J-S30016-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: R.T.L., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.J.L., JR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 525 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 15, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 88678

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2024

R.J.L. (“Father”) appeals from the decree involuntarily terminating his

parental rights to his daughter, R.T.L. (“Child”). Additionally, counsel for

Father, Mary C. Favinger, Esquire (“Counsel”), has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), and petitioned to withdraw. We grant 

Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the decree involuntarily terminating 

Father’s parental rights.

1

The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. 

Child was born in October 2021, two days after L.C. (“Mother”) was 

found slumped over in a stolen vehicle with a needle in her arm. See N.T., 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother absconded from a drug treatment facility in December 2023, and her 

whereabouts were unknown at the time of the termination hearing. See N.T., 

3/4/24, at 11-12. 
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3/4/24, at 8-9. Both Mother and Child tested positive for cocaine and opioids. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/24, at 2. In November 2021, Berks County 

Children and Youth Services (“BCCYS”) filed a petition for dependency 

asserting Child was without proper care or control, and, in November 2021, 

the court adjudicated Child dependent and transferred legal custody to BCCYS. 

See N.T., 3/4/24, at 9. Child was placed with kinship foster parents, with 

whom she has lived since birth and whose children she regards as siblings. 

See id. at 26. Mother and Father were ordered to complete parenting 

education, have mental health, drug, and alcohol evaluations, and establish 

appropriate housing and income; they were granted supervised visitation. 

See id. Father denied parentage of Child until paternity tests were completed 

in April 2022. See id. at 10-11.

The court held permanency reviews for Mother and Father in May 2022, 

November 2022, March 2023, and August 2023. In May 2022, the court found 

Father had not made progress toward alleviating the circumstances that led 

to the placement nor had he complied with the permanency plan; in November 

2022, the court found Father had made minimal progress toward alleviating 

the circumstances that led to placement and was minimally compliant with the 

permanency plan; in March 2023, the court found Father had made minimal 

progress toward alleviating the circumstances that led to placement and was 

minimally compliant with the permanency plan, and in August 2023, the court 

found Father had made no progress toward alleviating the circumstances that 
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led to placement and was minimally complaint with the permanency plan. See 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/24, at 3.

BCCYS filed involuntary termination petitions against Father and Mother 

in August 2023. See N.T., 3/4/24, at 25.

In January 2024, the court convened a hearing on BCCYS’s petitions. 

See N.T., 1/22/24, at 1.2 Limarys Alvarez (“Ms. Alvarez”), an outpatient 

specialist therapist at Commonwealth Clinical Group (“CCG”), testified CCG 

evaluated Father in August 2022, focusing on his unhealthy relationships with 

Mother and Child and related domestic violence issues, including a report he 

pushed Mother down the stairs during her pregnancy. See id. at 15-16, 42. 

In April 2023, Father began sessions with a CCG therapist and then after 

missing sessions, began sessions with Ms. Alvarez at the end of July 2023. 

See id. at 17. From July 2023 until January 2024, Ms. Alvarez had nine 

sessions with Father; Father missed six other sessions. See id. at 17. 

Although the sessions were designed to address Father’s history of domestic 

violence, Father denied that history and any need for mental health services,

alleging healthy relationships and domestic violence concerns did not apply to 

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2 Pursuant to In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. 2020), 

we must verify the court appointed counsel to represent Child, and if counsel 

served in a dual role, that the court determined before appointment that there 

was no conflict between the child’s best and legal interests. For children too 

young to express a preference, there is no conflict between the child’s legal 

and best interests, and the child’s right to counsel is satisfied by the 

appointment of an attorney-guardian ad litem (“GAL”). See In re T.S., 192 

A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018). Here, because Child was less than three 

years old at the time of the proceeding, the GAL did not have a conflict in 

representation. GAL has filed a brief in support of termination.
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him. See id. at 18-19. Father refused to focus on healthy relationships and 

focused only on obtaining custody of Child, which prevented progress on his 

domestic violence issues. See id. at 19-20, 23, 29-31, 34, 37-41. Ms. Alvarez 

testified Father always provided only “very limited” information about his 

current life. See id. at 20. 

