United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

and Subcommittees

February 1999 AVIATION SECURITY

FAA’s Actions to Study

Responsibilities and

Funding for Airport

Security and to Certify

Screening Companies

GAO/RCED-99-53

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Resources, Community, and

Economic Development Division

B-280885 

February 25, 1999

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees

After the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, the Congress focused its

attention on increasing aviation security, which culminated in the passage

of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. Congressional interest

was renewed in 1996 by the still unexplained crash of TWA Flight 800,

which resulted in additional efforts by the federal government to increase

aviation security. These efforts included the establishment of the White

House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security in August 1996. The

Commission’s report, issued in February 1997, 1

 made a number of

recommendations to improve aviation security. In addition, two laws were

enacted—the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the

Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 19972

 —which, among other

things, authorized and provided funding for the security recommendations

contained in the Commission’s report.

The Reauthorization Act required the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) to take specific actions to improve aviation security. Section 301

mandated that FAA conduct a study and report to the Congress by

January 9, 1997, on whether and, if so, how to (1) transfer certain federally

required security responsibilities of air carriers to either airports or the

federal government or (2) provide for shared responsibilities between air

carriers and airport operators or the federal government. The Congress

required that the report identify potential sources of federal and

nonfederal revenue that may be used to fund security activities and

propose legislation, if necessary, for accomplishing the transfer of

responsibilities. Section 302 of the act mandated that the FAA

Administrator certify companies providing security screening at airports

and improve the training and testing of security screeners3

 through the

development of performance standards. This report provides information

on (1) the status of FAA’s efforts to implement the requirements of section

1

Final Report to President Clinton, White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (Feb. 12,

1997).

2

The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264) was enacted on October 9, 1996, to

reauthorize programs of the Federal Aviation Administration and for other purposes. The Omnibus

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 (P.L. 104-208) was enacted on September 30, 1996, and

provided $144.2 million for the purchase of commercially available advanced explosives detection

equipment for checked and carry-on baggage.

3

Screeners are air carriers’ or screening companies’ security staff who examine all passengers and

other persons and all property intended to be carried in the cabin of airplanes or into controlled areas

to prevent any explosive, incendiary, or other deadly object or dangerous weapon from being carried

aboard airplanes or into controlled areas.

Page 1 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
B-280885 

301 of the act and (2) the status of FAA’s efforts to implement section 302

and issues that could impede FAA’s implementation of section 302.

Results in Brief FAA issued the report required by section 301 of the Reauthorization Act in

January 1999, about 2 years after the date mandated in the act.4

 The report

concludes that there should be no change to the current system of shared

aviation security responsibilities among FAA, the air carriers, and the

airport operators or to the current funding sources for aviation security.

FAA’s conclusions are based on the lack of any consensus in the civil

aviation community for changes.

To comply with the requirements of section 302, FAA is developing a

proposed regulation, which would require the certification of screening

companies. The proposed regulation would require screening companies

and air carriers to comply with uniform performance standards for

screeners and implement FAA-approved training and testing programs for

screeners. A critical step in the certification of screening companies is

having a reliable and consistent way to measure the screening companies’

performance. In January 1999, FAA, after several delays, validated that its

automated screener testing system is an accurate measurement of

screeners’ performance. Over the next several months, FAA will gather

additional data for use in developing performance standards for screeners.

The agency plans to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in late 1999

for comment and issue a final regulation in late 2000. The aviation industry

generally agrees that national standards for security-screening operations

are needed. Several issues could impede the issuance of the final

regulation. For example, the completion of FAA’s validation process had

been delayed several times and any further delays with completing FAA’s

current efforts could affect the issuance of the final regulation.

Background FAA, the air carriers, and the airport operators share the responsibilities for

aviation security. FAA is responsible for assessing threats, such as

terrorism, to the aviation system and determining the procedures and

equipment that will most effectively deter these threats. FAA’s regulations

prescribe the security responsibilities of air carriers and airport operators.

