IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-60934

LUMINANT GENERATION CO. LLC, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

On Petitions for Review of a Final Rule of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and BENAVIDES and GRAVES, Circuit

Judges. 

CARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge:

IT IS ORDERED that the opinion previously filed in this case,

Luminant Generation Co. L.L.C. v. U.S. E.P.A., No. 10-60934, 699 F.3d 427

(5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2012), is WITHDRAWN. The following opinion is

substituted therefor:

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 25, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Two sets of petitioners, hereinafter referred to as “Industry Petitioners”1

and “Environmental Petitioners,”2seek review of the United States

Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) final rule partially approving and

partially disapproving the most recent revision to Texas’s State Implementation

Plan (“SIP”) submitted by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality

(“TCEQ”) pursuant to the Clean Air Act (“CAA” or “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 7401

et seq.

3 Because we find that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or

contrary to law, or in excess of its statutory authority, in its partial approval and

partial disapproval of Texas’s SIP revision, we deny both petitions for review. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background

The CAA “establishes a comprehensive program for controlling and

improving the nation’s air quality through state and federal regulation.” BCCA

Appeal Grp. v. EPA, 355 F.3d 817, 821-22 (5th Cir. 2003). Under the CAA, the

EPA is responsible for identifying air pollutants and establishing National

Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) which specify maximum allowable

levels of certain types of pollutants in the air. Id. at 822; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-

7409. The states are then permitted, “within limits established by [the NAAQS],

to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their

own particular needs.” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n,

1 Luminant Generation Co. LLC, Oak Grove Management Co. LLC, Big Brown Power

Co. LLC, and Sandow Power Co. LLC.

2Environmental Integrity Project, Sierra Club, Environment Texas Citizen Lobby, Inc.,

Citizens for Environmental Justice, Texas Environmental Justice Advocacy Services, Air

Alliance Houston, and Community In-Power and Development Association.

3 Texas Oil & Gas Association of Business, Texas Association of Manufacturers, and

Texas Chemical Council have filed a brief in support of the EPA’s partial approval of Texas’s

SIP. The state of Texas has filed an amicus brief in support of Texas’s SIP, as submitted, in

its entirety.

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452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981). This federal-state partnership is often described as

“cooperative federalism.” Id.

To comply with its responsibilities under the Act, each state must create

and administer a SIP which provides for the “implementation, maintenance, and

enforcement” of NAAQS by setting “emission limitations and other control

measures.” 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1)-(2). The states have “wide discretion” in

formulating their SIPs, Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 250 (1976),

including the “broad authority to determine the methods and particular control

strategies they will use to achieve the statutory requirements.” BCCA Appeal

Grp., 355 F.3d at 822 (citing Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 266 (“So long as

national standards are met, the state may select whatever mix of control devices

it desires.”)). Once a state creates or revises a SIP, it is submitted to the EPA

for review. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(1),(k)(1)-(2). 

The Act confines the EPA to the ministerial function of reviewing SIPs for

consistency with the Act’s requirements. Id. at § 7410(k)(3). The EPA must

approve the plan in its entirety if it meets the applicable requirements of the

Act. Id. at § 7410(k)(3); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579, 587 (5th

Cir. 1981). If only “a portion of the [SIP] meets all the applicable requirements

of [the Act],” the EPA “may approve the [submittal] in part and disapprove the

[submittal] in part.” 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3). The EPA may also provide

“conditional approval” of a SIP, “based on a commitment of the State to adopt

specific enforceable measures by a date certain, but not later than 1 year after

the date of approval of the plan revision.” Id. at § 7410(k)(4). 

States must periodically revise their SIPs as necessary to ensure

continuing compliance with current NAAQS. Id. at § 7410(a)(2)(H). The EPA

must review and approve or disapprove a SIP revision within 18 months of

submission. Id. at §§ 7410(k)(1)(B),(2)-(3). The EPA shall disapprove a SIP

revision only if “the revision would interfere with any applicable requirement

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concerning attainment” of the NAAQS “or any other applicable requirement” of

the Act. Id. at § 7410(l). If the revision meets all of the applicable CAA

requirements, the EPA “shall approve such submittal as a whole.” Id. at §

7410(k)(3). Once approved by the EPA as meeting the requirements of the Act,

the SIP, or the approved portion thereof, is incorporated by reference into the

Code of Federal Regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.02 (2011). 

The CAA provides for shared enforcement of SIPs. A state must include

in its SIP, a “program to provide for the enforcement” of the plan. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7410(a)(2)(C). The program must provide the state permitting authority power

to “recover civil penalties in a maximum amount of not less than $10,000 per day

for each violation.” Id. at § 7661a(b)(5)(E). Additionally, the EPA has the power

to enforce a SIP by commencing “a civil action for a permanent or temporary

injunction, or to assess and recover a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 per

day for each violation, or both[.]” Id. at § 7413(b). Such suit may be brought in

district court, “and such court shall have jurisdiction to restrain such violation,

to require compliance, to assess such civil penalty, to collect any fees owed to the

United States . . . and to award any other appropriate relief.” Id. Finally, any

person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person who

is alleged to have violated an emission standard or limitation in a SIP. Id. at

§ 7604(a). A citizen suit may be brought in district court, which shall have

jurisdiction to enforce such an emission standard or limitation and to apply any

appropriate civil penalties. Id.

In assessing the amount of a civil penalty in either an EPA enforcement

action or a citizen suit, the court must consider the penalty assessment criteria

outlined in section 7413(e), i.e., the size of the business, the economic impact of

the penalty on the business, the violator’s full compliance history and good faith

efforts to comply, the duration of the violation as established by any credible

evidence (including evidence other than the applicable test method), payment by

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the violator of penalties previously assessed for the same violation, the economic

benefit of noncompliance, the seriousness of the violation, and “other factors as

justice may require.” Id. at § 7413(e).

B. Facts and Proceedings

In its final rule4 which became effective on January 10, 2011, the EPA

partially approved and partially disapproved the most recent revision to Texas’s

SIP which was submitted by the TCEQ in 2006.5 The portion of the SIP at issue

creates an affirmative defense against civil penalties for excess emissions during

both planned and unplanned startup, shutdown, and maintenance/malfunction

(“SSM”) events. The EPA approved the portion of the SIP revision providing an

affirmative defense against civil penalties for unplanned SSM events and

disapproved the portion of the SIP revision providing an affirmative defense

against civil penalties for planned SSM events. See 75 Fed. Reg. 68,989, 68,991.

