United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on

Armed Services, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m., EDT

Wednesday,

March 5, 1997

MILITARY ATTRITION

Better Screening of Enlisted

Personnel Could Save DOD

Millions of Dollars

Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, Military

Operations and Capabilities Issues, National Security and

International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our recently issued report on

military enlisted attrition.1 At the request of the former Chairman and the

former Ranking Minority Member of this Subcommittee, we concentrated

on attrition that occurs during the training phase, or the first 6 months. Let

me provide a quick overview of our findings and then go back and discuss

in more detail (1) the extent of the attrition problem, (2) the reasons why

enlistees are separated, (3) the adequacy of the data the Department of

Defense (DOD) has available for setting realistic attrition reduction goals,

(4) the savings the services could accrue by achieving their goals for

reducing 6-month attrition, and (5) changes in policy since we issued our

report in January.

Results in Brief In summary, we found that more than 14 percent of new recruits leave the

services during the first 6 months, and more than 30 percent leave before

the end of their first term. Because of this attrition, the services lose a

substantial investment in training, time, equipment, and related expenses

and must increase accessions to replace these losses. The main reasons

for the high attrition rate during the first 6 months are that (1) the services’

screening of applicants for disqualifying medical conditions or preservice

drug use is inadequate and (2) recruits fail to perform adequately because

they are in poor physical condition for basic training or lack motivation.

Although the services are greatly concerned about attrition, their goals for

reducing attrition are based on inconsistent, incomplete data, and are

unrealistic. If the services were to actually reach their goals, however, they

would realize immediate short-term annual savings ranging from $5 million

to $39 million.

Let me now provide you with some background information and expand

on these points.

Background The applicants’ first contact with the military is with a service recruiter

who prescreens them for disqualifying conditions. The applicants are then

sent to military entrance processing stations (MEPS), which are the

responsibility of the Military Entrance Processing Command. When the

applicants are determined to be qualified, through medical and aptitudinal

tests, they are sworn into the Individual Ready Reserve, in an unpaid

status, for up to 1 year. Once they are called to active duty, enlisted

personnel enter basic training, which can last from 6 to 12 weeks,

1

Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel

(GAO/NSIAD-97-39, Jan. 6, 1997).

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102
depending on the service. After basic training, recruits go on to initial skill

training, which can range from a few weeks to more than 1 year.

(Appendix I displays the process for recruiting and training enlisted

personnel.)

It costs the services between $9,400 and $13,500 in fixed and variable costs

to recruit and train an active-duty enlistee through basic training.

Considering that DOD recruited more than 176,000 new recruits in fiscal

year 1994, we calculated that DOD invested more than $2 billion in the

recruiting and training of these new personnel.

A Significant Amount

of Attrition Occurs

Within the First 

6 Months

New recruits take an enlistment oath and sign a contract to serve in one of

the military services for a specified period of time, typically 4 years.

Despite this contractual obligation, DOD data shows that about one out of

every three new recruits fails to complete the first term. Over the past 

10 years, this attrition rate has remained about the same in each of the

services.

We found that a significant portion of first-term attrition occurs during

enlistees’ first 6 months in the service. In fiscal year 1994, 6-month attrition

rates were 15.7 percent for the Army, 15.7 percent for the Navy,

12.5 percent for the Marine Corps, and 11.6 percent for the Air Force.2

 (See

table 1.) This means that in fiscal year 1994, more than 25,000 new recruits

did not remain in the military beyond the training phase.

Table 1: Percentage of Enlistees Who

Are Separated in the First 6 Months of

Their First Terms

Fiscal year enlistees

entered the services Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force All services

1986 10.4 13.1 15.9 10.7 11.8

1987 9.2 12.7 13.2 10.0 10.8

1988 9.8 14.4 12.6 9.0 11.6

1989 10.0 12.8 13.9 9.4 11.3

1990 10.7 10.1 15.6 10.2 11.1

1991 13.0 10.2 14.1 10.5 11.9

1992 12.8 12.9 12.9 9.2 12.3

1993 15.3 15.8 13.6 11.6 14.6

1994 15.7 15.7 12.5 11.6 14.4

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

2

The Defense Manpower Data Center maintains data on all the services’ enlistees; fiscal year 1994 was

the most current year for which complete data was available.

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102
Screening Processes

Do Not Identify

Thousands of Recruits

Who Are Unqualified

for Service

About 83 percent of the 25,000 who entered the services in fiscal year 1994

and were separated in their first 6 months were discharged because they

(1) were medically unqualified for military service, (2) failed to meet

minimum performance criteria, (3) had fraudulently or erroneously

entered the military, or (4) had character or behavior disorders.

