NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 08a0330n.06 Filed: June 11, 2008 No. 07-2365 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
URI AN R. STURGI S, SR ., JENN I F ER S TE PHENS, P lai nt iffs- App e lla nt s, Y. S
. , et al
. , m i n o r c h i l dre n , t h ro u gh pare nts Urian R. Sturgis, Sr. and Jenn if e r S te ph e ns , P lai nt iffs,
v. KA RENHA YE S, B ERN I CE HARRI S & MI CHAEL

PATTY, individually

and in their off

icial c a pa c iti e s at We ste rn

Way ne Chi ld Protective Servic es; SARAH Z ACHMANN & J ENNI FER STE VENS, ind ivi du a lly

and in t he ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s at St. F ra

nc is Catho lic Soc ia l Se rv ic e s; ST. FRANCI S CATHOL I C SOCI AL SER VI CES , De fend ant s- App e lle e s.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN
O P I N I O N

Be for e : M ERRI TT, M OORE, a nd R OG ER S, C ir c uit Judg e s. KA REN NELSO N MOORE , Circuit Judge. I n this c ase, two pare nts, suing on their own behalf and on beha lf of the c hildren that the State of Mic higa n has removed from them, assert thatR.S. and Y. S. w e re no t y e t bo rn . R. S. w a s b or n in De c e mbe r 2 00 4, and Y. S. w a s b or

n in 1 Fe bruar y 2006. 2 the district court e rre d when it dismissed their civil suit for lack of j u ri s d i ct ion under the Ro ok e rFeldman doctrine. We conclude that the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine did no t ba r t he pla int if

fs ’ c la ims
. There fore , we RE VE RSE and REMAND to the district c ourt for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. I. BACKG ROUND J ennife r Stephens (“ Stephens”) a nd Urian St u rgi s (“Sturg is”), a ma rried c ouple, see k damag es and other relief on acc ount of Mi chig an’s alleg edly improper termination of their par ental rig hts over their f

our minor childre n, Z .S., S.S., R.S., and Y.S. Although Stephens is the biolog ical mot he r o f a ll f

our c hil dr e n, Sturg is i s th e bio log ic a l f a the r o f o nly

R.S. and Y. S. I n J une 2004, Michig an’s Child Protective Servic es (“ CPS ”) visited Stephens’s home afte r
rec eiving a tip that S.S. was burned by scaldingwater

afte r S.S. failed to meet Sturg is’s expectations for potty training
. Acc ording to CPS’s brief, neither Z .S. nor S.S . wer e re moved from the house at that point in ti me. CPS ’s B r. at 6. On September 27, 2004, CPS rec eived a second tip indicating 1 that S.S. had suffere d new injuries. Tw o day s later, J ackie Buc kley , the bi ologic al father of Z .S. and S.S., t old CP S that he was wor ried a bout the safe ty

of his children. On September

30, 2004, CPS interviewe d Z .S. St ephens a sked t o b e p re s ent for the interview, but CPS tol d St ep h en s t h at t h e intervie w of Z .S. had to be private . On the basis of the evidenc e that CPS g ather ed, on October 5, 2004, a war rant issued for

Sturgis’s a

rre st, and offic ers
arr ested Sturg is on October 18, 2004. O n October 26, 2004, CPS remove d Z .S. and S.S. from Steph e n s ’ s h o me . A lt

h o u g hth e c h il dr e nw e r e r e mo v e d f r o m t h e h o me , CP S l a c k e d

s u f f ic ie ntTh e c omp la int do e s n ot m ake c le ar R ic ha rd Mc Kn ig ht’ s o r L a

ur a She ldo n’s ro le s in

thi s 2 case . Stephens and S turg is’s second complaint, althoug h it named neither McKnight nor Sheldon as def endants in that c ase, indicates that McKnig ht was a “ court[] ref ere e,” J.A. at 11 (Compl. ¶ 33), and Sheldon was a