Since the creation of its first SIP in 1972, Texas has provided for special

treatment of SSM activity. See Tex. SIP § XIV, Rule 12 (Jan. 26, 1972)

(providing emissions during “upsets” and “start-up or shutdown . . . may not be

required to meet the allowable emission levels”). The revised SIP submitted by

Texas in 2000 provided that emissions from SSM activity were “exempt from

compliance with air emission limitations established in permits, rules, and

orders of the commission” so long as the owner or operator complied with certain

reporting, record keeping, and operational requirements. See General Air

Quality Rules, 25 Tex. Reg. 6727, at § 101.11(b) (July 14, 2000). Further, the

exceptions were limited to SSM emissions that “could not have been prevented

4 Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Texas; Excess Emissions

During Startup, Shutdown, Maintenance, and Malfunction Activities, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,989

(Nov. 10, 2010).

5

30 Tex. Reg. 4090 (July 15, 2005) (proposed), amended by 31 Tex. Reg. 422 (Jan 20,

2006).

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through planning and design,” that “were not part of a recurring pattern,” and

that did “not cause or contribute to a condition of air pollution.” See id. 

The EPA approved the 2000SIPrevision, determining that the exemptions

for emissions during SSM activity contained in the plan met the requirements

of the CAA. See Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Texas;

Excess Emissions During Startup, Shutdown, Malfunction and Maintenance, 65

Fed. Reg. 70,792 (Nov. 28, 2000). In its approval, the EPA noted that “under the

[CAA], all excess emissions during SSM episodes are violations of applicable

emission limitations [however,] we believe it would be inequitable to penalize a

source for occurrences beyond the company’s control. A source has the burden

of proving that the excess emissions were due to circumstances beyond the

control of the operator or the owner.” Id. at 70,793. Additionally, the EPA found

that the 2000 SIP revision comported with past EPA guidance contained in its

policy statements regarding emissions from SSM activity. Id. at 70,792–93. 

These policy statements can be found in a collection of memos that we will refer

to as the “Bennett Memos” (19826 & 19837

) the “Herman Memo” (19998

). Id. at

70,792. 

6 Mem. of Kathleen Bennett, “Policy on Excess Emissions During Startup, Shutdown,

Maintenance, and Malfunctions” (Sept. 28, 1982) (providing that “it is reasonable to expect

that careful planning will eliminate violations of emissions limitations during [startup and

shutdown] periods. . . . [s]imilarly, scheduled maintenance is a predictable event which can

be . . . made to coincide with maintenance . . . or other source shutdowns. Consequently,

excess emissions during periods of scheduled maintenance should be treated as a violation[.]”).

7 Mem. of Kathleen Bennett, “Policy on Excess Emissions During Startup, Shutdown,

Maintenance, and Malfunctions” (Feb. 15, 1983) (recognizing that, in certain situations, excess

emissions during startup and shutdown “need not be treated as a violation if the source can

show that the excesses could not have been prevented . . . and that bypassing was unavoidable

to prevent loss of life, personal injury, or severe property damage.”).

8 Mem. of Steven A. Herman, “State Implementation Plans (SIPs): Policy Regarding

Excess Emissions During Malfunctions, Startup, and Shutdown” (Sept. 20, 1999) (providing

that “because excess emissions might . . . prevent attainment or interfere with maintenance

of [NAAQS], EPA views all excess emissions as violations. . . . Nevertheless, . . . imposition of

a penalty for sudden and unavoidable malfunctions . . . may not be appropriate.”). 

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Additionally, in accordance with the EPA’s request, 28 Tex. Reg. 5787,

5787 (July 25, 2003) (proposed), Texas’s 2004 SIP revision omitted the language

indicating that SSM emissions were “exempt,” and substituted language that

such emissions would be “subject to an affirmative defense.” 29 Tex. Reg. 118,

120 (Jan. 2, 2004) (final). Further, as a result of changes in state law, Texas also

distinguished between emissions resulting from planned SSM activity and all

other emission events and proposed providing an affirmative defense for these

emissions. Id. at 134 (§ 101.222(b),(c)). The proposed affirmative defense for

scheduled SSM activity required the owner or operator prove “the period of

unauthorized emissions . . . could not have been prevented through planning and

design.” Id. at 134 (§ 101.222(c)(2)). All other emissions would only be

protected if they were “caused by a sudden breakdown of equipment or process,

beyond the control of the owner or operator.” Id. at 134 (§ 101.222(b)(2)). The

proposed rules stated that the affirmative defense provision would expire on

June 30, 2005. Id. at 135 (§ 101.222(h)).

The EPA ultimately gave Texas’s 2004 SIP revision “limited approval.” 

See Limited Approval andPromulgation of Implementation Plans; Texas; Excess

Emissions During Startup, Shutdown and Malfunction Activities, 70 Fed. Reg.

16,129 (Mar. 30, 2005). The EPA explained that “the rule improves the SIP and

is largely consistent with the relevant requirements of the [CAA]” but noted that

the provisions allowing for an affirmative defense for scheduled SSM activity

were “ambiguous, at best, and inconsistent with the [CAA], at worst, and could

create problems with enforcing the underlying applicable emission limits.” 70

Fed. Reg. at 16,130. The EPA stated as follows: 

The EPA’s interpretation of [§ 7410] allows an

affirmative defense to be asserted against civil

penalties . . . for excess emissions activities which are

sudden, unavoidable or caused by circumstances beyond

the control of the owner or operator . . . . However, EPA

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has determined that it is inappropriate to provide an

affirmative defense for excess emissions resulting from

scheduled maintenance . . . . 

Id. at 16,131. Nevertheless, the EPA approved the 2004 provision, noting

section 101.222's expiration date of June 30, 2005, but in doing so, the agency

clarified that “if Texas revises its rules to include an affirmative defense for

excess emissions in the Texas SIP in the future, the State should ensure . . . that

the affirmative defense does not apply to excess emissions from scheduled

maintenance activities . . . .” Id. The EPA then granted a request from Texas to

extend the affirmative defense’s expiration date to June 30, 2006. See Limited

Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Texas; Excess Emissions

During Startup, Shutdown and Malfunction Activities, 70 Fed. Reg. 50,205, 

50,206 (Aug. 26, 2005). 

