alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Civ. No. 10599.

First Appellate District, Division Two.

July 5, 1938.]

#### CHRIS PETERSEN, as Trustee, Appellant, v. FRANK DONEGANI et al., Respondents.

Joseph A. Brown for Appellant.

R. L. Husted, Aaron W. Cohen and Sidney Rudy for Respondents.

NOURSE, P. J.

Plaintiff sued for secret profits alleged to have been retained by defendants while acting as his agents in a real estate transaction. An action of a similar nature brought by Ralph Munson was joined for trial before the court sitting without a jury. Munson had a judgment by stipulation. The defendants had a judgment against the plaintiff in this cause from which he appeals.

*432The trial court found that none of the defendants was at any time acting as agent for plaintiff. This finding is based upon the positive testimony of plaintiff denying any such agency. The trial court found that the plaintiff agreed with the defendants, as agents for the buyer, to sell the property at a fixed price, that - the sale was made as agreed. This finding is-supported by the only evidence on the issue. It was found that the defendants did not obtain a secret profit and did not cheat or defraud the plaintiff. The only evidence on the charge of a secret profit negatived the charge. On the other issues, the plaintiff made no proof at all. His present attack upon these findings simply calls for the timeworn reply that the trial court must pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.

There are only two questions raised by appellant which require consideration—the refusal to permit appellant to examine the plaintiff in the consolidated action under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the claimed error in the exclusion of certain testimony.

On the first question, the appellant cites no authorities and makes no showing of prejudice. The transcript discloses that he was given wide range in his examination of Munson, and that he failed to show that the witness was an adverse party. It is such a party that can be examined under the code section, but the fact that two parties are separately suing the same defendants for secret profits—the one having a good cause of action, the other having none—does not necessarily make them adverse parties. The determination of the status of the witness is a matter primarily with the trial court, and, until error is shown, this court may not interfere.

Appellant complains of the ruling of the trial court limiting his examination in rebuttal of the co-plaintiff and wife. The only showing which he makes on this point is in reference to questions upon irrelevant and cumulative matters. Appellant failed to make a *prima, facie*case in his own behalf. This so-called “rebuttal” was designed to impeach the testimony of Munson in relation to his own case. There is no suggestion of any possible error so far as appellant is concerned.

The judgment is affirmed.

Sturtevant, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
§ 3020.115 Mandatory technical conference. ( a ) *Date.* A date for a mandatory technical conference shall be included in the procedural schedule required by § 3020.110. The date for this technical conference shall be set based upon the pro forma schedule set forth in appendix A to this part. The conference shall be held at the offices of the Commission.
( b ) *Witnesses.* The Postal Service shall make available at the technical conference each witness whose prepared direct testimony was filed pursuant to § 3020.114. If the Postal Service seeks for any witness to be excused on the basis that the witness's testimony neither presents nor is based upon technical information, it shall make such a motion concurrent with its request.
( c ) *Purpose.* The purpose of the technical conference is to provide an informal, off-the-record opportunity for participants, the officer of the Commission representing the interests of the general public, and Commission staff to clarify technical issues and to identify and request information relevant to an evaluation of the nature of changes to postal services proposed by the Postal Service. The technical conference is not part of the formal record in the proceeding.
( d ) *Relation to discovery process.* Information obtained during the mandatory technical conference may be used to discover additional relevant information by means of the formal discovery mechanisms provided for in §§ 3020.116 through 3020.119.
( e ) *Record.* Information obtained during, or as a result of, the mandatory technical conference is not part of the decisional record unless admitted under the standards of § 3010.322(a) of this chapter.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
Quarterly Report of Alaska Airlines, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Bradley D. Tilden,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge,

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |                      
|----------------------- |  | ---------------------
|                        | 
|By                      |  | /S/ Bradley D. Tilden
|Bradley D. Tilden      
|Chief Financial Officer
|November 9, 2007
#### Joseph TOMLEY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. *17377.*

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 31, 1958.

Joseph Tomley, in pro. per., for appellant.

Floyd M. Buford, Asst. U. S. Atty., Macon, Ga., for appellee.

Before RIVES, TUTTLE and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted for conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C.A. § 641, and this Court, on December 26, 1957, affirmed the conviction, 250 F.2d 549, certiorari denied 356 U.S. 928, 78 S.Ct. 716, 2 L.Ed.2d 759. On April 25, 1958, appellant filed with the District Court an extraordinary motion for new trial based on an affidavit of a person who sought to impeach the testimony of the principal witness for the prosecution. The District Court denied the motion and this appeal resulted.