case worke r. 3 e vid e nc e of

a bu se to s up po rt

purs uin g a c ri min a l cha

rg e ; the la c k of ev ide nc e wa s all e g e dly du e to Ste ph e ns ’s re fu sa l to c oo pe rate wi th C PS. Despite CPS’s inabilit y to br ing a criminal complaint, the Michig an De partment of H uman Service s pursued the termination of Stephens’s and Sturgis’s pa renta l rig hts. On Marc h 29, 2007, the Mic hig an Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls uphe ld t

he te rm inatio n o f S te ph e ns ’s and Sturg is’ s p are nta l r ig hts to Z
. S
. , S.S., and R.S
. In re Stephe ns , 2007 WL 948879 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007) . I n the Mic hig an Co ur

t of Ap pe als , Ste ph e ns and

Sturg is a lle g e d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt fa ile d to take int o
acc ount the children’ s status as Native Ame rica ns, err oneously

admi t t ed Z. S .’s hea

rsay statement reg ardingabuse, a

nd g ener ally

lacke d sufficie nt evidenc e to terminate parenta l rig hts. The Michig an Court of Appea ls concluded that these cla ims all lacked mer it and aff ir m ed t h e termination of Stephens’s and Sturgis’s pare ntal rig hts. On J une 29, 2007, the Michig an Supreme Court declined to hear Stephens and Sturg is’s appea l. In re Stephe ns , 733 N.W.2d 397 (Mich. 2007). The United States Supreme Court denie d cer tiorari re view. Stu rg is v . Mi c hig an De p’ t of Hu ma n S e rv s. , 1 28 S. Ct. 617 (2007). Whil e Ste ph e ns and

Sturg is d e fe nd e d the ir pa re nta l rig hts in the state pr oc e e din g s, the y a lso broug ht a pro se, in f

orma pa uperis fe dera l civil case in the U .S. District Court fo r the Easter n Di str ic t of Mic hig an. On July 17 , 200 6, the y fi le d a su it i n th e ir ow n n ame s and

on be ha lf of Y. S. ag ainst Sarah Z achma

nn and Jennifer Stevens of St. Franc is Catholic Social Services, and Mic hael Patty , Kar en Ha

y es, and B ernic e Harris of CPS , as we ll as Richard McK night a nd L aura Sheldon. 24

The c omplaint alleg ed violations of six teen statutory provisions and demanded the imm ediate r eturn of the ir c hil dr e n, c ri min a l ind ic tme nts fo r a ll o f t he de fe nd ants , a

nd mil lio ns of

do lla rs in d ama g e s. On July 28 , 20 06 , the dis tr ic t jud g e dis mis se d the c omp la int a s fr ivo lou s under 2 8 U. S .C. § 1 91 5( e )( 2) . T he dis tr ict cou rt no te d th a t th e “ [p]la int if fs have a sse rt e d s e ve ra l c la ims a g a ins t de fe nd ants inc lud ing : c ivi l c on sp ir a c y , c ri min a l c on sp ir a c y , hin de ri ng pr os e c uti on , f ra ud , mi su se of fe dera l funds, intimi dation, hara ssment, coer cion, per jury , obstruction o f j u s t i ce, ma licious pr os e c uti on , a

nd br ibe ry . . . . Pla int if

fs a lso sa

y the ir F ir st, F ourt

h, Se ve nth , a

nd F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt r ig hts have be e n v iol a te d.
. . . A lth ou g h it a pp e ars tha

t pl ain tiff s h ave a tte mpt e d to invoke the Court’s fe dera l question jurisdiction, t he complaint does not set f orth alleg ations
rea sonably s u g g e s ti n g p la inti f f s mi g h t h av e a

f e d e r a l c la im
. ” Jo int A

p p e n d ix ( “ J. A
. ” ) a t 7 3

- 74 (O rd e r i n Ca se No . 0 6- 13 24 3) . St e ph e ns and Stu rg is d id n ot a

