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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/50NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 03-2177

GIL BERTO AR ROYO, Appellant

v. COMM ISSI ONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the Dis tri ct of New Jersey (D.C. Civi l No. 01-cv- 00055) District Judge: H onorab le Joseph A . Greena way, Jr.

Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

November 20, 2003 Be for e: R EN DE LL , BA RR Y a nd M AG ILL *, Circu it Judges
.

(Fil ed: December 17, 2003)

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

RE ND EL L, Circuit

Judge
. Gilbert o Arroyo c halle nges a fina l order of the Dist

rict Court, whic h affirmed t he

*Honorable Frank J . Magill , Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.2

decisio n of the C om missio ner o f the S ocial S ecurity A dm inistration denying his app li cat io n fo r d is abi li tyin sur anc e be nef it s ( “DI B”) and Supp le ment al Sec ur ity In come (“SSI”) prior t o February1, 1997. The Dis tri ct Court ha d juri sdiction over t he matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Our juri sdiction to entertai n this appeal arises unde r 28 U.S .C. § 12 91. We wil l a ffi rm. As we write exclus ively for the parti es, we reci te only those fac ts re levant

to the issues b efore us. A rroyo filed applic ations f or disa bility insuran ce an d SS I ben efits in January of 19 95, alleging disab ilityas of A ugust 30 , 1992. Th ese applications w ere denied i niti ally

and upon reconsi derati on. Arroy o file d a request for a de novo hearing before an Adminis trative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ decided that Arroyo was di sabled as of Fe bruary 1, 1997, bu t not disabled prior to tha t date. Arroyo soug ht review b efore the Appeals Counci l, whic h denied hi s request for revi ew. He then appeal ed to the Distri ct Court, which affirmed the decis ion. Thi s appeal f ollowed. We apply the same deferent ial s tandard a s the Dist

rict Court, t hat is , whether t

he ALJ’s findi ng are supported by“substantialevidence. ” Schaudeck v. Commissi oner of Soc ial Sec urity , 181 F.3d 429, 431 ( 3d Cir. 1999) ; 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Substantial evid enc e is “ suc h re leva nt ev iden ce a s a re aso nab le m ind mig ht ac cep t as a deq uate .” Ve ntura v . Shala la , 55 F.3d 900, 901 ( 3d Cir. 1995) . It is “l ess than a prepondera nce of the evi dence, but

more than a mere s cinti lla. ” Jesurum v. Secretary of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs ., 48 F.3d 114, 117 ( 3d Cir. 1995) . In maki ng this determi nation,3

we con side r the reco rd a s a w hol e. Schaudeck , 181 F.3d at 431. In ord er to qu alify for D IB o r SSI , a perso n m ust be disab led as th at term is def ined by the So cial S ecu rity Ac t and acc om pan ying re gul ation s. Burns v . Barnha rt , 312 F.3d 113, 118 ( 3d Cir. 2002) . Disabi lit y i s defined i n the Act as t he “inabi lit

y t o engage in anysubstant

ial gainful a ctivi ty by r eason of anymedicall y determinabl e phys ical or mental i mpairment which can be expected to resul t in death or which has last ed or can be exp ecte d to last f or a con tinu ous per iod of n ot les s tha n 12 mo nth s.” 4 2 U .S.C . § 1382c(a)( 3)(A) (2002) . In evaluating Arr oyo’ s clai m for benefit s, the ALJ applied the famili ar five -ste p analy sis. At step one, the ALJ found that Arroyo ha d not been employe d since August 30, 1992. At s teps two and three, the ALJ determined that Arroyo’ s spinaldisorde r and his mental di sabil ity were severe i mpairments , but t hat the y did not m eet or equa l any of the impa irments listed in A ppend ix 1 to Sub part P of P art 404 (“Listin g of Imp airme nts”). 20 C.F .R. § § 416 .920( d), 40 4.152 0(d). M ovin g on to step four , the ALJ found that pri or to February 1, 1997, Arr oyo maint ained the resi dual functiona l capacity to perform p ast relevant w ork as a dish wash er or a me chanic’s assistan t. How ever, a fter tha t date, the AL J deter mine d that A rroyo w as limite d to “sedentary work” due to a documente d increa se in t he severi ty of his i mpairments , and thus “ disab led” w ithin the mea ning of the Ac t. On a ppeal, A rroyo argues that the A LJ’s finding of non -disability prior to February 1, 1997 is not supported by s ubstantial e vidence because: ( 1) the ALJ fai led to c onsider4

whether the combinati on of his i mpairments was medicall y equi valent to a li sted impairment