On January 23, 2006, Texas submitted the revised SIP that is the subject

of this appeal. The 2006 SIP revision provides in part: 

(1) For any emission deemed excessive by the state executive director, no

affirmative defense would be available. See 30 Tex. Admin. Code

§ 101.222(a). 

(2) For “unplanned maintenance, startup or shutdown activity,” an

affirmative defense against civil penalties would be available if the “owner

or operator proves . . . all” of the listed criteria, including that “(2) the

periods of unauthorized emissions from unplanned [SSM] activity could

not have been prevented through planning and design,” and “(3) the

unauthorized emissions from unplanned [SSM] activity were not part of

a recurring pattern,” and that the “(9) unauthorized emissions did not

cause or contribute to an exceedance of the NAAQS . . . .” See 30 Tex.

Admin. Code §§ 101.1(108), 101.222(c); see also id. §§ 101.1(109),

101.222(b) (providing elements for “upset events”). 

(3) For “[p]lanned maintenance, startup, or shutdown activity,” an affirmative

defense against civil penalties would be available if the “owner or operator

proves all” of the criteria listed under the section for unplanned SSM

activity, including that “(2) the periods of unauthorized emissions from

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unplanned [SSM] activity could not have been prevented through planning

and design,” that “(3) the unauthorized emissions from unplanned [SSM]

activity were not part of a recurring pattern,” and that “(9) unauthorized

emissions did not cause or contribute to an exceedance of the NAAQS . .

. .” See 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 101.222(h) (emphasis added). The

affirmative defense for planned SSM activity would expire after, at most,

two years. See id. § 101.222(h)-(i). 

Thereafter, as mentioned above, the EPA partially approved and partially

disapproved the revisions. 75 Fed. Reg. at 68,991. In finalizing its approval of

the portion of the SIP revision containing an affirmative defense for unplanned

SSM activity, the EPA stated that section 101.222(a)-(g) “provides an affirmative

defense for certain emission events that is consistent with the interpretation of

the Act as set forth in our guidance documents.” Id. at 68,990. The EPA

explained that it has “recognized that sources may, despite good practices, be

unable to meet emission limitations during periods of startup and shutdown and,

that despite good operating practices, sources may suffer a malfunction due to

events beyond the control of the owner or operator.” Id. at 68,992.

The EPA then finalized its disapproval of section 101.222(h)-(j), which

contained an affirmative defense for planned SSM activity, 75 Fed. Reg. at

68,991, relying on its past reasoning that “[b]ecause these events are planned,

we believe that sources should be able to comply with applicable emission limits

during these periods of time.” 75 Fed. Reg. 26,892, 26,896 (May 13, 2010). The

EPA further stated that it disapproved of the affirmative defense for planned

startup and shutdown activity contained in the SIP revision because it found the

provisions for such activity to be nonseverable from those for planned

maintenance. 75 Fed. Reg. at 68,991. 

Environmental Petitioners seek review of the EPA’s final rule approving

the portion of the SIP revision providing an affirmative defense against civil

penalties for excess emissions resulting from unplanned SSM activity. Industry

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Petitioners seek review of the EPA’s final rule disapproving the portion of SIP

revision providing an affirmative defense against civil penalties for excess

emissions resulting from planned SSM activity. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b), this court has jurisdiction to hear a

petition for review of the EPA’s approval of a SIP under 42 U.S.C. § 7410. A

petition to review the EPA’s approval or disapproval of a SIP is governed by the

Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; BCCA Appeal Grp., 355 F.3d

at 824. The EPA’s decision is valid unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

Agency action that is in excess of statutory authority will also be set aside. Id.

at § 706(2)(C). 

“An agency rule is arbitrary and capricious ‘if the agency has relied on

factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider

an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that

runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could

not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’” Tex.

Oil & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. E.P.A., 161 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Motor

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 

“If the agency’s reasons and policy choices conform to minimal standards of

rationality, then its actions are reasonable and must be upheld.” Tex. Oil & Gas

Ass’n, 161 F.3d at 934. Nonetheless, the reviewing court “may not supply a

reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.” 

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43. “[T]he focal point for judicial review

should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record

made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). 

“The court applies the two-step Chevron analysis to questions involving

the EPA’s interpretation of the statutes it administers,” including the CAA. 

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Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). “If Congress

‘has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,’ the agency and the court

‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’” Chevron,

467 U.S. at 842-43. In performing this analysis, the court “employ[s] traditional

tools of statutory construction.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. “[A] statutory

provision cannot be read in isolation, but necessarily derives its meaning from

the context provided by the surrounding provisions, as well as the broader

context of the statute as a whole.” Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir.

2011). 

“If the statute, however, is ‘silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific

issue,’ the court must first assess the administrative decision-making process to

determine whether the agency’s action is entitled to Chevron deference.” United

States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-31 (2001) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at

843). “Under Mead, Congress must have ‘delegated authority to the agency

generally to make rules carrying the force of law,’ and that agency interpretation

claiming deference must have been promulgated in the exercise of that

authority.” BCCA Appeal Grp., 355 F.3d at 825 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-

27). “If the agency’s decision is a result of a sufficiently formal and deliberative

process to warrant deference, the second step of Chevron requires the court to

assess whether the agency’s interpretation is ‘based on a permissible

construction of the statute.’” Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S.

at 843). “If the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, it will be upheld.” Smiley

v. Citibank, N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1996). “Federal courts accord ‘great

deference’ to the EPA’s construction of the [CAA].” Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at

266.

Where an issue presented is a challenge to an agency’s interpretation of

its own regulation, the agency’s interpretation is controlling unless it is “plainly

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,

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461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,

359 (1989)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Arguments Raised By Environmental Petitioners

Environmental Petitioners argue that the EPA’s approval of the

affirmative defense for unplanned SSM events is in excess of the agency’s

statutory authority and is not in accordance with the Act. Specifically,

petitioners argue that the final rule conflicts with the plain language of the Act

authorizing civil penalties in EPA and citizen suit enforcement actions, as well

as the Act’s requirement that the state permitting authority be able to assess

civil penalties. Environmental Petitioners further argue that, even if the

affirmative defense against civil penalties for excess emissions resulting from

unplanned SSM activity is not contrary to the CAA, the EPA’s approval was

arbitrary and capricious. Finally, Environmental Petitioners argue that, in

approving the affirmative defense for unplanned SSM activity, the EPA altered

the meaning of the SIP as submitted by Texas. We address each of these

arguments in turn.

