwest. Extending along the coast was the Cyclops

Range, a lofty chain, the dominating

feature of the region. South of the

mountains was a fairly level, welldrained plateau, in the center of which

was Lake Sentani. Except for the area

around the lake, the terrain was rugged.

According to intelligence information,

there were good, if small, landing beaches

at Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bays.

Plans called for transforming the Hollandia region into a sizable air base and

a supply base, the latter to handle 180

days of supply for 200,000 men. Required would be six airfields, an air

depot, about four million square feet of

covered storage, 200 miles of road, tanks

for 118,000 barrels of gasoline, 16

Liberty ship docks, and numerous

camps and administrative buildings. At

Aitape, the coastal area seemed fairly

level, and there appeared to be no

obstructions to hinder movement inland.

A landing could probably be made

easily; base construction would be

minor.18

Since the Hollandia operation was to

be the most extensive so far undertaken

in the Southwest Pacific, preparations for

the assault and base construction began

well in advance. In mid-February, two

16

 (1) 57th Engr Combat Bn, War Diary-Jnl, 1

Jan-31 Mar 44. (2) Hist of the 131st Engr Combat

Bn. (3) Serv Comd APO 706, Final Unit Hist.

98-SC10-0.1 (16478)M 23 Dec 43-Dec 44. (4) Miller, CARTWHEEL, The Reduction of Rabaul, pp.

358ff. 17

 Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 9-12.

The Joint Chiefs' directive also contained instructions to Admiral Nimitz with regard to operation in

the Central Pacific. See above, p. 492.

18

 (1) RECKLESS Task Force, Hist of the Hollandia

Opn, p. 2. (2) RECKLESS Task Force, an. 4 to Admin

Order 1, Engr Plan, 5 Apr 44. Both in SWPA File

A141.
528 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 27

small engineer staffs had started planning for an amphibious attack at Hansa

Bay and construction of a base there.

One, made up of Sixth Army engineers,

working in Sixth Army headquarters at

Finschhafen under Colonel Robinson,

the task force engineer, was engaged in

planning for the assault and initial base

construction; the other, working in

USASOS headquarters at Brisbane, was

preparing more elaborate plans for base

construction. Soon after word was received on 10 March that the objective

area was changed to Hollandia, the two

staffs were consolidated at Sixth Army

headquarters and continued work there;

subsequently some of the planners

worked at nearby I Corps headquarters

under General Eichelberger, who had

been chosen task force commander.

Additional men were added from time

to time. Just before D-day, the task

force engineer staff totaled ninety-one

officers and men, most of them taken

from USASOS engineer units. This

was a most logical arrangement; transfer

of the base after the combat phase from

Sixth Army to USASOS would be rela-
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 529

lively easy.19 The importance of the

Hollandia operation from the engineering standpoint is shown by the fact that

GHQ operations instructions for that

operation, issued on 28 March, included

a separate engineer annex. Previously,

engineer requirements for an operation

had been contained in the G-4 annex.20

The task force engineers made elaborate calculations to determine how units

assigned to base construction might be

employed most effectively. They tried

to estimate not only when each facility

would be required, but also the type and

number of units needed to finish it on

schedule. Calculations along these lines

could now be made with some degree of

accuracy because Sturgis' staff had prepared tables setting forth the construction potential of experienced engineer

units, based on their records in the theater. A fully manned and equipped

aviation battalion was taken as the

standard construction unit. "Fully

manned and equipped" meant that the

work force of the battalion totaled approximately 500 men, working eight

hours a day, six days a week, on a 3-shift

basis. The amount of work the battalion could do in a month was called a

battalion month and its work potential

was arbitrarily rated as 1. An experienced general service regiment was rated

as 1.2; a newly arrived construction battalion, 0.8; a combat battalion, 0.6; a

naval construction battalion with three

months' experience, 1.2. The planners

set up construction schedules for the

thirty-three units to be assigned to the

operation. Equally detailed was planning for supply. After the engineers

had completed construction schedules,

they calculated supply needs, then broke

them down into priorities for shipment

to Hollandia.21

Hollandia—Assault

RECKLESS Task Force, together with its

supporting Allied naval and air units,

constituted the largest assemblage of

ships, planes, and men organized for any

operation in the Southwest Pacific up to

this time. Commanded by General

Eichelberger, and assigned the mission

of seizing the Hollandia area and initiating construction of Base G, RECKLESS

Task Force included the 24th and 41st

Divisions (the latter less the 163d RCT)

and twenty-eight attached combat and

service units, totaling approximately

60,000 men. The engineer component

amounted to about 41 percent, the highest for an amphibious operation so far

conducted in the Southwest Pacific; most

of this percentage represented construction units. By mid-April, preparations

for the assault were complete. The 24th

Division staged at Goodenough Island,

1,000 miles from Hollandia; the 41st

Division, at Finschhafen, 700 miles from

the objective area. The naval convoys

carrying these two divisions and their

19

 (1) USAFFE Bd SWPA, Rpt 31, Engr Opns,

RECKLESS (Hollandia) Task Force (cited hereafter as

USAFFE Bd Rpt 31). World War II Rcds Div, 4-

2.131/44. (2) RECKLESS Task Force, Hist of the

Hollandia Opn, p. 52. 20

 Ltr, Casey to Sturgis, 14 Aug. 50. SWPA Files.

21

 (1) USAFFE Bd Rpt 31. (2) Comments by General Sturgis on draft chapter. SWPA Files. (3) Ltr,

Lt Col Leonard L. Haseman to Staff Br, 28 Nov 50.

SWPA Files. (4) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, developed

slightly different percentages for engineer unit capabilities. See Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Admin Hist,

6 Apr 45-31 Dec 46, p. 11. SWPA Files.
530 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

supporting units sailed for the Admiralties, which they reached the first night;

thereupon, the combined task force

turned westward.22

On the morning of 22 April under

excellent sea and weather conditions, the

assault was made as scheduled. The 2d

Brigade's support battery was active.

Besides its 4 rocket LCVP's, 4 rocket

Dukws, and 2 flak LCM's, the battery

had 43 Buffaloes to carry troops across

reefs and shallow waters near the beaches.

The battery's craft were about equally

divided for the two assaults. When the

naval bombardment ceased, rocket

LCVP's and Dukw's and flak LCM's

moved to about 100 yards from shore

and loosed their barrages on the beaches.

Waves of landing craft brought in troops

and supplies.23

The 532d Boat and Shore Regiment,

less two companies, landed men and supplies for the 41st Division on the three

White Beaches at Humboldt Bay. Only

a few of the amphibian craft, upon approaching shore, were hit by enemy rifle

fire; most of the Japanese had fled inland. Ships had to be unloaded on

D-day so that they could get away that

night; stacked higher and higher on the

beaches, supplies were in a vulnerable

position. At Tanahmerah, the 542d

Boat and Shore Regiment helped land

the 24th Division on Red Beaches 1 and

2. Except for random rifle fire, enemy

interference was lacking. As at Humboldt Bay, complications began when

supplies piled up on shore. As intelligence reports had indicated, the beaches

were narrow; to the rear were mangrove

swamps, some of which had not shown up

on aerial photographs because of the

dense growth of trees in the water. Exits

were far more restricted than had been

anticipated. Red Beach 2 had such an

extensive swamp in back of it that moving supplies into the interior was out of

the question; during the first night, large

amounts were shuttled across Tanahmerah Bay to the other beach. Nor did

everything go smoothly at Humboldt

Bay.24 A lone Japanese plane coming

over on the second day dropped a number of bombs near an ammunition dump.

For three days explosions rocked the

area, and fires raged out of control. The

amphibian boatmen, bringing their craft

close to shore, rescued many of the men

trapped on the beaches by the flames.

Soon after the first landings, the combat engineers began to advance inland

with the infantry. The 116th Combat

Battalion (less Company A) of the 41st

Division came ashore at Humboldt Bay

on D-day. Enemy resistance was negligible. The men widened the trail leading from the beaches to the native village

of Pim, making it passable for trucks.

They then began to improve a Japanesebuilt road running from Pim to the airdromes. This road, which intelligence

sources had indicated was in fair condition, turned out to be little better than

a trail, which at most could take 21⁄2-ton

trucks in dry weather. In swampy areas

22

 (1) RECKLESS Task Force, Hist of the Hollandia

Opn, pp. 5-6. (2) Maj R. M. Little, 1st Aust Corps,

Rpt on Engr Opns at Hollandia and Aitape, Dutch

New Guinea, 22 Apr-4 May 44. SWPA File 128. 23

 2d ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt of Opns, Apr 1-30,

44. SWPA File E-20-4.

24

 (1) 532d EBSR, Unit Rpt No. 5, 15 Mar-7 Jun

44. SWPA Files. (2) RECKLESS Task Force, Hist of

the Hollandia Opn, p. 54. (3) Heavey, Down

Ramp!, pp. 116-17. (4) Ltr, Heavey to Reybold,

30 Jun 44. SWPA File 73.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 531

ENGINEERS OF THE 1881ST WITH FULL JUNGLE EQUIPMENT move along a Hollandia

beach.

it became a quagmire largely because of

the heavy, continuous traffic. The

116th engineers, helped by the 79th

Combat and the 1881st Aviation Battalions, had to make a major effort on this

road.25

At Tanahmerah Bay the 3d Combat

Battalion (less Company B) of the 24th

Division landed on D-day. The effort

required to support the infantry in the

advance to the airdromes was more laborious than at Humboldt Bay. The

trail leading inland was too narrow and

steep even for jeeps. For days, the men

had to carry supplies forward. Added

to these difficulties were the rains, which

began on the second day of the landing,

the lack of gravel or rock for surfacing,

the inadequate number of hand tools,

and the small number of natives in the

region willing to work. The most favorable element was the ineffectual

enemy resistance. By 26 April the three

airdromes were in American hands.26

25

 Rpt, Col Herbert G. Lauterbach, CO 116th

Engr Combat Bn, to Krueger, 28 Jun 44. SWPA

Files.

26

 (1) Tanahmerah Bay Landing Force, Hist Rpt.

SWPA Files. (2) 3d Engr Combat Bn, Hist Rpt,

an. 1. (3) USAFFE Bd Rpt 31.
532 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

As soon as the infantry reached the

airfields—named Sentani, Cyclops, and

Hollandia—the engineers began the job

of rebuilding them. The three runways,

satisfactorily located, considering the

terrain, were poorly constructed; they

were of earth, and drainage was inadequate. The subbase at Sentani was so

poor that the Japanese had placed the

runway surfacing on bamboo matting.

Allied bombings had damaged the fields

heavily. Four aviation battalions, working under the direction of headquarters,

931st Aviation Regiment, began the job

of reconstruction. The aviation engineers' main job was to find a suitable

material for surfacing. In nearby

streams they came upon sufficient quantities of rock and gravel. They graded

the Sentani and Cyclops runways and

placed crushed rock to a depth of about

six inches; after rolling the rock into a

compact layer, they dampened it slightly

and topped it first with an asphalt cutback and then with a coat of pure asphalt

and limestone chips. They surfaced the

Hollandia runway with iron ore which

they took from a nearby deposit, mixing

the ore with equal parts of sand. The

most troublesome job was providing adequate drainage. The water table was

high because of the many swamps and

streams. The men dug three-foot deep

ditches, which helped considerably to

lower the ground water level. On the

whole, the work of making the airdromes

serviceable progressed rapidly, despite the

terrain, which was poorer than expected.

By 29 April 4,000 feet of the Cyclops

runway was ready for dry-weather use by

transports, and by 3 May the Hollandia

strip had been completed to 5,000 feet

and a squadron of fighters was stationed

there.27

The unsatisfactory roads in the Hollandia area made it hard to get supplies

to the airfields and the area around

them where the base was being constructed. Japanese-built Tami airfield

near the coast southeast of Humboldt

Bay, if improved, could be used to airlift

supplies into the interior. Accordingly,

General Krueger directed the engineers

to lengthen the grass runway at Tami to

4,000 feet and surface it with steel mat.

By 3 May the engineers had improved

the strip sufficiently to make landings

and takeoffs by C-47's possible. In the

next few days C-47's made almost 500

trips from Tami to the fields at Hollandia, bringing in gasoline, supplies,

and troops. Useful in the early days of

the Hollandia operation, Tami was not

further developed because of its swampy

location.28

Aitape

The assault at Aitape by PERSECUTION

Task Force resembled the one at Hollandia, but on a reduced scale. Naval

and aerial bombardment killed or drove

away most of the Japanese in the beachhead area; the troops on landing met

only occasional rifle fire. This was the

first major landing in which units of

General Ogden's 3d Engineer Special

27

 (1) Dudley and Staggs, "Engineer Troops on

Airdrome Construction," The Military Engineer,

XXXVII (October, 1945), 386-88. (2) Engrs of

—SWPA, VI, 230. (3) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road

to Tokyo, p. 113. 28

 (1) Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 609-10.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 533

Brigade participated. The 593d Boat

and Shore Regiment, less two boat companies, furnished the boat and shore

teams. Despite the exposed beach with

its heavy surf, the amphibian engineers

carried on more or less routinely their

tasks of unloading LST's and establishing supply dumps. Moving inland, the

27th Combat Battalion and Company A

of the 116th Combat Battalion encountered no Japanese, mines, or obstacles.

The combat engineers worked mainly

on roads and bridges, the 27th widening

the road leading to the enemy-built airfields and the 116th constructing roads

along the beach. Since the light Japanese-built bridges and culverts would not

hold up under M4 tanks, the troops

constructed temporary spans of coconut

logs and put in culverts made of gasoline

drums covered with sand, which proved

to be satisfactory expedients.29

With sizable enemy forces at Wewak

and Hansa Bay, construction of airfields

at Aitape was urgent. Three mobile

works squadrons—the 5th, 6th, and 7th

—of the Royal Australian Air Force and

two American airborne aviation battalions—the 872d and 875th—had the

mission of rehabilitating the three

Japanese-built runways at Aitape, known

collectively as Tadji Drome. The units

were to work under the supervision of

Wing Comdr. William A. C. Dale, the

task force engineer. A few hours after

the landing, Dale and members of his

staff investigated the strip nearest the

beach. It was 400 feet long, fairly well

graded, and almost entirely overgrown

with kunai grass. The Australian units,

all three of them ashore by D+1, worked

around the clock with motor graders,

dozers, and sheepsfoot rollers. On 24

April, before 1000, the first fighter plane

landed. Soon the heavy rains turned

the runway into a quagmire, unusable

except in emergency. The Australians

then set out to cover the strip with

pierced plank; they finished this job on

the 28th. The field was again serviceable but not altogether satisfactory because of its poor drainage. To the south

lay the enemy-built bomber runway, in

the same state of neglect as the fighter

strip and pitted with bomb craters. On

the third day of the landing, the Australians began filling in the craters but

were not able until the 28th to transfer

any equipment from the fighter strip.

The two American airborne aviation

battalions, arriving on 4 May, joined the

Australians working on the bomber

strip. Poor terrain slowed construction.

Coral surfaced, the runway was ready for

fighters on 27 May, but not for bombers

until early in July.30

A Smaller Base at Hollandia

Problems had developed at Hollandia.

Although the engineers were able to reconstruct the airfields fairly rapidly for

fighters and transports, they could not

29

 (1) Task Force Engr Rpt on PERSECUTION Opn.

SWPA File A165. (2) 3d ESB, Hist Rpt, 3-30 Apr

44. SWPA File E-32-1.

30

 (1) Little, Rpt on Engr Opns at Hollandia and

Aitape, Dutch New Guinea, 22 Apr-4 May 44. (2)

Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 25 Apr 44, sub: Inspection

at Aitape. SWPA File 511. (3) Task Force Engr

Rpt on PERSECUTION Opn. (4) Hist of the 872d Airborne Engr Avn Bn. (5) Hist of the 875th Airborne

Engr Avn Bn.
534 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

readily develop runways for heavy bombers because of the swampy terrain.

Representatives of the major commands,

making a survey of the Hollandia area,

concluded that construction of a base of

the size outlined in GHQ's operations

instructions would be impracticable.

The unfavorable terrain, the poor roads,

and the impossibility of developing adequate harbor facilities at either Tanahmerah or Humboldt Bay within a reasonable time were all hard facts that

militated against building a base large

enough to support 200,000 men. Maj.

Gen. James L. Frink, commanding general of USASOS, advised construction of

a smaller base. General Kenney canceled plans for an air depot and directed

the building of minimal air facilities

only. Over-all plans for base and airfield construction were revised. MacArthur reduced the number of airfields

to be built from six to three, cut covered

storage from four to three million square

feet, and directed that supply facilities

be built for 140,000 instead of 200,000

men. Despite these reductions, construction needs were still tremendous,

and would necessitate a sustained effort

by all engineer units assigned to the

operation.31

Wakde

Even before the assault on Hollandia

and Aitape, plans and preparations for

amphibious strikes against points farther

west were well along. MacArthur's

planning staffs were concentrating on

two places in particular: the Wakde

Islands together with the nearby New

Guinea coast, about 125 miles northwest

of Hollandia, and the island of Biak,

some 200 miles still farther west. After

the detailed survey of the Hollandia area

had shown conclusively that the development there of heavy bomber fields was

not advisable, the capture of Wakde and

Biak was all the more compelling.

Until adequate fields could be built on

these islands, heavy bombers would have

to operate from the Admiralties, over

400 miles east of Hollandia. On 27

April MacArthur issued operations instructions calling for an assault on 15

May on the Wakde Islands and a 25-mile

stretch of the nearby New Guinea coast

from Sarmi to Toem. The 41st Division was to make the landings. The

division's 163d Regimental Combat

Team was to capture the Wakde Islands;

the remainder of the division, the area

along the coast. The attack on Biak

was tentatively scheduled for early June;

the precise date would be determined

later. While plans and preparations for

the assault on Wakde were being made,

aerial photographs coming in of the

coastal area indicated that it was a poor

place for airfield construction and that

concentrations of Japanese troops near

Sarmi might make the job hazardous as

well. MacArthur decided to revise his

strategy, and on 10 May issued new

operations instructions. The 163d RCT

was to seize the Wakde Islands and a

smaller nearby coastal strip, while the

remainder of the 41st Division would

prepare for the assault on Biak. The

landing at Wakde was now scheduled for

17 May; the one on Biak, ten days later.32

31

 (1) Craven and Cate eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 608-09. General Kenney Reports, pp. 394-

95. (2) USAFFE Bd Rpt 31. 32

 (1) TORNADO Task Force Engr Rpt. Sturgis File
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 535

About two miles off the New Guinea

shore line, the Wakde Islands included

Insoemoar, usually called Wakde by the

American troops, and smaller Insoemanai. Relatively flat Insoemoar, about

one and three-fourths miles long, had

limestone cliffs and terraces along its

southeastern edge. The Japanese-built

airstrip extended almost from the western to the eastern tip of the island.

Insoemanai was too small for base development. Colonel Sturgis had little time

to organize a task force engineer section

and assemble units for the assault.

Nevertheless, Lt. Col. Sherwood E. Liles,

Jr., the task force engineer, and his staff

of four officers and twenty-one enlisted

men from Headquarters, 1112th Combat

Group, after being briefed on the operation, and making a fairly detailed study

of terrain reports, aerial photographs,

and maps of the objective areas, were

able to piece together quite an accurate

picture of the airstrip, the nature of the

soil, the conditions at the beaches, and

the extent of the road net on the Wakde

Islands and the mainland. Before

D-day, Colonel Liles and his staff had

prepared a layout of the runway, taxiways, and dispersal areas to be constructed on Wakde. Eight engineer

units, hastily assembled from bases on

the New Guinea coast, were assigned to

the task force for airfield and base

construction.33

TORNADO Task Force arrived at its

objective area at dawn on 17 May. After

the bombings, the assault waves made

their landings on the New Guinea coast.

The amphibian engineers consisted of

the shore battalion of the 593d Boat and

Shore Regiment and Company A of the

boat battalion of the 542d Boat and

Shore Regiment. Shallow water and

heavy surf were the main obstacles; both

were so troublesome that a major effort

was necessary on the landing jetties.

The shore engineers, using their bulldozers, had the beach in fair condition

in about an hour. Enemy resistance was

slight; apparently the Japanese had not

expected a landing at this point. The

combat engineers, including the 27th

Combat Battalion and Company A of

the 116th, veterans of the recent Aitape

landing, had as their initial mission unloading LST's. After finishing this task,

two companies of the 27th improved the

coastal road and repaired the Japanesebuilt bridges. One of the companies

supported the infantry in its drive westward toward Japanese-built Maffin

Drome, some six miles from the landing

beach. As the troops moved forward,

enemy resistance stiffened noticeably;

the engineers frequently had to repair

roads and bridges under fire or while

harassed by enemy patrols and, at times,

had to fight as infantry to ward off

attacks.34

Meantime, a major amphibious assault

was under way against the Wakde

Islands. In the initial landing, on 18

May, Company A of the boat battalion

of the 542d Boat and Shore Regiment

and the shore battalion of the 593d Boat

and Shore Regiment went in with the

infantry. The amphibian engineers ran

42. (2) Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 620. 33

 TORNADO Task Force Engr Rpt.

34

 (1) TORNADO Task Force Engr Rpt. (2) 3d ESB,

Our Business Is Beachheads. (3) 3d ESB, Hist Rpt,

1-31 May 44. SWPA File E32-2.
536 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

into surprisingly strong enemy resistance. Despite the preinvasion bombardments and the shelling from guns emplaced on the mainland the day before,

many of the defenses, particularly those

in the limestone cliffs, were not severely

damaged. The Japanese had fortified

the beaches skilfully. They had even

taken turrets from disabled planes and

partially buried them in the sand, with

the guns trained on the shore. The

amphibian craft on approaching the

island ran into heavy fire. No infantrymen were wounded until the ramps were

lowered, but many of the boatmen, who

had to stand in exposed positions as their

craft neared the beach, were hit; three

were killed. Still, every boat reached

shore. One LCVP showed the marks of

more than sixty bullets and shell fragments. For its part in this landing,

Company A received the Distinguished

Unit Citation.35

The shore engineers, also, had a hard

time. The beach was littered with

debris. Strong enemy resistance and

artillery and rifle fire hampered the men

in clearing areas for supply dumps. By

the end of the first day, the beachhead,

200 yards wide, extended inland only

300 yards. During the next two days,

enemy infiltrators set fire to ESB machinery, trucks, and gasoline, and slashed

truck tires with bayonets. The combat

engineers—Company A of the 27th Engineers—functioned almost entirely as infantry during their first two days on

Wakde. Many of the island's defenders

were holed up in caves from which they

could not easily be dislodged. Combat

engineers and infantrymen attacked the

hideouts with hand grenades, bazookas,

and flame throwers and lowered explosives through the cave entrances.

Most of the enemy not destroyed by the

grenades and flame throwers were killed

by the concussions of the demolition

charges. The Japanese fought stubbornly from caves, foxholes, pillboxes,

and concrete emplacements. Every

strongpoint had to be reduced.36

Construction began soon after the first

troops landed. While Wakde was under

bombardment, the transport carrying the

836th Aviation Battalion arrived offshore; the men, lined up along the ship's

rails, watched guns and planes pound the

island. Disembarking while fighting

was still in progress, the aviation engineers came under fire, and several men

were wounded. During the afternoon

of their first day ashore, the troops,

digging in along the beach and setting

up their perimeter defense, could plainly

hear the sounds of battle; fighting was

going on only 900 feet away. The next

day, with the end of organized resistance,

the men began repairing the airfield,

which though badly torn up by the

bombing and fighting, proved to be an

excellent, coral-surfaced strip. Within

forty-eight hours the runway was ready

to take American planes. Thereafter,

the Japanese did not interfere with work

on the airfield, except for occasional

night bombings, which caused little

35

 (1) 2d ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt of Opns, May i31, 44. SWPA File E-20-5. (2) Heavey, "Amphibian Engineers in Action," The Miliary Engineer,

XXXVII (July, 1945), 256.

36

 (1) 3d ESB, Our Business Is Beachheads. (2) 3d

ESB, Hist Rpt, 1-31 May 44. (3) TORNADO Task

Force Engr Rpt. (4) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA Engr

Tech Info Bull No. 1, 10 Aug 44. SWPA File M163.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 537

damage. On 25 May the last pocket of

enemy resistance was destroyed.37

Biak

One of the Schouten Islands, situated

in Geelvink Bay, Biak had an area of

about 950 square miles. (See Map 27.)

A coral island, partly of volcanic origin,

it was rugged, with no streams of any

size. Roughly paralleling the southern

coast, from a few hundred yards to 2

miles inland, was a coral cliff, rising in

some places to a height of 300 feet;

largely a series of precipitous ridges and

terraces and heavily forested, it was

honeycombed with caves and tunnels

hollowed out by the action of water.

Between the cliff and the beach was a

coastal shelf, 10 to 50 feet above sea level.

Offshore were dangerous coral reefs.

The Japanese had built a number of

installations on the island, most of them

in the coastal area between cliff and sea.

Aerial photographs showed that Mokmer

airfield, about 300 yards from shore, had

a runway about 4,500 feet long, with an

extensive dispersal area. Two other

fields, Borokoe and Sorido, were not

operational in early May 1944, but apparently the Japanese were working on

them. On the southern coast, extending

from the shore to the outer edge of the

coral reef, were four jetties, which presumably could take barges, probably

only at high tide. What appeared to be

an excellent motor road followed the

coast from the native village of Bosnek

west to the airfields, a distance of 10

miles.38

The 41st Division, reinforced, less the

163d RCT, originally scheduled to seize

the New Guinea coast off Wakde, was

designated the HURRICANE Task Force

for the Biak operation. With the three

Japanese airstrips the initial objective,

the tactical plan called for a landing

near Bosnek, the point closest to Mokmer where the cliff rose sufficiently far

back from the beach to give the landing

forces fairly adequate room to maneuver.

Upon landing, the troops were to move

westward on the coastal shelf and seize

the airstrips. The rather abrupt change

of the task force's assault area from

Toem-Sarmi to Biak gave Colonel Lauterbach, the task force engineer, and his

staff, assembled during the first week of

May, little time for planning. Studies

of Biak's terrain indicated that bringing

in supplies and equipment over the coral

reefs would probably be a complicated

matter. Even though Biak appeared to

have a sizable Japanese garrison, no unusual problems were anticipated in

combat support. More difficult was

planning for base development, largely

the responsibility of Col. David W.

Heiman, commander of the 1112th Combat Group, and assistant task force engineer in charge of construction. Eight

officers and forty-three enlisted men in

group headquarters (all those who had

not been assigned to Colonel Liles and

the Wakde operation) worked with

Colonel Heiman on plans for the airfields and the base. Information on

what to build was vague. MacArthur's

operations instructions of 10 May had

37

 (1) 836th Engr Avn Bn, Hist Narration for 1944.

(2) TORNADO Task Force Engr Rpt. 38

 (1) Hq 162d Inf, an. 1-a to FO 1 Essential Elements of Terrain, 24 May 44. SWPA Files. (2)

USAFFE Bd SWPA, Rpt 49, Rpt on the Defense of

Biak, 29 Aug 44. (Cited hereafter as USAFFE Bd

Rpt 49). World War II Rcds Div, 4-2, 149/44.
538 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

no engineer annex. On 17 May Colonel

Heiman learned at Sixth Army headquarters at Finschhafen that he was to

construct two airdromes, one for fighters

and another for bombers, and that he

would receive additional instructions

later. Eventually Biak was to be expanded into a major air base. Heiman's

staff prepared tentative plans for airfields and base facilities, using aerial

photographs as a guide in locating installations. Eight engineer service units,

including three aviation battalions, were

scheduled to go in during the first days,

to begin work on the airfields and the

base as soon as possible.39

On the morning of the 27th HURRICANE Task Force arrived off the southern

coast of Biak. After the usual naval and

aerial bombardment, the launching of

landing craft began. The 542d Boat

and Shore Regiment (less the boat company at Wakde) and the support battery

of the 2d Brigade were on hand. Because of a haze and the smoke of the

bombings, which obscured the shoreline,

and because the ocean current was

stronger than expected, the naval assault

vessels imperceptibly drifted westward

and by the time of the initial landing

were about two miles beyond their

proper location; the first waves came

ashore to the west of the designated

beaches. Buffaloes of the support battery were among the craft coming ashore

at that point. Luckily, there was no

enemy opposition. The subsequent

landings were made at the scheduled

places. The beach was about one mile

long and 1,000 feet deep; to the rear was

the almost vertical cliff, 200 feet high.

Though the area was a shambles from

the bombing, the amphibian engineers

found the two coral jetties satisfactory

for unloading. Helped by the 116th

combat engineers, they pushed coral over

the reef and quickly provided new temporary landing areas and at the same

time began the construction of additional

jetties. Before long the beachhead was

well organized. The Japanese, intrenched in positions in the cliff, made

little effort to interfere; the amphibian

engineers reported the enemy did no

more than fire a few shots.40

Soon after the landing elements of the

162d Infantry began to advance along

the coastal road toward Mokmer. Company C of the 116th Combat Battalion

furnished engineer support. In fair

condition, the road required a minimum amount of work. There were a

few scattered mines and ineffectual obstacles. At one point, the Japanese had

buried, at random, twelve antitank

mines, each with an extra charge of two

blocks of picric acid. Nearby were two

100-kilogram bombs and two 25-pound

naval shells placed nose-up so as to be

detonated by pressure from a vehicle.

This was the first time since the Admiralties operation that the engineers were

called upon to deal with enemy mines.

They removed them easily. By the next 39

 (1) Seventh Amphib Force, Rpt of Biak Opn.

SWPA File 73. (2) Task Force Engr Rpt on Biak

Opn. Both in SWPA File 73. (3) Hq, HURRICANE

Task Force, an. 12 to FO 1, Engr. SWPA Files. (4)

GHQ SWPA, OI No. 51/1, 10 May 44, with ans. 1-4.

SWPA File A288. (5) Ltr, Heiman to Staff Br, 13

Oct 50. SWPA Files.

40

 (1) Seventh Amphib Force, Rpt of Biak Opn.

(2) 2d ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt of Opns, May 1-31,

44. SWPA File E-20-5. (3) Rpt, Capt Wallace M.

Mulliken, Adj 542d EBSR, to Krueger, 29 Aug 44.

SWPA File 73. (4) USAFFE Bd Rpt 49.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 539

morning the infantry had reached the

eastern end of Mokmer. Enemy resistance was so strong the troops were forced

to withdraw a distance of about half a

mile, where they were pinned down by

machine gun and mortar fire and

harassed by enemy infiltrators. Repeated Japanese frontal attacks were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.41

On 30 May the 864th Aviation Battalion, under Lt. Col. E. L. Griggs, Jr.,

arrived at Mokmer. The men were to

reconstruct the strip as a fighter, and

eventually, a bomber field. The Japanese, entrenched in various places in the

coral cliff, were able to prevent any kind

of work from being done. Since the

Americans had been ashore for three

days and still had no airfield and slight

prospects of getting one soon, another

location had to be found. General

Krueger thought a field might be built

in the interior of the island north of

Bosnek, but engineers sent out on reconnaissance reported it would take at least

three weeks to construct one there. Several small islands off Biak's southern

coast were a possibility. Engineers, airmen, and naval personnel, surveying the

islands during the first days of June,

agreed that Owi offered a good site.

Construction was urgent. It was rumored that the Japanese were planning

to send in reinforcements and that an

enemy fleet "had been sighted five hours

off Biak."

 42

 Meanwhile, the one aviation battalion on the island, unable to

work on Mokmer, was building jetties,

widening the road along the beach, unloading ships, carrying water to the

infantry, and maintaining trails to the

front lines. On 6 June, General Fuller,

commander of the 41st Division, directed

construction of a field on Owi. That

same day Company B of the 864th was

sent over to begin work. The remainder of the battalion arrived during

the next five days.43

General Fuller had meanwhile decided to capture Mokmer by an enveloping movement. He directed the 186th

Infantry, at that time in the Bosnek

beachhead, to drive westward along the

top of the coral cliff. On 1 June Company B of the 116th Combat Battalion

was attached to the infantry for support.

As the infantry advanced, the engineers

built a road in the rear to bring up

supplies; from the 2d to the 5th of June,

they completed seven and one-half miles.

The advance met strong resistance. At

night, the engineers bivouacked within

the infantry perimeter; but during the

day, unable to maintain continuous contact with the infantry, they had to

furnish their own protection. On one

occasion, a group of Japanese attacked

a working party, tried to cause panic by

"screams and fiendish laughter," and

killed one man and wounded three. A

few days later, a Japanese threw an explosive charge at the windshield of a

moving truck, the driver stepped on the

accelerator, and the charge bounced off,

exploding harmlessly. 41

 (1) Rpt, Co C 116th Engr Combat Bn to CO

116th Engr Combat Bn, 18 Aug 44. (2) Rpt, Hq

116th Engr Combat Bn to CG 41st Div, 20 Sep 44.

Both in SWPA Files. 42

 Hq 864th Engr Avn Bn, Narrative Rpt of Biak

and Owi Islands Opn, Covering Period 11 May-20

Aug 44, dtd 31 Aug 44.

43

 (1) Hq math Engr Combat Group, Hist Rcd of

Opns at Biak Island, 7 May-15 Jul 44. (2) Memo,

Sturgis for Casey, 12 Sep 44. SWPA File 73. (3)

Rpt Mulliken to Krueger, 29 Aug 44.
540 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

A severe handicap was the shortage of

water, unusual in the Southwest Pacific,

where, as a rule, sources were plentiful.

Each man of Company B was allowed one

canteen daily for drinking; there was

none for washing or cooking. A drenching rain on 6 June kept operations from

coming to an almost complete standstill.

The men were so eager to get water that

they spread their ponchos to serve as

catch basins to direct water into their

helmets. On the 7th the infantry descended on the coral ridge to the north

of Mokmer. The Japanese were forced

to retreat westward.44

On 8 June two aviation battalions, the

860th, under Lt. Col. Benjamin E.

Meadows, and the 863d, under Lt. Col.

Raymond J. Harvey, landed at Bosnek.

The former was scheduled to help the

864th engineers on Owi; the same day

Company B went to the island; Companies A and C followed shortly. The

mission of the 863d was to make Mokmer

operational within a day and a half.45

The big problem was getting the men

to Mokmer. General Fuller and Colonel

Heiman, discussing the matter, agreed

the most expeditious way would be to

transport them by LCT.

During the night of 9-10 June Company A set out from Bosnek. Colonel

Heiman helped bring in the first elements near the airfield. The landing

was made across a coral reef, 200 yards

wide, before dawn, under blackout conditions, with the continual threat of

Japanese mortar and artillery fire opening up, should the enemy become aware

of what was going on. A 6-foot tide

came in so rapidly that nearly all equipment was swamped; it had to be pulled

ashore and left to dry out. "We had to

work fast and in the darkness on a strip

of beach that was strange to all of us,"

Colonel Heiman wrote. "We were

lucky."

 46

The situation at Mokmer had not improved. Engineers, making a reconnaissance of the field soon after dawn, came

under enemy machine gun fire; during

the remainder of the day shelling was so

heavy that no work could be done. The

next day conditions were just as bad.

Since improvement of the airfield was

impossible, most of the aviation engineers were assigned to providing combat

support for the infantry driving westward toward Borokoe. On 12 June,

when fire on Mokmer slackened considerably, some of the aviation engineers

once more began to work on the field.

This time their efforts were not seriously interrupted, and by nightfall they

reported to Colonel Lauterbach that the

runway could receive fighter planes.

But during the next two days enemy fire

on the field was again so strong that little

could be done. Most of the aviation

engineers were again put to work supporting the infantry.47

A major job was destroying the enemy

in the caves and tunnels in the coral

cliff. Helping the infantry blast the

enemy out of their hideouts was one of

the most strenuous tasks of the 116th

Combat Battalion. On one occasion, a 44

 Rpt, Co B 116th Engr Combat Bn to CG 41st

Inf Div, 10 Jul 44. SWPA Files. 45

 (1) Ltr, Meadows to Krueger, 28 Aug 44. SWPA

Files. (2) 863d Engr Avn Bn, Rpt on Biak Campaign.

46

 Ltr, Heiman to Staff Br, 6 Oct 50. SWPA Files. 47

 (1) Task Force Engr Rpt on Biak Opn. (2) Hq

864th Engr Avn Bn, Narrative Rpt of Biak and Owi

Islands Opns.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 541

voluntary detail from Company C went

into the caves near the airfields and

spent two days cleaning out enemy

troops. With rifles, grenades, bazookas,

and flame throwers, infantry and engineers entered the intricate network of

caves and tunnels. In some cases they

lowered explosive charges into cave entrances and detonated them. The engineer-infantry teams considered the

flame thrower especially useful, since it

either burned the Japanese or drove

them out of the cave so that they could be

dealt with by rifle fire. Combat, amphibian, and aviation engineers at times

helped the infantry. Destroying the

Japanese not only in the cliff but also

in other areas of the island was a laborious task and required three weeks of

continuous effort.48

On 15 June General Eichelberger

temporarily took command of HURRICANE Task Force. Three days later

reinforcements, requested before he took

over, reached Biak. Eichelberger followed the tactical plan already in effect.

The Japanese withdrew from the two

westernmost airdromes and at the same

time retreated northward from the coral

cliff. Interference with work on Mokmer lessened noticeably. On 18 June

the 863d Aviation Battalion had a runway, 5,000 feet long, in excellent shape

for fighters; the same day a 4,500-foot

coral strip, finished on Owi, was able to

take several P-38's, which made forced

landings, and a B-25. Three days later

planes began using Owi regularly, and

on the next day P-40's began operating

from Mokmer. Work was coming along

well on Borokoe and Sorido, and plans

were being prepared for the construction

of base facilities. The airfields on Biak

had fallen behind schedule, mainly because of enemy interference. On Owi,

enemy action was limited to air attacks

which caused little damage, but a major

concern was scrub typhus. The 864th

had 64 cases; one officer and two enlisted

men died of the disease. Many were

sick of fevers, the exact cause of which

was unknown.

Progress by Midyear

By the end of June the Allied forces

were solidly entrenched at various

points on the New Guinea coast and

nearby islands as far west as Biak. Combat was largely over. In the Admiralties, the combat phase had ended on 18

May, when the Navy took over responsibility for airfield and base construction.

Although Hollandia and Aitape were to

remain under Sixth Army control until

late in August, construction was now the

only concern there. Early in June,

Japanese resistance was broken at Toem,

and Maffin Drome fell into American

hands. Wakde and Biak were still under Sixth Army, but there was no fighting

on Wakde and little on Biak; on these

islands, the major tasks were airfield and

base construction. In the South Pacific,

where combat was a thing of the past for

U.S. forces, troops were being transferred to more active theaters. The only

area where fighting still seemed likely

was to the east of Aitape along the

Driniumor River. Here a Japanese

build-up was in progress and an enemy

drive westward seemed probable. For

48

 (1) Ltr, CO Co C 1 16th Engr Combat Bn to CO

116th Engr Combat Bn 18 Aug 44. SWPA Files.

(2) Ltr, Co E 542d EBSR to CG 2d ESB, 17 Aug 44.

SWPA Files.
542 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

the engineers there had been little difference between the combat phase and the

logistics phase of operations; from the

start, their major tasks had been building

airfields and bases.

Logistical Support

Combat Versus Construction

"As usual, the Engineers up here are

way out in front," Colonel Sturgis had

written on 13 September 1943. "That's

what makes this war so different."49

This statement was equally true of the

campaign along the New Guinea coast

in 1944. The struggle in the South and

Southwest Pacific was a war of bases.

The engineers had to devote by far their

greatest efforts to building logistic facilities as quickly as possible in one of the

world's most underdeveloped regions.

The rugged terrain of Netherlands New

Guinea and the nearby islands was

similar to that of Papua, Northeast New

Guinea, and the Solomons. On practically every island where the engineers

had to build, the interiors were mountainous; the narrow coastal areas, jungled

and swampy. Construction had to start

from scratch and be carried forward with

all possible speed. The progress of the

Allied forces toward Japan was to a large

extent dependent on the rapidity with

which the engineers could build bases

and airfields, which meant that extensive

construction had to be done during the

combat phase of operations. Task force

commanders of Sixth Army, responsible

for combat missions, were at the same

time responsible for starting work on air

and supply facilities. Conditions in the

South and Southwest Pacific, especially

in the latter theater, were thus greatly

different from those in the European

theater of World War I, upon which

much of the pre-World War II concepts

and planning had been based.50

In both theaters tasks of the combat

engineers were surprisingly light. In

the operations along the New Guinea

coast, divisional engineers landed, as a

rule, in the third and fourth waves, prepared to meet strong resistance, but in

the first six months of 1944, tenacious

enemy opposition had been encountered

only in the Admiralties and on Wakde

and Biak. At most landing places, the

overpowering bombardments had driven

the Japanese away from the beaches.

Such defenses as were found were not

formidable, with the exception of those

on Wakde and Biak. Many were demolished or made useless by explosives.

Engineers, with bulldozers, destroyed

numerous pillboxes and roadblocks.

The Japanese rarely used mines, and

when they did, it was in an incompetent

manner. The engineers themselves seldom laid any because the advance was so

rapid and the enemy rarely counterattacked. There was little need for

bridging, either temporary or permanent.

River crossings were infrequent because

of MacArthur's strategy of leap-frogging

along the New Guinea coast and across

the nearby islands. When overland

movements were made, bridging opera49

 Ltr, Sturgis to Mr. H. B. Deal, H. B. Deal Constr

Co, 13 Sep 43. Sturgis File, Personal Corresp, 1943-

44.

50

 (1) Ltr, Lane to C Staff Br, 28 Jul 47. SWPA

Files. (2) Col Girard B. Troland, Notes on Army

Engr Opns in SWPA. SWPA File 104.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 543

tions had to be restricted. The sudden

heavy rains of the region quickly produced swollen streams and rivers, in

most cases precluding the use of ponton

bridges. The only noteworthy instance

of such bridging up to this point had

been the Australian crossing of the

Markham River near Nadzab. There

were no American bridging units in the

South or Southwest Pacific. One estimate was that in the campaign along the

New Guinea coast, combat support made

up only 10 percent of the effort of the

divisional engineers.51

In contrast, construction tasks during

the combat phase were heavy; by the

time USASOS took over, a vast amount

of work had already been accomplished.

Task force engineers faced numerous

problems. Their staffs were generally

too small to handle extensive construction missions adequately. They frequently found it difficult to assemble

adequate staffs because task force commanders, as a rule, did not think in

terms of base construction being done

during the combat phase of operations.

Even when staffs were adequate insofar

as numbers were concerned, time was

usually too short to build up an efficient

organization or to plan carefully. Partly

because of the shortage of shipping, task

force engineers found it hard to get

enough men and equipment early in an

assault. No definite rule existed as to

whether the task force commander or

his engineer should command the engineer units of the task force. Commanders generally expected their staff

engineers to direct the work of the engineer units, and, as a rule, staff engineers

did exercise command functions. The

fact that so much heavy construction had

to be performed in the combat zone and

sometimes in the midst of fighting necessitated resort to numerous administration

procedures that were hardly orthodox

according to prewar planning. Yet there

seemed to be no other way of doing the

construction quickly.52 Giving to task

force commanders the responsibility for

initiating base construction was, in

Casey's opinion, ". . . definitely the correct procedure under the conditions

which prevailed in the Southwest

Pacific."

 53

The New Bases

Engineer work went on apace, whether

under Sixth Army or USASOS. By

mid-1944, work in the Admiralties was

far along. After the friction between

Army engineers and Seabees had been

eliminated early in April with the reorganization which placed the Seabees

directly under the task force engineer,

operations were much improved. On

the 21st of the month Sverdrup, after a

visit to the islands, had reported that

Momote and Mokerang were operational. "Meeting the deadlines, is in

my opinion the finest construction

achievement yet accomplished in

SWPA," Sverdrup wrote. "It was accomplished by a tremendous amount of

51

 (1) Ltr, Maj John E. Brewer to The Comdt The

Engr School Ft. Belvoir, 30 Sep 44. EHD Files. (2)

Of C Engr SWPA, Engr Tech Intel Bull, 20 Sep 44.

SWPA File M163.

52

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

122-23. (2) Ltr, Brewer to The Comdt The Engr

School Ft Belvoir, 30 Sep 44. (3) Ltr, Sturgis to C

Staff Br, 7 Aug 50. SWPA Files. 53

 Ltr, Casey to Sturgis, 14 Aug 50. SWPA Files.
544 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

energy and drive. . . ."

 54

 By mid-May,

the Army engineers had built two docks,

camps for American and Australian

troops, a pipeline jetty, and had almost

finished putting up storage tanks for

40,000 barrels of gasoline. The naval

construction battalions were continuing

with work on the naval base. Work

was going ahead rapidly at Hollandia—

Base G—where, by mid-June, the engineers were developing the largest base

in northwest New Guinea. The camps

at Hollandia were extensive enough to

house a community of 35,000 people.

The engineers had provided three airfields. They had built three jetties and

one floating dock, and had started work

on a pile dock. They had installed four

2,000-barrel tanks for gasoline, had put

in 13 miles of pipeline, and had completed 70 miles of road through swamps

and over mountains. Army engineer

units and RAAF works units were working on the lesser base at Aitape. On

Wakde, construction was shaping up

well, and by early June the runway had

been extended to 7,000 feet. Additional

facilities constructed were minor. In

June Colonel Liles, the task force engineer, was directed to construct tanks for

aviation gasoline and a jetty, and, later

that month, the engineers were making

preparations to build a hospital and a

liberty ship dock on the nearby New

Guinea mainland. The island of Biak

—Base H—was being transformed into

the second largest base in northwestern

New Guinea. By the latter part of

June, the engineers had two bomber

runways there in excellent condition.

Work on a third—Borokoe—was under

way. Under Colonel Heiman, the engineers prepared to do extensive work on

Biak and build, in addition to the three

airfields, a complete array of facilities,

including two jetties, eight LST slots, a

floating dock, storage for gasoline, a

staging area with camp facilities, tented

hospital facilities, and some 13 miles of

road, all scheduled to be completed in

early August.55

Bougainville

While work was going on along the

New Guinea coast, the development of a

huge supply base in the service command area of Bougainville was progressing. A principal task of the 131st

Engineers, one of the first units on the

scene, was clearing the jungle for camps

and storage areas. One of the largest

projects was the ration dump for the

Quartermaster Corps. Four hundred

men with hand tools, 6 bulldozers, 2

clamshells, and 20 dump trucks worked

for two months "before any semblance

of order" was brought out of the swampy

jungle. The cleared area was equal in

extent to four large city blocks. The

storage platforms were erected on manmade elevations, 375 by 60 feet. Each

platform, 60 by 30 feet, was designed to

support 100 tons of rations. The 131st

Engineers used their sawmills to prepare

lumber from coconut logs, and by the

end of April, the men had built about

ten platforms on each elevation. Sup54

 Memo for Rcd, Sverdrup, 21 Apr 44. SWPA

File 164.

55

 (1) Task Force Engr Rpt, Opns at TEACUP, 13

May 44. Sturgis File 39. (2) USAFFE Bd Rpt 31.

(3) TORNADO Task Force Engr Rpt. Sturgis File 42.
HOLLANDIA DEVELOPMENT, 1944. Above, General MacArthur's quarters. Below, a

water purification unit.
546 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

plies were covered with canvas without

framing. While canvas was easy to

provide, it was not altogether satisfactory

because of the fungus growth which

spread over it rapidly, causing it to rot;

roofing paper would have been preferable. Fruits and other items likely to

be pilfered were kept within a barbed

wire enclosure 400 feet square. Also

within the enclosure was a tin hut for

storing flour. The engineers built seven

bakeries capable of producing 15 tons of

bread daily. They cleared 2.5 square

miles of jungle and here erected hundreds of small isolated bays for storing

ammunition for ordnance units. An

area of 4.5 square miles was cleared for

gasoline storage tanks. The chemical

warfare dump covered an area of about

one square mile. Camps and hospitals

were under tents. In all cases, simplicity

of construction was the rule. Because

of the high seas, it was almost impossible

to build piers and wharves. Landing

craft lightered supplies to a beach 600

feet long which had been selected as the

main unloading area. Here sand was

piled up to a height of 10 feet above the

breakers at high tide. The amenities

were not forgotten. Ten men with

bulldozers worked for a week to clear an

area 375 by 600 feet. The engineers

then erected ten buildings to house such

organizations as the Red Cross and the

chaplain's section. They built a theater,

called Loew's Bougainville, constructed

three tennis courts, two of them with

concrete surfaces, and laid out a baseball

diamond.56

Decline of Older Bases

At the older bases in the two theaters

construction declined, and at some it

ceased altogether during the first six

months of 1944. The principal bases of

1942 and 1943 in the Southwest Pacific

—Port Moresby, Milne Bay, and Oro

Bay—were no longer of strategic importance. Port Moresby was the first to be

discontinued. Milne Bay was still being

developed. Here by early 1944 the

engineers had completed 14 docks for

Libertys and had three more still under

construction as well as several docks for

small ships. A ponton assembly plant,

finished by mid-1944, was turning out

1,800 ponton cubes a month to be used

for floating piers or barges. At Oro Bay,

some berths for Libertys and other

facilities were finished early in the year,

but by mid-1944 Oro Bay had greatly

declined. Lae had been developed

mainly as a support and supply base for

construction and operations at Nadzab;

as air activity moved away from the

Markham Valley, Lae lost its importance

and was little used. Base F at Finschhafen, established officially 15 November

1943, was the largest base in New

Guinea during the first half of 1944.

Most transports going to that island

docked at this port, where base facilities

extended for 35 miles along the coast.

By the end of April, the engineers had

constructed 12 Liberty ship docks, 2

small ship docks, 2 oil jetties, almost

2,000,000 square feet of storage, 12

hospitals, 4 main staging areas, camps for

two divisions, and 75 miles of roads and

bridges. In the South Pacific, only

Bougainville was an extensive base by

mid-1944. The bases at New Caledonia,

56

 (1) Serv Comd APO 706, Final Unit Hist. 98-

SC10-0.1 (16478)M 23 Dec 43-Dec 44. (2) Hist of

the 131st Engr Combat Bn.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 547

Espíritu Santo, and Guadalcanal were

being dismantled.57

Troop Shortages and Reorganization

of Units

Still one of the most critical problems

in the building of bases was the chronic

shortage of engineer units, particularly

those needed for heavy construction.

Many Sixth Army engineers considered

the inadequate number of construction

units as their most frustrating problem.

Various ways were devised to get the

work done. The policy of not giving

the Army Air Forces exclusive control

of the aviation battalions was now showing its worth; task force commanders put

the battalions on many types of work

urgently needed in the forward areas.

Many units, such as combat battalions,

with no jobs to do for which they were

trained, were assigned to construction

projects. A number of nondivisional

combat battalions and camouflage companies were reorganized as construction

units. Engineer units, no matter of

what type, were often put on any job

which needed doing. "Aviation battalions have built docks," Major

Brewer wrote, "combat battalions . . .

airdromes, and Seabees have built army

headquarters."

 58

As exasperating as the shortage of

units was the failure to receive enough

replacements to bring the depleted units

up to authorized strength. To fill the

gaps, men were transferred to engineer

units principally from the infantry and

artillery; but until they were at least

partially trained for their new assignments, they could do little to speed up

construction. One hopeful sign during

the later phases of the New Guinea Campaign was that gradually a proportionally

greater number of engineer construction

units and replacements were arriving in

the Southwest Pacific.59

The "nontraditional" kind of warfare

in the Southwest Pacific necessitated

changes in the organization of some types

of engineer units. The combat battalions, in particular, seemed to stand in

need of changes in organization. These

units were called upon to do a great deal

of construction; in fact, generally speaking, their primary mission was construction. The battalions were inadequately

organized and equipped for their tasks.

To make them really effective units

they needed a substantial amount of

additional equipment. At Casey's request, MacArthur asked the War Department for more machinery for the

battalions, but no action was taken in

Washington. In 1944 the theater assigned additional personnel and equipment to the battalions. Certain types

of construction units also needed changes

in organization to make them more

suitable for the theater. As has been

seen, the units early found unsuitable

for the far-flung operations of the Southwest Pacific were the general service

regiments. They were of unwieldy size

and inadequately equipped for construction jobs at widely separated places in a

57

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I,

196. (2) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, Annual Rpt for

1944 (Draft MS). SWPA Files. 58

 (1) Ltr, Brewer to The Comdt The Engr School

Ft. Belvoir, 30 Sep 44. (2) Engr Sec Sixth Army,

Engr History, ch. XI.

59

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

120ff.
548 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

fast-moving campaign. It was often

necessary to split them into battalions,

companies, and detachments. In 1943

the War Department had organized the

construction battalion. This unit, with

some 900 officers and men, was the

equal of an aviation battalion in earthmoving capacity and of a naval construction battalion in equipment and grades

for enlisted men. After 1 April 1944

the War Department sent only construction battalions to the Southwest Pacific.

The theater converted a number of its

general service regiments into construction battalions. Airborne aviation battalions, successfully used in the Markham

Valley, subsequently proved to be

impractical in the Southwest Pacific because their equipment was too light.

Elements of an aviation or construction

battalion flown to an assault area with

regular equipment could accomplish far

more. Late in 1944, the airborne battalions in the Southwest Pacific were

converted into aviation battalions or

aviation service companies.60

As the scope of base construction

along the New Guinea coast increased,

a need became apparent for some kind

of engineer headquarters to function

under the task force commander and be

responsible for planning engineer work

and supervising the activities of engineer

units in a newly seized area. The task

force engineer's staff was too small and

sometimes too preoccupied with combat

duties to be able to give sufficient time

to supervising construction units under

the task force commander's control.

Even at rear bases, there was a need for

some kind of engineer headquarters to

direct the activities of the often large

numbers of units charged with construction. The engineers had no organization higher than a regimental headquarters to command construction units.

They had, however, adopted the brigade

type of organization for amphibious

operations. Other arms and services had

likewise adopted this type of organization for supervising a number of units

engaged in similar activities. Casey and

others believed that engineer construction units should be similarly supervised

to make possible better direction and

control. In March 1944, MacArthur

requested the War Department to authorize the activation of two construction

brigades. The War Department informed MacArthur that he could activate

the two units, and in June two were

organized—the 5201st and 5202d—the

former under Colonel Robinson and the

latter under Col. Orville E. Walsh.

Each brigade headquarters would have

21 officers and 88 enlisted men; for operations in a forward area, engineer units

would be assigned to a brigade as needed.

The plan was to use the brigades for the

first time in the coming campaign in the

Philippines.61

Construction Standards

Construction in the Southwest Pacific

continued to be on a hand-to-mouth

basis. A great deal of it was required

quickly, and there were relatively few

troops, meager amounts of materials,

and inadequate quantities of equipment

with which to do it. "Military engi60

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

143ff.

61

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

144-46. (2) Ltr, Lane to C Staff Br, 28 Jul 47.

SWPA Files. (3) Memo, Klinke for Casey, 12 May

44. SWPA File 42.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 549

neering, as opposed to engineering in

civil life," Colonel Sturgis wrote, "must

assume certain risks in the all-important

and prevailing interests of speed of construction and lack of materials."

 62

 In

no theater involved in the war with

Japan was military engineering put to a

greater test than in the Southwest

Pacific. To meet theater needs, the

engineers in Casey's and Colonel Ross's

offices had developed "standard" designs

for many types of construction to meet

the special requirements of the theater.

Equally valuable were the calculations

made as to the work potential of the

different types of engineer units. By

1944 the units which had been longest

in the theater had acquired considerable

experience in building in the Southwest

Pacific so that, even without "standard"

plans, they often knew the best way to

proceed. As before, a basic precept was

to make as much use of expedients as

possible. On the whole, the engineers

carried out their missions successfully.63

"The pressure for speed of construction

from all sources, GHQ, Air Force, and

hence by this headquarters," Sturgis informed Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, one

of Somervell's assistants in Headquarters,

Army Service Forces, "has, due to its

being the entire key to the advance, been

indescribable. I can say that in spite of

this green hell we have not failed

yet. . . ."64

By the time of the New Guinea Campaign, specifications for airfields and

procedures for their construction were

fairly well standardized. The task force

engineer and the local air force commander were, as a rule, the ones who

actually selected the site at a forward

base. A field usually consisted of one

strip or two parallel strips together with

hardstands, alert areas, and minimum

operational facilities. If the engineers

put in only one strip they almost invariably built a parallel taxiway alongside it.

New Guinea and the adjacent islands

had two types of terrain best suited for

airfields: the lowlands near the sea and

the "benchlands" a little farther inland.

In the lowlands, the most satisfactory

places were in the coconut groves, which,

as a rule, had been planted in the best

drained areas. The "benchlands" were

usually fairly well-drained, level stretches,

overgrown with kunai grass. By cutting

the grass and removing the boulders, the

engineers could quickly provide a strip

on which transport planes could land.

A more substantial runway would then

be constructed for fighters with the base

course and surfacing of rock, gravel, and

sand, which were usually found in quantities in the stream beds nearby. Since

the richest gravel deposits frequently

contained quantities of large stones,

rock crushers were at a premium.

Bombers required more substantial surfacing. Usually this was bitumen. The

method of construction that the engineers had developed in Australia and

Papua during the first year of the war—

two or more coats of bitumen, thinned

with diesel oil, on a well-compacted

base of sand and gravel—proved adequate for the fields along the New Guinea

coast. Runway failures during heavy

rains were now rare because the men had

learned from experience the importance

62

 Memo, Sturgis for Col George H. Decker, CofS

Sixth Army, 16 Jan 44. Sturgis File 25. 63

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

VI, 425ff. (2) Troland, Notes on Army Engr Opns

in SWPA. 64

 Ltr, Sturgis to Clay, 19 Aug 44. Sturgis Files,

EHD.
550 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

of adequate drainage. Coral, while

plentiful in most coastal areas, was not

as extensively used as in the Central or

South Pacific. At some fields, the engineers laid steel mat. Most often it

would be a field that needed some kind

of surfacing quickly or was so located

that it was difficult to send in materials

and equipment. If steel mat was used,

the field would in all likelihood be a

temporary one and would not be developed further. In most of the areas

seized along the New Guinea coast, the

Japanese had already built one or more

fields at the most favorable sites, but

these fields were so poorly constructed

that they could seldom be used without

being extensively rebuilt. The runways

were too short, and their substructures

not solid enough for heavily loaded

planes. If practicable, the engineers

would improve the runways. Pursuit

planes could usually land on a captured

field in two or three days, but at least two

weeks of additional work would be required before a plane heavier than a

C-47 could safely land.65

At a new base, supplies were initially

stored in the open or under canvas.

Later they were transferred to newly

erected prefabricated warehouses, most

of them of the standard widths of 20, 44,

or 88 feet, and all of light construction.

Since winds in the combat zone of the

Southwest Pacific seldom exceeded 15

miles an hour, such buildings were

adequate. Considerable quantities of

lumber were needed for the sides of the

warehouses. To cut down on the

amount, several of the smaller structures

would be combined and interior posts

used to support the roof—one large warehouse would, of course, require less

siding than a number of small ones containing the same amount of space.

Roofs were of corrugated iron or sisalcraft; floors were usually graveled. Excellent as shop buildings were nativetype structures, their framework lashed

together with vines and their roofs and

sometimes their sides covered with

kunai grass or sago palm. Because of

the fire hazard, such structures were not

much used as warehouses.

Hospital wards were at first usually

under canvas or in native-type buildings.

The latter had wide, overhanging eaves

and no sides. Sago palm was generally

used for roofing. Kunai was not suitable because it contained quantities of

grit and sometimes not a few insects

including ticks that transmitted typhus.

The 20-foot-wide prefabricated buildings were used as surgeries, clinics,

messes, and warehouses. As soon as possible, wards were transferred to prefabricated buildings.

Construction of piers followed uniform procedures. Design had been

standardized. At a new base, the

Navy's ponton floating wharves would at

first be used. Meanwhile, the engineers

would construct timber wharves as

rapidly as possible so that the ponton

structures could be moved forward.

Specifications for Libertys, for example,

called for a pile structure, 300 by 30 feet,

parallel to the shore. Sets of materials,

including piling, were shipped from

rear bases. If the troops building a

65

 (1) Troland, Notes on Army Engr Opns in

SWPA. (2) Ltr, Haseman to C, Staff Br, 28 Nov 50.

SWPA Files. (3) Ltr, Kenney to Arnold, 24 May

44. AAF, RG-501, Central Files, 312. 1-J. (4)

Ltr, with Incls, Casey to Col B. M. Harloe, C Engrg

and Development Div, Of CofEngrs, 17 Apr 44.

SWPA File 104.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 551

DISPENSARY IN NATIVE-TYPE BUILDING, MILNE BAY

dock had a sawmill, they could easily

supply additional materials from local

timber. Besides docks for Libertys, the

engineers built jetties and crib wharves

for barges and smoothed out landing

points for LST's and LCT's.

Bridges were for the most part needed

in the areas where base construction was

under way. Spans were invariably of

wood and usually fashioned from trees

found nearby. Because of quickly rising

streams during the New Guinea rainy

season, stringers and decking had to be

securely fastened to the piling. Abutments often had to be bolstered with

large rocks.66

Maps and Intelligence

Requirements for maps and intelligence differed greatly in the two theaters

by 1944. In the South Pacific, the demand was dwindling rapidly; in the

Southwest Pacific, it was becoming constantly greater and more difficult to

meet. General Casey's Intelligence Section, with its two major subsections,

Maps and Charts and Research and

Reports, had a growing work load. The

number of men increased, but not

enough to keep up with demands. Authorized on 1 January were 65 men; the

section had 35. In April 5 officers and 8

enlisted men were added; in June, 6

civilians arrived from the United States. 66

 Troland, Notes on Army Engr Opns in SWPA.
552 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

LIBERTY DOCKS, ORO BAY

By 1 July, the number of personnel had

risen to 54.67

Under the operational control of

GHQ SWPA and subject to the technical

supervision of the Intelligence Section

was the 648th Topographic Battalion,

which continued operations in Melbourne. Under the 648th's technical

supervision were all military mapmaking organizations in the Southwest

Pacific, including the Australian topographic units. By 1 July, there were in

the theater, besides the 648th, the 650th

Topographic Battalion and five topographic companies. The 650th, which

had arrived at Finschhafen in May, was

placed under Sixth Army and began to

produce maps for planning and combat.

The topographic companies, engaged

primarily in producing hasty maps for

combat, were moved as far forward in

the fighting zones as conditions would

permit. The 648th still produced most

of the maps for the theater. To give the

troops a better idea of the terrain they

would encounter, models of the objective areas were needed. In April, a

model-making detachment of one officer

and twenty-one enlisted men arrived at

Brisbane, was placed under the Intelli67

 The information in this and succeeding paragraphs, unless otherwise indicated, is from Office of

the Chief Engineer, GHQ SWPA, Annual Rpt for

1944, Intelligence Section.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 553

gence Section, and installed on the

second floor of a warehouse. The men,

most of whom were commercial artists

in civilian life, began to fashion terrain

models, using information gleaned from

aerial photographs.68

The air forces continued to supply

photographs to the map-making units.

The system, in effect at the beginning

of the year in the Southwest Pacific,

whereby the photographic squadrons

maintained direct liaison with the 648th

Topographic Battalion in order to make

engineer requirements better known to

the airmen, was continued. The difficulties that earlier plagued the photographic squadrons remained. A new

problem developed in the course of the

New Guinea operations. In the great

leaps forward scheduled for the combat

forces, photographic aircraft could not

reach an objective area, on an average,

until two and one half months before a

planned assault was scheduled. In the

short time remaining, getting satisfactory

photographs and preparing adequate

maps was well-nigh impossible.

Mapping units in SWPA continued to

have trouble getting topographic supplies. Units which should have been

receiving them from engineer bases

were either making purchases in Australia or working with reserve stocks

they had brought from the United

States. Since there were some 35,000

items of topographic supply, efficient

requisitioning was of the utmost importance. One of the missions of the

Topographic Supply Unit of Casey's

Intelligence Section was to gather data

on the status of topographic supply in

the theater. It advised the Chief Engineer, USASOS, of immediate supply

needs and probable future requirements.

At the same time, the section suggested

ways of improving equipment, packing

fragile instruments, and storing supply

items properly. Better co-operation between topographic engineers in GHQ

and USASOS resulted in improved

supply in 1944. As Sverdrup noted,

". . . certain old abuses of critical items

have ceased through education; zinc

plates are no longer used for roofing

sheets, press blankets are not cut into

seat pads or laid as flooring, and sensitized paper is not opened in daylight to

effect a physical sheet count." While

major "abuses" had seemingly been

fairly well eliminated, numerous minor

ones, caused in the main by "ignorance

in the identification, handling, and care

of topographic supplies" remained.69

The map depots were heavily taxed.

The 1604th Map Depot Detachment,

responsible for the automatic distribution of all maps, was stationed in Brisbane. It transshipped maps produced

by the 648th in Melbourne. The 1603d,

located at Finschhafen, distributed maps

to task forces. Organized on 26 May,

the 1608th Map Depot Detachment was

scheduled to begin operations in July at

Hollandia, and from there it would

distribute maps to units in western New

Guinea. The depots shipped out increasing quantities of maps; between 1

January and 1 July, 139 tons went by air

from Melbourne to Finschhafen alone.

Distribution over ever greater distances

68

 648th Engr Topo Bn, Interim Rpt, 10 Oct 43-

31 Dec 44. SWPA File 15.

69

 Memo, Sverdrup for Ross, 20 Oct 44. SWPA

File M168.
554 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

posed numerous problems. For maps to

reach units as scheduled, officers responsible for distribution in the map depots

had to follow up on shipments constantly; at times, even hourly checks

were necessary. Still, many shipments

went to the wrong places. Partly responsible were the "unbelievable apathy

and carelessness" of the personnel handling the shipments.

Since there was a growing need for

more information on the terrain of the

New Guinea coast and the offshore

islands, the Research and Reports Subsection had increasing responsibilities.

More men were needed to interpret

aerial photographs, now by far the principal source of information on enemyheld territory. A great deal of data was

required on landing areas and airfield

sites. The civilian specialists who arrived in June were from the United

States Geological Survey; they were

experts in geology, soil analysis, and the

structure of coast lines and beaches.

The data supplied by aerial photographs

and information brought back by men,

including the geologists who had been

on reconnaissance in forward areas, were

analyzed and written up in a variety of

reports.

Supply

Engineer supply gave rise to more and

more problems despite the fact that the

War Department adopted a somewhat

more realistic policy with regard to

supply levels. In January 1944 it reduced the requirements for Class II and

Class IV items for the South and Southwest Pacific from a 90-day operating

level and a 90-day reserve to a 90-day

operating level and a 120-day reserve.

In the Southwest Pacific, few engineer

stocks could be built up as prescribed.

As before, fortifications materials were

plentiful. Hand tools were up to about

80 percent of demand. Landing mat

was ample, since sufficient amounts were

arriving from the United States and

much of the mat at the older airfields

was being taken up, reconditioned, and

shipped forward. Australia continued

to be an important supplier of cement,

lumber, construction materials, prefabricated buildings, and certain types of

equipment. During 1944 about 25 percent of the stocks the engineers received

came from Commonwealth sources. But

numerous items needed for construction

remained in chronically short supply.

The most severe shortages were in corrugated iron, lumber, electric and welding

supplies, nails, and bolts. As before,

shortages were partly the result of the

lack of shipping from the United States.

On 1 May the backlog of engineer cargo

awaiting shipment from the United

States totaled about 300,000 ship tons.

Backlogs piled up in the theater also; by

the end of May, 32,000 ship tons had

accumulated in Australian ports, and the

amount was increasing. These developments were partly the result of inadequate docking and unloading facilities

at many of the New Guinea ports for

handling the quantities of supplies now

arriving from the United States and

Australia. One encouraging sign, during 1944, was the increase in the amounts

of supplies in the theater. Gradually

engineer depots were becoming better

stocked.70

70

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VII,

124ff., 129ff.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 555

SECTION OF THE MAP DISTRIBUTION AREA, FINSCHHAFEN

With increasing shipments from the

United States and the continued forward

movement of the Allied forces, problems of distribution became acute in

the Southwest Pacific. As has been

seen, the engineers had no central supply depot in the theater. Up to

1944 units requisitioned from various

USASOS engineer depots. One of the

chronic shortcomings of this system was

the lack of stock control. No engineer

office had over-all knowledge of what

items were in the theater, how many

there were, or where they were. Shortages of supplies and the enormous

distances within the theater made distribution all the more difficult. In the

opinion of many engineer officers, a

central depot was necessary. "Stock

records, location of stock and inventories

must be kept by a centralized agency,"

Col. Charles H. McNutt, executive

officer of the Chief Engineer, USASOS,

stated. "No depot can know what the

others may have from day to day and in

any case cannot handle supply distribution."

 71

 During the first half of 1944

efforts were made to improve procure71

 1st Memo Ind, McNutt to Casey, 3 Sep 44 on

Memo for Rcd, Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 30 Aug 44.

SWPA File 223.
556 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ment in the theater and provide better

stock control. On 1 January General

Frink set up the Procurement Division at

Sydney. It was to co-ordinate the purchase of all supplies in Australia. Its

Engineer Branch at first had seven officers and one enlisted man. On 1

February General Frink established the

Distribution Division at Sydney and

Distribution Branch, Base A, at Milne

Bay; these two offices would supervise the

distribution of supplies in the theater.

The Engineer Branch of Distribution

Division, with a staff of about thirty,

including military and civilian personnel, began operations in February; the

Engineer Section at Milne Bay, with an

initial staff of fifteen, began work at

about the same time.72

New theaterwide procedures for requisitioning and distributing were established. Henceforth, all requests for

supplies from engineer units went to the

Engineer Branch of the Procurement

Division. The branch prepared lists of

items that might be purchased in Australia and forwarded them to the

general purchasing agent for submission

to the Australian Government. Supplies not available in Australia were

requisitioned on the United States.

More troublesome than requisitioning

was getting supplies to the units. The

engineers of the Distribution Division

began the monumental task of setting

up a file of stock control cards for all

engineer items in the theater. Once a

month, they sent out questionnaires to

the engineer supply depots for information as to the quantities of items on

hand.73

It took time to get things organized.

Col. Charles R. Bathurst, who upon his

arrival in the theater in December 1943

became Casey's supply officer, visited the

Engineer Branch of Distribution Division late in March. He reported that

the organization, with 20 officers and 89

civilians, was "understaffed and overworked." Many of the civilians were

inexperienced, and considerable effort

had to be made to train them. In the

two months since it began work, the

branch had sent out 60,000 inventory and

requisition forms, and it had organized

a file index of some 15,000 stock control

cards. Estimates were that 200,000

cards would eventually be required and

that a force of 240 civilians would be

needed.74 The small section at Milne

Bay did not really get started with its

work until 15 April, when it settled

down to furnish engineer supplies for

Base G at Hollandia. This first major

project could be accomplished only by

extraordinary efforts because the organization was new and the staff too small.

"The Engineer supply requirements for

operation G," General Casey wrote to

the Deputy Chief of Staff, USAFFE, on

21 April, "will virtually deplete all

available resources in this theater. . . .

if requirements for immediate subsequent operations are to be provided,

special action must be taken to procure

and ship engineer construction materials

72

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

II, 64. (2) Ltr, Engr Br Distr Div USASOS to Dir

Distr Div USASOS, 26 May 44, sub: Hist Rpt, Period

Covered 1 Feb 44-31 Mar 44. World War II Rcds

Div.

73

 (1) Ibid. (2) Hq INTERSEC USASOS Distr Br

Engr Sec, Sec Diary, 17 Feb-30 Jun 44, 17 Jul 44.

World War II Rcds Div. 74

 Memo, C. R. B[athurst] for Casey, 22 Mar 44.

SWPA File 163.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 557

and equipment aggregating a very large

quantity in tonnage."75 In order to

have supplies within a reasonable time,

the chief of the Engineer Section at

Milne Bay was getting ready to take the

requisitions to the United States and

follow through in person.

Steady progress was made. Stock

control cards at Milne Bay increased

from 3,000 in mid-March to over 6,000

by 1 July. By this time requisitions had

been processed for 150,000 ship tons of

supplies and equipment for Hollandia,

Wakde, and Biak. There were interruptions to the work, however. Late in

June the Milne Bay Distribution Branch

was moved to Oro Bay. Since USASOS

installations still in Australia were soon

to be moved to New Guinea, plans now

called for moving Distribution Division

from Sydney to Oro Bay and consolidating it with Distribution Branch. Such

a move would mean the loss of the Australian civilians, who had now become

settled in their jobs, since the Australian

Government would not permit them to

go to New Guinea. Operations of the

branch would suffer.

Task force engineers were fortunate

if they received supplies on time and in

sufficient amounts. Procedures for securing supplies had been standardized.

A task force engineer sent a list of his

needs to the Sixth Army Engineer

Section, where it was edited and, if approved, was forwarded to the engineer

depot at Finschhafen. That depot supplied as many stocks as it could and sent

a request for the remainder to the Distribution Branch at Milne Bay. As a

rule, one platoon of a depot company

went in with a task force to store and

distribute supplies. A common complaint was that supplies were sent forward without adequate ships' manifests.

At Wakde, the only means of locating

certain materials was dependent on the

memory of the ship's crew that unloaded

the materials. Changing needs at some

bases, as, for example, Biak, made it hard

to analyze supply requirements. Shipping bottlenecks further slowed deliveries. The supply situation at Hollandia appeared to be an exception.76

There, Casey reported, "... the urgency

and importance of the priority for unloading engineer supplies required for

port facilities is fully understood by the

Task Force Commander." Colonel

Robinson, the task force engineer, Casey

continued, ".. . has had most detailed

information as to where all Engineer

supplies and equipment are and when

they may be expected." The chief engineer went on to say that this was due

solely to the "excellent work" of

Colonel Sturgis and his staff, who secured detailed data on where engineer

supplies were loaded on ships bound for

Hollandia and sent it promptly to

Colonel Robinson.77

Spare Parts

The spare parts situation remained

extremely critical. Requirements continued to be exceptionally high and shipments from the United States meager.

75

 Memo, Casey for Dep CofS USAFFE, 21 Aug 44.

SWPA File 104.

76

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 1

Sep 44. SWPA File 105. (2) TORNADO Task Force

Engr Rpt. 77

 Memo for Rcd, Casey, 26 May 44. SWPA File

164.
558 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

It was repeatedly stated that the many

makes of equipment in the theater only

made a bad situation worse. An added

aggravation was the chronic shortage of

men trained in stocking and distributing

the many types of parts. There had

been no parts supply companies in the

theater throughout 1943. The first one

arrived in January and went to Milne

Bay, where it began the job of processing

about 8,000 cases of spare parts and storing them in the recently completed warehouse. In April, a second one arrived

and went to work on setting up a spare

parts depot at Finschhafen. A survey

made in the Southwest Pacific in May

showed that spare parts were completely

lacking for pipeline pumping stations,

airborne equipment, refrigeration equipment, jungle warfare equipment, and

over forty other major items. Stocks

were much too low for twenty-three additional important items. "The statement

that parts for all important items . . .

are critically short or nonexistent is not

an exaggeration," Casey wrote on 6 June

to Brig. Gen. Raymond F. Fowler,

Assistant Chief of Engineers for Supply.

"It is not a question of keeping stocks

within prescribed levels but of reaching

and maintaining a satisfactory operating

level."

 78

The shortages of parts and the enormous distances within the theater rendered efficient distribution of utmost

importance. Distribution was normally

accomplished by water, but in emergencies air shipments were sometimes made.

During June 1944, for example, 650 tons

of parts were shipped by water and 50

tons by air. Preparations were under

way to fit out ships with bins for spare

parts, "floating warehouses" as they were

called, which would expedite distribution in forward areas; the first was expected to be ready in November.

With the shortage of spare parts, maintaining equipment was no easy task. To

make matters worse, during the first six

months of 1944 there was still only one

maintenance company in the theater,

and additional companies were not scheduled to arrive until after the middle of

the year. There were three heavy shop

companies, generally stationed in rear

areas. A heavy burden was placed on

engineer construction units, especially

those in the combat zone; most had to do

their own third and fourth echelon

maintenance.79

Efforts were made to better spare parts

supply for the amphibian landing craft.

In March 1944 the Engineer Branch of

the Distribution Division set up a

Marine Supply Section. The amphibian

engineers henceforth forwarded their requests through channels to this office,

and from there the requests were sent

to the Navy's spare parts distribution

center at Brisbane. Marine supply sections were organized at a number of

bases and staffed by amphibian engineers

insofar as possible to help expedite the

supply of spare parts for landing craft.

USASOS organized a special marine

supply service of fast nonconvoyed boats

which made the run from Milne Bay to

Oro Bay, each boat carrying about 300

tons of spare parts. Despite all efforts,

shortages remained as severe as ever, and

78

 Ltr, Casey to Fowler, 6 Jun 44. SWPA File 223.

79

 Conf, WD, Washington, D.C., Relative Engr

Equip Spare Parts Sup Situation, SWPA, ... 14 Jun

44. 319.1 SWPA.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 559

numerous craft were deadlined. As before, there were many reasons for this

situation—the Navy's Distribution Center at Brisbane was too far from the

forward areas where the amphibian engineers were operating; the Navy had

underestimated the quantities of spare

parts required; production in the

United States was inadequate; and distribution to the widely scattered units

within the theater was in itself a tremendous task.80

Attitude Toward Supply

The serious problems which plagued

engineer supply were at least in part the

result of the attitude of many officers

toward this important responsibility.

In the Southwest Pacific, most engineers

were apparently not fully aware of the

importance of logistic support and of its

complexity. Many engineers made determined efforts to avoid supply jobs.

"Our best officers," wrote Col. Miles M.

Dawson, Casey's supply officer from

August 1944 on, "avoided supply duty

like poison." Most engineers preferred

combat or wanted to be in charge of construction projects where they could point

to "tangible" evidence of their work and

where the experience gained would probably stand them in good stead later on in

the Army or in civilian life. Long hours

spent on supply jobs brought little praise.

A supply officer was more apt to receive

severe criticism. In Colonel Dawson's

opinion, supply was frequently on the

verge of breaking down, and it was only

". . . the constant effort of a few officers

like General Casey . . . and General

Sturgis . . . [which] kept the engineer

supply situation from becoming a veritable shambles."

 81

Camouflage

Camouflage was of little importance

in the South and Southwest Pacific.

Higher headquarters never developed an

over-all camouflage program since there

was no need for one. The troops

neglected camouflage almost entirely.

By mid-1944 the overwhelming Allied

air superiority made concealment seem

superfluous even in the most forward

areas. Japanese planes came over mostly

at night and struck mainly at airfields,

which could not be effectively camouflaged in any case. In the Southwest

Pacific, a small unit organized initially in

the Office of the Chief Engineer,

USASOS, subsequently transferred to the

Engineer Section in USAFFE and in September 1943 to Casey's office in GHQ, was

responsible for formulating the theaterwide camouflage program. It sent literature to the troops, conducted experiments, and supervised the production of

camouflage materials in Australia.

Three camouflage teams, each consisting of two noncommissioned officers,

visited units in the field and advised

mainly on camouflaging radar installations and artillery positions. In July

two camouflage companies, the 641st and

the 642d, each with some seventy officers

and men, arrived in the Southwest

Pacific and were assigned to Sixth Army.

During their first few months in the

80

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

142-43.