Separations for medical conditions and failure to meet performance

standards represent at least 55 percent of all 6-month attrition for enlistees

who entered the services in fiscal year 1994. However, this percentage is

misleading for two reasons. First, some persons who have medical

problems are categorized as fraudulent enlistments because they

concealed medical problems. Second, some persons who have

performance problems are categorized as having character or behavior

disorders.

Our review indicated that the DOD screening processes were not working

and there were insufficient incentives and checks to ensure that the

services are recruiting qualified personnel. For example, recruiters do not

have adequate incentives to ensure that their recruits are fully qualified. In

a sense, recruiters have a built-in conflict of interest. Although they are

expected to recruit only fully qualified personnel, their performance is

judged primarily on the number of recruits they enlist per month.

Recruiters’ monthly recruiting goals are established on the basis of the

services’ personnel needs, which are in turn driven by end-strength

numbers and budget allocations. The recruiters’ goals are also connected

to the numbers of slots for basic and follow-on training. That is, recruiters

must keep a steady and constant flow of enlisted personnel into the

services.

We believe that the services do not provide recruiters with adequate

incentives to ask applicants probing questions that might reveal

disqualifying information. Asking probing questions leads to two

complications for recruiters. First, if recruiters uncover potentially

disqualifying information about their applicants, they create more

paperwork for themselves in that they must request waivers. Second,

recruiters might have to reject applicants who are not qualified and miss

their monthly goals.

In June 1996, the Navy began to subtract points from recruiters’ quotas

when their enlistees did not graduate from basic training. While this

change appears quite positive, it is too early to determine its effect on

attrition. Over the years, the Marine Corps has allowed its recruiting units

the flexibility to tie recruiters’ incentive systems to enlistees’ successful

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102
completion of basic training. However, this policy has not been uniformly

applied throughout the Marine Corps, and its incentive system, like those

of the other services, does not appear to provide adequate incentives for

recruiters to screen out unqualified applicants.

Thousands of Recruits

Are Found to Be Not

Medically Qualified

Another reason that unqualified personnel are entering the services and

being separated within their first 6 months is that medical screening,

performed by Military Entrance Processing Station physicians, is not

comprehensive enough. The medical exams do not detect many problems

that later result in early separations. Around 6,800 of the approximately

25,000 enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1994 and did not

complete their first 6 months of service were found to be not medically

qualified. The services are enlisting persons with disqualifying medical

conditions for two primary reasons: (1) applicants knowingly and

unknowingly conceal their medical histories and (2) the services waive

medical conditions that, according to DOD directives, are disqualifying. One

reason that applicants might not disclose significant aspects of their

medical histories is that the services do not require all applicants to

provide the names of their medical insurers or their past medical

providers. If applicants report no medical problems, they are not required

to provide any supporting documentation. Also, the medical screening

forms used to question applicants for their medical histories contain vague

and ambiguous questions and may be easy for applicants to misunderstand

or falsify.

Another inadequacy of DOD’s medical screening process is that DOD does

not have a system for determining which medical conditions represent

good attrition risks. At present, DOD’s physical enlistment standards are

not empirically linked to performance in the military, but rather are based

on military experience and judgment. Also, the services now waive many

of these physical enlistment standards. The Army, for example, told us that

the only two medical conditions for which waivers cannot be granted are

pregnancy that existed prior to enlistment and human immunodeficiency

virus. In September 1996, DOD funded a project to compile a

comprehensive database of medical conditions for all military personnel.

This database will enable DOD to reevaluate its physical enlistment

standards, analyze the medical reasons that recruits are separated, make

fact-based policy changes to reduce medical attrition, and determine the

cost-effectiveness of providing more medical tests to all or selected groups

of applicants.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102
We also found that as a result of the services’ varying drug-testing policies,

more Navy and Marine Corps enlisted personnel were separated during

basic training than was the case with the Army and the Air Force. This was

because the Air Force and the Army tested all of their applicants for drugs

at the MEPS, before they enlisted, while—at the time of our review—the

Navy and the Marine Corps tested their applicants at basic training, after

they had enlisted.

In fiscal year 1994, 1,669 recruits were discharged from the Navy because

of drug use. The Navy offered no waivers for positive drug tests. On the

other hand, in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, around 70 percent of recruits

who tested positive for marijuana at Parris Island Marine Corps Recruit

Depot were granted waivers. In fiscal year 1995, 332 recruits tested

positive for marijuana at Parris Island; 231 of these received waivers. By

May of fiscal year 1996, 280 recruits had tested positive for marijuana at

Parris Island, and 194 of these received waivers.