Kristen Murphy (“Ms. Murphy”), a caseworker at Signature Family 

Services, began working with Father in March 20233 on parenting skills after 

testing showed he presented a medium-to-high risk in all five parent-related 

categories. See id. at 54. Father attended the first session, then missed the 

next four and the program discharged him in May 2023. See id. at 51-54. 

Ms. Murphy was also present during sixteen on-line visits Father had with 

Child. See id. at 55-56. During those sessions, Father became impatient and 

frustrated when Child, who was less than two years old, lost focus. See id. 

at 57-58. Father failed to appear for a first in-person visit in July 2023, and 

thereafter continued to cancel or not show up regularly to scheduled visits. 

See id. at 59-60.

In August 2023, a supervisor attended Father’s in-person meeting with 

Child and Ms. Murphy because Father had been argumentative and used

inappropriate language with Ms. Murphy. See id. at 61, 69. Child was upset 

and crying and would not engage with Father; Father had failed to bring a 

diaper bag or any other necessary supplies. See id. at 61-62. Father 

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3 Until August 2023, Father lived in Florida with his two other children. See

N.T., 3/4/24, at 16-18.
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attended one in-person visit later that month, but thereafter cancelled his 

visits or did not appear later in August, in September, or in early October, at 

which point he was discharged from the casework and nurturing parenting

program. See id. at 62-64. The hearing was continued after Ms. Murphy’s 

testimony. 

The court resumed the hearing in March 2024. Saniya Daryanani (“Ms. 

Daryanani”), Child’s BCCYS adoption caseworker since September 2022,

testified in-person visits for Father were not scheduled until he stated he 

moved to Pennsylvania in August 2023. See N.T., 3/4/24, at 6-7, 20-22. 

Instead of visiting Child weekly, Father visited monthly, and told BCCYS he 

would tell them when he wanted visitation as opposed to having a schedule. 

See id. at 23. In January 2024, Father declined visits that were offered to 

him on three consecutive weeks. See id. at 44. During an in-person visit in 

August 2023, Father grabbed Child out of foster father’s arms, greatly 

upsetting Child. See id. at 44. Ms. Daryanani testified Father was ordered in 

November 2022 to complete parenting education and mental health and 

domestic violence treatment. See id. at 24. Ms. Daryanani testified Father 

is standoffish during casework and is frustrated with her during visits with 

Child. See id. at 41-42. Ms. Daryanani testified Child is very attached to 

foster parents and turns to them for all her needs, including her hospital 

appointments for a highly communicable disease, a recent surgery for removal 

of her adenoids, and monitoring for signs of autism. See id. at 27. Ms. 

Daryanani testified Child sees foster parents’ home as hers and treats their 
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children as her siblings. See id. at 26-27. Ms. Daryanani does not see a 

detriment to Child arising from terminating Father’s parental rights. See id. 

at 28. 

Father testified he is waiting for a home and has a school Child can 

attend. See id. at 51. He produced a lease for a house in Blair County, three 

to four hours away, that he said was his, and for which he paid $25 monthly. 

See id. at 55-56. He testified his house’s distance from Berks County made 

his attendance at visits more difficult but he did not like Berks County and was 

familiar with Blair County. See id. at 58, 68. He asserted he had been 

working on domestic violence issues until his insurance lapsed. See id. at 63. 

He testified he receives $300 in SNAP support per month, which is sufficient 

to support himself, his two sons, and Child. See id. at 66-67. Father said he 

is unaware whether the health clinic in Blair County that treats his two sons 

could treat Child’s specialized needs, which include hepatitis and sickle cell 

anemia, for which she has been receiving treatment at Children’s Hospital of 

Philadelphia. See id. at 69, 74. He testified he has a felony criminal 

conviction for “pushing” Mother. See id. at 76.

In March 2024, the court issued a final decree terminating Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). 