81

 Memo, Dawson for Casey, 24 Jun 46. SWPA

Files.
560 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

theater they were engaged mainly in

trying to find ways and means of being

useful to the combat units.82

Training

By 1944 it was increasingly apparent

in the Southwest Pacific that some important aspects of engineer training in

the United States had not been sufficiently stressed insofar as operations in

SWPA were concerned. The most striking deficiencies were found in construction. To begin with, too many officers

and men lacked engineering backgrounds, and the few months of training

they received in the States did not offset

their lack of knowledge. Many officers,

too little versed in the principles of earthmoving, compaction, and drainage, could

not plan projects properly. Too many

enlisted men were not well trained in

operating equipment or in how to do

their work. Training for combat had

apparently been satisfactory, but in the

Southwest Pacific it was not the combat

units but the construction units which

were under pressure. The fact that construction requirements were so much

greater than had been considered "normal" undoubtedly explains in part why

training deficiencies of the construction

units showed up so glaringly.83 "After

World War I," Colonel Lane wrote, "all

Engineers were brought up on the histories of divisional Engineers." There

was little emphasis on the duties of engineers attached to the Services of Supply

and "no real analysis and study of the

work of the SOS Engineers" engaged in

providing logistic support.84 Lane's observations were fully supported by other

engineer officers in the Southwest

Pacific. Unfortunately, the pressure of

work in the theater kept the units from

receiving additional training. The officers with adequate backgrounds had to

help carry those whose engineering backgrounds were deficient.

As in previous years, Australian

schools continued to train a small number of specialists. Several new schools

were opened. In February 1944 the

RAAF opened one in Richmond, New

South Wales, to teach maintenance of

radar equipment, and assigned a student

quota to the engineers. In March and

April the LeTourneau Company conducted two schools in Sydney, one of

which taught welding, and the other how

to operate Tournapulls. Sydney Technical College gave a course in the operation of diesel engines, which fifteen engineers attended. An additional United

States Army Engineer school was organized in the first half of 1944 to provide

specialist instruction; this was the school

in refrigeration mechanics, which opened

in Melbourne in February to teach specialists how to operate and repair the

various types of refrigerators being used

in the theater. Two technical colleges

in Melbourne provided facilities and

instructors. Payment was by reverse

lend-lease. The bomb disposal school at

82

 (1) Engr Sec Sixth Army, Engr History, ch. XI

(Draft MS). (2) Memo for Rcd, Col Emil R. Klinke,

Opns Of C Eng GHQ SWPA, 7 Sep 44. (3) Memo

for Rcd, Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 1 Sep 44. Last

two in SWPA File 105. 83

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

II, 151. (2) USAFFE Bd SWPA, Rpt 28, Comments

on Tng of Engr Units. SWPA File 86. (3) Of C

Engr USASOS, Tech Memo, 17 Jun 44. SWPA File

14. 84

 Ltr, Lane to C Staff Br, 28 Jul 47. SWPA Files.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 561

Bonegilla was discontinued in the spring

because it was believed a sufficient number of men had been trained to meet

theater needs by this time. Small detachments of American personnel,

known as mobile bomb disposal schools,

traveled from unit to unit and gave refresher courses in bomb disposal. By

midyear, plans were under way to open

two additional schools, one at Oro Bay

to teach equipment maintenance and

another at Finschhafen to continue the

work of the soils mechanics school set up

at Port Moresby the year before.85

Specialist schools could train relatively

few men. Commanding officers were

frequently averse to sending men away

to such schools because they believed

they needed all available hands in their

units. General Casey was of the opinion

that it would be best to combine the

various specialist schools into one, to be

set up at a central location in the theater.

The engineers of the lower echelons

agreed that a theater school that would

provide an adequate program in specialist training for all units would be

desirable but were of the opinion that

provision of sufficient students, staff personnel, and equipment was beyond the

resources of the theater if operations

were to be supported to a maximum

degree. Since deficiencies in training

were becoming more pronounced, the

question of whether to organize a school

to teach specialists was one which would

have to be resolved soon.86

Western New Guinea and the

Moluccas

The remaining operations along the

New Guinea coast, while important in

the drive toward the Philippines, were

of a minor nature insofar as engineer

operations, especially combat support,

were concerned. Additional areas had

to be captured in order to bring MacArthur's air forces within striking distance of the Philippines. The same

procedures were followed as before

against steadily weakening enemy resistance. Capture of enemy areas was

followed by the construction of fighter

and bomber fields and the development

of minor base facilities.

Noemfoor

Since mid-May MacArthur's planners

had had under consideration an assault

on Noemfoor, an oval-shaped, coral

island, about 15 miles long, located in

Geelvink Bay, some 90 miles west of

Biak. Seizure of the island would be

followed by the construction of airfields

and minor base facilities. General

MacArthur ordered an amphibious assault for 2 July. The attack was to be

made by CYCLONE Task Force, made up

of the 158th Regimental Combat Team

and supporting units, including the 27th

Engineer Combat Battalion. Australian

Group Capt. William A. C. Dale was task

force engineer. Two aviation battalions

and three RAAF airfield construction

squadrons were assigned for work on the

base and airfields. Enemy troops on the

island were believed to total around

3,000. While its terrain was not as

rugged as Biak's, Noemfoor was densely

85

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

II, 152-53. (2) Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, Annual

Rpt for 1944 (Draft MS). 86

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

II, 209. (2) Memo, L[eif] J. S[verdrup] for G-3

GHQ SWPA, 11 Nov 44. SWPA File 52.
562 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

forested and had coral terraces. The

Japanese had built three airfields, which

could probably be improved without

much effort.87

The landing was made as scheduled

on the northwestern shore near Kamiri

airstrip. Units of the 2d and 3d Special

Brigades, including the shore battalion

of the 593d Boat and Shore Regiment, a

boat company of the 543d Boat and

Shore Regiment, and the 2d Brigade's

support battery took part in the landing. Operations were routine. The

only interference from the Japanese was

light rifle fire. All troops were transported in Buffaloes and Dukws until

naval demolition crews blasted passageways through the wide coral reef fringing

the beach. The shore engineers reported no unusual hindrances. About

800 yards long, the beach was a fairly

smooth coral ledge which, about 150

yards inland, rose abruptly to a bank

from 6 to 8 feet high. Because the landing was made at the site of the airfield,

it was not necessary to build roads. The

shore engineers transferred supplies to

dumps easily. Flak LCM's patrolled the

coastal waters, strafed beaches where the

Japanese might be lurking, and launched

rockets into the interior of the island.88

In the advance along the northern

coast, the 27th engineers found about

400 mines. Most were aerial bombs

which the Japanese had buried with the

nose fuses even with the surface of the

ground. The mines, though numerous

as compared with the quantities found

at other landings in the Southwest

Pacific, had no effect on the operation.

Most were not armed, and the Japanese

had marked the location of many with

sticks, so that little probing was required.

Demolition teams of American and Australian engineers quickly deactivated and

removed the mines. Eastward of Kamiri, along the shore, the infantry found

pillboxes, caves, and barbed wire entanglements designed to repulse landings

and prohibit movement along the coast;

these defenses were not manned. Few

Japanese were in evidence. Most had

retreated into the jungles of the central

and southern parts of the island. On

only two occasions were the 27th engineers called on to use flame throwers to

flush the enemy out of caves and dugouts. While there were isolated instances of fanaticism, Japanese resistance

on Noemfoor was negligible.89

The first job of the engineers was to

rebuild Kamiri. Requirements called

for a runway 5,000 feet long. On the

first day of the landing, with the field

still under intermittent enemy rifle fire,

the men of the 27th Battalion, dragging

lengths of Japanese rails behind trucks,

filled in bomb craters and smoothed the

runway. The 1874th Aviation Battalion and the 5th Airfield Construction

Squadron arrived within a few days and

set out to rehabilitate the strip. They

87 (1) Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp.

397ff. (2) Craven and Cate, eds., Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 642. (3) Hq Sixth Army FO 19, an. 3, 21

Jun 44. SWPA File A290. (4) Task Force Engr's

Rpt on TABLETENNIS Opn. Sturgis File 44. (5)

Seventh Amphib Force, Rpt on Noemfoor Opn.

SWPA File 74. 88

 (1) 3d ESB, Hist Rpt, 1-31 Jul 44. SWPA File

E-32-4. (2) 2d ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt of Opns,

Jul 1-31, 44. SWPA File E-20-7.

89

 (1) Rpt, Hq 27th Engr Combat Bn to CG U.S.

Forces APO 704, 31 Aug 44. SWPA Files. (2) Rpt

Hq 27th Engr Combat Bn to CG U.S. Forces APO

704, 17 Jul 44. SWPA Files.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 563

finished putting in the coral base in

about two weeks. On 20 July the runway and minimum facilities were ready

to base one fighter squadron. Higher

headquarters wanted Kamiri lengthened

an additional 500 feet, but this could not

be done because both ends of the runway

were too close to the sea. To the east,

the engineers improved a partially finished field called Kornasoren. Here

they built two bomber strips 7,000 feet

long. The first was usable on 25 July;

the second, early in September. A third

strip was started at the site of Namber

field, but work was discontinued because

the location did not permit extending

the runway to more than 4,500 feet.

Namber was used only for emergency

landings. In addition to the airfields,

the engineers built tanks for gasoline, a

fueling jetty, and a pipeline sufficient to

support air operations.90

Sansapor

From the time he first planned to

advance along the New Guinea coast,

MacArthur had reasoned that one or

more airfields would have to be built on

the Vogelkop Peninsula at the western

end of the island to provide adequate air

support for an attack on the Philippines.

During late 1943 and early 1944 MacArthur's planners had centered their attention on the Japanese base at Sorong,

on the western coast of the peninsula.

Along with Sorong, MacArthur planned

to seize Waigeo Island, sixty miles to the

northwest, and develop an air base there.

He also planned to seize the oil fields at

Klamono, thirty miles to the southeast of

Sorong, and develop them to provide

fuel and thus cut down on requirements

from the United States. Casey's staff did

considerable planning for the development of the oil fields. In the United

States, the Army Service Forces, with

the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

likewise did a good deal of planning, and

by April some 2,000 Engineer troops

were being trained and supplied with

equipment for operations at Klamono.

With the speedup of the campaign after

the bypassing of Wewak and the landing

at Hollandia in April, MacArthur revised his schedule for the advance along

the New Guinea coast and called for an

acceleration of operations. In July the

plan of developing the oil fields at

Klamono was abandoned, since they

could not be made to produce soon

enough. Air reconnaissances made that

same month indicated there were few if

any suitable sites on Waigeo Island for

an air base. MacArthur's planners then

directed their attention to the northern

coast of the Vogelkop Peninsula—the

Sansapor-Mar area. A reconnaissance

group sent out by Sixth Army reconnoitered the area, including two offshore

islands, Amsterdam and Middleburg,

during the last week in June. They

found no enemy troops. The beaches

were good, but poor terrain might make

the construction of airfields anything but

easy. On 30 June MacArthur directed

Krueger to seize the Sansapor-Mar area

on 30 July.91

90

 Task Force Engr's Rpt on TABLETENNIS Opn.

91

 (1) Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 425-

28. (2) Seventh Amphib Force, Rpt on Sansapor

Opn. SWPA File 74. (3) Hq, Sixth Army FO 20,

an. 3, 10 Jul 44. SWAP File A 291.
564 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

To seize the area, Krueger organized

the TYPHOON Task Force, made up of the

6th Infantry Division, reinforced, less

one regimental combat team. The 6th

Engineer Combat Battalion would provide combat support; eleven additional

engineer units were assigned, their work

to be supervised and directed by Headquarters, 1112th Engineer Combat

Group, under Colonel Heiman, the task

force engineer. The 836th, 1881st, and

1897th Aviation Battalions, the 43d Construction Battalion, and the 96th General

Service Regiment were the most important construction units. They were

to build two airfields, one for fighters

and one for bombers, the first to be

ready in twenty days; the second, in

thirty-five. Colonel Heiman's staff, after

studying the data available on the target

area, including the information brought

back by the reconnaissance party, concluded that combat operations would

probably be negligible; the construction

of airfields, difficult. The site for an

airfield on the mainland chosen by the

air forces was in a narrow coastal rain

forest in back of which was a swamp.

Amsterdam was too hilly. Middleburg

was flat, but possibly too small for an

airfield; long enough for a fighter strip,

it was only 240 acres in area. Colonel

Heiman recommended that the fighter

runway be built on the latter island,

small as it was, because completing such

a strip on the mainland on schedule

would be impossible. The airmen

agreed that construction should proceed

as Heiman suggested, if a reconnaissance

made after the landing showed his assumptions regarding terrain were correct.

The engineers prepared layout plans for

the airdromes accordingly and assigned

engineer units on a tentative basis.92

Since all indications pointed to no

combat but much construction at Sansapor, the engineers at all command levels

stressed the importance of sending men

and equipment to the objective area as

soon as possible. At a planning conference with MacArthur and Krueger, Casey

urged sending in engineer troops and

machinery at the earliest possible time.

A schedule for shipping engineer equipment forward was finally agreed upon.

Eight LST's of supplies for the task force

were to go in with each echelon up to

D plus 28. The engineers were given

5 of those scheduled to go in on D-day,

4.6 of those scheduled for D plus 2, and 5

of those scheduled for D plus 4. The

engineers put major emphasis on moving

equipment forward. The units themselves would arrive "piecemeal." Half

of the 6th Combat battalion, 30 percent

of the 836th Aviation Battalion, and 10

percent of the 617th Engineer Base

Equipment Company were to come in on

D-day. On D plus 2, another 10 percent

of the 6th Combat Battalion, 60 percent

of the 836th Aviation Battalion, and 20

percent of the 617th would land. Some

units would arrive in as many as five

echelons. It was believed that the advantage of getting the equipment to

Sansapor early would more than offset

the piecemeal arrival of the units.93

The assault, made as scheduled, en92 Task Force Engr Rpt, GLOBETROTTER Opn.

Sturgis File 45. 93

 (1) Task Force Engr Rpt, GLOBETROTTER Opn.

(2) 836th Engr Avn Bn, Narration for 1944. (3)

Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 434, 446.

(4) Hist of the 1112th Engr Constr Group.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 565

countered no enemy opposition. If

there were any Japanese in the area, they

remained out of sight. The skies were

clear and the seas tranquil. The first

landing was made on the New Guinea

coast; subsequently, troops were put

ashore on Amsterdam and Middleburg.

Operations of the 543d Boat and Shore

Regiment, less two boat companies, the

only amphibian unit participating in the

assault, proceeded smoothly. Enemy air

attacks began the next day but never

seriously interfered with amphibian

activities. The combat engineers were

soon at work on roads and bridges.

Colonel Heiman with three members of

his staff arrived on D-day. His executive officer, Lt. Col. I. K. Hearn, and a

number of airmen, including Brig. Gen.

Earl W. Barnes, who was to command

the air forces based on Sansapor, went to

Middleburg Island to make a survey,

while Colonel Heiman and the two other

engineer officers went to the New Guinea

coast to reconnoiter that area. Engineers and airmen agreed, after a thorough discussion, that the fighter strip

should be constructed on Middleburg

and the bomber runway on the mainland. On 2 August the 836th Aviation

Battalion, by now 90 percent disembarked, and with plentiful amounts of

equipment, began construction on

Middleburg. Because of the sandy soil,

the men were mainly concerned with

finding suitable material for the base

course on which to lay the pierced plank.

They solved the problem by dredging

coral from the ocean, placing it on the

runway area, and compacting it to a

thickness of four inches. Work progressed rapidly, and by 17 August the

field, called Klenso, was operational.

Good weather had favored the engineers.

The small amount of rain which fell

only helped to compact the coral.

Enemy air raids were not as severe as had

been expected; raiders came over only at

night and did not interfere with the

work.94

Meantime, progress was being made on

the bomber strip called Mar Drome, after

a nearby native village on the New

Guinea coast. The 1881st and 1897th

Aviation Battalions, the 43d Construction Battalion, and the 96th General

Service Regiment labored on this field,

carving the runway out of the rain

forest. To lower the water table, they

drained a swamp between the runway

and the beach. The loose, sandy soil

added to compaction difficulties. The

men nevertheless made steady headway,

and by early September the field was in

service. The strip on Middleburg was

ready one day ahead of schedule and Mar

Drome on the day it was supposed to be

operational. The meeting of the deadlines was in great part due to the careful

planning. The equipment and units

had arrived as scheduled; in fact, the task

force engineer reported that most of the

equipment arrived at Sansapor sooner

than expected. Since combat was not

anticipated, the engineers could send

in equipment early. During the operation the 1112th Combat Group headquarters was redesignated a construction

group headquarters, a title which more

accurately indicated what its real duties

94

 (1) 3d ESB, Hist Rpt, 1-31 Aug 44. SWPA File

E-32-5. (2)3d ESB, Our Business Is Beachheads.

(3) Hist of the 6th Engr Combat Bn.
566 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

DREDGING CORAL FOR RUNWAY CONSTRUCTION

were.95 "At Sansapor," Colonel Heiman

wrote, "we had the advantages of intensive planning, good units, good equipment, fairly good weather and minimum

enemy air interference."

 96

Morotai

The airfields at Sansapor, 600 miles

from Mindanao, were too distant to

furnish sufficient air cover for the first

operations in the Philippines. MacArthur had for some time planned to

seize one additional site somewhere to

the west or northwest of New Guinea.

He selected the small island of Morotai,

one of the Moluccas, and about 300 miles

northwest of the tip of New Guinea.

D-day was set for 15 September. Morotai was mountainous and heavily

wooded; along the southern coast was a

narrow coastal plain, one of the few

areas where airfield and base construction would be practicable. Here the

Japanese had begun work on a runway

but had abandoned the project. Surf

was heavy along Morotai's southern

95

 (1) Task Force Engr Rpt, GLOBETROTTER Opn.

Sturgis File 45. (2) Ltr, Sturgis to Casey, 13 Oct 44.

SWPA File 74. 96

 Incl with Ltr, Heiman to C Staff Br, 6 Oct 50.

SWPA Files.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 567

coast, and the many coral reefs made

navigation hazardous. The Gila Peninsula, jutting out in a southwesterly direction, helped protect the beaches on

Morotai's western coast from high surf.

On the basis of available information,

the western shore near the base of the

Gila Peninsula appeared to be the best

place for a landing.97

For the assault, General Krueger organized TRADEWIND Task Force, including Headquarters, XI Corps, the 31st

Infantry Division, and the 126th RCT

of the 32d Division, together with a large

number of supporting troops—all told,

about 40,000 men. The engineer component included twenty-six units. Assigned were a headquarters and

headquarters company of an aviation

regiment, three aviation battalions, a

headquarters and headquarters company

of a construction group, two construction battalions, and two RAAF airfield

construction squadrons. For the first

time, elements of the 4th Engineer Special Brigade were to take part in a major

assault. The brigade, headed by

Colonel Hutchings, had reached the

Southwest Pacific the previous March.

At Morotai, the 544th Engineer Boat

and Shore Regiment, less one boat company, and a shore battalion of the 534th

Boat and Shore Regiment were to handle

boat and shore missions. Colonel

Bathurst, the task force engineer, reported that while he and his staff had

ample time for planning, a major problem was assembling the various task force

engineer units, widely scattered along

the New Guinea coast and on nearby

islands.98

Unexpectedly, the landing was one of

the most difficult in the Southwest

Pacific. What had appeared on aerial

photographs as beaches of white sand or

coral proved to be gray mud three feet

deep. The shallow water forced LST's

to unload far out from land; many of

the men had to wade to shore in water

up to their necks. Particularly troublesome were submerged coral heads and

potholes in the ocean floor. The men

could not get much of their equipment

to the beach; on the day of the landing,

the 534th's shore battalion managed to

bring in only three of its eight bulldozers. Conditions improved after the

shore engineers built ramps and piers out

into the water. The excellent loading

plan which the 534th had worked out

and put into operation helped save the

situation in these first days. It was

fortunate that the Japanese did not interfere with the landing. Combat engineer

tasks were light. The 106th Engineer

Combat Battalion was occupied mainly

with sweeping the beaches for nonexistent mines, clearing jungled areas for

tactical units, building supply roads, and

reconnoitering. Since the island's coral

surface held up well under traffic, road

construction was easy. There were no

mines or obstacles. Most of the Japanese had retreated a good distance into

the jungle.99

97

 Rpt, Brigadier R. N. L. Hopkins, Austr Liaison

Off with Seventh Force, sub: INTERLUDE Opn, Morotai Island, 15 Sep 44. SWPA File B192.

98

 (1) Task Force Engr Rpt, INTERLUDE Opn. Sturgis File 46. (2) 4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, Sep 44.

SWPA File E-45. 99

 (1) 4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, Sep 44. SWPA

File E-45. (2) Hopkins Rpt, "INTERLUDE Opn,"

Morotai Island, 15 Sep 44. (3) Rpt, 106th Engr

Combat Bn to Engr XI Corps, 20 Oct 44, sub:

INTERLUDE Opn.
568 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MacArthur had directed the construction of three runways on Morotai—one

for fighters to be ready as soon as possible

and two for bombers, the first to be

usable by the 10th and the second by the

30th of October. Since the partially

completed Japanese strip near the landing beaches was unsuitable for rehabilitation because of poor drainage, the

engineers began work on a fighter strip

in the coconut groves near the southern

coast. The three aviation battalions

and the RAAF units were assigned to the

construction of Wama Drome, as the

strip was called. Despite heavy underbrush and tree roots which extended several feet underground, they made fairly

rapid progress. Wama received a 6-inch

coral base and was surfaced with landing

mat. On 3 October the 5,000-foot runway was operational. Reconnaissance

had shown that just to the north was an

area well suited for the construction of

the two bomber runways. Two of the

aviation battalions and a construction

battalion went to work, clearing the

trees, stripping the top soil down to the

coral substratum, cutting and filling

where necessary, and then compacting.

Surfacing was pierced plank. The first

runway, named Pitoe, was ready for

operations on 17 October.100

The engineers were not able to provide airfields on Morotai as rapidly as

MacArthur's operations instructions had

specified. This delay was the result of

various causes—the existing Japanese

field could not be rehabilitated so that

entirely new construction was required,

securing an adequate amount of suitable

coral had taken longer than expected,

rains had to some extent slowed construction, the shortage of spare parts had

deadlined much equipment, and, lastly,

the schedules set by planning staffs had

undoubtedly been somewhat optimistic.

Yet, within forty days three engineer

aviation battalions and two RAAF construction squadrons had constructed a

fighter runway and a bomber runway

and had completed 90 percent of the

work on a second bomber strip. They

had provided, in addition, storage for

40,000 barrels of aviation gasoline, together with a fuel jetty, and were rapidly

completing storage for another 40,000

barrels. They had installed two floating

wharves capable of taking three Liberty

ships and had almost completed work on

a pile dock. Construction on camps,

covered storage, hospitals, and access

roads was complete.101

The South Pacific

While the forces in the Southwest

Pacific made giant strides toward the

Philippines, the dwindling forces in the

South Pacific were reorganized. As already indicated, on 1 August USAFISPA

was redesignated South Pacific Base

Command and made subordinate to the

newly activated United States Army

Forces in the Pacific Ocean Area. SOS

SPA was inactivated and its personnel

transferred to SPBC. There was no

change in the mission of Army forces in

100 the South Pacific, except that responsi- (1) Task Force Engr Rpt, INTERLUDE Opn.

Sturgis File 46. (2) Hq, 931st Engr Avn Regt, Opns

Rpt—INTERLUDE. SWPA File, M15. (3) 836th Engr

Avn Bn, Hist Narration for 1944. (4) Ltr, 841st

Engr Avn Bn to CG XI Corps, 14 Oct 44. SWPA

File M15.

101

 (1) Hq, 931st Engr Avn Regt, Opns Rpt—INTERLUDE. (2) Ltr, Col J. H. Dudley to C Staff Br, 19

Jul 50. SWPA Files.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 569

bilities for training were discontinued.

SPBC henceforth had only the two primary missions of providing logistic support for operations in the Central and

Southwest Pacific and rehabilitating and

staging a number of divisions assigned to

those two theaters.

As engineer operations declined in

scope, the engineer organization in the

South Pacific was changed to conform

with the over-all reorganization of the

theater. The Engineer Sections of

USAFISPA and SOS were combined as

the Engineer Section, SPBC. Colonel

Beadle and Colonel Murrow had returned to the United States; Col. Peter

P. Goerz became the engineer of the

South Pacific Base Command. Engineer missions remained much as before.

They included principally technical

supervision of Engineer units, formulation of policies, planning, and furnishing technical advice to the commanding

general of the South Pacific Base Command. Engineer troop strength, which

had reached a peak in April 1944, of

some 20,000 men out of approximately

245,000 US Army troops, had by July

dropped to 11,000.102 Engineer work

now consisted mainly in helping the Seabees to maintain the base installations

still remaining on New Caledonia,

Espíritu Santo, Guadalcanal, and Bougainville. Colonel Lane, after a visit to

the South Pacific in July, wrote to

General Godfrey, "New Caledonia and

Espiritu Santo are well developed and

comfortable rear bases and of little interest to Engineers." Guadalcanal was

being used as a major supply base despite

the shortage of harbor facilities. Bougainville was "well developed" and at

the same time was a good example of

"the essential simplicity of Army construction." On the whole, Lane considered the ". . . general aspect of the

SOPAC area" a "tribute" to the Seabees,

but added that he found the commanders

of the aviation engineer units, in particular, ". . . very weary of trailing the

Construction Battalions and doing housekeeping work for the Air Force." They

were ".. . anxious to come to SWPA

where, although not under Air Force

control, they [would] be employed on

essential construction in the front

lines."

 103

Progress by 1 October

From the end of February to the

middle of September 1944 Allied forces

in the Southwest Pacific had advanced

from the Admiralties to Morotai and

were within striking distance of the

Philippines. By 1 October American

engineers in the Southwest Pacific Area

numbered 100,000 in a total troop

strength of 700,000; U.S. Army engineers

in that theater totaled 54 percent of all

American engineers in the theaters engaged in the war against Japan. Engineer units had been moving forward

continuously; one-third of the total were

now in Netherlands New Guinea, including the staffs in GHQ, USASOS, and

Sixth Army, which had moved to Hollandia in August and September. Long

before the conclusion of the New Guinea

campaign, these staffs and numerous

engineer units had begun preparations

for the recapture of the Philippines.

102

 AGO, Statistical and Accounting Br, Strength

Rpts of the U.S. Army.

103

 Ltr, Lane to Godfrey, 20 Jul 44. SWPA File

74.
CHAPTER XIV

Return to the Philippines

Leyte and Mindoro

General MacArthur's staff had begun

preliminary planning for the recapture

of the Philippines early in 1943. This

early planning was repeatedly revised in

accordance with changing tactical developments and instructions from the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. By March 1944 the war

in the Pacific was going well for the

Allies. The Marshalls had been seized

and were being converted into a powerful forward base. The Admiralties were

under attack, and the weak Japanese

resistance indicated that capture of these

islands was merely a matter of time.

On 12 March the Joint Chiefs directed

MacArthur to prepare detailed plans for

an attack on Mindanao, southernmost of

the major islands of the Philippines,

tentatively setting 15 November 1944 as

the date for the first landing. In midJune MacArthur issued his plan for a

return to the islands. He called for a

small-scale attack at Sarangani Bay, on

the southern coast of Mindanao, on 25

October and construction of a minor air

base there as soon as possible. On 15

November a major amphibious attack

would be launched against Leyte in the

central Philippines and an extensive base

built on that island to support an attack

on Luzon.1

Engineer Planning

The first assaults on the Philippines

were assigned to Sixth Army. In many

respects, operations would be similar to

those in New Guinea. The objective

areas would be softened up through

aerial and naval bombardments, amphibious landings made, the Japanese

destroyed or driven away from the

beaches, and airfield and base construction begun. Early in July, Sturgis and

his staff, recently moved from Finschhafen to Hollandia, were briefed on the

KING or K series of operations, scheduled

for the southern and central Philippines.

At this time, little up-to-date information

was to be had on those areas. The

photography of Sarangani Bay was far

from complete and ". . . as for Leyte

. . . , there was no photography at all

from which local conditions could be

determined and construction plans

based."

 2

A most important matter was the

weather. While temperatures in the

Philippines varied little, most of the

islands had two pronounced seasons, a

dry and a wet, determined to a large

extent by the prevailing winds, the

1

 M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the

Philippines, U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1954), pp. 1-3. 2

 Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., "Engineering Operations

in the Leyte Campaign, Part I," The Military Engineer, XXXIX (November, 1947), p. 458.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 571

northeast monsoons, lasting from October to April, and the southwest

monsoons, which continued from May

to September. This pattern of winds

brought rain to the eastern parts of the

mountainous islands during the northeast monsoon and to the western parts

during the southwest monsoon. Southern Mindanao had no pronounced wet

or dry season. MacArthur's plans called

for a landing on Leyte during the rainy

season. October and November were,

moreover, the months of strong winds

and typhoons. Since a great deal of

construction would have to be done, the

adverse weather, together with the inadequate number of engineer units and

the short time in which to do the

work, would create almost insuperable

problems.3

An Army Service Command

During the New Guinea Campaign

the need for an efficient construction and

logistics organization in a task force area

in the first days of an operation had

become apparent. Hastily assembled

task force engineer staffs had often not

been able to meet satisfactorily the numerous and frequently unforeseen problems which arose. The need for a

construction and supply agency in the

combat zone in the early phases of a

major assault in the Philippines would

be even more critical, since such an

operation would be more extensive in

scope than any undertaken previously.

A solution to the problem would be for

USASOS SWPA to organize a construction and logistics agency, and before the

scheduled assault, transfer it to Sixth

Army, which would move it forward as

soon as possible during the combat phase,

so that no time would be lost either in

providing combat support or in beginning base and airfield construction.

When Sixth Army subsequently transferred the newly built base to USASOS,

much of the organization, particularly

the part needed for base operations,

would go back to USASOS. With this

procedure, there would be a minimum

of dislocation when the transfer was

made.4

In line with this reasoning, USASOS

activated the Army Service Command

(ASCOM) at Brisbane on 23 July 1944.

Casey, now a major general, and on detached service from GHQ, was placed in

command; Sverdrup became MacArthur's acting chief engineer. During

August Casey organized his headquarters,

obtaining most of his staff from units of

USASOS, particularly the headquarters

of the 5201st Construction Brigade.

Colonel Robinson, head of the brigade,

became Casey's engineer. The ASCOM

staff prepared standing operating procedures and began to requisition supplies for the construction of a base at

Sarangani Bay and another on the east

coast of Leyte. Since the building of

airfields and bases was to be one of

ASCOM's major functions, a large number of engineer units were scheduled for

temporary transfer to the new command.

Part of the men assigned to ASCOM

headquarters were to make plans and

preparations for constructing a particu3

 Cannon, Leyte, pp. 35-36.

4

 (1) Ltr, Casey to CG USASOS, 12 Feb 45, sub:

Rpt on the "K" Opns. SWPA File 109. (2) Of C

Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 158-60.
572 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

lar base, and part of them, transferred to

ASCOM later on, were to be responsible

for operating it. The latter, together

with a number of units, would return

to USASOS when the combat phase was

over and the base passed to USASOS.

As soon as a base was a going concern,

those responsible for planning would

begin to make plans and preparations for

the next one. A hindrance to early

planning was that ASCOM was at Brisbane and Sixth Army headquarters at

Hollandia. Co-ordination was difficult.5

On 27 August MacArthur announced

a schedule of operations which called for

attacks on dates later than those he had

set in his plan of mid-June. There was

to be an assault on the Talaud Islands,

half-way between Morotai and Mindanao, on 15 October; on Sarangani Bay

on 15 November; and on Leyte on 20

December. While the later scheduling

of operations would give the engineers

more time for planning, they would still

have to build the extensive base on Leyte

during the rainy season. Planning was

moving ahead satisfactorily. Since construction and logistic support were expected to be generally of far greater

importance than combat, Casey's staff

had to do comprehensive planning.

Early in September ASCOM moved to

Hollandia, where major theater headquarters were located, and better coordination, particularly with Sixth Army

engineers, was possible. By the second

week of the month, planning was practically complete. Requisitions for all

classes of supplies and equipment had

been submitted to USASOS. On the

15th ASCOM was transferred to Sixth

Army, where it was placed on a corps

level; Casey would be directly responsible to General Krueger.6

The Assault Schedule Revised

From the 10th to the 14th of September Admiral Halsey's carrier fleet made

a number of strikes against the central

and southern Philippine islands. The

weak resistance his flyers encountered

was quite convincing evidence that Japanese strength in those parts of the archipelago was fairly well depleted. Halsey

informed Nimitz that the area was "wide

open." On the 14th he recommended

that the operations planned against Yap,

Talaud, and Sarangani Bay be canceled

and that Leyte be seized immediately.

Nimitz radioed Halsey's suggestion to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, then meeting with

the British Chiefs of Staff at the

OCTAGON Conference in Quebec. Marshall immediately asked MacArthur for

his views regarding the speeding up of

the attack schedule; MacArthur replied

two days later, agreeing to cancellation

of the operations as Halsey recommended. The Joint Chiefs at once instructed MacArthur to move directly

against Leyte and set the 20th of October

as the day for the attack.7

Intensified Planning for Leyte

Concentrating henceforth on planning

for the Leyte (K-2) operation the engi5

 (1) Ltr, Casey to CG USASOS, 12 Feb 45. (2)

Hist of ASCOM From 23 Jul to 26 Dec 44. SWPA

File A155.

6

 (1) Cannon, Leyte, pp. 7-8. (2) Ltr, Casey to

CG USASOS, 12 Feb 45. (3) Hist of ASCOM. 7

 Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the

United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945,

to the Secretary of War, p. 71.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 573

neers had numerous problems to deal

with. Not only had the target date been

moved up sixty days but the new objective area was some 350 miles more

distant. Leyte, about 600 miles north of

the airfields on Morotai and 1,000 miles

northwest of those on Biak, was, for all

practical purposes, beyond fighter and

medium-bomber range. The risks incident to carrying on extended operations

without land-based air support were considerable. It was of the utmost importance that the engineers have airfields

ready as soon as naval air support was

withdrawn; since the assault was scheduled for the beginning of the rainy

season, this might not be easy. To

make matters worse, only sketchy information was to be had regarding the

island's terrain. Leyte was still too far

from the most forward bases for landbased reconnaissance planes. Flyers

with Halsey's carrier fleet were the first

to photograph the target area, but the

films brought back, when developed,

showed important terrain features obscured by clouds. Pictures taken during the subsequent weeks were not much

better.8

Fortunately, a considerable amount of

information was available in topographic

studies made before the war; the United

States Coast and Geodetic Survey had

prepared hydrographic studies of beach

areas which contained especially valuable data. The eighth largest island of

the archipèlago, Leyte was some 115

miles long, 43 miles wide at the north,

and 16 miles wide at the center. (Map

28} Mountainous and, for the most

part, heavily wooded, it had two principal lowlands. The first, Leyte Valley,

stretching across the northeastern part of

the island from Leyte Gulf on the east to

Carigara Bay on the north, had many

streams and numerous rice paddies; it

would not be suitable for extensive construction, except perhaps during the dry

season. The second, the Ormoc plain,

on the west coast, would in all probability not be the scene of decisive fighting or of a great deal of construction.

Most of the island's roads were in the

northeast, and radiated from the capital,

Tacloban, located in the Leyte Valley on

the east coast. The island's few paved

thoroughfare's had only a thin and narrow surface of bitumen. Facilities for

supporting modern war were few. No

definite information was on hand regarding the number of airfields or their

condition, but it was known that the

Japanese had been working on several.

The most important, Tacloban, a 5,000-

foot prewar commercial field on the

Cataisan Peninsula, two miles southeast

of the capital, was undoubtedly operational. In central Leyte, located near

the dirt road running west from the

coastal town of Dulag to Burauen were

four fields—Dulag, San Pablo, Bayug,

and Buri. San Pablo, overgrown with

weeds, was not in use; the other three

seemed to be operational. There were

apparently additional fields but little was

known about them. Most of the island's

population lived on farms or in small

villages, called barrios.9 Even Taclo8

 (1) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte

Campaign, Part I," p. 459. (2) Of C Engr GHQ

AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 286.

9

 (1) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte

Campaign, Part I," pp. 459-60. (2) Cannon, Leyte,

pp. 10-13, 124. (3) Sixth Army, Rpt of the Leyte

Opn, 20 Oct 44-25 Dec 44, p. 231. 106-0.3 (20430).
574 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 28

ban, according to Sturgis was ". . . merely

an overgrown village with a few dilapidated warehouses and public buildings

and limited berthing facilities for two

Liberty ships."

 10

Neither combat nor service engineers

had enough time for adequate planning.

Insofar as combat was concerned, a major

obstacle arose from the fact that XIV

Corps, assigned to operations on Leyte,

had to be kept on Bougainville for mopup operations. The Central Pacific's

XXIV Corps, scheduled for the assault

on Yap and already en route to its destination, was diverted to Leyte. The

engineer units of that corps, prepared for

a landing on a small Pacific island, had

to be supplied with more equipment,

and eventually more engineer units

would have to be sent in to support

XXIV Corps. A second matter of importance was bridging. Combat on

Leyte, unlike that on New Guinea,

would probably require numerous

stream crossings, since the American

10

 Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte Campaign, Part I," p. 460.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 575

forces would most certainly have to move

inland to destroy the Japanese. There

were not enough bridging units or sufficient amounts of bridging equipment in

the theater to support an extensive overland advance. On hand were one heavy

ponton battalion—the 556th—and three

light ponton companies—the 506th,

510th, and 530th—and all four had only

a minimum of equipment. Of these

units, the 556th and 530th were assigned

to Sixth Army; the 506th, to X Corps.

The 510th was already committed to

support the operations on Morotai.

Bailey bridging, ideal for semipermanent

fixed spans, was in short supply; only a

few hundred feet of it were in New

Guinea. Most of this was collected and

loaded on Leyte-bound vessels which

happened to be handy. Sturgis believed

that the ponton units, at least part of the

time, would have to be put to building

fixed bridges on Leyte so that floating

equipment could be moved forward as

rapidly as possible to support the advance

of the infantry.11

ASCOM engineers were likewise

pressed for time for adequate planning.

Their immediate responsibility was the

all-important one of building the critically needed airfields. They were to

construct four. One runway, 5,000 feet

long, was to be ready for fighters within

5 days after the first landing. But airfields were only one of many responsibilities. ASCOM was to build a base to

provide logistical support for 200,000 air

and ground troops, including port facilities, warehouses, hospitals, and headquarters for various commands. Port

facilities were to include floating docks

for four Libertys, to be ready within 30

days. Eventually, ASCOM was to complete six fixed wharves for Libertys, each

to take two ships; the first wharf was to

be ready within 45 days. Seventeen

lighter jetties were to be built. ASCOM

was to provide 12,000 hospital beds, most

of them in tents. Initially, gasoline was

to be furnished by barges anchored offshore; meanwhile, ASCOM was to build

two small fuel jetties and begin work on

bolted tanks of 2,000-barrel capacity each.

Northern Leyte and southern Samar

Island were, in addition, to be the site of

an extensive naval base. To accomplish

his construction program, Casey had a

sizable number of engineer units. He

had, among others, 15 aviation battalions, 3 construction battalions, 2 port

construction and repair groups, and 7

dump truck companies. Of the 43,183

men assigned to ASCOM, 21,097, or

approximately 47 percent, were engineers. Supply posed one of the most

vexing problems. There was less than

a month left to finish planning for Leyte,

submit requisitions, and load the supplies on transports. Many items scheduled for Talaud and Sarangani Bay had

to be diverted willy-nilly to Leyte,

whether needed there or not.12

Amphibious Operations—Planning

Of all the amphibious assaults made

in the Pacific, the Leyte operation was

the only one in which both the engineer

special brigades of the Southwest Pacific 11

 (1) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte

Campaign, Part I," pp. 459. (2) Sturgis, "Engineer

Operation in the Leyte Campaign, Part II," The

Military Engineer, XXXIX (December, 1947), p. 518.

12

 (1) Ltr, Casey to CG USASOS, 12 Feb 45. (2)

Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 159.
576 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

and the shore party organizations of the

Central Pacific were to be used. Two

major landings were planned for the

island's east coast—one just below

Tacloban, the other, some fifteen miles

farther south near the town of Dulag.

The 2d Special Brigade, less one boat

and shore regiment, was to help land the

1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Division of X Corps near Tacloban. General Heavey made arrangements with

VII Amphibious Force to transport 290

LCM's, 57 LCVP's, and 38 auxiliary craft

to the target area; 130 LCM's and 42

LCVP's were to participate in the A-day

landings. This was to be by far the

largest movement of small craft in any

operation made in the Southwest Pacific

up to this time. At Dulag, two combat

group headquarters with three combat

battalions each were to do the shore

party work for the 7th and 96th Infantry

Divisions of XXIV Corps.13

The Assault

On 19 October two naval task forces

of the Third and Seventh Fleets approached the east coast of Leyte. Three

islands in Leyte Gulf had been occupied

a few days before and rather extensive

mine sweeping operations carried on to

make the offshore waters safer for amphibious operations. As already indicated, the tactical plan called for the

landing of two corps on the east coast.

X Corps, comprising the 1st Cavalry

Division and 24th Division (less one

RCT), was to land on the three miles of

beaches south of the Cataisan Peninsula

and north of the Palo River. XXIV

Corps, made up of the 7th and 96th

Divisions, was to come ashore near the

town of Dulag. One RCT of the 24th

Division was to land at Panaon Island

southeast of Leyte and secure the narrow

strait to enable motor torpedo boats to

proceed into Sogod Bay and the Mindanao Sea. The major assaults were to

be made on beaches near the two airdrome areas—the early capture of

Tacloban airdrome and the four fields in

central Leyte was essential.14 The plan

of campaign called for X Corps to advance northwest towards Carigara Bay

and thence - southward through the

mountains toward Ormoc on the west

coast. XXIV Corps was to drive across

the narrow waist of the island and then

advance northwest toward Ormoc to link

up with X Corps.

On the morning of the 20th the assault

began as scheduled. The weather was

ideal. The sea was calm, with the surf

between one and two feet high. In the

X Corps area, landings were made at

White Beach to the north and Red Beach

to the south. No mines or underwater

obstacles were encountered. Japanese

opposition was unexpectedly light, the

principal interference being fire, at times

fairly heavy, from five 75-mm. guns emplaced in jungle southwest of Red Beach.

Four LST's received direct hits and a

fifth was set on fire; shell fragments

damaged four engineer LCM's.

It was soon evident that Red Beach

was poor, with water so shallow that only

13

 (1) Ltr, Heavey to Krueger, 13 Dec 44. SWPA

File 75. (2) 1st Lt G. J. Pavia, Constr Serv CPBC,

Observers Rpt on Leyte Island Opn. Engr AGF

PAC, 319.1.

14

 (1) Cannon, Leyte, pp. 31-34. (2) Krueger,

From Down Under to Nippon, p. 150. (3) Seventh

Amphib Force, Rpt on Leyte Opn. SWPA File 75.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 577

one LST could get close enough to make

unloading practicable. Hydrographic

charts of the Coast and Geodetic Survey,

used extensively in planning, had clearly

indicated shallow water, as well as

swampy terrain between the shoreline

and Highway 1, which paralleled the

coast. But the tactical plan, which

called for X Corps to advance northwest

from the beaches, required a landing

north of the Palo River; obstacles at the

beaches would simply have to be overcome in one way or another. The Navy,

also aware of the unsatisfactory conditions offshore, had planned to build

ponton causeways but could not get the

ponton cubes in time to transport them

to Red Beach; plans were then made to

transfer cubes from the Dulag area, if

necessary. To add to the confusion,

naval beach parties, reconnoitering offshore the day before the landing, had

erroneously reported the water deeper

than it was. Ponton cubes, urgently requested from Dulag on the morning of

A-day, did not arrive until that evening.

Early the next morning, 21 October, unloading began over the floating piers, but

only one LST was able to unload that

day. Some transports were transferred

to White Beach, where all vessels had

unloaded and retracted by the end of the

second day. Others proceeded to the

beaches on the Cataisan Peninsula, where

they unloaded thousands of tons of supplies, which the shore parties piled up on

the airstrip.15

The shore parties at Red and White

Beaches had a hard time moving supplies

off the beach. Inland, 100 to 300 yards,

was a series of swamps, and between them

the Japanese had constructed antitank

ditches. These obstacles, together with

the lack of roads from the beaches, caused

not a little congestion. Work was,

moreover, interrupted by frequent air

raids and alerts, as the Japanese mustered

their dwindling air strength in a determined effort to disrupt the landing.

The raids caused no serious damage, but

the many alerts meant lack of sleep and

near exhaustion for the shore parties.

Some of the men were ordered to support the combat troops, which put an

added burden on those remaining on the

beaches. A major problem was getting

a road through from Red Beach to Highway 1. Under orders from the corps

commander, the 339th Construction Battalion was attempting to build one across

a swamp 600 feet wide, beyond which lay

a mile of flooded rice paddies. Going

ashore on A plus 1, Sturgis, recently

promoted to brigadier general, found

bulldozers and other equipment stuck in

mud and water. Making a quick reconnaissance with the S-3 of the 339th, he

found a fairly dry though somewhat

longer route a short distance to the south.

He had the unit transferred to this location, where it built a 3-lane road to the

highway in a few days.16

Despite the obstacles, unloading schedules were satisfactorily met, including

those for Green Beach on Panaon Island,

15 where no difficulties were encountered. (1) Ltr, Heavey to Krueger, 13 Dec 44. (2)

Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, p. 150. (3)

Seventh Amphib Force, Rpt on Leyte Opn. (4)

Samuel Eliot Morison, vol. XII, Leyte, "United States

Naval Operations in World War II" (Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1958), pp. 134-35.

16

 (1) Ltr, Heavey to Krueger, 13 Dec 44. (2) Hist

of the 339th Constr Bn. (3) Comments by General

Sturgis on draft of this chapter. SWPA Files.
578 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

When they hit their full stride on the

Leyte beaches, the amphibian engineers

were unloading approximately 100 tons

of cargo an hour, probably a record for

SWPA up to that time. On the average,

they unloaded an APA (transport, attack), which carried some 1,300 troops

and 450 tons of supplies, in four and

one-half hours; the unloading of some

Libertys, with their larger cargoes, took

considerably longer.17

Efficient operations were in part the

result of steadily improving teamwork

of the engineers and the Navy. The

apprehensiveness with which Navy men

had regarded amphibian engineer operations when the 2d Brigade first arrived

in the theater a year and a half earlier

was by now largely a thing of the past.

"The 7th Amphibious Force and 2d

Engineer Special Brigade," wrote Rear

Adm. Daniel E. Barbey, commander of

VII Amphibious Force, "have been associated in numerous amphibious operations . . . complete understanding has

been achieved through this close association and was reflected in the smoothness

with which the Leyte landing progressed."

 18

 General Heavey was of the

same opinion. He pointed out that the

successful results at Leyte could at least

in part be ascribed to "the fact that this

Brigade has been associated with Seventh

Amphibious Force in numerous preceding operations and knew its methods and

many of its beach personnel . . . ."

 19

Responsibilities of naval and amphibian engineer units assigned to task forces

had become more clearly defined as the

result of lessons learned in the course of

actual landings. In all assault operations, the amphibious brigades had been

under the control of Seventh Fleet.

Landing craft operated by Navy personnel usually carried the first waves of

infantry to shore. In the long forward

movements, the Seventh Fleet transported the amphibian engineers' craft.

The fact that the amphibian engineers

brought in part of the troops and subsequently engaged in resupply missions

along the shore or from island to island

was of distinct advantage to the Navy.

Probably the major benefit was that the

Seventh Fleet could withdraw its assault forces from a forward area at a

relatively early time.20

At Dulag, also, the weather was fair

and the seas calm on A-day. Demolition

crews easily removed the few underwater

obstacles found along the beaches.

There were no coral reefs, and offshore

slopes were steep enough to permit

expeditious unloading—LST's, LCM's,

LCVP's, and Dukws carried men and

supplies from ship to shore with little or

no trouble. Firm sandy beaches held up

well under truck traffic. Japanese opposition was lacking at the beaches, but

here, as at Red and White beaches, congestion became something of a problem.

Because of the danger of air attacks, the

Navy wanted its ships unloaded and out

of Leyte Gulf as soon as possible; at the

same time, the infantry, beginning to

meet stiff resistance inland, was not able

to advance as rapidly as had been hoped.

Nevertheless, work proceeded satisfactorily. Dozers of the shore party battalions, landed early in the operation, 17

 Ltr, Heavey to Krueger, 13 Dec 44. 18

 Seventh Amphib Force, Rpt on Leyte Opn. 19

 Ltr, Heavey to Krueger, 13 Dec 44. 20

 Ltr, Lane to C Staff Br, 28 Jul 47. SWPA Files.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 579

were used to cut trails from the beaches

and prepare dump areas. One company

from each combat battalion provided

security for the battalion as far as 800

yards inland. Neither occasional enemy

rifle fire nor rainy weather later on

interfered seriously with the work of

the shore parties. The shore party battalions of the 7th and 96th Divisions, in

the words of one observer, "worked at

such speed and efficiency that all passenger ships were unloaded of their equipment in 25 hours and all cargo ships were

unloaded in 44 hours, enabling them to

leave Leyte Gulf."

 21

ASCOM—Initial Operations

ASCOM's most important task—the

building of airfields—had to be begun

as soon as possible in view of the fact

that the American forces on Leyte were

without land-based air support and the

Japanese fleet was known to be operating

in Philippine waters. Urgently needed

were four all-weather fields. The one

at Tacloban and the three in central

Leyte were to be improved as quickly as

possible. All, except Tacloban, would

require much work to bring them up to

minimum standards.

ASCOM personnel and units arrived

early in the operation. Casey with some

members of his staff came ashore on

A-day; two days later the advance echelon of ASCOM headquarters arrived.

Since the Japanese at this time still held

the area at Palo allocated to headquarters, Casey installed his staff in a large

house near Tacloban, set up tents on

the grounds for overflow personnel, and

organized a system of perimeter defense

to guard against Japanese infiltrators.

He had organized two subordinate commands: the Construction Command, to

build the airfields and base facilities,

and the Base K Command, to be responsible for the operation of the base facilities. The former was given three construction areas on eastern Leyte—Tacloban, Palo, and Dulag—in each of which

a construction group headquarters was to

supervise the work. As many native

workers as possible were to be recruited.22

Tacloban was the first field to receive

attention; orders were that it was to be

improved sufficiently to take a fighter

group within five days. The 46th Construction Battalion reached the site on

A-day. On narrow, mile-long Cataisan

Peninsula, the strip would have to be

realigned about 10 degrees if it were to

be lengthened eventually to 6,000 feet

for bombers; realignment alone would

require a considerable additional construction effort. Doing any work on

A-day was next to impossible because of

the great quantities of supplies and

equipment being dumped on the runway

from LST's transferred from Red Beach.

Strenuous efforts to get supplies off the

runway caused such congestion of traffic

at the neck of the peninsula that the

engineers could haul little or no coral

from the nearby pits, and work on the

runway was set back at least two days.

On A plus 3 the 1881st Aviation Battalion and part of the 240th Construction

Battalion joined the 46th; the three units

bivouacked on the peninsula alongside 21

 (1) Maj Douglas F. Thomson, Of of Engr Tenth

Army, Rpt [Observer's Rpt on Leyte Opn]. Engr

AGF PAC. (2) Pavia, Observer's Rpt on Leyte

Island Opn. 22

 Hist of ASCOM.
580 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

LAYING PIERCED STEEL PLANK (MARSTON MAT) ON TACLOBAN AIRSTRIP

the runway to be near their work, despite

the exposed position. They strove to

put down a coral base solid enough to

support steel mats. By the fifth morning

after the landing, the situation was

critical. Enemy bombings were frequent; there were about twelve attacks

that morning alone. "The sky was

notably devoid of our own fighters,"

Sturgis wrote, "but Zeros and Bettys

were whizzing down from the low overcast like hornets. ... " Rumors were

abroad of a giant naval battle off Leyte,

as the Japanese fleet made a last desperate

gamble to destroy the American task

force and drive the Americans from

Leyte. Many U.S. planes came in for

crash landings; most cracked up on the

loose coral and sand of the runway.

The pilots explained that their carriers

had been sunk or disabled during the

battle with a Japanese naval force off the

southeast coast of Samar. The engineers

dozed some twenty-five wrecked planes

into the ocean. That night, between

alerts, they worked continuously on the

brilliantly lighted runway. By evening

of the next day, it was ready for fighters.23

Meanwhile, ASCOM units under

Colonel Heiman of the 1112th Construction Group had begun work on the airfields in Central Leyte. The Dulag strip

was captured on the second day of the

landing; the other three, during the next

five days. San Pablo was to be developed

into a bomber field; the others were to

be improved to take fighters and transports. Men sent out on reconnaissance

by Sturgis and Casey reported that work

23

 (1) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte

Campaign, Part I," pp. 462-63. (2) General Kenney

Reports, pp. 453-56.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 581

on the fields, located in the midst of rice

paddies and swamps, would be laborious

enough during the dry season and wellnigh impossible in wet weather. Supply

would be an almost insuperable problem,

since the fields were near the one-lane

road which ran from Dulag to Burauen

and which was already choked with

traffic to support the combat units.

Work began first on Dulag. The

808th Aviation Battalion, landing on

the morning of 23 October, headed

straight for the field, captured two days

previously. It was about 300 yards south

of the Dulag-Burauen road and parallel

to it. The Japanese had hauled gravel

in pushcarts from a nearby stream and

spread it over the runway to a thickness

of about one inch. The 808th, working

around the clock, smoothed the runway

and built roads to the river to enable

trucks to haul gravel.24 Two days later,

at about 0930, the men ". . . were surprised to see a couple of strange looking

planes circling the field. ... " They

turned out to be Navy fighters, which

could not return to their carriers.

About fifty planes landed; several

cracked up. The dry weather of the

next few days made a good deal of progress possible on the runway. On the

27th, the 821st Aviation Battalion joined

the 808th. Heavy rains at the end of

the month turned the whole area into a

sea of mud. The fields in central

Leyte could not be made operational

within a predictable time.25

The news had come on the morning

of the 26th that the Japanese fleet had

been defeated. The forces at Tacloban

had had a narrow escape; a study of the

battle reports indicated that if just one

of the Japanese warships, only a short

distance away, had sailed into Leyte

Gulf, it could have shot up the naval

transports and the beachhead and caused

incalculable damage. Kenney agreed to

take over responsibility from the Navy

for air support on A plus 7, even though

he had no planes on Leyte because there

were no adequate fields on which to base

them. He was apparently not greatly

concerned since he was already convinced

that the Japanese air force could no

longer do any serious damage; at the

most, it could merely delay the American

advance.26 Nevertheless, the lack of

American air power on Leyte enabled

the Japanese to send in sizable reinforcements via Ormoc, including two complete divisions and parts of three more

in the hope of making a decisive stand on

the island. In return, the Americans

committed the reserve 32d and 77th Infantry Divisions, the nth Airborne

Division, elements of the 38th Infantry

Division, and the 112th Cavalry RCT.

Despite the lack of sufficient air cover,

the campaign on Leyte developed generally as planned. Enemy opposition

was light, although stubborn pockets of

resistance developed in some areas.

While the Japanese reinforcements did

not alter the planned strategy, they did

prolong the fighting.27

Combat Engineers—Roads

and Bridges

Although the fighting on Leyte was

more or less in the nature of a conven- 24

 Hist of the 808th Engr Avn Bn, p. 513. 25

 (1) Ibid., p. 514. (2) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte Campaign, Part II," p. 515.

26

 General Kenney Reports, p. 461. 27

 Cannon, Leyte, p. 306.
582 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

tional overland advance, combat support

was much like that in New Guinea in

that road and bridge construction and

maintenance accounted for almost the

entire effort. Roads required the most

work by far. The island's thoroughfares

disintegrated rapidly under military

traffic. To make matters worse, five

days after A-day, heavy rains began—the

first of the season. In both corps areas,

long stretches of road became morasses.

During the first three weeks, X Corps

had only three combat battalions to

maintain roads in the Leyte Valley; they

could not cope with the rapid disintegration of the supply routes. The amphibian engineers saved the situation by

moving supplies along the northern

coast. The combat engineers continued

to have trouble with roads in the valley.

Since most of the roads were built above

the surrounding rice paddies, they were

extremely difficult to restore, once they

broke down. After the troops got out

of the valley, conditions were just as

critical. The advance through the

mountains from Pinamopoan on northern Leyte to Ormoc came almost to a

standstill because of the poor roads. In

some places, the troops had to be supplied by air drop or by native carriers

because constructing roads into these

regions was virtually impossible. The

few combat battalions on northern

Leyte had to maintain long stretches of

supply routes; a single battalion might

be responsible for as much as thirty or

forty miles. Many routes could not have

been kept open had it not been for the

help of native workmen. In the XXIV

Corps area in central Leyte, the 13th and

321st Engineer Battalions of the 7th and

96th Divisions were especially concerned

with the road leading west from Dulag

to Burauen, the main corps supply

route. This thoroughfare, which passed

through a number of low, swampy areas,

required a great deal of corduroy. The

constant stream of traffic made any real

job of improvement or even maintenance

almost impossible. The combat battalions in both parts of the island had an

especially heavy burden with regard to

road construction because of the insufficient number of corps engineer troops.

Some shore party engineers were put on

road work in the XXIV Corps area and

a number of ASCOM units were sent to

both corps, but few such men or units

could be spared.28

The main roads on Leyte had about

300 bridges, some 30 of which could be

regarded as of critical importance.

Were the Japanese to destroy any one of

the latter, the main supply routes might

be blocked for days. The astonishing

thing is that the Japanese left all the

principal bridges intact. They did destroy a number of minor structures,

most of them built of wood, and guerrillas had wrecked an additional number

of smaller spans. Neither Japanese nor

guerrillas destroyed bridges in an expert

manner; as a rule, they left piers and

abutments in place, so that the combat

engineers could easily replace most spans

with timber trestles. Bailey bridging,

scarce on Leyte, was especially valuable

in areas of extensive rice paddies, where

little timber was available. The 556th

Heavy Ponton Battalion was directed

to establish a "bridge park" where all

28

 (1) Sixth Army, Rpt of the Leyte Opn, p. 232.

(2) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte Campaign, Part II," p. 518.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 583

Bailey parts were concentrated. From

the miscellaneous tonnages shipped to

Leyte, a total of some 600 feet of doublelane Bailey bridging was assembled and

distributed as an Army-controlled item.29 Mines, Fortifications, and 

Japanese mines, fortifications, and

obstacles played an insignificant role in

the Leyte Campaign. The troops encountered a few antitank obstacles,

which were not effective. The enemy

had erected no fortifications in any real

sense. Mines were found in a number

of places, some near the landing beaches.

The Japanese had hurriedly mined Tacloban airstrip by burying about 100

bombs with the nose fuzes flush with the

surface. More mines were found in the

interior of Leyte, where the Japanese

had time to lay them after the American

forces landed. In the central part of

the island, a considerable number, including bombs, yardsticks, porcelain,

and tape-measure mines, were found

along the roads and around the airfields.

Too poorly concealed to be effective,

they played no appreciable part in the

campaign. In a warehouse in Tacloban,

the engineers came across a number of

coconuts. Each had been cut in half

and cleaned out; a grenade with nails

fastened to it had been placed inside.

Each coconut had then been wired together again, apparently to be boobytrapped so that the grenade would explode when the coconut was picked up.

As it was, no use was made of these

devices.30

ASCOM—Airfields and Base

Construction

Charged with both airfield and base

construction, ASCOM had heavy responsibilities. It was the airfields that remained of vital concern. Tacloban was

coming along as well as could be expected, but the almost complete lack of

progress on the fields in central Leyte

was cause for alarm. The heavy rains

of late October and early November

practically put an end to the work.

Casey, after a conference with Sturgis

and representatives of Fifth Air Force

and GHQ, suggested that better sites be

found near the landing beaches, and, if

none were acceptable to the air forces,

that the construction effort be restricted

to Tacloban and Dulag. The air forces

insisted on the completion of all four

fields in central Leyte, but their wishes

could not be met. Bayug and Buri, repaired for dry-weather use, became

completely unserviceable soon after the

rainy season began, and the roads leading to San Pablo became such impassable

sloughs that the field had to be abandoned in mid-November. Dulag finally

became operational on 18 November,

when 4,100 feet of landing mat was in

place.31

Colonel Heiman, sector engineer at

29

 (1) Sixth Army, Rpt of the Leyte Opn, p. 232.

(2) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte Campaign, Part II," p. 518.

30

 (1) Sixth Army, Rpt of the Leyte Opn, pp. 232-

33. (2) Thomson, Rpt [Observer's Rpt on Leyte

Opn]. Engr AGF PAC. 31

 (1) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte

Campaign, Part II," p. 515. (2) Sturgis, "Engineer

Operations in the Leyte Campaign, Part III," The

Military Engineers, XL (January, 1948), pp. 17-18.
584 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Dulag, was firmly of the opinion that

meeting the construction deadlines for

the fields in central Leyte was out of the

question. Shortly before Thanksgiving

Day, he met with Generals Kenney and

Whitehead at the Dulag strip. They

wanted to know when a parallel taxiway

would be ready so that a fighter group

could use the runway "with facility."

Colonel Heiman later wrote that his

reply at the time was, "As long as the

rains continue as they have, I can give no

estimated dates of completion for the

strip, taxiways or hardstands." Heiman

explained to Kenney and Whitehead

that even if the weather cleared, progress

on the airfield would be slow because

engineers would have to be diverted

from the airfields to keep the important

supply roads open. Heiman had informed Colonel Sturgis about the condition of the roads, and Sturgis had

directed that additional engineers be

put to work on them. General Kenney

pointed out that the plans for the Luzon

campaign were in jeopardy, and that he

needed a date at least for the completion

of the Dulag strip. Heiman thereupon

asked Kenney and Whitehead to take a

ride with him on the Dulag-Burauen

road. It was so bad they could not get

through. They were nevertheless very

much concerned about the diversion of

engineer strength to the road. On

Thanksgiving Day, Heiman recommended that plans for constructing

facilities at the three strips west of

Dulag be abandoned. Most other engineers were of the same opinion and many

had already made similar recommendations. Late in November, work on the

three western fields was stopped.32

With only two all-weather fields—

Tacloban and Dulag—on Leyte, another

was urgently needed, even though the

Japanese Air Force was no longer the

threat it had been. The only desirable

sites for additional fields were along the

eastern coast. Many miles of flat, sandy

beaches extended southward from the

Cataisan Peninsula. Eight miles from

Tacloban, near the town of Tanauan,

was a site, which, from the engineering

point of view, was almost ideal. Even

in rainy weather construction would not

be difficult. From the point of view of

the air forces, the area was not very desirable, because any field built there

would have the southern end of the

runway quite close to a hill some 250

feet high. A further complication was

that the site was already occupied

by Headquarters, Sixth Army. The

engineers nonetheless recommended construction there. General Kenney consented, and General Krueger agreed to

move his headquarters. Three aviation

battalions began work on 28 November;

within two and one half weeks, a fighter

runway, 6,000 feet long, surfaced with

steel mat, was ready.33

ASCOM engineers were providing

numerous additional facilities on Leyte.

A serious problem from the first was the

allocation of sites.. Because the maps

used in planning had been so inadequate,

the areas selected were not what had

been expected. Two of Sturgis' engineers, Col. William J. Ely, his executive,

and Col. John C. B. Elliott, his operations officer, reconnoitering close behind

the advancing infantry, found, in

32

 (1) Ltr, Heiman to C Staff Br, 11 Sep 50. SWPA

Files. (2) Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the

Leyte Campaign, Part III," pp. 17-18. 33

 Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte

Campaign, Part III," p. 18.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 585

Sturgis' words, that ". . . nearly all of

the proposed sites for depots were located

in rice paddies and swamps. . . . There

was very little available space that would

not become a quagmire when the rains

started. . . ."

 34

 The situation was aggravated by the fact that so many major

headquarters, all in need of space,

moved into Leyte in the first days of the

assault, and for the most part encamped

on the beachhead. At Sturgis' suggestion, Krueger organized a board made

up of two officers from each major command—its purpose to allocate space.

Meanwhile, about twenty officers and

men had the job of traveling about in

jeeps in search of dry areas.

In order to do the required construction, ASCOM needed large numbers of

native workers. Contrary to expectations, they were at first hard to recruit.

Many, having acquired ample stocks of

food from looted warehouses, were not

much interested in working; large numbers were not eager to go to areas likely

to be bombed; and many could not work

because there was no transportation from

their homes. Gradually, and with the

help of local government officials and

the encouragement of their priests, the

natives began to register for employment. By the end of October, 2,500 had

been recruited but their usefulness in

the early stage of the program was impaired by the high rate of absenteeism.35

The construction of docks had high

priority; work was to be completed in

sixty days, that is, by 18 December.

ASCOM engineers in charge of the

project ran into unexpected difficulties.

They found that men and materials

scheduled for the work had to be diverted to combat areas for road and

bridge construction. Also, they encountered unfavorable offshore conditions, such as rock bottoms, precipitous

underwater slopes, and, in some places,

shallow water. Still, dock and jetty

construction completed by late December was impressive. ASCOM had

finished a floating and a fixed dock for

Libertys and had a second fixed dock

about one-third done. Six fixed and

four floating lighter jetties were in

operation. Construction was continuing. The dredge Raymond arrived in

the first days of the operation to deepen

Tacloban harbor, but because of a

shortage of spare parts, the dredge was of

little use until the combat phase of

operations was almost over. The Raymond then pumped sand from the harbor bottom to Tacloban airdrome to

make up for the shortage of coral.36

ASCOM engineers had many other

construction responsibilities. One was

to provide storage tanks for gasoline,

together with distribution systems at the

airfields. At Tacloban, they had in

operation by 28 October a temporary

system, consisting of a 500-barrel tank

on the shore, connected by pipeline with

a fuel barge. The permanent system

subsequently installed there included

storage tanks for 11,250 barrels of aviation gasoline, 5,500 barrels of motor fuel,

and 5,500 barrels of diesel fuel, together

with pipelines and jetties. At Tanauan,

they completed a tank farm with a

capacity of 2,000 barrels. Dulag was

served by a fuel barge, connected by pipeline with the tank farm at the airfield. 34

 Sturgis, "Engineer Operations in the Leyte

Campaign, Part II," p. 515. 35

 Hist of ASCOM. 36

 Ltr, Casey to CG USASOS, 12 Feb 45.
586 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Included among ASCOM's accomplishments was provision for 13,500 hospital

beds in tents. A major job was to widen

and keep roads in usable condition;

about 100 miles of thoroughfare were

maintained and improved. Some projects fell behind schedule because of too

few supplies, a shortage of some kinds of

engineer troops, the diversion of others

to support the combat forces, and, finally,

the heavy rains—thirty-five inches fell in

the first forty days, about twice the average amount.37

The End of the Leyte Campaign

The struggle for Leyte, prolonged by

the ability of the Japanese to land reinforcements on the west coast near Ormoc,

nevertheless moved toward its inevitable

end; the enemy was gradually compressed

into the western part of the island and

destroyed. On 25 December, Sixth Army

turned control of operations on Leyte and

Samar over to Eighth Army. Organized

at Hollandia in September 1944 under

General Eichelberger and up to this point

engaged in destroying or neutralizing the

remnants of the Japanese forces in New

Guinea and on nearby islands, Eighth

Army was well prepared to participate in

more extensive operations in the Philippines. Eighth Army continued mopping-up on Leyte and Samar until May

1945-

Mindoro

As a prelude to the landings on western Luzon, the seizure of the lightly held

island of Mindoro and development of

airdromes near the city of San Jose on

the southwestern coast held a prominent

place in early planning. In midOctober MacArthur had directed Sixth

Army to seize the San Jose area. The

target date was set for 5 December.

Company C of the 161st Engineer

Parachute Battalion and Company B of

the 3d Combat Battalion were assigned

combat missions; a RAAF airfield construction squadron and three engineer

aviation battalions had the job of airfield

construction. The 532d Boat and Shore

Regiment was to land supplies and

equipment. At the beginning of December American land-based air units

still had only a precarious hold in the

Philippines. Leyte had two operational

fields; additional ones were urgently

needed. Sites tentatively selected on

Mindoro would be ideal because they

were on the western side of the island,

at that time of the year in its dry season.

Since enemy resistance on Leyte was so

stubborn and airfield construction so far

behind schedule that adequate air cover

for forward operations was impossible,

the assault was postponed for ten days.38

On 15 December the landing was

made near San Jose without opposition.

No preinvasion bombardment was necessary, and the objectives of the initial

assault were quickly reached. The

building of airfields on Mindoro was

easy. On the first day of the landing the

engineers began to rehabilitate the two

strips near San Jose. Within five days,

Hill Field, a 5,700-foot dry-weather runway for fighters, had been completed.

37

 (1) Ibid. (2) Sixth Army, Rpt of the Leyte Opn,

pp. 234, 231.

38

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI.

314.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 587

On 28 December, seven days ahead of

schedule, the 7,000-foot San Jose dryweather strip was ready for use. On 1

January Eighth U.S. Army took over

operations on Mindoro. Engineer tasks

continued. The aviation engineers began work on two additional all-weather

fields, which would be needed when the

rainy season set in. The fields on Mindoro assured more adequate air support

for the planned invasion of Luzon.39

"The success of the work at Tanauan

and the ease (logistics not considered)

with which the dromes at Mindoro were

shaped accelerated the loss of interest in

Leyte," Colonel Heiman wrote later.

"By New Years, 1945, it was evident that

Leyte would soon be a backwash."

 40

Luzon: The Drive to Manila

Tactical

Once Leyte and Mindoro had been

secured, Luzon was to be attacked. The

struggle for this island would be a crucial

one. The plan of campaign for the

MIKE series of operations, which were

scheduled for Luzon, included a landing

at Lingayen Gulf, a drive down the

Central Plains toward Manila, seizure of

the capital, capture of the fortified

islands in Manila Bay, and then a mopup of the Japanese who had retreated to

the outlying parts of Luzon. Probably

the most critical part of the campaign

would be the drive down the Central

Plains. From a military point of view,

the plains, with a maximum width of 40

miles and extending 100 miles from

Lingayen Gulf to Manila, were the most

vulnerable part of the predominantly

mountainous island. It was down them

that the Japanese had launched their

major attack in 1941. The campaign

of 1945 would be the campaign of 1941

in reverse, with the Americans the attackers and the Japanese the defenders.

The initial assault, the drive down the

Central Plains and the capture of Manila

—the M-1 operation—was to be the responsibility of two corps: I Corps, with

the 6th and 43d Infantry Divisions, and

XIV Corps, with the 37th and 40th

Infantry Divisions. The 158th Regimental Combat Team, the 13th Armored Group, and the 6th Ranger

Infantry Battalion were to provide

additional support as needed. In reserve were to be the 25th Division and

the 1st Cavalry Division. The Luzon

operation was at first scheduled to begin

on 20 February 1945, but the date for

the landing was later moved forward to

20 December 1944, and then back to 9

January.41

Engineer Planning: Sixth Army

and ASCOM

Engineer long-range planning required

for M-1, the most extensive overland

campaign in the Southwest Pacific, in

which some 250,000 men were to be engaged, was considerable. Every possible

angle of terrain intelligence had to be

39

 Ibid., pp. 315ff. 40

 Ltr, Heiman to C Staff Br, 11 Sep 50. SWPA

Files.

41

 (1) See Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the

Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1963), Chapter II, for a discussion of the over-all plan of the invasion of Luzon.

(2) Engr, Sixth U.S. Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign,

p. 1. SWPA Files.
588 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

studied; maps, and especially aerial

photographs, had to be scrutinized with

great care. The fact that the Philippines

had been an American possession was a

decided advantage. But almost all the

engineers who had firsthand knowledge

of the terrain of Luzon were prisoners of

the Japanese. Except for Casey, Sturgis,

and a few others who had served in the

Philippines before the war, Luzon was

unknown country to the men who had

to plan and prepare for the coming drive

to Manila.

Members of the Engineer Section,

Sixth Army, assisted by a number of

men from Col. Orville E. Walsh's 5202d

Construction Brigade, began preliminary

planning on 19 September for a landing

at Lingayen Gulf and a drive down the

Central Plains. A study of the Lingayen

Gulf area indicated that the best beaches

by far were on the eastern shore to the

south of San Fernando. But behind

them was a narrow coastal plain, and, in

back of it, stood precipitous mountains.

(Map 29.) Not only could that part of

the gulf be easily defended, but also an

invading force would have great difficulty

in maneuvering on the plain, which at

its southern end narrowed to a width of

less than a mile. Farther south, near

the town of San Fabian, the beaches appeared to be less desirable but still fairly

adequate. LST's could probably make

dry landings at a number of points.

Southwest of San Fabian, the beaches

were poor. Aerial photographs showed

waves breaking from 300 to 500 feet

from shore, indicating either that shoals

existed or that the surf was heavy. The

western shores of Lingayen Gulf could

not be considered as possible sites because of reefs, poor beaches, and rocky

terrain close to shore. All things considered, the most favorable landing area,

from the tactical point of view, included

that part of the gulf which stretched

from San Fabian to the mouth of the

Agno River. The beaches had drawbacks, but these were more than offset by

the fact that intelligence information

indicated the Japanese would probably

offer little resistance to a landing made

there, whereas they would almost certainly make a determined stand along the

eastern shores of the gulf.42

For the engineers, the plan of assault

had advantages and disadvantages. The

beaches from San Fabian to the mouth of

the Agno, the most favorable from the

tactical point of view, had decided drawbacks, the most serious of which were

shallow water and heavy surf. The terrain in back of the shoreline was hardly

more promising. Inland, for a distance

of from two to five miles, were meandering rivers, tidal estuaries, rice paddies,

fish ponds, and swamps. But once past

these hindrances and on dry ground, an

invading force would encounter few

natural obstacles on the way to Manila.

On the western side of the central Luzon

range, the Central Plains had their dry

season from November to mid-May.

The engineers would not have to contend

with excessive rains as on Leyte; if anything, dust would be a nuisance. Lines

of communications, while not plentiful,

were probably adequate. Highway 3, a

two-lane, all-weather road, partly concrete and partly asphalt, as well as a

number of one-lane, dry-weather, graveled roads, led from the gulf to the

42

 Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.

7-8.

590 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

capital. While these thoroughfares undoubtedly had deteriorated during the

Japanese occupation, they could probably still take military traffic. Some

twenty-five airfields were in the Central

Plains, but only one—Clark Field—had

well-developed runways; the others were

landing strips with little or no surfacing,

and on the whole, were suitable for

dry-weather use only. Like the Japanese in 1941, the Americans would have

to cross two large rivers—the Agno, flowing into Lingayen Gulf, and the Pampanga, which emptied into Manila Bay.

The remaining streams in the plains

could probably be fairly easily forded at

a number of places during the dry season, especially if the campaign began

after the season was well along. On the

whole, the plains would probably present

fewer natural obstacles to the U.S. Army

with its superior equipment than they

had to the Japanese.43

While combat engineer requirements

would probably not be unusually heavy,

a major concern for the first time—more

so than for Leyte—was bridging. Two

problems loomed: how to get the Army

across the numerous water barriers in

back of the beaches, especially in the

western half of the assault area; and how

to get the troops across the principal

rivers farther down in the Central Plains.

How many bridges would be intact or

but slightly damaged was uncertain. If

Japanese demolitions were as inept as

heretofore, numerous structures would

probably still be serviceable or could be

quickly repaired; however, it was known

that many spans wrecked in the retreat

in the last weeks of 1941 had not been

restored and that some of those rebuilt

could not carry more than 10-ton loads.

It could also be assumed that quite a

few spans still intact would be destroyed

by U.S. bombers before the assault landings at Lingayen Gulf began.44

Sturgis was especially concerned over

the shortage of bridging units and

equipment. He still had only the

heavy ponton battalion and the three

light ponton companies which had been

on hand for the Leyte operation.

Urgently needed were additional units,

including at least one with treadway

bridge equipment. Since indications

were that the number of bridging units

would be too small, Sturgis planned to

make intensive use of what was likely to

be available. To cross rivers which

emptied into Lingayen Gulf, infantry

support rafts and LCM's would be used

as ferries. In addition, the Engineer,

Sixth Army, planned to have the decks

of all cargo ships loaded with Navy

ponton cubes, to be assembled, if necessary, into 240-foot rafts. Each engineer

battalion, combat as well as construction,

was to have 150 feet of double-lane Bailey

and 200 feet of timber trestle bridging,

both types combat-loaded. As Sixth

Army advanced down the Central Plains,

repeated use was to be made of the floating bridges on hand. Sturgis planned to

replace them with semipermanent structures as soon as possible and leap frog

the floating equipment forward. This

would mean constructing fixed bridges

43

 (1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign,

p. 8. (2) Sturgis, Speech Made at Engr School, Ft.

Belvoir, 4 Apr 47, (MS). SWPA File M346. (3)

Lt. Col. James B. Lampert, "Combat Engineering—

Lingayen to Manilla," The Military Engineer,

XXXVIII (April, 1946), 143-44. 44

 Sturgis comments on draft of this chapter.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 591

in "half the usual minimum time."

Sturgis believed this procedure would

serve to get the Army across the Agno,

but thereafter engineer units would be

under considerable strain to replace

floating bridges with semipermanent

bridging fast enough to keep up with

the advancing infantry. Matters would

become especially critical when the

troops reached the Pampanga and the

major rivers beyond it; a severe shortage

of floating bridging might easily develop.

Sturgis asked Krueger to request more

bridging units from the United States.

Sixth Army engineer plans called for one

light ponton company assigned to each

corps and one heavy ponton battalion,

together with one light ponton and one

treadway bridge company, assigned to

army; eventually, more units would be

needed. MacArthur requested additional units, but it was realized the

chances were they would not arrive for

three or four months and then perhaps

without their equipment. The insufficient number of bridging units and

equipment, the delay in airfield construction on Leyte, and the Navy's

request for more time to make preparations were the principal reasons for the

postponement of M-1 from 20 December to 9 January.45

ASCOM began planning for M-1 at

Hollandia on 25 September, when a

number of Leyte planners were reassigned to the new operation. They

were scheduled to remain at Hollandia,

in order to continue work on M-1 after

the rest of ASCOM left for Leyte. General Casey directed that planning was

". . . to conform generally" with that

"employed for the K-2 operation. . . ."

On 6 October ASCOM sent Sixth

Army a "tentative plan outlining

[ASCOM] responsibilities in the operation."

 46

 Sixth Army approved it with

slight modifications. Thereafter, planning was largely a matter of filling in the

details. ASCOM was to be responsible

at Lingayen Gulf for the construction of

Base M, which was to support the drive

of the combat forces to Manila. The

base's operations would be of short duration; after the capital city was taken, a

more permanent base would be built in

the Manila Bay area.47

A question arose with regard to the

5202d Construction Brigade. Casey

wanted it assigned to ASCOM, as the

5201st had been on Leyte; Sturgis believed it would be advantageous to have

the brigade with its numerous construction units assigned to army, so that it

could be used in direct support of a

rapid drive on Manila. Since Base M,

in any event, was soon to be superseded

by the Manila base, construction requirements for the former would probably not

be so extensive as for Base K on Leyte.

Asked to decide the matter, Krueger

placed the 5202d under army.48 With

the Japanese Air Force already in a

seriously weakened condition, airfield

requirements, in particular, were less.

On Leyte, ASCOM had been charged

with building four all-weather fields.

At Lingayen, it was to have a temporary

runway, 5,000 feet long, ready six days

after the landing, and it was to have two

45

 (1) Ibid. (2) Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, ch. II, pp. 12-14.

46

 1st Lt John Mussachio, CAC, Hist of ASCOM,

26 Dec 44-13 Feb 45, pp. 2-3. SWPA File A154. 47

 Ibid., p. 3. 48

 Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 7.
592 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

all-weather strips finished in fifteen days.