Thousands of Recruits

Are Discharged for

Failure to Meet

Minimum

Performance Criteria

More than 7,200 of the recruits who entered the services in fiscal year 1994

were discharged in the first 6 months of service because they failed to

meet minimum performance criteria. Basic training personnel throughout

the services told us that these recruits are not physically prepared for

basic training and lack motivation. Basic training personnel suggested that

recruits might be better prepared for the physical demands of basic

training if they were more fully informed of the services’ physical training

requirements and encouraged to become physically fit before going to

basic training.

All the services now encourage their applicants to undergo physical

training while they await the call to active duty. However, we believe that

the services could provide further incentives for applicants to get into

good physical shape. For example, the services could ensure that

applicants have access to military fitness centers and to military medical

treatment facilities if they are injured.

To improve recruits’ motivation during training, all the services have taken

actions to improve the basic training environment. They have established

special units for recruits with motivational problems and injuries. Despite

these efforts, our interviews with 126 separating recruits suggest that

negative leadership techniques continue to be a factor in recruits’ lack of

motivation to meet performance standards. While all four services have

similar prohibitions on drill instructors’ treatment of basic trainees, about

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102
one-third of the separating recruits we interviewed told us that they were

subjected to “humiliating” treatment and that this treatment contributed to

their desire to leave the military. We were told that drill instructors

frequently used obscene language, although such language is prohibited by

service regulations. Although we cannot generalize from our interviews,

what we heard from recruits reinforced Army, Air Force, and Rand

studies, which concluded that negative motivation has a detrimental effect

on some recruits’ desire to stay in the military.

DOD’s Data Does Not

Allow the Services to

Set Realistic Attrition

Goals

While significant savings could be achieved by reducing attrition, we

believe that the services’ current goals for reducing attrition are arbitrary.

That is, DOD and the services do not currently have sufficient information

to determine what portion of 6-month attrition is truly avoidable. The

danger of setting arbitrary attrition-reduction goals is that the services

could simply begin to retain lower quality recruits, whom they are

currently separating, in order to meet the goals. To set realistic and

achievable targets for reducing attrition, DOD and the services need more

complete and accurate data on why recruits are being separated.

DOD’s current data on attrition is inconsistent and incomplete for two

reasons. First, the services interpret DOD’s definitions of separation codes

differently and therefore place enlistees with identical situations in

different discharge categories. For example, an enlisted person who

cannot adapt to military life is separated from the Air Force for a

personality disorder, from the Navy for an erroneous enlistment, and from

the Army and the Marine Corps for failure to meet minimum performance

standards.

Second, DOD’s separation codes—which represent DOD’s primary source of

servicewide data on why people are leaving the services—capture only the

official reason for discharge. Our analysis of these separation codes and

our interviews with service officials and separating recruits revealed that

enlistees generally have many reasons for leaving, only one of which is

recorded in DOD’s database on separations. In an attempt to standardize

the services’ use of these codes, DOD issued a list of the codes with their

definitions. However, it has not issued implementing guidance for

interpreting these definitions.

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102
DOD Could Save

Millions of Dollars by

Reducing Attrition

All the services agree that reducing early attrition is desirable. To this end,

three services have developed attrition-reduction goals ranging from 4 to

10 percent. We estimate that if the services were to reduce their 6-month

attrition by 4 percent, their immediate short-term savings would be

$4.8 million per year.3

 If the services achieved a 10-percent reduction of

attrition, their short-term savings would be $12 million. In other words, if

the services could screen out 10 percent of those unqualified applicants

who are now being sent to basic training, they could realize immediate

savings of $12 million each year.

Although the services’ goals are arbitrary, they clearly illustrate that the

services could realize immediate, short-term savings because they would

be transporting, feeding, clothing, and paying fewer recruits. In some

cases, reducing attrition may require that the services add preenlistment

medical tests or more screening mechanisms to their recruiting and

examining processes. However, we believe, and the Congressional Budget

Office agrees, that these added costs would be more than offset by the

immediate short-term savings. Even larger dollar savings could be realized

over time as the services began to reduce the infrastructure associated

with recruiting and training enlistees.

We derived our estimates by determining the marginal cost of sending a

Navy recruit to basic training and then separating him or her. We assumed

this cost would be similar for all the services.4

 For example, the Navy

calculates that its marginal cost for each recruit who is separated from

basic training is $4,700 for each male and $4,900 for each female. These

figures are based on the Navy’s estimate that it costs $83 to transport a

recruit to basic training; $3,650 to pay, feed, and house the recruit while at

basic training;5

 $91 to provide the recruit’s medical examination at basic

training; $817 to provide a male recruit with clothing ($995 for a female

recruit); and an additional $83 to transport the recruit home after

separation.