As we stated in Newman v. United States, 5 Cir., 238 F.2d 861, 862, even where the so-called newly discovered evidence is a recantation affidavit by the witness himself,

> “The function, on well-defined standards, is that of the District Judge for it is ‘ * * * important for the orderly administration of criminal justice that findings on conflicting evidence by trial courts on motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence remain undisturbed except for most extraordinary circumstances * * *,’ United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, at page 111, 66 S.Ct. 464, at page 466, 90 L.Ed. 562, at page 565. If the District Judge, on the basis of the whole record of the original *469trial and the matters presented on the hearing of the motion, believes the statements in the affidavit of recantation to be false and is not reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by the witness on the trial was false, the decision is for him to reach for he is ‘not at liberty to shift upon the shoulders of another jury his own responsibility, but (is) charged with the responsibility to seek the truth himself * * Gordon v. United States, 6 Cir., 178 F.2d 896, 900, certiorari denied 339 U.S. 935, 70 S.Ct. 664, 94 L.Ed. 1353.”

The affidavit in this case being one step removed from an affidavit of recantation, so much the less should an appellate court interfere with the judgment of the trial court in exercising his discretion to deny the motion for new trial.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### § 80.503 Delaware Bay.

A line drawn from Cape May Light to Harbor of Refuge Light; thence to the northernmost extremity of Cape Henlopen.

[CGD 77-118a, 42 FR 35784, July 11, 1977. Redesignated by CGD 81-017, 46 FR 28154, May 26, 1981, and CGD 87-008b, 52 FR 25218, July 6, 1987]
§ 762.29 Endorsement of disbursement postal money orders by payees. ( a ) *General requirements.* Disbursement Postal Money Orders shall be endorsed by the payee or the payees named, or by another on behalf of such payee or payees as set forth in this subpart B. The forms of endorsement shall conform to those recognized by general principles of law and commercial usage for the negotiation, transfer, or collection of negotiable instruments.
( b ) *Endorsement of disbursement postal money orders by a financial organization under the payee's authorization.* When a Disbursement Postal Money Order is credited by a financial organization to the payee's account under his authorization, the financial organization may use an endorsement substantially as follows: Credit to the account of the within-named payee in accordance with payee's or payees' instructions. Absence of endorsement guaranteed.
A financial organization using this form of endorsement shall be deemed to guarantee to all subsequent endorsers and to the Postal Service that it is acting as an attorney in fact for the payee or payees, under his or their authorization.
( c ) *Endorsement of disbursement postal money orders drawn in favor of financial organizations.* All Disbursement Postal Money Orders drawn in favor of financial organizations, for credit to the accounts of persons designating payment so to be made, shall be endorsed in the name of the financial organization as payee in the usual manner.
SERVED: April 7, 2014 

US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

IN THE MATTER OF 

MARTINAIRE AVIATION, LLC 

FAA DOCKET NO. [TO BE ASSIGNED] 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

FDMS NO. FAA- 2013 - 0040 

AMENDED HEARING NOTICE 

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that testimony and evidence will be heard and conside~ed on June 18, 

19 and 20,2014, inclusive, in the U.S. Tax Court, Courtroom 591, Federal Building, 207 S. Houston 

Street, Dallas, TX 75202. Hearings will commence at 9:00a.m. and conclude at 4:30p.m. each day. 

The parties shall vacate the courthouse on or before 5:00p.m. each day. 

The parties are advised another judge has the courtroom reserved for June 16 and 17. If that case 

carries over this case may be delayed. 

Richard C. Goodwin 

U.S. Administrative Law Judge 

Attachment- Service List 
SERVICE LIST 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W10001 

ONE COPY 

Michael L. Dworkin, Respondent's Counsel 

Michael L. Dworkin and Associates Law Offices . 

465 California Street, Suite 210 

San Francisco, CA 94104-1808 

TEL: 415-421-2500 

FAX: 415-421-2560 

James Archier, Complainant's Counsel 

Agency Attorney, Office ofthe Regional Counsel 

Southwest Region 

Federal Aviation Administration 

2601 Meacham Blvd., Suite 6E 

Fort Worth, TX 76137 

TEL: 817-222-5074 

FAX: 817-222-5092 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin, Administrative Law Judge 

Office ofHearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue,S.E. (Ell-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-5121 Staff Assistant 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

FDMS No. FAA-2013-0040 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000, Washington, 

DC 20591, Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430. 