Dock construction requirements, likewise, were less than on Leyte. Because

needs were less, ASCOM's organization

for M-1 was smaller than for K-2 and

it had fewer engineer units assigned to

it. ASCOM had fifteen aviation battalions for Leyte, but only nine for

Lingayen Gulf. Still, the number of

aviation battalions available for M-1

was no less than for K-2, since the battalions ASCOM lost had come under

Sixth Army control along with the

5202d Construction Brigade.49

Engineer amphibious operations at

Lingayen Gulf were to be the most extensive so far carried out in the Southwest

Pacific. They were assigned to the 4th

Special Brigade, which was reinforced

with two boat and shore regiments from

the 3d Brigade. Each boat and shore

regiment, supporting one division or

independent regimental combat team,

was to function under the direct control

of the unit to which it was attached.

The amphibian engineers made arrangements with the Navy for the shipment of

engineer landing craft aboard assault

vessels to the target area for arrival on

S-day; 69 craft were allotted to I Corps,

84 to XIV Corps, and 25 to the 25th

Division and other units of the reinforcement group. During the landings,

Colonel Hutchings, commander of the

4th ESB, was to act as a special staff

officer to General Krueger and as such

was to be mainly responsible for keeping

a close check on unloading operations

and apportioning landing craft to the

beaches in such a way that the discharge

of cargo would be expedited to the

greatest degree possible.50

Assault

The assault was made as planned on 9

January at Lingayen Gulf on a series of

beaches fifteen miles long. The 37th

and 40th Divisions of XIV Corps landed

on the right; the 6th and 43d Divisions

of I Corps on the left. The remaining

units of the attacking force, standing by,

were to come ashore within the next

few days. As the troops in their landing

craft neared shore, there was singularly

little enemy opposition—only sporadic

artillery fire and occasional aerial attacks. Sturgis, aboard one of the vessels

of the convoy, saw only two enemy aircraft, one at dusk on S-day, making an

unsuccessful suicide attack on the landing fleet, and another two days later,

engaged in reconnaissance.51

Amphibious Operations

As planned, the amphibian engineers

landed troops of XIV Corps on the right.

The 544th EBSR, supporting the 37th

Division, brought its first infantrymen

ashore at H plus 10 at Yellow Beach,

farthest to the east in the XIV Corps

area. The weather was fair, but the

seas were rough and the beaches poor.

Thirty-five feet in back of the low water

line was a dune up to ten feet high,

49

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

165. (2) Sturgis comments on draft of this chapter.

50

 4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, 1 Dec 44-31 Jan 45.

(2) Ltr, Krueger to Hutchings et al., 23 Nov 44.

Both in SWPA File E48. 51

 (1) Barbey, Rpt of the Lingayen Opn—San

Fabian Attack Force, 12 Feb 45, pp. 16-17. SWPA

File 82. (2) Sturgis comments on draft of this

chapter.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 593

which made the construction of roads

inland difficult. On the second day, the

seas became so heavy that a number of

LCVP's were broached and the unloading of landing craft became almost

impossible. The beach was so unsatisfactory that a new one had to be found;

after some reconnoitering, the 544th

discovered a likely site along the banks

of the nearby Dagupan River and transferred its unloading operations to that

point.52

To the west was Orange Beach. Here

the 594th EBSR landed the 40th Division. Some random rifle fire was received from the shore and during the

first night several air raids occurred in

the course of which enemy planes

dropped a few bombs. More hampering than the enemy was the surf. LST's

could get no closer than 200 feet from

shore. Causeways of ponton cubes

placed from the LST's to the beach made

dry landings possible, but the seas became so rough that the causeways could

not be kept in place. Orange Beach

was abandoned and the 594th sent its

landing craft to discharge cargo along the

banks of the Calmay River, which

paralleled the coast about two miles

inland. On the far right of the XIV

Corps landing area was Green Beach,

which was reserved for service units and

the unloading of bulk cargo such as

landing mat. On the second day two

companies of the 594th came ashore and

began unloading LCM's and LCVP's,

but shallow water made the job hard.

The amphibian engineers at this beach

were handicapped by their lack of

ponton cubes for causeways and bulldozers for the building of ramps.53

In the I Corps area, the problems were

of a somewhat different nature; the surf

was not so high, but the water, in most

places, was too shallow for satisfactory

unloading. On the right were Blue

Beaches 1 and 2. Here the 543d EBSR

brought in the 6th Division. The Japanese at first did nothing to oppose the

landing except to put some ineffectual

rifle fire on the beach. Shallow water

prevented LCM's from coming close to

land; most were grounded about 300

feet offshore. The Japanese Air Force

went into action and strafed the beach,

inflicting some casualties among the

amphibian engineers. On the second

day the seas became rough, with waves

up to six feet high, and many landing

craft floundered. During the succeeding days, as the surf subsided, supplies

could be brought ashore in large

quantities.

To the left, at White Beaches 1, 2, and

3, the 533d and 543d ESBR's found landing conditions favorable except on the

right. Attempts to land LST's and

LSM's here were futile because of the

shallow water and fairly heavy surf.

Unloading had to be shifted to the left

part of the beach. Japanese resistance

was more in evidence at the White

Beaches. On the first day a number of

boats were hit by mortar shells, and during the following days the enemy laid

down mortar and 75-mm. and 240-mm.

artillery fire, in the course of which the 52

 (1) 4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, 1 Dec 44-31

Jan 45. (2) Heavey, "Down Ramp," The Military

Engineer, XXXVIII (December, 1946), 519-25. (3)

Rpt, Engr Sixth Army, Luzon Campaign, pp. 22, 28.

53

 Heavey, "Down Ramp," The Military Engineer,

XXXVIII (December, 1946), 519-25.
594 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

shore party suffered a number of casualties. Because of the rough seas in

the XIV Corps area and at the Blue

Beaches, a considerable amount of

shipping was diverted to the White

Beaches. Some confusion and delays

resulted, but not of sufficient importance

to affect subsequent operations.54

The amphibian engineers assisted in

the landing of one additional unit. On

the far left, the shore battalion of the

534th EBSR helped bring in the 158th

RCT on Red Beach on S plus 2. The

Japanese offered more resistance here

than on any of the other beaches, placing

heavy artillery fire on the men coming

ashore, and causing numerous casualties.

The enemy also used small suicide boats

filled with explosives, but these did little

damage. The 25th Division, the 13th

Armored Group, and the 6th Ranger

Battalion came ashore on White and

Blue Beaches on S plus 2 in landing craft

operated by the Navy.55

On the whole, enemy opposition had

been surprisingly light. The amphibian

engineers had fewer casualties than had

been the case at Leyte, Biak, or Wakde.

Japanese air strength was noticeably

weak—the high surf and shallow water

gave the most trouble. In the days after

the first landings, the amphibian engineers continued unloading supplies and

gave increasing support to the logistical

development of the Lingayen Gulf area.

They helped construct unloading facilities and built roads and supply dumps.

They extended the scale of these activities when they passed from the control of

corps and divisions to ASCOM on 19

January.56

Combat Engineer Support

In the egress from the beaches and the

subsequent drive down the Central

Plains, combat engineer support was furnished by the divisional combat battalions and by engineer units assigned to

the two corps and to the 5202d Engineer

Construction Brigade under Sixth Army.

Five divisions, an RCT, and an armored

group took part in the initial advance.

XIV Corps with the 37th and 40th Divisions was on the right; I Corps with the

6th, 43d, and 25th Divisions, the 158th

Regimental Combat Team, and the 13th

Armored Group was on the left. XIV

Corps, scheduled to advance directly on

Manila, was to bear the brunt of the

drive. I Corps, responsible for protecting the left flank, was to drive across the

island in a southeasterly direction toward Dingalan Bay. General Krueger

believed that the Japanese, having expected a landing on the eastern shores

of Lingayen Gulf, would have strong

positions in the mountains to the northeast of the Central Plains, a view already

partly substantiated by enemy interference with the landings on the far left,

and to be still further substantiated by

the stubborn resistance which I Corps

was to meet in a number of places as it

drove ahead. Krueger's great concern

was that XIV Corps should not advance

so rapidly in the face of comparatively

light resistance that it would outrun its

54

 4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, 1 Dec 44-31 Jan 45. 55

 Ibid. (2) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of

SWPA,IV, 542-43.

56

 (1) Ltr, Heavey to Trudeau, 30 Jan 45. SWPA

Files. (2) 4th ESB, Monthly Hist Rpt, 1 Dec 44-31

Jan 45.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 595

supply lines or expose itself to a flank

attack.57

On the far right, the 40th Division,

supported by the 115th Combat Battalion, was scheduled to advance south from

Lingayen Gulf to Highway 13 and thence

to Highway 3, which led directly into

Manila. Resistance to the landing was

completely lacking. The movement

from the beach was easy; the combat

engineers broke down a bank, about

three feet high, beyond which roads led

to the town of Lingayen, where the

streets, but slightly damaged, easily carried military traffic. Within a distance

of two miles south of the town, two major

rivers had to be crossed—the Calmay

and the Agno; the bridges over both had

been destroyed. The combat engineers

took the troops over in assault boat

ferries constructed by Companies A and

B and in landing craft borrowed from

the 594th EBSR. Within three days

most of the division was across the Agno

and advancing down Highway 13.

Great expanses of wet rice paddies forced

the troops to stay close to the road.

Since smaller bridges, though usually intact, could seldom take more than 3-ton

loads safely, the 115th engineers strengthened them to take thirty-five tons. Only

one large bridge on Highway 13—at San

Clemente—was completely destroyed.

On Highway 3, a most important bridge

—the one over the Tarlac River—had

twenty spans, two of which were partly

demolished; they were repaired in two

hours. Complete destruction of this

bridge would have seriously slowed the

division. Within two weeks the 40th

Division had reached the town of Bamban, sixty miles from Lingayen Gulf and

somewhat more than halfway to

Manila.58

On the left in the XIV Corps area, the

117th Combat Battalion supported the

37th Division in its drive southeast from

Lingayen Gulf to Highway 3. The first

major obstacle again was the Calmay,

about a mile south of the landing area.

The river did not prove the hindrance it

might have been. The bridge which

the division was to use, some 600 feet

long, had 3 spans of 150 feet each and

one span of 120 feet, the latter on the

near shore. The first troops to reach the

site found the Japanese had destroyed the

120-foot span but had left the other 3

intact. The combat engineers on 13

January easily replaced the missing span

with a Bailey bridge. The 37th Division was scheduled to cross the Agno

some twelve miles to the south at Bayambang, where the 300-foot railroad bridge

over the river was only slightly damaged. The engineers on 14 January repaired the piers and placed decking on

the bridge so that it could take 15-ton

wheeled traffic. Two days later the

117th battalion constructed a ponton

bridge capable of taking 13-ton loads.

During the night of 15 January seventeen men of the 530th Light Ponton

Company and twenty-five men of the

117th engineers put a ponton bridge to

take 8-ton traffic across the Agno at

Wawa. Construction was difficult; the

men had no time for a reconnaissance,

and it turned out that a sandbar in the

57

 Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, pp.

226-28.

58

 (1) Hist of the 115th Engr Combat Bn. (2)

Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 28.
596 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

middle of the river forced the engineers

to put up two bridges.

From the Agno to the Pampanga,

bridging for the 37th Division was fairly

easy. The troops used fords extensively.

Where necessary, the combat engineers,

using local material, repaired or constructed timber trestle spans to carry

loads up to sixteen tons; this work, they

reported, constituted up to 75 percent of

their effort during the first two weeks.

The men built some bridges at night,

using lights, sometimes as much as ten

miles ahead of the main line of resistance, and without infantry protection.

Very little effort was required on roads.

Highway 3 had many holes but was

usable for all military traffic. The combat engineers expended time and effort

on developing a two-lane graveled road

east of Highway 3 into a parallel secondary route.59

It was much the same story in the I

Corps area. The 6th Combat Battalion,

supporting the 6th Division in its advance from the beaches to the town of

Urdaneta on Highway 3, had no trouble

at first, even though, as maps and aerial

photographs had correctly indicated, the

beachhead was something of an island.

To the south was the Binloc River, lined

with fish ponds, to the east the Bued, to

the west the Dagupan. LVT's carried

the assault troops across the waterways.

For the supply and support of the troops

the 6th engineers had to bridge the rivers

in the line of the advance. They constructed a 150-foot Bailey across the

Binloc, a major problem being the

marshy ground near the river's banks.

The next big job was getting the troops

across the Agno on Highway 3 near

Carmen. Here was the bridge of thirteen spans, each 160 feet long, one of

which the retreating American and Filipino forces had demolished during the

withdrawal of 1941. The Japanese had

replaced the destroyed span with a timber structure; American bombers sweeping over Luzon before the Lingayen

Gulf landing had destroyed more or less

completely four of the concrete spans.

To get the first troops across the river,

the engineers hired about 250 Filipinos

to build bamboo rafts; the natives put

70 together, but none were needed because the Japanese did not oppose the

crossing. The 506th Light Ponton

Company and one platoon of the 6th

engineers got the job of putting a ponton

bridge across the river and preparing the

approach roads. Before construction

began, Japanese forces reached the

opposite bank and held up work for

about twenty hours. As at Wawa, a

sandbar in the middle of the river bed

required the men to build two floating

bridges. The advance elements of the

6th Division crossed over on 20 January.

Beyond the Agno, the most important

jobs were improving and maintaining

the roads as far as the towns of Guimba

and Cabanatuan.60

Farther to the east, the 118th Combat

Battalion of the 43d Division reported

that it had little trouble. The roads

from the beach crossing swamps and

ponds were "intact." Farther inland,

the main roads were in "excellent condition." The bridges were too flimsy to

take division loads, but railroad bridges

59

 Hist of 117th Engr Combat Bn.

60

 (1) Hist of the 6th Engr Combat Bn. (2) Hist of

the 506th Light Ponton Co.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 597

and embankments, almost everywhere in

excellent shape, were quickly prepared

to take all traffic, and fords were easily

found. The engineers had no difficulty

developing and maintaining an adequate,

even if heavily traveled, road net. The

men, called upon to destroy occasional

obstacles such as pillboxes and barbed

wire entanglements, some of them mined

and boody-trapped, dealt with them

handily. Sometimes enemy infiltrators

tried to disrupt work by planting mines

at the job sites. "The Japs would come

in at night and lay a few mines at random

on a portion of road just constructed and

aside from the harassing effect accomplished little," the 118th reported.61

On the far left were the 65th Combat

Battalion, supporting the 25th Division,

and the 186th Combat Battalion, supporting the 13th Armored Group; both

combat battalions landed on S plus 2.

The 158th RCT, which came ashore the

same day, had no engineer unit. The

65th engineers were active in the San

Manuel-Santa Maria-Umingan area at

the northeast edge of the Central Plains.

They developed about 100 miles of new

roads and trails and strengthened about

fifteen timber bridges. The men

spanned the Agno, no more than a small

stream in this area, with an infantry

support bridge 150 feet long and prepared a ford 400 feet wide nearby for

heavier loads. Since fords were readily

found at all streams, road maintenance

was a far more time-consuming task than

bridging.62

The 186th engineers, in landing, encountered more opposition from the

Japanese than any other combat battalion. The unit came ashore at 1830 on

11 January; about 8 hours later the

enemy began shelling the ships as the

troops were unloading them. Six men

of the 186th were killed and two

wounded; enemy fire was so heavy that

unloading had to be postponed till morning. Since the 13th Armored Group

moved into bivouac, the 186th engineers

had no immediate combat missions.

They improved and maintained some

roads near their bivouac area and

spanned a nearby stream with a Bailey

bridge.63

The combat battalions had an additional construction task which at times

was of considerable importance—the

building of temporary landing strips

needed by artillery liaison planes for

courier service and by transports for the

evacuation of casualties. The men prepared most of these strips with bulldozers. Since the Central Plains had

many level, cleared areas, little earthmoving was required. Large expanses

of dry rice paddies offered the best sites.

In a short time, the troops leveled off

irrigation dikes and prepared a smooth

surface. "Dry weather airdromes across

rice paddies," Sturgis wrote to Somervell,

"was the easiest thing that we have had

fall in our lap in the last two years. . . ."

 64

Mines and Obstacles

The troops found few mines at the

beaches or on the routes leading inland

to the main highways of the Central

61

 Hist of the 118th Engr Combat Bn. 62

 Hist of the 65th Engr Combat Bn.

63

 Hist of the 186th Engr Combat Bn. 64

 (1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.

79-80. (2) Ltr, Sturgis to Somervell, 28 Jan 45.

Sturgis File 84.
598 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Plains. No units except the 118th engineers reported encountering any in

quantities. It was only after the troops

had advanced far down the Central

Plains that they ran into fairly large

numbers of mines in some areas. Quite

a few were found near Clark Field and

Fort Stotsenburg. At Clark, the 117th

engineers had to deal with approximately

1,300 buried aerial bombs, buried just

deep enough to put the nose fuze even

with the ground. Locating these mines

was easy; not only were the shipping

boxes scattered about in the mined area

but also the plugs were on the ground

nearby. In a few instances, the mined

areas were covered by enemy fire. In

that event, the infantry-engineer-tank

teams went into action. Fire from the

infantry and tanks covered the engineers

probing for mines. The men, as a rule,

disarmed the aerial bombs by hand.

They turned down the arming collar on

the fuze spindle, unscrewed the nose

fuze, and inserted the bomb plug in the

nose-well. Using an A-frame or truck

winch, they pulled the bomb out of the

ground. In the few cases where the

detonaters were jammed, the bombs

were blown in place with explosives.

Troops in the foothills on the east side

of the Central Plains found a number

of mines, including artillery shells, flower

pot and tape measure mines, and some

improvised box mines made of wood or

tin. None were placed in any identifiable pattern, and most were so poorly

camouflaged that they were easily detected.65

The combat troops ran into only a

few roadblocks or similar obstacles, and

most of these, almost invariably consisting of logs or wrecked equipment, had

been hastily put in place. Some machine gun emplacements covering strategic road intersections or bridges had

been constructed, but they were not

manned. On the whole, the obstacles

encountered on the Central Plains were

ineffectual. In the hills west of Fort

Stotsenburg, the Japanese had built

well-entrenched positions. They had

constructed elaborate defensive installations, including caves, many of them

blasted in vertical cliffs and interconnected by tunnels. These positions

were extremely difficult to reduce.

Since they were located on the flank of

the route to Manila, they had more of a

nuisance value than anything else and

did not slow down the advance to the

capital.66

ASCOM

The first elements of ASCOM came

ashore on S plus 1. General Casey,

scheduled to land on S-day, was delayed

until the next afternoon because the

destroyer on which he was aboard had to

escort a crippled transport. Upon landing, he went to Lingayen airstrip, situated between the town of Lingayen and

the sea, where he met Col. Reginald L.

Dean, chief of ASCOM's Construction

Section. Aircraft carrier support was to

be withdrawn seven days after the first

troops hit the beach; this meant an airfield would have to be ready within 5

65

 Memo for Rcd, 117th Engr Combat Bn, 2 Feb

45. SWPA File B78. 66

 Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 79.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 599

days; immediately required was a 5,000-

foot runway.67

Special efforts had been made to

prevent the confusion that had arisen at

Tacloban, where the thousands of tons

of supplies dumped on the runway had

made rapid rehabilitation of the airstrip

impossible. Kenney had prevailed on

MacArthur to call a special conference

shortly before the convoy set sail from

Leyte for Lingayen Gulf. Among those

present were Kenney, Krueger, Casey,

and Sturgis. The conferees agreed that

three fast supply ships loaded with steel

mat were to accompany the assault

echelon and land as close to Lingayen

airstrip as possible on S-day, that one

construction battalion scheduled to land

on White Beach 2 was to be shifted to

Orange Beach near the airstrip, that a

group of ASCOM engineers assigned to

the leading assault wave was to go at once

to Lingayen airfield and stake out the

construction area, and, finally, that the

commanding general of XIV Corps was

to see to it that troops, vehicles, and

supplies were kept away. These arrangements were for the most part being

carried out. However, landing conditions, the nature of the soil at the airstrip, and the degree of enemy resistance

that might develop were unknown

factors; how rapidly construction would

progress was, at least partially, dependent

on them. If soil conditions were not

satisfactory, four additional days might

be needed to make the strip operational.68

Making a quick reconnaissance of

Lingayen, Casey and Dean found the

turf runway badly torn up by the preinvasion bombings. Because of delays

in unloading and congestion on the

beaches, work on the strip could not

begin until the second day of the landing.

At that time 400 Filipino civilians went

to work to remove bomb fragments and

fill craters with sand from the beach.

Three days later one company of the

836th Aviation Battalion began work;

the next day, the remainder of the unit,

two companies of the 1879th Aviation

Battalion, and a number of men from

the 43d Construction Battalion arrived

with a few pieces of heavy equipment.

Little earth-moving was required. As

soon as troops and civilians had smoothed

the surface of the runway, they covered

it with palm fronds and placed steel mat

on top of these. Since the strip was to

be used only temporarily and the subgrade was sand, no drainage system was

installed. Seven days after the landing,

a 5,000-foot steel mat runway, with

undispersed parking areas, was in use.

Without the help of the Filipino civilians, the target date could not have

been met.

On 13 January Filipino civilians,

supplied with hand tools, began work on

a second runway about two miles south

of Blue Beach near the town of Dagupan.

The next day the 828th and 864th Aviation Battalions disembarked and, while

waiting for their equipment to be unloaded, did some work by hand on the

strip. Two days later, with all their

machinery at the site, the men began

construction in earnest. It was soon

evident that a high water table, together

with spongy soil, made the location

undesirable, even for dry-weather opera67

 Unless otherwise indicated, this account of

ASCOM activities in the Luzon Campaign is based

on History of ASCOM, 26 December 1944-13 February 1945. 68

 Sturgis comments on draft of this chapter.
600 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

tions. A reconnaissance team found a

better site west of the town of Mangaldan.

The 1876th Aviation Battalion began

work here on the night of 17 January.

With no specific instructions from

higher headquarters as to how to proceed, the unit went ahead on its own.

Since the water table was only eighteen

inches below the western end of the

runway, the men were careful not to

disturb the surface of the rice paddies,

except where necessary to remove dikes

and pull out shrubs and small trees.

The dry clay made a firm, hard surface.

By the time the runway was operational,

the tactical situation was so much better

than had been expected, and the weather

outlook was so favorable, that the original

directive calling for two all-weather airfields was replaced by one calling for

two dry-weather runways only. The

uncompleted strip at Dagupan, 4,500

feet long, was satisfactory for cub planes

and transports.69

A most important responsibility of

ASCOM was the erection of storage

tanks for gasoline. During the first

days of the landing, all such installations

were to be of a temporary nature, their

function to supply airstrips at Lingayen

and Mangaldan and the needs of the

troops in the beachhead area. Plans

called for fourteen barges to discharge

bulk petroleum fuel through temporary

lines to 500-barrel tanks on shore. Because of the heavy surf, the only possible

site for such tanks with their pipelines

was on the Dagupan River near the town

of the same name, but even here problems arose because the surf, together with

a sandbar, slowed the movement of

barges into the river. Nevertheless,

within nine days, a temporary system

consisting of one 500-barrel tank for

aviation gasoline, connected by pipeline

with a barge anchored in the Dagupan

River, was supplying Lingayen Drome.

A second pipeline was under construction from the Dugupan River to Mangaldan Drome.

From 16 to 31 January ASCOM

engineers began construction of more

permanent facilities at a number of

places in the Lingayen area. Undertaking repair of a marginal wharf in the

Dagupan River, they had it ready for use

by 24 January. Because of the heavy

surf and the lack of suitable sites, they

did not try to build small-ship docks

or lighter jetties (other than fuel)

at Lingayen Gulf. ASCOM engineers

maintained and improved more than

forty miles of roads and rehabilitated

thirty-five miles of railroad in the

Base M area. The many ASCOM projects were built without undue delay,

despite such major obstacles as poor unloading conditions. Equally annoying

was the improper loading of ships.

Many urgently needed items were at the

bottom of the holds, many crates were

broken and great quantities of supplies

were damaged. Ten thousand pipeline

couplings arrived from the United States

without bolts. The Sixth Army engineer reported that "more difficulties

with respect to unloading bulk petroleum supplies were encountered during

this period than ever before in the

theater." Nevertheless, ASCOM managed to finish a number of projects on

time and some ahead of schedule. The

rapid advance of the troops down the

69

 (1) Hist of the 1876th Avn Bn. (2) Engr Sixth

Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 29.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 601

Central Plains and the imminent capture

of Manila were sufficient indication that

Base M would not be needed long. For

28 days, ASCOM functioned as the construction agency of Sixth Army. On

13 February it was transferred to

USASOS and redesignated Luzon Base

Section. Casey returned to his post of

Chief Engineer, GHQ.70

Army and Corps Engineers

A substantial number of engineers

were assigned to army and the two corps

—about 8,100 to army and 8,000 to each

of the corps. The primary mission of

army and corps engineer units was to

provide facilities of a more substantial

nature than those supplied by divisional

combat battalions. Corps units followed

closely behind divisional units, improving such construction projects as was

necessary, thereby enabling divisional

units to move on in direct support of

their combat elements. Since corps

engineer staffs were small, the two corps

engineers, Col. W. D. Smith of XIV

Corps, and Col. Herbert G. Lauterbach

of I Corps, were each given an engineer

group headquarters to function as an

operations section staff. To help get the

troops across rivers, each corps had been

given a bridging unit: XIV Corps, the

530th Light Ponton Company, and I

Corps, the 510th Light Ponton Company. As soon as possible, army units

took over from corps units, thus enabling

the latter to keep up with the divisions.

In the army area, construction units

were under Colonel Walsh's 5202d Engineer Construction Brigade. Assigned

to the brigade were three bridging units

—the 556th Heavy Ponton Battalion,

the 506th Light Ponton Company, and

the 1011th Treadway Bridge Company

—and five aviation battalions, the latter

units responsible for building both runways and fixed bridges. Lauterbach and

Smith were to ask for army engineer support if needed; they kept abreast of

general developments through their

liaison officers in the army engineer

section. In the first days of the M-1

operation, Colonel Walsh sent reconnaissance parties into the corps areas to

get intelligence information, locate construction brigade units as they landed

and issue orders to them, and co-ordinate

the distribution of floating bridge equipment. Since important engineer information was frequently not sent in time

over the Sixth Army radio net, Sturgis

had arranged to have the Signal platoon

of the 4th Special Brigade set up its own

radio net and operate it to secure data

promptly from corps and divisions—an

arrangement which was to prove highly

advantageous. In the rapid advance

down the Central Plains, most of the

more complicated jobs, particularly

bridging, begun under corps direction,

were soon transferred to army. Increasing numbers of Filipino civilians were

hired to help the troops, particularly in

the army area, where the most extensive

construction was necessary. "Between

the corps rear boundary and the Army

Base boundary is where the big slug of

work on the communication lines, roads,

bridges, and railroads lies," Sturgis wrote

Brig. Gen. Francis K. Newcomer in late

January.71

70

 Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 34. 71 (1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.
602 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

A most important mission of the

bridging units, whether army or corps,

was to put floating bridges across rivers

to take the heavier divisional loads and

the great quantities of supplies needed

to support the advance of the combat

units. Requirements were especially

heavy in the maze of rivers in the Lingayen Gulf area; two waterways in particular needed more substantial bridges—

the Calmay and the Agno. With the

arrival on 10 January of the 1011th

Treadway Bridge Company, though

without most of its equipment, more

rapid forwarding of ponton bridging

was possible.

One of the longest floating bridges to

be constructed was the 396-foot steel

treadway across the Calmay south of

Lingayen, where the 40th Division had

crossed on rafts and ferries. Company

A of the 556th Heavy Ponton Battalion

was given this job on 11 January. The

bridge was open to traffic at 0930 of the

13th. On 17 January the battalion was

ordered to put a heavy ponton bridge

across the Agno at Wawa, where the

37th Division had crossed. Company B

completed it at 1600 of the next day; 240

feet, the ponton bridge was connected to

a trestle bridge 60 feet in length. Meantime, the railroad bridge across the Agno

at Bayambang, one span of which the

117th Combat Battalion had repaired to

enable the division to cross, was not satisfactory for heavy loads. On 18 January the 556th received orders to put a

treadway across the Agno near the railroad bridge. To get material, the men

dismantled the recently completed treadway across the Calmay and transported

it thirteen miles to the new site. Begun

just before noon on 20 January, the

new bridge, with the help of Company

A of the 1011th Treadway Company, was

completed at midnight on the same day.

The 863d Aviation Battalion began work

on 22 January on an unusual floating

bridge across the Agno—one made up of

Navy ponton cubes. This bridge, really

a floating causeway, consisted of three

sections of thirty pontons each, floated

into place, with the two end sections

anchored to clusters of piling driven into

the north and south banks of the river.

The men finished this floating causeway,

together with its approaches, on 27

January. The structure, while generally

satisfactory, required continuous maintenance because of the hinges breaking

in the center. The process of taking up

bridges and moving them forward was

well under way by 20 January, when

Sverdrup reported, "Treadway bridging

is replacing floating bridging as rapidly

as possible and the floating bridge material is being brought forward."

 72

Meantime, army engineer units were

repairing wrecked bridges and putting

in semipermanent spans to speed the

forward movement of both ponton

and treadway bridging. Semipermanent

fixed bridges, capable of carrying loads

up to thirty-five tons, were provided in

several ways. Since Japanese demolitions were usually not expert, the most

common way was to repair the partially

demolished concrete or timber structure.

7, 232-33. (2) 5202d Engr Constr Brigade, M-1 Opn.

SWPA File B95. (3) Ltr, Sturgis to Newcomer, 28

Jan 45. Sturgis File 84.

72

 (1) Hist of the 556th Heavy Ponton Bn. (2)

Hist of the 863d Avn Bn. (3) Check Sheet, Sverdup

to CofS et al. GHQ SWPA, 20 Jan 45. SWPA File

M203.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 603

Most bridges required one or more new

spans. If a concrete structure had been

but slightly damaged, the engineers, as a

rule, restored the abutments, realigned

the piers, if necessary, and poured new

slabs, utilizing as much of the reinforcing

steel as possible. Little concrete was

used because of the lack of time and a

shortage of cement. More often the

engineers replaced missing spans with

wooden trestles; a standard design for a

35-ton timber trestle span had been developed before the M-1 operation began.

Since the Central Plains had practically

no trees, materials consisted generally of

timbers salvaged from the wrecked

structures or taken from local stocks.

Most wooden bridges required additional bracing. Bailey bridging was

preferred on long narrow spans, where

the height of the bridge or the condition

of the stream had made the use of piling

uneconomical. Bailey bridging was very

effective and made for "great economy

of time and effort." The troops had no

serious trouble launching such bridging,

even though most of them had had no

experience with it except in training.

Since the Japanese frequently destroyed

a highway bridge, but left a nearby railroad bridge intact, numerous railroad

bridges were reconstructed or repaired

with additional decking to permit both

trucks and trains to cross within a short

time.73

The five aviation battalions assigned

to the 5202d Construction Brigade were

mainly responsible for building semipermanent bridges or repairing demolished structures to permit them to take

loads up to thirty-five tons. The aviation engineers often repaired smaller

bridges with timber trestle spans; for the

larger structures they used Baileys to

replace the demolished sections. In

some instances, they built entirely new

timber trestle bridges. The 1876th

Engineer Aviation Battalion from 14 to

18 January put in a new 274-foot long

pile-trestle bridge across a waterway

between San Fabian and San Fernando,

using salvaged timbers and coconut logs

cut on the spot; the 340th and 118th

Combat Battalions furnished the pile

drivers. More often, however, the engineers repaired, as quickly as possible, the

partially wrecked bridges left by the

Japanese. The 841st Aviation Battalion, for example, repaired two large

structures on Highway 3, one north, the

other, south of Bamban. The battalion

restored the bridge across the Cutcut

River north of the town by putting in

two 75-foot trestle approaches and erecting a 90-foot Bailey; south of the town,

it spanned the Bamban River with a 410-

foot Bailey, making use of the piers,

which had been left in place. North of

Angeles, the 841st Engineers repaired

existing concrete spans and constructed

a 350-foot H-20 bridge.74

One of the major jobs was the reconstruction of the badly damaged bridge

across the Agno near Carmen, the longest in the Philippines, which the 6th

Division had bypassed. The 1876th

and 1913th Aviation Battalions got the

task on 21 January; the 1913th was assigned the northern half, the 1876th, the

73

 Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.

55, 63.

74

 (1) Hist of the 1876th Avn Bn. (2) 5202d Engr

Constr Brigade, M-1 Opn, pp. 54-55. SWPA File

B95.
604 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

southern. Plans called for a good deal

of work. The four demolished spans

were to be replaced with Baileys, and

the pile-bent span was to be reinforced

to carry thirty tons. Eight of the other

spans needed new members welded in

and old ones reinforced. One cracked

pier had to be strengthened; the severely

damaged concrete decking had to be repaired. The 1876th and 1913th first

salvaged as many parts of the bridge as

possible and sent out parties to scour the

countryside for additional material; they

found some as far as forty miles away.

The four fallen spans posed a considerable problem, because, partly in the way,

they prevented the launching of the

Baileys. Short of oxygen and acetylene

for their blow torches, the engineers used

explosives to remove the wreckage; the

flying debris endangered the pneumatic

floats of the nearby ponton bridge. Preparing to do extensive blasting one night,

the men disconnected the 273-foot long

floating bridge from its abutments and

let the current carry it 600 feet downstream; the next morning, they returned

it to its original position. In the meantime the obstructing wreckage had been

blasted away. To fill the two gaps left

by the wrecked spans, the men launched

two Baileys, each 330 feet long and supported on a center pier. Repair of the

damaged truss members was a complex

undertaking; 74 of the truss members,

including 20 stringers, had to be replaced, and 32 needed major repairs.

The 1913th engineers reinforced the

cracked pier by wrapping a 3⁄4-inch cable

around it. Much work was required on

the decking. The men cleaned out the

holes and filled them with new concrete.

The 1876th reinforced the timber trestle

span with additional bracing; the chief

bottleneck here was getting the timbers.

Repairs were completed on schedule on

4 February, and the ponton bridging was

immediately sent forward.75

Another of the bigger jobs assigned to

army engineer units was the restoration

of bridges on the Manila Railroad.

"Demolitions accomplished by our own

air force bombers during the earlier days

of the campaign were very effective,

especially in the destruction of railway

truss bridges," the 117th Combat Battalion reported. Rehabilitation of the

main line and the restoration even of

partial traffic would help relieve congestion on the overtaxed highways.

ASCOM, assigned this mission initially,

had to limit its efforts, because of high

priority construction at Base M, to repairing bridges on feeder lines near

Lingayen Gulf, but it put a railroad

company to work to restore the tracks

from Lingayen Gulf to Manila.76

Aviation engineer units assigned to

the 5202d restored most of the bridges

on the main line of the Manila Railroad.

The retreating Japanese had left many

of the short spans intact but had partly

demolished the larger structures. A

bridge that required a substantial effort

was the one across the Agno at Bayambang, which the 117th Combat Battalion

had quickly repaired on 14 January to

take fifteen tons. The 841st Aviation

Battalion began work on this structure

75

 (1) Col. John H. Dudley, "Bridge Repairs on

Luzon," The Military Engineer, XL (October, 1948),

pp. 456-58. (2) Hist of the 1876th Avn Bn. (3)

931st Engr Constr Group (Avn), Rpt, Use of Sixth

Army Engr Trs on M-1 Opn. SWPA File B88. 76

 (1) Hist of the 117th Combat Bn. (2) Engr

Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 80.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 605

REPAIRS ON THE CARMEN BRIDGE OVER THE AGNO RIVER

seven days later. A pier, consisting of

two concrete columns, had been severely

damaged. One of the columns was

cracked below the water line; the other

badly sheared. The aviation engineers

constructed coffer dams of sandbags

around the damaged columns and

poured in reinforced concrete. They

strengthened damaged girders by welding steel plates to them. Trains began

crossing the bridge on 30 January. A

second large structure needing repair was

some thirty-five miles to the south over

the Cutcut River near the town of Capas.

Here Company A of the 1879th Aviation

Battalion on 29 January began the job

of replacing three 60-foot wrecked spans

with timber trestles. Company B took

over on 5 February and finished the

work a week later. Five miles to the

south, the bridge at Bamban required

considerable effort. The Japanese had

destroyed three spans at one end of the

structure but had left the piers and the

abutment intact. The 841st replaced

one of the spans with a Bailey and the

other two with a timber trestle structure,

144 feet long. The hardest task was

driving the piles into the rocky stream

bed. The work on the railroad bridges

and tracks produced results. By 29

January the railroad was open from

Lingayen Gulf to Tarlac. "The most

the railroad has gotten behind is about

thirty miles where we had a bad bridge

job over the Agno River which required

repairs to the piers and foundations,"

Sturgis wrote to Newcomer on 28 January, ". . . tomorrow this work will be

completed and we will be up within five
606 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

miles of the front lines with railroad

trains."

 77

Engineer units assigned to the 5202d

Brigade and the two corps had numerous

miscellaneous, but time-consuming, construction jobs. A good deal of work was

necessary on airstrips. Army engineers

further developed four runways which

had been started by divisional engineers;

intended for dry weather use only, they

required no drainage or crowned surfaces. Probably the major airfield rehabilitation job was the restoration of the

concrete runway at Clark Field. This

runway was patched up and made suitable for fighters and transports in short

order. Temporary facilities were developed nearby, including a 7,000-foot runway with a soil-stabilized subgrade and

asphalt surface. One aviation battalion

completed this job in ten days. As far

as possible, construction in the army area

was held to a minimum. Extensive

road repair was not necessary, and tents

and existing buildings were widely used,

so that little new construction was

necessary. Civilian workmen were employed in increasing numbers.78

Supply for Combat

One of the important responsibilities

of army and corps engineers on Luzon

was getting supplies to the engineer

units. In contrast to most previous

supply operations, this responsibility was

fairly well handled in the drive down

the Central Plains. Sixth Army engineers had two depot companies, twothirds of a parts supply company, and

some special service detachments to take

care of supply. Approximately 400

Filipino civilians were hired to help with

the work. Army dumps were in operation by S plus 4; soon thereafter depots

began functioning in the Base M area.

Each depot, covering an area of around

600 acres, received, stored, and issued

about 1,500 tons of supplies daily. Each

advance army depot required some 75

acres. The average distance from army

supply points to regiments and smaller

units was about fifty-six miles. As a

rule, trucks and trailers hauled supplies

forward, but the Manila Railroad was

used to some extent. Sections or platoons of depot companies moved forward

by truck. Stocks in depot areas were

dispersed but not camouflaged. While

organization was much improved and

stocks were more adequate, deficiencies

in training were still pronounced, being

especially noticeable with respect to

handling large quantities of supplies,

loading heavy materials, and planning

space requirements. For the tasks assigned, the number of parts supply

platoons was inadequate.79

Maps for Combat

Providing enough satisfactory maps

for combat on Luzon was even more

difficult than providing them for operations in New Guinea, a situation partly

explained by the comparatively extensive

overland advance which was now neces77

 (1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p.

80. (2) Hist of the 187th Avn Bn. (3) Ltr, Sturgis

to Newcomer, 28 Jan 45. Sturgis Files. 78

 (1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.

79-80. (2) Check Sheet, Sverdup to CofS et al.

GHQ SWPA, 20 Jan 45. SWPA File M203.

79

 Pacific Warfare Board Rpt, No. 33, 13 Aug 45.

SWPA File E123.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 607

sary. The number of map-making units

was not increased for operations in the

Philippines but remained what it had

been in mid-1944. The 648th, the one

base topographic battalion in the Southwest Pacific, continued to produce maps

at its plant in Melbourne. It was

scheduled to move to Luzon in April.

Sixth Army had an army-type topographic battalion—the 650th—for the

hasty production of maps. It had, in

addition, a survey liaison, a map depot,

and a model-making detachment. Each

corps had its topographic company for

hasty photomapping and map production in the field. Both army and corps

units had enough stocks of equipment

to permit them to produce maps from

negatives supplied by the base map

plant.80

From a theoretical standpoint, the

mapping organization in the Southwest

Pacific was adequate, but the war was

being fought in an unusual manner.

Even though working under great pressure, map-making units in the theater

fell considerably short of meeting their

requirements. As in the New Guinea

Campaign, one of the major difficulties

was the short time available for making

maps before the date set for an attack.

It was still the case that aerial photographs could not be obtained in time.

As a rule, a mapping unit, after receiving

aerial photographs, needed from four to

six months to produce accurate maps in

sufficient quantities for target areas as

large as those in the Philippines. For

the Leyte operation, aerial photography

was not received until thirty days before

the initial landing; the same was true for

the assault landing at Lingayen Gulf.81

To help provide maps for the drive

down the Central Plains, the Army Map

Service (AMS) in Washington sent reproduction material based on prewar

surveys. Theater mapping units, since

they had so few aerial photographs,

could do little in the way of producing

more up-to-date maps. Almost all maps

which Sixth Army used in its drive to

Manila were supplied in one form or

another by Army Map Service. Mapping units in the theater were engaged

chiefly in preparing maps from material

furnished by AMS or in reprinting

existing sheets. Many of the maps furnished to combat units were more or less

inaccurate because of changes in vegetation, in the areas under cultivation, and

in the courses of streams. Still, the

maps the Engineers provided proved to

be adequate for the first thirty days of

the Luzon Campaign.

By early February the fighting was

taking some of the forward elements out

of the Central Plains and into mountainous areas, many of which, particularly on

northern Luzon, had not been mapped.

"Much of the heaviest fighting is now in

blank areas on the AMS 1:50,000 series,

and the trend of operations is toward

other unmapped or incompletely mapped

areas . . . ," Lt. Col. H. E. Thomas of

Casey's Intelligence Section wrote on 7

February to Col. Ernest A. Dunbar,

chief of the section. Mapping units of

Sixth Army worked assiduously to make

hasty overprints of the blank areas to

show topography, streams, roads, and

trails in red, but this was admittedly only

80

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

199. 81

 Ibid., p. 198.
608 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

a stopgap procedure which did not result

in good maps. Sixth Army was faced

with the prospect of stopgap maps all the

way to the northern shores of Luzon.

"To say that we have been disturbed,

perturbed and alarmed over the Luzon

mapping picture would be a most modest

statement," Dunbar wrote on 11 February to Maj. Harold F. Drury, commander

of the 1679th Engineer Survey Liaison

Detachment. By this time mapping

units in the theater, working under great

pressure to compile maps from aerial

photographs to support imminent operations in the Visayas and Mindanao, could

devote little time to the preparation of

adequate maps of the more remote parts

of Luzon. At the same time there were

too few depot detachments to distribute

the great quantities of maps the troops

needed.82

In the Philippines campaign, mapping

units were asked to accomplish missions

they could not fulfill. By late 1944 the

inadequate number of maps and the

poor quality of some, together with instances of unsatisfactory distribution,

prompted Brig. Gen. George H. Decker,

General Krueger's chief of staff, to write

to General MacArthur about the state

of affairs. MacArthur did not regard the

situation as critical. General Sutherland in a letter to Krueger explained,

"The Philippines campaign, and the

New Guinea campaign before it, were

planned with a full realization of the

inadequacy and unreliability of existing

maps of the operational areas." He

went on to say, "In each operation where

insufficient time was allowed for compilation of adequate maps from aerial

photography, there have been obvious

tactical advantages in early attack, which

have outweighed the unsatisfactory

mapping situation."

 83

Landings at Subic Bay

and Nasugbu

To support Krueger's Sixth Army

drive down the Central Plains, MacArthur directed Eichelberger's Eighth

Army to make two landings on western

Luzon, one at Subic Bay, northwest of

Bataan Peninsula, and the other near

the town of Nasugbu, about forty miles

southwest of Manila. The purpose of

the landing at Subic Bay was twofold: to

cut off the Japanese troops already on

Bataan Peninsula and to prevent those

on central Luzon from retreating to that

area. The landing at Nasugbu was to

be diversionary; it would draw off enemy

troops from the defense of the northern

approaches of Manila and at the same

time pose a threat from the south for the

Japanese troops in the city. Both operations, to be planned and initiated by

Eighth Army, were to pass to Sixth Army

control soon after they got under way.84

Units of XI Corps—the 38th Infantry

Division and the 34th RCT of the 24th

Division, together with supporting

troops—made the landing at Subic Bay.

The 592d EBSR provided amphibian

support. On 29 January, at 0800, the

82

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Thomas, 18 Feb 45. SWPA

File I15. (2) Ltr, Thomas to Dunbar, 7 Feb 45.

SWPA File I16. (3) Ltr, Dunbar to Drury, 11 Feb

45. SWPA File I15.

83

 (1) Ltr, Decker to MacArthur, 24 Dec 44.

SWPA Files. (2) 1st Ind on above, Sutherland to

Krueger, 18 Jan 45. 84

 (1) CG Eighth Army, Rpt on the Nasugbu and

Bataan Opns, p. 1. SWPA Files. (2) Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 222, 313.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 609

first troops hit the beach. There was no

opposition. The only obstacle was a

sandbar, which the boatmen negotiated

by ramming their craft into it at full

speed and sliding over it. The beaches,

about 100 feet wide, were poor, and most

wheeled vehicles had to be pulled across

because of the loose sand and steep

banks. After the vehicles got beyond

the beaches, they had no trouble reaching Highway 7, at this point only a few

hundred feet from the coast. The next

day, when control of the operation

passed to Sixth Army, the troops were

already well on their way to ZigZag Pass

to the east, where it was believed the

major enemy defensive installations

would be encountered. This view was

correct. In the formidable terrain of

the pass area, the Japanese had for

months been preparing their positions,

which proved to be expertly sited, carefully concealed, and well supplied.85

To drive the enemy from these positions would take prolonged, bitter

fighting. Japanese resistance was exceptionally stubborn. The 113th Engineer

Combat Battalion had to reduce an

unusually large number of defensive

positions, including hundreds of caves,

scores of pillboxes, and innumerable

wooden box and magnetic mines and

bombs used as mines. The combat engineers were so overburdened with the

reduction of fortifications that a construction battalion and a dump truck

company had to be placed on combat

missions. All bridges except a few of

the concrete culvert type had to be

strengthened or replaced. Highway 7,

the main supply route, required a great

deal of maintenance. Eventually, in the

first days of February, the enemy positions at ZigZag Pass were bypassed, and

the troops of XI Corps headed for

Dinalupihan, six miles to the east and

near Manila Bay.

The landing at Nasugbu was the mission of the 11th Airborne Division, reinforced by a small number of service

troops. Organic to the 11th was the

127th Engineer Airborne Battalion.

Though airborne troops participated in

the assault, the landing actually was an

amphibious one. On the morning of 31

January the assault troops came ashore

unopposed on the beach at Nasugbu.

Though the men found no mines or

obstacles, the landing was difficult because the beaches were so poor. Initially grounded on a sandbar in from 5

to 12 feet of water, the LST's, by repeatedly retracting and ramming the beach,

finally managed to get to within 50 feet

of shore, where sand ramps were dozed

out to them. Since no amphibious

engineers were assigned to this operation

until five days later, the division engineers had the mission of unloading

supplies. The 127th Battalion, less one

company, did this work, providing

dumps and exit roads as planned.

As the troops advanced toward Manila,

they encountered an increasing number

of mines, obstacles, and pillboxes. One

stretch of road had five heavy barricades

made of steel roof trusses and wooden

posts about ten feet high; each barricade

extended across the road and about 100

yards beyond on either side to join up

with buildings. The five obstacles were

entangled and interlaced with discarded

85

 This account of the operations at Subic Bay and

Nasugbu is based on the Report, Engineer Sixth

Army, Luzon Campaign, pages 86-101, unless otherwise indicated.
610 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

equipment and barbed wire, and adjacent

areas were mined. The engineers reduced the obstacles under fire by winching the discarded equipment to the side

of the road and using explosives to cut

off the steel and wooden posts even with

the ground. The closer the troops came

to Manila, the greater the number of

mines. Most were either buried aerial

bombs or antiboat mines with acid vial

electric detonators. As was almost invariably the case with Japanese mine

fields, camouflage was poor. In fact, the

enemy had made no real effort to conceal

the mines. Removing them was easy,

but patrolling the fields was an arduous

task, because Japanese infiltrators tried

to place additional mines. Even though

the Japanese had demolished most of the

large bridges, no serious road or bridging

problems occurred. No portable bridging was required. If a bridge was out,

a ford could usually be found; it was

more often the case that the ineptly

wrecked structures could be quickly repaired and traffic routed across. The

127th airborne engineers quickly prepared two cub strips by marking off

sections of highway and removing nearby

telephone and electric wires. The operation continued under Eighth Army

control until 10 February.86

Approaching Manila

The rapid advance down the Central

Plains continued. By 31 January the

37th Division had occupied Calumpit,

and its patrols were well beyond that

town. An additional unit had been

committed to action—the 1st Cavalry

Division, a veteran element of Sixth

Army, "its leaders indoctrinated with

the concept of sweeping maneuver and

aggressive attack." Debarking at Lingayen Gulf on 26-27 January, the division had moved to Guimba, where

Krueger held it in reserve, planning to

commit it when the time came to make

a quick thrust into Manila. That time

arrived when the 37th Division was

crossing the Pampanga at Calumpit.

The 1st Cavalry Division, farthest to the

left in the XIV Corps area, was directed

to make a rapid advance down Highway

5. Meantime, the I Corps divisions were

advancing toward the southeast in an effort to capture San Jose and secure the line

Cabanatuan-Bongabon-Rizal. On the

right flank of the XIV Corps area, the

40th Division was attacking enemy positions in the Zambales Mountains west

of Fort Stotsenburg. On 2 February

patrols of the 1st Cavalry and 37th

Divisions met at Plaridel. Beyond this

point, the 37th Division, driving ahead

along Highway 3, was slowed by the

many demolished bridges, but the 1st

Cavalry Division continued south rapidly

on the east flank.87

In this final dash to Manila, the

tasks of the 117th Combat Battalion of

the 37th Division were particularly

heavy. The rapid advance brought the

capture intact of several bridges south

of Bamban, but it was more often the

case that the bridges were, at least in

part, destroyed. As the 37th Division

neared Calumpit, it was stopped by an

86

 Hist of the 127th Airborne Engr Bn. SWPA

File B33.

87

 (1) Sturgis comments on draft of this chapter.

(2) Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, pp.

239-44.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 611

unexpected waterway not shown on any

maps. Intelligence information available showed a drainage ditch at this

point with pools of stagnant water,

spanned by a double-tracked railroad

bridge. According to the maps, Highway 3 crossed to the east of the railroad

bridge. The new uncharted waterway

was spanned by a bridge carrying both a

highway and a single-track railway line.

Apparently, the Japanese during the

occupation had diverted water into the

drainage ditch and rerouted Highway 3

across the previously double-tracked railroad bridge. Two of the spans had

been wrecked. Something would have

to be done to get the troops across the

Sulipan Canal—the name soon given to

this new obstacle. Company B of the

556th Heavy Ponton Battalion was assigned the job. The heavy ponton

bridging which spanned the Bued River

near Lingayen Gulf was sent for and

arrived at the Sulipan Canal at 0100 on

2 February. The next morning at

1030, a ponton bridge, 240 feet long, was

open to 16-ton traffic. Two days later

the 1879th Aviation Battalion arrived to

begin work on a semipermanent bridge.

Plans called for repairing the slightly

damaged span and replacing the 160-foot

center with Bailey bridging for the highway half of the bridge and for the building of a timber trestle structure for the

railroad half.88

A few miles to the southeast, Highway

3 crossed the Pampanga at Calumpit.

Here were the two bridges Colonel

Skerry's engineers had blown up early on

New Year's Day in 1942. They had not

been repaired. To get the first troops

and supplies across the river, men of the

1279th Combat Battalion in the afternoon of 1 February constructed an M-3

raft of 18-ton capacity and built a dock

on the far shore, 75 feet out into the

shallow water. Later that afternoon

they constructed four infantry support

rafts and built two docks on the near

shore and two more on the far shore.

The five rafts, while efficient, could take

only lightly equipped troops. Heavy

traffic was stalled. XIV Corps staff

engineers rounded up as many cargo

trucks as possible to haul the treadway

bridge spanning the Agno at Bayambang

to the Pampanga, a distance of about

ninety miles. The first trucks inched

their way across the ponton bridge over

the Sulipan Canal while the bridge was

still under construction. Company A of

the 556th meanwhile began work on the

treadway from the far shore of the

Pampanga. After all the dismantled

material had arrived, a check showed it

was too short by 24 feet to span the

river, even though estimates had indicated there was enough. On 3 February four men of the 530th Light Ponton

Company set to work to fill in the 24-foot

gap with M-3 light ponton equipage.

The men connected the two bridges by

submerging the riverward end of the

light ponton bridge and placing the extended treadways from the other bridge

onto the decking. They placed infantry

assault bridge treadways on the ponton

bridge, connecting them with the extended treadways to provide a level

roadway. They lashed balk, treadways,

and rings of the floats together.

88

 (1) Ltr, Robert R. Smith, OCMH, to Col Skerry,

22 May 53. Copy in EHD Files. (2) Ltr, Skerry to

Smith, 19 Jun 53. Copy in EHD Files. (3) Hist of

556th Heavy Ponton Bn. (4) Hist of the 1879th

Avn Bn.
612 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The shortage of treadway delayed completion of the bridge by thirty-six hours;

the combination structure, 480 feet long,

was finished at 1030 on 4 February; it

could carry loads up to sixteen tons.

The mystery of the shortage of the treadway bridging was soon cleared up. In

the dismantling of the bridge across the

Agno in a blackout, one raft, consisting

of two pneumatic floats and 48 feet of

treadway, had broken loose and floated

downstream to Wawa, where it was not

discovered until three days later. As

soon as additional treadway bridging became available, it was substituted for the

light ponton section. Plans were already being prepared for a semipermanent bridge. The 841st Aviation Battalion got the assignment of building a

combination timber-trestle railway-highway bridge, 530 feet long, between the

two demolished structures. This construction would require earth fills at

both ends and the relocation of about

1,000 feet of railroad track.89

Beyond the Pampanga, swampy terrain

and a series of rivers prevented a rapid

advance. The Japanese had not destroyed as many bridges as expected, but

there were many weak and damaged

structures. Much of the wreckage had

not been caused by the Japanese. A

number of bridges had been destroyed

by American and Filipino forces retreating to Bataan in 1941; during the occupation, the Japanese had replaced some

of the spans with weak timber structures,

usually of no more than 10-ton capacity.

American airmen had destroyed several

bridges as a preliminary to the advance

down the Central Plains. The final

thirty miles that the 37th Division had

to cover from Calumpit to Manila had

six or seven rivers, each about 150 feet

wide. All bridges had been destroyed.

The 530th Light Ponton Company was

in close support of the 37th Division over

this stretch; with its light bridging equipment, it provided crossings at each

stream.90

General Krueger had sent the 1st

Cavalry Division to Manila by way of

the left flank in the belief that it would

avoid the swampy terrain of Highway 3

and would cross the shallower reaches of

the rivers flowing into Manila Bay or

would bypass the rivers altogether.

Sturgis had seen to it that the division

was amply supplied with bridging units

and equipment. Supplies of treadway,

which finally had arrived at Lingayen

Gulf in late January in response to the

urgent requests of the previous September, were given the highest unloading

priority and rushed to the 1st Cavalry

Division at Guimba. Bridging and

heavy construction units were readied to

support the division where necessary and

the 8th Engineer Squadron was directed

to provide immediate support, with bulldozers and bridge timbers, for stream

crossings. At this juncture, Maj. Gen.

Oscar W. Griswold, commander of

XIV Corps, wanted to have the 1011th

Treadway Bridge Company with its

equipment transferred to the 37th Division, struggling with the rivers in the

Manila Bay area, but Sturgis persuaded

89

 (1) Hist of the 556th Heavy Ponton Bn. (2)

Hist of the 530th Light Ponton Bn. (3) 5202d Engr

Constr Bn, M-1 Opn, p. 55.

90

 (1) Hist of the 117 Engr Combat Bn. (2)

Lambert, "Combat Engineering—Lingayen to Manila," The Military Engineer, XXXVIII (April

1946), 146-47.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 613

Brig. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Krueger's

G-3, to have the unit continue in direct

support of the 1st Cavalry Division.

On 1 February, the 1st Cavalry Division crossed the Pampanga on the repaired wooden trestle bridge on Highway

5 two miles north of Cabanatuan. Beyond the Pampanga, the Japanese

offered only light and scattered opposition. The troops crossed many streams

at fords and captured a number of

bridges before the Japanese could destroy them. The one major obstacle was

the Angat River at Baliuag. Company

A of the 556th Heavy Ponton Battalion

was directed to bridge the river with

a treadway. The ponton engineers

reached the site at 0200 on 2 February

and, aided by the 8th engineers, finished

the job at 0930. "The entire division is

waiting to cross," the company commander reported, adding that the men

of Company A had not had any sleep in

forty-eight hours. The advance of the

1st Cavalry Division from Cabanatuan

to Manila was merely a matter of days.91

Preparations were already under way

for the rehabilitation of Manila, a task

for which Sixth Army engineers were

mainly responsible. About a month before the landing at Lingayen Gulf,

Colonel Manzano, a survivor of Bataan,

and engaged in intelligence activities

during the occupation, had been contacted in the Philippine capital and assigned to the personnel section of

ASCOM. Late in January he arrived at

Sixth Army headquarters at Calasiao,

near the gulf, to report on conditions in

the city. The Japanese, preparing to

make a last-ditch stand in Manila, were

expected to turn much of the metropolis

into rubble. Buildings, streets, bridges,

utilities, and port facilities would be a

shambles. Sturgis and his staff began to

make plans and preparations to deal

with the many problems bound to arise.

A special engineer task group, called the

construction command, was to be organized. Sturgis conferred with Colonel

Walsh, who proposed that his executive

officer, Colonel Liles, be put in charge.

The construction command could operate as the advance echelon of the

5202d. Sturgis asked Colonel Dean of

ASCOM to select first-class units from

his organization which might be available. Manzano made his way back to

Manila and worked with the American

intelligence services to help key employees of the municipal facilities escape

from the capital and go to Sixth Army

headquarters at Calasiao.92

On 1 February Colonel Liles was

ordered to Calasiao to take charge of the

new command. His staff consisted of 11

officers, 8 enlisted men, and 2 Filipino

civilians. Eight engineer units were assigned to him, among them the 43d Construction Battalion, the 1876th Aviation

Battalion, the 1504th Water Supply

Company, the 963d Maintenance Company, and elements of the 556th Heavy

Ponton Battalion. Plans were made to

deal with a wide range of jobs which

might have to be done, including the

installation of floating bridges, clearing

and opening the city's main streets, re91

 (1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p.

101. (2) Sturgis comments on draft of this chapter.

(3) Hist of the 556th Heavy Ponton Bn.

92

 (1) 1st Ind, Krueger to MacArthur, 2 May 45, on

Ltr, Liles to Sturgis, 20 Apr 45. Sturgis File 28. (2)

Sturgis comments on draft of this chapter.
614 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

habilitating and operating the water and

electrical systems, furnishing power to

refugee centers and hospitals, fighting

fires, preparing emergency airstrips, demolishing unsafe structures, and removing mines. Special efforts were to be

made to save the key installations in the

city's water supply system, especially

Novaliches and San Juan Reservoirs to

the northeast of the capital, Balara

Filters to the east, and the aqueducts and

pipes carrying water into the city.93

The Capture of Manila and the

Islands of Manila Bay

North of the Pasig

The foremost elements of the 1st

Cavalry Division reached Grace Park in

northern Manila on the evening of 3

February. The Japanese plan of defense was almost immediately apparent.

While offering only light resistance in

the northern part of the city, the Japanese would withdraw across the Pasig,

destroy all the bridges, and make a

strong and, if necessary, suicidal stand

south of the river in the modern reinforced government buildings and in the

old walled section of the city, known as

Intramuros. Operations of the Japanese north of the river were therefore

only a delaying action, the purpose of

which was to enable most of the troops to

get across the Pasig. Demolition charges

had been placed several weeks before on

all bridges and in some important public

and commercial buildings.94 As the

American forces approached, the demolitions were set off. By 6 February the 1st

Cavalry and 37th Divisions had gained

possession of northern Manila up to the

river. "[No] . . . sooner had the leading

elements of the 37th Division reached

the Pasig River," Sturgis wrote, "than

the entire town in the general region of

the Escolta broke into flames and Jap

snipers and saboteurs opened up almost

everywhere in North Manila out to

Grace Park."

 95

 The fires were brought

under control before extensive damage

had been done. Meanwhile, the nth

Airborne Division had entered the

capital from the south. It met heavy

opposition in the Nichols Field area, but

nevertheless pushed slowly forward.

Enemy defenses north of the Pasig

were not strong. Mines and obstacles

were rare. Hastily prepared, they were,

in general, not effective. An elaborate

mine field was found in Laloma cemetery. Along the roads and in between

the graves, the Japanese had placed about

120 depth charges, twenty to thirty feet

apart; they had also mined a road near

the cemetery in the same way. Resembling an ashcan, each of the improvised mines, with about 250 pounds of

explosives, had a fuze in a tube in the

center and an improvised pressure plate

of wood directly in contact with the

firing pin mechanism. The weight of a

man would be sufficient to set the charge

off. Some of the mines were camouflaged with sod, burlap, or earth. To

cover the mine field, the Japanese had

erected pillboxes armed with 25-mm.

93

 (1) 1st Ind, Krueger to MacArthur, 2 May 45,

on Ltr, Liles to Sturgis, 20 Apr 45. (2) Ltr, Liles

to Sturgis, 20 Apr 45. 94

 See Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, Chapter

XIII, for a discussion of the Japanese plans to defend the city. 95

 Ltr, Sturgis to Tyler, 4 Mar 45.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 615

naval guns and had emplaced larger guns

in various strategic positions. The pillboxes, expertly blended with their surroundings, were hard to detect. Some

of them, resembling mounds of earth,

were even sodded and had flowers growing on them and a few were mounted

with crosses. There were many trenches

within the cemetery; dugouts and mausoleums were filled with quantities of ammunition. Expertly constructed, these

various strongpoints were of no value

because they were not manned. Deactivating the mines was no problem.

The engineers disarmed them by removing the wooden pressure plates, taking

out the striker through the well opening,

and then lifting out the firing mechanism and detonator. The 11th Airborne Division, entering Manila from

the south, had similar experiences. In

the Nichols Field-Fort McKinley area,

in particular, mines were numerous,

though most of them were placed in no

pattern. Only one regular mine field

was encountered, about 300 by 1,000

yards in area, but the mines were easily

deactivated.96

The combat engineers were concerned not only with demolitions, but

also with construction and rehabilitation

of airstrips. The first engineers to enter

the Manila metropolitan area went to

work to rehabilitate existing strips and

ready new ones as quickly as possible.

As soon as the 1st Cavalry Division had

taken Grace Park airstrip, elements of

the 8th Engineer Squadron began work

on it to make it usable for C-47's. In

nearby Quezon City the 8th completed a

strip in one and one half days. Though

short and rough, the runway could take

transport planes.97

Crossing the Pasig

On 7 February at 1000, the 117th

Combat Battalion was ordered to reconnoiter the Pasig for sites for an assault

crossing. Reconnaissance parties made

numerous attempts to find likely places,

and despite the rather intense enemy fire,

found several. At noon Company C received instructions to support the 148th

Infantry of the 37th Division in a crossing scheduled for 1400 near Malacanan

Palace. To get enough equipment on

such short notice was not easy. Nevertheless, by the prescribed time the

117th had rounded up thirty assault

boats and had them ready for launching.

During the next hour the artillery tried

to silence enemy guns on the south bank.

At 1500, men of Company C ferried the

first infantrymen across. In five trips

under strong enemy fire, the thirty boats

carried the assault troops over. As soon

as the first men reached the opposite

shore, the engineers built two infantry

support rafts powered by outboard

motors. The rafts would be in continuous use until a floating bridge could

be put across the river. On midmorning of 8 February M-3 ponton material arrived; sixty men from the 530th

Light Ponton Company and fifty from

the 117th engineers were to put a bridge

across the river but were unable to do so

because of the enemy's intense mortar

and machine gun fire. Construction was 96

 Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.

118, 124. (2) Engr Sixth Army, Engr Info Bull 18,

p. 33. SWPA Files. (3) CG Eighth Army, Rpt on

the Nasugbu and Bataan Opns, pp. 22ff. 97 Hist of the 8th Engr Squadron.
616 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

INFANTRY SUPPORT RAFTS ON THE PASIG RIVER

again started late that day and work

continued under cover of darkness.

The bridge was completed at 0100 on

the 9th.98

By this time the first elements of the

1st Cavalry Division were ready to cross

the river. On 9 February the 530th

engineers were ordered to construct a

footbridge near the Philippine Racing

Club to enable the assault troops of the

division to get to the south bank. The

materials arrived at the site at 1500.

The first cavalrymen crossed the river in

assault boats on the morning of the 10th.

Immediately thereafter construction of

the footbridge began. The engineers

placed anchor cables and had the bridge

partly assembled when Japanese troops

suddenly opened up with heavy fire, in

the course of which a number of men

were wounded and some of the equipment was destroyed. Further work on

the bridge was impossible, and the

cavalrymen made no more attempts to

cross the river that day. The next morning they again crossed over in assault

boats. Because of the continued heavy

concentration of enemy fire, the engineers made no further attempt to bridge

the Pasig at this point."

98

 (1) Hist of the 117th Engr Combat Bn. (2)

Hist of the 530th Light Ponton Co. (3) Engr Sixth

Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 118.

99

 (1) Ibid. (2) Hist of the 530th Light Ponton

Co.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 617

South of the Pasig

As the troops converged on the Japanese south of the Pasig, they encountered

increasingly stubborn resistance. The

enemy had built strong defensive positions in the numerous, modern, reinforced concrete government buildings

and behind the heavy walls surrounding

Intramuros. With sandbags, logs, and

steel plates, they had further strengthened the government buildings and the

stone ramparts of the old city. Caves

were numerous. Some streets were

blocked by rows of rails imbedded in

concrete and entangled with barbed

wire; these obstacles were covered by

small arms fire from pillboxes. Mines

seemed to be everywhere. Beach mines

and depth charges were especially plentiful, perhaps because a large number of

the enemy bottled up were naval per

sonnel. So effectively were mine fields

laid that tanks, armored vehicles, and

heavy construction equipment could not

move with safety until engineer troops

had first examined the route carefully

and cleared the mines.100

Destroying the enemy was a slow and

tedious job, primarily a mission of the

infantry, with close engineer support.

Engineer-tank teams were quite effective

in reducing a number of enemy strongpoints, especially caves. To seal some of

these hideouts, charges of over 250

pounds were required. Each fortified

building had to be taken individually.

As a rule, the attacking infantry, protected by fire from tanks, began the assault by throwing grenades into the basement or ground floor. The engineers

next set off explosive charges. The

Japanese almost invariably retreated

from room to room until the last man

was wiped out. To clear mines and

obstacles from the streets, particularly

the narrow lanes of Intramuros, a special

kind of tank-infantry-engineer team was

devised. To eliminate snipers, the infantry occupied the buildings on both

sides of the street where the mines were

located. Then a tank with tow cable

attached moved toward the mines, firing

its cannon straight ahead at enemy positions. Behind the tank came a 4-man

engineer mine disposal squad. When

the tank reached the mine field, it discontinued its cannon fire, but kept up its

machine gun fire at enemy positions.

One of the engineers ran out in front of

the tank, disarmed a mine, attached it to

the tow cable, then ran to the rear of the

tank. The machine backed away, pulling out the mine. Alternate men were

used for each succeeding mine. A welltrained mine disposal man could disarm

a mine in from 10 to 15 seconds. This

method, used often and with no casualties, was nerve-racking work and required frequent relief for the mine

disposal men. "There is no question,"

an engineer report stated, "that the Japanese defensive installations in South

Manila were effective in delaying our

occupation of that area and costly to us

also."

 101

Manila—Rehabilitation

Meanwhile, the rehabilitation of the

capital had begun. On 6 February

Colonel Liles and his staff, together with

100

 Engr Sixth Army, Engr Info Bull 21, pp. 13, 19.

SWPA Files.

101

 (1) Hist of the 117th Engr Combat Bn. (2)

Engr Sixth Army, Engr Info Bull 21, pp. 13, 19.
618 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

the 43d Construction Battalion, 963d

Maintenance Company, 1504th Water

Supply Company, and one platoon of

the 439th Depot Company, had moved

into the northern part of the city and set

up temporary headquarters near Grace

Park. Reporting to General Griswold,

commander of XIV Corps, Liles presented his plans for rehabilitation; they

were approved at once and the engineer

troops of the construction command began work.

One of their biggest jobs was rehabilitating Manila's water supply system. A

major effort had been made to capture

intact the most important installations,

all of them located to the northeast of

the city. Ipo and Montalban Dams and

Reservoirs, farthest from the capital, and

in mountainous areas occupied by the

enemy, were not taken in the first dash

to Manila, but a third reservoir, Novaliches, holding twelve billion gallons,

some ten miles southwest of Ipo, while

heavily mined, was captured intact.

The 13-mile aqueduct from Ipo to

Novaliches was running full, which

probably meant that Ipo was also undamaged. The water gauge on Novaliches showed 5 billion gallons, enough

to take care of Manila through the dry

season. Water from these three reservoirs flowed through aqueducts to Balara

Filters, which the 1st Cavalry Division

took just 30 minutes before the enemy

could set off the demolition charges.

The filters were dirty but undamaged.

From the filters, water flowed into the

new San Juan Reservoir, which had a

capacity of 56 million gallons. Here an

intake and an outlet valve had been

blown; estimates were that repair would

require about a week. The old San

Juan Reservoir nearby, with a capacity

of 50 million gallons, and being used as

a fish pond, was intact. Tests indicated

the water was satisfactory, and although

filters would have to be installed, this

source could be used and the new San

Juan Reservoir bypassed for the time

being. The water lines from the reservoirs to Manila were found unimpaired.

Japanese infiltrators had not given up

trying to damage the installations.

Early in the morning of 11 February an

enemy group destroyed a small section

of the aqueduct running from Novaliches Dam to Balara Filters. Subsequently, two breaks were found in

the mains feeding the city from San

Juan Reservoir. Repairs were begun

promptly. Casey informed MacArthur

on 18 February that the repair of the

lines from the old San Juan Reservoir to

the city would be completed that day,

releasing the 20 million gallons remaining in the reservoir.102

Since so many water mains within the

city had been damaged, distributing

water was no easy task. A number of

water supply points were set up. By the

evening of 11 February, the 1504th

Water Supply Company had 3 in operation, each providing some 30 gallons a

minute, and plans called for setting up

three more immediately. Navy ponton

cubes, mounted on 21⁄2-ton trucks, were

used to carry water to storage tanks in

various parts of the city. By 18 Febru102

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Chaffin, 11 Feb 45. SWPA

File M175. (2) Memo for Rcd, Chaffin, 12 Feb 45.

SWPA File M175. (3) Check Sheet, Casey for MacArthur, 14 Feb 45. SWPA File M203. (4) Of C

Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, VI, 362. (5)

Check Sheet, Casey to CofS SWPA et al., 18 Feb 45.

SWPA File M179.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 619

ary Manila had 31 water points. Between 400 and 500 employees of the

Municipal Water Department were rehired. Manila south of the Pasig posed

a most difficult problem, since all mains

crossing the river had been wrecked.

Fortunately, that part of the city had

some twenty artesian wells. A job of

first priority was to restore the water

mains across the Pasig. The old siphon

under the river was being repaired, and

some 20,000 feet of 4-inch invasion

weight pipe was on order for the repair

of the water mains across the river.103

Colonel Liles and his men had many

other important jobs. The Japanese,

in contrast with their ineffectiveness in

destroying the water supply system, had

almost completely demolished the electrical utilities which supplied light and

power to the capital and its suburbs.

They had in the words of one report,

concentrated on the most "critical units

in the best possible manner." The task

group set to work to provide temporary

sources of power. They rehabilitated

the generating units of a brewery to

make available some 140 kilowatts and

rehabilitated a manufacturing company's

generating plants to produce an additional 900 kilowatts. Liles's men rehabilitated those parts of the electrical

distribution system which were needed

to distribute the power generated by the

temporary power plants. Under fire at

times, the 556th Heavy Ponton Battalion

constructed two treadway bridges over

the Pasig, a third over the Mariquina,

and a fourth over an estero in south

Manila. As soon as the section south of

the Pasig was secured near the Jones

Bridge, two 200-foot Baileys, capable of

taking 35-ton loads, were put across the

river at this point. Liles's units in addition opened up innumerable roads,

cleared some of the dock areas, re-established the city fire department, and

helped clear mines and booby traps.

Because of the work of the Construction

Command, ". . . General Griswold had

little to worry in this respect and could

devote his energies to the rugged tactical

situation."104 The work of the task

force was well in hand by 4 March, when

the fighting for the city was virtually

over.

Corregidor

The capture of the capital city and its

port would mean little unless the islands

at the entrance to Manila Bay were under

American control. Consequently, soon

after the attack on Manila began, the

islands came under assault. First to be

attacked was Corregidor. Highly developed as a fortress before the war,

Corregidor would undoubtedly be

strongly defended by its Japanese occupants. Its capture was assigned to XI

Corps, already responsible for operations

at Subic Bay and on Bataan Peninsula.

Troops of the corps were to make an

amphibious landing at Mariveles, at the

tip of Bataan Peninsula, and, with that

point as a base, were to make both an

amphibious and a parachute landing on

Corregidor. The parachute landing was

to be made by a company of the 503d

103

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Chaffin, 12 Feb. 45. (2)

Check Sheet, Casey to CofS SWPA et al., 18 Feb 45.

104

 (1) Memo, Sturgis for Sutherland, 23 Apr 45.

Sturgis File 28. (2) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engr

Tech Info Bull No. 15, 20 Jun 45, pp. 14-16. SWPA

Files.
620 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Parachute Infantry; the amphibious assault, by the 3d Battalion (reinforced) of

the 34th Infantry. Engineer support

was to be furnished by Companies A and

D of the 592d Boat and Shore Regiment,

Company C of the 161st Airborne Battalion, and two combat units—Company

B of the 113th Combat Battalion and the

3d Platoon of Company C of the 3d

Combat Battalion. These units were to

support the airborne and amphibious

landings and the subsequent combat

operations, which would probably be

aimed mainly at reducing enemy

fortifications.105

The XI Corps task force landed at

Mariveles on 15 February. The infantry pushed rapidly inland and secured

the southern part of the peninsula.

That evening in Mariveles harbor, the

3d Battalion of the 34th Infantry embarked on two LCT's and twenty-five

LCM's, prepared to cross over to Corregidor. The next morning, at 0900,

the first elements of the parachute company dropped on the island. Two hours

later, the first amphibious landing began on the southern shore. The craft

encountered no underwater obstacles or

mines, but enemy machine gun fire was

intense. All engineer craft were hit;

nevertheless, all made successful landings. Completing their missions, they

returned to Mariveles, except six assigned to resupply runs. As had been

expected, enemy defenses on Corregidor

were formidable. The landing beach

was heavily mined and several vehicles

attempting to cross it were wrecked. A

group of engineers, assisted by an infantry mine platoon, rapidly cleared a

passageway through this mine field,

which contained about 130 antiboat

mines. The Japanese had apparently

prepared this field some time before the

landing, but as was usually the case, had

made little or no attempt to camouflage

the mines. A similar field of no discernible pattern was found on the west side

of North Harbor; none of the mines

were armed. On the beaches, along the

trails, and near Kindley Field, antiboat

mines were scattered about, some of

them armed. In general, all were ineffective. Of the many types of mines

found on the island—magnetic and

lunge mines, shaped charges, yardsticks,

and Molotov cocktails—most were still

in packing crates; only the antiboat

mines had been tactically emplaced. Because of the large numbers of shell

fragments on Corregidor, mine detectors

could not be used effectively; but, fortunately, the vast majority of the boat

mines were so poorly camouflaged that it

was easy to locate them. They were

dealt with in one of two ways; they were

disarmed and removed by hand or they

were blown in place with TNT.106

Destroying enemy caves was a different

matter. This was a slow process requiring three weeks of effort by the infantry

and engineers. In the first days of the

assault, the parachute engineers sealed

caves for the airborne infantry. Subsequently, the combat engineers were

called forward as needed. The terrain

105

 (1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign,

p. 146. (2) 3d Platoon Co C 3d Engr Combat Bn,

Encounter Rpt (for the Corregidor Opn). SWPA

File 82.

106

 (1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p.

146. (2) Engr XI Corps, Rpt, Fortifications, Mines,

Booby Traps, and Demolitions on Corregidor.

SWPA File 82. (3) Ltr, Heavey to Trudeau, 20 Feb

45. SWPA Files.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 621

was so rocky and littered with debris

that, as a rule, the only weapons that

could be used were those the individual

soldier could carry. The reduction of

caves was a time-consuming process, despite the fact that caves and tunnels,

seldom mutually supporting, could be

reduced one at a time, and enemy

weapons had only limited fields of fire,

in most cases but a few feet wide. An

effective way to reduce a cave was to fire

rockets or grenades into it, which either

forced the Japanese to come out or retreat to the rear. The demolition

parties would then place the charges at

the entrance. Flame throwers could

seldom be used to advantage. If the

terrain was such that a tank could

maneuver in front of the cave, it would

fire point-blank into the opening, while a

bulldozer gathered a large load of earth

with its blade. As soon as the tank

stopped firing, the dozer pushed the

earth into the mouth of the cave. This

procedure was repeated until the mouth

of the cave was closed.107

Caballo

Two miles south of Corregidor, on

small, rocky Caballo Island, was Fort

Hughes, occupied by an estimated 350

Japanese. On 27 March elements of

the 38th Division, with a platoon of

Company B of the 113th Combat Battalion, made an amphibious landing on

Caballo, supported by Naval gunfire and

land-based artillery. Resistance was

negligible; in two days the island was

overrun. During the next week the

attackers, using flame throwers and explosives, tried in vain to dislodge the

Japanese holed up in the underground

forts. Most of the enemy appeared to

be in what was known as the "mortar pit

area," a fortification with a number of

guns and several bombproof chambers.

The rocky terrain forbade using tanks,

and aerial bombing was out of the question because of the danger to the troops.

A new plan was tried. The 113th engineers fastened two Navy ponton cubes

to an LCM and, attaching a pump with

a hose, filled the cubes with diesel oil

and gasoline. The amphibian engineers

took the LCM to Caballo where, despite

mortar fire, they brought it to shore not

far from the mortar pit area. The combat engineers laid about 600 feet of

4-inch invasion-weight pipe from the

LCM up the cliff and into an opening of

the pit. They pumped in some 2,500

gallons of gasoline and fuel oil and set

the mixture on fire. The flames continued for two hours; from time to time,

small explosions were heard. The next

day, as the American troops approached,

they came under fire from the pit. Apparently the Japanese had left the pit

before the gasoline was ignited and had

returned after the fires burned out.

The combat engineers laid the pipe to

another opening in what was known as

the west pit. Before gasoline could be

pumped in, enemy small arms fire broke

the pipe. It was repaired and gasoline

and fuel oil were then pumped in and

ignited; fires and explosions lasted for

three hours. The next day the Japanese

continued to fire from this pit also.

The engineers thereupon lowered a 500-

107

 (1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p.

146. (2) Engr, XI Corps, Rpt, Fortifications, Mines,

Booby Traps, and Demolitions on Corregidor. (3)

Engr Sixth Army, Engr Info Bull 21, pp. 21-22.