Father appealed and he and the court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Thereafter, Counsel filed a petition to withdraw, and an Anders brief.

When counsel files an Anders brief, this Court may not review the 

merits of the appeal without first addressing counsel’s request to withdraw. 
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See In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending Anders

principles to appeals involving the termination of parental rights); see also 

In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (providing counsel 

appointed to represent an indigent parent on appeal from a decree 

involuntarily terminating parental rights may petition this Court for leave to 

withdraw representation and submit an Anders brief). 

To withdraw, counsel must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the 

[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel 

or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy 

of the court’s attention. 

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc). Counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter 

sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth v. 

Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

We review Counsel’s Anders brief for compliance with the requirements 

set forth in Santiago, 978 A.3d at 361. Under Santiago, counsel must 

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous.
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Id. “Once counsel has satisfied the [Anders] requirements, it is then this 

Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and 

render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly 

frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1228 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (citation omitted).

Counsel’s petition to withdraw certifies her conscientious review of the 

record and determination that Father’s appeal is frivolous. Likewise, Counsel 

has also filed an Anders brief that substantially complies with the 

requirements set forth in Santiago. Counsel’s Anders brief includes a 

summary of the procedural history and facts of the case, the issues raised by 

Father that arguably support the appeal, and Counsel’s assessment regarding 

why the appeal is frivolous with citations to relevant legal authority. Finally, 

Counsel attached to her petition a letter she sent to Father informing him of 

his rights. See Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1032; Millisock, 873 A.2d at 752.

4

Accordingly, Counsel complied with the requirements of Anders and 

Santiago. We therefore conduct our independent review to determine 

whether Father’s appeal is wholly frivolous.

Counsel’s Anders brief identifies the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err by terminating [Father’s] parental rights

based on the grounds for involuntary termination set forth [in 

the] Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), and (8) because [BCCYS] did not establish by clear 

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4 Father has not responded to counsel’s Anders brief. 
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and convincing evidence that [Father’s] parental rights should 

be terminated?

2. Did the trial court err by terminating [Father’s] parental rights 

based on the grounds for involuntary termination set forth [in 

the Pennsylvania Adoption Act, ] 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), 

and (8), by failing to consider that Father was not the removal 

source, [and] Father’s presentation of evidence that he has 

been remedying and continuing to remedy conditions leading 

to [Child’s] placement and he had a bond with [Child]? 

Anders Brief at 6 (capitalization and spacing standardized).

We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion, 

which requires an error of law or a showing of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 

580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). In applying this standard, appellate 

courts must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility 

determinations if they are supported by the record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 

256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021); see also In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 

343, 358 (Pa. 2021). 

Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act (“the Act”) governs involuntary termination 

of parental rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. Subsection

2511(a) provides grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights. If 

the trial court finds clear and convincing evidence supporting the existence of 

one of the grounds for termination set forth in subsection (a), the court must 

then consider whether termination would best serve the child under subsection 

(b). Id. § 2511(b). This Court need only agree with one of the grounds set 
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forth in subsection (a) to affirm, provided subsection (b) is also satisfied. See 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004).

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant 

to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). As we need only agree with the 

trial court’s determination as to any one section of 2511(a), we limit our 

discussion to sections 2511(a)(5) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * * * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency

for a period of six months, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the 

parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions with a 

reasonable period of time, the services or assistance 

reasonably available to the parent are not like to remedy 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child within a reasonable period of time and termination of 

the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child.

* * * * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), (b). 

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(5), BCCYS was required 

to provide clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Child had

been removed from Father’s care for at least six months; (2) the conditions 

that led to removal continued to exist; (3) Father could not or would not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time; (4) the services 

reasonably available to Father were unlikely to remedy 

the conditions which led to removal within a reasonable period of time; and 

(5) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of 

the child. See In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 607 (Pa. Super. 2012).