as requi red by 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1526(a); (2) the ALJ reject ed, without adequate expl anati on, portions of the evidence t hat contradicted the fi nding of nondisabi lit y prior t o February1, 1997, i n violat ion of the guideli nes set forth i n Cotter v. Ha rris , 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981 ); (3) the AL J erred in con cluding that A rroyo’s work as a dis hwasher and a mechanic ’s ass ist ant coul d be considered past r elevant work; and (4) the ALJ ignored Arroy o’s subj ecti ve complaint s of pain and t he corrobor ative testimony of a

witness. Because we find that the ALJ’s deni al of benefi ts i s support ed by subs tantial ev idenc e, we will af firm th e judg men t of the Distric t Cou rt. First , Arroy o contends t hat the ALJ failed t o consider whether the combinati on of hi s i mpai rme nt s was medi cal lyequ iv al ent to a l is te d i mpai rme ntas re qui re d by20 C. F. R. § 404.1526(a) . However, we note t hat the ALJ explici tly

stat ed that

“it [ had] not [be en] shown that t

he clai mant has any... com binati on of impairments which, when considered in con junctio n w ith the o rthop aedic and m ental d ifficu lties note d abo ve, is m edica lly equival ent to a ny l ist ed impairment.” Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that t he ALJ’s conclus ion was not bas ed on substantialevidence. Second, Arroy o argues that the ALJ reject ed, without adequat e explanation, portions of the evidence that contradicted the finding of non-disab ilityprior to Febru ary 1, 1997, i n violat

ion of the guideli ne set forth in Co tter v. H arris , 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981). Speci fical ly , Arroy o contends t hat the ALJ failed t o consider the November 19905

repo rt of D r. Pau l J. Kiell, w hich s tated th at Ar royo suf fered “sciatic n euro pathy ... with perm anen t neuro logic d isability estima ted at 2 0 per cent o f total.” H ow ever, w hile it is true t hat the ALJ did not addres s Dr. Kiel l’s report byname, he did a cknowledge Arroyo’ s proble ms, note t he absence of appr opriate neurologi cal fi ndings and di scuss t he lack of anyevidence i ndicating sensor y l oss, reflex l oss or motor loss. As a result , the AL J did n ot fail Cotter’s requir ement that “an examiner’ s findi ngs [] be as comprehensive and a nalytical as f easible and, w here a ppro priate, [] includ e a state men t of su bord inate factu al fou ndatio ns on wh ich the ultima te fac tual co nclus ions a re bas ed, so that a reviewing c ourt mayknow the basis for the de cisi on.” Id. at 705. The ALJ’s discuss ion was adequate i n light

of the other documentary evi dence, and hi s conclus ion was supporte d by subs tanti al evi dence. Third, Arroyo contends that t he AL J erred in concluding that Arroy o’s work as a dishwasher and a mec hanic’s assist ant could be considered past relevant work. “Past releva nt work” includes any “work experie nce [which] ... was done within the last 15 year s, l asted l ong enough for [the clai mant] to l earn to do i t, a nd was substantial gainful acti vity .” 20 C.F. R. § 404.1565(a ). Whil e Arroy o concedes that he worked as bot h a dishwasher a nd a mechanic’s assis tant wit hin the l ast 15 y ears, he argues t hat the y cannot be co nside red su bstan tial gainf ul activ ity becau se he only w orke d at the se po sitions p arttime and for

very low pay. However, “work may be subs tanti al even i f it i s done on a part- time basi s,” and “work ac tivi ty is gai nful if it i s the ki nd of work usuall y done for6

pay or profit , whether or

not a profi t is reali zed.” 20 C.F. R. § 404.1572(a )-(b) . Thus, t he AL J did not err in co ncluding th at Arroyo’s w ork as a dish wash er and a m echanic’s assistant could be considered past relevant w ork. Furtherm ore, our review of the reco rd indicates t

hat the ALJ had ample evidence fr om which to conclude t hat Arroy o had the resi dual functional c apacity t o perform thi s past relevant work prior to February1, 1997. Fourth, Arroyo c ontends t hat the ALJ ignored Arroy o’s subj ecti ve complaint s of pain and the corrobor ative testimony of a witness. While an ALJ should consi der an app lican t’s su bjec tive c om plain ts, Smith v. Cal ifano , 637 F.2d 968 ( 3d Cir. 1981) , the app lican t bea rs the bur den of p rod ucin g m edic al ev iden ce to sup por t tho se c om plain ts. Willi ams v. Sull ivan , 970 F.2 d 11 78, 1 186 (3d Cir . 199 2), cert. denied 507 U.S. 924 (199 3). O ur rev iew o f the re cord indica tes that A rroyo larg ely failed to supp ly much in the wa y of supporting m edical eviden ce. Thus , the AL J’s conclusion that Arroyo’s subjective complai nts of pai n were “not cr edible ” in li ght of the evidence i s support ed by substant ial e vidence. For th e ab ove re as ons , we wil l a ffi rm.7

TO THE CLERK OF COU RT: Please fi le the foregoing opi nion.

/s/ M arjorie O . Ren dell Circuit Judge