SWPA Files.
622 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

LAYING A PIPELINE TO THE MORTAR PIT, CABALLO ISLAND

and a 250-pound bomb about six feet

into a ventilator shaft and put 550

pounds of TNT in the entrance of a

railroad tunnel. They pumped diesel

fuel and gasoline into both pits. Bombs

and explosives were timed to go off when

the fuel was ignited. A number of

heavy explosions occurred, and small

arms fire was heard in the tunnels, probably ammunition exploding in one of

the magazines. There was no further

sign of enemy activity on the island, yet

weeks later an American officer was

killed by a Japanese sniper.108

Fort Drum

Six miles south of Caballo, on El

Fraile Island, was Fort Drum. Resembling a battleship, Fort Drum had

reinforced concrete sides about 30 feet

thick; its top was 18 feet thick. Its

"deck" had two turrets, each with two

guns; each side had a casemate with two

guns. From the standpoint of the attackers, the fort's vulnerable parts were

its turrets, casemates, stairwells, and

ventilator shafts. It was decided to attack Fort Drum in the same way as Fort

Hughes—that is, with TNT and gaso- 108

 (1) Engr XI Corps to Engr Sixth Army, 13 Apr

45, Rpt, Opns on Caballo Island. SWPA Files. (2)

William F. Heavey, "Amphibian Engineers in Action", The Military Engineer, XXXVIII (February,

1946), 61. (3) Engr Sixth Army, Engr Info Bull 19,

pp. 1-2. SWPA Files.
RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 623

FORT DRUM, JUST BEFORE THE EXPLOSION.

the fort.

At left, engineers are pulling away from

line. The same LCM would be used;

in addition, an LSM, equipped with a

drawbridge, would be needed; it was to

proceed to Fort Drum and swing its

drawbridge to the top of the fort to

permit the men to cross over. Once on

top of the fort, the men were to pack the

TNT and insert the pipe into the turrets

or other openings in order to pump gasoline into the interior. The Navy furnished an LSM for which the engineers

devised a drawbridge. Thirteen men of

the 113th Combat Battalion made up an

"oil and flame" party, and thirteen more

formed a "demolition" party. The 38th

Division again furnished the covering

force and the 592d Boat and Shore Regiment the crew for the LCM.

The assault was made on 13 April.

As the LSM moved up alongside the fort,

the drawbridge was swung into place;

infantry and engineers crossed over.

Occasional small arms fire from the Japanese inside the fort was of no moment.

The demolition party placed 600 pounds

of TNT in the after starboard stairwell,

tamped it with sandbags, and attached a

fuze of primacord. The oil and flame

party considered the after port stairwell

as best for their purpose. The men

signaled the LCM to come up alongside

the fort. They hauled up the hose and

inserted the nozzle in the stairwell, sandbagging it in position. The LCM began to pump gasoline and fuel into the

fort. Lighting the fuzes for the mixture
624 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

and the TNT, the two parties returned

to the LSM. After about 400 gallons

had been pumped, the hose broke.

Some of the men went back, cut the

fuzes, repaired the damaged section of

the hose, transferred the nozzle to a

ventilator shaft, and lit the fuzes once

more. The LCM pumped 2,200 gallons

into the fort and departed; the LSM had

already withdrawn to a safe distance.

At the scheduled time, the TNT detonated and the gasoline ignited. Fragments of concrete and steel shot

hundreds of feet into the air. After

three days the smoldering fort was still

too hot to be examined. Later, sixty

enemy dead were found. Of the attacking force, only two men had been

wounded by small arms fire. The

sturdiness of the fort was remarkable.

Despite the explosion, the turrets and

casemates remained in position; the sides

and top, intact.109

Carabao

The last fortified island in Manila

Bay still held by the Japanese was

Carabao, southwest of Fort Drum near

the Luzon coast, and believed to be

honey-combed with caves and tunnels.

After a preinvasion bombardment, the

1st Battalion of the 151st Infantry and

Company A of the 113th Combat Battalion landed on the island. For about

three hours, infantry and engineers were

busy destroying caves. A violent explosion from an unknown cause killed

5 men and wounded 18. Only 2 dead

Japanese were ever found on the island.

Apparently the garrison had left a few

days before the landing, swimming at

night to the mainland, a distance of only

a few hundred yards.110

109

 (1) Ltr, Engr XI Corps to Engr Sixth Army,

7 May 45, sub: Engr Opns in the Recapture of Fort

Drum (El Fraile Island). P.I. SWPA Files. (2) William F. Heavey, "Amphibian Engineers in Action,"

The Military Engineer, XXXVIII (February, 1946),

61. (3) Engr Sixth Army, Engr Info Bull 19, pp.

11-13. SWPA Files. 110

 (1) The Last Outpost in the Bay, Fall of Fort

Frank, Carabao Island (Draft MS). SWPA Files.

(2) William F. Heavey, "Amphibian Engineers in

Action," The Military Engineer, XXXVIII (February, 1946), 62.
CHAPTER XV

The Final Months of the War

During the last months of the war, the

Allied forces made great strides both in

driving toward the Japanese home

islands and in liquidating the Japanese

conquests made earlier in the war. The

destruction of organized resistance in the

Philippines and Borneo all but severed

the Japanese lines of communication to

the East Indies and southeast Asia, while

the capture of the islands of Iwo Jima

and Okinawa, so close to Japan itself, put

the Empire in gravest danger. In

southern China, the Japanese forces,

which had advanced threateningly in

1944, were, by the spring of 1945, in full

retreat. While enemy forces were being destroyed or were in retreat on the

islands of the Pacific and on the Asian

mainland, the more remote bases were

being dismantled and closed out, but an

enormous amount of base and airfield

construction was still under way, particularly in the Philippines and on

Okinawa, for the purpose of supporting

an invasion of Japan proper. At the

same time, plans and preparations were

being made for the invasion itself.

Destruction of the Japanese in the

Philippines and Borneo

Over-all Plans

Since the Philippines, particularly

Luzon, were to constitute the most important base area to support the coming

invasion of Japan, the enemy forces on

those islands had to be destroyed or

rendered harmless. No time was lost in

getting on with the job. While Manila

and Corregidor were still under attack,

operations were begun against the Japanese who had withdrawn into the outlying parts of Luzon as well as against

those still more or less in control of the

central and southern islands of the archipelago. On 5 February 1945 MacArthur directed Sixth Army to destroy

the Japanese in northern, eastern, and

southern Luzon. The next day, he directed Eighth Army to seize certain

islands in the central and southern

Philippines.

Sixth Army's plan of campaign on

Luzon called for the destruction of the

enemy by three corps. I Corps would

have the mission of capturing Baguio

and securing the Cagayan Valley, with

the city of Aparri, on Luzon's northern

coast. XIV Corps was to begin the task

of destroying the Japanese in the Sierra

Madre mountains of east central Luzon.

After the first few weeks, XI Corps was

to take over this mission, while XIV

Corps attacked the Japanese in the southern and southeastern parts of the island.

Eighth Army's operations in the central

and southern Philippines, to be known

as the VICTOR operations, were to be

amphibious assaults. The first would
626 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

be directed against the southwestern

islands—Palawan, the Zamboanga peninsula of Mindanao, and the Sulu Archipelago. Thereafter, four of the major

islands in the central Philippines—

Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Bohol—were

to come under attack. These four were

part of the Visayan group of islands, two

of which—Leyte and Samar—were already under American control. Lastly,

the Japanese in the main part of Mindanao would be crushed. Thereupon,

the Philippines would be completely

under American control.1

Engineer Planning

Sixth and Eighth Army engineers began planning after receiving MacArthur's

directives. Sturgis' engineer section

made a study of the terrain of the more

remote parts of Luzon and the highways

and trails leading to them. Unlike the

amphibious operations along the New

Guinea coast or the advance down the

Central Plains, the drives into the outlying parts of the island would be, for the

most part, through mountainous terrain.

After making extensive reconnaissances

from the air and on the ground, Sixth

Army engineers were convinced that

their most important task was the construction and maintenance of roads.

Bridging would probably not be a major

job until the onset of the rains in May.

Japanese mine fields and demolitions

would very likely be as crude as before,

but in the mountainous parts of the

island might be considerably more

1

 (1) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign,

p. 159. (2) Robert R. Smith, Triumph in the

Philippines, chs. XX, XXIII, XXIX. (3) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, p. 164.

effective in holding up an advance.

Engineer work, unlike that performed in

New Guinea, would, as a rule, be done

in the conventional manner. Troops

under corps and army would undertake

major construction in back of and not at

the front lines. Since there were not

enough engineer units or supplies to

support three simultaneous actions in

widely separated areas, General Sturgis

decided to keep most of his heavy construction troops under army control in

or near Manila until developments

showed where they could be used to best

advantage.2

Meanwhile, Eighth Army engineers

under Col. David M. Dunne were deep

in plans and preparations for the VICTOR

operations, of which there were to be

five. The various islands of the central

and southern Philippines had similar

terrain—a narrow coastal belt behind

which rose steep and wooded mountains.

There was little time for reconnaissance,

and map coverage was inadequate.

Since the attacks were to be amphibious,

they would undoubtedly be carried on in

the same manner as the earlier similar

operations along the New Guinea coast.

Heavy naval and air bombardments

would drive the enemy away from the

beaches and into the interior of the

islands so that, soon after the initial

landings, the engineers could begin

work on bases and airfields virtually unhampered. The Eighth Army engineers, in making tentative plans for

construction in each area, had to devote

considerable effort to getting sufficient

numbers of troops and adequate amounts

of supplies. The relatively few units

2

 Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 159.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 627

available were so apportioned that each

operation would have amphibian and

combat units and either aviation or construction battalions.3

East Central Luzon

On Luzon the first attack began on 20

February when the 1st Cavalry Division

and the 6th Infantry Division of XIV

Corps launched an assault against the

Japanese who had retreated into the

Sierra Madre Mountains in the east central part of the island. In this rugged

and inhospitable region, where roads

were few, the terrain greatly favored the

defenders. Here the Japanese had

under their control Ipo Dam, and ten

miles to the southwest, Montalban Dam,

two important elements of Manila's

water supply system which had to be

captured intact, if possible. The engineers were in continual demand to support the infantry in the drive through

the mountains. Tasks of the 8th Engineer Squadron and the 6th Combat

Battalion were similar. Mines were numerous along the narrow and primitive

roads. In many places, the Japanese had

set up roadblocks and covered them with

fire. Some were of the abatis type;

others were blasted out of the steep

slopes on both sides of the road or path.

Engineer demolition teams helped destroy caves, bunkers, and pillboxes in

which the enemy were hiding. A major

task was building and maintaining

roads. Often the infantry had to wait

until the engineers could fashion a trail.

Steep grades, large outcroppings of rock,

and enemy fire all slowed down construction. Maintenance of the roads,

most of them unsurfaced and rough, was

complicated by the constant traffic.4

Northern Luzon

The attack against the Japanese on

northern Luzon began on 21 February.

By that date, I Corps held a line across

the narrow waist of the island from

Damortis on Lingayen Gulf in the west

to Baler Bay in the east. The Cagayan

Valley, a major food-producing area,

stretched more than 200 miles to Aparri.

Bounded on the east, west, and south by

broad and rugged mountain ranges, it

had two approaches from the south

feasible for military operations: one

from Bambang; the other from Baguio,

fifty miles to the west. Bambang could

be reached by two routes. One was by

way of Highway 5 running from San

Jose, at the edge of the Central Plains,

up the Tulavera River valley to Balete

Pass. The enemy positions at the pass

were considered the key to the southern

defenses of the Cagayan Valley. Once

they were taken, the forward movement

down the valley would be relatively easy.

Another possible route was by way of the

Villa Verde Trail, a path for foot travelers and carabao, which began to twist

through the mountains 25 miles west of

Highway 5 and joined it just north of

Balete Pass. Baguio had four approaches. Highway 11, also known as

the Kennon Road, was the most direct.

From Rosario it ran northeast and then

north through the Cordillera Central

3

 CG Eighth Army Rpt on Panay-Negros and

Cebu Opns, pp. 4-11, 136-37. SWPA Files.

4

 (1) Hist of the 6th Engr Combat Bn. (2) Engr

Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 194.
628 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Mountains. A longer route was by way

of coastal Highway 3 and then inland by

way of Highway 9. Two trails to

Baguio cut through the rough triangle

formed by the three roads. From

Baguio, dirt roads and trails led eastward through the Cordilleras to the

Cagayan Valley. The 25th and 32d Infantry Divisions were to take Bambang;

the 33d Infantry Division was to capture

Baguio and then assist the other two in

the drive up the Cagayan Valley. Progress of the drives through the mountainous terrain of northern Luzon

would depend in large measure on the

success of the engineers in overcoming

natural and man-made obstacles.5

The Advance to Bambang

The 25th Division, with its 65th Combat Battalion, moving north from San

Jose along Highway 5, got off to a good

start. By mid-March, that is, in about

three weeks, it was nearing Balete Pass.

The engineers kept pace with the infantry, developing the highway, a twolane graveled road, as the main supply

route for the division. Most of the men

were engaged in repairing and reinforcing bridges. They cleared three mine

fields and spent much time probing for

additional mines which the enemy had

scattered about in haphazard fashion.

Just to the south of Balete Pass, the road

ran through a deep defile. The nearer

the troops approached the pass, the

greater became the enemy's resistance.

Since a frontal attack would be costly,

the engineers had to put in numerous

side roads through the rocky terrain to

make possible flank attacks on enemy

positions. Because the roads would be

abandoned after the troops had won the

area, bridges were not put in; the engineers either found fords or constructed

temporary crossings of steel culverts.

The men had to be continually on the

alert for mines. It was standard practice for the enemy to sneak back and

replant an area previously cleared.6

The Villa Verde Trail

When the 25th Division began its

drive toward Bambang, the 32d Division

with its 114th Combat Battalion was at

the lower end of the Villa Verde Trail

at Santa Maria. The infantry was to

advance along the trail; at the same time

the 114th engineers were to transform the

pathway into a combat road. Winding

some 25 miles through mountains and

over hogback ridges and reaching an

elevation of 4,800 feet, the trail connected two points only 11 miles apart by

air. The surface was hard-packed clay.

Because fairly rapid construction was

necessary, the engineers decided to dispense with some of the basic principles

of road building. In widening the footpath, which in places clung to the sides

of the steep hills, the men began cutting

from the bottom of a hill instead of the

top. The overhangs sometimes caved in,

burying equipment. Dozers, slipping

over the precipitous slopes, went down

as much as 400 feet and could be recovered only with difficulty; in a number

of instances, roads had to be built to

5

 G-3 Sixth Army, Combat Notes. SWPA File

M30. 6

 (1) Ibid. (2) Hist of the 65th Engr Combat Bn.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 629

them to get them back on the trail.

Although the infantrymen were well

ahead of the engineers most of the time,

the enemy infiltrated the rear areas on

several occasions. At Kilometer 19, one

of the dozers came under enemy fire;

eighteen 47-mm. shells landed near the

machine. Shell fragments tore many

holes in the blade and body of the dozer,

but caused no casualties.

On 5 March the infantry reached

Salacsac Pass, where the Villa Verde

Trail turned east toward Santa Fe and

Highway 5. The Japanese, waiting

there, made determined efforts to halt

the advance; enemy machine gun fire

was so heavy that no progress could be

made for days. The Japanese had built

numerous caves in the pass area. The

engineers brought up armored dozers to

prepare firing positions for tanks. Protected by their cabs, the men kept on

working despite minor wounds received

from bullets that found their way

through the portholes. One armored

dozer, working its way around a bend,

ran into fire from a machine gun about

twenty feet away. The operator, slightly

wounded, charged the gun with his

dozer. The bullets cut the cable and

dropped the blade. The operator withdrew to make way for a tank, which

proceeded to destroy the machine gun.

The cable was quickly repaired and

the bulldozer operator resumed work in

forty-five minutes. The next day he

buried three Japanese in caves. On the

whole, working with armored dozers on

the precipitous slopes of the Villa Verde

Trail was dangerous because the visibility of the operators was so severely

restricted. While the infantry vainly

attempted to get control of Salacsac Pass,

the 114th engineers continued to push

forward slowly on the road and to improve the part to the rear. Dreary

weeks passed while the enemy continued

to hold at the pass.7

The Drive to Baguio

Meanwhile, during the first part of

March, the 33d Division was advancing

on Baguio. Here, also, the work of the

108th Engineer Combat Battalion was

largely road construction, but, as elsewhere, many other jobs had to be done.

The Japanese had placed numerous mine

fields, most of them poorly camouflaged

and some so hastily laid that they were

wholly ineffective. Still, the combat

engineers could not take any chances

and cleared twenty-five fields. The

Japanese, in retreating, had destroyed

most of the bridges. Wherever possible,

the engineers located fords or repaired

the ruined structures, salvaging such materials as they could. At one point on

the Kennon Road, the Japanese had destroyed an 80-foot span over a gorge

forty feet deep. The site was at a horseshoe bend, with sheer cliffs on one side,

where only a 30-foot horizontal clearance

at the abutment was left in which to

maneuver. Instead of the usual two

hours, the men needed sixteen to swing

a Bailey into place.

One of the urgent missions of the

108th engineers was to seize intact the two

concrete and steel bridges across the

7

 (1) 32d Inf Div, Rpt After Action, M-1 Opn,

an. 8, Engr Rpt. SWPA File A149. (2) 114th Engr

Combat Bn, Tech Rpt of Villa Verde Trail, 8 Feb26 May 45. SWPA File B75. (3) Hist of the 114th

Engr Combat Bn.
630 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

TRUCKS NEGOTIATE THE VILLA VERDE TRAIL where Engineer construction is in

progress.

Bauang River near its mouth on the

west coast of Luzon. The two spans had

to be taken undamaged if the troops

were not to be unduly delayed. It was

known that the bridges were mined and

that the Japanese occupied positions

north of the river commanding the structures. At night an infantry battalion,

preceded by a platoon of combat engineers and a mine detection detachment,

moved to the south bank. The infantry

forded the river to attack enemy forces

in Bauang. Meanwhile, the engineers

crept up to the bridges. One detail removed about 400 pounds of explosives

from the stringers of the south span; it

had just finished the job when it was

attacked by the enemy. One engineer of

the platoon was killed in the skirmish in

which the Japanese were repulsed. The

bridges were captured undamaged.

Late in March the 37th Division was

sent from its garrison in Manila to relieve the 33d Division in its coastal

positions. Everywhere, progress was

painfully slow.8

8

 (1) 33d Inf Div, Opnl Highlights. Sturgis File

79. (2) Hist of the 108th Engr Combat Bn. (3)

WD GO No. 29, 30 Mar 46. SWPA File A80.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 631

FILIPINOS HELP CONSTRUCT A ROAD ACROSS A FORD in the Santa Cruz River, Luzon.

Southern Luzon

On 14 March XIV Corps, transferred

from the east central front to southern

Luzon, began the drive against the enemy

in that part of the island. In the vanguard was the nth Airborne Division,

which had been engaged in combat on

southern Luzon since its landing at

Nasugbu. Enemy resistance south of

Manila was weak. The division's 127th

airborne engineers constructed and repaired supply and combat roads in hilly

terrain, built and repaired bridges,

operated ferries, and leveled off rice

paddies for cub strips. They also took

care of mines and booby traps and

removed explosives from several bridges.

Mount Macalod, on the southeast shores

of Lake Taal, and Mount Malepunyo,

ten miles east of the lake, were heavily

mined. On the latter mountain, bombs

and shells, hung in low trees, were not

discovered until a patrol stumbled over

the wires. Hampered by a lack of

equipment usually furnished a combat

unit, the 127th resorted to expedients

and maximum use of local materials to

perform its missions. In mid-March

elements of the 592d Boat and Shore

Regiment supported part of the 158th

RCT in a series of shore-to-shore opera-
632 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

tions that lasted almost a week and that

cleared the enemy from Calumpan

Peninsula between Balayan and Batangas

Bays in southwestern Luzon.

With the transfer of the 1st Cavalry

Division from central Luzon to the Bicol

Peninsula on 23 March, the 8th Engineer

Squadron also transferred its activities to

that area. The men carried on their

usual tasks. While constructing two

ponton bridges, they encountered an unusual problem. Lily pads came floating

downstream in such tremendous numbers that they threatened to wreck the

bridges. The men stretched cables

from bank to bank to catch the pads

before they reached the bridges. By the

end of March southern Luzon, except

the Bicol Peninsula, had been cleared of

the enemy.9

Corps and Army Engineer Units

Behind the front lines, engineer units

assigned to corps and army were at work.

Road maintenance, improvement of

bridges, elimination of pockets of enemy

resistance, and some base construction

were the major jobs. Close behind the

combat forces moving towards Bambang

and Baguio were units of the 1136th

Construction Group, working under I

Corps. The corps engineers kept supplies flowing to the two fronts near

Bambang and Baguio, operated sawmills,

and built camps for the troops to use in

the coming rainy season. Because the

fighting was expected to drag on well

into the wet months, the group's principal job was to develop main supply

routes for all-weather use. Highway 5,

breaking down under heavy traffic, was

resurfaced and repaired. In the Baguio

area, where Highways 3 and 11 required

extensive work, the engineers raised roadbeds above the level of the surrounding

countryside, widened one-lane sections,

and installed drainage facilities. In east

central Luzon, the 1112th Construction

Group worked on supply routes and

bridges. At the end of March, when

most of the group was transferred to

Sixth Army for construction in rear

areas, responsibility for engineer work

in the XI Corps area was transferred to

the combat engineers of the two divisions. On southern Luzon, the 1129th

Engineer Combat Group under XIV

Corps direction furnished support to the

combat units. Among its tasks were the

repair of the pier at Batangas, rehabilitation of the airstrip at Lipa, and operation of a sawmill and an ice plant.10

The Eighth Army Campaign—

Palawan

Meanwhile, Eighth Army had begun

its campaign in the central and southern

Philippines. Palawan was the scene of

the first landing. On 28 February a task

force, made up mainly of the 186th RCT

of the 41st Division, disembarked on the

eastern shore of the island. Engineer

units included two companies of the

532d Boat and Shore Regiment, elements

of the 116th Combat Battalion, and the

1897th Aviation Battalion. The assault

waves came ashore at the three desig9

 Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 194.

10

 (1) 1136th Engr Constr Group, Opns Rpt, Luzon

Campaign. SWPA File B92. (2) 1112th Engr

Constr Group, Opns Rpt, 15 Feb-Jul 45. SWPA

File B89. (3) Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp. 196, 202, 214, 221, 228.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 633

nated beaches, amid some confusion, in

the course of which a number of the

engineer craft missed their proper landing points; but all of this was not serious,

since enemy opposition was nonexistent.

The beachhead was quickly consolidated.

No real resistance ever developed, and

the last Japanese elements were wiped

out in about a month. Little combat

engineering was required. The 1897th

engineers began to rehabilitate the airstrip at Puerto Princesa, badly damaged

by bombing, and in 19 days had it ready

for fighters.11

The Zamboanga Peninsula and the

Sulu Islands

After bringing Palawan under control,

troops of Eighth Army seized the

Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu

Islands. One hundred and fifty miles

long, the peninsula was connected with

the major part of Mindanao by a narrow

isthmus, and, together with the Sulus,

formed a series of steppingstones to

Borneo on the southwest. On 10 March

a naval task force began a bombardment

of the coastal areas east and west of

Zamboanga City, forcing the Japanese to

abandon their beach defenses. Shortly

after 0900, the infantry, assisted by elements of the 543d Boat and Shore Regiment, landed west of Zamboanga City

and was ashore in half an hour, encountering only light machine gun fire.

Zamboanga City fell the first day. Subsequently, enemy resistance stiffened and

a number of bitterly contested battles

were fought. Nevertheless, the American forces continually expanded the area

they held. Combat engineer operations,

the mission of elements of the 116th

engineers, were considerable on the peninsula, where well-camouflaged pillboxes,

mine fields, barbed wire entanglements,

and fortified caves and tunnels were

numerous. The combat engineers destroyed about 50 caves and pillboxes and

removed nearly 2,000 mines. They

built about 50 miles of roads and rehabilitated or constructed 16 bridges,

each capable of taking 35 tons.

The 370-odd islands of the Sulus, the

southernmost ones in the Philippines,

were mostly small, uninhabited, and unimportant. Three were of strategic significance—Basilan, Jolo, and Tawitawi.

The campaign began with the landing of

elements of the 41st Division on Basilan

on 16 March. Other islands were seized

later, including the main one, Jolo,

where the only enemy resistance worth

mentioning was encountered. In these

operations, elements of the 543d Boat

and Shore Regiment helped land the infantry, and the 116th engineers carried

out combat missions. Except on Jolo,

little combat support was needed. On

that island the engineers destroyed some

enemy fortifications, removed mines, repaired and constructed bridges, and built

about twenty miles of road. Construction units did additional work in the

Sulus and on Mindanao. The 873d

Aviation Battalion rehabilitated airfields

on the Zamboanga Peninsula and the

Sulus, and other engineer units began to

rehabilitate numerous local facilities.12

11

 (1) CG Eighth Army, Rpt on Palawan and Zamboanga Opns, pp. 114ff. SWPA Files. (2) Ltr, Hq

532d EBSR to Heavey, 3 Mar 45. SWPA File E92.

12

 CG Eighth Army, Rpt on Palawan and Zamboanga Opns, pp. 114-18.
634 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The Visayan Islands

To gain control of the remaining Visayan Islands, McArthur planned two operations, one by elements of the 40th Division, to seize Panay and western Negros, and the other by elements of the

Americal Division, to recapture Cebu,

Bohol, and eastern Negros. The 2d

Special Brigade, the 52d and 57th Combat Battalions, the 865th Aviation Battalion, and the 239th Construction Battalion were to provide major engineer

support. The first assault began on 18

March with the landing of elements of

the 40th Division near Iloilo, capital of

Panay. Eight days later, the Americal

Division launched the second assault

near Cebu City. These operations were

similar to those against Palawan and the

Zamboanga Peninsula. The naval and

aerial bombardments drove the Japanese

away from the beaches and forced them

to retreat into the mountainous interiors,

from which they could, as a rule, be

routed only after long and arduous campaigns.

The most effective enemy defenses

were found on Cebu, where the landing

forces came ashore just south of Cebu

City. Starting across the beach, the

troops discovered that the area was heavily mined and expertly camouflaged.

Within a few minutes, eight vehicles

were blown up. With men continuing

to come in, beaches were soon jammed.

A disaster would have been inevitable

had there been any Japanese opposition

besides light rifle fire. The engineers

worked frantically to open a path through

the mines. In back of the beaches and

on the road to Cebu were numerous obstacles, among them antitank ditches, log

walls, steel rails, and more mines. The

obstacles were not much of a problem

because they were not covered by fire.

Cebu City, like the other major cities of

the central Philippines, was practically

deserted. Again, construction of roads

and bridge building were by far the most

important jobs. The 865th Aviation

Battalion on Cebu and the 239th Construction Battalion on Panay and Negros

rehabilitated shattered airfields and other

facilities.13

Mindanao

The only large island in the southern

Philippines the Japanese still controlled

to some extent at the end of March was

Mindanao. A successful campaign by

American forces there would mean the

end of Japanese power in the central and

southern part of the archipelago. The

Japanese on Mindanao were already in a

precarious position because of the loss of

the Zamboanga Peninsula and the increasing harassment of Filipino guerrillas, led since 1942 by Colonel Fertig. In

February 1945 Fertig had under his command some 33,000 men, half of them

armed. Like the Visayan Islands, Mindanao offered many good opportunities

for defense. Much of the island was

mountainous, jungled, and swampy. Because of the relatively large size of the

island, its few good roads, and its complete lack of railroads, overland operations would be extremely difficult.14

Assault planners tried to take advantage of the few favorable terrain features.

An invasion of the east coast would be

13

 CG Eighth Army, Rpt on the Panay-Negros and

Cebu Opns, pp. 136ff. 14

 (1) Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 586.

(2) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, pp.

217-19.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 635

impractical because of the high surf, the

rugged shore line, and the almost impassable mountains farther inland. The

north coast had many good beaches, in

particular at Macajalar Bay, but high

ground farther inland would give the defending forces a decided advantage. A

major handicap on the southern coast

would be inadequate communications

with the remainder of the island. On

the west coast were many good beaches

and anchorages, and from this part of the

island the interior was most accessible.

Consequently, the initial assault was

planned for that coast.

On 17 April two divisions of X Corps,

the 24th and the 31st, landed near Parang. The 24th Division, with the help

of guerrillas, advanced eastward along

the highway leading to Davao. At the

same time the 533d Boat and Shore Regiment of the 3d Special Brigade, together

with naval units, moved some of the

troops up the Mindanao River to secure

the Fort Pikit-Kabacan area in the central part of the island, through which ran

the Sayre (North-South) Highway. On

26 April elements of the 24th Division

reached Davao Gulf, not far south of

Davao, turned northward, and occupied

their objective on 2 May. Meanwhile,

the 31st Division had started up the Sayre

Highway to split the Japanese forces in

the northern part of the island. On 10

May, at Macajalar Bay, at the northern

terminus of the highway, a second amphibious force came ashore and headed

south. Everywhere Japanese troops were

forced to retreat into the almost impenetrable jungles of the interior.15

"The engineer problem on ... Mindanao began with bridges and ended with

roads," said one engineer report. The

story of the 3d engineers of the 24th Division, almost from the time they landed

until they reached Davao was one of "...

by-passed bridges, rebuilt bridges and

newly constructed bridges, of frantic efforts to get bridge timber and Bailey up

forward . . . ." The 106th engineers of

the 31st Division likewise were occupied

mainly with roads and bridges. Their

first job was to improve the road net in

the vicinity of the landing area. When

the 31st Division started up the Sayre

Highway from the Fort Pikit-Kabacan

area, the 106th engineers, transferred to

the highway a company at a time, furnished increasing support.16

In worse shape than the roads were the

bridges. Between Kabacan and the first

gorge, twelve miles to the north, demolished structures spanning shallow streams

were either bypassed or hurriedly repaired to make rapid progress possible.

The first real gorge, 120 feet across and

35 feet deep, with the bridge in ruins at

the bottom, was a more serious obstacle.

Stringing a cableway downstream from

the site of the bridge, the engineers got

jeeps, 1⁄4-ton trailers, and howitzers

across. Heavy vehicles would need a

bridge. Because of the depth of the

gorge, construction of a timber trestle

was not practicable, and erection of a

Bailey would be laborious, if not impossible. The men solved the problem in

an ingenious way. They blasted out the

sides of the gorge at the two approaches;

the debris filled the gorge and made a

crossing possible. The job was finished

15

 (1) CG Eighth Army, Rpt on the Mindanao

Opn, pp. 145ff. SWPA Files. (2) 533d EBSR,

Opns Rpt, V-5, 1 Mar-7 May 45. SWPA File E59.

16

 Engr Opnl Hist, Mindanao Campaign (Draft

MS). SWPA File A164.
636 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

in two days and two nights. The combat engineers had numerous chores in

support of the infantry, arising from the

fact that the Japanese had fortified strategic points with systems of caves and

pillboxes and that enemy camouflage was

excellent. Base construction was kept

to a minimum, but as elsewhere, airfields

and other facilities were rehabilitated.17

Borneo

As early as October 1944 the Allies had

planned to seize certain areas of Borneo

to deprive the enemy of vital oil supplies

and to construct bases from which to cut

Japanese communications with the

Netherlands Indies. Plans called for

three attacks, the first against Tarakan

Island on 17 May, the second against

Brunei Bay on 10 June, and the third

against Balikpapan on 1 July. These

assaults were assigned to Australian and

Dutch troops, supported by American

naval forces and elements of the 3d Special Brigade. The 26th Australian

Brigade and a company of the Royal

Netherlands Indies Army took part in

the operations against Tarakan. The

first troops were put ashore on 30 April

without opposition on Sandau Island off

the east coast after withering naval and

air bombardment had blasted the main

landing area. Engineers and naval personnel went in and breached offshore obstacles in twelve places to permit LST's

to land. The Japanese did not try to defend their beach positions, and, after attempting to make a stand about 1,500

yards inland, were driven into the interior. Royal Australian Engineers had

combat and construction duties.

At the Brunei Bay landing on 10 June,

the task force included units of the 9th

Australian Division. After the naval

bombardment, landings were made unopposed. In view of the fact that the

Brunei Bay landing would sever northsouth communications, enemy reaction

in this area was remarkably weak, being

limited to only a few harassing air raids.

The amphibian engineers were hampered somewhat in unloading operations

on Labuan Island by the narrow roads

and swampy conditions near the beaches.

Elsewhere at Brunei Bay, landings were

easily made. It was expected that the

landing at Balikapan would be equally

successful.18

The End of Organized Resistance

on Luzon

Meanwhile, on Luzon the Japanese

were being compressed into smaller and

smaller areas. In mid-April the four

divisions striving to reach Baguio and

Bambang were still stalemated. Those

on the Bambang front were tied down at

Balete and Salacsac Passes, while in the

Baguio area, the 33d's advance had progressed only a few miles up the strongly

defended Kennon Road, and the 37th

Division was having just as hard a time

moving in from the coast. Engineer

tasks in support of the infantry were as

strenuous as before. The first breakthrough in the Baguio area came on 21

April when the 37th Division cracked resistance on Highway 9 at the Irisan River

17

 Ibid.

18

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I,

290-92, 297.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 637

ENGINEERS USE A JAPANESE TRUCK To SUPPORT A TEMPORARY BRIDGE

in the Cagayan Valley.

gorge, and together with the 33d Division, took Baguio five days later. On 5

May the 37th Division was transferred to

the Bambang area, where the Japanese

were still holding up the 25th and 32d

Divisions. The job still requiring the

greatest effort was the Villa Verde Trail,

where the rains which began in late April

compounded the difficulties. In May,

the downpours increased in intensity,

and work on the trail became impossible.

The engineers reported, "... dozers dug

themselves in as their tracks revolved

without traction. . . ." On 13 May the

25th Division finally captured Balete

Pass. Reaching Santa Fe twelve days

later, it turned west onto the trail and

headed toward Salacsac Pass. Meantime, after a 3-month struggle, the 32d

Division broke through enemy strongpoints at the pass. On 29 May the two

divisions met. Further engineer work

on the trail had been halted three days

previously, and all effort was henceforth

spent on keeping open the part that had

been improved.19

The stage was now set for the final

drive down the Cagayan Valley. The

plan was to have the 25th and 32d Di19

 114th Engr Combat Bn, Tech Rpt of Villa

Verde Trail.
638 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

visions remain at Bambang and most of

the 33d Division at Baguio to clear out

pockets of resistance. The 37th Division

was directed to pass through the 25th Division and spearhead the drive north on

the highway. It left Santa Fe on 31 May

and made good time, averaging five or six

miles a day. The 117th Engineer Combat Battalion had to move forward every

two or three days to keep up with the infantry. Highway 5 was in fair condition,

but most of the bridges were out. The

company farthest forward operated treadway ferries until permanent crossings

could be built, put in bypasses and culverts, and made minor road repairs.

The next one along made major repairs

to bridges, put gravel on bypasses, and

occasionally built new bridges. The

men put a floating bridge over the Magat

River at Bagabag, some twenty miles

north of Bambang. The 117th engineers also built several airstrips. At

Bayambang, they blocked off a portion

of a graveled roadway to serve as a runway; at Bagabag one hundred natives removed grass from an existing strip and

filled small shell holes. The engineers

were favored by the terrain in the flat,

open valley, but the heavy rains were a

major hindrance.20

To keep the enemy from escaping by

way of Aparri, a small group of Filipinos

and Americans—called the Connolly

Task Force—had been organized to go

rapidly up Highway 3 along the western

and northern shores to Aparri. Engineer reconnaissance parties learned

that much work would have to be done

on the highway to permit the convoy of

200 vehicles to reach its goal. Two

platoons of the 339th Construction Battalion went ahead of the main force, by

road and by LCT, to repair bridges, remove landslides, and widen the road.

The engineers also erected two hospital

ward tents, built an all-weather airstrip,

and installed and operated ferries.21

In east central Luzon, the advance was

slow. Early in March the 43d Infantry

Division replaced the 1st Cavalry Division, which had been transferred to

southern Luzon. On the 14th of the

month XI Corps assumed command of

the operation. An engineer company of

the 6th Battalion had an unusual task on

Mount Pacawagan, one of the numerous

peaks on which fighting took place, and

where the only possible route for a trail

was along a hogback ridge. The men

managed to get motorized compressors

up the steep sides to drill holes in rock

outcroppings, and then placed explosive

charges in the holes to blow up the rock

and make a roadway. They used 100

smoke pots to screen their work from the

enemy close by.

Early in May the final push began.

The 38th Division with the 113th Combat Battalion headed for Montalban Dam,

while the 43d was deployed from the

rear to take Ipo Dam. Road improvement continued to be the major job in

support of the infantry. With the seizure of Ipo Dam on 17 May and the capture of Montalban on the 28th, both of

them intact, the campaign in the Sierra

Madres was virtually over. The engineers, even though they had not always

been able to keep the infantry on the

20

 Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, p. 179. 21

 Ibid., p. 181.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 639

move, had contributed much to final victory.22

Fighting continued in southeastern

Luzon. On 1 April units of the 2d Special Brigade landed the 158th RCT without opposition at Legaspi, near the tip of

the peninsula. Squads of the 1279th

Combat Battalion cleared the beach of

mines which had not been detonated by

the preinvasion air assault. The infantry started inland but was soon halted by

the enemy near Daraga, a few miles

northwest of Legaspi. While fighting

raged, the combat engineers set about reconditioning the airstrip at Legaspi for

evacuation of the wounded. Under

enemy fire the first two days, the men

cut grass, dug drainage ditches, and filled

twenty large bomb craters with wreckage

from the port. The strip was ready for

operations on 6 April. Two days before,

the engineers had started rehabilitation

of the railroad. About 600 Filipinos,

using hand tools supplied by the engineers, restored the shops and replaced

tracks while the troops concentrated on

bridge construction. On 10 April resistance at Daraga collapsed. The advance

continued northwest on the Bicol Peninsula, where there were many well situated

but poorly camouflaged mine fields and

numerous roadblocks. On 12 April the

158th attacked the main Japanese force

in the Cituinan Hills near Camalig; the

same day the 1st Cavalry Division entered the Bicol Peninsula from the northwest. On 2 May elements of the 158th

RCT and the 1st Cavalry Division met at

San Augustin, and on 16 June, the Bicol

Peninsula was declared secure.23

Before the end of June the Japanese on

Luzon were almost completely crushed.

On the 8th of that month, with organized

enemy resistance in the east central part

of the island at an end, the 6th Division,

including the 6th Combat Battalion was

transferred to the Cagayan Valley. The

6th Division started up the highway behind the 37th. At Bagabag the two divisions turned northwest on Highway 4

toward Kiangan, where remnants of the

enemy were gathering. Fighting was approaching an end in northern Luzon.

On 21 June Connolly Task Force, which

had moved up the west coast, reached

Aparri. Reinforced by one battalion of

the 11th Airborne Division, it started

south on Highway 5 two days later, and

on 26 June its patrols met advance elements of the 37th Division at Alacan,

twenty-five miles south of Aparri. The

two units then started east to search for

the enemy in the mountains. There

were still some 65,000 Japanese left in

northern Luzon, but they were largely

unorganized and scattered. On 1 July

Eighth Army relieved Sixth Army to

carry on mop-up operations. Eighth

Army also continued with mop-up operations in the southern Philippines. The

operation against Balikpapan was carried

out as scheduled on 1 July.24

22

 (1)Ibid., p. 188. (2) Hist of the 6th Engr Combat Bn.

23

 Engr Sixth Army, Rpt, Luzon Campaign, pp.

194 and 196. 24

 (1) Ibid., pp. 179-81. (2) Of C Engr GHQ

AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, I, 277, 297-8. (3) Smith,

Triumph in the Philippines, p. 579.
640 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Iwo Jima

Meantime, decisive combat and amphibious operations had been under way

closer to the Japanese homeland. The

islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the

former 800 miles south of Tokyo and the

latter 900 miles southwest of the Japanese

capital, had come under assault. Both

were in the Pacific Ocean Area.

Admiral Nimitz had decided on the

capture of Iwo Jima principally for two

reasons: to make it impossible for the

enemy to use the island as a takeoff point

from which to bomb American bases in

the Marianas, and to provide B-29 fields

which could stage bombers headed for

Japan and at the same time enable crippled planes returning from missions to

make emergency landings. The capture

of the island, and most base construction

as well, was assigned to the marines and

the Navy. Plans called for building

three airfields: a large one with two runways for B-29's in the center of the

island, and two fighter fields with 5,000-

foot runways north and south of the B29 field. Most of the work was assigned

to Seabee units. One engineer construction unit—the 811th Aviation Battalion

—was scheduled to be sent in.25

The assault began on 19 February.

After three weeks of bitter fighting, the

island was secured on 16 March. The

811th engineers, the first Army unit to

arrive, landed in mid-April and on the

27th of that month took over construction on North Field from the Seabees.

(Map 30) The aviation engineers found

that Iwo Jima (Japanese for Sulphur

Island) was unusual insofar as terrain was

concerned. Five miles long and two

and one-half wide, it was of volcanic

origin. Mount Suribachi, an extinct

volcano 550 feet high, formed the southern tip. The northern half of the island

was a flattened dome about 400 feet above

sea level. Coral, usually found in this

latitude, was absent. The surface of

Iwo Jima consisted of volcanic ash, in

various stages of consolidation, with the

hardest resembling soft sandstone. Steam

vents were numerous, and just a few feet

under the surface, the ground was quite

hot. When the 811th engineers took

over construction on North Field on 27

April, the runway was operational, but

they still had much work to do on the

field. Principal tasks included the

building of taxiways, parking areas,

warehouses, and roads.26

Okinawa

Stretching for approximately 600 miles

from Kyushu to Formosa was a chain of

islands known as the Ryukyus. Almost

in the center was Okinawa, some 60 miles

long and 3 to 10 miles wide, which the

Joint Chiefs had for some time been considering as a site for an amphibious assault. The capture of this island by the

United States would have grave consequences for the Japanese Empire.

Control of Okinawa would enable American forces to develop airfields and bases

from which to deliver crushing attacks

on enemy communications and industrial

25

 Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Matterhorn

to Nagasaki, pp. 577-78.

26

 (1) USAFPOA, Participation in the Iwo Jima

Opn, pp. 39-40, 105, 183-91, 287-89. (2) Col. D. A.

Morris, "Engineer Operations on Iwo Jima," The

Military Engineer, XL (May, 1948), 199-200. (3)

Hist of the 811th Engr Avn Bn.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 641

MAP 30

centers. If the Japanese lost the island,

their lines of communications with southeast Asia and the Netherlands Indies

would be cut, whereas Allied communications with China would be secured.

With Okinawa gone, the Japanese would

not be able to carry on the war much

longer.

Terrain

Favorably located from the strategic

point of view, Okinawa was not the best

site for an amphibious assault. It was a

rough, generally mountainous, coral

island. (Map 31) The northern twothirds consisted almost entirely of rocky

terrain, which aerial photographs indicated was covered by forests and heavy

undergrowth. The southern one-third,

not so mountainous, consisted in part of

gently rolling country broken by ravines

and limestone cliffs. About 80 percent

of southern Okinawa was under cultivation, mostly in sugar cane and sweet

potatoes. Along the coasts were rice

paddies. The island's shoreline was

precipitous; mouths of streams broke the

steep slopes in only a few places. Good

landing beaches were scarce, the most

likely ones being on the east coast at

Nakagusuku Bay and on the west coast

between Hagushi and Itoman. In back

of these beaches were flat areas consisting principally of rice paddies—a potential hazard to vehicles. Most of the

few roads and trails ran along the coast.

Because of the rocky nature of the island,

stone for road surfacing would in all

probability be easy to obtain. Deposits

of coral and of slate, conglomerate, and

other types of rock were believed to be

plentiful. There were small streams but

no rivers. Since most of the waterways

could be waded, they would scarcely be

an obstacle from a military standpoint,

and bridging, consequently, would be

relatively easy. Rainfall was plentiful

and occurred throughout the year, with

the heaviest downpours taking place between May and September. From May

to November, typhoons could be expected. The only city of any size was

the capital, Naha, with a population of

about 65,000. The slow reduction of

enemy forces barricaded behind stone

walls of an extensive urban area, which

had been the case in Manila, was not an-
642 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 31

ticipated. However, throughout the

island, each house with its outbuildings

was, as a rule, surrounded by a dense row

of trees and often by a stone wall, ideally

suited for defensive fighting. There

were numerous burial vaults which

would provide advantageous positions

for the enemy.27

Engineer Planning

The capture of Okinawa had been assigned to Tenth Army. (See Map 31.)

Consequently, Brig. Gen. George J.

Nold, formerly engineer of the Alaskan

Department and since June 1944 Engineer, Tenth Army, was responsible for

over-all planning for combat engineering. He and his staff had begun work in

mid-October 1944. Since they expected

combat support to be largely routine,

they did not have to engage in extensive

planning. The major concern of the

27

 (1) Lt Col W. T. Bradley, Rpt on Engr Opns,

ICEBERG. SWPA File B119. (2) Roy E. Appleman,

James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John

Stevens, Okinawa: The Last Battle, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948), pp. 7-14.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 643

planners was obtaining enough engineer

troops to provide adequate support for

the initial amphibious assault and subsequent overland movement. Because

only about 70 percent of the units requested were available, some adjustments

had to be made.28

Planning for base construction on

Okinawa was a complex matter. Since

both the Army and the Navy wanted

numerous facilities, the engineers in

Hawaii had to make detailed calculations

regarding location and size. The airfield program alone was tremendous.

Six B-29 runways were to be built, together with a depot field, for the longrange heavy bombers. Also planned

were 6 heavy bomber, 2 medium

bomber, and 2 fighter runways, all to be

constructed of coral. To support such

an airbase storage tanks for about 1,800,-

000 barrels of gasoline, 6,000,000 square

feet of warehousing, 12,500 hospital beds,

housing for 375,000 men, 700 miles of

road, and extensive harbor facilities at

Naha would be needed. Estimates were

that ninety engineer units would have to

be sent to Okinawa to finish this construction on time. Higher headquarters also

considered it advisable to put base facilities on small nearby islands. Those on

Ie Shima, about two miles off the northwestern coast of Okinawa, would be the

most extensive.29

For the assault on Okinawa, two corps

were assigned—the Army's XXIV Corps,

including the 7th and 96th Divisions, and

the Marine Corps III Amphibious Corps,

consisting of the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions. In reserve were the 2d Marine

Division, afloat, and the Army's 27th Division at Ulithi. The plan of campaign

was a model of simplicity. Prior to the

attack, Tenth Army's 77th Infantry Division was to seize a number of small

islands to the west—the Kerama Islands

—where naval anchorages would be provided. Landing on the west side of

Okinawa near Hagushi, both corps, the

III Amphibious on the left and XXIV on

the right, were to drive eastward clear

across the island. Then the III Amphibious Corps was to turn north and

destroy Japanese forces in the northern

part of Okinawa; XXIV Corps would

turn south, and drive the enemy forces

toward the southern tip of the island

until they surrendered or were destroyed.

Since the Okinawa operation was to be

carried out by Pacific Ocean Area forces,

the island command or garrison type of

organization for base construction was

set up. Engineer units assigned to the

garrison force for base construction were

scheduled to land early.30

Planning for

Amphibious Operations

The landings in this assault would

differ from those in the Central Pacific

Area in that an engineer special brigade

organization was to be used. This was

the Headquarters and Headquarters

Company of the 1st Brigade, redeployed

in late 1944 from France, and now under

the command of Colonel Talley, for- 28

 (1) Bradley, Rpt on Engr Opns, ICEBERG. (2)

Tenth Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus Campaign, pp. 11-XI-1-30. EHD Files. 29

 USAFPOA, Participation in the Okinawa Opn,

I, 77. EHD Files.

30

 Navy Dept Of of CNO, Rpt, Amphib Opns—

Capture of Okinawa, 27 Mar-21 Jun 45. 9-1.0001/

46 (26670).
644 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

merly in charge of construction in Alaska.

The 1st Brigade differed considerably

from the special brigades of the Southwest Pacific. It was a shore organization

only and had been converted from an

amphibious-type unit while it was still in

England preparing to engage in the 1942

North African campaign. Later, the only

part of the brigade to be retained permanently was the Headquarters and

Headquarters Company. For each operation, engineer combat battalions, and

quartermaster, signal, ordnance, and

medical units were attached. The organization of the 1st Brigade thus fitted

in well with the Central Pacific's shore

party type of organization. The plan

was to place the shore parties of XXIV

Corps and III Amphibious Corps under

the headquarters of the 1st Engineer

Special Brigade.31

Operations to Mid-April

The Okinawa campaign began on 26

March. On that day, elements of the

77th Division landed on five of the

islands of the Kerama group. The 302d

Combat Battalion supported the division;

a company or a platoon was attached to

each of the battalion landing teams.

Missions were easily accomplished, including the provision of the usual support for the infantry and the destruction

of enemy installations, equipment, and

supplies.32

On the morning of 1 April at 0830,

XXIV Corps and III Amphibious Corps

landed on the west coast of Okinawa near

Hagushi. Weather and sea conditions

were almost perfect. The only obstacle

was a coral reef extending along the entire length of the 6-mile-long assault

beach. Since the heavier landing craft

could not cross over, men and cargo were

transferred to LVT's and Dukws, but in

some places even Dukws had difficulty

crossing the barrier until the engineers

prepared passageways with explosives

and bulldozers. Japanese resistance was

surprisingly light, the enemy laying down

only occasional artillery and mortar fire,

which caused few casualties and did

little damage. As was so often the case

elsewhere, infantry intrenchments, pillboxes, and other defensive positions near

the beaches were not occupied. About

2,000 posts had been placed along the

southern part of the reef; apparently

they were to have been strung with

barbed wire, but no wire was found and

the posts were easily removed. Once

more, natural obstacles were more formidable than the enemy. Reefs, bluffs,

and seawalls caused the troops to be

jammed along the shore. Colonel

Talley and his staff, initially using the

shore party units of XXIV Corps and

others assigned to the Island Command,

were soon busily engaged in directing the

unloading of supplies and moving them

to dumps. Because the organization had

too little time to work together as a team,

there were some difficulties. Confusion

in unloading was the result, in part, of

the limited time available for planning

and for integrating the organization.

There was a noticeable shortage of

Dukws and LVT's to haul supplies over

the reef.33

31

 (1) 1st ESB, Action Rpt, Okinawa Campaign 9

Apr-31 May 45. SWPA File E4. (2) William F.

Heavey, "Down Ramp," The Military Engineer,

XXXIX (February, 1947), 65-66. 32

 (1) Tenth Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus

Campaign, pp. 11-XI-3ff. (2) Hist of the 3020!

Engr Combat Bn. 33 (1) Navy Dept Of of CNO, Rpt, Amphib Opns—
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 645

Engineer Combat and Amphibian

Support

As the troops moved inland, Japanese

resistance continued to be light, and by

noon of the first day, the troops had captured Yontan and Kadena airfields. By

evening, some 50,000 men were ashore.

The next day, again in the face of light

resistance, the 7th Division reached the

east coast. III Amphibious Corps now

veered north, and XXIV Corps, south,

and began their drives to the tips of the

island.

During the next few days, the troops

generally made rapid progress. On

northern Okinawa, largely because the

infantry advanced so swiftly, the major

task of the Marine engineers was road

repair. Before long, division and corps

units were charged with the maintenance

and repair of more than 100 miles of concrete highway. More bridging was required than the nature of the terrain

had led the planners to expect. The

engineers repaired damaged structures,

mainly by putting in cribbing and timber supports, and replaced completely

destroyed bridges with Baileys. Fords,

dikes, and causeways were used whenever possible as temporary expedients.

Mines and fortifications were almost entirely lacking. Water supply was sometimes difficult because of the rapid advance of the troops and the few satisfactory sources of water. Rehabilitation

of Yontan airfield began on the second

day.

On southern Okinawa, also, as XXIV

Corps moved southward, division and

corps engineer missions were light.

Enemy resistance in any real sense did

not materialize. The engineers had to

give most attention to the roads in the

interior of the island, where, narrow and

only partly paved, they soon crumbled

under heavy traffic. Division and corps

engineers improved them with coral and

rubble from the buildings of native villages. The 13th Combat Battalion of

the 7th Division began rehabilitating

Kadena airfield the day after the landing;

the next day an aviation battalion took

over; four days later the runway was

operational. As the troops of XXIV

Corps penetrated farther into the southern part of the island, they found increasing numbers of mines. Some were

plastic; many were aerial bombs equipped

with pressure detonators. Roadblocks,

consisting of ditches, felled trees, and

junked equipment, became common.

The troops also came upon more booby

traps. These various obstacles were no

great hindrance to the advance of the

troops in the first days of the assault.34

By mid-April operations on Okinawa

were progressing well. All of the northern part of the island was in American

hands, except isolated pockets of resistance on Motobu Peninsula. The troops

were advancing toward the southern tip,

though at a slower pace and against

mounting enemy resistance.

Logistical support was proceeding satisfactorily. On the 9th, the 1st ESB had

assumed control of all shore party operations in the XXIV Corps area and was

scheduled to take over control of all unCapture of Okinawa, 27 Mar-21 Jun 45. (2) Island

Comd Okinawa, Action Rpt, 13 Dec 44-30 Jun 45.

98-ISCI-0.3(18017). (3) Heavey, "Down Ramp,"

The Military Engineer, XXXIX (February, 1947),

66-69.

34

 (1) Navy Dept Of of CNO, Rpt, Amphib Opns—-

Capture of Okinawa, 27 Mar-21 Jun 45. (2) Tenth

Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus Campaign, pp.

11-XI-5ff. (3) Hist of the 13th Engr Combat Bn.
646 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

loading on Okinawa, including that in

the Marine beach areas, on the 20th.

The brigade in landing troops and unloading supplies had experienced occasional fire from the enemy. In general, amphibian operations on Okinawa

indicated that an ESB headquarters company with temporarily attached units

could not operate as efficiently as a complete brigade with permanently assigned

boat and shore elements.35

Combat Support on CE Shima

On 16 April two regimental combat

teams of the 77th Division landed on CE

Shima. Daily aerial reconnaissance during the two weeks before the assault disclosed so few signs of enemy activity that

it was widely assumed the island had

been evacuated. When the first assault

waves hit the beach, they found IE Shim

anything but abandoned. Enemy resistance was savage; even civilians armed

with hand grenades and sticks took part

in the fighting. The third regimental

combat team, less one battalion, was sent

in to reinforce the first assault troops.

Elements of the 302d Combat Battalion,

attached to their respective combat

teams, were busy reducing obstacles, removing mines, and destroying caves and

pillboxes, and at times, fighting as infantry in hand-to-hand combat. The

island was strewn with all types of mines

—antipersonnel, antitank, and antiboat.

The two airfields were heavily mined.

The enemy made extensive use of aerial

bombs, which were buried in the ground

with fuzes pointed upward. Improvised

mines, consisting of 5-gallon cans of explosives fitted with a pressure-type fuze,

were numerous. During the final stages

of the campaign in the rugged eastern

part of the island, the troops had to

destroy hundreds of caves, some of them

cut in the sides of cliffs and two or three

stories high. The 302d engineers during

the fighting on IE Shim removed about

2,600 land mines, and reduced 560 caves,

pillboxes, and dugouts. For the 302d

this was the bloodiest fighting of the

Pacific war. The battalion suffered 11

men killed and 49 wounded. The island

was finally secured on 21 April, but even

after that mop-up operations were necessary.36

Southern Okinawa

Also on 21 April, three weeks after the

initial landing, organized resistance on

northern Okinawa came to an end.

Fighting was over considerably ahead of

expectations. But on southern Okinawa, a different story developed. South

of a line running roughly from Kuba to

Isa, in terrain admirably suited for defensive warfare and delaying tactics, the

Japanese had constructed a defensive

system so expertly devised as to be described as "fantastic." Here the enemy,

well entrenched in a rocky area honeycombed with caves and studded with

pillboxes, blockhouses, and mine fields,

put up a tenacious resistance. Not only

was opposition on the ground formid35

 Heavey, "Down Ramp," The Military Engineer,

XXXIX (February, 1947), 68.

36

 (1)Tenth Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus

Campaign-pp. 11-XI-11ff. (2) Lt. Col. Leigh C.

Fairbank, "Division Engineers, Part IV, Ryukyu

Islands," The Military Engineer, XXXIX (May, 1947),

198-99. (3) Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens,

Okinawa: The Last Battle, p. 154.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 647

able, but also day and night air raids, including attacks by kamikaze dive bombers, and assaults by suicide boats and

even swimmers harassed the American

forces. In late April the 77th Division

relieved the battle-weary 96th, and the

27th Division relieved the Marine 1st

Division. On 8 May the latter returned

to the lines and the Marine 6th Division

was also sent in. There was now a twocorps front.37

Combat engineer tasks on southern

Okinawa had been fairly easy up to now,

but this was not to be the case henceforth.

Only through hard fighting and with constant support of the combat engineers

could the infantry make any headway at

all. The enemy's defense tactics were

among the best encountered so far. One

of the principal elements in the defense

was cave warfare. On southern Okinawa the Japanese developed this type of

fighting to the highest degree in the war.

Many of their caves and other fortifications were on the sides of hills and cliffs

away from the approaching American

forces. The openings from which

weapons were fired were so small as to

be almost invisible. The enemy placed

machine gun and mortar fire on the tops

of the hills and ridges over which American troops had to advance to reach the

mouths of the caves. Probably the greatest improvement made by the Japanese

was to cover cave openings by fire. This

was done in various ways. The most

successful tactic was to make caves mutually supporting, with the entrance of

each cave covered by fire from others located to the front and flanks. Sometimes

machine guns, mortars, and even artillery

would be emplaced in the open to cover

cave entrances. The various weapons

were, as a rule, so cleverly camouflaged

that they were difficult to find. In the

last desperate effort to prevent the destruction of caves by American forces, the

Japanese would engage in grenade duels

and hand-to-hand combat.

A number of weaknesses in cave warfare

remained. For one thing, the small entrances greatly restricted the defenders'

field of fire. The lack of communications between caves limited the defenders' ability to maneuver, counterattack,

or withdraw. Japanese commanders

cautioned their troops not to be trapped

in caves. At the proper time at least

one-third of the men were to leave and

help cover the cave mouth from emplacements. But the defenders had little success in carrying out such orders. The

Japanese were aware of the weakness of

cave warfare, but had adopted it because

of the overwhelming U.S. fire power and

because of the chance cave warfare provided for slowing down the advance of

the U.S. forces. The Japanese were

making every effort to improve cave warfare and at the same time overcome its

disadvantages.

The U.S. infantry-tank teams destroyed innumerable caves by using

direct fire and flame throwers. The

8-inch howitzers of the artillery, and, at

times, bombardment by aircraft proved

very effective. The combat engineers

were widely used to reduce caves and

fortifications that could not be destroyed

by direct infantry assault, artillery fire,

or aerial bombardment, but had to be

eliminated by hand-placed explosive

charges. Engineer demolitions person37

 Navy Dept Of of CNO, Rpt, Amphib Opns

Capture of Okinawa, 27 Mar-21 Jun 45.
648 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

nel were organized in much the same

way as in previous assaults in the Central

Pacific. Usually a squad of from six to

twelve men was responsible for front-line

demolitions for an infantry unit as large

as a battalion. If intelligence indicated

numerous caves, pillboxes, and blockhouses in an area, an entire engineer

platoon might be directed to support one

infantry battalion. The battalion commander usually kept his engineer demolition teams near his command post in

order to have them readily available

should the infantry need help. While

waiting to be called forward, the men

prepared 24-pound satchel charges, which

were the ones mainly used on Okinawa.

Pole and shaped charges were, as a rule,

too unwieldy or too heavy.

Called forward, an engineer squad

operated in a more or less standard manner. The man in the lead advanced

toward the cave with the charge and

phosphorous grenades, followed by one

or two others with spare satchels; the

remainder of the group took up positions

as directed by the squad leader. The

infantry was in readiness to deliver protective fire. Reaching the mouth of the

cave, the lead man threw in phosphorous

grenades to blind the occupants. Next,

the satchel charge was thrown in—as far

as possible toward the rear of the cave—

to get the maximum blast effect. Tento-fifteen-second delayed fuzes gave the

men a chance to get away from flying

debris. The use of multiple fuzes, some

of which were dummies, made it difficult

for the occupants, already at least

partially blinded by the phosphorous

grenades, to pull the proper fuze out of

the charge before it exploded. Sometimes a second charge was thrown before

the smoke of the first had cleared away.

The aim was the complete destruction

and sealing of the fortification. Moving

in rapidly on the target and getting away

fast were essential. Operating in this

way, the engineers in the support of one

front-line infantry battalion often used

more than a ton of explosives to destroy

about forty pillboxes, caves, bunkers, and

ammunition dumps. Casualty rates

were high. The Japanese brought intense fire to bear on demolition teams.

During one 3-week period, for example,

one engineer combat battalion suffered

20 percent casualties.38

The defenders of southern Okinawa

made extensive use of mines. The

American forces found no fields laid in a

regular pattern, but standard and improvised mines were scattered about in

great profusion. The only new type was

the antipersonnel fragmentation mine.

All mines, including those that were

booby-trapped, were removed by 4-man

engineer teams, one team being assigned

to each tank platoon. Long demolition

"snakes" attached to tanks were used in

a few instances to clear paths through

mine fields. Armored bulldozers were

extensively used to clear roads of

obstacles. Booby traps were found in

caves and sometimes in abandoned tanks.

Road maintenance in southern Okinawa was an arduous task for the engineers because the poorly surfaced

thoroughfares broke down rapidly

under the heavy traffic. From 10 to 12

feet wide, most of the main highways

were coral surfaced. During the pro38

 This account of engineer participation in the

reduction of enemy defenses on Okinawa is based

on Bradley, Report of Engineer Operations, ICEBERG.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 649

longed rains in May, maintenance became critical; in the XXIV Corps area,

the engineers could keep but one main

supply route open, and even this was

possible only because corps and divisional engineers worked on the route

continuously. After the rainy season,

maintenance problems on roads were less

serious, but bridging remained a major

task. Bridges and culverts, almost invariably built of stone or reinforced

concrete, and with a capacity of thirtyfive tons or more, were adequate for

much of the military traffic, but most

bridges were only one lane. Baileys,

used extensively on southern Okinawa,

proved very satisfactory. There was

little need for ponton bridges, and only

three were put in place.39

The End of the Okinawa

Campaign

Bitter fighting continued during May,

and casualties were heavy as the defenders were pushed back slowly to the tip

of the island. In June enemy resistance

crumbled more rapidly. By the end of

that month the Japanese position was

hopeless. As the Americans pressed into

the southernmost part of Okinawa, some

of the defenders made last-ditch charges

against American positions; many committed suicide. On 2 July the Okinawa

campaign was declared officially ended.

Base and Airfield Construction for the

Assault on Japan

While fighting was still in progress in

the Philippines and on Okinawa, the

engineers in the rear areas were already

building up bases and developing airfields from which U.S. forces were to

launch the final assault on Japan. Two

theaters, the Southwest Pacific and the

Pacific Ocean Areas, were to be jointly

responsible for the final assault. The

major construction, by far, was being

done in the Philippines and on Okinawa.

In the meantime, finishing touches were

being put on work in Hawaii and other

islands of the central Pacific to support

the attack on the Japanese home islands.

Elsewhere, construction had slackened

off greatly or stopped entirely. Some

work was still in progress in the CBI

theater, but in the South Pacific, the

engineers were mainly dismantling bases.

Over-all Organization in the Pacific

Despite changes in the tactical commands, no great modifications were made

in the engineer organization in the

Pacific in late 1944 and 1945. The

greatest changes resulted from the Joint

Chiefs' activation of Army Forces,

Pacific (AFPAC), on 6 April 1945, under

the command of General MacArthur.

Henceforth, all Army units in the Pacific,

except those of the Strategic Air Forces,

were under MacArthur's direction. For

the time being, the new command was

only a nominal one since no immediate

changes in organization were made. In

the Southwest Pacific Area, GHQ SWPA

continued to function as MacArthur's

headquarters for that theater, and MacArthur and Nimitz agreed that U.S.

Army units in the Pacific Ocean Areas

would remain under Nimitz' control

until he released them to MacArthur.

Admiral Nimitz did not transfer the first

39

 Tenth Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus Campaign, pp. 11-XI-9ff.
650 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

POA units to AFPAC until 31 August

1945, when MacArthur assumed command of all Army units in the Ryukyus,

except those assigned to the Strategic Air

Forces.

Engineer Organization—

SWPA and AFPAC

When AFPAC was established, the

forward echelon of Casey's office was

located in the Manila City Hall; the rear

echelon was in the midst of moving from

Leyte to the Philippine capital. Authorized strength of the office was 65

officers and 114 enlisted men. In April

Casey's request for an increase of 50

percent in personnel strength was

granted. As Chief Engineer, SWPA and

AFPAC, Casey had theoretical technical

supervision over all U.S. Army and

Allied engineer units in the Pacific.

Probably his major task in his new

position was to co-ordinate the activities

of units insofar as possible in order to

prevent duplication of effort. Co-ordination was especially necessary with

regard to map-making organizations. In

both the Pacific Ocean and Southwest

Pacific Areas, they were already at work

on or were about to be engaged in an

extensive mapping program of the Japanese home islands.40

OCE USASOS

The office of General Ross, Chief

Engineer, USASOS SWPA, had finished

moving from Brisbane to Hollandia in

November 1944. By this time, an advance echelon was already at Tacloban,

Leyte; thereafter, additional elements

moved forward, and by February 1945

the entire office was settled in Leyte.

General Ross was now making preparations to move forward again, this time

to Manila. An advance echelon, headed

by Col. O. N. Rinehart, arrived in the

Philippine capital in February. In

April Col. Louis J. Rumaggi and the

Operations Division, together with supplies and equipment, were flown there.

They took over the third floor of one of

the buildings of Far Eastern University

and in a short time "were carrying on

business as usual." That same month

OCE USASOS was officially set up in

Manila.41

Engineer Districts

Since construction in the Philippines

was to be so extensive and vitally important, proper organization would be

highly essential. Especially in and around

the metropolitan area of Manila, an immense amount of construction and reconstruction was necessary. As in Australia

and New Guinea, General Frink, the

commander of USASOS, organized bases

to decentralize operations. He set up

five, one on Leyte (Base K), three on

Luzon (Base M at Lingayen Gulf, Base

X at Manila, and Base R at Batangas),

and one on Cebu (Base S). To supervise

their operations, he had redesignated the

Army Service Command, recently transferred from Sixth Army to USASOS, as

Luzon Base Section, made it an intermediate headquarters, and placed it over

40

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Admin Hist, 6 Apr

45-31 Dec 46, pp 1-3, 5-7. SWPA Files.

41

 Of C Engr AFWESPAC, First Semiannual Rpt,

p. 6. SWPA File A201b.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 651

the bases. In April Luzon Base Section

was renamed Philippine Base Section.

In Australia and New Guinea, where

engineer construction had been the responsibility of base section and base

commanders, staff engineers exercised

only technical supervision over engineer

work. In the Philippines, engineer construction, initially the responsibility of

the base commanders, was subsequently

entirely divorced from their activities.

It was assigned to engineer districts,

which were similar to such organizations

in the United States. To accomplish

construction on Leyte, General Frink

set up the Leyte Engineer District in

February 1945 and made it directly responsible to General Ross. That same

month, General Frink organized the

Luzon Engineer District (LUZED) under

Col. Alexander M. Neilson, placed it

under Luzon Base Section, and made it

responsible for USASOS construction on

Luzon. Both districts differed from

similar organizations in the United

States in only one major respect—engineer troops and not contracting firms

or civilian workers did the actual

construction.42

The Engineer Construction

Command

For some time considerable thought

had been given to putting all engineer

construction in the USASOS area under

one command to be headed by an engineer. Generals Casey and Sverdrup

and other members of MacArthur's staff

had discussed the desirability of making

such a move in late 1944 and early 1945.

Such an organization would be in line

with the War Department's policy of

centralizing control of major technical

activities in Headquarters, SOS, rather

than delegating control of them to commanders of bases and advance sections, a

policy the CBI theater had already implemented early in 1944.43

 Sverdrup,

made a major general on 5 January 1945,

was especially interested in setting up

such a command; it was generally assumed he would head it after Casey

returned from the Army Service Command to his position as MacArthur's

chief engineer. On 20 February 1945,

Sverdrup wrote Casey that it was

"... rather obvious that a concentration

of all construction forces within one

organization is advantageous as centralized control properly exercised means

far greater efficiency." Sverdrup had in

mind a construction command which

would have under it various engineer

districts. Two were already in existence

and Sverdrup thought perhaps three

more should be created. All would use

troop units or contractors to get the work

done. A fourth, organized along similar lines, would make use of Filipino

workmen for rehabilitating Manila.44

A major question was whether to place

such a command in GHQ, in USAFFE,

or in USASOS. It was finally decided to

put it directly under General Frink,

since, as commanding general of

USASOS, he was responsible for construction in the communications zone.

On 6 March the Engineer Construc42

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II,

189-90.

43

 See above, p. 438. 44

 Memo, Sverdrup for Casey, 20 Feb 45. 323.41,

SWPA Files, KCRC.
652 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

tion Command (ENCOM) was set up

under Sverdrup, who was henceforth responsible for co-ordinating and supervising all construction in the Southwest

Pacific that was under the control of

USASOS. This meant, in effect, responsibility for construction in the

Philippines, since the rear bases were by

this time being dismantled. Engineer

construction responsibilities in the communications zone in the islands were

thus placed under one engineer command, which was completely separate

from the base organizations. The men

for Sverdrup's new headquarters were

taken on a temporary basis, mostly from

the 5202d Construction Brigade and

from a number of aviation and construction battalions. The Leyte and

Luzon Engineer Districts were transferred to ENCOM.45

The General Engineer District

A new engineer district for ENCOM

was soon organized. Its establishment

had, in fact, been under consideration

since late 1944, when it seemed likely

that an extraordinary effort would have

to be made to rehabilitate and reconstruct facilities in and around Manila

after the Japanese there had been defeated. Colonel Lane, chief of Sverdrup's Operations Division, was one of

the first to suggest using a district organization to rehabilitate the Philippine

capital. He wrote Sverdrup on 26

November 1944: "In connection with

plans for rehabilitation of Manila, it has

occurred to me that it may be desirable

to establish an Engineer District Office

. . . and that the Chief of Engineers could

probably furnish a complete District

with all personnel for this work. ... "

Lane stated that such an organization

should plan to use as many Filipino

civilians as possible in order to free the

troops for more direct combat support.

Since local contracting firms would in all

likelihood not be available, large numbers of hired laborers would have to be

used.46 On 5 December MacArthur

radioed a request to the Chief of Engineers for an organization similar to an

engineer district office in the United

States. "The limited number of engineers at my disposal," MacArthur

pointed out, "will be fully occupied in

direct support of the campaign. . . .

This means that the maximum use must

be made of civilian labor."

 47

In line with MacArthur's request,

Reybold began recruiting men for the

new office. Some 150 officers and 300

enlisted men were supplied by division

and district offices in the United States.

They received a few weeks training at

Fort Belvoir and then flew to Manila,

arriving in late March. Headed by Col.

Robert C. Hunter they were designated

the General Engineer District (GENED).

It was hoped that at least some of the

reconstruction projects could be given

to local contractors, but this idea was

quickly given up. There were few

Philippine construction firms before the

war and these were now unable to do

any effective work because of the dislo45

 (1) Ltr, Ross to Worsham, 4 Jan 45. 323.41,

SWPA Files, KCRC. (2) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC,

Admin Hist, pp. 20ff. (3) Ltr, Sverdrup to Staff Br,

28 Aug 50. SWPA Files.

46

 Memo, Lane for Sverdrup, 26 Nov 44. SWPA

File 304. 47

 Radio, MacArthur to Reybold, 5 Dec 44.

323.41, SWPA Files, KCRC.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 653

cations caused by the conflict. Colonel

Hunter had to rely at first on hired labor.

He had the usual difficulties of organizing and supervising such a large work

force. Fortunately, many of those hired

had been employed by the U.S. Army

before the war and so had gained experience for the work they had to do. Because of the vast amount of destruction,

however, Hunter, contrary to original

plans, soon had to use large numbers of

troops.48

Construction Corps of the

Philippines

Although Sverdrup had considered

organizing a number of additional subordinate commands, only one more was

formed—the Construction Corps of the

Philippines (CONCOR), organized to

make further use of Filipino workmen.

It was set up on 25 April, under Col.

Samuel N. Karrick, to undertake reconstruction in the Philippines, especially

in and near Manila. Workmen, recruited on a voluntary basis for a minimum period of six months, would be

directed by American and Filipino officers. This type of organization was

expected to make possible a more efficient use of the Filipinos by providing

better organization and supervision and

reducing labor turnover. The workmen were to be organized into labor

battalions. At full strength, each would

have 92 officers and enlisted men from

the U.S. Army, the Philippine Army,

and the Philippine Scouts, and 1,037

civilians. A CONCOR battalion had a

special table of organization and equipment closely resembling that of the former Civilian Conservation Corps battalions in the United States. Recruitment was slow, and by 1 June, CONCOR

had only one battalion. Thereafter, expansion was more rapid, four battalions

being activated in June. Including

both skilled and unskilled workers, the

battalions became quite efficient in all

types of construction, except possibly

those requiring much earth moving.

They built barracks, warehouses, and

hospitals, and maintained roads and utilities. Labor turnover was of serious

concern at first but became less so as the

organization was improved. Though

wages were low, many Filipinos were

attracted to the organization mainly because it provided meals at cost and permitted employees to buy scarce articles

in the Army's post exchanges.49

Changes in ENCOM

In the rapidly changing conditions in

the Philippines, Sverdrup's staff, and

his subordinate commands as well, underwent almost continuous modification.

During the first months the number of

men in ENCOM headquarters fluctuated

greatly. In June the War Department

authorized a staff of 114 officers and 652

enlisted men. Meanwhile, Sverdrup

found himself directing the construction

efforts of a larger and larger engineer

force. Late in April, he had acquired

an additional unit. This was the Boat

48

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Admin Hist, pp. 22-23.

49

 Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Admin Hist, pp. 23-

26. (2) Memo, 2d Lt Warren D. Curds, Opns Sec

Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, for Colonel Lane et al, 4

May 45, with Incl, Staff Study, Constr Corps of the

Philippines, 20 Apr 45. SWPA Files M75. (3)

Of C Engr AFWESPAC, First Semiannual Rpt.
654 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Building Command, which had been

established in mid-1944 at Milne Bay to

direct the activities of the boat assembly

units in the theater. In early 1945 the

command was transferred to Batangas,

Luzon, where the men rebuilt their assembly plants and were soon putting

landing craft together again. The

Luzon Engineer District also expanded

rapidly, and by the end of April, Colonel

Neilson had about 250 military and civilians on his staff. Within the next few

weeks, he had some 30,000 engineer

troops and over 20,000 Filipino civilians

working on various projects. The General Engineer District likewise grew

rapidly. When the Leyte Engineer

District was inactivated in May, GENED

took over its projects, and it took over

LUZED's when that organization was

inactivated in July. By then, the

General Engineer District had under its

control most of the military construction

in the USASOS area in the Philippines.50

The type of construction organization

that many engineers had wanted since

the early days in Australia, one headed

by an engineer officer, was now a reality.

Nevertheless, many of the difficulties

previously experienced were still prevalent, undoubtedly because they were too

basic to be easily eliminated by a change

in organization. Shortages of men and

supplies were still the rule, as were the

problems generally encountered in coordinating a construction effort over a

vast area in a short time. Some felt that

ENCOM, directing work formerly

handled well enough by base section

and base commanders, was merely another headquarters that had to be dealt

with. From the standpoint of many

engineers, ENCOM had the great advantage that it was an engineer command. Engineer units of such a

command were more likely to receive a

sympathetic understanding of their

problems than they could get from nonengineer base and base section commanders. ENCOM consequently improved

the morale and efficiency of engineer

units. It further raised morale by giving a number of promotions that could

not be granted earlier because of limitations in the tables of organization.51

Army Forces, Western Pacific

On 7 June USASOS was redesignated Army Forces, Western Pacific

(AFWESPAC) and placed under the

command of Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer.

Somewhat expanded in functions over

its predecessor, AFWESPAC was to provide logistic support for U.S. Army

troops in SWPA and AFPAC as directed

by higher headquarters. On 10 June,

General Worsham, formerly division

engineer of the Northwest Service Command in Canada and Alaska, became

Engineer, AFWESPAC. His staff was

one of considerable size, by the end of

June consisting of 144 officers, 435 enlisted men, and 33 civilians—a total of

612. AFWESPAC had more than 200

engineer units numbering about 65,000

men, and within a month the figure had

risen to 90,000. Engineers made up

50

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

II, 188-89, 196. (2) Ltr, Heiman to Staff Br, 13

Oct 50. SWPA Files.

51

 (1) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA,

II, 198. (2) Ltr, Sverdrup to Staff Br, 28 Aug 50.

SWPA Files.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 655

one-fourth of all the troops under

AFWESPAC's command. Worsham's

staff was before long concerned primarily

with the construction and maintenance

of bases needed to support the invasion

of Japan and with making plans and

preparations to furnish the engineer

troops and supplies required for that

assault.52

Construction in the Philippines

Rehabilitation and construction in the

Philippines surpassed anything hitherto

attempted by the engineers in the Pacific

in a comparable period of time. Airfields had high priority and twenty on

Luzon were repaired, improved, or

newly constructed during the first six

months of 1945. One of the fields

which received a great deal of attention

was Clark. The engineers first put the

two existing runways in temporary operating condition and then began work

on two new 7,000-foot runways for bombers. At Porac, eight miles south of

Clark and at Floridablanca (formerly

Del Carmen), four miles still farther

south, they put in new strips for bombers, also. A great deal of effort was

necessary to rehabilitate Nichols and

Nielson Fields in the Manila area and to

provide them with additional facilities

such as gasoline storage and hangars.

Most other runways on Luzon, rehabilitated or constructed to meet current

operational requirements, were not developed to any great extent. The engineers did rather extensive work on a

number of fields in the southern

Philippines. The one at Puerto Princesa, Palawan, was rebuilt and lengthened to 7,000 feet; on Mindanao, the

fields at Zamboanga and Malabang were

improved and enlarged; two all-weather

fields were built on Mindoro; four were

developed in the Visayas. All told, the

engineers rehabilitated and newly constructed forty-five runways in the Philippines during the first six months of

1945.53

The engineers generally provided new

facilities for storing gasoline. At the

same time they constructed or rehabilitated fueling jetties and laid more than

500 miles of pipeline. One of the major

new storage installations was the large

tanker terminal near Mariveles on

Bataan, from which pipelines were extended to Clark and nearby airfields;

construction progressed rapidly during

the spring of 1945, despite unfavorable

weather. Before the battle for Luzon

ended, storage for 160,000 barrels had

been erected at Mariveles and over fifty

miles of 6-inch pipeline installed, with

aviation gasoline flowing through the

line at the rate of 412 barrels an hour.

The 40,000-barrel welded steel tanks at

Mariveles, the first of which were completed in August 1945, were the largest

storage tanks of this type erected in the

Southwest Pacific.

In an extensive hospital building program, major installations were erected

at Manila, San Fernando in northern

Luzon, and Batangas in southern Luzon.

One of the largest projects, built on the

52

 Of C Engr AFWESPAC, First Semiannual Rpt,

pp. 7-8. (2) Engrs of SWPA, II, pp. 176-80.

53

 The information in this and the following paragraphs on the rehabilitation in the Philippines is

taken from Office of the Chief Engineer, GHQ

SWPA, Annual Report for 1945. (Draft MS).