The air carriers and airport operators are responsible for complying with

the regulations and procedures. The air carriers are responsible for

screening all passengers and baggage, hiring and training their employees

or contracting for screening services, and procuring equipment to screen

4

Study and Report to Congress on Aviation Security Responsibilities and Funding, FAA (Jan. 5, 1999).

Page 2 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
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passengers and baggage. The screening of passengers and baggage is a

critical element in FAA’s strategy against terrorism. FAA’s regulations

provide basic standards for the screeners, equipment, and procedures to

be used in screening operations. The airport operators are responsible for

providing secure airport facilities and providing local law enforcement

support relating to air carrier and airport security measures.

The funding of the security operations is divided among FAA, the air

carriers, and the airport operators. FAA is responsible for paying the

salaries and costs associated with its oversight of air carrier and airport

security programs, including security inspections of screening operations

at airports, and for aviation security research and development activities.

FAA’s aviation security budget for fiscal year 1999 includes $100 million for

purchasing and deploying advanced explosives detection equipment to

selected airports, $52 million for research and development, and

$123 million for operations. Air carriers are responsible for paying for the

security personnel and checkpoint screeners, screening equipment, such

as X-ray machines and metal detectors, and the operation and

maintenance costs of that equipment. Airport operators are responsible for

paying for law enforcement officers, access control systems, and

perimeter fences and lighting. Currently, airport operators can fund

certain security functions, such as perimeter fencing, with funds from

FAA’s Airport Improvement Program.5

Both the White House Commission and the Congress recognized the need

to improve screeners’ performance. The Commission’s initial report in

September 1996 made 20 specific recommendations for improving

security, one of which was the development of uniform standards for the

selection, training, certification, and recertification of screening

companies and their employees.6

 Following this report, the Federal

Aviation Reauthorization Act mandated that FAA (1) study and report on

the current security responsibilities at airports and the potential sources of

funding for these activities, (2) certify screening companies, and

(3) improve the training and testing of security screeners through the

development of performance standards for security-screening services.

While FAA currently has training and testing requirements for screeners, it

does not have a requirement that screening companies be certified.

5

FAA’s Airport Improvement Program provides federal funding for planning and development at the

3,300 airports that make up the national airport system.

6

These recommendations were also contained in the Final Report to President Clinton, White House

Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (Feb. 12, 1997).

Page 3 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
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Section 301 Report

Issued in January 1999

FAA issued the report required under section 301 of the Reauthorization

Act of 1996 on January 5, 1999, about 2 years after the date mandated in

the act. FAA’s report concludes that there should be no change to the

current system of shared aviation security responsibilities among FAA, the

air carriers, and the airport operators or to the current funding sources for

aviation security.

Report Issued 2 Years Late FAA did not meet the January 9, 1997, deadline established by section 301

of the Reauthorization Act for submitting its report to the Congress. In a

letter dated January 21, 1997, FAA informed the Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science and Transportation that because the act directed FAA

to consider the findings of the White House Commission on Aviation

Safety and Security and because of the time required to complete

analytical work, FAA was unable to meet the January 9, 1997, deadline and

expected to release its report in April 1997. The report was delivered to

the Congress in January 1999.

FAA officials said the report was delayed because of the complex issues

involved and the need to consider the findings of numerous groups that

have studied these issues. FAA’s report is based, in part, on an 8-year-old

internal FAA study that analyzed alternatives for shifting security

responsibilities with respect to passengers, baggage, and cargo from the

air carriers to airport operators.7

 The study is appended to the report. FAA

also reviewed other reports, including reports from the President’s

Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism,8

 the White House

Commission on Aviation Safety and Security,9

 the National Civil Aviation

Review Commission,10 and Coopers & Lybrand.11

7

FAA Study on Security Responsibilities (1991).

8

Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (May 15, 1990).

9

See footnote 1.

10Avoiding Aviation Gridlock & Reducing the Accident Rate, A Consensus for Change (Dec. 1997). The

Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 established the National Civil Aviation Review

Commission and required a report to the Secretary of Transportation setting forth a comprehensive

analysis of the Administration’s budgetary requirements through 2002.