1. In excess of statutory authority & not in accordance with law 

The EPA’s decision partially approving the SIP revision containing an

affirmative defense for unplanned SSM activity is invalid if it found by this court

to be, inter alia, “not in accordance with law” or in excess of the agency’s

statutory authority. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(C). As stated above, the Act confines

the EPA to reviewing SIPs for consistency with the Act’s requirements. 42

U.S.C. §§ 7410(k)(3); 7410(a)(1). The EPA “shall not approve a revision of a plan

if the revision would interfere with any applicable requirement concerning

attainment” or “or any other applicable requirement” of the Act. Id. at § 7410(l). 

Further, as pointed out by petitioners, the CAA provides that, in the case of EPA

enforcement and citizen suits, a federal district court “shall have jurisdiction” to

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assess a “civil penalty.” Id. at §§ 7413(b); 7604(a). In assessing the amount of

a civil penalty in either an EPA enforcement action or a citizen suit, the court

must consider the penalty assessment criteria outlined in section 7413(e). Id.

at § 7413(e). Additionally, the CAA mandates that the state permitting

authority have the power to recover civil penalties for violations under the Act. 

42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(5)(E). 

The EPA construes section 7413 of the Act as authorizing affirmative

defenses against civil penalties if the defense is “narrowly tailored” to address

unavoidable, excess emissions and consistent with the penalty assessment

criteria set forth in section 7413(e). Accordingly, this court must determine if

the EPA’s interpretation of section 7413 is entitled to Chevron deference. 

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. We hold that it is. 

As an initial matter, we note that the EPA’s procedure of “notice-andcomment rulemaking” and “adjudication” is generally a sufficiently formal and

deliberative process. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229-30. Therefore, “[t]he court

applies the two-step Chevron analysis to questions involving the EPA’s

interpretation of the statutes it administers.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. “If

Congress ‘has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,’ the agency and

the court ‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”

Id. If the statute, however, is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific

issue,” the court must assess whether the agency’s interpretation of the Act is

“based on a permissible construction of the statute” and, therefore, entitled to

Chevron deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 

Thus, under Chevron step one, we begin by looking at whether the statute

is silent or ambiguous with regard to the specific issue in dispute. Here, section

7413 does not discuss whether a state may include in its SIP the availability of

an affirmative defense against civil penalties for unplanned SSM activity. 42

U.S.C. § 7413. Accordingly, we turn to step two of Chevron and ask whether the

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EPA’s interpretation of section 7413, as authorizing an affirmative defense for

unplanned SSM activity, is entitled to deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 

The EPA submits that its “interpretation of the CAA is that it is not

appropriate for SIPs to exempt periods of startup, shutdown, maintenance or

malfunction from compliance with applicable emission limits.” 75 Fed. Reg. at

68,991-92. To support this interpretation, the agency relies on section 302(k) of

the Act which defines “emission limitation” and includes a requirement that

emissions be limited on a continuous basis. Id. at 68,992; 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k).

Further, noting its authority to assess civil penalties under section 7413

of the Act, the agency reasons that an effective enforcement program must be

able to collect penalties to deter avoidable violations. 42 U.S.C. § 7413. The

EPA recognizes, however, that “sources may, despite good practices, be unable

to meet emission limitations during periods of startup and shutdown and, that

despite good operating practices, sources may suffer a malfunction due to events

beyond the control of the owner or operator.” Id. at 68,992. For this reason, the

agency submits that a SIP “should only provide [an affirmative defense against

civil penalties] for circumstances where it is infeasible to meet the applicable

limit and the criteria that the source must prove should ensure that the source

has made all reasonable efforts to comply.” Id. at 68,992-93; 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e). 

As a result, the EPA states that it has adopted an interpretation of section

7413 that would allow sources to assert an affirmative defense for periods of

unavoidable, excess emissions during certain SSM activity in an enforcement

action for penalties, though not in an action for injunctive relief. Id. at 68,992. 

The agency concludes that this interpretation is consistent with the Act because

the criteria a source must prove when asserting the affirmative defense are

consistent with the penalty assessment criteria identified in section 7413(e),

which are considered by the courts and the EPA in determining whether or not

to assess a civil penalty for violations and, if so, the amount. Id. at 68,992; 42

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U.S.C. § 7413(e). Thus, the affirmative defense criteria are tailored to ensure

that the source has made all reasonable efforts to comply with emission

limitations and remain in compliance with the Act. Id. at 68,992. Consequently,

the agency reasons that an appropriately crafted affirmative defense is one that

is narrowly tailored to address unavoidable, excess emissions and consistent

with the penalty assessment criteria in section 7413(e). Id. at 68,992; 42 U.S.C.

§ 7413. 

The approved portion of Texas’s SIP that contains an affirmative defense

for unplanned SSM activity provides, as an initial matter, that sources are

generally subject to enforcement actions for any “upset” events, i.e., an

unplanned and unavoidable malfunction that results in unauthorized emissions. 

30 Tex. Admin. Code § 101.1(109). If an “upset” event is considered an

“excessive” emission event based on a number of factors including frequency,

duration, impact on human health, and other measures, no affirmative defense

is available. Id. at § 101.222(a)-(b). If the violation is not deemed “excessive,”

and it occurred during unplanned SSM activity, and nine additional criteria are

met, including a demonstration that the unauthorized emissions “did not cause

or contribute to an exceedance of the NAAQS, PSD increments, or a condition of

air pollution,” and that the unauthorized emissions “could not have been

prevented through planning and design,” then the affirmative defense is

available. Id. at § 101.222(b),(c). Regardless, even if all nine required criteria

are met and the violator establishes the applicability of the approved affirmative

defense, injunctive relief is still available. 75 Fed. Reg. at 68,991 n.4.9 

9 Additionally, the availability of the affirmative defense does not negate the district

court’s jurisdiction to assess civil penalties using the criteria outlined in section 7413(e), or the

state permitting authority’s power to recover civil penalties, it simply provides a defense,

under narrowly defined circumstances, if and when penalties are assessed.

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The EPA submits that the above-mentioned affirmative defense for

unplanned SSM events is narrowly tailored to address unavoidable, excess

emissions and consistent with the penalty assessment criteria in section 7413(e). 