SWPA Files.
656 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

site of a Japanese airfield in the Mandaluyong area in southeastern Manila, was

the first in SWPA to use prefabricated

steel units. The main members were

prefabricated; an assembly line was used

to preassemble wall panels, floor joists,

roof girders, and posts. The steel units,

made of special lightweight metal, were

20 feet wide and varied in length from

48 to 240 feet. The floors were made of

plywood, the walls and ceilings of beaverboard, the windows of plastic. Some of

these units were also erected at Fort McKinley Hospital. The steel units could

be dismantled and then re-erected with

only a 5-percent loss of material, but reerection required considerably more

effort than putting up the wooden ones.

Warehousing was extensive. Most

storage was in the Greater Manila area,

where the engineers supplied about 9

million square feet of covered storage

and some 34 million square feet of open

storage. They made about 2 million

square feet of covered storage available

by rehabilitating existing buildings.

One of the largest projects was the

quartermaster depot built on the site of

the old Zablan Airfield, just east of the

capital. It consisted of 31 prefabricated

buildings, each of which, measuring no

by 405 feet, covered slightly more than

an acre, and took about a week to erect.

Floors were of steel mat, wood, concrete,

or crushed stone, depending upon the

type of supplies to be stored. Bases M

and R also had fairly large storage

facilities.

Port areas had been severely damaged,

especially at Manila, where the Japanese

had systematically destroyed the prewar

berthing facilities, particularly those of

South Harbor; none were usable when

the Americans captured the dock area.

The harbor was cluttered with some 600

sunken vessels. Reconstruction and

clearing began on 1 March. Floating

ponton piers were again invaluable and

the engineers used them extensively at

first to provide facilities rapidly, but

since these piers required a great deal of

maintenance and could be used successfully only in well-protected harbors, the

engineers rehabilitated existing facilities

and undertook some new construction.

They built two new fixed piers, which

provided eight additional berths in

South Harbor, and lengthened two existing piers. Pier 13 (formerly Pier 7), one

of the longest covered piers in the world,

was rehabilitated with the help of about

1,800 troops and 2,000 civilians and provided berths for six Libertys. During

the reconstruction period, five Army

dredges excavated 3,250,000 cubic yards

of material from North and South Harbors and the Pasig River. The Navy,

meanwhile, was clearing a path through

the wreckage in Manila Bay. The port

was made serviceable in a relatively short

time, the first Liberty docking on 17

March. The engineers also did harbor

work at San Fernando, Subic Bay, Mariveles, Puerto Princesa, Zamboanga, and

Cebu City.

Along with the reconstruction of

Manila Harbor, a major undertaking was

the rehabilitation of the city itself.

Engineer construction units under

ENCOM took over this work from

Colonel Liles's command in March.

One of the first jobs to be completed was

the restoration of the water supply

system. With the capture of Ipo and

Montalban Dams, the prewar water

pressure in north Manila was restored.

By putting a 16-inch water main across

the Pasig at Ayala Bridge, the engineers
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 657

partly restored water service in south

Manila. They were at the same time

repairing the sewerage system, which was

expected to be turned over to the civilian

authorities in the fall. The electric

power system had been so badly damaged

that large-scale reconstruction was necessary. Power resources remained low; for

a time a destroyer escort in Manila

Harbor was fitted up to provide 3,500

kilowatts for the city. Work on the

electric plant and power lines was a

time-consuming job. The engineers

cleared and repaired about ninety miles

of streets. They put temporary bridges

across the Pasig to replace the five destroyed during the fighting. They

pulled 200 sunken boats out of the harbor. In short, Manila was again made

habitable.

Engineer units did much additional

construction in various parts of the

islands. They provided staging areas

for 350,000 troops and replacement

depots and disposition centers for

125,000. They successfully carried out

railroad rehabilitation, and by 11 March

service was restored on the Manila Railroad from Lingayen Gulf to the capital.

An engineer combat battalion with the

158th RCT placed sixty-five miles of the

railroad on the Bicol Peninsula in operation. Other engineer efforts included

quick repair of seventy-four miles of

railroad on Panay and a short stretch on

Cebu, and attempts to speed up rehabilitation of sawmills and cement plants.

Construction on Okinawa

The organization established on Okinawa for construction was similar to

those set up on other islands of the

central Pacific. An island command, in

Army terms a garrison force, was organized and made responsible for the construction of the base and airfields and for

the supply of combat and garrison

troops. The island commander on

Okinawa was Maj. Gen. Fred C. Wallace.

His engineer, a naval officer, was responsible for construction for the Army

and the Navy; an Army engineer, with

the rank of colonel, was deputy engineer.

The Engineer Section was staffed with

officers and men from the 1181st Construction Group and from the Naval

Construction Office, Tenth Army.

Under the command of the island engineer were Army engineer units and naval

construction battalions, which were to

build the Army's and Navy's projects,

respectively. Constructing units, assigned to the Island Command and

scheduled for early landings on Okinawa,

were attached to XXIV Corps and III

Amphibious Corps. The first engineer

units of the Island Command landed on

D-day. Within the first month, nineteen

Army engineer units and naval construction battalions had come in; more arrived in May and June. In late May

16,000 tons of construction materials

arrived for the Navy—the first large shipment of such supplies to reach the

island. The first large shipment for the

Army was unloaded late in June. The

slow arrival of supplies, partly caused by

the bitter Japanese resistance, delayed

airfield and base construction. The unexpectedly tenacious resistance also

meant that some of the engineer construction units had to be diverted to

army and corps to provide engineer support. Tactical operations within the

Island Command area itself involved

mainly elimination of snipers and skirmishes with small enemy groups. The
658 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Island Command's area of responsibility

was gradually increased until by 30 June

1945 it included all of Okinawa.54

As indicated earlier, the construction

planned for the island was tremendous.

Six runways for B-29's were to be built,

the most extensive airfield complex ever

designed for an island in the central

Pacific. The initial program was not

only frequently revised, but also expanded. Early in January 1945 General

Buckner had directed that an airfield be

built on Ie Shima and that additional

base facilities be constructed on small

islands near Okinawa. After operations

on Okinawa were under way, reconnaissance indicated that there were

several additional good sites for B-29

runways. After a conference of major

echelon representatives in early May

1945, Nimitz directed that B-29 fields be

constructed on Okinawa only; construction on Ie Shima was to be limited to a

field for fighters. Plans now called for

6 Army airfields on Okinawa, but only

three of them for B-29's. Later, additional fields were required to take care

of units of Far East Air Forces which

were to be transferred to Okinawa, and,

still later, additional facilities were

needed for the Strategic Air Forces. By

30 June 22 runways on 13 airfields had

been proposed and suitable sites found

on Okinawa and Ie Shima; this revised

airfield program meant that Army facilities had to be provided for 450,000

men.55

Construction of airfields had begun

on 3 April with the rehabilitation of

Yontan and Kadena. Both fields had

been taken almost intact; such damage

as was found had been largely caused by

American bombings. Within a few

days, both fields were ready to take fighters. At Yontan, working from 30 April

to 30 June, engineer units under Island

Command put in the first American-built

runway on Okinawa—a 7,000-foot medium bomber strip. The first B-29

runway was constructed at Kadena and

was about 25 percent complete by the

end of June. At Bolo Airfield on the

western shore of the island, another B-29

runway was under construction and still

another B-29 runway was being developed at Futema. On the whole, construction of bomber and fighter runways

was progressing satisfactorily until heavy

rains in late May and early June slowed

down the work. Then much equipment

had to be diverted to tactical units to

keep supply routes open to the front,

Ie Shima was being transformed into a

giant airfield. After the enemy runways

had been rehabilitated, construction of

new ones began, but progress here was

hampered by the large number of mines

which the Japanese had placed in the

airfield area. Because the runways

occupied almost the entire island, the

civilian population was evacuated. By

mid-May, runways, taxiways, and hardstands on Ie Shima were fully operational. By the end of June, five airfields

on Okinawa and Ie Shima were operational, and six additional ones were being rehabilitated or newly constructed.56

54

 Island Comd Okinawa, Action Rpt, 13 Dec 44-

30 Jun 45. 98-1861-0.3(18017). 55

 (1) Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Matterhorn to Nagasaki, pp. 691-92. (2) USAFPOA, Participation in the Okinawa Opn, I, 167-68.

56

 (1) USAFPOA, Participation in the Okinawa

Opn, I, 167-68. (2) Island Comd Okinawa, Action

Rpt, 13 Dec 44-30 Jun 45. (2) Bradley, Rpt on

Engr Opns, ICEBERG.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 659

AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION, Iwo JIMA

Much other work was undertaken.

Repair of existing roads and construction

of new ones was vital. By midyear the

engineers had built supply roads along

both the east and the west coast, as well

as down the center. Most of the important thoroughfares were developed to

take two-lane traffic. By 30 June 340

miles of all classes of roads were being

maintained, 40 miles of the total having

been newly constructed. The situation

was at its worst during the heavy rains

of late May and early June. At one

time only one supply road to the front

lines was open. The development of

harbor facilities began on 30 April with

the construction of a 500-foot ponton

cube pier for barges at Buckner

(Nakagusuku) Bay. By 30 June six

temporary ponton piers to take barges

were in place, and preparations were well

along on the second phase of port development—the construction of permanent

piers. Of high priority was the construction of storage tanks for gasoline,

the laying of pipelines, and the installation of pumping systems to get the gasoline from the tankers to the airfields. By

25 April gasoline was being pumped

through pipelines to Yontan and

Kadena; by the end of June tank farms

had been erected at the major airfields
660 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

then in operation. The building of

camps and hospitals was delayed because

of the priority of combat and air force

construction.57

Construction on Iwo Jima

The main reason for taking Iwo Jima

had been its importance as an air base

site. This volcanic island presented

some unusual problems in airfield construction. The fields had to be built on

volcanic ash, and a major puzzle was how

to bind the hot asphalt mix to the ash.

The engineers developed a procedure

that proved to be successful. They put

down a layer of crushed stone two inches

thick and thoroughly rolled it into the

ash. When the ash was wet after a rain,

it settled, leaving the stones slightly exposed, so that the resultant mixture adhered to the 2-inch asphalt surface.

This method was also successfully used

in building roads on the island.

A strip of especially hot ground, about

400 feet wide, ran under the runways of

the B-29 field and one of the fighter

fields. The strip appeared to have the

same bearing capabilities as the cooler

ground, but after the surfacing had been

in place for several weeks, soft areas developed and the runway cracked. The

ash underneath had become saturated

with water produced by the condensation

of the steam trapped by the asphalt surface. The men checked this condition

by excavating about sixteen inches below

the asphalt surface, filling in 2 to 6

inches of rock, and laying a new surface.

As a further precaution, they left breathers at the edge of the stone fill.

After a prolonged rainy period, parts

of the asphalt surface of one of the

fighter strips became inflated and steam

began puffing out. The engineers dug

trenches from the side of the runway to

the steam vents and laid pipes in them

to carry off the steam, which could thereafter be seen hissing at the sides of the

runway. They sometimes treated a

bulging asphalt surface by driving perforated 1-inch pipes through it, leaving the

ends flush with the surface. This expedient solved the problem until the

heat caused the asphalt to disintegrate to

powder. When that happened, the engineers put down another 1-inch layer of

hot-mix asphalt and drove more vent

pipes. Little had to be done about

drainage because of the porous nature of

the volcanic ash.

The construction of storage for aviation gasoline presented the problem of

how to reduce the temperature of gasoline standing in the miles of pipe in the

hot, volcanic ash—pipes that had to be

put underground to get them clear of

runways and taxiways. The engineers

did not have the time or the materials to

provide insulation. In its heated state,

sometimes as much as 170° F., the gasoline could not be pumped into the

planes. Before the planes could be refueled, the engineers had to erect spare

storage tanks into which the gasoline

could be pumped about an hour before

takeoff. Only in this way could adequate amounts of fuel be cooled. "It

was profoundly inspiring," Col. D. A.

Morris, engineer of the garrison force on

Iwo Jima wrote, ". . . to see hundreds of

these mighty bombers coming in to land

57

 Island Comd Okinawa, Action Rpt, 13 Dec 44-

30 Jun 45.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 661

or to see two mile-long columns of them

. . . lined up for refueling."

 58

Construction in Hawaii

In 1945 General Richardson, commander of USAFPOA, still had many

projects to carry out in Hawaii—the

completion of seacoast defenses; further

development of the port of Honolulu;

construction of additional office space for

army headquarters; improvement of

some of the airfields, particularly Hickam

and John Rodgers; the furnishing of

housing for approximately 5,000 civilian

employees; and the construction of rest

and recreational facilities. Many of the

projects entailed new construction;

others, rehabilitation of old facilities.

The most important jobs were the completion of facilities for the Air Forces,

Signal Corps, and Ordnance, the building of recreational facilities for the

troops, and the construction of the new

Tripler General Hospital. Probably

the project that had been under way

longest of all was the installation of the

naval guns from damaged warships.

The delay was still mainly due to the

great amount of time required to manufacture the many necessary specialized

parts, as well as to the lack of two especially important items—the turning gear

worm and pinion. The scarcity of technicians forced the Navy to institute a

special training program on battleships

and in Navy shops. The guns would

not be finished in time to be of service

during the war. Battery Pennsylvania

was expected to be completed by September 1945; Battery Arizona, by the end of

the year.59

The South Pacific

There was little activity in the south

Pacific by 1945. Construction had

ceased, and on 1 December 1944 South

Pacific Base Command had directed that

all work except that of an emergency

nature or necessary to maintain installations be stopped. Engineer units were

continuing to move to the central and

southwest Pacific. Those still in the

area were, for the most part, on New

Caledonia, Guadalcanal, and Bougainville and belonged mainly to supply and

maintenance units. The roll-up of

bases, under way since mid-1944, was

accelerated. Efate and Tongatabu were

closed out in May 1945. By July, New

Zealand was closed out except for a few

personnel. It was planned to have New

Caledonia serve as the final storage area

and transshipment point for the south

Pacific. As of midyear, base facilities on

that island were still extensive. In

June the Engineer Section of the South

Pacific Base Command at Noumea still

had 11 officers and 84 enlisted men,

whose main job it was to supervise the

dismantling and disposal of facilities.

A most important part of their task was

the return of real estate to the owners—

about 85 percent of all leases in the

theater were for property on New Cale58

 (1) Morris, "Engineer Operations on Iwo Jima,"

The Military Engineer, XL (May, 1948), 200-201.

(2) Hist of the 811th Engr Avn Bn.

59

 (1) Ltr, Richardson to TAG, 17 Jan 45. Engr

AFG PAC, 600.1 (2) Ltr, Richardson to CG CPBC,

9 Jul 45. Engr AGF PAC, 600.1/6. (3) Memo,

Capt H. Perlis, C Special Installations Div Of of

Engr USAFPOA, to Loper, 6 Dec 44. Engr AGF

PAC.
662 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

donia. The number of troops continued

to decline. The base command had

some 13,000 engineers in January; the

number was down to 1,072 by midAugust.60

Declining CBI

In Burma and China, engineer work

was still considerable, for in early 1945

there was a possibility that fairly extensive operations would be undertaken

against the Japanese on the Asian mainland. The military outlook became

more favorable in the first months of the

year. With the capture of Lashio by

the Chinese on 7 March, all of northern

Burma was free, and British and Indian

troops continued their advance southward. The Chinese armies in Burma

began to return to their homeland for a

showdown with the Japanese; Wedemeyer hoped to strengthen them sufficiently to enable them to fight their way

to the coast by fall. The India-Burma

Theater, under Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan,

would for all practical purposes function

as a communications zone. Major jobs

for the engineers on the Asian continent

were building additional airfields in

China, improving the Ledo and Burma

Roads, and completing the system of

pipelines. As the war progressed, it became apparent that decisive operations

would not take place in China. In the

last months of the war, therefore, engineer work was largely of a routine

nature.61

The logistical build-up in support of

the China Theater would be of little

avail if the Chinese armies proved too

weak to drive the Japanese back. Wedemeyer detailed additional American instructors and liaison officers to Chinese

armies and divisions as training activities were stepped up. Meanwhile,

Chennault's engineers continued work

on a growing number of airfields to

replace the eastern ones overrun by the

enemy after August 1944. Resident

engineers supervised the building or improving of nine fields east of Kunming

and seven more north of the Yangtze

River and east of Chungking. When

fighting broke out between the Japanese

and the Chinese in April, Chennault's

airmen controlled the skies. In May

the Japanese began a general withdrawal,

preparatory to the evacuation of southern

China. As the Chinese moved eastward

in June and July, they recaptured several

of Chennault's airfields which the Japanese had demolished. With the recapture of Liuchow at the end of June,

Chennault flew in a detachment of the

930th Aviation Regiment to take charge

of restoring the heavy bomber field

there.62 At the same time, the engineers

were increasingly engaged on a program

of road improvement in southern China.

Late in April Wedemeyer directed the

Burma Road engineers to help their

60

 (1) Hq Constr Serv CPBC, Rpt, Summary of

Inspec, SPBC. Engr AGF PAC. (2) (Hist) Rpt,

SPBC Engr Sec. 319.1 (Misc) U.S. Army Forces in

New Caledonia, KCRC. (3) Ltr, Hq SPBC to CG

AFMIDPAC, 18 Aug 45, with Incl, Engr Tr Disposition Rpt, 15 Aug 45. 319.1 U.S. Army Forces in

New Caledonia.

61

 (1) Ltr, Col Craig Smyser, Actg Eng IBT to Gen

Johns, Of CofEngrs, 29 Jun 45. Theater Engr Ltr

File, Constr Serv Files. (2) Charles F. Romanus and

Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), ch. V. 62

 (1) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 344-45.

(2) Hist of the 930th Engr Regt.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 663

Chinese Army counterparts rehabilitate

roads in the Anshun-Kweiyang area, and

in June SOS, China Theater, detailed the

1880th Aviation Battalion to help improve the 600-mile post road from

Kunming eastward to Chihchiang. In

June, also, the 858th Aviation Battalion

and the 71st Light Ponton Company

arrived from Burma to help the YunnanBurma Highway Administration improve the Burma Road. Meanwhile, the

191st Light Ponton Company took up

ferry operations 260 miles east of

Kunming.63

Work went ahead on the Ledo Road.

It will be recalled that in August 1944

the War Department had authorized

construction beyond Myitkyina of a onelane paved road only. General Pick,

convinced that continuous traffic could

not be maintained over such a thoroughfare during the monsoon season, set out

to widen the Ledo Road to two lanes

throughout its length. When General

Farrell sounded out the War Department

in Washington in January 1945, he

learned that the Operations Division

would not object to widening the road

after all. Somervell started procurement of additional H-20 bridges to make

possible two-way traffic beyond Myitkyina.64

 Work progressed, but slowly.

Early in April, Lt. Col. W. S. Chapin, of

Headquarters, Construction Service,

after a personal inspection of the road,

wrote Colonel Welling: "The highway

from Myitkyina to Bhamo is now two

track. A considerable portion . . . from

Bhamo to Namhkan is two track and the

remaining portion between Namhkan

and Wanting is also two track. By 15

June a two track all-weather highway

will exist between Ledo and Wanting."

 65

The most spectacular feature of construction on the road in 1945 was the

erection of a number of bridges, particularly those over the Irrawaddy, Taping,

and Shweli. Pick planned to build a

combination bridge over the Irrawaddy

to replace the ponton bridge at Myitkyina

completed in early December 1944. The

new bridge was to be erected some 20

miles downstream from Myitkyina at a

point where the river was about 60 feet

deep during low water and rose as much

as 40 feet during floods. Pick decided to

use H-20 girders resting on steel barges

to form an 850-foot long center span.

Timber trestles would be used for the approaches. The barges, knocked down,

were already in the theater, having been

sent from the United States to transport

gasoline and other supplies on the Brahmaputra. The steel parts for the center

span, on order from the United States,

were not expected before the end of

March, by which time the Irrawaddy

would be in flood stage. The only feasible solution was to fabricate steel parts

from such scrap metal as could be found

in Advance Section. In mid-January

1945 the race against the flood waters began. To assemble and launch the barges,

the engineers set up a marine ways on the

river a short distance upstream from the

bridge site; at the same time, they manufactured on the spot the vital steel parts 63

 (1) Movement Order, Hq Burma Road Engrs,

28 Apr 45. GED, CTSOSEF. (2) Hist of the 71st,

858th, and 1880th Engrs. 64

 Memo, Kaminer, S-3 Adv Sec 3, to Pick, 6 May

45. Engr Sec File, LAC.

65

 (1) Memo, Chapin for Welling, 3 Apr 45. Opns

Br File, Constr Serv Files, (2) Work on the Teng- chung route was discontinued soon after the opening of the Ledo Road.
664 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

needed. On 31 March, about 75 days

after work began and two months before

the special bridging material arrived

from the United States, the bridge was

across the Irrawaddy. At its center it

had 6 floating spans resting on steel

barges, with a distance of about 110 feet

between barges. On either side of the

floating section were double-hinged spans,

each 225 feet long, which permitted the

center section to rise and fall with the

level of the river. Designed to take a

water fluctuation of 40 feet, the two

hinged sections were attached to fixed

trestles near the banks. This bridge,

two lane, had a capacity of 35 tons, and

with its approaches was 1,620 feet long.66

Beyond the Irrawaddy, all major

bridges were Baileys. In view of the

difficulties of getting H-20 bridges from

the United States, General Farrell in late

1944 had arranged with the British for

the procurement of Baileys. The parts

had been moved up the Ledo Road in

late 1944 and early 1945. In February

Company A of the 209th Combat Battalion completed a 400-foot Bailey over the

Taping. By 11 March Company B of

the 209th had built a similar structure,

450 feet long, across the Shweli.

On 21 May General Pick, then in

Washington, announced the formal completion of the Ledo Road. Typical of

the congratulations he received was the

one from Covell, stating that the Ledo

Road would "... stand forever as a monument to the unstinting labor, courage,

determination and ingenuity of both the

living and those who gave their lives in

this remarkable accomplishment."67

But after it was finished the road had far

less strategic importance than in the early

days of its construction. By 1945 the War

Department was no longer interested in

the tonnage goals set up at Quebec in

August 1943. The Department now

directed one-way deliveries of vehicles

and munitions only. No more than

eighty-eight truck companies would be

provided for all operations on the road.

To hold the thoroughfare open during

the monsoon of 1945, Pick kept 12,000

engineers busy resurfacing the roadway,

improving drainage, and repairing

bridges.68

The plans made at the QUADRANT

Conference for the construction of three

pipelines to China were cut drastically.

On 18 January Pick directed Colonel

Morse to complete the 6-inch standardweight line from Tinsukia as far as

Myitkyina. This job was to be finished

by 15 July. The 709th and 1382d

Petroleum Distribution Companies, reinforced by the 1304th Construction

Battalion and elements of four general

service regiments, began work on 16

February with pipe supplied by British

depots. Sultan, complying with Wedemeyer's request made in mid-April,

agreed to stop work on the 6-inch line at

66

 Col. James Truitt, "The Irrawaddy Bridge,

Ledo Road," The Military Engineer, XXXVII (October, 1945), 406-08.

67

 (1) Ltr, Covell to Pick, 26 Apr 45. Covell Ltr

File, Constr Serv Files. (2) Brig. Gen. Paul F.

Yount, in addition to commanding the Military

Railways, succeeded General Pick as Commanding

General, Advance Section, for the summer of 1945,

and he in turn was succeeded by Brig. Gen Walter

K. Wilson, Jr., who moved up from Mountbatten's

headquarters just as the war with Japan drew to a

close. 68

 (1) Bykofsky and Larson, Transportation Corps

in World War II: Operations Overseas, pp. 584-91.

(2) Hq IBT, Hist of IBT, app. 10, pp. 6-8. OCMH

Files.
THREE EXAMPLES OF BRIDGING IN THE CBI. Above, the steel barge bridge across the

Irrawaddy, with a temporary ponton bridge in the foreground. Below, the Bailey suspension

over the Taping River.
666 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Myitkyina and turn over to the Chinese

theater the cargo space thereby released.

Morse pushed his various projects to

completion. On 7 June the first gasoline reached Kunming through the 928-

mile 4-inch line, and nine days later the

6-inch line from Tinsukia to Myitkyina

was complete. Twelve of the seventeen

pipeline companies in the two Asian

theaters were thereafter engaged in

pumping and maintaining the lines

from Assam to Yunnan.69

Although the pipelines built were not

as extensive as had been originally

planned they still made up the greatest

military pipeline system in history.

(Map 32) Counting the spur lines from

Calcutta to the B-29 field in West Bengal

and the lines from Kunming to the airfields in Yunnan, the engineers had built,

in India, Burma, and China, a continuous pipeline system, with some 3,300

miles of pipe and 148 pumping stations.

During the last two years of the war,

engineer troops operating this enormous

network handled over 15,600,000 barrels

of gasoline and diesel oil. Most of this

fuel was consumed either in port activities at Calcutta or in aerial operations

from B-29 Bases in West Bengal or at

the transport fields in Assam. The two

6-inch lines delivered some 3,600,000

barrels to the Tinsukia tank farm.

From there, about 2,600,000 barrels

went to various points along the Ledo

Road and approximately 462,000 barrels

to points inside China.70

By mid-1945, the engineers in India

were putting an increasing effort into

the maintenance of airfields and the construction of warehouses at various fields

supporting the airlift to China. And

this drive was paying off. The Air

Transport Command delivered more

than 70,000 tons of supplies to Chinese

fields in July 1945. More and more,

engineer units were moving on to China,

where they were sorely needed to assist

in training Chinese engineers, restoring

the eastern airfields, improving the

Burma Road, holding open the roads,

and operating ferries in the wake of the

Chinese advance toward the coast.71

Maps

Supplying the great quantities of maps

of the target areas needed for an attack

on the Japanese home islands was the responsibility of the engineers of the

Southwest Pacific and the Pacific Ocean

Areas, the two theaters charged with the

final assault on Japan. When AFPAC

was formed, in April 1945, the number

of mapping units in the Pacific was fairly

adequate for the amount of work to be

done at that time. In the Southwest

Pacific, the mapping organization had

reached a strength of approximately

6,000 men. All tactical units had their

normal complement of topographic

troops, except Eighth Army, which had

only a corps topographic company. From

mid-February to mid-April, the 648th

Topographic Battalion, together with its

base map plant, moved from Melbourne

to Manila. The battalion was installed

69

 (1) Plng Div ASF, The Ledo Road, app. E,

p. 17. (2) Hq Constr Serv Pipeline Progr Rpts, 1

May and 3 Jun 45. 678 (In). 70

 (1) Hq IBT, Hist of IBT, app. 10. (2) Leslie

Anders, "American CBI Pipe Lines," The Military

Engineer, XLV (May-June, 1953), 618-71.

71

 (1) Ltr, Covell to Pick, 26 Apr 45. Admin Br

File, Constr Serv Files. (2) G-4, IBT, Weekly Rpts,

29 Jul, 5 Aug, 12 Aug, and 19 Aug 45. (3) Ltr,

Welling to Johns, 2 Aug 45. Admin Br File, Constr

Serv Files.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 667

MAP 32

in the Aguinaldo Building in downtown

Manila in space formerly occupied by a

department store. Production of maps resumed full speed early in June. The map

depot detachments had been moving to

the Philippines as rapidly as the situation

permitted.

The 30th Base Topographic Battalion,

which had arrived in Hawaii in January 1945, had been put in the huge threestory underground structure originally

intended for the Hawaiian Air Depot.

The underground chambers, completely

air-conditioned and fluorescent lighted,

were well suited for the work of the topographic battalion.72

With the mapping of the Japanese

home islands assuming greater and

greater importance after the formation

of AFPAC, more mapping units were

needed from the United States. MacArthur requested that the 29th Topographic Battalion be sent to the Philippines. Stationed at Portland, Oregon,

the 29th had helped on a number of

long-range projects for both the Pacific

and European theaters. MacArthur's

request was granted and the unit was

scheduled to arrive in Manila in July.73

Late in 1944 seven geologists from the

72

 Hist of the 30th Base Topo Bn.

73

 (1) 648th Engr Base Topo Bn, Interim Rpt, 1

Jan-31 Oct 45. SWPA File 16. (2) Of C Engr GHQ

AFPAC, Admin Hist, pp. 62-63.
668 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

U.S. Geological Survey had arrived in

Honolulu, their job to prepare terrain

studies of areas in the Pacific likely to

come under attack. Their assignments

were similar to those of the teams of

geologists who had gone to the Southwest

Pacific earlier that year. Responsible to

Brig. Gen. Herbert B. Loper, the Engineering and Terrain Intelligence Team,

as the group was called, prepared studies

as needed by tactical commanders. The

first request was for data on the beaches

and offshore conditions on Iwo Jima.

In preparation for the Okinawa campaign, about twenty-five studies were

prepared for Tenth Army. Thereafter

the intelligence team devoted its efforts

mainly to gathering information on the

terrain of southern Kyushu, one of the

Japanese home islands. Peak strength of

the team was 13 and included 10 geologists, 2 soil scientists, and a highway engineer.74

Maps made before the war gave a fairly

good coverage of Japan, but the need to

bring them up to date was urgent. The

most pressing need was to co-ordinate efforts of the photographic units which

were bringing back aerial photographs

of the Japanese home islands. Numerous sources were supplying photography.

The four main ones were squadrons of

the Far East Air Forces, based in the

Philippines; units of the Strategic Air

Forces, which took off from the Marianas

and Okinawa; Marine photographic

squadrons, which likewise took off from

the Marianas and Okinawa; and elements of the Fourteenth Air Force, operating from China. Among the lesser

contributors were Navy fliers who obtained photographs while making strikes

against the Japanese home islands.

Lack of co-ordination among so many

sources hampered efforts to secure adequate photographic coverage of Japan

proper and to distribute the photographs

promptly to the map-making units.

To improve this state of affairs, representatives of the various theaters and of

agencies in the United States concerned

with mapping held a conference in Hawaii in May. Among those represented

were AFPAC, CINCPOA, the Army Air

Forces, the Strategic Air Forces, the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and the

Army Map Service. Agreements were

reached on all important matters, including the areas of Japan to be mapped,

the types of maps to be made, the scales

to be used, and the priorities in which

maps were to be produced. Specifications

for aerial photographs were defined.

Responsibilities for the compilation, reproduction, and distribution of maps

were assigned. MacArthur was to have

primary responsibility for the control and

co-ordination of the mapping of the

Japanese home islands, since he was to

be primarily responsible for combat in

any invasion. Co-ordination of mapping

in the Southwest Pacific and the Pacific

Ocean Areas was brought about by making Loper, engineer of USAFPOA, the

head of Casey's Intelligence Division.

Meanwhile, the mapping of the Japanese home islands was proceeding satisfactorily. By early June accurate maps

of the four main islands, based largely

on prewar material, were available. Revisions, based on aerial photography,

74

 (1) Hist of Engrg and Terrain Intel Team.

SWPA File I19. (2) Memo, Sherman K. Neuschel,

C Geological Surveys Br U.S. Geological Surveys, for

C Staff Br, 16 Nov 48. SWPA Files.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 669

were required principally to show new

works of man.75 The conferees in Hawaii had also apportioned the responsibilities of the terrain intelligence teams

of the two theaters. The geologists in

the central Pacific were to continue with

their terrain studies of Kyushu, while

those in the Southwest Pacific were to

concentrate on studies of Honshu.

In a fast-moving campaign, such as was

being undertaken in the Southwest Pacific, map distribution was a most difficult task. During the operations on

Luzon, the map depot detachments

could not keep up with requirements,

even with the additional personnel supplied by replacement depots and labor

pools. Topographic supply was improved. During the New Guinea Campaign, a topographic supply depot, consisting of one officer and twelve enlisted

men, had been installed on a barge.

The barge, of reinforced concrete, arrived in Manila in the spring of 1945,

and was used to supply maps to units

engaged in combat in the outlying parts

of the archipelago.76

Supply in the Pacific

The engineers of the Southwest Pacific and the Central Pacific were also the

ones with the most pressing supply problems in the last months of the war and

would be the ones mainly responsible for

adequate enginer supply in the planned

invasion. Engineer supply, usually in a

rather precarious state, showed signs of

improvement in the closing months of

the war, but many of the basic problems

remained. In some respects there was a

trend for the better in the Southwest

Pacific, both in the combat zone and in

the rear areas. Engineer supply in support of combat, far from satisfactory on

Leyte because of the impromptu nature

of that operation, was adequate during

the remainder of the Philippine campaign. At least in part, this improvement resulted from the fact that the

organization for supply was better than

for most earlier operations. In the central and southern Philippines, Eighth

Army engineers sometimes found supply

not very satisfactory, but needs were not

so great.

The move to the Philippines inevitably caused a certain amount of dislocation in supply. With the inactivation

of the Distribution Division in February 1945, responsibility for stock control

was transferred to Luzon Base Section,

and later, Philippine Base Section.

After ENCOM was established in March,

most of the engineer units assigned to

bases in the Philippines were engaged in

supply work. As construction in the

Philippines expanded, difficulties in supply again became conspicuous. Once

more in evidence were insufficient longrange planning, poor stock control, careless unloading and storage, especially at

the ports, the misuse of supply units, and

the inadequate supply training of many

officers and men. To provide more efficient supervision of supply, the War Department had organized depot groups

which would direct supply more or less

as construction groups directed construc75

 (1) Check Sheet, Casey for CofS and AG GHQ

SWPA, 17 May 45. (2) Ltr, Loper to Casey, 26 May

45. Same File. (3) Of C Engr GHQ AFPAC,

Admin Hist, pp. 64ff.

76 Memo for Rcd, Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, Topo

Barge Depot, BCL 306.1. SWPA File M285.
670 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

tion.77 Interest in depot groups was not

strong, and few engineers seemed to be

aware of their value. "As I have said

several times," General Ross wrote to

Sverdrup on 19 February, "I am still of

the opinion that the Corps of Engineers

is not yet supply minded. . . . The need

for construction groups, brigades . . .

and other supervisory groups is well recognized and pushed . . . the need for

supply supervisory groups is even more

necessary. . . ."

 78

The distribution of spare parts improved during the Philippine campaign,

due partly to the arrival of larger quantities from the United States and partly

to better distribution in the theater. To

facilitate distribution to units in forward

areas, the engineers used ships stocked

with spare parts and known as "floating

depots." A Liberty ship, the Robert

Louis Stevenson, the first floating depot

to be used by the engineers, was ready in

time for the Leyte operation. Three of

the holds were assigned to the engineers

and two to ordnance. Bins between the

decks of the three hatches held loose

items and boxed spare parts were

stored in the holds. Since there had

been little time for remodeling, certain

deficiencies were more or less to be expected. There was no ventilating system between decks and no stairwell between the top deck and the section of

the ship where the binned parts were

kept. All parts had to be handled by

ships tackle or an improvised A-frame

with block and tackle.79 A second vessel, the Armand Considere, a concrete

steamship operated by civilians, helped

supply Eighth Army engineer units in

the southern Philippines. Spare parts

were also shipped by air.80 Two marine

spare parts depots were opened—one in

Tacloban and another in Manila. The

"floating warehouse" system was also

used for marine parts. A barge, the

Douglas Fir, operated by a crew of men

from the 2d Special Brigade, supplied

spare parts to amphibian units.81

The maintenance of equipment improved considerably during the Philippine campaign, mainly because the

number of maintenance companies was

increased. An engineer "service center"

was opened in Manila, where a number

of heavy shop and maintenance companies were installed and given the job

of putting equipment back in shape. To

facilitate repair in the forward areas during operations in the Philippines, a

heavy shop company was installed on a

concrete barge and did fifth echelon

maintenance.82

In the central Pacific, most of the difficulties that had plagued the engineers

in 1944 continued on into 1945. Although the quantity of stocks arriving

from the United States increased, problems of distribution remained. Still all

too common, especially in the forward

areas, were the shortage of trained personnel and inadequate stock control.

77

 GHQ AFPAC Pac Warfare Bd Rpt No. 33, 13

Aug 45, AGF Questionnaire—Engr Sec. SWPA File

E123. 78

 Ltr, Ross to Sverdrup, 19 Feb 45. SWPA File

M306.

79

 Memo, Dawson for Sverdrup, 8 Oct 44. SWPA

File 166. 80

 Memo, Capt Ralph Hartzler, Sup Div Of C Engr

SWPA, for Dawson, 7 May 45. SWPA File M135. 81

 Memo, Sup Div Of C Engr GHQ SWPA for

Sverdrup, 9 Dec 44. SWPA File 223. 82

 Of C Engr GHQ, SWPA, Annual Rpt for 1945,

Sup Sec. (Draft MS). SWPA File A33.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 671

An engineer officer making an inspection of supply depots on the islands of

the western Pacific early in 1945 reported

".. . a rather dismal situation in the

forward areas insofar as Engineer stock

control and depot operations are concerned." He felt the trouble in large

part resulted from "inadequate trained

personnel and lack of preplanning."

The inexperienced men handling the

large quantities of supplies in the depots

could not even tell what many of the

items they had on hand were used for,

which in itself helps to explain why

stock control was faulty and distribution

inefficient. The supply of spare parts

was inadequate and the numerous problems in obtaining and distributing them

continued until the end of the war.83

Training

During the Philippine campaign, engineer training had further been put to the

test. As in New Guinea, training for

combat was on the whole adequate, but

still a number of senior engineer officers

thought certain changes in emphasis

would be desirable. They believed

more stress should be placed on map

reading and the interpretation of aerial

photography, and on placing mines and

booby traps, as well as on detecting those

of the enemy. They also held that, in

view of the great importance of amphibious operations in the Southwest

Pacific, more emphasis should be put on

familiarizing the men with certain details of amphibious operations. With

regard to the latter, it was believed especially desirable to teach the men how to

recognize the different types of landing

craft and to instruct selected personnel

in how to waterproof vehicles and remove them from landing craft.

As before, training for construction

and supply was noticeably deficient, and

also as before, little time was available

for additional instruction because of the

pressure of work. Units of Sixth Army,

Eighth Army, and USASOS carried on

training in such subjects as construction

operations, equipment maintenance,

bridge erection, and mine removal, but

the instruction was mainly refresher

courses in subjects neglected or not required during the preceding years.84

Serious deficiencies in training on the

part of many Engineer officers and men

in planning and supervising construction

and in operating and maintaining heavy

equipment, made more and more apparent the need for some kind of central

theater engineer school with a technical

curriculum. Such a school would have

to provide more advanced instruction

than could be given in unit on-the-job

training or in Australian or unit specialist schools. Casey and Sverdrup, especially, were interested in setting up such

a school. Training experts estimated

that to be adequate, the school should

have approximately 70 officers and 350

enlisted men in attendance. An instructional, administrative, and housekeeping

staff of about 50 officers and 180 enlisted

men would be required. This require- 83

 (1) Ltr, Capt Don H. Chapman, CE, to CG

CPBC, n.d., sub: Staff Visit and Inspec Trip. Engr

AGF PAC. (2) Ltr, Col William H. Lewis, ExecO

Of of the Engr AFMIDPAC, 17 Oct 45. SWPA File

M13.

84

 (1) Ltr, Casey to Worsham, Asst CofEngrs, 29

Mar 45. SWPA File M140. (2) Of C Engr GHQ

AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 207.
672 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ment would mean the withdrawal of men

and equipment from active operations,

but since the total would be less than 1

percent, the effect on operations would

be negligible. The chief engineer of

USASOS and the engineers of Sixth and

Eighth Armies and FEAF were not in

favor of setting up the school because of

the pressure of operational responsibilities. They felt it would be preferable

to continue the engineer schools already

in progress and possibly expand further

the Equipment Maintenance School already functioning at Base B as part of

the USASOS specialist training center.85

General Casey's office, however, began

planning in late 1944 for a central theater

school. The object was to organize the

school in New Guinea as soon as possible

and establish it in the Philippines, preferably near Manila. Organization proceeded slowly. A commandant was

appointed who prepared a curriculum

and obtained instructional material from

the United States. By 15 March 1945 a

tentative course of instruction had been

worked out, and in July a site for the

school was found at Clark Field, about

fifty-five miles from Manila. Actual instruction did not begin until 3 September 1945. The engineer school was thus

a long time in getting under way. The

differences of opinion regarding the advisability of having the school, the difficulties in getting qualified instructors

and suitable training equipment, and the

shortage of facilities to transport the

students to the school all had delayed its

establishment.86

Planning for the Invasion of Japan

Preliminary Planning for Kyushu

Planning for the invasion of the Japanese home islands was first undertaken

by the engineers of the Southwest Pacific

late in 1944. On 12 December, General

Whitlock, MacArthur's G-4, asked Acting Chief Engineer Sverdrup for a preliminary estimate of engineer needs to

support a force of more than 500,000

men who would land on Kyushu, southernmost of the four main islands of

Japan. After the assault, the engineers

would construct three bases on Kyushu

to support subsequent operations in the

Japanese home islands. No date was set

for the assault.87

At that time, the engineers had little

information on Kyushu aside from what

they could get from maps and the

sketchy published data on hand. They

therefore had to estimate their requirements from the size of the invasion force.

The construction required would be the

most extensive for any operation in the

Pacific so far. Estimates, prepared in

about a week, called for eleven runways

to support thirty air groups. Exact information on Japanese airfields on southern Kyushu was lacking; the assumption

was that existing fields would be almost

completely destroyed and that new construction would amount to approximately 90 percent of the total. Two

4,000-foot dry-weather strips for fighters

could probably be provided from existing fields in three days; three 6,000-foot

85

 (1) Check Sheet, Sverdrup to G-3 GHQ SWPA,

11 Nov 44. SWPA File 52. (2) Of C Engr GHQ

AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 209-10. 86

 (1) Memo, Sverdrup for AG GHQ and G-3

USAFFE, 26 Jan 45. SWPA File 50. (2) Of C Engr

GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, II, 210-11. 87

 Check Sheet, G-4 GHQ SWPA for Sverdrup, 12

Dec 44. SWPA File T19.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 673

runways for six groups of aircraft, by the

end of two weeks. Storage for 576,000

barrels of aviation gasoline could probably be readied in four months. Estimates were that repair and improvement

of some 500 miles of roads would be

necessary. A port capacity of between

500,000 and 600,000 long tons a month

would probably be needed, with port

facilities consisting of either wharves or

lighter jetties. Widespread destruction

would result if the Japanese made their

usual suicidal stand; probably few supplies would be available locally and great

quantities would have to be shipped in.

Perhaps 20 percent of needs could be

procured in Japan. USASOS would be

responsible for logistic support and

would use one or more service commands.88

Planning progressed slowly during the

winter. On 17 February Casey, just returned to his post as MacArthur's chief

engineer, wrote General Whitlock that a

terrain study of southern Kyushu was

under way, with a view to determining

general locations for facilities and the

feasibility of construction. The task

was difficult since no aerial photography

was available and all conclusions had to

be based on maps and published data,

which, Casey stated, did not ". . . permit

accurate location of existing installations

or possible sites for construction, particularly with reference to airfields, of

which a large number will be necessary. . . ." Although a considerable

number of airfields were reportedly in

the area, many were believed to be too

small to be expanded to the sizes necessary for American aircraft.89

 It appeared that amphibious operations

would be moderately difficult on the

assault beaches tentatively scheduled for

landings near the town of Kushikino on

Kyushu's western coast and near the town

of Shibushi on Ariake Bay on the island's

southeastern coast. Extensive use of

floating piers would probably be necessary at both places. Southern Kyushu

had few good harbors. Casey recommended that the industrial city of Kagoshima, about 20 miles southeast of

Kushikino, and at the head of Kagoshima

Bay, be developed to provide a port

capacity of about 6,500 long tons a day.

Information on roads and railroads was

meager, but it was believed the road net

would be adequate if it could be maintained. The single-track railroad had

many tunnels and would probably be

blocked in many places.

Preliminary Planning for Honshu

Two days after reporting to General

Whitlock on the engineers' progress in

planning for the invasion of Kyushu,

Casey received a request for a similar

estimate for requirements to support an

assault against Honshu in the TokyoYokohama area, the industrial heart of

Japan. Tentative plans called for a

landing at Sagami Bay, southwest of

Tokyo, and on Honshu's Pacific coast

east of the capital. The attacking forces

would advance northeastward and northwestward, isolate Tokyo, and then drive

the Japanese armed forces to the outlying

parts of the island, where they would

88

 Check Sheet, Sverdrup for G-4, 20 Dec 44.

SWPA File T19.

89

 Check Sheet, Casey for G-4 GHQ SWPA, 17 Feb

45. SWPA File T19.
674 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

either have to surrender or be destroyed.

The initial landing forces would include

12 infantry divisions, an armored division, and 3 airborne divisions, with 9

infantry divisions in reserve. No target

date had been set for the assault.

The engineers spent approximately

two months in preparing their estimates.

The information they had regarding the

Tokyo-Yokohama area was only slightly

more adequate than that regarding southern Kyushu. Sagami Bay, on the basis

of small-scale hydrographic charts, appeared to be quite shallow and could

probably be used only by small landing

craft. Casey believed the bay should be

used only temporarily, for, with the

capture of Yokohama and Tokyo, together with their ports and harbors,

there would be adequate facilities for

handling the required 40,000 long tons

a day. Casey proposed to rehabilitate

facilities and do minimum construction

at the two cities to provide berths for

forty-five Liberty ships. The rest of the

cargo would be handled by smaller

vessels and lighters. The Tokyo-Yokohama area had an extensive railroad

system. Casey recommended that it be

fully rehabilitated and be used to the

maximum extent. The road net was not

satisfactory, and, in view of the heavy

traffic it would probably have to carry,

would require considerable maintenance.

Some fifty airfields existed in the Tokyo

area, most of them fighter fields, few of

which were near the coast. The area

west of Tokyo and Yokohama appeared

to have the greatest concentration of airfields and appeared to present the most

favorable sites for additional ones. The

information was too sketchy to permit

pinpointing. The area to the east of

Tokyo was expected to present a wide

variety of drawbacks. It had relatively

few roads and railroads, and rice paddies

were numerous, which indicated that desirable sites for airfields would probably

be hard to find. For a total assault

force of somewhat over a million men,

the engineer troops would number approximately 185,000. Combat engineer

support, including three special brigades,

would total some 98,000 men; service

engineers, about 87,000.90

Planning Progress

During the spring, planning continued

on both proposed operations, but to a

far greater extent for the assault on

Kyushu, which was given the code name

OLYMPIC. Additional information on

Kyushu became available and, at the

same time, the scope of the operations

was extended. The original 31-group

air program was increased to 40 and later

to 51 groups. Planning could now turn

from the general to the specific. On 10

April, shortly after the Joint Chiefs

issued their first study for the operation,

General Whitlock held a conference to

iron out problems of responsibility for

logistic support within AFPAC. Casey

had too small a planning staff to prepare

the basic engineer logistic plan, but he

reviewed plans of subordinate commands

with regard to engineer matters. At his

request, a conference was held on 21

April attended by representatives from

Sixth Army, which had been designated

to carry out the combat operations, and

90

 (1) Check Sheet, G-4 GHQ SWPA for Casey, 19

Feb 45. (2) Check Sheet, Casey for G-4, 18 Apr 45.

(3) Check Sheet, Casey for G-4, 31 Mar 45. All three

in SWPA File T20.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 675

by representatives from other interested

agencies to co-ordinate engineer planning for the support of a force now grown

to over 600,000 men. It was still impossible to set definite figures for the

amount of engineer supplies and the

number or type of engineer troops

needed because the basic concept was

still fluid.91 Casey and Sturgis, especially, had many problems to work out.

A conference on 4 May was the first of

many that month at which the engineers

of AFPAC, USASOS, and Sixth Army

met to co-ordinate their thinking on

various aspects of OLYMPIC. Engineer

troops would, as before, play important

roles in combat support, but Casey and

Sturgis now gave more thought to base

development. At the three bases on

Kyushu—one at Kagoshima, another at

Shibushi, and a third at Miyazaki, on

Kyushu's eastern coast about 35 miles

north of Shibushi—construction was to

be limited to the minimum essential

operating facilities, but the minimum

tended to grow. Finding answers for

various problems and fitting them into

the whole picture continued to keep

Casey and Sturgis busy.92

Planning for OLYMPIC reached its final

stages in June. AFWESPAC submitted

estimates of the various types of equipment, materials, and supplies that would

be needed for operations and the construction of the three bases. Preparations were made to order supplies and

assemble them in the United States. On

14 June the War Department granted

MacArthur's request for four additional

engineer construction brigades. Frequent conferences were held, sometimes

to discuss general problems, sometimes a

specific subject, such as the number of

bridges needed for roads and railroads,

or how extensively prefabricated buildings should be used. A list of engineer

troops was made, only to be replaced by

another, which, in turn, gave way to a

third. On 12 June MacArthur held a

conference on construction planning, at

which Casey and Sturgis brought up numerous matters for discussion. The

conferees reached agreement on several

points, such as standards of construction,

the loading and shipping of construction

materials, phasing of arrival of ships,

facilities to be provided, and the number

and kinds of engineer troops. It was

conceded that very little local labor

would be available.93

Assault Directives for OLYMPIC

On 20 June MacArthur issued Operations Instructions No. 1 for the OLYMPIC

operation. In conjunction with the

Pacific fleet, Sixth Army was to carry out

the assault, using as its major components

three Army corps—I, IX, and XI—together with the Marine V Amphibious

Corps. The initial landings were to be

made at Kushikino, Ariake Bay, and

Miyazaki. (Map 33) The ground forces

upon landing were to co-ordinate their

operations and seize and occupy roughly

one-third of Kyushu and establish bases

there to support an attack on the "indus- 91

 Memo for Rcd, Whitlock, G-4 GHQ SWPA,

sub: Questions and Answers at Conf on OLYMPIC

Opn, 0930 hours, 10 Apr 45. SWPA File T19. 92

 Memo, Sturgis for Casey, 9 May 45. OLYMPIC

Opn. Sturgis File 63.

93

 (1) Rad, MacArthur to TAG, 11 Jun 45. Sturgis File 63. (2) Memo for Rcd, Col John P. Buehler,

C Opns Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 13 Jun 45. SWPA

File T19.
676 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MAP 33

trial heart of Japan." AFWESPAC was

to furnish all supplies for Army units

mounted from the Philippines; Army

Forces Middle Pacific was to supply units

mounted from the central Pacific area.94

AFWESPAC's Logistic Instructions No.

1 for the OLYMPIC operation provided

for the organization of an army service

command from AFWESPAC personnel

who would be transferred to Sixth Army

and moved to Kyushu as soon as possible.

The date for the operation was set for

1 November 1945.

Estimates called for a sizable engineer

force to support OLYMPIC. The engineers were to number 117,570 out of a

total assault force of 549,503 men, or

about 21.4 percent of the total. Amphibian engineers, including the 2d, 3d,

and 4th Special Brigades, and combat

engineers would total approximately

50,159 men out of 252,150, or 20 percent

of the total combat troops. Service and

Air Forces engineers would total 67,408

men out of 297,353, or 22.6 percent of the

94

 (1) USAFPOA was redesignated AFMIDPAC in

July. (2) AFWESPAC Logistic Instructions No. 1

for the OLYMPIC Opn, 16 Jul 45. SWPA File T15.

(3) Hq AFWESPAC, Engr Base Development Plan,

17 Jul 45. SWPA File T30.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 677

total service troops. These figures were

exclusive of the marines.95

As far as the engineers were concerned,

the most important part of the plan for

OLYMPIC pertained to construction of

the three bases. Kushikino, to support

400,000 men, was to be the largest. Here

the engineers were to build berths for

ten Liberty ships, storage for 205,000

barrels of gasoline, 220 miles of roads,

7,500,000 square feet of storage, three

hospitals with 13,250 beds, and two allweather runways. The second largest

base was to be at Shibushi, to support

185,000 men; it would have similar but

less extensive facilities. The third and

smallest base was to be at Miyazaki, to

support 135,000 men.96

Additional Planning for Honshu

Meanwhile, work was continuing on

the plans for the invasion of Honshu,

which had received the code name

CORONET. A major problem was revising engineer estimates to keep pace with

the changing concepts of the operation.

In late June plans called for making two

landings on the Honshu coast east of

Tokyo on Y-day, one by an army, the

other by at least two corps. A landing

would be made at Sagami Bay thirty days

later. For the engineers these changes

meant that estimates regarding port construction and reconstruction would have

to be revised. An initial attack on the

east coast would probably mean that

Tokyo and Yokohama would be captured later—possibly not till ninety or

more days after the first landing. This

would mean that more extensive temporary port facilities would have to be built

during the first days of the landing—two

artificial harbors might even have to be

constructed. With regard to the lines

of communication, no great changes were

anticipated. Probably only the phasing

would have to be altered. The eastern

highways and railroads would have to be

rehabilitated first, but the effort required

would probably not be so great initially

because of the fewer roads and railroads

east of Tokyo. A larger number of airfields would have to be built east of the

capital, and construction problems there

would probably be more complicated because of the many rice paddies. More

storage would have to be provided in the

eastern areas. The total engineer tonnages sent in would undoubtedly remain

more or less the same, but the phasing of

shipments would have to be radically

changed. Three special brigades would

take part in the CORONET operation.97

On 7 August Casey's planners finished

a preliminary draft of the Engineer annex to the CORONET operations instructions. Though estimates were not finalized, an idea of the vast scope of the

contemplated program may be derived

from a partial enumeration of the

planned facilities. Eleven all-weather

runways were to be completed in 3

months; 171 lighter berths, seven floating Liberty berths, and 7,800,000 square 95

 (1) Memo for Rcd, Lt Col John H. Ericson,

Opns Of C Engr GHQ SWPA, 31 July 45. SWPA

File T20. (2) Check Sheet, Casey to G-4 GHQ

SWPA, 28 May 45. SWPA File T19. (3) Of C Engr

GHQ AFPAC, Engrs of SWPA, IV, 692-93. 96

 GHQ SWPA, Basic Plan for OLYMPIC Opn, an.

4, Basic Logistic Plan. SWPA File T18.

97

 Memo, Maj R. S. Kramer, Opns Of C Engr

GHQ SWPA for Col Buehler, C Opns, 27 Jun 45.

SWPA File T20.
678 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

feet of covered storage in 6 months;

garrison camps for 500,000 men and hospitalization for 42,750 fixed beds in 5

months; plus camps for 475,000 replacements, POW's, and civilian internees,

within an unspecified period. This

construction would require 1,016,591

deadweight tons of supplies. The proportion of engineer troops required for

the CORONET operation was roughly the

same as that for OLYMPIC. Combat

engineers, together with three ESB's,

totaled 102,427 men out of 555,115 assault troops, or 18.5 percent of the total.

Service and air force engineers totaled

133,769 out of 513,925, or 26.1 percent

of the total. The over-all figures were

236,196 engineers out of 1,069,040

troops. Despite the extensive construction required, the underlying idea of

CORONET differed from previous operations in the war against Japan. This

was an operation to vanquish the enemy

in the territory being invaded and was

not designed to establish bases from

which to conduct further operations.98

Planning for a Peaceful Occupation

Since late spring Allied leaders had

felt there was a possibility of Japan's

surrender or collapse before an invasion

of the home islands took place. On 14

June the Joint. Chiefs had directed MacArthur to prepare a plan for the peaceful

occupation of the country. On 25 July

MacArthur issued his Basic Outline for

the BLACKLIST Operations to Occupy

Japan Proper and Korea After Surrender

or Collapse. Over-all planning for a

peaceful occupation did not require a

great deal of effort. It was based largely

on the planning already prepared for the

assault. Sixth Army would occupy

roughly the western half of the Japanese

homeland, including the islands of

Kyushu and Shikoku and the western

half of Honshu; Eighth Army would

occupy eastern Honshu, Hokkaido, and

the southern half of Sakhalin. Tenth

Army was scheduled to occupy Korea.

AFWESPAC and AFMIDPAC would

provide the logistics.

For the engineers, BLACKLIST would

not mean the immense amount of combat

support or the construction effort that an

armed assault would require, especially

an assault against suicidal resistance.

Construction would be limited. Existing facilities would be used as much as

possible and local resources and labor

employed to the maximum extent. On

the whole, forces and projects were about

the same as were being planned for the

assault, but conditions for construction

would be far easier."

Meanwhile, the war was moving

rapidly to an end. The Japanese position by the summer of 1945 was hopeless.

On 6 August the first atomic bomb was

dropped on Hiroshima. Two days later

Russia declared war on Japan and began

a rapid invasion of Manchuria. The

next day a second atomic bomb was

dropped, this time on Nagasaki. On 10

August the Japanese asked for peace.

Five days later, fighting stopped. With

the landing of American paratroops at

98

 (1) Draft Annex (Engr) for CORONET Opn.

SWPA File T33. (2) Memo for Rcd, Ericson, 31

Jul 45. SWPA File T20.

99

 GHQ AFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for BLACKLIST

Opns to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea After Surrender or Collapse. SWPA File T36.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 679

Atsugi airfield on 30 August, the occupation of the Japanese home islands began

and the BLACKLIST plan went in effect.

Three days later, the official surrender

ceremony took place aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

Conclusion

The long war against Japan was over.

In few conflicts had military engineers

played so important a role as in this one.

Engineers of the United States Army

had been active in an immense area.

From the barren reaches of Alaska to

the deserts of Australia, from remote

islands of the South Pacific to China and

India, they had furnished the engineer

combat and logistic support necessary

for victory. Thousands of miles from

the United States, they had worked and

fought in regions consisting for the most

part of deserts, jungles, coral atolls, subarctic wastes, and isolated areas cut off

from the outside world by lofty mountain chains. They had been an integral

and vital part of a complex and farflung organization.

The story of the engineers in World

War II is one of greatly expanded activities and unprecedented growth. In

1939 the Corps had 12 units, 10 of them

combat, 2 of them topographic. By mid1940 the number of units had risen to

25, of which 18 were combat. By the

time Japan surrendered, there were, in

the Pacific alone, 700 units, totaling

235,764 men in an army of 1,458,911.

Many of the new organizations were

highly specialized and responsible for

missions which new technological developments had made necessary. Alongside the traditional combat battalions

and general service regiments were such

units as special shop battalions, pipeline

operating detachments, model-making

detachments, foundry teams, photomapping teams, technical intelligence teams,

dredge crews, and port construction and

repair groups. But even with the great

expansion in personnel and the multiplication of specialized units, there were

never enough engineer troops. To do

the great amount of work for which they

were responsible, the engineers wherever

possible used civilians as well as troops.

Within the United States and its possessions they engaged contractors and recruited workmen. Overseas, foreign

governments employed local contractors

and furnished workmen to do the building for the U.S. Army behind the front

lines, while the engineers furnished the

technical supervision. In some areas

natives, scarcely out of the stone age and

little acquainted with modern civilization, helped build the facilities the Army

needed.

The absence of modern industry in

much of the world where the war with

Japan was fought, the vast extent of the

theaters of operations, and the lack of

long-range planning for a struggle in

numerous overseas theaters greatly complicated the most important of all engineer tasks—construction. One of the

most exasperating problems, particularly in the Southwest Pacific, was the

shortage of building materials, a shortage

arising from the inadequacy of such supplies in the United States, the shortage

of shipping to overseas theaters, and the

inadequate amounts of materials in the

overseas theaters themselves. In an attempt to make up for deficiencies in the

many theaters, the engineers had to use
680 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

materials locally available and resort extensively to improvising. Designs were

simplified, and flimsier, though still adequate, types of construction were used.

More efficient designs were developed

for many kinds of installations—runways

were not crossed but built in parallel,

more suitable oil pumping machinery

and pipelines were devised for the combat zones, and, to a greater extent, prefabricated buildings were used. Local

materials, some of them little known

before the war, were utilized to the

greatest extent possible. Coral was a

godsend on the islands of the Pacific and

native-type thatched roof huts served

many a useful purpose. In their battle

to furnish the facilities the Army needed

not the least of the Engineer tasks was to

curb unnecessary and sometimes extravagant construction, which various elements of the Army, for one reason or

another, insisted on having.

Of great importance was obtaining the

co-operation of other organizations to

accomplish the Engineer mission. In

the Pacific Ocean Area, for example, a

continuing problem was the co-ordination of Army engineer and Navy construction activities, a co-ordination, on

the whole, successfully accomplished.

Highly important, too, was winning the

co-operation of the engineers of the

Allied armies, a feat achieved with varying degrees of success. It was easiest to

secure by far with the armed forces of the

members of the British Commonwealth;

more difficult, if the national backgrounds were quite different from the

American. Of equally great importance

was making the best possible use of the

available civilian forces—particularly in

rear areas, as, for example, Australia,

India, and Burma. This was sometimes

a complex matter, calling for a good deal

of ingenuity and a better than average

understanding of the national background and character. Even with the

great technological advances, men were

still important; the success of the war

effort depended on the co-operation of

many millions.

The war was not fought without certain shortcomings, notably in organization, becoming manifest. A continual

handicap was the shortage of units, especially in the combat areas, where civilians, even if available, could not be

employed to bolster the work force.

Shortages of troops existed everywhere,

except on the Alcan Highway and possibly in the Hawaiian Islands, during

the first two years of the conflict. They

were particularly severe in the ChinaBurma-India theater and in the Southwest Pacific, where a number of

engineers cited the continual shortage of

troops as their greatest problem.

Equally difficult was the getting of individual replacements to bring up to

strength the depleted units in the overseas theaters. It was even harder to

secure qualified, well-trained replacements. The big cry was for great numbers of well-qualified men and units—a

goal difficult, if not impossible, of

achievement in modern war.

Since the war against Japan was

fought over a much larger area than had

been anticipated and in regions where

so much unexpected engineer work had

to be done, it is hardly surprising that a

"balanced" engineer force was seldom

attained. There were sometimes too

many units of one type and more often

not enough of another; on the whole,
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 681

there were more than enough combat

and camouflage units but far too few

construction and supply units. This

being the case, units were put on construction and supply jobs, even though

not trained for or experienced in such

work—this was especially true in the

South and Southwest Pacific. A makeshift arrangement, it was the best one

possible under the conditions, but did

not make for efficient operations.

In a war of rapid movement over great

expanses, particularly the kind being

fought in the Southwest Pacific from

Australia to the Philippines, various

problems in organization arose, one of

the most important being to achieve

flexibility of organization. To provide

such flexibility the group type of organization—exemplified by construction brigades, construction groups, and combat

groups—was developed and used to an

ever greater extent. Each type of group

had a headquarters to which units were

assigned for a particular task; upon

completion of the task some units were

transferred out and others were assigned

for the next, and somewhat different,

task. Such relatively large, stable, and

unwieldy units as the general service

regiments were not well suited for a

war of movement on an extensive scale.

In addition to the fluid group type of

organization, which could be adapted to

the work at hand, the Southwest Pacific

made use of the army service commands

designed to begin extensive construction

and logistical support in the forward

areas at any early date; here again service

units were assigned to a large and flexible

organization for work in a combat zone

in accordance with needs.

A matter of continuing controversy in

theaters where a great variety of work

had to be done was how best to assign

engineer units to the various commands;

the problem was particularly difficult

with regard to the aviation engineer

battalions, considered theoretically a

component part of the Army Air Forces.

Engaged in vital construction as the aviation battalions were, it was sometimes

debatable whether they should be assigned to the Air Forces exclusively or

to other commands as needed, particularly the Services of Supply. The basic

policy, on the whole, was that under

emergency conditions, where there was

much work with few troops to do it, all

engineer units should be utilized and assigned as the theater commander thought

best, regardless of the regulations automatically assigning certain types of units

to certain commands. Another problem

was whether to put engineer construction

and supply activities in the field under

base commanders and have the engineers

exercise only technical supervision or

whether to set up a separate engineer

construction command as was done in

the Southwest Pacific and in part of the

China-Burma-India theater. Here a

comparison of results appeared to be inconclusive. Having engineer construction and supply in the field carried on

under the direction of base commanders

seemed to be a satisfactory arrangement,

provided such commanders had a broad

understanding of their mission and gave

adequate support to the construction

effort. While a separate engineer command would assure adequate support to

construction, it was sometimes difficult

to co-ordinate the responsibilities of such

a command with those of the base

sections and combat elements.
682 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

A serious deficiency was the shortage

of supplies and supply units. Even

more serious was the lack of spare parts,

especially for the hard-worked equipment. In the overseas theaters, a serious

weakness was the lack of adequate distributing systems for supplies and spare

parts, most keenly felt in the Southwest

Pacific, where exceptionally large quantities were needed. Much time was lost

within theaters in shipping and transshipping stocks. Enormous distances

and changing tactical situations militated

against setting up an efficient distribution

system. Effective, theaterwide stock

control was lacking almost everywhere,

so that it was difficult to make really efficient use of even the little that was on

hand. Two of the greatest needs were,

first, personnel well trained in the stocking and distribution of supplies and

spare parts, and second, a much larger

number of well-stocked and well-managed supply and spare parts depots. A

critical situation was made worse by the

fact that many Engineer officers were

indifferent to supply and seemingly not

fully aware of its importance. Of all the

problems facing the engineers, those of

supply were probably the most serious.

As the war progressed, the inadequate

training and insufficient engineering

background of many officers and enlisted

men, particularly those who entered the

Army after Pearl Harbor, came more

and more to the fore. Many officers did

not have an adequate engineering background to prepare plans for construction,

to devise proper methods for undertaking a project, or to supervise the work

itself. Enlisted men were poorly trained

with regard to many aspects of construction; most glaring, perhaps, was the deficient training in the operation of

machinery. The officers themselves, all

too often inexperienced in such matters,

could not instruct the men of their own

units in how a job should be done.

Training for combat, generally, had

been sound, but in the war in the Pacific,

combat support, unexpectedly, did not

have the overriding importance it had

had in previous conflicts on which planning had been so largely based. Direct

combat support had been the engineers'

traditional wartime mission; many engineer officers preferred it to other tasks,

which partly explains their failure to

appreciate the importance of the engineer "service" functions behind the

combat zones.

All of these shortcomings might have

had more serious consequences had the

Japanese not been plagued by far greater

deficiencies. Japan had gone to war

with only a small part of its military

forces assigned to the war against the

United States and the British Commonwealth. Of the Japanese Army's 51

divisions, 59 mixed brigades, and 1,500

first-line planes in December 1941,

Imperial General Headquarters could

spare only 11 divisions and 700 planes

for operations in the Pacific.100 Large

forces had to be maintained in China to

hold the Chinese in check and sizable

forces kept in Manchukuo and the home

islands as a precaution against a possible

Russian attack.

More serious than Japan's shortage of

troops was her scant industrial potential.

In terms of population, Japan may have

ranked as a great power, but in industrial

100

 Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., Command Decisions (Washington, 1960), p. 74.
THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR 683

capacity she was roughly the equal of

Belgium. The plan of the Japanese

leaders was to wage a limited war. They

did not propose to invade the American

mainland or even the Hawaiian Islands.

It was their intention to destroy the

U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor, defeat the

Allied forces in the western Pacific, get

control of the islands there, and transform them into powerful defensive

barriers. The Japanese hoped the Allies

would not be able to break through the

barriers, even after long and bitter fighting. A compromise peace would result.

This might have been the course of the

war had it not been for the overwhelming technological superiority of the

United States, a superiority that became

more marked as the conflict continued.

The battleship, the aircraft carrier, the

airplane, and the bulldozer made

Japan's defeat inevitable. Innumerable

engineer after action reports stated that

the terrain was more of an obstacle than

the enemy. From the engineer standpoint, the war was as much a conquest

of geography as of the Japanese.

Despite deficiencies, which were more

or less unavoidable, the Engineer mission was successfully accomplished.

The amount of work done was tremendous. That so much was done was

in no small measure due to the courage

and skill of all ranks. Morale was generally high; as in the rest of the Army,

there was an overriding determination to

defeat Japan. Officers and men alike

worked long hours, made the best use of

the resources at hand, and adapted themselves to new ways of doing things.

Once the tide of war had turned at the

Battle of Midway in 1942, there was

scarcely any doubt as to the outcome of

the conflict.
Appendix A

U.S. ARMY AND ARMY ENGINEER PERSONNEL STRENGTH IN OVERSEAS THEATERS

1 JANUARY 1942-1 OCTOBER 1945

 a

a

 The top figure for each month indicates over-all Army strength; the lower figure, Engineer strength. Figures are for the first of

the month. b

 Theaters for which the figure 0 is given may have had some U.S. Army and Engineer personnel, but if so, the number was too

small to appear on War Department statistical tables. c

 Personnel strengths of the U.S. Army and the Engineers in the Philippines on 1 January and 1 April 1942 are not included

in the Southwest Pacific figures. d

 Combined figures for Central Pacific and South Pacific Theaters. e

 Combined figures for Central Pacific, South Pacific, and Southwest Pacific Theaters.
Appendix B

TYPES OF ENGINEER UNITS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS

Airborne Aviation Battalion Aviation Regiment

29 officers, 501 enlisted men.1 Equipped with light machinery, this unit prepared captured airdromes, usually

located behind enemy lines, for early use

by Army Air Forces. It was sometimes

flown in to clear landing strips when

regular aviation battalions, because of

their heavy equipment, could not be

used.

Aviation Battalion

33 officers, 744 enlisted men. The

basic engineer construction unit of the

Army Air Forces. It was completely

equipped to construct an airfield and all

its appurtenances. It might also be

called upon to camouflage, maintain, and

defend airfields.

Aviation Company, Separate

5 officers, 171 enlisted men. Similar

in organization to a company of a combat

battalion, but with more machinery for

runway construction.

66 officers, 1 warrant officer, 2,160 enlisted men. This large unit was organized, trained, and equipped in the early

days of the defense build-up. It constructed, repaired, maintained, camouflaged, and defended airfields wherever

such work was concentrated in a small

area. The battalions of the regiment

were the same as regular aviation

battalions.

Headquarters and Headquarters

Company,

Base Depot Group

11 officers, 2 warrant officers, 62 enlisted men. Provided the overhead

needed to supervise the operations of an

engineer base depot group. Normally

such a group was at or near a port of

debarkation. The headquarters and

headquarters company with its attached

troops operated either the engineer

section of a general base depot or an

engineer base depot. One or more of

the following units were attached: base

depot company, heavy shop company,

base equipment company, parts supply

platoon or company, gas generating unit,

quartermaster truck company.

Base Equipment Company

5 officers, 168 enlisted men. This

unit, usually located at or near an engi1

 Since most engineer units underwent reorganization during the war, the strength figures for officers

and enlisted men are approximate and are, as a rule,

those in effect in the closing months of the war.

Information is based on data contained in Engineer

Field Manuals FM 5-5, 31 January 1941 and 11

October 1943, with changes; Office of the Chief Engineer, GHQ SWPA, Engineer Estimating Data, 1 June

1945; and TOE's published during World War II.
686 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

neer depot, made various types of heavy

construction equipment available to

engineer units on a loan basis. Skilled

operators were sometimes sent with the

equipment.

Camouflage Company, Separate

5 officers, 62 enlisted men. Usually

assigned to a task force or independent

corps, supervised and inspected camouflage work, discipline, and training;

experimented with new camouflage

methods; and helped troops camouflage

their areas.

Combat Battalion

29 officers, 3 warrant officers, 605 enlisted men. This was the Engineer component of the triangular infantry

division. It increased the division's

combat effectiveness by means of general

engineer work, including construction of

roads and bridges, the clearing of mines,

and the destruction of obstacles. The

unit thereby helped make it possible for

the infantry to advance, and by laying

mines, erecting obstacles, and using demolitions helped the infantry thwart an

enemy attack.

Combat Company, Separate

4 officers, 176 enlisted men.. Usually

employed in improving routes of communication. The amount of work the

company could do with its men and tools

alone was relatively small.

Headquarters and Headquarters

Company,

Combat Group

15 officers, 69 enlisted men. The primary mission of this unit was to supervise

the operations of corps and army combat

engineer troops. The composition of

the group was determined by the engineer mission and the units and facilities

available.

Combat Regiment

39 officers, 1 warrant officer, 908 enlisted men. The Engineer component

of the square infantry division, the combat regiment performed the same engineer work for the square division that

the combat battalion performed for the

triangular division.

Construction Battalion

29 officers, 2 warrant officers, 869 enlisted men. Organized in 1943, this

unit, capable of operating independently

or as part of a group, was the equal of an

aviation battalion in earth-moving capacity and of a Navy construction battalion

in equipment and grades for skilled personnel. It had more heavy equipment

and higher grades for its skilled personnel than a general service regiment.

Headquarters and Headquarters

Company,

Construction Group

13 officers, 1 warrant officer, 80 enlisted

men. Organized to supervise the operations of from three to six construction

battalions.

Depot Company

7 officers, 202 enlisted men. Its primary mission was the operation of an

engineer depot or other engineer supply

point in a theater of operations. It
APPENDIX B 687

sometimes was a part of a large special

engineer depot or the engineer section of

a general depot; sometimes it operated

as a separate engineer supply unit.

Dredge Crew

Varying from 5 officers, 4 warrant officers, 47 enlisted men to 6 officers, 4

warrant officers, 57 enlisted men, this

unit dredged rivers, harbors, and

channels.

Dump Truck Company

4 officers, 103 enlisted men. Its principal mission was to assist other engineer

units by furnishing transportation for

the movement of heavy materials. This

unit was usually attached to engineer

units engaged in road and railroad construction involving earth moving, clearing, grading, and paving.

Engineer Squadron

14 officers, 441 enlisted men. This

unit, the Engineer component of the

cavalry division, did work comparable

to that performed by the combat battalion for the infantry division.

Headquarters and Headquarters

Company,

Forestry Battalion

8 officers, 2 warrant officers, 82 enlisted

men. The headquarters and headquarters company supervised 3 or more

forestry companies (each with 5 officers

and 150 enlisted men) whose job it was

to supply lumber and other forest products from woodlands in or near a theater

of operations. The companies either

set up and operated the sawmills with

which they were equipped or they used

sawmills already in the area.

Foundry Team

1 officer, 16 enlisted men. This team

was capable of producing molten metal

in the following quantities:

Cast iron—about 108 lbs. per hour

Steel—about 100 lbs. per hour

Bronze—about 132 lbs. per hour

A team was normally assigned to a heavy

shop company.

General Service Regiment

39 officers, 11 warrant officers, 1,221

enlisted men. Performed general engineer work—especially that requiring a

fair amount of skilled labor—throughout

the army service area and communications zone of a theater of operations.

A general service regiment, with its large

headquarters organization, large number of specialists, and special equipment,

plus the fact that it remained a longer

time in an area, could under take extensive and permanent work. General

service regiments could be reinforced

with other engineer units.

Heavy Ponton Battalion

12 officers, 462 enlisted men. Transported and maintained four units of

heavy ponton equipage, 25-ton M1940,

with which it constructed bridges and

rafts, sometimes with the assistance of

other engineer troops. In an extensive

river crossing operation, the battalion

was attached to a corps to provide a

bridge capable of supporting heavier

loads.
688 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Heavy Shop Company

6 officers, 165 enlisted men. A semimobile unit, the heavy shop company

performed fourth echelon maintenance

on all equipment for which the Corps

of Engineers had maintenance responsibility. Fourth echelon maintenance included rebuilding a unit's equipment,

overhauling the attachments and accessories, doing emergency overhaul of

major units, and recovering equipment

from the battlefield, reclaiming, and

salvaging it.

Light Equipment Company

4 officers, 114 enlisted men. Furnished supplementary equipment with

operators to engineer combat battalions

and operated as a replacement pool for

construction equipment. Light equipment companies were attached to corps

or army.

Light Ponton Company

6 officers, 215 enlisted men. Organized and trained to maintain its streamcrossing equipage, to construct floating

bridges and rafts, to guard and maintain

completed bridges, to regulate traffic

thereon, and to dismantle bridges and

rafts.

Maintenance Company

6 officers, 185 enlisted men. A mobile

unit, the maintenance company had as its

primary mission third echelon maintenance of all equipment, including that

used by other arms and services, for

which the Corps of Engineers had

maintenance responsibility. Third echelon maintenance included the making

of minor repairs on a unit's equipment.

Map Depot Detachment

1 officer, 11 enlisted men. Received,

stored, and issued maps. This unit was

adequate to provide map depot facilities for one base section.

Model Making Detachment

1 officer, 18 enlisted men. Constructed scale models of terrain to assist

air and ground forces in planning.

Normal attachment was to a topographic

unit since photo processes were used in

model making. The unit was assigned

as directed by the commander of the

theater of operations.

Parts Supply Company

6 officers, 168 enlisted men. Established and operated an engineer spare

parts supply depot and other spare parts

supply agencies. This company was a

nonmobile unit which operated as part

of the engineer depot organization of a

base installation. It could not operate

as a separate supply unit unless it was

furnished with motor transportation.

Petroleum Distribution Company

7 officers, 209 enlisted men. The primary mission of this unit was to design,

construct, operate, and maintain military

pipeline systems for transporting, distributing, and storing gasoline in a theater of operations.
APPENDIX B 689

Pipeline Operating Detachment

1 officer, 24 enlisted men. Organized

and equipped to operate a bulk petroleum terminal consisting of 50,000

barrels of tankage with the necessary

tanker unloading facilities and a threepump station pipeline system.

Photomapping Team

2 officers, 78 enlisted men. This team

was equipped to perform original topographic mapping from aerial photographs. It was normally attached to a

topographic unit having planning, computing, and reproduction facilities; it

was sometimes used to increase the capacity of a base topographic battalion.

Headquarters and Headquarters

Company,

Port Construction and Repair Group

17 officers, 255 enlisted men. This

unit, with its attached units, made ready

for use the facilities of ports of debarkation in a theater of operations, and performed work required for the improvement or expansion of such ports,

exclusive of harbors.

Railway Operating Battalion

18 officers, 803 enlisted men. Operated trains and yards of a railway division, maintained tracks and structures,

and repaired equipment. A battalion

might also be assigned the operation and

maintenance of a large railway terminal

or regulating station. Railway battalions were transferred to the newly organized Transportation Corps in November

1942.

Railway Shop Battalion

20 officers, 642 enlisted men. Handled heavy shop work for several railway

operating battalions. These units were

transferred to the newly organized

Transportation Corps in November

1942.

Separate (Labor) Battalion

22 officers, 1,197 enlisted men. Usually assigned to armies or to GHQ, the

separate battalion performed general

engineer work throughout a theater of

operations. It was frequently attached

to reinforce other engineer units in

whole or in part.

Technical Intelligence Team, Combat

Technical Intelligence Team, Research

1 officer, 3 enlisted men; 3 officers, 6

enlisted men. Both kinds of teams

operated in a theater of operations.

The combat team furnished technical

intelligence information for use in the

theater; the research team sent information to the zone of interior for further

study.

Topographic Battalion, Army

19 officers, 3 warrant officers, 404 enlisted men. This unit had the mission

of furnishing adequate map information

for tactical and strategical requirements

for an army and established and extended horizontal and vertical control

for army and corps requirements. It

was the organization trained and

equipped to prepare and reproduce

photomaps, maps of limited areas, over-
690 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

lays, and sketches, and to revise and

reproduce existing maps.

Topographic Company, Corps

5 officers, 113 enlisted men. Reproduced maps in quantity in forward areas,

distributed them to corps troops and to

divisions, and established and extended

the ground control required for coordination of field artillery fire. When

aerial photographs were made available,

corps-topographic companies used them

to prepare photomaps and to revise existing maps. Initial requirements of the

corps were met by the corps topographic

company, which rapidly prepared and

supplied map information, particularly

the hasty type of map substitute.

Topographic Battalion, GHQ

29 officers, 767 enlisted men. Its primary mission was the reproduction at

the outbreak of hostilities of existing

maps of the theater of operations and

of such maps, sketches, and drawings of

permanent character as might be needed

thereafter. Its reproduction functions

approached those of a permanent establishment and its equipment was relatively heavy and immobile. It prepared

maps by photogrammetrical methods as

the situation required. It sometimes

reinforced army topographic battalions.