11Federal Aviation Administration: Independent Financial Assessment, Coopers & Lybrand (Feb. 28,

1997). The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 required FAA to contract with an independent

entity to conduct a complete independent assessment of the financial requirements of the agency

through 2002.

Page 4 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
B-280885 

In addition, FAA conducted a literature search and reviewed testimony

provided for the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security

and various congressional hearings on aviation security.

No Consensus for

Changing Security

Responsibilities or

Funding Sources

FAA’s report considered the views of the various commissions and other

parties that studied or commented on transferring air carriers’ security

responsibilities to the airport operators or to the federal government, or

for sharing responsibilities among the air carriers, the airport operators,

and the federal government. The report also considered the Commissions’

and other parties’ views on potential sources of funding for aviation

security, such as the Airport Improvement Program, Passenger Facility

Charges,12 and user fees. The report points out that the source of security

funding has been a matter of continuing controversy over the last 30 years.

FAA concluded that there appears to be a consensus in the civil aviation

community to retain the current system of shared responsibilities for

aviation security. Therefore, FAA would continue to be responsible for

establishing and enforcing regulations, policies, and procedures and for

identifying potential threats and appropriate countermeasures. Air carriers

would bear the primary responsibility for applying screening and other

security measures to passengers, baggage, and cargo. Airport operators

would be responsible for maintaining a secure airport environment and for

providing local law enforcement support.

FAA also concluded that there is no apparent consensus for changing the

overall system of funding for aviation security and that there is no

definitive answer to the long-standing question of who should pay for

aviation security. FAA therefore did not make any legislative proposals for

transferring security responsibilities from air carriers or any

recommendations for changing funding sources. FAA officials, however,

stated that even though the report made no recommendations regarding

funding sources for aviation security, this issue will continue to need

discussion and study because of its high cost. FAA estimated in May 1997

that the total 10-year cost to the federal government, airport authorities,

and the airlines for security programs at the nation’s largest and busiest

airports alone would be close to $3 billion. Thus, funding methods for

aviation security improvements is an issue that the Congress and FAA will

be faced with for a number of years.

12A Passenger Facility Charge is a fee imposed by airport authorities on passengers to be used to fund

capital development.

Page 5 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
B-280885 

Officials of three principal aviation industry associations that we

contacted—Air Transport Association (ATA),13 Airports Council

International-North America (ACI-NA),14 and American Association of

Airport Executives (AAAE)15 —generally agreed with the current division of

airport security responsibilities. These officials stated that the continuity

of screening would be broken if the air carriers were not the ultimate

responsible party. For example, under current procedures, if a passenger

is identified as a potential threat at the airport check-in or ticket counter,

the air carrier will label the passenger’s bag appropriately and that air

carrier will take additional security measures for examining the

passenger’s bag, such as sending the bag through explosives detection

equipment. Under any scenario where the carrier is not responsible for all

screening operations, the air carrier would have to transfer the

information about the potential security threat to another entity, such as

the airport operator, and then that entity would further scrutinize the

passenger’s bag. This would disrupt the continuity of the

baggage-screening process and allow for a potential break in the chain of

information.

The associations expressed differing views with regard to funding aviation

security. Two of the associations—ACI-NA and AAAE—believe that the

federal government should provide the initial funding for any increase in

the baseline security standards and then, through the use of increased

Airport Improvement Program funding and an expanded local funding

mechanism, namely the Passenger Facility Charge, the airport users would

have a greater ability to raise funds for the increased security. However,

the third association, ATA, does not support an increased Passenger

Facility Charge for security improvements at airports. ATA believes that the

funding for explosives-detection-screening equipment should be provided

under direct federal appropriations and not from Airport Improvement

Program funds and Passenger Facility Charges.

13ATA is the trade organization for the principal U.S. air carriers.

14ACI-NA represents airport operators who operate about 1,250 airports across 155 countries and

territories.

15AAAE is a professional organization representing airport management personnel at public use

airports nationwide.