In determining the evidence satisfied section 2511(a)(5), the trial court 

“fully credit[ed]” the testimony of the three BCCYS witnesses which showed: 

1) Child had been removed from Father’s care for more than six months (and 

had never been in Father’s care), 2) although Father appears to care for Child, 

“given numerous opportunities, [he] has not shown that he has the ability –

or desire – to remedy the conditions which led to the removal of Child,” id. at 

10, 3) “Father ha[d] returned to Pennsylvania to be close to [Child] but 

relocated to an area several hours from Child . . . [and] missed a number of 

sessions and visits with [Child] because he did not have adequate means of 

transportation,” id., 4) Father chose to live in Blair County because he enjoyed 

living there but “[Child] is currently receiving medical treatment in 

Philadelphia and Father felt that he could change providers to have someone 
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treat [Child] closer to his current home. [That] is unrealistic and would be 

disruptive to the medical care Child is already receiving,” id., and 5) 

termination was in Child’s best interests, see id.

Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court 

in finding grounds for termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(5). The record

clearly indicates Child had never been in Father’s custody and first saw him 

when she was eighteen months old. Father chose to live hours away from 

Child, limiting his ability to visit her, and Father in fact told BCCYS that visits 

would be at his discretion, not theirs. Further, the conditions that led to 

removal continue to exist, due to Father’s minimal compliance with his goals

and discharge from various programs for non-attendance. Additionally, Father

was unwilling to remedy the conditions that led to removal, including his 

refusal to acknowledge his need for domestic violence treatment, which 

restricted any possible progress. It was unlikely the services available to 

Father would remedy the conditions that led to removal – Father admitted he 

had not even ascertained whether Blair County’s health clinic would be able 

to treat Child’s serious health needs, including hepatitis, sickle cell anemia, 

and possible autism. Finally, termination is in Child’s best interests, given 

foster parents’ attentiveness to Child’s needs and Child’s relatively weak bond 

to Father. Accordingly, Father’s claim is frivolous. In re Adoption of C.M., 

255 A.3d at 358; Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123; In re B.C., 36 

A.3d at 607.
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We next address section 2511(b). Where the grounds for termination 

under section 2511(a) are met, the trial court shall then give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child under section 2511(b). See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 

267 (Pa. 2013). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been 

interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. 

Id. The determination of the child’s needs and welfare requires consideration 

of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. Id. The utmost 

attention should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently 

severing the parental bond. Id.

The evaluation of a child’s parental bonds is not always an easy task. 

“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond 

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular 

case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citation 

omitted). When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). Moreover, a parent’s emotional bond with his child, while 

a major component of the section 2511(b) analysis, is nevertheless only one 
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of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the 

best interest of the child:

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider 

the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent [as well as the] 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child 

bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal 

citations omitted). 

In determining termination of Father’s parental rights under section 

2511(b), the trial court concluded that whatever bond Father had with Child, 

it was outweighed by Child’s bond with foster parents: 

[T]he evidence shows that while Father loves [Child], that is not 

enough to overcome other evidence presented in this case. What 

is in the best interest of this Child is outweighed by what little 

evidence was presented regarding the bond between Father and 

Child. Moreover, this court finds that the evidence clearly 

establishes that [Child] is well-bonded with foster parents and that 

[Child’s] interests are best served by terminating Father’s parental 

rights and opening [Child] up for adoption.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/24, at 11 (capitalization standardized).

Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding 

Child’s needs and welfare favor termination of parental rights pursuant to 

section 2511(b). Ms. Daryanani testified Child is very attached to foster 

parents, turns to them for all her needs, sees their home as her home, and 

foster parents attend to her specialized medical needs and will be able to 

continue to do so. See N.T., 3/4/24, at 26-27. Ms. Daryanani opined Child 

would not suffer any detriment if the court terminated Father’s parental rights. 
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See id. at 28. The record, accordingly, supports the trial court’s finding under 

section 2511(b) that termination would serve Child’s best interests.

Following our independent review and based on our conclusion that trial 

court properly terminated Father’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(5) 

and (b), we agree with Counsel that the appeal from the decree terminating 

Father’s parental rights is wholly frivolous.

Decree affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/11/2024