Topographic Company, Aviation

8 officers, 141 enlisted men. Revised,

prepared, and reproduced maps, aeronautical charts, navigation charts, target

charts, and mosaics for the Army Air

Forces.

Treadway Bridge Company

4 officers, 134 enlisted men. Transported, maintained, and constructed

bridges with its steel treadway equipage,

guarded, maintained, and regulated

traffic thereon, and dismantled completed bridges.

Headquarters and Headquarters

Company,

Water Supply Battalion

10 officers, 2 warrant officers, 112 enlisted men. A headquarters and headquarters company supervised several

water supply companies (each with 4

officers and 116 enlisted men), whose

principal mission was the procurement,

purification, and distribution of potable

water to troops in areas where the local

supply was inadequate. It might also

be charged with the repair of water

plants and with developing water supply

sources. A water supply company could

operate alone or as part of a battalion.
Bibliographical Note

Documentary Sources

The unpublished documentary sources

cited in the text, and on which this

account of the Engineers in the war

against Japan is largely based, are located for the most part in various offices

and records depositories of the Department of the Army. The following is a

brief description of the sources cited:

1. SWPA Files, located in the Engineer

Historical Division, include selected files

from the Office of the Chief Engineer,

Southwest Pacific Area and Army Forces,

Pacific (SWPA and AFPAC), 1942-46,

together with letters, memorandums, reports, and comments which Engineer

officers who served in the war against

Japan sent to the Staff Branch, Office of

the Chief Engineer, GHQ, AFPAC and

FEC in connection with the writing of

the series, Engineers of the Southwest

Pacific. Most SWPA files have a number; the Historical Division has a list of

the numbers with the corresponding

titles of the files.

2. The Casey Files, located in the

Engineer Historical Division, comprise

nine volumes numbered 1 through 9.

Numbers 1 through 8 are files of the

Office of the Engineer, USAFFE, 1941-

42, which survived the Japanese conquest. File No. 9 contains material on

the Philippines compiled after the fall of

the islands. The titles are:

No. 1, General Casey's Notes, 26

January-28 February 1942.

No. 2, Construction—General, August-December 1941.

No. 3, Landing Fields, 1941-42.

No. 4, Operations, 1941-42.

No. 5, no title; papers pertain mainly

to civilians engaged in Engineer operations.

No. 6, Journal File, 1942.

No. 7, Construction, December .1941-

March 1942.

No. 8, Philippine Defense, December

1941-January 1942.

No. 9, no title; contains information

on the construction of airfields in the

Philippines before the outbreak of war.

3. The Sturgis Files, in approximately

100 folders, at present in the custody of

the Engineer Historical Division, contain personal correspondence and papers

of General Sturgis pertaining to Engineer operations of Sixth Army from 1943

to 1946. The Engineer Historical Division has an index to these files.

4. Engineer Historical Division

(EHD) files contain documents and

photostatic copies of documents pertaining to Engineer activities in the continental United States and overseas before and during World War II. Also

included are letters from and notes of

interviews with Engineer officers who

participated in Engineer operations during World War II.

5. Canal Zone Files, pertaining to

Engineer operations in the Caribbean

Defense Command and the Panama

Canal Department before and during
692 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

World War II, were received from

Headquarters, U.S. Army, Caribbean,

Fort Amador, Canal Zone, and are at

present in the custody of the Engineer

Historical Division.

6. Alcan Files include original reports,

letters, and various papers or photostatic

copies thereof pertaining to the construction of the Alcan Highway, obtained, for the most part, from the Office

of the Chief of Engineers. These files

are at present in the Engineer Historical

Division.

7. Canol Files include original reports,

letters, and various papers or photostatic

copies thereof pertaining to the construction of Canol, obtained, for the most

part, from the Office of the Chief of

Engineers. These files are at present in

the Engineer Historical Division.

8. The National Archives and Records

Service is the depository for unit histories, after action reports of units

which served overseas, files of Engineer

offices in the United States and the outlying territories, Army Air Forces Central Files, files of the War Plans Division

and the Operations Division, G-4, files,

files of the Alaska Defense Command,

and some files of the China-Burma-India

theater (CBI). Material containing file

designations but for which no depository

is given is located in National Archives

Records Service.

9. The Federal Records Center, General Services Administration, Kansas

City, Missouri, contains retired files from

all types of Engineer offices and units

which served overseas and in the United

States in World War II. Included are

files of the Engineer, Army Ground

Forces, Pacific, consisting of the files of

the Engineer offices in the Hawaiian

Islands, Engineer files of the Southwest

Pacific Area which are not in the custody

of the Engineer Historical Division, files

of G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Engineer files of

the South Pacific Area, Engineer files of

the Caribbean Defense Command and

of Panama and the surrounding areas,

and files of the CBI.

10. The U.S. Air Force Historical

Division, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, has custody of Army Air Force

Unit Historical Reports for the war

period.

11. The Office, Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C., has a number of

documents and narratives in manuscript

form pertaining to Engineer operations

overseas during World War II.

12. The Hawaii War Records Depository, University of Hawaii, Honolulu,

contains a few documents not found elsewhere pertaining to activities of the

Corps of Engineers in Hawaii during

World War II.

Published Works

A number of published works which

shed light on Engineer operations, particularly their interconnection with other

Army and other service activities, have

been used in the preparation of this

volume. Listed here are those of a special value, but this list is by no means

all-inclusive.

1. UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II—various volumes of

this series (some of them in manuscript

form) dealing with the War Department,

the defense of the Western Hemisphere,

the war in the Pacific, and the ChinaBurma-India theater, have been extensively used to furnish background mate-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 693

rial and explanations for Engineer

activities. A list of the published

volumes in the series can be found on

pages 702-04.

2. Bureau of Yards and Docks, Building the Navy's Bases in World War II

(Washington, 1947). Two volumes.

3. Craven, Wesley Frank, and James

Lea Cate (eds.), "The Army Air Forces

In World War II," vol. 1, Plans and

Early Operations: January 1939 to

August 1942 (Chicago: The University

of Chicago Press, 1948); vol. IV, The

Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August

1942 to July 1944 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950); and vol.

V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki,

June 1944 to August 1945 (Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press, 1953).

4. Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific,

Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, 8

vols. Vol. 1, Engineers in Theater Operations (Washington, 1947); vol. II,

Organizations, Troops and Training

(Washington, 1953); vol. III; Engineer

Intelligence, (Washington, 1950), vol.

IV; Amphibian Engineer Operations

(Washington, 1959); vol. VI, Airfield

and Base Development (Washington,

1951), vol. VII, Engineer Supply (Washington, 1949); vol. VIII, Critique (Washington, 1951). Vol. V, Engineer Combat

Operations, is in preparation.

Various publications of the Congress

of the United States dealing with legislation pertaining to or investigations of

the National Defense Program contain

information on the Engineer effort during the defense build-up and war periods.

Among them are:

1. Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings,

Military Establishment Appropriation

Bill for 1940 and War Department Civil

Functions Appropriation Bill, 1940,

76th Congress, 1st session, and subsequent hearings on appropriation bills.

2. Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program,

Hearings, Investigation of the National

Defense Program, 77th and 78th Congress.

3. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, 1st and 2d sessions (Washington,

1946).

A number of personal reminiscences

and general accounts of the war against

Japan or various phases thereof contain

information on Engineer operations or

provide background material for a better

understanding of the Engineer story.

Among them are:

1. Allen, Gwenfread, Hawaii's War

Years (Honolulu: University of Hawaii

Press, 1950).

2. Bowman, Waldo G. et al., Bulldozers Come First (New York: McGrawHill Book Company, 1946).

3. Brereton, Lewis H., The Brereton

Diaries (New York: William Morrow

Company, 1946).

4. Chennault, Claire L., Way of a

Fighter (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,

1949). 5. Eichelberger, Robert L., Our Jungle

Road to Tokyo (New York: The Viking

Press, 1950).

6. Heavey, William F., Down Ramp!

The Story of the Army Amphibian Engineers (Washington: Infantry Journal

Press, 1947).

7. Kenney, George C., General Kenney

Reports: A Personal History of the
694 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Pacific War (New York: Duell, Sloan and

Pearce, 1949).

8. Krueger, Walter, From Down

Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth

Army in World War II (Washington:

Combat Forces Press, 1953).

9. Marshall, S. L. A., Island Victory

(Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

1944). 10. Morison, Samuel Eliot, "History

of United States Naval Operations in

World War II," nine volumes dealing

with the war in the Pacific (Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1948-60).

11. Smith, Holland M., Coral and

Brass (New York: Charles Scribner's

Sons, 1949).

12. Stilwell, Joseph W., The Stilwell

Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948).

13. Wainwright, Jonathan M., General Wainwright's Story (New York:

Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1946).
List of Abbreviations

AAF Army Air Forces

ABDA American, British, Dutch, Australian

AC Air Corps

ACofEngrs Assistant Chief of Engineers

ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff

ADC Alaska Defense Command

Adj Adjutant

Admin Administrative

Adv Advance

AF Air Force

AFB Air Force base

AFMIDPAC Army Forces, Middle Pacific

AFPAC Army Forces, Pacific

AFWESPAC Army Forces, Western Pacific

AG Adjutant General

AGF Army Ground Forces

AGO Adjutant General's Office

AIF Australian Imperial Forces

ALF Allied Land Forces

AMF Australian Military Forces

AMMISCA American Military Mission to China

Amphib Amphibious

AMS Army Map Service

ANMB Army and Navy Munitions Board

an. Annex

APA Transport, attack

Appns Appropriations

AreaO Area officer

Arty Artillery

ASF Army Service Forces

ATC Air Transport Command

ATIS Allied Translator and Interpreter Service

Aust Australian

AUS Army of the United States

AVG American Volunteer Group

Avn Aviation

AWC Allied Works Council

AWS Aircraft Warning Service

Bd Board

BLT Battalion landing team

Br Branch

C Chief
696 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

CA Coast Artillery

CAA Civil Aeronautics Authority

CBI China-Burma-India

CCC Civilian Conservation Corps

CDC Caribbean Defense Command

CE Corps of Engineers

CG Commanding general

Chmn Chairman

Cmte Committee

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CO Commanding officer

Co Company

CofAC Chief of Air Corps

CofEngrs Chief of Engineers

CofS Chief of Staff

Com Communications

Comd Command

Comdr Commander

COMINCH Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

CONCOR Construction Corps of the Philippines

Conf Conference

Cong Congress

Constr Construction

Corresp Correspondence

COSC Combined Operational Service Command

CPA Central Pacific Area

CPBC Central Pacific Base Command

CPFF Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee

CQM Constructing quartermaster

DCofAS Deputy Chief of Air Staff

DCofS Deputy Chief of Staff

Dep Deputy

Dept Department

DF Disposition form

Dir Director

Dist District

Distr Distribution

Div Division

Dukw 21⁄2-ton 6x6 amphibian truck

EBSR Engineer boat and shore regiment

Ech Echelon

EHD Engineer Historical Division

EinC Engineer in charge

EM Enlisted men

ENCOM Engineer Construction Command

Engr Engineer

ESB Engineer special brigade
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 697

ExecO Executive officer

FEAF Far East Air Force

FEC Far East Command

FO Field orders

FWA Federal Works Agency

FY Fiscal year

G-1 Personnel section of divisional or higher staff

G-2 Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff

G-3 Operations section of divisional or higher staff

G-4 Supply section of divisional or higher staff

GENED General Engineer District

GHQ General headquarters

GO General orders

GS General Service

H House

HD Hawaiian Department

Hist Historical; history

Hq Headquarters

HR House of Representatives

IB India-Burma

IBT India-Burma Theater

IG Inspector General

IGD Inspector General's Department

Incl Inclosure

Ind Indorsement

Inspec Inspection

Instal Installation

INTERSEC Intermediate Section

Interv Interview

Intl International

J-1 Personnel Section of Joint Army-Navy Staff

J-2 Intelligence Section of Joint Army-Navy Staff

J-3 Operations Section of Joint Army-Navy Staff

J-4 Supply Section of Joint Army-Navy Staff

JB Joint Board

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

Jnl Journal

KCRC Kansas City Records Center

LCI Landing craft, infantry

LCM Landing craft, mechanized

LCT Landing craft, tank

LCVP Landing craft, vehicle, personnel

Legis Legislative

LHQ Allied Land Headquarters

LST Landing ship, tank

LUZED Luzon Engineer District

Maint Maintenance
698 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MID Military Intelligence Division

Mil Military

Min Minutes

Mtg Meeting

n.d. No date

NGF New Guinea Force

NLF North Luzon Force

NPD North Pacific Division

OCAAF Office of the Chief of the Army Air Forces

OCE Office of the Chief of Engineers

OCG Office of the commanding general

Of Office

Of C Engr Office of the Chief Engineer

Off Officer

OI Operations instructions

OinC Officer in charge

OPD Operations Division

Opns Operations

Orgn Organization

OUSW Office of the Under Secretary of War

Pan Panama

PCD Panama Canal Department

Pers Personnel

Phil Philippine

Plng Planning

POA Pacific Ocean Area

PRA Public Roads Administration

Prelim Preliminary

Proc Procurement

Prog Program

Proj Project

Prov Provisional

pt. Part

PT Motor torpedo boat

QM Quartermaster

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force

Rad Radiogram

RAE Royal Australian Engineers

RAF Royal Air Force

RAN Royal Australian Navy

Rcd Record

Rcn Reconnaissance

RCT Regimental combat team

Rpt Report

Rqmts Requirements

Rqn Requisition

S-3 Operations and training section of a unit

not having a general staff
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 699

SEAC Southeast Asia Command

Secy Secretary

Serv Service

sess Session

SFPOE San Francisco Port of Embarkation

SGS Secretary of the General Staff

SLF South Luzon Force

SOP Standing operating procedure

SOPAC South Pacific Area

SOS Services of Supply

SPA South Pacific Area

SPBC South Pacific Base Command

SPD South Pacific Division

Stat. Statutes

Sup Supply

SupO Supply officer

SW Secretary of War

SWPA Southwest Pacific Area

TAG The Adjutant General

TC Transportation Corps

Telg Telegram

TIG The Inspector General

TM Technical manual

Tng Training

TofOpns Theater of operations

Topo Topographic

TQMG The Quartermaster General

Tr Troop

Twx Teletype message

USAF U.S. Air Forces

USAFFE U.S. Army Forces in the Far East

USAFIA U.S. Army Forces in Australia

USAFICPA U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area

USAFINZ U.S. Army Forces in New Zealand

USAFISPA U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area

USAFPOA U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Area

USASOS U.S. Army, Services of Supply

USFIP U.S. Forces in the Philippines

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USW Under Secretary of War

VDC Volunteer Defense Corps

WD War Department

WDC Western Defense Command

WDGS War Department General Staff

WPA Work Projects Administration

WPD War Plans Division

WPO War Plan ORANGE

Y-FOS Y-Force Operations Staff
List of Code Names

ARCADIA

BLACKLIST

BOBCAT

BOSTON

CARTWHEEL

CORONET

CYCLONE

DEXTERITY

ELKTON

FORAGER

GALVANIC

GLOBETROTTER

HURRICANE

ICEBERG

INTERLUDE

KING

MAPLE

MATTERHORN

MICHAELMAS

MIKE

OCTAGON

OLYMPIC

ORANGE

PERSECUTION

U.S.-British conference held in Washington, December 1941-January 1942.

General Douglas MacArthur's plan for occupation

of Japan.

U.S. Navy fueling station in Society Islands; first

advance base to be established in Pacific after

Pearl Harbor.

The Abau-Mullins Harbor area in southeast New

Guinea.

Converging drive on Rabaul, New Britain, by force

of South Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas.

Assault planned for the island of Honshu, Japan,

to take place in March 1946.

Task force for Noemfoor.

Allied operations against Cape Gloucester and

Arawe, New Britain, and Saidor, northeast New

Guinea.

Plan for seizure of New Britain, New Guinea, and

New Ireland area.

U.S. operation to capture Mariana Islands.

U.S. invasion of Gilbert Islands.

Allied operation against Sansapor area, Netherlands

New Guinea.

Assault force for Biak, New Guinea.

Allied invasion of Ryukyu Islands.

Allied operation against Morotai Island, Netherlands East Indies.

Plans for U.S. operations to secure initial lodgment

in southern and central Philippines and establish

bases to support subsequent operations.

Port Moresby, New Guinea.

Plan for operating B-29's from Cheng-tu against

Japan.

Task force for seizure of Saidor, New Guinea.

Plans covering operations for recapture of Luzon.

U.S.-British conference at Quebec, September 1944.

Projected Allied operation to invade island of Kyushu, Japan, in fall of 1945.

Prewar plan of operation in event of war with

Japan.

Allied task force that carried out operations against

Aitape area, New Guinea, to seize and rehabilitate Japanese airstrips.
LIST OF CODE NAMES 701

QUADRANT

RAINBOW

SUNDANCE

TABLETENNIS

TEACUP

TORNADO

TRADEWIND

TRIDENT

TULSA

TYPHOON

VICTOR

First Anglo-American conference, 14-24 August

1943, at Quebec, Canada, attended by President

Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to

meet Axis aggression.

Majuro Atoll, Marshall Islands.

Allied operation against Noemfoor Island, carried

out by CYCLONE Task Force, 2 July-31 August

1944. Manus Island, Bismarck Archipelago.

Allied task force under HURRICANE Task Force

which carried out operation against Wake IslandToem, New Guinea, area, 17 May-2 September

1944. Allied task force under ALAMO which carried out

Operation INTERLUDE against Morotai Island,

Netherlands New Guinea.

U.S.-British conference held at Washington, May

1943.

Early plans for General Headquarters, Southwest

Pacific Area, for operations directed at capture

of Rabaul, New Britain.

Task force for Sansapor, New Guinea, operation.

Eighth Army's operations in central and southern

Philippines.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press.

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive
703

The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Empoyment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan

Index

Abau: 150, 178-80

Abau Trail: 178-80

Abbott, Lt. Col. Ward T.: 112, 135-37, 248

Abel, Cecil: 180

Abel's Landing: 180-81, 192

Adak Island: 284, 290, 294-95, 332

Adelaide: 113-14, 119, 124, 141

Administrative Planning Committee, Australian:

113, 120-22

Administrative procedures

Australia: 113, 121, 242

CBI: 453

Hawaii: 41, 52, 341-42, 353-54. 356-58, 363-64,

370-73, 376, 486-89

India: 401

Philippines, 1941-42: 61

SWPA: 556-57

Admiralty Islands: 521-27, 529, 541-43, 544, 570

Advance Sections, SOS CBI: 395, 396, 415, 418, 439,

452

Advisory Commission to Council of National Defense: 24-25

Aeronautical charts, compilation and distribution:

458

Agana: 506

Agno River: 75-77, 588-91, 595-97, 601-06, 611-12

Agra: 392, 395-96, 399-400, 404

Agriculture and Forestry Board, Hawaii: 346

Aguadulce Airfield: 30, 32

Aguinaldo Building, Manila: 667

Ahioma: 257

Air attacks

Biak: 538

Borneo: 636

Carolines: 514, 516

Japan: 456, 467-68, 518, 668

Kwajalein: 479, 482

Luzon: 596, 599, 604, 612, 639

New Guinea: 179, 527

Okinawa: 647, 658

Philippines, 1944-45: 572, 626, 633-34

Rabaul: 272

Saipan: 496

SOPAC: 542

SWPA: 542

Wakde: 536

Air attacks, Japanese

Alaska: 276, 283-89

Assam: 400-401

Borneo: 636

Central Pacific: 386

Corregidor: 101-02, 105

Hollandia: 530

Air attacks, Japanese—Continued

Lae: 251

Leyte: 577, 580, 584

Luzon: 592-93

Milne Bay: 178

New Britain: 273-74

New Guinea: 143, 146, 157, 251, 253

Okinawa: 647

Port Moresby: 142-43, 145-46

Saipan: 497, 499, 501, 518

SOPAC: 559

SWPA: 559, 565

Wakde: 536

Air bases: See Airfield construction and repair;

B-29's.

Air bases, Japanese: 143

Air commandos: 427-28, 430, 445, 447, 455

Air defense construction. See also Aircraft warning

stations, construction of; Civilian defense, Hawaii.

Alaska: 36

Canal Zone: 50

Corregidor: 66

Hawaii: 40-41, 43-44, 344, 361-62, 365

India: 398, 400

Air defense measures: 66, 125, 249, 344-49, 366-67.

See also Civilian defense, Hawaii.

Air ferry routes. See also islands and areas by name.

airfield construction and repair: 45-48, 52-53,

161-64, 168-69, 232-33

to Alaska: 287-88

alternate routes: 161, 168-69, 171

become operational: 163-64, 220-22

climate, effect of: 168

communications facilities: 161

defenses, status of: 168

to Philippines, 1941: 45

priority rating: 161

reconnaissance, engineer: 168-69

shipping shortages: 161

storage facilities, construction and operation: 164

to USSR: 288

Air Forces

Caribbean: 29

Far East: 71-72, 392, 658, 668, 672

Hawaiian: 38-39, 342, 346, 348, 354

Strategic: 649-50, 658, 667-68

Fifth: 157, 183-88, 230, 242, 248, 583

Seventh: 361-62, 365, 373, 376, 478, 507

Tenth: 391-92, 398-400, 416, 428-29, 458, 463, 466,

468, 472

Eleventh: 282-83

Thirteenth: 243
706 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Air Forces—Continued

Fourteenth: 417-18, 427-29, 438, 452-53, 458, 468-

70, 668. See also American Volunteer Group.

Air Forces Service Commands

V: 260-62

X: 429

XIII: 243

Air offensive against Japan: 7-8, 107, 150, 153-54,

387-89, 391-92, 408-09, 417-18, 421, 425, 428,

430-32, 437-38, 463, 467, 561, 563, 566, 573- 581, 586, 587, 598, 674. See also B-29's; China.

Air Service Area Command, 5308th: 439, 451

Air Service Command, CBI: 429, 439

Air strength, Japanese: 522, 591, 594

Air strength, SWPA: 234-35

Air strips, construction and repair. See Airfield construction and repair.

Air superiority, Allied: 662

Air Transport Command: 324, 431, 452, 454, 472, 666

Air Unit, 5318th: 428

Air units, arrival in China: 431-32

Airborne Division, 11th: 581, 609, 614, 631, 639

Airborne engineer troops. See Engineer airborne

aviation battalions.

Airborne operations

Arnold and: 428

Burma: 444-46, 454

Corregidor: 619-20

New Guinea: 248-49, 252

Philippines, 1944-45: 619-20

Aircraft, supplied to China: 389, 391-92

Aircraft repair shops, construction: 370, 373-74, 507,

577

Aircraft warning service, Hawaii: 347, 362, 365

Aircraft warning stations, construction of

Alaska: 18, 36-37, 53, 278, 283, 287-88

Bataan: 64, 66

Canal Zone: 20-21, 30-31

Hawaii: 15, 18, 40-42, 51, 53, 346

Ledo Road: 435

Panama: 20-21, 30-32

Philippines, 1941-42: 59, 64, 66

Airfield construction and repair

Admiralties: 521-27, 541-42

air ferry routes: 45-48, 52-53, 161-64, 168-69,

232-33

Alaska: 12, 19, 21-23, 28, 33-35, 37, 50-53, 276-78,

281, 284-89, 291, 296-98, 328-29, 331-34

Alaska Highway: 313

Allied Air Forces and: 182

Arnold and: 430

by ASCOM: 583-84, 591-92, 598-600

Assam: 392, 396-97, 400-401, 416-18, 420, 425, 431,

438-39, 452-53

Attu: 331

Australia: 45-46, 111, 113-20, 123-26, 133-37,

141-45, 147-52, 154-55, 158, 218-20, 223, 239,

260, 549-50

Airfield construction and repair—Continued

Bataan: 61, 64-65, 71, 78-79, 89, 95

Biak: 537-42, 544

Burma: 428, 444-47, 454-55, 459, 463-64, 467-68,

472

Canada: 288, 299

Canal Zone: 29-32

Canol: 321, 324-27

Canton Island: 45-47, 161, 163-64, 385

Carolines: 512-17

CBI: 392, 430, 437

Central Pacific: 381-86, 476, 518

China: 387-89, 392, 397, 402-04, 415-16, 419-20,

425, 429-32, 437, 439-42, 451-53, 456, 468-69, 662-63

Christmas Island: 45-47, 161, 164, 385

coral, uses in: 385-86

Corregidor: 61, 103, 105

Fiji: 45, 48, 161, 163, 171, 232-33, 256

Guadalcanal: 171-72, 206-07, 256

Guam: 493, 506, 517

Hawaii: 28, 38-42, 51, 161, 340-43, 346-49, 361-62,

365, 370- 373-74, 486-87, 507-08

Hollandia: 527-28, 531-34, 543-44

India: 392-94, 396-97, 399-404, 406-08, 416-18,

420, 425, 429-32, 438-42, 455-56, 467-68, 666

Iwo Jima: 659-60

Japan, for assault on: 672-74, 677-78

JCS directives on: 527

Kwajalein: 476-79, 483-85

Lae: 230-31, 234, 244

Leyte: 573, 575, 579-81, 583-84, 586, 590

Luzon: 58-61, 64-65, 79, 590-92, 597, 606, 610, 615,

631-33, 638-39, 655

Manila: 615

Marianas: 592-93, 518

Marquesas: 168

Marshalls: 485-86

Milne Bay: 151-54, 157-58, 174-75, 186, 221, 235-

36

Mindanao: 59, 61, 65, 570, 578, 636, 655

Navy's role in: 12

New Britain: 273

New Caledonia: 45, 161, 163-67, 171, 206-07, 221-

22, 233, 256

New Guinea: 143-48, 150-59, 174, 180-87, 194,

198-99, 202, 218-20, 230-31, 235-38, 244-49,

251-52, 254, 257-60, 274-75, 533, 549-50, 561

New Hebrides: 170-71, 232

New Zealand: 48

Okinawa: 625, 643, 645, 657-58

Panama: 21, 23, 31-32, 50

Philippine Commonwealth: 59

Philippines, 1941-42: 45, 55, 58-59, 63-66, 71

Philippines, 1944-45: 625-26, 633-34, 655

POA: 380, 640

Port Moresby: 143, 145-48, 151-57, 174-75, 184- 86, 188, 220, 236, 259
INDEX 707

Airfield construction and repair—Continued

QMC's role in: 12-14, 19

Saipan: 493, 498-501, 503, 511, 518

Solomons: 245, 249-50, 254-55

SOPAC: 232-33, 243, 255-56, 266, 549-50

by SOS CBI: 437-39

SWPA: 218-20, 230-31, 234, 256-57, 266, 549-50,

566-68, 561-66

Wakde: 645-46, 651, 654-55

Airfield construction and repair, Japanese: 477, 550

Airfield defense measures, Hawaii: 348-49, 374

Airfields, Japanese seizure of: 468-69, 662

Airlift operations. See also Supply, by airlift.

Admiralties: 525

Burma: 427-28, 468

New Guinea: 180-81, 192, 205

Aitape: 527, 532-34, 541-44

Aitutaki Island: 169, 171, 233

Alacan: 639.

Alaska: 3, 4, 7-8, 11, 12-14, 16-19, 21-23, 27, 28,

33-37, 48-53, 276-98, 305-06, 328-34. See also

Alaska Highway; North Pacific Area; islands by

name.

Alaska-Canada Highway. See Alaska Highway.

Alaska, Gulf of: 281

Alaska Defense Command: 33, 332-34. See also Buckner, Lt. Gen. Simon B., Jr.

Alaska Defense Force: 17-18, 33. See also Buckner,

Lt. Gen. Simon B., Jr.

Alaska Highway: 276, 299-318, 334, 337, 339

Alaska Railroad: 18-19, 22-23, 34, 287, 289, 295

Alaskan Department: 333, See also Alaska Defense

Command; Alaska Defense Force; Buckner, Lt.

Gen. Simon B., Jr.

Alaskan International Highway Commission: 299

Alaskan Siberian Ferry Route (ALSIB): 288

Albany Race Track, Calif.: 362

Albrook Field: 7-8, 14

Alcan: 312

Alcan Highway. See Alaska Highway.

Aleutian Islands: 284-85, 290-98, 364. See also islands

by name.

Alexandra Falls: 327

Aliamanu Crater: 15, 39-42, 51, 370

Alice Springs: 114, 123, 148, 239, 241

Allahabad: 397

Allied Air Forces, SWPA: 128, 182-83. See also

Brett, Maj. Gen. George H.; Kenney, Maj. Gen.

George C.

Allied Land Forces, SWPA: 128. See also Blamey,

General Sir Thomas.

Allied Naval Forces, SWPA: 128

Allied Supply Council: 141

Allied Works Council, Australia:

construction machinery and equipment, procurement by: 155, 215-16

and construction program and progress: 141-45,

223-24

Allied Works Council, Australia—Continued

co-operation with SWPA: 120-22, 134-35, 137-38,

140-41, 151-52

and costs of construction: 152, 223-24, 239-41, 260

and hospital construction: 239-40

labor force, mobilizing: 241-42

labor force, strength: 211

road construction and repair: 239

specialist training by: 271-72

Alligators (LVT's): 273, 382, 496, 506

Almirante: 30

Aloha Tower, Honolulu: 346

Altman, Col. Ellis F.: 424

Amberley Airfield: 114-15, 127, 260

Amchitka Island: 288-89

American-Australian Lend-Lease agreement: 141

American-British-Dutch-Australian Command

(ABDA): 118, 392

American Military Mission to China: 389

American Procurement Commission, USAFIA: 126

American Red Cross, construction for: 546

American Volunteer Group: 389, 391-92, 415. See

also Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L.; China,

China Air Task Force

Ammunition storage facilities, construction of. See

Storage facilities, construction and operation.

Ammunition storage plan, Hawaii: 367-69

Amphibious Force, VII: 576-78

Amphibious operations. See also Engineer special

brigades; Landing craft.

Admiralties: 522-23

Borneo: 636

Central Pacific: 476

control of: 227

coral, effect on: 385

Iwo Jima: 640-41

Japan, for assault on: 673-74, 677

lessons gained from: 273, 577-78

Leyte: 575-78

Luzon recovery: 594, 608, 610, 639

Navy's role in: 273, 577-78

New Britain: 272-74

New Guinea: 179, 181, 192, 246-48, 251-54, 272-

75, 535

Okinawa: 643-44

Philippines, 1944-45: 619-21, 625-26, 632-35

SWPA planning for: 520-21, 527-28, 534

training program: 271, 330-31, 478, 490-91, 671

Amphibious truck. See Dukws.

Amsterdam Island: 563-65

Anchorage: 16-19, 22, 26, 33, 34-35, 37, 282, 284, 289,

290, 295-96, 324-25

Andrews, Maj. Gen. Frank M.: 29-32

Angat River: 613

Angaur Island: 514-16

Angeles, Luzon: 77-78, 603

Ango: 195, 205

Annette Island: 12, 19, 21-22, 35-37, 278, 283, 296
708 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Anshun: 663

Antitank defenses, Japanese: 383, 583, 634

Apamama Island: 381

Aparri: 66, 72-74, 625, 638-39

Appropriations. See Congress, defense appropriations

by.

Arawe: 272-74

Arayat River: 77

ARCADIA Conference: 107, 164, 390

Archerfield (airfield): 114-15, 127

Argenlieu, Rear Adm. Thierry d': 163-64

Ariake Bay: 675

Arias, Dr. Arnulfo: 21, 32

Arizona: 350-51

Armand Considere: 670

Armies

Third: 471n

Fourth: 11, 276

Sixth: 230, 238-39, 242, 244, 256-57, 520-21, 523,

527-28 563-64 600-601 , 537-38, 541-42, 547, 551-52, 557, 559-60, 570-72606-09, 613 , 574-75 , 625-26 , 584, 632 , 58, 63

674-76, 678

Eighth: 586-87, 608-10, 625-27, 632-33, 639, 666,

669-72, 678

Tenth: 642-43, 657, 668, 678

Armies, British

Eighth: 408

Fourteenth: 446-47

Annies, Chinese

First: 468

Sixth: 468

XI Group: 466

Armored Group, 13th: 587, 594, 597

Army, Australian First: 196

Army Air Forces (AAF). See also Air Forces; Air

Forces Service Commands.

and Alaska Highway: 313

and China supply: 464

construction, pressure for: 135-36, 174, 184-86, 354,

365, 397, 401-02, 416-17, 437-38, 486, 549, 583

construction transferred to: 437-39

and engineer units, control of: 547

in India-Burma sector: 428-29

and Ledo Road: 464

and map compilation and distribution: 668

Army Forces, Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC): 675, 678

Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC): 649, 668, 674-75

Army Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESPAC): 654,

675, 678. See also United States Army Services of

Supply.

Army Map Service: 188, 290, 458, 607, 668

Army and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB): 48-49

Army Service Command (ASCOM): 571

airfield construction and repair: 583-84, 591-92,

598-600

base construction and operation: 584-85, 591

Base K: 579, 591, 650-51

Army Service Command (ASCOM)—Continued

Base M: 591, 600-601, 604-06, 650-51

beach defense construction: 585

bridge construction and repair: 585

cargo unloading and distribution: 600-601

civilians, employment of: 585, 599

construction, problems of: 584-85

Construction Command: 579, 619

dredging operations: 585

engineer organization: 571-72

engineer units, arrival: 598-99

engineer units, control of: 591, 594

engineer units, shortages of: 586

engineer units, strength: 575

Hollandia, transfer to: 572

hospital construction: 586

in Japan assault: 676

land acquisition: 584

Leyte Campaign: 575, 579, 582-86, 591-92

Luzon Base Command, redesignation to: 601

Luzon Base Section, redesignation to: 651

Luzon Campaign: 591-92, 598-601

pipeline construction and operation: 585, 600

port facilities, construction and repair: 585, 600-

601

railroad construction and repair: 600, 604

road construction and repair: 585-86, 600

Sixth Army, assignment to: 572, 601

spare parts shortage: 585

storage facilities, construction and operation: 585-

86, 600

USASOS, assignment to: 601

Army service commands. See Service commands.

Army Service Forces: 429-30, 436-37, 442, 448, 563.

See also Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.

Arnold, General Henry H.: 391-92, 418, 428, 430

Arrowsmith, Brig. Gen. John C.: 398-401, 406-12,

415-17, 423-24, 432

Arthur, Col. Joseph D., Jr.: 166

Artillery fire support: 482, 536, 621, 647

Artillery fire support, Japanese: 104-05

Arundel Island: 250

Asensio, Col. Manuel J.: 463, 468, 472

Aslito Airfield: 496-98

Assam: 392, 393-97, 399-401, 404, 405, 409, 

18, 419, 420, 424, 425, 426-27, 431, 435, 438-39.

441-42, 452-53, 457, 466-67, 471, 464-66

Assam Oil Company: 449

Athabaska, Lake: 324

Athabaska River: 320-22

Atherton Tablelands: 241

Atimonan: 82

Atka Island: 284-87

Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company: 60

Atomic bombs, use of: 678

Atsugi Airfield: 679

Attu Island: 276, 284, 290, 322, 329-31, 364

Auckland: 233, 243
INDEX 709

Australia: 107, 160, 164, 170, 364. See also Australian

Army; Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

AAF, pressure for construction: 135-36

Administrative Planning Committee, 113, 120-22

administrative procedures: 113, 121, 242

airfield construction and repair: 45-46, 111, 113-20,

123-26, 133-37, 141-45, 147-52, 154-55. 158, 218- 20, 223, 239, 260, 549-50

Allied Works Council. See Allied Works Council,

Australia.

base construction and operation: 112-13, 119, 239

camouflage measures: 219-20, 559-60

civilians, employment of: 112, 120, 142-44, 154-55,

158, 215, 239, 557, 680

construction, control of: 133-39, 651

construction, problems of: 116-17, 119-22, 135, 144,

148-49, 155, 241-42

construction design standards: 120, 139

construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 117, 123-24, 127, 140-41, 144-45, 148-49,

152-53, 155, 241, 554

construction materials, improvised: 125-26, 149,

261-62

construction materials, procurement: 117-18, 120,

124-27, 134-35, 140-41, 155, 213-16, 260-62,

266-67, 554-56

construction programs and progress: 113-22, 133-

34, 138-44, 152-53, 214-15, 217, 220, 223, 239,

260

co-operation from: 111-14, 131, 144, 158, 215-16

costs of construction: 152, 223-24, 240-41

demolition operations: 138-39, 216

duplication of effort: 134-35

Economic Cabinet: 215

engineer mission: 111-14

engineer units, arrival and departure: 118, 122-

26, 131, 144-49, 152, 190, 228, 247

engineer units, requirements: 133

engineer units, strength: 144

engineers as infantry: 149-50

financial aid from: 112

hospital construction: 114-15, 223, 240

housing arrangements: 114, 217

housing construction: 114-15, 119, 124, 139-40, 223,

260

labor force, mobilizing: 121, 142, 241-42

land clearing operations: 148

and lend-lease: 140-41, 216, 560

maintenance and repair, general: 126, 148-49

map compilation and distribution: 189-91, 551-52

planking, pierced, first use: 125

port congestion: 126-27, 242

port facilities, construction and repair: no, 113-

port facilities, construction and repair—Continued

15, 240, 260

priority rating: 121-22, 134-35, 137-38, 215-16,

241-42, 260

purchasing, centralized: 126-27

Australia—Continued

RAAF in construction program: 136-38, 154, 158,

560

railroad construction and repair: 241

reconnaissance, engineer: 119-20, 123, 135, 144

resources: 108-09, 140-41, 216

road construction and repair: 122-23, 128, 138,

239-40

shipping: 140, 155, 554

shop construction and operation: 229

Soils Mechanics School: 272, 561

spare parts shortage: 149

specialists, training: 271-72, 560-61

storage facilities, construction and operation: 113-

15, 119, 141, 223, 239, 260

supply situation: 126-27, 140-41, 149, 152-53, 155,

556

terrain model construction: 552-53

topographic supplies, procurement: 553

training programs: 122, 124-25, 136, 271

Australian Army. See also Royal Australian Engineers.

in Borneo assault: 636

construction policy: 139

Hiring Service: 113

map compilation and distribution: 188-89

in New Guinea: 155, 174-78, 182, 193, 200-02,

204-05, 235, 238, 244, 247-48, 251-54

specialists, training: 271-72

storage facilities, construction and operation.

217-18

Australian Army units

Infantry Brigade, 26th: 636

Infantry Divisions

7th: 174, 178, 193, 252

9th: 251, 636

Australian Chiefs of Staff: 109, 113, 118, 129, 216

Australian Imperial Forces: 108, 118

Australian Military Forces: 109, 133

Australian-New Guinea Administrative Unit

(ANGAU): 269

Australian Survey Corps: 189-90, 200

Ayala Bridge, Manila: 656-57

B-17's: 55-59, 63-65, 143, 152, 164, 341, 347, 361-62,

439-40

B-18's: 286

B-24's: 484, 495

B-25's 181, 554

B-29's: 387, 428, 430, 437-42, 449-53, 456, 467-68,

492, 493. 499-501, 503, 506, 510-11. 517, 518, 640, 643, 658, 660, 666

Babelthuap Island: 514

Baccus Marsh: 123

Bagabag: 637-39

Bagac: 86, 89-91

Bagac River: 97

Baguio: 625, 627-32, 636-38
710 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Bailey, Sir Donald Coleman: 448

Bailey bridges: 448, 465, 470

Baker, Capt. C. D.: 47, 163, 165, 488

Baker Island: 380

Bakery construction: 546

Balara Filters, Luzon: 614

Baldwin, Lt. Col. Herbert: 363-64

Baler Bay: 627

Balete Pass: 627-28, 636-37

Balikpapan Island: 636-37, 639

Baliuag: 613

Bamban: 76-77, 595, 604-05, 610

Bamban River: 77, 603

Bambang: 627-29, 632, 636-38

Banga Cave: 81

Bangalore, India: 399

Bangkok: 456

Banzai charges: 500, 592, 594, 647, 649

Barbed wire obstacles: See Wire obstacles; Wire obstacles, Japanese.

Barber's Point: 351

Barbey, Rear Adm. Daniel E.: 578

Barge lines. See Waterways, development and use.

Barking Sands, Kauai: 39, 349, 361

Barnes, Brig. Gen. Earl W.: 565

Barnes, Brig. Gen. Julian F.: 109, 128, 157. See also

United States Army Forces in Australia.

(USAFIA).

Barracks construction. See Housing construction.

Base B: 672

Base K: 579, 591, 650-51

Base M: 591, 600, 604, 606, 650, 656

Base R: 650, 656

Base S: 650

Base X: 650

Base construction and operation

Admiralties: 524-25, 527, 534, 541-42

Alaska: 282-83, 289-91, 331-34

by ASCOM: 584-85, 591

Assam: 395-96

Attu: 331

Australia: 112-13

Biak: 537-38, 541-42, 544

Burma: 413, 465

CBI: 395-96

Central Pacific: 381, 476, 507, 518

China: 395-96, 415, 418-21

Espíritu Santo: 569

Guam: 492

Hawaii: 366, 369-70, 380

Hollandia: 527-29, 533-34, 544, 557

India: 395-96, 404

Japan, for assault on: 674-75, 677

JCS directives on: 527

Kwajalein: 484

Lae: 244-45, 258-59, 546-47

Ledo: 405-06, 409-10, 412, 419, 467n

Leyte: 570-72, 575, 584-85

Base construction and operation—Continued

Luzon: 93, 591, 606, 625, 632, 650-51

Manila: 93, 656, 670

Manila Bay area: 591

Marianas: 492

Marshalls: 478-79, 484-86, 570

Milne Bay: 236, 245, 257, 556-58

Mindanao: 572, 636

New Caledonia: 661

New Guinea: 236, 238-39, 244, 256-58, 275, 544,

546-47, 557

Okinawa: 643, 658

Port Moresby: 174-75, 236, 245, 258

Saipan: 493-94, 499-503

Solomons: 245, 250, 527, 544-47

SOPAC: 255-56, 542-43, 546-47, 649

by SOS CBI: 395-96, 409, 415, 418

SWPA: 182-83, 209-10, 256-57, 543-44, 546

USASOS: 236, 245, 256-59, 262-63, 528

Wakde: 535, 542

Base construction and operation, Japanese: 512-14

Base General Depot No, 2, SOS CBI: 456

Base Sections, SOS, CBI:

1: 395-96, 398, 402

2: 395

3: 409, 423-24, 431-32, 436, 438, 442

Basilan Island: 633

Bataan Peninsula: 55, 57-58, 61, 64-65, 66, 71, 72-

101, 608

Batangas: 84, 632, 650, 655

Batangas Bay: 632

Batchelor Field: 110

Bathing facilities, installation: 266

Bathurst, Col. Charles R.: 556, 567

Battery Arizona: 661

Battery Closson: 349

Battery Hatch: 349

Battery Pennsylvania: 661

Battery Williston: 349

Bauang: 76, 630

Bauang River: 630

Bauer Airfield, New Hebrides: 232

Bayambang: 76, 595, 602, 604, 611

Bayombong: 638

Bayug Airfield: 573, 576, 580, 583

Beach defense construction: 351-52, 365, 374, 585

Beach defense construction, Japanese: 501

Beach party operations. See also Shore party operations.

Biak: 538

Carolines: 514

Kwajalein: 479-82

Leyte: 576-77

Luzon: 592-94, 597, 608-09

Marianas: 506

Marshalls: 483

New Guinea: 535

Okinawa: 644
INDEX 711

Beach party operations—Continued

Saipan: 501, 496-97

Wakde: 536

Beadle, Col. Frank L.: 172, 214, 232, 243, 520, 569

Beard, Lt. Col. Cornelius: 222, 233

Beaver Creek: 314

Bechtel, McCone & Parsons: 28

Bedford, Earle: 84

Bellows Field: 39, 45, 51-54, 340, 347-48, 361

Bena Bena Airfield: 244

Bengal-Assam Railway: 449-50, 456

Bengal, Bay of: 405

Bengal Province: 450, 666

Benguet Consolidated Mining Company: 60

Bering Sea: 283, 285, 288, 325

Bermel, Maj. Peter E.: 11

Bethel, Alaska: 295

Belts, Col. Austin W.: 469

Bhamo: 389-91, 405, 430, 460-65, 468, 472-73, 663

Biak Island: 534, 537-42, 544, 557

Bicol Peninsula: 64, 80, 632, 639, 657

Big Delta: 295, 299, 302, 307, 309-10, 312, 315, 334

Big Delta Airfield: 288

Binloc River: 596

Birdum: 110, 148

Bismarck Archipelago. See islands by name.

Bismarck Sea: 272, 522

Bissell, Brig. Gen. Clay ton L.: 391, 400, 416, 429

BLACKLIST: 678, 679

Blarney, General Sir Thomas. See also New Guinea

Force.

and Allied Land Forces: 128, 139-40, 182-83, 190

and demolitions operations: 216

and New Guinea Force: 179

in Rabaul offensive: 244-45

Blasting operations

Alaska Highway: 312-14, 317

Luzon: 604, 638

Marshalls: 485

Mindanao: 635-36

Saipan: 498-99, 511

Bloch, Rear Adm. Claude C.: 42, 45

Blueberry River, Canada: 308

Bluemel, Brig. Gen. Clifford: 91, 97

Boat Building Command, USASOS: 653-54

Boatner, Brig. Gen. Haydon L.: 455

Bohol Island: 626, 634

Bolo Airfield: 658

Bomana Airfield: 146, 186

Bomb disposal, training in: 271, 560-71. See also

Demolition operations.

Bombardment, aerial. See Air attacks; Air attacks,

Japanese.

Bombardment Group, 9th: 21

Bombay: 396, 411

Bomber Commands

XX: 458

XXI: 518

Bond, Maj. Gen. Richard L. (British): 391-92

Bonegilla: 271

Bongabon: 610

Bonham, Maj. Roscoe: 69-70, 75-76, 87, 92-93, 99-

100

Booby traps, Japanese

Leyte: 583

Luzon: 597, 631

Manila: 619

Okinawa: 645, 648

Saipan: 499

Bootless Inlet: 183

Borneo: 118, 633, 636

Borokoe Airfield: 537, 540, 544

Bosnek: 537, 539-40

Bostock, Air Vice Marshal William D. (RAAF):

136-37

Bougainville Island: 234, 254-55, 520, 526, 544-47,

569

Bourake Airfield: 167

Brady, Col. Francis M.: 71

Brahmaputra River and Valley: 427, 431, 450, 467n,

663

Brandt, Col. Carl A.: 261

Breene, Maj. Gen. Robert G.: 214, 232, 256

Brereton, Maj. Gen. Lewis H.: 71, 110, 115, 117,

392-96, 397, 399-400

Bres, Col. E. S.: 136

Bretschneider, Pvt. Karl F.: 149

Brett, Maj. Gen. George H.: 109-13, 115-16, 118-24,

126-28, 135-37, 147-48, 150, 153-54, 392

Brewer, Maj. John E.: 547

Bridge construction and repair. See also Ponton

bridges; type by name or model designation.

Alaska Highway: 307, 312-13, 315-18, 334

by ASCOM: 585

Burma: 444, 458-59

Burma Road: 413, 435

Canol: 328, 337

Fiji: 256

Guadalcanal: 207-08

Ledo Road: 413, 433, 447-49, 457, 465, 470-7

663-64

Leyte: 574-75, 581-83, 585

Luzon: 76-77, 80-81, 590-91, 595-97, 602-06, 609,

611-13, 616, 626, 628-32, 638-39

Manila: 619, 657

Mindanao: 635-36

New Guinea: 247, 257, 274, 533, 535, 543, 546, 551

Okinawa: 645, 649

Philippines, 1941-42, 64

Philippines, 1944-45: 633-34

Solomons: 249, 255, 526

SOPAC: 542

SWPA: 542, 551, 565

Brisbane: 109-10, 112-13, 114, 115, 119, 122, 138-39,

141, 153, 156, 240, 242, 272, 288, 520, 528, 552-

54, 558, 571
712 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Brisbane River: 114

Bristol Bay: 288

British Army

in Burma: 391, 407-08, 409, 463

in China: 389, 464, 662

in India: 392-93, 396, 416-17, 420

Ledo Road, attitude toward: 407-08, 464

British Chiefs of Staff. See Combined Chiefs of Staff.

British Columbia-Yukon-Alaska Highway Commission, Canada: 299

British Infantry Division, 36th: 468

British Royal Air Force: 391

British Royal Engineers

Assam: 400-401, 416-17, 425, 431, 452

India: 392-93, 396-97, 400-402, 406, 416-17, 420,

425, 440

Ledo Road: 409-10, 412-13, 423-24, 450

British Royal Navy: 405-06

Brizay, Mr.: 217-19

Broken Hill Proprietary Company: 140

Brown, Lt. Col. Desloge: 378, 486

Brown, Lt. Col. Herbert E., Jr.: 484, 517

Brown, Col. Rothwell H.: 444

Bruce, Lt. Col. Burton B.: 144

Brunei Bay: 636

Buckner, Lt. Gen. Simon B., Jr. See also Alaska;

Alaska Defense Command; Alaska Defense

Force; Alaskan Department; Armies, Tenth.

and airfield construction and repair: 34-35, 658

commands Alaska Defense Command and Force:

17, 33, 333 and construction, control of: 282

demands staff engineer: 37

and radar installations: 283

Buckner (Nakagusuku) Bay: 641, 659

Budge-Budge: 450

Bued River: 596, 611

Buffaloes (LVT's): 273, 382, 497, 506, 530, 538, 562

Bulldog Village: 231, 260

Bulldozers, tactical use of

Admiralties: 523-24

Carolines: 515

Corregidor: 621

Guam: 506

Luzon: 628-29

Okinawa: 648

SOPAC: 542

SWPA: 542

Buna: 153-55, 156-57, 173-74, 179-80, 188-89, 192-

205

Buna Force: 156

Buna Mission: 193, 196, 198-203

Bunker defenses, Japanese, assaults on. See Demolition operations.

Burauen: 573

Bureau of Aeronautics, Philippine Commonwealth:

66

Bureau of Public Works, Philippine Commonwealth: 62-64, 66, 73-74, 76-77, 80-81

Burgin, Maj. Gen. Harry T.: 350, 368

Buri Airfield: 573, 576, 580, 583

Burma: 391-92, 404, 406-08, 413, 415-18, 420-21,

425, 429, 431, 443, 450, 456, 469, 473-

China; China-Burma-India Theater; India;

India-Burma Theater; Stilwell, Gen. Joseph. W.

AAF, construction transferred to: 437-38

airfield construction and repair: 428, 444-47, 454-

55, 459, 463-64, 467-68, 472

base construction and operation: 465

bridge construction and repair: 444, 458-59

China-India road, proposed: 405

civilians, employment of: 465, 680

climate, effect of: 393

command and staff structure: 397-98

construction, control of: 394-95

construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 430, 472

construction materials, procurement: 430, 466

construction programs and progress: 393-94, 464,

661-62

demolition operations: 445

Distinguished Unit Citation awarded: 455

engineer missions: 387-89

engineer organization: 438-39

engineer units, arrival: 445, 454-55, 466, 468, 472

engineer units, diversity in: 427

engineers as infantry: 444, 453-55, 463

isolation of: 387-89

labor force, mobilizing: 465, 467, 471

and Ledo Road. See Ledo Road.

malaria: 462

map compilation and distribution: 457-58

pipeline construction and operation: 390, 426-27,

430, 434-35, 442, 454, 457, 463-67, 

port facilities, construction and repair: 467, 471

railroad construction and repair: 389

railroad system: 393, 435

rainfall, effect of: 436, 446, 454-55, 462

reconnaissance: 445, 454-55

river crossings: 444, 454-55, 459, 468, 472

Burma Railway: 445-47, 468

Burma Road: 389-91, 404, 405, 406, 408, 413-15,

418-19, 421-22, 425-27, 435-36, 442, 455, 

60, 464, 465-66, 468, 472, 473-75, 662-63, 666

Burma Road Engineer Detachment: 459

Burma Road Engineer Divisions

2d: 465-66

3d: 466

Burmah Oil Company: 467, 471

Burns, Col. Brendan A.: 479-80, 493, 498, 511

Burns Airport: 39, 349

Burt, Maj. R. P., Jr.: 167

Bush flyers: 306, 309

Butaritari Island: 382
INDEX 713

Butjo Luos Island: 524

Byroade, Maj. Henry A.: 395-97, 400, 417, 419, 431,

439-40, 451, 469

C-47's: 247-48, 445, 550, 615

C. W. Cunningham Company: 327

Caballo Island: 57, 104, 621-23

Cabanatuan: 66, 75, 77, 596, 610-13

Cabcaben: 79, 93, 95

Cableway construction and operation: 466

Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Company: 70

Cagayan River and Valley: 73-74, 625, 627-28, 637-38

Cairns Airfield: 143, 235, 240-42, 260

Calasiao: 614

Calcutta: 392, 396-97, 411-12, 416, 424, 427-30, 439-

40, 449, 456-57, 467, 471, 475, 666

California Packing Company: 348

Callahan Construction Company: 25, 41, 320, 325,

327

Calmay River: 593, 595, 602

Calumpan Peninsula: 632

Calumpit: 80, 82, 610-12

Camalig: 639

Camouflage

air ferry routes: 168

Alaska: 37, 51, 290-91

Assam: 400

Australia: 219-20, 559-60

Bataan: 91

Canal Zone: 32

Hawaii: 44-45, 346, 350-52, 361-62, 365

India: 398-99

SOPAC: 559-60

SWPA: 219, 559-60

training in: 271-72

USASOS: 559-60

Camouflage, Japanese

Carolines: 515

Corregidor: 620

Luzon: 598, 610, 629, 639

Manila: 614

Okinawa: 647

Philippines, 1944-45: 633-34

Camp Claiborne: 430

Camp Columbia: 115

Camp construction. See Housing construction.

Camp Prairie: 321

Camp Seymour: 124-25

Canada: 276, 288, 299, 302-03, 305, 339. See also

Alaska Highway; Canol.

Canada-Alaska Highway. See Alaska Highway.

Canal Zone: 3, 4, 6-15, 20-21, 27-28, 29-33, 48-49,

50, 52, 53. See also Panama, Republic of.

Canals. See Waterways systems.

Candaba River: 77

"Canec": 367

Canol: 276, 313-17, 318-28, 335-39

Canton, China: 452

Canton Island: 45-47, 16 162, 163-65, 385

Capas: 605

Cape Endaiadere: 193-96, 200

Cape Esperance: 209

Cape Gloucester: 272, 274

Cape Muari: 399

Cape Prince of Wales: 22

Cape Spencer: 281

Cape York Peninsula: 109, 134, 143-44, 150-55, 158,

230, 245

Carabao Island: 57, 104, 624

Carcross: 302-03, 310

Card, Lt. Francis C.: 402

Carew, Col. John J.: 194-98, 203

Cargo unloading and distribution

Admiralties: 523-24

Alaska: 297-98

ASCOM: 600-01

Assam: 400

Biak: 537-39

Guam: 504

Hollandia: 529-30

Leyte: 577-79

Luzon: 592-94, 597, 600, 609

New Guinea: 533, 535

Okinawa: 644, 646

Saipan: 496-97

Solomons: 546

SOPAC: 214

SWPA: 212, 562, 567

Caribbean Defense Command: 28

Carigara Bay: 573, 576

Carmen, Luzon: 76-77, 596, 603

Carnegie, Capt. Orris A.: 190

Carney Airfield: 256

Caroline Islands: 489-90, 491-92, 507, 510, 512-17

Carter, Brig. Gen. A. H.: 319, 322

CARTWHEEL: 225, 229, 234, 244, 245, 255, 272, 275

Casablanca Conference: 225, 328, 418

Casey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.

and AAF pressure for construction: 185-87

arrival in Australia: 99, 127

and base construction and operation: 238-39, 543

Bataan defense: 86-90, 94, 97-99

civilians, employment of: 72

commands of: 57, 63-64, 130, 230, 571, 650

and construction, control of: 133-40, 220, 229-30,

651

on construction design standards: 549

and construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 110, 236, 547, 556-57

Corregidor defense: 103

and elimination of nonessential construction: 154,

217

and engineer units, control of: 147, 187, 230, 548,

591
714 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Casey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.—Continued

and engineer units, shortages of: 153-54, 186-88,

234-35, 650 and forestry units: 262

and Japan, assault on: 673-75, 677

Krueger, relationship to: 572

Leyte Campaign: 557, 579-81, 583

Luzon, 1941-42: 68, 74-75, 80-82, 84

Luzon, 1944-45: 588, 591, 598-600 and Manila: 618 and map compilation and distribution: 190, 269

mission: 230

and New Guinea offensive: 237-38, 521

and oil field development plans: 563

and port facilities, construction and repair: 148,

254

professional background: 63-64

reconnaissances by: 178-79, 183, 236-37

and Sansapor-Mar operation: 564

and spare parts procurement: 558

and specialists training: 561, 671

and stock control: 557-58

and supply policy: 141, 263-64, 559

Casey, Capt. Patrick J.: 445

Casualties, Allied

Burma: 444-45, 455, 463

Milne Bay: 177

Casualties, evacuation of: 208-09

Casualties, Japanese: 177, 330, 462, 504

Casualties, U.S. Attu: 330

Guam: 504

Lae: 251

Luzon,1944-45: 597, 630

Okinawa: 646, 648

Philippines, 1944-45: 622, 624

Saipan: 500

Solomons: 250

Wakde: 536

Cataisan Peninsula: 573, 576-77, 579, 584

Caucasus: 326

Causeway construction and repair

Carolines: 516

Kwajalein: 482

Leyte: 577

Luzon: 593

Marshalls: 485

New Guinea: 183-84, 187

Cavalry Brigades

1st: 522-23

2d: 522, 524

Cavalry Division, 1st: 271, 526, 576, 587, 610-18, 627,

632, 638-39

Cavalry Regiments

12th: 524

112th: 581

Cave defenses, Japanese

Biak: 540-41

Carolines: 515

Corregidor: 620-21

Guam: 506

Luzon: 598, 609, 627, 629

Manila: 617

Mindanao: 636

Okinawa: 646-48

Philippines, 1944-45: 624, 633

Saipan: 499-500

Wakde: 536

Caves, The, Australia: 260

Cavite Province: 84, 94, 104

Cawnpore: 397

Cebu: 634, 650, 656

Cebu Island: 93, 105, 626, 634, 657

Cement plants, rehabilitation of: 657

Central Pacific Area (CPA): 161, 170, 340, 377-86,

476-79, 489-90, 491, 492, 506-10, 511-12, 518-19,

568-69, 669, 670, 671. See also Halsey, Admiral

William F.

Central Pacific Base Command: 491, 508

Central Plain, Luzon: 73-75, 587-90, 594, 597-98,

600-03, 607, 610, 612

Central Public Works Department, India: 387, 396

Chabua: 400, 458

Chaffin, Capt. Andrew D., Jr.; 123

Chagres River: 32

Chakulia: 416, 450

Chamberlain, Maj. Gen. Stephen J.: 269

Chame Airfield: 30-32, 50

Champagne, Yukon Territory: 317

Chanco, Capt. Antonio P.: 85

Changsha: 428, 430, 468

Chanyi: 415

Chapin, Lt Col. W. S.: 663

Chaplains' facilities, construction of: 546

Charlie Lake: 310

Charon Kanoa: 493, 496, 499

Charters Towers Airfield: no, 115, 122, 128, 137,

141, 260

Chemical Warfare Service: 32

Chen Cheng, General (Chinese): 413

Chen Chin-chieh, Lt. Gen. (Chinese): 414

Chengkung: 402-03, 415-16

Cheng-tu: 430-31, 440, 452, 456, 467

Cheng-tu Valley: 440

Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L.

and air offensive in China: 408, 417-18, 421, 432,

452-53 and air units, deployment of: 469

and airfield construction and repair: 437

and AVG: 389, 391-92, 415, 425

and China Air Task Force, 402

and demolition operations: 469

and construction, control of: 451-52
INDEX 715

Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L.—Continued

and Fourteenth Air Force: 417-18

freedom of action by: 429

Chenoweth, Capt. William C.: 80-81, 87-89, 93, 98-

100

Chernofski Bay: 280

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo. See also China;

China-Burma-India Theater; Chinese Army,

and air offensive in China: 428-29

and airfield construction and repair: 415

and Burma offensive: 404-06, 418, 421

and Burma Road: 421

and Chinese troops in India: 403

Combined Chiefs, exclusion from: 390

and Ledo Road: 411, 460-62

and lend-lease: 402

and road construction and repair: 391

Stilwell, relationship to: 397-98, 470

Chichagof Valley: 329-30

Chief of Engineers. See also Reybold, Lt. Gen. Eugene; Schley, Maj. Gen. Julian L.

and Alaska Highway: 300, 314

and bridge types: 448-49

and Canol: 319-20, 323

and construction, control of: 282, 360

and construction design standards: 315-16

and construction materials, procurement: 63

and cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts: 24-25, 487-88

and Hawaii defenses: 360

and Ledo Road: 448

and map compilation and distribution: 489-90,

668

mission: 6-7

and pipeline construction and operation: 427, 434,

467

and storage facilities, construction and operation:

442

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See Craig, General Malin;

Marshall, General of the Army George C.

Chiefs of Staff Committee, Australia: 113, 121

Chihchiang: 663

Chilkoot Barracks: 8

China: 398-99, 449-50, 473, 625, 682. Chiang Kaishek, Generalissimo; China-Burma-India Theater; Chinese Army; Stilwell, General Joseph W.

AAF, construction transferred to: 438-39

AAF pressure for construction: 437-38

airfield construction and repair: 387-89, 392, 397,

402-04, 415-16, 419-20, 425, 429-32, 437, 439-42, 4

base for air offensive: 387-89, 409, 417-18, 421,

425, 428, 430-31, 437-38

base construction and operation: 395-96, 415, 418-

21

China Air Task Force (CATF): 402

China-India road. See Ledo Road,

civilians, employment of: 403, 415, 431, 440

China—Continued

construction, control of: 403, 416, 437-41

construction, problems of: 452

construction design standards: 451

construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 403, 452, 472

construction materials, procurement: 430, 452

construction programs and progress: 419, 425, 431,

440-41, 452, 661-62

costs of construction: 422, 441, 452

demolintion operations: 469

engineer missions: 387-89, 402-03, 416

engineer organization: 395-96, 416, 439-40, 451-52,

470

engineer units, arrival: 438, 475, 663, 666

engineer units, requirements: 408

hospital construction: 419

housing construction: 402-03, 419

labor force, mobilizing: 403, 451, 472

and Ledo Road. See Ledo Road.

lines of communication: 387-88, 391, 394, 397, 405-

06, 418-19, 425-26, 429-30, 641

map compilation and distribution: 416, 457-58

Military Engineering Commission: 403, 440, 451

mines, installation of: 462-63

Mitu Road Authority: 436

National Military Council: 390

officials, inaction of: 413-14, 415, 421, 436, 472

photography, aerial: 458

pipeline construction and operation: 390, 418, 426-

27, 430, 466, 471, 475, 662, 666

POL supply to: 427, 467-68

RAF in supply role: 391

railroad construction and repair: 389

rainfall, effect of: 425

reconnaissance, engineer: 440

river crossings: 663, 666

road construction and repair: 413, 430, 472, 662

road system, enemy control of: 393

and shipping shortage: 408

storage facilities, construction and operation: 402

supply, by airlift: 387, 391-92, 396-97, 400-01, 415,

418, 420, 425, 426, 431-32, 452-54, 464, 467, 

supply, measurement tons to: 391, 418, 420, 426,

431, 464, 666

supply, overland: 387-88, 391, 404-06, 408-09, 415,

424-25, 432, 464, 470, 474-75

supply system: 425-26, 429-30

technology, lack of: 413

telephone and telegraph, installation of: 419

tunnel construction and repair: 462

U.S. Task Force in: 390

War Ministry: 408, 422

Yunnan-Burma Highway Engineering Administration: 408, 413-15, 421-22, 465, 663

Yunnan-Burma Railroad Authority: 389, 403, 415
716 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

China-Burma-India Theater: 387, 389, 390, 392, 393-

99, 426, 427-29, 430, 431, 436-39, 442, 453, 456- 58, 463-64, 466, 470, 475, 649, 651, 680. See also

Assam; Burma; Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo;

China; India; Stilwell, General Joseph W.;

Wheeler, Maj. Gen. Raymond A.

China-India road, proposed: 405

Chindits: 427-28, 445-47, 454-55

Chindwin River: 462

Chinese Army. See also Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo; China,

and Burma offensive: 408-09, 420-21, 442, 453-56,

458-63 and Burma Road: 408, 458-59

German influence on: 403-04

India, troops in: 403, 416

Kunming Training Center: 455

on Ledo Road: 410-12

supply system: 413-15, 421

training program: 403-05, 420-21, 426, 455-56, 463,

662

X-Force: 405

Y-Force: 405, 408, 413-15, 421, 442, 454-56, 458-62,

470, 662

in Yunnan Province: 462-63

Chinese Engineer units: 411, 431, 465, 470

Chittagong: 467, 471

Chittagong-Tinsukia railway: 467, 471

Chorrera Airfield: 31, 50

Christmas Island: 45-47, 161, 162, 164-65, 385

Chungking: 389, 391, 397, 413, 453, 458, 469-70

Churchill, Winston S.

and Alaska defenses: 328

at ARCADIA Conference: 107

at Casablanca Conference: 225, 328

and China as theater: 390

and Germany—first policy: 107

and guerrilla operations: 427

and Rabaul, isolation of: 255

and SEAC: 428

and U.S. role in Pacific: 128

Cituinan Hills: 639

Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA): 12, 19, 28, 33-34,

37, 39-41, 46, 51, 59, 66, 278, 281, 283, 287, 292,

296

Civil Constructional Corps, Australia: 142-43, 154,

236

Civil disturbances: 398, 400, 404, 431

Civil engineering missions: 5-6, 20

Civilian Conservation Corps: 19, 22, 35, 653

Civilian defense, Hawaii: 342, 344-46

Civilian Defense Director, Hawaii: 342, 345

Civilians, employment of: 679-80. See also Labor

forces, difficulties with; Labor forces, mobilizing; Labor forces, shortages in; Labor forces,

strength.

Alaska Highway: 300-301, 305-07, 310-18, 334

ASCOM: 585, 599

Civilians, employment of—Continued

Assam: 400

Australia: 112, 120, 142-44, 154-55. 158, 215, 239,

557, 680

Burma: 465, 680

Burma Road: 414-15, 422

Canol: 320-25, 327, 335

Central Pacific: 509

China: 403, 415, 431, 440

Fiji: 268-69

Guadalcanal: 208-09

Hawaii: 23-25, 341, 353-55, 369, 486

Hollandia: 531

India: 392-93, 396, 399, 401, 416-17, 440, 680

Ledo Road: 406, 409-11, 424-25

Leyte: 579, 585

Luzon: 596, 599, 601, 606, 638-39

Manila: 651-52

New Guinea: 181, 198, 202, 231, 235-37, 248, 254,

268

in Philippines, 1941-42: 73, 75, 77, 79-82, 101-02

Philippines, 1944-45: 635, 653

POA: 507

Solomons: 235, 268-69

SWPA: 554, 556

USASOS: 268-69, 653-54

Civilians, evacuation of: 163, 165, 285, 658

Civilians, Japanese, in combat: 646

Clagett, Brig. Gen. Henry B.: 115

Clark, Barney: 64

Clark Field: 59-60, 63-66, 72-73, 598, 655, 672

Clatterbos, Maj. Louis J.: 355

Clay, Maj. Gen. Lucius D.: 549

Climate, effect of. See also Ice formation problem;

Permafrost; Rainfall, effect of; Snowfall, effect

of; Temperature, effect of; Weather, effect of;

Winds, effect of.

on air ferry routes: 168

Alaska: 291-92

Alcan Highway: 307

Burma: 393

Guadalcanal: 208-09

India: 393

New Guinea: 151, 157-58, 186, 191, 220, 235

Clipperton Island: 8

Cloncurry: 137, 141

Clowes, Maj. Gen. Cyril A. (Australian): 175, 177

Coal mines, operation of: 289

Coast Artillery Brigade, Hawaiian Separate: 23

Coast Artillery Corps: 348-51

Coast defenses construction: 7

Alaska: 287, 291

Canal Zone: 50

Hawaii: 42, 52-53, 346, 349-52, 365-66, 661

naval guns: 349-52, 374, 661

Panama mounts: 58

Philippines, 1941-42: 57

Cochran, Col. Philip G.: 428, 445
INDEX 717

Cocos Island: 8

Coen Airfield: 143-44

Cold Bay: 37, 278, 280-81, 283, 287, 329

Cold storage, installation of. See Refrigeration

plants, installation and operation.

Cold Weather, effect of. See Climate, effect of;

Weather, effect of.

Cole, Lt. Col. Heston R.: 124

Colombia: 31-32

Columbus Engineer Spare Parts Depot: 375

Combined Chiefs of Staff. See also Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

and Burma offensive: 409, 418, 426

CBI, plans for: 426, 430, 463

Chiang excluded from: 390

India-Burma Theater, directive to: 470

and Leyte: 572

and map compilation and distribution: 458

and Pacific offensives: 463

and pipeline construction and operation: 426-27

and Rabaul, isolation of: 225

and SWPA offensive: 225

Combined Intelligence Center, SOPAC: 270

Combined Operations Service Command (SOCS): 182

Command and staff structures

Burma: 397-98

CBI: 397-98, 428-29, 437, 470

Central Pacific: 506-07

China: 390-91, 397-98, 428-29

Hawaii: 491

India: 397-98

POA: 377-79

SEAC: 437

SOPAC: 232

SWPA: 128

Commerce, Department of: 278

Committee on Aeronautical Affairs, China: 402-03

Committee on Military Affairs, House: 7

Communications facilities

on air ferry routes: 161

Alaska Highway: 303-05, 313

Australia: 155

Canol: 337

China: 419

Luzon: 601

Communications zones: 438, 662

Concrete. See Construction materials, improvised;

Construction materials, procurement.

Concrete mixers. See Construction machinery and

equipment, procurement.

Congress

Alaska Highway, hearings on: 307-08

Canol, hearings on: 319, 335-36

cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts, hearings on: 23

defense appropriations by: 7-14, 19, 38, 40-41, 55-

59 and Selective Service Act: 14

Truman Committee hearings: 335, 362

Connell, Brig. Gen. Carl W.: 260

Constantine Harbor: 289

Construction. See Costs of Construction and by type.

Construction, control of: 681

Alaska, 278, 281-82

Alaska Highway: 301-03, 313-14

Assam: 394-95, 413

Australia: 133-39, 651

Burma: 394-95

CBI: 394-98, 651

China: 403, 416, 437-41

Hawaii: 341-42, 353, 491

India: 392-94, 398, 438

Ledo Road: 409, 433-34

Marianas: 492

New Britain: 274

New Guinea: 236, 650-51

Okinawa: 657,

Philippines, 1944-45: 601, 651-52

POA: 379

Saipan: 501

SOPAC: 242

SWPA: 229-30, 521, 548, 651-54

USASOS: 229-30, 257-58, 651-54

War Department policy: 360

Construction Command, ASCOM: 579, 619

Construction Corps of the Philippines (CONCOR):

653

Construction design standards: 502

Alaska: 296-98

Alaska Highway: 305, 315-18

Assam: 452, 471

Australia: 120, 139

Burma Road: 413

China: 451

Hawaii: 366

India: 401-02, 471

Ledo Road: 409, 433

Marshalls: 478

SOPAC: 266-67

SWPA: 216-20, 266, 521, 548-51

Construction machinery and equipment, diversified:

264-65, 558

Construction machinery and equipment, improvised:

247, 261-62, 329-31

Construction machinery and equipment, maintenance and repair of: See Maintenance and repair, general; Spare parts procurement.

Construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 49-50

Alaska: 278-80, 297-98

Alaska Highway: 302-05, 310-11

Australia: 117, 123-24, 127, 140-41, 144-45, 148-49,

152-53, 155, 215-16, 241, 554

Burma: 430, 472

Burma Road: 414

Canol: 321-23

CBI: 436, 442
718 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Construction machinery and equipment, procurement—Continued

Central Pacific: 476, 510

China: 430, 452, 472

Guadalcanal: 209

Hawaii: 43-44, 343, 355-56, 362-63, 366, 369, 372, 

India: 398, 402, 420, 450

Kwajalein: 482, 484-86

Led465 o Road: 406, 409-13, 433, 449, 453-54, 456-57 , 47 , 0

Marshalls: 478

New Britain: 273

New Caledonia: 212

New Guinea: 151, 155, 202

New Zealand: 47-48

Philippines, 1941-42: 62-63, 69-70

Saipan: 496-98

SWPA: 210-12, 236, 264

War Department policy: 547, 549

Construction materials, improvised

Australia: 125-26, 149, 261-62

Bataan: 93-94

Ledo Road: 663-64

New Caledonia: 165

Construction materials, measurement tons, for

Canol: 323

Construction materials, procurement: 49-50, 381-82,

508-09

Alaska: 278-81, 289, 295-98, 333-34

Alaska Highway: 301, 316-18, 334

Assam: 400-401, 424, 441-42, 471

Australia: 261-62, 266-67, 554-56

Bataan: 92-94, 99-100

Burma: 430, 466

Burma Road: 458

Canol: 323-27

CBI: 436

China: 430, 452

Corps of Engineers and: 682

Corregidor: 103-04

Hawaii: 342-43, 353-57, 362-63, 366-67, 375-76

Hollandia: 531-32

India: 397, 399-400, 402-03, 424, 471

Kwajalein: 484-86

Ledo Road: 406, 409, 424, 447, 449-50, 456, 465-66, 471, 664

Leyte: 574-75, 586

Luzon: 602, 612

Marshalls: 478

Milne Bay: 239

New Caledonia: 214

New Guinea: 155, 238, 258, 262-63, 266-67

New Zealand: 213-14, 261-62, 266-67

Okinawa: 657

Philippines, 1941-42: 69-70

Saipan: 496-97

SOPAC: 260-64

Construction materials, procurement—Continued

SWPA: 260-63, 548, 554, 682

by USAFIA: 117-18

Construction missions

Corps of Engineers: 5-6

Quartermaster Corps: 6, 20

Construction problems: 20-21, 679-80

Alaska: 11, 21-22, 35, 280-83, 291-96

Alaska Highway: 308-09, 312

ASCOM: 584-85

Assam: 416-17

Australia: 116-17, 119-22, 135, 144, 148-49, 155,

241-42

Burma Road: 414-15

Canal Zone: 11, 14-15, 20-21, 30-31

CBI: 393-94

Central Pacific: 384

China: 452

Hawaii: 11, 19, 39, 52, 365-66

India: 393-94, 401-02, 417

Ledo Road: 466

Leyte: 585

Luzon: 632

New Guinea: 151, 157-58, 181-82, 257

Philippines, 1941-42: 59-61, 64-65

SOPAC: 542

SWPA: 542

Construction programs and progress

Admiralties: 543

Alaska: 33-37, 50-52, 276-78, 280-81, 283-84, 286-

88, 291, 298, 333-34

Alaska Highway: 305-15

Allied Works Council: 141-45, 223-24

Assam: 393-94, 396-97, 399-400, 404

Australia: 113-22, 133-34, 138-44, 152-53, 214-15. 217, 220, 223, 239, 260

Bataan: 58, 95-96

Biak: 537-38

Burma: 393-94, 464, 661-62

Burma Road: 406, 413-15, 418-19, 421-22, 425-26,

435-36, 442, 458-59, 465-66, 473-75, 662-63, 666

Canal Zone: 29-33, 50

Canol: 321, 325-27, 336-38

Canton Island: 47

Carolines: 515-17

CBI: 431, 649

Central Pacific: 381-82, 476, 506, 511-12

China: 419, 425, 431, 440-41, 452, 661-62

Christmas Island: 47

Corregidor: 58, 65-66, 71, 102-04

Fiji: 242-43

Guadalcanal: 172-73, 208-09, 232, 569, 661

Guam: 517

Hawaii: 38-45, 51-53, 361, 363, 365, 372-74, 486-87,

506-10, 649

Hollandia: 541-42, 544

India: 392-94, 396-97, 399-400, 404, 407-08, 416-17,

438-39
INDEX 719

Construction programs and progress—Continued

Japan, for assault on: 675

Lae: 258

Ledo Road: 408-13, 418-19, 422-25, 426, 431-34,

442-49, 453-54. 456-57, 465. 472, 474-75, 662-64

Manila: 650

Manila Bay area: 58

Marianas: 506

Milne Bay: 181-82, 220-22, 238-39

naval construction: 287

New Britain: 273

New Caledonia: 206-07, 569, 661

New Guinea: 133-34, 174-75, 181-85, 220-22, 231-

32, 238, 244, 246-47, 258, 541-42, 548

New Hebrides: 569

New Zealand: 222, 233, 661

Okinawa: 649

Philippines, 1941-42: 59-66, 71-72, 86-87

Philippines, 1944-45: 649

POA: 378-79

Port Moresby: 133-34, 181-82, 185, 220-22, 235

Saipan: 497, 499-503, 511

Solomons: 526, 544-46, 568-69, 661

SOPAC: 220-24, 231-32, 242-43, 542-43, 648-49

SWPA: 220-4, 235, 542-43

Wakde: 543-44

Construction Service, CPA: 507-68, 510

Construction Service, SOS CBI: 438, 475, 681

Contact Creek: 314

Contract negotiation. See Administrative procedures;

Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts.

Cook, Les: 309

Cooktown Airfield: 143-44

Coral: 385-86

Coral Sea, Battle of, 150, 157, 168

Cordillera Central Mountains: 627-28

Cordova, Alaska: 279, 283

Corlett, Maj. Gen. Charles H.: 331, 477, 482

CORONET: 677, 678

Corozal, Post of: 10, 14

Corps, Philippine Army

I: 87-91, 96-97, 99-100

II: 87-91, 97, 99-100

Corps. See also Marine Amphibious Corps.

I: 196, 528-29, 587, 592-95, 601, 610, 625, 627, 632,

675-76

IX: 675-76

X: 574-77. 582, 635

XI: 567, 608-09, 619-20, 625, 632, 638, 675-76

XIV: 255, 526, 574, 587, 592-96, 599, 601, 610-12,

625, 627, 630-32

XXIV: 574776. 582, 643-45, 649, 657

Corps of Engineers, Philippine Army: 66, 68-69

Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. See Engineers, Corps

of.

Corpus Christi, Tex.: 326

Corregidor Island: 55, 57, 58, 61, 65-66, 71, 72-80,

93-95, 101-06, 619-21, 625

Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts

Congress and: 23

Hawaii: 353, 363, 371-72, 487-89, 507

Philippines, 1941-42: 61

War Department policy: 24

Costa Rica: 31-32

Costs of construction

Alaska: 278

Allied Works Council and: 152, 223-24, 239-41, 260

Australia: 152, 223-24, 240-41

Burma Road: 414, 421, 435-36

Canal Zone: 50

Canol: 338

China: 422, 441, 452

Hawaii: 52, 342, 353, 355-58, 363, 371-72, 488

Ledo Road: 421

Philippines, 1941-42: 61, 66, 70

Counterattacks, Japanese: 330, 514, 526, 539-40. See

also Suicide attacks, Japanese.