Thus, it approved this portion of Texas’s SIP revision as being consistent with

section 7413 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7410(l). We hold this to be a

permissible interpretation of section 7413, warranting deference. Chevron, 467

U.S. at 843. Accordingly, the EPA acted neither contrary to law nor in excess of

its statutory authority when it based its partial approval of the plan on this

construction. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(C). 

2. Arbitrary and Capricious

Environmental Petitioners argue that, even if the affirmative defense for

unplanned SSM activity is not contrary to the CAA, the EPA’s approval was

nonetheless arbitrary and capricious. They argue that the EPA failed to explain

why it approved the affirmative defense in light of (1) the EPA’s position that

affirmative defenses should not be available where a small group of sources

could cause exceedance of the NAAQS; (2) precedent indicating that civil

penalties serve to encourage compliance with the Act; and (3) the burden an

affirmative defense would place on citizen suits. 

The EPA’s decision is not valid if found by this court to be arbitrary or

capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “An agency rule is arbitrary and capricious ‘if

the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,

entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an

explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,

or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the

product of agency expertise.’” Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 161 F.3d at 933. “If the

agency’s reasons and policy choices conform to minimal standards of rationality,

then its actions are reasonable and must be upheld.” Id. at 934. 

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With respect to their first argument, Environmental Petitioners are

correct that the EPA has stated in its past policy guidance that “[w]here a single

source or small group of sources has the potential to cause an exceedance of the

NAAQS or PSD increments . . . an affirmative defense approach will not be

adequate to protect public health and the environment . . . .”

10 Petitioners are

also correct that the approved affirmative defense provision does not contain

specific language excluding emissions caused by “a single source or small group

of sources” that could potentially “cause an exceedance of the NAAQS or PSD

increments.” But, as pointed out by the agency in its brief, the affirmative

defense excludes all emissions that could “cause or contribute to an exceedance

of the NAAQS, PSD increments, or a condition of air pollution.” 30 Tex. Admin.

Code § 101.222 (b)(11), (c)(9). Thus, the approved portion of the affirmative

defense is not inconsistent with the agency’s past policy guidance. 

Environmental Petitioners’ remaining two arguments as to why the EPA’s

approval of the affirmative defense was arbitrary and capricious are also

unavailing. Environmental Petitioners are correct that the EPA has recognized

that the availability of civil penalties serves as an incentive for companies to

take actions to avoid excess emissions. 75 Fed. Reg. at 68,999. In its partial

approval of the SIP revision, however, the EPA further recognized that while

“the availability of civil penalties serves as an incentive for companies to be more

cautious, to take more preventative actions, and to seek to develop technologies

and management practices to avoid excess emissions[,] . . . the criteria a source

would need to prove in order to successfully assert an affirmative defense will

encourage companies to take such caution.” Id. at 68,999. 

The EPA’s reasoning relies on the fact that the narrowly tailored

affirmative defense presents a high burden for any company seeking entitlement

10 See infra Mem. of Steven A. Herman, “State Implementation Plans (SIPs): Policy

Regarding Excess Emissions During Malfunctions, Startup, and Shutdown” (Sept. 20, 1999).

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to it. Assuming the violation is not deemed “excessive,” and it occurred during

unplanned SSM activity, nine additional criteria must be met, including a

demonstration that the unauthorized emissions “did not cause or contribute to

an exceedance of the NAAQS, PSD increments, or a condition of air pollution,”

and that the unauthorized emissions “could not have been prevented through

planning and design.” 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 101.222(c). This reasoning

supports the EPA’s position that its approval of the affirmative defense for

unplanned SSM activity will not serve as a disincentive for companies to avoid

excess emissions. Thus, there is no conflict with the agency’s previous

statements that civil penalties encourage compliance with the Act. 

Environmental Petitioners’ second argument that the affirmative defense

places an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs is also without merit. 

Environmental Petitioners contend that the affirmative defense only requires a

“prima facie showing” by defendants, after which the burden will shift to the

plaintiffs to show that the affirmative defense does not apply. As pointed out by

the EPA, however, when a source asserts the affirmative defense, it has the

burden of proving the “enumerated factors, including that the period of excess

emissions was minimized to the extent practicable and that the emissions were

not due to faulty operations or disrepair of equipment.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 68,992

(citing see 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 101.222(b),(c)). The provision makes no

reference to a prima facie showing. Id. Accordingly, the burden remains on the

party seeking entitlement to the affirmative defense, not a plaintiff seeking relief

under the Act. Given these facts, we agree with the EPA’s position that the

approved affirmative defense for unplanned SSM activity does not place an

unreasonable burden on plaintiffs. 

Consequently, we hold that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously

in its partial approval of the SIP revision. The above-mentioned reasons and

policy choices provided by the EPA for approving the affirmative defense for

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unplanned SSM activity “conform to minimal standards of rationality”;

therefore, they are reasonable and will be upheld by this court. Tex. Oil & Gas

Ass’n, 161 F.3d at 934. 

3. Alteration of the meaning of the SIP

Environmental Petitioners’ final argument is that, by approving the

affirmative defense for unplanned SSM activity, the EPA impermissibly altered

the meaning of the SIP by making the defense potentially applicable to citizen

and EPA enforcement actions, thereby limiting injunctive relief available under

the Act and delaying the enforcement of excess emission violations. 

Environmental Petitioners identify a statement by the TCEQ that “its rules are

not intended to nor do they impact citizens’ legal rights under the [CAA].” 30

Tex. Reg. at 8922. 

Environmental Petitioners are correct that, in partially approving a SIP,

the EPA may not “overid[e] state policy,” Bethlehem, 742 F.2d at 1036-37, and

alter the meaning of the SIP. In its partial approval of the SIP revision,

however, the EPA reasoned as follows: “[A]pproval of the provisions in sections

101.222(b), (c), (d), and (e) into the Texas SIP does not preclude citizen suits

under the Act. Rather, the affirmative defense may be raised in defense of a

claim brought by EPA, the State or a private citizen.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 68,999.

The EPA went on to state that “even where an affirmative defense is successfully

raised in defense to an action for penalties, it does not preclude other judicial

relief that may be available, such as injunctive relief or a requirement to

mitigate past harm or to correct the non-compliance at issue.” Id. 