pp e a l th e dis mis sa l. Approxim ately

one month later, on Aug ust 31, 2006, Stephens and S turg is filed a second pro se, in forma

pauper is feder al complaint (Case No. 06-13890). The case was initially assig ned to a differ ent judg e, but the cour t noted that the “c ase a

ppear s to be a companion case to 06-13243[, the initial federa l complaint] ,” and tr ansfe rre d the case to the orig inal district judge . J .A. at 63 (O rder Reg ardingReassig nment of Companion Case). This second complaint involved slightly differ ent parties than the first fe dera l case , with the addition of Z .S., R.S ., and S.S. as plaintiffs, and the addition of defe ndant St. Fra ncis Catholic Social Service s, while deletingRichard M cK night a nd L aura Sheldon. I n addition, the second c omplaint raised simi lar claims, asser ting causes of

action
un de r 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 fo r v iol a tio ns of th e Fou rth A me ndme nt, de nia l of the F ourt e e nth A m e n dm e n t ’ s d

u e p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n s , an d i n f r i n g e m e n t s u

p o nS t e p h e n s ’ s an d

S tu r g i s ’ s r i g h t s to familial integ rity . The sec ond complaint also alleg ed neg lige nce, f raud, pe rjury , and discriminationOn Marc h 26, 2007, Stephens and Sturg is filed a t h ird fede ral c omplaint (Case No. 06- 3 11 30 1) . T hat c a se is n ot at is su e in t his a pp e a l. 5 claims. Althoug h the sec ond complaint did not expli citly seek the return of the childre n, plaintiffs asked the district court for unspecifie d compensatory and punitive damag es, injunctive re lief, and
a de c laratio n th a t th e de fe nd ants ’ a c tio ns we re un c on sti tut ion a l. Th e de fe nd ants mov e d f

or dis mis sa l and

summa ry jud g me nt. Th e St. F ra

nc is d e fe nd ants claimed that the s ec o n d compl aint was virtually identical to the ea

rlier, f rivolous suit and that the do ctrine s o f r e s ju dic a ta

and c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l ba

rr e d th e su it. Th e CPS d e fe nd ants ra ise d th os e same de fense s and also asse rted that the Rooke r-Feldman d o ct ri n e and Y ounger a b s te nti on principles require d dismiss al, t h e p laintiffs lacke d standing to sue on beha lf of their c hildren, the plaintiffs fa ile d to state a

c la im, and

the El e ve nth

Am e ndme nt b arr e d c la ims a g a ins t th e st ate de fe nd ants in the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s. On Au g us t 16 , 2 00 7, the dis tr ic t ju dg e dis mis se d Ste ph e ns and Sturg is’ s se c on d c omp la int
. Th e jud g e ob se rv e d that the de fe nd ants “ pr e se nt s e ve ra l g ro un ds fo r d ism iss a l, a ll o f whic h a re we lltaken.” J
. A. at 2 5 (O rd er Dismissi ng Case No. 06- 13890 at 5). The judge held that “plaintiff[s’] claim is barr ed by

the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. . .
. A fa i r re ading of the c omplaint revea ls that pla int if f s ’ f e d e r a l c a s e i s ani mp e r

m i s s i b l e a t t a c k

o f [] s t a t e c o u rtj u d g m e n t s r e l a t i n g t o t h e s ame issues raised in the c omplaint. Pl aintffs’ c omplaint is an attempt to declare those state cour t judgme nts void by decla

ring the underly

ing premise unconstitutional.” J .A. at 26 (Orde r Dismissing Case No. 06- 13890 at 6). On O ctober 11, 2007, the district court de nied plaintiffs ’ m o t i o n for
re c on sid e ratio n. Ste ph e ns and Sturg is f iled a ti mely

pr o s e a pp e a l, a nd it i s th e dis mis sa l of

thi s
se c on d c a se that is no w b e fo re us . 36 II. AN AL YSI S

“ Th is C ourt

re vie ws de novo the district court rulingthat the Rooke r -Feldman doctrine prec luded subject matter

jurisdiction.” McCormick v. Brave rman , 451 F.3d 382, 389 ( 6 th Ci r . 2006), cert. de nied , _