2
Original

No. 78-077

#### Albert J. Millard v. Everett I. Perrin, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison

September 18, 1978

*Albert J. Millard,*pro se.

*Thomas D. Rath,*attorney general *(Richard B. Michaud*by brief), for the defendant.

Memorandum opinion

In this petition for writ of habeas corpus, Albert J. Millard challenges the statutory method of computing good time credits on the maximum part of his prison sentence. The defendant moved to dismiss the petition. We grant the motion.

The plaintiff is currently serving three concurrent sentences: two of two to seven years and one of two to five years. Under RSA 651:55-b, he is entitled to credits for good conduct against both the minimum and maximum terms of his sentence, based on the following formula: “Ninety days for each full year of the minimum term of his sentence, prorated for a part of any such year. ...” RSA 651:55-b I. He argues that the statute denies him equal protection, in that a prisoner with the same maximum term as the plaintiff but a longer minimum term may finish his sentence earlier than the plain*566tiff. For example, a prisoner with a sentence of three-and-one-half to seven years may receive a sentence reduction of three hundred and fifteen days for good conduct, whereas the plaintiff, having a sentence of two to seven years, will receive a sentence reduction of one hundred and eighty days. The plaintiff argues that the earlier release of a prisoner with the same maximum and a greater minimum constitutes an invidious discrimination.

 In deciding an equal protection challenge to a statute treating prisoners differently in the application of good time credits, we must determine “whether the challenged distinction rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose.” *McGinnis v. Royster,*410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973). It is inappropriate to decide this question in the case at bar. The plaintiff contends that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that his maximum sentence be reduced for good conduct by ninety days for each full year of the *maximum*term of his sentence. Yet even under this formulation he will not have served his maximum sentence until 1980, at the earliest. He might be paroled before then, rendering our construction of RSA 651:55-b moot as to him. A decision invalidating the statute would not presently free the plaintiff or change the conditions of his incarceration. *See Martineau v. Perrin,*118 N.H. 167, 384 A.2d 135 (1978).

This court declines to engage in constitutional and statutory interpretation when such interpretation might have no effect on legal rights. “Because we hold that the proper time to bring this claim does not arise until a prisoner is in a position to realize a tangible benefit, we grant the motion to dismiss the petition without prejudice.” *Martineau v. Perrin,*118 N.H. at 168, 384 A.2d at 136.

*Dismissed.*
United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Liora Samandarova, Plaintiff,

v.

Hookah Exotix LLC, and others, 

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil Action No. 22-22787-Civ-Scola

Final Default Judgment

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Final 

Judgment (Mot., ECF No. 34) and the Court’s order granting default judgment 

(Order Granting Def. J., ECF No. 38). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

58, the Court enters this separate final default judgment against Defendant 

Alexandre Arkhipov and in favor of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, for good cause 

shown, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Final Default Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintiff, Liora

Samandarova, and against the Defendant, Alexandre Arkhipov, in the 

amount of $16,008.00, calculated as follows, for which let execution issue:

a. Unpaid/underpaid minimum wages in the amount of $3,944.00; 

b. Unpaid overtime wages in the amount of $3,060.00;

c. Unpaid contractual compensation in the amount of $2,000.00; and

d. Liquidated damages in the amount of $7,004.00.

2. The Plaintiff has not submitted a motion for an award of attorneys’ fees, 

and the time to do so has passed. Accordingly, the Court declines to award 

attorneys’ fees. 

3. Interest upon this judgment amount will accrue at the applicable legal rate. 

4. The Clerk is directed to close this matter. Any pending motions are denied 

as moot.

Done and ordered in Miami, Florida, on March 21, 2023.