The above-mentioned reasoning provided by the EPA supports its position

that it did not alter the meaning of the SIP or broaden its application beyond

what Texas intended in its partial approval of the plan. We therefore reject

Environmental Petitioners’ argument.

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B. Arguments Raised By Industry Petitioners

Industry Petitioners argue that the portion of the SIP revision containing

the affirmative defense for planned SSM activity fully complies with the CAA

and should have been approved by the EPA and that the EPA’s disapproval was

contrary to law. They further argue that the EPA’s decision was arbitrary and

capricious. In the alternative, Industry Petitioners argue that the EPA should

have severed and approved the affirmative defense for planned startup and

shutdown activity, even if it disapproved the affirmative defense for planned

maintenance activity. Industry Petitioners also request that approval of the SIP

be backdated to June 30, 2006, so as to eliminate any gap between the expiration

of the previous affirmative defense and the current affirmative defense. 

1. Compliance with the CAA

The EPA’s decision partially disapproving the SIP revision containing an

affirmative defense for planned SSM activity is invalid if it is found by this court

to be, inter alia, “not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The Act

provides that the EPA “shall not approve a revision of a plan if the revision

would interfere with any applicable requirement concerning attainment” of

NAAQS or “or any other applicable requirement” of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §

7410(l). 

The EPA interprets section 7413 of the Act as only authorizing affirmative

defenses that are narrowly tailored to address periods of unavoidable, excess

emissions during certain SSM activity, “where it is infeasible to meet the

applicable limit.” Consequently, the agency concludes that section 7413 does not

authorize an affirmative defense for planned SSM activity. Accordingly, this

court must determine if the EPA’s interpretation of section 7413 is entitled to

Chevron deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. We hold that it is. 

As stated, the EPA’s procedure of “notice-and-comment rulemaking” and

“adjudication” is generally a sufficiently formal and deliberative process. Mead

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Corp., 533 U.S. at 229-30. Therefore, “[t]he court applies the two-step Chevron

analysis to questions involving the EPA’s interpretation of the statutes it

administers.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. “If Congress ‘has directly spoken to

the precise question at issue,’ the agency and the court ‘must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’” Id. If the statute, however, is

“silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court must assess

whether the agency’s interpretation of the Act is “based on a permissible

construction of the statute” and, therefore, entitled to Chevron deference. 

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 

Thus, under Chevron step one, we begin by looking at whether the statute

is silent or ambiguous with regard to the specific issue in dispute. Here, section

7413 does not discuss whether a state may include in its SIP the availability of

an affirmative defense against civil penalties for planned SSM activity. 42

U.S.C. § 7413. Accordingly, we turn to step two of Chevron and ask whether the

EPA’s interpretation of section 7413, as not authorizing an affirmative defense

against civil penalties for planned SSM activity, is entitled to deference.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 

As stated, relying on the definition of “emission limitation” found in

section 302(k) of the Act, the EPA submits that its “interpretation of the CAA is

that it is not appropriate for SIPs to exempt periods of startup, shutdown,

maintenance or malfunction from compliance with applicable emission limits.” 

75 Fed. Reg. at 68,991-92; 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k). 

Citing its authority to assess civil penalties under section 7413 of the Act,

the agency reasons that an effective enforcement program must be able to collect

penalties to deter avoidable violations. 42 U.S.C. § 7413. Further, while the

EPA acknowledges that “sources may, despite good practices, be unable to meet

emission limitations” during certain SSM activity, the EPA’s interpretation of

section 7413 only allows sources to assert an affirmative defense for periods of

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unavoidable, excess emissions “where it is infeasible to meet the applicable

limit.” Id. at 68,992. For this reason, a SIP “should only provide [an affirmative

defense against civil penalties] for circumstances where it is infeasible to meet

the applicable limit and the criteria that the source must prove should ensure

that the source has made all reasonable efforts to comply.” Id. at 68,992-93; 42

U.S.C. § 7413. Consequently, the agency reasons that an appropriately crafted

affirmative defense is one that is narrowly tailored to address unavoidable,

excess emissions. 

The EPA submits that the portion of the SIP revision providing an

affirmative defense for planned SSM activity is inconsistent with section 7413

of the Act because it is not narrowly tailored to address unavoidable, excess

emissions. Id. at 68,992. The agency supports this position by submitting that

it does not “believe that it is infeasible for sources to meet applicable limits

during planned maintenance” activities. Id. at 68,993. The agency reasons that

because planned maintenance activities are predictable, a source can avoid

excess emissions from these activities by scheduling maintenance during

shutdown periods. Id. at 68,992. Consequently, the agency concludes that the

affirmative defense for planned SSM activity is inconsistent with section 7413

of the Act. We hold this to be a permissible interpretation of section 7413 of the

Act, warranting deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; 42 U.S.C. § 7413. 

Accordingly, the EPA did not act contrary to law when its based its partial

disapproval of the plan on this construction. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

2. Arbitrary and Capricious

Industry Petitioners submit several arguments in support of their

assertion that the EPA’s partial disapproval of the SIP revision was arbitrary

and capricious. We address each of these in turn.

As previously stated, the EPA’s decision is not valid if found by this court

to be arbitrary or capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). On the other hand, “[i]f the

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agency’s reasons and policy choices conform to minimal standards of rationality,

then its actions are reasonable and must be upheld.” Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 161

F.3d at 934. 

Citing GHASP v. U.S. E.P.A., 289 F. App’x 745 (5th Cir. 2008), Industry

Petitioners argue that the EPA must approve any SIP revision that is more

stringent than the preexisting SIP. In 2000, the EPA approved a Texas excess

emissions rule that included an exemption for emissions from planned

maintenance. See 65 Fed. Reg. 70,792 (Nov. 28, 2000); 25 Tex. Reg. 6727-6751

(July 14, 2000). In its brief, however, the EPA points out that it has publicly

conceded that its approval of the Texas 2000 rule was erroneous.11It is the

agency’s position that it should not be required to make the same mistake twice

for the sole purposes of consistency. 

An agency is not bound to follow a prior, incorrect interpretation of its own

policy. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 

Moreover, an agency is permitted to change its policy interpretations. FCC v.

Fox Tele. Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514-15 (2009); National Cable &

Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005). 

Consequently, we hold that the EPA’s previous, admittedly erroneous, approval

of a prior Texas SIP provision, does not mandate its approval of the current SIP

revision at issue, simply because it is more stringent than the provision

previously approved in error. 