__ U. S. _

__ , 1 28 S. Ct . 4 1 ( 20 07 ). We c on c lud e th at th e di stric t c ourt imp ro pe rl y applied the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine to b ar S te ph e ns and Sturg is’ s c la ims
. Be fore addre ssing the me rits of this case, it is worth providinga fe w words on standing . The defe ndants in this case a ssert that Stephens and Sturgis lacke d standing to br ing this suit beca use the state of Mic hig an h a s te rm inate d th e ir pa re nta l r ig hts . A lth ou g h p are nts c ann ot b ri nga su it o n b e ha lf of childre n for whom they have no le g al re sponsibili ty , Elk GroveUnified Sch. Dist

. v. Newdow , 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004), pare nts ma y file complaints to enfor ce the ir own rig hts, W inkleman v . Parma City Sc h. Di st. , ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. C t. 1994, 2006 (2007) (I DEA c laims). Whil e S t ep h ens and Sturgis did sue on behalf of their c hildren, they also broug ht all of their cla ims on their own behalf
. Thus , Step he ns and Sturg is ha d s tand ingto b ri ngthi s su it i n th e ir ow n n ame s, and

the iss ue of

the ir standing to bring claims on beha lf of the c hildren nee d not be re solved. The Rooke r-Feldman doctrine e merg ed out of two c ases, Rooke r v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Cour t of Appeals v. Feldman , 4 6 0 U
. S
. 4 6 2 ( 1 9 8 3 )
. “ In both case s, the losing pa

rty in state court filed suit in federa l court af ter the state proce eding s ended, complaining of an injury

cause d by

the state-c ourt judg ment and see king r eview a nd reje ction of that judgme nt.” Exx on Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U. S. 280 , 2 91 (2 00 5) . In e ff e c t, the plaintiffs in Rooke r

and Feldman so ug ht to “ a pp e a l” the ir

state c a se s to a

fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt
. After various circuits adopted differinginterpre tations of the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine, the Supreme Court re cently

took the opportunity

to clarify the doctrine ’s limited scope:7

The Rooke r-Feldman doctrine, w e hold today , is confined to case s of the kind from which the do ct ri ne ac quired its name: ca ses broug ht by state-c ourt losers complaining of injuries cause d by state-c ourt judgme nts r ender ed befor e the district court proc eeding s commence d and inviting district cour t re v iew and r ejec tion of those judg ments. Rooke r-Feldman does not otherwise o v er ride or suppla nt pr e c lus ion

do c tr ine or

a ug me nt t he c ir c ums c ri be d do c tr ine s that a llo w f e de ra l c ourt s to s tay or dis mis s p ro c e e din g s in

de fe re nc e to s tate -c ourt

a c tio ns . Ex x on Mo bil , 544 U.S. at 284. Thus, the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine does not pr ec l u d e a l l federal
c a se s th a t ar e so me ho w re late d to a prio r state -c ourt de c isi on . “I f a fe de ra l pl a int if

f ‘ pr e se nt[s ] som e ind e pe nd e nt c la im, a lbe it o ne that de nie s a le g a l c on c lus ion

tha t a state c ourt

ha s r e a c he d in

a c a se to which he was a party
. . ., then there is jurisdiction and state law deter mines whether the def

endant preva ils unde r principles of prec lusion.’” Id. at 293 (alter ation and omi ssion in original) ( quoting GASH Assocs. v . Rosemont , 995 F.2d 726, 728 ( 7th Cir. 1993)). This distinction betwee n case s that are cover ed by the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine and tho se that are not, a lthough c larified in Ex x on Mo bil , actua lly

dates ba ck to Feldman . I n Feldman , at the same time that the Supreme Court stated that the district court lac k ed j u ri s d iction for some of the
c la ims , th e Court