Page 6 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
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Lengthy Process

Involved for

Implementing the

Section 302

Requirement for

Certifying Screening

Companies

FAA is developing a regulation to comply with the mandated section 302

requirements to certify screening companies and improve the training and

testing of security screeners. FAA expects the final regulation to be issued

in late 2000. While the aviation industry generally agrees that national

standards for security-screening operations are needed, some issues could

impede the final regulation’s issuance.

FAA’s Efforts to Comply

With Section 302

FAA plans to issue a new regulation that would establish the requirements

for certifying screening companies.16 One of the requirements for

certification would compel screening companies and air carriers to

comply with the performance standards that would be established by FAA

and to implement FAA-approved training and testing programs for

screeners. As the first step toward issuing a regulation, FAA, on March 11,

1997, issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requesting

comments and suggestions on issues related to the certification of

screening companies and the improvement of screening operations. FAA

identified 10 issues of particular interest. They included the establishment,

by regulation, of a uniform security-screening program for use by all air

carriers and screening companies, methods for measuring screeners’

performance, and a curriculum for training screeners. FAA also sought

comments on the estimated costs of meeting any qualification or

operational requirements that might be imposed. (See app. I for a list of all

the issues on which FAA requested comments.)

FAA recognizes that a critical step in the certification of screening

companies is having a reliable and consistent way to measure their

performance. By collectively analyzing and measuring screener’s

performance, FAA can hold screening companies accountable for safe,

effective screening operations. FAA has focused its efforts on developing,

field testing, and validating an automated screener testing-system called

Threat Image Projection (TIP) which would provide the basis for

establishing and monitoring performance standards for screening

companies.

16The proposed regulation would define a screening company as an air carrier or other entity that

inspects persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, deadly or

dangerous weapon, or destructive substances before entry into a controlled area or carriage aboard an

aircraft.

Page 7 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
B-280885 

TIP is an automated system that was developed to improve and maintain

the effectiveness of image interpretation by screening personnel employed

at screening locations in airports. When installed on existing X-ray

machines at airport checkpoints, TIP tests screeners’ detection capabilities

by projecting threat images, including guns and explosives, into bags as

they are being screened or projecting images of bags containing threat

objects onto the X-ray screen as live baggage is being screened.17

Screeners are then responsible for positively identifying the threat image

and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted, TIP indicates to the

screener whether the threat is real and then records the screener’s

performance in a database that FAA can access to analyze performance

trends. TIP exposes screeners to threat images on a routine basis to enable

them to become more adept at recognizing threat objects.

In order to adequately field test and validate the proposed automated

screener-testing system—TIP—and to continue to collect and analyze data

to develop performance standards for screeners, FAA withdrew the

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on May 13, 1998, and changed

the estimated issuance date of its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking from

March 1999 to the end of 1999. FAA expects to issue its final regulation

within 1 year of the closing of the comment period for the Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking, which would be by the end of 2000. In April 1998,

we reported that FAA, at that time, planned to issue the final regulation in

March 2000, which was about a year behind its previous estimated

issuance date.18

In February 1999, FAA officials told us that during January 1999, they had

analyzed the TIP data gathered to date and validated TIP as an effective and

reliable means to measure screeners’ performance. The completion of this

effort, previously projected for September 1998, had been delayed several

times. According to FAA, TIP’s validation process had been slowed because

of one manufacturer’s slowness in bringing the equipment to an operating

level. In addition, the validation of TIP had been further delayed by its

17FAA will propose that TIP be installed initially on X-ray and explosives-detection systems at all

Category X and Category I airports. The installations at Category II through Category IV airports would

be phased in during subsequent years. Screeners’ performance at these smaller airports, which,

according to FAA officials, account for only about 5 percent of the passengers boarding planes, would

be measured in the interim by existing and/or enhanced checkpoint-testing procedures, including the

use of special testing and the random testing of screeners by air carriers and FAA. Category X airports

represent the nation’s largest and busiest airports as measured by the volume of passenger traffic and

are potentially attractive targets for criminal and terrorist activity. Category I airports are somewhat

smaller airports that have an annual volume of at least 2 million passengers.

18Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but Completion Will Take

Several Years (GAO/RCED-98-102, Apr. 24, 1998).