Industry Petitioners next argue that the EPA, in partially disapproving

the SIP revision, impermissibly made the SIP more stringent than what Texas

had intended,i.e., aSIP without any accommodation for planned SSM emissions. 

We disagree.

11 Technical Support Document for 30 Tex. Admin. Code Chapter 101, General Air

Quality Rules, Rule Log Numbers 2001-075-101-AI & 2003-038-101-AI (March 2, 2004).

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The EPA may approve or disapprove a provision in a SIP, but may not

require a state to add any provision to its proposal. See Fla. Power & Light Co.,

650 F.2d at 587-89. Further, the EPA may not exercise its power to partially

approve and disapprove portions of a SIP to make it more stringent than

intended by the state. See Bethlehem Steel, 742 F.2d at 1034-35. 

In its partial disapproval of the SIP, the EPA noted the following:

The provisions being disapproved address completely

separate activities . . . (planned activities) from those

addressed by the provisions being approved (unplanned

activities). The approved provisions will provide the

exact limited relief intended by the State for sources

covered by those provisions . . . . EPA's action

disapproving similar relief for excess emissions during

planned activities does not affect the stringency of the

defense being approved for periods of excess emissions

during unplanned activities.

75 Fed. Reg. at 68,993. This reasoning supports the EPA’s position that its

partial disapproval of the SIP did not make the remaining approved portions

more stringent than what Texas had intended.

Industry Petitioners next argue that the EPA’s partial disapproval of the

SIP revision was in error because the agency never established that the

affirmative defense for planned SSM activity “would interfere” with NAAQS

attainment. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(l). 

With respect to this issue, the EPA stated that it does not interpret the Act

as requiring it to demonstrate that there will be a violation of NAAQS if it

disapproves a SIP revision. 75 Fed. Reg. at 68,994. The agency further noted

that “the language in section 110(l) provides that EPA must disapprove a SIP

revision if it ‘would interfere with any applicable requirement concerning

attainment.’ This is quite distinct from an obligation to prove that a violation

will occur.” Id. 

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We agree with the EPA’s position that it is not required by the Act to prove

that a violation will occur as a prerequisite to disapproving the plan. However,

in disapproving a plan, the agency is required to provide reasoning supporting

its conclusion that the disapproved provision would interfere with an applicable

requirement of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(l). As stated, the agency has provided

sufficient reasoning supporting its conclusion that the affirmative defense for

planned SSM activity was inconsistent with section 7413 of the Act because it

was not narrowly tailored to address unavoidable, excess emissions because it

provided a defense for SSM activities during which excess emissions could be

avoided. Consistent with our previous holding that this conclusion is a

permissible construction of the statute that is not contrary to law, we hold the

same conclusion to be a sufficient basis for the agency’s partial disapproval of the

plan pursuant to sections 7413 and 7410(l). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7410(l) 

Industry Petitioners also argue that the EPA was required to approve the

affirmative defense scheme as a necessary step to Texas’s transition to a

permitting scheme. In support of their argument, Industry Petitioners point to

the doctrines of “administrative necessity” and “one-step-at-a-time.” See Ala.

Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 357-60 (D.C. Cir. 1979); U.S. Brewers Ass’n,

Inc. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 974, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1979). With respect to this issue, the

EPA provided the following response:

[T]he State's submitted phased-in permitting process

will not serve to modify any applicable requirement

under the Texas SIP. Furthermore, our action

disapproving the three provisions at issue . . . merely

maintains the status quo and should have no effect on

that permitting process.

 . . . .

[S]ources have been obligated to comply at all times

with the applicable emission limits with no enforcement

discretion or affirmative defense provisions since the

previous Texas rules expired from the Texas SIP on

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June 30, 2006 by their own terms. Thus there is no

administrative necessity or “one step at a time”

argument applicable in this situation.

75 Fed. Reg. at 69,899-900. This reasoning supports the EPA’s position that it

was not required to approve the provision containing an affirmative defense for

planned SSM activity in light of Texas’s transition to a permitting scheme.

Consequently, we hold that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously

in its disapproval of the portion of the SIP revision containing an affirmative

defense for planned SSM activity. The above-mentioned reasons provided by the

EPA for disapproving the provision “conform to minimal standards of

rationality”; therefore, they are reasonable and will be upheld by this court. Tex.

Oil & Gas Ass’n, 161 F.3d at 934. 

3. Severability of planned startup and shutdown activity

The EPA has determined that the provisions relating to planned startup

and shutdown activities are not severable from the planned maintenance

provisions. 75 Fed. Reg. 68,991, 68,997. Industry Petitioners argue that the

EPA should have severed and approved the affirmative defense for planned

startup and shutdown activity, even if it had determined that there should be

no affirmative defense for planned maintenance activity. We disagree.

We decline to address the issue of whether the EPA was correct in

concluding that the provisions relating to planned startup and shutdown

activities are not severable from the planned maintenance provisions because,

even if severed, the provisions would not have been consistent with the agency’s

interpretation of section 7413 of the Act. For the same reasons provided in our

discussion above upholding the EPA’s disapproval of the affirmative defense for

planned maintenance activity contained in 101.222(h), we uphold the EPA’s

disapproval of the affirmative defense as it applies to planned startup and

shutdown activity. The portion of the SIP revision providing an affirmative

defense for planned SSM activity is inconsistent with section 7413 of the Act

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because it is not narrowly tailored to address unavoidable, excess emissions 

because it provided a defense for SSM activities during which excess emissions

could be avoided. Id. at 68,992. Consequently, we hold that the EPA was not

arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to law, in disapproving the provision as a

whole.

4. Backdating approval of the SIP

In their final argument, Industry Petitioners request that approval of the

SIP be backdated to June 30, 2006. In light of our conclusion that the EPA was

not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, when it disapproved the portion of

the SIP revision containing an affirmative defense for planned SSM activity, we

pretermit discussion of this issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these foregoing reasons, we conclude that the EPA did not act

arbitrarily or capriciously, contrary to law, or in excess of its statutory authority,

in its partial approval and partial disapproval of Texas’s SIP revision. We

therefore deny the petitions for review submitted by both Environmental

Petitioners and Industry Petitioners. 

PETITIONS DENIED. 