a ls o no ted that

the dis tr ic t c ourt possessed jurisdiction over the alleg ations that “involve[d] a g ener al attac k on the consti tutionality of” bar admittance rules. Feldman , 460 U.S. at 487. Thus, what the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine pr imarily bars a re c laims that seek “r elief f rom injury ‘cau sed b y ’ t h e s tat e cou rtju dgmen t. ” 18 B C H A RLES A L AN W R I GHT , A RT H U R R. M I LL ER & E DW AR D H. C OOPER , F ED ER A L P R AC TI C E AND P ROCE D U RE § 4 4 6 9
. 1 a t1 1 ( 2 d e d
. S u p p . 2 0 0 8 )
. In contra st, the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine provides no esc ape f rom claims that see k relief from other inj ur ie s, su c h a s th os e c a

us e d b y thi rd pa rt ie s. We have f ollo w e d th e Su p r e meCo u

r t’ s g u id a nce, a nd we a pply the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine “only when a plaintiff complains of i njury from the state court judgment itself.” Col es v . G ra nv ill e ,8

448 F.3d 853, 858 (6th Cir. 2006). In other wor ds, the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine applies “when a plaintiff asser

ts before a federa l district court that a state c ourt judg ment itself was unc onstitut ional or in violation of fede ral law .” M c Co rmick , 4 5 1 F.3d at 395. To further explain the differe nce betwee n normal pre clusion and Rooke r-Feldman pr inc ipl e s, we have a pp ro vin g ly

qu ote d th e Te nth Circuit’s explanation:

“ Ap p e l l a t e r e v i e w

—t h e t yp e o f

j u d i c i a l a c t i o nb ar

r e d b y Rooke r-Feldman —c on sis ts of a r eview of

the proc eeding s alrea dy conducte d by the ‘lower ’ tribunal to determine whether it r eac hed its re sult in acc ordanc e with law. When, in contrast, the se cond c ourt tr ie s a matte r a ne w a nd re a c he s a con c lus ion

c on tr ary to a jud g me nt b y

the fi rs t court, without conc erningitself with the bona fides of t he prior judg ment (which ma y or may not have be en a la

wful judg ment under the evidenc e and a rgument prese nted t o the first cour

t), it is not conducting a ppellate r eview, r eg ardle ss of whethe r compliance with the second judgme nt w ould make it impossible to comply with the fi rs t ju dg me nt. I n thi s latte r s itu a tio n th e c on fl ic t be tw e e n th e tw o ju dg me nts is t o be re so lve d und e r p re c lus ion do c tr ine , n ot Rooke r-Feldman .” Coles , 4 4 8 F. 3 d

at 8 5 8 -5 9 (q u o t i n g Bolden v. City of Topeka , 441 F.3d 1129, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006)). I n the case at hand, Stephens and Sturg is do not claim injury from the state -cour

t decision; instead, they

asser t independent c laims ag ains t t h i rd parties. Stephens a nd Sturgis alleg e that the employ ees at CP S an d S t
. Fr ancis violated the ir constitutional rights and c ommitt ed other acts of neg lige nce, f

raud, discr imination, and perjury
. The plainti ffs’ claims in the i nstant case , while they may lead a fede ral c ourt to rea ch a c onclusion contrar y to the Michig an cour

ts, do not seek fe dera l appellate revie w of the state -cour t decision. The c ase at hand is quite simil ar to McCormick , in which we he ld that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine did not apply

to severa l cl ai m s i n which the plaintiff w as not attac king the state-c ourt judgme nt itself. I n the claims for which we he ld that the Rooke r-Feldman d o c t r i n e d i d n o ta p p l y, the plaintiff in McCormick ha d a sse rt e d th a t th e “ state c ourt jud g me nts we re pr oc ur e d by c e rt a in9