Page 8 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
B-280885 

software, which did not provide enough unique identification numbers for

all screeners using TIP. FAA has since corrected that problem. During the

next several months, FAA will continue to gather larger samples of TIP data

that it can use to develop performance standards for screeners.

Industry’s Views on

Section 302

Our review of comments to the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

from air carriers, screening companies, airport operators, and associations

representing segments of the aviation industry showed that most agreed

that a national standard security-screener program for screening

companies should be established. Many of the comments also stated that

certification for individual screeners should also be required. Several

commenters believed that certification would enhance screeners’

performance and professionalism. For example, both AAAE and ACI-NA

stated that FAA needs to develop a standard training curriculum to certify

individual screeners. They stated that FAA-certified screeners would then

be invested with a valuable and transferable skill and would be

compensated accordingly. FAA, however, does not plan to require the

certification of individual screeners because it does not have statutory

authority to do so but, instead, will certify companies. In addition, officials

from ATA, ACI-NA, and AAAE informed us that, in their opinion, all screening

companies who wish to be certified to perform aviation security screening

should be regulated by FAA, that FAA should develop a minimum national

standard security-screening program, and that FAA should continue to

perfect a consistent way to measure screening companies’ performance.

These actions are consistent with FAA’s proposed approach for certifying

screening companies.

Issues That Could Impede

Issuance of Final Rule

The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 allows FAA 16 months

from the close of the comment period of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

to publish the final regulation. FAA plans to expedite the process by

publishing the final rule within 1 year of the closing of the comment

period, which would be at the end of 2000. FAA believes that it is important

to implement the final regulation at the earliest date possible to realize the

performance improvements expected to be brought about by the proposed

certification requirements, training requirements, and performance

measurements and standards. However, several issues could impede FAA’s

efforts to complete this undertaking.

Page 9 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
B-280885 

In addition to the TIP validation and data-gathering efforts previously

discussed, the human factors19 staff in FAA’s Office of Aviation Research is

conducting a sophisticated and long-term evaluation using TIP to assess

how such variables as screeners’ experience, method of training,

checkpoint operating environment, and shift lengths affect screeners’

performance. TIP is still in the research and development stage; therefore,

the Office of Aviation Research developed a test and evaluation plan for

TIP.

20 The effort is expected to be completed by mid-1999. This assessment

could identify issues regarding screeners’ performance that would have to

be addressed and could potentially delay the issuance of the regulation.

We have previously pointed out the importance of internal coordination

between human factors research programs and all units within FAA in

order to (1) understand the relationship between human performance

capabilities and limitations and the means to measure them and

(2) maximize the opportunity to leverage resources for research on human

factors.21

In addition, FAA has identified other issues that must be addressed before

the final regulation can be issued, including (1) ensuring that the costs of

the rule will result in substantial screening improvements and

(2) establishing a balance of responsibilities between carriers and

screening companies that is clear and effective. FAA is preparing a cost and

benefits analysis for inclusion in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on

which interested parties will have the opportunity to comment. According

to FAA, the costs for this regulation could be relatively high, and it is

imperative that the regulation result in substantial measurable

improvements to an individual screener’s performance, to screening

companies’ operations, and in decreasing the aviation security system’s

vulnerabilities.

The issue of balanced responsibility involves how much responsibility

screening companies should assume and how air carriers should oversee

the operations of screening companies. FAA recognizes that the successful

implementation of its proposed regulation will require it to clearly outline

19The study of human factors examines how humans interact with machines and other people and

determines whether procedures and regulations take into account abilities and limitations. Identifying

chances for human error can reduce the need for later replacing or modifying equipment and

procedures.

20Test and Evaluation Plan for Airport Demonstration for Threat Image Projection for Checkpoint

Operations (Aug. 1996).

21Human Factors: Status of Efforts to Integrate Research on Human Factors Into FAA’s Activities

(GAO/RCED-96-151, June 27, 1996).

Page 10 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
B-280885 

this division of responsibility and create enforcement guidance that will

avoid any confusion regarding accountability.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine the status of FAA’s efforts to implement sections 301 and 302

of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, we reviewed the

legislation and other related documents, such as the Final Report of the

White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. We obtained

FAA’s implementation plans and status reports and interviewed officials in

FAA’s Office of Civil Aviation Security and the Office of Aviation Research.