Couplings, victaulic: 427

Covell, Brig. Gen. William E. R.: 437-40, 456, 466,

664

Craig, General Malin: 7-8

Crow River: 309

Curtin, John: 118, 120-21, 140, 215

Cutcut River: 603, 606

CYCLONE: 561

Cyclops Airfield: 531-32

Cyclops Mountains: 527

Dagupan: 600

Dagupan air strip: 599-600

Dagupan River: 593, 596, 600

Dale, Wing Comdr. William A. C. (RAAF): 533, 561

Dallas huts: 266

Dam construction and repair: 285-86

Damage control, Corregidor: 102-04, 146

Damortis: 76, 627

Daraga: 638-39

Darwin: 45, 109, 110-11, 112-13, 114, 115-19,

122, 123-24, 134, 147-48. 158, 231, 240-41

Darwin Civil Field: no

Darwin RAAF Field: no

Davao: 635

Davao Gulf: 635

Davidson, Brig. Gen. Howard C.: 429

Dawson, Lt. Col. Louis Y., Jr.: 408, 413-15, 420-22,

435-36, 458-59, 461-62, 465

Dawson, Col. Miles M.: 559

Dawson Creek: 299, 301, 305, 312, 315, 327, 334

DC-3's: 181

Dean, Col. Reginald L.: 598-99, 613

Decker, Brig. Gen. George H.: 608

Defence Department, Australia: 124, 131

Defense appropriations. See Congress, defense appropriations by.

Defense Battalions, Army

3d: 478, 485
720 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Defense Battalions, Army—Continued

4th: 478

Defense battalions, CPA: 381

Defenses, build-up of

Alaska: 7-8, 12-14, 16-19, 28, 35-36, 276-78, 298

Australia: 109-11

Burma: 391

Canal Zone: 6-15, 20-21, 27-28, 32-33

Canton Island: 162, 164-65

China: 387-90

Christmas Island: 162, 164-65

Corregidor: 57, 619-20

Fiji: 162, 164, 232-33

Hawaii: 6-16, 19-20, 27-28, 341-42, 362

New Caledonia: 160, 162, 164-66

New Hebrides: 169-70

Panama: 12, 15

Philippines, 1941-42: 55

SOPAC: 169-71

Del Carmen Airfield: 63-66, 73, 79, 655

Del Gallego: 81

De Longe, Maj. Merrill E.: 270

Del Monte: 61, 65, 71

Demolition operations

Admiralties: 523-24

Australia: 138-39, 216

Bataan: 100-01

Biak: 540-41

Burma: 445

Burma Road: 455

Carolines: 515-16

Central Pacific: 382-83

China: 469

Corregidor: 620-21

Guam: 506

Hawaii: 352-53, 361

Kwajalein: 479-81

Leyte: 578

Luzon: 74-84, 597, 609-12, 627, 632

Manila: 84, 617

Marshalls: 483-85

Mindanao: 106

New Guinea: 146

Okinawa: 646-48

Philippines, 1941-42: 66-68, 74, 596

Philippines, 1944-45: 621-24, 633

Saipan: 496-98, 500

SOPAC: 542

SWPA: 542

Wakde: 536

Demolition operations, Japanese

Leyte: 582

Luzon: 590, 595, 602-04, 610-11, 618, 626, 629, 638

Manila: 613-14, 619, 656

Mindanao: 635

Dengue fever: 186, 517

Denver, Rio Grande and Western Railroad: 389

Department of Interior, Australia: 121

Department of the Interior: 13, 19, 288. See also

Ickes, Harold L.

Department of Public Works, New Caledonia: 163,

223

Depot construction and operation. See Base construction and operation; Base construction and

operation, Japanese; Storage facilities, construction and operation.

Depot Field: 506

Derby, Maj. George T.: 112-14, 117, 120

Derra: 115

DeWitt, Lt. Gen. John L.: 276

and air build-up: 276

and airfield construction and repair: 18-19, 22-23,

28, 34-36, 284

and Alaska defenses: 11, 33, 331

and construction, control of: 20, 25-26, 28, 34, 282

and construction programs and progress: 34-37,

276-78

and engineer units, strength: 276-78

and port facilities, construction and repair: 281

and storage facilities, construction and repair: 37,

281

and threat to Alaska: 284

Diamond Head: 351

Dibrugarh: 400, 427, 467n

Digboi: 434, 457, 463, 467n

Dimapur: 446

Dimond, Anthony J.: 299

Dinalupihan: 79, 609

Dingalan Bay: 594

Dinjan: 391, 400

Diseases, effect of: 393, 423-24, 433, 462, 466, 541

Distinguished Unit Citation awards: 455, 536

Districts, SOS CBI: 438-40, 452

Divisions, SOS CBI

1st: 438

2d: 439

Dobodura: 156, 193-96, 198-99, 202-03, 205, 235-38,

245-257-58

Dock construction and repair. See Port facilities,

construction and repair.

Dogs, training with: 490-91

Dorn, Col. Frank: 421

Douglas Fir: 670

Drawings, standard. See Construction design standards.

Dredging operations: 501, 516, 585, 656. See also

Port facilities, construction and repair; Port

facilities, construction and repair, by Japanese.

Driniumor River: 541

Drury, Maj. Harold F.: 608

Duke River: 311

Dukws: 273-74, 476, 497, 506, 530, 562, 578, 644

Dulag: 573-78

Dulag Airfield: 573-74, 576, 579-80, 584-86

Dulag-Burauen road: 581-82, 584

Dunbar, Col. Ernest A.: 607
INDEX 721

Dunn, Col. Beverly C.: 18, 22, 28, 33-34, 37, 49, 278,

280-82, 287

Dunne, Col. David M.: 626

Dutch Harbor: 12, 16-18, 28, 35-36, 276, 278, 284,

287, 288, 290, 308, 322

E. W. Elliott Company: 302, 311

Eagle Farm Air Base: 115, 127, 141, 260

Earth Moving Manufacturers Group: 140, 213

East-West Road, Australia: 114

Eastern Command, British: 440

Economic Cabinet, Australia: 215

Eddleman, Brig. Gen. Clyde D.: 613

Edmondton: 288, 299-301, 311, 313, 321, 324, 327

Efate Island: 169-70, 212, 214, 222, 662

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L. See also Armies,

Eighth; Corps, I.

and Biak: 541

in Buna campaign: 199, 201-03

commands of, 196, 586

and Hollandia: 528-29

El Fraile Island: 57, 104, 622-24

Electric power plants, installation of. See Power

plants, installation and operation.

Electrical fixtures: 261

ELKTON plan: 225, 231, 234, 235

Ellice Islands: 380

Elliott, Col. John C. B.: 584

Ellison, Lt. Col. Marvin C.: 522

Ellison, Maj. William J., Jr.: 258

Elmendorf Field: 10, 12, 14, 16-19, 28, 34-37, 278,

283, 287, 296

Ely, Col. William J.: 239, 246, 584

Eman Point: 89

Embessa: 181

Embogo: 195

Embogo River: 202

Emmons, Lt. Gen. Delos C. See also Hawaiian

Islands.

and air defense measures: 344, 347-48

and air ferry routes: 168-69

and airfield construction and repair: 361

and ammunition storage plan: 368

and coast defenses: 350-51

command of: 161, 344

and construction, control of: 354, 360-61

and construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 355, 375

and construction programs and progress: 361, 365,

367 and food production: 343-44

and mines, requisition for: 352

and naval guns, emplacement of: 374

and priority ratings: 346

and road construction and repair: 369

and storage facilities, construction and operation:

366-67

Empress Augusta Bay: 255

Ende, Capt. Carl F.: 48

Engebi Island: 484-85

Engineer Airborne Aviation Battalions

871st: 248-49, 252, 254

872d: 248, 254, 533

873d: 633

875th: 533

879th: 450, 454-55

Engineer Airborne Aviation Company, 900th: 445

Engineer Airborne Combat Battalion, 127th: 609-10,

630-31

Engineer Aviation Battalions

802d: 36, 278, 286, 290

803d: 63, 69, 73, 79, 93, 95-98, 100, 103, 105

804th: 41, 47-53, 162, 340-41, 349, 380-86, 498-500,

518

805th: 50, 500

807th: 281, 284, 297, 331

808th: 122-24, 127, 148, 153, 157-58, 181-182, 187,

235, 258, 267, 275, 581

810th: 167, 171, 206, 223, 256

811th: 167, 223, 233, 640

813th: 283, 289

821st: 71, 232-33, 256, 581

822d: 207, 232, 256

823d: 398, 400, 406, 409-12, 424

828th: 212, 232, 256, 599

836th: 258, 526, 536, 564-65, 599

839th: 264

841st: 274, 603-05, 612

842d: 235, 265

848th: 452

849th: 433

853d: 450

854th:478, 484, 517

857th: 235, 258

858th: 663

860th: 275, 540

863d: 275, 539-41, 602

864th: 264, 274, 538-41, 599

865th: 634

930th: 468, 662

1874th: 562

1875th: 450, 472

1876th: 600, 603-04, 613

1877th: 450, 468

1878th: 503

1879th: 599, 605, 611

1880th: 663

1881st: 564-65, 579

1883d: 433, 444-447

1884th: 515

1887th: 515-16

1888th: 450, 468

1897th: 564-66, 632

1905th: 434, 447

1913th: 274, 603-04
722 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Engineer Aviation Companies

804th: 38, 41

805th: 29, 50

807th: 36, 280-81

809th: 63

Engineer Aviation Regiments

28th: 19, 22, 360

931st: 525, 532

Engineer Aviation Topographical Companies

955th: 223, 270

958th: 458

960th: 270

Engineer Base Equipment Company, 617th: 525, 564

Engineer Base Shop Battalion, 411th: 229

Engineer Base Topographical Battalion, 30th: 667

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments

532d: 246, 251, 253, 530, 632

553d: 593, 635

534th: 567, 594

542d: 530, 535-36, 538

543d: 562, 565, 593, 633

544th: 567, 592-93

592d: 608, 620, 623, 631

593d: 533, 535-36, 562

594th: 593, 595

Engineer Brigade, 1st Provisional: 511-12

Engineer Camouflage Companies

639th: 282-83, 291

641st: 559-60

642d: 559-60

Engineer Combat Battalions: 144-45, 547

3d: 43-44, 369, 531, 586, 620, 635-36

6th: 564, 596, 627, 638-39

13th: 328-31, 478-79, 582, 645

14th: 69, 73, 80, 90-91, 94, 98, 100

27th: 533, 535-36, 561-62

34th: 495

50th: 478, 482

52d: 514, 516-17, 634

57th: 167, 170, 207-09, 526, 634

65th: 43, 209, 249-50, 342, 352, 369, 597, 628

79th: 530-31

102d: 381-83, 478, 482-83, 485, 495-96, 499-500

104th: 482-83, 485

106th: 567, 635

108th: 629

112th: 535

113th: 609, 619-24, 638-39

114th: 181, 192, 194-95, 198-203, 205, 271, 274,

628-29

115th: 595

116th: 171, 182, 237, 246-47, 261-62, 271, 530, 533,

535, 538-40, 632-33

117th: 171, 249-50, 255-56, 526, 595, 598, 602, 604,

610-11, 615, 638

118th: 233, 245, 249-50, 596, 598, 603

131st: 212, 223

132d: 503-04

Engineer Combat Battalions—Continued

152d: 381-83, 386, 495

154th: 514

155th: 515-17

186th: 597

209th: 433-34, 448, 454-55, 465, 472, 

233d: 504

236th: 454-55, 465, 473

242d: 504

302d: 503-06, 644, 646

306th: 514-16

321st: 582

340th: 603

1279th: 611, 639

1341st: 495, 506

Engineer Combat Companies

32d Separate: 17, 33, 36, 278

59th Separate: 246, 251, 273

223d: 332-33

404th: 246

521st: 332-33

Engineer Combat Groups

1112th: 537, 564-65, 580

1129th: 632

1138th: 514-15

1165th: 495-96

Engineer Combat Regiments

3d: 10, 16, 23, 38, 42-43, 342, 352

11th: 10-11, 14, 21, 29

14th: 61, 68

18th: 295, 300, 302-03, 310-17, 331

34th: 41-42, 53, 342, 354, 369, 375, 381, 478, 482,

495

35th: 300-301, 305, 310-16, 326, 335

50th: 328-33

131st: 526, 544

151st: 36, 278-79, 281, 284, 289

Engineer Combat Squadron, 8th: 271, 522-24, 613,

615, 627, 632

Engineer Construction Battalions: 547-48

43d: 564-65, 599, 613, 618

46th: 579

47th: 501-02, 511

239th: 634

240th: 579-80

339th: 577, 638

382d: 434, 440, 450, 456

1304th: 465, 470, 664

1398th: 502

1399th: 509

Engineer Construction Brigades: 548

5201st: 548, 571

5202d: 548, 588, 591, 594, 601, 603-06, 652

Engineer Construction Command (ENCOM): 651-54,

656, 669, 681

Engineer Construction Groups

1112th: 565-66, 632

1136th: 632
INDEX 723

Engineer Construction Groups—Continued

1176th: 495, 498, 500-01, 511-12

1181st: 657

Engineer Depot Companies

301st: 153

439th: 618

452d: 375, 510

456th: 411, 418

Engineer Dump Truck Companies

195th: 398, 403

198th: 239

576th: 187-88

Engineer General Service Battalion, 47th: 495, 501

Engineer General Service Regiments: 210, 307, 436

42d: 279, 283, 286-87

43d: 124, 127,147-48, 158, 175-78, 182, 188, 198-99,

203, 235-38, 261-62

45th: 398-400, 406-07, 409-12, 424, 432-33, 447, 453

46th: 124-28, 144-45, 149-51, 155-56, 158, 175-76, 187, 235, 238-39, 246

47th: 70, 369, 381, 478, 482, 485, 495

91st: 272

93d: 302-03, 310, 317

95th: 305, 310-11, 317

96th: 272, 564-65

97th: 303, 310, 312, 314-15, 317

176th: 292

177th: 287, 289

330th: 411-12, 420, 424, 431-35, 444, 447-48, 465, 47 0

331st: 287

339th: 239

340th: 303, 310-11, 314-17

341st: 305, 309-11, 316-17

349th: 331

Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalions

89th: 321-22

90th: 321, 326-27

556th: 575, 582-83, 601-02, 611-14, 619

Engineer Heavy Shop Company, 445th: 239

Engineer Hill: 329-30

Engineer Intelligence Section, USASOS, 269

Engineer Light Ponton Companies

71st: 444, 472-74, 663

73d: 302, 312, 317

74th: 301, 312, 317

75th: 470-71

76th: 444, 448

77th: 444

191st: 663

504th: 455

506th: 575, 596, 601

510th: 575, 601

530th: 575, 595-96, 601, 611-12, 615-16

Engineer Maintenance Companies

468th: 290

472d: 213

479th: 411, 433

Engineer Maintenance Companies—Continued

963d: 613, 618

Engineer Map Depot Detachments

1603d: 553

1604th: 553

1608th: 553-54

Engineer missions

Admiralties: 523-25

Alaska: 278, 291, 339

Alaska Highway: 300

Australia: 111-14

Burma: 387-89

Canada: 276, 339

Carolines: 514-16

CBI: 389, 431

Central Pacific: 381-83, 518-19

China: 387-89, 402-03, 416

Guam: 504-06

Hawaii: 340-45, 353, 358, 369-70, 372-73, 507-08

Hollandia: 527-28

India: 396, 404

Japan, in assault on: 674-75, 677-78

Kwajalein: 477-78

Leyte: 574-75

Luzon: 72-85, 587-92, 601-03, 605-06, 610-11, 626-

27, 637

Marianas: 493

Marshalls: 477-78

New Guinea: 133-34, 160, 174, 521, 541-42

Okinawa: 642-47

Philippines, 1944-45: 570-71

POA: 507-08

Rabaul: 244

Saipan: 496-97

Solomons: 172-73, 244-45, 249

SOPAC: 275, 542, 568-69

SWPA: 130-38, 275, 520-21, 542

USASOS: 521

Engineer Office, CPA: 377-78. See also Honolulu

Engineer District.

Engineer organization

Admiralties: 522

AFPAC: 650

Alaska: 281-83, 333

Alaska Highway: 302-05, 313-14, 316-17

ASCOM: 571-72

Assam: 438-39

Australia: 120-21

Bataan: 86-87, 99

Burma: 438-39

Burma Road: 422

CBI: 395-96, 398-99, 429, 431, 437-39, 453

China: 395-96, 416, 439-40, 451-52, 470

Hawaii: 340-42, 353-54, 358, 360-61, 486, 491-92

Hollandia: 527-28

India: 395-96, 398-99, 403-04, 415-16, 429, 438-39

India-Burma Theater: 470, 475

Japan, for assault on: 676-78
724 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Engineer organization—Continued

Ledo Road: 409-10

Leyte: 579, 651

Luzon: 601, 650-51

Marianas: 493-95

New Guinea: 147, 174, 521

Okinawa: 657

Philippines, 1941-42: 66, 69

in POA: 507

Saipan: 511-12

SOPAC: 232, 243, 520-21, 543, 568-69

SOS CBI: 398-99, 438-39

SWPA: 130-31, 230, 235, 243-44, 520-21, 548, 551-

52, 556, 571-72, 650-51, 654

USAFIA: 119

USASOS: 243-44, 257, 520-21, 528-29, 571-72, 650-

54

Engineer Parachute Combat Battalion, 161st: 586,

620

Engineer Petroleum Distribution Companies

138th: 467

699th: 449

706th: 449, 457

709th: 450, 466, 471, 664

775th: 449, 457, 471

776th: 450, 466

777th: 450, 467

778th: 457, 466

779th: 457, 471

780th: 457, 471

1381st: 471

1382d: 471, 664

Engineer Port Construction and Repair Group,

1052d: 264

Engineer Railroad Battalion, 714th: 287

Engineer Section, SOS CBI: 398

Engineer Separate Battalions

91st: 144-45, 149-50, 155, 178, 182, 235

96th: 144-52, 155, 181, 183, 235, 238

388th: 321, 326

Engineer Special Brigades: 226-30, 246, 578, 644, 646

1st: 643-46

2d: 228, 235, 246, 253, 273-74, 524, 530, 538, 562,

576, 578, 634, 639, 670, 676

3d: 521, 532-33, 562, 592, 635, 676

4th: 252, 567, 592, 601, 676

Engineer survey. See Reconnaissance, engineer.

Engineer Survey Liaison Detachment, 1679th: 608

Engineer Topographical Battalions

29th: 23, 33, 278, 290, 302, 306, 490, 667

64th: 489-90, 510

648th: 190-91, 269-70, 301, 306, 552-53, 607, 666

650th: 552, 607

651st: 490

653d: 440, 458

Engineer Topographical Companies

64th: 376-77, 381-82, 490

69th: 190, 200, 270

Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, 1011th: 601-

02, 612-13

Engineer Unit Training Center: 430

Engineer units, arrivals and departures

Admiralties: 525

Alaska: 16-18, 279-83, 285-91, 295, 297-98, 331

Alaska Highway: 300-305, 307, 316, 334

ASCOM: 598-99

Assam: 400, 442

Australia: 118, 122-26, 131, 144-49, 152, 190, 228,

247

Biak: 538-40

Burma: 445, 454-55, 466, 468, 472

Burma Road: 459

Canol: 321, 326, 335

Carolines: 514-16

CBI: 430, 436-37

China: 438, 475, 663, 666

Fiji: 171, 263

Guadalcanal: 206-07, 209, 255-56

Guam: 503-04, 517

Hawaii: 369, 375-76, 490, 666-67

Hollandia: 530

India: 398, 411, 430, 440, 450, 458, 475

India-Burma Theater: 475

Kwajalein: 484

Lae: 258

Ledo: 406-09, 457

Ledo Road: 406-12, 432-34, 449-50, 454-55, 

Leyte: 579-81

Luzon: 599-600, 602, 607, 610-11

Marianas: 506

Marshalls: 485

Milne Bay: 238-39, 521, 558

New Britain: 274

New Caledonia: 164-67, 206, 213, 223

New Guinea: 144-49, 151, 154-55, 157-58, 187-88,

235, 239, 258, 274-75, 533, 551-52, 558

Okinawa: 657

Philippines, 1941-42: 63

Philippines, 1944-45: 666-67

POA: 640

Saipan: 496, 498-501

Solomons: 249, 526, 544

SOPAC: 161, 164-68, 171-72, 226-27, 266, 270, 541

SWPA: 227, 263, 266, 270, 559-60, 564

Wakde: 536

Engineer units, control of: 681

by AAF: 547

Admiralties: 525-26

AFPAC: 649-50

by ASCOM: 591, 594

India: 400

Luzon: 591, 612-13, 626

New Guinea: 174, 182, 187, 202

Okinawa: 657

POA: 649-50
INDEX 725

Engineer units, control of—Continued

SOPAC: 243, 543

SWPA: 229-30, 543, 547-48, 649-50

USASOS: 187

Engineer units, imbalance in: 680-81

Engineer units, National Guard: 5

Engineer units, organization: 681

Engineer units, requirements

Assam: 417

Australia: 133

Biak: 538

CBI: 395, 426, 436, 463-64

Central Pacific: 489-90

China: 408

Guam: 503

Hawaii: 16, 342-43, 489-90

Japan, for assault on: 672, 674-75, 677-78

Ledo Road: 406, 409, 423-25, 429, 456-57, 464

Luzon: 590-91

New Guinea: 152-54, 187-88, 244-45

Okinawa: 643

Philippines, 1944-45: 626-27

Rabaul: 234

Saipan: 494-95

SOPAC: 232, 234

SWPA: 231-32, 234-35

Engineer units, shortages of

Alaska: 278-79

ASCOM: 586

CBI: 680

Leyte: 586

New Guinea: 238

Philippines, 1941-42: 59-60

SOPAC: 210-11, 267-68, 680

SWPA: 210, 267-60, 547-48, 680

USASOS: 238

Engineer units, specialized. See Specialists, shortage

of; Specialists, training.

Engineer units, strength

Alaska: 33, 35-36, 53, 278, 283

Alaska Highway: 307, 680

ASCOM: 575

Australia: 144

Bataan: 88

Burma Road: 466, 473

Canal Zone: 10, 53

Canol: 338

Central Pacific: 519

Fiji: 163

Hawaii: 10, 38, 42, 342, 380, 680

Hollandia: 529

India: 404, 450

Kwajalein: 478, 482

Ledo Road: 432, 442, 454, 456, 465, 664

Leyte: 575

Luzon: 587, 592, 594, 601

Milne Bay: 175, 239

New Caledonia: 256

Engineer units, strength—Continued

New Guinea: 182, 569

Okinawa: 645

Philippines, 1941-42: 61, 68-69

POA: 507, 519

prewar and postwar: 5, 679

Saipan: 512

SOPAC: 210, 243, 275, 520, 569, 661

SWPA: 210, 243, 275, 520, 567, 569, 666

USASOS: 654

Engineer units work potential formula. See Work

potential formula.

Engineer Water Supply Company, 1504th: 613, 618

Engineering and Terrain Intelligence Team: 668-69

Engineers, Chief of. See Chief of Engineers.

Engineers, Corps of

civil engineering missions: 5-6, 20

civilians, employment of: 679-80

construction, problems of: 20-21, 679-80

construction materials, procurement and use: 682

construction missions: 5-6

construction transferred to: 20, 25-26

defense appropriations, share of: 9, 14

engineer units, imbalance in: 680-81

engineer units, strength prewar and postwar: 5,

679

liaison, interservice and Allied: 680

logistical tasks: 5

military engineering missions: 4-5

mobilization plans: 5

spare parts procurement: 682

stock control: 682

supply system, deficiencies in: 682

training, deficiencies in: 682

training missions: 227

and war plans: 4-7

Engineers as artillerymen: 162

Engineers as infantrymen

Attu: 330

Australia: 149-50

Bataan: 87-100

Biak: 539-41

Burma: 444, 453-55, 463

Carolines: 514-15

Guadalcanal: 207

Guam: 503-04

Kwajalein: 480-82

Luzon: 597-98, 609

Manila: 617

Marshalls: 483

New Guinea: 175-78, 205, 252-53, 535, 543

Okinawa: 646

Saipan: 496, 498-500

Solomons: 249-51, 526-27

Wakde: 535-6

Engineers, Office of Chief of. See Chief of Engineers.

Eniwetok Island: 477, 483-85

Entrance Creek: 193, 200, 202-03
726 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Equipment, construction. See Construction machinery and equipment.

Equipment Maintenance School: 672

Escolta, Manila: 614

Espíritu Santo Island: 171, 206, 214, 221-22, 547, 569

European Theater of Operations: 117, 227

Ewa Marine Air Station: 53-54

Excursion Inlet: 287

F-4's: 270

Faie Island: 516

Fairbanks: 19, 22, 34, 283, 288, 292, 293, 295-96, 313, 315, 325-27, 335-38

Falalop Island: 515-16

Far Eastern University: 651

Farrar, Capt. Willard: 112-14

Farrell, Brig. Gen. Thomas F.: 430, 437-38, 448-51,

456, 462, 467, 475, 663-64

Fasari Airfield: 180-81, 192

Federal Bureau of Investigation: 487

Federal Works Agency (FWA): 317

Ferry operations. See River crossings.

Fertig, Col. Wendell W.: 61-62, 65, 71-72, 79, 87, 92,

95, 100, 106, 634

Fiji: 45, 46, 48, 118, 161, 162, 163, 164, 171, 214, 220-

22, 232-33, 242-43, 256, 263, 268-69

Finschhafen: 234, 244, 252-54, 258, 272-73, 528-29,

546, 554, 557-58, 561

Fire-fighting: 518, 530

Fischer, Maj. Harry O.: 62, 100

Flame throwers, tactical use: 245, 249, 383, 462, 480,

483, 496-97, 500, 515, 536, 541, 562, 621, 647

Flanders, Maj. Edward A.: 380

Fleets

Pacific: 232, 675

Third: 576

Fifth: 492, 496

Seventh: 265, 576, 578

Fleming, Maj. Robert J., Jr.: 168

Floating depot concept: 558, 670

Floridablanca: 655

Food production, Hawaii: 343-44, 358

FORAGER: 492, 496

Forestry units, requirements: 262

Formosa: 463, 467

Fort Belvoir: 653

Fort Drum. See Carabao Island.

Fort Fitzgerald: 320-22, 324

Fort Frank. See Carabao Island.

Fort Hertz: 427, 430, 434

Fort Hughes. See Caballo Island.

Fort Kamehameha: 340

Fort Kobbe: 14

Fort McKinley: 61, 64, 66, 84, 615, 656

Fort McMurray: 320-21

Fort Mears: 280

Fort Mills. See Corregidor Island.

Fort Nelson: 299, 301, 305-09, 311, 315-17, 334

Fort Nelson River: 309

Fort Ord: 328

Fort Pikit: 635

Fort Raymond: 33

Fort Richardson: 14, 33-34, 36, 282

Fort St. John: 299, 301, 304-10, 312, 315

Fort Shatter: 10, 14, 16

Fort Simpson: 315, 326

Fort Smith: 321-22, 327

Fort Stotsenburg: 45, 598

Fortifications, construction of

Admiralties: 523

Bataan: 87-90, 97

Hawaii: 346, 365, 373

Solomons: 526

Fortifications, construction of, Japanese

Biak: 537, 542

Carolines: 515

Central Pacific: 383

Corregidor: 620

Leyte: 582

Luzon: 598, 609-10, 627

Manila: 614-15, 617

Mindanao: 636

New Britain: 274

Okinawa: 642, 644-45, 646-48

Philippines, 1944-45: 633-34

Saipan: 496-98

SOPAC: 542

SWPA: 542, 562

Wakde: 536, 542

Fowler, Brig. Gen. Raymond F.: 362, 558

France: 13, 163

France Field: 8

Frank, Maj. Gen. Walter H.: 488

Fraser, Peter: 48, 213

Freight unloading and distribution. See Cargo unloading and distribution.

Fremantle: 240

French canal, Panama: 32

Frink, Maj. Gen. James L.: 534, 556, 650-51. See also

United States Army Services of Supply.

Fritsche, Capt. Frederick L.: 32

Frostbite: 292

Fuel storage construction. See Storage facilities, construction and operation.

Fuller, Maj. Gen. Horace H.: 236-57, 539-40

Fuller, Kent: 325

Futema Airfield: 658

Fyzabad: 397

Galapagos Islands: 8

Galena Airfield: 288, 295

Ganges River: 467

Garapan: 493, 498

Garapan-Charan Kanoa road: 502

Garbutt Field: no, 115, 141, 363
INDEX 727

Garrison forces

Central Pacific Area: 381, 386

Kwajalein: 478, 484

Marshalls: 478, 484-85

Okinawa: 643-44, 657-58

Saipan: 495

Gasoline. See POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants).

Gasoline storage facilities. See Storage facilities,

construction and operation.

Gaya: 397

Geelvink Bay: 537, 561

Gehr, Capt. Harvey W.: 422

General Engineer District (GENED): 652-53

General Headquarters, India: 392-93, 396, 417, 420

General Headquarters, SWPA: 128, 649. See also

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas;

Southwest Pacific Area.

General Headquarters, U.S. Army: 5

General Purchasing Board, USAFIA: 126

General Staff Geological Survey, India: 457

Geological surveys

Central Pacific: 669

Iwo Jima: 667-68

Japan: 673

Okinawa: 667-68

SWPA: 554, 669

Germany: 13-14, 27, 35, 107, 210, 326, 403-04

Gertrude Cove: 331-32

Gewald, Capt. Harold T.: 92, 105

Ghormley, Vice Adm. Robert L.: 170-72, 206

Gibson, Col. Herbert D.: 164-65

Gila Peninsula: 567

Gilbert Islands: 164, 377-83, 386, 463, 476

Gili Gili: 238-39, 257

Giru Airfield: 145, 149

Girua River: 194, 205

Gliders: 247, 445, 447, 454

Godfrey, Brig. Gen. Stuart C.: 249, 261, 430, 437, 468,

569

Goerz, Col. Peter P.: 282, 569

Goldie River: 182

Gona: 193, 200

Goodenough Island: 192, 236, 238, 244, 257, 520, 529

Gormsen, Lt. Col. Harold F.: 495

Grace Park, Manila: 614, 618

Grafe, Paul: 41, 327

Graham, Col. James H.: 318-19

Grande Island: 57

Grant, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S.: 47 in

Gray, Cpl. Charles H.: 204

Great Slave Lake: 322, 324

Green, Clinton: 501, 518

Green, Lt. Col. Edwin B.: 403

Green, Lt. Col. James E.: 328

Green, Lt. Col. William J.: 433-34, 449

Greenlee, Lt. Col. Harold E.: 454

Grenades, improvised: 352

Griggs, Lt. Col. E. L., Jr.: 539

Griswold, Maj. Gen. Oscar W.: 613, 618-19

Gruening, Ernest: 22, 279. See also Alaska.

Grunert, Lt. Gen. George: 55, 58, 488

Guadalcanal Island: 159, 205, 233, 326, 546-47

airfield construction and repair: 171-72, 206-07, 256

base construction and operation: 569

bridge construction and repair: 207-08

civilians, employment of: 208-09

climate, effect of: 208-09

construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 209

construction materials, procurement: 214

construction program and progress: 172-73, 208-

09, 232, 569, 661

engineer units, arrival: 206-07, 209, 255-56

engineers as infantry: 207

map compilation and distribution: 188-91

mines, Japanese: 208

road construction and repair: 208-09, 256

topography: 207

Guam: 4, 45, 52, 492, 493, 503-06, 517, 577

Guardia, Ricardo Adolfo de la: 33, 53

Guerrilla operations

Burma: 427-28, 454-55

Churchill and: 427

Leyte: 582

Mindanao: 634

Philippines: 106

Guimba: 596, 610, 612

Gulf Oil Company: 318

Gulkana: 310-11

Gunderson, Maj. Frank N.: 457-58

Gunther & Shirley Company: 25, 41

Gurkha troops: 455

Gurney Airdrome: 257

Gusap Airfield: 254

Guskhara: 399

Guy F. Atkinson Company: 287

H. C. Price Company: 320, 325, 327

H-20 bridge: 447-49, 470

Hagushi: 641, 643-44

Haines: 317

Haleakala: 46

Halsey, Admiral William F. See also Central Pacific

Area (CPA); South Pacific Area (SOPAC).

and Admiralties: 522

command of: 206, 232

and Leyte: 572

MacArthur, conferences with: 234

offensive plans: 225

and Philippines, 1944-45: 572

and Solomons: 244, 250

Hammond Iron Works: 51

Hangar construction: 217-19. See also Airfield construction and repair.

Hankow: 453

Hanna, J. L.: 322
728 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Hannum, Col. Warren T.: 24, 344, 362

Hansa Bay: 527-28, 533

Hansell, Brig. Gen. Haywood S., Jr.: 518

Harbor construction and repair. See Port facilities,

construction and repair; Waterways, development and use.

Harding, Maj. Gen. Edwin F.: 192-95

Harmon, Maj. Gen. Millard F.: 172, 251

Harris, 1st Lieut. Henry: 98

Harrison, Maj. Gen. Desmond (British): 437, 439-40

Harrison, Lt. Col. Raymond L.: 213, 236

Harvey, Lt. Col. Raymond J.: 540

Hauwei Island: 524

Hawaii Air Depot: 361, 667

Hawaii Island: 348-49

Hawaii National Park: 23

Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command: 350

Hawaiian Constructors: 25, 41-42, 46-47, 51-52, 162,

341-43, 345-49, 353-56, 359-64, 371-72, 487-89

Hawaiian Contracting Company: 353

Hawaiian Department Reproduction Plant: 376

Hawaiian Islands: 3, 4, 6-9, 13-14, 20, 27, 54

administrative procedures: 41, 52, 341-42, 353-54,

356-58, 363-64, 370-73, 376, 486-89

air defense construction: 40-41, 43-44, 344, 348-

49, 361-62, 365, 374

aircraft repair shops, construction of: 370, 373-

74, 507

aircraft warning stations, construction of: 15, 18,

40-42, 51, 53, 346

airfield construction and repair: 28, 38-42, 51, 161,

340-43, 346-49, 361-62, 365, 370, 373-74, 486-87,

507-08

airfield defense measures: 348-49, 374

ammunition storage plan: 367-69

base construction and operation: 366, 369-70, 380

beach defenses, construction of: 351-52, 365, 374

blackout control: 341, 343

camouflage measures: 44-45, 346, 350-52, 361-62,

365

civilian defense: 342, 344-46

civilians, employment of: 23-25, 341, 353-55, 369,

486

coast defense construction: 42, 52-53, 346, 349-52,

365-66, 661

construction, control of: 341-42, 353, 491

construction, nonessential, efforts to eliminate:

370-71, 373

construction, problems of: 11, 19, 39, 52, 365-66

construction design standards: 366

construction machinery and equipment, proceurement: 43-44, 343, 355-56, 362-63, 366, 369, 372,

375-76, 488

construction materials, procurement: 342-43, 353-

57, 362-63, 366-67, 375-76

construction programs and progress: 38-45, 51-53,

361, 363, 365, 372-74, 486-87, 506-10, 649

Hawaiian Islands—Continued

cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts: 353, 363, 371-72,

487-89, 507

costs of construction: 52, 342, 353, 355-58, 363- 371-72, 488

demolition measures: 352-53, 361

engineer missions: 340-45, 353, 358, 369-70, 372-

73, 507-08

engineer organizations: 340-42, 353-54, 358, 360-

61, 486, 491-92

engineer units, arrival: 369, 375-76, 490, 666-67

engineer units, requirements: 16, 342-43, 489-90

engineer units, strength: 10, 38, 42, 342, 380, 680

financial problems: 356-57, 363-64

fortifications, construction of: 346, 365, 373

hospital construction: 365-66, 374, 486, 507-08, 661

housing: 366

housing construction: 38-39, 346, 361, 366-67, 373-

74, 486-87, 507-08

labor force, mobilizing: 23, 342-43, 359-60, 369,

371-73

labor force, strength: 357, 369

land acquisition: 40-41, 51-52, 341-42, 346, 355-

59, 374 map compilation and distribution: 376-77, 489-90,

666-69

mines, improvised: 352-53

mine's, installation and removal: 348-49, 365-66,

377

mines, number required: 352, 362, 365

naval guns, emplacement of: 349-52, 374, 661

Navy, co-operation from: 370, 374, 376, 661

pipeline construction and operation: 42

POL rationing: 343, 356, 358

port congestion: 367

port facilities, construction and repair: 12, 40, 367,

373-74, 486

POW camp construction: 507

power plant installation: 373

priority ratings: 48-50, 346, 351, 353-56, 369, 373

prisoners, employment of: 345

radar station, construction of: 347

railroad construction and repair: 23

rainfall, effect of: 371

reconnaissance, engineer: 16, 51-52, 350, 368, 486

refrigeration plant installation: 486

road construction and repair: 23, 43, 346, 350,

369, 374

roadblocks, construction of: 352

seaplane base construction: 365, 374

sewerage installation: 366, 373

shipping, allocation of: 356

shipping shortage: 343-44, 355, 362-63

and SOPAC supply: 171-72

spare parts procurement: 354-56, 375-76

specialists, shortage of: 354-55, 375

as staging area: 366
INDEX 729

Hawaiian Islands—Continued

storage facilities, construction and operation: 39-

42, 51-53, 350, 365-70, 373-75, 486, 507

telephone exchange installation: 370

temperatures, effect of: 370

transportation facilities: 354, 365-66

trench obstacles, construction of: 344-45

tunnel construction and repair: 350, 368-70, 374

utilities, installation and maintenance: 365

water supply and distribution: 373

waterways, development and use: 342

Hawaiian Pineapple Company: 348

Hay River: 327

Hearn, Lt. Col. I. K.: 565

Heating plants, installation: 297, 316

Heavey, Brig. Gen. William F.: 228-29, 247, 252, 266,

576, 578

Heiberg, Lt. Col. Elvin R.: 112, 121, 126, 130, 137

Heiman, Col. David W.: 537, 540, 564-66, 580, 583-

84, 587

Henderson Field: 206, 256

Heng-yang: 469

Hermosa: 79

Herne Bay: 223

Herron, Maj. Gen. Charles D.: 10, 15-16, 20, 26-27

Hickam Field: 8, 38-39, 44, 52, 53, 340, 341, 348, 365,

507, 661

Hicks, Lt. Col. William E.: 435

Highway 1, Leyte: 577

Highway 3, Luzon: 74, 82, 588-90, 595-96, 603, 610-

13, 628, 632, 638

Highway 4, Luzon: 639

Highway 5, Luzon: 74, 610, 613, 627-28, 632, 638-39

Highway 7, Luzon: 609

Highway 9, Luzon: 628, 636

Highway 11, Luzon (Kennon Road): 627, 629, 632,

636

Highway 13, Luzon: 595

Highway construction and repair. See Road construction and repair.

Highway systems. See Road systems.

Hill Field: 586

Hilo: 39, 348-49, 361

Himalaya Mountains: 387, 393, 404, 426, 432, 439,

454, 462

Hiring Service, Australian Army: 113

Hiroshima: 678

Hirshfield, Maj. Robert A.: 399, 407, 410, 417, 465

Hodges, Col. John N.: 10

Hoge, Brig. Gen. William M.: 300-305, 307, 313

Hokkaido Island: 678

Holcombe, Col. William H.: 390-94, 397, 416-17

Holland Park, Brisbane: 223, 240

Hollandia

airfield construction and repair: 527-28, 531-34,

543-44

ASCOM move to: 572

Hollandia—Continued

base construction and operation: 527-29, 533-34.

544, 557

cargo unloading and distribution: 529-30

civilians, employment of: 531

construction materials, search for: 531-32

construction program and progress: 541-42, 544

engineer missions: 527-28

engineer organization: 527-28

engineer units, arrival: 530

engineer units, strength: 529

fire-fighting: 530

housing construction: 527, 544

map compilation and distribution: 553-54

naval construction battalions at: 529

photography, aerial: 530

pipeline construction and operation: 544

port facilities, construction and repair: 527, 544

rainfall, effect of: 531

road construction and repair: 527, 530-31, 544

shore party operations: 530-31

stock control: 557-58

storage facilities, construction and operation: 527,

544

supplies, measurement tons: 557

topography: 527

USASOS move to: 569, 650

work potential formula: 529

Hollandia Airfield: 531-32

Holtz Bay: 329

Homestead, Hawaii: 361

Honolulu: 12, 23, 40, 344-45, 367, 369, 374, 509

Honolulu Engineer District: 10-12, 20, 23, 38-44,

47487-89 . 169, 340, 353, 356-64,, 367 

Hans; Wyman, Col. Theodore, Jr.

Honshu Island: 518, 669, 673-74, 677-78

Horn Island Airfield: 143-44, 152, 155, 230

Horowitz, Col. Louis G.: 430

Hospital construction

Alaska: 291

by Allied Works Council: 239-40

by ASCOM: 586

for assault on Japan: 677-78

Australia: 114-15, 223, 240

Biak: 544

China: 419

Fiji: 232, 256

Hawaii: 365-66, 374, 486, 507-08, 661

Kwajalein: 485

Leyte: 575, 586

Luzon: 638

Manila: 655

Marianas: 493

Milne Bay: 257

New Britain: 273

New Caledonia: 220
730 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Hospital construction—Continued

New Guinea: 235, 257, 259, 546

New Zealand: 232, 243

Okinawa: 643, 660

Philippines, 1944-45: 653, 655-56

Port Moresby: 259

Saipan: 502

Solomons: 250-51

SOPAC: 267

SWPA: 267, 550, 568

Wakde: 544

War Department and: 486

House Committee on Appropriations: 8-9

Housing: 114, 217, 366, 410

Housing construction

Admiralties: 543

Alaska: 33, 37, 278, 282-83, 286-87, 291, 296-97

Alaska Highway: 313, 315-16

for assault on Japan: 678

Australia: 114-15, 119, 124, 139-40, 223, 240-41,

260

Biak: 544

Canol: 321

Carolines: 516

Central Pacific: 476

China: 402-03, 419

Fiji: 232-33

Guadalcanal: 208, 256

Hawaii: 38-39, 346, 361, 366-67, 373-74, 486-87,

507-08

Hollandia: 527, 544

India: 396-99, 401-03, 456

Kwajalein: 486

Leyte: 575

Luzon: 632

Marianas: 493

Marshalls: 478-79, 485

Navy's role in: 267

New Caledonia: 167, 223

New Guinea: 184-85, 254, 257-58, 546

New Hebrides: 256

New Zealand: 243

Okinawa: 643, 660

Philippines, 1944-45: 653

Port Moresby: 185

Saipan: 503

Solomons: 544

SOPAC: 256, 266-67

SWPA: 217, 266-67, 568

Howell, Lt. Col. Harold K.: 478

Hoy, C. A.: 121

Hsinching: 440

Hukawng Valley: 442, 444, 446, 465

Humboldt Bay: 527, 530-31, 534

Hump, the. See Himalaya Mountains.

Hump airfields: 393, 396-97, 400-401

Hunter, Col. Robert C.: 652

HURRICANE: 537, 538, 541

Hutchings, Brig. Gen. Henry: 252, 567, 592

Hyane Harbour: 522-23

Hyland, Maj. James F.: 416

Iba: 71

I-beam bridge, on Ledo Road: 448

Ice formation problem: 316, 328

Ickes, Harold L.: 279, 299, 322. See also Department

of the Interior.

Icy Strait: 287

Ie Shima: 643, 646, 658. See also Okinawa.

Igloo warehouse: 217-19, 502

Iloilo: 634

Imperial General Headquarters: 179, 682

Imperial Oil Company: 318-25, 335-38

Imphal: 446, 462

Import Procurement Department, Australia: 126

Imus River: 84

India, 389-91, 405, 427-28, 438, 453, 458, 680.

AAF, pressure for construction, 397, 401-02, 416-17

administrative procedures: 401

aeronautical charts, compiling: 458

air defense construction: 398, 400

airfield construction and repair: 392-94, 396-97,

399-404, 406-08, 416-18, 420, 425, 429-32, 438-

42, 455-56, 467-68, 666

base construction and operation: 395-96, 402, 404,

406

camouflage measures: 398-99

Central Public Works Department: 387, 396

civilians, employment of: 392-93, 396, 399, 401,

416-17, 440, 680

climate, effect of: 393

command and staff structure: 397-98

construction, control of: 392-93, 398, 404, 438

construction, problems of: 393-94, 401-02, 417

construction design standards: 401-02, 471

construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 398, 402, 420, 450

construction materials, procurement: 397, 399-

400, 402-03, 424, 471

construction programs and progress: 392-94, 396-

97, 399-400, 404, 407-08, 416-17, 438-39

customs, effect of: 450

diseases: 393

engineer mission: 396, 404

engineer organization: 395-96, 398-99, 403-04,

415-16, 429, 438-39

engineer units, arrival: 398, 411, 430, 440, 450, 458,

475

engineer units, control of: 400

engineer units, strength: 404, 450

housing construction: 396-99, 401-03, 456

India-China road. See Ledo Road,

labor force, mobilizing: 393, 400, 471

and Ledo Road. See Ledo Road.
INDEX 731

India—Continued

map compilation and distribution: 457-58

pipeline construction and operation: 387, 419,

426-27, 439, 442, 450, 457, 466-67, 471, 666

POL supply: 427

port congestion: 396

port facilities, construction and repair: 394, 396,

399

power plants, installation of: 399

priority rating: 401

Public Works Department: 416-17

rainfall, effect of: 392-93, 397, 399

reconnaissance, engineer: 440

refrigeration plants, installation and operation:

399 road construction and repair: 393, 398-99, 403

road system: 393

Royal Engineers in: 392-93, 396-97, 400-402, 406,

416-17, 420, 425, 440

shipping shortage: 471

storage facilities, construction and operation: 394-

96, 400, 467, 666

supply, by airlift: 472

supply system: 394-95, 425, 429

training facilities, construction of: 403

transportation facilities: 399-400, 402-03

utilities, installation and operation: 403

wire obstacles, erection of: 399

India-Burma Theater: 470, 475, 662

Indian Navy: 471

Indochina: 452

Infantry Divisions

Americal: 206-07, 209, 634

Philippine: 61, 69

6th: 564, 587, 592-96, 603, 627, 639

7th: 328, 332, 477, 575-76, 579, 582, 643, 645

24th: 23, 43, 529-32, 575-12, 609, 635

25th: 43, 206, 209, 250, 587, 592, 594, 597, 628-29,

637-38

27th: 381, 478, 482-83, 492, 494-97, 506, 643, 647

31st: 567, 635

32d: 118, 124, 156, 178, 192-96, 274, 567, 581, 627-

29, 637-38

33d: 628-30, 636-38

37th: 171, 249, 255, 587, 593-95, 602, 610, 612-15,

630, 636-39

38th: 582, 609, 621-23, 638

40th: 587, 592-95, 602, 610, 634

41st: 118, 124, 156, 205, 237, 247, 529-31, 534, 537,

539, 632-33

43d: 233, 245, 587, 592, 594, 596, 638-39

77th: 492, 503, 581, 643-44, 646-47

81st: 512-14

96th: 575-76, 579, 582, 643, 647

Infantry Regiments

34th: 608, 619-20

105th: 496, 500

Infantry Regiments—Continued

106th: 482-83

126th: 567

148th: 615

151st: 624

158th: 561, 588, 594, 597, 631-32, 638-39, 657

162d: 538

163d: 529, 534, 537

164th: 206

165th: 381, 496

186th: 539, 632-33

305th: 503

321st: 514

322d: 514

323d: 515

Infantry-tank teams: 647

Ingalls, Col. Robert D.: 300-301, 305, 309, 314

Inland Passage: 280-81

Insoemanai Island: 535

Insoemoar Island: 535

Inspector General, War Department: 377

Intelligence Center, POA: 376

Intelligence estimates and reports

Hollandia: 527, 530

Luzon: 587-88, 601, 611

Manila: 613

Marianas: 493

by Navy: 284

New Guinea: 156, 158

Saipan: 499

SOPAC: 269-71, 551-52

SWPA: 269-71

International Harvester: 140

Intramuros, Manila: 614, 617

Ioribaiwa: 179

Ipo Dam and Reservoir: 618, 627, 638, 656

Iran, U.S. Military Mission to: 394

Irisan River: 637

Iron Range Airfield: 260

Irrawaddy Plain: 394

Irrawaddy River: 391, 406, 454-55, 465, 468, 470,

472, 663-64

Irwin, Maj. Francis I.: 147

Isa: 647

Isely, Commander Robert H.: 498n

Island Command, Okinawa: 643-44, 657-58

Isley Airfield: 498-99, 501-03, 511, 518

Isurava: 173

Itoman: 641

Iwo Jima: 625, 640-41, 660-61, 668

Jacky Jacky Point Airfield: 155, 230-31

Jake's Corner: 307, 310, 315

James River, Virginia: 471n

Japan: 3-4, 27, 50, 52, 53-54, 71-72, 153, 179, 325,

326, 364, 456, 467-68, 510, 518, 625, 636, 640-41,

649, 650, 654-55, 667-69, 672-79, 682-83
732 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Japanese Combined Fleet: 153

Jaqué: 30

Jarman, Maj. Gen. Sanderford: 495, 499, 511

Jarrett, Lt. Col. Donald L.: 449

Jaure: 178, 192

Java: 118, 392

John Rodgers Airport: 40, 367, 374, 507, 661

Johns, Brig. Gen. Dwight F.: 112, 119-21, 125-27,

136, 140-41, 152, 182-83, 185, 190

Johnson, Col. Alexander L. P.: 114-15

Johnson, Col. Frank M. S.: 302

Johnson, Maj. John P.: 395-96, 399

Johnson, Lt. Col. W. H.: 373

Johnson's Crossing: 327

Joint Army and Navy Board: 10, 14, 17, 35, 39, 51

Joint Chiefs of Staff. See also Combined Chiefs of

Staff.

and AFPAC: 649

and airfield construction and repair: 527

and Alaska defenses: 284, 288, 328, 331

and base construction directives: 527

and Canol: 336

and Central Pacific offensives: 377-80, 492

and Japan, assault on: 674

and Japan, occupation of: 678

and Kavieng, seizure of: 527

and Klamono oil fields: 563

and Leyte: 572

and Marianas: 492

and Marshalls: 477-78

and Mindanao: 570

and Okinawa: 641

and Pacific areas, division of: 128

and Philippines, 1944-45: 570

and Rabaul: 153, 172, 234

resources, allocation of: 225, 234

SOPAC, directives to: 234

and SOPAC offensive: 170, 172

SWPA, directives to: 234

Joint Expeditionary Force, Kwajalein: 482

Joint Logistical Board, POA: 378

Joint Planning Committee, Australia-U.S.: 113

Joint Purchasing Board, SOPAC: 171-72, 214

Joint Staff, POA: 378-79

Joint Supply Council, New Zealand: 214

Jolo Island: 633

Jones, Brig. Gen. Albert M.: 82

Jones, Air Marshal George (RAAF): 241

Jones Bridge, Manila: 619

Jorhat: 447

Juneau: 279, 281, 283, 287, 289

Jungle warfare, Saipan: 500

Jungle warfare training: 156, 490-91

K. B. Mission: 238-39

Kabacan: 635

Kadena Airfield: 645, 658-59

Kagman Point: 500

Kagoshima: 673-75

Kahuku: 348, 361

Kalihi Valley: 345

Kamiri air strip: 562

Kanchow: 419-20, 452, 469

Kanchow Construction Company: 419

Kaneohe Seaplane Base: 53

Kansas City Engineer District: 321, 323

Kapa Kapa Trail: 178-79

Kapalama Basin: 40, 42, 367, 374, 486

Karachi: 392, 393, 394-96, 398, 399-400, 402, 404,

406, 417

Karrick, Col. Samuel W.: 653

Katherine, Australia: 123, 149

Kauai Island: 348-50

Kavieng: 522

Kayangel Island: 516

Keehi Lagoon: 40, 365, 367, 374

Kelso Airfield: 145

Kenerson, Lt. Col. Waldo I.: 440, 451-52

Kenney, Maj. Gen. George C. See also Allied Air

Forces, SWPA.

and Admiralties: 522-23

and airfield construction: 174, 184-85, 188, 220,

230, 581, 584

and airlift operations: 180

commands of: 157

construction, pressure for: 184-87

and engineer units, control of: 187, 229

and Hollandia base: 534

in Leyte campaign: 581, 584

and Luzon: 599

Kennon Road, Luzon. See Highway 11, Luzon.

Kerama Retto: 643-44. See also Okinawa.

Kewalo Basin: 340-41

Kharagpur: 440, 456

Khasi Hills: 393

Kiangan: 639

Kiangsi Province: 419, 431, 452

Kila Drome: 143, 152

Kimmel, Admiral Husband E.: 347

Kindley Field: 61, 103, 105, 620

King, Maj. Gen. Edward P., Jr.: 62, 99, 101

King, Admiral Ernest J.: 169, 378. See also United

States Navy.

King, William L. Mackenzie: 300. See also Canada.

KING operations: 570, 572, 592

Kingman, Brig. Gen. John J.: 6, 60, 390

King's Wharf, Makin: 382

Kingsbury, Lt. Col. Leonard L.: 478

Kinjaki Barige: 181

Kinkaid, Rear Adm. Thomas C.: 328

Kinsolving, Col. William C.: 439, 449-50, 457, 446-67,

471

Kipapa: 361

Kipapa Gulch: 368, 370, 374

Kiriwina Island: 231, 234, 239, 244, 246, 251

Kirkpatrick, Capt. Harry F.: 415
INDEX 733

Kiska Harbor: 331-32

Kiska Island: 33, 276, 284, 286, 290, 322, 328-29, 331-

34, 364

Kiunglai: 293

Klamono oil fields: 563

Klenso Field: 565

Klinke, Maj. Emil F.: 130

Kluane Lake: 302-03, 310-11, 316-17

Knox, Frank: 18, 27, 299. See also United States Navy.

Kodiak Island: 12, 17, 18, 22, 35, 278, 284, 287, 295-96

Kohloss, Col. Fabius H.: 395, 401, 408, 413-15, 421-22

Kokee: 16, 51

Kokoda Trail: 156-57, 173, 178-80, 192

Kokoda Village: 157-58

Kolombangara Island: 250

Koontz, Capt. Clyde L.: 398

Korea: 678

Kornasoren Airfield: 563

Koromokina River: 255

Koumac Airfield: 171

Kramer, Brig. Gen. Hans: 369-74, 377-78, 381, 478,

486-87, 489, 491, 493

Kromer, Col. Philip F.: 438

Krueger, General Walter. See also Armies, Sixth.

and Admiralties: 522

and Biak: 539

and General Casey: 572

heads Sixth Army: 225

and Hollandia: 532

and Leyte: 584-85

and Luzon: 591, 594-95, 599, 610, 612

and Morotai: 567

and New Guinea: 238-39, 244

and Sansapor-Mar: 563-64

Kuba: 646

Kuluk Bay: 286

Kumon Mountains: 446

Kumpe, Maj. Emil F.: 190

Kung, C. C.: 415, 421-22, 472. See also YunnanBurma Highway Engineering Administration.

Kunming: 389-91, 395-96, 402-03, 408, 413-15, 419-

21, 425, 427, 430, 439, 451, 454, 464, 469-71, 474-

75, 662-63, 666

Kunming Training Center: 455

Kushikino: 673, 675, 677

Kuskokwim River: 288, 295

Kwajalein Atoll: 476-82, 483-86, 496

Kwanghan: 440

Kweilin: 418-19, 431, 452, 468-69

Kweiyang: 663

Kyushu Island: 456, 467-68, 668-69, 672-78

La Joya Airfield: 31, 50

Labaun Island: 636

Labor forces, difficulties with

Alaska: 21-22, 35

China: 451

Hawaii: 23, 371-73

Labor forces, difficulties with—Continued

Ledo Road: 457

Labor forces, mobilizing

by Allied Works Council: 241-42

by ASCOM: 585

Assam: 401, 471

Australia: 121, 142, 241-42

Burma: 465, 471

Burma Road: 466

Canal Zone: 29, 32-33, 50

China: 403, 451, 472

Hawaii: 342-43, 359-60, 369, 373

India: 393, 400, 471

Ledo Road: 424-25, 450

Leyte: 585

New Guinea: 180-81

Philippines 1941-42: 69

Labor forces, shortages in: 278-79

Labor forces, strength

Alaska Highway: 334

under Allied Works Council: 211

Burma: 467

Burma Road: 473

Canal Zone: 32

Canol: 335, 338

Fiji: 163

Hawaii: 357, 369

New Caledonia: 163

Ladd Field: 9, 12, 19, 28, 34-37, 278, 287, 288, 291,

293, 296

Lae: 143, 174, 230-31, 234, 244-45, 248, 251-52, 258-

59, 546-47

Laguna Province: 84

Lahore: 410

Laiana: 245, 249

Laloki Airfield: 146, 186

Laloma Cemetery, Manila: 614

Lanai Island: 348

Land acquisition and return

by ASCOM: 584

Hawaii: 40-41, 51-52, 341-42, 346, 355-56, 358-59,

374

Leyte: 584

New Caledonia: 661-62

Panama: 29-33, 50, 53

Philippine Commonweath: 60

Philippines, 1941-42: 60, 65

by USAFFE: 60

Land clearing operations: 148, 157-58, 307-12, 314

Landhi: 396

Landing craft. See also LCI's; LCM's; LCT's;

LCVP's; LSM's; LST's; LVT's.

Admiralties: 523-24

Biak: 537-38, 540, 544

by Boat Building Command: 653-54

Borneo: 636

Carolines: 516

Central Pacific: 382, 476
734 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Landing craft—Continued

concept formulated: 227

Corregidor: 620

Dukw: 476, 497, 506, 530, 562, 578, 644

Hollandia: 529

Kwajalein: 479-80, 485

Leyte: 576-79

Luzon: 588, 590-93, 595-96, 609

Marianas: 506

Navy-operated: 578

New Britain: 273

New Guinea: 533

Okinawa: 644

Philippines, 1944-45: 621-24, 632-33, 638

Saipan: 496-98, 511

Solomons: 546

spare parts for: 265, 558-59

SWPA: 551, 562, 564, 567

Tinian: 506

training with: 671

Wakde: 536

Lane, Col. Albert L.: 305, 560, 569, 652

Lane, Col. Thomas A.: 258-59, 265

Langemak Bay: 258

Larrimah: 123, 239, 241

Larrison, Lt. Col. G. K.: 345

Lashio: 389, 391, 413, 662

Lauterbach, Col. Herbert G.: 537, 540, 601

Layac Junction: 85

LCI's (landing craft, infantry): 251

LCM's (landing craft, mechanized): 228-29, 235, 247,

251, 253, 273, 476, 496, 530, 562, 576, 578, 593, 620-24

LCT's (landing craft, tank): 253, 516, 540, 551, 620,

638

LCVP's (landing craft, vehicle-personnel): 229, 235,

247, 251, 253, 273, 497, 530, 536, 576, 578, 593

Leahy, Flight Lt. Michael J. (RAAF): 180, 231

Leary, Vice Adm. Herbert F.: 128

Leavey, Brig. Gen. Edmond H.: 378-80

Ledo: 391, 405-10, 412, 419, 434, 44&-49, 454, 457.

4671, 473, 663

Ledo Road: 387-89, 391, 404-13, 418-19, 421, 422-25,

426456-58 66266 , 427, 429, 430, 431-35, 439, 442-50 ,. 460-62 Se , 453-55, e also, 463-67 Pick, Brig , 468 . Gen, 4. 

Lee, Col. John C. H.: 11, 18, 33

Lee Wen-ping, Dr.: 414, 422

Legaspi: 6, 72, 81, 639

Lehr, Maj. William: 141

Lend-Lease

Act, passage of: 27

Australia: 140-41, 216, 560

China: 389, 398-99, 402-03

India: 392-93, 395, 398-99, 401-02

New Zealand: 213-14, 222

Lenox, Maj. George H.: 167

Lentaigne, Maj. Gen. W. D. A.: 446-47

Leron River: 244

Le Sueur, R. V.: 322

Leyte: 570-88, 590, 591-92, 599, 611, 650, 651, 670

Leyte Engineer District: 651-54

Leyte Gulf: 572, 576, 578-79

Leyte Gulf, Battle of: 580-81

Leyte River and Valley: 573, 582

Liard River: 309, 311, 315

Liberty ship berths. See Port facilities, construction

and repair.

Libmanan Cave: 81

Likhapani: 410-11, 457, 466

Liles, Lt. Col. Sherwood E., Jr.: 535, 537, 544, 613,

617-19, 656

Lim, Brig. Gen. Vicente: 98-99

Limay: 71, 85, 95, 97

Lines of communication

Alaska: 287-88, 295-96

Assam: 394, 435

Australia: 118, 141, 160, 170, 364

Bataan: 87, 90

Burma: 387, 391, 416, 435-36, 474-75

Canol: 322

China: 387-88, 391, 394, 397, 405-06, 418-19, 425-

26, 429-30, 641

Hawaii: 352, 380

India: 391, 394, 397, 405, 426, 429-31, 475

Japan: 625, 636, 640-41, 677

Luzon: 588

New Caledonia: 166

SOPAC: 160, 168

SWPA: 231, 380

Lines of communication, Japanese: 446, 462, 625, 636,

640-41

Lingayen: 595, 602

Lingayen Drome: 598-600

Lingayen, Gulf: 73-76, 79, 587-95, 600-602, 604-07,

610, 612-13, 650, 657

Ling-ling: 469

Lipa: 632

Liuchow: 663

"Loew's Bougainville": 546

Logistical missions, Corps of Engineers: 5

Logistical systems

for assault on Japan: 672-75

POA: 507

SWPA: 209-10

USASOS: 570-71

Logai: 449

Loper, Brig. Gen. Herbert B.: 489-91, 507, 510, 668

Loper-Hotine Agreement: 190

Loran station, construction of: 517

Lorengau: 522, 524-25

Los Angeles Port of Embarkation: 362, 456

Los Banos: 93

Los Negros Island: 522-25

Lovett, 1st Lt. Max D.: 136

Loving, Harry W.: 487-88
INDEX 735

LSM's (landing ship, medium): 590, 593

LST's (landing ship, tank): 253, 382, 476, 485, 496,

498, 511, 523-24, 533, 544, 551, 564, 567, 576-79,

588, 593, 609, 636

Lubang Island: 64, 66

Lubricants. See POL.

Lumber. See Construction materials improvised;

Construction materials, procurement; Sawmill

construction and operation.

Lung Yun, Governor; 403, 422, 466, 472, 474

Lung-ling: 456, 459, 461

Luzon: 55-57, 62-63, 66-71, 92, 570, 598, 614, 617-18,

636. See also Bataan Peninsula; Manila, Manila

Bay area,

airfield construction and repair: 58-61, 64-65, 79,

590-92, 597, 606, 610, 615, 631-33, 638-39, 655

base construction and operation: 93, 591, 606, 625,

632, 650-51

Base M: 591, 600, 604, 606, 650, 656

Base R: 650, 656

beach party operations: 592-94, 597, 608-09

blasting operations: 604, 638

bridge construction and repair: 76-77, 80-81, 590-

91, 595-97, 602-06, 609, 611-13, 616, 626, 628-

32, 638-39

bulldozers, tactical use: 628-29

cargo unloading and distribution: 592-94, 597, 600,

609

causeway construction and repair: 593

civilians, employment of: 596, 599, 601, 606, 638-39

communications facilities: 601

construction, control of: 601

construction, problems of: 632

construction materials, procurement: 602, 612

demoliton operations: 74-84, 597, 609-12, 627, 632

engineer district in: 651

engineer missions: 72-85, 587-92, 601-03, 605-06,

610-11, 626-27, 637

engineer organization: 601, 650-51

engineer units, arrival: 599-600, 602, 607, 610-11

engineer units, control of: 591, 612-13, 626

engineer units, requirements: 590-91

engineer units, strength: 587, 592, 594, 601

engineers as infantry: 597-98, 609

hospital construction: 638

housing construction: 632

map compilation and distribution: 607-08, 668-69

mines, shortage of: 75

photography, aerial: 588, 596, 607-08

pipeline construction and operation: 600

POL, evacuation and destruction of: 84

ponton cubes, employment of: 590, 593, 602

port facilities, construction and repair, 592, 600,

632

priority ratings: 604, 612

railroad construction and repair: 596-97, 600, 602-

06, 612, 639

rainfall, effect of: 588, 637-38

Luzon—Continued

reconnaissance, engineer: 588, 593, 599, 601, 615,

626, 638

refrigeration plant, construction and operation:

632

river crossings: 590-91, 595-96, 602, 610-13, 615-16,

630, 638

road construction and repair: 594, 596-97, 600,

609, 626-32, 637-39

roadblock construction: 74, 77

salvage operations: 603-04, 629

sawmill construction and operation: 632

storage facilities, construction and operation: 594,

600, 609

supply system: 606

wire obstacles, erection of: 82

Luzon Base Command: 601

Luzon Base Section: 651, 669

Luzon Engineer District (LUZED): 651-52, 654

Luzon Force: 99

LVT's (landing vehicle, tracked): 273, 382, 480, 496,

497, 506, 530, 538, 562, 596, 644

Lyman, Brig. Gen. Albert K. B.: 15-16, 23, 38-39, 41-

44, 341-44, 348, 350-54, 358-64, 367, 3

Lyons, Lt. Col. F. Russel: 302, 314

Mabatang: 87

Mabatang-Mauban line: 97

Macajalar Bay: 635

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas. See also

General Headquarters, SWPA; Southwest Pacific Area; United States Army Forces in the Far

East: United States Forces in the Philippines,

and Admiralties: 521-23

air build-up by: 150

and air ferry routes construction: 47

and airfield construction and repair: 59, 229-30,

525, 563, 566, 568 and airlift operations: 180

arrival in Australia: 127

and base construction and operation: 258

and Biak: 537-38

commands of: 57, 99, 128, 649, 650

and construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 547

and demolition operations: 216

and engineer construction brigades: 548, 675

and engineer districts: 652

and engineer special brigades: 227-28

and engineer units, control of: 649

Halsey, conferences with: 234

and Hollandia: 527, 534

and Japan, assault on: 675, 678

and Klamono oil fields: 563

and land acquisition: 60

and Leyte: 571-72

and Luzon: 591, 599, 608

and Manila: 618
736 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas—

Continued

and map compilation and distribution: 608, 667-

68

and Marianas: 492

and Mindanao: 570

and Mindoro: 586

and Morotai: 566, 568

and New Guinea: 153, 156-57

and Noemfoor: 561

offensive plans: 129-30, 216, 225, 272-75

ordered to Australia: 99

and Philippines, 1941-44: 57, 80, 82, 87, 89, 92, 98

and Philippines, 1944-45: 570, 572

and Philippines build-up: 55

and priority ratings: 70, 215-16, 260

and Rabaul: 255

and Sansapor-Mar: 563-64

and Solomons: 153

and Southern Philippines: 625, 634

and strategy of isolation: 520, 527, 542-43, 563

and Waigeo: 563

and Wakde: 534

McBride, Brig. Gen. Allan C.: 99

McCandlish, W. L.: 77-78, 81-83

McCarthy, Maj. James A.: 314

MacCasland, Capt. Stanford: 46-48, 163

MacDonald, Thomas H.: 300, 305, 310-11. See also

Public Roads Administration.

McGrath, Alaska: 288

MacIsaac, Col. Kenneth: 434-35, 449, 457, 463, 466

Mackenzie Mountains: 327

Mackenzie River: 276, 318-21, 324, 327

McNutt, Col. Charles H.: 167, 555

Madang: 234, 244

Madsen, Lt. Col. Kenneth E.: 438-39, 450

Maeda, Lt. Gen. Masami: 79n

Maffin Drome: 535, 541

Magat River: 638

Magicienne Bay: 498

Magnusson, Warren G.: 299

Maintenance and repair, general. See also Spare

parts procurement; Specialists, shortages of:

Specialists, training.

Alaska: 279-80, 290

Alaska Highway: 313, 317-18

Australia: 126, 148-49

Burma: 442

Burma Road: 422

Guam: 517

Ledo Road: 412-13, 433-34

Manila: 670-71

New Guinea: 186, 265-66

Philippines, 1941-42: 62-63

Philippines, 1944-45: 669-70

SOPAC: 264-66

SWPA: 271-72

Majuro Island: 477-78, 482-83, 485

Makin Garrison Force: 386

Makin Island: 381-86, 478

Malabang: 61, 65, 71, 655

Malacañan Palace, Manila: 615

Malaria, incidence of: 151, 238

Malaya: 390

Malicbuy: 81

Malinta Hill and Tunnel: 66, 101-02, 105

Malir: 396, 398-99

Manchuria: 467, 678, 682

Mandalay: 391, 394, 468

Mandaluyong: 656

Mangaldan Drome: 600-601

Manila: 76, 80-85, 92. 93, 587, 591, 604-05, 607-19, 625, 650, 651-53, 655, 656-57, 666-67, 670-71

Manila Bay area: 55, 57-58, 74, 98, 104, 587, 591, 612-

13, 656. See also islands and forts by name.

Manila Railroad: 74, 77, 81-82, 84, 604-06, 657

Manipur Plain: 446-47, 454, 462, 468

Manipur Province: 450

Manus Island: 522, 524-25

Manzano, Lt. Col. Narciso L.: 75, 77, 82-84, 106, 613

Map compilation and distribution

by AAF: 668

Alaska: 23, 33, 290

Alaska Highway: 305-06

Attu: 290

Australia: 189-91, 551-52

by Australian Army: 188-89

Bataan: 94-95

Burma: 457-58

Canal Zone: 15

Carolines: 489-90, 510, 516

CBI: 457-58

Central Pacific: 381-82, 489-90, 510

China: 416, 457-58

Combined Chiefs directive on: 458

Corregidor: 94-95

Guadalcanal: 188-91

Hawaii: 376-77, 489-90, 666-69

Hollandia: 553-54

India: 457-58

Japan, for assault on: 518, 650, 667-69

Ledo Road: 410, 457-58

Luzon: 607-08, 668-69

Manila: 666-67

Marianas: 489-90

New Caledonia: 269-70

New Guinea: 188-91, 269-70, 553-54, 668-69

Philippines, 1941-42: 94

Philippines, 1944-45: 626, 668-69

POA: 650, 668

Port Moresby: 199-200

Solomons: 188-89

SOPAC: 188-89, 269-71, 551-52, 666-67

SWPA: 188-91, 269-70, 650, 666-69

USAFIA: 189-90

Maps, Japanese, used by U.S.: 490
INDEX 737

Mar: 653

Mar Drome: 565

Mareeba: 144

Mariana Islands: 467, 503, 510-11, 518. See also

Guam; Saipan.

beach party operations: 506

construction: 492-93, 506, 518

engineer mission: 493

engineer organization: 493-95

engineer units, arrival and departure: 506

intelligence estimates and reports: 493

JCS directive on: 492

map compilation and distribution: 489-90

mines, Japanese: 506

photography, aerial: 490, 493

planning phase: 492-95

road construction and repair: 506

shipping routes to: 493-94

shore party operations: 506

supply, measurement tons: 493-94, 496

training for: 495

Marilinan Airfield: 248

Marine Amphibious Corps

I: 255

III: 492, 495, 643-45, 657

V: 492, 675

Marine Brigade, 1st Provisional: 492, 495, 503-04

Marine Corps photographic squadrons: 668

Marine Corps troops. 153, 173, 205-08, 211, 232, 242,

244-45, 380, 503, 506, 514, 526, 640, 646. See also

Marine Amphibious Corps; Marine Divisions.

Marine Divisions

1st: 274, 642, 647

2d: 209, 492, 495-96, 498, 503, 643

3d: 255, 492, 495, 504-05

4th: 477, 492, 495, 498, 503

6th: 643, 647

Marine Operators Association: 327

Marine raider battalions: 245

Marine Supply Section, USASOS: 558-59

Mariquina River: 619

Mariveles: 71, 92-93, 95, 108, 619-20, 655-56

Mariveles-Bagac road: 95

Mariveles Harbor: 620

Mariveles Mountains: 86, 90, 105

Markham River and Valley: 230, 244, 247-48, 251-

52, 260, 543, 546, 548

Marquesas Inlands: 168

Marshall, General of the Army George C.: See also

War Department.

and air support for CBI: 392

and Alaska defenses: 18, 35

and Alaska Highway: 318

and Australia build-up: 107, 111, 118

becomes Chief of Staff: 16

and Burma offensive: 404, 418

and Canol: 319

and central purchasing board: 126

Marshall, General of the Army George C.—

Continued

and China air offensive: 409, 418

and China theater status: 397

and guerrilla operations: 427-28

and India airfields: 420

and Ledo Road: 408-09, 464

and Leyte: 572

and Philippines defenses: 57-58

and priority ratings: 70

and Rabaul: 255

and SOP AC defenses: 170

and Stilwell: 390, 398

Marshall, Brig. Gen. Richard J.: 157, 174, 182, 187.

See also United States Army Services of Supply.

Marshall Islands: 476-86, 495-96, 570

Marsman and Company: 60

Marston mat: 125, 219

Martin, Maj. Gen. Frederick L.: 39

Maryborough: 260

Mason, Capt. George J.: 403

Massacre Bay: 329, 331

Massacre Valley: 329

Matanikau River: 207-09

Materials, construction. See Construction materials,

improvised; Construction materials, measurement tons, for Canol; Construction materials,

procurement.

Mathison, Jack: 144

MATTERHORN: 430, 438, 441, 449, 450, 453, 456, 467

Matthews, Col. Albert G.: 124-28, 137, 144-45, 147,

174-75, 181-83, 185, 212, 218

Mauban: 87

Maui airport: 39

Maui Island: 6

Mawlu: 446-47

Maynard, Maj. Clarence F.: 94

Mayo Landing: 319

Meadows, Lt. Col. Benjamin E.: 540

Mechanics. See Maintenance and repair, general;

Specialists, shortages of: Specialists, training.

Medal of Honor award: 253-54

Meeandah: 223, 240

Mekong River: 414-15, 435

Melbourne: 109, 149

base operation: 112, 153

construction: no, 112, 114, 119, 122, 138, 141, 153

housing arrangements: 114

map compilation and distribution: 551-52, 607, 666

specialists, training: 271-72, 560-61

Merauke Airfield: 152, 158, 230

Merrill, Brig. Gen. Frank D.: 405-06, 424, 426, 444

Merrill's Marauders: 444, 446, 454-55

Metlakatla Indians: 19, 22

Mexico, Philippines: 78

Middleburg Island: 563-65

Midway Island: 153, 157, 284, 287, 364, 365, 683

on air ferry routes: 45, 161
738 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Midway Island—Continued

port facilities, construction and repair: 12

Mielenz, Col. Lloyd E.: 58, 65, 87, 93, 101-04

MIKE: 587, 591, 592, 601, 603

Military aid to China, costs: 389

Military Engineering Commission, China: 403, 440,

451

Military engineering missions, Corps of Engineers:

4-5

Miller, Col. Ernest B.: 78

Millingimbi Airfield: 231

Milne Bay: 179

airfield construction and repair: 151-54, 157-58,

174-75, 186, 221, 235-36

base construction and operation: 236, 245, 257,

556-58

battle of: 175-78

construction materials, procurement: 239

construction program and progress: 181-82, 220-

22, 238-39

engineer units, arrival: 238-39, 521, 558

engineer units, strength: 175, 239

hospital construction: 257

ponton cube assembly plant: 546

port facilities, construction and repair: 151, 158,

175, 183, 221, 257, 546

rainfall, effect of: 239

reconnaissance, engineer: 238

road construction and repair: 221, 235

spare parts procurement: 265, 557-58

storage facilities, construction and operation: 257,

265

Minaker River: 308

Mindanao: 72, 105, 608, 626, 633

airfield construction and repair: 59, 61, 65, 570,

578, 636, 655

base construction and operation: 572, 636

blasting operations: 635-36

bridge construction and repair: 635-36

demolition operations: 106

guerrilla operations: 634

photography, aerial: 570

road construction and repair: 635

topography: 634-35

weather, effect of: 570-71

Mindanao River: 635

Mindanao Sea: 576

Mindoro: 64, 586-87, 655

Mine laying, marine, China: 462-63

Mine sweeping, marine, Leyte: 576

Mines, Japanese

Admiralties: 524-25

Biak: 538-39

Burma: 459

Corregidor: 620

Guadalcanal: 208

Leyte: 582-83

Luzon: 597-98, 609, 614, 617, 626-30, 639

Mines, Japanese—Continued

Manila: 614-15, 617, 619

Marianas: 506

Okinawa: 645-46, 648, 658

Philippines, 1944-45: 633-34

Saipan: 497-99

SOPAC: 542

SWPA: 542, 562

Mines

improvised: 352-53

installation in Hawaii: 348-49, 365-66, 377

required for Hawaii: 352, 362, 365

shortage of, Luzon: 75

Mines, marine, Japanese: 183

Ministry of Communications, China: 403, 414

Missouri: 679

Mitu: 413, 415

Mitu Road: 421-22, 435-36

Miyazaki: 675, 677

Mobile Construction Force: 422

Mobilization plans: 5, 43-44, 341

Mogaung: 443-44, 446, 468, 470, 472

Mohanbari: 400

Mokerang Peninsula: 522, 524-25, 543

Mokmer Airfield: 537-41

Mokuleia: 348, 361, 507

Molokai Island: 39, 361

Molucca Island: 566-68

Momote Airfield: 522-25, 543

Mong Yu: 464-65, 473

Monsoons. See Rainfall, effect of.

Montalban Dam and Reservoir: 618, 627, 638, 656

Montgomery, Col. Harry A.: 430

Moore, Maj. Gen. Richard C.: 25

Morale

Australia: 149

Corps of Engineers: 683

Ledo Road: 423

New Guinea: 146

SWPA: 654

USASOS: 654

Morobe: 246, 251

Moron: 86-87

Morotai: 566-68

Morris, Col. D. A.: 660

Morse, Col. Birney K.: 466, 471, 664

Morse Field: 39, 348

Motobu Peninsula: 645

Mount Austen: 207-09

Mount Barigada: 505

Mount Bataan: 85

Mount Hagen: 231

Mount Haleakala: 16, 23, 41, 51, 347

Mount Isa: 114, 239, 241

Mount Kaala: 16, 23, 51, 347

Mount Kokee: 347

Mount Macolod: 631

Mount Malepunyo: 631
INDEX 739

Mount Natib: 85, 87, 89

Mount Pacawagan: 638

Mount Popomanisu: 207

Mount Santa Rosa: 505

Mount Silanganan: 87, 89

Mount Suribachi: 640

Mount Tapotchau: 493, 498-99

Mountain Engineer Division: 282

Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis: 428, 439, 446-47,

455, 466. See also Southeast Asia Command.