27

 Case: 10-60934 Document: 00512185307 Page: 27 Date Filed: 03/25/2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BILL OF COSTS

NOTE: The Bill of Costs is due in this office within 14 days from the date of the

opinion, See FED. R. APP. P. & 5 CIR. R. 39. Untimely bills of costs must be TH

accompanied by a separate motion to file out of time, which the court may deny.

_______________________________________________ v. __________________________________________ No. _____________________

The Clerk is requested to tax the following costs against: _________________________________________________________________________________________

COSTS TAXABLE UNDER

Fed. R. App. P. & 5 Cir. R. 39 th

REQUESTED ALLOWED

(If different from amount requested)

No. of Copies Pages Per Copy Cost per Page* Total Cost No. of

Documents

Pages per

Document

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Docket Fee ($450.00)

Appendix or Record Excerpts

Appellant’s Brief

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Other:

Total $ ________________ Costs are taxed in the amount of $ _______________

Costs are hereby taxed in the amount of $ _______________________ this ________________________________ day of __________________________, ___________.

LYLE W.CAYCE, CLERK 

State of

County of _________________________________________________ By ____________________________________________

Deputy Clerk 

I _____________________________________________________________, do hereby swear under penalty of perjury that the services for which fees have been charged were

incurred in this action and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed. A copy of this Bill of Costs was this day mailed to

opposing counsel, with postage fully prepaid thereon. This _______________ day of ________________________________, ______________.

_____________________________________________________________________

(Signature) 

*SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR RULES

GOVERNING TAXATION OF COSTS Attorney for __________________________________________ 

 Case: 10-60934 Document: 00512185311 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/25/2013
FIFTH CIRCUIT RULE 39

39.1 Taxable Rates. The cost of reproducing necessary copies of the brief, appendices, or record excerpts shall be taxed at a rate not higher than $0.15 per page, including cover,

index, and internal pages, for any for of reproduction costs. The cost of the binding required by 5 CIR. R. 32.2.3that mandates that briefs must lie reasonably flat when open shall TH

be a taxable cost but not limited to the foregoing rate. This rate is intended to approximate the current cost of the most economical acceptable method of reproduction generally

available; and the clerk shall, at reasonable intervals, examine and review it to reflect current rates. Taxable costs will be authorized for up to 15 copies for a brief and 10 copies

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39.3 Time for Filing Bills of Costs. The clerk must receive bills of costs and any objections within the times set forth in FED. R. APP. P. 39(D). See 5 CIR. R. 26.1. TH

FED. R. APP. P. 39. COSTS

(a) Against Whom Assessed. The following rules apply unless the law provides or the court orders otherwise;

(1) if an appeal is dismissed, costs are taxed against the appellant, unless the parties agree otherwise;

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(b) Costs For and Against the United States. Costs for or against the United States, its agency or officer will be assessed under Rule 39(a) only if authorized by law.

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authorized by rule 30(f). The rate must not exceed that generally charged for such work in the area where the clerk’s office is located and should encourage economical methods of

copying.

(d) Bill of costs: Objections; Insertion in Mandate.

(1) A party who wants costs taxed must – within 14 days after entry of judgment – file with the circuit clerk, with proof of service, an itemized and verified bill of costs.

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issues before costs are finally determined, the district clerk must – upon the circuit clerk’s request – add the statement of costs, or any amendment of it, to the mandate.

(e) Costs of Appeal Taxable in the District Court. The following costs on appeal are taxable in the district court for the benefit of the party entitled to costs under this rule:

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(3) premiums paid for a supersedeas bond or other bond to preserve rights pending appeal; and

(4) the fee for filing the notice of appeal.

 Case: 10-60934 Document: 00512185311 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/25/2013
United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

LYLE W. CAYCE

CLERK

TEL. 504-310-7700

600 S. MAESTRI PLACE

NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

March 25, 2013

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES LISTED BELOW

Regarding: Fifth Circuit Statement on Petitions for Rehearing or

Rehearing En Banc

No. 10-60934, Luminant Generation Company, et al v. EPA

USDC No. 75 Fed. Reg. 68,989

---------------------------------------------------

Enclosed is a copy of the court's decision. The court has

entered judgment under FED. R. APP. P. 36. (However, the opinion

may yet contain typographical or printing errors which are

subject to correction.)

FED. R. APP. P. 39 through 41, and 5TH CIR. RULES 35, 39, and 41

govern costs, rehearings, and mandates. 5TH CIR. RULES 35 and 40

require you to attach to your petition for panel rehearing or

rehearing en banc an unmarked copy of the court's opinion or

order. Please read carefully the Internal Operating Procedures

(IOP's) following FED. R. APP. P. 40 and 5TH CIR. R. 35 for a

discussion of when a rehearing may be appropriate, the legal

standards applied and sanctions which may be imposed if you make

a nonmeritorious petition for rehearing en banc.

Direct Criminal Appeals. 5TH CIR. R. 41 provides that a motion

for a stay of mandate under FED. R. APP. P. 41 will not be

granted simply upon request. The petition must set forth good

cause for a stay or clearly demonstrate that a substantial

question will be presented to the Supreme Court. Otherwise, this

court may deny the motion and issue the mandate immediately.

Pro Se Cases. If you were unsuccessful in the district court

and/or on appeal, and are considering filing a petition for

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, you do not need to

file a motion for stay of mandate under FED. R. APP. P. 41. The

issuance of the mandate does not affect the time, or your right,

to file with the Supreme Court.

The judgment entered provides that petitioners pay to respondent

the costs on appeal.

 Sincerely,

 LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk

 By:_________________________

 Jamei R. Cheramie, Deputy Clerk

 Case: 10-60934 Document: 00512185312 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/25/2013
Enclosure(s)

Mr. Thomas Lee Casey III

Mr. Scott Fulton

Mr. Philip Stephen Gidiere III

Mrs. Kelly Leigh Haragan

Mr. Matthew Brian Henjum

Mr. Charles William Irvine

Ms. Samara Lackman Kline

Mr. Matthew Lynn Kuryla

Mr. Steven G. McKinney

Mr. Jon Niermann

Mr. Matthew Robert Oakes

Mr. Matthew G. Paulson

Mr. Harry Max Reasoner

Ms. Anika Christine Stucky

Mr. Eric Alan White

 Case: 10-60934 Document: 00512185312 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/25/2013