3

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has agreed with our estimate of about $5 million in annual

short-term savings that would result from the services’ 4-percent reduction of attrition. CBO calculates

that if the services reduced the attrition that results from inadequate medical screenings designed to

identify pre-existing conditions, DOD could save $5 million in fiscal year 1998, $5 million in fiscal year

1999, $5 million in fiscal year 2000, $6 million in fiscal year 2001, and $6 million in fiscal year 2002.

CBO’s estimates include a calculation of the offsetting costs of adding new medical screening tests.

4

We requested similar cost data from the other three services. They were unable, however, to provide

us with marginal costs comparable to those of the Navy because the services (1) calculated costs

differently, (2) captured different data elements, and (3) did not capture certain data elements that are

necessary to calculate how much it costs to send recruits to basic training and then separate them.

5

This calculation is based on the Navy’s estimate that the average recruit remains at basic training 25

days before being separated and costs the Navy $146 per day.

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102
Over time, the services could save even more money by gradually reducing

the infrastructure associated with recruiting and training its enlisted

personnel. We estimate that in fiscal year 1996, DOD and the services spent

about $390 million in fixed and variable costs to recruit and train

individuals who never made it to their first duty stations. This cost

includes both the marginal costs discussed earlier and the cost of

maintaining DOD’s recruiting and training infrastructures. According to

DOD, it costs between $9,400 and $13,500 to recruit and train an active-duty

enlistee through basic training and an additional $6,100 to $16,300 to train

the enlistee in an initial skill. Over time, if the services reduced 6-month

attrition by 4 percent, their marginal and fixed cost savings could be as

high as $15.6 million. If they were able to reduce their 6-month attrition by

10 percent, potential savings for both marginal and fixed costs could be as

much as $39 million.

Service Actions in

Response to the

Recommendations in

Our January 1997

Report

In our January 1997 report, we made several recommendations to reduce

the attrition of enlisted personnel during the first 6 months of their terms

of enlistment. Among them, we recommended that the Secretary of

Defense issue implementing guidance on DOD’s separation codes and direct

the services to strengthen their recruiter incentive and medical screening

systems. We also recommended that DOD use its newly proposed database

of medical diagnostic codes to improve medical screening and move all

the services’ drug testing to the MEPS.

The services have taken some action since we issued our report. Although

it is too soon for us to draw any sound conclusions, we are intrigued by

three initiatives that the Navy says it is undertaking to (1) strengthen the

relationship between its recruiting and training activities, (2) more

accurately define recruit quality, and (3) change its drug-testing policy.

Officials within the Navy’s Recruiting Command told us that they are

already subtracting a percentage of the incentive points from their

recruiters when their enlistees fail to graduate from recruit training and

adding a smaller number of incentive points to their recruiters’ records

when their enlistees graduate. These officials also told us that they are

seriously considering making more stringent modifications to this policy.

According to these officials, a Recruiting Command working group has

proposed deducting total incentive points from a recruiter for all recruits,

regardless of reason, who separate within the first 30 days of recruit

training. We believe this change, which was scheduled to take effect this

week, follows the intent of the recommendation in our recent report on

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102
attrition that the services more closely link their recruiting quotas to their

recruits’ successful completion of basic training.

According to Navy Recruiting Command officials, the Command is also

attempting to use data maintained at the Navy’s Recruit Training

Command to identify all the factors that make a quality recruit. Currently,

DOD defines a “quality” recruit as one who has a high school degree and

has scored in the upper mental categories on the Armed Forces

Qualification Test. Despite historically meeting DOD’s benchmarks for

quality, all of the services continue to experience early attrition, thus

suggesting that certain elements that make a quality recruit are not

captured in the current standards. The Navy hopes to gain a better

understanding of recruit quality through this initiative.

Navy officials tell us that they will soon be testing applicants for drugs at

the MEPS, as well as at basic training. They say that, after reviewing the

effectiveness of this change in policy, they may later eliminate drug-testing

at basic training.

Our recent work with the Army and Air Force indicates that these two

services still see clear lines of separation between recruiting and basic

training. Officials within these services have expressed concerns that

recruiters should not be held accountable for actions that occur beyond

their control at basic training and later. The Marine Corps currently does

not operate under a national recruiter incentive system, but instead

provides its regions, districts, and stations with the flexibility to design

their own recruiter incentive systems. The Marine Corps intends to

implement a national system in fiscal year 1998.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

respond to any questions that you or the other Members of the

Subcommittee may have.

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102
Appendix I 

Process of Recruiting and Training Enlisted

Personnel

(703194) Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102
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