De fe nd ants thr ou g h f

ra ud , mi sr e pr esen tation, or oth e r i mpr op e r m e ans , a nd that a state statut e is vague and ove rbroa d.” McCormick , 451 F.3d at 392. After

analy zing these c laims, simi lar to the
on e s in the ins tant c a se , w e no te d th a t “ [n]on e of the se c la ims a ssert an in

ju ry c a us e d b y the state
cou rt judgme nts; P laintiff does not cla im that the state court judg ments themselves ar e unconstitutional or in violation of feder al law.” Id. Had the plaintiff in McCormick (or the pla intiffs in the instant case) claimed that the state-c ourt judg ments cause d the i njuries, t he result would have be e n d if fe re nt:

“ Sup po se a

state c ourt , b a se d p ur e ly

on state law, te rm inate s a fathe r’ s pa re nta l r ig hts and orde rs the state to take custody of his son. I f t he father sues in fede ral c ourt for the re turn of his s o n o n g rounds that the state judg ment violates his fede ral substantive due-pr ocess r ights a s a par ent, he is complaining of an injury cause d by the st at e j u d gment and see king its re versa l. This he may not do, reg ardle ss of wh e the r h e ra ise d a

ny c on sti tut ion a l c la ims in state c ourt , b e c a us e on ly the Sup re me Court may

hear appea ls from state-c ourt judg ments.” Id. at 3 9 4 (q u o t i n g Hoblock v . Albany County Bd. of Elections , 422 F.3d 77, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2005))
. A claim asse rting injuries cause d by a state-c ourt dec ision would trigg er the application of the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. Howeve r, beca use the plaintiff in McCormick a l l e g e d w r o n g s b y a third p arty , n o t b y

th e s tate c o u rt, th e p la inti f f a s s e rte d anin d e p e n d e n t c la im

an d the Ro ok

e rFeldman doctrine did not apply
. Id. at 393 (“ I f there is some other source of injury , such as a third party ’s ac tions, then t h e p l ai n t i ff asser ts an independe nt claim.”). In the same w ay , Stephens and Sturgis’s c omplaints ag ainst the employ ees of CPS and St. Fra

ncis ca nnot be cha

ract er i z ed as an at t ac k o nt h e s t at e- co u rt j u d gm en t i t s el f; ra t h er t h an al l egi n g i n j u ry fr o m t h e j u d gm en t , t h ey al l ege injury from the unc onstitut ional actions of these third pa rties involved in the re moval of the c hildren from Stephens’s home
.10

Be cause the plaintiffs do “not complain of an injury cause d by a st ate court judgme nt, we find t h a t[ t h e y ar e ] a s s e rt i n g i n d e p e n d e n t c l a i m s , w h i c h ar e n o t b ar r e d b y Rooke r-Feldman .” Pittman v. Cuy ah og a Coun ty De

p’ t of Chi ldr e n and Fa mi ly Se rv s. , 2 41 F . App ’x 28 5, 28 8 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) ; see als o S o utherland v. Giuliani , 4 F. App’ x 33 (2d Cir. 2001) (holdingthat the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine doe s not bar a pla intiff’s claims of c onstitut ional violations related to the r emoval of children f rom the plaintiff’s home ). Although the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine does not apply , “the Supre me Court has instructed that prec lusion law is the appropriate solut ion for these independe nt claims.” McCormick , 451 F.3d at 392. While the district court called the defe ndants’ various ar g uments for dismissal “well-taken,” J .A. at 25 (O rder

Dismissi ng Case No
. 0 6 -1 3890 at 5), it addre ssed only the application of the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. F or that re ason, we leave to the district court on re mand the de te rm inatio n o f t

he a pp lic a bil ity of the do c tr ine s o f p re c lus ion and any ot her

re ma ini ngmatte rs . See F eldman , 460 U.S. at 488. III . C ON CL USI ON We hold t hat the district cour t erre d in its application of the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine to independe nt claims that did not assert injuries c aused by the state-c ourt judg ment. Acc ording ly , we RE VE RSE and REMAND for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.