Upon its issuance in January 1999, we obtained FAA’s report to the

Congress required by section 301 of the Reauthorization Act. We obtained

industry’s views by reviewing comments provided in response to the

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and by meeting with

representatives of three aviation associations: ATA, ACI-NA, and the AAAE. We

conducted our review from August 1998 through January 1999 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Agency Comments We provided the Department of Transportation and FAA with a draft of this

report for review and comment. We met with agency officials, including

representatives of FAA’s Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and

Planning. FAA generally agreed with the facts in the report and provided

updated information on its validation of the Threat Image Projection

system and some suggested clarifying language, which we incorporated as

appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 7 days from the

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to interested

congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and the

Administrator of FAA. We will make copies available to others upon

request.

Page 11 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
B-280885 

Major contributors to this report include A. Donald Cowan, Robert J. Di

Vito, and Barry R. Kime. Please call me on (202) 512-3650 if you have any

questions about the report.

Gerald L. Dillingham

Associate Director,

 Transportation Issues

Page 12 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
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List of Congressional Committees and Subcommittees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Commerce, Science,

 and Transportation

United States Senate

The Honorable Slade Gorton

Chairman

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Aviation,

Committee on Commerce, Science,

 and Transportation

United States Senate

Page 13 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Issues on Which FAA

Sought Public

Comment in Its

Advance Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking

16

Related GAO Products 20

Abbreviations

AAAE American Association of Airport Executives

ACI-NA Airports Council International-North America

ATA Air Transport Association

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

TIP Threat Image Projection

Page 14 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
Page 15 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
Appendix I 

Issues on Which FAA Sought Public

Comment in Its Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking

1. Oversight by Air Carriers: Guidelines that an air carrier should follow

when selecting or overseeing a screening company.

2. Joint-Use Screening Locations: Methods of structuring air carriers’

selection of a screening company for joint-use screening locations and

oversight of that screening company’s activities.

3. Screening Security Program: The regulatory establishment of a uniform

screening-security program for use by all carriers and screening

companies, the prevention of the unauthorized use of these standards, and

the establishment of performance standards for screeners.

4. Screener Training: Requirement to incorporate into each security

program the specific curriculum to be used for training screeners.

5. Qualifications and Operations of Screening Companies: Minimum

standards for a screening company to be certified in the areas of local and

national qualifications, aviation-screening experience, and screening and

training equipment.

6. Individual Screeners: Encouraging a stronger sense of professionalism.

7. Screening by Air Carriers: Whether screening by air carriers should be

subject to the same standards as certified screening companies.

8. New Screening Companies: Ensuring the qualifications of a company

that has no aviation screening experience before it begins aviation

screening.

9. Checkpoint Operational Configuration Deficiencies: The configuration

of checkpoints for optimal screening conditions.

10. Foreign Air Carriers: The regulation’s application and impact on

foreign air carriers.

Page 16 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
Page 17 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
Page 18 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
Page 19 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
Related GAO Products

Aviation Security: FAA’s Deployments of Equipment to Detect Traces of

Explosives (GAO/RCED-99-32R, Nov. 13, 1998).

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-Term Attention Is

Needed (GAO/T-RCED-98-190, May 14, 1998).

Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but

Completion Will Take Several Years (GAO/RCED-98-102, Apr. 24, 1998).

Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in

Identifying and Responding to Risks (GAO/RCED-98-6, Feb. 27, 1998).

Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices

(GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection

Devices (GAO/RCED-97-ll9R, Apr. 24, 1997).

Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the

Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and

Security (GAO/T-RCED-97-90, Mar. 5, 1997).

Aviation Security: Technology’s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262, Sept. 19, 1996).

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251, Sept. 11, 1996).

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).

Human Factors: Status of Efforts to Integrate Research on Human Factors

Into FAA’s Activities (GAO/RCED-96-151, June 27, 1996).

(348109) Page 20 GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
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