Mukden: 467

Mullins Harbor: 150

Muncho Lake: 309

Munda: 245, 249, 256

Municipal Water Department, Manila: 619

Murray River: 122

Murrow, Col. Lacey V.: 243, 267, 520, 569

Musa River: 180-81, 192

Musita Island: 193, 200-201, 203-04

Muskeg problem: 35, 293-94, 305, 308

Muskwa River: 309, 313

Myitkyina: 391, 405, 435, 443, 446-47, 454-55, 457-

460-66, 468, 470-73, 663-66

Nabesna Highway, Alaska: 304

Nabesna River: 295

Nadzab: 230, 244, 252, 254, 258, 543, 546

Nafutan Point: 498

Nagasaki: 678

Naha: 641-43

Nakagusuku (Buckner) Bay: 641, 659

Naknek River: 295

Namber Field: 563

Namhkam: 473, 663

Namur Island: 477

Nandi Airfield: 46, 48, 163-64, 222, 233

Nanomea Island: 380

Narewa: 222

Nassau Bay: 246, 273

Nasugbu landing: 608-09, 636

National Guard: 5, 14

National Military Council, China: 390

National Park Service: 41, 51

Nausori Highlands: 256

Naval base construction

Admiralties: 521-22, 543-44

Alaska: 16-18, 33, 35, 37, 287

Carolines: 515-16

Kodiak: 17

Leyte: 575

Marianas: 492

Marshalls: 483-85

Samar: 575

Naval construction battalions

Admiralties: 521-25, 543-44

Alaska: 287

Carolines: 516

Central Pacific: 380-81

Naval construction battalions—Continued

Guam: 506, 517

Hollandia: 529

Marianas: 493, 506

Marshalls: 485

Mindanao: 635

New Guinea: 258

POA: 640

Saipan: 498, 511-12

Solomons: 171-72, 233, 243, 255

SOPAC: 211, 232-33, 244-46, 569

7th: 157

40th: 523, 525

57th: 516

104th: 525-26

Naval Construction Regiment, 17th: 525

Naval districts: 36, 42

Naval gunfire support

Biak: 538

Borneo: 636

Carolines: 514, 516

Guam: 503-04

Hollandia: 530

Kwajalein: 479, 482

New Guinea: 532, 535

Philippines, 1944-45: 621, 626, 633-34

Saipan: 496

SOPAC: 542

SWPA: 542

Wakde: 536

Naval guns, emplacement in Hawaii: 349-52, 374,

661

Nawadih: 399

Nawngyang River: 433

Negro troops: 144n

Negros Island: 626, 634

Neilson, Col. Alexander M.: 651, 654

Nenana: 295

Netherlands East Indies: 107, 148, 230, 625, 636, 641

New Britain: 234-35, 272-74, 521

New Caledonia: 118, 234, 652

airfield construction and repair: 45, 161, 163-67,

171, 206-07, 221-22, 233, 256

base construction and operation: 661

construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 212

construction materials, improvised: 165

construction materials, procurement: 214

construction programs and progress: 206-07, 569,

661

defenses, build-up of: 160, 162, 164-66

engineer units, arrival: 164-67, 206, 213, 223

engineer units, strength: 256

hospital construction: 220

housing construction: 167, 223

labor force, strength: 163

land acquisition and return: 661-62

lines of communication: 166
740 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

New Caledonia—Continued

map compilation and distribution: 269-70

port facilities, construction and repair: 167, 223

power plant, installation and operation: 167

quarry operation: 223

railroad construction and repair: 167

reconnaissance, engineer: 46, 48

road construction and repair: 166, 167, 223

spare parts procurement: 264-65

New Delhi: 395, 397-99, 439, 448, 453, 458

New Georgia Islands: 234, 245, 249-51, 256

New Guinea: 172, 234, 520, 557, 586. See also towns

by name.

AAF pressure for construction: 184-86

airfield construction and repair: 143-48, 150-59,

174, 180-87, 194, 198-99, 202, 218-20, 230-31,

235-38, 244-49, 251-52, 254, 257-60, 274-75, 533,

549-50, 561

airfield construction and repair, by Japanese: 550

base construction and operation: 236, 238-39, 244,

256-58, 275, 544, 546-47, 557

beach party operations: 535

bridge construction and repair: 247, 257, 274, 533,

535, 543, 546, 551

cargo unloading and distribution: 533, 535

causeway construction and repair: 183-84, 187

civilians, employment of: 181, 198, 202, 231, 235-

37, 248, 254, 268

climate, effect of: 151, 157-58, 186, 191, 220, 235

construction, control of: 236, 650-51

construction, problems of: 151, 157-58, 181-82, 257

construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 151, 155, 202

construction materials, procurement: 155, 238, 258,

262-63, 266-67

construction programs and progress: 133-34, 174-

75, 181-85, 220-22, 231-32, 238, 244, 246-47, 258,

541-42, 548

demolition operations: 146

engineer missions: 133-34, 160, 174, 521, 541-42

engineer organization: 147, 174, 521

engineer units, arrival: 144-49, 151, 154-55, 157-

58, 187-88, 235, 239, 258, 274-75, 533, 551-52,

558

engineer units, control of: 174, 182, 187, 202

engineer units, requirements: 152-54, 187-88, 244-

45

engineer units, shortage of: 238

engineer units, strength of: 182, 569

engineers as infantry: 175-78, 205, 252-53, 535, 543

hospital construction: 235, 257, 259, 546

housing construction: 184-85, 254, 257-58, 546

labor force, mobilizing: 180-81

land clearing: 157-58

maintenance and repair, general: 186, 265-66

malaria, incidence of: 151, 238

map compilation and distribution: 188-91, 269-70,

553-54, 668-69

New Guinea—Continued

mines, marine: 183

morale: 146

naval construction battalions at: 258

photography, aerial: 189, 191, 258, 553

pipeline construction and operation: 244, 258

port facilities, construction and repair: 158, 183,

194, 202, 235, 238, 244, 246, 257-58, 544, 546, 554

quarry operation: 152, 188

rainfall, effect of: 151, 156, 186, 247, 252, 258, 274,

533, 549-50

reconnaissance, aerial: 150, 563

reconnaissance, engineer: 150-51, 156, 178-81, 230,

236, 238-39, 258, 521

road construction and repair: 158, 182, 194, 202,

205, 230, 237-38, 244, 246, 251, 257-59, 274, 533,

535, 546

roadblock construction: 205

shore party operations: 533, 535

Soils Mechanics School: 272

spare parts shortage: 186, 265-66

specialists, training: 271-72, 672

storage facilities, construction and operation: 238,

244, 251, 257-58, 265, 546

topography: 178-79, 542

trail clearance: 178-80, 231

weather, effect of: 248

New Guinea Force: 174, 179, 182, 202

New Hebrides: 48, 169-71, 232, 256, 546-47, 569

New Ireland: 522

New Malir: 396

New Zealand: 112, 160, 211

construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 47-48

construction materials, procurement: 213-14, 261-

62, 266-67

construction program and progress: 222, 233, 661

hospital construction: 232, 243

housing construction: 243

POL survey: 222, 233, 243

reconnaissance, engineer: 48

storage facilities, construction and operation: 233

New Zealand Chiefs of Staff: 170

Newcomer, Brig. Gen. Francis K.: 416, 453, 601, 605

Newmann, Col. David L.: 305

Newnam, Lt. Col. Frank H.: 471

Ngulu Island: 516

Nichols Field: 58-63, 66, 73, 84, 615, 655

Nielson Field: 66, 84, 92, 655

Night operations: 177, 491

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W. See also Pacific Ocean

Areas; South Pacific Area.

and Alaska defenses: 288, 331

and B-29 bases: 658

and Central Pacific offiensives: 492

and engineer units, control of: 649-50

and Gilberts: 380

and Hawaii defenses: 350
INDEX 741

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.—Continued

and Iwo Jima: 640

and Leyte: 572

and Marianas: 492

and Marshalls: 477-78

and Philippines, 1944-45: 572

heads POA: 128, 170, 347, 378-79

Richardson, relationship to: 507

and Solomons: 153

Nisutlin Bay: 315

Nob Pier, Kwajalein: 485

Noble Drilling Corporation: 325, 335, 337

Noce, Brig. Gen. Daniel: 265

Noemfoor Island: 561

Nold, Brig. Gen. George J.: 19, 21-22, 35, 37, 278-79,

282, 289-90, 333, 642

Nolting, Maj. John P.: 417

Nome: 33, 278, 288, 325

Norman Wells: 318-27, 335-38

North, Col. Earl: 10-11, 14-15, 21, 29

North Africa campaign: 409

North Burke Airfield: 219

North Drome, New Guinea: 251

North Field, Guam: 517

North Field, Iwo Jima: 640

North Harbor, Corregidor: 620

North Harbor, Manila: 656

North Island, New Zealand: 222

North Luzon Force (NLF): 73-80

North Pacific Area: 170, 276, 328, 333, 339

North Pacific Division: 11, 18, 33, 36

North-South Highway, Mindanao. See Sayre (NorthSouth) Highway, Mindanao.

North-South Road, Australia: 114, 239

North way Airfield: 288, 292, 295

Northwest Division, NSC: 316-17

Northwest Service Command (NSC): 313-14, 316-17

Northwest Staging Route: 288, 299, 313, 318, 338

Norton Sound: 18, 288

Nouméa: 165-66, 212-14, 223, 233, 661

Novaliches Reservoir: 614, 618

Nukufetau Island: 380

Nurse, Lt. Col. Howard B.: 357-59, 372

Oahu Island. See Hawaiian Islands; Honolulu.

Oahu Railway & Land Company: 342

Oakes Construction Company: 315

Oakland, Calif.: 362

Obstacles, ground, construction of: 80, 88, 97, 634.

See also Roadblock construction; Roadblock

construction, Japanese; Wire obstacles; Wire

obstacles, Japanese.

O'Connor, Brig. Gen. James A.: 304, 307, 309, 313,

325-453, 458, 461, 465, 475

OCTAGON (Quebec) Conference: 572

O'Donnell Field: 61-64, 71, 73

Offensive plans. See MacArthur, General of the

Army Douglas; also areas by name.

Office of Chief of Engineers (OCE). See Chief of

Engineers.

Officer candidate schools, SWPA: 272

Ogden, Brig. Gen. David A. D.: 521, 532

Ogelbang Airfield: 231

Ohmer, Maj. John F., Jr.: 37

Oil. See POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants).

Okinawa: 625, 641, 642-49, 657-58, 659-60, 667-68

OLYMPIC: 674-78

On Chong's Wharf, Makin: 382

Ondal: 399

Operations Division, WDGS: 464, 663

Operators, engineer equipment. See Specialists,

shortage of; Specialists, training.

ORANGE plans: 3-5, 10, 55, 58, 66, 76-77, 89, 92-94

Orani: 79

Orion: 85, 89, 91-93

Ormoc: 576, 581-82, 586

Ormoc Plain: 573

Oro Bay: 194, 202, 221, 236-37, 257-58, 546, 557-58,

561

Orote peninsula: 503-04, 506

Ostrand, Capt. James A., Jr.: 44

Oua Tom Airfield: 233, 256

Owen Stanley Range: 158, 178-80, 192, 198

Owi Island Airfield: 539-41

P-38's: 541

P-40's: 541

Pacific Commercial Company: 70

Pacific Division: 11

Pacific hut: 297

Pacific Ocean Areas (POA): 128, 153, 170, 376, 377-

79, 380, 383, 507-08, 518-19, 640, 649-50, 668,

680. See also Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.; islands or areas by name.

Pacific theater: 27, 49-50, 128, 463, 649-50, 667-69.

See also Central Pacific Area; Pacific Ocean

Areas; South Pacific Area; Southwest Pacific

Area.

Paez, Jose: 81

Pagbilao: 81

Pago Bay: 504

Paint, photo-resistant: 44

Palau Islands: 510, 512-14, 518, 527

Palawan Island: 626, 632-33

Pallets, use in unloading: 496-97

Pallikulo Airfield: 206-07

Palmerston North: 222

Palo: 579

Palo River: 576

Palolo Valley: 345-46

Pampanga River: 74, 76-80, 82-84, 590-91, 596,

610-13

Pan American Airways: 47, 163

Pan American Highway: 14-15

Panama, Republic of: 12, 15, 20-21, 23, 29-33, 50, 53

Panama Canal. See Canal Zone.
742 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Panama Canal Department. See Stone, Maj. Gen.

David L.; Van Voorhis, Lt. Gen. Daniel.

Panama mounts: 58, 287

Panaon Island: 576, 577

Panay Island: 105, 626, 634, 657

Pandacan District, Manila: 84

Pandasveswar: 399

Pangsau Pass: 411, 433, 466

Paoshan: 414

Papua: 156. See also New Guinea.

"Papuan Aviation Battalion": 181

Parachute Infantry Regiment, 503d: 252, 619-20

Parang: 635

Park, Col. Richard: 33-35, 279, 282

Parker, Maj. David B.: 196, 203

Parker, Brig. Gen. George M., Jr.: 73, 80, 87, 89, 100

Parry Island: 483

Pasig River: 69, 614-17, 619, 656-57

Passage Canal: 18

Patch, Brig. Gen. Alexander M.: 164, 167, 170, 206,

208-09

Patkai Mountains: 405, 411-12, 423

Patnode, Pvt. Jerald F.: 149

Pattee, Lt. Col. Karl M.: 452

Patterson, Robert P.: 24-25, 41, 61

Paules, Lt. Col. Earl G.: 300, 302, 311, 314

Paxton, Maj. John W.: 498

Peace River: 301, 312, 315, 326-27, 334

Pearl City: 374

Pearl Harbor: 53-54

Pearl Harbor Board: 488

Peiping-Hankow railway: 452

Pekoa Airfield: 206-07

Peleliu Island: 514

Pelly River: 337

Pengshan: 440

Pennsylvania: 350-51

Penrhyn Island: 169, 171, 233

Permafrost: 292-93, 309-12

Permanant Joint Board of Defense, Canada-U.S.: 300

PERSECUTION: 532

Perth: 119

Pest control: 308, 501, 550

Peter Kiewit Company: 327

Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL). See Pipeline

construction and operation; POL; Storage facilities, construction and operation.

Philippe, 1st Lt. Hersel E.: 105

Philippine Army

in CONCOR: 653

Corps of Engineers of: 66, 68-69. See also Philippine Army Units by name.

mobilization: 55, 57, 68-69, 72-73

training program: 97-98

Philippine Army Engineer Combat Battalions

1st: 87

2d: 87

11th: 73, 76, 87

Philippine Army Engineer Combat Battalions—

Continued

21st: 73, 76, 87

31st: 73, 76, 87

41st: 80, 87-88, 90

51st: 80, 82, 87, 91, 100

61st: 105

71st: 73, 76, 87, 95-96

81st: 105

91st: 73, 76-77, 87

101st: 105

201st: 88, 100

202d: 88, 100

Philippine Army Engineer Combat Regiment, 301st:

88, 90

Philippine Army Infantry Divisions

11th: 89

31st: 91

41st: 98

Philippine Base Section: 651, 669

Philippine Department. See Philippine Army;

Philippines, Commonwealth of; Philippines,

1941-42; Philippines, 1944-45.

Philippine Engineer Depot: 69

Philippine engineer districts: 650-53

Philippine Racing Club: 616

Philippine Scouts: 653

Philippine Sea, Battle of: 503

Philippines, Commonwealth of

airfields, 1940-41: 58-59

Bureau of Aeronautics: 66

Bureau of Public Works: 62-64, 66, 73-77, 80-81

independence of: 57n

and land acquisition: 60

Philippines, 1941-42: 4, 52-53, 76, 89, 92-93. See also

Grunert, Lt. Gen. George; MacArthur, General

of the Army Douglas; islands and areas by name.

aircraft warning stations, construction of: 59, 64,

66

airfield construction and repair: 45, 55, 58-59, 63-

66, 71

bridge construction and repair: 64

civilians, employment of: 73, 75, 77, 79-82, 88,

101-02

coast defense construction: 57

construction, problems of: 59-61, 64-65

construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 62-63, 69-70

construction materials, procurement: 69-70

construction programs and progress: 59-66, 71-72,

86-87

demolition operations: 66-68, 74, 596

engineer organization: 66, 69

engineer units, arrival: 63

engineer units, shortage of: 59-60

engineer units, strength: 61, 68-69

guerrilla operations: 106

labor force, mobilizing: 69
INDEX 743

Philippines, 1941-42—Continued

land acquisition: 60, 65

maintenance and repair, general: 62-63

map compilation and distribution: 94

port facilities, construction and repair: 61, 66, 71

prisoners, employment of: 65-66

railroad construction and repair: 78

reinforcements for: 55-57, 72, 109

road construction and repair: 60-61, 64

spare parts procurement: 62-63

storage facilities, construction and operation: 66

troop units, defense organization: 55, 66-69

tunnel construction and repair: 61, 64, 66, 71

weather, effect of: 61-62

Philippines 572 , 1944-45: 463, 468, 561, 563, 566, 586 , 569-70, , 619-20, 632, 635, 6

Arthur, General of the Army Douglas; islands

or areas by name.

airfield construction and repair: 625-26, 633-34,

655

base construction and operation: 625-27, 650-51

bridge construction and repair: 633-34

cement plants, rehabilitation: 657

construction, control of: 651-52

construction program and progress: 649

demolition operations: 621-24, 633

engineer districts in: 650-53

engineer missions: 570-71

engineer organization: 650-54

engineer units, arrival: 666-67

enginer units, requirements: 626-27

flame throwers, tactical use: 621

floating depot concept: 670

fortifications, construction by Japanese: 633-34

hospital construction: 653, 655-56

housing construction: 653

maintenance and repair, general: 669-70

map compilation and distribution: 626, 668-69

pipeline construction and operation: 655

POL, tactical uses: 621-24

ponton cubes, employment of: 621

port facilities, construction and repair: 655-56

railroad construction and repair: 657

reconnaissance, engineer: 626

road construction and repair: 633-34, 653

sawmill construction and operation: 657

snipers, Japanese: 622

spare parts procurement: 669-71

specialists, training: 671-72

storage facilities, construction and operation: 653,

655-56

topography: 626

training, deficiencies in: 671

weather, effect of: 570-71

Photo interpretation: 554

Photo Squadrons

1st: 33

8th: 189-91

Photography, aerial

Admiralties: 522

Alaska: 290

Alaska Highway: 308-09

Biak: 538

Burma: 445

Carolines: 516

Central Pacific: 490, 510

China: 458

Guam: 517

Hollandia: 530

Japan: 510, 518, 668-69, 673

Lae: 252

Leyte: 570, 573

Luzon: 588, 596, 607-08

Marianas: 490, 493

Marshalls: 483

Mindanao: 570

by Navy: 668

New Guinea: 189, 191, 258, 553

Okinawa: 641

POA: 382

Saipan: 490, 495, 503

Solomons: 250

SOPAC: 270-71

SWPA: 271, 552-54, 567

Wakde: 534-35

Photography, trimetrogon: 189-91

Photomaps, compilation and distribution: 376-77,

607. See also Map compilation and distribution;

Photography, aerial.

Pick, Brig. Gen. Lewis A.: 433. See also Ledo Road,

and bridge construction and repair: 444, 448,

663-64

and Chinese, supplies to: 472-73

commands of: 432, 438, 439, 443

completes Ledo Road: 664

and construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 456, 465, 472

and construction program and progress: 434, 453-

54, 465-66, 470

and engineer units, diversity of: 466

and engineer units, strength: 465, 664

and engineers as infantry: 444

leads first convoy to Kunming: 473-74

and Myitkyina base: 463, 466, 473

and Myitkyina-Teng-chung road: 473

and pipeline construction and operation: 434, 462,

466, 664

and reconnaissance, engineer: 462, 465

and reinforcements: 457, 463

and road construction and repair: 433, 444, 447,

663-64

and route selection: 460, 462, 465

and spare parts procurement: 442, 456

Pilar: 79, 85-86, 89, 93

Pilar-Bagac road: 90, 93

Pilar-Orion road: 95
744 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Pilar River: 97

Pillboxes. See Demolition operations; Demolition

operations, Japanese; Fortifications, construction

by Japanese.

Pim: 530

Pinamopoan: 582

Pine Creek Airfield: 149

Pineapple Growers Association: 343

Pipe, invasion weight: 426-27, 434, 449-50

Pipeline construction and operation

Admiralties: 544

Alaska: 288

by ASCOM: 585, 600

Assam: 426-27, 439, 442, 457, 466-67, 471, 664-66

Burma: 390, 426-27, 430, 434-35, 442, 454, 457,

463-67, 471, 666

Canol: 320, 323-28, 335-38

CBI: 436, 466

Central Pacific: 386

China: 390, 418, 426-27, 430, 466, 471, 475, 662,

666

Combined Chiefs directive on: 426-27

Fiji: 222

Hawaii: 42

Hollandia: 544

India: 387, 426-27, 439, 442, 450, 457, 466-67, 471,

666

India-Burma Theater: 662

Lae: 244

Ledo Road: 427, 434-35, 439, 449-50, 454, 457, 462, 466-67, 471, 475, 664-66

Leyte: 585

Luzon: 600

Manila: 619

New Guinea: 244, 258

Okinawa: 659-60

Philippines, 1944-45: 655

SWPA: 563

Pitoe Airfield: 568

Plaines des Gaiacs Airfield: 48, 161, 163-67, 222-23,

233, 256

Planking, pierced, first use of: 125, 219

Plaridel: 83, 610

Pleasanton Hotel, Honolulu: 358-59

Pock, 1st Lt. Hugh A.: 473

Poindexter, Joseph P.: 344-45

POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants)

deposits, exploration for: 337

evacuation and destruction of: 84

rationing: 343, 356, 358

requirements: 339, 426-27

shortages: 95, 100

supply of in CBI: 427, 466-68

surveys for: 222, 233, 243

tactical use: 621-24

as weapon against Japan: 325

Pongani Airfield: 181, 192

Ponton bridges: 444, 470, 471n, 472-74. See also Bridge

construction and repair; River crossings.

Ponton cubes, employment of

Central Pacific: 476, 511

Leyte: 577

Luzon: 590, 593, 602

Manila: 618, 656

Okinawa: 659

Philippines, 1944-45: 621

Saipan: 511

SWPA: 550

Ponton cube assembly plant: 546

Popa, Cpl. Stephen: 253

Porac: 655

Port congestion

Australia: 126-27, 242, 554

Hawaii: 367

India: 396

Pacific Coast: 343

San Francisco: 355, 362

SWPA: 264, 554, 557

Port facilities, construction and repair

Admiralties: 544

Alaska: 36, 280-81, 283, 286-89, 291, 297-98, 331,

333-34

ASCOM: 585, 600-601

Attu: 331

Australia: no, 113-15, 240, 260

Bataan: 61, 66, 95

Biak: 539, 544

Burma: 467, 471

Carolines: 515-17

Central Pacific: 476, 511

Fiji: 222

Hawaii: 12, 40, 367, 373-74, 486

Hollandia: 527, 544

India: 394, 396, 399

Japan, for assault on: 673-74, 677-78

Kwajalein: 485

Lae: 244-45, 258

Leyte: 575, 585

Luzon: 592, 600, 632

Manila: 619, 656

Marshalls: 485

Milne Bay: 151, 158, 175, 183, 221, 257, 546

New Britain: 273

New Caledonia: 167, 223

New Guinea: 158, 183-84, 194, 202, 235, 238, 244,

246, 257-58, 544, 546, 554

Okinawa: 643, 659

Philippines, 1941-42: 61, 66, 71

Philippines, 1944-45: 655-56

Port Moresby: 145, 174, 182-83, 259

Saipan: 499, 501-02, 511

Solomons: 245, 249-50, 546

SWPA: 550-51, 567

Wakde: 544

War Department directive on: 287

Port facilities construction and repair, by Japanese:

476-77

Port Heiden: 28, 37, 51, 278, 281, 283, 285, 287
INDEX 745

Port Moresby: 118, 142, 150, 173, 546

airfield construction and repair: 143, 145-48, 151-

57, 174-75, 184-86, 188, 220, 236, 259

base construction and operation: 174-75, 236, 245,

258

construction programs and progress: 133-34, 181-

82, 185, 220-22, 235

hospital construction: 259

housing construction: 185

map compilation and distribution: 199-200

port facilities, construction and repair: 145, 174,

182-83, 259

road construction and repair: 259

Soils Mechanics School: 272, 561

specialists, training: 271-72

Porter, Col. Horace L.: 495

Portland, Ore.: 290

Portland Roads Airfield: 152, 155

Power plants, installation and operation: 167, 373,

399, 502, 619, 657

Prefabricated housing. See Housing construction.

Press correspondents: 473

Preventive maintenance. See Maintenance and repair, general; Spare parts procurement.

Price, Maj. Charles F. B.: 396, 402, 418-19

Prince George, B.C.: 299

Prince Rupert: 280, 289, 302, 323, 327

Prince William Sound: 18, 287

Priority ratings

air ferry routes: 161

Alaska: 48-50, 279, 282, 289-90

Assam: 416-17

Australia: 121-22, 134-35, 137-38, 215-16, 241-42,

260

Burma: 409

Canal Zone: 48-49

CBI: 436, 456

Central Pacific: 377, 381

Hawaii: 48-50, 346, 351, 353-56, 369, 373

India: 401

Kwajalein: 486

Luzon: 604, 612

Philippines, 1944-45: 70

POA: 379

USAFFE: 242, 260

Prisoners, employment of: 65-66, 345

Prisoners of war: 403, 507

Propaganda broadcast, by Japanese: 146

Prophet River: 308

Public relations, in Hawaii: 358-60, 363

Public Roads Administration (PRA): 21, 278, 300-

302, 305-07, 310-17, 334

Public Works Department, India: 416-17

Public Works Department, New Zealand: 233

Puerto Princesa: 633, 655-56

Puerto Rican Department: 6-7, 28

Pulo Anna Island: 516

Punahou Academy: 341-42, 346, 355, 358-59

Pyron, Brig. Gen. Walter B.: 318-19

QUADRANT (Quebec) Conference: 255, 388-89, 425-

28, 431, 444, 448, 466-67, 664

Quarry Heights: 14

Quarry operation: 152, 188, 223, 500, 511

Quartermaster Corps: 6, 9, 12-14, 19, 20

Quebec Conferences: 255, 388-89, 425, 426-28, 431,

448, 466-67, 572, 664

Queensland Agricultural College: 114

Queensland Island Defense Road: 239

Queensland Main Roads Commission: 144, 152, 158

Quezon, Manuel L.: 60

Quezon City: 615

Quinauan Point: 96, 103

Quoin Hill Airfield: 232

Quonset hut: 267, 297

R. G. Le Tourneau, Inc.: 140, 272, 560

Rabaul

air attacks on: 272

as air base, Japanese: 143

air support requirements: 153-54

Combined Chiefs directive on: 225

engineer mission: 244

engineer units, requirements: 234

fall of: 118

JCS directives on: 153, 172, 234

offensive, Allied: 150, 153-54, 160, 172, 225, 244,

255, 272, 275

task force concentration, by Japanese: 149

Radar stations, construction of: 250, 283, 347

Radio station, construction of: 315

Ragay: 80

Railroad construction and repair

Alaska: 18-19, 22, 34, 36, 52, 53, 278, 283, 287-89

by ASCOM: 600, 604

Australia: 241

Burma: 389

Carolines: 516

China: 389

Fiji: 222

Hawaii: 23

Japan, for assault on: 677

Ledo Road: 410

Luzon: 596-97, 600, 602-06, 612, 639

Manila: 604-05

New Caledonia: 167

Philippines, 1941-42: 78

Philippines, 1944-45: 657

Saipan: 502-03

Railroad systems

Assam: 393, 471

Australia: 108, 123

Burma: 393, 435

Canada: 302-03, 305

India: 393, 471

Japan: 673-74

Luzon: 74

New Caledonia: 166

Railroads, Japanese control of: 393
746 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Rails, source of: 389

RAINBOW plans: 10, 14, 19

Rainfall, effect of. See also Weather, effect of.

Alaska Highway: 305, 317, 334

Assam: 393, 400, 416

Burma: 436, 446, 454-55, 462

Burma Road: 414

Carolines: 516

China: 425

Hawaii: 371

Hollandia: 531

India: 392-93, 397, 399

Lae: 252

Ledo Road: 411, 423-25, 432, 453-54, 456-57, 465

Leyte: 580-84, 586

Luzon: 588, 637-38

Milne Bay: 239

New Britain: 274

New Guinea: 151, 156, 186, 247, 252, 258, 274, 533,

549-50

Okinawa: 641, 649, 658-59

Saipan: 500-503

Solomons: 249

SOPAC: 256, 543

SWPA: 542, 565, 568

Ralph Woolley and Company: 41, 359

Ramey, Maj. Roger M.: 46, 48

Ramgarh: 403-05, 416

Ranger Battalion, 6th: 587, 594

Rangoon: 390-91, 430-31

Rangoon-Lashio railway: 390-91

Rations, shortage of: 96

Raymond: 585

RECKLESS: 529

Reconnaissance, aerial

Alaska: 283

Alaska Highway: 306, 308-09

Burma: 445

Canol: 323

Luzon: 626

New Guinea: 150, 563

Okinawa: 646

Solomons: 231

SOPAC: 231

Reconnaissance, aerial, Japanese: 401, 592

Reconnaissance, combat: 250, 454-55, 482, 522-23

Reconnaissance, engineer

air ferry routes: 168-69

Alaska: 12-14, 33-34, 36-37, 283-85, 288-89, 305-

06, 331

Alaska Highway: 300-301, 305-06, 308-12, 314-16

Australia: 119-20, 123, 135, 144

Biak: 537, 539-40

Burma Road: 413-15, 466

Canol: 325, 327

Canton Island: 46-47

Carolines: 516-17

Central Pacific: 384, 510

China: 440

Reconnaissance, engineer—Continued

Christmas Island: 46

Fiji: 46

Guam: 517

Hawaii: 16, 51-52, 350, 368, 486

India: 440

Kwajalein: 482, 484

Ledo Road: 406-07, 409-10, 423-24, 461-62, 465

Leyte: 577, 580-81, 584-85

Luzon: 588, 593, 599, 601, 615, 626, 638

Milne Bay: 238

New Britain: 521

New Caledonia: 46, 48

New Guinea: 150-51, 156, 178-81, 230, 236, 238-

39, 258, 521

New Hebrides: 48

New Zealand: 48

Okinawa: 658

Philippines, 1944-45: 626

POA: 380

Saipan: 496, 499-500, 503

Solomons: 48

SOPAC: 271

SWPA: 230, 549, 554, 563-65, 568

Wakde: 535

Recreation facilities, construction of: 546

Red I Point. See Jacky Jacky Point Airfield.

Refinery construction and operation: 326-28, 335-39

Refrigeration plants, installation and operation: 399,

478, 486, 632

Reid River: 125

Reinforcements

Philippines: 55-57, 72, 92, 109

SOPAC: 164

Reinforcements, Japanese: 205-06, 581, 586

Rendova Island: 245

Repair of machinery. See Maintenance and repair,

general; Spare parts procurement; Specialists,

shortages of; Specialists, training.

Replacements, requirements for: 547

Requisitions. See Administrative procedures.

Reserve Corps: 5

Reserve Force, USAFFE: 73

Reybold, Lt. Gen. Eugene: 42-43. See also Chief of

Engineers.

and Alaska Highway: 300, 305, 317, 324

becomes Chief of Engineers: 45

and Canol: 319-20, 323-24

and construction, control of: 354

and construction programs and progress: 278

and engineer districts: 652

and engineer units, shortages of: 342-43

and maintenance and repair, general: 266

and specialists: 263-64

supply policy: 140, 261

Rhine River: 471n

Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr. See also Hawaiian Islands; United States Army Forces in

the Pacific Ocean Areas.
INDEX 747

Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr.—Continued

commands of: 377, 491, 507

and defense battalions: 381

and engineer missions: 507, 661

and Hawaiian Constructors: 487

Nimitz, relationship to: 507

Richardson Highway: 33, 278, 290, 303-04

Richmond, Australia: 560

Riddell-Webster, General Sir Thomas: 426

Rinehart, Col. O. N.: 650

Rio Hato Airfield: 8-9, 11-12, 14, 21, 50

River crossings. See also Bridge construction and repair; Ponton bridges

Alaska Highway: 310, 312

Burma: 444, 454-55, 459, 468, 472

China: 663, 666

Ledo Road: 470, 472-73

Leyte: 574-75

Luzon: 590-91, 595-96, 602, 610-13, 615-16, 630,

638

New Guinea: 192

SOPAC: 542

SWPA: 542

Rivers, development and use. See Waterways, development and use.

Rizal, Luzon: 610

Rizal Province: 84

Road construction and repair: 16. See also Burma

Road; Land clearing operations; Trail clearing

operations.

Admiralties: 524

Alaska: 36, 50, 278, 283, 288, 291, 295-96, 329-33

by Allied Works Council: 239

by ASCOM: 585-86, 600

Attu: 329-31

Australia: 122-23, 128, 138, 239-40

Bataan: 61, 90-91, 95-97

Biak: 538, 544

Burma: 391, 413, 430, 443, 464

Canal Zone: 20-21

Canol: 321, 325-28, 335-37

Carolines: 514, 516

Central Pacific: 386

China: 413, 430, 472, 662

Fiji: 220-22, 232-33, 256

Guadalcanal: 208-09, 256

Guam: 504-06

Hawaii: 23, 43, 346, 350, 369, 374

Hollandia: 527, 530-31, 544

India: 393, 398-99, 403

Iwo Jima: 660

Japan, for assault on: 673, 677

Kwajalein: 480, 482, 485

Lae: 244, 258

Ledo: 412, 663

Leyte: 577-86

Luzon: 594, 596-97, 600, 609, 626-32, 637-39

Manila: 619, 657

Marianas: 506

Road construction and repair—Continued

Marshalls: 485

Milne Bay: 221, 235

Mindanao: 635

New Britain: 273

New Caledonia: 167, 223

New Guinea: 158, 182, 194, 202, 205, 230, 237-38,

244, 246, 251, 257-59, 274, 533, 535, 546

New Hebrides: 170, 256

Okinawa: 643, 645, 648-49, 659

Panama Republic: 50

Philippines, 1941-42: 60-61, 64

Philippines, 1944-45: 633-34, 653

POA: 380

Port Moresby: 259

Saipan: 498-502

Solomons: 249-50, 255, 526

SOPAC: 256

SWPA: 565, 567-68

Road systems

Australia: 108, no, 114

Bataan: 85-86

Burma: 393

India: 393

Japan: 674

Leyte: 573

Luzon: 74, 588-90, 627-29

New Caledonia: 166

Roadblock construction. See also Obstacles, ground,

construction of.

Bataan: 100

Hawaii: 352

Luzon: 74, 77

New Guinea: 205

Roadblock construction, Japanese

Luzon: 598, 609-10, 627, 639

Manila: 617

Okinawa: 645, 648

Philippines, 1944-45: 634

Robb, Col. Holland L.: 369

Robert Louis Stevenson: 670

Robins, Maj. Gen. Thomas M.: 319

Robinson, Col. Bernard L.: 39

and airfield construction and repair: 219

and base construction and operation: 528

and civilians, employment of: 231

and coast defense construction: 351

commands of: 528, 548, 557

and construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 153

and costs of construction: 353

and engineer units, control of: 147

and engineer units', shortage of: 153

and Hawaiian Constructors: 356, 969, 488

and priority ratings: 215

reconnaissance, engineer, by: 47-48, 156

on SWPA staff: 130, 571

Rocket fire support: 273-74, 530, 562

Rockhampton: 45
748 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Rocky Mountain Trench: 299

Rocky Mountains: 308

Rohl, Hans Wilhelm: 489

Rohl-Connolly Company: 25, 489

Roi Island: 476-77

Roome, Maj. Gen. Horace L.: 417

Roosevelt, Franklin D.

activates USAFFE: 57

and Alaska defenses: 328

and Alaska Highway: 299-300

approves RAINBOW: 14

and Australia build-up: 118

authorizes transfer of construction to Engineers: 20

and 6-29 bases: 441

and Burma Road: 404

and Canol: 319, 322-23

at Casablanca Conference: 225, 328

and China air offensive: 417-18, 428

and China lend-lease: 389

and China as theater: 390

defense planning by: 13-14

and Germany-first policy: 107, 210

and hemisphere defense: 7

and Ledo Road: 409

orders MacArthur to Australia: 99

and SEAC: 428-29

and Stilwell: 398, 470

and U.S. role in Pacific: 128

Rorona Airfield: 147, 186

Rosario, Luzon: 627

Ross, Brig. Gen. Lewis T.: 520, 549, 651, 670

Roto Airfield: 219

Rowell, Maj. Gen. Sydney F.: 174, 178, 182

Royal Australian Air Force: 136-38, 154, 158, 211,

544, 561-63, 567-68, 586

Engineer Construction Squadron, 5th: 562-63

Engineer Mobile Works Squadrons

5th: 533

6th: 533

7th: 533

Royal Australian Engineers: 133, 146-47, 152, 155-56,

158, 211, 231, 271, 636. See also Australian Army.

Royal Australian Navy (RAN): 108

Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu: 358-59

Royal Melbourne Hospital: 114

Royal Netherlands Indies Army: 636

Rumaggi, Col. Louis J.: 650

Russell, Maj. Gen. Henry D.: 488

Russell Islands: 233

Rutledge, Col. Paul W.: 164

Ryukyu Islands. See Ie Shima; Kerama Retto; Okinawa.

S. G. Hindes: 367

Sabotage, by Japanese: 536, 614

Sadon: 466

Sagami Bay: 673-74, 677

Saidor: 272-73, 275

Sailor's Home, Melbourne: 114

Saint, Capt. Frederick G.: 73

Saint-Gaudens, Col. Homer: 32

St. Paul Island: 284, 286-87

Saipan: 492-503, 511-12, 518

Sakhalin Island: 678

Salacsac Pass: 628-29, 636-37

Salamaua: 143, 174, 234, 244, 247-48, 251-52

Salt Lake City: 282

Salvage operations: 93, 603-04, 629

Salween Gorge: 397

Salween River: 405, 408, 413, 421, 435, 454-55, 45s-

62, 466

Samar: 580, 586

Samarai Island: 173

Samboga River: 195

San Agustin, Luzon: 639

San Clemente, Luzon: 595

San Diego, Calif.: 328

San Fabian, Luzon: 588, 603

San Fernando, La Union: 74-75, 588, 603, 655-56

San Fernando, Pampanga: 76-77, 82, 85

San Francisco, Calif.: 52-53, 171-72, 261, 344, 355,

362, 379, 494

San Jose, Luzon: 610, 627-28

San Jose, Mindoro: 586-87

San Juan Reservoirs, Luzon: 614, 617-18

San Juan del Monte: 61

San Manuel, Luzon: 597

San Pablo Airfield: 573, 576, 579-80, 583

Sanananda: 193, 204-05

Sand Island: 367

Sandau Island: 636

Sandvall, Lt. Col. Leslie E.: 454

Sansapor: 564-66

Santa Fe, Luzon: 629, 637-38

Santa Maria, Luzon: 597, 628

Sarana Pass: 329

Sarana Valley: 329

Sarangani Bay: 570-72, 575

Saratoga: 350

Sarmi: 534, 537

Sauer, Maj. Richard P.: 48, 163, 165, 167, 170, 511

Sawmill construction and operation: 433, 544, 551,

632, 657

Sayre (North-South) Highway, Mindanao: 635

Schley, Maj. Gen. Julian L.: 6, 22, 29, 33-34, 36, 42,

45, 63, 70, 389. See also Chief of Engineers.

Schofield Barracks: 10, 14, 23, 53, 350, 510

Schouten Islands: 537, 539, 561-63

Schull, Col. Herman W., Jr.: 429

Seabees: See Naval construction battalions.

Seacoast defenses. See Coast defenses construction.

Seamen's Mission, Melbourne: 114

Seaplane base construction: 365, 374, 515

Seattle: 302, 319, 323

Seattle Engineer District: 11, 19, 28, 34, 36-37, 49,

278-82, 288-91, 296, 333
INDEX 749

Secretary of the Navy. See Knox, Frank.

Secretary of War. See Stimson, Henry L.; Woodring,

Harry H.

Seeadler Harbour: 522, 526

Seedlock, Lt. Col. Robert F.: 453, 465-66, 473

Seeman, Col. Lyle E.: 429, 437

Selective Service Act: 14

Semichi Islands: 328

Sentani, Lake: 527

Sentani Airfield: 531-32

Service commands: 214, 676

Services of Supply, CBI

activated: 394

advance sections activated: 395-96, 415, 418

and airfield construction and repair: 437, 439

base sections activated: 395-96, 409

China: 470

Construction Service: 438, 475, 681

divisions and districts activated: 438-39

engineer organizations: 398-99; 438-39

Engineer Section: 398

Services of Supply, SOPAC: 172, 214, 568

Services of Supply, USAFISPA: 172, 214, 568

Seven-Mile Drome: 143, 146, 152, 186-87, 220

Seward: 17, 287, 289-90

Seward peninsula: 283, 288

Sewerage installation: 366, 373, 502, 657

Shaffer, Maj. C. N.: 479

Shao-yang: 469

Sheepsfoot rollers. See Construction machinery and

equipment, procurement.

Sheldon Lake: 325, 327

Shell Oil Company: 233, 390, 426

Shemya Island: 328, 331, 333

Shepard, O. F.: 358-59

Shibushi: 673, 675, 677

Shield, Maj. John E.: 47, 162, 164-65

Shikoku Island: 678

Shingbwiyang: 405, 411, 424, 433-35, 443, 447, 449

Shipping, allocations: 264, 356, 379

Shipping congestion. See Port congestion.

Shipping losses, Japanese: 425, 432, 452, 468

Shipping priorities: 478-79

Shipping routes: 379, 493-94

Shipping shortages

on air ferry routes: 161

Alaska: 280-81, 289

Australia: 140, 155

Burma: 471

Canol: 325

CBI: 436

China: 408

Congressional hearings on: 362

Hawaii: 343-44, 355, 362-63

India: 471

SOPAC: 543

SWPA: 175, 186, 210-12, 543, 554

USASOS: 186-88

Shop construction: 229

Shore party operations: See also Beach party operations; Cargo unloading and distribution.

Carolines: 514-15

Guam: 503-04

Hollandia: 530-51

Kwajalein: 479-82

Leyte: 477-79

Marianas: 506

Marshalls: 482-83

New Guinea: 533, 535

Okinawa: 644-45

Saipan: 494-97

Wakde: 536

Short, Lt. Gen. Walter C. See also Hawaiian Islands.

and air ferry routes: 45-46, 161-63

and airfield construction and repair: 361

heads Hawaiian Department: 27, 38, 344

and construction machinery and equipment,

shortages: 42-43

and construction programs and progress: 341-43

and Hawaii defenses: 27-28, 40

as military governor: 341, 343

and priority rating: 49

Shweli River: 473-74, 663-64

Siberia: 326

Sibul Springs: 76

Sierra Madre Mountains, Luzon: 625, 627, 638

Signal Corps: 347, 362

Silhavy, 2d Lt. Robert C.: 80

Silver Star awards: 444

Simemi: 193, 196, 199

Simemi Creek: 193, 196, 200

Sincheng: 419-20, 452

Sincheng Construction Company: 419

Singapore: 118, 390

Sitka: 12, 18, 22, 36, 278, 287

Skagway: 302-03, 319, 323-24, 326, 335, 339

Skerry, Lt. Col. Harry A.: 68, 73-78, 83, 87-88, 91,

96, 98-99, 611

Slana: 304, 312

Slave River: 320, 322

Slim's River: 313

Sloat, Lt. Col. James W.: 407, 409

Smith, Lt. Gen. Holland M., USMC: 492, 496-97,

502

Smith, Col. W. D.: 601

Smoke, tactical use: 523, 638

Smoke screen, use considered: 32

Snipers, Japanese: 484, 614, 617, 622, 657

Snowfall, effect of: 294-95, 309

Society Islands: 168

Sogod Bay: 576

Soil cement: 219

Soils Mechanics School: 272, 561

Soldier's Summit: 315

Solomon Islands

airfield construction and repair: 245, 249-50, 254-55
750 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Solomon Islands—Continued

bakery construction: 546

base construction and operation: 245, 250, 527,

544-47

bridge construction and repair: 249, 255, 526

civilians, employment of: 235, 268-69

construction machinery and equipment, improvised: 247

construction programs and progress: 526, 544-46,

568-69, 661

engineer mission: 172-73, 244-45, 249

engineer units, arrival: 249, 526, 544

engineers as infantry: 249-51, 526-27

flame throwers, tactical use: 245, 249

hospital construction: 250-51

housing construction: 544

map compilation and distribution: 188-89

naval construction battalions at: 171-72, 233, 243,

255

offensive, Allied: 153, 172, 233-34, 245-46, 249-51,

254-55, 574

photography, aerial: 250

port facilities, construction and repair: 245, 249-

50, 546

rainfall, effect of: 249

reconnaissance, aerial: 231

reconnaissance, combat: 250

reconnaissance, engineer: 48

road construction and repair: 249-50, 255, 526

sawmill construction and operation: 544

seizure by Japanese: 165

storage facilities, construction and operation: 526,

544

water supply and distribution: 249-51

Sommerfeld mat: 380

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.: 29. See also Army

Service Forces.

activates India Committee: 429

and Alaska Highway: 313, 318, 324

and Canol: 318-19, 322-26, 339

and CBI supply: 436, 442

and China pipeline: 419

and China supply system: 426, 429-30

and construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 236

and Hawaii base development: 375-76

and Ledo Road: 429-30, 464, 663

and pipeline construction and operation: 436-37

and POA staff: 378-79

and POL survey: 222

and port construction and repair: 281

and road construction and repair: 288

and shipping shortages: 436-37

and TOE: 438

Sookerating: 400

Soong, T. V.: 474

Sorido Airfield: 537, 541

Sorong: 563

South China Sea: 88, 97

South Harbor, Manila: 656

South Island, N.Z.: 222, 233

South Luzon Force (SLF): 73, 79-82

South Pacific Area (SOPAC): 160, 162, 169-70, 173,

214, 244-46, 379, 507. See also Ghormley, Vice

Adm. Robert L.; Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.

activation: 170

airfield construction and repair: 232-33, 243, 255-

56, 266, 549-50

base construction and operation: 255-56, 542-43,

546-47, 649

bridge construction and repair: 542

bulldozers, tactical use: 542

camouflage: 559-60

construction, control of: 242

construction, problems of: 542

construction design standards: 266-67

construction machinery and equipment, diversified: 264-65

construction materials, procurement: 260-64

construction programs and progress: 220-24, 231-

32, 242-43, 542-43, 648-49

demolition operations: 542

engineer missions: 275, 542, 568-69

engineer organization: 232, 243, 520-21, 543, 568-

69

engineer units, arrival and departure: 161, 164-68,

171-72, 226-27, 266, 270, 541

engineer units, control of: 243, 543

engineer units, requirements: 232, 234

engineer units, shortages of: 210-11, 267-68, 680

engineer units, strength: 210, 243, 275, 520, 569,

661

hospital construction: 267

housing construction: 256, 266-67

maintenance and repair, general: 264-66

map compilation and distribution: 188-89, 269-71,

551-52, 666-67

photography, aerial: 270-71

rainfall, effect of: 256, 543

reconnaissance, aerial: 231

reconnaissance, engineer: 271

reinforcements for: 164

river crossings: 542

road construction and repair: 256

spare parts procurement: 264-66

specialists, shortage of: 263-65

storage facilities, construction and operation: 256,

267

theater missions: 225, 568-69

topography of islands: 542

training program: 271-72

troop units, strength: 210, 243, 569

South Pacific Base Command, SOPAC: 507, 568, 661

South Pacific Engineer Division: 24
INDEX 751

South Pacific Force: 244

Southeast Asia Command: 428, 437, 470, 473-75. See

also Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis.

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA): 107, 128, 153, 156,

174, 175, 186, 225, 380, 522, 527-28, 534, 670.

See also MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas; United States Army Services of Supply,

activated: 128

airfield construction and repair: 218-20, 230-31,

234, 256-57, 266, 549-50, 561-66

Allied Works Council and: 120-22, 134-35, 137-38,

140-41, 151-52

bases, construction and operation: 182-83, 209-10,

256-57, 543-44, 546

bridge construction and repair: 542, 551, 565

bulldozers, tactical use: 542

camouflage: 219, 559-60

civilians, employment of: 554, 556

combat battalion organization: 547

construction, control of: 229-30, 521, 548, 651-54

construction, problems of: 542

construction battalion organization: 547-48

construction brigade organization: 548

construction design standards: 216-20, 266, 521,

548-51

construction machinery and equipment, diversified: 265, 558

construction machinery and equipment, improvised: 261-62

construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 210-12, 236

construction machinery and equipment, shortages:

264

construction materials, procurement: 260-63, 548,

554

construction materials, shortages: 260-62, 554, 682

construction programs and progress: 220-24, 235,

542-43

construction units, deficiencies in: 560

demolition operations: 542

engineer missions: 130-38, 275, 520-21, 542

engineer organization: 130-31, 230, 235, 243-44,

520-21, 548, 551-52, 556, 571-72, 650-51, 654

engineer units, arrival: 227, 263, 266, 270, 559-60,

564

engineer units, control of: 229-30, 543, 547-48

engineer units, requirements: 231-32, 234-35

engineer units, shortages: 210, 267-69, 547-48, 680

engineer units, strength: 275, 520, 567, 569, 666

flame throwers, tactical use: 562

forestry units, demand for: 262

general service regiment organization: 210, 548

General Headquarters in: 128, 649

geological survey: 554, 669

hangar construction: 217-19

hospital construction: 267, 550, 568

housing construction: 217, 266-67, 568

Southwest Pacific Area—Continued

maintenance and repair, general: 271-272

map compilation and distribution: 188-91, 269,

650, 666-69

photography, aerial: 271, 552-54, 567

pipeline construction and operation: 563

ponton cubes, employment of: 550

port facilities, construction and repair: 550-51, 567

RAAF in construction program: 561-63, 567-68

rainfall, effect of: 542, 565, 568

reconnaissance, engineer: 230, 549, 554, 563-65, 568

replacements, need of: 547

river crossings: 542

road construction and repair: 565, 567-68

sawmill construction and operation: 551

Soils Mechanics School: 272, 561

spare parts procurement: 212, 264-66, 509-10, 557-

59, 568

specialists, shortage of: 263-64, 547, 558, 590

specialists, training: 271-72, 560-61, 671-72

storage facilities, construction and operation: 217-

19, 220, 267, 550, 562-63, 568

task force organization: 521

terrain model construction: 552-53

topographic supplies, procurement: 553

topography of islands: 542

training program: 271-73, 560-61, 671-72

troop units, strength: 210, 243, 567, 569

winds, effect of: 550

Spaatz, Brig. Gen. Carl: 71

Spare parts procurement

Alaska: 279-80, 290

by ASCOM: 585

Australia: 149

Bataan: 100

Burma: 442

Central Pacific: 509-10, 671

and Corps of Enginers: 682

Hawaii: 354-56, 375-76

for landing craft: 265, 558-59

Ledo Road: 412-13, 434, 456

Leyte: 585

Manila: 671

Milne Bay: 265, 557-58

Navy's role in: 558

New Caledonia: 264-65

New Guinea: 186, 265-66

Philippines, 1941-42: 62-63

Philippines, 1944-45: 669-71

SOPAC: 264-66

SWPA: 212, 264-66, 509-10, 557-59, 568

Specialists, shortages of: 263-65, 354-55, 375, 456-57.

509, 547, 558, 560

Specialists, training. See by geographic name.

Specifications, standard. See Construction design

standards.

Spruance, Admiral Raymond A.: 496
752 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Staging areas: 256, 257, 366, 495-96, 529, 544, 546,

657

Standard Oil Company of California: 320

Standard Oil Company of New Jersey: 318-20, 322,

338

Stark, Admiral Harold R.: 35

State Department: 15

Steel. See Construction materials, improvised; Construction materials, procurement.

Steel units, prefabricated: 656

Steele, Maj. Gen. Clive S. (Australian): 131-33, 136-

37, 139, 143

Stefansson, Vilhjalmur: 318-19

Stickney, Col. Henry H.: 57, 59-64, 66, 70, 73-74, 79,

82, 86, 93-94, 96, 99-100, 103, 105

Stilwell, General Joseph W. See also China-BurmaIndia Theater.

activates CBI Air Service Command: 429

and airfield construction and repair: 430-31

arrival in Burma: 392

arrival in China: 391

arrival in India: 391

and B-29 bases: 441

Brereton, relationship to: 397

and Burma offensive: 404-06, 417-18, 421, 434-35,

436, 442-44, 447, 461-62

Chiang, relationship to: 397-98

and China defensive: 469

and Chinese Army training: 418, 420-21, 426

and Chinese troops in India: 403

commands of: 390, 391, 470

and construction, control of: 394-95, 397, 438, 451-

52

construction, transfers to AAF: 438

and construction program and progress: 394

and costs of construction: 441

and demolition operations: 469

and Ledo Road: 407, 411-12, 421, 423-24, 433-34,

447, 454-457, 460-61, 465

and lines of communication: 394

Marshall, relationship to: 398

mission in CBI: 391, 397-98

Mountbatten, relationship to: 428

Newcomer, relationship to: 416, 453

offensive plans: 391

and pipeline construction and operation: 434

plans North Africa invasion: 391

recalled: 470

as Roosevelt's representative: 398

and shipping shortage: 408

and SOS CBI: 438

supply plans: 391

and theater status: 397

and troop units, requirements: 395, 408-09, 463-64

Wavell, relationship to: 397

Wheeler, relationship to: 394, 402

Stimson, Henry L. See also War Department.

and Alaska defenses: 35

and Alaska Highway: 299

and Australia defenses: 107

and Canol: 320, 322, 335-36

and China supply: 467-68

and Hawaii defenses: 27

and Hawaiian Constructors: 489

selects Stilwell for CBI: 390

Stirling Range: 176

Stock control: 508-10, 555-58, 669-71, 682

Stone, Maj. Gen. David L.: 8, 12. See also Papama,

Republic of.

Storage facilities, construction and operation

Admiralties: 544

on air ferry routes: 164

Alaska: 37, 276-78, 281, 283, 287-89, 291, 333

by ASCOM: 585-86, 600

Australia: 113-15, 119, 141, 223, 239, 260

Australian Army: 217-18

Bataan: 95

Biak: 544

Burma: 457, 463

Canol: 323

Carolines: 516

Central Pacific: 386

China: 402

Hawaii: 39-42, 51-53, 350, 365-70, 373-75, 486, 507

Hollandia: 527, 544

India: 394-96, 400, 402, 467, 666

Iwo Jima: 660

for Japan, assault on: 673, 677-78

Kwajalein: 485

Lae: 244

Ledo Road: 410

Leyte: 575, 585

Luzon: 594, 600, 609

Manila: 656

Marianas: 493

Marshalls: 477-78, 485

Milne Bay: 257, 265

New Caledonia: 167, 233-34

New Guinea: 238, 244, 251, 257-58, 265, 546

New Hebrides: 256

New Zealand: 233

Okinawa: 643, 659-60

Philippines, 1941-42: 66

Philippines, 1944-45: 653, 655-56

Saipan: 498-503

Solomons: 526, 544

SOPAC: 256, 267

SWPA: 217-20, 267, 550, 562-63, 568

Wakde: 544

Stout-type houses: 297

Straight, Col. Clio E.: 487

Strategic planning, Japanese: 179

"Strategic triangle": 3, 27
INDEX 753

Stratemeyer, Maj. Gen. George E.: 428-31, 437, 463,

472

Street fighting, Manila: 617

Strong, Col. Frederick S.: 417, 420, 436-37

Strong, Brig. Gen. George V.: 7

Sturdevant, Brig. Gen. Clarence L.: 300, 305, 310,

313, 322-23, 325

Sturgis, Brig. Gen. Samuel D., Jr.

and airfield construction and repair: 525, 573-74,

580, 583, 597 and base construction and repair: 238-39, 584-85

and bridge construction and repair: 575, 590-91,

605-06, 612

and communications, signal: 601

and construction programs and progress: 548-49,

601

and engineer units, control of: 591, 612-13, 626

and Japan, assault on: 675

and logistical facilities: 542

and Manila, 1944-45: 613-14

and Philippines, 1944-45: 570, 580, 588, 592, 599,

626

and road construction and repair: 577, 584

as Sixth Army engineer: 225, 235, 520

and specialists, shoratge of: 590

and supply system: 263, 557, 559

and task force engineers: 521

and Wakde: 535

work potential formula: 529

Styer, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D.: 423, 429, 436, 654

Subic Bay: 656

Subic Bay landing: 57, 608-09

Submarine threat to Alaska: 280

Sugar Plantations Association: 343

Sui-chuan: 469

Suicide attacks, Japanese: 500, 592, 594, 647, 649

Sulipan Canal: 611

Sultan, Maj. Gen. Daniel I.: 466, 468, 470, 473, 662,

664-66

Sulu Archipelago: 626, 633

Sumatra: 118, 467

Sung Shan Mountain: 459, 462

Superior Oil Company: 222

Supplies, construction. See Construction materials,

improvised; Construction materials, procurement.

Supply, by airdrop: 157, 180-81, 582

Supply, by airlift

Assam: 471

Burma: 466, 472

China: 387, 391-92, 396-97, 400-401, 415, 418, 420,

425-26, 431-32, 425-54, 467, 472, 666

Hollandia: 532

India: 472

Ledo Road: 456, 471

SWPA: 558

Supply, daily requirements: 554

Supply, hand-carried: 582

Supply, measurement tons

Alaska: 289

Biak: 557

China: 391, 418, 420, 426, 431, 464, 666

Hollandia: 557

Japan, for assault on: 677-78

Marianas: 493-94, 496

Saipan: 496

SWPA: 212, 556-58

Wakde: 557

Supply, overland: 198, 387-88, 391, 404-06, 408-09,

415, 424-25, 432, 464, 470, 474-75

Supply, by water, SWPA: 558

Supply dumps. See Storage facilities, construction

and operation.

Supply duty, attitude toward: 559, 682

Supply Mission, New Zealand: 213

Supply systems

Attu: 329-30

Australia: 155, 556

Burma: 466, 394-95, 432, 436, 443, 446

Burma Road: 473

Central Pacific: 508-10, 568-69, 669

China: 425-26, 429-30

Chinese Army: 413-15

deficiencies in: 682

India: 394-95, 425, 429

Leyte: 611

Luzon: 606

Marshalls: 485

Navy's role in: 265

Philippines, 1944-45: 669-70

POA: 378

Port Moresby: 263

SOPAC: 171-72, 214, 233-34, 262-63

SWPA.: 211-14, 262-63, 558, 568-69, 669

War Department directives on: 171-72, 211, 261,

264, 508-09, 554, 669-70

Supply systems, Japanese: 443

Surrender, by Japan: 678-79

Survival training: 491

Sutherland, Col. Edwin M.: 396

Sutherland, Lt. Gen. Richard K.: 179, 187, 234, 608

Suva: 162

Sverdrup, Maj. Gen. Leif J.

and airfield construction and repair: 46-48, 154,

231, 236, 525

becomes SWPA acting chief engineer: 571

and bridge construction and repair: 602

commands of: 130-31, 174, 651-52, 653-54

and construction, obstacles to: 186

and construction deadlines: 543-44

and construction reorganization: 174

and engineer units, control of: 202

forms Construction Corps of Philippines: 653

and Hawaii contractors: 488
754 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Sverdrup, Maj. Gen. Leif J.—Continued

and labor force, mobilizing: 181

and Musita Island action: 204

and reconnaissance, engineer: 48, 168-69, 178-80,

230

and specialists, training: 671-72

and supply discipline: 553

Sverdrup and Parcel, engineering firm: 41, 47-48,

112, 120, 163, 320

Sweeper Creek: 286

Sydney: 109, 114, 126, 134, 136, 138, 141-42, 240, 242,

271-72, 556-57, 560

Sydney Technical College: 560

Szechwan Province: 431, 451

Taal, Lake: 71, 631

Tacloban: 573, 576, 579, 581, 585, 599, 670

Tacloban Airdrome: 576, 579, 583-85

Tactical methods: 77, 82, 91-92, 542

Tadji Drome: 533

Tagish Lake: 312

Tagoloan River: 65

Tagudin: 74

Taipha Ga: 443-44

Talaud Islands: 572, 575

Talley, Col. Benjamin B.: 22-23, 28, 34, 36, 278, 280,

282-84, 288, 292-93, 295, 331, 333, 643-44

Tambu Bay: 247

Tami Airfield: 532

Tanacross Airfield: 288, 307, 310, 315

Tanaga Island: 284

Tanahmerah Bay: 527-28, 531-32, 534

Tanai River: 442-43, 447, 453

Tanana: 288, 325

Tanana River: 295, 304, 310, 312

Tanapag Harbor: 500-501, 511

Tanauan: 584-85, 587

Tanchuk: 469

Tank action, Burma: 444

Tank fire support

Corregidor: 621

Kwajalein: 480-81

Luzon: 598

Manila: 617

New Guinea: 205, 533

Okinawa: 647

Tank-infantry teams, Okinawa: 647

Tanks, control by USAFFE: 78

Taping River: 663-64

Tarakan Island: 636

Tarawa Island: 381

Tarlac: 75, 78, 93, 605

Tarlac River: 75, 77, 595

Tarung River: 435, 443, 447-48

Task forces

2600: 32, 324, 335

Brewer: 522, 524

Task forces—Continued

Connolly: 638-39

CYCLONE: 561

Efate: 171

HURRICANE: 537, 538, 541

New Guinea, organization in: 251

PERSECUTION: 532

RECKLESS: 529

Southwest Pacific Area, organization in: 521

TORNADO: 535

TRADEWIND: 567

TYPHOON: 564

Task forces, Japanese: 149

Tasmania: 137, 216

Tatana Island: 183, 187

Tate, Maj. Ferdinand J.: 398, 400, 410-12

Tawang River: 448

Tawitawi Island: 633

Teale, Col. Willis E.: 151, 153, 158, 213, 215-16, 266,

520

Technology: 413, 682-83

Tehran Conference: 463

Telegraph and telephone installation: 337, 370, 419

Temperature Zone Hospital: 241

Temperature, effect of: 310, 370, 501. See also Climate, effect of; Weather, effect of.

Teng-chung: 456, 460-62, 465, 472-73

Teng-chung-Myitkyina road: 472-74

Tennant Creek: 114, 240-41

Tenney, Col. Clesen H.: 381

Terminals, port. See Port facilities, construction and

repair.

Terowie: 123

Terrain model construction: 552-53

Territorial Airport Contractors: 41, 348

Teslin Lake: 303, 310-12

Teslin River: 303, 312

Thailand: 390

The Caves, Australia: 260

Theodore, Edward G.: 121, 127, 137-38, 141-43, 215,

241-42

Thomas, Lt. Col. H. E.: 607

Three-Mile Drome: 186

Tignuan River: 81

Tiis River: 97

Tingkawk Sakan: 467

Tinian Island: 490, 492-93, 503, 506, 511

Tinker, Maj. Gen. Clarence L.: 348, 361

Tinsukia: 449-50, 457, 466-67, 471, 664-66

Tocumwal Repair and Assembly Depot: 122, 141

Toem: 534, 537, 541

Tojo, General Hideki: 50

Tokyo: 518, 673-74, 677

Tokyo Bay: 679

Tonga Islands: 168-69

Tongatabu Island: 169-70, 661

Tontouta Airfield: 46-48, 161, 163-67, 223, 233, 256

Toobally Lakes: 309, 315
INDEX 755

Tools, construction. See Construction machinery and

equipment, diversified; Construction machinery

and equipment, improvised; Construction machinery and equipment, procurement.

Topographical supplies, procurement: 533

TORNADO: 535

Torrens Creek: 125

Townsville: 150, 158

airfield construction and repair: 45, no, 115, 119,

125, 127-28, 143, 164

base construction and operation: 112-13, 153

port congestion: 243

port facilities, construction and repair: no, 115,

128, 240

reconnaisance, engineer: 46

road construction and repair: 138

storage facilities, construction and operation: 260

TRADEWIND: 567

Traffic control and congestion: 316-18, 343, 577, 580,

599, 611, 634

Trail clearing operations: 178-80, 231, 443-44, 447,

470

Training, deficiencies in: 97-98, 330-31, 606, 682

Training centers, in Australia: 271

Training facilities, construction in India: 403

Training missions, Corps of Engineers: 227

Training programs

amphibious operations: 271, 330-31, 478, 490-91,

671

Australia: 122, 124-25, 136

bomb disposal: 271, 560-71

camouflage measures: 271-72

Central Pacific: 478

Chinese Army: 403-05, 420-21, 426, 455-56, 463,

662

Hawaii: 377, 490-91

India: 403-04

jungle operations: 156, 490-91

with landing craft: 671

Marianas: 495

Marshalls: 478

night operations: 491

on-the-job: 271-72

Philippine Army: 97-98

Philippines, 1944-45: 671

Saipan: 496

SOPAC: 271-72

specialists: 271-72, 560-61, 671-72

in survival: 491

SWPA: 271-73, 560-61, 671-72

USASOS: 671-72

Transporation Corps: 325

Transportation facilities: 320-21, 323-25, 327, 338,

365-66, 399-400, 402-03, 476

Transports, naval, in CPA: 476

Trans-Siberian railroad: 293

Trench obstacles, construction in Hawaii: 344-45

Triangle, The, New Guinea: 196, 200-01

TRIDENT (Washington) Conference: 164, 377, 390,

418-20, 426

Trik, Capt. Carl H.: 355-56

Trinidad Base Command: 28

Tripler General Hospital: 374, 486, 507, 661

Troop assignment methods, USAFIA: 124

Troop units

Japanese strength: 248, 682

organization for Philippines defense: 55, 66-69

shortages of: 509, 670

strength; 68, 210, 243, 496, 518-19, 567, 569

Trucks, assembling: 400

Trudeau, Col. Arthur G.: 227-28

Truk Island: 492

Truman Committee hearings: 335, 362. See also Congress.

Tseng Yang-fu. Dr.: 421

Tsili Tsili Airfield: 244, 248, 252

Tuguegarao: 66

Tulagi Island: 168, 172

Tulavera River and Valley: 627

Tully, Lt. Col. James K.: 51

TULSA plan: 153

Tuna Packers cannery, Honolulu: 340

Tundra: 293-94, 329, 331

Tunnel construction and repair

Alaska: 283

Bataan: 61, 71, 95

China: 462

Corregidor: 66, 101-04

Hawaii: 350, 368-70, 374

Ledo Road: 410

Philippines, 1941-42: 61, 64, 66, 71

Tunnel defenses, Japanese: 383, 598, 633. See also

Cave defenses, Japanese.

Tuol River: 97

Turnbull, J. Gordon: 320

Turnbull Airdrome: 257

Turner, Rear Adm. Richmond K.: 482, 492

Twitty, Brig. Gen. Joseph J.: 378, 490, 510

"Two-Ocean Navy Act": 14

Tydings-McDuffie Act: 57n

Tyler, Brig. Gen. Max C.: 6

TYPHOON: 564

Ulithi Atoll: 514-16

Ulupau Head: 351

Umingan: 597

Umnak Island: 28, 37, 51, 278, 280-81, 284, 285, 296-

98

Unalaska Island: 37, 281, 285, 296-97

Under Secretary of War. See Patterson, Robert P.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): 27, 35,

288, 293, 326, 333, 463, 678, 682

United States Advanced Base, Port Moresby: 174

United States Army, expansion of: 14

United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA):

109, 113, 117-18, 119, 124, 126, 156, 171,
756 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA)—

Continued

189-90. See also Barnes, Brig. Gen. Julian F.;

Brett, Maj. Gen. George H.

United States Army Forces in the Central Pacific

Area (USAFICPA): 377

United States Army Forces in the Chinese Theater

of Operations, Burma, and India: 390

United States Army Forces in the Far East

(USAFFE): 57, 60, 78, 230, 242, 260. See also

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas.

United States Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean

Areas (USAFPOA): 507, 568. See also Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr.

United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area

(USAFISPA): 172, 214, 507, 568

United States Army Services of Supply. See also

Army Forces, Western Pacific; Frink, Maj. Gen.

James L.; Marshall, Brig. Gen. Richard J.;

Southwest Pacific Area; Styer, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D.

AFWESPAC, redesignation to: 654

Army Service Command (ASCOM) activated: 571

ASCOM, assignment to: 601

Australia, transfer from: 557

base construction and operation: 236, 245, 256-59,

262-63, 528

Boat Building Command: 653-54

camouflage: 559-60

civilians, employment of: 268-69, 653-54

construction, control of: 229-30, 257-58, 651-54

Construction Corps of the Philippines: 653

Engineer Construction Command (ENCOM): 651-

53, 681

engineer districts of: 650-53

Engineer Intelligence Section: 269

engineer mission: 521

engineer organization: 243-44, 257, 520-21, 528-29,

571-72, 650-54

and engineer units, control of: 187

engineer units, shortage of: 238

engineer units, strength: 654

General Engineer District (GENED): 652

Hollandia, move to: 569, 650

Japan, assault on: 673, 675

Leyte, move to: 650

logistical system: 570-71

Manila, move to: 650

Marine Supply Section: 558-59

mission: 183, 262-63

morale: 654

New Guinea, move to: 557

and shipping shortage: 186-88

specialists, training: 671-72

supply divisions activated: 556, 558-59

stock control: 555-56

training program: 671-72

USAFIA, redesignated from: 156

United States Coast and Geodetic Survey: 94, 376,

573, 577

United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP): 99.

See also MacArthur, General of the Army

Douglas; Wainwright, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M.

United States Geological Survey: 668-69

United States Navy. See also Naval construction battalions; Naval gunfire support.

airfield construction and repair: 12

amphibious operations, role in: 577-78

in construction program: 278, 287, 501, 511-12,

541-44, 657

fleet expansion: 10-11

Hawaii, co-operation in: 370, 374, 376, 661

housing construction: 267

intelligence estimates and reports: 284

at Iwo Jima: 640

landing craft operation: 578

in Luzon, 1944-45: 591-92, 594

in Manila rehabilitation: 656

photography, aerial: 668

and pilots for AVG: 389

POA, liaison in: 680

SOPAC, role in: 160

spare parts procurement: 558

in supply system: 265

war plan: 4

United States Task Force in China: 390

Upolo Field: 348

Urbana Force: 199-201, 205

Urbiztondo: 77

Urdaneta: 596

Utiladors: 292

Utilities, installation and maintenance: 365, 403

Valdez, Alaska: 303

Van Noy, Pvt. Junior N.: 253-54

Van Voorhis, Lt. Gen. Daniel: 15, 20-21, 28-32. See

also Canal Zone.

Vasey, Maj. Gen. George A.: 193

Vella Lavella Island: 250

Viardo, Capt. Emilio: 68

VICTOR plans: 625

Vigan: 72, 74

Vila: 170

Vila Airfield: 250

Villa Verde Trail: 627-29, 637

Visayan Islands: 72, 608, 625, 634, 655

Visayan-Mindanao Force: 105-06

Viti Levu: 46, 222

Vitiaz Strait: 272

Vogelkop peninsula: 563

Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC): 109

W. A. Bechtel Company: 320, 325, 327

W. E. Callahan Construction Company: 25, 41, 320,

325, 327

Wacol: 115
INDEX 757

Waga Waga: 176-77, 238

Wahiawa: 23

Wahiawa Gulch: 368

Waianae Amphibious Training Center: 491

Waiele Gulch: 362

Waigani Drome: 157, 186

Waigeo Island: 563

Waikakalaua Gulch: 40-42, 368, 370

Wainwright, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M.: 73, 75-77, 79, 83,

87, 89, 96, 99, 105, 128

Wakde Island: 534-36, 541, 542, 543-44

Wake Island: 45, 161

Walawbum: 444

Walker, Maj. James A.: 410

Walker, Lt. Col. Nelson M.: 51

Walkway construction: 502

Wallace, Maj. Gen. Fred C.: 657

Walsh, Col. Orville E.: 239, 246, 548, 588, 601, 613

Wama Drome: 568

Wanamaker, Col. William W.: 522, 525

Wanigela Mission: 180-81, 192

Wanting: 474, 663

War Cabinet, Australia: 216

War Department. See also Chief of Engineers; Marshall, General of the Army George C.; Stimson,

Henry L.; War Department General Staff; War

Plans Division, WDGS.

activates SOS, CBI: 394

and aircraft for China: 391-92

and Alaska defenses: 276-78, 299, 333

and Alaska Highway: 299-300

and American Military Mission to China: 389

appropriations, prewar: 9

and Burma offensive: 404, 409

and Canol: 318-21, 335-36, 339

and China, supply of: 423

and China defenses: 389, 408

and China theater status: 390, 397

and Communications Zone organization: 438

and construction, control of: 360

construction directives: 25, 281-82, 402, 508

and construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 547, 549

and construction units: 547-48, 675

and cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts: 24

and Engineer Construction Command: 654

and Hawaii defenses: 16, 342-43, 360-61

and hospital construction: 486

and India airfields: 420

and Ledo Road: 463-64, 663-64

and pilots for AVG: 389

and POL surveys: 222, 233

and port facilities, construction and repair: 287

and radar installations: 283

and specialists: 265, 270, 456, 463-64

supply system and directives on: 171-72, 211, 261,

264, 508-09, 554, 669-70

War Department General Staff. See also Marshall,

General of the Army George C.; Operations

Division, WDGS; War Department; War Plans

Division, WDGS.

Alaska inspection by: 51

and Alaska Highway: 299

hemisphere defense plans: 7

ORANGE plans, changes in: 3-5

RAINBOW plans, changes in: 10, 14, 19

War Ministry, China: 408, 422

War Office, British: 420

War plans, U.S.: 4-7

War Plans Division, WDGS

and Alaska defenses: 16, 18, 23, 34

and Alaska Highway: 299

and Canol: 318-19

Warazup: 454

Ward's Drome: 186

Warehouse construction and operation. See Storage

facilities, construction and operation.

Warren Force: 199-200

"Washing Machine Charley": 274

Washington Conference: 107, 164, 377, 390, 418-20

Water purification. See Water supply and distribution.

Water seepage problem: 292-93, 316

Water supply and distribution

Australia: 155

Biak: 539-40

Central Pacific: 476

Corregidor: 103

Hawaii: 373

Kwajalein: 483

Manila: 614, 618-19, 656-57

Marshalls: 478, 483, 485

Okinawa: 645

Saipan: 501-02

Solomons: 249-51

Waterways, Alberta: 319-27

Waterways, development and use: 288-89, 295, 319,

321-25, 327-28, 342

Waterways systems: 73-74, 312-13, 590, 602, 612-13,

641

Watson Lake: 299, 301-04, 309, 311, 325-26, 328, 335

Watut River: 252

Wau: 231, 260

Wavell, Field Marshal Sir Archibald: 118, 391, 397,

404-05. See also General Headquarters, India;

India.

Wawa: 77, 84, 595-96, 602, 612

Weather, effect of. See also Climate, effect of; Permafrost; Rainfall, effect of; Snowfall, effect of;

Winds, effect of.

Alaska: 281, 283-89, 291-96, 333-34

Alaska Highway: 315-18

Attu: 329

Canol: 324-25, 327-28, 337
758 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Weather, effect of—Continued

Ledo Road: 433

Leyte: 576, 578, 580-81

Mindanao: 570-71

New Guinea: 248

Philippines, 1941-42: 61-62

Philippines, 1944-45; 570-71

Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C. See also China.

and Burma offensive: 662

Chiang, relationship to: 470

heads China Theater: 470

and pipeline construction and operation: 664-66

and road construction and repair: 662-63

at SEAC: 437

training program: 662

Wehuria Creek: 176-77

Welling, Col. Alvin C.: 301, 475, 663

Wells, drilling in Alaska: 293, 325-27, 335-37

West Construction Company: 34, 36, 278, 287

Western Defense Command: 276

Wewak: 284, 527, 533, 563

Wheeler, Maj. Gen. Raymond A.: 112, 436. See also

China-Burma-India Theater: Services of Supply,

CBI.

and airfield construction and repair: 418, 420, 431

base establishment by: 409, 418

and Burma Road: 405

and construction, control of: 394-95, 397-98, 437-

38 and construction program and progress: 397

and engineer units, arrival: 436

heads SOS, CBI: 394-95, 437 and Ledo Road: 406, 409-12, 423-24

lines of communication, operation by: 394

and pipeline construction and operation: 434

at SEAC: 437

Stilwell, relationship to: 394, 402

and supply of Chinese forces: 406, 408

Wheeler, Col. W. J.: 313

Wheeler Field: 8, 28, 39, 44, 51, 53, 340, 347, 361

Whipple, Col. Stephen C.: 303

White, Capt. George E., Jr.: 348

White Pass & Yukon Railroad: 302, 326

White River, Canada: 314-15, 317, 328

Whitehead, Brig. Gen. Ennis C.: 184-85, 229, 584

Whitehorse: 288, 299, 302-04, 307, 309-11, 314-15,

319-20, 322-28, 335-38

Whitlock, Brig. Gen. Lester J.: 178, 672-74

Whittier, Alaska: 287, 289

Wilcox, Maj. H. Case: 395

Wilkinson, Rear Adm. Theodore S.: 225

Williams, Mr.: 104

Willingdon Airdrome: 392, 399

Williwaws: 294-95

Wilson, Brig. Gen Walter K., Jr.: 437, 440, 664n

Wimer, Col. Benjamin R., 378, 486-88, 507-10

Winds, effect of: 294-95, 550

Wingate, Brig. Gen. Orde C.: 427-28, 430, 444-46

Wire obstacles: 82, 351, 399, 525

Wire obstacles, Japanese: 481, 562, 610, 617, 633

Womeldorff, Lt. Col. Virgil M.: 330-31

Woodbury, Lt. Col. Harry G.: 249

Woodlark Island: 231, 234, 239, 244, 246, 251

Woodring, Harry H.: 7, 18, 20

Woodstock Airfield: 125, 145, 149

Work potential formula: 529, 549

Works Progress Administration (WPA): 38-39

World War I ponton bridge: 471n

Worsham, Brig. Gen. Ludsoh D.: 317, 327, 334, 655

Wright, Col. Albert: 127, 140

Wyman, Col. Theodore, Jr.: 16

and AAF pressure for construction: 354

and aircraft repair shops: 361

and airfield construction and repair: 39-40, 45-46,

48, 161-65, 168, 348

as Canol director: 316, 320-21, 323, 327

and civilian defense construction: 344-45

and civilians, evacuation of: 345-46

and coast defenses: 349-51

and construction machinery and equipment, procurement: 49, 343

and construction materials, procurement: 49, 343

and cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts: 41, 52, 320

and costs of construction: 52, 353

and engineer units, requirements: 38

and food production: 344

and Hawaii defense construction: 38-40, 42, 52,

341-353 and Hawaiian Constructors: 52, 356, 488-89

heads Northwest Division: 316-17

and land acquisition: 356

and pipeline construction and operation: 42, 325

and POL delivery: 324-25, 343

and priority ratings: 161, 343

and public relations: 359-60

and reconnaissance, engineer: 168-69

and road construction and repair: 325

and staff organization: 340-41

and storage facilities, construction and operation:

41 and supply, by airlift: 324

supply difficulties: 324, 327, 355-56

X-Force, Chinese: 405

Y-Force, Chinese: 405, 408, 413-15, 421, 442, 454-56,

458-62, 470, 662

Y-Force Operations Staff: 421

Yakutat: 12, 22, 35-37, 278, 283, 295-96

Yakutat hut: 297

Yangkai: 403, 415

Yangtze. River and Valley: 425, 432, 452, 662

Yap Island: 514, 572, 574

Yawata: 456

Yoder, Lt. Col. Leverett G.: 144, 147, 150-51, 181

Yokohama: 673-74, 677
INDEX 759

Yontan Airfield: 645, 658-59

York, Col. Robert E.: 432

Young, Col. Gordon R.: 10, 29, 31-33

Young Hotel, Honolulu: 340

Yount, Brig. Gen. Paul F.: 395, 664n

Yukon River: 288, 295, 309, 325

Yukon Territory: 305, 312

Yunnan-Burma Highway Engineering Administration: 408, 413-15, 421-22, 465, 663. See also

Kung, C. C.

Yunnan-Burma railroad: 413, 436

Yunnan-Burma Railroad Authority: 389, 403, 415

Yunnan Province: 392, 397, 403-05, 409, 416, 429,

455, 459, 462, 666

Yunnanyi: 415, 421, 471

Yupbang Ga: 435, 442

Zablan Airfield: 656

Zambales Mountains: 610

Zamboanga: 633, 655-56

Zamboanga peninsula: 626, 633-34

Zamboanga Province: 65-66

Zero aircraft: 518

Zigzag Pass: 609

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1987 O—190-307