________________________________

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Case 1:22-cv-22787-RNS Document 40 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2023 Page 1 of 1
§ 183.558 Hoses and connections. ( a ) Each hose used between the fuel pump and the carburetor must be “USCG Type A1” hose.
( b ) Each hose used— ( 1 ) For a vent line or fill line must be: ( i ) “USCG Type A1” or “USCG Type A2”; or
( ii ) “USCG Type B1” or “USCG Type B2” if no more than five ounces of fuel is discharged in 21 ⁄ 2 minutes when: ( A ) The hose is severed at the point where maximum drainage of fuel would occur,
( B ) The boat is in its static floating position, and
( C ) The fuel system is filled to the capacity market on the tank label under § 183.514(b)(3).
( 2 ) From the fuel tank to the fuel inlet connection on the engine must be: ( i ) “USCG Type A1”; or
( ii ) “USCG Type B1” if no more than five ounces of fuel is discharged in 21 ⁄ 2 minutes when: ( A ) The hose is severed at the point where maximum drainage of fuel would occur,
( B ) The boat is in its static floating position, and
( C ) The fuel system is filled to the capacity marked on the tank label under § 183.514(b)(3).
( c ) Each hose must be secured by: ( 1 ) A swaged sleeve;
( 2 ) A sleeve and threaded insert; or
( 3 ) A hose clamp.
( d ) The inside diameter of a hose must not exceed the actual minor outside diameter of the connecting spud, pipe, or fitting by more than the distance shown in Table 8.
Table 8
If minor outside diameter of the connecting spud, pipe, or fitting is—
The inside diameter of the hose must not exceed the minor outside diameter of the connecting spud, pipe, or hose fitting by more than the following distance: Less than 3/8 in
0.020 in. 3/8 in. to 1 in
0.035 in. Greater than 1 in
0.065 in.
[CGD 74-209, 42 FR 5950, Jan. 31, 1977, as amended by CGD 85-098, 52 FR 19728, May 27, 1987]
Irwin Home Equity
12677 Alcosta Blvd.
Suite 500
San Ramon, CA 94583-442
925.277.2001
925.277.0481 Fax

Irwin Home Equity (LOGO)

Management's Assertion Regarding Compliance
With Minimum Servicing Standards

As of and for the year ended  December 31, 1999,  Irwin Home Equity,  a majority
owned  subsidiary of Irwin Financial  Corporation,  has complied in all material
respects with the minimum servicing  standards set forth in the Mortgage Bankers
Association  of  America's  Uniform  Single  Attestation  Program  for  Mortgage
Bankers. As of and for this same period, the parent corporation, Irwin Financial
Corporation,  had in effect,  a fidelity bond and errors and omissions policy in
the amount of $14,000,000.



Octavio Ricart
Vice President - Finance and Accounting

Patricia A. S. Schwinn
Chief Administrative Officer
Chief Financial Officer

Elena Delgado
President


an Irwin Financial Company
TS-ACET10/20/30/40/50

Attachment #8 

Pt. 2, Sec. B, End 

Worker/Occupational Exposure and Environmental Release Information on the New 

Chemical Substances at Industrial Sites Controlled by Others
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

RUBEN FERNANDEZ, JR.,

 

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 State.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-17-00217-CR

Appeal from the

41st District Court

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 20160D02348)

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the Appellant’s third motion for extension of time within which to 

file the brief until June 21, 2018. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO 

FILE THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. Daniel Robledo, Appellant’s attorney, prepare the 

Appellant’s brief and forward the same to this Court on or before June 21, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 21

st day of May, 2018.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
#### § 3.55-10 Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach Marine Inspection Zone and Captain of the Port Zone.

Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach's (LA-LB) office is located in San Pedro, CA. The boundaries of Sector LA-LB's Marine Inspection Zone and Captain of the Port Zone start at a point near the intersection of Monterey County and San Luis Obispo County and the California coast at latitude 35°47′43′′ N, longitude 121°20′51′′ W, proceeding southwest to the outermost extent of the EEZ at latitude 34°05′05′′ N, longitude 124°56′43′′ W; thence south along the outermost extent of the EEZ to latitude 32°01′17′′ N, longitude 123°37′22′′ W; thence northeast to the intersection of Orange County and San Diego County and the California coast at latitude 33°23′12′′ N, longitude 117°35′45′′ W; thence including all of Orange County, Riverside County, Ventura County, Los Angeles County, San Bernardino County, Santa Barbara County, Kern County, and San Luis Obispo County in California.

[USCG-2006-25556, 72 FR 36325, July 2, 2007]
EXHIBIT 31.2
     CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
    1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Robert F; Rood, Chief Financial Officer certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Kore Holdings, Inc.

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The Registrant's other certifying officers and I am responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and I have:

         (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

         (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this
annual report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

         (c) presented in this annual report my conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on my evaluation
as of the Evaluation Date;

5. The Registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

         (a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

         (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
controls; and

6. The Registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this
annual report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls
or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent
to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with
regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Dated:  February 15, 2006

/s/ Robert F. Rood
Robert F. Rood
Chief Financial Officer